Outlines of Pyrrhonism

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

c. AD 160–210

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Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited



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INTRODUCTION

Sextus Empiricus was a Greek doctor of the "Empiric" school who lived around AD 200; almost nothing else is known about him. His *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* is the fullest account to survive of ancient skepticism: the way of thinking traced back to Pyrrho of Elis, who went to India with Alexander the Great, and revived by Aenesidemus in the first century BC.

Book I explains what the skeptic does. Faced with any question, he sets the arguments on each side against one another, finds them equally strong, and suspends judgment; and suspension, he finds, is followed "like a shadow" by tranquillity. Sextus sets out the famous Ten Modes, which show how the same thing appears differently to different animals, people, senses and circumstances, and the Five Modes of Agrippa, which show that every attempt at proof runs into disagreement, infinite regress, relativity, arbitrary assumption or circular reasoning. He explains what skeptics mean by their slogans ("no more this than that", "I determine nothing"), and how they live: by appearances, nature, custom and the ordinary practice of the arts, without holding beliefs.

Books II and III turn these tools on the dogmatic philosophers, especially the Stoics, part by part: logic (the criterion of truth, signs, proof, definition), physics (god, cause, body, motion, place, time, number) and ethics (whether anything is good or bad by nature, and whether there is an art of living). Rediscovered in the Renaissance, the book shaped Montaigne, Descartes, Bayle and Hume, and with them the problem of knowledge in modern philosophy.

Book I

What skepticism is
Suspension of judgment, tranquillity, the Ten Modes and the Five, and how the skeptic differs from his neighbors.

CHAPTER 1: ΠΕΡῚ ΤΗ̃Σ ἈΝΩΤΑΤΩ ΔΙΑΦΟΡᾶΣ ΤΩ̃Ν ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΩ̃Ν

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.1	Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὕρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὑρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως.	When people investigate any subject, the likely outcome is one of three: they find it; or they deny that it can be found and admit that it is inapprehensible; or they keep on investigating.
1.2	διόπερ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὑρηκέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφήναντο μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν.	That is perhaps why, with the things investigated in philosophy too, some have said that they have found the truth, others have declared that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating.
1.3	καὶ εὑρηκέναι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως καλούμενοι δογματικοί, οἷον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφήναντο οἱ περὶ Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδημαϊκοί, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί.	Those who think they have found it are the dogmatists in the proper sense: Aristotle and his followers, for example, Epicurus and his, the Stoics, and certain others. Clitomachus, Carneades and other Academics have declared that things are inapprehensible. And the skeptics are still investigating.[1]
1.4	ὅθεν εὐλόγως δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς εἶναι, δογματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτική. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέροις ἁρμόσει λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες, ὅτι περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν λεχθησομένων διαβεβαιούμεθα ὡς οὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως καθάπερ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἑκάστου.	So it seems reasonable to hold that there are three most basic kinds of philosophy: the dogmatic, the Academic and the skeptical. It will be for others to discuss the first two. For now, we will speak in outline about the skeptical way. But first we should say this: on none of the things we are about to say do we firmly maintain that it is absolutely as we say. We simply report on each item as a chronicler would, according to how it appears to us at the moment.

CHAPTER 2: ON THE ACCOUNTS OF SKEPTICISM

Sextus distinguishes the general account of skepticism from the specific account that argues against each part of philosophy.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.5	Τῆς σκεπτικῆς οὖν φιλοσοφίας ὁ μὲν λέγεται καθόλου λόγος ὁ δὲ εἰδικός, καὶ καθόλου μὲν ἐν ᾧ τὸν χαρακτῆρα	There are two kinds of account of skeptical philosophy, a general one and a specific one. In the gen-

1 Carneades (214–129 BC) and his pupil Clitomachus led the Academy, Plato's school, in its skeptical phase.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τῆς σκέψεως ἐκτιθέμεθα, λέγοντες τίς ἔννοια αὐτῆς καὶ τίνες ἀρχαὶ καὶ τίνες λόγοι, τί τε κριτήριον καὶ τί τέλος, καὶ τίνες οἱ τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς, καὶ πῶς παραλαμβάνομεν τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἀποφάσεις, καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῆς σκέψεως ἀπὸ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφιῶν·	eral account we set out the character of skepticism. We say what its concept is, what its principles and its arguments are, what its criterion is and what its goal, what the modes of suspension of judgment are, how we take the skeptical statements, and how skepticism is distinguished from the philosophies closest to it.
1.6	εἰδικὸς δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλέγομεν. περὶ τοῦ καθόλου δὴ πρῶτον διαλάβωμεν λόγου, ἀρξάμενοι τῆς ὑφηγήσεως ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὀνομάτων.	In the specific account we argue against each part of what is called philosophy. Let us first deal with the general account, and begin our exposition with the names of the skeptical way.

CHAPTER 3: ON THE NAMES OF SKEPTICISM

The skeptical way is called investigative, suspensive, aporetic and Pyrrhonian, and Sextus explains why.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.7	Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγὴ καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον γινομένου πάθους, καὶ ἀπορητικὴ ἤτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ παντὸς ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, ὡς ἔνιοί φασιν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀμηχανεῖν πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν ἢ ἄρνησιν, καὶ Πυρρώνειος ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρρωνα σωματικώτερον καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.	The skeptical way is called *investigative*, from its activity of investigating and inquiring. It is called *suspensive*, from the feeling that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation. It is called *aporetic*, either, as some say, from its being at a loss and investigating about everything, or from its being unable to choose between assent and denial. And it is called *Pyrrhonian*, because Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to skepticism more fully and more conspicuously than anyone before him.[2]

CHAPTER 4: WHAT SKEPTICISM IS

Skepticism is an ability to set out oppositions, leading through equipollence to suspension of judgment and then tranquility.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.8	Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἱονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχήν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν.	Skepticism is an ability to set out oppositions between what appears and what is thought, in any way whatever. Starting from it, because of the equipollence of the opposed objects and arguments, we come first to suspension of judgment, and after that to tranquility.
1.9	'δύναμιν' μὲν οὖν αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ περίεργον ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι· 'φαινόμενα' δὲ λαμβάνομεν νῦν τὰ αἰσθητά, διόπερ ἀντιδιαστέλλομεν αὐτοῖς τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ 'καθ' οἱονδήποτε τρόπον' δύναται προσαρμόζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἵνα ἁπλῶς τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ὄνομα, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ τῷ 'ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων'· ἐπεὶ γὰρ	We call it an "ability" not in any elaborate sense, but simply in the sense of being able to. By "what appears" we here mean objects of perception, which is why we contrast them with objects of thought. "In any way whatever" can be attached to "ability," so that we take the word "ability" in its simple sense, as we said. It can also be attached to

2 The three Greek names come from verbs meaning "to investigate," "to hold back (judgment)" and "to be at a loss" (*aporein*); *skepsis* itself means "inquiry." Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BC) was regarded as the founder of the movement.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ποικίλως ἀντιτίθεμεν ταῦτα, ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλὰξ ἀντιτιθέντες, ἵνα πᾶσαι αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἐμπεριέχωνται, λέγομεν ‘καθ’ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον’. ἢ ‘καθ’ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων’, ἵνα μὴ ζητῶμεν πῶς φαίνεται τὰ φαινόμενα ἢ πῶς νοεῖται τὰ νοούμενα, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς ταῦτα λαμβάνωμεν.	“set out oppositions between what appears and what is thought.” For since we oppose these in various ways—what appears to what appears, what is thought to what is thought, or the one to the other—we say “in any way whatever” so that all the oppositions are included. Or it can be attached to “what appears and what is thought,” so that we don’t investigate how what appears appears or how what is thought is thought, but simply take them as they come.
1.10	‘ἀντικειμένους’ δὲ λόγους παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχὶ πάντως ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μαχομένους. ‘ἰσοσθένειαν’ δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκεῖσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον. ‘ἐποχὴ’ δέ ἐστι στάσις διανοίας δι’ ἣν οὔτε αἴρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν. ‘ἀταραξία’ δέ ἐστι ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία καὶ γαληνότης. πῶς δὲ τῇ ἐποχῇ συνεισέρχεται ἡ ἀταραξία, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τέλους ὑπομνήσομεν.	By “opposed” arguments we don’t necessarily mean a denial and an affirmation, but simply arguments that conflict. By “equipollence” we mean equality with respect to being convincing or unconvincing, so that none of the conflicting arguments takes precedence over any other as more convincing. “Suspension of judgment” is a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything. “Tranquility” is freedom from disturbance and calmness of soul. How tranquility comes along with suspension of judgment we will point out when we discuss the goal.

CHAPTER 5: ON THE SKEPTIC

The Pyrrhonian philosopher is simply the one who has this ability.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.11	Καὶ ὁ Πυρρώνειος δὲ φιλόσοφος δυνάμει τῇ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐννοίᾳ συναποδέδοται· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μετέχων ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως.	The Pyrrhonian philosopher, too, has implicitly been accounted for in the concept of the skeptical way: he is the one who possesses this ability.

CHAPTER 6: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SKEPTICISM

Skepticism began in the hope of tranquility; its chief principle is that every argument has an equal argument opposed.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.12	Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μέν φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτήσειν· οἱ γὰρ μεγαλοφυεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίσιν αὐτῶν χρὴ μᾶλλον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν, τί τε ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτήσοντες. συστάσεως δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεῖσθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου καταλήγειν δοκοῦμεν εἰς τὸ μὴ δογματίζειν.	We say that the causal principle of skepticism is the hope of becoming tranquil. People of talent were disturbed by the anomaly in things and at a loss as to which of them they should rather assent to. So they set out to investigate what in things is true and what is false, thinking that by deciding these questions they would become tranquil. The chief principle of the skeptical system is that to every argument an equal argument is opposed. For it is from this, we think, that we end up holding no beliefs.

CHAPTER 7: WHETHER THE SKEPTIC HOLDS BELIEFS

The skeptic assents to how he is affected, but not to anything non-evident; his phrases cancel themselves.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.13	Λέγομεν δὲ μὴ δογματίζειν τὸν σκεπτικὸν οὐ κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ σημαινόμενον τοῦ δόγματος καθ' ὃ δόγμα εἶναί φασί τινες κοινότερον τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινι πράγματι (τοῖς γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν κατηναγκασμένοις πάθεσι συγκατατίθεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἷον οὐκ ἂν εἴποι θερμαινόμενος ἢ ψυχόμενος ὅτι δοκῶ μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ψύχεσθαι), ἀλλὰ μὴ δογματίζειν λέγομεν καθ' ὃ δόγμα εἶναί φασί τινες τήν τινι πράγματι τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητουμένων ἀδήλων συγκατάθεσιν (οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων συγκατατίθεται ὁ Πυρρώνειος).	When we say that the skeptic does not hold beliefs, we don't mean "belief" in the more general sense in which some say that belief is simply acquiescing in something. (For the skeptic does assent to the feelings forced on him by an impression: when he is warmed or chilled, for example, he would not say "I think I am not being warmed" or "chilled.") Rather, we say that he does not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some non-evident matter of the kind investigated by the sciences. (For the Pyrrhonian assents to nothing non-evident.)
1.14	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ προφέρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰς σκεπτικὰς φωνάς, οἷον τὴν 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' ἢ τὴν 'οὐδὲν ὁρίζω' ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὕστερον λέξομεν δογματίζει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δογματίζων ὡς ὑπάρχον τίθεται τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο ὃ λέγεται δογματίζειν, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς τίθησι ταύτας οὐχ ὡς πάντως ὑπαρχούσας· ὑπολαμβάνει γὰρ ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἡ 'πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ' φωνὴ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἡ 'οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές' ὁμοίως, οὕτως καὶ ἡ 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτήν φησι μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράφει. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν λέγομεν.	Nor does he hold beliefs when he utters the skeptical phrases about non-evident matters—"no more (this than that)," for example, or "I determine nothing," or any of the others we will discuss later. For someone who holds a belief posits as real the thing he is said to hold the belief about. The skeptic, by contrast, does not posit these phrases as absolutely real. He supposes that the phrase "everything is false" says that it too, along with everything else, is false, and similarly with "nothing is true." In just the same way, "no more" says that it too, along with everything else, is no more so than not, and so it cancels itself along with the others. And we say the same about the other skeptical phrases.
1.15	πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρεται ὡς δυνάμει ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λεχθείη. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστως, μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος.	Besides, if the person who holds beliefs posits as real what he holds a belief about, while the skeptic utters his phrases on the understanding that they are implicitly cancelled by themselves, then he could not be said to hold beliefs in uttering them. Most important of all, in uttering these phrases he says what appears to himself and reports his own feeling without holding opinions, making no firm claim about the external objects.

CHAPTER 8: WHETHER THE SKEPTIC HAS A SCHOOL

In one sense the skeptic has no school; in another he follows a way of life according to appearances.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.16	Ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶσθαι εἰ αἵρεσιν ἔχει ὁ σκεπτικός. εἰ μὲν ⟨γάρ⟩ τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι πρόσκλισιν δόγμασι πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ	We take a similar line when we are asked whether the skeptic has a school. ⟨For⟩ if someone says

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	⟨τὰ⟩ φαινόμενα, καὶ λέγει δόγμα πράγματι ἀδήλῳ συγκατάθεσιν, φήσομεν μὴ ἔχειν αἵρεσιν.	that a school is an adherence to many beliefs that are consistent both with one another and with ⟨the⟩ appearances, and says that a belief is assent to something non-evident, then we will say that the skeptic has no school.
1.17	εἰ δέ τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι φάσκει τὴν λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἀγωγήν, ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἔστιν ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν ζῆν ὑποδεικνύοντος (τοῦ ὀρθῶς μὴ μόνον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀλλ' ἀφελέστερον) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν δύνασθαι διατείνοντος, αἵρεσίν φαμεν ἔχειν· ἀκολουθοῦμεν γάρ τινι λόγῳ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ὑποδεικνύντι ἡμῖν τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη.	But suppose someone says that a school is a way of life that follows a certain line of reasoning in accordance with what appears—reasoning that shows how it is possible to seem to live correctly ("correctly" taken not only with reference to excellence, but in a looser sense) and that leads to being able to suspend judgment. Then we say that he has a school. For we follow a line of reasoning that, in accordance with what appears, points us to a life in conformity with our ancestral customs, our laws, our ways of life and our own feelings.

CHAPTER 9: WHETHER THE SKEPTIC DOES NATURAL SCIENCE

The skeptic studies nature only to oppose arguments and for the sake of tranquility, not to hold beliefs.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.18	Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν εἰ φυσιολογητέον τῷ σκεπτικῷ· ἕνεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ βεβαίου πείσματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι περί τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν φυσιολογίαν δογματιζομένων οὐ φυσιολογοῦμεν, ἕνεκα δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἔχειν ἀντιτιθέναι καὶ τῆς ἀταραξίας ἁπτόμεθα τῆς φυσιολογίας. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἠθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ἐπερχόμεθα.	We say much the same when it is asked whether the skeptic should do natural science. We do not do natural science in order to make statements with firm conviction about any of the matters on which natural science holds beliefs. But we do take up natural science in order to be able to oppose to every argument an equal argument, and for the sake of tranquility. We approach the logical and the ethical parts of what is called philosophy in the same way.

CHAPTER 10: WHETHER THE SKEPTICS DO AWAY WITH APPEARANCES

Skeptics grant that honey appears sweet; they question only what is said about appearances.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.19	Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀνήκοοι μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένων· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ἀβουλήτως ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν οὐκ ἀνατρέπομεν, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ φαινόμενα. ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὁποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι φαίνεται δίδομεν, ζητοῦμεν δ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου· τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει τοῦ ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φαινομένου.	Those who say that the skeptics do away with appearances seem to me not to have listened to what we say. As we said before, we do not overturn the things that lead us, against our will, to assent in accordance with an impression we are passively affected by; and these are the appearances. When we investigate whether the underlying thing is such as it appears, we grant that it appears. What we investigate is not what appears, but what is said about what appears—and that is different from investigating what appears itself.
1.20		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οἷον φαίνεται ⟨μὲν⟩ ἡμῖν γλυκάζειν τὸ μέλι (τοῦτο συγχωροῦμεν· γλυκαζόμεθα γὰρ αἰσθητικῶς), εἰ δὲ καὶ γλυκὺ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ζητοῦμεν· ὃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλὰ ⟨τὸ⟩ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου λεγόμενον. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ κατὰ τῶν φαινομένων ἐρωτῶμεν λόγους, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν βουλόμενοι τὰ φαινόμενα τούτους ἐκτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύντες τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν· εἰ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀπατεών ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὥστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ ὑφορᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις, ὥστε μὴ κατακολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ προπετεύεσθαι;	For example, honey appears to us to be sweet. This we concede, since we perceive the sweetness. But whether it is also sweet, as far as the argument goes, we investigate; and that is not what appears but ⟨what is⟩ said about what appears. And if we do propound arguments directly against appearances, we set them out not because we want to do away with appearances, but to expose the rashness of the dogmatists. For if reason is such a trickster that it all but snatches even appearances from under our eyes, surely we should be wary of it in non-evident matters, so as not to follow it and be rash?

CHAPTER 11: ON THE CRITERION OF SKEPTICISM

The skeptic's criterion of action is what appears: nature, feelings, laws and customs, and the arts.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.21	ὅτι δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχομεν, δῆλον ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς. κριτήριον δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, τό τε εἰς πίστιν ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας λαμβανόμενον, περὶ οὗ ἐν τῷ ἀντιρρητικῷ λέξομεν λόγῳ, τό τε τοῦ πράσσειν, ᾧ προσέχοντες κατὰ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν πράσσομεν τὰ δ' οὔ, περὶ οὗ νῦν λέγομεν.	That we attend to appearances is clear from what we say about the criterion of the skeptical way. "Criterion" has two senses. One is the criterion adopted to give conviction about whether something is real or not; we will discuss it in our counter-arguments. The other is the criterion of action: by attending to it in everyday life we do some things and not others. It is this one we are now discussing.
1.22	κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν οὕτω καλοῦντες· ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν. διὸ περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐδεὶς ἴσως ἀμφισβητήσει, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ὁποῖον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.	We say, then, that the criterion of the skeptical way is what appears—implicitly meaning by this the impression. For since the impression lies in our being affected and in involuntary feeling, it is not open to investigation. That is why no one, presumably, will dispute that the underlying thing appears this way or that. What is investigated is whether it is such as it appears.
1.23	τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. ἔοικε δὲ αὕτη ἡ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερὴς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑφηγήσει φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἐθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν, ὑφηγήσει μὲν φυσικῇ	So we attend to appearances and live without holding opinions, in accordance with the observances of everyday life, since we cannot be wholly inactive. These observances of everyday life seem to fall into four parts. One lies in the guidance of nature, one in the necessity of feelings, one in the handing down of laws and customs, and one in the teaching of arts. The guidance of nature is
1.24	καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοί ἐσμεν, παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ καθ' ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφὴν ἡμᾶς ὁδηγεῖ, δίψος δ' ἐπὶ πόμα, ἐθῶν δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ὡς ἀγαθὸν τὸ	that by which we are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking. The necessity of feelings is that by which hunger leads us to food and thirst to drink. The handing down of customs and laws is

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ὡς φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἀνενέργητοί ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν τέχναις. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα φαμὲν ἀδοξάστως.	that by which, in everyday life, we accept piety as good and impiety as bad. The teaching of arts is that by which we are not inactive in the arts we take up. But we say all this without holding opinions.

CHAPTER 12: WHAT THE GOAL OF SKEPTICISM IS

The goal is tranquility in matters of opinion; suspension brought it, as Apelles' sponge painted the foam.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.25	Τούτοις ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διεξελθεῖν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὗ χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν. φαμὲν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν.	The next thing would be to go through the goal of the skeptical way. A goal is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it is not itself for the sake of anything else; or, the final object of desire. We say, so far, that the goal of the skeptic is tranquility in matters of opinion and moderate feeling in matters forced upon us.
1.26	ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς φαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεν· ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἡ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία.	The skeptic began to do philosophy in order to decide among impressions and apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil. But he ran into equipollent disagreement, and since he could not decide it, he suspended judgment. And once he had suspended judgment, tranquility in matters of opinion followed, as it happened.
1.27	ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταράσσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπό τε τῶν φύσει κακῶν νομίζει ποινηλατεῖσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθά, ὡς οἴεται· ἅπερ κτησάμενος πλείοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει, διά τε τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν μεταβολὴν πάντα πράσσει, ἵνα μὴ ἀποβάλῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι.	For anyone who holds the opinion that something is by nature good or bad is constantly disturbed. When he lacks the things that seem to him good, he thinks he is being hounded by things that are by nature bad, and he chases after what he supposes to be good. Then, once he has acquired these, he falls into still more disturbances. He is elated beyond reason and without measure, and because he fears change he does everything he can so as not to lose the things that seem to him good.
1.28	ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καλῶν ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τι οὔτε διώκει συντόνως· διόπερ ἀταρακτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν περὶ Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται, τοῦτο ὑπῆρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἵππον γράφων καὶ τὸν ἀφρὸν τοῦ ἵππου μιμήσασθαι τῇ γραφῇ βουληθεὶς οὕτως ἀπετύγχανεν ὡς ἀπειπεῖν καὶ τὴν σπογγιὰν εἰς ἣν ἀπέμασσε τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ γραφείου χρώματα προσρῖψαι τῇ εἰκόνι· τὴν δὲ προσαψαμένην ἵππου ἀφροῦ ποιῆσαι μίμημα.	But someone who does not determine anything about what is good or bad by nature neither avoids nor pursues anything intensely, and so he is tranquil. What happened to the skeptic, then, is just what is told of Apelles the painter. They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to depict the horse's foam. He failed so badly that he gave up and threw at the picture the sponge he used to wipe the paint off his brush—and the sponge, striking the picture, produced a likeness of the horse's foam.[3]

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.29	καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἤλπιζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρῖναι, μὴ δυνηθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἡ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιὰ σώματι. οὐ μὴν ἀόχλητον πάντῃ τὸν σκεπτικὸν εἶναι νομίζομεν, ἀλλ' ὀχλεῖσθαί φαμεν ὑπὸ τῶν κατηναγκασμένων· καὶ γὰρ ῥιγοῦν ποτε ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ διψῆν καὶ τοιουτότροπά τινα πάσχειν.	So too the skeptics were hoping to achieve tranquility by deciding the anomaly in what appears and what is thought. Unable to do this, they suspended judgment. And once they had suspended judgment, tranquility followed, as if by chance, as a shadow follows a body. We do not, however, think that the skeptic is wholly undisturbed. We say that he is disturbed by things forced upon him: we do agree that he is sometimes cold and thirsty, and has various feelings of that sort.
1.30	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται δισσαῖς συνέχονται περιστάσεσιν, ὑπό τε τῶν παθῶν αὐτῶν καὶ οὐχ ἧττον ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰς περιστάσεις ταύτας κακὰς εἶναι φύσει δοκεῖν· ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὸ προσδοξάζειν ὅτι ἔστι κακὸν τούτων ἕκαστον ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν περιαιρῶν μετριώτερον καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπαλλάσσει. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξίαν τέλος εἶναί φαμεν τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. τινὲς δὲ τῶν δοκίμων σκεπτικῶν προσέθηκαν τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἐποχήν.	But even here ordinary people are afflicted twice over: by the feelings themselves, and no less by thinking that these conditions are by nature bad. The skeptic, by doing away with the additional opinion that each of them is bad by nature, gets off more moderately even here. That is why we say that the goal of the skeptic is tranquility in matters of opinion and moderate feeling in matters forced upon us. Some eminent skeptics have added to these suspension of judgment in investigations.

CHAPTER 13: ON THE GENERAL MODES OF SUSPENSION

Suspension comes from opposing appearances and thoughts to one another, and present arguments to future ones.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.31	Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐφάσκομεν τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅπως ἡμῖν ἡ ἐποχὴ περιγίνεται. γίνεται τοίνυν αὕτη, ὡς ἂν ὁλοσχερέστερον εἴποι τις, διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ, οἷον φαινόμενα μὲν φαινομένοις,	Since we have said that tranquility follows suspension of judgment about everything, the next thing would be to say how we come to suspend judgment. To put it in rather general terms, it comes about through the opposition of things. We oppose what appears to what appears, or what is thought to what is thought, or the one to the other. We oppose what appears to what appears, for example,
1.32	ὅταν λέγωμεν 'ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος, ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος', νοούμενα δὲ νοουμένοις, ὅταν πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθῶμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ τούτου συνάγωμεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν·	when we say, "The same tower appears round from a distance but square from close up." We oppose what is thought to what is thought when, against someone who establishes from the order of the heavenly bodies that there is providence, we set the fact that the good often fare badly and the bad fare well, and conclude from this that there is no providence.
1.33	νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ ⟨κατασκευάζοντι⟩ λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ὅτι ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐστὶ μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν ἄρα μέλαινά ἐστιν. καθ' ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπίνοιαν ἀντιτίθεμεν ὁτὲ	We oppose what is thought to what appears, as Anaxagoras did in reply to ⟨someone who argued⟩ that snow is white: snow is frozen water, and water is black; so snow too is black. On another way

3 Apelles (fourth century BC), court painter to Alexander the Great, was the most celebrated painter of antiquity.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	μὲν παρόντα παροῦσιν, ὡς τὰ προειρημένα· ὁτὲ δὲ παρόντα παρεληλυθόσιν ἢ μέλλουσιν, οἷον ὅταν τις ἡμᾶς ἐρωτήσῃ λόγον ὃν λῦσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα, φαμὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι,	of looking at it, we sometimes oppose present things to present things, as in the cases just mentioned, and sometimes present things to past or future ones. For instance, when someone propounds an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say to him:[4]
1.34	ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν εἰσηγησάμενον τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν μετέρχῃ, οὐδέπω ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν λόγος ὑγιὴς ὢν ἐφαίνετο, ὑπέκειτο μέντοι ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῷ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτηθέντι νῦν λόγῳ ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, μηδέπω δ' ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι, ὥστε οὐδέπω χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῷ δοκοῦντι νῦν ἰσχυρῷ εἶναι λόγῳ.	"Before the founder of the school you follow was born, the argument for it did not yet appear sound, though in nature it was already there. In the same way, it is possible that the argument opposed to the one you have just propounded is there in nature but does not yet appear to us. So we should not yet assent to the argument that now seems strong."
1.35	ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῖν ὑποπεσεῖν, καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ὑποθήσομαι δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεται, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους οὔτε περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν διαβεβαιούμενος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθροὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησομένων.	But so that we may grasp these oppositions more precisely, I will also set out the modes through which suspension of judgment is brought about. I make no firm claims about their number or their force: they may be unsound, and there may be more of them than the ones I am about to describe.

CHAPTER 14: ON THE TEN MODES

Sextus lists the ten modes of suspension handed down by the older skeptics and groups them under relativity.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.36	Παραδίδονται τοίνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ λόγους καὶ τύπους συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν, δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας,	The older skeptics usually hand down modes through which suspension of judgment seems to be brought about, ten in number; they also call them, interchangeably, "arguments" and "patterns." They are these: first, the mode depending on the variety of animals; second, the one depending on the differences among human beings; third, the one depending on the different constitutions of the sense organs; fourth, the one depending on circumstances; fifth, the one depending on positions, distances and places; sixth, the one depending on admixtures;[5]
1.37	ἕβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι, ἔννατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις.	seventh, the one depending on the quantities and preparations of the underlying things; eighth, the one from relativity; ninth, the one depending on constant or rare encounters; tenth, the one depending on ways of life, customs, laws, mythical beliefs and dogmatic suppositions.

4 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was a fifth-century BC natural philosopher.
5 The Ten Modes are usually attributed to Aenesidemus (first century BC), who revived Pyrrhonism.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.38	χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς. τούτων δὲ ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται οἱ πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ κρῖνον ἢ ζῷόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ ἔν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου ⟨ἀνάγονται⟩ ὁ ἕβδομος καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ ὄγδοος καὶ ὁ ἔννατος.	We use this order by stipulation. Over these there are three higher modes: the one from the judge, the one from what is judged, and the one from both. Under the mode from the judge fall the first four, since the judge is either an animal, or a human being, or a sense, or in some circumstance. The seventh and the tenth ⟨are referred⟩ to the mode from what is judged; and the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth to the mode composed of both.
1.39	πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρός τι, ὡς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρός τι, εἰδικοὺς δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεβηκότας δὲ τοὺς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τάδε.	These three in turn are referred to the mode of relativity. So relativity is the most generic, the three are specific, and the ten are subordinate. This is what we say about their number, as is plausible. About their force, the following.

THE FIRST MODE: ANIMALS

Animals differ in birth and bodily make-up, so the same things produce different impressions in them.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.40	Πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ' ὃν ⟨παρὰ⟩ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ἔκ τε τῆς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰς συστάσεις τῶν σωμάτων παραλλαγῆς.	The first argument, we said, is the one according to which, ⟨owing to⟩ the differences among animals, the same things do not produce the same impressions. We infer this both from the differences in the ways animals come into being and from the variation in the composition of their bodies.
1.41	περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς γενέσεις, ὅτι τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεται τὰ δ' ἐκ συμπλοκῆς. καὶ τῶν μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς γίνεται ὡς τὰ ἐν ταῖς καμίνοις φαινόμενα ζῳύφια, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὕδατος φθειρομένου ὡς κώνωπες, τὰ δ' ἐξ οἴνου τρεπομένου ὡς σκνῖπες, τὰ δ' ἐκ γῆς ⟨ὡς....⟩, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἰλύος ὡς βάτραχοι, τὰ δ' ἐκ βορβόρου ὡς σκώληκες, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὄνων ὡς κάνθαροι τὰ δ' ἐκ λαχάνων ὡς κάμπαι, τὰ δ' ἐκ καρπῶν ὡς οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐρινεῶν ψῆνες, τὰ δ' ἐκ ζῴων σηπομένων ὡς μέλισσαι ταύρων καὶ σφῆκες ἵππων·	First, the ways they come into being. Some animals are generated without sexual union, others from intercourse. Of those generated without union, some come from fire, like the tiny creatures that appear in furnaces; some from stagnant water, like gnats; some from wine turning sour, like midges; some from earth, ⟨like ...⟩; some from slime, like frogs; some from mud, like worms; some from donkeys, like beetles; some from vegetables, like caterpillars; some from fruit, like the gall-insects that come from wild figs; and some from rotting animals, like bees from bulls and wasps from horses.
1.42	τῶν δ' ἐκ συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοιογενῶν ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνομοιογενῶν ὡς ἡμίονοι. πάλιν κοινῇ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν ζῳοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ' ᾠοτοκεῖται ὡς ὄρνιθες, τὰ δὲ σαρκοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄρκτοι.	Of those generated from intercourse, most come from parents of the same kind, but some from parents of different kinds, like mules. Again, in general, some animals are born live, like human beings; some are born as eggs, like birds; and some are born as lumps of flesh, like bears.[6]

6 It was widely believed in antiquity that bear cubs are born as shapeless lumps of flesh that the mother licks into shape.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.43	εἰκὸς οὖν τὰς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνομοιότητας καὶ διαφορὰς μεγάλας ποιεῖν ἀντιπαθείας, τὸ ἀσύγκρατον καὶ ἀσυνάρμοστον καὶ μαχόμενον ἐκεῖθεν φερομένας.	It is likely, then, that these dissimilarities and differences in the way they come into being produce great differences in how they are affected, and that from this source they derive their incompatibility, their lack of harmony and their conflict.
1.44	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρίνειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκότων, μεγίστην δύναται ποιεῖν μάχην τῶν φαντασιῶν [παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων παραλλαγήν]. οἱ γοῦν ἰκτεριῶντες ὠχρά φασιν εἶναι τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκά, καὶ οἱ ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες αἱμωπά. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν ὠχροὺς ἔχει τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς τὰ δ' ὑφαίμους τὰ δὲ λευκανθίζοντας τὰ δ' ἄλλην χροιὰν ἔχοντας, εἰκός, οἶμαι, διάφορον αὐτοῖς τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν γίγνεσθαι.	Moreover, differences in the most important parts of the body, especially those whose nature is to judge and to perceive, can produce a very great conflict among impressions [owing to the variation among animals]. People with jaundice, at any rate, say that things which appear white to us are yellow, and people with a bloodshot eye say they are blood-red. Now, some animals have yellow eyes, others bloodshot, others whitish, others some other color. So it is likely, I think, that they perceive colors differently.
1.45	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνατενίσαντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον τῷ ἡλίῳ, εἶτα ἐγκύψαντες βιβλίῳ τὰ γράμματα χρυσοειδῆ δοκοῦμεν εἶναι καὶ περιφερόμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τινὰ φύσει λαμπηδόνα ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχει καὶ φῶς λεπτομερές τε καὶ εὐκίνητον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστέλλει, ὡς καὶ νυκτὸς ὁρᾶν, δεόντως ἂν νομίζοιμεν ὅτι μὴ ὅμοια ἡμῖν τε κἀκείνοις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποπίπτει.	Again, if we stare at the sun for a long time and then bend over a book, the letters seem to us golden and moving around. Now, some animals naturally have a brightness in their eyes and send out from them a fine and mobile light, so that they can even see at night. So we would be right to think that external things do not strike them and us in the same way.
1.46	καί γε οἱ γόητες χρίοντες τὰς θρυαλλίδας ἰῷ χαλκοῦ καὶ θολῷ σηπίας ποιοῦσιν ὁτὲ μὲν χαλκοῦς ὁτὲ δὲ μέλανας φαίνεσθαι τοὺς παρόντας διὰ τὴν βραχεῖαν τοῦ μιχθέντος παρασποράν. πολὺ δήπου εὐλογώτερόν ἐστι, χυμῶν διαφόρων ἀνακεκραμένων τῇ ὁράσει τῶν ζῴων, διαφόρους	Conjurers, too, by smearing lamp-wicks with copper rust or cuttlefish ink, make the people present look copper-colored at one moment and black at another, just by sprinkling in a little of the mixture. Surely, then, it is far more reasonable that, since different humors are blended into the vision of ⟨animals⟩, different
1.47	φαντασίας αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι. ὅταν τε παραθλίψωμεν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενὰ φαίνεται τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὁρατῶν. εἰκὸς οὖν ὅτι ὅσα τῶν ζῴων λοξὴν ἔχει τὴν κόρην καὶ προμήκη, καθάπερ αἶγες αἴλουροι καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα, διάφορα φαντάζεται τὰ ὑποκείμενα εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ οἷα τὰ περιφερῆ τὴν κόρην ἔχοντα ζῷα εἶναι αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνει.	impressions should arise for them. When we press the side of an eye, the outlines, shapes and sizes of visible things appear elongated and narrow. So it is likely that animals whose pupils are slanting and elongated—goats, cats and the like—have impressions of the underlying things as different, and do not suppose them to be such as animals with round pupils do.
1.48	τά τε κάτοπτρα παρὰ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν ὁτὲ μὲν μικρότατα δείκνυσι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα ὡς τὰ κοῖλα, ὁτὲ δ' ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενά ὡς τὰ κυρτά· τινὰ δὲ τὴν μὲν κεφαλὴν κάτω δείκνυσι τοῦ κατοπτριζομένου, τοὺς δὲ πόδας ἄνω.	Mirrors, too, because of their different construction, sometimes show external objects as very small, as concave mirrors do, and sometimes as elongated and narrow, as convex ones do. Some show the head of the person looking into them at the bottom and the feet at the top.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.49	ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀγγείων τὰ μὲν ἐξόφθαλμα κομιδῇ προπέπτωκεν ὑπὸ κυρτότητος, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερά ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἐν ὑπτίῳ πλάτει βέβηκεν, εἰκὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ μήτε ἴσα τοῖς μεγέθεσι μήτε ὅμοια ταῖς μορφαῖς ὁρᾶν τὰ αὐτὰ κύνας ἰχθύας λέοντας ἀνθρώπους ἀλλ' οἵαν ἑκάστου ποιεῖ τύπωσιν ἡ δεχομένη τὸ φαινόμενον ὄψις.	Now, of the organs of sight, some bulge right out because of their convexity, some are more concave, and some lie flat. So it is likely that for this reason too impressions are altered, and that dogs, fish, lions and human beings do not see the same things as equal in size or alike in shape, but each according to the imprint made by the vision that receives the appearance.
1.50	ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων λόγος· πῶς γὰρ ἂν λεχθείη ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν τά τε ὀστρακόδερμα καὶ τὰ σαρκοφανῆ καὶ τὰ ἠκανθωμένα καὶ τὰ ἐπτερωμένα ἢ λελεπιδωμένα; πῶς δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τά τε στενώτατον ἔχοντα τὸν πόρον τὸν ἀκουστικὸν καὶ τὰ εὐρυτάτῳ τούτῳ κεχρημένα, ἢ τὰ τετριχωμένα τὰ ὦτα καὶ τὰ ψιλὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα; ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν παραβύσαντες τὰ ὦτα, ἄλλως δὲ ἣν ἁπλῶς αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.	The same argument holds for the other senses too. How could one say that creatures with shells, creatures with bare flesh, creatures covered in spines and creatures covered in feathers or scales are all moved in the same way by touch? How could creatures with a very narrow auditory passage and those with a very wide one perceive in the same way by hearing, or creatures with hairy ears and those with smooth ones? After all, even we are affected one way in hearing when we have stopped up our ears, and another way when we simply use them.
1.51	καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις δὲ διαφέροι ἂν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα ἐμψυγέντες καὶ τοῦ φλέγματος πλεονάσαντος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἄλλως δὲ ἣν τὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἡμῶν μέρη πλεονασμὸν αἵματος ὑποδέξηται, ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὰ εὐώδη τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ ὥσπερ πλήττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν νομίζοντες, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν πλαδαρά τέ ἐστι φύσει καὶ φλεγματώδη, τὰ δὲ πολύαιμα σφόδρα, τὰ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσαν καὶ πλεονάζουσαν ἔχοντα τὴν ξανθὴν χολὴν ἢ τὴν μέλαιναν, εὔλογον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διάφορα ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι τὰ ὀσφρητά.	Smell, too, would differ with the variety of animals. We ourselves are affected one way when we have a chill and there is an excess of phlegm in us, and another way when the parts around our head take in an excess of blood: then we turn away from what seems fragrant to others and think we are, as it were, being struck by it. Now, some animals are by nature flabby and phlegmatic, others very full of blood, and in others yellow or black bile predominates and is in excess. So it is reasonable that for this reason too objects of smell should appear different to each of them.
1.52	καὶ τὰ γευστὰ ὁμοίως τῶν μὲν τραχεῖαν καὶ ἄνικμον ἐχόντων τὴν γλῶσσαν τῶν δὲ ἔνυγρον σφόδρα, εἴγε καὶ ἡμεῖς ξηροτέραν ἐν πυρετοῖς τὴν γλῶτταν σχόντες γεώδη καὶ κακόχυμα ἢ πικρὰ τὰ προσφερόμενα εἶναι νομίζομεν, τοῦτο δὲ πάσχομεν καὶ παρὰ τὴν διάφορον ἐπικράτειαν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν χυμῶν εἶναι λεγομένων· ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὰ ζῷα διάφορον τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον ἔχει καὶ διαφόροις χυμοῖς πλεονάζον, διαφόρους ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν φαντασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων λαμβάνοι.	So too with objects of taste, since some animals have a rough, dry tongue and others a very moist one. When our own tongue becomes drier in fevers, we think what we are given is earthy and bad-tasting, or bitter; and we experience this because of the different predominance of the humors said to be in us. Since, then, animals too have different organs of taste, with different humors in excess, they would also get different impressions of the underlying things by taste.
1.53	ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τροφὴ ἀναδιδομένη ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλὲψ ὅπου δὲ ἀρτηρία ὅπου δὲ ὀστέον ὅπου δὲ νεῦρον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑποδεχομένων αὐτὴν μερῶν διάφορον ἐπιδεικνυμένη	Consider the same food: when distributed through the body, it becomes a vein in one place, an artery in another, a bone in another, a sinew in another, and so on with each of the rest, displaying a differ-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δύναμιν, καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ ἓν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀναδιδόμενον εἰς τὰ δένδρα ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλοιὸς ὅπου δὲ κλάδος ὅπου δὲ καρπὸς καὶ ἤδη σῦκον καὶ ῥοιὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον,	ent power according to the difference of the parts that receive it. Consider water, one and uniform: when distributed into trees, it becomes bark in one place, a branch in another, fruit in another—a fig, indeed, or a pomegranate, and so on with each of the rest.
1.54	καὶ καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ μουσουργοῦ πνεῦμα ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμπνεόμενον τῷ αὐλῷ ὅπου μὲν γίνεται ὀξὺ ὅπου δὲ βαρύ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπέρεισις τῆς χειρὸς ἐπὶ τῆς λύρας ὅπου μὲν βαρὺν φθόγγον ποιεῖ ὅπου δὲ ὀξύν, οὕτως εἰκὸς καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διάφορα θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν τὰς φαντασίας ὑπομενόντων ζῴων.	Consider the musician's breath, one and the same: blown into the pipe, it becomes high in one place and low in another; and the same pressure of the hand on the lyre produces a low note in one place and a high one in another. In just the same way, it is likely that external objects are observed as different according to the different constitutions of the animals that receive the impressions.
1.55	ἐναργέστερον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις. μύρον γοῦν ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἥδιστον φαίνεται, κανθάροις δὲ καὶ μελίσσαις δυσανάσχετον· καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὠφελεῖ, σφῆκας δὲ καὶ μελίσσας ἀναιρεῖ καταρραινόμενον· καὶ τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδές ἐστι πινόμενον καὶ φαρμακῶδες, ἰχθύσι δὲ ἥδιστον καὶ πότιμον.	One can learn this more clearly from what animals choose and avoid. Perfume, for instance, appears very pleasant to human beings but unbearable to beetles and bees. Olive oil is beneficial to human beings, but when sprinkled on wasps and bees it kills them. Seawater is unpleasant and poisonous for human beings to drink, but very pleasant and drinkable for fish.
1.56	σύες τε ἥδιον βορβόρῳ λούονται δυσωδεστάτῳ ἢ ὕδατι διειδεῖ καὶ καθαρῷ. τῶν τε ζῴων τὰ μέν ἐστι ποηφάγα τὰ δὲ θαμνοφάγα τὰ δὲ ὑληνόμα τὰ δὲ σπερμοφάγα τὰ δὲ σαρκοφάγα τὰ δὲ γαλακτοφάγα, καὶ τὰ μὲν σεσηπυίᾳ χαίρει τροφῇ τὰ δὲ νεαρᾷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὠμῇ τὰ δὲ μαγειρικῶς ἐσκευασμένῃ. καὶ κοινῶς τὰ ἄλλοις ἡδέα ἄλλοις ἐστὶν ἀηδῆ καὶ φευκτά καὶ θανάσιμα.	Pigs would rather wash in the foulest-smelling mud than in clear, clean water. Some animals eat grass, some shrubs, some woodland growth, some seeds, some flesh, some milk. Some enjoy stale food, others fresh; some raw food, others food prepared by cooking. And in general, what is pleasant to some is to others unpleasant, to be avoided, and deadly.
1.57	τὸ γοῦν κώνειον πιαίνει τοὺς ὄρτυγας καὶ ὁ ὑοσκύαμος τὰς ὗς, αἵ δὴ χαίρουσι καὶ σαλαμάνδρας ἐσθίουσαι, ὥσπεροῦν ἔλαφοι τὰ ἰοβόλα ζῷα καὶ αἱ χελιδόνες κανθαρίδας. οἵ τε μύρμηκες καὶ οἱ σκνῖπες ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδίας καὶ στρόφους ἐμποιοῦσι καταπινόμενοι· ἡ δὲ ἄρκτος ἢν ἀρρωστίᾳ τινὶ περιπέσῃ, τούτους καταλιχμωμένη ῥώννυται.	Hemlock, for instance, fattens quails, and henbane fattens pigs—and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders, just as deer enjoy venomous creatures and swallows blister beetles. Ants and midges, when swallowed, give human beings nausea and colic; but a bear, if she falls ill, licks them up and gets her strength back.
1.58	ἔχιδνα δὲ θιγόντος αὐτῆς μόνον φηγοῦ κλάδου καροῦται, καὶ νυκτερὶς πλατάνου φύλλου. φεύγει δὲ κριὸν μὲν ἐλέφας, λέων δὲ ἀλεκτρυόνα, καὶ θραγμὸν κυάμων ἐρεικομένων τὰ θαλάττια κήτη, καὶ τίγρις ψόφον τυμπάνου. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβειν δοκῶμεν, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέν ἐστιν ἀηδῆ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀηδὲς ἐν φαντασίᾳ κεῖται, διάφοροι γίνονται τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίαι.	A viper is stupefied if merely touched by an oak branch, and so is a bat by a plane leaf. The elephant runs from the ram, the lion from the cockerel, whales from the crackle of beans being crushed, and the tiger from the sound of a drum. One could say more than this; but so as not to seem to dwell on it longer than we should: if the same things are unpleasant to some and pleasant to others, and pleasant and unpleasant lie in im-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		pressions, then animals get different impressions from the underlying things.
1.59	εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα ἀνόμοια φαίνεται παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν, ὁποῖον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ δυνησόμεθα τὰς φαντασίας τάς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, μέρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενοι.	And if the same things appear dissimilar owing to the variety of animals, we will be able to say how the underlying thing is observed by us, but we will suspend judgment about how it is in its nature. For we will not be able to decide between our own impressions and those of the other animals ourselves. We are part of the disagreement, and so we will need someone to decide it rather than being able to judge it ourselves.
1.60	καὶ ἄλλως οὔτε ἀναποδείκτως δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις γινομένων οὔτε μετ’ ἀποδείξεως. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἴσως, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν, αὐτὴ ἡ λεγομένη ἀπόδειξις ἤτοι φαινομένη ἡμῖν ἔσται ἢ οὐ φαινομένη. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ φαινομένη, οὐδὲ μετὰ πεποιθήσεως αὐτὴν προοισόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φαινομένη ἡμῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων τοῖς ζῴοις ζητεῖται καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡμῖν φαίνεται ζῴοις οὖσι, καὶ αὐτὴ ζητηθήσεται εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς καθό ἐστι φαινομένη.	Besides, we cannot give our own impressions preference over those that arise in non-rational animals, either without proof or with proof. Quite apart from the fact that there is perhaps no such thing as proof, as we will point out, the so-called proof itself will either appear to us or not appear to us. If it does not appear, we will not put it forward with any confidence. If it does appear to us, then—since what is under investigation is what appears to animals, and the proof appears to us, who are animals—the proof itself will be under investigation as to whether it is true, insofar as it appears.
1.61	ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν καὶ ἄπιστον, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον, πιστὸν μὲν ἡ βούλεται ἀποδεικνύειν, ἄπιστον δὲ ᾗ ἀποδείκνυται. οὐχ ἕξομεν ἄρα ἀπόδειξιν δι’ ἧς προκρινοῦμεν τὰς ἑαυτῶν φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις καλουμένοις ζῴοις γινομένων. εἰ οὖν διάφοροι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν, ἃς ἐπικρῖναι ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.	But it is absurd to try to establish what is under investigation by means of what is under investigation. The same thing would then be both convincing and unconvincing, which is impossible: convincing insofar as it purports to prove, unconvincing insofar as it is being proved. So we will have no proof by which to give our own impressions preference over those arising in the so-called non-rational animals. If, then, impressions differ owing to the variety of animals, and it is impossible to decide among them, we must suspend judgment about external objects.

THE REASONING DOG

For good measure, Sextus argues that a dog has reason, excellence and even Stoic logic.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.62	Ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ συγκρίνομεν τὰ ἄλογα καλούμενα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ φαντασίαν· καὶ γὰρ καταπαίζειν τῶν δογματικῶν τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαυτολογούντων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν μετὰ τοὺς πρακτικοὺς τῶν λόγων. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτεροι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἁπλῶς εἰώθασι συγκρίνειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ·	For good measure, we also compare the so-called non-rational animals with human beings with respect to impressions. After our serious arguments, we don’t refuse to have some fun at the expense of the dogmatists, puffed up and self-praising as they are. Our own people usually compare the non-rational animals as a whole with human beings.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.63	ἐπεὶ δὲ εὑρησιλογοῦντες οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄνισον εἶναί φασι τὴν σύγκρισιν, ἡμεῖς ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐπὶ πλέον παίζοντες ἐπὶ ἑνὸς ζῴου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον, οἷον ἐπὶ κυνός, εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦ εὐτελεστάτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. εὑρήσομεν γὰρ καὶ οὕτω μὴ λειπόμενα ἡμῶν τὰ ζῷα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν πίστιν τῶν φαινομένων.	But the dogmatists quibble and say the comparison is unfair. So, with plenty to spare and to make the joke even better, we will rest the argument on a single animal—the dog, say, if you like, which is thought to be the lowliest of all. For we will find that even so the animals we are discussing are not inferior to us as regards the credibility of what appears to them.
1.64	ὅτι τοίνυν αἰσθήσει διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον ἡμῶν, οἱ δογματικοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὀσφρήσει μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα αὐτῷ θηρία διὰ ταύτης ἀνιχνεύων καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς θᾶττον ἡμῶν ταῦτα ὁρῶν καὶ τῇ ἀκοῇ αἰσθανόμενος ὀξέως.	Now, the dogmatists agree that this animal surpasses us in perception. It perceives by smell better than we do, using it to track down wild animals it cannot see; it sees them with its eyes more quickly than we do; and its hearing is keen.
1.65	οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἔλθωμεν. τούτου δὲ ὁ μέν ἐστιν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. ἴδωμεν οὖν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου. οὗτος τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῖν ἀντιδοξοῦντας νῦν δογματικούς, τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἐν τούτοις ἔοικε σαλεύειν, τῇ αἱρέσει τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῇ γνώσει τῶν εἰς τοῦτο συντεινουσῶν τεχνῶν, τῇ ἀντιλήψει τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀρετῶν ⟨καὶ⟩ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη.	So let us come to reason. One kind of reason is internal, the other expressed in speech. Let us look first at internal reason. According to the dogmatists who at present most oppose us, the Stoics, internal reason seems to turn on these things: choosing what is one's own and avoiding what is alien; knowing the arts that contribute to this; and grasping the excellences that belong to one's own nature ⟨and⟩ those concerned with feelings.[7]
1.66	ὁ τοίνυν κύων, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἔδοξε στῆσαι παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, αἵρεσιν ποιεῖται τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγὴν τῶν βλαβερῶν, τὰ μὲν τρόφιμα διώκων, μάστιγος δὲ ἀναταθείσης ὑποχωρῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνην ἔχει πoριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, τὴν θηρευτικήν.	Now, the dog—the animal we decided to rest the argument on, for the sake of example—chooses what is its own and avoids what is harmful: it goes after food and backs away when the whip is raised. It also has an art for procuring what is its own—namely, hunting.
1.67	ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἐκτός· τῆς γέ τοι δικαιοσύνης οὔσης τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀποδοτικῆς ἑκάστῳ, ὁ κύων τοὺς μὲν οἰκείους γε καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντας σαίνων καὶ φρουρῶν τοὺς δὲ ἀνοικείους καὶ ἀδικοῦντας ἀμυνόμενος οὐκ ἔξω ἂν εἴη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.	Nor is it without excellence. Justice, at any rate, is giving each their due. And since the dog fawns on and guards those who are its own and treat it well, and wards off those who are not its own and do wrong, it could hardly be said to lack justice.
1.68	εἰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχει, τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀντακολουθουσῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχει, ἃς οὔ φασιν ἔχειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἱ σοφοί. καὶ ἄλκιμον δὲ ὄντα ὁρῶμεν ἐν ταῖς ἀμύναις καὶ συνετόν, ὡς καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐμαρτύρησεν, ποιήσας τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀνθρώποις ἀγνῶτα ὄντα ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ τοῦ Ἀργοῦ ἐπιγνωσθέντα, μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τἀνδρὸς ἀπατηθέντος τοῦ κυνός, μήτε ἐκστάντος τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας, ἣν μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχων ἐφάνη.	But if it has justice, then, since the excellences entail one another, it also has the other excellences—the ones the wise say most human beings do not have. We see, too, that it is brave in warding people off, and intelligent. Homer testified to this as well: he portrayed Odysseus as unrecognized by all the people of his household and recognized by Argus alone. The dog was neither deceived by the change in the man's body nor did it lose hold

7 "Reason" translates *logos,* which also means "speech": the Stoics distinguished reason as inner thought from reason uttered in speech.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		of its apprehensive impression—which it evidently had to a greater degree than the human beings.[8]
1.69	κατὰ δὲ τὸν Χρύσιππον τὸν μάλιστα συμπολεμοῦντα τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις καὶ τῆς ἀοιδίμου διαλεκτικῆς μετέχει. φησὶ γοῦν αὐτὸν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ πέμπτῳ διὰ πλειόνων ἀναποδείκτῳ, ὅταν ἐπὶ τρίοδον ἐλθὼν καὶ τὰς δύο ὁδοὺς ἰχνεύσας δι' ὧν οὐ διῆλθε τὸ θηρίον, τὴν τρίτην μηδ' ἰχνεύσας εὐθέως ὁρμήσῃ δι' αὐτῆς. δυνάμει γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν λογίζεσθαί φησιν ὁ ἀρχαῖος 'τῇδε ἢ τῇδε ἢ τῇδε διῆλθε τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῇδε οὔτε τῇδε·	According to Chrysippus, who is especially hostile to non-rational animals, the dog even shares in their celebrated dialectic. At any rate, the man just mentioned says that the dog applies the fifth indemonstrable with more than two alternatives. This happens when it comes to a place where three roads meet, sniffs at the two roads its quarry did not take, and rushes straight off down the third without even sniffing it. For, says the venerable man, the dog is implicitly reasoning like this: "The animal went either this way, or this way, or this way; but not this way, and not this way;[9]
1.70	τῇδε ἄρα.' ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικός τέ ἐστι καὶ παραμυθητικός· σκόλοπος γὰρ αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν τούτου ὁρμᾷ τῇ τοῦ ποδὸς πρὸς τὴν γῆν παρατρίψει καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων. ἕλκος τε εἰ ἔχει που, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ῥυπαρὰ ἕλκη δυσαλθῆ ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ καθαρὰ ῥᾳδίως θεραπεύεται, πρᾴως ἀποψᾷ τὸν γινόμενον ἰχῶρα.	therefore this way." What is more, the dog is aware of its own feelings and able to relieve them. When a thorn has stuck in it, it sets about removing it by rubbing its foot on the ground and with its teeth. And if it has a wound somewhere, then, since dirty wounds are hard to cure while clean ones heal easily, it gently wipes away the pus that forms.
1.71	ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Ἱπποκράτειον φυλάσσει μάλα καλῶς· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποδὸς ἄκος ἀκινησία, εἴ ποτε τραῦμα ἐν ποδὶ σχοίη, μετεωρίζει τοῦτον καὶ ὡς οἷόν τε ἄσκυλτον τηρεῖ. ὀχλούμενός τε ὑπὸ χυμῶν ἀνοικείων πόαν ἐσθίει, μεθ' ἧς ἀποβλύζων τὸ ἀνοίκειον ὑγιάζεται.	It also observes Hippocrates' rule very well. Since rest is the cure for a foot, if it ever gets a wound in its foot it holds the foot up and keeps it as undisturbed as it can. And when it is troubled by humors that don't agree with it, it eats grass, vomits up what disagrees with it along with the grass, and gets well.
1.72	εἰ τοίνυν ἐφάνη τὸ ζῷον, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἐστήσαμεν παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, καὶ αἱρούμενον τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ὀχληρὰ φεῦγον, τέχνην τε ἔχον ποριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικὸν καὶ παραμυθητικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξω ἀρετῆς, ἐν οἷς κεῖται ἡ τελειότης τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου, τέλειος ἂν εἴη κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ κύων· ὅθεν μοι δοκοῦσί τινες τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἑαυτοὺς σεμνῦναι τῇ τοῦ ζῴου τούτου προσηγορίᾳ.	The animal we rested our argument on for the sake of example has, then, evidently chosen what is its own and avoided what is troublesome; it has an art for procuring what is its own; it is aware of its own feelings and able to relieve them; and it is not without excellence. Since the perfection of internal reason lies in these things, the dog would to that extent be perfect. That, I think, is why some philosophers have dignified themselves with the name of this animal.[10]
1.73	περὶ δὲ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου τέως μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖν· τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τῶν δογματικῶν ἔνιοι	As for reason expressed in speech, there is no need to investigate it for the present. Even some of

8 The "apprehensive impression" is the Stoic criterion of truth: an impression so clear that it could only come from the thing it represents. Argus is Odysseus' old dog in *Odyssey* 17.
9 The indemonstrables are the five basic argument forms of Stoic logic, from which all others were derived; the fifth runs "Either A or B; not A; therefore B." Chrysippus (c. 280–207 BC) was the third head of the Stoic school.
10 The Cynics, whose name comes from the Greek *kyōn*, "dog."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	παρῃτήσαντο ὡς ἀντιπράττοντα τῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναλήψει, διὸ καὶ παρὰ τὸν τῆς μαθήσεως χρόνον ἤσκησαν σιωπήν· καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἴη ἄνθρωπος ἐνεός, οὐδεὶς φήσει αὐτὸν εἶναι ἄλογον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, μάλιστα μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὰ ζῷα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἀνθρωπίνας προφερόμενα φωνάς, ὡς κίττας καὶ ἄλλα τινά.	the dogmatists have rejected it as a hindrance to acquiring excellence, which is why they practiced silence during the period of their instruction. Besides, if a human being were mute, say, no one would call him non-rational. But let us pass over these points too. We do in fact see the animals we are discussing uttering even human sounds—jays, for instance, and some others.[11]
1.74	ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐάσωμεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνίεμεν τὰς φωνὰς τῶν ἀλόγων καλουμένων ζῴων, ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικὸς διαλέγεσθαι μὲν ταῦτα, ἡμᾶς δὲ μὴ συνιέναι· καὶ γὰρ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων φωνῆς ἀκούοντες οὐ συνίεμεν ἀλλὰ μονοειδῆ ταύτην εἶναι δοκοῦμεν.	Let us set that aside as well. Even if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called non-rational animals, it is not at all unlikely that they converse and we simply fail to understand. After all, when we hear the speech of foreigners, we don't understand it, and it seems to us to be all one sound.
1.75	καὶ ἀκούομεν δὲ τῶν κυνῶν ἄλλην μὲν φωνὴν προϊεμένων ὅταν ἀμύνωνταί τινας, ἄλλην δὲ ὅταν ὠρύωνται, καὶ ἄλλην ὅταν τύπτωνται, καὶ διάφορον ἐπὰν σαίνωσιν. καὶ ὅλως εἰ τις εἰς τοῦτο ἀτενίσειεν, εὕροι ἂν πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν τῆς φωνῆς παρὰ τούτῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐν ταῖς διαφόροις περιστάσεσιν, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα εἰκότως λέγοιτ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ μετέχειν λόγου τὰ καλούμενα ἄλογα ζῷα.	And we hear dogs utter one sound when they are warding someone off, another when they howl, another when they are beaten, and a different one when they fawn. In general, anyone who looked closely into this would find great variation in the voice of this and the other animals in different circumstances. So for these reasons it might reasonably be said that the so-called non-rational animals also share in reason expressed in speech.
1.76	εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λείπεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα μήτε τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ λόγῳ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ εἰπεῖν μηδὲ τῷ προφορικῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἀπιστότερα ἡμῶν εἴη κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας.	And if they are inferior to human beings neither in the precision of their senses, nor in internal reason, nor—to say it for good measure—in reason expressed in speech, then they would be no less credible than we are as regards their impressions.
1.77	καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἴσως ἱστάντας τὸν λόγον ταῦτα ἀποδεικνύειν δυνατόν ἐστιν. οἷον γοῦν τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τοὺς ὄρνιθας ἀγχινοίᾳ τε διαφέρειν καὶ τῷ προφορικῷ κεχρῆσθαι λόγῳ; οἵ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ παρόντα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἐπίστανται καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις προδηλοῦσιν, ἄλλως τε σημαίνοντες καὶ τῇ φωνῇ προαγορεύοντες.	Perhaps we could show this by resting the argument on each of the non-rational animals in turn. Who, for instance, would deny that birds excel in shrewdness and use reason expressed in speech? They know not only the present but also the future, and they reveal it in advance to those who can understand them, both through other signs and by announcing it with their voices.
1.78	Τὴν δὲ σύγκρισιν ἐποιησάμην, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεσημηνάμην, ἐκ περιόντος, ἱκανῶς, ὡς οἶμαι, δείξας [ἔμπροσθεν] ὅτι μὴ δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις γινομένων. ἀλλ' εἰ μή ἐστιν ἀπιστότερα τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων παραλλαγήν, ὁποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δυνήσομαι λέγειν,	As I indicated before, I made this comparison for good measure, having already shown sufficiently, I think, [earlier] that we cannot give our own impressions preference over those arising in non-rational animals. But if the non-rational animals are no less credible than we are in judging impressions, and different impressions arise owing to the variation among animals, then I will be able to say

11 The Pythagoreans reportedly imposed a long period of silence on their pupils.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι τῇ φύσει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα ἐπέχειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι.	how each of the underlying things appears to me; but because of what has been said, I will be forced to suspend judgment about how it is in its nature.

THE SECOND MODE: HUMAN BEINGS

Human beings differ in body and soul, so they too receive different impressions from the same things.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.79	Καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος τοιοῦτός ἐστι, δεύτερον δὲ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἵνα γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ τις πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εὑρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσαγομένην. δύο τοίνυν εἶναι λεγομένων ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, κατ' ἄμφω ταῦτα διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, οἷον κατὰ σῶμα ταῖς τε μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἰδιοσυγκρισίαις.	Such, then, is the first mode of suspension. The second, we said, is the one from the differences among human beings. For even if one were to grant, for the sake of argument, that human beings are more credible than non-rational animals, we will find that suspension of judgment is brought in as far as our own differences go. A human being is said to be composed of two things, soul and body, and we differ from one another in both. In body, for example, we differ in our shapes and in our idiosyncrasies.
1.80	διαφέρει μὲν γὰρ κατὰ μορφὴν σῶμα Σκύθου Ἰνδοῦ σώματος, τὴν δὲ παραλλαγὴν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἡ διάφορος τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτεια. παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτειαν διάφοροι γίνονται καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ παρεστήσαμεν. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐν τῇ αἱρέσει καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἐκτὸς διαφορὰ πολλὴ κατ' αὐτούς ἐστιν· ἄλλοις γὰρ χαίρουσιν Ἰνδοὶ καὶ ἄλλοις οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ διαφόροις χαίρειν τοῦ παρηλλαγμένας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίας, λαμβάνειν ἐστὶ μηνυτικόν.	The body of a Scythian differs in shape from the body of an Indian, and the variation is produced, so they say, by a different predominance of humors. And impressions too differ with the different predominance of humors, as we established in the first argument. This, indeed, is why there is a great difference among peoples in what external things they choose and avoid: Indians enjoy some things and people in our part of the world others. And enjoying different things is an indication of receiving varying impressions from the underlying things.
1.81	κατὰ δὲ ἰδιοσυγκρισίας διαφέρομεν ὡς ἐνίους κρέα βόεια πετραίων ἰχθυδίων ῥᾷον πέττειν καὶ ὑπὸ Λεσβίου οἰναρίου εἰς χολέραν περιτρέπεσθαι. ἦν δέ, φασίν, γραῦς Ἀττικὴ τριάκοντα ὁλκὰς κωνείου ἀκινδύνως προσφερομένη, Λῦσις δὲ καὶ μηκωνείου τέσσαρας ὁλκὰς ἀλύπως ἐλάμβανεν.	We differ in idiosyncrasies in that some people digest beef more easily than little rock-fish, and are given a violent stomach upset by a drop of weak Lesbian wine. There was, they say, an old woman in Attica who took thirty drachms of hemlock without danger, and Lysis took four drachms of opium without ill effect.
1.82	καὶ Δημοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοποιὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ γινόμενος ἢ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἐρρίγου, ἐν σκιᾷ δὲ ἐθάλπετο, Ἀθηναγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος ὑπό σκορπίων καὶ φαλαγγίων ἀλύπως ἐπλήσσετο, οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι Ψυλλαεῖς οὐδ' ὑπὸ ὄφεων ἢ ἀσπίδων δακνόμενοι βλάπτονται,	Demophon, Alexander's table-servant, shivered in the sun or in a bath and felt warm in the shade. Athenagoras of Argos could be stung by scorpions and venomous spiders without ill effect. The people called the Psylli are not harmed even when bitten by snakes or asps,[12]
1.83		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οἱ δὲ Τεντυρῖται τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οὐ βλάπτονται πρὸς [ἄνω κάτω] τῶν κροκοδείλων. ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἰθιόπων οἱ ἀντιπέραν τῆς Μερόης παρὰ τὸν Ἀστάπουν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντες σκορπίους καὶ ὄφεις καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀκινδύνως ἐσθίουσιν. καὶ Ῥουφῖνος δὲ ὁ ἐν Χαλκίδι πίνων ἑλλέβορον οὔτε ἤμει οὔτε ὅλως ἐκαθαίρετο, ἀλλ' ὥς τι τῶν συνήθων προσεφέρετο καὶ ἔπεσσεν.	and the Tentyrites in Egypt are not harmed by crocodiles. Again, those Ethiopians who live across from Meroë along the river Astapus eat scorpions, snakes and the like without danger. And Rufinus of Chalcis drank hellebore without vomiting or being purged at all: he took and digested it like something he was used to.[13]
1.84	Χρύσερμος δὲ ὁ Ἡροφίλειος εἴ ποτε πέπερι προσηνέγκατο, καρδιακῶς ἐκινδύνευεν. καὶ Σωτήριχος δὲ ὁ χειρουργὸς εἴ ποτε σιλούρων ἤσθετο κνίσσης, χολέρᾳ ἡλίσκετο. Ἄνδρων δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος οὕτως ἄδιψος ἦν ὡς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὁδεύειν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιζητοῦντα ποτόν. Τιβέριος δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐν σκότῳ ἑώρα. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἱστορεῖ Θάσιόν τινα ᾧ ἐδόκει ἀνθρώπου εἴδωλον προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διὰ παντός.	Chrysermus the Herophilean, whenever he took pepper, was in danger of a heart attack. Soterichus the surgeon was seized with a violent stomach upset whenever he smelled catfish cooking. Andron of Argos was so free from thirst that he even traveled through waterless Libya without needing a drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark. Aristotle tells of a man from Thasos who thought that the image of a man was always walking ahead of him.[14]
1.85	τοσαύτης οὖν παραλλαγῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὰ σώματα, ἵνα ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων ἀρκεσθῶμεν εἰπόντες, εἰκός ἐστι καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· τύπος γάρ τίς ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς καὶ ἡ φυσιογνωμονικὴ σοφία δείκνυσιν. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον δεῖγμα τῆς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου διαφορᾶς ἡ διαφωνία τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς λεγομένων περί τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίνα μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι προσήκει τίνα δὲ ἐκκλίνειν.	Since there is so much variation among human beings in their bodies—to be content with mentioning a few of the many cases recorded by the dogmatists—it is likely that human beings also differ from one another in the soul itself. For the body is a kind of imprint of the soul, as the wisdom of physiognomy shows. But the greatest indication of the great, indeed endless, difference in human intellect is the disagreement in what the dogmatists say, both about other things and about what one should choose and what one should avoid.
1.86	δεόντως οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ περὶ τούτων ἀπεφήναντο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πίνδαρός φησιν ἀελλοπόδων μέν τιν' εὐφραίνουσιν ἵππων τιμαί ⟨τε⟩ καὶ στέφανοι, τοὺς δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοις θαλάμοις βιοτά· τέρπεται δὲ καί τις ἐπ' οἶδμ' ἄλιον ναῒ θοᾷ διαμείβων. ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς λέγει ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία μεστὴ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστί· λέγει γοῦν εἰ πᾶσι ταὐτὸν καλὸν ἔφυ σοφόν θ' ἅμα, οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις, καὶ πάλιν δεινόν γε ταὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν ἀνδάνειν βροτῶν τοῖς δ' ἔχθος εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ	The poets, then, have aptly expressed themselves on these matters. Pindar says: "One man is gladdened by storm-footed horses, their honors ⟨and⟩ crowns; others by a life in chambers rich with gold; and someone delights in crossing the swell of the sea in a swift ship." And the poet says: "Different men delight in different deeds." Tragedy too is full of such remarks. It says, for instance: "If the same thing were fine and wise for everyone by nature, there would be no disputed strife among mankind"; and again: "Strange, that the same thing should please some mortals

12 The Psylli were a North African people famed as snake-charmers immune to snakebite.
13 Hellebore was the standard ancient emetic and purgative.
14 A Herophilean was a follower of Herophilus, the great Alexandrian physician of the third century BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		and be hateful to others." Since, then, choice and avoidance lie in pleasure[15]
1.87	καὶ ἀηδισμῷ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ ἀηδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθήσει κεῖται καὶ φαντασίᾳ, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν αἱρῶνται οἱ δὲ φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινοῦνται, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ᾑροῦντο ἢ ἐξέκλινον. εἰ δὲ τὰ ⟨αὐτὰ⟩ διαφόρως κινεῖ παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰσάγοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐποχή, ὅ τι μὲν ἕκαστον φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὡς πρὸς ἑκάστην διαφορὰν ἴσως λέγειν ἡμῶν δυναμένων, τί δὲ ἔστι [κατὰ δύναμιν] ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε ὄντων ἀποφήνασθαι.	and displeasure, and pleasure and displeasure lie in perception and impression, then when some people choose the very things others avoid, it follows that we should infer that they are not moved alike by the same things either; otherwise they would have chosen or avoided the same things alike. And if ⟨the same⟩ things move people differently owing to the differences among them, suspension of judgment would reasonably be brought in on this ground too. We can perhaps say how each of the underlying things appears relative to each difference, but we cannot declare what it is [potentially] in its nature.
1.88	ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα παραδεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς λέξει ὅτι Πλάτωνι, ὁ Ἐπικούρειος δὲ Ἐπικούρῳ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως ἀνεπικρίτως στασιάζοντες αὖθις ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν περιστήσουσιν.	For we will believe either all human beings or some. If all, we will be attempting the impossible and accepting opposites. If some, let them tell us which ones we should assent to. The Platonist will say Plato, the Epicurean Epicurus, and the rest likewise. And so, by quarreling without any way of deciding between them, they will bring us round once again to suspension of judgment.
1.89	ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι παιδαριῶδές τι προοίσεται, οὐδενὸς δυναμένου πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διαλογίσασθαι τί τοῖς πλείστοις ἀρέσκει, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἔν τισιν ἔθνεσιν, ἃ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν σπάνια τοῖς πλείοσι προσεῖναι τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς συμβαίνοντα σπάνια ὑπάρχειν, ὡς τοὺς πολλοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ φαλαγγίων δακνομένους μὴ ἀλγεῖν, τινὰς δὲ σπανίως ἀλγεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων ἰδιοσυγκρισιῶν τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν ἐποχήν.	Anyone who says we should assent to the majority will be making a childish suggestion. No one can go round all human beings and work out what the majority think. It is possible that among some peoples we know nothing of, things that are rare among us are true of most, while things that happen to most of us are rare there. Most of them, say, feel no pain when bitten by spiders, while a few occasionally do; and analogously with the other idiosyncrasies mentioned earlier. So suspension of judgment is necessarily brought in by the differences among human beings too.
1.90	Ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοί τινες ὄντες οἱ δογματικοί φασι δεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτούς προκρίνειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν ὅτι ἄτοπός ἐστιν ἡ ἀξίωσις αὐτῶν (μέρος γάρ εἰσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτοὺς προκρίνοντες οὕτω κρίνωσι τὰ φαινόμενα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῆς κρίσεως τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζουσιν, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτρέποντες),	The dogmatists, being rather in love with themselves, say that they should be given preference over other human beings in judging things. We know that their claim is absurd. (They are themselves part of the disagreement; and if they give themselves preference and judge appearances on that basis, they take for granted the point under investigation before they have even begun to judge, by entrusting the judgment to themselves.)

15 "The poet" is Homer (*Odyssey* 14.228); the first tragic passage is from Euripides, *Phoenician Women* 499–500, the second from an unidentified play.

THE THIRD MODE: THE SENSES

The senses disagree about the same object, so we cannot say what an apple is in its nature.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.91	ὁμῶς δ’ οὖν ἵνα καὶ ἐπὶ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν λόγον ἱστάντες, οἷον τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὀνειροπολουμένου σοφοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντῶμεν, τὸν τρίτον τῇ τάξει τρόπον προχειριζόμεθα. τοῦτον δ’ ἐλέγομεν τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, πρόδηλον.	Nevertheless, so that we may arrive at suspension of judgment even when we rest the argument on a single human being—for instance, the wise man of their dreams—we take up the mode that is third in order. This, we said, is the one from the differences among the senses. That the senses differ from one another is evident.
1.92	αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἁφῇ. καὶ τὸ μέλι τῇ μὲν γλώττῃ ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἐπί τινων, τοῖς δ’ ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀηδές· ἀδύνατον οὖν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἡδύ ἐστιν εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἀηδές. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύρου ὁμοίως· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὄσφρησιν εὐφραίνει, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ἀηδίζει.	Paintings, at any rate, seem to the eye to have recesses and projections, but not to touch. Honey appears pleasant to the tongue for some people, but unpleasant to the eyes; so it is impossible to say whether it is purely pleasant or unpleasant. Likewise with perfume: it delights the sense of smell but is unpleasant to the taste.
1.93	τό τε εὐφόρβιον ἐπεὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς λυπηρόν ἐστι τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ σώματι παντὶ ἄλυπον, οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν, πότερον ἄλυπόν ἐστιν εἰλικρινῶς τοῖς σώμασιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἢ λυπηρόν. τό τε ὄμβριον ὕδωρ ὀφθαλμοῖς μέν ἐστιν ὠφέλιμον, ἀρτηρίαν δὲ καὶ πνεύμονα τραχύνει, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον, καίτοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρηγοροῦν. καὶ ἡ θαλαττία νάρκη τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τεθεῖσα ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, τῷ δ’ ἄλλῳ σώματι ἀλύπως παρατίθεται. διόπερ ὁποῖον μὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστον τούτων οὐχ ἕξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται ἑκάστοτε δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν.	Again, spurge juice is painful to the eyes but painless to all the rest of the body; so we will not be able to say whether, as far as its own nature goes, it is purely painless to bodies or painful. Rainwater is beneficial to the eyes but roughens the windpipe and lungs—as olive oil does too, although it soothes the skin. And the electric ray, placed on the extremities, makes them numb, but can be placed on the rest of the body without harm. So we will not be able to say what each of these things is like in its nature, but it is possible to say what it appears like on each occasion.
1.94	καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ διατρίβωμεν, διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν [τοῦ τρόπου] τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον. ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτειν δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἄδηλον οὖν πότερόν ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μέν ἐστιν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν.	One could say more than this; but so as not to linger, given the plan [of the mode] of this treatise, this is what needs to be said. Each of the perceptible things that appear to us seems to strike us as many-sided—an apple, for example, as smooth, fragrant, sweet and yellow. So it is non-evident whether it really has only these qualities; or whether it has just one quality but appears different because of the different constitutions of the sense organs; or whether it has more qualities than appear, some of which do not strike us.
1.95	μονόποιον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται λογίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα ἀναδιδομένης τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ εἰς τὰ δένδρα ἀναδιδομένου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ [ἐν] αὐλοῖς καὶ σύριγξι καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ὀργάνοις ⟨ἐμπνεομένου⟩· δύναται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μῆλον μονοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι, διάφορον	That it has just one quality can be inferred from what we said earlier about food being distributed into bodies, about water being distributed into trees, and about breath ⟨blown⟩ into pipes, panpipes and similar instruments. For the apple, too, may be uniform and yet be observed as different

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δὲ θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων περὶ ἃ γίνεται αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀντίληψις.	according to the difference of the sense organs through which it is perceived.
1.96	πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιοτήτων ἔχειν τὸ μῆλον ποιότητας δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. ἐννοήσωμέν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἁφὴν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ ὄσφρησιν καὶ γεῦσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὁρῶντα. οὗτος τοίνυν ὑπολήψεται μήτε ὁρατόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνα ἐκεῖνα τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ποιοτήτων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται.	That the apple may have more qualities than the ones that appear to us we infer as follows. Let us imagine someone who from birth has touch, smell and taste, but can neither hear nor see. He will suppose that there is nothing visible or audible at all, and that only those three kinds of quality exist that he is able to perceive.
1.97	καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιοτήτων, ὧν ἐσμεν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἷόν τέ ἐστι ποιότητας, ὑποπιπτούσας ἑτέροις αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχήκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν.	So it is possible that we too, having only the five senses, perceive only those of the apple's qualities that we are capable of perceiving. Other qualities may exist, striking other sense organs that we have no share in; and that is why we do not perceive the perceptible things that correspond to them either.
1.98	ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ποία φύσις, διαφωνίας τοσαύτης ἀνεπικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὔσης περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ' αὐτήν; ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰ ἔστι φύσις, εἰ μὲν ἰδιώτης εἴη, ἄπιστος ἔσται κατ' αὐτούς, φιλόσοφος δὲ ὢν μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ κρινόμενος αὐτὸς ἀλλ' οὐ κριτής.	"But nature," someone will say, "made the senses commensurate with their objects." What nature? There is so much undecidable disagreement among the dogmatists about whether nature even exists. Whoever is to decide this very question—whether nature exists—will, if he is an ordinary person, be unconvincing by their standards; and if he is a philosopher, he will be part of the disagreement, and himself under judgment rather than a judge.
1.99	πλὴν ἀλλ' ⟨εἰ⟩ ἐνεχώρει καὶ ταύτας μόνας ὑποκεῖσθαι παρὰ τῷ μήλῳ τὰς ποιότητας ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦμεν, καὶ πλείους τούτων, ἢ πάλιν μηδὲ τὰς ἡμῖν ὑποπιπτούσας, ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ μῆλον. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν λόγος. τῶν αἰσθήσεων μέντοι μὴ καταλαμβανουσῶν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια ταῦτα δύναται καταλαμβάνειν, ⟨σφαλλουσῶν αὐτὴν τῶν ὁδηγῶν⟩ ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δόξει.	Now, ⟨if⟩ it is possible that the apple has only the qualities we seem to perceive, or more than these, or again not even those that strike us, then what the apple is like will be non-evident to us. The same argument holds for the other objects of perception. And if the senses do not apprehend external things, neither can the intellect apprehend them, ⟨since its guides lead it astray⟩. So on this argument too, suspension of judgment about external objects will seem to follow.

THE FOURTH MODE: CIRCUMSTANCES

Health, sleep, age, motion, love, hunger, drink and emotion change how things appear.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.100	Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾶς ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἱστάντες τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἔχωμεν καταλήγειν εἰς τὴν ἐποχήν, παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον αὐτῆς. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις. θεωρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτόν φαμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ	So that we may also end up in suspension of judgment when we rest the argument on each single sense, or even set the senses aside altogether, we adopt the fourth mode of suspension as well. This is the one said to depend on circumstances, by "circumstances" meaning conditions. We say it is

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	παρὰ φύσιν ⟨ἔχειν⟩ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν, παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκορεσμένους, παρὰ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι, [ἢ] παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν.	observed in being in a natural or an unnatural ⟨state⟩, in being awake or asleep, in age, in moving or being at rest, in hating or loving, in being in need or sated, in being drunk or sober, in prior conditions, in being confident or afraid, [or] in being distressed or glad.
1.101	οἷον παρὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀνόμοια ὑποπίπτει τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν φρενιτίζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούμενοι δαιμόνων ἀκούειν δοκοῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὔ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀποφορᾶς στύρακος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἤ τινος τοιούτου καὶ ἄλλων πλειόνων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πολλάκις λέγουσιν, ἡμῶν μὴ αἰσθανομένων. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ φλεγμαίνουσι μὲν τόποις ἐπιχυθὲν ζεστὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡμῖν δὲ χλιαρόν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἱμάτιον τοῖς μὲν ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχουσι φαίνεται κιρρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔ. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλι ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται γλυκύ, τοῖς δὲ ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν.	For instance, things strike people as dissimilar according as they are in a natural or an unnatural state. People who are delirious or possessed by a god think they hear spirits, while we do not. Likewise they often say they perceive a waft of storax or frankincense or something of the sort, and many other things, while we perceive nothing. The same water poured on inflamed areas seems to them scalding, but to us lukewarm. The same cloak appears orange to people with bloodshot eyes, but not to me. The same honey appears sweet to me but bitter to people with jaundice.
1.102	εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι χυμῶν τινων παραπλοκὴ ἀνοικείους φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ποιεῖ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες χυμοὺς ἔχουσιν ἀνακεκραμένους, δύνανται οὗτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα τῇ φύσει ὁποῖα φαίνεται τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν λεγομένοις, ἑτεροῖα φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν.	Someone may say that it is an intermixture of certain humors that produces unsuitable impressions from the underlying things in people who are in an unnatural state. We must reply that healthy people too have humors mixed in them; so these humors could be making external objects—which in their nature are such as they appear to those said to be in an unnatural state—appear otherwise to the healthy.
1.103	τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν τοῖς χυμοῖς μεταβλητικὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων διδόναι δύναμιν, τούτοις δὲ μή, πλασματικόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες κατὰ φύσιν μὲν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαινόντων ἔχουσι, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσούντων, οὕτω καὶ οἱ νοσοῦντες παρὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσούντων, ὥστε κἀκείνοις πρός τι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι πιστευτέον.	To grant those humors the power to alter the underlying things, but not these, is a fabrication. For just as the healthy are in a state natural to the healthy but unnatural to the sick, so too the sick are in a state unnatural to the healthy but natural to the sick. So the sick too should be believed, since they too are in a natural state—relative to something.
1.104	παρὰ δὲ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι, ἐπεὶ ὡς καθ' ὕπνους φανταζόμεθα, οὐ φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, οὐδὲ ὡς φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φανταζόμεθα, ὥστε εἶναι αὐταῖς ἢ μὴ εἶναι γίνεται οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὕπνους ἢ πρὸς ἐγρήγορσιν. εἰκότως οὖν καθ' ὕπνους ὁρῶμεν ταῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀνύπαρκτα ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι, οὐ[κ ἐν τῷ] καθάπαξ ἀνύπαρκτα ὄντα· ἔστι γὰρ καθ' ὕπνους, ὥσπερ τὰ ὕπαρ ἔστιν κἂν μὴ ᾖ καθ' ὕπνους.	Different impressions arise according as we are asleep or awake. The way we have impressions in sleep is not the way we have them awake, and the way we have them awake is not the way we have them in sleep. So their existence or non-existence is not absolute but relative—relative to sleeping or to waking. It is reasonable, then, that in sleep we see things which do not exist in the waking state, though they are not absolutely non-existent: they exist in sleep, just as the things of waking life exist even though they do not exist in sleep.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.105	παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἡλικίας, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀὴρ τοῖς μὲν γέρουσι ψυχρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν εὔκρατος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσι κατακορές, καὶ φωνὴ ὁμοίως ἡ αὐτὴ τοῖς μὲν ἀμαυρὰ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν τοῖς δ' ἐξάκουστος.	According to age: the same air seems cold to the old but mild to those in their prime; the same color appears faint to older people but vivid to those in their prime; and likewise the same sound seems faint to some but clearly audible to others.
1.106	καὶ παρὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς ἀνομοίως κινοῦνται οἱ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέροντες· παισὶ μὲν γάρ, εἰ τύχοι, σφαῖραι καὶ τροχοὶ διὰ σπουδῆς εἰσιν, οἱ ἀκμάζοντες δὲ ἄλλα αἱροῦνται, καὶ ἄλλα οἱ γέροντες. ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται ὅτι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἡλικίας.	People who differ in age are also moved dissimilarly in what they choose and avoid. Children, for instance, take balls and hoops very seriously; people in their prime choose other things, and the old still others. From this we conclude that the same underlying things produce different impressions according to differences of age too.
1.107	παρὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρεμεῖν ἀνόμοια φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ ἅπερ ἑστῶτες ὁρῶμεν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ταῦτα παραπλέοντες κινεῖσθαι δοκοῦμεν.	Things appear dissimilar according as we are moving or at rest. Things we see as motionless when we are standing still seem to be moving when we sail past them.
1.108	παρὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν, ὅτι κρέα ὕεια τινὲς μὲν ἀποστρέφονται καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τινὲς δὲ ἥδιστα προσφέρονται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Μένανδρος ἔφη οἷος δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι φαίνεται; ἀφ' οὗ τοιοῦτος γέγονεν; οἷον θηρίον. τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ καλοὺς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ. πολλοὶ ⟨δὲ⟩ καὶ ἐρωμένας αἰσχρὰς ἔχοντες ὡραιοτάτας αὐτὰς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.	According to loving or hating: some people are utterly revolted by pork, while others eat it with the greatest pleasure. That is why Menander said: "And what does he look like, even in his face, since he became like this? Like a wild beast! Doing no wrong makes us beautiful as well." And many men whose beloveds are ugly think them extremely beautiful.
1.109	παρὰ δὲ τὸ πεινῆν ἢ κεκορέσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδεσμα τοῖς μὲν πεινῶσιν ἥδιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ κεκορεσμένοις ἀηδές. παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, ὅτι ἅπερ νήφοντες αἰσχρὰ εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ταῦτα ἡμῖν μεθύουσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται.	According to being hungry or sated: the same dish seems very pleasant to the hungry but unpleasant to the sated. According to being drunk or sober: things we think shameful when sober don't appear shameful to us when we're drunk.
1.110	παρὰ δὲ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοῖς μὲν φοίνικας ἢ ἰσχάδας προφαγοῦσιν ὀξώδης φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ κάρυα ἢ ἐρεβίνθους προσενεγκαμένοις ἡδὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαλανείου παραστὰς τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσιόντας θερμαίνει, ψύχει δὲ τοὺς ἐξιόντας, εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοιεν.	According to prior conditions: the same wine appears sour to people who have just eaten dates or dried figs, but seems sweet to people who have had nuts or chickpeas. And the vestibule of the bathhouse warms those coming in from outside but chills those going out, if they linger in it.
1.111	παρὰ δὲ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ μὲν δειλῷ φοβερὸν καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τῷ θαρραλεωτέρῳ δὲ οὐδαμῶς. παρὰ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα τοῖς μὲν λυπουμένοις ἐστὶν ἐπαχθῆ τοῖς δὲ χαίρουσιν ἡδέα.	According to being afraid or confident: the same thing seems fearful and terrible to the coward, but not at all to someone bolder. According to being distressed or glad: the same things are burdensome to the distressed but pleasant to the glad.
1.112	Τοσαύτης οὖν οὔσης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαθέσεις, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων γινομένων, ὁποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστιν οὐκέτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ	There is this much variation depending on conditions, and people are in different conditions at different times. So it is perhaps easy to say what each underlying object appears like to each person, but

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπικρίνων ταύτην ἤτοι ἔν τισι τῶν προειρημένων διαθέσεων ἐστιν ἢ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ· τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶ διαθέσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ὅτι ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ διαθέσει τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν, οἷον οὔτε ὑγιαίνει οὔτε νοσεῖ, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε ἠρεμεῖ, οὔτε ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ ἐστίν, ἀπήλλακται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, τελέως ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ δὲ ἔν τινι διαθέσει ὢν κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας,	not what it is like, since the variation is also undecidable. For whoever decides it is either in some of the conditions just mentioned or in no condition at all. Now, to say that he is in no condition whatsoever—that he is neither healthy nor ill, neither moving nor at rest, of no particular age, and free of the other conditions as well—is utterly absurd. But if he judges the impressions while he is in some condition, he will be a party to the disagreement,
1.113	καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἰλικρινὴς τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἔσται κριτὴς διὰ τὸ τεθολῶσθαι ταῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐν αἷς ἔστιν· οὔτε οὖν ὁ ἐγρηγορὼς δύναται συγκρίνειν τὰς τῶν καθευδόντων φαντασίας ταῖς τῶν ἐγρηγορότων, οὔτε ὁ ὑγιαίνων τὰς τῶν νοσούντων ταῖς τῶν ὑγιαινόντων· τοῖς γὰρ παροῦσι καὶ κινοῦσιν ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὸ παρὸν συγκατατιθέμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ παροῦσιν.	and besides, he will not be an impartial judge of external objects, because he is muddied by the conditions he is in. So the waking person cannot compare the impressions of sleepers with those of people awake, nor the healthy person the impressions of the sick with those of the healthy. For we assent to what is present and affecting us at present rather than to what is not present.
1.114	καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ προκρίνων φαντασίαν φαντασίας καὶ περίστασιν περιστάσεως ἤτοι ἀκρίτως καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἢ κρίνων καὶ ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἄνευ τούτων (ἄπιστος γὰρ ἔσται), οὔτε σὺν τούτοις. εἰ γὰρ κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, πάντως κριτηρίῳ κρινεῖ.	The variation in such impressions is undecidable for another reason too. Whoever prefers one impression to another, and one circumstance to another, does so either without judging and without proof, or by judging and proving. But he can do it neither without these (for then he will not be credible) nor with them. For if he judges the impressions, he will certainly judge them by a criterion.
1.115	τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέξει ἢ ψευδές. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ψευδές, ἄπιστος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο φήσει, ἤτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως λέξει ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, πάντως δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἄπιστος ἔσται. ἀληθῆ οὖν λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν εἰς πίστωσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου λαμβανομένην πότερον κεκρικὼς αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ κεκρικώς;	Now he will say that this criterion is either true or false. If false, he will not be credible. If he says it is true, he will say that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without proof, he will not be credible. If with proof, the proof too will certainly have to be true, or else he will not be credible. So when he says that the proof he has adopted to confirm the criterion is true, will he have judged it or not?
1.116	εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ κρίνας, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κρίνας, δῆλον ὅτι κριτηρίῳ φήσει κεκρικέναι, οὗ κριτηρίου ζητήσομεν ἀπόδειξιν, κἀκείνης κριτήριον. χρῄζει γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις κριτηρίου, ἵνα βεβαιωθῇ, καὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως, ἵνα ἀληθὲς εἶναι δειχθῇ· καὶ οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ὑγιὴς εἶναι δύναται μὴ προϋπάρχοντος κριτηρίου ἀληθοῦς, οὔτε κριτήριον ἀληθὲς μὴ προπεπιστωμένης τῆς ἀποδείξεως.	If he has not judged it, he will not be credible. If he has, he will obviously say that he judged it by a criterion—and for that criterion we will ask for a proof, and for that proof a criterion. For a proof always needs a criterion in order to be confirmed, and a criterion always needs a proof in order to be shown true. A proof cannot be sound unless a true criterion is already there, and a criterion cannot be true unless the proof has already been confirmed.
1.117		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ οὕτως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τό τε κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμφότερα εὑρίσκεται ἄπιστα· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τὴν θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον ὁμοίως τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστιν ἄπιστον. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ⟨καὶ κριτηρίου⟩ μήτε σὺν τούτοις δύναταί τις προκρῖναι φαντασίαν φαντασίας, ἀνεπίκριτοι ἔσονται αἱ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους διαθέσεις διάφοροι γινόμεναι φαντασίαι, ὥστε εἰσάγεται ἡ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.	And so the criterion and the proof fall into the mode of reciprocity, in which both are found to lack credibility: each waits on the other for its credibility, and so is just as uncredible as the other. If, then, no one can prefer one impression to another either without proof ⟨and criterion⟩ or with them, the different impressions that arise from different conditions will be undecidable. So, as far as this mode goes too, suspension of judgment about the nature of external objects is brought in.[16]

THE FIFTH MODE: POSITIONS, DISTANCES, PLACES

A colonnade, a tower and an oar in water look different depending on where they are seen from.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.118	Πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ αὐτὴ στοὰ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς ὁρωμένη μείουρος φαίνεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πλοῖον πόρρωθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἑστὼς, ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινούμενον, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος.	The fifth argument is the one depending on positions, distances and places. For depending on each of these, the same things appear different. The same colonnade, for example, seen from one end, appears to taper, but seen from the middle it appears symmetrical on all sides. The same ship appears small and stationary from far off, but large and moving close up. And the same tower appears round from far off but square close up.
1.119	ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ δὲ τοὺς τόπους ὅτι τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν σκότῳ δὲ λαμπρόν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἔναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη ἔξαλος δὲ εὐθεῖα, καὶ τὸ ᾠὸν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὄρνιθι ἁπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ λυγγούριον ἐν μὲν λυγγὶ ὑγρὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ κοράλιον ἐν θαλάττῃ μὲν ἁπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν σύριγγι γινομένη, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν αὐλῷ, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν ἀέρι ἁπλῶς.	These depend on distances. Depending on places: lamplight appears dim in the sunlight but bright in the dark; the same oar appears bent in the water but straight out of it; an egg is soft inside the bird but hard in the air; lyngurium is liquid inside the lynx but hard in the air; coral is soft in the sea but hard in the air; and a sound appears one way when it is made in a panpipe, another in a reed pipe, and another simply in the air.[17]
1.120	παρὰ δὲ τὰς θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπτιαζομένη μὲν λεία φαίνεται, ποσῶς δὲ ἐπινευομένη εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρῶμα.	Depending on positions: the same painting appears smooth when tilted back, but tilted forward to a certain degree it seems to have recesses and projections. And the necks of doves appear different in color depending on the different angles at which they are turned.
1.121	ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἔν τινι θεωρεῖται καὶ ἀπό τινος διαστήματος καὶ κατά τινα θέσιν, ὧν ἕκαστον πολλὴν ποιεῖ παραλλαγὴν περὶ τὰς φαντασίας, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, ἀναγκασθησόμεθα καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ	Since, then, everything that appears is observed in some place, from some distance and in some position, and each of these produces great variation in the impressions, as we have pointed out, we will

16 The mode of reciprocity is circular reasoning: A is established by B, and B in turn by A. It returns as the fifth of the Five Modes (1.169).

17 Lyngurium ("lynx-stone") was believed to be the lynx's urine, which hardened into a gem on contact with the air.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τρόπου καταντᾶν εἰς ἐποχήν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ βουλόμενος τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν προκρίνειν τινὰς ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσει.	be forced by this mode too to arrive at suspension of judgment. For anyone who wants to prefer some of these impressions to others will be attempting the impossible.
1.122	εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ποιήσεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται χρήσασθαι, εἰ μὲν ψευδῆ λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἑαυτὸν περιτρέψει, ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγων εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι, κἀκείνης ἄλλην, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστιν ἀπείρους ἀποδείξεις παραστῆσαι·	If he makes his pronouncement simply and without proof, he will not be credible. If he wants to use a proof, then if he says the proof is false, he will refute himself; and if he says the proof is true, he will be asked for a proof that it is true, and for another proof of that one (since it too must be true), and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to produce infinitely many proofs;
1.123	οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνήσεται προκρίνειν φαντασίαν φαντασίας. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸς ἔσται τις ἐπικρίνειν τὰς προειρημένας φαντασίας, συνάγεται ἡ ἐποχή, ὁποῖον μὲν φαίνεται ἕκαστον κατὰ τήνδε τὴν θέσιν ἢ κατὰ τόδε τὸ διάστημα ἢ ἐν τῷδε εἰπεῖν ἴσως δυναμένων ἡμῶν, ὁποῖον δέ ἐστιν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀδυνατούντων ἀποφαίνεσθαι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.	so he will not be able to prefer one impression to another with a proof either. And if no one can decide between the impressions just mentioned either without proof or with proof, suspension of judgment follows. We can perhaps say what each thing appears like in this position, or at this distance, or in this place; but for the reasons given we cannot declare what it is like in its nature.

THE SIXTH MODE: ADMIXTURES

Nothing reaches us pure, but always mixed with air, water, or the fluids of our own organs.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.124	Ἕκτος ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιγάς, καθ' ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ σύν τινι, ὁποῖον μέν ἐστι τὸ μῖγμα ἔκ τε τοῦ ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ ᾧ συνθεωρεῖται τάχα δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον εἰλικρινῶς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν λέγειν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐκτὸς καθ' αὑτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ πάντως σύν τινι, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοῖον θεωρεῖται, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι.	The sixth mode is the one depending on admixtures. By it we conclude that, since none of the underlying objects strikes us by itself but always together with something, we can perhaps say what the mixture of the external object and the thing it is observed together with is like, but we could not say what the external object is like in its pure state. That none of the external objects strikes us by itself, but always together with something, and that it is observed as different because of this, is evident, I think.
1.125	τὸ γοῦν ἡμέτερον χρῶμα ἀλλοῖον μὲν ὁρᾶται ἐν ἀλεεινῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ἐν [τῷ] ψυχρῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν ὁποῖον ἔστι τῇ φύσει τὸ χρῶμα ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὁποῖον σὺν ἑκάστῳ τούτων θεωρεῖται. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται σὺν λεπτῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλοία δὲ σὺν παχυμερεῖ, καὶ τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν βαλανείῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ πληκτικώτερα μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ἀέρι καταψύχρῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ὕδατος μὲν περιεχόμενον κοῦφόν ἐστιν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀέρος βαρύ.	Our complexion, at any rate, is seen as one color in warm air and another in cold, and we could not say what our complexion is like by nature, only what it is like as observed together with each of these. The same sound appears one way in thin air and another in dense air. Perfumes are more pungent in the bathhouse and in the sun than in chilly air. And a body surrounded by water is light, but surrounded by air it is heavy.
1.126	ἵνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιξίας ἀποστῶμεν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ὑγρά. τὰ οὖν	To set aside admixture from outside as well: our eyes contain within themselves both membranes

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὁρατὰ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἄνευ τούτων θεωρεῖται, οὐ καταληφθήσεται πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· τοῦ γὰρ μίγματος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἰκτερικοὶ πάντα ὠχρὰ ὁρῶσιν, οἱ δ' ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες ὕφαιμα. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ ἑλικοειδέσι, καὶ ἀλλοία μὲν ἐν καθαρῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν τεθολωμένῳ, εἰκός ἐστι μὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς εἰλικρινῶς τῆς φωνῆς· τὰ γὰρ ὦτα σκολιόπορά ἐστι καὶ στενόπορα καὶ ἀτμώδεσιν ἀποφορήσεσιν, αἳ δὴ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν φέρεσθαι λέγονται τόπων, τεθολωμένα.	and fluids. So, since visible things are not observed without these, they will not be apprehended accurately; for what we perceive is the mixture. That is why people with jaundice see everything yellow, and those with bloodshot eyes see everything reddish. And since the same sound appears one way in open places and another in narrow, winding ones, one way in clear air and another in murky air, it is likely that we do not perceive sound in its pure state either. For the ears have winding, narrow passages, and they are muddied by vaporous effluvia, which are said to be carried up from the regions around the head.
1.127	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυξωτῆρσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς γεύσεως τόποις ὑλῶν ὑποκειμένων, μετ' ἐκείνων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν γευστῶν καὶ τῶν ὀσφρητῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰλικρινῶς. ὥστε διὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνονται ὁποῖα πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενά ἐστιν.	Again, since there are substances present in the nostrils and in the organs of taste, we perceive tastes and smells together with them, and not in a pure state. So, because of admixtures, the senses do not perceive what external objects are accurately like.
1.128	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια, μάλιστα μὲν ἐπεὶ αἱ ὁδηγοὶ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεις σφάλλονται· ἴσως δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἐπιμιξίαν τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀναγγελλόμενα· περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, χυμούς τινας ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὁτιδήποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζῴου τοῦτο τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον ὁρῶμεν, ὅτι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα.	Nor does the intellect—chiefly because the senses, which are its guides, go wrong; but perhaps it too adds some admixture of its own to what the senses report. For in each of the places where the dogmatists think the ruling part is located, we observe certain humors present—whether one wants to place it in the brain, or in the heart, or in any other part of the animal whatever. So by this mode too we see that, having nothing to say about the nature of external objects, we are forced to suspend judgment.[18]

THE SEVENTH MODE: QUANTITIES AND PREPARATIONS

Goat's horn, sand, wine and drugs have different effects depending on amount and composition.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.129	Ἕβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες κοινῶς τὰς συνθέσεις. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, δῆλον. οἷον γοῦν τὰ ξέσματα τοῦ κέρατος τῆς αἰγὸς φαίνεται μὲν λευκὰ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ συνθέσεως θεωρούμενα, συντιθέμενα δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κέρατος ὑπάρξει μέλανα θεωρεῖται. καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου [τὰ μέρη] τὰ ῥινήματα κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν ὄντα μέλανα φαίνεται, σὺν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς λευκὰ ὑποπίπτει.	The seventh mode, we said, is the one depending on the quantities and preparations of underlying objects—by "preparations" we mean compositions in general. That by this mode too we are forced to suspend judgment about the nature of things is clear. Shavings of goat's horn, for example, appear white when observed simply, without being put together; but put together in the actual horn they are seen as black. And silver filings appear black

18 The "ruling part" (*hēgemonikon*) is the Stoic term for the soul's command center, which some placed in the heart and others in the brain.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		on their own, but together with the whole mass they strike us as white.
1.130	καὶ τῆς Ταιναρείας λίθου τὰ μὲν μέρη λευκὰ ὁρᾶται ὅταν λεανθῇ, σὺν δὲ τῇ ὁλοσχερεῖ ξανθὰ φαίνεται. καὶ αἱ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐσκεδασμέναι ψάμμοι τραχεῖαι φαίνονται, ὡς σωρὸς δὲ συντεθεῖσαι ἁπαλῶς κινοῦσι τὴν αἴσθησιν. καὶ ὁ ἐλλέβορος λεπτὸς μὲν καὶ χνοώδης προσφερόμενος πνιγμὸν ἐπιφέρει, κριμνώδης δὲ ὢν οὐκέτι.	Pieces of Taenarian marble look white when they are polished, but together with the whole block they appear yellow. Grains of sand scattered apart appear rough, but put together in a heap they affect our senses softly. And hellebore taken fine and powdery causes choking, but not when it is coarse-ground.
1.131	καὶ ὁ οἶνος σύμμετρος μὲν πινόμενος ῥώννυσιν ἡμᾶς, πλείων δὲ λαμβανόμενος παραλύει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ τροφὴ παραπλησίως παρὰ τὴν ποσότητα διάφορον ἐπιδείκνυται δύναμιν· πολλάκις γοῦν διὰ τὸ πολλὴ προσενεχθῆναι καθαίρει τὸ σῶμα διά τε ἀπεψιῶν καὶ χολερικῶν παθῶν.	Wine drunk in moderation strengthens us, but taken in larger quantity it enfeebles the body. Food likewise shows different effects depending on quantity: often, at any rate, when too much is eaten it purges the body through indigestion and bilious attacks.
1.132	ἔξομεν οὖν κἀνταῦθα λέγειν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τοῦ κέρατος τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ ὁποῖον τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λεπτομερῶν συγκείμενον, καὶ ὁποῖος μέν ἐστιν ὁ μικρομερὴς ἄργυρος ὁποῖος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκείμενος, καὶ ὁποία μὲν ἡ ἀκαριαία Ταιναρεία λίθος ὁποία δὲ ἡ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρῶν συγκειμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψάμμων καὶ τοῦ ἐλλεβόρου καὶ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ πρός τι, τὴν μέντοι φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλίαν.	Here too, then, we will be able to say what a fine shaving of horn is like and what a horn composed of many fine shavings is like; what silver in small particles is like and what silver composed of many is like; what a tiny piece of Taenarian marble is like and what the stone composed of many small pieces is like; and, in the case of sand, hellebore, wine and food, what they are like relatively. But we will not be able to say what the nature of things is in itself, because of the variation among impressions that depends on compositions.
1.133	καθόλου γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα λυπηρὰ γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν κατὰ ποσότητα ἄμετρον αὐτῶν χρῆσιν, καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἐν τῷ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν παραλαμβάνεσθαι ἀκαριαῖα μὴ λυπεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἰατρικὰς δυνάμεις θεωρούμενον, ἐν αἷς ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν μῖξις τῶν ἁπλῶν φαρμάκων ὠφέλιμον ποιεῖ τὸ συντεθέν, ῥοπῆς δὲ βραχυτάτης ἐνίοτε παροραθείσης οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερώτατον καὶ δηλητήριον πολλάκις.	In general, it seems, even beneficial things become harmful when they are used in immoderate quantities, and things that seem harmful do no harm when taken in extremely small amounts. The strongest evidence for this argument is what we observe in the effects of medicines. There, an exact mixture of the simple drugs makes the compound beneficial; but sometimes, when the slightest weight is overlooked, it is not only not beneficial but extremely harmful, and often poisonous.
1.134	οὕτως ὁ κατὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας λόγος συγχεῖ τὴν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ὕπαρξιν. διόπερ εἰκότως ἂν καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς περιάγοι μὴ δυναμένους εἰλικρινῶς ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.	So the argument from quantities and preparations throws the reality of external objects into confusion. That is why this mode too would reasonably bring us round to suspension of judgment, since we cannot make any pure pronouncement about the nature of external objects.

THE EIGHTH MODE: RELATIVITY

Everything appears relative to the judge and to what accompanies it, so we suspend judgment on its nature.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.135	ὄγδοος ἐστι τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι, καθ' ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, περὶ τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν ἀπολύτως καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρὴ γινώσκειν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τῷ 'ἔστι' καταχρώμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ 'φαίνεται', δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες 'πρός τι πάντα φαίνεται.' τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἅπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον (τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ κρινόμενον πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον φαίνεται), καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὡς τὸ δεξιὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν.	The eighth mode is the one from relativity, by which we conclude that, since everything is relative, we will suspend judgment about what things are absolutely and in their nature. But we must realize that here, as elsewhere, we use "is" loosely in place of "appears," saying in effect "everything appears relative." This is said in two ways: first, relative to what judges (for the external object being judged appears relative to what judges it); and second, relative to the things observed along with it, as right is relative to left.
1.136	ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρῖνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῷον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ πρὸς τοιάνδε περίστασιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὅτι πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ποσότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται.	That everything is relative we have already reasoned earlier: with respect to what judges, in that each thing appears relative to this animal, this human being and this sense, and relative to this kind of circumstance; and with respect to the things observed along with it, in that each thing appears relative to this admixture, this manner, this composition and quantity, and this position.
1.137	καὶ ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· πότερον διαφέρει τῶν πρός τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὔ; εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει, καὶ αὐτὰ πρός τι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ διαφέρον πρός τι ἐστίν (λέγεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὗ διαφέρει), πρός τι ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφοράν.	It is also possible to conclude in a separate way that everything is relative, as follows. Do things that are "by difference" differ from relatives or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative. If they do differ, then, since everything that differs is relative (for it is spoken of relative to what it differs from), things that are by difference are relative.[19]
1.138	τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀνωτάτω γένη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ' ἔσχατα εἴδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἴδη· πάντα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι πρός τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρός τι. ἔτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν, καὶ σημαίνοντα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαινόμενα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φαινομένων τὰ ἄδηλα· ὄψις γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα. τὸ δὲ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ σημαινόμενόν ἐστι πρός τι· πρός τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα.	Again, of the things that exist, according to the dogmatists, some are highest genera, some lowest species, and some both genera and species; but all of these are relative; therefore everything is relative. Further, of the things that exist some are evident and some non-evident, as they themselves say; the things that appear are signifiers, and the non-evident things are signified by the things that appear—for according to them the things that appear are a glimpse of the non-evident. But signifier and signified are relative; therefore everything is relative.
1.139	πρὸς τούτοις τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ὅμοια τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἄνισα· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι πρός τι· πάντα	In addition, of the things that exist some are similar and some dissimilar, some equal and some un-

19 Things "by difference" is a technical term for things with an intrinsic, non-relational character, as opposed to relatives.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἄρα ἐστὶ πρός τι. καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρός τι βεβαιοῖ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρός τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρός τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δείκνυσι, καὶ οὐ καθόλου, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν ἐναντιοῦται.	equal; but these are relative; therefore everything is relative. And whoever says that not everything is relative confirms that everything is relative. For by the very arguments with which he opposes us, he shows that "everything is relative" is itself relative to us, and not universal.
1.140	πλὴν ἀλλ' οὕτω παριστάντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, δῆλόν ἐστι λοιπόν, ὅτι ὁποῖον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν καὶ εἰλικρινῶς λέγειν οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὁποῖον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ πρός τι. ⟨ᾧ⟩ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.	At any rate, once we have established in this way that everything is relative, it is clear from then on that we will not be able to say what each of the underlying objects is like in its own nature and in its pure state, but only what it appears like in relation to something. ⟨From this⟩ it follows that we must suspend judgment about the nature of things.

THE NINTH MODE: CONSTANT OR RARE ENCOUNTERS

A comet astonishes and the sun does not, only because one is rare and the other constant.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.141	Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις τρόπου, ὃν ἔννατον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τῇ τάξει, τοιαῦτά τινα διέξιμεν. ὁ ἥλιος πολλῷ δήπου ἐκπληκτικώτερός ἐστιν ἀστέρος κομήτου· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον συνεχῶς ὁρῶμεν, τὸν δὲ κομήτην ἀστέρα σπανίως, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ἀστέρι ἐκπλησσόμεθα ὥστε καὶ διοσημείαν αὐτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ οὐδαμῶς. ἐὰν μέντοι γε ἐννοήσωμεν τὸν ἥλιον σπανίως μὲν φαινόμενον, σπανίως δὲ δυόμενον, καὶ πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως φωτίζοντα, πάντα δὲ ἐξαίφνης ἐπισκιάζεσθαι ποιοῦντα, πολλὴν ἔκπληξιν ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωρήσομεν.	About the mode depending on constant or rare encounters, which we said was ninth in order, we set out something like the following. The sun is surely far more astonishing than a comet. But since we see the sun constantly and a comet rarely, we are so astonished at the comet that we even take it for a divine portent, while we are not astonished at the sun at all. Yet if we imagine the sun appearing rarely and setting rarely, lighting up everything all at once and suddenly plunging everything into shadow, we will see much to be astonished at in the matter.
1.142	καὶ ὁ σεισμὸς δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θορυβεῖ τούς τε πρῶτον αὐτοῦ πειρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἔθει τούτου γεγενημένους. πόσην δὲ ἔκπληξιν ἀνθρώπῳ φέρει θάλασσα πρῶτον ὀφθεῖσα. ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλος σώματος ἀνθρωπίνου πρῶτον καὶ ἐξαίφνης θεωρούμενον συγκινεῖ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ ἐν ἔθει τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι γένοιτο. καὶ τὰ μὲν σπάνια τίμια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ σύντροφα ἡμῖν καὶ εὔπορα οὐδαμῶς.	An earthquake, too, does not alarm those who experience it for the first time and those who have grown used to it in the same way. How astonished a person is by the sea when seeing it for the first time! Again, the beauty of a human body, seen suddenly and for the first time, moves us more than if seeing it became a habit. And rare things seem precious, while things that are familiar to us and easy to come by do not seem so at all.
1.143	ἐὰν γοῦν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ ὕδωρ σπανίζον, πόσῳ ἂν τῶν τιμίων εἶναι δοκούντων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερον ἡμῖν φανείη. ἢ ἐὰν ἐνθυμηθῶμεν τὸν χρυσὸν ἁπλῶς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐρριμμένον πολὺν παραπλησίως τοῖς λίθοις, τίνι δόξομεν ἔσεσθαι τοῦτον τίμιον ἢ κατάκλειστον οὕτως;	At any rate, if we imagine water being scarce, how much more precious it would appear to us than everything that seems precious! Or if we picture gold simply strewn about on the ground in large amounts, like stones, to whom do we think it will be precious, or worth locking up as it is now?
1.144	ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους περιπτώσεις ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκπληκτικὰ ἢ τίμια, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ	Since, then, the same things seem at one time astonishing or precious and at another time not, de-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τοιαῦτα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι ὁποῖον μὲν φαίνεται τούτων ἕκαστον μετὰ συνεχοῦς περιπτώσεως ἢ σπανίας ἴσως δυνησόμεθα λέγειν, ψιλῶς δὲ ὁποῖον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐκ ἐσμὲν δυνατοὶ φάσκειν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπέχομεν.	pending on whether they are encountered constantly or rarely, we conclude that we will perhaps be able to say what each of these appears like when encountered constantly or rarely, but we cannot state what each external object is like in itself. So by this mode too we suspend judgment about them.

THE TENTH MODE: CUSTOMS AND LAWS

Ways of life, customs, laws, myths and dogmatic beliefs conflict from people to people.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.145	Δέκατός ἐστι τρόπος, ὃς καὶ μάλιστα συνέχει πρὸς τὰ ἠθικά, ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. ἀγωγὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν αἵρεσις βίου ἤ τινος πράγματος περὶ ἕνα ἢ πολλοὺς γινομένη, οἷον περὶ Διογένην ἢ τοὺς Λάκωνας·	The tenth mode, which bears most of all on ethics, is the one depending on ways of life, customs, laws, beliefs in myth and dogmatic suppositions. A way of life is a choice of a life, or of some course of conduct, adopted by one person or by many—for example, by Diogenes or by the Spartans.[20]
1.146	νόμος δέ ἐστιν ἔγγραφος συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται, ἔθος δὲ ἢ συνήθεια (οὐ διαφέρει γάρ) πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κοινὴ πράγματός τινος παραδοχή, ἣν ὁ παραβὰς οὐ πάντως κολάζεται, οἷον νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ μοιχεύειν, ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.	A law is a written contract among citizens, and whoever transgresses it is punished. A custom or habit (there is no difference) is the common acceptance of some practice by many people, and whoever transgresses it is not necessarily punished. For example, it is a law not to commit adultery, and a custom among us not to have sex with a woman in public.
1.147	μυθικὴ δὲ πίστις ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων τε καὶ πεπλασμένων παραδοχή, οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλα τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ Κρόνου μυθευόμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλοὺς εἰς πίστιν ἄγει. δογματικὴ δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παραδοχὴ πράγματος δι' ἀναλογισμοῦ ἤ τινος ἀποδείξεως κρατύνεσθαι δοκοῦσα, οἷον ὅτι ἄτομα ἔστι τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ ⟨ἢ⟩ ἐλάχιστα ἤ τινα ἄλλα.	A mythical belief is the acceptance of things that never happened and were made up, such as, among others, the stories told about Cronus; for these lead many people to believe them. A dogmatic supposition is the acceptance of something that seems to be established by reasoning by analogy or by some proof—for example, that the elements of existing things are atoms, or homoeomeries, ⟨or⟩ minimal parts, or something else.[21]
1.148	ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ὁτὲ μὲν ἑαυτῷ, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστῳ. οἷον ἔθος μὲν ἔθει οὕτως· τινὲς τῶν Αἰθιόπων στίζουσι τὰ βρέφη, ἡμεῖς δ' οὔ· καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ποδήρει χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπρεπές· καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἰνδοὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶ δημοσίᾳ μίγνυνται, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι ἡγοῦνται.	We oppose each of these sometimes to itself and sometimes to each of the others. Custom to custom, for example, like this: some Ethiopians tattoo their babies, while we do not; the Persians think it seemly to wear brightly dyed, ankle-length clothing, while we think it unseemly; and the Indians have sex with their women in public, while most other peoples consider this shameful.

20 Diogenes of Sinope (fourth century BC), the founding figure of the Cynics, was famous for living in poverty and flouting convention.

21 Atoms were the elements of Democritus and Epicurus; "homoeomeries" (stuffs whose every part is like the whole) those of Anaxagoras; "minimal parts" those of Diodorus Cronus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.149	νόμον δὲ νόμῳ οὕτως ἀντιτίθεμεν· παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὁ τῆς πατρῴας ἀποστὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς χρέα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις πάντως ἀποδίδωσιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν Ταύροις τῆς Σκυθίας νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καλλιερεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ἀπείρηται πρὸς ἱερῷ φονεύεσθαι.	Law to law, like this: among the Romans, a man who renounces his father's estate does not pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians he pays them in any case; and among the Tauri in Scythia it was the law that strangers be sacrificed to Artemis, while among us it is forbidden for a human being to be killed at a sacred place.[22]
1.150	ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀγωγῇ, ὅταν τὴν Διογένους ἀγωγὴν ἀντιτιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν πίστει μυθικῇ, ὅταν ὅπου μὲν ⟨λέγωμεν⟩ τὸν Δία μυθεύεσθαι πατέρα ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, ὅπου δὲ τὸν Ὠκεανόν, λέγοντες Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν. δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν,	Way of life to way of life, when we oppose the way of life of Diogenes to that of Aristippus, or that of the Spartans to that of the Italians. Mythical belief to mythical belief, when ⟨we say⟩ that in one place Zeus is said in myth to be "father of men and gods," and in another Ocean, as when people say "Ocean, origin of the gods, and mother Tethys." We oppose dogmatic suppositions to one another[23]
1.151	ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς μὲν ἓν εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἄπειρα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν τὴν ψυχήν, τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προνοίᾳ θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ ἀπρονοήτως.	when we say that some declare there is one element and others infinitely many; that some declare the soul mortal and others immortal; and that some say our affairs are governed by the providence of the gods, and others that they are governed without providence.
1.152	τὸ ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀντιτίθεμεν, οἷον νόμῳ μέν, ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι ἀρρενομιξίαις χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγορεύεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ μοιχεύειν ἀπειρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Μασσαγέταις ⟨ἐν⟩ ἀδιαφορίας ἔθει παραδεδόσθαι, ὡς Εὔδοξος ὁ Κνίδιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περιόδου, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἀπηγορεῦσθαι μητράσι μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι μάλιστα οὕτω γαμεῖν. καὶ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦσιν, ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀπείρηται νόμῳ.	We oppose custom to the others: to law, for example, when we say that among the Persians it is the custom to engage in sex between men, while among the Romans it is forbidden by law to do so; that among us adultery is forbidden, while among the Massagetae it is handed down by custom as a matter of indifference, as Eudoxus of Cnidus reports in the first book of his *Circuit of the Earth*; and that among us it is forbidden to have sex with one's mother, while among the Persians it is very much the custom to marry in this way. The Egyptians, too, marry their sisters, which among us is forbidden by law.[24]
1.153	ἀγωγῇ δὲ ἔθος ἀντιτίθεται, ὅταν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀναχωροῦντες μιγνύωνται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναιξίν, ὁ δὲ Κράτης τῇ Ἱππαρχίᾳ δημοσίᾳ· καὶ ὁ μὲν Διογένης ἀπὸ ἐξωμίδος περιῄει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς εἰώθαμεν.	Custom is opposed to way of life when most people withdraw in private to have sex with their wives, while Crates did so with Hipparchia in public; and when Diogenes went about in a tunic that left one shoulder bare, while we dress as we are accustomed to.[25]
1.154	μυθικῇ δὲ πίστει, [ὡς] ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ μῦθοι ὅτι ὁ Κρόνος κατήσθιεν αὐτοῦ τὰ τέκνα, ἔθους ὄντος ἡμῖν προνοεῖσθαι	To mythical belief, when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, while it is our custom to look after our children; and when among us it is

22 The Tauri lived in the Crimea; their sacrifice of strangers is the background of Euripides' *Iphigenia among the Taurians*.
23 Aristippus of Cyrene, a follower of Socrates, was known for a life of comfort and pleasure—the opposite of Diogenes' austerity.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	παίδων· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν συνήθεια ὡς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν σέβειν τοὺς θεούς, τιτρωσκόμενοι δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται.	the habit to revere the gods as good and untouched by evils, while the poets portray them being wounded and envying one another.
1.155	δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν ἡμῖν μὲν ἔθος ᾖ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖν τὰ ἀγαθά, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος λέγῃ μὴ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ἡμῶν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν ὁ μὲν Ἀρίστιππος ἀδιάφορον ἡγῆται τὸ γυναικείαν ἀμφιέννυσθαι στολήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο ἡγώμεθα εἶναι.	To dogmatic supposition, when it is our custom to ask the gods for good things, while Epicurus says that the divine pays no attention to us; and when Aristippus considers it a matter of indifference to wear women's clothing, while we consider it shameful.
1.156	ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀντιτίθεμεν νόμῳ μέν, ὅταν νόμου ὄντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι τύπτειν ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερον καὶ εὐγενῆ οἱ παγκρατιασταὶ τύπτωσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ τὴν ἀγωγὴν τοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς βίου, καὶ ὅταν ἀπειρημένου τοῦ ἀνδροφονεῖν οἱ μονομάχαι ἀναιρῶσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.	We oppose way of life to law when, though there is a law against striking a free and well-born man, pancratiasts strike one another because of the way of life they lead; and when, though killing a person is forbidden, gladiators kill one another for the same reason.[26]
1.157	μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀγωγῇ ἀντιτίθεμεν, ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ὅτι οἱ μὲν μῦθοι παρὰ τῇ Ὀμφάλῃ τὸν Ἡρακλέα λέγουσιν εἴριά τε ξαίνειν καὶ δουλοσύνης ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἅπερ οὐδ' ἂν μετρίως προῃρημένος ἐποίησεν ἄν τις, ἡ δὲ ἀγωγὴ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἦν γενναία.	We oppose mythical belief to way of life when we say that the myths tell of Heracles at Omphale's house carding wool, putting up with slavery, and doing things that no one with even moderately high principles would have done, while Heracles' way of life was noble.[27]
1.158	δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀθληταὶ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ ⟨τινος⟩ τῆς δόξης ἀντιποιούμενοι ἐπίπονον ἀγωγὴν βίου δι' αὐτὴν ἐπαναιρῶνται, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων φαῦλον εἶναι τὴν δόξαν δογματίζωσιν.	To dogmatic supposition, when athletes, striving for glory as ⟨something⟩ good, take up a toilsome way of life for its sake, while many philosophers hold the belief that glory is worthless.
1.159	τὸν δὲ νόμον ἀντιτίθεμεν μυθικῇ μὲν πίστει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ εἰσάγωσι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ μοιχεύοντας καὶ ἀρρενομιξίαις χρωμένους, νόμος δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν κωλύῃ ταῦτα πράττειν, δογματικῇ	We oppose law to mythical belief when the poets portray the gods committing adultery and engaging in sex between males, while the law among us forbids doing these things; and to dogmatic
1.160	δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι λέγωσι τὸ μητράσιν ἢ ἀδελφαῖς μίγνυσθαι, ὁ δὲ νόμος ταῦτα κωλύῃ.	supposition, when Chrysippus and his followers say that having sex with one's mother or sister is a matter of indifference, while the law forbids these things.
1.161	μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν δογματικῇ ὑπολήψει ἀντιτίθεμεν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ λέγωσι τὸν Δία κατελθόντα θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἀδύνατον τοῦτο εἶναι νομίζηται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς λέγῃ,	We oppose mythical belief to dogmatic supposition when the poets say that Zeus came down and had sex with mortal women, while the dogmatists consider this impossible; and when the poet says
1.162	ὅτι Ζεὺς διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ ἐπὶ Σαρπηδόνι αἱματοέσσας ψεκάδας κατέχευεν ἔραζε, δόγμα μέντοι φιλοσόφων ⟨ἦ⟩	that Zeus, out of grief for Sarpedon, "shed drops of blood upon the earth," while it ⟨is⟩ a belief of

24 The Massagetae were nomads east of the Caspian Sea; Eudoxus of Cnidus was a fourth-century BC mathematician and geographer.
25 Crates of Thebes, a pupil of Diogenes, and his wife Hipparchia were both Cynic philosophers.
26 The pancration was a Greek combat sport combining boxing and wrestling.
27 Omphale was a queen of Lydia to whom Heracles was sold as a slave.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν ⟨.....⟩ τὸν τῶν ἱπποκενταύρων μῦθον ἀναιρῶσιν, ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα τὸν ἱπποκένταυρον ἡμῖν φέροντες.	philosophers that the divine is free of feeling; and when ⟨.....⟩ do away with the myth of the hippocentaurs, offering us the hippocentaur as an example of something that does not exist.[28]
1.163	πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐνῆν καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν προειρημένων ἀντιθέσεων λαμβάνειν παραδείγματα· ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτα ἀρκέσει. πλὴν τοσαύτης ἀνωμαλίας πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου δεικνυμένης, ὁποῖον μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς τόνδε τὸν νόμον ἢ πρὸς τόδε τὸ ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων ἐπέχειν ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη. οὕτω μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν δέκα τρόπων καταλήγομεν εἰς τὴν ἐποχήν.	Many other examples could be taken for each of the oppositions mentioned, but for a brief account these will be enough. At any rate, since this mode too shows so much variation in things, we will not be able to say what the underlying object is like in its nature, only what it appears like relative to this way of life, or this law, or this custom, and so on for each of the others. So by this mode too we must suspend judgment about the nature of external objects. In this way, then, through the Ten Modes, we end up in suspension of judgment.

CHAPTER 15: ON THE FIVE MODES

The later skeptics' five modes: disagreement, infinite regress, relativity, hypothesis and reciprocity.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.164	οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι σκεπτικοὶ παραδιδόασι τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς πέντε τούσδε, πρῶτον τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας, δεύτερον τὸν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα, τρίτον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι, τέταρτον τὸν ὑποθετικόν, πέμπτον τὸν διάλληλον.	The more recent skeptics hand down the following five modes of suspension: first, the one from disagreement; second, the one that throws us into infinite regress; third, the one from relativity; fourth, the one from hypothesis; and fifth, the one from reciprocity.[29]
1.165	καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ἐστὶ καθ' ὃν περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιν παρά τε τῷ βίῳ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εὑρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, δι' ἣν οὐ δυνάμενοι αἱρεῖσθαί τι ἢ ἀποδοκιμάζειν καταλήγομεν εἰς ἐποχήν.	The mode from disagreement is the one by which we find that undecidable dissension about the matter proposed has arisen both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of it we are unable either to choose or to reject anything, and we end up in suspension of judgment.
1.166	ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ τὸ φερόμενον εἰς πίστιν τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πίστεως ἑτέρας χρῄζειν λέγομεν, κἀκεῖνο ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς μὴ ἐχόντων ἡμῶν πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς κατασκευῆς τὴν ἐποχὴν ἀκολουθεῖν.	The mode from infinite regress is the one in which we say that what is offered to confirm the matter proposed needs another confirmation, and that one another, and so on to infinity; so that, since we have no point from which to begin establishing anything, suspension of judgment follows.
1.167	ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι, καθὼς προειρήκαμεν, ἐν ᾧ πρὸς μὲν τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα τοῖον ἢ τοῖον φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐπέχομεν.	The mode from relativity, as we said before, is the one in which the underlying object appears such-and-such relative to what judges and to the things observed along with it, while we suspend judgment about what it is like in its nature.

28 Sarpedon, a son of Zeus, was killed at Troy; the bloody rain is from Homer, *Iliad* 16.459.
29 Diogenes Laertius attributes the Five Modes to Agrippa, a skeptic probably of the first century AD.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.168	ὁ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἔστιν ὅταν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμενοι οἱ δογματικοὶ ἀπό τινος ἄρξωνται ὃ οὐ κατασκευάζουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀναποδείκτως κατὰ συγχώρησιν λαμβάνειν ἀξιοῦσιν.	The mode from hypothesis occurs when the dogmatists, being driven into an infinite regress, start from something which they do not establish, but which they claim to assume simply and without proof, as a concession.
1.169	ὁ δὲ διάλληλος τρόπος συνίσταται, ὅταν τὸ ὀφεῖλον τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιωτικὸν χρείαν ἔχῃ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως· ἔνθα μηδέτερον δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν πρὸς κατασκευὴν θατέρου, περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπέχομεν. ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰς τούτους ἀνάγειν τοὺς τρόπους ἐνδέχεται, διὰ βραχέων ὑποδείξομεν οὕτως.	The mode of reciprocity arises when what ought to confirm the matter under investigation itself needs to be made credible by the matter under investigation. Then, being unable to take either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both. That every matter under investigation can be brought under these modes we will show briefly, as follows.
1.170	τὸ προτεθὲν ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν, ὁποῖον δ᾽ ἂν ᾖ, διαπεφώνηται· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνα φασὶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, οἱ δὲ μόνα τὰ νοητά, οἱ δέ τινα μὲν αἰσθητά, τινὰ δὲ νοητά. πότερον οὖν ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσι τὴν διαφωνίαν ἢ ἀνεπίκριτον; εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον, λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ ἐπέχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνουμένων οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτήν, πόθεν ἐπικριθήσεται πυνθανόμεθα.	What is proposed is either perceptible or thinkable, and whichever it is, there is disagreement about it. Some say that only perceptible things are true, others only thinkable things, and others that some perceptible and some thinkable things are. Will they say, then, that the disagreement is decidable or undecidable? If undecidable, we say that we must suspend judgment; for one cannot make assertions about matters on which there is undecidable disagreement. If decidable, we ask how it is to be decided.
1.171	οἷον τὸ αἰσθητόν (ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ προτέρου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον) πότερον ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἄλλου δεήσεται πρὸς πίστιν. εἰ δὲ κἀκεῖνο αἰσθητὸν ἔσται, πάλιν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλου δεήσεται τοῦ πιστώσοντος, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου.	Take the perceptible, for example (we will base the argument on this first): is it to be decided by something perceptible or by something thinkable? If by something perceptible, then, since it is perceptible things we are investigating, that too will need something else to make it credible. And if that is also perceptible, it in turn will need something else to make it credible, and so on to infinity.
1.172	εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι δεήσει τὸ αἰσθητόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ διαπεφώνηται, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο νοητὸν ὂν κρίσεως τε καὶ πίστεως. πόθεν οὖν πιστωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται ὁμοίως· εἰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρελήφθη νοητόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πίστιν αἰσθητόν, ὁ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος.	If the perceptible is to be decided by something thinkable, then, since there is disagreement about thinkable things too, this, being thinkable, will also need to be judged and made credible. So how will it be made credible? If by something thinkable, it will fall into infinite regress in the same way. If by something perceptible, then, since something thinkable was adopted to make the perceptible credible, and something perceptible to make the thinkable credible, the mode of reciprocity is brought in.
1.173	εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φεύγων ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος ἡμῖν κατὰ συγχώρησιν καὶ ἀναποδείκτως ἀξιώσειε λαμβάνειν τι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ἐξῆς, ὁ ὑποθετικὸς εἰσαχθήσεται	If, to escape this, the person arguing with us should claim to assume something by concession and without proof in order to prove what follows,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τρόπος, ἄπορος ὑπάρχων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος πιστός ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς ἀεὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὑποτιθέμενοι οὐκ ἐσόμεθα ἀπιστότεροι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές τι ὑποτίθεται ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος, ὕποπτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καθ' ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὸ λαμβάνων ἀλλὰ μὴ μετὰ κατασκευῆς· εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος, σαθρὰ ἔσται ἡ ὑποβάθρα τῶν κατασκευαζομένων.	the mode from hypothesis will be brought in, and it leads nowhere. For if the person who makes the hypothesis is credible, we will be no less credible if we always hypothesize the opposite. And if what he hypothesizes is true, he makes it suspect by taking it as a hypothesis rather than establishing it; if it is false, the foundation of what is being established will be rotten.
1.174	καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνύει τι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι πρὸς πίστιν, αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον ὑποτιθέσθω, καὶ μὴ ἕτερόν τι δι' οὗ δὴ κατασκευάσει τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος· εἰ δὲ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἄτοπον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκός.	Again, if hypothesizing achieves anything toward credibility, let him hypothesize the very thing under investigation, and not something else through which he will supposedly establish the matter under discussion. But if it is absurd to hypothesize what is under investigation, it will also be absurd to hypothesize what lies above it.
1.175	ὅτι δὲ καὶ πρός τι ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά, δῆλον· ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθανομένους. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὅπερ ἂν ἡμῖν προτεθῇ πρᾶγμα αἰσθητόν, εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους ἀνάγειν τοῦτο εὐμαρές ἐστιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφωνῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δοθήσεται ἡμῖν τὸ δεῖν ἐπέχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ.	That all perceptible things are relative is also clear: they are relative to those who perceive them. It is evident, then, that whatever perceptible thing is proposed to us, it is easy to bring it under the Five Modes. We reason in the same way about the thinkable. If it is said that there is undecidable disagreement about it, it will be granted to us that we must suspend judgment about it.
1.176	εἰ δὲ ἐπικριθήσεται ἡ διαφωνία, εἰ μὲν διὰ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλοῦμεν, εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πάλιν διαφωνούμενον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον δι' αὑτοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τοῦ νοητοῦ δεήσεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.	If the disagreement is to be decided, then if through something thinkable, we will drive it into infinite regress; if by something perceptible, into reciprocity. For the perceptible, being in turn disputed and unable to be decided through itself because of the infinite regress, will need the thinkable, just as the thinkable needs the perceptible.
1.177	διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνων τι πάλιν ἄτοπος ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρός τί ἐστι τὰ νοητά· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν νοῦν νοητὰ λέγεται, καὶ εἰ ἦν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ὁποῖον λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν διεφωνήθη. ἀνήχθη οὖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους, διόπερ ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πάντως ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν. Τοιοῦτοι μὲν καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις παραδιδόμενοι πέντε τρόποι· οὓς ἐκτίθενται οὐκ ἐκβάλλοντες τοὺς δέκα τρόπους, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποικιλώτερον καὶ διὰ τούτων σὺν ἐκείνοις ἐλέγχειν τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν.	For these reasons, anyone who assumes something by hypothesis will again be acting absurdly. Thinkable things, moreover, are relative too: they are called thinkable relative to the mind, and if they were by nature such as they are said to be, there would be no disagreement about them. So the thinkable too has been brought under the Five Modes, and therefore we must in every case suspend judgment about the matter proposed. Such, then, are the Five Modes handed down by the more recent skeptics. They set them out not to throw out the Ten Modes, but to expose the rashness of the dogmatists in a more varied way, using these together with those.

CHAPTER 16: WHAT THE TWO MODES ARE

Nothing is apprehended either through itself or through something else.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.178	Παραδιδόασι δὲ καὶ δύο τρόπους ἐποχῆς ἑτέρους· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἤτοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρου, ⟨ὑπομιμνήσκοντες ὅτι οὔτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τι οὔτε ἐξ ἑτέρου⟩ καταλαμβάνεται, τὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπορίαν εἰσάγειν δοκοῦσιν. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεται, φασί, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς γεγενημένης παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς περί τε τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἁπάντων οἶμαι διαφωνίας, ἣ δὴ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μήτε αἰσθητῷ μήτε νοητῷ κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν λάβωμεν διαπεφωνημένον, εἶναι ἄπιστον,	They also hand down two other modes of suspension. Since everything that is apprehended seems to be apprehended either through itself or through something else, they think that, ⟨by pointing out that nothing is apprehended either through itself or through something else⟩, they bring in perplexity about everything. That nothing is apprehended through itself, they say, is clear from the disagreement that has arisen among the natural philosophers about all perceptible and thinkable things, I think—a disagreement which is undecidable, since we cannot use either a perceptible or a thinkable criterion, because anything we adopt is disputed and therefore not credible.
1.179	διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδ’ ἐξ ἑτέρου τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι συγχωροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ τι καταλαμβάνεται ἀεὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνεσθαι δεήσει, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἢ τὸν ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλουσι τρόπον. εἰ δὲ βούλοιτό τις λαβεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβανόμενόν τι ἐξ οὗ καταλαμβάνεται ἕτερον, ἀντιπίπτει τὸ μηδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. τὸ δὲ μαχόμενον πῶς ἂν δύναιτο καταληφθῆναι ⟨ἢ⟩ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀφ’ ἑτέρου, ἀποροῦμεν, τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ τῆς καταλήψεως μὴ φαινομένου, σημείων δὲ καὶ δίχα ἀποδείξεως διατρεπομένων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς εἰσόμεθα. τοσαῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.	And for this reason they do not concede that anything is apprehended through something else either. For if that through which something is apprehended must always itself be apprehended through something else, they throw us into the mode of reciprocity or the mode of infinite regress. And if someone wants to take something apprehended through itself as that through which something else is apprehended, he runs up against the fact that nothing is apprehended through itself, for the reasons already given. How what is in dispute could be apprehended ⟨either⟩ from itself or from something else, we are at a loss to say, since the criterion of truth or of apprehension does not appear, and signs, even apart from proof, are overturned, as we will see in what follows. That will be enough to have said about the modes of suspension for now.

CHAPTER 17: WHAT MODES THERE ARE FOR OVERTURNING CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS

Aenesidemus’ eight modes against causal explanations, and how the Five Modes also apply to causes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.180	Ὥσπερ δὲ τοὺς τρόπους ⟨τῆς⟩ ἐποχῆς παραδίδομεν, οὕτω καὶ τρόπους ἐκτίθενταί τινες, καθ’ οὓς ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις διαποροῦντες ἐφιστῶμεν τοὺς δογματικοὺς διὰ τὸ μάλιστα ἐπὶ ταύταις αὐτοὺς μέγα φρονεῖν. καὶ δὴ Αἰνησίδημος ὀκτὼ τρόπους παραδίδωσι καθ’ οὓς οἴεται πᾶσαν δογματικὴν αἰτιολογίαν ὡς μοχθηρὰν ἐλέγχων ἀποφήνασθαι,	Just as we hand down the modes of suspension, so some set out modes by which, raising difficulties about particular causal explanations, we bring the dogmatists up short, since it is these above all that they pride themselves on. Aenesidemus, for instance, hands down eight modes by which he

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		thinks he can test every dogmatic causal explanation and show it to be faulty.
1.181	ὧν πρῶτον μὲν εἶναί φησι καθ' ὃν [τρόπον] τὸ τῆς αἰτιολογίας γένος ἐν ἀφανέσιν ἀναστρεφόμενον οὐχ ὁμολογουμένην ἔχει τὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιμαρτύρησιν· δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃν πολλάκις εὐεπιφορίας οὔσης δαψιλοῦς ὥστε πολυτρόπως αἰτιολογῆσαι τὸ ζητούμενον, καθ' ἕνα μόνον τρόπον τοῦτό τινες αἰτιολογοῦσιν·	The first of these, he says, is the one by which the kind of causal explanation that deals with unseen things has no agreed testimony from what appears. The second is the one by which, often, although there is ample scope for explaining the matter under investigation in many ways, some people explain it in one way only.
1.182	τρίτον καθ' ὃν τῶν τεταγμένως γινομένων αἰτίας ἀποδιδόασιν οὐδεμίαν τάξιν ἐπιφαινούσας· τέταρτον καθ' ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα λαβόντες ὡς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα νομίζουσιν ὡς γίνεται κατειληφέναι, τάχα μὲν ὁμοίως τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων, τάχα δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως·	The third, the one by which they give causes for things that happen in an orderly way which display no order. The fourth, the one by which, having grasped how things that appear come about, they think they have apprehended how things that do not appear come about—when perhaps unseen things are brought about in the same way as things that appear, and perhaps not in the same way but in a way peculiar to themselves.
1.183	πέμπτον καθ' ὃν πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν στοιχείων ὑποθέσεις ἀλλ' οὐ κατά τινας κοινὰς καὶ ὁμολογουμένας ἐφόδους αἰτιολογοῦσιν· ἕκτον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις τὰ μὲν φωρατὰ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι παραλαμβάνουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀντιπίπτοντα καὶ τὴν ἴσην ἔχοντα πιθανότητα παραπέμπουσιν·	The fifth, the one by which practically all of them give causal explanations according to their own hypotheses about the elements, and not according to any common and agreed methods. The sixth, the one by which they often admit what fits their own hypotheses, but dismiss what conflicts with them, even though it has equal plausibility.
1.184	ἕβδομον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ἀποδιδόασιν αἰτίας οὐ μόνον τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι μαχομένας· ὄγδοον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ὄντων ἀπόρων ὁμοίως τῶν τε φαίνεσθαι δοκούντων καὶ τῶν ἐπιζητουμένων, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων ποιοῦνται τὰς διδασκαλίας.	The seventh, the one by which they often give causes that conflict not only with what appears but even with their own hypotheses. The eighth, the one by which, often, when the things that seem to appear and the things being investigated are equally puzzling, they base their teaching about things equally puzzling on things equally puzzling.
1.185	οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ φησι καὶ κατά τινας ἐπιμίκτους τρόπους, ἠρτημένους ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, διαπίπτειν ἐνίους ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις. τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πέντε τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς ἀπαρκοῖεν πρὸς τὰς αἰτιολογίας. ἤτοι γὰρ σύμφωνον πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἱρέσεσι καὶ τῇ σκέψει καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις αἰτίαν ἐρεῖ τις ἢ οὔ. καὶ σύμφωνον μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· τά τε γὰρ φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα πάντα διαπεφώνηται.	He says it is not impossible, either, that some people go wrong in their causal explanations by certain mixed modes, which depend on those just mentioned. But perhaps the Five Modes of suspension would also be enough against causal explanations. For a person will propose a cause that either agrees with all the philosophical schools, with skepticism and with what appears, or does not. And it is perhaps not possible for it to agree; for there is disagreement about everything, both what appears and what is non-evident.
1.186	εἰ δὲ διάφωνον, ἀπαιτηθήσεται καὶ ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ φαινομένην μὲν φαινομένης ἢ ἄδηλον ἀδήλου λαμβάνων	If it does not agree, he will be asked for the cause of this cause too. If he adopts an apparent cause

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται, ἐναλλὰξ δὲ αἰτιολογῶν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ἱστάμενος δέ που, ἢ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις λέξει τὴν αἰτίαν συνεστάναι, καὶ εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι, ἀναιρῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ἢ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι λαμβάνων ἐπισχεθήσεται. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐλέγχειν ἴσως τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις προπέτειαν.	for an apparent one, or a non-evident cause for a non-evident one, he will fall into infinite regress; if he explains them alternately, into reciprocity. And if he comes to a stop somewhere, either he will say that the cause holds as far as what has been said goes, and so bring in relativity, abolishing its being so in its nature; or he will assume something by hypothesis and be stopped short. So it is perhaps possible to expose the rashness of the dogmatists in causal explanations by these modes as well.

CHAPTER 18: ON THE SKEPTICAL PHRASES

Sextus turns to the phrases skeptics use to express how they are affected.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.187	Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑκάστῳ χρώμενοι τούτων τε καὶ τῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπων ἐπιφθεγγόμεθα φωνάς τινας τῆς σκεπτικῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς πάθους μηνυτικάς, οἷον λέγοντες ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ ‘οὐδὲν ὁριστέον’ καὶ ἄλλας τινάς, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τούτων ἑξῆς διαλαβεῖν. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ φωνῆς.	When we use each of these modes and the modes of suspension, we utter certain phrases that reveal the skeptical disposition and the way we are affected—saying, for example, “no more,” “nothing is to be determined,” and others. So it would be fitting to discuss these next. Let us begin with the phrase “no more.”

CHAPTER 19: ON THE PHRASE “NO MORE”

“No more” is elliptical for “no more this than that” and expresses equipoise, not a claim.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.188	Ταύτην τοίνυν ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς ἔφην προφερόμεθα, ὁτὲ δὲ οὕτως ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’· οὐ γὰρ ὥς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσι, τὴν μὲν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ ἐν ταῖς εἰδικαῖς ζητήσεσι παραλαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’ ἐν ταῖς γενικαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως τήν τε ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ καὶ τὴν ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’ προφερόμεθα, καὶ νῦν ὡς περὶ μιᾶς διαλεξόμεθα. ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὕτη ἡ φωνὴ ἐλλιπής. ὡς γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν ‘διπλῆ’, δυνάμει φαμὲν ‘διπλῆ’, καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν ‘πλατεῖα’, δυνάμει λέγομεν ‘πλατεῖα ὁδός’, οὕτως ὅταν εἴπωμεν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον,’ δυνάμει φαμὲν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε,	We utter this phrase sometimes in the form I gave, and sometimes as “in no way more.” For it is not the case, as some suppose, that we use “no more” in specific investigations and “in no way more” in general ones: we utter “no more” and “in no way more” indifferently, and we will now discuss them as one. This phrase, then, is elliptical. Just as when we say “a double” we mean in effect “a double house,” and when we say “a broad” we mean in effect “a broad road,” so when we say “no more” we mean in effect “no more this than that,[30]
1.189	ἄνω κάτω.’ τινὲς μέντοι τῶν σκεπτικῶν παραλαμβάνουσιν ἀντὶ πύσματος τὸ ‘οὐ’ (⟨ἀντὶ⟩ τοῦ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε, τὸ τί παραλαμβάνοντες νῦν ἀντὶ αἰτίας), ἵν’ ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον ‘διὰ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε;’ σύνηθες δέ ἐστι καὶ πύσμασιν ἀντὶ ἀξιωμάτων χρῆσθαι, οἷον τίς τὸν Διὸς σύλλεκτρον οὐκ οἶδε βροτῶν; καὶ ἀξιώμασιν ἀντὶ πυσμάτων, οἷον ‘ζητῶ ποῦ οἰκεῖ Δίων’ καὶ	up or down.” Some skeptics, however, take the “no” as a question—⟨in place of⟩ “what more this than that?”, taking the “what” here as asking for a cause—so that what is said is “why this more than that?” It is common to use questions in place of statements, as in “Who among mortals does not know the one who shared Zeus’ bed?”, and state-

30 The Greek text is defective here; editors restore “a double hearth,” that is, a house with two rooms.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	‘πυνθάνομαι τίνος ἕνεκα χρὴ θαυμάζειν ἄνδρα ποιητήν.’ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τί ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ ⟨τί⟩ παραλαμβάνεται παρὰ Μενάνδρῳ· τί γὰρ ἐγὼ κατελειπόμην; δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ ‘οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε’ καὶ πάθος ἡμέτερον,	ments in place of questions, as in “I am looking for where Dion lives” and “I am asking why one should admire a poet.” And “what” is used in place of “on account of ⟨what⟩” in Menander: “What was I left behind for?” The phrase “no more this than that” also reveals the way we are affected,[31]
1.190	καθ’ ὃ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων πραγμάτων εἰς ἀρρεψίαν καταλήγομεν, ἰσοσθένειαν μὲν λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὴν ⟨ἰσότητα τὴν⟩ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν πιθανόν, ἀντικείμενα δὲ κοινῶς τὰ μαχόμενα, ἀρρεψίαν δὲ τὴν πρὸς μηδέτερον συγκατάθεσιν.	in which, because of the equipollence of the opposed things, we end up in equipoise. By “equipollence” we mean ⟨equality⟩ in what appears plausible to us; by “opposed” we mean, in general, conflicting; and by “equipoise” we mean assent to neither side.
1.191	ἡ γοῦν ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’ φωνὴ κἂν ἐμφαίνῃ χαρακτῆρα συγκαταθέσεως ἢ ἀρνήσεως, ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως αὐτῇ χρώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως αὐτὴν παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, ἤτοι ἀντὶ πύσματος ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν ‘ἀγνοῶ τίνι μὲν τούτων χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι, τίνι δὲ μὴ’ [συγκατατίθεσθαι]. πρόκειται ⟨γὰρ⟩ ἡμῖν δηλῶσαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φωνὴν δι’ ἧς αὐτὸ δηλοῦμεν ἀδιαφοροῦμεν. κἀκεῖνο δὲ χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι προφερόμεθα τὴν ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’ φωνὴν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι περὶ τοῦ πάντως ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ βεβαίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς λέγοντες.	Even if the phrase “in no way more” displays the character of assent or of denial, we do not use it in that way. We adopt it indifferently and loosely, either in place of a question or in place of saying “I do not know which of these I should assent to and which [to assent to] not.” ⟨For⟩ our aim is to make clear what appears to us, and we are indifferent about the phrase by which we make it clear. We must realize this too: we utter the phrase “in no way more” without affirming that it is certainly true and firm; we say this about it too only as it appears to us.

CHAPTER 20: ON NON-ASSERTION

Non-assertion means neither affirming nor denying anything non-evident.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.192	Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀφασίας λέγομεν τάδε. φάσις καλεῖται διχῶς, κοινῶς καὶ ἰδίως, κοινῶς μὲν ἡ δηλοῦσα θέσιν ἢ ἄρσιν φωνή, οἷον ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,’ ἰδίως δὲ ἡ δηλοῦσα θέσιν μόνον, καθ’ ὃ σημαινόμενον τὰ ἀποφατικὰ οὐ καλοῦσι φάσεις. ἡ οὖν ἀφασία ἀπόστασίς ἐστι τῆς κοινῶς λεγομένης φάσεως, ἡ ὑποτάσσεσθαι λέγομεν τήν τε κατάφασιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὡς εἶναι ἀφασίαν πάθος ἡμέτερον δι’ ὃ οὔτε τιθέναι τι οὔτε ἀναιρεῖν φαμεν.	About non-assertion we say the following. “Assertion” has two senses, a general and a specific one. In the general sense it is an utterance that posits or denies something—for example, “It is day,” “It is not day”; in the specific sense it is one that only posits, and in this sense negative statements are not called assertions. Non-assertion, then, is refraining from assertion in the general sense, under which, we say, both affirmation and negation fall. So non-assertion is a way we are affected in which we say we neither posit nor reject anything.
1.193	ὅθεν δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀφασίαν παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τοιούτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων ὥστε πάντως ἀφασίαν κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἡμεῖς νῦν, ὅτε προφερόμεθα αὐτήν, ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ζητουμένων τοῦτο πεπόνθαμεν. κἀκεῖνο χρὴ μνημονεύειν, ὅτι μηδὲν	From this it is clear that we adopt non-assertion too, not on the assumption that things are by nature such as to produce non-assertion necessarily, but to indicate that we, now, when we utter it,

31 The verse opens Euripides’ *Heracles*; the one who “shared Zeus’ bed” is Amphitryon, husband of Alcmena, whom Zeus also slept with.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τιθέναι μηδὲ ἀναιρεῖν φαμεν τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄδηλον δογματικῶς λεγομένων· τοῖς γὰρ κινοῦσιν ἡμᾶς παθητικῶς καὶ ἀναγκαστικῶς ἄγουσιν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν εἴκομεν.	are affected in this way about these matters under investigation. And we must remember this too: what we say we neither posit nor reject is anything said dogmatically about what is non-evident. For we yield to whatever affects us passively and drives us by necessity to assent.

CHAPTER 21: ON "PERHAPS," "POSSIBLY" AND "MAYBE"

These words indicate non-assertion, implying their opposites as well.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.194	Τὸ δὲ 'τάχα' καὶ 'οὐ τάχα' καὶ 'ἔξεστι' καὶ 'οὐκ ἔξεστι' καὶ 'ἐνδέχεται' καὶ 'οὐκ ἐνδέχεται' παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ 'τάχα μὲν ἔστιν τάχα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν' καὶ 'ἔξεστι μὲν εἶναι ἔξεστι δὲ μὴ εἶναι' καὶ 'ἐνδέχεται μὲν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται δὲ μὴ εἶναι' ὡς παραλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς συντομίας χάριν τὸ 'μὴ ἐξεῖναι' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἐξεῖναι μὴ εἶναι' καὶ τὸ 'μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι' καὶ τὸ 'οὐ τάχα' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'τάχα μὴ εἶναι'.	We adopt "perhaps" and "not perhaps," "possibly" and "not possibly," "maybe" and "not maybe" in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not," "possibly it is and possibly it is not," and "maybe it is and maybe it is not." So for brevity's sake we adopt "not possibly" in place of "possibly it is not," "not maybe" in place of "maybe it is not," and "not perhaps" in place of "perhaps it is not."
1.195	πάλιν δὲ ἐνταῦθα οὐ φωνομαχοῦμεν, οὐδὲ εἰ φύσει ταῦτα δηλοῦσιν αἱ φωναί, ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως αὐτάς, ὡς εἶπον, παραλαμβάνομεν. ὅτι μέντοι αὗται αἱ φωναὶ ἀφασίας εἰσὶ δηλωτικαί, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. ὁ γοῦν λέγων 'τάχα ἔστιν' δυνάμει τίθησι καὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι δοκοῦν αὐτῷ, τὸ 'τάχα μὴ εἶναι', τῷ μὴ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτό. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔχει.	Here again we do not fight about words, nor do we investigate whether the phrases mean these things by nature; we adopt them indifferently, as I said. That these phrases indicate non-assertion is evident, I think. Anyone who says "perhaps it is," at any rate, in effect also posits what seems to conflict with it, "perhaps it is not," by not affirming that it is. And the same holds for the rest.

CHAPTER 22: ON "I SUSPEND JUDGMENT"

The phrase means the skeptic cannot say which of the opposed views to believe.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.196	Τὸ δὲ 'ἐπέχω' παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ 'οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν τίνι χρὴ τῶν προκειμένων πιστεῦσαι ἢ τίνι ἀπιστῆσαι', δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἴσα ἡμῖν φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα πρὸς πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσα ἐστίν, οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτε ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει, λέγομεν. καὶ ἡ ἐποχὴ δὲ εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπέχεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς μήτε τιθέναι τι μήτε ἀναιρεῖν διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ζητουμένων.	We adopt "I suspend judgment" in place of "I cannot say which of the things proposed I should believe and which I should disbelieve," indicating that the things appear to us equal as regards credibility and lack of credibility. Whether they are equal we do not affirm; we say what appears to us about them when it strikes us. And suspension of judgment gets its name from the intellect's being held back so that it neither posits nor rejects anything, because of the equipollence of the matters under investigation.

CHAPTER 23: ON "I DETERMINE NOTHING"

The phrase reports how the skeptic is affected, not a dogmatic claim, and applies even to itself.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.197	Περὶ δὲ τοῦ 'οὐδὲν ὁρίζω' ταῦτα φαμέν. ὁρίζειν εἶναι νομίζομεν οὐχὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς λέγειν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄδηλον προφέρεσθαι μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁρίζων ὁ σκεπτικὸς τάχα εὑρεθήσεται, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ 'οὐδὲν ὁρίζω·' οὐ γάρ ἐστι δογματικὴ ὑπόληψις, τουτέστιν ἀδήλῳ συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ πάθους ἡμετέρου δηλωτική. ὅταν οὖν εἴπῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς 'οὐδὲν ὁρίζω', τοῦτό φησιν 'ἐγὼ οὕτω πέπονθα νῦν ὡς μηδὲν τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν τήνδε πεπτωκότων τιθέναι δογματικῶς ἢ ἀναιρεῖν'. τοῦτο δέ φησι λέγων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἀπαγγελτικῶς, οὐ δογματικῶς μετὰ πεποιθήσεως ἀποφαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὃ πάσχει διηγούμενος.	About "I determine nothing" we say this. We take determining to be not simply saying something, but putting forward something non-evident with assent. In this sense the skeptic will perhaps be found to determine nothing—not even "I determine nothing" itself. For this is not a dogmatic supposition, that is, assent to something non-evident, but a phrase that indicates the way we are affected. So when the skeptic says "I determine nothing," what he is saying is: "I am now affected in such a way as neither to posit nor to reject dogmatically any of the things that fall under this investigation." And in saying this he is reporting what appears to him about the matters proposed—not making a confident, dogmatic declaration, but describing how he is affected.

CHAPTER 24: ON "EVERYTHING IS UNDETERMINED"

"Everything" means the non-evident matters examined, and "is" means "appears to me."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.198	Καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία δὲ πάθος διανοίας ἐστί, καθ' ὃ οὔτε αἱρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, τουτέστι τῶν ἀδήλων. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα' τὸ μὲν 'ἔστι' λαμβάνει ἀντὶ τοῦ 'φαίνεσθαι αὐτῷ', πάντα δὲ λέγει οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀλλ' ἅπερ διεξῆλθε τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων, ἀόριστα δὲ μὴ προύχοντα τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ κοινῶς μαχομένων κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν.	Indeterminacy, too, is a way the intellect is affected, in which we neither reject nor posit any of the things investigated dogmatically, that is, of the non-evident things. So when the skeptic says "everything is undetermined," he takes "is" in place of "appears to him"; by "everything" he means not all existing things, but those of the non-evident things investigated by the dogmatists that he has gone through; and by "undetermined" he means not surpassing their opposites, or the things that conflict with them in general, in credibility or lack of credibility.
1.199	καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λέγων 'περιπατῶ' δυνάμει φησὶν 'ἐγὼ περιπατῶ', οὕτως ὁ λέγων 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα' συσσημαίνει 'καθ' ἡμᾶς' ἢ 'ὡς πρὸς ἐμέ' ἢ 'ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται', ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον 'ὅσα ἐπῆλθον τῶν ⟨παρὰ τοῖς⟩ δογματικοῖς ζητουμένων, τοιαῦτά μοι φαίνεται ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν τοῦ μαχομένου προύχειν μοι δοκεῖν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν'.	And just as someone who says "I walk" is in effect saying "I myself walk," so someone who says "everything is undetermined" also implies "in our view," or "as far as I am concerned," or "as it appears to me." So what he says amounts to this: "All the things investigated ⟨by the⟩ dogmatists that I have examined appear to me such that none of them seems to me to surpass what conflicts with it in credibility or lack of credibility."

CHAPTER 25: ON "EVERYTHING IS INAPPREHENSIBLE"

The phrase reports that the matters examined so far appear inapprehensible to the speaker.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.200	Οὕτω δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα·' καὶ γὰρ τὸ 'πάντα' ὁμοίως ἐξηγούμεθα καὶ τὸ 'ἐμοὶ' συνεκδεχόμεθα, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον 'πάντα ὅσα ἐφώδευσα τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων φαίνεταί μοι ἀκατάληπτα'. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οὐ διαβεβαιουμένου περὶ τοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητούμενα φύσεως εἶναι τοιαύτης ὡς εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλοντος, καθ' ὅ, φησίν, ὑπολαμβάνω ὅτι ἄχρι νῦν οὐδὲν κατέλαβον ἐκείνων ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ εἰς περιτροπὴν φερόμενα πάντα ἀπᾴδοντα εἶναι δοκεῖ μοι τῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀπαγγελλομένων.	We take the same line when we say "everything is inapprehensible." We interpret "everything" in the same way, and we supply "to me," so that what is said amounts to this: "All the non-evident things investigated dogmatically that I have examined appear to me inapprehensible." This is not the statement of someone affirming that the things investigated by the dogmatists are of such a nature as to be inapprehensible, but of someone reporting his own feeling—a feeling in which, he says, "I suppose that up to now I have apprehended none of them, because of the equipollence of the opposites." Hence all the arguments brought forward to show that the phrase refutes itself seem to me out of tune with what we are reporting.

CHAPTER 26: ON "I AM NON-APPREHENSIVE" AND "I DO NOT APPREHEND"

These phrases too express a feeling of one's own, not a belief.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.201	Καὶ ἡ 'ἀκαταληπτῶ' δὲ καὶ ἡ 'οὐ καταλαμβάνω' φωνὴ πάθους οἰκείου ἐστὶ δηλωτική, καθ' ὃ ἀφίσταται ὁ σκεπτικὸς ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τοῦ τιθέναι τι τῶν ζητουμένων ἀδήλων ἢ ἀναιρεῖν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων φωνῶν.	The phrases "I am non-apprehensive" and "I do not apprehend" also indicate a feeling of one's own, in which the skeptic refrains, for the present, from positing or rejecting any of the non-evident matters under investigation—as is clear from what we have said about the other phrases.

CHAPTER 27: ON "TO EVERY ARGUMENT AN EQUAL ARGUMENT IS OPPOSED"

Sextus explains each word of the phrase, which some skeptics take as an instruction.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.202	Ὅταν δὲ λέγωμεν 'παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται', παντὶ μὲν λέγομεν τῷ ὑφ' ἡμῶν διεξωδευμένῳ, λόγον δέ φαμεν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν κατασκευάζοντά τι δογματικῶς, τουτέστι περὶ ἀδήλου, καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸν ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ὁπωσοῦν κατασκευάζοντα. 'ἴσον' δέ φαμεν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, τό τε 'ἀντίκειται' λαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ 'μάχεται' κοινῶς, καὶ τὸ 'ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται' συνεκδεχόμεθα.	When we say "to every argument an equal argument is opposed," by "every" we mean every one we have examined. By "argument" we mean not argument in general, but argument that establishes something dogmatically, that is, about something non-evident—and not necessarily one made up of premises and a conclusion, but one that establishes in any way whatever. By "equal" we mean equal in credibility or lack of credibility; we take "is opposed" in the general sense of "conflicts"; and we supply "as it appears to me."
1.203	ὅταν οὖν εἴπω 'παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται' δυνάμει τοῦτό φημι 'παντὶ τῷ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ζητουμένῳ λόγῳ,	So when I say "to every argument an equal argument is opposed," I am in effect saying: "To every

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὃς κατασκευάζει τι δογματικῶς, ἕτερος λόγος κατασκευάζων τι δογματικῶς, ἴσος αὐτῷ κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, ἀντικεῖσθαι φαίνεταί μοι', ὡς εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λόγου προφορὰν οὐ δογματικὴν ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπείου πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὅ ἐστι φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι.	argument investigated by me which establishes something dogmatically, there appears to me to be opposed another argument, establishing something dogmatically, equal to it in credibility and lack of credibility." So uttering the phrase is not dogmatic; it is the report of a human feeling, which is apparent to the person who feels it.
1.204	προφέρονται δέ τινες καὶ οὕτω τὴν φωνήν 'παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεῖσθαι', ἀξιοῦντες παραγγελματικῶς τοῦτο 'παντὶ λόγῳ δογματικῶς τι κατασκευάζοντι λόγον δογματικῶς ζητοῦντα, ἴσον κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, μαχόμενον αὐτῷ ἀντιτιθῶμεν', ἵνα ὁ μὲν λόγος αὐτοῖς ᾖ πρὸς τὸν σκεπτικόν, χρῶνται δὲ ἀπαρεμφάτῳ ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ, τῷ 'ἀντικεῖσθαι' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἀντιτιθῶμεν'.	Some also utter the phrase in this form: "to every argument an equal argument is to be opposed," meaning it as an instruction: "To every argument that establishes something dogmatically, let us oppose an argument that investigates dogmatically, equal in credibility and lack of credibility, and conflicting with it." For them the formula is addressed to the skeptic, and they use the infinitive in place of the imperative—"to be opposed" in place of "let us oppose."
1.205	παραγγέλλουσι δὲ τοῦτο τῷ σκεπτικῷ, μή πως ὑπὸ τοῦ δογματικοῦ παρακρουσθεὶς ἀπείπῃ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ζήτησιν, καὶ τῆς φαινομένης αὐτοῖς ἀταραξίας, ἣν νομίζουσι παρυφίστασθαι τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, σφαλῇ προπετευσάμενος.	They give this instruction to the skeptic in case he is somehow tricked by the dogmatist into giving up the investigation of it, and through rashness misses the tranquility that appears to them—the tranquility they think follows on suspension of judgment about everything, as we pointed out earlier.

CHAPTER 28: SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS ON THE SKEPTICAL PHRASES

The phrases cancel themselves along with what they are about, as purgatives flush themselves out.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.206	Περὶ τοσούτων ἀρκέσει τῶν φωνῶν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει διεξελθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων δυνατόν ἐστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν παραλελειμμένων. περὶ πασῶν γὰρ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν ἐκεῖνο χρὴ προειληφέναι, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθεῖς αὐτὰς εἶναι πάντως οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγομεν δύνασθαι, συμπεριγραφομένας ἐκείνοις περὶ ὧν λέγονται, καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ τῶν φαρμάκων οὐ μόνον τοὺς χυμοὺς ὑπεξαιρεῖ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὰ τοῖς χυμοῖς συνεξάγει.	It will be enough to have gone through this many of the phrases, as befits an outline, especially since what we have now said makes it possible to speak about those we have left out as well. About all the skeptical phrases we must grasp in advance that we do not affirm that they are definitely true—after all, we say that they can be done away with by themselves, being cancelled along with the things they are said about, just as purgative drugs not only drive the humors out of the body but flush themselves out along with the humors.
1.207	φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ὡς οὐ κυρίως δηλοῦντες τὰ πράγματα, ἐφ' ὧν παραλαμβάνονται, τίθεμεν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως καὶ εἰ βούλονται καταχρηστικῶς· οὔτε γὰρ πρέπει τῷ σκεπτικῷ φωνομαχεῖν, ἄλλως τε ἡμῖν συνεργεῖ τὸ μηδὲ ταύτας τὰς φωνὰς εἰλικρινῶς σημαίνειν λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς σκεπτικούς.	We also say that we use them not as indicating strictly the things they are applied to, but indifferently, and loosely if people like. For it does not suit the skeptic to fight about words; and besides, it works in our favor that not even these phrases are said to signify purely, but relatively—relative, that is, to the skeptics.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.208	πρὸς τούτοις κἀκείνου δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι οὐ περὶ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων καθόλου φαμὲν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν φαμεν καὶ οὐχὶ διαβεβαιωτικῶς περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἀποφαινόμεθα· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων πᾶν σόφισμα πρὸς φωνὴν ἐνεχθὲν σκεπτικὴν οἶομαι δύνασθαι διατρέπεσθαι.	In addition, we must remember that we do not say them about all things universally, but about what is non-evident and investigated dogmatically; and that we say what appears to us, and make no affirmative declarations about the nature of external objects. For on these grounds, I think, every sophism brought against a skeptical phrase can be overturned.
1.209	ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ κριτήριον καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐφοδεύσαντες, καὶ περὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν εἰπόντες, τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐμπεφανίκαμεν, ἀκόλουθον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι καὶ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφιῶν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν διάκρισιν συντόμως ἐπελθεῖν, ἵνα σαφέστερον τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν ἀγωγὴν κατανοήσωμεν. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίας.	We have now made clear the character of skepticism by going through its concept, its parts, its criterion and its goal, and also the modes of suspension, and by discussing the skeptical phrases. So we think it fitting to go briefly through the distinction between skepticism and the philosophies close to it, so that we may understand the suspensive way more clearly. Let us begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus.

CHAPTER 29: THAT THE SKEPTICAL WAY DIFFERS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

Skepticism is no road to Heraclitus, who makes dogmatic claims about opposites.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.210	Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη διαφέρει τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀγωγῆς, πρόδηλον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος περὶ πολλῶν ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεται δογματικῶς, ἡμεῖς δ' οὐχί, καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον ἔλεγον ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν, διότι προηγεῖται τοῦ τἀναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τἀναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ μὲν σκεπτικοὶ φαίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτό, οἱ δὲ Ἡρακλείτειοι ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ μετέρχονται, φαμὲν πρὸς τούτους, ὅτι τὸ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι οὐ δόγμα ἐστὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα οὐ μόνον τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑποπῖπτον·	That this philosophy differs from our way is evident: Heraclitus makes dogmatic declarations about many non-evident things, and we do not, as has been said. But Aenesidemus and his followers said that the skeptical way is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy. Their reason was that opposites' appearing to hold of the same thing comes before their actually holding of it; and the skeptics say that opposites appear to hold of the same thing, while the Heracliteans move on from this to their actually holding. Against them we say that opposites' appearing to hold of the same thing is not a belief of the skeptics but a fact that strikes not only the skeptics but other philosophers and all human beings too.[32]
1.211	οὐδεὶς γοῦν τολμήσαι ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μέλι οὐ γλυκάζει τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας ἢ ὅτι τοὺς ἰκτερικοὺς οὐ πικράζει, ὥστε ἀπὸ κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεως ἄρχονται οἱ Ἡρακλείτειοι, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἴσως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι φιλοσοφίαι. διόπερ εἰ μὲν ἀπό τινος τῶν σκεπτικῶς λεγομένων ἐλάμβανον τὸ τἀναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκεῖσθαι, οἷον τοῦ 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα' ἢ τοῦ 'οὐδὲν ὁρίζω' ἤ τινος τῶν παραπλησίων, ἴσως ἂν συνῆγον	No one, at any rate, would dare to say that honey does not taste sweet to the healthy, or that it does not taste bitter to people with jaundice. So the Heracliteans start from a preconception common to all human beings, just as we do—and perhaps the other philosophies do too. If, then, they took the claim that opposites hold of the same thing

32 Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 500 BC) taught that opposites coexist in the same thing: "the way up and the way down are one and the same."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὃ λέγουσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ τῷ βίῳ ὑποπιπτούσας, τί μᾶλλον τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀγωγὴν ἢ ἑκάστην τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφιῶν ἢ καὶ τὸν βίον ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι λέγοι τις ἄν, ἐπειδὴ πάντες κοιναῖς ὕλαις κεχρήμεθα;	from one of the things skeptics say, such as "everything is inapprehensible" or "I determine nothing" or something similar, perhaps they would draw the conclusion they claim. But since their starting points strike not only us but other philosophers and ordinary life as well, why should anyone say that our way, rather than each of the other philosophies, or ordinary life itself, is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy, since we all make use of common material?
1.212	μήποτε δὲ οὐ μόνον οὐ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίας ἡ σκεπτικὴ ἀγωγή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποσυνεργεῖ, εἴγε ὁ σκεπτικὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου δογματιζόμενα ὡς προπετῶς λεγόμενα διαβάλλει, ἐναντιούμενος μὲν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει, ἐναντιούμενος δὲ τῷ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς δόγματος τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου τὴν μὲν δογματικὴν προπέτειαν διασύρων, τὸ δὲ 'οὐ καταλαμβάνω' καὶ τὸ 'οὐδὲν ὁρίζω' ἐπιφθεγγόμενος, ὡς ἔφην ἔμπροσθεν· ὅπερ μάχεται τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι τὸ τὴν μαχομένην ἀγωγὴν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν τῆς αἱρέσεως ἐκείνης ᾗ μάχεται· ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν.	Perhaps the skeptical way not only does not help toward knowing the Heraclitean philosophy but actually hinders it. For the skeptic disparages all of Heraclitus' beliefs as rashly stated: he opposes the conflagration, he opposes the claim that opposites hold of the same thing, and in the case of every belief of Heraclitus he mocks the dogmatic rashness and says "I do not apprehend" and "I determine nothing," as I said earlier—which conflicts with the Heracliteans. But it is absurd to say that a conflicting way is a road to the very school it conflicts with. It is therefore absurd to say that the skeptical way is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy.[33]

CHAPTER 30: HOW THE SKEPTICAL WAY DIFFERS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRITUS

Democritus uses "no more" differently and asserts that atoms and void are real.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.213	Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Δημοκρίτειος φιλοσοφία λέγεται κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ τῇ αὐτῇ ὕλῃ ἡμῖν κεχρῆσθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μέλι τοῖς δὲ πικρὸν τὸν Δημόκριτον ἐπιλογίζεσθαί φασι τὸ μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε πικρόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι τὴν 'οὐ μᾶλλον' φωνὴν σκεπτικὴν οὖσαν. διαφόρως μέντοι χρῶνται τῇ 'οὐ μᾶλλον' φωνῇ οἵ τε σκεπτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου· ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ μηδέτερον εἶναι τάττουσι τὴν φωνήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν, πότερον ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐθέτερόν τι ἔστι τῶν φαινομένων.	The philosophy of Democritus, too, is said to have something in common with skepticism, since it seems to use the same material as we do. For from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and bitter to others, Democritus, they say, reasons that it is neither sweet nor bitter, and for this reason utters the phrase "no more," which is a skeptical phrase. But the skeptics and the Democriteans use the phrase "no more" differently. The Democriteans apply it to neither alternative being the case; we apply it to our not knowing whether both, or neither, of the things that appear is the case.
1.214	ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν διαφέρομεν, προδηλοτάτη δὲ γίνεται ἡ διάκρισις ὅταν ὁ Δημόκριτος λέγῃ 'ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν'. 'ἐτεῇ' μὲν γὰρ λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἀληθείᾳ'· κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὑφεστάναι λέγων τάς τε ἀτόμους καὶ τὸ	So we differ in this respect too; but the distinction becomes most evident when Democritus says "in reality, atoms and void." By "in reality" he means "in truth"; and since he says that the atoms and the void exist in truth, it is superfluous, I think, to

33 The "conflagration" is the periodic destruction of the cosmos by fire, which the Stoics attributed to Heraclitus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	κενὸν ὅτι διενήνοχεν ἡμῶν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας τῶν φαινομένων ἄρχεται, περιττόν οἶμαι λέγειν.	say that he differs from us, even if he starts from the variation in what appears.

CHAPTER 31: HOW SKEPTICISM DIFFERS FROM THE CYRENAIC WAY

The Cyrenaics make pleasure the goal and declare external things inapprehensible.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.215	Φασὶ δέ τινες ὅτι ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ ἀγωγὴ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει, κἀκείνη τὰ πάθη μόνα φησὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνη μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησιν τέλος εἶναι λέγει, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν, ᾗ ἐναντιοῦται τὸ κατ' ἐκείνους τέλος· καὶ γὰρ παρούσης τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ μὴ παρούσης ταραχὰς ὑπομένει ὁ διαβεβαιούμενος τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἐπελογισάμην. εἶτα ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐπέχομεν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων, οἱ δὲ Κυρηναϊκοὶ ἀποφαίνονται φύσιν αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἀκατάληπτον.	Some say that the Cyrenaic way is the same as skepticism, since it too says that only feelings are apprehended. But it differs from skepticism. It says that the goal is pleasure and the smooth motion of the flesh, whereas we say it is tranquility, to which their goal is opposed: for whether pleasure is present or not, anyone who affirms that pleasure is the goal suffers disturbances, as I argued in the section on the goal. Then, too, we suspend judgment about external objects, as far as the argument goes, whereas the Cyrenaics declare that they have an inapprehensible nature.

CHAPTER 32: HOW SKEPTICISM DIFFERS FROM THE WAY OF PROTAGORAS

Protagoras makes the human being the measure, but holds beliefs about flowing matter.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.216	Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας δὲ βούλεται πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, 'μέτρον' μὲν λέγων τὸ κριτήριον, 'χρημάτων' δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς δυνάμει φάσκειν πάντων πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ μόνα, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι.	Protagoras, too, holds that a human being is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. By "measure" he means the criterion, and by "things" he means objects; so that in effect he is saying that a human being is the criterion of all objects—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. And for this reason he posits only what appears to each person, and in this way introduces relativity.[34]
1.217	διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνείους. διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰσόμεθα τὴν διαφοράν, ἐξαπλώσαντες συμμέτρως τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ. φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, ῥεούσης δὲ αὐτῆς συνεχῶς προσθέσεις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀποφορήσεων γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοσμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παρά τε ⟨τὰς⟩ ἡλικίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευὰς τῶν σωμάτων.	That is why he seems to have something in common with the Pyrrhonians. But he differs from them, and we will see the difference once we have set out, at moderate length, what Protagoras thought. He says that matter is in flux, and that as it flows, additions continually arise to replace what is given off; and that the senses are rearranged and altered depending on ⟨their⟩ ages and on the other constitutions of bodies.
1.218	λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων τῶν φαινομένων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δύνασθαι τὴν ὕλην ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ πάντα εἶναι ὅσα πᾶσι φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους	He also says that the principles of everything that appears are present in matter, so that matter, as

34 Protagoras of Abdera was a fifth-century BC sophist; his "a human being is the measure" opened his book *Truth*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν διαθέσεις· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καταλαμβάνειν ἃ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι φαίνεσθαι δύναται, τὸν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἃ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν.	far as it itself goes, can be everything that appears to everyone. Human beings, he says, perceive different things at different times depending on their different conditions: someone in a natural state apprehends those things in matter which can appear to people in a natural state, and someone in an unnatural state those which can appear to people in an unnatural state.
1.219	καὶ ἤδη παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν διαθέσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. γίνεται τοίνυν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων κριτήριον ὁ ἄνθρωπος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἔστιν. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι δογματίζει, ἀδήλων ὄντων καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφεκτῶν.	And again, the same account holds depending on ages, on being asleep or awake, and on every kind of condition. So according to him the human being becomes the criterion of what exists: for everything that appears to human beings also is, and what appears to no human being is not. We see, then, that he holds beliefs both about matter being in flux and about the principles of everything that appears being present in it—things that are non-evident, and on which we suspend judgment.

CHAPTER 33: HOW SKEPTICISM DIFFERS FROM THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

Plato, the New Academy, Arcesilaus and the later Academics are compared with skepticism.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.220	Φασὶ μέντοι τινὲς ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει· διόπερ ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τούτου διεξελθεῖν. Ἀκαδημίαι δὲ γεγόνασιν, ὡς φασὶ⟨ν οἱ⟩ πλείους [ἢ], τρεῖς, μία μὲν καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἡ τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα, δευτέρα δὲ καὶ μέση ἡ τῶν περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον τὸν ἀκουστὴν Πολέμωνος, τρίτη δὲ καὶ νέα ἡ τῶν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τετάρτην προστιθέασι τὴν περὶ Φίλωνα καὶ Χαρμίδαν, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πέμπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν περὶ [τὸν] Ἀντίοχον.	Some people, however, say that the Academic philosophy is the same as skepticism, so it would be fitting to go through this question too. According to ⟨most⟩ accounts there have been three Academies. The first and most ancient is that of Plato and his circle. The second, or Middle, Academy is that of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo. The third, or New, Academy is that of Carneades and Clitomachus. Some add a fourth as well, that of Philo and Charmidas, and some even count a fifth, that of Antiochus.[35]
1.221	ἀρξάμενοι τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἴδωμεν τὴν ⟨πρὸς ἡμᾶς⟩ διαφορὰν τῶν εἰρημένων φιλοσοφιῶν. τὸν Πλάτωνα οὖν οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικόν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ μέν τι ἀπορητικόν, κατὰ δέ τι δογματικόν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς γυμναστικοῖς [φασι] λόγοις, ἔνθα ὁ Σωκράτης εἰσάγεται ἤτοι παίζων πρός τινας ἢ ἀγωνιζόμενος πρὸς σοφιστάς, γυμναστικόν τε καὶ ἀπορητικόν φασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα, δογματικὸν δέ, ἔνθα σπουδάζων ἀποφαίνεται ἤτοι διὰ Σωκράτους ἢ Τιμαίου ἤ τινος τῶν τοιούτων.	Let us begin with the ancient one, then, and see how the philosophies just mentioned differ ⟨from us⟩. Some have said that Plato was dogmatic, others that he was aporetic, and others that he was aporetic in some respects and dogmatic in others. In his exercise dialogues [they say], where Socrates is brought on either playing with certain people or contending against sophists, his character is exercising and aporetic. But it is dogmatic where he speaks seriously and makes pronounce-

35 Arcesilaus (third century BC) first turned the Academy skeptical; Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon (first century BC), its last heads, moved it back toward doctrine.

GREEK

ENGLISH

ments, whether through Socrates or Timaeus or someone of that kind.

1.222 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν δογματικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λεγόντων, ἢ κατὰ μέν τι δογματικόν, κατὰ δέ τι ἀπορητικόν, περισσὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν νῦν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαφοράν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς σκεπτικὸς πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διαλαμβάνομεν, νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λέγομεν κατὰ ⟨τοὺς⟩ περὶ Μηνόδοτον καὶ Αἰνησίδημον (οὗτοι γὰρ μάλιστα ταύτης προέστησαν τῆς στάσεως), ὅτι ὅταν ὁ Πλάτων ἀποφαίνηται περὶ ἰδεῶν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι ἢ περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον αἱρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ μετὰ κακιῶν, εἴτε ὡς ὑπάρχουσι τούτοις συγκατατίθεται, δογματίζει, εἴτε ὡς πιθανωτέροις προστίθεται, ἐπεὶ προκρίνει τι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, ἐκπέφευγε τὸν σκεπτικὸν χαρακτῆρα· ὡς γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀλλότριον, ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον.

Now, about those who say he is dogmatic, or dogmatic in some respects and aporetic in others, it would be superfluous to speak at present, for they themselves admit that he differs from us. Whether he is purely skeptical we discuss more fully in our commentaries. For now, as in an outline, we say, following ⟨the circle of⟩ Menodotus and Aenesidemus (they were the chief champions of this position), that when Plato makes pronouncements about forms, or about there being providence, or about the life of excellence being more choiceworthy than the life of vice, there are two possibilities. If he assents to these things as real, he holds beliefs. If he accepts them as more persuasive, then, since he prefers one thing to another on grounds of credibility or lack of credibility, he has abandoned the skeptical character. That this too is foreign to us is evident from what we said earlier.[36]

1.223 εἰ δέ τινα καὶ σκεπτικῶς προφέρεται, ὅταν, ὡς φασί, γυμνάζηται, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔσται σκεπτικός· ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἑνὸς δογματίζων, ἢ προκρίνων φαντασίαν φαντασίας ὅλως κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ⟨ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος⟩ περί τινος τῶν ἀδήλων, τοῦ δογματικοῦ γίνεται χαρακτῆρος, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ Τίμων διὰ τῶν περὶ Ξενοφάνους αὐτῷ λεγομένων.

Even if he puts forward some things in a skeptical way when, as they say, he is exercising, that will not make him a skeptic. For someone who holds a belief about even one thing, or who prefers one impression to another at all on grounds of credibility or lack of credibility, ⟨or makes assertions⟩ about anything non-evident, takes on the dogmatic character. Timon too shows this by what he says about Xenophanes.

1.224 ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐπαινέσας [τὸν Ξενοφάνην], ὡς καὶ τοὺς σίλλους αὐτῷ ἀναθεῖναι, ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὀδυρόμενον καὶ λέγοντα ὡς καὶ ἐγὼν ὄφελον πυκινοῦ
νόου ἀντιβολῆσαι
ἀμφοτερόβλεπτος· δολίῃ δ’ ὁδῷ ἐξαπατήθην
πρεσβυγενὴς ἔτ’ ἐὼν καὶ ἀμενθήριστος ἁπάσης
σκεπτοσύνης. ὅππῃ γὰρ ἐμὸν νόον εἰρύσαιμι,
εἰς ἓν ταὐτό τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο· πᾶν δ’ ἐὸν αἰεί
πάντῃ ἀνελκόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἵσταθ’ ὁμοίην. διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ ὑπάτυφον αὐτὸν λέγει, καὶ οὐ τέλειον ἄτυφον, δι’ ὧν φησι Ξεινοφάνης ὑπάτυφος, ὁμηραπάτης ἐπισκώπτης,
εἰ τὸν ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων θεὸν ἐπλάσατ’ ἶσον ἁπάντῃ,
⟨ἀτρεμῆ⟩ ἀσκηθῆ νοερώτερον ἠὲ νόημα. ὑπάτυφον μὲν γὰρ εἶπε τὸν κατά τι ἄτυφον, ὁμηραπάτης δὲ ἐπισκώπτην, ἐπεὶ τὴν παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ ἀπάτην διέσυρεν.

Timon praised him [Xenophanes] in many respects, so far as even to dedicate his *Lampoons* to him, and he made him lament and say: “If only I too had met with a shrewd mind,
one that looks both ways! But I was cheated by a treacherous road,
old as I already was, and heedless of all skepticism. For wherever I turned my mind, everything resolved into one and the same; and all that is, forever
drawn back every way, settled into a single, uniform nature.” That, at any rate, is why he calls him “half free of conceit,” and not perfectly free of conceit, in the lines: “Xenophanes, half free of conceit, mocker of Homer’s deceit,
who fashioned a god far from human beings,

36 Menodotus of Nicomedia (second century AD) was a doctor of the Empiric school and a leading skeptic.

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		equal on every side, ⟨unshaken⟩, unharmed, more mind-like than thought." He called him "half free of conceit" because he was free of conceit in some respect, and "mocker of Homer's deceit" because he ridiculed the deceit in Homer.[37]
1.225	ἐδογμάτιζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσιν, εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν· ὅθεν καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὴν Ξενοφάνους πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν ἐπιδεικνύναι. πλὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον, ὅτι κἂν περί τινων ἐπαπορῇ ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἔν τισι φαίνεται ἢ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἀποφαινόμενος πραγμάτων ἀδήλων ἢ προκρίνων ἄδηλα κατὰ πίστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σκεπτικός.	Xenophanes held the belief, against the preconceptions of other people, that the universe is one, and that god is grown together with all things and is spherical, impassive, unchangeable and rational. So it is easy to show how Xenophanes differs from us. In any case, it is evident from what has been said that even if Plato raises puzzles about some things, he would not be a skeptic. For in some places he appears either to make pronouncements about the reality of non-evident things or to prefer some non-evident things to others on grounds of credibility.
1.226	Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας, εἰ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι πάντα φασί, διαφέρουσι τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ λέγειν πάντα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα (διαβεβαιοῦνται γὰρ περὶ τούτου, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καταληφθῆναί τινα προσδοκᾷ), διαφέρουσι δὲ ἡμῶν προδήλως ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν κρίσει. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ καὶ κακὸν οὐχ ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως, ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν τι ἢ κακὸν εἶναι λεγόντων οὐδὲν μετὰ τοῦ πιθανὸν εἶναι νομίζειν ὅ φαμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστως ἑπομένων τῷ βίῳ, ἵνα μὴ ἀνενέργητοι ὦμεν.	The members of the New Academy say that everything is inapprehensible. Even so, they differ from the skeptics, perhaps precisely in saying that everything is inapprehensible. They affirm this firmly, whereas the skeptic expects that it is possible for some things to be apprehended as well. But they evidently differ from us in their judgment of good and bad things. When the Academics say that something is good or bad, they do not say it as we do. They say it with the conviction that what they call good is more persuasively good than the opposite, and likewise with the bad. When we say that something is good or bad, we do not think that what we say is persuasive. We simply follow life without holding opinions, so as not to be inactive.
1.227	τάς τε φαντασίας ἡμεῖς μὲν ἴσας λέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὰς μὲν πιθανὰς εἶναί φασι τὰς δὲ ἀπιθάνους. καὶ τῶν πιθανῶν δὲ λέγουσι διαφοράς· τὰς μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανὰς ὑπάρχειν ἡγοῦνται, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ διεξωδευμένας, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ περιωδευμένας καὶ ἀπερισπάστους. οἷον ἐν οἴκῳ σκοτεινῷ ποσῶς κειμένου σχοινίου ἐσπειραμένου πιθανὴ ἁπλῶς φαντασία γίνεται ἀπὸ τούτου ὡς ἀπὸ ὄφεως τῷ ἀθρόως ἐπεισελθόντι·	We say that impressions are equal in credibility or lack of credibility, as far as the argument goes. They say that some impressions are persuasive and others unpersuasive. They also distinguish among persuasive impressions. Some, they think, are merely persuasive. Others are persuasive and examined. Still others are persuasive, tested and undiverted. For instance, when a coiled rope is lying in a fairly dark room, someone who rushes in all at once gets a simply persuasive impression from it, as if it came from a snake.

37 Timon of Phlius (third century BC), Pyrrho's disciple, wrote satirical poems called *Silloi* ("Lampoons"). Xenophanes of Colophon (sixth century BC) was a poet-philosopher who mocked Homer's gods.

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1.228	τῷ μέντοι περισκοπήσαντι ἀκριβῶς καὶ διεξοδεύσαντι τὰ περὶ αὐτό, οἷον ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται, ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, φαίνεται σχοινίον κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία τοιάδε ἐστίν. λέγεται ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀποθανοῦσαν τὴν Ἄλκηστιν αὖθις ἐξ Ἅιδου ἀναγαγεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τῷ Ἀδμήτῳ, ὃς πιθανὴν ⟨μὲν⟩ ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος καὶ περιωδευμένην· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ᾔδει ὅτι τέθνηκεν, περιεσπᾶτο αὐτοῦ ἡ διάνοια ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἔκλινεν. ⟨....⟩	But someone who has looked around carefully and examined the details may notice that it does not move, that its color is such-and-such, and each of the other points. To him it appears to be a rope, in virtue of the impression that is persuasive and tested. The undiverted impression is like this. Heracles is said to have brought Alcestis back up from Hades after she had died, and to have shown her to Admetus. Admetus received an impression of Alcestis that was persuasive and tested. But since he knew that she had died, his mind was diverted from assent and inclined toward disbelief. ⟨....⟩[38]
1.229	προκρίνουσιν οὖν οἱ ἐκ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας τῆς μὲν πιθανῆς ἁπλῶς τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην φαντασίαν, ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τούτων τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον. εἰ δὲ καὶ πείθεσθαί τισιν οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λέγουσι, πρόδηλος καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦτο διαφορὰ τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν.	So the members of the New Academy prefer the persuasive and tested impression to the simply persuasive one. To both of these they prefer the impression that is persuasive, tested and undiverted. And even if both the Academics and the skeptics say that they are persuaded by certain things, the difference between the philosophies is evident on this point too.
1.230	τὸ γὰρ πείθεσθαι λέγεται διαφόρως, τό τε μὴ ἀντιτείνειν ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς ἕπεσθαι ἄνευ σφοδρᾶς προσκλίσεως καὶ προσπαθείας, ὡς ὁ παῖς πείθεσθαι λέγεται τῷ παιδαγωγῷ· ἅπαξ δὲ τὸ μετὰ αἱρέσεως καὶ οἱονεὶ συμπαθείας κατὰ τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι συγκατατίθεσθαί τινι, ὡς ὁ ἄσωτος πείθεται τῷ δαπανητικῶς βιοῦν ἀξιοῦντι. διόπερ ἐπειδὴ οἱ μὲν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον μετὰ προσκλίσεως σφοδρᾶς πείθεσθαί τε καὶ πιθανὸν εἶναί τί φασιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἴκειν ἄνευ προσπαθείας, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν αὐτῶν διαφέροιμεν.	"Being persuaded" is said in different senses. In one sense it means not resisting but simply going along, without strong inclination or attachment, as a child is said to be persuaded by (that is, to obey) his attendant. In another sense it means assenting to something by choice and with a kind of sympathy, out of a strong desire, as a profligate is persuaded by someone who urges him to live extravagantly. Carneades, Clitomachus and their followers say, with strong inclination, that they are persuaded and that something is persuasive. We say so in the sense of simply yielding, without attachment. So we would differ from them on this point too.
1.231	ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ τέλος διαφέρομεν τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι λέγοντες ἄνδρες τῷ πιθανῷ προσχρῶνται κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πάθεσιν ἑπόμενοι βιοῦμεν ἀδοξάστως. καὶ πλείω δ' ἂν εἴπομεν πρὸς τὴν διάκρισιν, εἰ μὴ τῆς συντομίας ἐστοχαζόμεθα.	We also differ from the New Academy in matters bearing on the goal of life. The men who say they order their lives by its rule make use of the persuasive in living. We live without holding opinions, following laws, customs and natural feelings. And we would have said more to draw the distinction if we were not aiming at brevity.
1.232	Ὁ μέντοι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνείοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν	Arcesilaus, however, whom we called the head and founder of the Middle Academy, seems to me to share a great deal in the Pyrrhonian arguments,

38 In the myth, dramatized in Euripides' *Alcestis,* Alcestis died in place of her husband Admetus, and Heracles won her back from Death.

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	κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας τινὸς ἀποφαινόμενος εὑρίσκεται, οὔτε κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν προκρίνει τι ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχει. καὶ τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχήν, ᾗ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς ἐφάσκομεν.	so that his way and ours are practically one. He is not found making pronouncements about the reality or unreality of anything, and he does not prefer one thing to another on grounds of credibility or lack of credibility. He suspends judgment about everything. He says that the goal is suspension of judgment, which, as we said, is accompanied by tranquility.
1.233	λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐποχάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος συγκαταθέσεις. ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ διαβεβαιωτικῶς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι αὐτὸν λέγειν τὴν ἐποχήν, κακὸν δὲ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν.	He also says that particular suspensions of judgment are good and particular assents are bad. One might object that we say these things according to what appears to us and not affirmatively, whereas he says them as statements about the nature of things. On that view he would actually be saying that suspension of judgment is good and assent is bad.
1.234	εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις πιστεύειν, φασὶν ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρόχειρον Πυρρώνειος ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δογματικὸς ἦν· καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν ἑταίρων ἀπόπειραν ἐλάμβανε διὰ τῆς ἀπορητικῆς, εἰ εὐφυῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων, δόξαι αὐτὸν ἀπορητικὸν εἶναι, τοῖς μέντοι γε εὐφυέσι τῶν ἑταίρων τὰ Πλάτωνος παρεγχειρεῖν. ἔνθεν καὶ τὸν Ἀρίστωνα εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὄπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διόδωρος, διὰ τὸ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τῇ κατὰ τὸν Διόδωρον, εἶναι δὲ ἄντικρυς Πλατωνικόν.	If we are also to trust what is said about him, they say that on the surface he appeared to be a Pyrrhonian, but in truth he was a dogmatist. He used aporetic argument to test his companions, to see whether they had the natural gifts to take up Plato's beliefs. For this reason he was thought to be aporetic, though he would pass on Plato's doctrines to those companions who were gifted. That is why Ariston said of him: "Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle." He made use of Diodorus' dialectic, but he was an out-and-out Platonist.[39]
1.235	Οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, καταληπτά. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στοὰν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὡς καὶ εἰρῆσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ Στωικά· ἐπεδείκνυε γὰρ ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνι κεῖται τὰ τῶν Στωικῶν δόγματα. ὡς πρόδηλον εἶναι τὴν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διαφορὰν πρός τε τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τὴν πέμπτην καλουμένην Ἀκαδημίαν.	Philo and his followers say that things are inapprehensible as far as the Stoic criterion goes, that is, the apprehensive impression. As far as the nature of the things themselves goes, however, they say things are apprehensible. Antiochus, for his part, transferred the Stoa into the Academy, so that it was even said of him that he did Stoic philosophy in the Academy. He tried to show that the Stoics' beliefs are already to be found in Plato. So the difference between the skeptical way and the so-called Fourth and Fifth Academies is evident.

CHAPTER 34: WHETHER EMPIRIC MEDICINE IS THE SAME AS SKEPTICISM

Empiric medicine asserts too much; the Methodist school of medicine is closer to skepticism.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.236		

39 Ariston of Chios was a Stoic. His line parodies Homer's Chimaera ("lion in front, serpent behind, goat in the middle"), and Diodorus Cronus was a dialectician famous for logical puzzles.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν αἱρέσει τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναί λέγουσί τινες τὴν σκεπτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, γνωστέον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη περὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων διαβεβαιοῦται, οὔτε ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει οὔτε ἁρμόζοι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην μέθοδον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δύναιτο ἂν μετιέναι·	Some people also say that the skeptical philosophy is the same as the Empiric school of medicine. It should be understood that if that Empiricism firmly affirms that non-evident things are inapprehensible, then it is not the same as skepticism, and it would not suit the skeptic to take up that school. It seems to me that he could rather follow the so-called Method.[40]
1.237	αὕτη γὰρ μόνη τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἱρέσεων περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀδήλων δοκεῖ μὴ προπετεύεσθαι, πότερον καταληπτά ἐστιν ἢ ἀκατάληπτα λέγειν αὐθαδειαζομένη, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἑπομένη ἀπὸ τούτων λαμβάνει τὸ συμφέρειν δοκοῦν κατὰ τὴν τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀκολουθίαν. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ὁ βίος ὁ κοινός, ᾧ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς χρῆται, τετραμερής ἐστιν, τὸ μέν τι ἔχων ἐν ὑφηγήσει φύσεως, τὸ δ’ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δ’ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἐθῶν, τὸ δ’ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν.	Of all the medical schools, this one alone seems not to be rash about non-evident things, presuming to say whether they are apprehensible or inapprehensible. It follows appearances and takes from them what seems beneficial, in keeping with the skeptics’ practice. We said earlier that the common life, which the skeptic also makes use of, has four parts. One lies in the guidance of nature, one in the compulsion of feelings, one in the handing down of laws and customs, and one in the teaching of arts.
1.238	ὥσπερ οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην τῶν παθῶν ὁ σκεπτικὸς ὑπὸ μὲν δίψους ἐπὶ ποτὸν ὁδηγεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ λιμοῦ ἐπὶ τροφήν, καὶ ἐπί τι τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς ἰατρὸς ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα ὁδηγεῖται, ὑπὸ μὲν στεγνώσεως ἐπὶ τὴν χαύνωσιν, ὡς καταφεύγει τις ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ ψῦχος ἐπιτεταμένον πυκνώσεως ἐπὶ ἀλέαν, ὑπὸ δὲ ῥύσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἱδρῶτι πολλῷ περιρρεόμενοι καὶ ἐκλυόμενοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτοῦ παραγίνονται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τὸν ψυχρὸν ἀέρα καταφεύγουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσει ἀλλότρια ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτῶν ἰέναι καταναγκάζει, πρόδηλον, ὅπου γε καὶ ὁ κύων σκόλοπος αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτοῦ παραγίνεται.	By the compulsion of feelings, the skeptic is led to drink by thirst, to food by hunger, and likewise to other things. In the same way, the Methodist doctor is led by the affections to what corresponds to them. Constriction leads him to relaxation, just as someone takes refuge in warmth from the contraction caused by intense cold. Flux leads him to stop it, just as people in a bathhouse who are dripping with sweat and growing faint come to stop it, and for that reason take refuge in the cool air. It is also evident that things alien to nature compel us to set about removing them, since even a dog, when a thorn has stuck in it, sets about getting it out.
1.239	καὶ ἵνα μὴ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγων ἐκβαίνω τὸν ὑποτυπωτικὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς, πάντα οἶμαι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν μεθοδικῶν οὕτω λεγόμενα ὑποτάσσεσθαι δύνασθαι τῇ ἐκ τῶν παθῶν ἀνάγκῃ, τῶν τε κατὰ φύσιν ⟨καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν⟩ πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστόν τε καὶ ἀδιάφορον τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κοινὸν εἶναι τῶν ἀγωγῶν.	I do not want to depart from the outline character of this treatise by speaking about each case. So I will say only that I think everything the Methodists say in this way can be brought under the compulsion of the affections, both those in accordance with nature ⟨and those contrary to nature⟩. Besides, both ways have in common an undogmatic and indifferent use of words.
1.240	ὡς γὰρ ὁ σκεπτικὸς ⟨ἀδοξάστως⟩ χρῆται τῇ ‘οὐδὲν ὁρίζω’ φωνῇ καὶ τῇ ‘οὐδὲν καταλαμβάνω,’ καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς ‘κοινότητα’ λέγει καὶ ‘διήκειν’ καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀπεριέργως. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐνδείξεως	The skeptic uses the phrases “I determine nothing” and “I apprehend nothing” ⟨without holding opinions⟩, as we have said. In the same way the Methodist speaks of “commonality” and “pervad-

40 Ancient medicine had rival schools. The Rationalists inferred hidden causes, the Empirics relied on experience, and the Methodists treated observable “commonalities” of disease.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὄνομα ἀδοξάστως παραλαμβάνει ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων παθῶν τῶν τε κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ὁδηγήσεως ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ δίψους καὶ ἐπὶ λιμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπεμίμνῃσκον.	ing" and the like, without overelaboration. He also takes up the term "indication" without holding opinions, meaning by it the guidance from the apparent affections, both natural and unnatural, toward what seem to be the corresponding remedies. I mentioned this in the case of thirst, hunger and the rest.
1.241	ὅθεν οἰκειότητά τινα ἔχειν τὴν ἀγωγὴν τὴν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν τῶν μεθοδικῶν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἱρέσεων (καὶ ὡς πρὸς σύγκρισιν ἐκείνων, οὐχ ἁπλῶς), ῥητέον ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων τούτοις τεκμαιρομένους. Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν παρακεῖσθαι δοκούντων τῇ κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς ἀγωγῇ διεξελθόντες, ἐν τούτοις ἀπαρτίζομεν τόν τε καθόλου τῆς σκέψεως λόγον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.	Judging from these and similar points, then, we should say that the Methodists' way in medicine has a certain affinity with skepticism, more than the other medical schools have. Even so, this holds only in comparison with them, not without qualification. Having said this much about the approaches that seem to lie close to the skeptics' way, we here complete both the general account of skepticism and the first book of the *Outlines*.

Book II

Against the logicians
The criterion of truth, signs, proof, syllogism, induction and definition.

CHAPTER 1: Εἰ ΔΥΝΑΤΑΙ ΖΗΤΕΙΝ Ὁ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΙΣ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΙΣ

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.1	Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικοὺς μετήλθομεν, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας συντόμως καὶ ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐφοδεύσωμεν, πρότερον ἀποκρινάμενοι πρὸς τούς ἀεὶ θρυλοῦντας ὡς μήτε ζητεῖν μήτε νοεῖν ὅλως οἷός τέ ἐστιν ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν δογματιζομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς.	Since we have taken up the investigation against the dogmatists, let us go through each of the parts of what is called philosophy, concisely and in outline. First, though, we must reply to those who keep repeating that the skeptic cannot investigate, or even think at all, about the things they hold beliefs about.
2.2	φασὶ γὰρ ὡς ἤτοι καταλαμβάνει ὁ σκεπτικὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα ἢ οὐ καταλαμβάνει· καὶ εἰ μὲν καταλαμβάνει, πῶς ἂν ἀποροίη περὶ ὧν κατειληφέναι λέγει; εἰ δ' οὐ καταλαμβάνει, ἄρα περὶ ὧν οὐ κατείληφεν οὐδὲ οἶδε λέγειν.	They say that the skeptic either apprehends what the dogmatists say or does not apprehend it. If he apprehends it, how could he be puzzled about things he says he has apprehended? If he does not apprehend it, then he does not even know how to speak about things he has not apprehended.
2.3	ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδώς, εἰ τύχοι, τί ἐστι τὸ *καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου ἢ τὸ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν* θεώρημα, οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν τι δύναται περὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ὁ μὴ γινώσκων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὐ δύναται ζητεῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δύναται ζητεῖν ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς.	Someone who does not know, say, what the "by subtraction" theorem or the "through two conditionals" theorem is cannot say anything about them either. In the same way, someone who does not know each of the things the dogmatists say cannot investigate against them about things he does not know. So the skeptic is in no way able to investigate what the dogmatists say.[1]
2.4	οἱ δὴ ταῦτα λέγοντες ἀποκρινάσθωσαν ἡμῖν, πῶς λέγουσι νῦν τὸ καταλαμβάνειν, πότερον τὸ νοεῖν ἁπλῶς ἄνευ τοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐκείνων περὶ ὧν ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἐκείνων τιθέναι περὶ ὧν διαλεγόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ καταλαμβάνειν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατατίθεσθαι, τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὔσης ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένης καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένης, οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ βουλήσονται τάχα μὴ δύνασθαι ζητεῖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἃ μὴ κατειλήφασιν οὕτως.	Let those who say this answer us: in what sense are they using the word "apprehending" here? Do they mean simply thinking, without also firmly affirming the reality of the things we are discussing? Or do they mean thinking together with positing the reality of the things we are discussing? Suppose they say that in their argument apprehending is assenting to an apprehensive impression. The apprehensive impression is one that comes from something real, imprinted and stamped in accordance with that real thing itself, of such a kind as could not come from something unreal. In that case perhaps not even they will want it to be

1 Two theorems of Stoic logic; the Greek text of their names is uncertain.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		impossible to investigate things they have not apprehended in this way.
2.5	οἷον γοῦν ὅταν ὁ Στωικὸς πρὸς τὸν Ἐπικούρειον ζητῇ λέγοντα ὅτι διῄρηται ἡ οὐσία ἢ ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὐ προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἢ ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, πότερον κατείληφεν ἢ οὐ κατείληφεν; καὶ εἰ μὲν κατείληφεν, ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ λέγων ἅρδην ἀναιρεῖ τὴν Στοάν· εἰ δ' οὐ κατείληφεν, οὐ δύναταί τι πρὸς αὐτὰ λέγειν.	For example, suppose the Stoic investigates against the Epicurean, who says that substance is divided, or that god does not exercise providence over things in the world, or that pleasure is good. Has the Stoic apprehended these claims or not? If he has apprehended them, then in saying they are real he does away with the Stoa altogether. If he has not, he cannot say anything against them.
2.6	τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἱρέσεων ἀναγομένους λεκτέον, ὅταν τι ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις αὐτῶν ἐθέλωσιν. ὥστε οὐ δύνανται περί τινος ζητεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ χρὴ μὴ ληρεῖν, συγχυθήσεται μὲν αὐτῶν ἅπασα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡ δογματική, συντόνως δὲ προσαχθήσεται ἡ σκεπτικὴ φιλοσοφία, διδομένου τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ζητεῖν περὶ τοῦ μὴ οὕτως κατειλημμένου.	The same must be said to the adherents of the other schools whenever they want to investigate the views of those who think differently. So they cannot investigate anything with one another. Or rather, if we are not to talk nonsense, practically their whole dogmatism will be thrown into confusion, and the skeptical philosophy will be firmly established, once it is granted that one cannot investigate what has not been apprehended in this way.
2.7	ὁ γὰρ περί τινος ἀδήλου πράγματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι τε καὶ δογματίζων ἤτοι κατειληφὼς αὐτὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέξει ἢ μὴ κατειληφώς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ κατειληφώς, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ κατειληφώς, ἤτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὸν αὐτῷ τοῦτο λέξει κατειληφέναι ἢ διά τινος ἐρεύνης καὶ ζητήσεως.	Take someone who makes assertions and holds beliefs about some non-evident matter. He will say that he makes assertions about it either having apprehended it or without having apprehended it. If he has not apprehended it, he will not be credible. If he has apprehended it, he will say that he apprehended it in one of two ways. Either it presented itself to him directly, of itself and clearly, or he reached it through some inquiry and investigation.
2.8	ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ περιπτωτικῶς κατ' ἐνάργειαν λέγοι ὑποπεσεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ κατειλῆφθαι τὸ ἄδηλον, οὕτως ἂν οὐδὲ ἄδηλον εἴη ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον καὶ ὁμολογούμενον καὶ μὴ διαπεφωνημένον. περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνήνυτος γέγονε παρ' αὐτοῖς διαφωνία· οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὸν αὐτῷ κατειληφὼς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄδηλον ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ διαβεβαιούμενός τε καὶ ἀποφαινόμενος δογματικός.	Suppose he says that the non-evident thing presented itself to him directly, of itself and clearly, through his encountering it, and was apprehended. Then it would not be non-evident at all. It would be apparent to everyone equally, agreed upon and undisputed. But about each non-evident thing an endless disagreement has arisen among them. So the dogmatist who firmly affirms and makes assertions about the reality of a non-evident thing cannot have apprehended it by its presenting itself to him of itself and clearly.
2.9	εἰ δὲ διά τινος ἐρεύνης, πῶς οἷός τε ἦν ζητεῖν πρὸ τοῦ καταλαβεῖν ἀκριβῶς αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν; τῆς μὲν γὰρ ζητήσεως χρῃζούσης τοῦ πρότερον ἀκριβῶς κατειλῆφθαι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτω ζητεῖσθαι, τῆς δὲ καταλήψεως τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος	If he reached it through some inquiry, how was he able to investigate it before he had precisely apprehended it, on the hypothesis before us? Investigation requires that what is to be investigated first be precisely apprehended, and only then in-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δεομένης πάλιν αὐτῆς τοῦ προεζητῆσθαι πάντως αὐτό, κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τῆς ἀπορίας ἀδύνατον αὐτοῖς γίγνεται καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τὸ δογματίζειν, ἤν τε ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως ἄρχεσθαι βούλωνταί τινες, μεταγόντων ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν αὐτὸ προεζητηκέναι πρὸ τοῦ κατειληφέναι, ἤν τε ἀπὸ τῆς ζητήσεως, ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ζητεῖν κατειληφέναι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μήτε καταλαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαί τι τῶν ἀδήλων μήτε ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαβεβαιωτικῶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.	vestigated. Apprehension of the thing under investigation, in turn, requires that it has in every case been investigated beforehand. So by the mode of reciprocity it becomes impossible for them either to investigate non-evident things or to hold beliefs about them. If some of them want to start from apprehension, we bring them round to the point that they must have investigated the thing before apprehending it. If they want to start from investigation, we bring them round to the point that they must have apprehended what is to be investigated before investigating it. So for these reasons they can neither apprehend any non-evident thing nor make firm assertions about such things.
	ἐξ ὧν ἀναιρεῖσθαι μὲν τὴν δογματικὴν εὑρεσιλογίαν αὐτόθεν, οἶμαι, συμβήσεται, τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν δὲ εἰσάγεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν.	From this it will follow directly, I think, that the dogmatists' clever inventions are done away with and the suspensive philosophy is brought in.
2.10	εἰ δὲ φήσουσι μὴ τοιαύτην [λέγειν] κατάληψιν ἡγεῖσθαι ζητήσεως προσήκειν, νόησιν δὲ ἁπλῶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον [ἐν] τοῖς ἐπέχουσι περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν ἀδήλων ζητεῖν. νοήσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπείργεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἶμαι, ἀπό τε τῶν παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων ⟨καὶ⟩ κατ' φαινομένων αὐτῷ λόγων γινομένης καὶ μὴ πάντως εἰσαγούσης τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν νοουμένων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ ὑπάρχοντα νοοῦμεν, ὥς φασιν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα. ὅθεν καὶ ζητῶν καὶ νοῶν ἐν τῇ σκεπτικῇ διαθέσει μένει ὁ ἐφεκτικός· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ὑποπίπτουσιν αὐτῷ, καθὸ φαίνεται αὐτῷ, συγκατατίθεται, δεδήλωται.	They may say instead that the kind of apprehension they think must precede investigation is not this kind but simply thinking. In that case it is not impossible for those who suspend judgment about the reality of non-evident things to investigate. The skeptic is not, I think, barred from thinking. Thinking arises from things that strike him passively ⟨and⟩ from arguments that appear to him, and it does not in every case bring with it the reality of what is thought. For we think not only of real things, as they say, but also of unreal ones. So the person who suspends judgment remains in the skeptical disposition both while investigating and while thinking. We have already shown that he assents to what strikes him by way of a passive impression, insofar as it appears to him.
2.11	ὅρα δὲ μὴ καὶ νῦν οἱ δογματικοὶ ζητήσεως ἀπείργωνται. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁμολογοῦσι τὸ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνακόλουθον, τοῖς δ' ἐπ' ἀκριβὲς οἰομένοις ταῦτα γινώσκειν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πέρας ἤδη πάρεστιν ἡ ζήτησις, ὡς ὑπειλήφασιν, οἷς δὲ τὸ δι' ὃ πᾶσα συνίσταται ζήτησις ἀκμὴν ὑπάρχει, τὸ νομίζειν ὡς οὐχ εὑρήκασιν.	Consider whether it is not rather the dogmatists who are barred from investigation even now. Going on investigating things is not inconsistent for those who admit that they do not know how things are in their nature. It is inconsistent for those who think they know them precisely. For the latter, investigation has already reached its end, as they suppose. For the former, the reason why any investigation is undertaken is still present: the thought that they have not found the answer.
2.12	Οὐκοῦν ζητητέον ἡμῖν ἐστι περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας συντόμως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλὴ γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς διαφωνία περὶ	So for the present we must investigate each part of what is called philosophy, concisely. There has been much disagreement among the dogmatists

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τῶν μερῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, τῶν μὲν ἕν, τῶν δὲ δύο, τῶν δὲ τρία εἶναι λεγόντων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ ἂν εἴη προσῆκον πλείω διεξιέναι, τὴν δόξαν τῶν δοκούντων τελειότερον ἀνεστράφθαι κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐκθέμενοι κατ' αὐτὴν προσάξομεν τὸν λόγον.	about the parts of philosophy: some say there is one, some two, some three. It would not be appropriate to go into this further. We will set out, even-handedly, the view of those who seem to have dealt with the matter more thoroughly, and conduct our argument in line with it.

CHAPTER 2: WHERE THE INVESTIGATION AGAINST THE DOGMATISTS SHOULD BEGIN

Following the Stoic division of philosophy, Sextus begins with logic and the criterion.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.13	Οἱ Στωικοὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τρία μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἶναι λέγουσι, λογικὸν φυσικὸν ἠθικόν· καὶ ἄρχονταί γε τῆς διδασκαλίας ἀπὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ, καίτοι πολλῆς καὶ περὶ τοῦ πόθεν ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ στάσεως γεγενημένης. οἷς ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδοξάστως, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ μέρεσι λεγόμενα κρίσεως χρῄζει καὶ κριτηρίου, ὁ δὲ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τῷ λογικῷ μέρει, ἀρξώμεθα ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγου καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους,	The Stoics, then, and some others say that there are three parts of philosophy: logic, physics and ethics. They begin their teaching with logic, although there has been much dispute about where one ought to begin. We will follow them, without holding opinions. What is said in the three parts requires judgment and a criterion, and the account of the criterion seems to be included in the logical part. So let us begin with the account of the criterion and with the logical part,

CHAPTER 3: ON THE CRITERION

The senses of "criterion," and the criterion "by which," "through which" and "according to which."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.14	ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες, ὅτι κριτήριον μὲν λέγεται τό τε ᾧ κρίνεσθαί φασιν ὕπαρξιν καὶ ἀνυπαρξίαν καὶ τὸ ᾧ προσέχοντες βιοῦμεν, πρόκειται δὲ ἡμῖν νῦν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι λεγομένου διαλαβεῖν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον σημαινόμενον ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς σκέψεως λόγῳ διεξήλθομεν.	after first saying this. "Criterion" is used both of that by which, they say, reality and unreality are judged, and of that which we attend to in living. Our task now is to discuss what is said to be the criterion of truth. We went through the criterion in the other sense in our account of skepticism.
2.15	Τὸ κριτήριον τοίνυν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν λέγεται τριχῶς, κοινῶς ἰδίως ἰδιαίτατα, κοινῶς μὲν πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ οὕτω προσαγορεύεται κριτήρια, ὡς ὅρασις· ἰδίως δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ὡς κανὼν καὶ διαβήτης· ἰδιαίτατα δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικὰ οὐ λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικὰ καὶ ἅπερ οἱ δογματικοὶ φέρουσι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν.	The criterion under discussion, then, is spoken of in three ways: in a general, a special and a most special sense. In the general sense it is any standard of apprehension, and in this sense even natural things, like sight, are called criteria. In the special sense it is any technical standard of apprehension, like a ruler or a pair of compasses. In the most special sense it is any standard of apprehension of a non-evident matter. In this sense the things of everyday life are not called criteria. Only logical criteria are, the ones the dogmatists bring forward for judging truth.
2.16	φαμὲν οὖν προηγουμένως περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ κριτηρίου διεξιέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λέγοιτ' ἂν τριχῶς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὅ, οἷον ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ἤτοι αἴσθησις ἢ διάνοια, καθ' ὃ δὲ	So we propose to go through the logical criterion primarily. But the logical criterion too might be spoken of in three ways: the criterion "by which,"

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἡ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλει κρίνειν διά τινος τῶν προειρημένων.	"through which" and "according to which." For instance, the "by which" is a human being. The "through which" is either perception or the intellect. The "according to which" is the impact of the impression, according to which the human being sets about judging through one of the things just mentioned.
2.17	Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἁρμόζον ἦν ἴσως προειπεῖν, ἵνα ἐννοήσωμεν, περὶ οὗ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν χωρῶμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας προπετῶς κατειληφέναι τὸ κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ἀρξάμενοι.	It was perhaps appropriate to say this first, so that we have a conception of what our argument is about. Now let us proceed to our rebuttal of those who rashly say they have apprehended the criterion of truth, beginning with the disagreement.

CHAPTER 4: WHETHER THERE IS A CRITERION OF TRUTH

The disagreement about the criterion cannot be settled without falling into regress or reciprocity.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.18	Τῶν διαλαβόντων τοίνυν περὶ κριτηρίου οἱ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο ἀπεφήναντο, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Κορίνθιος Ξενιάδης καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος, λέγων δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται· ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπέσχομεν, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.	Of those who have discussed the criterion, some have asserted that there is one, like the Stoics and some others. Others have asserted that there is not. Among them are Xeniades of Corinth and Xenophanes of Colophon, who says: "but opinion is fashioned over all things." We have suspended judgment as to whether there is one or not.
2.19	ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἤτοι ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσιν ἢ ἀνεπίκριτον· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον, αὐτόθεν [εἶναι] δώσουσι τὸ δεῖν ἐπέχειν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτήν, τίνι κριθήσεται λεγέτωσαν, μήτε κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, μήθ' ὅλως εἰ ἔστιν εἰδότων ἀλλὰ ζητούντων.	They will say, then, that this disagreement is either decidable or undecidable. If it is undecidable, they will grant at once that one must suspend judgment. If it is decidable, let them say what it will be judged by. We have no agreed criterion. We do not even know whether there is one at all; we are still investigating.
2.20	καὶ ἄλλως, ἵνα ἡ γενομένη περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνία ἐπικριθῇ, δεῖ κριτήριον ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ὡμολογημένον, δι' οὗ δυνησόμεθα κρίνειν αὐτήν· καὶ ἵνα κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἔχωμεν, δεῖ πρότερον ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνίαν. οὕτω δὲ εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτοντος τρόπον τοῦ λόγου, ἄπορος ἡ εὕρεσις τοῦ κριτηρίου γίνεται, μήτε ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἡμῶν ἐώντων αὐτοὺς κριτήριον λαμβάνειν, ἐάν τε κριτηρίῳ τὸ κριτήριον κρίνειν ἐθέλωσιν, εἰς ἀπειρίαν αὐτοὺς ἐκβαλλόντων. ἀλλὰ καί, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις δεῖται κριτηρίου ἀποδεδειγμένου, τὸ δὲ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐκβάλλονται τρόπον.	Again, for the disagreement about the criterion to be decided, we must have an agreed criterion by which we can judge it. And for us to have an agreed criterion, the disagreement about the criterion must first be decided. With the argument falling into the mode of reciprocity in this way, finding the criterion becomes impossible. We do not allow them to adopt a criterion by hypothesis, and if they want to judge the criterion by a criterion, we throw them into an infinite regress. Further, since a proof needs a proven criterion and a criterion needs a judged proof, they are thrown into the mode of reciprocity.
2.21	Οἰόμενοι οὖν ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι δεικνύναι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν κατὰ τὸν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγον, ἵνα καὶ ποικίλως αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν, οὐκ	We think these points too are enough to show the rashness of the dogmatists in their account of the criterion. Still, so that we can refute them in vari-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἄτοπον προσκαρτερῆσαι τῷ τόπῳ. οὐ μὴν ἑκάστῃ τῶν περὶ κριτηρίου δοξῶν ἀμιλληθῆναι προαιρούμεθα εἰδικῶς (ἀμύθητος γὰρ ἡ διαφωνία γέγονεν, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀμέθοδον καὶ ἡμᾶς λόγον ἐμπεσεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται), ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κριτήριον περὶ οὗ ζητοῦμεν τρισσὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τό τε ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὅ, ἕκαστον τούτων ἐπελθόντες ἐν μέρει τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν αὐτοῦ παραστήσομεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμέθοδος ἅμα καὶ τέλειος ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσται. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ· δοκεῖ γάρ πως συναπορεῖσθαι τούτῳ καὶ τὰ λοιπά.	ous ways, it is not out of place to dwell on the topic. We do not propose to contend with each of the views about the criterion in detail. The disagreement has become unspeakably large, and that way we too would necessarily fall into an unmethodical argument. But the criterion we are investigating seems to be threefold: the "by which," the "through which" and the "according to which." So we will go through each of these in turn and establish its inapprehensibility, and in this way our argument will be both methodical and complete. Let us begin with the "by which," for the others seem somehow to become puzzling along with it.

CHAPTER 5: ON THE "BY WHICH"

The human being cannot be conceived or apprehended, and no one person, expert or majority can be trusted.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.22	Ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοίνυν δοκεῖ μοι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ μόνον ἀκατάληπτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνεπινόητος εἶναι. ἀκούομεν γοῦν τοῦ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Σωκράτους διαρρήδην ὁμολογοῦντος μὴ εἰδέναι, πότερον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι. παριστάναι τε βουλόμενοι τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν διαφωνοῦσιν, εἶτα καὶ ἀσύνετα λέγουσιν.	The human being, it seems to me, is not only inapprehensible but even inconceivable, as far as what the dogmatists say goes. At any rate, we hear Plato's Socrates explicitly admitting that he does not know whether he is a human being or something else. And when they want to establish the concept of a human being, first they disagree, and then they say unintelligible things.[2]
2.23	ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημόκριτός φησιν ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν. ὅσον δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὐ γνωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ κύνα ἴσμεν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔσται καὶ ὁ κύων ἄνθρωπος. τινάς τε ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἴσμεν· διὸ οὐκ ἔσονται ἄνθρωποι. μᾶλλον δέ, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ταύτῃ, οὐδεὶς ἔσται ἄνθρωπος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μέν φησι δεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων γινώσκεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐδένα δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἴσασι πάντες ἄνθρωποι, οὐδεὶς ἔσται κατ' αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπος.	Democritus says that a human being is what we all know. As far as this goes, we will not know the human being. We also know a dog, and on that ground the dog too will be a human being. And there are some human beings we do not know, so they will not be human beings. Or rather, as far as this concept goes, no one will be a human being. He says that a human being must be known by everyone, and no human being is known by all human beings, so on his view no one will be a human being.
2.24	καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ σοφιζόμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀκολουθίας φαίνεται. μόνα γὰρ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχειν φησὶν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ τὸ κενόν, ἅπερ φησὶν οὐ μόνον τοῖς ζῴοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρίμασιν ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἰδιότητα, ἐπειδὴ κοινὰ πάντων ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὑπόκειται παρὰ ταῦτα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔξομεν δι' οὗ	That we are not arguing sophistically here is apparent from what follows from his position. The man says that only atoms and the void truly exist. He says that these belong not only to animals but to all compounds. So as far as these go, we will not conceive what is peculiar to the human being, since they are common to everything. But nothing else exists besides these. So we will have nothing

2 In Plato's *Phaedrus* (230a) Socrates says he is investigating whether he is a beast more complex than Typhon or a gentler, simpler creature.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τὸν ἄνθρωπον διακρῖναί τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ εἰλικρινῶς νοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.	by which we can distinguish the human being from the other animals and conceive him clearly.
2.25	ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρός φησιν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ τοιουτονὶ μόρφωμα μετὰ ἐμψυχίας. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δέ, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δείξει ἐμφανίζεται, ὁ μὴ δεικνύμενος οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ εἰ μὲν γυναῖκα δείκνυσί τις, ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ ἄνδρα, ἡ γυνὴ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔσται. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν περιστάσεων ἃς ἴσμεν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τρόπου τῆς ἐποχῆς.	Epicurus says that a human being is this sort of shape, endowed with soul. On his view too, since a human being is exhibited by pointing, anyone who is not pointed out is not a human being. If someone points out a woman, a man will not be a human being; if he points out a man, a woman will not be one. We will argue the same way from the difference of circumstances, which we know from the fourth mode of suspension.
2.26	ἄλλοι ⟨δὲ⟩ ἔφασκον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν δείκνυται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπῳ, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι ζῷον ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά ἐστι πάντα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγομένοις, οὐ γνωσόμεθα, τί ποτε λέγουσιν.	Others have said that a human being is a rational mortal animal, receptive of mind and knowledge. But the first mode of suspension shows that no animal is non-rational, and that all animals are receptive of mind and knowledge, as far as their own statements go. So we will not know what in the world they mean.
2.27	τά τε κείμενα ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ συμβεβηκότα ἤτοι κατ' ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν ἢ δυνάμει. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἤδη τελείαν ἀνειληφὼς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τέλειος ὢν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν καθεστώς· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ θνητόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων τέλειον οὔτε ὁ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀνειληφώς· [καὶ] τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. καὶ ταύτῃ ἄρα ἀσύστατος πέφηνεν ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.	Moreover, they mean the attributes included in the definition either in actuality or in potentiality. If in actuality, no one is a human being who has not already acquired complete knowledge, is perfect in reason, and is in the very act of dying, since that is what being mortal in actuality is. If in potentiality, then neither someone with perfect reason nor someone who has acquired mind and knowledge will be a human being, and this is more absurd than the first. So in this way too the conception of the human being has turned out to be incoherent.
2.28	ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων, ὅταν ἀποφαίνηται τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῷον ἄπτερον δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ διαβεβαιωτικῶς τοῦτο ἐκτίθεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἕν τί ἐστι τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν γινομένων μέν, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄντων, ἀδύνατον δὲ περὶ τῶν μηδέποτε ὄντων διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἀξιώσει τὸν ὅρον ἐκτίθεσθαι δοκεῖν ὡς διαβεβαιούμενος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴωθεν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγων.	Plato declares that a human being is a featherless, two-footed, flat-nailed animal, receptive of political knowledge. But not even he claims to set this out with firm affirmation. On his view the human being too is one of the things that come to be but never really are, and on his view it is impossible to make firm assertions about things that never are. So Plato will not want it to seem that he sets out the definition as a firm affirmation. He is speaking, as he usually does, in terms of what is persuasive.
2.29	Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίημεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν, ὅτι ἐπινοεῖσθαι δύναται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀκατάληπτος εὑρεθήσεται. συνέστηκε μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα καταλαμβάνεται τάχα οὔτε ἡ ψυχή· οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα.	Even if we were to grant, for the sake of argument, that the human being can be conceived, he will be found to be inapprehensible. He is composed of soul and body, and perhaps neither the body nor

GREEK

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the soul is apprehended. So neither is the human being.

2.30 καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ σῶμα οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τὰ συμβεβηκότα τινὶ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἐκείνου ᾧ συμβέβηκεν. ὅταν οὖν χρῶμα ἤ τι παραπλήσιον ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτῃ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ σώματι εἰκὸς ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. τό γέ τοι σῶμα τριχῇ διαστατὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν· ὀφείλομεν οὖν τὸ μῆκος καὶ τὸ πλάτος καὶ τὸ βάθος καταλαμβάνειν, ἵνα τὸ σῶμα καταλάβωμεν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπέπιπτεν, ἐγινώσκομεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑπάργυρα χρυσία. οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἄρα.

That the body is not apprehended is clear from this. The attributes of something are different from what they belong to. So when a color or something of the sort strikes us, it is likely that the attributes of the body strike us, not the body itself. They say, at any rate, that the body is extended in three dimensions. So to apprehend the body we ought to apprehend its length, breadth and depth. If that struck us, we would also recognize gilded silver coins for what they are. So the body is not apprehended either.

2.31 ἵνα δὲ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμφισβήτησιν παρῶμεν, πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος εὑρίσκεται ἀκατάληπτος διὰ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν αὕτη, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς διαλαβόντων, ἵνα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνήνυτον μάχην παραλίπωμεν, οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον Δικαίαρχον, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον.

And even if we set aside the dispute about the body, the human being is again found to be inapprehensible, because the soul is inapprehensible. That the soul is inapprehensible is clear from this. Leaving aside the extensive and endless conflict, among those who have discussed the soul some said that there is no soul, like Dicaearchus of Messene and his followers. Others said that there is one, and others suspended judgment.

2.32 ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον εἶναι λέξουσιν οἱ δογματικοί, δώσουσιν αὐτόθεν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκαταληψίαν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτήν, τίνι ἐπικρινοῦσιν αὐτὴν εἰπάτωσαν. αἰσθήσει μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύνανται διὰ τὸ νοητὴν ὑπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεσθαι· εἰ δὲ λέξουσιν ὅτι διανοίᾳ, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀδηλότατόν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια, ὡς δεικνύουσιν οἱ περὶ μὲν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοφωνοῦντες, περὶ δὲ τῆς διανοίας διαφερόμενοι, εἰ τῇ

If the dogmatists say that this disagreement is undecidable, they will grant at once that the soul is inapprehensible. If they say it is decidable, let them tell us what they will decide it by. They cannot decide it by perception, since they say the soul is an object of thought. Suppose they say they will decide it by the intellect. Then we will say that the intellect is the most non-evident part of the soul, as is shown by those who agree about the soul's existence but differ about the intellect. So if, by means of the

2.33 διανοίᾳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθέλουσι καταλαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς διαφωνίαν ἐπικρίνειν, τῷ μᾶλλον ζητουμένῳ τὸ ἧττον ζητούμενον ἐπικρίνειν τε καὶ βεβαιοῦν ἐθελήσουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ τοίνυν ἐπικριθήσεται ἡ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνία. οὐδενὶ ἄρα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καταλαμβάνοιτ' ἄν.

intellect, they want to apprehend the soul and decide the disagreement about it, they will be trying to decide and confirm what is less in question by what is more in question, and that is absurd. So the disagreement about the soul will not be decided by the intellect either. It will be decided by nothing, then. And if so, the soul is inapprehensible too. Hence the human being would not be apprehended either.

2.34 Ἵνα δὲ καὶ δῶμεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, μήποτε οὐκ ⟨ἂν⟩ ἐνδέχοιτο δεῖξαι, ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρίνεσθαι δεῖ τὰ πράγματα. ὁ γὰρ λέγων, ὅτι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ἤτοι ἄνευ

Even if we grant that the human being is apprehended, it may well be impossible to show that things ought to be judged by him. Anyone who says that things ought to be judged by a human be-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέξει ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. οὔτε δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ κεκριμένην, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπό τινος κεκριμένην. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ὁμολογουμένως, ὑφ' οὗ κριθῆναι δυνήσεται αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπόδειξις (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸ κριτήριον τὸ ὑφ' οὗ), οὐ δυνησόμεθα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπικρίνειν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ κριτήριον, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀποδεικνύναι.	ing will say it either without proof or with proof. He cannot say it with proof, because the proof must be true and judged, and therefore judged by something. We cannot say in an agreed way what the proof itself can be judged by, since we are investigating the criterion "by which." So we will not be able to decide the proof, and therefore we will not be able to prove the criterion under discussion either.
2.35	εἰ δὲ ἀναποδείκτως λεχθήσεται, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ἄπιστον ἔσται, ὥστε οὐχ ἕξομεν διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὑπὸ τίνος δὲ καὶ κριθήσεται, ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀκρίτως τοῦτο λέγοντες πιστευθήσονται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπασθήσεται.	If it is said without proof that things ought to be judged by the human being, it will not be credible. So we will not be able to affirm firmly that the criterion "by which" is the human being. And what will judge that the criterion "by which" is the human being? They surely won't be believed if they say this without judgment. If it is judged by a human being, the very point under investigation will be taken for granted.
2.36	εἰ δ' ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ζῴου, πῶς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ κριτήριον παραλαμβάνεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρίτως, οὐ πιστευθήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κρίσεως, πάλιν ἐκεῖνο ὑπό τινος ὀφείλει κριθῆναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, μένει ἡ αὐτὴ ἀτοπία (τὸ ζητούμενον γὰρ διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κριθήσεται)· εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος· εἰ δὲ ὑπό τινος παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλου, πάλιν ἐκείνου τὸ κριτήριον ἀπαιτήσομεν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄρα οὐχ ἕξομεν λέγειν, ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα.	If it is judged by another animal, how is that animal brought in to judge that the criterion is a human being? If without judgment, it will not be believed. If with judgment, it in turn must be judged by something. If it is judged by itself, the same absurdity remains, for what is under investigation will be judged by what is under investigation. If it is judged by a human being, the mode of reciprocity comes in. If it is judged by something else besides these, we will again demand the criterion "by which" for that, and so on to infinity. For this reason too, then, we will not be able to say that things ought to be judged by a human being.
2.37	Ἔστω δὲ καὶ πεπιστώσθω τὸ δεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα. οὐκοῦν, ἐπεὶ πολλὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ διαφορά, πρότερον οἱ δογματικοὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν, ὅτι τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δεῖ προσέχειν, εἶθ' οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι κελευέτωσαν. εἰ δ' ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάῃ καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλῃ — τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοῦ λόγου — περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνήσουσιν, πῶς ἡμᾶς ἐπείγουσι προπετῶς τινι συγκατατίθεσθαι;	But let it be so, and let it be taken on trust that things ought to be judged by the human being. Well then, since there is great difference among human beings, let the dogmatists first agree that this particular human being is the one we should attend to, and only then tell us to assent to him too. But if they are going to disagree about him "as long as water flows and tall trees flourish," as the saying goes, how can they press us to assent rashly to anyone?
2.38	ἦν γὰρ καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τῷ σοφῷ πιστευτέον, ἐρωτήσομεν αὐτούς, ποίῳ σοφῷ. πότερον τῷ κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον ἢ τῷ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἢ ⟨τῷ Κυρηναϊκῷ ἢ⟩ τῷ Κυνικῷ; οὐχ ἕξουσι εἰπεῖν.	If they say that one must trust the wise man, we will ask them which wise man. Epicurus' wise man, the Stoics', ⟨the Cyrenaic, or⟩ the Cynic? They will not be able to say.
2.39		

GREEK

εἰ δὲ ἀξιώσει τις ἡμᾶς τῆς περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ζητήσεως ἀποστάντας ἁπλῶς τῷ συνετωτέρῳ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων πιστεύειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίς συνετώτερός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων διαφωνήσουσιν, εἶτα κἂν δοθῇ συμφώνως δύνασθαι ληφθῆναι, τίς ἐστι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων συνετώτερος, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται πίστεως οὗτος ἄξιος.

2.40 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πολλὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειρός ἐστιν ἐπίτασίς τε καὶ ἄνεσις κατὰ σύνεσιν, φαμὲν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὃν λέγομεν εἶναι τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων συνετώτερον, ἕτερον συνετώτερον ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι. ὥσπερ οὖν τῷ νῦν εἶναι λεγομένῳ φρονιμωτέρῳ τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ πιστεύειν ἀξιούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐσομένῳ συνετωτέρῳ τούτου μᾶλλον [τούτου] χρὴ πιστεύειν. καὶ ἐκείνου γενομένου πάλιν ἄλλον ἐλπίζειν χρὴ συνετώτερον αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι, κἀκείνου ἄλλον, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.

2.41 καὶ ἄδηλον, πότερόν ποτε συμφωνήσουσιν ἀλλήλοις οὗτοι ἢ διάφωνα λέξουσιν. διόπερ, κἂν τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων συνετώτερος εἶναι ὁμολογηθῇ τις, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν διαβεβαιωτικῶς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἔσται τούτου ἀγχινούστερος (ἄδηλον γάρ), ἀεὶ δεήσει τὴν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου συνετωτέρου κρίσιν περιμένειν καὶ μηδέποτε συγκατατίθεσθαι τῷ κρείττονι.

2.42 ἵνα δὲ καὶ κατὰ συγχώρησιν δῶμεν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τοῦ ὑποτιθεμένου συνετοῦ συνετώτερος οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ἐγένετο οὔτε ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὡς πιστεύειν αὐτῷ προσήκει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ συνετοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κατασκευῇ τοῖς σαθροῖς παριστάμενοι πράγμασιν ὑγιῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν, ὅταν τι λέγῃ οὗτος ὁ ἀγχίνους, οὐκ εἰσόμεθα πότερόν ποτε, ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα φύσει, οὕτω λέγει, ἢ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ὡς ἀληθὲς παρίστησι καὶ ἡμᾶς πείθει φρονεῖν ὡς περὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἅτε δὴ συνετώτερος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὑπάρχων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐλέγχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος.

οὐδὲ τούτῳ τοίνυν συγκαταθησόμεθα ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντι, διὰ τὸ οἷόν τε μὲν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἴεσθαι δ' ὅτι δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγχινοίας τὰ ψευδῆ τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἀληθῆ βουλόμενος παριστᾶν ἅ φησι λέγει. διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τῷ τῶν ἁπάντων ἀγχινουστάτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων χρὴ πιστεύειν.

ENGLISH

Someone might ask us to give up the investigation about the wise man and simply trust the most intelligent of everyone alive. First, they will disagree about who is more intelligent than the rest. Then, even if it were granted that it could be agreed who is more intelligent than everyone who is and has been, not even so will he deserve to be trusted.

Intelligence varies a great deal, almost infinitely, in degree. So we say that someone more intelligent may come along than this man whom we call more intelligent than all who have been and are. We are asked to trust the man now said to be more sensible than all who are and have been, because of his intelligence. In the same way we ought rather to trust the man who comes after him and is more intelligent than he is. And when that one has come, we must expect yet another to come who is more intelligent than he is, and after that one another, and so on to infinity.

And it is non-evident whether these people will agree with one another or say conflicting things. So suppose someone is agreed to be more intelligent than all who have been and are. We cannot affirm firmly that no one will be sharper than he is, since that is non-evident. So we will always have to wait for the judgment of the more intelligent person still to come, and never assent to the superior one.

And even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that no one is, was or will be more intelligent than the intelligent man we are supposing, it is still not appropriate to trust him. Intelligent people especially like, when they build up a case, to champion unsound positions and make them seem sound and true. So whenever this sharp-witted man says something, we will not know whether he is saying it as the matter is by nature, or presenting what is false as true and persuading us to think of it as true. After all, he is more intelligent than everyone, and for that reason we cannot refute him.

So we will not assent to him either as someone who judges things truly. It is possible that he speaks the truth, but we would also suspect that his surpassing sharpness of wit leads him to say what he says because he wants to present falsehoods as true. For these reasons, then, we must

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		not trust in judging things even the man who seems the sharpest of all.
2.43	Εἰ δὲ φήσει τις, ὅτι τῇ τῶν πολλῶν συμφωνίᾳ χρὴ προσέχειν, λέξομεν ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστι μάταιον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ σπάνιον ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται ἕνα τῶν πολλῶν φρονιμώτερον εἶναι. εἶτα καὶ παντὶ κριτηρίῳ πλείους ἀντιδοξοῦσι τῶν κατ' αὐτὸ συμφωνούντων· οἱ γὰρ ὁποιονοῦν ἀπολιπόντες κριτήριον ἕτερον τοῦ συμφωνεῖσθαι δοκοῦντος παρά τισιν ἀντιδοξοῦσί τε αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ πολὺ πλείους εἰσὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ συμφωνούντων.	If someone says that we must attend to the agreement of the many, we will say that this is futile. First, truth is perhaps rare, and for this reason one person may be more sensible than the many. Second, more people disagree with any criterion than agree on it. Those who adopt any criterion other than the one some people seem to agree on disagree with it, and they far outnumber those who agree on it.
2.44	χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, οἱ συμφωνοῦντες ἤτοι ἐν διαφόροις εἰσὶ διαθέσεσιν ἢ ἐν μιᾷ. ἐν διαφόροις μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ἔλεγον περὶ αὐτοῦ; εἰ δὲ ἐν μιᾷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ εἷς ὁ λέγων ἕτερόν τι μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καὶ οὗτοι πάντες οἱ συμφωνοῦντες μίαν, ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς διαθέσεσιν αἷς προσέχομεν οὐδὲ κατὰ πλῆθος εὑρίσκεται διαφορά τις.	Besides this, those who agree are either in different conditions or in one. As far as the point at issue goes, they are not in different conditions at all, for how would they then say the same things about it? If they are in one condition, the problem is this. The single person who says something different has one condition, and all these who agree also have one. So as far as the conditions we attend to go, no difference is found even in number.
2.45	διόπερ οὐ χρὴ τοῖς πολλοῖς προσέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἑνί, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς σκέψεως ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὴν κατὰ πλῆθος διαφορὰν τῶν κρίσεων, ἀπείρων τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ ἡμῶν μὴ δυναμένων ἁπάντων αὐτῶν τὰς κρίσεις ἐπελθεῖν καὶ ἀποφήνασθαι, τί μὲν οἱ πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ἀποφαίνονται, τί δὲ οἱ ἐλάττους. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἄτοπος ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος πρόκρισις τῶν κρινόντων.	So we should not attend to the many rather than to the one. Besides, as we noted in the fourth mode of skepticism, the difference in judgments according to number is inapprehensible. Individual human beings are infinitely many, and we cannot survey the judgments of all of them and declare what the majority of all people assert and what the minority assert. On this ground too, then, preferring judges by their number is absurd.
2.46	Εἰ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει προσέξομεν, οὐχ εὑρήσομεν οὐδένα ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι τοσαῦτα κατὰ συγχώρησιν δόντες. διόπερ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων ἀκατάληπτον εὑρίσκεται τὸ κριτήριον ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα.	And if we are not to attend to number either, we will not find anyone by whom things will be judged, even though we have granted so much for the sake of argument. So from all this the criterion by which things will be judged is found to be inapprehensible.
2.47	Συμπεριγραφομένων δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἤτοι μέρος ἢ πάθος ἢ ἐνέργημά ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀκόλουθον μὲν ἦν ἴσως ἐπί τι τῶν ἑξῆς προϊέναι τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἱκανῶς εἰρημένων ἐν τούτοις· ἵνα δὲ μηδὲ τὴν εἰδικὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντίρρησιν φεύγειν δοκῶμεν, ὀλίγα καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου λέξομεν. πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τοῦ δι' οὗ καλουμένου διαλεξόμεθα.	The other criteria are cancelled along with this one, since each of them is either a part, an affection or an activity of the human being. So it would perhaps be consistent to move our argument on to one of the next topics, on the grounds that enough has been said about those criteria as well in what we have said here. But so that we do not seem to be avoiding a specific rebuttal of each, we will say a little about them too, as a bonus. First we will discuss the so-called criterion "through which."

CHAPTER 6: ON THE "THROUGH WHICH"

Neither the senses, nor the intellect, nor both together can be shown to judge things.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.48	Πολλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄπειρος σχεδὸν ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ γέγονε διαφωνία παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς· ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τοῦ ἐμμεθόδου προνοούμενοι φαμὲν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲν δὲ οὗτος ἔχοι ἂν δι' οὗ κρίνειν δυνήσεται (καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν) ἢ αἴσθησιν καὶ διάνοιαν, ἐὰν δείξωμεν, ὅτι οὔτε δι' αἰσθήσεως μόνης δύναται κρίνειν οὔτε διὰ μόνης τῆς διανοίας οὔτε δι' ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν, συντόμως πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς κατὰ μέρος δόξας εἰρήκαμεν· πᾶσαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἰς τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας ἀναφέρεσθαι στάσεις.	There has been great and almost endless disagreement about this among the dogmatists. But again we take care to be methodical. On their view the human being is that by which things are judged. And he would have nothing through which he could judge except perception and the intellect, as they themselves also agree. So if we show that he can judge neither through perception alone, nor through the intellect alone, nor through both together, we will have answered all the particular views concisely, for all of them seem to come down to these three positions.
2.49	ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τινὲς μὲν κενοπαθεῖν τὰς αἰσθήσεις φασίν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκεῖσθαι ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα ὑποκεῖσθαι ὑφ' ὧν οἴονται κινεῖσθαι λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑποκεῖσθαι, τίνι συγκαταθησόμεθα οὐχ ἕξομεν· οὔτε γὰρ τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρινοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ περὶ αὐτῆς ζητοῦμεν, πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἢ ἀληθῶς καταλαμβάνει, οὔτε ἑτέρῳ τινί, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι κριτήριον δι' οὗ χρὴ κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν.	Let us begin with the senses. Some say that the senses are affected emptily, since nothing real underlies what they seem to perceive. Others say that everything by which they think the senses are moved really exists. Still others say that some of these things exist and some do not. So we will have nothing to assent to. We will not decide the disagreement by perception, since it is perception we are investigating, whether it is affected emptily or truly apprehends. Nor will we decide it by anything else, since on the hypothesis before us there is no other criterion through which one must judge.
2.50	ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται, πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ καταλαμβάνει τι· ᾧ συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἡμᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνῃ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβάνει τι.	So it will be undecidable and inapprehensible whether perception is affected emptily or apprehends something. And with this comes the conclusion that we should not attend to perception alone in judging things, since we cannot say whether it apprehends anything in the first place.
2.51	ἀλλ' ἔστω κατὰ συγχώρησιν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀντιληπτικὰς εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον καὶ οὕτως ἄπιστοι εὑρεθήσονται πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων. αἱ γοῦν αἰσθήσεις ὑπεναντίως κινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτός, οἷον ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέλιτος ὁτὲ μὲν πικράζεται, ὁτὲ δὲ γλυκάζεται, καὶ ἡ ὅρασις τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα ὁτὲ μὲν αἱμωπὸν, ὁτὲ δὲ λευκὸν εἶναι ⟨δοκεῖ⟩ ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἑαυτῇ συμφωνεῖ·	But let it be granted, for the sake of argument, that the senses are capable of grasping things. Even so, they will be found no less untrustworthy for judging external real objects. At any rate, the senses are moved in contrary ways by external things. Taste, for instance, finds the same honey bitter at one time and sweet at another. To sight the same color ⟨seems⟩ blood-red at one time and white at another. Nor does smell agree with itself.
2.52	τὸ γοῦν μύρον ὁ μὲν κεφαλαλγικὸς ἀηδὲς εἶναί φησιν, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχων ἡδύ. καὶ οἱ θεόληπτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ φρενιτίζοντες ἀκούειν δοκοῦσί τινων διαλεγομένων	Someone with a headache says that perfume is unpleasant, while someone not in that state says it is pleasant. And people possessed by a god, and the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	αὐτοῖς, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐπακούομεν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ τοῖς μὲν φλεγμαίνουσιν ἀηδὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ δι' ὑπερβολὴν θερμότητος, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις χλιαρόν.	delirious, think they hear certain people talking to them whom we do not hear. And the same water seems unpleasant to people with an inflammation because it is excessively hot, but lukewarm to others.
2.53	πότερον οὖν πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φήσει τις, ἢ τάσδε μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τάσδε δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἢ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἁπάσας, εἰπεῖν ἀμήχανον, μηδὲν ἡμῶν ἐχόντων κριτήριον ὡμολογημένον δι' οὗ κρινοῦμεν ὃ προκρίνειν μέλλομεν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἀποδείξεως εὐπορούντων ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ κεκριμένης, διὰ τὸ μέχρι νῦν ζητεῖσθαι τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, δι' οὗ καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ ἀπόδειξιν ἐπικρίνεσθαι προσήκει.	Should one say, then, that all impressions are true, or that these are true and those false, or that all are false? It is impossible to say. We have no agreed criterion through which to judge what we are going to prefer, and we have no true and judged proof available either. The criterion of truth, through which even a true proof ought to be decided, is still under investigation.
2.54	διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ ἀξιῶν τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν [ἐν τούτοις] πιστεύειν, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένοις μηδαμῶς, ἄτοπος ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀναποδείκτως τοῦτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται, οὔτε ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ καὶ κεκριμένην ἕξει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.	For these reasons, anyone who asks us to trust those in a natural condition [in these matters] but not to trust at all those in an unnatural condition will be talking absurdly. If he says this without proof he will not be believed, and for the reasons already given he will not have a true and judged proof.
2.55	εἰ μέντοι καὶ συγχωρήσειέ τις τὰς μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων φαντασίας εἶναι πιστάς, τὰς δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένων ἀπίστους, καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατος εὑρεθήσεται ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μόνων κρίσις τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων. ἡ ὅρασις γοῦν καὶ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα τὸν ⟨αὐτὸν⟩ πύργον μὲν στρογγύλον, ὁτὲ δὲ τετράγωνον εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τὰ αὐτὰ σιτία ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κεκορεσμένων ἀηδῆ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πεινώντων ἡδέα φησὶν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ παραπλησίως τῆς αὐτῆς φωνῆς νυκτὸς μὲν ὡς εὐμεγέθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ἡμέρας δὲ ⟨ὡς⟩ ἀμαυρᾶς,	Even if someone were to concede that the impressions of those in a natural condition are trustworthy and those of people in an unnatural condition untrustworthy, judging external real objects through the senses alone will still be found impossible. Sight, even in its natural condition, says the ⟨same⟩ tower is round at one time and square at another. Taste says the same food is unpleasant to people who are full and pleasant to people who are hungry. Hearing likewise perceives the same sound as loud at night and faint by day,
2.56	καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν δυσώδη ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν βυρσοδεψῶν οὐδαμῶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁφὴ εἰσιόντων μὲν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον θερμαίνεται ὑπὸ τῆς παραστάδος, ἐξιόντων δὲ ψύχεται. διόπερ ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἑαυταῖς μάχονται, καὶ ἡ διαφωνία ἐστὶν ἀνεπίκριτος, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχομεν ὡμολογημένον ⟨κριτήριον⟩ δι' οὗ κρίνεσθαι δύνανται, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω μεταφέρειν πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν ἐνδέχεται ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπων. διόπερ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀληθὲς ἴσως τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν μόνην δύνασθαι κρίνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα.	and smell finds the same things foul to most people but not at all to tanners. The same touch is warmed by the entrance hall when we go into the bathhouse, but chilled by it when we come out. So the senses conflict with themselves even in their natural condition. The disagreement is undecidable, since we have no agreed ⟨criterion⟩ through which they can be judged. So the same puzzles must follow. Many other points can also be carried over from what we said earlier about the modes of suspension to establish this. So it would perhaps not be true that perception alone can judge external real objects.
2.57	Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν μετέλθωμεν τῷ λόγῳ. οἱ τοίνυν ἀξιοῦντες τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνῃ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν	Let our argument move on, then, to the intellect. Those who think we should attend to the intellect

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	πραγμάτων πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἔξουσιν δεικνύναι, ὅτι καταληπτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι διάνοιαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν Γοργίας οὐδὲν εἶναι φάσκων οὐδὲ διάνοιαν εἶναί φησι, τινὲς δὲ ταύτην ἀποφαίνονται ὑπάρχειν, πῶς οὖν ἐπικρινοῦσι τὴν διαφωνίαν; οὔτε γὰρ διανοίᾳ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν, οὔτε ἄλλῳ τινί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο εἶναί φασι κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὴν νῦν ὑποκειμένην, δι' οὗ κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα. ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται, πότερον ἔστι διάνοια ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ᾧ συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κρίσει, τῇ μηδέπω κατειλημμένῃ.	alone in judging things will not, first of all, be able to show that the existence of the intellect is apprehensible. Gorgias, in saying that nothing exists, says that the intellect does not exist either, while some assert that it does. How, then, will they decide the disagreement? Not by the intellect, since they would be taking the point at issue for granted. Nor by anything else, since on the hypothesis now before us they say there is nothing else through which things are judged. So it will be undecidable and inapprehensible whether the intellect exists or not. And with this comes the conclusion that we should not attend to the intellect alone in judging things, since it has not yet been apprehended.[3]
2.58	ἀλλὰ κατειλήφθω ἡ διάνοια, καὶ ὡμολογήσθω τὸ εἶναι ταύτην καθ' ὑπόθεσιν· λέγω ὅτι οὐ δύναται κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' ἑαυτὴν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾷ, ἀλλὰ διαφωνεῖ περί τε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, πῶς ἂν δυνηθείη τῶν ἄλλων τι ἀκριβῶς καταλαμβάνειν;	But let the intellect be apprehended, and let it be agreed by hypothesis that it exists. I say that it cannot judge things. It does not even see itself precisely, and it disagrees about its own substance, the manner of its coming into being, and the place it is in. So how could it apprehend any of the other things precisely?
2.59	διδομένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν κριτικὴν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐχ εὑρήσομεν πῶς κατ' αὐτὴν κρινοῦμεν πολλῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς κατὰ διάνοιαν διαφορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἑτέρα μέν ἐστιν ἡ Γοργίου διάνοια, καθ' ἣν φησι μηδὲν εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ Ἡρακλείτου, καθ' ἣν λέγει πάντα εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ τῶν λεγόντων τάδε μὲν εἶναι τάδε δὲ μὴ εἶναι, πῶς ἐπικρίνωμεν τὴν τῶν διανοιῶν διαφορὰν οὐχ ἕξομεν, οὐδὲ δυνησόμεθα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τῇ μὲν τοῦδε διανοίᾳ κατακολουθεῖν προσήκει, τῇ τοῦδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς.	And even granting that the intellect is capable of judging things, we will not find out how to judge by it. Intellects differ a great deal. Gorgias' intellect, by which he says that nothing exists, is one thing. Heraclitus', by which he says that everything exists, is another. The intellect of those who say that some things exist and some do not is another again. So we will not be able to decide the difference between intellects, nor to say that we ought to follow this man's intellect but not that man's at all.
2.60	ἤν τε γὰρ διανοίᾳ τινὶ κρίνειν τολμῶμεν, τῆς διαφωνίας μέρει συγκατατιθέμενοι τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσομεν· ἤν τε ἑτέρῳ τινί, ψευσόμεθα ὅτι μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα.	If we dare to judge by some particular intellect, we will be assenting to one side of the disagreement and taking the point at issue for granted. If we judge by something else, we will be lying when we say that things must be judged by the intellect alone.
2.61	λοιπὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ [λεγομένων] ῥηθέντων δεικνύναι δυνησόμεθα, ὅτι μήτε τὴν ἀγχινουστέραν τῶν ἄλλων διάνοιαν εὑρεῖν δυνάμεθα, ὅτι τε ἂν εὕρωμεν τῶν τε γεγενημένων καὶ οὐσῶν διανοιῶν ἀγχινουστέραν διάνοιαν, ἐπεὶ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, εἰ πάλιν ταύτης ἑτέρα ἔσται ἀγχινουστέρα, οὐ δεῖ προσέχειν αὐτῇ,	Further, from what was said about the criterion "by which" [said], we will be able to show several things. We cannot find the intellect that is sharper than the others. And if we do find an intellect sharper than all those that have been and are, we should not attend to it, since it is non-evident

3 Gorgias of Leontini (fifth century BC), the famous orator, argued in his treatise *On What Is Not* that nothing exists.

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whether yet another, sharper than this one, will come along.

2.62 ὅτι τε κἂν ὑποθώμεθα διάνοιαν ἧς ἐντρεχεστέρα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα τῷ δι' αὐτῆς κρίνοντι, εὐλαβούμενοι μὴ ψευδῆ τινα λόγον προφερόμενος διὰ τὸ ὀξυτάτης διανοίας μετεσχηκέναι δύναται ἡμᾶς πείθειν ὅτι ἔστιν ἀληθής. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνῃ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα.

And even if we posit an intellect than which there could be none more acute, we will not assent to the one who judges through it. We would be wary that he might put forward some false argument and, because he possesses the keenest intellect, be able to persuade us that it is true. So things should not be judged by the intellect alone either.

2.63 Λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι δι' ἀμφοτέρων. ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οὐχ ὁδηγοῦσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὴν διάνοιαν πρὸς κατάληψιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντιοῦνται αὐτῇ. ἀμέλει γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ μέλι τοῖσδε μὲν πικρὸν τοῖσδε δὲ γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος ἔφη μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε πικρόν, ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεών τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. οὕτως ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁρμωμένη ἡ διάνοια διάφορά τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἀναγκάζεται. τοῦτο δὲ ἀλλότριόν ἐστι κριτηρίου καταληπτικοῦ. εἶτα κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον·

It remains to say that things are judged through both. That again is impossible. Not only do the senses not guide the intellect toward apprehension; they even oppose it. At any rate, from the fact that honey appears bitter to some and sweet to others, Democritus said that it is neither sweet nor bitter, and Heraclitus that it is both. The same argument holds for the other senses and their objects. So the intellect, starting from the senses, is compelled to make different and conflicting assertions, and this is foreign to an apprehensive criterion. Then there is this to be said as well.

2.64 ἤτοι πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς πάντων διανοίαις κρινοῦσι τὰ πράγματα ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσαις λέξει τις, ἀδύνατα ἀξιώσει τοσαύτης μάχης ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐμφαινομένης, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ τῆς Γοργίου διανοίας ἀπόφασίς ἐστι τὸ μὴ δεῖν μήτε αἰσθήσει μήτε διανοίᾳ προσέχειν, περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος. εἰ δὲ τισίν, πῶς κρινοῦσιν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ⟨τῇδε⟩ τῇ διανοίᾳ προσέχειν δεῖ, ταῖσδε δὲ οὔ, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ὡμολογημένον, δι' οὗ τὰς διαφόρους αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ διανοίας ἐπικρινοῦσιν;

They will judge things either by all the senses and everyone's intellects, or by some. If someone says by all, he will be asking for the impossible, since so much conflict is apparent in the senses and the intellects. Besides, the verdict of Gorgias' intellect is that one should attend neither to perception nor to intellect, so the argument will turn itself around. If by some, how will they judge that one should attend to these senses and ⟨this⟩ intellect and not to those? They have no agreed criterion through which to decide between the different senses and intellects.

2.65 ἢν δὲ λέγωσιν, ὅτι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι κρινοῦμεν, ⟨.....⟩ τισὶ δὲ μή, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζουσιν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰ δύναταί τις διὰ τούτων κρίνειν ζητοῦμεν.

If they say that we will judge the senses and the intellects by the intellect and the senses, ⟨.....⟩ but not by some, they are taking the point at issue for granted. For what we are investigating is whether anyone can judge through these.

2.66 εἶτα κἀκεῖνο ῥητέον, ὅτι ἤτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τάς τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας κρινοῦσιν, ἢ ταῖς διανοίαις τάς τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας, τῇ δὲ διανοίᾳ τὰς αἰσθήσεις. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀμφότερα κρίνειν ἐθελήσουσιν, οὐκέτι δι' αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας κρινοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑνὸς τούτων, ὅπερ ἂν ἕλωνται· καὶ

Then there is this to be said as well. They will judge in one of four ways. They will judge both the senses and the intellects by the senses. Or they will judge both the senses and the intellects by the intellects. Or they will judge the senses by the senses and the intellects by the intellects. Or they will judge the intellects by the senses and the senses by the intellect. If they want to judge both

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	παρακολουθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς αἱ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημέναι ἀπορίαι.	by the senses or both by the intellect, they will no longer be judging through perception and intellect, but through one of these, whichever they choose. And the puzzles stated earlier will dog them.
2.67	εἰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ μάχονται καὶ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ διάνοιαι διανοίαις, ἥντινα ἂν λάβωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν· μέρος γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας ὡς πιστὸν ἤδη λήψονται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπ' ἴσης αὐτῷ ζητουμένων ἐπίκρισιν.	Suppose they decide the senses by the senses and the intellects by the intellect. Senses conflict with senses and intellects with intellects. So whichever of the conflicting senses they adopt for judging the other senses, they will be taking the point at issue for granted. They will be treating one part of the disagreement as already credible in order to decide things that are just as much in question as it is.
2.68	ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διανοιῶν λόγος. εἰ δὲ ταῖς μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινοῦσι, τῇ διανοίᾳ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὁ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, καθ' ὅν, ἵνα μὲν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐπικριθῶσι, δεῖ προκεκρίσθαι τὰς διανοίας, ἵνα δὲ αἱ διάνοιαι δοκιμασθῶσι, χρὴ προδιευκρινεῖσθαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις.	The same argument holds for the intellects too. Suppose instead they decide the intellects by the senses and the senses by the intellect. Then we find the mode of reciprocity. For the senses to be decided, the intellects must have been judged first. For the intellects to be tested, the senses must have been thoroughly sorted out first.
2.69	ἐπεὶ οὖν μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τὰ ὁμογενῆ κριτήρια δύναται ἐπικρίνεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ ἑνὸς γένους ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἐναλλάξ, οὐ δυνησόμεθα προκρίνειν διάνοιαν διανοίας ἢ αἴσθησιν αἰσθήσεως. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔξομεν διὰ τίνος κρινοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ μήτε πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις κρίνειν δυνησόμεθα, μήτε εἰσόμεθα ποίαις μὲν δεῖ κρίνειν, ποίαις δὲ μή, οὐχ ἕξομεν δι' οὗ κρινοῦμεν τὰ πράγματα ὥστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀνύπαρκτον ἂν εἴη τὸ κριτήριον τὸ δι' οὗ.	Criteria of one kind cannot be decided by criteria of the same kind, nor both kinds by one kind, nor each kind by the other kind in turn. So we will not be able to prefer one intellect to another or one perception to another. For this reason we will have nothing through which to judge. We cannot judge by all the senses and intellects, and we will not know which ones we should judge by and which not. So we will have nothing through which to judge things. For these reasons too, then, the criterion "through which" would be unreal.

CHAPTER 7: ON THE "ACCORDING TO WHICH"

The impression cannot be conceived, apprehended or trusted as the standard for judging things.

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2.70	Ἴδωμεν οὖν ἑξῆς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα. πρῶτον τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ⟨.....⟩ ἀνεπινόητός ἐστιν ἡ λέγουσι γὰρ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἢ λεπτομερέστερόν τι πνεύματος, ὡς φασίν, οὐ δυνήσεταί τις τύπωσιν ἐπινοεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε κατ' εἰσοχὴν καὶ ἐξοχήν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σφραγίδων ὁρῶμεν, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τερατολογουμένην ἑτεροιωτικήν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μνήμην τοσούτων ἀναδέξαιτο	Next, then, let us look at the criterion according to which they say things are judged. The first thing that can be said about it is that ⟨.....⟩ it is inconceivable. They say that an impression is an imprinting in the ruling part. Now the soul and the ruling part are breath, or something finer than breath, as they say. So no one will be able to conceive an imprinting in it either by depression and projection, as we see with seals, or by the fabled "alteration" kind. It would not retain the memory

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	θεωρημάτων ὅσα συνίστησι τέχνην, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγινομέναις ἑτεροιώσεσι τῶν προυποκειμένων ἀπαλειφομένων.	of the many theorems that make up an art, since the earlier ones would be wiped out by each alteration that came after.[4]
2.71	εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναιτο ἡ φαντασία, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ καταληψόμεθα.	Even if the impression could be conceived, it will be inapprehensible. It is an affection of the ruling part, and the ruling part is not apprehended, as we showed. So we will not apprehend its affection either.
2.72	εἶτα εἰ καὶ δοίημεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ἡ φαντασία, οὐ δύναται κρίνεσθαι [καὶ] κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ ⟨δι' αὐτῆς⟩ φαντασιοῦται ἡ διάνοια, ὡς φασίν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσιν, μόνα δέ, εἰ ἄρα, τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη. καὶ ἡ φαντασία οὖν τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔσται, ὅπερ διαφέρει τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει.	Then, even if we were to grant that the impression is apprehended, things cannot be judged according to it. The intellect does not make contact with external things through itself, nor ⟨through itself⟩ receive impressions, as they say; it does so through the senses. The senses do not apprehend external real objects, but only, if anything, their own affections. So the impression too will be of the sense's affection, and that differs from the external real object. Honey is not the same as my tasting sweetness, nor wormwood the same as my tasting bitterness; they are different.
2.73	εἰ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, ἡ φαντασία ἔσται οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, ἀλλ' ἑτέρου τινὸς διαφέροντος αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν κατὰ ταύτην κρίνει ἡ διάνοια, φαύλως κρίνει καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὰ ἐκτὸς κρίνεσθαι λέγειν.	If this affection differs from the external real object, the impression will not be of the external real object but of something else, different from it. So if the intellect judges according to this impression, it judges badly and not according to the real object. So it is absurd to say that external things are judged according to the impression.
2.74	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καταλαμβάνει διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν παθῶν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, διὰ τὸ ὅμοια τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις. πόθεν γὰρ εἴσεται ἡ διάνοια, εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστι τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, μήτε αὐτὴ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐντυγχάνουσα, μήτε τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῇ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν δηλουσῶν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐπελογισάμην.	Nor can one say that the soul apprehends external real objects through the affections of the senses because those affections are similar to the external real objects. How will the intellect know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the objects of sense? It does not itself encounter external things. And the senses do not reveal those things' nature to it, only their own affections, as I argued from the modes of suspension.
2.75	ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγνοῶν μὲν Σωκράτην, εἰκόνα δὲ τούτου θεασάμενος οὐκ οἶδεν, εἰ ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ διάνοια τὰ μὲν πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐποπτεύουσα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς μὴ θεωροῦσα, οὐδὲ εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστι τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθη τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις εἴσεται. οὐδὲ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἄρα δυνήσεται ταῦτα κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν.	Take someone who doesn't know Socrates but has looked at a picture of him. He doesn't know whether the picture resembles Socrates. In the same way the intellect observes how the senses are affected but does not see the external things, so it will not know whether the senses' affections resemble the external objects either. So it will not be able to

4 Cleanthes took the imprint literally, like a seal in wax, while Chrysippus called it an "alteration."

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judge these things by the impression on the basis of resemblance either.

2.76 ἀλλὰ δῶμεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν, πρὸς τῷ ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἔτι καὶ ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι τοῦ κρίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι τοῦ λόγου πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπομνήσαντος. οὐκοῦν ἤτοι πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ πιστεύσομεν ⟨καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν ἤ τινι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσῃ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ξενιάδου φαντασίᾳ πιστεύσομεν⟩, καθ' ἣν ἔλεγε πάσας τὰς ἀπίστους εἶναι, καὶ περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ὥστε καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ πράγματα.

But let us concede, for the sake of argument, that besides being conceivable and apprehended, the impression is also the kind of thing by which objects can be judged, even though the argument has pointed to the very opposite. Then we will trust either every impression ⟨or some. But if every one, clearly we will also trust Xeniades' impression⟩, according to which he said that all impressions are untrustworthy. The argument will then turn itself around: not all impressions are such that objects can be judged by them.[5]

2.77 εἰ δέ τισιν, πῶς ἐπικρινοῦμεν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς φαντασίαις πιστεύειν προσήκει, ταῖσδε δὲ ἀπιστεῖν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄνευ φαντασίας, δώσουσιν ὅτι παρέλκει ἡ φαντασία πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, εἴγε χωρὶς αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι [τὰ] πράγματά τινα λέξουσιν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ φαντασίας, πῶς λήψονται τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φαντασιῶν κρίσιν;

If some, how will we decide that it is right to trust these impressions and to distrust those? If we decide without an impression, they will be granting that the impression is superfluous for judging, since they will be saying that some objects can be judged without it. If with an impression, how will they get hold of the impression they bring in to judge the other impressions?

2.78 ἢ πάλιν αὐτοῖς ἄλλης φαντασίας δεήσει πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῆς ἑτέρας φαντασίας, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνης κρίσιν ἄλλης, καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρῖναι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα εὑρεῖν, ποίαις μὲν φαντασίαις ὡς κριτηρίοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ποίαις δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἐπεὶ οὖν, κἂν δῶμεν ὅτι κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα, ἑκατέρωθεν περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πᾶσι πιστεύειν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τισὶ μὲν πιστεύειν ὡς κριτηρίοις, τισὶ δὲ ἀπιστεῖν, συνάγεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν τὰς φαντασίας πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς κριτήρια παραλαμβάνειν.

They will need yet another impression to judge that other impression, and another to judge that one, and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to decide infinitely many things. So it is impossible to find out which impressions we should use as criteria and which not at all. Even if we grant that objects should be judged by impressions, then, the argument turns itself around either way, both if we trust all of them and if we trust some as criteria and distrust others. It follows that impressions should not be adopted as criteria for judging objects.

2.79 Ταῦτα μὲν ἀρκεῖ νῦν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ἐλέγετο. εἰδέναι δὲ χρή, ὅτι οὐ πρόκειται ἡμῖν ἀποφήνασθαι, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον [τὸ] τῆς ἀληθείας (τοῦτο γὰρ δογματικόν)· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οἱ δογματικοὶ πιθανῶς δοκοῦσι κατεσκευακέναι, ὅτι ἔστι τι κριτήριον ἀληθείας, ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς πιθανοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι λόγους ἀντεθήκαμεν, οὔτε ὅτι ἀληθεῖς εἰσι διαβεβαιούμενοι οὔτε ὅτι πιθανώτεροι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν φαινομένην ἴσην πιθανότητα τούτων τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων τὴν ἐποχὴν συνάγοντες.

For now it is enough to have said this much, in outline, against the criterion according to which objects were said to be judged. But you should be aware that it is not our purpose to declare that the criterion of truth is unreal; that would be dogmatic. The dogmatists seem to have established plausibly that there is a criterion of truth, so we have set against them arguments that seem plausible. We do not affirm that these are true, or that they are more plausible than their opposites. We conclude to suspension of judgment because of the

5 Xeniades of Corinth (fifth century BC) held that every impression and opinion is false.

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		apparent equal plausibility of these arguments and of those put forward by the dogmatists.

CHAPTER 8: ON WHAT IS TRUE AND ON TRUTH

The Stoics' distinction between what is true and truth, and why only the former need be attacked.

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2.80	Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίημεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναί τι τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, ἄχρηστον εὑρίσκεται καὶ μάταιον, ἐὰν ὑπομνήσωμεν ὅτι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀνύπαρκτος μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀνυπόστατον δὲ τὸ ἀληθές.	Even if we were to grant, by hypothesis, that there is some criterion of truth, it turns out to be useless and pointless once we point out that, as far as what the dogmatists say goes, truth is unreal and what is true has no real existence.
2.81	ὑπομιμνήσκομεν δὲ οὕτως. λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ συστάσει δυνάμει· οὐσίᾳ μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντική, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πὼς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμή, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα· ἔστι γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα)·	We point this out as follows. What is true is said to differ from truth in three ways: in essence, in composition and in power. In essence, because what is true is incorporeal (for it is a proposition and a sayable), whereas truth is a body. For truth is knowledge capable of asserting everything true, and knowledge is the ruling part in a certain state, just as a fist is the hand in a certain state; and the ruling part is a body, since according to them it is breath.[6]
2.82	συστάσει δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἁπλοῦν τί ἐστιν, οἷον 'ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι', ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεων συνίσταται·	In composition, because what is true is something simple, like "I am conversing," whereas truth is made up of many pieces of true knowledge.
2.83	δυνάμει δέ, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως. διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον ἀληθές τι εἰπεῖν. ταῦτα μὲν οἱ δογματικοί.	In power, because truth involves knowledge, whereas what is true does not always do so. That is why they say that truth is found only in the good person, while what is true is found in the bad person too, since a bad person can say something true. So much for the dogmatists.
2.84	ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τῆς κατὰ τὴν συγγραφὴν προαιρέσεως στοχαζόμενοι πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἀληθὲς νῦν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα, ἐπεὶ συμπεριγράφεται τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, σύστημα τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως εἶναι λεγομένη. πάλιν δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσι καθολικώτεροι, δι' ὧν αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κινοῦμεν, οἱ δὲ εἰδικοί, δι' ὧν δείκνυμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ἐν λεκτῷ ἢ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας, τοὺς καθολικωτέρους ἐκθέσθαι μόνους ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα. ὥσπερ γὰρ τείχους θεμελίῳ κατενεχθέντι καὶ τὰ ὑπερκείμενα πάντα συγκαταφέρεται, οὕτω τῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ὑποστάσει διατρεπομένῃ καὶ αἱ κατὰ μέρος τῶν δογματικῶν εὑρεσιλογίαι συμπεριγράφονται.	For our part, we will keep in view once again the aim of this treatise and direct our arguments for now against what is true alone. Truth, which is said to be a system of knowledge of true things, is cancelled along with it. Again, some of our arguments are more general: by these we challenge the very existence of what is true. Others are specific: by these we show that what is true is not in the utterance, or in the sayable, or in the motion of the intellect. We think it enough for the present to set out only the more general ones. When the foundation of a wall is brought down, everything built on top comes down with it. In the same way, when the existence of what is true is overturned, the

6 Stoic term: a "sayable" (*lekton*) is the incorporeal content of what is said.

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dogmatists' ingenious arguments on particular points are cancelled along with it.

CHAPTER 9: WHETHER ANYTHING IS TRUE BY NATURE

Neither appearances nor non-evident things, nor some of each, can be shown to be true.

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2.85 Διαφωνίας τοίνυν οὔσης περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἐπεί τινες μέν φασιν εἶναί τι ἀληθές, τινὲς δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρῖναι, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λέγων εἶναί τι ἀληθὲς οὔτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν· ἤν τε καὶ ἀπόδειξιν βούληται φέρειν, ἢν μὲν ψευδῆ ταύτην εἶναι συνομολογήσῃ, ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι λέγων εἰς τὸν διάλληλόν τε ἐμπίπτει λόγον καὶ ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται ⟨τοῦ⟩ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἐκείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδεῖξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα γνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

There is disagreement among the dogmatists about what is true: some say that something is true, others that nothing is. This disagreement cannot be decided. Whoever says that something is true will not be believed if he says it without proof, because of the disagreement. And if he wants to offer a proof as well, he will not be believed if he admits that the proof is false. If he says that the proof is true, he falls into the mode of reciprocity, and he will be asked for a proof ⟨of⟩ its being true, then another for that one, and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to prove infinitely many things. So it is impossible even to know that something is true.

2.86 καὶ μὴν τὸ 'τι', ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον, ἤτοι ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ἢ οὔτε ψεῦδος οὔτε ἀληθές, ἢ καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν ψεῦδος αὐτὸ εἶναι φήσουσιν, ὁμολογήσουσιν, ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ. ὥσπερ γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῷον ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ζῷα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔμψυχά ἐστιν, οὕτως, εἰ τὸ γενικώτατον πάντων (τό 'τι') ψεῦδός ἐστι, καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔσται ψευδῆ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. ᾧ συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ψεῦδος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ 'πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ' καὶ τὸ 'ἔστι τι ψεῦδος' τῶν πάντων καθεστὼς ψεῦδος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθές ἐστι τό 'τι', πάντα ἔσται ἀληθῆ· ᾧ συνεισάγεται πάλιν τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, εἴγε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὶ ὑπάρχον (λέγω δὲ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές) ἀληθές ἐστιν.

Again, the "something," which they say is the most generic of all things, is either true or false, or neither false nor true, or both false and true. Now if they say it is false, they will be admitting that everything is false. Just as, since animal has a soul, all particular animals have souls too, so if the most generic of all things (the "something") is false, all the particulars will be false too, and nothing will be true. This brings with it the consequence that nothing is false either. For "everything is false" and "something is false" are themselves among all things, so they too will be false. If the "something" is true, everything will be true. This brings with it, again, the consequence that nothing is true, since this very thing (I mean "nothing is true") is a something, and so it is true.

2.87 εἰ δὲ καὶ ψεῦδός ἐστι καὶ ἀληθὲς τό 'τι', ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ψεῦδος ἔσται καὶ ἀληθές. ἐξ οὗ συνάγεται τὸ μηδὲν φύσει εἶναι ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ φύσιν ἔχον τοιαύτην ὥστε ἀληθὲς εἶναι, πάντως οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀληθές τό 'τι', ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους μήτε ψευδῆ μήτε ἀληθῆ εἶναι λεγόμενα οὐκ ἔσται ἀληθῆ. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται, εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθές.

If the "something" is both false and true, each particular will be both false and true. It follows that nothing is true by nature, since what has a nature such as to be true would certainly not be false. And if the "something" is neither false nor true, it is admitted that all the particulars too, said to be neither false nor true, will not be true. For these reasons, then, it will be non-evident to us whether there is anything true.

2.88

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	πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ ἀληθῆ, ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν ἄδηλά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ, ἤτοι πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα λέξουσιν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἢ τινά. καὶ εἰ μὲν πάντα, περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος· φαίνεται γάρ τισι τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές. εἰ δέ τινα, ἀνεπικρίτως μὲν οὐ δύναταί τις λέγειν, ὅτι τάδε μέν ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ, κριτηρίῳ δὲ χρώμενος ἤτοι φαινόμενον εἶναι λέξει τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ ἄδηλον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· μόνα γὰρ ὑπόκειται νῦν ἀληθῆ τὰ φαινόμενα.	Further, true things are either only apparent, or only non-evident, or some true things are non-evident and some apparent. None of these is true, as we will show; so nothing is true. Now if true things are only apparent, they will say either that all apparent things are true or that some are. If all, the argument turns itself around, since it appears to some people that nothing is true. If some, no one can say without deciding the matter that these are true and those false. And if he uses a criterion, he will say that this criterion is either apparent or non-evident. It cannot possibly be non-evident, since the hypothesis now is that only apparent things are true.
2.89	εἰ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἐπεὶ ζητεῖται, τίνα μὲν φαινόμενά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τίνα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ τὸ λαμβανόμενον φαινόμενον πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαινομένων πάλιν ἑτέρου δεήσεται κριτηρίου φαινομένου, κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρίνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καταλαβεῖν, εἰ φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ ἀληθῆ.	If it is apparent, then, since the question is which apparent things are true and which false, the apparent thing adopted to judge apparent things will itself need another apparent criterion, and that one another, and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to decide infinitely many things. So it is impossible to apprehend whether only apparent things are true.
2.90	ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ λέγων τὰ ἄδηλα μόνον εἶναι ἀληθῆ πάντα μὲν οὐ λέξει εἶναι ἀληθῆ (οὐ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέξει ἢ τὸ περιττοὺς τούτους ὑπάρχειν)· εἰ δέ τινα, τίνι κρινοῦμεν, ὅτι τάδε μὲν τὰ ἄδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; φαινομένῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀδήλῳ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν, τίνα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τίνα ψευδῆ, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἄδηλον ἀδήλου ἑτέρου τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος αὐτό, κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἄδηλα μόνον ἐστὶ τἀληθῆ.	Similarly, someone who says that only non-evident things are true will not say that all of them are true; he will not say that the stars' being even in number is true and also their being odd. And if some, by what will we judge that these non-evident things are true and those false? Certainly not by something apparent. If by something non-evident, then, since we are asking which non-evident things are true and which false, this non-evident thing too will need another non-evident thing to decide it, and that one another, and so on to infinity. So true things are not only non-evident either.
2.91	λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι φαινόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἤτοι γὰρ πάντα τά τε φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, ἤ τινα φαινόμενα καί τινα ἄδηλα. εἰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, πάλιν περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος, ἀληθοῦς εἶναι διδομένου καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, λεχθήσεταί τε ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περιττοὺς τούτους ὑπάρχειν.	It remains to say that some true things are apparent and some non-evident. But this too is absurd. Either all apparent and non-evident things are true, or some apparent ones and some non-evident ones. If all, the argument will again turn itself around, since "nothing is true" is granted to be true. And both "the stars are even in number" and "they are odd" will be called true.
2.92	εἰ δέ τινα τῶν φαινομένων καί τινα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς ἐπικρινοῦμεν, ὅτι τῶν φαινομένων τάδε μέν ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; εἰ μὲν ⟨γὰρ⟩ διὰ φαινομένου, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται ὁ λόγος· εἰ δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα δεῖται κρίσεως, πάλιν τοῦτο	If some apparent and some non-evident things are true, how will we decide that, among apparent things, these are true and those false? ⟨For⟩ if by something apparent, the argument is thrown into infinite regress. If by something non-evident,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	⟨τὸ⟩ ἄδηλον διὰ τίνος κριθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ⟨γὰρ⟩ διὰ φαινομένου, ὁ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, εἰ δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων.	then, since non-evident things too need to be judged, by what will this non-evident thing be judged in turn? ⟨For⟩ if by something apparent, the mode of reciprocity turns up; if by something non-evident, the mode that throws us into infinite regress.
2.93	ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων λεκτέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδήλῳ τινὶ κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται, ὁ δὲ φαινομένῳ ἢ ἀεὶ φαινόμενον προσλαμβάνων εἰς ἄπειρον, ἢ ἐπὶ ἄδηλον μεταβαίνων εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ψεῦδος ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα.	The same must be said about non-evident things. Someone who tries to judge them by something non-evident is thrown into infinite regress. Someone who judges them by something apparent either keeps adding something apparent and goes on to infinity, or switches to something non-evident and falls into reciprocity. So it is false to say that some true things are apparent and some non-evident.
2.94	εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ μήτε τὰ ἄδηλα μόνα, μήτε τινὰ μὲν φαινόμενα, τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κριτήριον δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς χρησιμεύειν, ἄχρηστον καὶ μάταιόν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον, κἂν δῶμεν αὐτῷ κατὰ συγχώρησιν ἔχειν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν. καὶ εἴγε ἐφεκτέον περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς διαλεκτική ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ψευδῶν καὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων προπετεύεσθαι.	If, then, true things are not apparent things alone, nor non-evident things alone, nor some apparent and some non-evident, nothing is true. And if nothing is true, while the criterion is thought to serve for judging what is true, the criterion is useless and pointless, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that it has some existence. And if we must suspend judgment about whether anything is true, it follows that those who say dialectic is the knowledge of what is true, what is false and what is neither are being rash.
2.95	Ἀπόρου δὲ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας φανέντος, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν εἶναι δοκούντων, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἔτι οἷόν τέ ἐστι διισχυρίζεσθαι, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν καταλαμβάνειν οἱ δογματικοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἐὰν ἐπέχειν περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν καλουμένων ἀναγκαζώμεθα, πῶς ἂν περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμήσαιμεν;	Now that the criterion of truth has turned out to be problematic, it is no longer possible, as far as what the dogmatists say goes, to make firm assertions either about things that seem to be clear or about non-evident things. The dogmatists think they apprehend non-evident things on the basis of clear ones. So if we are forced to suspend judgment about the so-called clear things, how could we dare to make declarations about non-evident ones?
2.96	ἐκ πολλοῦ δὲ τοῦ περιόντος καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄδηλα τῶν πραγμάτων ἰδίως ἐνστησόμεθα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα διὰ σημείου τε καὶ ἀποδείξεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ κρατύνεσθαι δοκεῖ, διὰ βραχέων ὑπομνήσομεν, ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν προσήκει. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ σημείου· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ.	Still, for good measure, we will also mount a separate challenge against non-evident things. Since these are thought to be apprehended and established by means of sign and proof, we will point out briefly that it is proper to suspend judgment about sign and proof as well. Let us begin with the sign, since proof too is thought to be, generically, a sign.

CHAPTER 10: ON THE SIGN

The dogmatists' classes of things, and recollective signs, which life relies on, versus indicative ones.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.97	Τῶν πραγμάτων τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς τὰ μέν ἐστι πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν καθάπαξ ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα. καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, καθάπαξ δὲ ἄδηλα, ἃ μὴ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν κατάληψιν, ὡς τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας,	According to the dogmatists, some things are evident and others non-evident. Of the non-evident, some are non-evident once and for all, some non-evident for the moment, and some non-evident by nature. Evident, they say, are the things that come to our knowledge of themselves, such as its being day. Non-evident once and for all are the things that are not of a nature to fall within our apprehension, such as the stars' being even in number.
2.98	πρὸς καιρὸν δὲ ἄδηλα ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐναργῆ παρὰ τινας ἔξωθεν περιστάσεις κατὰ καιρὸν ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται, ὡς ἐμοὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, φύσει δὲ ἄδηλα τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα φύσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδέποτε ἐξ ἑαυτῶν φαίνονται, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἐξ ἑτέρων καταλαμβάνεσθαι ἂν νομισθεῖεν, οἷον τῶν ἱδρώτων ἤ τινος παραπλησίου.	Non-evident for the moment are the things that are clear by nature but are made non-evident to us for the time being by certain external circumstances, as the city of Athens is now to me. Non-evident by nature are the things that are not of a nature to fall within our clear perception, like the intelligible pores. These never appear of themselves; if at all, they would be thought to be apprehended from other things, such as sweat or something of that sort.[7]
2.99	τὰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλα μὴ δεῖσθαι σημείου φασίν· ἐξ ἑαυτῶν γὰρ αὐτὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβανόμενα. τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα καὶ τὰ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ σημείων μὲν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐ μὴν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν.	Evident things, they say, do not need a sign, since they are apprehended of themselves. Nor do things that are non-evident once and for all, since they are not apprehended at all. Things non-evident for the moment and things non-evident by nature are apprehended through signs, but not through the same ones: things non-evident for the moment through recollective signs, and things non-evident by nature through indicative ones.
2.100	τῶν οὖν σημείων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ὑπομνηστικὰ κατ' αὐτούς, τὰ δ' ἐνδεικτικά. καὶ ὑπομνηστικὸν μὲν σημεῖον καλοῦσιν ὃ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας ἅμα τῷ ὑποπεσεῖν, ἐκείνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ἐναργῶς μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός.	Of signs, then, according to them, some are recollective and some indicative. They call a sign recollective when it has been clearly observed together with the thing it signifies. When it strikes us while that thing is non-evident, it leads us to recall what was observed together with it and is not now clearly perceived. This is how it is with smoke and fire.
2.101	ἐνδεικτικὸν δέ ἐστι σημεῖον, ὥς φασιν, ὃ μὴ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς σημαίνει τὸ οὗ ἐστι σημεῖον, ὥσπεροῦν αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεις σημεῖά εἰσι	An indicative sign, they say, is one that has not been clearly observed together with the thing signified. It signifies what it is a sign of from its own nature and constitution, as the movements of the

7 "Intelligible pores" were invisible channels in the skin posited by some doctors and philosophers, detectable only by reasoning (for instance, from sweating).

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅθεν καὶ ὁρίζονται τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον οὕτως ‘σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος.’	body are signs of the soul. Hence they define this sign as follows: “A sign is an indicative proposition that is the leading antecedent in a sound conditional and reveals the consequent.”
2.102	διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν σημείων διαφορᾶς, ὡς ἔφαμεν, οὐ πρὸς πᾶν σημεῖον ἀντιλέγομεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν πεπλάσθαι δοκοῦν. τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνηστικὸν πεπίστευται ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου, ἐπεὶ καπνὸν ἰδών τις σημειοῦται πῦρ καὶ οὐλὴν θεασάμενος τραῦμα γεγενῆσθαι λέγει. ὅθεν οὐ μόνον οὐ μαχόμεθα τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ συναγωνιζόμεθα, τῷ μὲν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πεπιστευμένῳ ἀδοξάστως συγκατατιθέμενοι, τοῖς δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ἰδίως ἀναπλαττομένοις ἀνθιστάμενοι.	There are two different kinds of signs, then, as we said. We do not argue against every sign but only against the indicative one, since it seems to have been invented by the dogmatists. The recollective sign is relied on by ordinary life: someone who sees smoke takes it as a sign of fire, and on seeing a scar says there has been a wound. So far from fighting against ordinary life, we even take its side. We assent, without holding beliefs, to what it relies on, while we resist what the dogmatists invent on their own account.
2.103	Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἤρμοζεν ἴσως προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς σαφηνείας τοῦ ζητουμένου· λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν χωρῶμεν, οὐκ ἀνύπαρκτον δεῖξαι τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον πάντως ἐσπουδακότες, ἀλλὰ τὴν φαινομένην ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν φερομένων λόγων πρός τε τὴν ὕπαρξιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν ὑπομιμνήσκοντες.	It was perhaps fitting to say this first, to make the subject of inquiry clear. Now let us move on to the counterargument. We are not at all eager to show that the indicative sign is unreal. We aim to point out the apparent equipollence of the arguments brought for its reality and for its unreality.

CHAPTER 11: WHETHER THERE IS ANY INDICATIVE SIGN

Arguments that the indicative sign is inconceivable, set against arguments that it exists.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.104	Τὸ σημεῖον τοίνυν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἀνεπινόητόν ἐστιν. αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀκριβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ διειληφέναι δοκοῦντες, οἱ Στωικοί, βουλόμενοι παραστῆσαι τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σημείου, φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀξίωμά φασιν εἶναι λεκτὸν αὐτοτελὲς ἀπόφαντον ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ, ὑγιὲς δὲ συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος.	As far as what the dogmatists say about it goes, the sign is inconceivable. To start with, the Stoics, who seem to have defined it precisely, want to set out the concept of the sign and say that a sign is a proposition that is the leading antecedent in a sound conditional and reveals the consequent. A proposition, they say, is a complete sayable that is assertoric in itself. A sound conditional is one that does not begin with something true and end with something false.
2.105	τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον ἤτοι ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν’, ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, οἷον ‘εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτερωτή ἐστιν ἡ γῆ,’ ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, οἷον ‘εἰ ἔστιν ἡ γῆ, πέταται ἡ γῆ’, ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον ‘εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ’. τούτων δὲ μόνον τὸ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος μοχθηρὸν εἶναί φασιν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὑγιῆ.	For a conditional either begins with something true and ends with something true, like “if it is day, it is light.” Or it begins with something false and ends with something false, like “if the earth flies, the earth has wings.” Or it begins with something true and ends with something false, like “if the earth exists, the earth flies.” Or it begins with something false and ends with something true, like “if the earth flies, the earth exists.” Of these, they say only the one that begins with something

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		true and ends with something false is unsound, and the rest are sound.
2.106	προκαθηγούμενον δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἐν συνημμένῳ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθὲς ἡγούμενον. ἐκκαλυπτικὸν δέ ἐστι τοῦ λήγοντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ ‘γάλα ἔχει αὕτη’ τοῦ ‘κεκύηκεν αὕτη’ δηλωτικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ ‘εἰ γάλα ἔχει αὕτη, κεκύηκεν αὕτη’.	A leading antecedent, they say, is the antecedent in a conditional that begins with something true and ends with something true. And it reveals the consequent, since in the conditional “if she has milk, she has conceived,” “she has milk” is thought to make clear “she has conceived.”
2.107	ταῦτα μὲν οὗτοι· ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν πρῶτον, ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, εἰ ἔστι ⟨τι⟩ λεκτόν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοί φασι μὴ εἶναί ⟨τι⟩ λεκτόν, οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ εἶναι, ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ Στωικοὶ εἶναί τι λεκτόν, ἤτοι μόνῃ φάσει χρῶνται ἢ καὶ ἀποδείξει. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν φάσει, ἀντιθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τι λεκτόν· εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξιν παραλήψονται ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων συνέστηκε λεκτῶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἐκ τῶν λεκτῶν δὲ συνεστῶσα οὐ δυνήσεται πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ λεκτὸν εἶναι παραλαμβάνεσθαι (ὁ γὰρ μὴ διδοὺς εἶναι λεκτὸν πῶς συγχωρήσει σύστημα λεκτῶν ὑπάρχειν;)	So much for them. We say, first, that it is non-evident whether there is ⟨any⟩ sayable. Among the dogmatists, the Epicureans say that there is not ⟨any⟩ sayable and the Stoics that there is. So when the Stoics say that there is a sayable, they use either mere assertion or proof as well. If assertion, the Epicureans will set against them the assertion that there is no sayable. If they bring in a proof, then, since proof is composed of propositions, which are sayables, a proof composed of sayables cannot be adopted to confirm that there is a sayable (for how will someone who does not grant that there is a sayable concede that a system of sayables exists?)
2.108	— διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου τοίνυν τὸ ζητούμενον πιστοῦσθαι βούλεται ὁ ἐκ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ συστήματος τῶν λεκτῶν εἶναί τι λεκτὸν πειρώμενος κατασκευάζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἁπλῶς μήτε δι’ ἀποδείξεως ἐνδέχεται παριστᾶν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν, ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα·	—so whoever tries to establish that there is a sayable from the existence of a system of sayables wants to confirm what is in question through what is in question. If, then, it is possible to establish that there is a sayable neither simply nor by proof, it is non-evident that there is a sayable. Likewise, it is non-evident whether there is a proposition,
2.109	λεκτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀξίωμα. μήποτε δὲ καὶ εἰ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν εἶναί τι λεκτὸν δοθείη, τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀνύπαρκτον εὑρίσκεται, συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λεκτῶν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις. οἷον γοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν’, ὅτε λέγω τὸ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν’, οὐδέπω ἔστι τὸ ‘φῶς ἔστιν’, καὶ ὅτε λέγω τὸ ‘φῶς ἔστιν’, οὐκέτι ἔστι τὸ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν’. εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν συγκείμενα ἔκ τινων ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις τῶν μερῶν αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται τὸ ἀξίωμα οὐ συνυπάρχει ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸ ἀξίωμα.	since a proposition is a sayable. Perhaps, too, even if it were granted by hypothesis that there is a sayable, the proposition would turn out to be unreal, since it is composed of sayables that do not exist together with one another. Take “if it is day, it is light.” When I say “it is day,” “it is light” does not yet exist, and when I say “it is light,” “it is day” no longer exists. Now things composed of parts cannot exist unless their parts exist together with one another, and the parts of which the proposition is composed do not exist together with one another. So the proposition will not exist.
2.110	ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον ἀκατάληπτον εὑρεθήσεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Φίλων φησὶν ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, οἷον ἡμέρας οὔσης καὶ ἐμοῦ διαλεγομένου τὸ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι’, ὁ δὲ	But let us leave these points aside too: the sound conditional will turn out to be inapprehensible. Philo says that a sound conditional is one that does not begin with something true and end with something false. An example, when it is day and I

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	Διόδωρος, ὃ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος· καθ' ὃν τὸ μὲν εἰρημένον συνημμένον ψεῦδος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρας μὲν οὔσης ἐμοῦ δὲ σιωπήσαντος ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρξάμενον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος καταλήξει,	am conversing, is "if it is day, I am conversing." Diodorus says it is one that neither could nor can begin with something true and end with something false. According to him the conditional just mentioned seems to be false: when it is day and I have fallen silent, it will begin with something true and end with something false.[8]
2.111	ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα'· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ 'οὐκ ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα' εἰς ἀληθὲς καταλήξει κατ' αὐτὸν τὸ 'ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα'. οἱ δὲ τὴν συνάρτησιν εἰσάγοντες ὑγιὲς εἶναί φασι συνημμένον, ὅταν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντι μάχηται τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ· καθ' οὓς τὰ μὲν εἰρημένα συνημμένα ἔσται μοχθηρά, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.	On the other hand this one is true: "if there are no partless elements of things, there are partless elements of things." For according to him it always begins with something false, "there are no partless elements of things," and will end with something true, "there are partless elements of things." Those who bring in connection say that a conditional is sound when the opposite of its consequent conflicts with its antecedent. According to them the conditionals just mentioned will be unsound, while this one is true: "if it is day, it is day."
2.112	οἱ δὲ τῇ ἐμφάσει κρίνοντές φασιν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι συνημμένον οὗ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ περιέχεται δυνάμει· καθ' οὓς τὸ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστι' καὶ πᾶν τὸ διαφορούμενον [ἀξίωμα] συνημμένον ἴσως ψεῦδος ἔσται·	Those who judge by implication say that a conditional is true when its consequent is potentially contained in its antecedent. According to them "if it is day, it is day," and every duplicated conditional [proposition], will perhaps be false,
2.113	αὐτὸ γάρ τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχεσθαι ἀμήχανον. ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικριθῆναι ἀμήχανον ἴσως εἶναι δόξει. οὔτε γὰρ ἀναποδείκτως προκρίνοντές τινα τῶν στάσεων τῶν προειρημένων πιστοὶ ἐσόμεθα οὔτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὑγιὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα αὐτῆς ὡς λῆγον ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον οὕτως 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν. εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς ἔστιν'.	since it is impossible for anything to be contained in itself. It will perhaps seem impossible, then, to decide this disagreement. We will not be credible if we prefer one of the positions just mentioned without proof, or with proof either. For a proof is thought to be sound when its conclusion follows from the conjunction of its premises as a consequent follows from an antecedent. For example: "If it is day, it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light"—"if it is day, it is light, and it is day, then it is light."
2.114	ζητουμένου δὲ περὶ τοῦ πῶς κρινοῦμεν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ λήγοντος πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὁ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται τρόπος. ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀποδειχθῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῖς λήμμασι τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἵνα δὲ πάλιν τοῦτο πιστευθῇ, δεῖ τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐπικεκρίσθαι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.	But when the question is how we are to judge the following of the consequent from the antecedent, the mode of reciprocity turns up. For the judgment of the conditional to be proved, the conclusion must follow from the premises of the proof, as we said before. And for this in turn to be believed, the conditional and the following must already have been decided. That is absurd.
2.115	ἀκατάληπτον ἄρα τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ προκαθηγούμενον ἄπορόν ἐστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ	So the sound conditional is inapprehensible. The leading antecedent is problematic too. For the

8 Philo the Dialectician was a logician of the late fourth century BC, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus.

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	προκαθηγούμενον, ὥς φασιν, ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τοιούτῳ συνημμένῳ, ὃ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές.	leading antecedent, as they say, is the antecedent in a conditional of the kind that begins with something true and ends with something true.
2.116	εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ σημεῖον, ἤτοι πρόδηλόν ἐστι τὸ λῆγον ἢ ἄδηλον. εἰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλον, οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος δεήσεται, ἀλλὰ συγκαταληφθήσεται αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ σημειωτόν, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο τούτου σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διαπεφώνηται ἀνεπικρίτως, ποία μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ ποῖα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ ὅλως εἰ ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, ἄδηλον ἔσται, εἰ εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ συνημμένον. ᾧ συνεισέρχεται καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι εἰ προκαθηγεῖται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενον.	And if the sign reveals the consequent, the consequent is either evident or non-evident. If evident, it will not even need anything to reveal it. It will be apprehended together with the sign and will not be signified by it, so the sign will not be a sign of it either. If non-evident, then, since there is undecidable disagreement about non-evident things—which of them are true and which false, and in general whether any of them is true—it will be non-evident whether the conditional ends in something true. And this brings with it the consequence that it is non-evident whether its antecedent is the leading antecedent.
2.117	ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, οὐ δύναται ἐκκαλυπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ λήγοντος, εἴγε πρὸς τὸ σημεῖόν ἐστι τὸ σημειωτὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ. τὰ γὰρ πρός τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται· καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ δεξιὸν πρὸ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ὡς δεξιὸν ἀριστεροῦ καταληφθῆναι οὐ δύναται, οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρός τι παραπλησίως, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον πρὸ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ὡς σημειωτοῦ καταληφθῆναι δυνατὸν ἔσται.	But let us leave these points aside too. The sign cannot reveal the consequent, given that the thing signified is relative to the sign and for that reason is apprehended together with it. Relatives are apprehended together with one another. The right cannot be apprehended as right of the left before the left, nor the reverse, and the same holds for the other relatives. In the same way it will not be possible for the sign to be apprehended as sign of the thing signified before the thing signified.
2.118	εἰ δ’ οὐ προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν αὐτοῦ δύναται ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἅμα αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ μετ’ αὐτὸ καταλαμβανομένου. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινότερον λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἀνεπινόητόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ γὰρ πρός τι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, πρὸς ᾧ φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι, τοῦτο εἶναι λέγουσιν.	And if the sign is not apprehended before the thing signified, it cannot reveal it either, since that thing is apprehended at the same time as the sign and not after it. So the sign is inconceivable as far as what those of other persuasions say in more general terms goes, too. For they say that it is both relative and revelatory of the thing signified, to which they say it is relative.
2.119	ὅθεν εἰ μὲν πρός τι ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ, συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι πάντως ὀφείλει τῷ σημειωτῷ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῷ δεξιῷ καὶ τὸ ἄνω τῷ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ⟨τὰ⟩ πρός τι. εἰ δὲ ἐστι τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ πάντως ὀφείλει, ἵνα προεπιγνωσθὲν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἀγάγῃ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γινωσκομένου πράγματος.	Hence if it is relative, and relative to the thing signified, it must certainly be apprehended together with the thing signified, as left is with right, up with down, and so with the other relatives. But if it reveals the thing signified, it must certainly be apprehended before it, so that, being recognized first, it may lead us to a conception of the thing that becomes known from it.
2.120	ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐννοῆσαι πρᾶγμα μὴ δυνάμενον πρὸ ἐκείνου γνωσθῆναι, οὗ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀνάγκην ἔχει· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐπινοεῖν τι καὶ πρός τι ὂν καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχον πρὸς ᾧ νοεῖται. τὸ δὲ	But it is impossible to conceive of a thing that cannot be known before the thing it must be apprehended before. So it is impossible to conceive of something that is both relative and revelatory of

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	σημεῖον καὶ πρός τι φασὶν εἶναι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ σημεῖον.	the very thing in relation to which it is thought. But they say that the sign is both relative and revelatory of the thing signified. So it is impossible to conceive of the sign.
2.121	Πρὸς τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. διαφωνία γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, τῶν μὲν λεγόντων εἶναί τι σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικόν, τῶν δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικὸν φασκόντων. ὁ λέγων οὖν εἶναί τι σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικὸν ἤτοι ἁπλῶς ἐρεῖ καὶ ἀναποδείκτως, ψιλῇ φάσει χρώμενος, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν φάσει μόνῃ χρήσεται, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀποδεῖξαι βουλήσεται, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσει.	This too must be said. There has been disagreement among our predecessors: some say that there is an indicative sign, others assert that there is no indicative sign. So whoever says that there is an indicative sign will say so either simply and without proof, using bare assertion, or with proof. If he uses mere assertion, he will not be believed. If he wants to prove it, he will be taking for granted what is in question.
2.122	ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημεῖον εἶναι λέγεται, ἀμφισβητουμένου τοῦ πότερον ἔστι τι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται καὶ περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐδαμῶς, ὥσπερ καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν ζητουμένου εἰ ἔστι ζῷον, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος· ζῷον γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἴσης ζητουμένου ἢ δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἀποδεικνύναι· οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἀποδείξεως ἄρα δυνήσεταί τις διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, ὅτι ἔστι σημεῖον.	For proof is said to be, generically, a sign. So if it is disputed whether there is a sign or not, it will also be disputed whether there is proof at all. Suppose, for example, that we were investigating whether there is such a thing as an animal. We would also be investigating whether there is such a thing as a human being, since a human being is an animal. But it is absurd to prove what is in question through what is equally in question, or through itself. So no one will be able to affirm by proof either that there is a sign.
2.123	εἰ δὲ μήτε ἁπλῶς μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως οἷόν τέ ἐστι περὶ τοῦ σημείου διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ καταληπτικὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιήσασθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνεται μετὰ ἀκριβείας τὸ σημεῖον, οὐδὲ σημαντικὸν εἶναι λεχθήσεταί τινος ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ αὐτὸ ὁμολογούμενον· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ σημεῖον ἔσται. ὅθεν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται τὸ σημεῖον καὶ ἀνεπινόητον.	And if it is possible to make a firm declaration about the sign neither simply nor with proof, it is impossible to make an apprehensive statement about it. And if the sign is not apprehended with precision, it will not be said to signify anything either, since there is no agreement even about the sign itself. For this reason it will not even be a sign. So by this reasoning too the sign will be unreal and inconceivable.
2.124	Ἔτι μέντοι κἀκεῖνο ῥητέον. ἤτοι φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν σημείων τὰ μέν ἐστι φαινόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὑγιές· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημεῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄδηλα οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τὰ σημεῖα, ἐντεῦθεν δείκνυται. τὸ ἄδηλον οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται, ὡς οἱ δογματικοί φασιν, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἑτέρου ὑποπίπτει. καὶ τὸ σημεῖον οὖν, εἰ ἄδηλον εἴη, ἑτέρου δεήσεται σημείου ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν, κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα σημεῖα λαμβάνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον καταληφθῆναι ἄδηλον ὄν. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται, μὴ δυνάμενον σημαίνειν τι καὶ σημεῖον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι.	Further, this too must be said. Signs are either only apparent or only non-evident, or some signs are apparent and some non-evident. None of these is sound, so there is no sign. That not all signs are non-evident is shown as follows. The non-evident does not appear of itself, as the dogmatists say, but is perceived through something else. So the sign too, if it were non-evident, will need another non-evident sign, since on the hypothesis before us nothing apparent is a sign; and that sign will need another, and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to take in infinitely many signs. So it is impossible for the sign to be apprehended if it is non-evident. For this reason it will also be unreal: since it is not

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		apprehended, it cannot signify anything or be a sign.
2.125	εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ σημεῖα φαινόμενά ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ, τὰ δὲ πρός τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι λεγόμενα σὺν τοῖς φαινομένοις καταλαμβανόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἅμα ὑποπιπτόντων τοῦ τε δεξιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ἢ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τοῦ δεξιοῦ φαίνεσθαι λέγεται, οὕτω συγκαταλαμβανομένων τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ σημεῖον ἢ τὸ σημειωτὸν φαίνεσθαι ῥητέον.	Suppose all signs are apparent. The sign is relative, and relative to the thing signified, and relatives are apprehended together with one another. So the things said to be signified, being apprehended together with apparent things, will be apparent. When right and left strike us at the same time, the right is said to appear no more than the left, and the left no more than the right. In the same way, when the sign and the thing signified are apprehended together, we must say that the sign appears no more than the thing signified.
2.126	εἰ δὲ φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὸ σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημειωτὸν ἔσται μὴ δεόμενον τοῦ σημανοῦντος αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκκαλύψοντος. ὅθεν ὥσπερ ἀναιρουμένου δεξιοῦ οὐδὲ ἀριστερὸν ἔστιν, οὕτως ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐδὲ σημεῖον εἶναι δύναται, ὥστε ἀνύπαρκτον εὑρίσκεται τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ φαινόμενα μόνα εἶναι λέγοι τις τὰ σημεῖα.	And if the thing signified is apparent, it will not even be signified, since it does not need anything to signify and reveal it. When right is abolished, there is no left either; in the same way, when the thing signified is abolished, there can be no sign either. So the sign turns out to be unreal if one says that signs are only apparent.
2.127	λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι τῶν σημείων τὰ μέν ἐστι φαινόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα· καὶ οὕτως δὲ αἱ ἀπορίαι μένουσιν. τῶν τε γὰρ φαινομένων σημείων τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι λεγόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν, καὶ μὴ δεόμενα τοῦ σημανοῦντος οὐδὲ σημειωτὰ ὅλως ὑπάρξει, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα σημεῖα ἔσται, μηδὲν σημαίνοντα·	It remains to say that some signs are apparent and some non-evident. Even so the difficulties remain. The things said to be signified by the apparent signs will be apparent, as we said before. Since they do not need anything to signify them, they will not be signified at all. Hence those signs will not be signs either, since they signify nothing.
2.128	τά τε ἄδηλα σημεῖα χρῄζοντα τῶν ἐκκαλυψόντων αὐτά, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπὸ ἀδήλων σημαίνεσθαι λέγηται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτοντος τοῦ λόγου ἀκατάληπτα εὑρίσκεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνύπαρκτα, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἐὰν δὲ ὑπὸ φαινομένων, φαινόμενα ἔσται σὺν τοῖς φαινομένοις αὐτῶν σημείοις καταλαμβανόμενα, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί τι πρᾶγμα, ὃ καὶ ἄδηλόν ἐστι φύσει καὶ φαινόμενον, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα περὶ ὧν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἄδηλα ὑποτεθέντα, φαινόμενα εὑρέθη κατὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν τοῦ λόγου.	As for the non-evident signs, they need things to reveal them. If they are said to be signified by non-evident things, the argument falls into infinite regress and they turn out to be inapprehensible, and for that reason unreal, as we said before. If they are said to be signified by apparent things, they will be apparent, since they are apprehended together with their apparent signs; and for that reason they will be unreal too. For it is impossible for anything to be both non-evident by nature and apparent. Yet the signs under discussion, though assumed to be non-evident, have been found to be apparent as the argument turns itself around.
2.129	εἰ οὖν μήτε πάντα τὰ σημεῖα φαινόμενά ἐστι μήτε πάντα ἄδηλα, μήτε τῶν σημείων τινὰ μέν ἐστι φαινόμενα, τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὡς καὶ αὐτοί φασιν, ἀνύπαρκτα ἔσται τὰ λεγόμενα σημεῖα.	If, then, signs are neither all apparent nor all non-evident, nor some apparent and some non-evident, and there is nothing besides these, as they themselves say, the so-called signs will be unreal.
2.130	Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀρκέσει νῦν εἰρῆσθαι πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικόν· ἑξῆς δὲ	These few points out of many will suffice for now to suggest that there is no indicative sign. Next we

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καὶ τὰς ὑπομνήσεις τοῦ εἶναί τι σημεῖον ἐκθησόμεθα, ἵνα τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγων παραστήσωμεν. ἤτοι οὖν σημαίνουσί τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου φωναὶ φερόμεναι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄσημοί εἰσιν, πῶς ἂν κινήσειαν τὴν ὕπαρξιν τοῦ σημείου;

2.131 εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσί τι, ἔστι σημεῖον. ἔτι ἤτοι ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐκ ἀποδεικνύουσι τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημεῖόν ἐστιν, ἐκκαλυπτικὴ οὖσα τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἔσται σημεῖον. ὅθεν καὶ συνερωτᾶται λόγος τοιοῦτος· εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον δι' ἀποδείξεως, ἣ δή ἐστι σημεῖον, δείκνυται. ἤτοι δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· ἔστιν ἄρα σημεῖον.

2.132 τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ παράκειται τοιοῦτος λόγος. εἰ οὐκ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι σημεῖον ὅ φασιν οἱ δογματικοὶ εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον. τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ πρός τι εἶναι λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, ἀνύπαρκτον εὑρίσκεται, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν.

2.133 ἤτοι δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημεῖον. καὶ περὶ τῶν φωνῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ σημείου αὐτοὶ ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ δογματικοί, πότερον σημαίνουσί τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν, οὐ πιστοῦται τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον· εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσιν, ἀκολουθήσει αὐταῖς τὸ σημειωτόν. τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ εἶναί τι σημεῖον· ᾧ ἕπεται τὸ ⟨μὴ⟩ εἶναι, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου περιτροπήν. Πλὴν ἀλλ' οὕτω πιθανῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι λόγων φερομένων, οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι σημεῖον ἢ μὴ εἶναι ῥητέον.

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will also set out the considerations suggesting that there is a sign, so as to show the equipollence of the opposing arguments. The utterances brought against the sign either signify something or signify nothing. If they signify nothing, how could they shake the existence of the sign?

If they signify something, there is a sign. Again, the arguments against the sign are either probative or not probative. If they are not probative, they do not prove that there is no sign. If they are probative, then, since proof is generically a sign, revealing its conclusion, there will be a sign. Hence an argument of this kind is propounded: if there is a sign, there is a sign; and if there is not a sign, there is a sign, since that there is not a sign is shown by proof, which is a sign. Either there is a sign or there is not a sign; therefore there is a sign.

Alongside this argument is set one of this kind. If there is not any sign, there is not a sign; and if there is a sign, of the kind the dogmatists say there is, there is not a sign. For the sign under discussion is said, by its very concept, to be both relative and revelatory of the thing signified, and it turns out to be unreal, as we showed.

Either there is a sign or there is not a sign; therefore there is not a sign. And as for the utterances on behalf of the sign, let the dogmatists themselves answer whether they signify something or signify nothing. If they signify nothing, they do not confirm that there is a sign. If they signify something, the thing signified will follow from them. And that was that there is a sign; from which it follows that there is ⟨not⟩ one, as we pointed out, as the argument turns itself around. However, since such plausible arguments are brought both for there being a sign and for there not being one, we must say that there is "no more" a sign than not.

CHAPTER 12: ON PROOF

Proof, as a kind of sign, is equally in doubt; Sextus sets out the Stoic account of it.

GREEK

2.134 Φανερὸν μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὁμολογούμενόν τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐπέχομεν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δὲ σημεῖόν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ γὰρ εὑρήσομεν τοὺς περὶ

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It is plain from this that proof is not something agreed upon either. If we suspend judgment about the sign, and proof is a kind of sign, we must suspend judgment about proof as well. Indeed, we

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	τοῦ σημείου λόγους ἠρωτημένους ἐφαρμόζεσθαι δυναμένους καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρός τι εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὴ τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οἷς ἠκολούθει τὰ πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον ἡμῖν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα.	will find that the arguments propounded about the sign can be applied against proof too. Proof too is thought to be relative and revelatory of its conclusion, and almost everything we said against the sign followed from these features.
2.135	εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἰδίως περὶ ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν, συντόμως ἐπελεύσομαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον, πρότερον σαφηνίσαι πειραθεὶς διὰ βραχέων, τί φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. Ἔστιν οὖν, ὡς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. σαφέστερον δὲ ὃ λέγουσιν ἔσται διὰ τούτων. λόγος ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς·	But if we must also speak about proof specifically, I will go through the argument about it concisely, first trying to make clear briefly what they say proof is. Proof, then, as they say, is an argument that, by means of agreed premises, reveals a non-evident conclusion by way of deduction. What they mean will become clearer from what follows. An argument is a system made up of premises and a conclusion.
2.136	τούτου δὲ λήμματα μὲν εἶναι λέγεται τὰ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος συμφώνως λαμβανόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐπιφορὰ δὲ [συμπέρασμα] τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευαζόμενον ἀξίωμα. οἷον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ⟨λόγῳ⟩ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν' τὸ μὲν 'φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν' συμπέρασμά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ λήμματα.	Its premises are said to be the propositions adopted by agreement for establishing the conclusion, and the conclusion [conclusion] is the proposition established from the premises. For instance, in this ⟨argument⟩, "If it is day, it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light," "therefore it is light" is the conclusion, and the rest are premises.
2.137	τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ ἀσύνακτοι, συνακτικοὶ μέν, ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν τοῦ λόγου λημμάτων συμπεπλεγμένου, λῆγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν αὐτοῦ, ὑγιὲς ᾖ, οἷον ὁ προειρημένος λόγος συνακτικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ταύτῃ 'ἡμέρα ἔστι', καὶ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν' ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ 'φῶς ἔστιν' ἐν τούτῳ τῷ '[εἰ] ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν.' ἀσύνακτοι δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες.	Of arguments, some are conclusive and some inconclusive. They are conclusive when the conditional that begins with the conjunction of the argument's premises and ends in its conclusion is sound. The argument just mentioned, for example, is conclusive, since "it is light" follows from the conjunction of its premises, "it is day" and "if it is day, it is light," in this conditional: "[if] it is day, and if it is day, it is light." Inconclusive arguments are those that are not like this.
2.138	τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μέν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον τὸ συνημμένον ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς, ὡς προειρήκαμεν, ὑγιὲς ᾖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχῃ, ὅ ἐστιν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ. ἀληθὲς δὲ συμπεπλεγμένον ἐστὶ τὸ πάντα ἔχον ἀληθῆ, ὡς τὸ 'ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν.'	Of conclusive arguments, some are true and some not true. They are true when not only the conditional formed from the conjunction of the premises and the conclusion is sound, as we said before, but also the conclusion is true, and so is the conjunction of its premises, which is the antecedent in the conditional. A true conjunction is one all of whose parts are true, like "it is day, and if it is day, it is light."
2.139	οὐκ ἀληθεῖς δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος 'εἰ νὺξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νὺξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν' συνακτικὸς μέν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο ὑγιές ἐστιν '[εἰ] νὺξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νὺξ ἔστι, σκότος ⟨ἔστιν· σκότος⟩ ἄρα ἔστιν', οὐ μέντοι ἀληθής. τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον ψεῦδός ἐστι, τὸ 'νὺξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νὺξ ἔστι,	Not true are those that are not like this. Take an argument like "If it is night, it is dark; but it is night; therefore it is dark." It is conclusive, since this conditional is sound: "[if] it is night, and if it is night, it is dark, ⟨it is dark; therefore⟩ it is dark." It is not, however, true. The conjunction "it is night,

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	σκότος ἔστι,' ψεῦδος ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ 'νὺξ ἔστιν·' ψεῦδος γάρ ἐστι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ψεῦδος. ἔνθεν καὶ ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναί φασι τὸν δι' ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα.	and if it is night, it is dark" is false, because it contains the false "it is night"; for a conjunction that contains something false is false. Hence they also say that a true argument is one that deduces a true conclusion through true premises.
2.140	πάλιν δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀποδεικτικοὶ, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ μὲν οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλόν τι συνάγοντες, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι οἷον ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος λόγος 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικός· τὸ γὰρ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ συμπέρασμα, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ ἱδρῶτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἱδρῶτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας· εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι' ἀποδεικτικός ἐστι, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχων ἄδηλον, τὸ 'εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι'.	Again, of true arguments, some are probative and some not probative. Probative are those that deduce something non-evident through evident things; not probative are those that do not. For example, an argument like "If it is day, it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light" is not probative, since its conclusion, that it is light, is evident. But an argument like "If sweat flows through the surface, there are intelligible pores; but sweat flows through the surface; therefore there are intelligible pores" is probative, since its conclusion, "therefore there are intelligible pores," is non-evident.
2.141	τῶν δὲ ἄδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. οἷον ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρτῆσθαι δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ τίς σοι εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος, πλουτήσει οὗτος· οὑτοσὶ δὲ ὁ θεός (δείκνυμι δὲ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὸν Δία) εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος· πλουτήσει ἄρα οὗτος'· συγκατατιθέμεθα γὰρ τῷ συμπεράσματι οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τῶν λημμάτων ἀνάγκην ὡς πιστεύοντες τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάσει.	Of those that deduce something non-evident, some lead us through the premises to the conclusion merely by way of progression; others do so by way of progression and of revelation at once. Arguments by way of progression are those that seem to depend on trust and memory, such as this one: "If someone has told you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; this god here (I point, for the sake of argument, to Zeus) has told you that this man will be rich; therefore this man will be rich." We assent to the conclusion not so much because of the necessity of the premises as because we trust the god's declaration.
2.142	οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἱδρῶτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα·' τὸ γὰρ ῥεῖν τούς ἱδρῶτας ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ πόρους εἶναι, διὰ τὸ προειλῆφθαι ὅτι διὰ ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι.	Others lead us to the conclusion not only by way of progression but also by way of revelation, like this one: "If sweat flows through the surface, there are intelligible pores. But the first; therefore the second." Sweat's flowing reveals that there are pores, because it has been assumed beforehand that liquid cannot pass through a solid body.
2.143	ἡ οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ λόγος εἶναι ὀφείλει καὶ συνακτικὸς καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα [καὶ] ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. διὰ τούτων μὲν οὖν σαφηνίζειν εἰώθασι τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως.	Proof, then, must be an argument; it must be conclusive and true; and it must have a non-evident conclusion [and] one revealed by the power of the premises. That is why proof is said to be an argument that, by means of agreed premises, reveals a non-evident conclusion by way of deduction. This, then, is how they usually explain the concept of proof.

CHAPTER 13: WHETHER THERE IS PROOF

Arguments, conclusiveness and the Stoic indemonstrables are attacked, and proof is found to be unreal.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.144	ὅτι δὲ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν λέγουσιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν, ἕκαστον τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ διατρέποντα. οἷον γοῦν ὁ λόγος σύγκειται ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα πράγματα οὐ δύναται ὑπάρχειν, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχῃ, ὡς πρόδηλον ἀπὸ κλίνης καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ λόγου ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνυπάρχει. ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον λῆμμα, οὐδέπω ὑπάρχει οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα οὔτε ἡ ἐπιφορά· ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερόν φαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον λῆμμα οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφορὰ οὐδέπω ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν προφερόμεθα, τὰ λήμματα αὐτῆς οὐκέτι ὑφέστηκεν. οὐ συνυπάρχει ἄρα ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχειν δόξει.	That proof is unreal can be inferred from what they themselves say, by overturning each of the elements included in its concept. For instance, an argument is composed of propositions. But composite things cannot exist unless their components exist together with one another, as is evident from a bed and similar things; and the parts of an argument do not exist together with one another. When we state the first premise, neither the other premise nor the conclusion exists yet. When we state the second, the first premise no longer exists and the conclusion does not exist yet. When we pronounce the conclusion, its premises no longer exist. So the parts of an argument do not exist together with one another, and hence the argument itself will not seem to exist either.
2.145	χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ οὗτος κρίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολουθίας, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνημμένον ἀκολουθία ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται καὶ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀκατάληπτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ σημείου λόγῳ ὑπεμνήσαμεν, καὶ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται.	Apart from this, the conclusive argument is inapprehensible. It is judged by the following in the conditional, and the following in the conditional is the subject of undecidable disagreement and is perhaps inapprehensible, as we pointed out in the discussion of the sign. So the conclusive argument will be inapprehensible too.
2.146	οἵ γε μὴν διαλεκτικοί φασιν ἀσύνακτον λόγον γίγνεσθαι ἤτοι παρὰ διάρτησιν ἢ παρὰ ἔλλειψιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ κατὰ μοχθηρὸν ἠρωτῆσθαι σχῆμα ἢ κατὰ παρολκήν. οἷον κατὰ διάρτησιν μέν, ὅταν μὴ ἔχῃ τὰ λήμματα ἀκολουθίαν πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πωλοῦνται·	Now the dialecticians say that an argument comes out inconclusive through disconnection, or through deficiency, or through being propounded in an invalid form, or through redundancy. It is inconclusive through disconnection, for example, when the premises have no connection with one another and with the conclusion, as in this one: "If it is day, it is light; but wheat is being sold in the market;
2.147	Δίων ἄρα περιπατεῖ'. παρὰ δὲ παρολκήν, ὅταν εὑρίσκηται λῆμμα παρέλκον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου συναγωγήν, οἷον 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δίων περιπατεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν'. παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι σχήματι, ὅταν μὴ ᾖ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου συνακτικόν, οἷον ὄντων συλλογιστικῶν, ὡς φασί, τούτων 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν', 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, ⟨φῶς ἔστιν⟩· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν', ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστιν οὗτος 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν'.	therefore Dion is walking." It is inconclusive through redundancy when a premise is found to be redundant for the argument's deduction. For example: "If it is day, it is light; but it is day, and Dion is walking too; therefore it is light." It is inconclusive through being propounded in an invalid form when the form of the argument is not conclusive. For example, while these arguments, they say, are syllogistic—"If it is day, it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light," and "If it is day, ⟨it is light⟩; but it is not light; therefore it is not day"—

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this one is inconclusive: "If it is day, it is light; but it is light; therefore it is day."

2.148 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ συνημμένον ἐντὸς τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λῆγον, εἰκότως τοῦ ἡγουμένου προσλαμβανομένου ἐπάγεται καὶ τὸ λῆγον, καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀνῃρημένου ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἦν ἂν καὶ τὸ λῆγον. τοῦ δὲ λήγοντος προσλαμβανομένου οὐ πάντως τίθεται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπισχνεῖτο τὸ συνημμένον τῷ λήγοντι ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡγουμένῳ τὸ λῆγον μόνον.

For the conditional announces that, if its antecedent holds, the consequent holds too. So it is reasonable that when the antecedent is added as a premise, the consequent is inferred as well, and when the consequent is denied, the antecedent is denied as well; for if the antecedent held, the consequent would hold too. But when the consequent is added, the antecedent is not necessarily posited. The conditional did not promise that the antecedent follows the consequent, only that the consequent follows the antecedent.

2.149 διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λῆγον συνάγων συλλογιστικὸς εἶναι λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ συνάγων· ὁ δὲ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἡγούμενον συνάγων ἀσύνακτος, ὡς ὁ προειρημένος, παρὸ καὶ ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ ψεῦδος συνάγει, ὅταν λυχνιαίου φωτὸς ὄντος νυκτὸς λέγηται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ 'ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστι' πρόσληψις, ἡ δὲ 'ἡμέρα ἄρα ⟨ἔστιν⟩' ἐπιφορὰ ψευδής.

That is why an argument that deduces the consequent from a conditional and its antecedent is said to be syllogistic, as is one that deduces the opposite of the antecedent from a conditional and the opposite of the consequent. But an argument that deduces the antecedent from a conditional and its consequent is inconclusive, like the one just mentioned. That is why, even when its premises are true, it deduces something false, if it is stated at night by lamplight. The conditional "if it is day, it is light" is true, and so is the additional premise "but it is light," but the conclusion "therefore it is day" is false.

2.150 κατὰ παράλειψιν δέ ἐστι μοχθηρὸς λόγος, ἐν ᾧ παραλείπεταί τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν συναγωγὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος χρησιμευόντων· οἷον ὑγιοῦς ὄντος, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ λόγου τούτου 'ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακὸς ἢ ἀδιάφορος· οὔτε δὲ κακός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀδιάφορος· ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ἐστίν', φαῦλός ἐστι παρὰ ἔλλειψιν οὗτος ὁ λόγος 'ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κακός· ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ἐστίν'.

An argument is faulty through omission when something needed for deducing the conclusion is left out. For example, this argument, as they think, is sound: "Wealth is either good or bad or indifferent; but it is neither bad nor indifferent; therefore it is good." But this one is faulty through deficiency: "Wealth is either good or bad; but it is not bad; therefore it is good."

2.151 ἐὰν οὖν δείξω ὅτι οὐδεμία διαφορὰ τῶν ἀσυνάκτων διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν, ἔδειξα ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος, ὡς περιττὰς εἶναι τὰς κατὰ διαλεκτικὴν ⟨παρ'⟩ αὐτοῖς φερομένας ἀπειρολογίας. δείκνυμι δὲ οὕτως.

If, then, I show that, according to them, no kind of inconclusive argument can be distinguished from conclusive ones, I will have shown that the conclusive argument is inapprehensible. Their endless chatter about dialectic, current ⟨among⟩ them, will then be superfluous. I show it as follows.

2.152 Ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος ἐλέγετο ἐγνωρίσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν τὰ λήμματα αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλά ⟨τε⟩ καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ συνημμένου, ἀνεπίκριτον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνημμένον, ὡς

The argument inconclusive through disconnection was said to be recognized by the fact that its premises have no connection with one another ⟨and⟩ with the conclusion. Judgment of the conditional must come before knowledge of this con-

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	ἐπελογισάμην, ⟨ἀδιάκριτος⟩ ἔσται καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος.	nection, and the conditional cannot be decided, as I have argued. So the argument inconclusive through disconnection will also be ⟨indistinguishable⟩.
2.153	καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέγων κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτον εἶναί τινα λόγον, φάσιν μὲν προφερόμενος μόνην ἀντιτιθεμένην αὐτῷ φάσιν ἕξει τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ προειρημένῃ· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ διὰ λόγου ἀκούσεται, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πρότερον συνακτικὸν εἶναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἀποδεικνύειν, ὅτι ἀσυνάρτητα τὰ λήμματα τοῦ διηρτῆσθαι λεγομένου λόγου. οὐ γνωσόμεθα δὲ εἰ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικός, μὴ ἔχοντες συνημμένου σύμφωνον κρίσιν, ᾗ κρινοῦμεν εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐχ ἕξομεν διακρίνειν τῶν συνακτικῶν τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λεγόμενον.	Take someone who says that some argument is inconclusive through disconnection. If he offers mere assertion, he will find set against him the assertion opposed to his. If he proves it by an argument, he will be told that this argument must first be conclusive, and only then prove that the premises of the argument said to be disconnected are unconnected. But we will not know whether it is probative, since we have no agreed way of judging the conditional by which to judge whether the conclusion follows from the conjunction of the argument's premises. So on this count too we will be unable to distinguish the argument said to be invalid through disconnection from conclusive ones.
2.154	τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λόγον τινὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν φαύλῳ σχήματι ἠρωτῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ κατασκευάζων ὅτι μοχθηρόν τι σχῆμά ἐστιν, οὐχ ἕξει ὁμολογούμενον συνακτικὸν λόγον δι' οὗ δυνήσεται συνάγειν ὃ φησιν.	We will say the same to someone who says that an argument is invalid through being propounded in a bad form. Whoever argues that some form is invalid will not have an agreed conclusive argument through which he can deduce what he says.
2.155	δυνάμει δὲ ἀντειρήκαμεν διὰ τούτων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πειρωμένους παρ' ἔλλειψιν ἀσυνάκτους λόγους εἶναι δεικνύναι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐντελὴς ⟨καὶ⟩ ἀπηρτισμένος ἐστί, καὶ ὁ ἐλλιπὴς ἄδηλος ἔσται. καὶ ἔτι ὁ διὰ λόγου δεικνύναι τινὰ ἐλλιπῆ βουλόμενος λόγον, μὴ ἔχων συνημμένου κρίσιν ὡμολογημένην, δι' ἧς κρίνειν δυνήσεται τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένου λόγου, οὐ δυνήσεται κεκριμένως καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἐλλιπής ἐστιν.	With this we have also, in effect, answered those who try to show that arguments are inconclusive through deficiency. For if the complete ⟨and⟩ finished argument is non-evident, the deficient one will be non-evident too. Further, someone who wants to show by argument that some argument is deficient has no agreed way of judging the conditional, by which he could judge the following in the argument he states. So he will not be able to say, with sound judgment and correctly, that it is deficient.

THE INDEMONSTRABLES ARE REDUNDANT

Sextus argues that the five Stoic indemonstrables and categorical syllogisms all contain a superfluous premise.

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2.156	ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κατὰ παρολκὴν λεγόμενος εἶναι μοχθηρὸς ἀδιάκριτός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν. ὅσον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ καὶ οἱ θρυλούμενοι παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἀναπόδεικτοι ἀσύνακτοι εὑρεθήσονται, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἡ πᾶσα διαλεκτικὴ ἀνατρέπεται· οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οὕς φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν, ἀποδεικτικοὺς δὲ ὑπάρχειν ⟨διὰ⟩ τοῦ	Moreover, the argument said to be invalid through redundancy cannot be distinguished from probative ones. As far as redundancy goes, even the indemonstrables the Stoics talk so much about will turn out to be inconclusive. And if they are done away with, the whole of dialectic is overturned. For these are the arguments that, they say, need

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	καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συνάγειν λόγους. ὅτι δὲ παρέλκουσιν, ἔσται σαφὲς ἐκθεμένων ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους καὶ οὕτως ὅ φαμεν ἐπιλογιζομένων.	no proof to establish themselves, but are probative ⟨by⟩ making the other arguments conclusive. That they are redundant will be clear once we have set out the indemonstrables and then inferred what we are claiming.
2.157	Πολλοὺς μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ ἀναποδείκτους ὀνειροπολοῦσιν, πέντε δὲ τούτους μάλιστα ἐκτίθενται, εἰς οὓς οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες ἀναφέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, πρῶτον ⟨τὸν⟩ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λῆγον συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν’. δεύτερον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ φῶς·	⟨Now⟩ they dream up many indemonstrables, but they chiefly set out these five, to which all the rest seem to be reduced. First, ⟨the one⟩ that deduces the consequent from a conditional and its antecedent, for example “If it is day, it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light.” Second, the one that deduces the opposite of the antecedent from a conditional and the opposite of the consequent, for example “If it is day, it is light; but it is not light;
2.158	οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν’. τρίτον τὸν ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νὺξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν’. τέταρτον τὸν ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐπεζευγμένων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νὺξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ ἔστιν’. πέμπτον τὸν ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ἑνὸς τῶν ἐπεζευγμένων τὸ λοιπὸν συνάγοντα, οἷον ‘ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νὺξ ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ νὺξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν’.	therefore it is not day.” Third, the one that deduces, from a negated conjunction and one of its conjuncts, the opposite of the other conjunct, for example “Not both: it is day and it is night; but it is day; therefore it is not night.” Fourth, the one that deduces, from a disjunction and one of its disjuncts, the opposite of the other, for example “Either it is day or it is night; but it is day; therefore it is not night.” Fifth, the one that deduces, from a disjunction and the opposite of one of its disjuncts, the other disjunct, for example “Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night; therefore it is day.”
2.159	Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ θρυλούμενοι ἀναπόδεικτοι, πάντες δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀσύνακτοι εἶναι κατὰ παρολκήν. αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἵνα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀρξώμεθα, ἤτοι ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ‘φῶς ἔστιν’ τῷ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν’ ἡγουμένῳ αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν’ συνημμένῳ, ἢ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ συνημμένον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὄντος τοῦ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ τὸ ‘φῶς ἔστιν,’ εἰπόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν, συνάγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον ‘ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν’, καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν’ συνημμένον.	These, then, are the much-talked-about indemonstrables, and all of them seem to me to be inconclusive through redundancy. To start right away with the first: either it is agreed that “it is light” follows “it is day,” its antecedent, in the conditional “if it is day, it is light,” or this is non-evident. If it is non-evident, we will not grant the conditional as agreed. But if it is evident that if “it is day” holds, “it is light” will necessarily hold too, then once we have said that it is day, it is also deduced that it is light. So an argument like “It is day; therefore it is light” suffices, and the conditional “if it is day, it is light” is redundant.
2.160	ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος μὴ ὄντος εἶναι τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς τὸ συνημμένον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ‘οὐχὶ τὸ λῆγον’ τίθεται καὶ τὸ ‘οὐχὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον’, καὶ παρέλκει πάλιν τὸ συνημμένον, τῆς	We proceed in the same way with the second indemonstrable. Either it is possible for the antecedent to hold when the consequent does not, or it is not possible. If it is possible, the conditional will not be sound. If it is not possible, then as soon as “not the consequent” is posited, “not the antecedent” is posited too. Once again the conditional

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	συνερωτήσεως τοιαύτης γινομένης ‘οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα [ὅτι] ἡμέρα ἔστιν’.	is redundant, and the argument is propounded like this: “It is not light; therefore [that] it is not day.”
2.161	ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ συνυπάρξαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀναιρεῖται τὸ λοιπόν, καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ ἔστιν’.	The same reasoning applies to the third indemonstrable. Either it is evident that the parts of the conjunction cannot hold together, or it is non-evident. If non-evident, we will not grant the negated conjunction. If evident, then as soon as one is posited the other is eliminated, and the negated conjunction is redundant, since we propound the argument like this: “It is day; therefore it is not night.”
2.162	τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πέμπτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μετὰ μάχης τελείας, ὅπερ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ διεζευγμένον, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ διεζευγμένον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, τεθέντος ἑνὸς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος ἑνὸς πρόδηλον ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν συνερωτᾶν οὕτως ‘ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νὺξ ἔστιν’, ‘οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νὺξ ἄρα ἔστιν’, καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ διεζευγμένον.	We say much the same about the fourth and fifth indemonstrables. Either it is evident that in the disjunction one part is true and the other false, in complete conflict, which is what the disjunction announces, or it is non-evident. If non-evident, we will not grant the disjunction. If evident, then when one of them is posited it is plain that the other does not hold, and when one is eliminated it is evident that the other holds. So it suffices to propound the arguments like this: “It is day; therefore it is not night,” “It is not day; therefore it is night”; and the disjunction is redundant.
2.163	Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγειν ἔνεστι καὶ περὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν, οἷς μάλιστα χρῶνται οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου. οἷον γοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ‘τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τό καλὸν ⟨δὲ⟩ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν’ ἤτοι ὁμολογεῖται καὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἔστιν ἄδηλον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δοθήσεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου συνερώτησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ συνάξει ὁ συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ καλόν, τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι τόδε τι καλόν ἐστι συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερώτησιν ‘τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν’, καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα ἐν ᾧ τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐλέγετο.	Much the same can be said about the so-called categorical syllogisms too, which are used above all by the Peripatetics. Take this argument: “What is just is fine, ⟨and⟩ what is fine is good; therefore what is just is good.” Either it is agreed and evident that what is fine is good, or it is disputed and non-evident. If it is non-evident, it will not be granted when the argument is propounded, and so the syllogism will not be conclusive. But if it is evident that whatever is fine is certainly also good, then as soon as it is said that this particular thing is fine, its being good comes in along with it. So an argument like “What is just is fine; therefore what is just is good” suffices, and the other premise, in which what is fine was said to be good, is redundant.
2.164	ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ ‘Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῷον,’ εἰ μὲν οὔκ ἐστι πρόδηλον αὐτόθεν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅ τι περ ἂν ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ ζῷόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται ἡ καθόλου πρότασις, οὐδὲ δώσομεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ	Likewise with an argument like “Socrates is a human being; every human being is an animal; therefore Socrates is an animal.” If it is not immediately evident that whatever is a human being is also an animal, the universal premise is not agreed, and we will not grant it in the

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2.165	συνερωτήσει. εἰ δὲ ἕπεται τῷ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ καὶ ζῷον αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁμολογουμένως ἡ ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον’ πρότασις, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερώτησιν ‘Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῷον,’ καὶ παρέλκειν τὴν ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον’ πρότασιν.	propounding of the argument. But if being an animal follows from being a human being, and for that reason the premise “every human being is an animal” is admittedly true, then as soon as it is said that Socrates is a human being, his being an animal comes in along with it. So an argument like “Socrates is a human being; therefore Socrates is an animal” suffices, and the premise “every human being is an animal” is redundant.
2.166	παραπλησίαις δὲ μεθόδοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρώτων κατηγορικῶν λόγων χρῆσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ νῦν ἐνδιατρίβωμεν. Πλὴν ἐπεὶ παρέλκουσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐν οἷς τὴν ὑποβάθραν τῶν συλλογισμῶν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ τίθενται, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ διατρέπεται πᾶσα ἡ διαλεκτική, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν διακρῖναι τοὺς παρέλκοντας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀσυνάκτους λόγους ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν.	Similar methods can be used with the other primary categorical arguments too, but let us not dwell on them now. The dialecticians lay these arguments down as the foundation of syllogisms, and they are redundant. So, as far as redundancy goes, the whole of dialectic is overturned, since we cannot distinguish the redundant, and therefore inconclusive, arguments from the so-called conclusive syllogisms.
2.167	εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἀρέσκει τισὶ λόγους μονολημμάτους εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀξιοπιστότεροι Ἀντιπάτρου, ὃς οὐδὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζει. Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς συνακτικὸς καλούμενος λόγος. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος ἀνεύρετός ἐστι διά τε τὰ προειρημένα καὶ ἐπεὶ πάντως ὀφείλει εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λεγόμενον ἤτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον.	And if some people do not accept that there are single-premise arguments, they are no more trustworthy than Antipater, who does not reject such arguments either. For these reasons, then, what the dialecticians call a conclusive argument cannot be decided. Moreover, the true argument cannot be found, both for the reasons already given and because it must certainly end in something true. For the conclusion said to be true is either apparent or non-evident.[9]
2.168	καὶ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι δι’ ἑαυτοῦ προσπῖπτον καὶ οὐχ ἧττον τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ φαινόμενον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, διόπερ καὶ ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εἶναι λεγομένου λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα, πότερον ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ συναγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος. ἀγνοήσομεν οὖν, πότερον ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἀνεύρετος ἔσται ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος.	It certainly cannot be apparent. If it were, it would not be revealed through the premises, since it would strike us of itself and would be no less apparent than its premises. If it is non-evident, then, since there is undecidable disagreement about non-evident things, as we pointed out earlier, and for that reason they are inapprehensible, the conclusion of the argument said to be true will be inapprehensible too. And if this is inapprehensible, we will not know whether what is deduced is true or false. So we will not know whether the argument is true or false, and the true argument will not be found.
2.169	ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρῶμεν, ὁ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγων ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἕπεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἡ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δ’ ἑπόμενον καὶ τὸ λῆγον πρός τι ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, τὰ δὲ	But let us pass over these points too. The argument that deduces something non-evident through evident things cannot be found. The con-

9 Antipater of Tarsus was head of the Stoic school in the second century BC.

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	πρός τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἄδηλα ἔσται καὶ τὰ λήμματα, εἰ δὲ πρόδηλά ἐστι τὰ λήμματα, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἅτε συγκαταλαμβανόμενον αὐτοῖς προδήλοις οὖσιν, ὡς μηκέτι ἐκ προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγεσθαι.	clusion follows from the conjunction of its premises; what follows, the consequent, is relative, relative to the antecedent; and relatives are apprehended together with one another, as we showed. So if the conclusion is non-evident, the premises will be non-evident too. And if the premises are evident, the conclusion will be evident too, since it is apprehended together with them, evident as they are. Then something non-evident is no longer deduced from evident things.
2.170	διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐκκαλύπτεται ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ἡ ἐπιφορά, ἤτοι ἄδηλος οὖσα καὶ μὴ καταλαμβανομένη, ἢ πρόδηλος καὶ μὴ δεομένη τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ συναγωγήν, τουτέστι συνακτικός, διά τινων ὁμολογουμένως ἀληθῶν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον, ὑπεμνήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι οὔτε λόγος τις ἔστιν οὔτε συνακτικὸς οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε διά τινων προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγων οὔτε ἐκκαλυπτικὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος, φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.	For these reasons the conclusion is not revealed by the premises either. Either it is non-evident and not apprehended, or it is evident and does not need anything to reveal it. Proof is said to be an argument that, by way of deduction (that is, conclusively), reveals a non-evident conclusion through things admittedly true. But we have pointed out that there is no argument, nor any conclusive one, nor any true one, nor any that deduces something non-evident through evident things, nor any that reveals its conclusion. So it is plain that proof has no real existence.
2.171	Καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ καὶ ἀνεπινόητον εὑρήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ὁ γὰρ λέγων εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἤτοι γενικὴν τίθησιν ἀπόδειξιν ἢ εἰδικήν τινα· ἀλλ’ οὔτε τὴν γενικὴν οὔτε εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν τιθέναι δυνατόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· παρὰ δὲ ταύτας ἄλλο τι νοεῖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· οὐκ ἄρα δύναταί τις ὡς ὑπάρχουσαν τιθέναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.	We will also find proof to be unreal, or even inconceivable, by the following approach. Whoever says that there is proof posits either generic proof or some specific proof. But it is possible to posit neither generic nor specific proof, as we will point out, and nothing besides these can be conceived. So no one can posit proof as existing.
2.172	ἡ μὲν οὖν γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀνυπόστατός ἐστι διὰ τάδε. ἤτοι ἔχει λήμματά τινα καί τινα ἐπιφορὰν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ λήμματά τινα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφοράν τινα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὕτω καὶ ἀποδεικνύον ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, εἰδικὴ ἔσται ἀπόδειξις· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰδική.	Now, generic proof is unreal, for the following reasons. Either it has some premises and some conclusion, or it does not. If it does not, it is not even a proof. But if it has some premises and some conclusion, then, since everything that is proved and that proves in this way is particular, it will be a specific proof. So there is no generic proof. But there is no specific proof either.
2.173	ἤτοι γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύστημα ἀπόδειξιν ἐροῦσιν, ἢ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον· οὐθέτερον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις.	For they will call a proof either the compound made up of the premises and the conclusion, or the compound of the premises alone. But neither of these is a proof, as I will establish. So there is no specific proof.
2.174	τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς οὐκ ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μέρος τι ἔχουσα ἄδηλον, τουτέστι τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ἄδηλος ἔσται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἰ γὰρ ἄδηλός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, αὐτὴ	The compound made up of the premises and the conclusion is not a proof. First, since it has a part that is non-evident, namely the conclusion, it will itself be non-evident, which is absurd. For if the

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	δεήσεται τοῦ ἀποδείξοντος αὐτὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρων ἔσται ἀποδεικτική.	proof is non-evident, it will need something to prove it rather than being able to prove other things.
2.175	εἶτα καὶ ἐπεὶ πρός τι φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι πρὸς ἑτέροις νοεῖται, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν, ἕτερον εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον τῆς ἀποδείξεως· εἰ οὖν τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, οὐ νοηθήσεται ἡ ἀπόδειξις σὺν τῷ συμπεράσματι. καὶ γὰρ ἤτοι συμβάλλεταί τι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν συμβάλλεται, ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικόν, εἰ δὲ οὐ συμβάλλεται ἀλλὰ παρέλκει, οὐδὲ μέρος τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔσται ἐπεὶ κἀκείνην κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐροῦμεν εἶναι μοχθηράν.	Next, they say that proof is relative, and relative to the conclusion. Relative things, as they themselves say, are thought of in relation to other things. So what is proved must be different from the proof. If, then, the conclusion is what is proved, the proof will not be thought of together with the conclusion. Indeed, either the conclusion contributes something to its own proof or it contributes nothing at all. If it contributes, it will reveal itself. If it does not contribute but is redundant, it will not even be part of the proof, since otherwise we would call the proof itself faulty by redundancy.
2.176	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον ἀπόδειξις ἂν εἴη· τὶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν' [φῶς ἔστιν] ἢ λόγον εἶναι ἢ διάνοιαν ὅλως ἀπαρτίζειν; οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν. οὐδὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ἄρα ἀπόδειξις ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἡ εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις ὑφέστηκε μήτε ἡ γενική, παρὰ δὲ ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν ἐννοεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.	Nor would the compound of the premises alone be a proof. For who would say that something stated like this, "If it is day, it is light; but it is day" [it is light], is an argument, or even expresses a complete thought at all? So the compound of the premises alone is not a proof either. Therefore specific proof has no reality either. And if neither specific nor generic proof exists, and apart from these no proof can be conceived, proof is unreal.
2.177	Ἔτι ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἀνυπόστατον τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔνεστιν ὑπομιμνῄσκειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἤτοι φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἢ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος φαινομένου ἢ φαινομένη ἀδήλου· οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων δύναται ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ἀνεπινόητος ἄρα ἐστίν.	Again, the unreality of proof can be pointed out from the following. If there is proof, it is either an apparent proof revealing something apparent, or a non-evident proof revealing something non-evident, or a non-evident proof revealing something apparent, or an apparent proof revealing something non-evident. But it cannot be conceived as any of these. So it is inconceivable.
2.178	εἰ μὲν γὰρ φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐκκαλυπτική ἐστιν, ἔσται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ἅμα φαινόμενόν τε καὶ ἄδηλον, φαινόμενον μέν, ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπετέθη, ἄδηλον δέ, ἐπεὶ δεῖται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποπίπτει ἡμῖν σαφῶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου, αὐτὴ δεήσεται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος αὐτὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἑτέρων, ὅπερ ἀφέστηκε τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς ἀποδείξεως.	If it is an apparent proof revealing something apparent, then what is revealed will be at once apparent and non-evident. It will be apparent because that is how it was assumed to be. It will be non-evident because it needs something to reveal it and does not present itself to us clearly of its own accord. If it is a non-evident proof of something non-evident, it will itself need something to reveal it and will not reveal other things, which departs from the very concept of proof.
2.179	διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προδήλου δύναται εἶναι ἀπόδειξις· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πρός τι ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται,	For these reasons there cannot be a non-evident proof of something evident either. Nor can there be an evident proof of something non-evident.

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	συγκαταλαμβανόμενον τῇ προδήλῳ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι λεγόμενον πρόδηλον ἔσται, ὡς περιτρέπεσθαι τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ εὑρίσκεσθαι πρόδηλον αὐτὴν ἀδήλου ἀποδεικτικήν. εἰ οὖν μήτε φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις μήτε ἄδηλος ἀδήλου μήτε ἄδηλος προδήλου μήτε πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.	Proof is relative, and relative things are apprehended together with one another. So what is said to be proved, being apprehended together with the evident proof, will be evident. The argument thus turns itself around, and the proof is not found to be an evident proof of something non-evident. So if proof is neither apparent of the apparent, nor non-evident of the non-evident, nor non-evident of the evident, nor evident of the non-evident, and they say there is nothing besides these, we must say that proof is nothing.
2.180	Πρὸς τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. διαπεφώνηται περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲ εἶναι λέγουσιν αὐτήν, ὡς οἱ μηδὲν ὅλως εἶναι φάσκοντες, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν δογματικῶν· ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ εἶναι φαμέν.	In addition to this, the following should also be said. There is disagreement about proof. Some say that it does not even exist, as do those who claim that nothing exists at all. Others say that it exists, as do most of the dogmatists. And we say that it "no more" exists than does not exist.
2.181	καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ἀπόδειξις δόγμα πάντως περιέχει, περὶ παντὸς δὲ δόγματος διαπεφωνήκασιν, ὥστε περὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἀνάγκη εἶναι διαφωνίαν. εἰ γὰρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν λόγου ἕνεκεν ὁμολογουμένης καὶ τὸ εἶναι κενὸν συνομολογεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες περὶ τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δογμάτων, ὧν εἰσιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἐν διαφωνίᾳ ἐστίν.	Besides, a proof always contains a belief, and there has been disagreement about every belief. So there must be disagreement about every proof. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the proof that there is void is granted. Then the existence of void is granted along with it. Clearly, then, those who dispute whether there is void also dispute its proof. The same argument holds for the other beliefs that proofs are about. So every proof is disputed and in disagreement.
2.182	ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄδηλός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς (τὰ γὰρ διάφωνα, καθὸ διαπεφώνηται, ἄδηλά ἐστιν), οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς προῦπτος ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει ἡμῖν συνίστασθαι. ἡ οὖν ἀπόδειξις δι' ἧς κατασκευάζεται ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὁμολογουμένη μὲν καὶ προῦπτος οὐκ ἔσται (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ὅλως), διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ ἄδηλος οὖσα δεήσεται ἀποδείξεως ἄλλης, κἀκείνη ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδεῖξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα παραστῆσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.	Since, then, proof is non-evident because of the disagreement about it (for things in dispute, insofar as they are disputed, are non-evident), it is not plain of itself but must be established for us by a proof. Now the proof by which proof is established will not be agreed upon and plain, since we are now investigating whether there is any proof at all. Being disputed and non-evident, it will need another proof, and that one another, and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to prove infinitely many things. So it is impossible to establish that there is proof.
2.183	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ σημείου δύναται ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι ζητουμένου γὰρ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοῦ σημείου δεομένου πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρξιν, ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως σημείου δεομένης, τοῦ δὲ σημείου πάλιν ἀποδείξεως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπικρῖναι δυνατόν ἐστι ⟨τὴν⟩ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως διαφωνίαν, ἐπεὶ μὲν κριτηρίου ἡ ἐπίκρισις, ζητήσεως δὲ οὔσης περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον, ὡς	Nor can it be revealed through a sign. It is under investigation whether there is a sign, and the sign needs a proof for its own reality. So we find the reciprocal mode: proof needs a sign, and the sign in turn needs proof, which is absurd. For these reasons it is not possible to decide the disagreement about proof either. Deciding needs a criterion. But there is an investigation into whether there is a

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	παρεστήσαμεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδείξεως τοῦ κριτηρίου δεομένου τῆς δεικνυούσης ὅτι ἔστι τι κριτήριον, ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρίσκεται πάλιν.	criterion, as we have shown, and so the criterion needs a proof to show that there is some criterion. And so the difficulty of the reciprocal mode turns up again.
2.184	εἰ οὖν μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως μήτε διὰ σημείου μήτε διὰ κριτηρίου ἔστιν ὑπομνῆσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς πρόδηλός ἐστιν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις· νενόηται μὲν γὰρ σὺν τῷ ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο μὴ καταλαμβανομένη. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.	So it is not possible to point out by proof, or by sign, or by criterion that there is proof, and proof is not evident of itself either, as we have shown. Then whether there is proof will be inapprehensible. For this reason proof will also be unreal. It is conceived together with its proving, but it could not prove anything if it is not apprehended. Hence there will be no proof.

THE DOGMATISTS' REPLY: PROOF BY SELF-REFUTATION

The dogmatists argue that any argument against proof proves proof; skeptical arguments purge themselves along with the rest.

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2.185	Ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ τοὐναντίον κατασκευάζοντές φασιν, ὅτι ἤτοι ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἠρωτημένοι λόγοι ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί· καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐ δύνανται δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐκ περιτροπῆς εἰσάγουσιν.	This much, said in outline, will be enough on proof as well. The dogmatists, arguing the opposite, say that the arguments propounded against proof are either demonstrative or not demonstrative. If they are not demonstrative, they cannot show that there is no proof. If they are demonstrative, they themselves bring in the reality of proof, by self-refutation.
2.186	ὅθεν καὶ τοιοῦτον συνερωτῶσι λόγον· 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις' ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦτον ἐρωτῶσι τὸν λόγον· 'τὸ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἑπόμενον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ἀντίκειται δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις "ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις — οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις", ὧν ἑκατέρῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις'.	Hence they also propound an argument like this: "If there is proof, there is proof; if there is no proof, there is proof; but either there is proof or there is no proof; therefore there is proof." With the same force they also propound this argument: "What follows from opposites is not only true but necessary. These are opposed to each other: 'There is proof'—'There is no proof'; and from each of them it follows that there is proof. Therefore there is proof."
2.187	ἔνεστι μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιλέγειν, οἷον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ μὴ νομίζομέν τινα λόγον εἶναι ἀποδεικτικόν, καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους οὐ πάντως φαμὲν ἀποδεικτικοὺς εἶναι ἀλλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν πιθανούς· οἱ δὲ πιθανοὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί. εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν (ὅπερ οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα) πάντως καὶ ἀληθεῖς. ἀληθεῖς δέ εἰσι λόγοι δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθὲς συνάγοντες· οὐκοῦν ἀληθής ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ἐπιφορά. ἦν δέ γε αὕτη 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις'· ⟨ἀληθὲς⟩ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' ἐκ περιτροπῆς.	Now, it is possible to reply to these. For instance, since we do not think that any argument is demonstrative, we do not say outright that the arguments against proof are demonstrative either. We say only that they appear persuasive to us, and persuasive arguments are not necessarily demonstrative. But if they are in fact demonstrative (which we do not affirm), they are surely true as well. True arguments are those that conclude something true by way of true premises. So their conclusion is true. But their conclusion was "So

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		there is no proof." Therefore "There is no proof" is ⟨true⟩, by self-refutation.
2.188	δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα ταῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἑαυτὰ συνεξάγει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς εἶναι λεγομένοις καὶ ἑαυτοὺς συμπεριγράφειν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ αὕτη ἡ 'οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές' οὐ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὴν ἐκείνοις συμπεριτρέπει. ὅ τε λόγος οὗτος δύναται δείκνυσθαι ἀσύνακτος 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα', καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μέν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκούντως διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.	Purgative drugs flush themselves out along with the matter present in the body. In the same way these arguments can cancel themselves along with the other arguments said to be demonstrative. There is nothing incongruous in this. The phrase "Nothing is true" likewise turns around not only every other statement but itself along with them. Again, this argument can be shown to be inconclusive: "If there is proof, there is proof; if there is no proof, there is proof; but either there is or there is not; therefore there is." There are several ways of doing so, but for present purposes the following line of reasoning is enough.
2.189	εἰ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις', δεῖ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος, τουτέστι τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις', μάχεσθαι τῷ 'ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις'· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τοῦ συνημμένου τὸ ἡγούμενον. ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς συνημμένον ὑγιὲς εἶναι ἐκ μαχομένων ἀξιωμάτων συνεστώς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνημμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λῆγον, τὰ δὲ μαχόμενα τοὐναντίον, ὄντος τοῦ ἑτέρου αὐτῶν ὁποιουδήποτε ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν ὑπάρχειν. ὄντος ἄρα ὑγιοῦς τοῦδε τοῦ συνημμένου 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' οὐ δύναται ὑγιὲς εἶναι τοῦτο ⟨τὸ⟩ συνημμένον 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.'	If this conditional is sound, "If there is proof, there is proof," then the opposite of its consequent, that is, "There is no proof," must conflict with "There is proof," since that is the antecedent of the conditional. But according to them a conditional made up of conflicting propositions cannot be sound. A conditional announces that if its antecedent holds, its consequent holds too. Conflicting propositions announce the opposite: if either one of them holds, whichever it is, the other cannot. So if the conditional "If there is proof, there is proof" is sound, the conditional "If there is no proof, there is proof" cannot be sound.
2.190	πάλιν δ' αὖ συγχωρούντων ἡμῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τόδε τὸ συνημμένον 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις', δύναται συνυπάρχειν τὸ 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' τῷ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις'. εἰ δὲ δύναται αὐτῷ συνυπάρχειν, οὐ μάχεται αὐτῷ. ἐν ἄρα τῷ 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' συνημμένῳ οὐ μάχεται τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον,	Again, suppose we grant for the sake of hypothesis that the conditional "If there is no proof, there is proof" is sound. Then "There is proof" can hold together with "There is no proof." And if it can hold together with it, it does not conflict with it. So in the conditional "If there is proof, there is proof" the opposite of the consequent does not conflict with the antecedent. So this conditional, in its turn, will not be sound,
2.191	ἐκείνου κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὡς ὑγιοῦς τιθεμένου, μὴ μαχομένου δὲ τοῦ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' τῷ 'ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις'. οὐδὲ τὸ διεζευγμένον ὑγιὲς ἔσται τὸ 'ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις'· τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς διεζευγμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ἓν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγιὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ψεῦδος ἢ ψευδῆ μετὰ μάχης. ἢ εἴπερ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ διεζευγμένον, πάλιν φαῦλον εὑρίσκεται τὸ 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' συνημμένον, ἐκ μαχομένων συνεστώς. οὐκοῦν ἀσύμφωνά	since the other one is laid down as sound by concession, and "There is no proof" does not conflict with "There is proof." Nor will the disjunction "Either there is proof or there is no proof" be sound. For a sound disjunction announces that one of its members is true and the other, or the others, false, with conflict. Or, if the disjunction is sound, the conditional "If there is no proof, there is proof" is once again found to be faulty, being made up of conflicting propositions. So the

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	τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀναιρετικὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ προειρημένῳ λήμματα· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὴς ὁ λόγος.	premises in the argument just stated are discordant and do away with one another. Hence the argument is not sound.
2.192	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις δύνανται δεικνύναι, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ἀκολουθίας, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα. Ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ περιουσίας λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ πιθανοὶ μέν εἰσιν οἱ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγοι (ἔστωσαν γάρ), πιθαναὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν λεγόμεναι ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι λέγοντας.	Nor can they show that anything follows from opposites, since they have no criterion of following, as we have argued. But we say all this as a bonus. For suppose the arguments in favor of proof are persuasive (let them be so), and the objections brought against proof are persuasive too. Then we must suspend judgment about proof as well, saying that there is "no more" proof than no proof.

CHAPTER 14: ON SYLLOGISMS

Standard syllogisms argue in a circle, since the universal premise rests on the particular cases it proves.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.193	Διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν θρυλουμένων συλλογισμῶν ἴσως περιττόν ἐστιν διεξιέναι, τοῦτο μὲν συμπεριτρεπομένων αὐτῶν τῇ ὑπάρξει τῆς ἀποδείξεως (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκείνης μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος χώραν ἔχει), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δυνάμει διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν λελεγμένων ἀντειρηκότων ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτε περὶ τῆς παρολκῆς διαλεγόμενοι μέθοδόν τινα ἐλέγομεν δι' ἧς ἐνδέχεται δεικνύναι, ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ λόγοι τῶν τε Στωικῶν καὶ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν ἀσύνακτοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.	That is why it is perhaps superfluous to go through the much-talked-of syllogisms. For one thing, they are turned around along with the reality of proof, since clearly, if there is no proof, there is no room for a demonstrative argument either. For another, we have in effect already argued against them in what we said earlier. When we were discussing redundancy, we described a method by which it can be shown that all the demonstrative arguments of both the Stoics and the Peripatetics turn out to be inconclusive.
2.194	ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου δὲ οὐ χεῖρον ἴσως καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ αὐτῶν διαλαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ μάλιστα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς μέγα φρονοῦσιν. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν λέγειν τὸ ἀνυπόστατον αὐτῶν ὑπομιμνῄσκοντας· ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει δὲ ἀρκεῖ τῇδε τῇ μεθόδῳ χρῆσθαι κατὰ αὐτῶν. λέξω δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ τῶν ἀναποδείκτων· τούτων γὰρ ἀναιρουμένων καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ σύμπαντες λόγοι διατρέπονται, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ συνάγειν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.	Still, as an extra, it is perhaps no bad thing to deal with them separately too, since they pride themselves on them above all. Much could be said in pointing out that they are unreal, but in an outline it is enough to use the following method against them. Here too I will speak about the indemonstrables. If these are done away with, all the remaining arguments are overturned as well, since they derive from them the proof that they are conclusive.
2.195	Ἡ πρότασις τοίνυν αὕτη 'πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον' ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιοῦται· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον ὄντα καὶ ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ Πλάτωνα ὁμοίως καὶ Δίωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος, δυνατὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν, ὡς εἰ κἂν ἕν τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντιούμενον φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὴς ἡ καθόλου πρότασις, οἷον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ. μόνος δὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω, οὐκ ἐστιν ἀληθὴς ἡ 'πᾶν ζῷον τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ' πρότασις.	Now, the premise "Every human is an animal" is confirmed by induction from the particular cases. Socrates, being human, is also an animal, and likewise Plato and Dion and each of the particular cases. From this it seems possible to affirm that every human is an animal. So if even one of the particular cases should appear to conflict with the others, the universal premise is not sound. For instance, most animals move the lower jaw, and the

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		crocodile alone moves the upper. So the premise "Every animal moves its lower jaw" is not true.[10]
2.196	ὅταν οὖν λέγωσι 'πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, Σωκράτης δ' ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῷον', ἐκ τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως τῆς 'πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον' τὴν κατὰ μέρος πρότασιν συνάγειν βουλόμενοι, τὴν 'Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῷον', ἣ δὴ βεβαιωτικὴ τῆς καθολικῆς προτάσεως ἐστι κατὰ τὸν ἐπαγωγικὸν τρόπον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι λόγον, τὴν μὲν καθολικὴν πρότασιν δι' ἑκάστης τῶν κατὰ μέρος ⟨.....⟩	So when they say "Every human is an animal; Socrates is human; therefore Socrates is an animal," they want to deduce from the universal premise "Every human is an animal" the particular one "Therefore Socrates is an animal." But this particular premise is just what confirms the universal premise by way of induction, as we pointed out. So they fall into the reciprocal argument, confirming the universal premise by means of each of the particular ones ⟨.....⟩
2.197	ἐκ τῆς καθολικῆς συλλογιστικῶς. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου 'Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος τετράπους, Σωκράτης ἄρα οὐκ ἐστι τετράπους' τὴν μὲν 'οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους' πρότασιν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βουλόμενοι βεβαιοῦν, ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκ τῆς 'οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους' συλλογίζεσθαι θέλοντες, τῇ κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον ἀπορίᾳ περιπίπτουσι.	from the universal by syllogism. Similarly with an argument like this: "Socrates is human; no human is four-footed; therefore Socrates is not four-footed." They want to confirm the premise "No human is four-footed" inductively from the particular cases, and they want to deduce each of the particular cases from "No human is four-footed." So they fall into the difficulty of reciprocity.
2.198	ὁμοίως δὲ ἐφοδευτέον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς λεγομένων ἀναποδείκτων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν'. τό τε γὰρ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνακτικόν ἐστιν, ὡς φασί, τοῦ 'φῶς ἔστι', τό τε 'φῶς ἐστι' μετὰ τοῦ 'ἡμέρα ἔστι βεβαιωτικόν ἐστι τοῦ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν'. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑγιὲς ἐνομίσθη τὸ προειρημένον συνημμένον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τεθεώρητο συνυπάρχον ἀεὶ τὸ 'φῶς ἔστι' τῷ 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.	The rest of the indemonstrables spoken of among the Peripatetics should be examined in the same way. So should arguments like this one: "If it is day, it is light." For "If it is day, it is light" is, as they say, what concludes "It is light," and "It is light," together with "It is day," is what confirms "If it is day, it is light." The conditional just mentioned would not have been thought sound unless "It is light" had first been observed always to hold together with "It is day."
2.199	εἰ οὖν δεῖ προκατειληφέναι, ὅτι ἡμέρας οὔσης πάντως ἔστι καὶ φῶς, εἰς τὸ συνθεῖναι τὸ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνημμένον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ συνημμένου τούτου συνάγεται τὸ ὅτι ἡμέρας οὔσης φῶς ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν συνύπαρξιν τοῦ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ φῶς εἶναι συνάγοντος τοῦ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνημμένου ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ προκειμένῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ, τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τῆς συνυπάρξεως τῶν προειρημένων βεβαιούσης, κἀνταῦθα ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας ἀνατρέπει τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λόγου.	So, in order to frame the conditional "If it is day, it is light," one must have apprehended beforehand that whenever it is day there is certainly light too. Yet it is by means of this conditional that one concludes that when it is day it is light. As far as the indemonstrable in question goes, the conditional "If it is day, it is light" concludes that its being day and its being light hold together, while their holding together confirms the conditional. So here too the difficulty of the reciprocal mode overturns the reality of the argument.
2.200	ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν'. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἄνευ φωτὸς ἡμέραν θεωρεῖσθαι ὑγιὲς ἂν εἶναι	Likewise with an argument of this kind: "If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day." From the fact that day is not observed

10 Dion is the stock name for an arbitrary person in Stoic logic, something like "John Doe."

GREEK

ENGLISH

νομισθείη τὸ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι συνημμένον, ὡς εἴγε καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν ἡμέρα μὲν φανείη ποτέ, φῶς δὲ μή, ψεῦδος ἂν λεχθείη τὸ συνημμένον εἶναι· ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ προειρημένῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμέραν φωτὸς μὴ ὄντος διὰ τοῦ ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι’ συνάγεται, ὥστε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βεβαίωσιν χρῄζει τοῦ τὸ ἕτερον βεβαίως εἰλῆφθαι, ἵνα δι’ αὐτοῦ πιστὸν γένηται κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον.

without light, the conditional “If it is day, it is light” might be thought sound. If, hypothetically, it should ever appear to be day and yet not light, the conditional would be called false. But as far as the indemonstrable just mentioned goes, the fact that it is not day when there is no light is concluded by means of “If it is day, it is light.” So each of them, to be confirmed, needs the other to have been firmly grasped first, so that it may become credible through it, in the reciprocal mode.

2.201 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχειν τινά, οἷον ἡμέραν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ νύκτα, τό τε ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τὸ ‘οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νὺξ ἔστι’, καὶ τὸ διεζευγμένον, τὸ ‘ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νὺξ ἔστιν’, ὑγιῆ νομίζοιτο ἂν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ ⟨μὴ⟩ συνυπάρχειν αὐτὰ βεβαιοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τε τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ τοῦ διεζευγμένου, λέγοντες ‘οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νὺξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νὺξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν’· ‘ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νὺξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νὺξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν’, ἢ ‘οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν’.

Again, some things cannot hold together with one another, day and night for instance. From this fact the negated conjunction, “Not both: it is day and it is night,” and the disjunction, “Either it is day or it is night,” might be thought sound. But they think that the ⟨not⟩ holding together of these things is confirmed by the negated conjunction and by the disjunction. They say: “Not both: it is day and it is night; but it is night; therefore it is not day”; and “Either it is day or it is night; but it is night; therefore it is not day”; or “but it is not night; therefore it is day.”

2.202 ὅθεν ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν βεβαίωσιν τοῦ διεζευγμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ χρῄζομεν τοῦ προκατειληφέναι, ὅτι τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀξιώματά ἐστιν ἀσυνύπαρκτα, τὸ δὲ ἀσυνύπαρκτα ταῦτα εἶναι συνάγειν δοκοῦσι διά τε τοῦ διεζευγμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ, ὁ δι’ ἀλλήλων εἰσάγεται τρόπος, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μήτε τοῖς προειρημένοις τροπικοῖς πιστεύειν ἄνευ τοῦ τὸ ἀσυνύπαρκτον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχομένων ἀξιωμάτων καταλαβεῖν, μήτε τὸ ἀσυνύπαρκτον αὐτῶν διαβεβαιοῦσθαι πρὸ τῆς τῶν συλλογισμῶν διὰ τῶν τροπικῶν συνερωτήσεως.

From this we in turn infer the following. To confirm the disjunction and the negated conjunction, we need to have apprehended beforehand that the propositions contained in them cannot hold together. Yet they think they conclude that these cannot hold together by means of the disjunction and the negated conjunction. So the reciprocal mode is brought in. We cannot trust the leading premises just mentioned without apprehending that the propositions contained in them cannot hold together. Nor can we affirm that they cannot hold together before the syllogisms have been propounded by means of these leading premises.

2.203 διόπερ οὐκ ἔχοντες, πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς πίστεως διὰ τὸ παλίνδρομον, λέξομεν μήτε τὸν τρίτον μήτε τὸν τέταρτον μήτε τὸν πέμπτον τῶν ἀναποδείκτων ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν. Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ συλλογισμῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.

Hence, since this circling back leaves us nowhere to begin our trust, we will say that neither the third, nor the fourth, nor the fifth indemonstrable has any reality, as far as these considerations go. This much will suffice on syllogisms too, for the present.

CHAPTER 15: ON INDUCTION

Induction must survey all particulars, which are infinite, or only some, which may be contradicted.

GREEK

ENGLISH

2.204

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Εὐπαραίτητον δὲ εἶναι νομίζω καὶ τὸν περὶ ἐπαγωγῆς τρόπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πιστοῦσθαι βούλονται δι' αὐτῆς τὸ καθόλου, ἤτοι πάντα ἐπιόντες τὰ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν ἢ τινά. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τινά, ἀβέβαιος ἔσται ἡ ἐπαγωγή, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῷ καθόλου τινὰ τῶν παραλειπομένων κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ· εἰ δὲ πάντα, ἀδύνατα μοχθήσουσιν, ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀπεριορίστων. ὥσθ' οὕτως ἑκατέρωθεν, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει σαλεύεσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγήν.	I think the method of induction too can easily be dismissed. By means of it they want to establish the universal from the particulars. So they will do this by surveying either all the particulars or some of them. If some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars left out of the induction may conflict with the universal. If all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and unbounded. So in this way, I think, induction turns out to be shaken from both sides.

CHAPTER 16: ON DEFINITIONS

Definitions are needed neither for apprehending things nor for teaching them, and can be ridiculous.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.205	Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ περὶ ὅρων δὴ τεχνολογίᾳ μέγα φρονοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, ἣν τῷ λογικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἐγκαταλέγουσιν. φέρε οὖν καὶ περὶ ὅρων ὀλίγα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἴπωμεν. Πρὸς πολλὰ τοίνυν χρησιμεύειν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν δογματικῶν δοκούντων, δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω κεφάλαια ⟨ἃ⟩	The dogmatists also pride themselves on their technical treatment of definitions, which they count as part of the logical branch of what they call philosophy. So let us say a few things about definitions too, for now. The dogmatists think definitions are useful for many things. But there are two topmost headings ⟨which⟩
2.206	πάσης λέγουσιν ἀναγκαιότητος αὐτῶν ἴσως εὑρήσεις· ἢ γὰρ ὡς πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ ὡς πρὸς διδασκαλίαν ἐν πᾶσι παραδεικνύουσι τοὺς ὅρους ἀναγκαίους. ἐὰν οὖν ὑπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων χρησιμεύουσι, περιτρέψομεν, οἶμαι, πᾶσαν τὴν γεγενημένην περὶ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ματαιοπονίαν.	they say comprise the whole of their necessity, as you will perhaps find. In every case they show definitions to be necessary either for apprehension or for teaching. So if we point out that they are useful for neither of these, we will, I think, overturn all the futile labor the dogmatists have spent on them.
2.207	εὐθέως οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀγνοῶν τὸ ὁριστὸν οὐχ οἷός τέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ γινωσκόμενον αὐτῷ ὁρίσασθαι, ὁ δὲ γινώσκων, εἶθ' ὁριζόμενος οὐκ ἐκ ὅρου τὸ ὁριστὸν κατείληφεν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προκατειλημμένῳ τούτῳ τὸν ὅρον ἐπισυντέθεικεν, πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ ὅρος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖος. καὶ γὰρ ἐπεὶ πάντα μὲν ὁρίζεσθαι θέλοντες καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ὁρισόμεθα διὰ τὴν ⟨εἰς⟩ ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ δίχα τῶν ὅρων ὁμολογοῦντες οὐκ ἀναγκαίους πρὸς κατάληψιν τοὺς ὅρους ἀποφαίνομεν, καθ' ὅν τρόπον τὰ μὴ ὁρισθέντα κατελήφθη, δυναμένων ἡμῶν πάντα χωρὶς τῶν ὅρων καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ καθάπαξ	To begin with, then: someone who does not know the thing to be defined cannot define what he does not know. And someone who knows it and then defines it has not apprehended the thing defined from the definition. He has added the definition to something already apprehended. If so, definition is not necessary for the apprehension of things. Indeed, if we want to define everything, we will define nothing at all, because of the infinite regress. If we admit that some things are apprehended even without definitions, we show that definitions are not necessary for apprehension, since we could apprehend everything without definitions in the same way the undefined things were apprehended. So either we will define nothing at all
2.208	οὐδὲν ὁρισόμεθα διὰ τὴν [εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν] ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαίους τοὺς ὅρους ἀποφανοῦμεν. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ	because of the [infinite regress], or we will show that definitions are not necessary. For these reas-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	πρὸς διδασκαλίαν αὐτοὺς εὕροιμεν ἂν ἀναγκαίους· ὡς γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος τὸ πρᾶγμα γνοὺς ἔγνω τοῦτο χωρὶς ὅρου, κατὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον καὶ ὁ διδασκόμενος αὐτὸ δύναται χωρὶς ὅρου διδαχθῆναι.	ons we would not find them necessary for teaching either. The first person who came to know the thing knew it without a definition. In the same way, the one being taught it can be taught it without a definition.
2.209	ἔτι ἀπὸ τῶν ὁριστῶν ἐπικρίνουσι τοὺς ὅρους, καί φασι μοχθηροὺς ὅρους εἶναι τοὺς περιέχοντάς τι τῶν μὴ προσόντων τοῖς ὁριστοῖς, ἤτοι πᾶσιν ἢ τισίν. διόπερ ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῷον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον ἢ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν γραμματικόν, ὅπου μὲν μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἀθανάτου, ὅπου δὲ τινῶν μὴ γραμματικῶν ὄντων, φασὶ μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸν ὅρον.	Moreover, they judge definitions by the things defined. They say that definitions are faulty if they contain something that does not belong to the things defined, either to all of them or to some. So when someone says that a human is a rational immortal animal, or a rational mortal literate animal, they say the definition is faulty. In the first case no human is immortal, and in the second some are not literate.
2.210	τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀνεπίκριτοί εἰσιν οἱ ὅροι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνεσθαι ὀφείλουσιν· εἶτα οὐκ ἂν καταληπτικοί τε καὶ διδακτικοὶ τούτων εἶεν ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνονται δηλονότι προεπεγνωσμένων, εἴγε ἄρα, καὶ προκατειλημμένων πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γελοῖον τὸ λέγειν ὡς οἱ ὅροι χρησιμεύουσι πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ διδασκαλίαν ἢ σαφήνειαν ὅλως, ἀσάφειαν ἡμῖν ἐπεισκυκλοῦντες τοσαύτην;	But perhaps definitions cannot be judged at all, because the particulars by which they ought to be judged are infinite. And then they could not give us apprehension and teaching of the very things by which they are judged. Those things, clearly, have been recognized and apprehended beforehand, if at all. How would it not be ridiculous to say that definitions are useful for apprehension, or teaching, or clarity of any kind, when they wheel in so much unclarity on us?
2.211	οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα τι καὶ παίξωμεν, εἰ τις παρά του βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι εἰ ἀπήντηται αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ ἵππου ὀχούμενος καὶ κύνα ἐφελκόμενος, τὴν ἐρώτησιν οὕτω ποιήσαιτο ‘ὦ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, ἀπήντητό σοι ζῷον γελαστικὸν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν, ζῴῳ θνητῷ χρεμετιστικῷ τὰ σφαιρώματα ἐφηδρακός ἐφελκόμενον ζῷον τετράπουν ὑλακτικόν;’ πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη καταγέλαστος, εἰς ἀφασίαν οὕτω γνωρίμου πράγματος ἐμβαλὼν τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τοὺς ὅρους; οὐκοῦν ἄχρηστον εἶναι τὸν ὅρον ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις λεκτέον,	For example—to have a little fun—suppose someone wanted to find out from somebody whether he had met a man riding a horse and leading a dog, and put the question like this: “Rational mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge, have you encountered a laughter-capable, flat-nailed animal, receptive of political knowledge, with its hemispheres seated upon a mortal neighing animal, leading a four-footed barking animal?” How would he not be a laughingstock, leaving the man speechless about so familiar a thing because of his definitions? So we must say that, as far as these considerations go, definition is useless,
2.212	εἴτ’ οὖν λόγος εἶναι λέγοιτο διὰ βραχείας ὑπομνήσεως εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἄγων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς φωναῖς πραγμάτων, ὡς δῆλόν γε (οὐ γάρ;) ἐκ τῶν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων, εἴτε λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλῶν, εἴτε ὃ βούλεταί τις. καὶ γὰρ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὅρος βουλόμενοι παριστᾶν εἰς ἀνήνυτον ἐμπίπτουσι διαφωνίαν, ἣν διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς γραφῆς παρίημι νῦν, εἴγε καὶ δοκεῖ διατρέπειν τοὺς ὅρους ⟨ὅσα ἐν τούτοις περὶ τοῦ ἄχρηστον	whether it is said to be an account that leads us, by means of a brief reminder, to a conception of the things the words stand for—as is clear, isn’t it, from what we said a little earlier—or an account that reveals what it is to be something, or whatever anyone likes. In trying to establish what a definition is, they fall into an endless disagreement. I pass over it now, in keeping with the plan of this work, since ⟨what we have been saying

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	εἶναι τὸν ὅρον ἐλέγομεν⟩. Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ ὅρων ἀπόχρη μοι νῦν λελέχθαι.	here about definition being useless⟩ seems to overturn definitions anyway. That is enough for me to have said about definitions for now.

CHAPTER 17: ON DIVISION

Dialectic claims a science of division; Sextus lists the four kinds of division to be examined.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.213	Ἐπεὶ δέ τινες τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν διαλεκτικὴν εἶναί φασιν ἐπιστήμην συλλογιστικὴν ἐπαγωγικὴν ὁριστικὴν ⟨διαιρετικήν⟩, διελέχθημεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἤδη, τοὺς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους, περί τε συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων, οὐκ ἄτοπον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι καὶ περὶ διαιρέσεως βραχέα διαλαβεῖν. γίνεσθαι τοίνυν τὴν διαίρεσίν φασι τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ὄνομα εἰς σημαινόμενα διαιρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλον εἰς μέρη ἢ γένος εἰς εἴδη ἢ εἶδος εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὅτι δὲ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη διαιρετική, ῥᾴδιον ἴσως ἐπελθεῖν.	Some of the dogmatists say that dialectic is a science of syllogizing, inducing, defining ⟨and dividing⟩. We have already discussed, after the arguments about the criterion, the sign and proof, syllogisms, induction and definitions. So we think it is not out of place to deal briefly with division too. They say, then, that division happens in four ways. A name is divided into its meanings, or a whole into parts, or a genus into species, or a species into individuals. That there is no science of division in any of these cases is perhaps easy to go through.

CHAPTER 18: ON THE DIVISION OF A NAME INTO ITS MEANINGS

Names signify by convention, so there can be no science of dividing them into meanings.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.214	Εὐθέως οὖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν φύσει φασὶν εἶναι, τῶν θέσει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ εἰκότως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη βέβαιόν τι καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον πρᾶγμα εἶναι θέλει, τὰ δὲ θέσει ῥᾳδίαν θέσεων, εὐμετάπτωτον τὴν μεταβολήν, ταῖς ἐναλλαγαῖς τῶν θέσεων, αἳ εἰσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἑτεροιούμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ὀνόματα θέσει σημαίνει καὶ οὐ φύσει (πάντες γὰρ ἂν συνίεσαν πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα, ὁμοίως Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὰ σημαινόμενα οἷς ἂν βουλώμεθα ὀνόμασιν ⟨καὶ⟩ ἀεὶ δηλοῦν τε καὶ σημαίνειν), πῶς ἂν δυνατὸν εἴη διαιρετικὴν ὀνόματος εἰς σημαινόμενα ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; ἢ πῶς ἐπιστήμη σημαινόντων τε καὶ σημαινομένων, ὡς οἴονταί τινες, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ δύναιτ' ἂν ὑπάρχειν;	First, then, they say that sciences concern what is by nature and not at all what is by convention, and reasonably so. Science aims to be something firm and unchangeable, whereas what is by convention changes readily and easily, altering with changes of convention, which are up to us. Now, names signify by convention and not by nature. Otherwise everyone, Greeks and non-Greeks alike, would understand everything signified by words. Besides, it is up to us to indicate and signify the things signified by whatever names we like, ⟨and⟩ at any time. So how could there be a science that divides a name into its meanings? Or how could dialectic be, as some think, a science of things that signify and things signified?

CHAPTER 19: ON WHOLE AND PART

Ten cannot be divided into its supposed parts, which together would make fifty-five.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.215	Περὶ δὲ ὅλου καὶ μέρους διαλεξόμεθα μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς δὴ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος περὶ τῆς λεγομένης διαιρέσεως τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ τάδε λεκτέον. ὅταν λέγῃ τις διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα εἰς μονάδα	We will discuss whole and part in what are called the physical sections too. For now, the following must be said about the so-called division of a whole into its parts. When someone says that ten

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ἡ δεκάς. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς ἀρθῆναι μέρος, ἵνα κατὰ συγχώρησιν νῦν τοῦτο δῶμεν, οἷον τὴν μονάδα, οὐκέτι ὑπόκειται ἡ δεκάς, ἀλλ' ἐννέα καὶ ὅλως ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν δεκάδα.	is divided into one, two, three and four, ten is not divided into these. For as soon as its first part is removed—to grant this for now by concession—the one, say, ten is no longer there, but nine, and in general something other than ten.
2.216	ἡ οὖν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀφαίρεσίς τε καὶ διαίρεσις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἀλλ' ἀπό τινων αλλων, καθ' ἑκάστην ἀφαίρεσιν ἑτεροιουμένων. τάχα οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὅλον διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι αὐτοῦ μέρη. καὶ γὰρ εἰ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον εἰς μέρη, φιλεῖ τὰ μέρη ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως, οὐ περιέχεται δὲ ἴσως. οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος στήσωμεν πάλιν τὸν λόγον, τῆς δεκάδος μέρος φασὶ πάντως εἶναι τὰ ἐννέα· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐννέα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὀκτὼ ὁμοίως· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς ὀκτὼ καὶ δύο. καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ ὁμοίως καὶ ἓξ καὶ πέντε καὶ τέσσαρα καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν.	So the removal and division of the rest is made not from ten but from other numbers, which change with each removal. Perhaps, then, it is not possible to divide the whole into what are said to be its parts. For if the whole is divided into parts, the parts must be contained in the whole before the division. But perhaps they are not contained in it. For instance—to rest the argument on ten again—they say that nine is certainly a part of ten, since ten is divided into one and nine. But so is eight, likewise, since ten is divided into eight and two. And likewise seven, six, five, four, three, two and one.
2.217	εἰ οὖν ταῦτα πάντα ἐν τῇ δεκάδι περιέχεται καὶ συντιθέμενα μετ' αὐτῆς πεντεκαιπεντήκοντα γίνεται, ἐν τοῖς δέκα περιέχεται πεντεκαιπεντήκοντα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε περιέχεται ἐν τῇ δεκάδι τὰ λεγόμενα αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη, οὔτε ἡ δεκὰς εἰς ἐκεῖνα διαιρεῖσθαι δύναται ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, ἃ μηδὲ ὅλως ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρεῖται.	So if all these are contained in ten, and added together with it they make fifty-five, then fifty-five is contained in ten, which is absurd. So the things said to be its parts are not contained in ten. Nor can ten be divided into them as a whole into parts, since they are not observed in it at all.
2.218	τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἀπαντήσεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὅταν τὸ δεκάπηχυ μέγεθος, εἰ τύχοι, διαιρεῖν ἐθέλοι τις. οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὖν ἴσως διαιρεῖν οὐδὲ ὅλον εἰς μέρη.	The same will happen with magnitudes too, when someone wants to divide, say, a magnitude of ten cubits. So perhaps it is not possible to divide a whole into parts either.

CHAPTER 20: ON GENERA AND SPECIES

A single genus can be present in its species neither as a whole nor in part.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.219	Οὐκοῦν ὁ περὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὑπολείπεται λόγος, περὶ οὗ πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις διαλεξόμεθα, ὥς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ νῦν ταῦτα λέξομεν. εἰ μὲν ἐννοήματα εἶναι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη λέγουσιν, αἱ κατὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐπιχειρήσεις αὐτούς διατρέπουσιν· εἰ δὲ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῖς ἀπολείπουσιν, τί πρὸς τοῦτο ἐροῦσιν;	There remains the argument about genera and species. We will discuss it more fully elsewhere, but for now we will put it briefly. If they say that genera and species are concepts, the arguments against the ruling part and against impressions overturn them. But if they grant them a reality of their own, what will they say to this?
2.220	εἰ ἔστι τὰ γένη, ἤτοι τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὅσα τὰ εἴδη, ἢ ἕν ἐστι κοινὸν πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ λεγομένων εἶναι [εἶδος ἤγουν] γένος. εἰ μὲν οὖν τοσαῦτά ἐστι τὰ γένη ὅσα τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν, οὐκέτ' ἂν εἴη κοινὸν γένος, ὃ εἰς αὐτά διαιρεθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ἓν εἶναι λέγοιτο ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτοῦ γένος, ἤτοι ὅλου αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον εἶδος αὐτοῦ μετέχει ἢ μέρους αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὅλου μὲν οὐδαμῶς·	If there are genera, either they are as many as the species, or there is one [species, that is,] genus common to all the species said to belong to it. If the genera are as many as their species, there will no longer be a common genus to be divided into them. If one genus is said to be in all its species, then each of its species participates either in the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀμήχανον γάρ ἐστιν ἔν τι ὑπάρχον ⟨ἐν⟩ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ κατὰ ταὐτὸ περιέχεσθαι ὡς ὅλον ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεωρεῖσθαι τῶν ἐν οἷς εἶναι λέγεται. εἰ δὲ μέρους, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθήσει τῷ εἴδει τὸ γένος πᾶν, ὡς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ζῷον ἀλλὰ μέρος ζῴου, οἷον οὐσία, οὔτε δὲ ἔμψυχος οὔτε αἰσθητική.	whole of it or in a part of it. But not in the whole. It is impossible for something that is one to be contained in this thing and that in the same way, so as to be observed as a whole in each of the things it is said to be in. And if in a part, then, first, the whole genus will not follow on the species, as they suppose. A human will not be an animal but part of an animal—substance, for instance, but neither animate nor capable of perception.
2.221	εἶτα μέντοι καὶ ἤτοι ταὐτοῦ λέγοιτο ἂν μετεσχηκέναι πάντα τὰ εἴδη μέρους τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, ἢ ἑτέρου καὶ ἑτέρου. ἀλλὰ ταὐτοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. εἰ δὲ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου, οὔτε ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις ἔσται τὰ εἴδη κατὰ γένος, ὅπερ οὐ προσδέξονται, ἄπειρόν τε ἔσται γένος ἕκαστον εἰς ἄπειρα τεμνόμενον (οὐ μόνον τὰ εἴδη ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ θεωρεῖται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῷον ὁ Δίων εἶναι λέγεται). εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, οὐδὲ κατὰ μέρος μετέσχηκε τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἑνὸς ὄντος.	Next, it would be said that all the species participate either in the same part of their genus or in different parts. But not in the same part, for the reasons just given. If in different parts, the species will not be similar to one another in genus, which they will not accept. And each genus will be infinite, being cut into infinitely many pieces—not only into the species but into the individuals too, in which it is observed along with its species. For Dion is said to be not only a human but an animal too. If these consequences are absurd, the species do not participate in a part of their genus either, if it is one.
2.222	εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅλου μετέσχηκεν ἕκαστον εἶδος τοῦ γένους μήτε μέρους αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ἓν εἶναι γένος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεῖσθαι; τάχα οὐκ ἄν ἔχοι τις λέγειν μὴ οὐχὶ ἀναπλάσσων τινὰς εἰδωλοποιήσεις, ἅἵ ταῖς ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ἀνεπικρίτοις διαφωνίαις κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους περιτραπήσονται.	If each species participates neither in the whole of the genus nor in a part of it, how could one genus be said to be in all its species, so as to be divided into them? Perhaps no one could say, short of inventing some phantoms. And those will be overturned by the dogmatists' own undecidable disagreements, following the skeptical methods.
2.223	Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. τὰ εἴδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖά ἐστιν· τούτων τὰ γένη ἤτοι καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, ἢ τοῖα μὲν τοῖα δὲ οὐ, ἢ οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα. οἷον ἐπεὶ τῶν τινῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ ἔνια μὲν λευκά, εἰ τύχοι, ἔνια δὲ μέλανα, καὶ ἔνια μὲν μέγιστα ἔνια δὲ σμικρότατα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, τὸ τὶ λόγου ἕνεκεν, ὅ φασιν εἶναί τινες γενικώτατον, ἢ πάντα ἔσται ἢ τὰ ἕτερα ἢ οὐδέν.	In addition, the following must be said. Species are of this sort or of that sort. Their genera are either of both this sort and that sort, or of this sort but not that, or of neither this sort nor that. For instance, among somethings, some are bodies and others incorporeal, some true and others false, some white, say, and others black, some very large and others very small, and so on. Then the "something," to take an example, which some say is the most generic of all, will be either all of these, or one side only, or none.[11]
2.224	ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸ τι, οὐδὲ τὸ γένος, πέρας ἔχει ἡ ζήτησις. εἰ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ῥηθείη, πρὸς τῷ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν οἷς ἐστι δεήσει πάντα εἶναι. ὡς γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῷον, ὡς φασίν, οὐσία ἐστὶν ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική, ἕκαστον	If the something is nothing at all, the genus is nothing either, and the inquiry is at an end. If it should be said to be all of them, then, besides the claim being impossible, each of the species and individuals it is in will have to be all of them too. An-

11 The Stoics made "something" (ti) their highest genus, covering both bodies and incorporeals.

GREEK

τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία εἶναι λέγεται καὶ ἔμψυχος καὶ αἰσθητική, οὕτως εἰ τὸ γένος καὶ σῶμά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ψευδὲς καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ μέλαν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ λευκὸν καὶ σμικρότατον καὶ μέγιστον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον πάντα ἔσται· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. ψεῦδος οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

2.225 εἰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα μόνα ἐστί, τούτων τὸ γένος τῶν λοιπῶν οὐκ ἔσται γένος, οἷον εἰ σῶμα τὸ τί, τῶν ἀσωμάτων, καὶ εἰ λογικὸν τὸ ζῷον, τῶν ἀλόγων, ὡς μήτε ἀσώματόν τι εἶναι ζῷον μήτε ἄλογον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε καὶ τοῖον καὶ τοῖον τὸ γένος, οὔτε τοῖον μὲν τοῖον δὲ οὔ, οὔτε μὴν οὔτε τοῖον οὔτε τοῖον δύναται εἶναι [γένος]· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ γένος. εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις ὅτι δυνάμει πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, λέξομεν, ὡς τὸ δυνάμει τι ὂν δεῖ τι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, οἷον οὐ δύναταί τις γραμματικὸς εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ τὸ γένος οὖν εἰ δυνάμει πάντα ἐστίν, ἐρωτῶμεν αὐτοὺς τί ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ οὕτω μένουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπορίαι.

τἀναντία μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι οὐ δύναται.

2.226 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον, οἷον σῶμα μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δὲ ἀσώματον. δυνάμει γάρ ἐστιν ὃ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ ὑποστῆναι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐνεργείᾳ ⟨ὂν⟩ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀσώματον κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ὥστε εἰ λόγου χάριν σῶμά ⟨τι⟩ ἔστιν οὔκ ἐστιν ἀσώματον δυνάμει, καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ γένος τὰ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐδὲ ὑφέστηκεν. οὐκοῦν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ γένος, ὃ διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ εἴδη λέγουσιν.

2.227 ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο θεάσασθαι ἄξιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ, ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Πάρις, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ μὲν 'Ἀλέξανδρος περιπατεῖ' ἀληθὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ 'Πάρις περιπατεῖ' ψεῦδος, οὕτως εἰ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι Θέωνι καὶ Δίωνι, εἰς σύνταξιν ἀξιώματος ἀγομένη ἡ 'ἄνθρωπος' προσηγορία ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα. οὐ θεωρεῖται δὲ τοῦτο· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Δίωνος καθημένου Θέωνος δὲ περιπατοῦντος τὸ 'ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ' ἐφ' οὗ μὲν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἐφ' οὗ δὲ ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα κοινή ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων ἡ

ENGLISH

imal, as they say, is animate, perceiving substance, and so each of its species is said to be substance, animate and perceiving. In the same way, if the genus is both body and incorporeal, false and true, black, say, and white, smallest and largest, and everything else, then each of the species and individuals will be all of these, which is not observed. So this is false too.

If it is one side only, the genus of these will not be the genus of the rest. If the something is body, for instance, it will not be the genus of incorporeals; and if animal is rational, it will not be the genus of non-rational animals. Then there will be no incorporeal something and no non-rational animal, and likewise in other cases, which is absurd. So the genus can be neither of both this sort and that, nor of this sort but not that, nor indeed of neither this sort nor that [as a genus]. If so, there is no genus at all. If someone says that the genus is all things potentially, we will say that what is potentially something must also be something actually. For instance, no one can be potentially literate unless he is also something actually. So if the genus is all things potentially, we ask them what it is actually, and so the same difficulties remain.

For it cannot be all the contraries actually.

Nor can it be some things actually and others only potentially—body actually, say, and incorporeal potentially. For what is potentially something is what can come to exist actually. But what is actually body cannot be incorporeal in actuality. So if, for the sake of argument, something is body, it is not incorporeal potentially, and vice versa. So the genus cannot be some things actually and others only potentially. And if it is nothing at all actually, it does not even exist. So the genus which they say they divide into species is nothing.

This too is worth considering. Alexander and Paris are the same person, so it cannot be that "Alexander is walking" is true while "Paris is walking" is false. In the same way, if being human is the same thing for Theon and for Dion, the name "human," brought into the structure of a proposition, will make the proposition either true for both or false for both. But this is not what we observe. When Dion is sitting and Theon walking, "A human is walking" is true said of one and false said of the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	‘ἄνθρωπος’ προσηγορία, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἰδία ἑκατέρου.	other. So the name “human” is not common to both, nor the same for both, but, if anything, peculiar to each.[12]

CHAPTER 21: ON COMMON ACCIDENTS

Sight or breathing cannot be one and the same in Dion and Theon.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.228	Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγεται καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν συμβεβηκότων. εἰ γὰρ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συμβέβηκε Δίωνί τε καὶ Θέωνι τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἐὰν καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν φθαρῇ μὲν Δίων, Θέων δὲ περιῇ καὶ ὁρᾷ, ἤτοι τὴν ὅρασιν τοῦ ἐφθαρμένου Δίωνος ἄφθαρτον μένειν ἐροῦσιν, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει, ⟨ἢ⟩ αὐτὴν ὅρασιν ἐφθάρθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐφθάρθαι λέξουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ Θέωνος ὅρασις ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ Δίωνος, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἰδία ἑκατέρου. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταὐτὸν συμβέβηκε Δίωνί τε καὶ Θέωνι τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἐν Θέωνι ἀναπνοὴν εἶναι, τὴν ἐν Δίωνι δὲ μὴ εἶναι· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τοῦ μὲν φθαρέντος τοῦ δὲ περιόντος· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ αὐτή ἐστιν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον νῦν ἀρκέσει συντόμως λελέχθαι.	Similar things are said about common accidents too. Suppose one and the same accident, seeing, belongs to both Dion and Theon. If, hypothetically, Dion dies while Theon survives and sees, they will say either that the sight of the dead Dion remains undestroyed, which is incongruous, ⟨or⟩ that the same sight has been destroyed and not destroyed, which is absurd. So Theon’s sight is not the same as Dion’s, but, if anything, each has his own. Again, if the same accident, breathing, belongs to both Dion and Theon, it cannot be that the breathing in Theon exists while the breathing in Dion does not. Yet it can, when one has died and the other survives. So it is not the same. That will do for now as a brief treatment of these matters.

CHAPTER 22: ON SOPHISMS

Dialectic cannot solve the useful sophisms; experts in each art and everyday experience do that.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.229	Οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἐπιστῆσαι λόγῳ διὰ βραχέων, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτων διάλυσιν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν οἱ σεμνύνοντες αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τε ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν λόγων, φασίν, ἐστὶν αὕτη διαγνωστική, ψευδεῖς δὲ λόγοι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, καὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη διακριτικὴ λυμαινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν φαινομέναις πιθανότησιν. ὅθεν ὡς βοηθοῦντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ σαλεύοντι τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις δὴ τῶν σοφισμάτων μετὰ σπουδῆς ἡμᾶς πειρῶνται διδάσκειν, λέγοντες σόφισμα εἶναι λόγον πιθανὸν καὶ δεδολιευμένον ὥστε προσδέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἤτοι ψευδῆ ἢ ὡμοιωμένην ψευδεῖ ἢ ἄδηλον ἢ ἄλλως ἀπρόσδεκτον,	Perhaps it is not out of place to dwell briefly on the subject of sophisms as well, since those who glorify dialectic say it is necessary for resolving these too. For if, they say, dialectic can tell true arguments from false ones, and sophisms are false arguments, it will also be able to discern these, which corrupt the truth with apparent plausibility. So the dialecticians, as though coming to the aid of a tottering life, earnestly try to teach us the concept of sophisms, their varieties, and their solutions. They say that a sophism is a persuasive argument, cunningly crafted so as to get one to accept a conclusion that is either false, or similar to a falsehood, or non-evident, or otherwise unacceptable.
2.230	οἷον ψευδῆ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ ⟨τούτου⟩ τοῦ ἔχει ‘οὐδεὶς δίδωσι κατηγόρημα πιεῖν· κατηγόρημα δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν· οὐδεὶς ἄρα δίδωσιν ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν’, ἔτι δὲ ὅμοιον ψευδεῖ	False, as in this case: “No one gives a predicate to drink; to drink wormwood is a predicate; therefore no one gives wormwood to drink.” Similar to a

12 Alexander is another name for Paris, the Trojan prince of the *Iliad*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ‘ὃ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε δὲ ἐνεδέχετο οὔτε ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει· ⟨οὐκ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει⟩’.	falsehood, as in this case: “What neither was possible nor is possible is not absurd; it neither was possible nor is possible that the doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, commits murder; ⟨therefore it is not absurd that the doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, commits murder⟩.”[13]
2.231	ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον οὕτως ‘οὐχὶ καὶ ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον, καὶ οὐχὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἄρτιοί εἰσιν· ἠρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον· οἱ ἄρα ἀστέρες ἄρτιοί εἰσιν’. ἔτι δὲ ἀπρόσδεκτον ἄλλως, ὡς οἱ λεγόμενοι σολοικίζοντες λόγοι, οἷον ‘ὃ βλέπεις, ἔστιν· βλέπεις δὲ φρενιτικόν· ἔστιν ἄρα φρενιτικόν’. ‘ὃ ὁρᾷς, ἔστιν· ὁρᾷς δὲ φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον· ἔστιν ἄρα φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον’.	Non-evident, thus: “It is not the case both that I have asked you something first and that the stars are not even in number; but I have asked you something first; therefore the stars are even in number.” Otherwise unacceptable, like the so-called solecistic arguments, for instance: “What you look at exists; you look at him raving; therefore him raving exists.” Or: “What you see exists; you see an inflamed place; therefore exists an inflamed place.”[14]
2.232	εἶτα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις αὐτῶν [ὁρᾶν ἤτοι] πριστᾶν ἐπιχειροῦσι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σοφίσματος, ὅτι ἄλλο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συγκεχώρηται καὶ ἄλλο ἐπενήνεκται. συγκεχώρηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ πίνεσθαι κατηγόρημα, καὶ εἶναι κατηγόρημα τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν, οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀψίνθιον. διὸ δέον ἐπιφέρειν ‘οὐδεὶς ἄρα πίνει τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν’, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπενήνεκται ‘οὐδεὶς ἄρα ἀψίνθιον πίνει’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, οὐ συναγόμενον ἐκ τῶν συγκεχωρημένων λημμάτων.	Next they try [to see, that is,] to set out their solutions. Of the first sophism they say that one thing has been granted in the premises and another inferred. What has been granted is that a predicate is not drunk, and that to drink wormwood, not wormwood itself, is a predicate. So the conclusion ought to have been “Therefore no one drinks to-drink-wormwood,” which is true. Instead, what was inferred was “Therefore no one drinks wormwood,” which is false and does not follow from the premises granted.
2.233	ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτι δοκεῖ μὲν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν ὡς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους ὀκνεῖν αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι, συνάγει δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ ‘οὐκ ἄρα ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει’. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἄτοπόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστι τὸ ‘ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεύει’. διὸ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀπαγωγή, φασίν,	Of the second, they say that it seems to lead to a falsehood, so that it makes the unwary hesitate to assent to it, but that it concludes something true: “Therefore it is not absurd that the doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, commits murder.” For no proposition is absurd, and “The doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, commits murder” is a proposition. So this is not absurd either. The argument that leads to something non-evident, they say,
2.234	ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γένους τῶν μεταπιπτόντων ἐστίν. μηδενὸς γὰρ προηρωτημένου κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀληθὲς γίνεται, ψευδοῦς τῆς συμπλοκῆς οὔσης παρὰ τὸ ἐμπεπλέχθαι ψεῦδος τὸ ‘ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον’ ἐν αὐτῇ. μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθῆναι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τῆς προσλήψεως ἀληθοῦς γενομένης ‘ἠρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον’, διὰ τὸ ἠρωτῆσθαι πρὸ τῆς προσλήψεως τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἡ τοῦ	belongs to the class of changing arguments. When nothing has been asked beforehand, as the hypothesis requires, the negated conjunction is true. For the conjunction is false, since the falsehood “I have asked you something first” is part of it. But once the negated conjunction has been asked, the additional premise “But I have asked you some-

13 In Stoic logic a predicate such as “to drink wormwood” is an incorporeal “sayable,” not something one can drink; wormwood was a bitter medicinal drink.
14 In Greek these conclusions keep the object case from the premise and so are ungrammatical; the English imitates the error.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς πρότασις γίνεται ψευδὴς τοῦ ἐν τῷ συμπεπλεγμένῳ ψεύδους γενομένου ἀληθοῦς· ὡς μηδέποτε δύνασθαι συναχθῆναι τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ συνυπάρχοντος τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῇ προσλήψει.	thing first" becomes true. Because the negated conjunction was asked before the additional premise, the negated conjunction becomes false, since the false member of the conjunction has become true. So the conclusion can never be drawn, since the negated conjunction never holds together with the additional premise.
2.235	τοὺς δὲ τελευταίους, φασὶν ἔνιοι, τοὺς σολοικίζοντας λόγους, ἀτόπως ἐπάγεσθαι παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν. Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν τινες διαλεκτικοί φασι περὶ σοφισμάτων (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄλλα λέγουσιν)· ταῦτα δὲ τὰς μὲν τῶν εἰκαιοτέρων ἀκοὰς ἴσως δύναται γαργαλίζειν, περιττὰ δέ ἐστι καὶ μάτην αὐτοῖς πεπονημένα. καὶ τοῦτο δυνατὸν μὲν ἴσως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἤδη λελεγμένων ἡμῖν ὁρᾶν· ὑπεμνήσαμεν γάρ, ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος κατὰ τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ποικίλως τε ἄλλως καὶ τῷ τὰ μαρτύρια τῆς συλλογιστικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους διατρέπεσθαι λόγους.	As for the last kind, the solecistic arguments, some say that their conclusions are drawn absurdly, contrary to ordinary usage. That is the kind of thing some dialecticians say about sophisms (others say other things). This may perhaps tickle the ears of the more careless, but it is superfluous, and the effort spent on it is wasted. This can perhaps be seen even from what we have already said. We pointed out that the true and the false cannot be apprehended on the dialecticians' principles. We did so in various other ways, and also by overturning the witnesses to their syllogistic ability, namely proof and the indemonstrable arguments.
2.236	εἰς δὲ τὸν προκείμενον τόπον ἰδίως καὶ ἄλλα μὲν πολλὰ λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ὡς δὲ ἐν συντόμῳ νῦν τόδε λεκτέον. ὅσα μὲν σοφίσματα ἰδίως ἡ διαλεκτικὴ δύνασθαι δοκεῖ διελέγχειν, τούτων ἡ διάλυσις ἄχρηστός ἐστιν· ὅσων δὲ ἡ διάλυσις χρησιμεύει, ταῦτα ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς οὐκ ἂν διαλύσειεν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παρακολούθησιν ἐσχηκότες.	On the topic before us in particular, there is much else that could be said, but for now let us say this briefly. The sophisms that dialectic seems peculiarly able to refute are ones whose solution is useless. Those whose solution is useful the dialectician would not solve. They are solved by the people in each art who have a close acquaintance with the matters in question.
2.237	εὐθέως γοῦν, ἵνα ἑνὸς ἢ δευτέρου μνησθῶμεν παραδείγματος, ἐρωτηθέντος [ἰατρῷ] τοιούτου σοφίσματος 'κατὰ τὰς νόσους ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τήν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον· ἐπὶ πάσης δὲ τυπώσεως νόσου πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου πάντως γίνεται παρακμή· ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου τήν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ὡς τὸ πολὺ παραλαμβάνειν' ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι πρὸς διάλυσιν τοῦ λόγου, καίτοι χρησίμην οὖσαν,	To mention one or two examples, suppose a sophism like this were put [to a doctor]: "In illnesses, a varied diet and wine should be approved during the abatements; in every type of illness an abatement certainly occurs before the first three-day period; therefore it is necessary, for the most part, to take a varied diet and wine before the first three-day period." The dialectician would have nothing to say toward solving the argument, useful though the solution is,[15]
2.238	ὁ δὲ ἰατρὸς διαλύσεται τὸ σόφισμα, εἰδὼς ὅτι παρακμὴ λέγεται διχῶς, ἥ τε τοῦ ὅλου νοσήματος καὶ ἡ ἑκάστης ἐπιτάσεως μερικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκμῆς ῥοπὴ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖσσον', καὶ πρὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου ὡς τὸ πολὺ γίνεται παρακμὴ ἡ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως τῆς μερικῆς, τὴν δὲ ποικίλην δίαιταν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ δοκιμάζομεν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ παρακμῇ	but the doctor will solve the sophism. He knows that "abatement" is used in two senses: the abatement of the illness as a whole, and the turn for the better after the peak of each partial intensification. He knows that before the first three-day period it is mostly the abatement of a partial intensi-

15 The "three-day period" (diatritos) was a key interval in Methodist medicine, by which treatment was timed.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τοῦ ὅλου νοσήματος. ὅθεν καὶ διηρτῆσθαι λέξει τὰ λήμματα τοῦ λόγου, ἑτέρας μὲν παρακμῆς ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ λήμματι λαμβανομένης, τουτέστι τῆς τοῦ ὅλου πάθους, ἑτέρας δὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, τουτέστι τῆς μερικῆς.	fication that occurs, whereas we approve a varied diet not in that, but in the abatement of the illness as a whole. So he will say that the premises of the argument are disconnected. One abatement is taken in the first premise, namely that of the whole condition, and another in the second, namely the partial one.
2.239	πάλιν τε ἐπί τινος πυρέσσοντος κατὰ πύκνωσιν ἐπιτεταμένην ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου ‘τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματά ἐστιν· ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν· κατάλληλον ἄρα τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν’ ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς ἡσυχάσει, ὁ δὲ ἰατρός,	Again, suppose that, in the case of someone feverish because of an intense condensation, an argument like this were put: “Opposites are cures of opposites; cold is opposite to the present heat; therefore cold is suited to the present heat.” The dialectician will keep quiet. But the doctor,[16]
2.240	εἰδὼς τίνα μέν ἐστιν προηγουμένως προσεχῆ πάθη, τίνα δὲ συμπτώματα τούτων, ἐρεῖ μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπτωμάτων προκόπτειν τὸν λόγον (ἀμέλει γοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τοῦ ψυχροῦ πλείονα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνειν τὴν πύρωσιν) ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν προσεχῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν στέγνωσιν εἶναι προσεχῆ, ἥτις οὐ τὴν πύκνωσιν ἀλλὰ τὸν χαλαστικὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπακολουθούσης θερμασίας οὐ προηγουμένως προσεχές, ὅθεν μηδὲ τὸ κατάλληλον εἶναι δοκοῦν αὐτῇ.	knowing which affections are primarily and directly relevant and which are their symptoms, will say that the argument applies not to the symptoms (and in fact, when cold water is poured on, the fever happens to get worse) but to the directly relevant affections. The constriction is the directly relevant affection, and it calls not for condensing but for the relaxing type of treatment. The heat that follows on it is not primarily relevant, and so neither is what seems suited to it.
2.241	καὶ οὕτως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς σοφίσμασι τοῖς χρησίμως ἀπαιτοῦσι τὴν διάλυσιν οὐδὲν ἔξει λέγειν ὁ διαλεκτικός, ἐρωτήσας δὲ ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους ‘εἰ οὐχὶ καὶ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις, κέρατα ἔχεις· οὐχὶ δὲ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις·	So with the sophisms whose solution is usefully required, the dialectician will have nothing to say. Instead he puts to us arguments like these: “If it is not the case both that you have beautiful horns and that you have horns, you have horns; but it is not the case both that you have beautiful horns and that you have horns;
2.242	κέρατα ἄρα ἔχεις.’ ‘εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν (μένει γάρ), οὔτε [δὲ] ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν (πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνεργοίη τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐν ᾧ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔστιν;)	therefore you have horns.” “If something moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in the place where it is not. But not in the place where it is (for it is at rest there), nor in the place where it is not (for how could anything act in a place where it is not at all?);
2.243	οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖταί τι.’ ‘ἤτοι τὸ ὂν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὂν οὐ γίνεται (ἔστι γάρ)· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν· (τὸ μὲν γὰρ γινόμενον πάσχει τι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὐ πάσχει) οὐδὲν ἄρα γίνεται.	therefore nothing moves.” “Either what is comes to be or what is not. What is does not come to be (for it is); nor does what is not (for what comes to be undergoes something, but what is not undergoes nothing); therefore nothing comes to be.”
2.244	ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός· μέλαν δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν. μέλαινα ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ χιών.’ καὶ τοιούτους τινὰς ἀθροίσας ὕθλους συνάγει τὰς ὀφρῦς, καὶ προχειρίζεται τὴν	“Snow is frozen water; but water is black; therefore snow is black.” Having collected rubbish of this sort, he knits his brows, brings out dialectic,

16 In Methodist theory every disease was a state of constriction or of relaxation, to be treated by its opposite.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	διαλεκτικήν, καὶ πάνυ σεμνῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ κατασκευάζειν ἡμῖν δι' ἀποδείξεων συλλογιστικῶν, ὅτι γίνεταί τι, καὶ ὅτι κινεῖταί τι, καὶ ὅτι ἡ χιών ἐστι λευκή, καὶ ὅτι κέρατα οὐκ ἔχομεν, καίτοι γε ἀρκοῦντος ἴσως τοῦ τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῖς ἀντιτιθέναι πρὸς τὸ θραύεσθαι τὴν διαβεβαιωτικὴν θέσιν διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἰσοσθενοῦς αὐτῶν ἀντιμαρτυρήσεως. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς φιλόσοφος ⟨τις⟩ κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιεπάτησεν, καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄνθρωποι πεζάς τε καὶ διαποντίους στέλλονται πορείας κατασκευάζουσί τε ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἀμελοῦντες λόγων.	and very solemnly tries to establish for us by syllogistic proofs that something comes to be, that something moves, that snow is white, and that we do not have horns. Yet perhaps it would be enough to set clarity against them, to shatter their confident position by the equipollent counter-testimony of appearances. That is why a ⟨certain⟩ philosopher, when an argument against motion was put to him, walked about in silence. And people in everyday life set out on journeys by land and sea, build ships and houses, and have children, paying no attention to the arguments against motion and coming-to-be.[17]
2.245	φέρεται δὲ καὶ Ἡροφίλου τοῦ ἰατροῦ χαρίεν ⟨τι⟩ ἀπομνημόνευμα· συνεχρόνισε γὰρ οὗτος Διοδώρῳ, ἐναπειροκαλῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ λόγους διεξῄει σοφιστικοὺς κατά τε ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τῆς κινήσεως. ὡς οὖν ἐκβαλών ποτε ὦμον ὁ Διόδωρος ἦκε θεραπευθησόμενος ὡς τὸν Ἡρόφιλον, ἐχαριεντίσατο ἐκεῖνος πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγων 'ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπῳ ὁ ὦμος ὢν ἐκπέπτωκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἦν οὔτε ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐκπέπτωκεν', ὡς τὸν σοφιστὴν λιπαρεῖν ἐᾶν μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἰατρικῆς ἁρμόζουσαν αὐτῷ προσάγειν θεραπείαν.	There is also a charming anecdote told of Herophilus the doctor. He was a contemporary of Diodorus, who indulged in dialectic in poor taste and used to go through sophistical arguments against motion, among many other things. Once Diodorus dislocated his shoulder and came to Herophilus to be treated. Herophilus teased him, saying: "Your shoulder slipped out either in the place where it was or in the place where it was not; but neither in the place where it was nor in the place where it was not; therefore it has not slipped out." And the sophist begged him to drop arguments like that and give him the appropriate medical treatment.
2.246	ἀρκεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ ἐμπείρως τε καὶ ἀδοξάστως κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς τηρήσεις τε καὶ προλήψεις βιοῦν, περὶ τῶν ἐκ δογματικῆς περιεργίας καὶ μάλιστα ἔξω τῆς βιωτικῆς χρείας λεγομένων ἐπέχοντας. εἰ οὖν ὅσα μὲν εὐχρήστως ἂν ἐπιλυθείη, ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν διαλύσαιτο ἡ διαλεκτική, ὅσα δὲ ἐπιλύεσθαι δοίη τις ἂν ἴσως ὑπ' αὐτῆς σοφίσματα,. τούτων ἡ διάλυσις ἄχρηστός ἐστιν, ἄχρηστός ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν τῶν σοφισμάτων ἡ διαλεκτική.	For it is enough, I think, to live by experience and without beliefs, in accordance with common observations and preconceptions, suspending judgment about what is said out of dogmatic over-subtlety and, above all, about what lies outside the needs of life. So dialectic could not solve the sophisms whose solution would be useful, and the solution of those sophisms one might perhaps grant it can solve is useless. If so, dialectic is useless when it comes to solving sophisms.
2.247	Καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς λεγομένων ὁρμώμενός τις οὕτως ἂν συντόμως ὑπομνήσειε περιττὰ εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων παρ' αὐτοῖς δὴ τεχνολογούμενα. ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικὴν φασιν ὡρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναι τί ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι' ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι· λέγουσι γοῦν εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.	Starting from the very things the dialecticians say, one could also briefly point out, as follows, that their technical treatment of sophisms is superfluous. The dialecticians say that they took up the art of dialectic not simply in order to know what follows from what, but chiefly in order to know how to judge truths and falsehoods by means of demonstrative arguments. At any rate, they say that dialectic is the science of what is true, what is false, and what is neither.

17 The philosopher is traditionally Diogenes the Cynic, answering arguments against motion like those of Zeno of Elea.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.248	ἐπεὶ τοίνυν αὐτοί φασιν ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι τὸν δι' ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα, ἅμα τῷ ἐρωτηθῆναι λόγον ψεῦδος ἔχοντα τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰσόμεθα ὅτι ψευδής ἐστιν καὶ οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἤτοι μὴ εἶναι συνακτικὸν ἢ μηδὲ τὰ λήμματα ἔχειν ἀληθῆ.	Now, they themselves say that a true argument is one that concludes a true conclusion by means of true premises. So as soon as an argument with a false conclusion is put to us, we will know that it is false and will not assent to it. For the argument itself must either not be conclusive or not have true premises.
2.249	καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. ἤτοι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἔσται· λέγουσι γὰρ συνακτικὸν γίνεσθαι λόγον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκὴν εἶναί ψευδῆ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας· φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος ψεύδει μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀληθεῖ δὲ οὐδαμῶς.	This is clear from the following. Either the false conclusion of the argument follows from the conjunction of its premises or it does not. If it does not follow, the argument will not even be conclusive; for they say an argument is conclusive when its conclusion follows from the conjunction of its premises. If it does follow, then the conjunction of the premises must also be false, by their own technical rules. For they say that what is false follows from what is false, but never from what is true.
2.250	ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὴ συνακτικὸς ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς λόγος κατὰ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικός ἐστιν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. εἰ τοίνυν ἐρωτηθέντος λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, αὐτόθεν γινώσκομεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ψευδές, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν παρὰ τί τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἔχει. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ψηφοπαικτῶν γινόμενα συγκατατιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴσμεν ὅτι ἀπατῶσιν, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως ἀπατῶσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῖς ψευδέσι μέν, πιθανοῖς δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσι λόγοις πειθόμεθα, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως παραλογίζονται.	And it is clear from what was said earlier that an argument that is not conclusive, or not true, is not demonstrative either, according to them. So when an argument with a false conclusion is put to us, we know at once, from the fact that its conclusion is false, that the argument is not true or not conclusive. Then we will not assent to it, even if we do not know where its deceptiveness lies. We do not assent to the tricks of conjurors as true, but know that they are deceiving us, even if we do not know how they deceive us. In the same way we are not persuaded by arguments that are false but seem persuasive, even if we do not know how they mislead.
2.251	ἢ ἐπεὶ ἵ' οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν τὸ σόφισμά φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἀτοπίας, κοινότερον οὕτω συνερωτητέον. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος λόγος ἤτοι ἐπί τι ἀπρόσδεκτον ἡμᾶς ἄγει ἢ ἐπί τι τοιοῦτον ὡς χρῆναι αὐτὸ προσδέχεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἀτόπως αὐτῷ συγκαταθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ ἐπί τι ἀπρόσδεκτον, οὐχ ἡμᾶς τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ δεήσει συγκατατίθεσθαι προπετῶς διὰ τὴν πιθανότητα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοῖς ἀτόποις ἀναγκάζοντος συγκατατίθεσθαι, εἴγε μὴ ληρεῖν παιδαριωδῶς, ἀλλὰ τἀληθῆ ζητεῖν, ὡς ὑπισχνοῦνται, προῄρηνται.	Or, since they say that a sophism leads not only to something false but also to other absurdities, the argument must be put more generally, as follows. The argument propounded leads us either to something unacceptable or to something we ought to accept. If the latter, we will assent to it without absurdity. But if it leads to something unacceptable, it is not we who must rashly assent to the absurdity because of its plausibility. Rather, they must abandon the argument that compels assent to absurdities—if, that is, they have chosen not to babble like children but to seek the truth, as they promise.
2.252	ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ὁδὸς εἴη ἐπί τινα κρημνὸν φέρουσα, οὐκ ἂν ὡθοῦμεν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κρημνὸν διὰ τὸ ὁδόν τινα εἶναι	Suppose there were a road leading to a cliff. We would not throw ourselves over the cliff because

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	φέρουσαν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἀφιστάμεθα τῆς ὁδοῦ διὰ τὸν κρημνόν, οὕτω καὶ εἰ λόγος εἴη ἐπί τι ὁμολογουμένως ἄτοπον ἡμᾶς ἀπάγων, οὐχὶ τῷ ἀτόπῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀποστησόμεθα τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν.	there is a road leading to it; we would turn off the road because of the cliff. In the same way, if there is an argument leading us to something admittedly absurd, we will not assent to the absurdity because of the argument; we will abandon the argument because of the absurdity.
2.253	ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν συνερωτᾶται λόγος, καθ' ἑκάστην πρότασιν ἐφέξομεν, εἶτα τοῦ ὅλου συνερωτηθέντος λόγου τὰ ⟨ἡμῖν⟩ δοκοῦντα ἐπάξομεν. καὶ εἴγε οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον δογματικοὶ ἐν τῇ συνερωτήσει τοῦ σωρίτου προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου φασὶ δεῖν ἵστασθαι καὶ ἐπέχειν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωσιν εἰς ἀτοπίαν, πολὺ δήπου μᾶλλον ἂν ἡμῖν ἁρμόζον εἴη σκεπτικοῖς οὖσιν, ὑποπτεύουσιν ἀτοπίαν, μὴ προπίπτειν κατὰ τὰς συνερωτήσεις τῶν λημμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπέχειν καθ' ἕκαστον ἕως τῆς ὅλης συνερωτήσεως τοῦ λόγου.	So when an argument is put to us in this way, we will suspend judgment on each premise, and then, when the whole argument has been put, we will add what seems right ⟨to us⟩. Chrysippus and the dogmatists of his school say that, when the sorites is being put, they must stop and suspend judgment as the argument proceeds, so as not to fall into absurdity. If so, it would surely be much more fitting for us, as skeptics who suspect absurdity, not to rush ahead as the premises are put, but to suspend judgment on each one until the whole argument has been put.[18]
2.254	καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀδοξάστως ἀπὸ τῆς βιωτικῆς τηρήσεως ὁρμώμενοι τοὺς ἀπατηλοὺς οὕτως ἐκκλίνομεν λόγους, οἱ δογματικοὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτως ἕξουσι διακρῖναι τὸ σόφισμα ἀπὸ τοῦ δεόντως δοκοῦντος ἐρωτᾶσθαι λόγου, εἴγε χρὴ δογματικῶς αὐτούς ἐπικρῖναι, καὶ ὅτι συνακτικόν ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὅτι τὰ λήμματά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει·	And we, starting without beliefs from the observation of everyday life, avoid deceptive arguments in this way. The dogmatists, though, will be unable to tell a sophism apart from an argument that seems properly put, if they must judge dogmatically that the form of the argument is conclusive and that the premises are true, or that this is not so.
2.255	ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς συνακτικοὺς λόγους δύνανται καταλαμβάνειν οὔτε ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι κρίνειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι, μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἔχοντες, ὡς ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑπεμνήσαμεν. παρέλκει οὖν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἡ θρυλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων τεχνολογία.	For we pointed out earlier that they can neither apprehend conclusive arguments nor judge that anything is true, since they have no agreed criterion or proof; we pointed this out from what they themselves say. So, as far as these considerations go, the much-vaunted technical treatment of sophisms among the dialecticians is superfluous.
2.256	Παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαστολῆς τῶν ἀμφιβολιῶν λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀμφιβολία λέξις ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω σημαίνουσα καὶ αἱ λέξεις σημαίνουσι θέσει, ὅσας μὲν χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἀμφιβολίας διαλύεσθαι, τουτέστι τὰς ἔν τινι τῶν ἐμπειριῶν, ταύτας οἱ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἐγγεγυμνασμένοι διαλύσονται, τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ τῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεποιημένης θετικῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τῶν σημαινομένων, ὁ δὲ διαλεκτικὸς οὐδαμῶς,	We say similar things about distinguishing ambiguities. An ambiguity is an expression that signifies two or more things, and expressions signify by convention. So the ambiguities that it is useful to resolve, namely those that arise within some field of expertise, will be resolved by people trained in each art. For they themselves are experienced in the conventional use they have made of names for the things signified. But the dialectician will not resolve them at all.
2.257	οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφιβολίας 'ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τὴν ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον'. ἤδη δὲ	Take, for instance, this ambiguity: "In the abatements a varied diet and wine should be approved."

18 The sorites ("heap") asks, one grain at a time, when a heap begins; Chrysippus advised falling silent before the doubtful steps.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄχρι καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὁρῶμεν διαστελλομένους ἀμφιβολίας, ὧν ἡ διαστολὴ χρησιμεύειν αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ. εἰ γοῦν τις ὁμωνύμους οἰκέτας ἔχων κελεύοι παιδίον κληθῆναι αὐτῷ τὸν Μάνην, εἰ τύχοι (τοῦτο γὰρ τοὔνομα τοῖς οἰκέταις ἔστω κοινόν), πεύσεται ὁ παῖς ποῖον. καὶ εἰ πλείονας καὶ διαφόρους τις οἴνους ἔχων λέγοι τῷ παιδίῳ ‘ἔγχεόν μοι τοῦ οἴνου πιεῖν’, ὁμοίως ὁ παῖς πεύσεται ποίου.	And in everyday life we see even slave boys distinguishing ambiguities when distinguishing them seems useful to them. If someone who had slaves with the same name told a boy to call Manes, say, for him (let that be the name the slaves share), the boy will ask, “Which one?” And if someone who had several different wines said to the boy, “Pour me some of the wine to drink,” the boy will likewise ask, “Which?”
2.258	οὕτως ἡ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐμπειρία τοῦ χρησίμου τὴν διαστολὴν εἰσάγει. ὅσαι μέντοι μὴ ἔν τινι τῶν βιωτικῶν ἐμπειριῶν εἰσιν ἀμφιβολίαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν δογματικαῖς οἰήσεσι κεῖνται καὶ εἰσὶν ἴσως ἄχρηστοι πρὸς τὸ ἀδοξάστως βιοῦν, περὶ ταύτας ἰδίως ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχων ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ὁμοίως ἐπέχειν κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους, καθὸ πράγμασιν ἀδήλοις καὶ ἀκαταλήπτοις ἢ καὶ ἀνυποστάτοις ἴσως εἰσὶ συνεζευγμέναι.	So in each field it is experience of what is useful that brings in the distinguishing. But some ambiguities do not arise in any field of everyday experience. They lie in dogmatic opinions and are perhaps useless for living without beliefs. The dialectician, who is peculiarly concerned with these, will be forced to suspend judgment about them too, following the skeptical methods, insofar as they are bound up with things that are non-evident and inapprehensible, or perhaps even unreal.
2.259	ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ εἰσαῦθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δέ τις δογματικὸς πρός τι τούτων ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειροίη, κρατυνεῖ τὸν σκεπτικὸν λόγον, ἐκ τῆς ἑκατέρωθεν ἐπιχειρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀνεπικρίτου διαφωνίας τὴν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐποχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς βεβαιῶν. Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν εἰπόντες αὐτοῦ που περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.	But we will discuss these matters again later. And if some dogmatist tries to argue against any of this, he will strengthen the skeptical argument. By the arguments on both sides and the undecidable disagreement, he will himself confirm suspension of judgment about the matters under investigation. Having said this much about ambiguities too, we bring the second book of the *Outlines* to a close here.

Book III

Against the physicists and the ethicists
God, cause, body, motion, place, time and number; good and bad, and whether there is an art of living.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.1	Περὶ μὲν ⟨οὖν⟩ τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει τοιαῦτα ἀρκούντως λέγοιτο ἄν·	So much, ⟨then⟩, may suffice as an account, in outline, of the logical part of what they call philosophy.

CHAPTER 1: ON THE PHYSICAL PART

Sextus turns to physics, attacking its most general claims rather than each doctrine.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς ἐπιόντες οὐ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αὐτοῖς κατὰ τόπον ἀντεροῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθολικώτερα κινεῖν ἐπιχειρήσομεν, οἷς συμπεριγράφεται καὶ τὰ λοιπά. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγου.	Going through its physical part in the same manner of writing, we will not argue against each of their statements one by one. Instead we will try to unsettle the more general points, and the rest are canceled along with these. Let us begin with the account of principles.

CHAPTER 2: ON ACTIVE PRINCIPLES

Principles are material or active; the active ones come first.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Καὶ ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις συμπεφώνηται τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δραστικὰς, ἀπὸ τῶν δραστικῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιησόμεθα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ κυριωτέρας τῶν ὑλικῶν φασιν εἶναι.	Most thinkers agree that some principles are material and others active. So we will begin our account with the active ones, since they say these are also more important than the material ones.

CHAPTER 3: ON GOD

God cannot be conceived or proved, and providence over all, some or nothing each leads to impiety.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.2	Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ θεὸν εἶναι δραστικώτατον αἴτιον οἱ πλείους ἀπεφήναντο, πρότερον περὶ θεοῦ σκοπήσωμεν, ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες, ὅτι τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμὲν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτούς φαμεν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν προπέτειαν τῶν δογματικῶν τάδε λέγομεν. Τῶν ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τὰς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν ὀφείλομεν, οἷον εἰ σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη· οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἵππον ἐννοῆσαι δύναιτο μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἵππου μαθών. τό τε ἐννοούμενον ἐννοεῖσθαί που ὀφείλει.	Since most have declared that god is the most active cause, let us first consider god. We should say beforehand that, following ordinary life without holding beliefs, we say that there are gods, we revere gods, and we say that they exercise providence. But against the rashness of the dogmatists we say the following. We ought to form a conception of the substance of the things we conceive of, for example whether they are bodies or incorporeal. We ought also to conceive of their shapes, since no one could conceive of a horse without

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		first having learned the shape of a horse. And what is conceived of ought to be conceived of as being somewhere.
3.3	ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν σῶμά φασιν εἶναι τὸν θεόν, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωποειδῆ, οἱ δὲ οὔ, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τόπῳ, οἱ δὲ οὔ, καὶ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ οἱ μὲν ἐντὸς κόσμου, οἱ δὲ ἐκτός, πῶς δυνησόμεθα ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν μήτε οὐσίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοῦ ὁμολογουμένην μήτε εἶδος μήτε τόπον ἐν ᾧ εἶη; πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογησάτωσάν τε καὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν, ὅτι τοιόσδε ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, εἶτα ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ὑποτυπωσάμενοι οὕτως ἀξιούτωσαν ἡμᾶς ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν. ἐς ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνοῦσιν, τί νοήσομεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογουμένως παρ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχομεν.	Among the dogmatists, some say that god is a body and others that he is incorporeal. Some say he is human in form, others not. Some say he is in a place, others not, and of those who put him in a place, some put him inside the cosmos and others outside it. How, then, shall we be able to form a concept of god, when we have no agreed account of his substance, or of his form, or of the place where he would be? Let them first come to an agreement and concur that god is of such-and-such a kind. Then, once they have sketched him out for us, let them require us to form a concept of god. As long as they disagree undecidably, we have nothing agreed upon from them about what we are to think.
3.4	ἀλλ' ἄφθαρτόν τι, φασί, καὶ μακάριον ἐννοήσας, τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν εὔηθες· ὥσπερ ⟨γὰρ⟩ ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὸν Δίωνα οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ ὡς Δίωνι δύναται νοεῖν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐννοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.	"But think of something imperishable and blessed," they say, "and take that to be god." This is simple-minded. ⟨For⟩ someone who does not know Dion cannot think of the attributes Dion has as belonging to Dion either. In the same way, since we do not know the substance of god, we shall not be able to learn or conceive his attributes either.
3.5	χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστι τὸ μακάριον, πότερον τὸ ἐνεργοῦν κατὰ ἀρετὴν καὶ προνοούμενον τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ τεταγμένων, ἢ τὸ ἀνενέργητον καὶ μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχον μήτε ἑτέρῳ παρέχον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαφωνήσαντες ἀνεπικρίτως ἀνεννόητον ἡμῖν πεποιήκασι τὸ μακάριον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν θεόν.	Besides this, let them tell us what the blessed is. Is it what acts in accordance with excellence and exercises providence over the things ranked beneath it? Or is it what is inactive, neither having trouble itself nor causing trouble for anyone else? They have disagreed undecidably about this too, and so they have made the blessed inconceivable to us, and for that reason god as well.
3.6	Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐπινοῆται ὁ θεός, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν πρόδηλον μὲν οὔκ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προσέπιπτεν, συνεφώνησαν ἂν οἱ δογματικοί, τίς ἐστι καὶ ποδαπὸς καὶ ποῦ· ἡ ἀνεπίκριτος δὲ διαφωνία πεποίηκεν αὐτὸν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ ἀποδείξεως δεόμενον.	And even if god is conceived, it is necessary to suspend judgment about whether he exists or not, as far as the dogmatists are concerned. For it is not evident that god exists. If it struck us of itself, the dogmatists would have agreed about who he is, of what sort he is, and where he is. Instead, the undecidable disagreement has made him seem to us non-evident and in need of proof.
3.7	ὁ μὲν οὖν ⟨ἀποδεικνύων⟩ ὅτι ἔστι θεός, ἤτοι διὰ προδήλου τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσιν ἢ δι' ἀδήλου. διὰ προδήλου μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πρόδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικνύον ὅτι ἔστι θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνυόμενον πρὸς τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι νοεῖται, διὸ καὶ συγκαταλαμβάνεται	Now anyone ⟨proving⟩ that god exists proves it either through something evident or through something non-evident. Not through something evident, certainly. Suppose what proves that god exists were evident. What is proved is thought of

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	αὐτῷ, καθὼς καὶ παρεστήσαμεν, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ εἶναι θεόν, συγκαταλαμβανόμενον τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι αὐτὸ προδήλῳ ὄντι. οὔκ ἐστι δὲ πρόδηλον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ ἀποδείκνυται ἄρα διὰ προδήλου. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου.	relative to what proves it, and is therefore apprehended together with it, as we have established. So that god exists would also be evident, since it would be apprehended together with what proves it, which is evident. But it is not evident, as we pointed out; so it is not proved through something evident either. Nor is it proved through something non-evident.
3.8	τὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι θεόν, ἀποδείξεως χρῄζον, εἰ μὲν διὰ προδήλου λέγοιτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι, οὐκέτι ἄδηλον ἔσται ἀλλὰ πρόδηλον [τὸ εἶναι θεόν]. οὐκ ἄρα ἀποδεικτικὸν αὐτοῦ ἄδηλον διὰ προδήλου ἀποδείκνυται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἐκπεσεῖται ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, αἰτούντων ἡμῶν ἀεὶ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ φερομένου ἀδήλου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προεκκειμένου. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑτέρου δύναται ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὸ εἶναι θεόν.	For the non-evident thing that is supposed to prove that god exists needs proof itself. If it is said to be proved through something evident, it will no longer be non-evident but evident [that god exists]. So the non-evident thing that proves it is not proved through something evident. Nor through something non-evident: whoever says this will fall into infinite regress, since we shall always ask for a proof of the non-evident thing brought forward to prove the one before. Therefore it cannot be proved from something else that god exists.
3.9	εἰ δὲ μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστι πρόδηλον μήτε ἐξ ἑτέρου ἀποδείκνυται, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστι θεός. Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο λεκτέον. ὁ λέγων εἶναι θεὸν ἤτοι προνοεῖν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ φησὶν ἢ οὐ προνοεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὲν προνοεῖν, ἤτοι πάντων ἢ τινων. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντων προυνόει, οὐκ ἦν ἂν οὔτε κακόν τι οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας δὲ πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι λέγουσιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάντων προνοεῖν λεχθήσεται ὁ θεός.	But if it is neither evident of itself nor proved from something else, whether god exists will be inapprehensible. This too should be said. Whoever says that god exists says either that he exercises providence over the things in the cosmos or that he does not; and if he does, then either over all of them or over some. But if he exercised providence over all things, there would be nothing bad and no vice in the cosmos; yet they say that everything is full of vice. So god will not be said to exercise providence over all things.
3.10	εἰ δέ τινων προνοεῖ, διὰ τί τῶνδε μὲν προνοεῖ, τῶνδε δὲ οὔ; ἤτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μέν, οὐ δύναται δέ, ἢ δύναται μέν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἠβούλετο καὶ ἠδύνατο, πάντων ἂν προυνόει· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ἄρα καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μέν, οὐ δύναται δέ, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστι τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν οὐ δύναται προνοεῖν ὧν οὐ προνοεῖ·	And if he exercises providence over some, why over these and not over those? For either he both wants to and is able to exercise providence over all things; or he wants to but is not able; or he is able but does not want to; or he neither wants to nor is able. If he both wanted to and was able, he would exercise providence over all things. But he does not exercise providence over all things, for the reasons just given. So it is not the case that he both wants to and is able to exercise providence over all things. And if he wants to but is not able, he is weaker than the cause that makes him unable to exercise providence over the things he does not;
3.11	ἔστι δὲ παρὰ τὴν θεοῦ ἐπίνοιαν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἶναί τινος αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δύναται μὲν πάντων προνοεῖν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, βάσκανος ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη. εἰ δὲ οὔτε	but it goes against the concept of god for him to be weaker than anything. If he is able to exercise providence over all things but does not want to, he

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	βούλεται οὔτε δύναται, καὶ βάσκανός ἐστι καὶ ἀσθενής, ὅπερ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβούντων ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ οὐδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀποτέλεσμα, οὐχ ἕξει τις εἰπεῖν, πόθεν καταλαμβάνεται ὅτι ἔστι θεός, εἴγε μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται μήτε δι' ἀποτελεσμάτων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ ἔστι θεός.	would be thought envious. And if he neither wants to nor is able, he is both envious and weak, which only impious people would say about god. So god does not exercise providence over the things in the cosmos. But if he exercises providence over nothing, and there is no work or effect of his, no one will be able to say how it is apprehended that god exists, since he neither appears of himself nor is apprehended through any effects. For these reasons too, then, whether god exists is inapprehensible.
3.12	ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι ἴσως ἀσεβεῖν ἀναγκάζονται οἱ διαβεβαιωτικῶς λέγοντες εἶναι θεόν· πάντων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν προνοεῖν λέγοντες κακῶν αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσιν, τινῶν δὲ ἢ καὶ μηδενὸς προνοεῖν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἤτοι βάσκανον τὸν θεὸν ἢ ἀσθενῆ λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσονται, ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀσεβούντων προδήλως.	From this we conclude that those who firmly assert that god exists are perhaps forced into impiety. If they say that he exercises providence over all things, they will be saying that god is the cause of bad things. If they say that he exercises providence over some things, or even over none, they will be forced to say that god is either envious or weak. To say these things is plainly impious.

CHAPTER 4: ON CAUSE

The dogmatists disagree on what a cause is and list containing, joint and auxiliary causes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.13	Ἵνα δὲ μὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς βλασφημεῖν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ πραγματικῶς ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν, κοινότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ αἰτίου διαπορήσομεν, πρότερον ἐπιστῆσαι πειραθέντες τῇ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίᾳ. ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐννοῆσαί τις τὸ αἴτιον δύναιτο, εἴγε πρὸς τῷ διαφώνους καὶ ἀλλοκότους ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου ⟨ἀποδίδοσθαι⟩ ἔτι καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν ἀνεύρετον διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ διαφωνίαν.	The dogmatists, at a loss for a way to argue against us on the substance of the matter, might try to revile us as impious too. To prevent this, we shall raise difficulties about the active cause in more general terms, after first trying to examine the concept of cause. As far as what the dogmatists say goes, no one could even conceive of cause. Besides ⟨giving⟩ conflicting and outlandish concepts of cause, they have also made its existence undiscoverable through their disagreement about it.
3.14	οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον τὸ αἴτιον εἶναί φασιν. δόξαι δ' ἂν αἴτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ' αὐτοὺς δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χεῖσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασιν, οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες, οἷον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἷον τοῦ χεῖσθαι. διό, καθάπερ εἶπον, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα.	Some say that a cause is a body, others that it is incorporeal. In their view, a cause in the more general sense would seem to be that through whose activity the effect comes about. In this sense the sun, or the sun's heat, is the cause of the wax's being melted, or of the melting of the wax. For they have disagreed on this point too: some say that a cause is a cause of appellatives, such as "melting", others that it is a cause of predicates, such as "being melted". So, as I said, a cause in the more general sense would be that through whose activity the effect comes about.
3.15		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούτων δὲ τῶν αἰτίων οἱ μὲν πλείους ἡγοῦνται τὰ μὲν συνεκτικὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ συνεργά, καὶ συνεκτικὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ὧν παρόντων πάρεστι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ αἱρομένων αἴρεται καὶ μειουμένων μειοῦται (οὕτω γὰρ τὴν περίθεσιν τῆς στραγγάλης αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τοῦ πνιγμοῦ), συναίτιον δὲ ὃ τὴν ἴσην εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν ἑτέρῳ συναιτίῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα (οὕτω ⟨γὰρ⟩ ἕκαστον ἑλκόντων τὸ ἅροτρον βοῶν αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τῆς ὁλκῆς τοῦ ἀρότρου), συνεργὸν δὲ ὃ βραχεῖαν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὅταν δυοῖν βάρος τι βασταζόντων μόλις τρίτος τις προσελθὼν συγκουφίσῃ τοῦτο.	Of these causes, most hold that some are containing causes, some joint causes, and some auxiliary causes. Containing causes are those whose presence brings the effect's presence, whose removal removes it, and whose diminution diminishes it (that is how they say the placing of a noose is the cause of strangling). A joint cause is one that contributes a power equal to another joint cause toward the effect's existing (⟨for⟩ that is how they say each of the oxen drawing a plow is a cause of the plow's being drawn). An auxiliary cause is one that contributes a slight power, and toward the effect's existing with ease: as when two people are carrying some weight with difficulty and a third comes along and helps lighten it.
3.16	ἔνιοι μέντοι καὶ παρόντα μελλόντων τῶν αἴτια ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς τὰ προκαταρκτικά, οἷον τὴν ἐπιτεταμένην ἡλίωσιν πυρετοῦ. τινὲς δὲ ταῦτα παρῃτήσαντο, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἴτιον πρός τι ὑπάρχον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὂν οὐ δύναται προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον. ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορήσει τοιάδε λέγομεν.	Some, however, have also said that present things are causes of future things, as antecedent causes are; for example, prolonged exposure to the sun is a cause of fever. Others have rejected these. Since a cause is relative, and relative to the effect, it cannot precede the effect as its cause. In raising difficulties about causes, we say the following.

CHAPTER 5: WHETHER ANYTHING IS A CAUSE OF ANYTHING

Arguments for and against causes are equally persuasive, so the skeptic suspends judgment.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.17	Πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὔξησις γένοιτο, μείωσις, γένεσις, φθορά, καθόλου κίνησις, τῶν φυσικῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἕκαστον, ἡ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου διοίκησις, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, εἰ μὴ κατά τινα αἰτίαν; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν τούτων ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχει, λέξομεν ὅτι διά τινα αἰτίαν πάντως φαίνεται ἡμῖν τοιαῦτα, ὁποῖα οὔκ ἐστιν.	It is plausible that there is cause. Without some cause, how could there be growth, diminution, generation, destruction, motion in general, each of the physical and psychic effects, the ordering of the whole cosmos, and everything else? Indeed, even if none of these is real in its nature, we shall say that it is surely because of some cause that they appear to us as what they are not.
3.18	ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα ἐκ πάντων καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἂν ἦν μὴ οὔσης αἰτίας. οἷον ἵπποι μὲν ἐκ μυῶν, εἰ τύχοι, γεννηθήσονται, ἐλέφαντες δὲ ἐκ μυρμήκων· καὶ ἐν μὲν ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις Θήβαις ὄμβροι ποτὲ ἐξαίσιοι καὶ χιόνες ἂν ἐγίνοντο, τὰ δὲ νότια ὄμβρων οὐ μετεῖχεν, εἰ μὴ αἰτία τις ἦν, δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν νότιά ἐστι δυσχείμερα, αὐχμηρὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἕω.	What is more, if there were no cause, anything would come from anything, and at random. Horses, for instance, might be born from mice, and elephants from ants. Egyptian Thebes would get heavy rains and snow at times, and the southern regions would get no rain, if there were not some cause that makes the southern regions stormy and those toward the east dry.
3.19	καὶ περιτρέπεται δὲ ὁ λέγων μηδὲν αἴτιον εἶναι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ τινὸς αἰτίας τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ διά τινα αἰτίαν, βουλόμενος ἀναιρεῖν	Anyone who says that there is no cause refutes himself. If he says that he asserts this simply and without any cause, he will not be credible. But if he asserts it because of some cause, then in want-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τὸ αἴτιον τίθησιν, ἀποδιδόσθω αἰτίαν δι' ἣν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον. Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον·	ing to abolish cause he posits it. Let him give us the cause through which there is no cause! For these reasons, then, it is plausible that there is cause;
3.20	ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναί τινός τι αἴτιον πιθανόν ἐστι, φανερὸν ἔσται λόγους ἡμῶν ἐκθεμένων ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς τὴν τούτου ὑπόμνησιν. οἷον γοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοῆσαι πρὶν τὸ ἀποτούτου τούτου καταλαβεῖν ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ· τότε γὰρ γνωρίζομεν, ὅτι αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα καταλαμβάνωμεν.	but it is also plausible to say that nothing is a cause of anything. This will be clear once we set out a few arguments out of many, for now, to bring the point to mind. For instance, it is impossible to conceive of a cause before apprehending its effect as its effect. We recognize that it is a cause of the effect only when we apprehend that as an effect.
3.21	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ καταλαβεῖν δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ καταλάβωμεν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ· τότε γὰρ καὶ ὅτι ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν δοκοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ καταλάβωμεν.	But neither can we apprehend the effect of a cause as its effect unless we apprehend the cause of the effect as its cause. We think we know that it is its effect only when we apprehend its cause as its cause.
3.22	εἰ οὖν, ἵνα μὲν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ αἴτιον, δεῖ προεπιγνῶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἵνα δὲ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα γνῶμεν, ⟨ὡς⟩ ἔφην, δεῖ προεπίστασθαι τὸ αἴτιον, ὁ διάλληλος τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπος ἄμφω δείκνυσιν ἀνεπινόητα, μήτε τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου μήτε τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς ἀποτελέσματος ἐπινοεῖσθαι δυναμένου· ἑκατέρου γὰρ αὐτῶν δεομένου τῆς παρὰ θατέρου πίστεως, οὐχ ἕξομεν ἀπὸ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς ἐννοίας. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀποφαίνεσθαι δυνησόμεθα, ὅτι ἔστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον.	So, to conceive of the cause we must first recognize the effect, and to know the effect, ⟨as⟩ I said, we must first know the cause. If that is so, the mode of reciprocity shows both to be inconceivable: neither the cause can be conceived as a cause nor the effect as an effect. Since each of them needs the other to be made credible, we shall have no way of telling which of them to start from in forming the concept. Hence we shall not be able to state that anything is a cause of anything.
3.23	ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐννοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ αἴτιον συγχωρήσῃ τις, ἀκατάληπτον ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν ⟨εἶναι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὃς γάρ φησιν⟩ εἶναι ⟨τὶ⟩ τινὸς αἴτιον, ἤτοι ἁπλῶς μηδεμιᾶς ὁρμώμενος αἰτίας εὐλόγου τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἢ διά τινας αἰτίας ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ταύτην ἰέναι λέξει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἁπλῶς, οὐκ ἔσται πιστότερος τοῦ λέγοντος ἁπλῶς μηδὲν εἶναι μηδενὸς αἴτιον· εἰ δὲ αἰτίας λέξει δι' ἃς εἶναι ⟨τὶ⟩ τινὸς αἴτιον νομίζει, τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ παριστᾶν ἐπιχειρήσει· ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν, εἰ ἐστι τὶ τινὸς αἴτιον, αὐτὸς ὡς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον αἴτιον εἶναι φησίν.	And even if someone grants that cause can be conceived, it would be thought inapprehensible because of the disagreement. For some say ⟨that something is a cause of something, others that it is not, others... For whoever says⟩ that ⟨something⟩ is a cause of something either says so simply, prompted by no reasonable cause, or will claim that he arrived at this assent because of certain causes. If he says so simply, he will be no more credible than someone who says simply that nothing is a cause of anything. If he states causes on account of which he thinks that ⟨something⟩ is a cause of something, he will be trying to establish what is in question by means of what is in question. For when we are investigating whether anything is a cause of anything, he says that there is a cause on the grounds that there is a cause of there being a cause.
3.24		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ αἰτίου ζητοῦμεν, δεήσει πάντως αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναί τι αἴτιον αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, κἀκείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀπείρους αἰτίας παρασχεῖν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφῆναι, ὅτι ἐστὶ τί τινὸς αἴτιον.	Besides, since we are investigating whether cause exists, he will certainly have to provide a cause for the cause of there being a cause, and another for that one, and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to provide infinitely many causes; therefore it is impossible to state firmly that anything is a cause of anything.
3.25	πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι ὂν καὶ ὑφεστὼς ἤδη αἴτιον τὸ αἴτιον ποιεῖ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἢ μὴ ὂν αἴτιον. καὶ μὴ ὂν μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ὄν, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρότερον ὑποστῆναι καὶ προγενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπάγειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ὅπερ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγεται ὄντος ἤδη αἰτίου. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, σαφὲς ὅτι μὴ δύναται τούτου ὡς αἴτιον προυποστῆναι· οὐδὲ ὂν ἄρα αἴτιον τὸ αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖν δύναται τὸ οὗ ἐστιν αἴτιον.	Moreover, the cause produces the effect either when it already exists and is real as a cause, or when it is not a cause. When it is not, certainly not. If when it is, it must first be real and have come into being as a cause, and only then bring on the effect, which is said to be produced by it when it already is a cause. But since a cause is relative, and relative to the effect, it clearly cannot be real as its cause before it. So not even when it is a cause can the cause produce that of which it is the cause.
3.26	εἰ δὲ μήτε μὴ ὂν αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖ τι μήτε ὄν, οὐδὲ ἀποτελεῖ τι· διὸ οὐδὲ αἴτιον ἔσται· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποτελεῖν τι τὸ αἴτιον οὐ δύναται ὡς αἴτιον νοεῖσθαι. ὅθεν κἀκεῖνο λέγουσί τινες· τὸ αἴτιον ἤτοι συνυφίστασθαι δεῖ τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ἢ προϋφίστασθαι τούτου ἢ ⟨εἶναι⟩ μετὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι ⟨ἀποτέλεσμα⟩ τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ αἴτιον εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἄγεται μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μὴ καὶ γελοῖον ᾖ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ προυφίστασθαι δύναται τούτου· πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ νοεῖσθαι λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρός τι φασὶν αὐτοί,	But if it produces nothing either when it is not a cause or when it is, it does not produce anything at all; and so it will not be a cause either, since without producing something a cause cannot be thought of as a cause. Hence some also say this. The cause must either be real together with the effect, or be real before it, or ⟨exist⟩ after the ⟨effect⟩ comes about. Now to say that the cause is brought into existence after its effect has been generated may well be laughable. But neither can it be real before it. For it is said to be thought of relative to the effect, and relatives, as they themselves say,
3.27	καθὸ πρός τι ἐστίν, συνυπάρχειν καὶ συννοεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συνυφίστασθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἀποτελεστικὸν αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον ὑπὸ ὄντος ἤδη γίνεσθαι χρή, πρότερον δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον γενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἶθ' οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. εἰ οὖν τὸ αἴτιον μήτε προϋφίσταται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μήτε συνυφίσταται τούτῳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ⟨τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα⟩ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γίνεται, μήποτε οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεως ὅλως μετέχει.	exist together and are thought of together, insofar as they are relatives. Nor can it be real together with the effect. For if it produces the effect, and what comes about must come about through something that already exists, the cause must first become a cause and then produce the effect. So the cause is neither real before its effect nor together with it, and ⟨the effect⟩ does not come about before it either. Perhaps, then, it has no share in existence at all.
3.28	σαφὲς δὲ ἴσως ὅτι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ αἰτίου πάλιν περιτρέπεται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον ὡς μὲν πρός τι οὐ δύναται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ προεπινοηθῆναι, ἵνα δὲ ὡς αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ νοηθῇ, δεῖ αὐτὸ προεπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ, ἀδύνατον δὲ	It is perhaps clear that through these arguments too the concept of cause turns itself around again. As a relative, the cause cannot be conceived before its effect. Yet in order to be conceived as the cause of its effect, it must be conceived before its effect. And it is impossible for a thing to be conceived be-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	προεπινοηθῆναί τι ἐκείνου οὗ προεπινοηθῆναι [τι] οὐ δύναται, ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ αἴτιον.	fore that before which [a thing] cannot be conceived. So it is impossible for the cause to be conceived.
3.29	Ἐκ τούτων οὖν λοιπὸν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι ⟨εἰ⟩ πιθανοὶ μέν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι καθ' οὓς ὑπεμνήσαμεν ὡς χρὴ λέγειν αἴτιον εἶναι, πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ παριστάντες, ὅτι μὴ προσήκει αἴτιον εἶναί τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων προκρίνειν τινὰς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, μήτε σημεῖον μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν παρεστήσαμεν, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ αἰτίου, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναί τι αἴτιον λέγοντας ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.	From all this, then, we conclude as follows. ⟨Suppose⟩ the arguments by which we pointed out that one should say there is cause are plausible. Suppose the arguments establishing that it is not proper to state that there is any cause are plausible too. And suppose it is not possible to prefer any of them, since we have no agreed sign, criterion or proof, as we established earlier. Then it is necessary to suspend judgment about the existence of cause as well, saying that there is "no more" a cause than not, as far as what the dogmatists say goes.

CHAPTER 6: ON MATERIAL PRINCIPLES

Philosophers disagree endlessly about the elements, from Thales' water to Democritus' atoms.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.30	Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δραστικῆς τοσαῦτα νῦν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι· συντόμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν καλουμένων ἀρχῶν λεκτέον. ὅτι τοίνυν αὗταί εἰσιν ἀκατάληπτοι, ἄληπτοι, ῥᾴδιον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν γεγενημένης διαφωνίας παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. Φερεκύδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστὴς τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἵππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χῖος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἵππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγῖνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν,.	That much will be enough to have said for now about the active principle. But we should also speak briefly about the so-called material principles. That these are inapprehensible, ungraspable, is easy to see from the disagreement there has been about them among the dogmatists. Pherecydes of Syros said that earth is the principle of all things; Thales of Miletus, water; Anaximander, his pupil, the unlimited; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus in the *Orphica*, fire, water and earth;[1]
3.31	οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν — περὶ γὰρ τῆς τερατολογουμένης ἀποίου παρά τισιν ὕλης, ἣν οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ καταλαμβάνειν διαβεβαιοῦνται, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τὸν Περιπατητικὸν πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα,	Empedocles and his school, and the Stoics, fire, air, water and earth. (As for the matter without qualities that some tell marvelous tales about, which not even they firmly claim to apprehend, why even mention it?) Aristotle the Peripatetic and his school said fire, air, water, earth and the body that moves in a circle;
3.32	Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους,	Democritus and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homoeomeries; Diodorus, nicknamed Cronus, minimal and partless bodies; Her-

1 Most of these are early Greek natural philosophers of the sixth and fifth centuries BC; Onomacritus was a sixth-century BC compiler of poems attributed to Orpheus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οἱ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας.	aclides of Pontus and Asclepiades of Bithynia, jointless masses; Pythagoras and his followers, numbers; the mathematicians, the limits of bodies; Strato the natural philosopher, qualities.[2]
3.33	τοσαύτης τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι πλείονος διαφωνίας γεγενημένης περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἤτοι πάσαις συγκαταθησόμεθα ταῖς κειμέναις στάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἢ τισίν. ἀλλὰ πάσαις μὲν οὐ δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου δυνησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην συγκατατίθεσθαι, θραυστὰ εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγουσι καὶ ποιά, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Δημόκριτον, ἄτομα ταῦτα εἶναι φάσκουσι καὶ ἄποια, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν, πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ποιότητα περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν.	So much disagreement has arisen among them about the material principles, and more besides. We shall therefore assent either to all the positions mentioned, and the others too, or to some of them. But assenting to all is not possible. We surely cannot assent at once to Asclepiades and his followers, who say that the elements are breakable and have qualities; to Democritus and his followers, who claim that they are indivisible and without qualities; and to Anaxagoras and his followers, who leave every perceptible quality in the homoeomeries.
3.34	εἰ δέ τινα στάσιν τῶν ἄλλων προκρινοῦμεν, ἤτοι ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως προκρινοῦμεν ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἄνευ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεως οὐ συνθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ἀληθῆ δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ἀληθὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄν δοθείη μὴ οὐχὶ κεκριμένη κριτηρίῳ ἀληθεῖ, ἀληθὲς δὲ κριτήριον εἶναι δείκνυται δι' ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης.	And if we prefer one position over the others, we shall prefer it either simply and without proof, or with proof. Without proof we shall not accept it. If with proof, the proof must be true. But a proof could not be granted to be true unless it had been judged by a true criterion, and a criterion is shown to be true by means of a judged proof.
3.35	εἰ τοίνυν, ἵνα μὲν ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡ προκρίνουσά τινα στάσιν ἀληθὴς εἶναι δειχθῇ, δεῖ τὸ κριτήριον αὐτῆς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἵνα δὲ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδειχθῇ, δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προκεκρίσθαι, ὁ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει προβαίνειν τὸν λόγον, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως ἀεὶ κριτηρίου δεομένης ἀποδεδειγμένου, τοῦ κριτηρίου δὲ ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης.	So, for the proof that prefers some position to be shown true, its criterion must have been proved; and for the criterion to be proved, its proof must have been judged beforehand. If that is so, we find the mode of reciprocity, which will not let the argument advance, since the proof always needs a proved criterion and the criterion a judged proof.
3.36	εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ κριτήριον κριτηρίῳ κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδείξει ἀποδεικνύναι βούλοιτό τις, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβληθήσεται. εἰ τοίνυν μήτε πάσαις ταῖς περὶ στοιχείων στάσεσι δυνάμεθα συγκατατίθεσθαι μήτε τινὶ τούτων, ἐπέχειν προσήκει περὶ αὐτῶν.	And if someone wanted always to judge a criterion by a criterion and prove a proof by a proof, he will be thrown into infinite regress. So if we can neither assent to all the positions about elements nor to any one of them, it is proper to suspend judgment about them.
3.37	Δυνατὸν μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τούτων μόνων ὑπομιμνῄσκειν τὴν τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀκαταληψίαν· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφέστερον τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν, ἐνδιατρίψωμεν συμμέτρως τῷ τόπῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλαὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειροί τινές εἰσιν αἱ περὶ στοιχείων δόξαι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἑκάστην λέγειν εἰδικῶς νῦν παραιτησόμεθα διὰ τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς συγγραφῆς, δυνάμει δὲ πρὸς πάσας ἀντεροῦμεν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἦν ἂν τις εἴπῃ περὶ στοιχείων	Perhaps it is possible to point out the non-apprehension of the elements and material principles through these considerations alone. But so that we can refute the dogmatists more comprehensively, let us spend a reasonable amount of time on the topic. As we pointed out, the opinions about elements are many, almost infinite. Because of the character of this treatise, we shall excuse

2 Strato of Lampsacus headed Aristotle's school, the Peripatetics, in the third century BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	στάσιν, ἤτοι ἐπὶ σώματα κατενεχθήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ ἀσώματα, ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα ὑπομνῆσαι, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτα μέν ἐστι τὰ σώματα, ἀκατάληπτα δὲ τὰ ἀσώματα· διὰ γὰρ τούτου σαφὲς ἔσται, ὅτι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἀκατάληπτα.	ourselves for now from addressing each of them specifically, but in effect we shall argue against all of them. Whatever position anyone states about elements will come down either to bodies or to incorporeals. So we think it is enough to point out that bodies are inapprehensible and that incorporeals are inapprehensible. This will make it clear that the elements are inapprehensible too.

CHAPTER 7: WHETHER BODIES ARE APPREHENSIBLE

Neither body nor the incorporeal can be apprehended, so the elements cannot be either.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.38	Σῶμα τοίνυν λέγουσιν εἶναί τινες ὃ οἷόν τε ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι τοῦτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔστι τι αἴτιον, οὐδὲ εἰ ἔστι τι πάσχον εἰπεῖν δυνάμεθα· τὸ γὰρ πάσχον πάντως ὑπὸ αἰτίου πάσχει. ἀκαταλήπτου δὲ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος, διὰ ταῦτα ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα.	Some say that a body is what is capable of acting or being acted upon. But as far as this concept goes, body is inapprehensible. For cause is inapprehensible, as we pointed out. And since we cannot say whether there is any cause, we cannot say whether there is anything acted upon either, for what is acted upon is certainly acted upon by a cause. Since both cause and what is acted upon are inapprehensible, body too will be inapprehensible for these reasons.
3.39	τινὲς δὲ σῶμα εἶναι λέγουσι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας. σημεῖον μὲν γάρ φασιν οὗ μέρος οὐθέν, γραμμὴν δὲ μῆκος ἀπλατές, ἐπιφάνειαν δὲ μῆκος μετὰ πλάτους· ὅταν δὲ αὕτη καὶ βάθος προσλάβῃ καὶ ἀντιτυπίαν, σῶμα εἶναι, περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, συνεστὼς ἔκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας.	Others say that a body is what has three dimensions together with resistance. A point, they say, is that which has no part; a line is length without breadth; a surface is length with breadth. When the surface also takes on depth and resistance, it is a body, made up of length, breadth, depth and resistance. Body is the subject of our present discussion.
3.40	εὐμαρὴς μέντοι καὶ ὁ πρὸς τούτους λόγος. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ἤτοι οὐδὲν παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι λέξουσιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν τῶν προειρημένων. καὶ ἔξωθεν μὲν τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τοῦ βάθους καὶ τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι τὸ σῶμα, ἐὰν δείξῃ τις, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστιν, ἀναιροίη ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὰ γὰρ ὅλα συναναιρεῖται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πᾶσι μέρεσιν. ποικίλως μὲν οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα ἐλέγχειν· τὸ δὲ νῦν ἀρκέσει λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὰ πέρατα, ἤτοι γραμμαί εἰσιν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι ἢ σώματα.	The argument against these people is easy too. They will say either that body is nothing besides these things or that it is something other than the combination of them. Now apart from length, breadth, depth and resistance, body would be nothing. But if these things are body, then anyone who showed that they are unreal would abolish body too, for wholes are abolished along with all their parts. There are various ways of refuting these things, but for now it will be enough to say this: if the limits exist, they are either lines, or surfaces, or bodies.
3.41	εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφάνειάν τινα ἢ γραμμὴν εἶναί λέγοι τις, καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι κατὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι δύνασθαι λεχθήσεται ἢ μόνον περὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ὑπάρχουσαν	Suppose someone says that there is a surface or a line. Then it will be said either that each of the things mentioned can be real on its own, or that they are only observed in connection with what

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	ἤτοι γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν ὀνειροπολεῖν ἴσως εὔηθες. εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι λέγοιτο μόνον καὶ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑπεστάναι τούτων ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι τὰ σώματα (ἐχρῆν γάρ, οἶμαι, ταῦτα πρότερον ὑπόστασιν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ οὕτω συνελθόντα πεποιηκέναι τὰ σώματα),	are called bodies. But to dream up a line or a surface existing by itself is perhaps simple-minded. And suppose each of them were said to be observed only in connection with bodies, and not to be real by itself. First, it will straightaway be granted that bodies have not come into being from them (for these ought, I suppose, first to have had existence by themselves, and then to have come together and made the bodies);
3.42	εἶτα οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις σώμασιν ὑφέστηκεν. καὶ τοῦτο διὰ πλειόνων μέν ἐστιν ὑπομιμνῄσκειν, ἀρκέσει δὲ νῦν τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἁφῆς ἀπορούμενα λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπτεται ἀλλήλων τὰ παρατιθέμενα σώματα, τοῖς πέρασιν αὐτῶν, οἷον ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις, ψαύει ἀλλήλων. αἱ οὖν ἐπιφάνειαι ὅλαι μὲν δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλαις οὐχ ἑνωθήσονται κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ἐπεὶ σύγχυσις ἔσται ἡ ἁφὴ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ἁπτομένων διασπασμός· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται.	and then, they are not real even in so-called bodies. This can be pointed out in many ways, but for now it will be enough to state the difficulties raised by contact. If bodies placed side by side touch one another, they make contact by their limits, by their surfaces, for instance. Now the surfaces will not be wholly united with one another through and through when they are in contact, since then contact would be fusion, and separating things in contact would be tearing them apart. That is not what we observe.
3.43	εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις ⟨μὲν⟩ μέρεσιν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ἅπτεται τῆς τοῦ παρατιθεμένου αὐτῇ σώματος ἐπιφανείας, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνωται τῷ σώματι οὗ ἐστι πέρας, ⟨οὐκ ἔσται ἀβαθής, διαφόρων τῶν αὐτῆς μερῶν νοουμένων κατὰ βάθος, τοῦ μὲν τοῦ παρατιθεμένου ἁπτομένου, τοῦ δὲ καθ' ὃ συνήνωται τῷ σώματι οὗ ἐστι πέρας⟩. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ περὶ σώματι θεωρῆσαι δύναταί τις μῆκος καὶ πλάτος ἀβαθές, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιφάνειαν.	Suppose the surface touches the surface of the body placed beside it with ⟨some⟩ of its parts, and is united by others with the body whose limit it is. ⟨Then it will not be without depth, since its parts are thought of as different in depth: one touching the adjacent body, the other being where it is united with the body whose limit it is.⟩ So no one can observe length and breadth without depth even in connection with a body, and hence no surface either.
	ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δύο ἐπιφανειῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ λήγουσι, κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτῶν μῆκος εἶναι, τουτέστι κατὰ γραμμάς, αἱ γραμμαὶ αὗται, δι' ὧν ἅπτεσθαι λέγονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐχ ἑνωθήσονται μὲν ἀλλήλαις (συγχυθεῖεν γὰρ ἄν)· εἰ δὲ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τοῖς κατὰ πλάτος ἅπτεται τῆς παρατιθεμένης αὐτῇ γραμμῆς, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνωται τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἧς ἐστι πέρας, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπλατής, ὅθεν οὐδὲ γραμμή. εἰ δὲ μήτε γραμμὴ ἔστιν ἐν σώματι μήτε ἐπιφάνεια, οὐδὲ μῆκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος ἔσται ἐν σώματι.	Similarly, suppose two surfaces are placed side by side along the limits in which they end, that is, along what is said to be their length: along lines. These lines, by which the surfaces are said to touch one another, will not be united with one another (for they would be fused). And if each of them touches the line placed beside it with some of its parts in breadth, and is united by others with the surface whose limit it is, it will not be without breadth, and hence it will not be a line. And if there is neither line nor surface in a body, there will be no length or breadth or depth in a body either.
3.44	εἰ δέ τις σώματα εἶναι λέγοι τὰ πέρατα, σύντομος ἔσται ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπόκρισις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος σῶμα ἐστίν, δεήσει τοῦτο εἰς τὰς τρεῖς αὐτοῦ μερίζεσθαι διαστάσεις, ὧν ἑκάστη σῶμα οὖσα πάλιν αὐτὴ διαιρεθήσεται εἰς	If someone says that the limits are bodies, the answer to him will be short. If length is a body, it will have to be divided into its three dimensions. Each of these, being a body, will itself be divided in turn

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	διαστάσεις ἄλλας τρεῖς, αἳ ἔσονται σώματα, καὶ ἐκεῖναι εἰς ἄλλας ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἀπειρομέγεθες γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρα μεριζόμενον· ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐδὲ σώματα ἄρα εἰσὶν αἱ προειρημέναι διαστάσεις. εἰ δὲ μήτε σώματά εἰσι μήτε γραμμαὶ ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐδὲ εἶναι νομισθήσονται.	into three other dimensions, which will be bodies; and those likewise into others, and so on to infinity. The body would then become infinitely large, being divided into infinitely many parts, which is absurd. So the dimensions mentioned are not bodies either. And if they are neither bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will not be thought to exist at all.
3.45	Ἀκατάληπτος δέ ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. αὕτη γὰρ εἴπερ καταλαμβάνεται, ἁφῇ καταλαμβάνοιτο ἄν. ἐὰν οὖν δείξωμεν, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ἡ ἁφή, σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ἡ ἁφή, διὰ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. τὰ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἤτοι μέρεσιν ἀλλήλων ἅπτεται ἢ ὅλα ὅλων. ὅλα μὲν οὖν ὅλων οὐδαμῶς· ἑνωθήσεται γὰρ οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἅψεται ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· τὰ γὰρ μέρη αὐτῶν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέρη ἑαυτῶν ὅλα. ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ὅλα, ⟨ἅ⟩ ἐστιν ἑτέρων μέρη, ὅλα μὲν ὅλων οὐχ	Resistance, too, is inapprehensible. If it is apprehended, it would be apprehended by touch. So if we show that touch is inapprehensible, it will be clear that resistance cannot be apprehended. That touch is inapprehensible we infer as follows. Things that touch each other touch either part to part or whole to whole. Whole to whole, certainly not, for then they would be united and would not touch each other. Nor part to part. For their parts are parts in relation to the wholes, but wholes in relation to their own parts. So these wholes, ⟨which⟩ are parts of other things, will not touch whole to whole
3.46	ἅψεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τούτων μέρη ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν μέρη ὅλα ὄντα οὔτε ὅλα ὅλων ἅψεται οὔτε μέρεσι μερῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ὁλότητα μήτε κατὰ μέρη γινομένην ἁφὴν καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται ἡ ἁφή. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις καὶ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον τούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτον. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα·	for the reasons just given, nor part to part. For their parts too are wholes in relation to their own parts, and so will touch neither whole to whole nor part to part. And if we do not apprehend contact taking place either as a whole or by parts, touch will be inapprehensible. For this reason resistance will be too, and hence body too. For if body is nothing besides the three dimensions and resistance, and we have shown that each of these is inapprehensible, body too will be inapprehensible. Thus, as far as the concept of body goes, it is inapprehensible whether there is any body.
3.47	λεκτέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ προκείμενον. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν φασιν εἶναι αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἁπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως ἐπὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν νοητῶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν. καὶ αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν· κατὰ γὰρ συναθροισμὸν μήκους καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ χρώματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, σὺν οἷς θεωρεῖται· αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἁπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι λέγονται παρ' αὐτοῖς.	This too should be said on the topic at hand. Of the things that exist, they say, some are perceptible and some intelligible. Some are apprehended by thought and others by the senses. The senses, they say, are affected only in a simple way, while thought proceeds from the apprehension of perceptibles to the apprehension of intelligibles. If there is any body, then, it is either perceptible or intelligible. It is not perceptible. It seems to be apprehended through an aggregate of length, depth, breadth, resistance, color and certain other things, along with which it is observed; but they themselves say that the senses are affected only in a simple way.

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3.48	〈....〉 εἰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, δεῖ τι πάντως ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητόν, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων νοητῶν ὄντων ἔσται νόησις. οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον αὐτόθεν νοητόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινος ἀφ' οὗ ἡ νόησις ἔσται τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθητόν ἐστι μήτε νοητόν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα.	〈....〉 But if body is said to exist, there must certainly be something perceptible in the nature of things from which the conception of bodies, intelligible as they are, will arise. But there is nothing besides body and the incorporeal. Of these, the incorporeal is intelligible from the start, and body is not perceptible, as we pointed out. So, since there is nothing perceptible in the nature of things from which the conception of body could arise, body will not be intelligible either. And if it is neither perceptible nor intelligible, and there is nothing besides these, we must say, as far as the argument goes, that body is nothing.
3.49	διὰ ταῦτα οὖν ἡμεῖς ἀντιτιθέντες τοὺς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος λόγους τῷ φαίνεσθαι [δοκεῖν] ὑπάρχον τὸ σῶμα, συνάγομεν τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχήν. Τῇ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταληψίᾳ συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ ἀσώματον. αἱ γὰρ στερήσεις τῶν ἕξεων νοοῦνται στερήσεις, οἷον ὁράσεως τυφλότης καὶ ἀκοῆς κωφότης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως. διόπερ ἵνα στέρησιν καταλάβωμεν, δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν ἡμᾶς προκατειληφέναι, ἧς λέγεται στέρησις εἶναι ἡ στέρησις· ἀνεννόητος γάρ τις ὢν τῆς ὁράσεως οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο λέγειν, ὅτι ὅρασιν ὅδε οὐκ ἔχει, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι.	For these reasons, then, we set the arguments against body against the fact that body appears [to seem] real, and so we arrive at suspension of judgment about body. The non-apprehension of body brings with it the inapprehensibility of the incorporeal. For privations are thought of as privations of states: blindness of sight, deafness of hearing, and similarly in other cases. So in order to apprehend a privation, we must already have apprehended the state of which the privation is said to be a privation. Someone who had no concept of sight could not say that this person does not have sight, which is what being blind is.
3.50	εἰ οὖν στέρησις σώματός ἐστι τὸ ἀσώματον, τῶν δὲ ἕξεων μὴ καταλαμβανομένων ἀδύνατον τὰς στερήσεις αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. καὶ γὰρ ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν. εἴτε δὲ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν δέκα τρόπων· εἴτε νοητόν, μὴ διδομένης αὐτόθεν τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως, ἀφ' ἧς ὁρμώμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν δοκοῦμεν, οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν αὐτόθεν κατάληψις δοθήσεται, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου.	So the incorporeal is a privation of body. Privations cannot be apprehended if the states are not apprehended, and it has been shown that body is inapprehensible. If all this holds, the incorporeal will be inapprehensible too. Moreover, it is either perceptible or intelligible. If it is perceptible, it is inapprehensible because of the differences among animals, among humans, among the senses and among circumstances, because of admixtures, and because of the rest of what we said in discussing the Ten Modes. If it is intelligible, there is a difficulty. The apprehension of perceptibles is not granted from the start, and it is from perceptibles that we seem to reach out to intelligibles. So the apprehension of intelligibles will not be granted from the start either, and hence neither will that of the incorporeal.
3.51	ὅ τε φάσκων καταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσώματον ἤτοι αἰσθήσει τοῦτο παραστήσει καταλαμβάνειν ἢ διὰ λόγου. καὶ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις κατὰ ἐπέρεισιν καὶ νύξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσι τῶν	Anyone who claims to apprehend the incorporeal will make the case that he apprehends it either by perception or by argument. Not by perception, certainly. The senses seem to grasp perceptibles

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αἰσθητῶν, οἷον ἡ ὅρασις, ἐάν τε κατὰ ἔντασιν γίνηται κώνου, ἐάν τε κατὰ εἰδώλων ἀποκρίσεις τε καὶ ἐπικρίσεις, ἐάν τε ⟨κατ'⟩ ἀκτίνων ἢ χρωμάτων ἀποχύσεις, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ δέ, ἤν τε ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀήρ, ἤν τε τὰ μόρια τῆς φωνῆς φέρηται περὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ πλήττῃ τὸ ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα ὥστε τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῆς φωνῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ὀδμαὶ τῇ ῥινὶ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ αὖ τῇ γλώττῃ προσπίπτουσιν, καὶ τὰ τὴν ἁφὴν κινοῦντα ὁμοίως τῇ ἁφῇ.

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by pressure and impact. Take sight, whether it happens by the stretching of a cone, or by images being emitted and received, or by outpourings of rays or colors. Or take hearing, whether it is the air that is struck or the particles of the sound that travel to the ears and strike the auditory breath, so as to produce the perception of the sound. Odors, again, strike the nose and flavors the tongue, and likewise the things that move touch strike touch.

3.52 τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα ἐπέρεισιν τοιαύτην ὑπομένειν οὐχ οἷά τέ ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο τῇ αἰσθήσει ⟨ταῦτα⟩ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ λόγου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ λεκτόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀσώματος, ὡς οἱ Στωικοί φασιν, ὁ λέγων διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζει. ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν, εἰ δύναταί τι ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀσώματόν τι λαβὼν ἁπλῶς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν ἀσωμάτων ποιεῖσθαι θέλει. καίτοι αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ ἀσώματός ἐστι, τῆς τῶν ζητουμένων ἐστὶ μοίρας.

But incorporeals cannot undergo pressure of this kind, so ⟨they⟩ could not be apprehended by perception. Nor by argument either. If argument is a sayable and incorporeal, as the Stoics say, whoever says that incorporeals are apprehended by argument is taking for granted the point at issue. For when we are investigating whether anything incorporeal can be apprehended, he simply takes something incorporeal and wants to use it to apprehend incorporeals. Yet argument itself, if it is incorporeal, is one of the things under investigation.

3.53 πῶς οὖν ἀποδείξει τις, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο τὸ ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεται (φημὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον); εἰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἄλλου ἀσωμάτου, κἀκείνου ζητήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ διὰ σώματος, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τῆς καταλήψεως τῶν σωμάτων· διὰ τίνος οὖν δείξομεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται τὸ σῶμα τὸ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἀσωμάτου λόγου λαμβανόμενον; εἰ μὲν διὰ σώματος, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα· εἰ δὲ δι' ἀσωμάτου, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον ἐκπίπτομεν. μένοντος οὖν οὕτως ἀκαταλήπτου τοῦ λόγου, εἴπερ ἀσώματός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό τις λέγειν δι' αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ἀσώματον.

How, then, will anyone prove that this incorporeal (I mean argument) is apprehended in the first place? If through another incorporeal, we shall ask for the proof that that one is apprehended too, and so on to infinity. If through a body, the apprehension of bodies is also under investigation. So through what shall we show that the body is apprehended, the body we use to prove that incorporeal argument is apprehended? If through a body, we are thrown into infinite regress; if through an incorporeal, we fall into the mode of reciprocity. Since argument thus remains inapprehensible, if it is incorporeal, no one could say that the incorporeal is apprehended through it.

3.54 εἰ δὲ σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων διαπεφώνηται, πότερον καταλαμβάνεται ἢ οὔ, διὰ τὴν λεγομένην συνεχῆ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν, ὡς μηδὲ τὴν 'τόδε' δεῖξιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μηδὲ εἶναι νομίζεσθαι, παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων γινόμενα μέν, ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀπορῶ πῶς ἐπικριθήσεται ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου διαφωνία, μήτε σώματι μήτε ἀσωμάτῳ ταύτην ὁρῶν ἐπικρίνεσθαι δυναμένην διὰ τὰς μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένας ἀτοπίας. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ λόγῳ δυνατόν ἐστι καταλαμβάνειν τὰ ἀσώματα.

And suppose argument is a body. There is disagreement about bodies too, whether they are apprehended or not, because of what is called their continual flux. For this reason they do not even admit of being pointed out as "this", and are not thought to exist; that is why Plato calls bodies things that come into being but never are. So I am at a loss how the disagreement about the incorporeal will be decided. I see that it can be decided neither by a body nor by an incorporeal, because of the absurdities stated a little earlier. So it is not possible to apprehend incorporeals by argument either.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.55	εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτει μήτε διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως καταλαμβάνοιτο. Εἰ τοίνυν μήτε περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος μήτε περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οἷόν τέ ἐστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἐφεκτέον, τάχα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, εἴγε τούτων τὰ μὲν σώματα, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἠπόρηται. πλὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν τε δραστικῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἐφεκτῶν οὐσῶν ἄπορός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγος.	And if they neither fall under perception nor are apprehended through argument, they could not be apprehended at all. If, then, it is not possible to make firm assertions about the existence of body or of incorporeals, we must suspend judgment about the elements too. Perhaps we must also suspend judgment about the things that come after the elements, since some of them are bodies and others incorporeals, and both have been shown to be problematic. At any rate, since both the active and the material principles are subjects of suspension for these reasons, the account of principles ends in aporia.

CHAPTER 8: ON BLENDING

Mixture is inconceivable: a cup of hemlock blended through ten cups of water would equal them.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.56	Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπῃ τις, πῶς ἄρα καὶ γίνεσθαί φασι τὰ συγκρίματα ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, μήτε θίξεως καὶ ἀφῆς ὑπαρχούσης μήτε κράσεως ἢ μίξεως ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ ἀφή, μικρῷ πρόσθεν ὑπέμνησα, ὅτε περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ σώματος διελεγόμην· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κράσεως ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν δυνατός ἐστι, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιστήσω. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς στάσεις· ὅθεν εὐθέως ἅμα τῇ ἀνεπικρίτῳ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τοῦ σκέμματος συνάγοιτ' ἄν. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀντίρρησιν παραιτησάμενοι διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς, τάδε λέξειν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀποχρώντως ὑπολαμβάνομεν.	And even if one sets all this aside, how do they say that compounds come into being from the primary elements, when there is no touching or contact, and no blending or mixing at all? That contact is nothing I pointed out a little earlier, when I was discussing the existence of body. That the manner of blending is not possible either, as far as what they say goes, I shall indicate briefly. Much is said about blending, and the dogmatists hold almost endless positions on the question before us. So the inapprehensibility of the question might be concluded straightaway, along with the undecidable disagreement. But because of the aim of this treatise, we shall excuse ourselves for now from rebutting each of them, and we think it will be enough at present to say the following.
3.57	Τὰ κιρνάμενα ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαι φασίν. ἤτοι οὖν τὰς μὲν οὐσίας αὐτῶν μίγνυσθαι φήσει τις, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας μηδαμῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν ποιότητας ἀναμίγνυσθαι, μηκέτι δὲ τὰς οὐσίας, ἢ μηθέτερον ἀναμίγνυσθαι θατέρῳ, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἑνοῦσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε αἱ ποιότητες οὔτε αἱ οὐσίαι ἀναμίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις, ἀνεπινόητος ἔσται ἡ κρᾶσις· πῶς γὰρ μία αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τῶν κιρναμένων γίνεσθαι συμβήσεται, εἴγε κατὰ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων μίγνυται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κιρνάμενα;	They say that things that are blended are composed of substance and qualities. So someone will say one of four things. Either their substances are mixed but their qualities are not at all; or their qualities are mixed but their substances are not; or neither is mixed with the other; or both are united with one another. But if neither the qualities nor the substances are mixed with one another, blending will be inconceivable. For how will a single perception arise from the things blended, if they are mixed with one another in none of the ways mentioned?
3.58		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	εἰ δὲ αἱ μὲν ποιότητες ἁπλῶς παρακεῖσθαι λεχθεῖεν ἀλλήλαις, αἱ δὲ οὐσίαι μίγνυσθαι, καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ κεχωρισμένων τῶν ποιοτήτων τῶν ἐν ταῖς κράσεσιν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὡς μιᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν κιρναμένων ἀποτελουμένης αἰσθανόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τὰς μὲν ποιότητας μίγνυσθαι λέγοι τις, τὰς δὲ οὐσίας μηδαμῶς, ἀδύνατα λέξει· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ποιοτήτων ὑπόστασις ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν, διόπερ γελοῖον ἂν εἴη λέγειν, ὡς αἱ μὲν ποιότητες χωρισθεῖσαι τῶν οὐσιῶν [καὶ] ἰδίᾳ μίγνυνταί που ἀλλήλαις, ἄποιοι δὲ αἱ οὐσίαι χωρὶς ὑπολείπονται.	If the qualities were said simply to lie side by side with one another while the substances are mixed, that too would be absurd. We do not perceive the qualities in blends as separate; we perceive them as a single quality produced from the things blended. And if someone says the qualities are mixed but the substances not at all, he will be saying something impossible. The qualities have their existence in the substances, so it would be ridiculous to say that the qualities, separated from the substances, [and] are mixed with one another somewhere on their own, while the substances are left behind separately, without qualities.
3.59	λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κιρναμένων καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι χωροῦσι δι' ἀλλήλων καὶ μιγνύμεναι τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. ὃ τῶν προειρημένων ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον· ἀδύνατος γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη κρᾶσις. οἷον γοῦν ἐὰν δέκα κοτύλαις ὕδατος κωνείου χυλοῦ κοτύλη μιχθῇ, παντὶ τῷ ὕδατι συνανακίρνασθαι ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ κώνειον· εἰ γοῦν καί τι βραχύτατον μέρος τοῦ μίγματος λάβοι τις, εὑρήσει πεπληρωμένον αὐτὸ τῆς τοῦ κωνείου δυνάμεως.	It remains to say that both the qualities and the substances of the things blended pass through one another and, by mixing, produce the blend. This is more absurd than the previous options, for such a blend is impossible. Suppose, for instance, that a cup of hemlock juice is mixed with ten cups of water. The hemlock would be said to be blended through all the water; at any rate, if you took even the tiniest part of the mixture, you would find it full of the hemlock's power.
3.60	εἰ δὲ ἐπιμίγνυται τὸ κώνειον παντὶ μέρει τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ παρεκτείνεται αὐτῷ ὅλον ὅλῳ κατά τε τὴν τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτῶν δι' ἀλλήλων δίοδον, ἵν' οὕτως ἡ κρᾶσις γένηται, τὰ δὲ παρεκτεινόμενα ἀλλήλοις καθ' ἅπαν μέρος τὸν ἴσον ἐπέχει τόπον, διὸ καὶ ἴσα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἴση ἔσται ἡ κοτύλη τοῦ κωνείου ταῖς δέκα κοτύλαις τοῦ ὕδατος, ὡς εἴκοσι κοτύλας ὀφείλειν εἶναι τὸ μῖγμα ἢ δύο μόνας, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇδε τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως· καὶ κοτύλης πάλιν ὕδατος ταῖς εἴκοσι κοτύλαις ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐπεμβληθείσης τεσσαράκοντα κοτυλῶν ὀφείλει τὸ μέτρον εἶναι ἢ πάλιν δύο μόνων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν κοτύλην εἴκοσι κοτύλας ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν, ὅσαις παρεκτείνεται, καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι κοτύλας μίαν, ἡ συνεξισοῦνται.	Suppose, then, that the hemlock is mixed into every part of the water and extended along it, whole along whole, by the passage of their substances and qualities through one another, so that blending comes about in this way. And things extended along one another in every part occupy an equal space, and are therefore equal to one another. Then the one cup of hemlock will be equal to the ten cups of water, so that the mixture ought to be twenty cups, or only two, as far as this hypothesis about the manner of blending goes. And again, if a cup of water is added to the twenty cups, the measure ought to be forty cups, as far as the reasoning of the hypothesis goes, or again only two. For the one cup can be thought of as the twenty cups it is extended along, and the twenty cups as the one cup with which they are made equal.[3]
3.61	δυνατὸν δὲ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν κοτύλην ἐπεμβάλλοντα καὶ ὁμοίως συλλογιζόμενον συνάγειν, ὅτι αἱ εἴκοσιν ὁρώμεναι τοῦ μίγματος κοτύλαι δισμύριαί που καὶ πρὸς ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως, αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ δύο μόναι· ὅπερ ἀπεμφάσεως	Adding one cup at a time in this way and reasoning similarly, one can conclude that the twenty cups of mixture we see ought to be twenty thousand cups and more, as far as the hypothesis about the manner of blending goes, and that the same

3 The cup here is the kotylē, a Greek liquid measure of roughly a quarter of a liter.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπεν. οὐκοῦν ἄτοπός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις τῆς κράσεως.	cups are also only two. An incongruity could hardly go further than that. So this hypothesis about blending is absurd too.
3.62	εἰ δὲ οὔτε τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων μιγνυμένων ἀλλήλαις οὔτε τῶν ποιοτήτων μόνων οὔτε ἀμφοτέρων οὔτε οὐθετέρου δύναται γίνεσθαι κρᾶσις, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀνεπινόητος ὁ τρόπος τῆς τε κράσεως καὶ ὅλως τῆς μίξεως ἐστίν. διόπερ εἰ μήτε κατὰ θίξιν παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μήτε ἀνακιρνώμενα ἢ μιγνύμενα ποιητικὰ τῶν συγκριμάτων εἶναι δύναται, ἀνεπινόητός ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τούς δογματικούς φυσιολογία καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.	So blending cannot come about when the substances alone are mixed with one another, nor when the qualities alone are, nor when both are, nor when neither is; and nothing besides these can be conceived. Therefore the manner of blending, and of mixing in general, is inconceivable. So the so-called elements can produce compounds neither by being placed side by side in contact nor by being blended or mixed. If that is so, the dogmatists' account of nature is inconceivable, as far as this argument goes too.

CHAPTER 9: ON MOTION

Since compounds arise through motion, the dogmatists' physics fails if motion is in doubt.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.63	Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἦν ἐπιστῆσαι τῷ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἀδύνατος ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη ἡ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιολογία. πάντως γὰρ κατά τινα κίνησιν τῶν τε στοιχείων καὶ τῆς δραστικῆς ἀρχῆς ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι τὰ συγκρίματα. ἐὰν οὖν ὑπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι μηδὲν εἶδος κινήσεως ὁμολογεῖται, σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι καὶ διδομένων καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τῶν προειρημένων ἁπάντων μάτην ὁ καλούμενος φυσικὸς λόγος τοῖς δογματικοῖς διεξώδευται.	In addition to what has been said, one could consider the argument about motions, and how the dogmatists' account of nature would be thought impossible on that score too. For compounds must certainly come about through some motion of the elements and of the active principle. So if we point out that no kind of motion is agreed upon, it will be clear that, even if everything above is granted by hypothesis, the dogmatists have worked through their so-called physics in vain.

CHAPTER 10: ON MOTION FROM PLACE TO PLACE

Clear appearances favor motion, Diodorus' arguments deny it; the skeptic suspends judgment.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.64	Φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ κινήσεως διειληφέναι ἓξ εἴδη ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, τοπικὴν μετάβασιν, φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, αὔξησιν, μείωσιν, γένεσιν, φθοράν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῶν προειρημένων εἰδῶν τῆς κινήσεως κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπιστήσομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοπικῆς μεταβάσεως ἀρξάμενοι. ἔστιν οὖν αὕτη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς καθ' ἣν τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται τὸ κινούμενον ἤτοι καθ' ὁλότητα ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ⟨καθ'⟩ ὅλον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν περιπατούντων, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ κέντρῳ κινουμένης σφαίρας· ὅλης γὰρ αὐτῆς μενούσης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη τοὺς τόπους ἀμείβει.	Those who seem to have treated motion most thoroughly say that it has six kinds: change of place, natural alteration, growth, diminution, generation and destruction. We shall consider each of these kinds of motion separately, beginning with change of place. According to the dogmatists, this is the motion by which the moving thing passes from place to place, either as a whole or by parts. As a whole is the case of people walking; by parts is the case of a sphere rotating around its center, for while the whole sphere stays in the same place, its parts exchange places.
3.65		

GREEK

τρεῖς δέ, οἶμαι, γεγόνασιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως στάσεις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βίος καί τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ Παρμενίδης τε καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἔφασαν οἱ σκεπτικοί· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκθέμενοι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν τῶν τε εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν ἀποφαινομένων, ἐὰν τὴν διαφωνίαν εὑρίσκωμεν ἰσοσθενῆ, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν λέγειν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ENGLISH

There have been, I think, three main positions about motion. Ordinary life and some philosophers hold that there is motion. Parmenides, Melissus and certain others hold that there is not. And the skeptics have said that there is "no more" motion than not: as far as appearances go, there seems to be motion, but as far as philosophical argument goes, it is not real. So we shall set out the case on both sides, from those who hold that there is motion and from those who declare that there is none. If we find the disagreement equipollent, we shall be compelled to say that there is "no more" motion than not, as far as what is said goes.

3.66 ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν λεγόντων. οὗτοι δὴ τῇ ἐναργείᾳ μάλιστα ἐπερείδονται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φασί, κίνησις, πῶς μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς ὁ ἥλιος φέρεται, πῶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας ποιεῖ, παρὰ τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνεγγισμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀποστάσεις γιγνομένας; ἢ πῶς νῆες ἀπὸ λιμένων ἀναχθεῖσαι καταίρουσιν ἐπὶ λιμένας ἄλλους πάμπολυ τῶν προτέρων ἀφεστῶτας; τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρῶν πρόεισι τῆς οἰκίας καὶ αὖθις ἀναστρέφει; ταῦτα δὴ τελέως ἀναντίρρητα εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς ⟨τὸν⟩ κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβάδισεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας παριστάς, ὅτι ὑπαρκτή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυσωπεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τοὺς τῆς ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς στάσεως ὄντας·

Let us begin with those who say that it is real. These rely above all on clarity. If there is no motion, they say, how does the sun travel from east to west? How does it produce the seasons of the year, which come about as it approaches us and withdraws from us? How do ships put out from one harbor and come in to others very far from the first? And how does the man who abolishes motion go out of his house and come back again? These things, they say, are utterly undeniable. That is why one of the Cynics, when presented with the argument against motion, gave no answer but stood up and walked about, showing by his action and through clarity that motion is real. This, then, is how they try to shame those who hold the opposite position;

3.67 οἱ δὲ τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιροῦντες λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦσι τοιούτοις. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖται ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρου, ⟨.....⟩. τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀναιτίως κινηθήσεται ἢ κατά τινα αἰτίαν. ἀναιτίως μὲν οὐδέν φασι γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κατά τινα αἰτίαν κινεῖται, ἡ αἰτία, καθ' ἣν κινεῖται, κινητικὴ αὐτοῦ γενήσεται, ὅθεν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει κατὰ τὴν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην ἐπιβολήν.

while those who abolish the existence of motion argue in ways like the following. If something moves, it is moved either by itself or by something else. But if by something else, ⟨.....⟩. For what is said to be moved by something else will be moved either without a cause or because of some cause. Nothing, they say, comes about without a cause. And if it is moved because of some cause, the cause because of which it is moved will be what moves it; and so there is a fall into infinite regress, following the line of thought stated a little earlier.

3.68 ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ τὸ κινοῦν ἐνεργεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται, κἀκεῖνο δεήσεται κινοῦντος ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τρίτου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἄναρχον γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινεῖται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ ⟨γὰρ⟩ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἤτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ ἐπισπώμενον ἢ ἀνωθοῦν ἢ ἐνθλῖβον, δεήσει τὸ ἑαυτὸ

Besides, if what moves something is active, and what is active is in motion, it too will need another mover, and the second a third, and so on to infinity, so that the motion turns out to have no beginning, which is absurd. So not everything that moves is moved by something else. Nor is it moved by itself. ⟨For⟩ everything that moves something moves it by pushing it forward, or by

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	κινοῦν κατά τινα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν.	pulling it, or by pushing it up, or by pressing it down. So what moves itself will have to move itself in one of these ways.
3.69	ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν προωστικῶς ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ, ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἔμπροσθεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνωστικῶς, ὑποκάτω, εἰ δὲ ἐνθλιπτικῶς, ἐπάνω. ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτό τι ἑαυτοῦ ἐπάνω εἶναι ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω ἢ ὀπίσω· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖται μήτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου, οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι.	But if it moves itself by pushing, it will be behind itself; if by pulling, in front of itself; if by pushing up, beneath itself; if by pressing down, above itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above, in front of, beneath or behind itself; so it is impossible for anything to be moved by itself. And if nothing is moved either by itself or by something else, nothing is moved at all.
3.70	εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν καταφεύγοι, ὑπομνηστέον αὐτὸν τῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν διαφωνίας, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίκριτος αὕτη καθέστηκεν, κριτήριον ἡμῶν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄχρι νῦν οὐχ εὑρηκότων.	And if someone takes refuge in impulse and choice, we must remind him of the disagreement about what is up to us, and that it has remained undecidable, since we have not found a criterion of truth so far.
3.71	Ἔτι κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν· μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν· οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅπου γάρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ δρᾶσαί τι οὐδὲ παθεῖν δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖταί τι. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔστι μὴν Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, πολλῶν δὲ ἀντιρρήσεων τετύχηκεν, ὧν τὰς πληκτικωτέρας διὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκθησόμεθα μετὰ τῆς φαινομένης ἡμῖν ἐπικρίσεως.	This too should be said. If something moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in the place where it is not. But not in the place where it is, for it stays in it, if it is in it. Nor in the place where it is not, for where a thing is not, it can neither act nor be acted upon. So nothing moves. This argument is Diodorus Cronus', and it has met with many rejoinders. Because of the character of this treatise, we shall set out the more striking of them, along with the verdict on them that appears to us.
3.72	φασὶν οὖν τινες, ὅτι δύναταί τι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι· τὰς γοῦν περὶ τοῖς κέντροις περιδινουμένας σφαίρας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μενούσας τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι. πρὸς οὓς μεταφέρειν χρὴ τὸν λόγον ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς σφαίρας, καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκοντας, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ κατὰ μέρη κινεῖται, συνάγειν ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖταί τι.	Some, then, say that a thing can move in the place where it is. At any rate, they say, spheres spinning around their centers move while staying in the same place. Against them we should transfer the argument to each of the sphere's parts. We point out that, as far as the argument goes, the sphere does not move even by parts, and so conclude that nothing moves in the place where it is either.
3.73	τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον δυεῖν ἔχεται τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται. πευσόμεθα γὰρ αὐτῶν, πότε φέρεται τὸ κινούμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου εἰς τὸν ἕτερον, ἆρα ὅτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ. ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν δεύτερον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἐστιν· ὅτε δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ, οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.	We shall do the same against those who say that what moves occupies two places, the one in which it is and the one into which it travels. We shall ask them when the moving thing travels from the place in which it is into the other. Is it when it is in the first place or when it is in the second? When it is in the first place, it is not passing into the second, for it is still in the first. And when it is not in the first, it is not passing from it.
3.74	πρὸς τῷ καὶ συναρπάζεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ δήπου	Besides, the point at issue is being taken for granted. A thing cannot be active where it is not; and

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	φέρεσθαι εἴς τινα τόπον συγχωρήσει τις ἐκεῖνο ἁπλῶς ὃ μὴ δίδωσι κινεῖσθαι.	surely no one who does not grant outright that a thing moves will grant that it travels into some place.
3.75	τινὲς μέντοι κἀκεῖνο φασίν· τόπος λέγεται διχῶς, ὁ μὲν ἐν πλάτει, οἷον ὡς ἐμοῦ ἡ οἰκία, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν, ὡς λόγου χάριν ὁ περιτετυπωκώς μου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. λέγεται οὖν ἐν τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος.	Some, however, also say this. "Place" is used in two ways: broadly, as when my house is my place, and strictly, as for example the air that has molded itself around the surface of my body. What moves, then, is said to move in a place, not in the strict place but in the broad one.
	πρὸς οὓς ἔνεστιν ὑποδιαιροῦντας τὸν ἐν πλάτει τόπον λέγειν, ὅτι τούτου ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστι κυρίως τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον σῶμα, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου· εἶτα συνάγοντας, ὅτι μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύναται μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος καταχρηστικῶς λεγομένῳ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύναται· συστατικὰ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τό τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧν ἐν οὐθετέρῳ κινεῖσθαί τι δύνασθαι δέδεικται.	Against them we can subdivide the broad place. The body said to move is, strictly speaking, in one part of it, its strict place, and is not in the others, the remaining parts of the broad place. Then, having concluded that a thing can move neither in the place where it is nor in the place where it is not, we can infer that nothing can move in the broad place either, which is called a place only loosely. For the broad place is made up of the place where the thing strictly is and the place where it strictly is not, and it has been shown that a thing can move in neither.
3.76	Ἐρωτητέον δὲ κἀκεῖνον τὸν λόγον. εἰ κινεῖταί τι, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸ πρότερον ⟨πρότερον⟩ κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ μεριστὸν διάστημα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον δύναταί τι κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι ἄρα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεταί τι κινεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν δῆλον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνονται τὰ σώματα καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἷς κινεῖσθαι λέγεται τὰ σώματα, οὐ γενήσεται κίνησις, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος τοῦ πρῶτόν τι ἐν ἀπείροις εὑρεθῆναι, ἀφ' οὗ πρώτου κινήσεται τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον.	One should also put forward the following argument. If something moves, it moves either step ⟨by step⟩ or over a divisible interval all at once. But nothing can move either step by step or over a divisible interval all at once, as we shall show; so nothing moves. That nothing can move step by step is plain straight off. Suppose bodies, and the places and times in which bodies are said to move, are divided to infinity. Then there will be no motion, since among infinitely many things it is impossible to find a first one, from which the thing said to move will first move.
3.77	εἰ δὲ εἰς ἀμερὲς καταλήγει τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κινουμένων ὁμοίως τὸ πρῶτον ἀμερὲς τοῦ τόπου τῷ πρώτῳ ἑαυτοῦ ἀμερεῖ μετέρχεται χρόνῳ, πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ, οἷον ὁ ταχύτατος ἵππος καὶ ἡ χελώνη· ὅπερ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον γίνεται ἡ κίνησις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα.	And suppose the things mentioned end in something partless, and each moving thing likewise passes through the first partless bit of place in the first partless bit of its time. Then all moving things are equally fast, the swiftest horse and the tortoise, for instance, which is even more absurd than the first alternative. So motion does not take place step by step. Nor does it take place over a divisible interval all at once.
3.78	εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥς φασιν, μαρτυρεῖσθαι τὰ ἄδηλα χρή, ἐπεί, ἵνα τις ἀνύσῃ σταδιαῖον διάστημα, δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀνύσαι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ σταδίου μέρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι	As they say, non-evident things must be attested by appearances. Now anyone who is to cover the length of a stade must first cover the first part of the stade, then the second, and the others likewise. In the same way, everything that moves

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	προσήκει, ἐπεί τοί γε εἰ ἀθρόως διιέναι τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιτο πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται, ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ἔσται τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν εἴη μέρος, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τοῦ δι' οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ τὸ μέν, εἰ τύχοι, μέλαν, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν ὥστε καὶ χρώζειν τὰ ἐντυγχάνοντα δύνασθαι, τὸ κινούμενον ἔσται θερμόν τε ἅμα καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.	should move step by step. For suppose the moving thing were said to pass all at once through all the parts of the place in which it is said to move. Then it will be in all those parts at the same time. And if one part of the place it moves through were cold and another hot, or, say, one black and another white, so that they could color what came into contact with them, the moving thing would be hot and cold, black and white, all at once, which is absurd.
3.79	εἶτα καὶ πόσον ἀθρόως διέξεισι τόπον τὸ κινούμενον, εἰπάτωσαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τοῦτον εἶναι φήσουσιν, προσδέξονταί τι κινεῖσθαι διά πάσης τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύγουσιν, ὁρισάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τόπου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὁρίζειν τὸν τόπον, οὗ πλέον διάστημα οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον δυνήσεται διελθεῖν τὸ κινούμενον ἀθρόως, πρὸς τῷ ἀποκληρωτικὸν καὶ προπετὲς ἢ καὶ γελοῖον ἴσως εἶναι, εἰς τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτει· πάντα γὰρ ἔσται ἰσοταχῆ, εἴγε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὁμοίως κατὰ περιωρισμένους τόπους τὰς μεταβάσεις τῶν κινήσεων ποιεῖται.	Next, let them tell us how much place the moving thing passes through all at once. If they say it is unlimited, they will be accepting that something moves through the whole earth all at once. If they shun this, let them define the size of the place for us. They might try to define precisely the place beyond which the moving thing cannot pass all at once, by even a hair's breadth. But that is arbitrary and rash, perhaps even laughable; and besides, it falls into the original difficulty. Everything will be equally fast, if each of them likewise makes the transitions of its movements by precisely defined places.
3.80	εἰ δὲ φήσουσιν, ὅτι μικρὸν μέν, οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δὲ περιωρισμένον τόπον ἀθρόως κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἐνέσται ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν σωριτικὴν ἀπορίαν ἀεὶ τῷ ὑποτεθέντι μεγέθει ἀκαριαῖον προστιθέναι μέγεθος τόπου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ στήσονταί που τοιαύτην ποιουμένων ἡμῶν συνερώτησιν, πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἀκριβῆ περιορισμὸν καὶ τὴν τερατείαν ἐκείνην ἐμπεσοῦνται· εἰ δὲ προσήσονται τὴν παραύξησιν, ἀναγκάσομεν αὐτοὺς συγχωρεῖν ἀθρόως τι δύνασθαι κινηθῆναι διὰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς ἁπάσης. ὥστε οὐδὲ ⟨κατὰ⟩ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται τὰ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενα.	And suppose they say that the moving thing moves all at once through a place that is small, but not precisely defined. Then we shall be able, in the manner of the sorites puzzle, always to add a minute extent of place to the size proposed. If they stop somewhere while we are putting this series of questions, they will fall back into precise definition and that piece of fantasy. If they admit the increase, we shall force them to grant that something can move all at once across the extent of the whole earth. So the things said to move do not move over a divisible interval all at once either.
3.81	εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν τόπον μήτε κατὰ τὸ πρότερον ⟨πρότερον⟩ κινεῖταί τι, οὐδὲ κινεῖταί τι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω τούτων φασὶν οἱ τὴν μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀναιροῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ μήτε τοὺς λόγους τούτους μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾧ κατακολουθοῦντες εἰσάγουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς κινήσεως, δυνάμενοι διατρέπειν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιθέσει τῶν τε φαινομένων καὶ τῶν λόγων, ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστι κίνησις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.	And if nothing moves either over a divisible place all at once or step ⟨by step⟩, nothing moves at all. This, and more besides, is what those who abolish motion from place to place say. As for us, we are unable to overturn either these arguments or the appearance they follow when they introduce the existence of motion. So, as far as the opposition between appearances and arguments goes, we suspend judgment about whether there is motion or not.

CHAPTER 11: ON GROWTH AND DIMINUTION

Since substance is always flowing, nothing can properly be said to grow or diminish.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.82	Τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι λογισμῷ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεως τε καὶ περὶ μειώσεως ἐπέχομεν· ἡ γὰρ ἐνάργεια δοκεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν, ἣν οἱ λόγοι διατρέπειν δοκοῦσιν. ἢ θέασαι γοῦν· τὸ αὐξόμενον ὂν καὶ ὑφεστὼς εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδιδόναι προσήκει, ὡς εἴγε ἑτέρῳ προσθέσεως γενομένης ἕτερον ηὐξηκέναι τις λέγοι, ψεύσεται. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ οὐσία οὐδέποτε ἕστηκεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ῥεῖ τε καὶ ἑτέρα ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἐπεισκρίνεται, τὸ ηὐξηκέναι λεγόμενον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν προτέραν οὐσίαν καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἄλλην τὴν προστεθεῖσαν ἀλλ' ὅλην ἑτέραν.	Using the same reasoning, we also suspend judgment about growth and diminution. Clarity seems to introduce their existence, and the arguments seem to overturn it. Just consider: what grows must exist and be real and increase in size, so that if someone said that one thing had grown when an addition was made to another, he will be speaking falsely. Now substance never stands still; it is always flowing, one substance coming in to replace another. So what is said to have grown does not have its earlier substance plus another added to it, but an entirely different one.
3.83	ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ, λόγου χάριν, ξύλου τριπήχεος ὄντος δεκάπηχυ ἕτερον ἀγαγών τις ηὐξηκέναι τὸ τρίπηχυ λέγοι, ψεύσεται διὰ τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦτο ἐκείνου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ αὔξεσθαι λεγομένου, τῆς προτέρας ὕλης ἀπορρεούσης καὶ ἑτέρας ἐπεισιούσης, εἰ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον, οὐκ ἂν αὔξησίν τις εἴποι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅλου ἑτεροίωσιν.	Suppose, for example, there is a piece of wood three cubits long, and someone brings another, ten cubits long, and says that he has made the three-cubit piece grow. He will be speaking falsely, because the one is entirely different from the other. So too in the case of everything said to grow: the earlier matter flows away and other matter comes in, and if what is said to be added is added, no one would call such a thing growth, but total alteration.
3.84	ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῆς μειώσεως λόγος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑφεστὼς ὅλως πῶς ἄν μεμειῶσθαι λέγοιτο; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ ἡ μὲν μείωσις γίνεται κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ αὔξησις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν οὔτε ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε πρόσθεσις, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἡ μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ αὔξησις ἔστι τι.	The same argument applies to diminution too. How could what is not real at all be said to have diminished? Besides, diminution comes about by subtraction and growth by addition. So if there is no such thing as subtraction or addition, then neither diminution nor growth is anything either.

CHAPTER 12: ON SUBTRACTION AND ADDITION

Nothing can be subtracted from or added to anything, as the case of numbers shows.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.85	Ὅτι δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται. εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος, ἤτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ τὸ μεῖζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος. κατὰ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν· ἀδύνατος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφαίρεσις. ὅτι δὲ κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἡ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπό τινος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι χρὴ πρὸ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τῷ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρεῖται.	That subtraction is nothing they infer as follows. If something is subtracted from something, either the equal is subtracted from the equal, or the greater from the lesser, or the lesser from the greater. But subtraction takes place in none of these ways, as we shall establish; so subtraction is impossible. That it takes place in none of the ways mentioned is plain from what follows. What is subtracted from something must, before the subtraction, be contained in what it is subtracted from.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.86	οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται, οἷον τὰ ἓξ ἐν τοῖς ἕξ· μεῖζον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ περιέχον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τοῦ ἀφαιρουμένου, ἵνα μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ὑπολείπηταί τι· τούτῳ γὰρ διαφέρειν δοκεῖ τῆς παντελοῦς ἄρσεως ἡ ἀφαίρεσις· οὔτε τὸ μεῖζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ, οἷον τὰ ἓξ ⟨ἐν⟩ τοῖς πέντε· ἀπεμφαίνει γάρ.	But the equal is not contained in the equal, six in six, for example. The container must be greater than what it contains, and what something is subtracted from must be greater than what is subtracted, so that something is left over after the subtraction; that seems to be what distinguishes subtraction from total removal. Nor is the greater contained in the lesser, six ⟨in⟩ five, for example; that is incongruous.
3.87	διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἓξ περιέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλείοσιν ἐλάσσονα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχεθήσεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι τὰ τρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἕν. ἕξει οὖν τὰ ἓξ πέντε τέσσαρα τρία δύο ἕν, ὧν συντεθέντων γίνεται ὁ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀριθμός, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἓξ περιέχεσθαι συνάγεται διδομένου τοῦ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεσθαι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ πεντεκαίδεκα τῷ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἐμπεριεχομένῳ ὁ τριακοντακαιπέντε ἀριθμὸς περιέχεται καὶ κατὰ ὑπόβασιν ἄπειροι. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἀπείρους ἀριθμοὺς ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἓξ ἀριθμῷ· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεται τὸ ἔλασσον.	And for this reason the lesser is not contained in the greater either. If five is contained in six, as the lesser in the greater, four will be contained in five, three in four, two in three, and one in two. So six will contain five, four, three, two and one. Added together these make the number fifteen, which, once it is granted that the lesser is contained in the greater, turns out to be contained in six. In the same way, the number thirty-five is contained in the fifteen that is contained in the six, and so on down, until there are infinitely many. But it is absurd to say that infinitely many numbers are contained in the number six; so it is also absurd to say that the lesser is contained in the greater.
3.88	εἰ οὖν χρὴ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπό τινος περιέχεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι μέλλει, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται οὔτε τὸ μεῖζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ οὔτε τὸ μικρότερον ἐν τῷ μείζονι, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος. Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου.	So what is subtracted from something must be contained in what it is to be subtracted from. But the equal is not contained in the equal, the greater is not contained in the lesser, and the lesser is not contained in the greater. If all this holds, nothing is subtracted from anything. Again, if something is subtracted from something, either a whole is subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from a whole.
3.89	ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λέγειν ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους ἀπεμφαίνει προδήλως. λείπεται δὴ λέγειν τὸ μέρος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν στήσωμεν τὸν λόγον τοῦ σαφοῦς ἕνεκα, ἔστω δεκάς, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λεγέσθω μονάς. αὕτη οὖν ἡ μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ λειπομένου μέρους τῆς δεκάδος, τουτέστι τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.	To say that a whole is subtracted, whether from a whole or from a part, is plainly incoherent. So it remains to say that a part is subtracted, either from a whole or from a part, and this is absurd. Take an example, resting the argument on numbers for clarity's sake. Let there be a ten, and let a unit be said to be subtracted from it. This unit can be subtracted neither from the whole ten nor from the part of the ten that remains, that is, the nine, as I shall show. So it is not subtracted at all.
3.90	εἰ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκὰς οὔτε ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ' ἡ συνέλευσις πασῶν τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ ἑκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει ἡ μονάς, ἵνα	For suppose the unit is subtracted from the whole ten. The ten is neither something other than the ten units nor any one of the units, but the aggregate of all the units. So if the unit is to be subtracted

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρῆται τῆς δεκάδος. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ μονάδος οὐδὲν δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἀδιαίρετοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀφαιρεθήσεται ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος οὕτως.	from the whole ten, it has to be subtracted from each unit. In the first place, nothing can be subtracted from a unit at all, since units are indivisible. For this reason the unit will not be subtracted from the ten in this way.
3.91	εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη τις ἀπὸ ἑκάστης τῶν μονάδων ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, δέκα ἕξει μέρη ἡ μονάς, δέκα δὲ ἔχουσα μέρη δεκὰς ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ δέκα ἕτερα μέρη ἀπολέλειπται, ἀφ' ὧν ἀφῄρηται τὰ τῆς μονάδος λεγομένης δέκα μέρη, ἔσται τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι. ἄτοπον δὲ λέγειν τὸ ἓν δέκα εἶναι καὶ τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ αὐτοὺς διαιρεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα.	But even if someone were to grant that the unit is subtracted from each of the units, the unit will have ten parts, and having ten parts it will be a ten. What is more, ten other parts are left over, from which the ten parts of the so-called unit were subtracted, so the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say that one is ten and ten is twenty, and that what is indivisible by their own account is divided. So it is absurd to say that the unit is subtracted from the whole ten.
3.92	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει ὁλόκληρον, ἡ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς μονάδος ὁλόκληρος μένει. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐννεὰς οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰς ἐννέα μονάδας, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης αὐτῆς λέγοιτο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ μονάς, ἐννεάδος ἀφαίρεσις ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ἐννέα, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτώ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἄτοπα ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, διαιρετὴν εἶναι φήσουσι τὴν μονάδα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.	Nor is the unit subtracted from the nine that remains. For what something is subtracted from does not remain intact, but the nine remains intact after that unit has been subtracted. Besides, the nine is nothing apart from the nine units. So if the unit were said to be subtracted from the whole of it, there will be a subtraction of nine. If it is said to be subtracted from a part of the nine, then either it is subtracted from the eight, and the same absurdities will follow, or it is subtracted from the last unit, and they will be saying that the unit is divisible, which is absurd.
3.93	οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε ἀπὸ μέρους αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου τι ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος.	So the unit is not subtracted from the nine either. And if it is subtracted neither from the whole ten nor from a part of it, then a part cannot be subtracted from a whole or from a part. If, then, nothing is subtracted as a whole from a whole, or as a part from a whole, or as a whole from a part, or as a part from a part, then nothing is subtracted from anything.
3.94	Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπείληπται. τὸ γὰρ προστιθέμενον, φασίν, ἤτοι ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προυποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεστῶτι· τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὑγιές· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ προστίθεταί τι τινί. οἷον γοῦν ἔστω τι τετρακοτυλιαῖον πλῆθος, καὶ προστιθέσθω κοτύλη. ζητῶ τίνι προστίθεται· ἑαυτῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν προστιθέμενον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ᾧ προστίθεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερόν ἐστιν.	Addition, too, has been taken by them to be one of the impossible things. For what is added, they say, is added either to itself, or to what was there before, or to the compound of both. None of these holds up, so nothing is added to anything. For instance, let there be a quantity of four cups, and let one cup be added. I ask what it is added to. It cannot be added to itself, since what is added is other than what it is added to, and nothing is other than itself.
3.95		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης· πῶς γὰρ ἂν προστεθείη τι τῷ μηδέπω ὄντι; καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ καὶ τῇ κοτύλῃ μίγνυται ἡ κοτύλη ἡ προστιθεμένη, ἑξακοτυλιαῖον ἔσται πλῆθος ἀπὸ τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης καὶ τῆς προστιθεμένης κοτύλης.	Nor can it be added to the compound of both, the four cups and the cup, for how could anything be added to what does not yet exist? Besides, if the added cup is mixed with the four cups and the cup, there will be a quantity of six cups, made up of the four cups, the cup, and the added cup.
3.96	εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ προστίθεται ἡ κοτύλη, ἐπεὶ τὸ παρεκτεινόμενόν τινι ἴσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ παρεκτείνεται, τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ πλήθει ἡ κοτύλη παρεκτεινομένη διπλασιάσει τὸ τετρακοτυλιαῖον ὡς γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος ὀκτὼ κοτυλῶν· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον μήτε τῷ προυποκειμένῳ μήτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ προστίθεται οὐδὲν οὐδενί.	And suppose the cup is added to the four cups alone. What is extended alongside something is equal to what it is extended alongside, so the cup, extended alongside the quantity of four cups, will double the four cups, and the whole quantity will come to eight cups. That is not what we observe. If, then, what is said to be added is added neither to itself, nor to what was there before, nor to the compound of these, and there is nothing besides these, then nothing is added to anything.

CHAPTER 13: ON TRANSPOSITION

Transposition is subtraction plus addition, so it falls along with them.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.97	Τῇ δὲ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως ὑποστάσει συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ μετάθεσις (αὕτη γὰρ ἀπό τινος μέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις τινὶ δὲ πρόσθεσις μεταβατικῶς),	Along with the reality of addition, subtraction and local motion, transposition is canceled too (for it is subtraction from one thing and addition to another, by way of transfer),

CHAPTER 14: ON WHOLE AND PART

The whole is neither something besides its parts nor the parts themselves.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.98	Καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ καὶ τὸ μέρος. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ συνέλευσιν καὶ πρόσθεσιν τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ, κατ᾽ ἀφαίρεσιν δέ τινος ἢ τινων παύεσθαι τοῦ ὅλον εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ ἔστι τι ὅλον, ἤτοι ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ⟨τὸ⟩ ὅλον ἐστίν.	and so are whole and part. For a whole seems to come about through the coming together and addition of parts, and to stop being a whole through the subtraction of some part or parts. Besides, if there is a whole, either it is something other than its parts, or its parts themselves are ⟨the⟩ whole.
3.99	ἕτερον μὲν οὖν τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται τὸ ὅλον εἶναι· ἀμέλει γοῦν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται, ἵνα ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα λογισώμεθα τὸ ὅλον. εἰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, ὄνομα ἔσται μόνον τὸ ὅλον καὶ προσηγορία κενή, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδίαν οὐχ ἕξει, καθάπερ οὐδὲ διάστασίς ἐστί τι παρὰ τὰ διεστῶτα οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰ δεδοκωμένα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ὅλον.	Now the whole does not appear to be anything other than the parts. At any rate, when the parts are removed, nothing is left over that would let us reckon the whole as something other than them. And if the parts themselves are the whole, the whole will be merely a name and an empty label, with no reality of its own. In the same way a distance is nothing apart from the things that stand apart, and a framework of beams is nothing apart from the beams laid on. So there is no whole.
3.100		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μέρη. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μέρη, ἤτοι τοῦ ὅλου ταῦτά ἐστι μέρη ἢ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον. οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὅλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ μέρη (καὶ ἄλλως τὰ μέρη οὕτως ἔσται μέρη ἑαυτῶν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου), οὔτε ἀλλήλων, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέρος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἐστι μέρος, καὶ ἄτοπόν ἐστι λέγειν τὴν χεῖρα, εἰ τύχοι, ἐν τῷ ποδὶ περιέχεσθαι.	Nor are there parts. For if there are parts, they are parts either of the whole, or of one another, or each of itself. They are not parts of the whole, since there is nothing besides the parts (and in any case, on that view the parts would be parts of themselves, since each of the parts is said to help make up the whole). Nor are they parts of one another, since a part seems to be contained in what it is a part of, and it is absurd to say that the hand, for example, is contained in the foot.
3.101	ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἕκαστον ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἔσται· διὰ γὰρ τὴν περιοχὴν ἔσται τι ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον. εἰ οὖν μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε ἀλλήλων μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι μέρη, οὐδενός ἐστι μέρη. εἰ δὲ μηδενός ἐστι μέρη, οὐδὲ ἔστι μέρη· τὰ γὰρ πρός τι ἀλλήλοις συναναιρεῖται. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄλλως εἰρήσθω κατὰ παρέκβασιν, ἐπειδὴ ἅπαξ ὅλου καὶ μέρους ἐπεμνήσθημεν.	Nor will each be a part of itself, for because of the containing, something will be greater and smaller than itself. If, then, the things said to be parts are parts neither of the whole, nor of themselves, nor of one another, they are parts of nothing. And if they are parts of nothing, there are no parts, for relatives are abolished along with one another. Let this much be said in passing, as a digression, since we have happened to mention whole and part.

CHAPTER 15: ON NATURAL CHANGE

Neither body nor incorporeal, neither what is nor what is not, can change.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.102	Ἀνυπόστατον δὲ εἶναι λέγουσί τινες καὶ τὴν καλουμένην φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦντες τοιούτοις. εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ ἀσώματον· ἑκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἠπόρηται· ἄπορος ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς λόγος.	Some say that what is called natural change has no reality either, and they try arguments like these. If something changes, what changes is either a body or something incorporeal. But each of these has been called into question, so the account of change will be puzzling too.
3.103	εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, κατά τινας ἐνεργείας αἰτίου καὶ πάσχον μεταβάλλει. ⟨.....⟩ διατρέπεται γὰρ ἡ τοῦ αἰτίου ὑπόστασις, ᾧ τὸ πάσχον συμπεριτρέπεται μὴ ἔχον ὑπὸ ὅτου πάθῃ. οὐδὲ μεταβάλλει τι ἄρα.	If something changes, it changes by being acted upon, through certain activities of a cause. ⟨.....⟩ For the reality of the cause is overturned, and the thing acted upon is overturned along with it, since it has nothing to be acted upon by. So nothing changes either.
3.104	εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὂν ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστι καὶ οὔτε πάσχειν τι οὔτε δρᾶν δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεται. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστι μεταβάλλει ἢ καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν.	If something changes, either what is changes or what is not. Now what is not has no reality and can neither be acted upon nor act, so it does not admit of change either. And if what is changes, it changes either insofar as it is, or insofar as it is not.
3.105	καθὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστι μεταβάλλει, ἕτερον ἐστι τοῦ ὂν εἶναι, τουτέστιν οὐκ ὂν ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ ὂν οὐκ ὂν γίνεσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλει μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ ταῦτα δὲ	Insofar as it is not, it does not change, for it is not something that is not. And if it changes insofar as it is, it will be other than being, that is, it will be what is not. But it is absurd to say that what is becomes what is not, so what is does not change

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οὐδὲν ἔστι, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει. ἔτι καὶ ταῦτά φασί τινες.	either. And if neither what is changes nor what is not, and there is nothing besides these, it remains to say that nothing changes. Some also say the following.
3.106	τὸ μεταβάλλον ἔν τινι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλειν ὀφείλει· οὔτε δὲ ἐν τῷ παρῳχηκότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τι. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ παρεληλυθότι ἢ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει· τούτων γὰρ οὐθέτερος ἐνέστηκεν, ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστι δρᾶν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι καὶ ἐνεστηκότι χρόνῳ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι.	What changes must change in some time. But nothing changes in past time or in future time, nor yet in present time, as we shall show. So nothing changes. Now nothing changes in past or future time, since neither of these is present, and it is impossible to act or be acted upon in a time that does not exist and is not present. Nor does anything change in present time.
3.107	ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο νῦν ὑπερθώμεθα, ἀμερής ἐστιν· ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστιν ⟨ἐν⟩ ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ νομίζειν τὸν σίδηρον, εἰ τύχοι, ἀπὸ τῆς σκληρότητος εἰς μαλακότητα μεταβάλλειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν ἑκάστην γίνεσθαι· παρατάσεως γὰρ αὗται φαίνονται χρῄζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι μήτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι ⟨μήτε ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, οὐδὲ⟩ μεταβάλλειν τι ῥητέον.	For present time is perhaps non-existent as well. But to set that aside for now, it has no parts, and it is impossible to suppose that in a partless time iron, for example, changes from hard to soft, or that any of the other changes takes place, since these appear to need duration. If, then, nothing changes in past time, nor in future time, ⟨nor in present time, then we should not⟩ say that anything changes.
3.108	πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τις μεταβολή, ἤτοι ⟨.....⟩ αἰσθήσεις ἁπλοπαθεῖς εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ συμμνημόνευσιν ἔχειν δοκεῖ τοῦ τε ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· εἰ δὲ νοητή ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν νοητῶν ἀνεπίκριτος γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς διαφωνία, καθάπερ ἤδη πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔξομεν λέγειν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς μεταβολῆς.	Furthermore, if there is such a thing as change, either ⟨.....⟩ the senses are affected in a simple way, whereas change seems to involve remembering together both what something changes from and what it is said to change into. And if it is an object of thought, then, since there has been undecidable disagreement among the ancients about the existence of objects of thought, as we have often pointed out already, we shall have nothing to say about the existence of change either.

CHAPTER 16: ON COMING INTO BEING AND PERISHING

Socrates could have been born neither when he was nor when he was not.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.109	Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ τῇ προσθέσει καὶ τῇ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ μεταβολῇ χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὔτε γένοιτο ἄν τι οὔτε φθαρείη, οἷον γοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης, ὡς φασίν, ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος, καὶ τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τῆς μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου κατὰ μεταβολήν. ὥστε ἀναιρουμένων τῶν προειρημένων κινήσεων ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἴσως ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττόν τινες κἀκεῖνα φασίν.	Coming into being and perishing are overturned along with addition, subtraction and natural change, since without these nothing would come into being or perish. For instance, when the ten perishes, as they say, a nine comes into being through the subtraction of a unit; the ten comes into being when the nine perishes, through the addition of a unit; and rust comes into being when bronze perishes, through change. So if the motions just mentioned are abolished, coming into

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		being and perishing must perhaps be abolished too. Nonetheless, some also say the following.
3.110	εἰ ἐγεννήθη Σωκράτης, ⟨ἤτοι⟩ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν Σωκράτης ἐγένετο Σωκράτης ἢ ὅτε ἦν ἤδη Σωκράτης. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ὅτε ἦν ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δὶς ἂν εἴη γεγενημένος· εἰ δὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, ἅμα καὶ ἦν Σωκράτης καὶ οὐκ ἦν. ἦν μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἦν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.	If Socrates was born, ⟨either⟩ Socrates came into being when Socrates was not, or when Socrates already was. But if he were said to have been born when he already was, he would have been born twice. And if he was born when he was not, Socrates both was and was not at the same time: he was, by having come into being, and he was not, by hypothesis.
3.111	καὶ εἰ ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἤτοι ὅτε ἔζη ἀπέθανεν ἢ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν. καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἔζη, οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν καὶ ἔζη καὶ ἐτεθνήκει· ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ δὶς ἂν εἴη τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι λεγομένων ἱστάντα ἀναιρεῖν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν.	And if Socrates died, he died either while he was alive or after he had died. He did not die while he was alive, since then the same man would be both alive and dead. Nor did he die after he had died, since then he would have died twice. So Socrates did not die. By applying this argument to each of the things said to come into being or perish, one can abolish coming into being and perishing.
3.112	ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ γίνεταί τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβεβηκέναι δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ὄν, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστι γίνεται ἢ καθὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γίνεται. εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστι γίνεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου φασὶ γίνεσθαι, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα γινόμενον οὐκ ὂν ἔσται, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει.	Some also put the argument this way. If something comes into being, either what is comes into being or what is not. What is not does not come into being, since nothing can happen to what is not, and so neither can coming into being. Nor does what is. For if what is comes into being, it comes into being either insofar as it is or insofar as it is not. Insofar as it is not, it does not come into being. And if it comes into being insofar as it is, then, since they say that what comes into being comes into being as one thing out of another, what comes into being will be other than what is, that is, it will be what is not. So what comes into being will be what is not, which is incoherent.
3.113	εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὂν γίνεται μήτε τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ γίνεταί τι. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεταί τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν φθείρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὂν οὐ φθείρεται· πάσχειν γάρ τι δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἤτοι γὰρ μένον ἐν τῷ ὂν εἶναι φθείρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένον ἐν τῷ ὂν εἶναι, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν·	If, then, neither what is not nor what is comes into being, nothing comes into being. By the same reasoning nothing perishes either. For if something perishes, either what is perishes or what is not. What is not does not perish, since what perishes must be acted upon. Nor does what is. For it perishes either while remaining in being or while not remaining. And if it perishes while remaining in being, the same thing will at once be what is and what is not:
3.114	ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ φθείρεται καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν, καθὸ μὲν ἐφθάρθαι λέγεται, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ὄν, καθὸ δὲ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεσθαι λέγεται, ὂν ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ αὐτὸ	for since it perishes not insofar as it is not but insofar as it is, then insofar as it is said to have perished, it will be other than what is, and therefore what is not; but insofar as it is said to perish while

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	εἶναι καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεται τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ οὐ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι τὸ ὂν φθείρεται, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι περιίσταται πρῶτον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως φθείρεται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεται· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὑπεμνήσαμεν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ὂν φθείρεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ φθείρεταί τι.	remaining in being, it will be what is. But it is absurd to say that the same thing both is and is not, so what is does not perish while remaining in being. And suppose what is perishes not while remaining in being, but first passes over into not being and only then perishes. Then it is no longer what is that perishes but what is not, and we have pointed out that this is impossible. If, then, neither what is nor what is not perishes, and there is nothing besides these, nothing perishes.
	Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι, οἷς ἕπεται τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπινόητον τὴν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιολογίαν.	This much, said as in an outline, will be enough about motions too. From it follows that the dogmatists' study of nature has no existence and cannot be conceived.

CHAPTER 17: ON REST

If all bodies are in flux, as Plato and Heraclitus say, nothing is at rest.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.115	Ἑπομένως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν μονῆς ἠπόρησάν τινες λέγοντες, ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μένει, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα διαρκῶς κινεῖται κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν ὑπολήψεις, ῥευστὴν εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀεὶ διαφορήσεις τε καὶ προσθέσεις ποιουμένην, ὡς τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα μηδὲ ὄντα λέγειν τὰ σώματα ἀλλὰ γινόμενα μᾶλλον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἡράκλειτον ὀξείᾳ ποταμοῦ ῥύσει τὴν εὐκινησίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ὕλης ἀπεικάζειν. οὐδὲν ἄρα σῶμα μένει.	Following on from this, some have also raised puzzles about rest as it occurs in nature. They say that what is in motion is not at rest, and that on the dogmatists' assumptions every body is continually in motion. For the dogmatists say that substance is in flux and is always giving off effluences and receiving additions. That is why Plato says bodies are not even things that are, and prefers to call them things that come to be, and why Heraclitus likens the ready mobility of our matter to the swift current of a river. So no body is at rest.
3.116	γε μὴν λεγόμενον μένειν συνέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ συνεχόμενον πάσχει· οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι πάσχον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ αἴτιον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ μένει τι ἄρα. ἐρωτῶσι δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα μένειν λεγόμενον κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, οὐ μένει.	Moreover, what is said to be at rest seems to be held together by what surrounds it, and what is held together is acted upon. But nothing is acted upon, since there is no cause either, as we pointed out. So nothing is at rest. Some also put forward this argument: what is at rest is acted upon, and what is acted upon is moved; so what is said to be at rest is moved; and if it is moved, it is not at rest.
3.117	ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον ἐνδέχεται μένειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον, εἴπερ ἄρα, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον οὔτε πάσχειν δύναται οὔτε μένειν, οὐδὲν ἄρα μένει.	From this it is clear that nothing incorporeal can be at rest either. For if what is at rest is acted upon, and being acted upon is peculiar to bodies, if to anything, and not to incorporeals, then nothing incorporeal can either be acted upon or be at rest. So nothing is at rest.
3.118	Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ μονῆς εἰρήσθω. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἄνευ τόπου ἢ χρόνου ἐπινοεῖται,	Let this much be said about rest too. But since none of the things discussed above is conceived

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	μετιτέον ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων σκέψιν· ἐὰν γὰρ ταῦτα δείξῃ τις ἀνυπόστατα, ἀνυπόστατον ἔσται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου.	without place or time, we must move on to examine these. For if one shows that these have no reality, each of those will have no reality on their account too. Let us begin with place.

CHAPTER 18: ON PLACE

Stoic and Peripatetic accounts of place collapse, though clarity favors it; the skeptic suspends judgment.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.119	Τόπος τοίνυν λέγεται διχῶς, κυρίως καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, καταχρηστικῶς μὲν [ὡς] ὁ ἐν πλάτει, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἡ πόλις, κυρίως δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατέχων, ὑφ' οὗ περιέχομαι πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. ζητοῦμεν οὖν περὶ τοῦ τόπου ⟨τοῦ⟩ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔθεσαν, οἱ δὲ ἀνεῖλον, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον περὶ αὐτοῦ.	Place is spoken of in two ways, strictly and loosely. Loosely, [as] place in the broad sense, as the city is my place; strictly, the place that occupies something precisely, by which I am precisely contained. Our inquiry, then, is about ⟨the⟩ place in the precise sense. Some have posited it, some have abolished it, and some have suspended judgment about it.
3.120	ὧν οἱ μὲν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν φάσκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν καταφεύγουσιν. τίς γὰρ ἄν, φασί, λέξειε μὴ εἶναι τόπον ὁρῶν τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, οἷον τὰ δεξιὰ τὰ ἀριστερά, τὰ ἄνω τὰ κάτω, ἔμπροσθεν ὀπίσω, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχοῦ γιγνόμενος, βλέπων τε, ὅτι ἔνθα ὁ ὑφηγητὴς ὁ ἐμὸς διελέγετο, ἐνταῦθα ἐγὼ νῦν διαλέγομαι, τόπον τε διάφορον καταλαμβάνων τῶν κούφων φύσει καὶ τῶν φύσει βαρέων,	Of these, those who say that it exists take refuge in clarity. For who, they say, would claim that there is no place when he sees the parts of place, such as right and left, up and down, front and back; when he is now here and now somewhere else; when he sees that where my teacher used to hold his discussions, I am holding mine now; when he apprehends that things light by nature have a different place from things heavy by nature;
3.121	ἔτι καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκούων λεγόντων 'ἤτοι μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα χάος ἐγένετο '. εἶναι γάρ φασι χάος τὸν τόπον ἀπὸ τοῦ χωρητικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένων. εἴγε μὴν ἔστι τι σῶμα, φασίν, ἔστι καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἄνευ γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὗ, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.	and when, besides, he hears the ancients saying, "First of all Chaos came to be"? For they say that Chaos is place, from its being able to make room for the things that come to be in it. Moreover, if there is any body, they say, there is also place, for without place there would be no body. And if there is the "by which" and the "from which", there is also the "in which", and that is place. But the first part holds in each of the two cases; so the second part holds in both.[4]
3.122	οἱ δὲ ἀναιροῦντες τὸν τόπον οὔτε τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου διδόασιν εἶναι· μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν τόπον παρὰ τὰ τούτου μέρη, καὶ τὸν συνάγειν πειρώμενον, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τόπος ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ὡς ὄντα λαμβάνειν, τὸ ζητούμενον δι' ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευάζειν βούλεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ ληρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἔν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαί τι ἢ γεγονέναι φάσκοντας, ὅλως μὴ διδομένου τοῦ τόπου. συναρπάζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕπαρξιν μὴ διδομένην αὐτόθεν· καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ δείκνυσθαι ἀνύπαρκτα παραπλησίως τῷ τόπῳ.	Those who abolish place do not grant that the parts of place exist either. For place, they say, is nothing apart from its parts, and whoever tries to conclude that place exists by taking its parts as existing is trying to establish what is in question by means of itself. Likewise, those who say that something comes to be or has come to be in some place are talking nonsense, when place is not granted at all. They are also helping themselves to

4 The line is from Hesiod's *Theogony* (116); the Greek links *chaos* with *chōrein*, "to make room for".

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		the existence of body, which is not granted outright; and the "from which" and the "by which" are shown to be non-existent in the same way as place.
3.123	τόν τε Ἡσίοδον μὴ ἀξιόχρεων εἶναι κριτὴν τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. καὶ οὕτω διακρουόμενοι τὰ εἰς κατασκευὴν φερόμενα τοῦ εἶναι τόπον, ἤδη καὶ ποικιλώτερον κατασκευάζουσιν, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, ταῖς ἐμβριθεστέραις εἶναι δοκούσαις τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεσι περὶ τοῦ τόπου προσχρώμενοι, τῇ τε τῶν Στωικῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.	And Hesiod is not a trustworthy judge of philosophical questions. Having fended off in this way the considerations brought forward to establish that there is place, they go on to establish, in more elaborate ways, that it does not exist. They make use of the dogmatists' positions on place that are thought to carry the most weight, those of the Stoics and the Peripatetics, in the following manner.
3.124	Οἱ Στωικοί φασι κενὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ, ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθεκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον δὲ διάστημα ὑπὸ ὄντος κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν, νῦν ὂν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, χώραν δὲ διάστημα κατὰ μέν τι κατεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος κατὰ δέ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον, ἐνίων χώραν εἰπόντων εἶναι τὸν τόπον τοῦ μεγάλου σώματος, ὡς ἐν μεγέθει τὴν διαφορὰν εἶναι τοῦ τε τόπου καὶ τῆς χώρας.	The Stoics say that void is what can be occupied by an existent but is not occupied, or an interval empty of body, or an interval not occupied by body. Place is an interval occupied by an existent and equal to what occupies it (here they are calling body "an existent"). Room is an interval occupied by body in one part and unoccupied in another. Some, however, have said that room is the place of a large body, so that the difference between place and room lies in size.
3.125	λέγεται οὖν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ διάστημα ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενόν φασιν εἶναι τὸν τόπον, πῶς καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτὸν εἶναι διάστημα; πότερον τὸ μῆκος τοῦ σώματος ἢ τὸ πλάτος ἢ τὸ βάθος μόνον ἢ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν διάστασιν, οὐκ ἐξισάζεται ὁ τόπος τῷ οὗ τόπος ἐστίν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ μέρος τοῦ περιεχομένου τὸ περιέχον εἶναι, ὃ παντάπασιν ἀπεμφαίνει.	Now it is said in reply: since they say that place is an interval occupied by body, in what sense do they call it an interval? Is it the length of the body, or its breadth, or its depth alone, or the three dimensions? If it is one dimension, the place is not equal to what it is the place of. Besides, the container would then be part of the contained, which is utterly incoherent.
3.126	εἰ δὲ αἱ τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐπεὶ οὔτε κενὸν ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ τόπῳ οὔτε ἄλλο σῶμα διάστασιν ἔχον, μόνον δὲ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ λεγόμενον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τῶν διαστάσεων (ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος καὶ ἀντιτυπία, ἣ δὴ συμβεβηκέναι λέγεται ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς προειρημέναις), αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ τόπος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις διάστασις τόπου ὑποκειμένου. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος.	And if it is the three dimensions, then, since neither void nor any other body having dimension underlies what is called place, but only the body said to be in place, which is made up of the dimensions (for it is length, breadth, depth and resistance, and resistance is said to be an accident of the dimensions just mentioned), the body itself will be its own place, and the same thing will be container and contained, which is absurd. So there is no dimension belonging to an underlying place. For this reason place is not anything either.
3.127	ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ διπλαῖ αἱ διαστάσεις οὐ θεωροῦνται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι λεγομένων, ἀλλ' ἓν μῆκος καὶ ἓν πλάτος καὶ ἓν βάθος, πότερον μόνου τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις αὗται ἢ	This argument is also put forward. In each of the things said to be in place we do not observe double dimensions, but one length, one breadth and one depth. Do these dimensions, then, belong

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μόνου τοῦ τόπου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μόνου τοῦ τόπου, οὐχ ἕξει τὸ σῶμα ἴδιον μῆκος οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος οὐθέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ σῶμα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

3.128 εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ τὸ κενὸν οὐδεμίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ τὰς διαστάσεις, εἰ αἱ διαστάσεις αἱ τοῦ κενοῦ ὑπόκεινται ἐν τῷ σώματι συστατικαὶ οὖσαι αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τοῦ κενοῦ συστατικὰ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔσται συστατικά. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐκ ἔστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μόνων δὲ τῶν διαστάσεων φαινομένων κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον σῶμα, αἵπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ αἱ αὐταὶ τῷ κενῷ, κενὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ μόνου τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις, οὐδεμία ἔσται διάστασις τόπου, διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος. εἰ τοίνυν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων εὑρίσκεται ἡ τοῦ τόπου διάστασις, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.

3.129 πρὸς τούτοις λέγεται, ὅτι ὅτε ἔπεισι τῷ κενῷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ γίνεται τόπος, ἤτοι ὑπομένει τὸ κενὸν ἢ ὑποχωρεῖ ἢ φθείρεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται καὶ πλῆρες καὶ κενόν· εἰ δὲ ὑποχωρεῖ κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς ἢ φθείρεται μεταβάλλον, σῶμα ἔσται τὸ κενόν· σώματος γὰρ ἴδιά ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν κενὸν καὶ πλῆρες, ἢ ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον.

3.130 διὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἀνυπόστατον εὑρίσκεται, εἴγε μὴ δυνατόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ κατασχεθῆναι ὑπὸ σώματος καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον· ἐλέγετο γὰρ κενὸν εἶναι ὃ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι. συμπεριτρέπεται δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ χώρα· εἴτε γὰρ ὁ μέγας τόπος ἐστὶ χώρα, συμπεριγράφεται τῷ τόπῳ, εἴτε ἡ κατὰ μέν τι ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχομένη, κατὰ δέ τι κενὴ διάστασις, ἀμφοτέροις συναναιρεῖται.

3.131 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω πρὸς τὴν στάσιν τῶν Στωικῶν περὶ τοῦ τόπου λέγεται· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοί φασιν εἶναι τόπον τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει, ὡς ἐμοῦ τόπον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν περιτετυπωμένην τῷ ἐμῷ σώματι. ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅτε γὰρ μέλλει ἔν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καθὸ μὲν οὐδὲν δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι, δεῖ προυπάρχειν τὸν τόπον, ἵνα οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ γένηται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ διὰ

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to the body alone, or to the place alone, or to both? If they belong to the place alone, the body will have no length, breadth or depth of its own at all, so that the body will not even be a body, which is absurd.

If they belong to both, then, since the void has no reality apart from the dimensions, if the dimensions of the void underlie the body and constitute the body itself, what constitutes the void will also constitute the body. For about the existence of resistance it is not possible to make firm assertions, as we pointed out earlier. And since only the dimensions appear in what is called body, and these belong to the void and are the same as the void, the body will be void, which is absurd. And if the dimensions belong to the body alone, there will be no dimension of place, and therefore no place either. If, then, no dimension of place is found in any of the ways just described, place does not exist.

In addition, it is said that when body enters the void and place comes about, the void either stays, or withdraws, or perishes. If it stays, the same thing will be both full and void. If it withdraws, moving from one place to another, or perishes by changing, the void will be a body, since these are affections peculiar to body. But it is absurd to say that the same thing is void and full, or that the void is a body. So it is absurd to say that the void can be occupied by body and become place.

For these reasons the void too is found to have no reality, if it cannot be occupied by body and become place; for void was said to be what can be occupied by body. Room is overturned along with these. If room is the large place, it is canceled along with place; if it is the interval occupied by body in one part and empty in another, it is abolished along with both.

These things, and more besides, are said against the Stoics' position on place. The Peripatetics say that place is the limit of the container insofar as it contains, so that my place is the surface of the air that is molded around my body. But if this is place, the same thing will both be and not be. When a body is about to come to be in some place, then, insofar as nothing can come to be in what does not exist, the place must exist beforehand, so that the

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	τοῦτο ἔσται ὁ τόπος πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ σῶμα. καθὸ δὲ περιτυπουμένης τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιφανείας τῷ περιεχομένῳ ἀποτελεῖται, οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆναι ὁ τόπος πρὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται τότε.	body may come to be in it; and for this reason the place will exist before the body that is in the place comes to be in it. But insofar as place is brought about when the surface of the container is molded around the contained, place cannot exist before the body comes to be in it; and for this reason it will not exist then.
	ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν καὶ εἶναί τι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τόπος τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει.	But it is absurd to say that the same thing both is and is not. So place is not the limit of the container insofar as it contains.
3.132	πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος, ἤτοι γεννητός ἐστιν ἢ ἀγέννητος. ἀγέννητος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν· περιτυπούμενος γάρ, φασίν, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματι ἀποτελεῖται. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ γεννητός· εἰ γάρ ἐστι γεννητός, ἤτοι ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, τότε γίνεται ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἤδη λέγεται εἶναι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, ἢ ὅτε οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ.	Further, if place is something, it is either generated or ungenerated. It is not ungenerated, since it is brought about, they say, by being molded around the body in it. Nor is it generated. For if it is generated, the place comes into being either when the body is in place (the place in which what is in place is already said to be), or when the body is not in it.
3.133	οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν (ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματος ὁ τόπος) οὔτε ὅτε οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴγε περιτυποῦται μέν, ὡς φασίν, τῷ περιεχομένῳ τὸ περιέχον καὶ οὕτω γίνεται τόπος, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν δύναται περιτυπωθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, μήτε ὅτε οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, γίνεται ὁ τόπος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖν, οὐδὲ γεννητός ἐστιν ὁ τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε γεννητός ἐστι μήτε ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.	But it does not come into being when the body is in it, since the place already belongs to the body in it. Nor does it come into being when the body is not in it, if, as they say, the container is molded around the contained and so becomes place, and nothing can be molded around what is not in it. And if place comes into being neither when the body is in place nor when it is not in it, and nothing besides these can be conceived, then place is not generated. And if it is neither generated nor ungenerated, it does not exist.
3.134	κοινότερον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δύναται λέγεσθαι. εἴ ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἑκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἀπορεῖται, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἄπορος. ὁ τόπος πρὸς τῷ σώματι νοεῖται, οὗ ἐστι τόπος· ἄπορος δέ ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος λόγος· καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἄρα. ὁ τόπος ἑκάστου ἀίδιος μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν, γίνεσθαι δὲ λεγόμενος ἀνυπόστατος εὑρίσκεται γενέσεως μὴ ὑπαρχούσης.	These points can also be made more generally. If place is something, it is either body or incorporeal; but each of these is puzzling, as we pointed out; so place is puzzling too. Place is conceived in relation to the body it is the place of; but the account of the existence of body is puzzling; so the account of place is puzzling too. The place of each thing is not eternal; but if it is said to come into being, it is found to have no reality, since there is no such thing as coming into being.
3.135	Ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ τὸν λόγον μηκύνωμεν, ἐκεῖνο ἐπακτέον, ὅτι τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς ἐντρέπουσι μὲν οἱ λόγοι, δυσωπεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια. διόπερ οὐθετέρῳ προστιθέμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ τόπου.	Many other things could be said. But so as not to drag out the discussion, we must add this: the skeptics are given pause by the arguments, but they are also abashed by the clarity. So we attach ourselves to neither side, as far as what the dogmatists say goes, but suspend judgment about place.

CHAPTER 19: ON TIME

Time seems real but is neither limited nor unlimited, divisible nor indivisible.

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3.136	Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πάσχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ζητήσει· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖ τι εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. χρόνον γὰρ εἶναί φασιν οἱ μὲν διάστημα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κινήσεως (ὅλον δὲ λέγω τὸν κόσμον), οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ κόσμου, Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἢ ὥς τινες Πλάτων, ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, Στράτων δέ, ἤ ὥς τινες Ἀριστοτέλης,	The same thing happens to us in the inquiry into time. As far as appearances go, time seems to be something; but as far as what is said about it goes, it appears to have no reality. For some say that time is the interval of the motion of the whole (by "the whole" I mean the cosmos), others that it is the motion of the cosmos itself. Aristotle (or, as some say, Plato) says it is the number of the before and after in motion. Strato (or, as some say, Aristotle) says it is
3.137	μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς, Ἐπίκουρος δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων φησί, σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς.	the measure of motion and rest. Epicurus, as Demetrius the Laconian reports, says it is an accident of accidents, attending on days and nights, on seasons, on feelings and absences of feeling, on motions and rests.[5]
3.138	κατ' οὐσίαν τε οἱ μὲν σῶμα αὐτὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον (μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφέρειν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου σώματος), οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον. ἤτοι οὖν πᾶσαι αἱ στάσεις αὗταί εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, ἢ πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς, ἢ τινὲς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε δὲ πᾶσαι ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν δύνανται (μάχονται γὰρ αἱ πλεῖσται) οὔτε πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς εἶναι δοθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.	As to its substance, some have said that it is a body, like Aenesidemus and his followers (for they say it does not differ from what is and from the primary body), and others that it is incorporeal. Either, then, all these positions are true, or all are false, or some are true and some false. They cannot all be true, since most of them conflict; nor will the dogmatists grant that they are all false.
3.139	καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ δοθείη ψεῦδος μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἀσώματός ἐστιν, αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται ἡ τοῦ χρόνου ἀνυπαρξία· παρὰ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται ἕτερον. οὔτε τίνες μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς δυνατὸν καταλαβεῖν διά τε τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν κατὰ ⟨τὸ⟩ κριτήριόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔξομεν περὶ χρόνου διαβεβαιώσασθαι.	Besides, if it were granted that it is false that time is a body, and false too that it is incorporeal, the non-existence of time would be granted outright, since there can be nothing besides these. Nor is it possible to apprehend which are true and which false, because of the equipollent disagreement and the impasse about the criterion and proof. So for these reasons we shall be unable to affirm anything firmly about time.
3.140	εἶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄνευ κινήσεως ἢ καὶ μονῆς ὁ χρόνος ὑφεστάναι δοκεῖ, τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιρουμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς μονῆς, ἀναιρεῖται ὁ χρόνος. οὐδὲν δέ ἧττον καὶ τάδε φασί τινες κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου. εἰ ἐστί ⟨τι⟩	Then again, time does not seem to exist without motion, or rest too. So when motion is abolished, and rest likewise, time is abolished. Nonetheless, some also say the following against time. If there is ⟨any⟩
3.141	χρόνος, ἤτοι πεπέρασται ἢ ἄπειρός ἐστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πεπέρασται, ἀπό τινος χρόνου ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς τινα χρόνον λήξει· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν χρόνος	time, it is either limited or unlimited. If it is limited, it began from some time and will end at some time. For this reason there was once a time when

5 Demetrius of Laconia was an Epicurean philosopher of the second century BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	(πρὸ τοῦ ἄρξασθαι αὐτόν), καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος (μετὰ τὸ λῆξαι αὐτόν)· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος.	there was no time (before it began), and there will one day be a time when there will be no time (after it ends), which is absurd. So time is not limited.
3.142	εἰ δὲ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ λέγεται παρῳχηκός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, ὁ μέλλων καὶ ὁ παρῳχηκὼς ἤτοι εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὐκ εἰσίν, μόνου τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος ὑπολειπομένου, ὅς ἐστιν ἀκαριαῖος, πεπερασμένος ἔσται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαι· εἰ δὲ ὁ παρῳχηκὼς ἔστι καὶ ὁ μέλλων ἔστιν, ἐνεστὼς ἔσται ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἐνεστῶτα τὸν παρῳχηκότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἄπειρός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄπειρος μήτε πεπερασμένος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως χρόνος.	And if it is unlimited, then, since part of it is called past, part present and part future, the future and the past either exist or do not. If they do not exist, only the present is left, which is momentary, so time will be limited and the difficulties raised at the start will follow. And if the past exists and the future exists, each of them will be present. But it is absurd to call past and future time present. So time is not unlimited either. And if it is neither unlimited nor limited, time does not exist at all.
3.143	πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἤτοι μεριστός ἐστιν ἢ ἀμέριστος· ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς τε τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καὶ εἰς τὸν παρῳχηκότα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μεριστῶν καταμετρεῖται ὑπό τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους, καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος τοῦ μετρουμένου γινομένου τοῦ μετροῦντος, ὡς ὅταν δακτύλῳ πῆχυν μετρῶμεν. ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δύναται καταμετρεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστὼς λόγου χάριν καταμετρεῖ τὸν παρῳχημένον, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν παρῳχηκότα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρῳχηκώς, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὁμοίως μέλλων. καὶ ὁ μέλλων εἰ καταμετροίη τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνεστὼς ἔσται καὶ παρῳχηκώς, καὶ ὁ παρῳχηκὼς παραπλησίως μέλλων ἔσται καὶ ἐνεστώς· ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστος μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.	Further, if time exists, it is either divisible or indivisible. It is not indivisible, since it is divided into present, past and future, as they themselves say. Nor is it divisible. For every divisible thing is measured out by some part of itself, the measuring part being laid against each part of what is measured, as when we measure a cubit with a finger's breadth. But time cannot be measured out by any part of itself. For if the present, say, measures the past, it will be laid against the past and therefore be past; and in the same way, with the future, it will be future. And if the future were to measure the others, it will be present and past; and the past, similarly, will be future and present. That is incoherent. So time is not divisible either. And if it is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.
3.144	ὅ τε χρόνος λέγεται τριμερὴς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν παρῳχηκώς, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ μέλλων. ὧν ὁ μὲν παρῳχηκὼς καὶ ὁ μέλλων οὐκ εἰσίν· εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ νῦν ὅ τε παρῳχηκὼς καὶ ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἔσται ἐνεστὼς ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ ἐνεστώς· εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, ἤτοι ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ἢ μεριστός. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι χρόνῳ λέγεται τὰ μεταβάλλοντα μεταβάλλειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει, οἷον ὁ σίδηρος εἰς μαλακότητα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. ὥστε οὐκ ἐστιν ἀμέριστος ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος.	Again, time is said to have three parts: one past, one present and one future. Of these, past and future do not exist; for if past and future time existed now, each of them would be present. Nor does the present exist. For if present time exists, it is either indivisible or divisible. It is not indivisible, since things that change are said to change in present time, but nothing changes in a partless time, as iron does when it becomes soft, or as each of the other things does. So present time is not indivisible.
3.145	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός· εἰς ἐνεστῶτας μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μερισθείη, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὀξεῖαν ῥύσιν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἀνεπινοήτως ὁ ἐνεστὼς εἰς παρῳχηκότα μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς παρῳχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα· ἔσται	Nor is it divisible. It could not be divided into presents, since, because of the swift flux of things in the cosmos, the present is said to change into the past faster than can be conceived. Nor could it

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	γὰρ οὕτως ἀνύπαρκτος, τὸ μέν τι μηκέτι ὂν ἔχων μέρος ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μηδέπω ὄν.	be divided into past and future, for then it would have no existence, having one part of itself that no longer exists and another that does not yet exist.
3.146	ὅθεν οὐδὲ τέλος τοῦ παρῳχημένου καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος εἶναι δύναται ὁ ἐνεστώς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἔσται μὲν [οὖν] ὡς ἐνεστώς, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστὼς μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος μηδὲ τοῦ παρῳχημένου μηδὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐδέ ἐστί τι χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνυπάρκτων συνεστὼς ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστιν.	Hence the present cannot be the end of the past and the beginning of the future either, since it will both be and not be: it will be, [then,] as present, but it will not be, since its parts do not exist. So it is not divisible. And if the present is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist. And if neither the present nor the past nor the future exists, time is not anything either; for what is made up of non-existent things is non-existent.
3.147	Λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου κἀκεῖνος ὁ λόγος. εἰ ἔστι χρόνος, ἤτοι γενητός ἐστι καὶ φθαρτὸς ἢ ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος. ἀγένητος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄφθαρτος οὐκ ἐστιν, εἴγε αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν παρῳχηκέναι λέγεται καὶ μηκέτι εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μέλλειν καὶ μηδέπω εἶναι.	This argument is also advanced against time. If there is time, it is either generated and perishable or ungenerated and imperishable. It is not ungenerated and imperishable, if part of it is said to be past and no longer to exist, and part to be future and not yet to exist.
3.148	ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός. τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα ἔκ τινος ὄντος γίγνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα εἴς τι ὂν φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις. εἰ οὖν εἰς τὸν παρῳχημένον φθείρεται, εἰς οὐκ ὂν φθείρεται, καὶ εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεται, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεται· οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι μήτε γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔστιν.	Nor is it generated and perishable. For, according to the dogmatists’ own hypotheses, what comes into being must come into being from something that exists, and what perishes must perish into something that exists. If, then, it perishes into the past, it perishes into what does not exist; and if it comes into being from the future, it comes into being from what does not exist, for neither of these exists. But it is absurd to say that anything comes into being from what does not exist or perishes into what does not exist. So time is not generated and perishable. And if it is neither ungenerated and imperishable nor generated and perishable, it does not exist at all.
3.149	Πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ, εἰ γίνεται ὁ χρόνος, ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται. ἤτοι οὖν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται ἢ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίγνεται τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνομένου ὀφείλει προυπάρχειν, ὁ γιγνόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ χρόνος, εἰ μὲν γίνεται, οὐδέπω ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ἤδη ἔστιν. ὥστε οὐδὲ γίνεται ἐν ἑαυτῷ.	Further, everything that comes into being seems to come into being in time. So if time comes into being, it comes into being in time. Either, then, it comes into being itself in itself, or one time in another. If it comes into being itself in itself, the same thing will both be and not be. For since that in which something comes into being must exist before what comes into being in it, the time that comes into being in itself does not yet exist insofar as it comes into being, but already exists insofar as it comes into being in itself. So it does not come into being in itself.
3.150	ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἕτερος. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστὼς ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι γίγνεται, μέλλων ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστώς, καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ	Nor does one time come into being in another. For if the present comes into being in the future, the

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	παρῳχηκότι, παρῳχηκώς. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων χρόνων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἕτερος χρόνος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται μήτε ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ γενητός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. ἐδείκνυτο δέ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀγένητός ἐστιν. μήτε οὖν γενητὸς ὢν μήτε ἀγένητος οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἤτοι γενητὸν ἢ ἀγένητον εἶναι προσήκει.	present will be future; and if in the past, it will be past. The same must be said about the other times too. So one time does not come into being in another time either. And if time comes into being neither itself in itself nor one in another, time is not generated. But it was shown that it is not ungenerated either. Being neither generated nor ungenerated, then, it does not exist at all; for each existing thing must be either generated or ungenerated.

CHAPTER 20: ON NUMBER

The Pythagorean claim that numbers exist apart from counted things is refuted.

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3.151	Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ χρόνος δοκεῖ μὴ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ θεωρεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄτοπον καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ βραχέα διεξελθεῖν. ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν τι φαμὲν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τι ἀκούομεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ τὸν κατὰ τούτου κεκίνηκε λόγον.	Since time seems not to be observed without number, it would not be out of place to go briefly through number as well. As far as everyday practice goes, we say, without holding beliefs, that we count things, and we hear that number is something. But the dogmatists' over-subtlety has stirred up the argument against this too.
3.152	αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι λέγουσιν. φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ἔκ τινος συνέστηκεν, ἁπλᾶ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἄδηλα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. τῶν δὲ ἀδήλων τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα, ὡς οἱ ἀτμοὶ καὶ οἱ ὄγκοι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ὥς σχήματα καὶ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀριθμοί. ὧν τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι σύνθετα, συνεστῶτα ἔκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας ἢ καὶ βάρους. οὐ μόνον ἄρα ἄδηλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσώματά ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖα.	The Pythagoreans, for example, say that numbers are actually the elements of the cosmos. They say that what appears is composed of something, and that elements must be simple; so the elements are non-evident. Of non-evident things, some are bodies, like atoms and masses, and others incorporeal, like shapes, forms and numbers. Of these, bodies are composite, made up of length, breadth, depth and resistance, or weight as well. So the elements are not only non-evident but incorporeal too.
3.153	ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἕκαστον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔχει τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἢ γὰρ ἕν ἐστιν ἢ δύο ἢ πλείω. δι' ὧν συνάγεται, ὅτι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν οἱ ἄδηλοι καὶ ἀσώματοι καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιθεωρούμενοι ἀριθμοί. καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἥ τε μονὰς καὶ ἡ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη ἀόριστος δυάς, ἧς κατὰ μετουσίαν αἱ κατὰ μέρος γίγνονται δυάδες.	Moreover, each incorporeal thing, when considered, is seen to have number belonging to it, for it is one, or two, or more. From this they conclude that the elements of the things that exist are the numbers, which are non-evident and incorporeal and observed in everything. And not numbers in general, but the unit and the indefinite dyad, which comes about through the addition of the unit, and by participation in which the particular dyads are dyads.
3.154	ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζεσθαι λέγουσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σημεῖον τὸν τῆς μονάδος ἐπέχειν λόγον, τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν τὸν τῆς δυάδος	For from these, they say, the other numbers come about, those observed in the things counted, and the cosmos is constructed. The point stands for the unit; the line for the dyad, since it is observed

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(δύο γὰρ σημείων μεταξὺ θεωρεῖσθαι ταύτην), τὴν δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν τὸν τῆς τριάδος (ῥύσιν γὰρ εἶναί φασι τῆς γραμμῆς εἰς πλάτος ἐπ' ἄλλο σημεῖον ἐκ πλαγίου κείμενον), τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸν τῆς τετράδος· ἐπανάστασιν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐπί τι σημεῖον ὑπερκείμενον.

3.155 καὶ οὕτω τά τε σώματα καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον ἐνειδωλοποιοῦσιν, ὄντινα καὶ διοικεῖσθαί φασι κατὰ ἁρμονικοὺς λόγους, τόν τε διὰ τεσσάρων, ὅς ἐστιν ἐπίτριτος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ὀκτώ, καὶ τὸν διὰ πέντε, ὅς ἐστιν ἡμιόλιος, ὧς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ἐννέα, καὶ τὸν διὰ πασῶν, ὅς ἐστι διπλάσιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ δώδεκα.

3.156 ταῦτά τε οὖν ὀνειροπολοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ κατασκευάζουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι εἰ τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐστίν, εἰ τύχοι, ἕν, τὸ φυτόν, ἐπεὶ μή ἐστι ζῷον, οὐκ ἔσται ἕν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ φυτὸν ἕν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ζῷον, ⟨ὡς ζῷον⟩, ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατά τι ἕτερον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ, οὗ μετέχει ἕκαστον καὶ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸ ἕν. καὶ εἰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ἐπειδὴ ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμητοὶ καὶ βόες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἵπποι, ἄνθρωποι καὶ βόες καὶ ἵπποι ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμός, καὶ λευκὸς ἀριθμὸς καὶ μέλας καὶ γενειήτης, εἰ τύχοιεν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες οἱ μετρούμενοι.

3.157 ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτοπα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπιθεωρεῖται τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς καὶ ἔστι στοιχεῖον. Οὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων, ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἐστι τὰ ἀριθμητά, παρεισῆλθεν ἡ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία. λέγεται γάρ, ὅτι εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμός, ἤτοι αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἔξωθεν· οὔτε δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ὧς ἀπέδειξαν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, οὔτε ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμός.

3.158 ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔξωθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμός, παραστήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος τὸν λόγον στήσαντες εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας ἕνεκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ μονάς, ἧς μετέχον ἕκαστον τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτῆς γίνεται ἕν, ἤτοι μία ἔσται αὐτὴ ἡ μονὰς ἢ τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μία ἐστίν, πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν μετέχειν αὐτῆς λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν μονάδα, εἰ τύχοι, ὁ εἷς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτι ἔσται μονὰς ἧς

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between two points; the surface for the triad, since they say it is a flowing of the line breadthwise toward another point lying to the side; and the body for the tetrad, since it comes about when the surface rises up toward a point lying above.

In this way they picture bodies and the whole cosmos, and they also say that the cosmos is governed according to harmonic ratios: the fourth, which is the ratio of four to three, as eight is to six; the fifth, which is the ratio of three to two, as nine is to six; and the octave, which is double, as twelve is to six.

These are their dreams. They also try to establish that number is something other than the things counted. If an animal, by its own definition, is one, say, then a plant, since it is not an animal, will not be one; but ⟨the⟩ plant is one too. So an animal is not one ⟨as an animal⟩, but by virtue of something else, observed outside it, in which each thing participates and through which it becomes one. And if number is the things counted, then, since the things counted are, say, people and cattle and horses, number will be people and cattle and horses; and number will be white and black and bearded, if the things measured happen to be like that.

But these consequences are absurd. So number is not the things counted, but has a reality of its own apart from them, by virtue of which it is observed in the things counted and is an element. When they had concluded in this way that number is not the things counted, the puzzle against number crept in. For it is said that if there is number, either number is the things counted themselves or something else outside them. But number is not the things counted themselves, as the Pythagoreans proved, nor something else besides them, as we shall point out. So number is nothing.

That number is not something outside, besides the things counted, we shall show by resting the argument on the unit, for clarity of exposition. If the unit is something by itself, by participating in which each of the things that participate in it becomes one, either this unit will be one, or there will be as many units as there are things that participate in it. If it is one, does each of the things said to participate in it participate in the whole of

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	μεθέξει ὁ εἷς ἵππος ἢ ὁ εἷς κύων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι ἕν, ὥσπερ καὶ πολλῶν ὑποτεθέντων γυμνῶν ἀνθρώπων,	it or in a part of it? If, say, the one human being has the whole unit, there will no longer be a unit for the one horse or the one dog to participate in, or for each of the other things that we call one. It is just as if we supposed that there were many naked people
3.159	ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος ἱματίου καὶ τοῦτο ἑνὸς ἀμφιασαμένου, γυμνοὶ μενοῦσιν οἱ λοιποὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἱματίου. εἰ δὲ μέρους αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν ἕξει μέρος τι ἡ μονάς, καὶ ἄπειρά γε ἕξει μέρη, εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἶτα ὡς τὸ μέρος τῆς δεκάδος, οἷον ἡ δυάς, οὔκ ἐστι δεκάς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς μονάδος ἔσται μονάς, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μεθέξει τι τῆς μονάδος. ὥστε οὔκ ἐστι μία ἡ μονὰς ἧς μετέχειν λέγεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος.	and only one cloak, and one of them put it on: the rest will remain naked and without a cloak. And if each participates in a part of it, then first, the unit will have some part, and indeed infinitely many parts into which it is divided, which is absurd. Next, just as a part of the ten, such as the two, is not a ten, so a part of the unit will not be a unit either; and for this reason nothing will participate in the unit. So the unit in which particular things are said to participate is not one.
3.160	εἰ δὲ ἰσάριθμοι τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἕν, αἱ μονάδες εἰσίν, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος λέγεται ἕν, ἄπειροι ἔσονται αἱ μετεχόμεναι μονάδες. καὶ αὗται ἤτοι μετέχουσιν ἐπαναβεβηκυίας μονάδος ἢ μονάδων ἰσαρίθμων αὐταῖς (καὶ διὰ τοῦτό εἰσι μονάδες) ἢ οὐ μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ χωρίς τινος μετοχῆς μονάδες εἰσίν.	Suppose instead that the units, by participation in which each particular thing is called one, are equal in number to the things counted that are called one. Then the units participated in will be infinite. And these units either participate in a higher unit, or in units equal in number to themselves (and that is why they are units), or they do not participate but are units without any participation.
3.161	〈...〉 εἰ μὲν γὰρ χωρὶς μετοχῆς μονάδες εἶναι δύνανται αὗται, δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς μονάδος μετοχῆς ἓν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτόθεν περιτρέπεται ἡ καθ' ἑαυτὴν θεωρεῖσθαι λεγομένη μονάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μετοχῆς κἀκεῖναι μονάδες εἰσίν, ἤτοι μιᾶς μετέχουσι πᾶσαι ἢ μία ἑκάστη ἰδίας. καὶ εἰ μὲν πᾶσαι μιᾶς, ἤτοι κατὰ μέρος ἑκάστη ἢ ὅλης λεχθήσεται μετέχειν, καὶ μένουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀτοπίαι·	〈...〉 For if they can be units without participation, each perceptible thing too will be able to be one without participation in a unit, and the unit said to be observed by itself is overturned outright. And if those units too are units by participation, either they all participate in one unit, or each participates in its own. If they all participate in one, each will be said to participate either in a part of it or in the whole of it, and the original absurdities remain.
3.162	εἰ δὲ ἑκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν μονάδων ἑκάστῃ μονάδα ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθεωρουμέναις ἐκείναις ἄλλας, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. εἰ οὖν ἵνα καταλάβωμεν, ὅτι εἰσί τινες καθ' ἑαυτὰς μονάδες, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἕν, δεῖ κατειληφέναι ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους νοητὰς μονάδας, ἀδύνατον δὲ καταλαβεῖν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους μονάδας νοητάς, ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀποφήνασθαι, ὅτι εἰσί τινες νοηταὶ μονάδες καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἓν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἰδίας μονάδος γινόμενον ἕν.	And if each participates in its own, a unit must be observed over each of those units too, and others over those, and so on to infinity. To apprehend that there are some units by themselves, by participation in which each existing thing is one, we would have to have apprehended infinitely many infinities of intelligible units. But it is impossible to apprehend infinitely many infinities of intelligible units. So it is impossible to declare that there are intelligible units and that each existing thing is one by becoming one through participation in its own unit.

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3.163	ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι τοσαῦταί εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε μία ἐστὶν ἡ καθ' ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη μονὰς μήτε τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως μονὰς καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔσται· χρῆσθαι γὰρ ἔνεστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ λόγῳ παραδειγματικῶς νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος ἠρωτημένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε καθ' ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου παρέστησαν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲ εἶναι ἀριθμόν.	So it is absurd to say that there are as many units as there are things that participate in them. And if the unit said to exist by itself is neither one nor as many as the things that participate in it, there is no unit by itself at all. Likewise none of the other numbers will exist by itself either, since the argument just put forward about the unit, as an example, can be used for all the numbers. But if number neither exists by itself, as we have pointed out, nor is the things counted themselves, as the Pythagoreans showed, and there is nothing besides these, we must say that number does not exist either.
3.164	Πῶς δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαί φασιν ἐκ τῆς μονάδος τὴν δυάδα οἱ ἔξωθέν τι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά; ὅτε γὰρ συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἑτέρᾳ μονάδι, ἤτοι προστίθεταί τι ταῖς μονάσιν ἔξωθεν, ἢ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἢ οὔτε προστίθεταί τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε προστίθεταί ⟨τι⟩ οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται δυάς. οὔτε γὰρ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὖσαι αἱ μονάδες εἶχον τὴν δυάδα ἐπιθεωρουμένην αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον, οὔτε νῦν τι αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν προσγέγονεν,	And how do those who think that number is something outside, besides the things counted, say that the dyad comes into being from the unit? When we put a unit together with another unit, either something is added to the units from outside, or something is subtracted from them, or nothing is either added or subtracted. If nothing is either added or subtracted, there will be no dyad. For the units, when apart from each other, did not have the dyad observed in them by their own definition, and nothing has now been added to them from outside,
3.165	ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀφῄρηται κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς ἡ σύνθεσις τῆς μονάδος πρὸς τὴν μονάδα, μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως μήτε προσθέσεως ἔξωθέν τινος γινομένης. εἰ δὲ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔσται δυάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μειωθήσονται αἱ μονάδες. εἰ δὲ προστίθεται αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν ἡ δυάς, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται δυάς, τὰ δύο δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσσαρα ἔσται· ὑπόκειται γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονάς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἔξωθεν δυάδος ὁ τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν.	just as nothing has been subtracted either, by hypothesis. So the putting together of a unit with a unit will not be a dyad, if there is neither subtraction nor addition of anything from outside. If subtraction takes place, not only will there be no dyad, but the units will actually be diminished. And if the dyad is added to them from outside so that a dyad may come about from the units, what seem to be two will be four. For there is a unit and another unit to begin with, and if a dyad were added to them from outside, the number four would result.
3.166	ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λεγομένων. εἰ οὖν μήτε κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μήτε κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἄνευ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως γίγνονται οἱ σύνθετοι λεγόμενοι εἶναι ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, ἀσύστατός ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις τοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ εἶναι λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀγένητοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμοί, δηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ συντίθεσθαί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ γίγνεσθαι φάσκοντες ἐκ τῶν	The same argument applies to the other numbers that are said to be brought about by composition. If, then, the numbers said to be composite come about from the higher ones neither by subtraction nor by addition nor without subtraction and addition, the coming into being of a number said to exist on its own, apart from the things counted, does not hold together. That composite numbers are not ungenerated either, the dogmatists themselves make plain, since they say that these are com-

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	ἐπαναβεβηκότων, οἷον τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου.	posed and come into being from the higher ones, that is, the unit and the indefinite dyad.
3.167	οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμός. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται μήτε ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς περιεργίαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν εἰσενηνεγμέναις. τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ καλουμένου τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρους ἀρκούντως ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λελέχθω.	So number does not exist on its own. And if number is neither observed on its own nor has its reality in the things counted, then number is not anything, as far as the over-subtleties introduced by the dogmatists go. Let this much be said about the so-called physical part of philosophy too, which is enough for an outline.

CHAPTER 21: ON THE ETHICAL PART OF PHILOSOPHY

Sextus turns to ethics: first the concepts of good, bad and indifferent.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.168	Λείπεται τὸ ἠθικόν, ὅπερ δοκεῖ περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῶν τε καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων καταγίγνεσθαι. ἵνα οὖν κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν, περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ζητήσωμεν, τὴν ἔννοιαν ἑκάστου προεκθέμενοι.	There remains the ethical part, which seems to be concerned with distinguishing fine, bad and indifferent things. So, to treat this too in summary fashion, let us investigate the existence of good, bad and indifferent things, first setting out the concept of each.

CHAPTER 22: ON GOOD, BAD AND INDIFFERENT THINGS

Stoic and other definitions of the good state only its accidents, not what it is.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.169	Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Στωικοὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας, ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πρᾶξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πρᾶξις ἐνέργειά τις οὖσα κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄντικρύς ἐστιν ὠφέλεια, ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας.	The Stoics say that good is benefit or not other than benefit. By benefit they mean excellence and excellent action; by what is not other than benefit, the excellent person and the friend. For excellence, being the ruling part in a certain condition, and excellent action, being an activity in accordance with excellence, are benefit outright, while the excellent person and the friend are not other than benefit.
3.170	μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχουσα· τὰ δὲ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν εἶναι λέγουσιν (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος χείρ), οὔτε ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ μέρη (οὐκ ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὑφέστηκεν). διόπερ οὐχ ἕτερα τῶν μερῶν τὰ ὅλα λέγουσιν. ὅθεν τὸν σπουδαῖον ὅλον ὄντα ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπερ ἔφασαν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας εἶναι λέγουσιν. ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν φασι λέγεσθαι.	For benefit is a part of the excellent person, being his ruling part. Wholes, they say, are neither the same as their parts (for a man is not a hand) nor other than their parts (for they do not exist without the parts). That is why they say wholes are not other than their parts. Hence they say that the excellent person, being a whole in relation to his own ruling part, which they called benefit, is not other than benefit. From this they go on to say that the good is spoken of in three ways.
3.171	καθ' ἕνα μὲν γὰρ τρόπον φασὶν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀρετή, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ αἱ	In one way, they say, good is that by which one can be benefited, and this is the most fundamental good, namely excellence. In another, it is that ac-

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κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ ⟨τὴν⟩ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον, θεούς τε καὶ σπουδαίους δαίμονας, ὡς τὸ μὲν δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου σημαινομένου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ πρώτου.

3.172 τινὲς δέ φασιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἱρετόν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ συλλαμβάνον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ τὸ συμπληρωτικόν· εὐδαιμονία δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ Στωικοί φασιν, εὔροια βίου. Τοιαῦτα μέν τινα εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγεται.

3.173 εἴτε δὲ τὸ ὠφελοῦν εἴτε τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἱρετὸν εἴτε τὸ συνεργοῦν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγαθόν τις εἶναι λέγοι, οὐχὶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρίστησιν, ἀλλά τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτῷ λέγει. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάταιον. ἤτοι γὰρ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ συμβέβηκε τὰ προειρημένα ἢ καὶ ἑτέροις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἑτέροις, οὔκ ἐστι χαρακτηριστικὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κοινοποιούμενα· εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τούτων νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν·

3.174 ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἀνεννόητος ἵππου οὔτε τὸ χρεμετίζειν τί ἐστιν οἶδεν, οὔτε διὰ τούτου δύναται εἰς ἔννοιαν ἐλθεῖν ἵππου, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἵππῳ χρεμετίζοντι ἐντύχοι, οὕτω ⟨καὶ⟩ ὁ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητῶν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, οὐ δύναται γινώσκειν τὸ ἰδίως αὐτῷ καὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῆσαι δυνηθῇ. πρότερον γὰρ δεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἶθ' οὕτω συνεῖναι ὅτι ὠφελεῖ καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστι καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν.

3.175 ὅτι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἐστιν ἱκανὰ μηνῦσαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δηλοῦσιν ἔργῳ οἱ δογματικοί. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι αἱρετόν ἐστι, παρὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται τὸ οἱονεὶ ἀγαστόν, καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ ποιητικόν, πάντες ἴσως συγχωροῦσιν· ἐρωτώμενοι δέ, τί ἐστιν ᾧ ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν, εἰς ἄσπειστον ἐμπίπτουσι πόλεμον, οἱ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ ἀλυπίαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. καίτοι εἰ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὅρων ἐδείκνυτο τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν ἐστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τούτου φύσεως.

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cording to which benefit comes about, such as excellence and actions in accordance with excellence. In a third way, it is what is able to benefit; and this is excellence, ⟨the⟩ action in accordance with excellence, the excellent person and the friend, and gods and excellent divinities. So the second sense of good includes the first, and the third includes the second and the first.

Some say that good is what is choiceworthy for its own sake; others, what contributes to happiness or helps make it up. Happiness, as the Stoics say, is a smooth flow of life. These, roughly, are the things said about the concept of the good.

But whether one says that good is what benefits, or what is choiceworthy for its own sake, or what contributes to happiness, one does not show what the good is, but states one of its accidents. That is futile. For the properties just mentioned belong either to the good alone or to other things as well. If they belong to other things as well, they are not distinctive marks of the good, since they are shared. If they belong to the good alone, we cannot conceive the good from them.

Someone who has no concept of a horse does not know what neighing is, and cannot arrive at a concept of a horse through it, unless he has first come across a horse neighing. In the same way, someone who is inquiring what the good is because he does not know the good cannot recognize what belongs peculiarly to it alone, so as to be able to conceive the good itself through that. For one must first learn the nature of the good itself, and only then understand that it benefits, that it is choiceworthy for its own sake, and that it produces happiness.

That the accidents just mentioned are not enough to reveal the concept and nature of the good, the dogmatists show in practice. Everyone, perhaps, agrees that the good benefits, that it is choiceworthy (which is why it is called good, *agathon*, as if it were *agaston*, "admirable"), and that it produces happiness. But when they are asked what it is that these properties belong to, they fall into a war without truce: some say excellence, some pleasure, some freedom from pain, some something else. Yet if what the good itself is had been shown by the definitions given above, they would

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		not be at odds, as though its nature were unknown.
3.176	Οὕτω μὲν οὖν διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οἱ δοκιμώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν δογματικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ διηνέχθησαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, λέγοντες κακὸν εἶναι βλάβην ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον βλάβης, οἱ δὲ τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ φευκτόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ κακοδαιμονίας ποιητικόν. δι' ὧν οὐχὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλά τινα τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἴσως αὐτῷ φάσκοντες εἰς τὴν προειρημένην ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀπορίαν.	This, then, is how those reputed to be the most eminent of the dogmatists differ about the concept of the good. They have differed in the same way about the bad, some saying that bad is harm or not other than harm, others that it is what is to be avoided for its own sake, others that it is what produces unhappiness. In saying these things they state not the essence of the bad but, perhaps, some of its accidents, and so they fall into the difficulty described above.
3.177	Τὸ δὲ ἀδιάφορόν φασι λέγεσθαι μὲν τριχῶς, καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὁρμὴ μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας· καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὁρμὴ μὲν ἢ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυεῖν τετραδράχμων ἀπαραλλάκτων, ὅταν δέῃ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αἱρεῖσθαι· ὁρμὴ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε· κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συμβαλλόμενον, ὥς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον· ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν εὖ, ὁτὲ δὲ κακῶς χρήσασθαι, τοῦτο ἀδιάφορον εἶναί φασιν, περὶ οὗ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς διαλαμβάνειν λέγουσιν.	Indifferent, they say, is spoken of in three ways. In one way, it is that toward which there is neither impulse nor repulsion, such as the number of the stars, or of the hairs on one's head, being even. In another, it is that toward which there is impulse or repulsion, but no more toward this than toward that, as with two indistinguishable four-drachma coins when one has to choose one of them: there is an impulse to choose one of them, but no more toward this one than toward that. In a third way, they say, indifferent is what contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness, such as health and wealth; for what can be used sometimes well and sometimes badly is, they say, indifferent, and it is mainly this sense, they say, that they discuss in ethics.
3.178	τίνα μέντοι καὶ περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας δεῖ φρονεῖν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμῖν περί τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν σαφές ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέστησαν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν προειρημένων ἑκάστου· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπεικὸς πεπόνθασιν ἐν ἀνυποστάτοις τάχα πράγμασι σφαλλόμενοι. ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον, ἐντεῦθέν τινες ἐπιλογίζονται.	What one should think about this concept too is clear from what we have said about good and bad things. So it is plain that they have not brought us to the concept of each of the things mentioned. Nor is it surprising that this has happened to them, since they are stumbling over things that perhaps have no reality. For some reason as follows to the conclusion that nothing is by nature good or bad or indifferent.

CHAPTER 23: WHETHER ANYTHING IS BY NATURE GOOD, BAD OR INDIFFERENT

What is good by nature would affect everyone alike, but nothing called good does.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.179	Τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαῖνον πᾶσι φαίνεται ἀλεαντικόν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν φύσει ψύχουσα πᾶσι φαίνεται ψυκτική, καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει κινοῦντα ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν, ὥς φασίν, ἔχοντας. οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας κινεῖ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι	Fire, which heats by nature, appears heating to everyone; snow, which cools by nature, appears cooling to everyone; and everything that affects us by nature affects alike everyone who is, as they say, in a natural condition. But none of the so-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	φύσει ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, δῆλον, φασίν.	called goods affects everyone as good, as we shall point out. So there is nothing good by nature. That none of the so-called goods affects everyone alike is clear, they say.
3.180	ἵνα γὰρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας παρῶμεν, ὧν οἱ μὲν εὐεξίαν σώματος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λαγνεύειν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀδηφαγεῖν, οἱ δὲ οἰνοφλυγίαν, οἱ δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι κύβοις, οἱ δὲ πλεονεξίαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χείρω τινὰ τούτων, αὐτῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων τινὲς μὲν τρία γένη φασὶν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν, ὥς οἱ Περιπατητικοί· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ὡς ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὡς φίλους, πλοῦτον,	Let us pass over ordinary people, some of whom think that bodily fitness is good, others sexual indulgence, others gluttony, others heavy drinking, others gambling, others greed, and others things even worse than these. Among the philosophers themselves, some say that there are three kinds of goods, like the Peripatetics: some goods, they say, are in the soul, like the excellences; some concern the body, like health and the like; and some are external, like friends, wealth
3.181	τὰ παραπλήσια. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τριγένειαν μὲν καὶ αὐτοί φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ ⟨τὸν⟩ φίλον, τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτε ἐκτός, οἷον τὸν σπουδαῖον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν· τὰ μέντοι περὶ σῶμα [ἢ ἢ ἐκτός], ἅ φασιν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὔ φασιν ἀγαθά. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἠσπάσαντο ὡς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακὸν αὐτὴν ἄντικρυς εἶναί φασιν, ὥστε καί τινα τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγξασθαι ‘μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην’.	and the like. The Stoics too say that there is a threefold class of goods: some are in the soul, like the excellences; some are external, like the excellent person and ⟨the⟩ friend; and some are neither in the soul nor external, such as the excellent person in relation to himself. But the bodily things [or external], which the Peripatetics say are goods, they say are not goods. Some have embraced pleasure as good, while others say it is downright bad, so that one of the philosophers even cried out, “I would rather go mad than feel pleasure.”[6]
3.182	εἰ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν φύσει κινοῦντα πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως κινούμεθα, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε πάσαις ταῖς προεκκειμέναις στάσεσι πιστεύειν ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὴν μάχην οὔτε τινί. ὁ γὰρ λέγων, ὅτι τῇδε μὲν πιστευτέον τῇ στάσει, τῇδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς, ἐναντιουμένους τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἀντιδοξούντων λόγους αὐτῷ ἔχων, μέρος γίνεται ⟨τῆς⟩ διαφωνίας, καὶ τοῦ κρινοῦντος αὐτὸς δεήσεται διὰ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑτέρους κρινεῖ. μήτε οὖν κριτηρίου ὄντος ὁμολογουμένου μήτε ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον καὶ περὶ τούτων διαφωνίαν, εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, τί ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.	If, then, the things that move us by nature move everyone in the same way, but we are not all moved in the same way by the so-called goods, nothing is good by nature. For it is not possible to trust all the positions set out above, because they conflict, nor any one of them. Whoever says that this position should be trusted and that one not at all has the arguments of those who hold the opposite view ranged against him. So he becomes part of the disagreement, and for this reason he will himself need someone to judge, along with the others, instead of judging others. Therefore, since there is no agreed criterion or proof, because of the undecidable disagreement about these too, he will end up in suspension of judgment, and for this reason he will not be able to affirm what is good by nature.
3.183	Ἔτι κἀκεῖνο λέγουσί τινες, ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἤτοι τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ αἱρούμεθα. τὸ μὲν οὖν	Again, some people also say this: the good is either choosing itself or what we choose. Now choosing

6 The saying is usually attributed to Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	αἱρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσπεύδομεν τυχεῖν ἐκείνου ὃ αἱρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἔτι αὐτὸ αἱρεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἦν τὸ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι ποτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπεύδομεν ποτοῦ τυχεῖν· ἀπολαύσαντες γὰρ τούτου τῆς ἀντιποιήσεως αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλαττόμεθα. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πεινῆν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν, εἰ μή γε καὶ ὀχληρόν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν σπεύδει μετασχεῖν τροφῆς, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ πεινῆν ὀχλήσεως, καὶ ὁ ἐρῶν ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ διψῶν.	is not good on its own account. Otherwise we would not hurry to get what we choose, for fear of losing the further choosing of it. For example, if seeking after drink were good, we would not hurry to get drink, since once we have enjoyed it we are rid of seeking it. Likewise with being hungry, being in love and the rest. So choosing is not choiceworthy for its own sake—not to say that it is actually a nuisance. For the hungry man hurries to get food so as to be rid of the nuisance of hunger, and likewise the lover and the thirsty man.
3.184	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ αἱρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἤτοι ἔξωθέν ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἡμῶν, ἤτοι ποιεῖ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀστείαν κίνησιν καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστὸν πάθος, ἢ οὐδαμῶς ἡμᾶς διατίθησιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὔκ ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἀγαστόν, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔσται οὔτε ἐπάξεται ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ οὔτε ὅλως αἱρετὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ γίνεταί τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς προσηνὲς κατάστημα καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν πάθος, οὐχὶ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἱρετὸν ἔσται τὸ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῷ γινομένην διάθεσιν·	Nor is the good what is chosen. For this is either outside us or in us. If it is outside us, either it produces in us a pleasing motion, a welcome condition and an agreeable feeling, or it does not affect us at all. If it is not agreeable to us, it will not be good, nor will it draw us to choose it, nor will it be choiceworthy at all. But if a pleasant condition and a welcome feeling arises in us from the external thing, the external thing will not be choiceworthy for its own sake, but because of the state that comes about in us as a result of it;
3.185	ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐκτὸς εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἤτοι γὰρ περὶ σῶμα εἶναι λέγεται μόνον ἢ περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην ἢ περὶ ἀμφότερα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν περὶ σῶμα μόνον, ἐκφεύξεται τὴν γνῶσιν ἡμῶν· ψυχῆς γὰρ αἱ γνώσεις εἶναι λέγονται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἄλογον εἶναί φασιν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς διατείνειν λέγοιτο, τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντιλήψει καὶ τῷ ταύτης ἀγαστῷ πάθει δοκοίη ἂν αἱρετὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κρινόμενον ὡς αἱρετὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ κρίνεται κατὰ αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγῳ σώματι.	so what is choiceworthy for its own sake cannot be external. But it cannot be in us either. For it is said to be either in the body alone, or in the soul alone, or in both. If it is in the body alone, it will escape our knowledge. For knowledge is said to belong to the soul, and the body, they say, is non-rational in itself. And if it were said to extend to the soul as well, it would seem to be choiceworthy by virtue of the soul's grasping it and the soul's agreeable feeling. For according to them, what is judged choiceworthy is judged by the intellect, not by the non-rational body.
3.186	λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ λέγουσιν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, καθὼς ἐπελογισάμην ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγῳ. πῶς δ' ἂν θαρροίη τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τι γίνεσθαι λέγειν, ὃ μὴ καταλαμβάνει;	It remains to say that the good is in the soul alone. But this too is impossible, given what the dogmatists say. For the soul perhaps does not even exist; and even if it does exist, it is not apprehended, as far as what they say goes, as I argued in my account of the criterion. How then could anyone be confident in saying that something comes about in a thing he does not apprehend?
3.187	ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλείπωμεν, πῶς ἄρα καὶ λέγουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι; εἰ γοῦν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἡδονῇ τίθεται τὸ τέλος καί φησι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντα, ἐξ ἀτόμων συνεστάναι, πῶς ἐν ἀτόμων σωρῷ	But to leave this aside too: how exactly do they say the good comes about in the soul? Epicurus, for instance, places the end in pleasure and says that the soul, like everything else, is composed of

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δυνατὸν ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι καὶ συγκατάθεσιν ἢ κρίσιν τοῦ τόδε μὲν αἱρετὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν, τόδε δὲ φευκτὸν καὶ κακόν, ἀμήχανον εἰπεῖν.	atoms. If so, there is no way of saying how pleasure can arise in a heap of atoms, or assent, or the judgment that this is choiceworthy and good and that is to be avoided and bad.

CHAPTER 24: WHAT THE SO-CALLED ART OF LIVING IS

The Stoic excellences as arts in the soul are inconceivable, as is Plato's soul.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.188	Πάλιν οἱ Στωικοὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθά φασιν εἶναι τέχνας τινὰς, τὰς ἀρετάς· τέχνην δὲ εἶναί φασι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων, τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, πνεύματι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχοντι, ἐναπόθεσις γίνεται καταλήψεων καὶ ἀθροισμὸς τοσούτων ὡς γενέσθαι τέχνην, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐννοῆσαι, τῆς ἐπιγινομένης τυπώσεως ἀεὶ τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἀπαλειφούσης, ἐπεὶ χυτόν τέ ἐστι τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐξ ὅλου κινεῖσθαι λέγεται καθ' ἑκάστην τύπωσιν.	Again, the Stoics say that the goods in the soul are certain arts, namely the excellences. An art, they say, is a system of apprehensions exercised together, and apprehensions arise in the ruling part. But how a deposit of apprehensions, and an accumulation of enough of them to make an art, could come about in the ruling part—which according to them is breath—is impossible to conceive. For each new imprint would always wipe out the one before it, since breath is fluid and is said to move as a whole with each imprint.
3.189	τὸ γὰρ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν λέγειν ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φημὶ δὲ τὴν κρᾶσιν τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ ταὐτοῦ, ἢ τούς ἀριθμούς, τέλεον ληρῶδές ἐστιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ἀγαθόν.	As for saying that Plato's fantasy can be receptive of the good—I mean his blend of the indivisible and the divisible substance and of the nature of the different and the same—or the numbers, that is utter nonsense. So the good cannot be in the soul either.[7]
3.190	εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, μήτε ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετόν, μήτε περὶ σῶμά ἐστι μήτε περὶ ψυχήν, ὡς ἐπελογισάμην, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθόν Διὰ δὲ τὰ προειρημένα οὐδὲ κακόν τι ἔστι φύσει. τὰ γὰρ ἑτέροις δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά, ταῦτα ἕτεροι διώκουσιν ὡς ἀγαθά, οἷον ἀσέλγειαν ἀδικίαν φιλαργυρίαν ἀκρασίαν, τὰ ἐοικότα. ὅθεν εἰ τὰ μὲν φύσει πάντας ὁμοίως πέφυκε κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα εἶναι κακὰ οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει κακόν.	But if choosing itself is not good, and what is choiceworthy for its own sake neither exists outside us nor is in the body or in the soul, as I argued, then nothing at all is good by nature. And for the reasons already given, nothing is bad by nature either. For the things that seem bad to some people, others pursue as good—licentiousness, injustice, greed, lack of self-control and the like. So if what is natural is by nature such as to move everyone in the same way, but the things said to be bad do not move everyone in the same way, nothing is bad by nature.
3.191	Ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἀδιάφορόν ἐστί τι φύσει διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων διαφωνίαν. οἷον γοῦν οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δὲ οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἱκανὴν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα ὡς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἱκανὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν ὡς πενίαν νόσον, μήτε δὲ προηγμένα μήτε	Likewise, nothing is indifferent by nature either, because of the disagreement about indifferents. For instance, the Stoics say that of the indifferents some are preferred, some dispreferred, and some neither preferred nor dispreferred. Preferred are those that have considerable value, such as health

7 Sextus alludes to Plato's *Timaeus* (35a), where the soul is mixed from indivisible and divisible being, sameness and difference; "the numbers" refers to later Platonists who defined the soul as a number.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀποπροηγμένα ὡς τὸ ἐκτεῖναι ἢ συγκάμψαι τὸν δάκτυλον.	and wealth; dispreferred, those that do not have considerable value, such as poverty and illness; and neither preferred nor dispreferred, things like stretching out or bending your finger.
3.192	τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φύσει προηγμένον ἢ ἀποπροηγμένον εἶναι λέγουσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ὁτὲ μὲν προηγμένον φαίνεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένον. εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύοιντο ὑπὸ τυράννου οἱ δὲ πένητες εἰρηνεύοιντο, πᾶς ἄν ἕλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ πλούσιος, ὡς ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον.	But some say that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or dispreferred. For each of them, depending on the circumstances, appears now preferred and now dispreferred. If, they say, the rich were being plotted against by a tyrant while the poor were left in peace, everyone would choose to be poor rather than rich, so that wealth would become dispreferred.
3.193	ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀδιαφόρων οἱ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ κακόν, ἅπαντες δ' ἂν ὁμοίως ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, εἴγε ἀδιάφορον ἦν φύσει, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει ἀδιάφορον. Οὕτως καὶ εἴ τις φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι λέγοι τὴν ἀνδρείαν διὰ τὸ τοὺς λέοντας φυσικῶς τολμᾶν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ ταύρους, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους τινὰς καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας, λέγομεν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δειλία τῶν φύσει αἱρετῶν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἔλαφοι καὶ λαγῴ καὶ ἄλλα πλείονα ζῷα φυσικῶς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὁρμᾷ. καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειλοὶ θεωροῦνται· σπανίως μὲν γάρ τις ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἑαυτὸν ἐπέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον βλακευσάμενος ἢ ἄλλως θερμόν τι τυφωθεὶς ἔδοξέ τις διαπράττεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πλεῖστος ὅμιλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκκλίνει.	So, since some say that each of the so-called indifferents is good and others that it is bad, whereas everyone would have considered it indifferent in the same way if it were indifferent by nature, nothing is indifferent by nature. In the same way, if someone said that courage is choiceworthy by nature because lions seem to be naturally bold and brave—and bulls too, say, and some men, and cocks—we reply that, as far as this goes, cowardice too is among the things choiceworthy by nature, since deer, hares and many other animals are naturally drawn to it. Most human beings, too, are seen to be cowards. Only rarely has someone given himself up to death for his country out of foolishness, or, puffed up in some other way, seemed to do something hot-headed; the great mass of humanity avoids all such things.
3.194	ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι δεικνύναι νομίζουσι φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῷά φασιν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα, ὁρμᾶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνειν δὲ ἀλγηδόνας.	This is also how the Epicureans think they show that pleasure is choiceworthy by nature. Animals, they say, as soon as they are born, while they are still unperverted, are drawn to pleasure and avoid pains.
3.195	καὶ πρὸς τούτους δὲ ἔστι λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσει ἀγαθόν· ἡ δέ ἡδονὴ κακῶν ἐστι ποιητική· πάσῃ γὰρ ἡδονῇ παραπέπηγεν ἀλγηδών, ἥ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς φύσει κακόν. οἷον γοῦν ἥδεται ὁ μέθυσος ἐμφορούμενος οἴνου καὶ ὁ γαστρίμαργος τροφῆς, καὶ ὁ λάγνος ἀφροδισίοις ἀμέτρως χρώμενος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πενίας καὶ νόσων ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ἅπερ ἀλγεινά ἐστι καὶ κακά, ὡς φασίν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή.	Against them too it can be said that what produces something bad could not be good by nature. But pleasure produces bad things, for pain is fastened to every pleasure, and pain, according to them, is bad by nature. For instance, the drunkard takes pleasure in filling himself with wine, the glutton with food, and the lecher in indulging in sex without measure; but these things produce poverty and illness, which are painful and bad, as they say. So pleasure is not good by nature.
3.196	παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ οὔκ ἐστι φύσει κακόν, ἡδονὰς δὲ ἀποτελοῦσιν ἀλγηδόνες· καὶ γὰρ	Similarly, what produces something good is not bad by nature; and pains bring about pleasures.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπιστήμας ἀναλαμβάνομεν μὲν πονοῦντες, καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἐρωμένης οὕτως ἐγκρατὴς γίνεταί τις, καὶ ὑγίειαν περιποιοῦσιν αἱ ἀλγηδόνες. οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πόνος φύσει κακόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ φύσει ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ, φαῦλον δὲ ὁ πόνος, πάντες ἂν ὁμοίως διέκειντο περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐλέγομεν· ὁρῶμεν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸν μὲν πόνον καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν αἱρουμένους, τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.	For we acquire knowledge through toil; this is also how someone gets possession of wealth or of a beloved; and pains secure health. So toil is not bad by nature. Indeed, if pleasure were good by nature and toil bad, everyone would be disposed in the same way toward them, as we were saying; but we see many philosophers choosing toil and endurance and despising pleasure.
3.197	ὁμοίως δ' ἂν περιτρίποιντο καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες, ἐκ τοῦ τινὰς τῶν σοφῶν τὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς αἱρεῖσθαι βίον, ὡς ἐκ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις διαφωνίας τὸ φύσει τι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι διατρέπεσθαι.	In the same way, those who say that the life of excellence is good by nature could be turned around by the fact that some of the wise choose the life of pleasure. Thus the disagreement among those very people overturns the claim that anything is by nature of this kind or that.

LAWS AND CUSTOMS AROUND THE WORLD

A survey of sex, food, religion and burial shows that what is shameful varies everywhere.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.198	Οὐκ ἄτοπον δ' ἂν ἴσως εἴη πρὸς τούτοις καὶ εἰδικώτερον ἐπιστῆσαι διὰ βραχέων ταῖς ὑπολήψεσι ταῖς περὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρῶν, ἀθέσμων τε καὶ οὐ τοιούτων καὶ νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν καὶ τῆς εἰς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς κατοιχομένους ὁσιότητος καὶ τῶν ἐοικότων· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πολλὴν εὑρήσομεν ἀνωμαλίαν.	It may perhaps not be out of place, in addition, to dwell briefly and more specifically on the views about what is shameful and not shameful, unlawful and not, and about laws and customs, piety toward the gods, reverence toward the dead and the like. For in this way too we shall find great variation about what should and should not be done.
3.199	οἷον γοῦν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ παράνομον νενόμισται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς φασίν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔν τι τῶν συνήθων. λέγεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ Θηβαίοις τὸ παλαιὸν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τὸν Μηριόνην τὸν Κρῆτα οὕτω κεκλῆσθαί φασι δι' ἔμφασιν τοῦ Κρητῶν ἔθους, καὶ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς Πάτροκλον διάπυρον φιλίαν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνάγουσί τινες.	For instance, among us sex between men is considered shameful, or rather actually illegal; but among the Germans, they say, it is not shameful but one of the ordinary things. It is said that among the Thebans too, in the old days, this was not thought shameful; and they say that Meriones the Cretan got his name as a hint at the Cretan custom; and some trace the ardent friendship of Achilles for Patroclus to this.[8]
3.200	καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον τοῦτο εἶναί φασιν; καὶ τὸ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι, καίτοι παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν, παρά τισι τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίζεται· μίγνυνται γοῦν ἀδιαφόρως δημοσίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Κράτητος ἀκηκόαμεν.	And what is surprising in that, when the Cynic philosophers and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus say that it is indifferent? Again, having sex with a woman in public, though it seems shameful among us, is not thought shameful among some of the Indians. They have sex in public without concern, as we have also heard about the philosopher Crates.
3.201	ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑταιρεῖν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων	Again, for women to work as prostitutes is shameful and disgraceful among us, but among many

8 The name Meriones was punningly connected with mēros, "thigh," as an allusion to intercourse between the thighs.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	εὐκλεές· φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι αἱ πλείστοις συνιοῦσαι καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσι περισφύριον, σύνθημα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς σεμνολογήματος. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ κόραι πρὸ τῶν γάμων τὴν προῖκα ἐξ ἑταιρήσεως συνάγουσαι γαμοῦνται. καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς δὲ ὁρῶμεν οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγοντας τὸ ἑταίρᾳ συνοικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἑταίρας ἐργασίας διαζῆν.	Egyptians it is a mark of honor. They say, at any rate, that those who have slept with the most men even wear an anklet, a token of their pride. And among some of them girls collect their dowries from prostitution before marriage and then marry. We see the Stoics too saying that it is not out of place to live with a prostitute or to make a living from a prostitute's earnings.
3.202	ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Σαρμάτων στίζουσι τὰ γεννώμενα.	Again, being tattooed seems shameful and degrading among us, but many Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their newborn children.
3.203	τό τε ἐλλόβια ἔχειν τοὺς ἄρρενας παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρόν ἐστι, παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥσπερ καὶ Σύροις, εὐγενείας ἐστὶ σύνθημα. τινὲς δὲ ἐπιτείνοντες τὸ σύνθημα τῆς εὐγενείας, καὶ τὰς ῥῖνας τῶν παίδων τιτρώσκοντες κρίκους ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀργυρέους ἢ χρυσοῦς ἀπαρτῶσιν, ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις,	For males to wear earrings is shameful among us, but among some foreign peoples, such as the Syrians, it is a token of noble birth. Some, taking this token of noble birth further, even pierce their children's noses and hang silver or gold rings from them—which no one among us would do,
3.204	ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνθοβαφῆ καὶ ποδήρη τις ἄρρην ἐνταῦθα ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀμφιέσαιτο ἐσθῆτα, καίτοι παρὰ Πέρσαις εὐπρεπεστάτου τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχροῦ τούτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ δὲ τῷ τῆς Σικελίας τυράννῳ τοιαύτης ἐσθῆτος Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστίππῳ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις προσενεχθείσης ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἀπεπέμψατο, εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν ἄρρην πεφυκώς, ὁ δὲ Ἀρίστιππος προσήκατο, φήσας καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν οὖσ' ἥ γε σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται. οὕτω καὶ τῶν σοφῶν ᾧ μὲν οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ᾧ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει τοῦτο εἶναι.	just as no man here would dress in a flowered, ankle-length robe, although among the Persians this, which seems shameful among us, is thought most becoming. And when such a robe was offered at the court of Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, to the philosophers Plato and Aristippus, Plato sent it back, saying: "I could not put on a woman's robe, when I was born a man." Aristippus accepted it, saying: "For even amid Bacchic revels the woman who is chaste will not be corrupted." So even among the wise, this seemed not shameful to one and shameful to the other.[9]
3.205	ἄθεσμον τέ ἐστι παρ' ἡμῖν μητέρα ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἰδίαν γαμεῖν· Πέρσαι δέ, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ σοφίαν ἀσκεῖν δοκοῦντες, οἱ Μάγοι, γαμοῦσι τὰς μητέρας, καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἄγονται πρὸς γάμον, καὶ ὡς ὁ ποιητής φησιν, Ζεὺς Ἥρην προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρῖψαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῇ χειρὶ τρῖψαι φαῦλον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι. καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δογματίζει τόν τε πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς παιδοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ καθολικώτερον κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν' ἀπεφήνατο.	Among us it is unlawful to marry one's own mother or sister. But the Persians, and especially those of them reputed to practice wisdom, the Magi, marry their mothers; the Egyptians take their sisters in marriage; and, as the poet says, "Zeus addressed Hera, his sister and wife." Zeno of Citium, too, says it is not out of place to rub one's mother's private part with one's own, just as no one would say it was bad to rub any other part of her body with one's hand. Chrysippus in his *Republic* holds the belief that a father should have children by his daughter, a mother by her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato declared, more generally, that wives should be held in common.
3.206		

9 Both replies quote Euripides' *Bacchae* (836 and 317–318).

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ἐπάρατον ὂν παρ' ἡμῖν ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει· καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ὧς ἀγαθῷ τινι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ κακῷ πυνθανόμεθα.	And masturbation, which is detestable among us, Zeno does not disapprove of; and we hear that others too make use of this bad thing as if it were something good.
3.207	ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωπείων γεύεσθαι σαρκῶν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἄθεσμον, παρ' ὅλοις δὲ βαρβάροις ἔθνεσιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους λέγειν, ὅπου καὶ ὁ Τυδεὺς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ πολεμίου λέγεται φαγεῖν, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναί φασι τὸ σάρκας τινὰ ἐσθίειν ἄλλων τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ;	Again, tasting human flesh is unlawful among us, but among whole foreign nations it is indifferent. And why speak of foreigners, when even Tydeus is said to have eaten his enemy's brain, and the Stoics say it is not out of place for someone to eat the flesh of other people and of himself?[10]
3.208	τό τε ἀνθρωπείῳ μιαίνειν αἵματι βωμὸν θεοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄθεσμον, Λάκωνες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς Ὀρθωσίας Ἀρτέμιδος μαστίζονται πικρῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολλὴν αἵματος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς θεοῦ γενέσθαι ῥύσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπόν τινες, καθάπερ καὶ Σκύθαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς ξένους· ἡμεῖς δὲ χραίνεσθαι τὰ ἱερὰ δοκοῦμεν ἀνθρώπου φόνῳ.	To stain a god's altar with human blood is, among us, unlawful in most people's view; but the Spartans are flogged bitterly at the altar of Artemis Orthosia so that a great stream of blood may flow over the goddess's altar. Some, too, sacrifice a human being to Cronus, just as the Scythians sacrifice strangers to Artemis; whereas we think that holy places are defiled by the killing of a human being.
3.209	τούς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος, παρὰ δέ τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς τῶν ἑτέρων γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι· καὶ φιλοσόφων δέ τινές φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.	Among us the law punishes adulterers, but among some peoples it is indifferent to have sex with other men's wives; and some philosophers too say that having sex with another man's wife is indifferent.
3.210	τοὺς πατέρας τε ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελείας ἀξιοῦσθαι κελεύει παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος· οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γενομένους αὐτοὺς ἀποσφάττουσιν. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, εἴγε ὁ μὲν Κρόνος τῇ ἅρπῃ τὰ αἰδοῖα ἐξέτεμε τοῦ πατρός, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς τὸν Κρόνον κατεταρτάρωσεν, ἡ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ μετὰ Ἥρας καὶ Ποσειδῶνος τὸν πατέρα δεσμεύειν ἐπεχείρησεν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ὁ Κρόνος ἀναιρεῖν ἔκρινεν,	Among us the law commands that fathers should receive care from their children; but the Scythians cut their throats once they are past sixty. And what is surprising in that, if Cronus cut off his father's genitals with a sickle, Zeus cast Cronus down into Tartarus, and Athena, with Hera and Poseidon, tried to put her father in chains? Cronus, too, decided to do away with his own children,
3.211	καὶ ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀκρίτων νόμον ἔθετο, καθ' ὃν φονεύειν ἑκάστῳ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν· παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας φονεύειν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι. οἵ τε Ῥωμαίων νομοθέται τοὺς παῖδας ὑποχειρίους καὶ δούλους τῶν πατέρων κελεύουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν παίδων μὴ κυριεύειν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐλευθερίας οἱ παῖδες τύχωσι κατὰ τούς ἀργυρωνήτους· παρ' ἑτέροις δὲ ὡς τυραννικὸν τοῦτο ἐκβέβληται.	and Solon gave the Athenians his law on acts not liable to trial, under which he allowed each man to kill his own child; whereas among us the laws forbid killing children. The Roman lawgivers order children to be subject to their fathers, and their slaves, and the children's property to be controlled not by the children but by the fathers, until the children obtain their freedom, as bought slaves do; but among others this has been rejected as tyrannical.
3.212	νόμος τέ ἐστι τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους κολάζεσθαι· οἱ μονομάχαι δὲ φονεύοντες πολλάκις καὶ τιμῆς	It is the law that murderers are punished; but gladiators who kill are often even honored. Again, the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τύπτειν ἐλευθέρους οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν· οἱ ἀθληταὶ δὲ τύπτοντες ἐλευθέρους ἄνδρας, πολλάκις ⟨δὲ⟩ καὶ ἀναιροῦντες, τιμῶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιοῦνται.	laws forbid striking free men; but athletes who strike free men, ⟨and⟩ often even kill them, are thought worthy of honors and crowns.
3.213	νόμος τε παρ' ἡμὶν κελεύει μιᾷ συνοικεῖν ἕκαστον, Θρᾳκῶν δὲ καὶ Γαιτούλων (Λιβύων δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο) πολλαῖς ἕκαστος συνοικεῖ.	Among us the law orders each man to live with one wife, but among the Thracians and the Gaetulians (a Libyan people) each man lives with many.
3.214	τό τε λῃστεύειν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν παράνομον καὶ ἄδικόν ἐστι, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ ἄτοπον. φασὶ δέ, ὅτι καὶ εὐκλεὲς τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἐν λῃστείᾳ τελευτήσαντας τιμῆς ἀξίους εἶναι δοκεῖν. καὶ ὁ Νέστωρ δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, μετὰ τὸ φιλοφρονήσασθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦ μαψιδίως ἀλάλησθε / οἷά τε λῃστῆρες; καίτοι εἰ ἄτοπον ἦν τὸ λῃστεύειν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως αὐτοὺς φιλοφρονησάμενος διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν, μὴ ἄρα τοιοῦτοί τινες εἶεν.	Piracy is illegal and unjust among us, but among many foreign peoples it is not thought out of place. They say the Cilicians even considered it glorious, so that those who died while raiding were thought worthy of honor. And Nestor in the poet, after welcoming Telemachus and his companions warmly, says to them: "Or do you wander at random, / like pirates?" Yet if piracy were out of place, he would not have welcomed them so warmly while suspecting that they might be people of that kind.
3.215	ἀλλὰ καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ κλέπτειν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἄδικον καὶ παράνομόν ἐστιν· οἱ δὲ καὶ κλεπτίστατον εἶναι θεὸν λέγοντες τὸν Ἑρμῆν οὐκ ἄδικον τοῦτο νομίζεσθαι ποιοῦσιν (πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη κακός;). φασὶ δέ τινες, ὅτι καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τοὺς κλέψαντας ἐκόλαζον οὐ διὰ τὸ κεκλοφέναι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πεφωρᾶσθαι.	Again, ⟨stealing⟩ is unjust and illegal among us; but those who say that Hermes is the most thieving of gods make it seem not unjust (for how could a god be bad?). And some say that the Spartans too punished thieves not for having stolen but for having been caught.
3.216	ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ὁ ῥίψασπις ἀνὴρ κολάζεται παρὰ πολλοῖς νόμῳ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῷ παιδὶ ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἐξιόντι διδοῦσα Λάκαινα 'σὺ ἔφη, 'τέκνον, ἢ ταύταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύταν'. Ἀρχίλοχος δέ, ὥσπερ σεμνυνόμενος ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν ἀσπίδα ῥίψας φυγεῖν, ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων, αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος.	Again, in many places the law punishes the coward and the man who throws away his shield. That is why the Spartan woman, handing her son his shield as he set out for war, said, "Either with this, my child, or on this." But Archilochus, as if boasting to us about having thrown away his shield and run, says of himself in his poems: "Some Saian delights in my shield, which beside a bush I left—a blameless weapon—against my will; but I myself escaped the end of death."[11]
3.217	αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες καὶ ἐχώλευον τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν γεννωμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνδρεῖον αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι δύνασθαι, περὶ πόλεμον δὲ ἔσχον αὐταί, τοῦ ἐναντίου παρ' ἡμῖν καλῶς ἔχειν νενομισμένου. καὶ ἡ μήτηρ δὲ τῶν θεῶν προσίεται τοὺς θηλυδρίας, οὐκ ἂν οὕτω κρίνασα ἡ θεός, εἴγε φύσει φαῦλον ἦν τὸ μὴ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.	The Amazons even lamed the male children they bore, so that they would be unable to do anything manly, while they themselves took charge of war—though among us the opposite is considered right. And the mother of the gods accepts her castrated priests; the goddess would not have judged so if not being manly were bad by nature.[12]
3.218	οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καλοῦ πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει. Καὶ τὰ περὶ	So too, views about what is just and unjust, and about what is fine in the matter of courage, show

10 Tydeus, one of the Seven against Thebes, was said to have eaten the brain of his enemy Melanippus as he lay dying.
11 The Saians were a Thracian tribe against whom Archilochus (seventh century BC) fought.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν ⟨θεραπείας⟩ πεπλήρωται πολλῆς διαφωνίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Διαγόραν τὸν Μήλιον καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον. καὶ τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναμένων οἱ μὲν τοὺς πατρίους νομίζουσι θεούς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δογματικαῖς αἱρέσεσιν ἀναπλασσομένους, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ἀσώματον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Στωικοὶ δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, Ξενοφάνης δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ.	great variation. Matters of piety and the ⟨worship⟩ of the gods are also full of disagreement. Most people say that there are gods, but some say there are not, like Diagoras of Melos, Theodorus, and Critias of Athens. And of those who have declared that there are gods, some believe in their ancestral gods, others in the gods fashioned in the dogmatic schools. Aristotle, for instance, said that god is incorporeal and the limit of the heavens; the Stoics, that he is a breath pervading even ugly things; Epicurus, that he has human shape; Xenophanes, that he is an impassive sphere.
3.219	καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, οἱ δὲ μὴ προνοεῖν· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ὁ Ἐπίκουρός φησί μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε ἑτέροις παρέχειν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἱ μὲν ἕνα φασὶν εἶναι θεόν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς μορφαῖς, ὡς καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπολήψεις ἐμπίπτειν, κυνοπροσώπους καὶ ἱερακομόρφους καὶ βόας καὶ κροκοδείλους καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ νομιζόντων τοὺς θεούς.	Some say that the gods provide for our affairs, others that they do not; for Epicurus says that what is blessed and indestructible neither has troubles itself nor causes them for others. Hence among ordinary people too, some say there is one god, others that there are many, of differing shapes—so much so that they even fall into the beliefs of the Egyptians, who think the gods are dog-faced, hawk-shaped, cows, crocodiles and what not.
3.220	ὅθεν καὶ τὰ περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς θρησκείας ὅλως πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει· ἃ γὰρ ἔν τισιν ἱεροῖς ⟨νομίζεται⟩ ὅσια, ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνόσια. καίτοι εἰ φύσει τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο ἐνομίσθη. οἷον γοῦν Σαράπιδι χοῖρον οὐκ ἂν θύσειέ τις, Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῷ θύουσιν. πρόβατον Ἴσιδι θύειν ἄθεσμον, τῇ μητρὶ μέντοι λεγομένῃ τῶν θεῶν καὶ θεοῖς ἄλλοις καλλιερεῖται.	Hence matters of sacrifice, and the worship of the gods in general, also show great variation. What ⟨is considered⟩ holy in some temples is unholy in others. Yet if the holy and the unholy were so by nature, this would not have been believed. For instance, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but people do sacrifice pigs to Heracles and Asclepius. To sacrifice a sheep to Isis is unlawful, but sheep are offered with good omens to the so-called mother of the gods and to other gods.
3.221	ται. ⟨...⟩ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπον, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζεται. αἴλουρον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῷ Ὥρῳ θύουσι, καὶ Θέτιδι σίλφην· ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις. ἵππον τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καλλιεροῦσιν· Ἀπόλλωνι δέ, ἐξαιρέτως τῷ Διδυμαίῳ, τὸ ζῷον ἀπεχθές. αἶγας Ἀρτέμιδι θύειν εὐσεβές, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀσκληπιῷ.	⟨...⟩ sacrifice a human being to Cronus, which most people consider impious. In Alexandria they sacrifice a cat to Horus, and to Thetis a beetle—something no one among us would do. They offer a horse to Poseidon with good omens; but to Apollo, especially Apollo of Didyma, the animal is hateful. To sacrifice goats to Artemis is pious, but not to Asclepius.
3.222	καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ λέγειν ἔχων ἐῶ, τῆς συντομίας στοχαζόμενος. εἰ μέντοι τι ἦν ὅσιον φύσει θῦμα καὶ ἀνόσιον, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο. Παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν εὑρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θρησκείᾳ περὶ τοὺς θεούς.	I could cite a great many more examples like these, but I leave them aside, aiming at brevity. Yet if any sacrifice were holy or unholy by nature, it would be considered so by everyone alike. Similar things can also be found in people's religious observances about diet.

12 The mother of the gods (Cybele) was served by the Galli, eunuch priests who dressed as women.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.223	Ἰουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἱερεὺς Αἰγύπτιος θᾶττον ἂν ἀποθάνοι ἢ χοίρειον φάγοι, Λίβυς δὲ προβατείου γεύσασθαι κρέως τῶν ἀθεσμοτάτων εἶναι δοκεῖ, Σύρων δέ τινες περιστερᾶς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἱερείων. ἰχθῦς τε ἐν τισὶ μὲν ἱεροῖς θέμις ἐσθίειν, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἀσεβές. Αἰγυπτίων τε τῶν σοφῶν εἶναι νενομισμένων οἱ μὲν κεφαλὴν ζῴου φαγεῖν ἀνίερον εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠμοπλάτην, οἱ δὲ πόδα, οἱ δὲ κρόμμυον τι.	A Jew or an Egyptian priest would sooner die than eat pork; for a Libyan, tasting mutton seems among the most unlawful of things; for some Syrians, tasting dove, and for others, sacrificial victims. In some cults it is lawful to eat fish, in others impious. And among the Egyptians who are reputed to be wise, some think it unholy to eat an animal's head, others the shoulder blade, others the foot, others an onion.
3.224	κρόμμυον δὲ οὐκ ἄν τις προσενέγκαιτο τῶν καθιερουμένων τῷ κατὰ Πηλούσιον Κασίῳ Διί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἱερεὺς τῆς κατὰ Λιβύην Ἀφροδίτης σκόρδου γεύσαιτο ἄν. ἀπέχονται δὲ ἐν ⟨οἷς⟩ μὲν ἱεροῖς μίνθης, ἐν οἷς ἡδυόσμου, ἐν οἷς δὲ σελίνου. ἔνιοι δὲ θᾶττον ἂν τὰς κεφαλὰς φαγεῖν φασι τῶν πατέρων ἢ κυάμους. ἀλλὰ παρ' ἑτέροις ταῦτα ἀδιάφορα.	No one consecrated to Zeus Casius at Pelusium would take an onion, just as a priest of Aphrodite in Libya would not taste garlic. In some temples they abstain from mint, in others from garden mint, in others from celery. Some say they would sooner eat their fathers' heads than beans. But among others these things are indifferent.
3.225	κυνείων τε γεύσασθαι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀνίερον εἶναι, Θρᾳκῶν δὲ ἔνιοι κυνοφαγεῖν ἱστοροῦνται. ἴσως δὲ καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησι τοῦτο ἦν σύνηθες· διόπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ὁρμώμενος τισὶ τῶν πασχόντων σκυλάκεια δίδοσθαι κελεύει κρέα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων σάρκας, ὡς ἔφην, ἀδιαφόρως ἐσθίουσιν, ὅπερ ἀνίερον παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι νενόμισται.	We think it unholy to taste dog meat, but some Thracians are reported to eat dogs. Perhaps this was customary among the Greeks too; that is why Diocles, drawing on the Asclepiads' teachings, prescribes that puppy meat be given to certain patients. And some, as I said, eat human flesh without concern, which among us is considered unholy.[13]
3.226	καίτοι εἴγε ἦν φύσει τὰ τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τῶν ἀθέσμων, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο. Παραπλήσια δὲ ἔστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τοὺς κατοιχομένους ὁσιότητος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁλοκλήρως περιστείλαντες τοὺς ἀποθανόντας γῇ καλύπτουσιν, ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζοντες ἡλίῳ δεικνύειν αὐτούς· Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὰ ἔντερα ἐξελόντες ταριχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ σὺν ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ γῆς ἔχουσιν.	Yet if matters of worship and of what is unlawful were so by nature, they would be considered the same by everyone. Similar things can be said about reverence toward the dead. Some wrap the dead completely and cover them with earth, thinking it impious to show them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out the entrails, embalm them, and keep them above ground with them.
3.227	Αἰθιόπων δὲ οἱ ἰχθυοφάγοι εἰς τὰς λίμνας ἐμβάλλουσιν αὐτούς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων βρωθησομένους· Υρκανοὶ δὲ κυσὶν αὐτοὺς ἐκτίθενται βοράν, Ἰνδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν. Τρωγλοδύτας δέ φασιν ἐπί τινα γεώλοφον ἄγειν τὸν ἀποθανόντα, εἶτα δεσμεύσαντας αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν πρὸς τοὺς πόδας λίθοις βάλλειν μετὰ γέλωτος, εἶθ' ὅταν χώσωσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς βαλλομένοις ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι.	The Fish-eaters of Ethiopia throw them into the lakes to be eaten by the fish; the Hyrcanians put them out as food for dogs, and some Indians for vultures. The Troglodytes, they say, take the dead person to a hill, tie his head to his feet, and pelt him with stones, laughing; then, when they have buried him under the stones they have thrown, they go away.
3.228	τινὲς δὲ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας θύσαντες ἐσθίουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νεότητι ἀποθανόντας γῇ κρύπτουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καίουσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας· ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῶν τὰ ὀστέα κηδεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ	Some foreign peoples sacrifice and eat those who are over sixty, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn their dead; of these, some gather up the bones and give them burial, while others

13 Diocles of Carystus was a fourth-century BC physician; the Asclepiads were the medical guild that traced itself back to Asclepius.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀφροντίστως καταλείπουσιν ἐρριμμένα. Πέρσας δέ φασιν ἀνασκολοπίζειν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας καὶ νίτρῳ ταριχεύειν, εἶθ' οὕτω τελαμῶσι συνειλεῖν. ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσον πένθος ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπομένουσιν ὁρῶμεν.	carelessly leave them lying scattered. The Persians, they say, impale their dead and embalm them with natron, and then wrap them in bandages. And we see how much grief others endure over the dead.
3.229	καὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ φευκτόν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν. τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, / τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται; καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δέ φησιν 'ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.' φασὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς εἴπερ συνεστήκαμεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁ δὲ θάνατος διάλυσίς ἐστι ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὅτε μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος (οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα), ὅτε δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς· τῷ γὰρ μηκέτι τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν.	Death itself, too, some think terrible and to be avoided, others not. Euripides, for one, says: "Who knows whether living is being dead, / and being dead is counted living down below?" And Epicurus says: "Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us." They also say that if we are composed of soul and body, and death is the dissolution of soul and body, then when we exist death does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and when death exists we do not exist; for since the combination of soul and body no longer exists, neither do we.
3.230	ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά, τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ κακῶν πεπαυμένον χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπολήψεως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται·	Heraclitus says that both living and dying are present both in our living and in our being dead. For when we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; and when we die, our souls come back to life and live. Some even suppose that dying is better for us than living. Euripides, for one, says: "We ought to gather together and mourn the newborn for all the ills he is entering, but the one who has died and ceased from troubles to send forth from the house with joy and words of blessing." And these lines too were spoken from the same view:
3.231	ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον, / μηδ' ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου, φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι καὶ κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γαῖαν ἐφεσσάμενον. καὶ τὰ περὶ Κλέοβιν δὲ καὶ Βίτωνα ἴσμεν, ἅ φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱερείας λόγῳ.	"Best of all for mortals is never to be born, / nor to see the rays of the piercing sun; but once born, to pass as quickly as may be through the gates of Hades, and lie with much earth heaped over one." And we know the story of Cleobis and Biton, which Herodotus tells in his account of the priestess of Argos.[14]
3.232	ἱστοροῦνται δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν ἔνιοι περικαθεσθέντες τὸν γεννηθέντα θρηνεῖν. οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος οὖν τῶν φύσει δεινῶν εἶναι νομίζοιτο ἄν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν τῶν φύσει καλῶν. οὐδὲ τῶν προειρημένων τι ἐστὶ φύσει τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, νομιστὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ πρός τι.	Some Thracians, too, are reported to sit around a newborn child and lament. So death would not be considered one of the things that are terrible by nature, just as living is not one of the things that are fine by nature. Nor, then, is any of the things

14 Herodotus (1.31): after the brothers drew their mother, a priestess of Hera, to the temple by cart, the goddess granted them the best gift for mortals—death in their sleep.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		mentioned above by nature of this kind or that; all are matters of convention and relative.
3.233	Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μεταφέρειν ἔστι καὶ ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ μὴ ἐξεθέμεθα νῦν διὰ τὴν συντομίαν τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ περί τινων μὴ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν αὐτόθεν ἀνωμαλίαν, λεκτέον, ὅτι ἔν τισιν ἔθνεσιν ἀγνοουμένοις ἡμῖν ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τούτων εἶναι διαφωνίαν.	The same method of argument can be carried over to each of the other cases, which we have not set out now, to keep the account brief. And even if there are some matters about which we cannot point to variation straight away, we must say that it is possible that there is disagreement about these too among some peoples unknown to us.
3.234	ὡς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἐγιγνώσκομεν, εἰ τύχοι, τὸ περὶ τοῦ τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔθος, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς διεβεβαιούμεθα ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκείνων, ἐν οἷς οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσιν ἡμῖν ἀνωμαλίαι, διαβεβαιοῦσθαι προσήκει μὴ εἶναι διαφωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐνδεχομένου, καθάπερ ἔφην, τοῦ παρά τισιν ἔθνεσι τῶν ἡμῖν μὴ γινωσκομένων τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.	If, say, we did not know the Egyptian custom of marrying sisters, we would be wrong to affirm that it is agreed by everyone that one should not marry one's sisters. In the same way, about those matters in which no variations come to our notice, it is not proper to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, since it is possible, as I said, that among some of the peoples unknown to us there is disagreement about them.

THE SKEPTIC'S MODERATE FEELING

Without beliefs about natural good and bad, the skeptic suffers only moderately and avoids added turmoil.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.235	Ὁ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον εἶναι, κἀν τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος προπετείας, ἔπεται δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς μένει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ·	The skeptic, then, seeing so much variation in things, suspends judgment about whether anything is by nature good or bad, or in general to be done, and in this he keeps clear of the dogmatists' rashness. He follows the observance of everyday life without holding beliefs, and for this reason he remains unaffected in matters of belief, while in matters forced upon him he has moderate feeling.
3.236	ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικὸς πάσχει, μὴ προσδοξάζων δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο ὃ πάσχει κακόν ἐστι φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστῶτας διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν.	For as a human being with senses he is affected; but since he does not add the belief that what he is undergoing is bad by nature, his feeling is moderate. For adding a belief of that kind is worse than the actual undergoing: sometimes people who are being operated on, or undergoing something of the sort, bear it, while the bystanders faint because of their belief that what is happening is bad.
3.237	ὁ μέντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταράσσεται ποικίλως. καὶ γὰρ παρόντων αὐτῷ τούτων ἃ νομίζει φύσει κακὰ εἶναι ποινηλατεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ γινόμενος ἐγκρατὴς ὑπό τε τοῦ τύφου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν φόβου, [καὶ] εὐλαβούμενος μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς	But the person who has posited that something is by nature good or bad, or in general to be done or not to be done, is troubled in all sorts of ways. When the things he thinks bad by nature are present to him, he thinks he is being hounded by avengers; and when he gets hold of what seem to him good things, he falls into no ordinary troubles, both from conceit and from fear of losing

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	νομιζομένοις παρ' αὐτῷ γένηται, ταραχαῖς οὐχὶ ταῖς τυχούσαις περιπίπτει·	them, [and] being anxious that he may again find himself among the things he considers bad by nature.
3.238	τοὺς γὰρ ἀναπόβλητα εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λέγοντας ἐφέξομεν ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὅθεν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ τὸ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν κακόν ἐστι καὶ φευκτόν, ἡ δὲ πεποίθησις τοῦ τάδε μὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθά, τάδε δὲ κακὰ ταραχὰς ποιεῖ, κακόν ἐστι καὶ φευκτὸν τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ πεποιθέναι φαῦλόν τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκεῖ λελέχθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων·	As for those who say that goods cannot be lost, we shall bring them to a standstill with the impasse that arises from the disagreement. Hence we conclude that if what produces something bad is bad and to be avoided, and the conviction that these things are good by nature and those bad produces troubles, then positing and being convinced that anything is bad or good in its nature is bad and to be avoided. That is enough, for now, about good, bad and indifferent things.

CHAPTER 25: WHETHER THERE IS AN ART OF LIVING

The art of living has no specific works, and the Stoics' own precepts are monstrous.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.239	Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὅτι οὐδὲ τέχνη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν βίον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοιαύτη τέχνη, περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἔχει· διὸ τούτων ἀνυπάρκτων ὄντων ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ μὴ ὁμοφώνως μίαν ἀπολείπουσι πάντες οἱ δογματικοὶ τέχνην περὶ βίον, ἀλλ' ἄλλοι ἄλλην ὑποτίθενται, ὑποπίπτουσι τῇ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας λόγῳ, ὃν ἠρώτησα ἐν τοῖς περὶ τἀγαθοῦ λελεγμένοις ἡμῖν.	It is clear from what has been said that there could not be any art of living either. For if there is such an art, it is concerned with the study of good, bad and indifferent things; so, since these do not exist, the art of living does not exist either. Besides, since the dogmatists do not all agree in recognizing a single art of living, but different ones posit different arts, they fall under the disagreement and the argument from disagreement that I put forward in what we said about the good.
3.240	εἰ μέντοι καὶ μίαν εἶναι πάντες λέγοιεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, οἷον τὴν ἀοίδιμον φρόνησιν, ἥτις ὀνειροπολεῖται μὲν παρὰ Στωικοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ πληκτικωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀτοπίαι παρακολουθήσουσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἀρετή, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ Στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ οὐχ	But even if, for the sake of hypothesis, they all said that the art of living is one—for instance, the celebrated practical wisdom that the Stoics dream about, which seems more impressive than the others—absurdities will follow just the same. For since practical wisdom is an excellence, and only the wise man had excellence, the Stoics, not being wise, will not
3.241	ἕξουσι τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. ὅλως τε, ἐπεὶ μὴ δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑποστῆναι τέχνη, οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν βίον ἔσται τέχνη τις ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν. οἷον γοῦν τέχνην εἶναί φασι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, κατάληψιν δὲ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν. ἀνεύρετος δέ ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία καταληπτική ἐστιν, οὔτε ποία τίς ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ἐπιγνωσθῆναι δύναται, ἐπεὶ μήτε πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ δυνάμεθα κρίνειν ἁπλῶς, τίς μέν ἐστι καταληπτική, τίς δὲ οὐ τοιαύτη, χρῄζοντές τε καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία εἰς ἄπειρον	have the art of living. And in general, since according to them an art cannot exist, there will not be an art of living either, as far as what they say goes. For instance, they say that an art is a system of apprehensions, and that an apprehension is assent to an apprehensive impression. But the apprehensive impression cannot be found. For not every impression is apprehensive, nor can it be recognized which of the impressions is the apprehensive one, since we cannot simply judge by any impression whatever which is apprehensive and

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐκβαλλόμεθα, εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς λαμβανομένης ὡς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἄλλην αἰτούμενοι.	which is not. And since we need an apprehensive impression in order to recognize which is the apprehensive impression, we are thrown into an infinite regress, demanding another apprehensive impression to recognize the one taken to be apprehensive.
3.242	ταῦτά τοι καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐννοίας ἀποδόσει οὐχ ὑγιῶς φέρονται· καταληπτικὴν μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν λέγοντες τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος γινομένην, ὑπάρχον δὲ εἶναι λέγοντες ὃ οἷόν τε κινεῖν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπον. εἰ τοίνυν, ἵνα μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον ᾖ τις τέχνη, δεῖ πρότερον εἶναι τέχνην, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ τέχνη, κατάληψιν προυφεστάναι, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ κατάληψις, καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν κατειλῆφθαι, ἀνεύρετος δέ ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.	That is why the Stoics too go astray in setting out the concept of the apprehensive impression. They say that an apprehensive impression is one that comes from what is real, and that what is real is what is capable of producing an apprehensive impression; and so they fall into the mode of reciprocity. If, then, for there to be an art of living there must first be an art, and for an art to exist apprehension must already exist, and for apprehension to exist assent to an apprehensive impression must have been apprehended, but the apprehensive impression cannot be found, then the art of living cannot be found.
3.243	Ἔτι κἀκεῖνο λέγεται. πᾶσα τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίως ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἀποδιδομένων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν ἴδιον ἔργον τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνης· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἔργον εἶναι ταύτης λέγῃ τις, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὑρίσκεται καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, οἷον τὸ τιμᾶν γονεῖς, τὸ παραθήκας ἀποδιδόναι, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ φρονίμης διαθέσεως φαίνεσθαι γινόμενόν τι ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου ἢ ποιούμενον (ὡς φασί τινες) ἐπιγνωσόμεθα, ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως ἔργον ἐστίν.	This too is said. Every art seems to be apprehended from the works it specifically produces; but there is no work specific to the art of living. For whatever one says is its work turns out to be common to ordinary people as well—honoring one’s parents, for instance, returning deposits, and all the rest. So there is no art of living. Nor shall we recognize that something is a work of practical wisdom from the fact that it appears to be done or produced by the practically wise man from a wise disposition (as some say).
3.244	αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις ἀκατάληπτός ἐστι, μήτε ἐξ αὐτῆς ἁπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς· κοινὰ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. τό τε λέγειν, ὅτι τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμβάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγγομένων ἐστὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ εὐχομένων μᾶλλον ἢ τἀληθῆ λεγόντων· τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων / οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.	For the wise disposition itself is inapprehensible, since it appears neither from itself, simply and directly, nor from its works; for these are common to ordinary people too. And to say that we apprehend the person who has the art of living by the consistency of his actions is the talk of people who overrate human nature and are praying rather than telling the truth: “For such is the mind of men upon the earth / as the day the father of men and gods brings on them.”
3.245	Λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνων ⟨τῶν⟩ ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἅπερ ἀναγράφουσιν ἐν ταῖς βίβλοις· ὧν πολλῶν καὶ παραπλησίων ἀλλήλοις ὄντων ὀλίγα ἐκθήσομαι παραδείγματος χάριν. οἷον γοῦν ὁ αἱρεσιάρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησι περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τάδε ‘διαμηρίζειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον	It remains to say that the art of living is apprehended from the works they record in their books. Since these are many and similar to one another, I shall set out a few by way of example. For instance, the founder of their school, Zeno, in his *Discourses*, says this, among other similar things, about the upbringing of boys: “Have intercourse

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικά, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἐν παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά ἐστιν'.	between the thighs no more and no less with a beloved than with one who is not a beloved, nor with females than with males; for it makes no difference whether with beloveds or not, or with females or males, but the same things are fitting and suitable."
3.246	περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς ὁσιότητος ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰοκάστην καὶ τὸν Οἰδίποδα, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τρίβειν τὴν μητέρα. 'καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερόν τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος τρίψας ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα μέρη τρίψας εὔφραινεν, ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν;' τούτοις δὲ ὁμογνωμονεῖ καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος· ἐν γοῦν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φησὶ 'δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτω διεξάγειν, καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἴθισται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας'.	On piety toward parents, the same man says, with reference to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing terrible in his rubbing his mother. "If, when she was ill, he had helped her by rubbing some other part of her body with his hands, there would be nothing shameful in it. Then if he gave her pleasure by rubbing other parts, putting an end to her distress, and begot noble children by his mother, was that shameful?" Chrysippus agrees with this. In his *Republic*, at any rate, he says: "It seems to me right to arrange these matters too in the way that is customary even now, and not wrongly, among many peoples: so that a mother has children by her son, a father by his daughter, and a brother by his sister born of the same mother."
3.247	καὶ ⟨συνεχῶς καὶ τὸ⟩ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντάγμασιν ἡμῖν ἐπεισάγει· φησὶ γοῦν 'καὶ ἐὰν τῶν ζώντων ἀποκοπῇ τι μέρος πρὸς τροφὴν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ῥίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερον μέρος γένηται'.	And in the same treatises he ⟨repeatedly⟩ introduces ⟨even⟩ cannibalism to us. At any rate he says: "And if a part useful for food is cut off from the living, we should neither bury it nor throw it away in some other manner, but consume it, so that from our parts another part may come into being."
3.248	ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς ῥητῶς φησιν ' ἀπογενομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἁπλουστάταις, ὡς ἂν τοῦ σώματος, καθάπερ ὀνύχων ἢ ὀδόντων ἢ τριχῶν, οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιστροφῆς ἢ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῇ χρήσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος, ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις· ἀχρείων δὲ ὄντων ἢ κατορύξαντες ἐάσουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ῥίψαντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφὴν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.'	In his work *On What Is Appropriate*, on the burial of parents, he says explicitly: "When our parents have passed away, we should use the simplest burials, since the body, like nails or teeth or hair, is nothing to us, and we do not need to pay any such attention or care. So if the flesh is useful, they will use it for food, just as with one's own parts—for instance, if a foot is cut off, it would be fitting to use it and the like. But if it is useless, they will either bury it and leave it, or burn it and let the ashes go, or throw it far away and pay it no more attention than a nail or hair."
3.249	τοιαῦτα μὲν πλεῖστα ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· ἅπερ οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν διαπράττεσθαι, εἴγε μὴ παρὰ Κύκλωψιν ἢ Λαιστρυγόσι πολιτεύοιντο. εἰ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασίν εἰσιν, ἃ δὲ πράττουσι, κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἴδιον ἔργον ἐστὶ τῶν ἔχειν ὑποπτευομένων τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. εἰ οὖν αἱ μὲν	The philosophers say a great many things of this sort—things they would not dare to put into practice unless they lived as citizens among the Cyclopes or the Laestrygonians. And if they never act on these at all, while what they do is common to ordinary people too, there is no work specific to

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τέχναι πάντως ὀφείλουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴδιον ἔργον ὁρᾶται τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένης τέχνης, οὐ καταλαμβάνεται αὕτη. διόπερ οὐδὲ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς δύναταί τις, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπαρκτή.	those suspected of having the art of living. So if arts must in every case be apprehended from their specific works, and no specific work is seen for the so-called art of living, it is not apprehended. That is why no one can affirm about it that it is real.[15]

CHAPTER 26: WHETHER THE ART OF LIVING ARISES IN HUMAN BEINGS

The art of living cannot belong to humans by nature, since most are bad.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.250	Καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἤτοι φύσει ἐγγίνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φύσει, ἤτοι καθό εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι ἐγγίνοιτο ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἢ καθὸ οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι. εἰ δὲ καθό εἰσιν ἄνθρωποί, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπῆρξεν ἂν ἡ φρόνησις, ὥς πάντας εἶναι φρονίμους τε καὶ ἐναρέτους καὶ σοφούς.	Moreover, if the art of living arises in human beings, it arises in them either by nature or through learning and teaching. If by nature, the art of living would arise in them either insofar as they are human beings or insofar as they are not human beings. Insofar as they are not human beings, not at all—for it is not the case that they are not human beings. If insofar as they are human beings, then practical wisdom would belong to all human beings, so that all would be practically wise, excellent and wise.
3.251	φαύλους δὲ τοὺς πλείστους λέγουσιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ καθό εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι ὑπάρξειεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὐδὲ φύσει ἄρα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπειδὴ τὴν τέχνην σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων εἶναι βούλονται συγγεγυμνασμένων, διὰ πείρας τέ τινος καὶ μαθήσεως ἐμφαίνουσι μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι τάς τε ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ ταύτην περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος.	But they say that most people are bad. So the art of living would not belong to them insofar as they are human beings either; and so not by nature. Besides, since they hold that an art is a system of apprehensions exercised together, they suggest rather that the other arts, and the one under discussion too, are acquired through some experience and learning.

CHAPTER 27: WHETHER THE ART OF LIVING IS TEACHABLE

Teaching requires a subject taught, a teacher and learner, and a method.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.252	Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ μαθήσει ἀναλαμβάνεται. ἵνα γὰρ ὑπόστασιν ἔχῃ ταῦτα, δεῖ τρία προωμολογῆσθαι, τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα, τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὑφέστηκεν· οὐδὲ ἡ διδασκαλία ἄρα.	But it is not acquired by teaching and learning either. For these to exist, three things must first be agreed: the thing taught, the teacher and the learner, and the method of learning. But none of these exists; so neither does teaching.

CHAPTER 28: WHETHER ANYTHING IS TAUGHT

Neither the true nor the false, the apparent nor the non-evident, can be taught.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.253	Οἷον γοῦν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἤτοι ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψεῦδος· καὶ εἰ μὲν ψεῦδος, οὐκ ἂν διδάσκοιτο· ἀνύπαρκτον γάρ	For instance, what is taught is either true or false. If it is false, it would not be taught; for they say the

15 The Cyclopes and Laestrygonians are the man-eating giants of Homer's *Odyssey*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	φασιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀνυπάρκτων δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδασκαλία. ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγοιτο· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, ὑπεμνήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ψεῦδος μήτε τὸ ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα διδακτὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἀδιδάκτων ὄντων τοὺς ἀπόρους μόνους διδάσκειν ἐρεῖ τις), οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.	false does not exist, and there could be no teaching of what does not exist. Nor if it were said to be true; for we pointed out in our discussion of the criterion that the true does not exist. So if neither the false nor the true is taught, and apart from these nothing is teachable (for surely no one will say that, while these cannot be taught, people teach only the puzzling things), then nothing is taught.
3.254	τό τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα ἤτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔσται διδασκαλίας δεόμενον· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄδηλα διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον περὶ αὐτῶν διαφωνίαν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἔσται διδακτόν· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καταλαμβάνει τις, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο διδάσκειν ἢ μανθάνειν δύναιτο; εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.	Again, the thing taught is either apparent or non-evident. If it is apparent, it will not need teaching, for what appears appears to everyone alike. If it is non-evident, it will not be teachable, since non-evident things are inapprehensible because of the undecidable disagreement about them, as we have often pointed out; for how could anyone teach or learn what he does not apprehend? And if neither what appears nor what is non-evident is taught, nothing is taught.
3.255	ἔτι τὸ διδασκόμενον ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον, ἑκάτερον δὲ αὐτῶν ἤτοι φαινόμενον ἢ ἀδηλούμενον ⟨ἂν⟩ οὐ δύναται διδάσκεσθαι κατὰ τὸν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένον λόγον.	Further, what is taught is either a body or incorporeal; and each of these, being either apparent or non-evident, cannot be taught, by the argument we gave a little earlier.
3.256	οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεταί τι. πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι τὸ ὂν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὂν οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι αἱ διδασκαλίαι, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἀληθὲς δὲ ὂν καὶ ὑπάρξει· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἶναί φασιν ὃ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντίκειταί τινι. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι λέγειν ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν.	So nothing is taught. Moreover, either what is is taught or what is not. Now what is not is not taught. For if what is not is taught, then, since teachings are thought to be of truths, what is not will be true. And being true, it will also be real; for they say that the true is what is real and is opposed to something. But it is absurd to say that what is not is real. So what is not is not taught.
3.257	ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ ὄν, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστι διδάσκεται ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. ἀλλ' εἰ μέν, καθό ⟨ἐστι⟩ ἔστι διδακτόν, τῶν ὄντων ἔσται, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ διδακτόν· τὰς γὰρ διδασκαλίας ἐκ τινῶν ὁμολογουμένων καὶ ἀδιδάκτων γίνεσθαι προσήκει. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν καθὸ ὄν ἐστι διδακτόν ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι.	But neither is what is. For if what is is taught, it is taught either insofar as it is or in virtue of something else. If it is teachable insofar as it ⟨is⟩, it will be one of the things that are, and for that reason not teachable; for teaching must proceed from things that are agreed and need no teaching. So what is is not teachable insofar as it is. Nor, indeed, in virtue of something else.
3.258	τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ὂν καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὐ διδάσκεται, οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστιν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴτε φαινόμενον εἴη τὸ ὂν ὃ λέξουσι διδάσκεσθαι, εἴτε ἄδηλον, ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀπορίαις ὑποπῖπτον ἀδίδακτον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὂν διδάσκεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ διδασκόμενον.	For what is has nothing else accidental to it that is not. So if what is is not taught insofar as it is, it will not be taught in virtue of anything else either; for whatever is accidental to it is. Besides, whether the being they will say is taught is apparent or non-evident, it falls under the puzzles already stated and will be unteachable. And if neither

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		what is nor what is not is taught, there is nothing that is taught.

CHAPTER 29: WHETHER THERE IS A TEACHER AND A LEARNER

Neither expert nor non-expert can teach the other, so there is no teacher.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.259	Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ὅ τε διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον καὶ κατὰ ἰδίαν ἀποροῦνται. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάσκει ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον. ὁ μὲν οὖν τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην οὐ διδάσκει· οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν, καθό ἐστι τεχνίτης, δεῖται μαθήσεως. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τυφλὸν ὁδηγεῖν δύναται τυφλός. οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην·	The teacher and the learner are overturned along with this; but they are no less puzzling taken on their own. For either the expert teaches the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the expert, or the expert the non-expert. Now the expert does not teach the expert; for neither of them, insofar as he is an expert, needs learning. Nor does the non-expert teach the non-expert, any more than the blind can lead the blind. Nor the non-expert the expert:
3.260	γελοῖον γάρ. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ὅλως γὰρ ὑποστῆναι τεχνίτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι λέγεται, ἐπεὶ μήτε αὐτοφυῶς τις καὶ ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι τεχνίτης ὑφιστάμενος βλέπεται μήτε ἐξ ἀτέχνου γίνεταί τις τεχνίτης. ἤτοι γὰρ ἓν θεώρημα καὶ μία κατάληψις δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην ἢ οὐδαμῶς.	that would be ridiculous. It remains to say that the expert teaches the non-expert; but this too is impossible. For it is said to be altogether impossible for an expert to exist, since no one is seen to be an expert spontaneously, from birth, nor does anyone become an expert from being a non-expert. For either one theorem and a single apprehension can make the non-expert an expert, or not at all.
3.261	ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν κατάληψις μία τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην ἀπεργάζεται, πρῶτον μὲν ἐνέσται λέγειν, ὅτι οὔκ ἐστι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἡ τέχνη· ὁ γὰρ μηδὲν ὅλως εἰδώς, εἰ θεώρημα διδαχθείη τέχνης, τεχνίτης ἂν οὕτω λέγοιτο εἶναι. εἶτα καὶ ἐὰν λέγῃ τις, ὡς ὁ τινὰ θεωρήματα τέχνης ἀνειληφὼς καὶ προσδεόμενος ἑνὸς ἔτι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὢν ἄτεχνος, ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο προσλάβῃ, τεχνίτης ἐξ ἀτέχνου ἀποτελεῖται ἐκ καταλήψεως μιᾶς, ἀποκληρωτικὸν λέξει.	If a single apprehension makes the non-expert an expert, then, first, it will be possible to say that an art is not a system of apprehensions; for someone who knew nothing at all would, if taught one theorem of an art, be called an expert on that basis. Then too, suppose someone says that a person who has acquired some theorems of an art and needs one more, and is for that reason a non-expert, is made an expert from a non-expert by a single apprehension if he acquires that one: he will be speaking arbitrarily.
3.262	ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο δεῖξαί τινα ἄτεχνον μὲν ἔτι, τεχνίτην δὲ ἐσόμενον, ἐὰν ἕν τι θεώρημα προσλάβῃ· οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἐξαρίθμησιν τῶν θεωρημάτων ἑκάστης τέχνης ἐπίσταταί τις, ὥστε ἀπαριθμησάμενος τὰ ἐγνωσμένα θεωρήματα, πόσα λείπεται πρὸς τὸν πλήρη τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς τέχνης ἀριθμὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν. οὐκοῦν ἑνὸς θεωρήματος γνῶσις οὐ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην.	For in particular cases he could not point to someone who is still a non-expert but will be an expert if he acquires some one theorem. Surely no one knows the count of the theorems of each art, so as to be able to tally the theorems already known and say how many are left to make up the full number of the art's theorems. So knowledge of one theorem does not make the non-expert an expert.
3.263	εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀληθές, ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα ἀθρόως τὰ θεωρήματα τῶν τεχνῶν ἀναλαμβάνει τις, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἄρα,	And if this is true, then, since no one acquires all the theorems of the arts at once, but, if at all, one

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	κατὰ ἓν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τις καὶ τοῦτο καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν διδῷ, ὁ κατὰ ἓν θεώρημα τῆς τέχνης ἀναλαμβάνειν λεγόμενος οὐκ ἂν τεχνίτης γένοιτο· ὑπεμιμνήσκομεν γάρ, ὅτι οὐ δύναται θεωρήματος ἑνὸς γνῶσις τὸν ἄτεχνον ποιῆσαι τεχνίτην. οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀτέχνου τοίνυν γίνεταί τις τεχνίτης. ὥστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φαίνεται ἀνυπόστατος εἶναι ὁ τεχνίτης. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ διδάσκων.	at a time (to grant this too for the sake of hypothesis), the person said to acquire the theorems of the art one at a time would not become an expert; for we pointed out that knowledge of a single theorem cannot make a non-expert an expert. So no one becomes an expert from being a non-expert either. Therefore, for these reasons too, the expert appears not to exist; and for this reason neither does the teacher.
3.264	ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ μανθάνειν λεγόμενος, ἄτεχνος ὤν, δύναται τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, ἧς ἐστιν ἄτεχνος, μανθάνειν τε καὶ καταλαμβάνειν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός, εἰς ὅσον ἐστὶ πηρός, οὐκ ἂν λάβοι χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφὸς ὁμοίως φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος καταλάβοι ἂν τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα ἧς ἐστιν ἄτεχνος. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς εἴη τεχνίτης τε καὶ ἄτεχνος τῶν αὐτῶν, ἄτεχνος μὲν ἐπεὶ οὕτως ὑπόκειται, τεχνίτης δὲ ἐπεὶ κατάληψιν ἔχει τῶν τῆς τέχνης θεωρημάτων.	Nor can the person said to be learning, being a non-expert, learn and apprehend the theorems of the art in which he is a non-expert. Someone blind from birth, insofar as he is blind, could not get a perception of colors, nor likewise someone deaf from birth a perception of sound; just so, the non-expert could not apprehend the theorems of the art in which he is a non-expert. For in that case the same person would be both an expert and a non-expert in the same things: a non-expert, since that is the hypothesis, and an expert, since he has apprehension of the art’s theorems.
3.265	ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον διδάσκει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάσκει μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὔτε ὁ διδάσκων ἔστιν οὔτε ὁ διδασκόμενος.	So the expert does not teach the non-expert either. And if neither the expert teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non-expert, nor the non-expert the expert, nor the expert the non-expert, and apart from these there is nothing, then there is neither a teacher nor a person taught.

CHAPTER 30: WHETHER THERE IS ANY METHOD OF LEARNING

Teaching works neither by clarity nor by speech, so there is no method of learning.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Μὴ ὄντος δὲ μήτε τοῦ μανθάνοντος μήτε τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας παρέλκει.	Since there is neither learner nor teacher, the method of teaching is superfluous as well.
3.266	Οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον καὶ ⟨οὗτος⟩ διὰ τούτων ἀπορεῖται. ὁ γάρ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ἤτοι ἐναργείᾳ γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργείᾳ γίνεται οὔτε λόγῳ, καθάπερ παραστήσομεν· οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος ἄρα τῆς μαθήσεως ἐστιν εὔπορος. ἐναργείᾳ μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται διδασκαλία, ἐπεὶ τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνάργεια. τὸ δὲ δεικνύμενον πᾶσίν ἐστι φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ᾗ φαίνεται, πᾶσίν ἐστι ληπτόν· τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον· οὐκ ἄρα τι ἐναργείᾳ διδακτόν ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ διδάσκεταί τι.	But ⟨it⟩ is no less puzzling for the following reasons. The method of teaching works either by clarity or by speech; but it works neither by clarity nor by speech, as we shall show; so the method of learning is not easy to come by either. Teaching does not work by clarity, since clarity belongs to things that are shown. What is shown is apparent to everyone; what is apparent, insofar as it appears, can be grasped by everyone; and what can be grasped by everyone in common cannot be taught. So nothing is teachable by clarity. Nor, indeed, is anything taught by speech.
3.267		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οὗτος γὰρ ἤτοι σημαίνει τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ ἔσται τινὸς διδασκαλικός. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἤτοι φύσει σημαίνει τι ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούοντας συνιέναι, οἷον Ἕλληνας βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων.	For speech either signifies something or signifies nothing. If it signifies nothing, it will not teach anything either. If it signifies something, it signifies either by nature or by convention. It does not signify by nature, because not everyone understands everyone when they hear them—Greeks do not understand non-Greeks, for instance, nor non-Greeks Greeks.
3.268	θέσει δὲ εἰ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμέναι ἀντιλήψονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἅπερ ἠγνόουν, ἀλλὰ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανεούμενοι ταῦτα ἅπερ ᾔδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρῄζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως καὶ μὴ εἰδότες, καθ' ὧν εἰσιν αἱ λέξεις τεταγμέναι, οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν ἕξουσιν.	If it signifies by convention, it is clear that those who have already apprehended the things the words are assigned to will grasp them—not by being taught by the words what they did not know, but by recalling and renewing what they knew—whereas those who need to learn what they do not know, and do not know what the words are assigned to, will grasp nothing.
3.269	διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως ὑποστῆναι δύναιτο ἄν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ διδάσκων κατάληψιν τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς διδασκομένης τέχνης ἐμποιεῖν ὀφείλει τῷ μανθάνοντι, ἵνα οὕτως ἐκεῖνος τὸ σύστημα τούτων καταλαβὼν τεχνίτης γένηται. οὐδὲν δέ ἐστι κατάληψις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ὑφεστάναι δύναται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι μήτε ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὔτε μάθησις ἔστιν οὔτε διδασκαλία.	So the method of learning could not exist either. Moreover, the teacher must produce in the learner an apprehension of the theorems of the art being taught, so that the learner, by apprehending the system of them, may thus become an expert. But apprehension is nothing, as we pointed out earlier; so the method of teaching cannot exist either. And if neither the thing taught exists, nor the teacher and the learner, nor the method of learning, then there is neither learning nor teaching.
3.270	Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κοινότερον ἐπικεχείρηται περὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας· ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπορεῖν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς λεγομένης περὶ βίον εἶναι τέχνης. οἷον γοῦν τὸ μὲν διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τουτέστι τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀνυπόστατον ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· ἀνυπόστατος δέ καὶ ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον διδάξει τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα· οὐδεὶς δὲ τούτων οὐδένα διδάσκει· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λεγομένη τέχνη.	These arguments have been made in fairly general terms about learning and teaching; but one can raise the same puzzles about the so-called art of living in particular. For instance, we showed earlier that the thing taught, namely practical wisdom, does not exist; and the teacher and the learner do not exist either. For either the wise man will teach the art of living to the wise man, or the fool to the fool, or the fool to the wise man, or the wise man to the fool; but none of these teaches any of the others. So the so-called art of living is not taught.
3.271	καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως περιττὸν καὶ λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα διδάσκει τὴν φρόνησιν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν ἄγνοιαν ἔχει τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ἄγνοιαν δὲ τούτων ἔχων πάντως διδάσκοντος αὐτὸν τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ γνώσεται δὲ ταῦτα. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστώς, ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἀφροσύνη τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων θεωρητική.	About the other cases it is perhaps superfluous even to speak. But suppose the wise man teaches the fool practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is knowledge of things good, bad and neither; so the fool, not having practical wisdom, is ignorant of things good, bad and neither. And being ignorant of these, when the wise man teaches him the good, the bad and the neither, he will certainly only hear what is said; he will not know these things. For if he grasped them while remaining in a state

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		of folly, folly too would be capable of discerning things good, bad and neither.
3.272	οὐχὶ δέ γε τούτων κατὰ αὐτοὺς ἡ ἀφροσύνη θεωρητικὴ καθέστηκεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄφρων ἔσται φρόνιμος. ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως λόγον. μὴ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἂν διδάσκοιτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ μήτε ἐναργείᾳ μήτε διὰ λόγου δύναται διδάσκεσθαι, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας ἐγγίνεταί τινι ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένη τέχνη μήτε φύσει, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένη τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον.	But according to them folly is not capable of discerning these things, since then the fool would be wise. So the fool does not grasp what the wise man says or does in accordance with the principle of practical wisdom. And not grasping it, he could not be taught by him—especially since, as we said before, he cannot be taught either by clarity or through speech. So, then: if the so-called art of living arises in no one, either through learning and teaching or by nature, the art of living that the philosophers keep harping on cannot be found.
3.273	Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίη τις ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐγγενέσθαι τινι τὴν ὀνειροπολουμένην τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, βλαβερὰ καὶ ταραχῆς αἰτία φανήσεται μᾶλλον τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν ἢ ὠφέλιμος.	Yet even if one were to grant, most generously, that this dreamed-of art of living does arise in someone, it will appear harmful and a cause of turmoil to those who have it, rather than beneficial.

CHAPTER 31: WHETHER THE ART OF LIVING BENEFITS THE ONE WHO HAS IT

The self-controlled sage either has no bad impulses to master or is the most troubled of men.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἵνα παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν εἴπωμεν, ὠφελεῖν ἂν δοκοίη τὸν σοφὸν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρεχομένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς.	For instance, to mention a few examples out of many, the art of living might seem to benefit the wise man by giving him self-control in his impulses toward the fine and his repulsions from the bad.
3.274	ὁ οὖν λεγόμενος κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς ἤτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐγκρατής, καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ γίνεται ὁρμῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ καθόσον εἶχε μὲν φαύλας ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμάς, περιεκράτει δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ.	Now the wise man whom they call self-controlled is called self-controlled either in that he never has any impulse toward the bad or repulsion from the good, or in that he did have bad impulses and repulsions but mastered them by reason.
3.275	ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐγκρατής· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσει οὗ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατῆ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν (οὐδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἐπιζήτησις αὐτοῖς γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων, ἵνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξαναστῶσι τῆς ἐπιζητήσεως), τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατῆ ῥητέον διὰ τὸ μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πάθος οὗ ἔσται ἐγκρατής.	But in virtue of not having bad judgments he would not be self-controlled; for he will not control what he does not have. No one would call a eunuch self-controlled with regard to sex, or a man with a bad stomach self-controlled with regard to enjoying food (for they have no desire for such things at all, which they might rise above with self-control). In the same way, the wise man should not be called self-controlled either, since no feeling arises in him over which he could exercise control.
3.276	εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώσουσιν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατῆ καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν, περιγίνεται δὲ	But if they claim that he is self-controlled in that he does have bad judgments but overcomes them

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσιν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἡ φρόνησις, ἀκμὴν ἐν ταραχαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας δεόμενον, εἶτα καὶ κακοδαιμονέστερος τῶν φαύλων λεγομένων εὑρίσκεται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾷ ἐπί τι, πάντως ταράσσεται, εἰ δὲ περικρατεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ταράσσεται τοῦ φαύλου ἐκείνου μηκέτι τοῦτο πάσχοντος·	by reason, then, first, they will be granting that practical wisdom has done him no good, since he is still in turmoil and in need of help; and second, he turns out to be more wretched than the people they call bad. For if he has an impulse toward something, he is certainly troubled; and if he masters it by reason, he holds the bad thing inside himself, and for this reason he is more troubled than the bad man, who no longer suffers this.
3.277	εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾷ, ταράσσεται, εἰ δὲ τυγχάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, παύεται τῆς ταραχῆς. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατὴς γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἴπερ γίνεται, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κακοδαιμονέστατος, διόπερ οὐκ ὠφέλειαν, ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν αὐτῷ μεγίστην ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον παρέσχε τέχνη. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομίζων ἔχειν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἐπεγνωκέναι, τίνα τέ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τίνα φαῦλα, ταράσσεται σφόδρα καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ παρόντων καὶ τῶν κακῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν.	For the bad man, if he has an impulse, is troubled; but if he gets what he desires, he is rid of his trouble. So the wise man does not become self-controlled, as far as practical wisdom goes; or if he does, he is the most wretched of all human beings, so that the art of living has given him not benefit but the greatest turmoil. And we pointed out earlier that the person who thinks he has the art of living, and through it has recognized what things are good in their nature and what bad, is intensely troubled both when the good things are present to him and when the bad ones are.
3.278	λεκτέον οὖν, ὅτι εἰ μήτε ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ὑπόστασις ὁμολογεῖται, ἥ τε περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑφεστάναι δοθείη καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν παρέχει, τοὐναντίον δὲ ταραχὰς αὐτοῖς ἐμποιεῖ μεγίστας, μάτην ὠφρυῶσθαι δοκοῖεν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ κἀν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἠθικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας.	We must say, then, that if the reality of good, bad and indifferent things is not agreed, and the art of living perhaps does not even exist, and, even if it were granted by hypothesis to exist, brings no benefit to those who have it but on the contrary produces the greatest turmoil in them, then the dogmatists would seem to put on their lofty airs for nothing in the so-called ethical part of what they call philosophy as well.
3.279	Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου συμμέτρως ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει διεξελθόντες, ἐνταῦθα περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ τρίτον σύνταγμα καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων σπούδασμα, ἐκεῖνο ἐπειπόντες·	Having gone through this much about the ethical part too, in due measure, as befits an outline, we here bring to a close both the third book and our whole work, the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, adding just this:

CHAPTER 32: WHY THE SKEPTIC SOMETIMES PROPOUNDS WEAK ARGUMENTS

Like a doctor, the skeptic suits stronger or milder arguments to the severity of dogmatic conceit.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.280	Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπος εἶναι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν οἴησίν τε καὶ προπέτειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι, τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κουφότερα, καὶ ὁ	Because he loves humankind, the skeptic wants to cure the conceit and rashness of the dogmatists by argument, as far as he can. Doctors of bodily ailments have remedies of different strength: to those who are severely affected they apply the strong ones, to those mildly affected the milder

GREEK

σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους ἐρωτᾷ [καὶ] κατὰ ἰσχὺν λόγους,

3.281 καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐμβριθέσι καὶ εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζειν δυναμένοις τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως τῶν δογματικῶν πάθος ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρᾷ τῇ προπετείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρῆται, τοῖς δὲ κουφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον ἐχόντων τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως πάθος καὶ ὑπὸ κουφοτέρων πιθανοτήτων ἀνασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς ταῖς πιθανότησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ ἀμαυροτέρους φαινομένους οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συνερωτᾶν ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ὁρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὡς ἀρκοῦντας αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον.

ENGLISH

ones. In the same way the skeptic propounds arguments that differ [and] in strength:

against those who are badly afflicted with severe rashness he uses weighty arguments, capable of vigorously demolishing the dogmatists' affliction of conceit; and against those whose affliction of conceit is superficial and easily cured, and can be demolished by milder persuasive arguments, he uses milder ones. That is why someone whose starting point is skepticism does not hesitate to propound arguments that are sometimes weighty in their persuasiveness and sometimes apparently rather feeble. He does so deliberately, since these are often enough for him to achieve his purpose.