Ethics

BARUCH SPINOZA
1632–1677

Ethics

Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata

Translated from the Latin with AI (Claude) and edited



FORAGE
forage.com

Ethics · Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677)

Translated from the Latin with AI (Claude) and edited. Parallel-text edition, Forage, September 2026. forage.com/spinoza/ethics

Latin text: the *Opera posthuma* (Amsterdam, 1677) in the edition of J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land, as reprinted by Charles Appuhn (Paris, 1913), via Latin Wikisource (la.wikisource.org/wiki/Ethica_(Spinoza)). English: translated from the Latin with AI (Claude), then edited for accuracy and consistency. Not reviewed by a human specialist. Free to reuse under CC BY-SA 4.0. Margin labels give part, then D (definition), A (axiom), P (proposition), C (corollary), S (scholium): 1P8S2 is Part 1, Proposition 8, Scholium 2.

The original text is in the public domain. This translation is free to share and adapt under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0): creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0

Set in Source Serif 4, with Gentium Book Plus.

CONTENTS

Introduction vii

Part I: Of God 1

One substance for each attribute 2
God exists necessarily 8
Whatever is, is in God 11
Everything follows from God's nature 16
God as cause of all things 23
Things could not have been otherwise 28
Appendix: against final causes 32
Good, bad, order and beauty 37

Part II: Of the nature and origin of the mind 41

God thinks and is extended 42
The order of ideas and the order of things 45
The mind is the idea of the body 50
A short physics of bodies 53
Imagination and memory 57
What the mind knows of itself and its body 62
Duration, falsity and error 68
Common notions and the three kinds of knowledge 71
Truth is its own standard 76
There is no free will 82
Objections answered, and the doctrine's uses 85

Part III: Of the origin and nature of the affects 91

Definitions and postulates 92
Neither mind nor body moves the other 94
The striving to persevere 99
Joy, sadness and desire 101
How affects become linked 104
Hope, fear and their kin 107
Sharing the fortunes of what we love and hate 108
The imitation of the affects 112
Love returned, jealousy and longing 117
Doing harm and doing good 121
Hatred conquered by love 125
Freedom, omens and superstition 127
Wonder, disdain and self-regard 130
The active affects 138
The Definitions of the Affects 140
Affects of desire 149
General definition of the affects 152

Part IV: Of human bondage, or the powers of the affects 155
Definitions and the axiom 158
Why knowing the good is not enough 164
The dictates of reason 169
What agrees with our nature is good 175
People agree under the guidance of reason 179
The state of nature and the civil state 184
Hatred, laughter, hope and fear 190
Pity, humility, repentance and pride 193
Reason can do what passion does 199
The free man 205
Appendix: the right way of living 210

Part V: Of the power of the intellect, or of human freedom 219
The first remedies for the affects 222
Rules of life 228
The love of God and the remedies summed up 230
The eternity of the mind 234
The intellectual love of God 239
Death, virtue and blessedness 243

INTRODUCTION

Baruch Spinoza's *Ethics*, published just after his death in 1677, is laid out like Euclid's geometry: definitions, axioms, propositions and proofs. Its conclusions are among the boldest in philosophy.

There is only one substance, which Spinoza calls "God or Nature"; mind and body are the same thing seen two ways; everything happens by necessity; and freedom is not free will but understanding. From this he builds an account of the emotions and of how a person can move from bondage to them toward a calm, lasting joy: the "intellectual love of God."

The book has five parts. Readers new to it often start with the prefaces, the appendix to Part I, and the scholia, where Spinoza steps out of the geometry and speaks plainly.

Part I: Of God

Spinoza argues that there is only one substance, God or Nature, and that everything follows from it by necessity.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1D1	I. Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam; sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens.	Definition 1. By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.
1D2	II. Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita, quæ aliâ ejusdem naturæ terminari potest. Ex. gr. corpus dicitur finitum, quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio aliâ cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione; nec cogitatio corpore.	Definition 2. A thing is said to be finite in its own kind when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. In the same way, a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.
1D3	III. Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur, hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.	Definition 3. By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing from which it must be formed.
1D4	IV. Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.	Definition 4. By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence.
1D5	V. Per modum intelligo substantiæ affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur.	Definition 5. By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another, through which it is also conceived.[1]
1D6	VI. Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.	Definition 6. By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.
1D6Ex	EXPLICATIO. Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.	Explanation. I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind. For of whatever is infinite only in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite belongs whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.
1D7	VII. Ea res libera dicetur, quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur: Necessaria autem vel potius coacta, quæ ab alio	Definition 7. That thing will be called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. That

1 "Affections" (affectiones): states or modifications of a thing—not to be confused with affectus, "affects," the emotions treated in Part 3.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.	thing, on the other hand, will be called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce effects in a fixed and determinate way.
1D8	VIII. Per æternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei æternæ definitione necessario sequi concipitur.	Definition 8. By eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of an eternal thing.
1D8Ex	EXPLICATIO. Talis enim existentia ut æterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur, proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.	Explanation. For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of the thing, and therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, even if duration is conceived as lacking a beginning and an end.
1A1	I. Omnia, quæ sunt, vel in se vel in alio sunt.	Axiom 1. Everything that is, is either in itself or in another.
1A2	II. Id, quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet.	Axiom 2. What cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.
1A3	III. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus, et contra, si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est, ut effectus sequatur.	Axiom 3. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and conversely, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible for an effect to follow.
1A4	IV. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causæ dependet, et eandem involvit.	Axiom 4. Knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of its cause, and involves it.
1A5	V. Quæ nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt, sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.	Axiom 5. Things that have nothing in common with each other also cannot be understood through each other; that is, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.
1A6	VI. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.	Axiom 6. A true idea must agree with its object.[2]
1A7	VII. Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, ejus essentia non involvit existentiam.	Axiom 7. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.

ONE SUBSTANCE FOR EACH ATTRIBUTE

Spinoza proves that a substance cannot be produced by another, that it exists, and that it is infinite.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P1	PROPOSITIO I. *Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.*	Proposition 1. *Substance is by nature prior to its affections.*
1P1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex *Definitione* 3 *et* 5.	Demonstration. This is evident from Definitions 3 and 5.
1P2	PROPOSITIO II. *Duæ substantiæ, diversa attributa habentes, nihil inter se commune habent.*	Proposition 2. *Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with each other.*

2 "Its object" renders ideatum, Spinoza's term for the thing of which an idea is the idea.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet etiam ex *Defin.* 3. Unaquæque enim in se debet esse, et per se debet concipi, sive conceptus unius conceptum alterius non involvit.	Demonstration. This too is evident from Definition 3. For each must be in itself and must be conceived through itself; that is, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.
1P3	PROPOSITIO III. *Quæ res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.*	Proposition 3. *When things have nothing in common with each other, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.*
1P3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per *Axiom.* 5), nec per se invicem possunt intelligi, adeoque (per *Axiom.* 4) una alterius causa esse non potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If they have nothing in common with each other, then (by Axiom 5) they cannot be understood through each other either; and so (by Axiom 4) one cannot be the cause of the other. QED
1P4	PROPOSITIO IV. *Duæ aut plures res distinctæ, vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum, vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum.*	Proposition 4. *Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.*
1P4D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnia, quæ sunt, vel in se vel in alio sunt (per *Axiom.* 1), hoc est (*per Defin.* 3 *et* 5), extra intellectum nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones. Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur, per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt, præter substantias, sive quod idem est (*per Defin.* 4), earum attributa, earumque affectiones. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Everything that is, is either in itself or in another (by Axiom 1); that is (by Definitions 3 and 5), outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections. There is nothing, then, outside the intellect through which several things can be distinguished from one another except substances—or, what is the same thing (by Definition 4), their attributes—and their affections. QED
1P5	PROPOSITIO V. *In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ aut plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ sive attributi.*	Proposition 5. *In the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.*
1P5D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si darentur plures distinctæ, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum, vel ex diversitate affectionum (*per Prop. præced.) Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo, non dari nisi unam ejusdem attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substantia sit prior natura suis affectionibus* (per Prop. *1), depositis ergo affectionibus, et in se considerata, hoc est* (per Defin. *3* et Axiom. *6) vere considerata, non poterit concipi ab alia distingui hoc est* (per Prop. præced.*), non poterunt dari plures, sed tantum una.* Q.E.D.	Demonstration. If there were several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference of attributes or by a difference of affections (by the preceding proposition). If only by a difference of attributes, then it will be granted that there is only one of the same attribute. But if by a difference of affections, then, since a substance is by nature prior to its affections (by Proposition 1), let the affections be set aside and the substance be considered in itself—that is (by Definition 3 and Axiom 6), considered truly—and it cannot be conceived as distinguished from another. That is (by the preceding proposition), there cannot be several substances, but only one. QED
1P6		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	PROPOSITIO VI. *Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.*	Proposition 6. *One substance cannot be produced by another substance.*
1P6D	DEMONSTRATIO. In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi (*per Prop. præced.*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 2), quæ aliquid inter se commune habent. Adeoque (*per Prop.* 3), una alterius causa esse nequit, sive una ab alia non potest produci, *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. In the nature of things there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by the preceding proposition), that is (by Proposition 2), two substances that have something in common with each other. And so (by Proposition 3) one cannot be the cause of the other; that is, one cannot be produced by the other. QED
1P6C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, substantiam ab alio produci non posse. Nam in rerum natura nihil datur præter substantias earumque affectiones, ut patet ex *Axiom.* 1 et *Defin.* 3 *et* 5. Atqui a substantia produci non potest (*per præced Prop.*). Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci non potest. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary. From this it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in the nature of things there is nothing except substances and their affections, as is evident from Axiom 1 and Definitions 3 and 5. But it cannot be produced by a substance (by the preceding proposition). Therefore a substance cannot be produced by anything else at all. QED
1P6CD2	ALITER. Demonstratur hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, ejus cognitio a cognitione suæ causæ deberet pendere (*per Axiom. 4*); adeoque (*per Defin.* 3) non esset substantia.	Alternatively. This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of the contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, knowledge of it would have to depend on knowledge of its cause (by Axiom 4); and so (by Definition 3) it would not be a substance.
1P7	PROPOSITIO VII. *Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere.*	Proposition 7. *It pertains to the nature of substance to exist.*
1P7D	DEMONSTRATIO. Substantia non potest produci ab alio (*per Coroll. Prop. præced.*); erit itaque causa sui, id est (*per Defin.* 1), ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam, sive ad ejus naturam pertinet existere. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by the Corollary to the preceding proposition); it will therefore be the cause of itself; that is (by Definition 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist. QED
1P8	PROPOSITIO VIII. *Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.*	Proposition 8. *Every substance is necessarily infinite.*
1P8D	DEMONSTRATIO. Substantia unius attributi, non nisi unica existit (*per Prop.* 5), et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere (*per Prop.* 7). Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam (*per Defin.* 2) deberet terminari ab alia ejusdem naturæ, quæ etiam necessario deberet existere (*per Prop.* 7); adeoque darentur duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi, quod est absurdum (*per Prop.* 5). Existit ergo infinita. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A substance of one attribute exists only as a single, unique substance (by Proposition 5), and it pertains to its nature to exist (by Proposition 7). It will therefore be of its nature to exist either as finite or as infinite. But not as finite. For then (by Definition 2) it would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature, which would also have to exist necessarily (by Proposition 7); and so there would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by Proposition 5). It exists, therefore, as infinite. QED
1P8S1		

LATIN	ENGLISH
SCHOLIUM I. Cum finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio, et infinitum absoluta affirmatio existentiæ alicujus naturæ, sequitur ergo ex sola 7 *Prop.* omnem substantiam debere esse infinitam.	Scholium 1. Since being finite is in truth partly a negation, and being infinite is the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from Proposition 7 alone that every substance must be infinite.
1P8S2 SCHOLIUM II. Non dubito quin omnibus, qui de rebus confuse judicant, nec res per primas suas causas noscere consueverunt, difficile sit, demonstrationem 7 *Prop.* concipere; nimirum quia non distinguunt inter modificationes substantiarum et ipsas substantias, neque sciunt, quomodo res producuntur. Unde fit, ut principium, quod res naturales habere vident substantiis affingant; qui enim veras rerum causas ignorant, omnia confundunt, et sine ulla mentis repugnantia tam arbores quam homines loquentes fingunt, et homines tam ex lapidibus quam ex semine formari, et quascunque formas in alias quascunque mutari imaginantur. Sic etiam, qui naturam divinam cum humana confundunt, facile Deo affectus humanos tribuunt, præsertim quamdiu etiam ignorant, quomodo affectus in mente producuntur. Si autem homines ad naturam substantiæ attenderent, minime de veritate 7 *Prop.* dubitarent; imo hæc Prop.	Scholium 2. I do not doubt that all who judge things confusedly, and are not accustomed to know things through their first causes, find it difficult to grasp the demonstration of Proposition 7. This is, of course, because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced. So it happens that they ascribe to substances the beginning they see natural things have. For those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything. Without any resistance of mind they picture trees speaking just as readily as people, and imagine that people are formed from stones as readily as from seed, and that any forms whatever change into any others. So too those who confuse the divine nature with human nature easily attribute human affects to God, especially as long as they are also ignorant of how affects are produced in the mind. But if people paid attention to the nature of substance, they would not doubt the truth of Proposition 7 in the least. Indeed, this proposition[3]
omnibus axioma esset, et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per substantiam intelligerent id, quod in se est et per se concipitur, hoc est id, cujus cognitio non indiget cognitione alterius rei. Per modificationes autem id, quod in alio est, et quarum conceptus a conceptu rei, in qua sunt, formatur: quocirca modificationum non existentium veras ideas possumus habere; quandoquidem, quamvis non existant actu extra intellectum, earum tamen essentia ita in alio comprehenditur, ut per idem concipi possint. Verum substantiarum veritas extra intellectum non est, nisi in se ipsis, quia per se concipiuntur.	would be an axiom for everyone, and would be counted among the common notions. For by substance they would understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of any other thing; and by modifications, that which is in another, and whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are. That is why we can have true ideas of modifications that do not exist: although they do not actually exist outside the intellect, their essence is nevertheless so contained in another that they can be conceived through it. But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect except in the substances themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.[4]
Si quis ergo diceret, se claram et distinctam, hoc est veram ideam substantiæ habere, et nihilominus dubitare,	So if someone said that he had a clear and distinct —that is, a true—idea of a substance, and yet

3 Affect (affectus): an emotion together with its bodily counterpart; the subject of Part 3. People formed from stones: an allusion to the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha, who repopulated the earth by throwing stones.
4 Common notions: truths evident to every mind and shared by all; Spinoza develops the idea in Part 2.

LATIN

num talis substantia existat, idem hercle esset ac si diceret, se veram habere ideam, et nihilominus dubitare, num falsa sit (ut satis attendenti fit manifestum); vel, si quis statuat, substantiam, creari, simul statuit, ideam falsam factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest; adeoque fatendum necessario est substantiæ existentiam, sicut ejus essentiam, æternam esse veritatem. Atque hinc alio modo concludere possumus, non dari nisi unicam ejusdem naturæ quod hic ostendere operæ pretium esse duxi. Ut autem hoc ordine faciam, notandum est: I veram uniuscujusque rei definitionem nihil involvere neque exprimere præter rei definitæ naturam.

Ex quo sequitur hoc II, nempe nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuorum involvere neque exprimere, quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit, quam naturam rei definitæ. Ex. gr. definitio trianguli nihil aliud exprimit, quam simplicem naturam trianguli; at non certum aliquem triangulorum numerum. III Notandum, dari necessario uniuscujusque rei existentis certam aliquam causam, propter quam existit. IV. Denique notandum, hanc causam, propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et definitione rei existentis (*nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere*) vel debere extra ipsam dari. His positis, sequitur quod, si in natura certus aliquis numerus individuorum existat, debeat necessario dari causa, cur illa individua, et cur non plura nec pauciora existunt. Si ex. gr.

in rerum natura 20 homines existant (*quos, majoris perspicuitatis causa, suppono simul existere, nec alios antea in Natura exstitisse*), non satis erit (*ut scilicet rationem reddamus, cur 20 homines existant*), causam naturæ humanæ in genere ostendere; sed insuper necesse erit, causam ostendere, cur non plures nec pauciores, quam 20 existant; quandoquidem (*per* III *Notam*) uniuscujusque debet necessario dari causa, cur existat. At hæc causa (*per Notam* II *et* III) non potest in ipsa natura humana contineri, quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit; adeoque (*per Notam* IV) causa, cur hi viginti homines existunt, et consequenter cur unusquisque existit, debet necessario extra unumquemque dari; et propterea absolute

ENGLISH

doubted whether such a substance exists, that would, heaven knows, be the same as saying that he had a true idea and yet doubted whether it was false (as becomes plain to anyone who pays enough attention). Or if someone maintains that a substance is created, he maintains at the same time that a false idea has become true—and nothing more absurd than that can be conceived. So it must necessarily be admitted that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth. And from this we can conclude in another way that there is only one substance of the same nature, which I have thought it worthwhile to show here. To do this in order, the following must be noted. I. The true definition of each thing involves and expresses nothing except the nature of the thing defined.

From this there follows II: namely, that no definition involves or expresses any fixed number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing other than the simple nature of a triangle, not any fixed number of triangles. III. It must be noted that for each existing thing there is necessarily some definite cause on account of which it exists. IV. Finally, it must be noted that this cause, on account of which a thing exists, must either be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (namely, because it pertains to its nature to exist) or lie outside it. With these points established, it follows that if some fixed number of individuals exists in nature, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals exist, and why neither more nor fewer. If, for example,

twenty people exist in the nature of things (for the sake of greater clarity, I suppose that they exist at the same time and that no others existed in Nature before them), it will not be enough (if, that is, we are to give the reason why twenty people exist) to show the cause of human nature in general. It will further be necessary to show the cause why neither more nor fewer than twenty exist, since (by Note III) there must necessarily be a cause why each one exists. But this cause (by Notes II and III) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of a human being does not involve the number twenty. And so (by Note IV) the cause why these twenty people exist,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	concludendum, omne id, cujus naturæ plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario ut existant, causam externam habere.	and consequently why each one of them exists, must necessarily lie outside each one. We must therefore conclude without qualification that everything whose nature allows several individuals of it to exist must necessarily have an external cause in order to exist.
	Jam quoniam ad naturam substantiæ (*per jam ostensa in hoc Schol.*) pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessariam existentiam involvere, et consequenter ex sola ejus definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. At ex ipsius definitione (*ut jam ex Nota* II *et* III *ostendimus*) non potest sequi plurium substantiarum existentia; sequitur ergo ex ea necessario, unicam tantum ejusdem naturæ existere, ut proponebatur.	Now, since it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (by what has already been shown in this scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently its existence must be inferred from its definition alone. But from its definition (as we have already shown from Notes II and III) the existence of several substances cannot follow. It therefore follows necessarily from it that only one substance of the same nature exists, as was proposed.
1P9	PROPOSITIO IX. *Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquæque res habet, eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.*	Proposition 9. *The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.*
1P9D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex Defin. 4.	Demonstration. This is evident from Definition 4.
1P10	PROPOSITIO X. *Unumquodque unius substantiæ attributum per se concipi debet.*	Proposition 10. *Each attribute of a single substance must be conceived through itself.*
1P10D	DEMONSTRATIO. Attributum enim est id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit tamquam ejus essentiam constituens (*per Defin.* 4); adeoque (*per Defin.* 3) per se concipi debet. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (by Definition 4); and so (by Definition 3) it must be conceived through itself. QED
1P10S	SCHOLIUM. Ex his apparet, quod, quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur, hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere, ipsa duo entia, sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura substantiæ, ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur; quandoquidem omnia, quæ habet, attributa simul in ipsa semper fuerunt, nec unum ab alio produci potuit; sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiæ exprimit.	Scholium. From this it is clear that although two attributes may be conceived as really distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—we still cannot conclude from this that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another; rather, each expresses the reality or being of substance.
	Longe ergo abest, ut absurdum sit, uni substantiæ plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi, et, quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat, eo plura attributa, quæ et necessitatem, sive æternitatem, et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat; et consequenter nihil etiam clarius, quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (*ut Defin.* 6 *tradidimus*) ens, quod constat infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam quærit, ex quo ergo signo diversitatem	So it is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance. On the contrary, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has that express necessity, or eternity, and infinity. Consequently, nothing is clearer either than that a being absolutely infinite must necessarily be defined (as we did in Definition 6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. But

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes Propositiones, quæ ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere, eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quæreretur.	if someone now asks by what sign, then, we shall be able to recognize a difference between substances, let him read the following propositions. They show that in the nature of things only one substance exists, and that it is absolutely infinite; so that sign would be sought in vain.

GOD EXISTS NECESSARILY

Three proofs that God, a substance of infinite attributes, must exist, and why substance cannot be divided.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P11	PROPOSITIO XI. *Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.*	Proposition 11. *God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.*
1P11D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, Deum non existere. Ergo (*per Axiom.* 7) ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (*per Proposit.* 7) est absurdum: Ergo Deus necessario existit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that God does not exist. Then (by Axiom 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Proposition 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. QED
1P11D2	ALITER. Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio, tam cur existit, quam cur non existit. Ex. gr. si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet, cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet, quæ impedit, quo minus existat, sive quæ ejus existentiam tollat. Hæc vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet, vel extra ipsam. Ex. gr. rationem, cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; nimirum quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur, quæ scilicet existentiam involvit (*vide Prop.* 7).	Alternatively. For each thing a cause or reason must be assigned, both for why it exists and for why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; and if it does not exist, there must also be a reason or cause that prevents it from existing, or that takes its existence away. This reason or cause must be contained either in the nature of the thing or outside it. For example, the very nature of a square circle shows the reason why it does not exist: namely, that it involves a contradiction. Why a substance, by contrast, does exist likewise follows from its nature alone, since that nature involves existence (see Proposition 7).
	At ratio, cur circulus vel triangulus existit, vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur, sed ex ordine universæ naturæ corporeæ; ex eo enim sequi debet, vel jam triangulum necessario existere, vel impossibile esse ut jam existat. Atque hæc per se manifesta sunt. Ex quibus sequitur, id necessario existere, cujus nulla ratio nec causa datur, quæ impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit, quæ impedit quo minus Deus existat, vel quæ ejus existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est, eundem necessario existere. At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura vel extra ipsam dari deberet, hoc est in alia substantia alterius naturæ. Nam si ejusdem naturæ esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum.	But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not, does not follow from their nature, but from the order of the whole of corporeal nature. For from that order it must follow either that the triangle necessarily exists now, or that it is impossible for it to exist now. These things are self-evident. From them it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause that prevents it from existing. So if there can be no reason or cause that prevents God from existing, or that takes his existence away, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily exists. But if there were such a reason or cause, it would have to be either in God's very nature or outside it, that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were

LATIN	ENGLISH
	of the same nature, that very fact would grant that God exists.
At substantia, quæ alterius esset naturæ, nihil cum Deo commune habere (*per* 2 *Prop.*), adeoque neque ejus existentiam ponere neque tollere posset. Cum igitur ratio seu causa, quæ divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa ejus natura, quæ propterea contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de Ente absolute infinito et summe perfecto affirmare, absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur, quæ ejus existentiam tollat, ac proinde Deus necessario existit. *Q.E.D.*	But a substance of another nature would have nothing in common with God (by Proposition 2), and so could neither posit his existence nor take it away. Since, then, a reason or cause that took away the divine existence cannot lie outside the divine nature, it would necessarily have to lie—if indeed God does not exist—in his nature itself, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to affirm this of a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd. Therefore there is no cause or reason, either in God or outside God, that takes away his existence; and hence God necessarily exists. QED
1P11D3 ALITER. Posse non existere impotentia est, et contra posse existere potentia est (*ut per se notum*). Si itaque id, quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt; sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute infinito; atque hoc (*ut per se notum*) absurdum est; ergo vel nihil existit, vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos vel in nobis, vel in alio, quod necessario existit, existimus (*vid. Axiom.* 1 *et Prop.* 7). Ergo Ens absolute infinitum, hoc est (*per Defin.* 6) Deus necessario existit. *Q.E.D.*	Alternatively. To be able not to exist is lack of power; and conversely, to be able to exist is power (as is self-evident). So if what now necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite; and this (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore either nothing exists, or a being absolutely infinite also necessarily exists. But we exist, either in ourselves or in something else that necessarily exists (see Axiom 1 and Proposition 7). Therefore a being absolutely infinite—that is (by Definition 6), God—necessarily exists. QED
1P11S SCHOLIUM. In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui, ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea, quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam, cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur, quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturæ competit, eo plus virium a se habere, ut existat; adeoque Ens absolute infinitum sive Deum, infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit. Multi tamen forsan non facile hujus demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt, quia assueti sunt eas solummodo res contemplari, quæ a causis externis fiunt; et ex his, quæ cito fiunt, hoc est quæ facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident, et contra eas res factu difficiliores judicant, hoc est ad existendum non adeo faciles, ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt.	Scholium. In this last demonstration I chose to show God's existence a posteriori, so that the demonstration would be grasped more easily—not because God's existence does not follow a priori from this same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more strength it has of itself to exist; and so a being absolutely infinite, or God, has of itself an absolutely infinite power of existing, and for that reason exists absolutely. Yet perhaps many will not easily be able to see the force of this demonstration, because they are used to contemplating only things that come about from external causes. Among these, they see that things which come about quickly—that is, which exist easily—also perish easily; and conversely they judge that things are harder to bring about—that is, less easy to bring into existence—the more they conceive to belong to them.[5]

5 A posteriori: arguing from effects (here, from our own existence); a priori: arguing from the nature of the thing itself.

LATIN

Verum, ut ab his præjudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere, qua ratione hoc enunciatum, *quod cito fit, cito perit*, verum sit, nec etiam, an respectu totius naturæ omnia æque facilia sint an secus. Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit, me hic non loqui de rebus, quæ a causis externis fiunt, sed de solis substantiis, quæ (*per Prop.* 6) a nulla causa externa produci possunt. res enim, quæ a causis externis fiunt, sive eæ multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtuti causæ externæ debetur, adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causæ externæ, non autem suæ oritur.

Contra, quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causæ externæ debetur; quare ejus etiam existentia ex sola ejus natura sequi debet, quæ proinde nihil aliud est, quam ejus essentia. Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit, sed contra ponit; imperfectio autem contra eandem tollit; adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus, quam de existentia Entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti, hoc est Dei. Nam quandoquidem ejus essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit, absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit, summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.

1P12 PROPOSITIO XII. *Nullum substantiæ attributum potest vere concipi, ex quo sequatur, substantiam posse dividi.*

1P12D DEMONSTRATIO. Partes enim, in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel naturam substantiæ retinebunt, vel non. Si primum, tum (*per* 8 *Prop.*) unaquæque pars debebit esse infinita, et (*per Prop.* 6) causa sui, et (*per Prop.* 5) constare debebit ex diverso attributo, adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (*per Prop.* 6) est absurdum. Adde, quod partes (*per Prop.* 2) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent, et totum (*per Defin.* 4 *et Prop.* 10) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit. Si autem secundum ponatur, quod scilicet partes naturam substantiæ non retinebunt: ergo, cum tota substantia in æquales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiæ amitteret, et esse desineret, quod (*per Prop.* 7) est absurdum.

ENGLISH

But to free them from these prejudices, I do not need to show here in what sense the saying *what comes about quickly perishes quickly* is true, nor whether, with respect to the whole of nature, all things are equally easy or not. It is enough simply to note that I am speaking here not of things that come about from external causes, but only of substances, which (by Proposition 6) cannot be produced by any external cause. For in the case of things that come about from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, whatever perfection or reality they have is owed entirely to the power of the external cause; and so their existence arises solely from the perfection of the external cause, not from their own.

By contrast, whatever perfection a substance has is owed to no external cause; so its existence too must follow from its nature alone, which is therefore nothing other than its essence. Perfection, then, does not take away a thing's existence but, on the contrary, posits it; imperfection, on the other hand, takes it away. And so there is nothing whose existence we can be more certain of than the existence of a being absolutely infinite, or perfect—that is, God. For since his essence excludes all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it removes every reason for doubting his existence and gives the highest certainty about it. This, I believe, will be plain to anyone who pays even moderate attention.

Proposition 12. *No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.*

Demonstration. For the parts into which a substance so conceived would be divided will either retain the nature of substance or not. If the first, then (by Proposition 8) each part will have to be infinite and (by Proposition 6) the cause of itself, and (by Proposition 5) will have to consist of a different attribute; and so several substances could be formed from one, which (by Proposition 6) is absurd. Besides, the parts (by Proposition 2) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Definition 4 and Proposition 10) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which no one can doubt is absurd. But if the second is supposed—namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance—then, when the

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		whole substance had been divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and cease to be, which (by Proposition 7) is absurd.
1P13	PROPOSITIO XIII. *Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.*	Proposition 13. *A substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.*
1P13D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si enim divisibilis esset, partes, in quas divideretur, vel naturam substantiæ absolute infinitæ retinebunt, vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ, quod (*per Prop.* 5) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (*ut supra*) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (*per Prop.* 11) est etiam absurdum.	Demonstration. For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of a substance absolutely infinite or not. If the first, there will be several substances of the same nature, which (by Proposition 5) is absurd. If the second is supposed, then (as above) a substance absolutely infinite could cease to be, which (by Proposition 11) is also absurd.
1P13C	COROLLARIUM. Ex his sequitur, nullam substantiam, et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.	Corollary. From these it follows that no substance —and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance—is divisible.
1P13S	SCHOLIUM. Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc solo intelligitur, quod natura substantiæ non potest concipi nisi infinita, et quod per partem substantiæ nihil aliud intelligi potest quam substantia finita, quod (*per Prop.* 8) manifestam contradictionem implicat.	Scholium. That substance is indivisible is understood more simply from this alone: that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing can be understood except a finite substance, which (by Proposition 8) implies an obvious contradiction.

WHATEVER IS, IS IN GOD

God is the only substance, and Spinoza answers the objection that extended substance is unworthy of God.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P14	PROPOSITIO XIV. *Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.*	Proposition 14. *Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.*
1P14D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum, de quo nullum attributum, quod essentiam substantiæ exprimit, negari potest (*per Defin.* 6), isque necessario existat (*per Prop.* 11); si aliqua substantia præter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei, sicque duæ substantiæ ejusdem attributi existerent, quod (*per Prop.* 5) est absurdum; adeoque, nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest, et consequenter non etiam concipi. Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi ut existens; atqui hoc (*per primam partem hujus Demonst.*) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Definition 6), and he necessarily exists (by Proposition 11). So if there were any substance besides God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and thus two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by Proposition 5) is absurd. And so no substance outside God can be, and consequently none can be conceived either. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore outside God no substance can be or be conceived. QED
1P14C1		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc clarissime sequitur: I° Deum esse unicum, hoc est (*per Defin. 6*) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari, eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in *Scholio Prop.* 10 jam innuimus.	Corollary 1. From this it follows very clearly, first, that God is unique: that is (by Definition 6), in the nature of things there is only one substance, and it is absolutely infinite, as we already hinted in the Scholium to Proposition 10.
1P14C2	COROLLARIUM II. Sequitur: II° rem extensam et rem cogitantem vel Dei attributa esse, vel (*per Axiom*. 1) affectiones attributorum Dei.	Corollary 2. It follows, second, that the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of God or (by Axiom 1) affections of God's attributes.[6]
1P15	PROPOSITIO XV. *Quicquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.*	Proposition 15. *Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.*
1P15D	DEMONSTRATIO. Præter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (*per Prop*. 14), hoc est (*per Defin*. 3) res, quæ in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (*per Defin.* 5) sine substantia nec esse nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse, et per ipsam solam concipi possunt- Atqui præter substantias et modos nil datur (*per Axioma* 1). Ergo nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Except God, no substance is or can be conceived (by Proposition 14), that is (by Definition 3), no thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Definition 5) can neither be nor be conceived without substance; so they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But there is nothing except substances and modes (by Axiom 1). Therefore nothing can be or be conceived without God. QED
1P15S	SCHOLIUM. Sunt, qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem, atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt: sed, quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto: nam omnes, qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo, quod per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem, longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest. Attamen interim aliis rationibus, quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt, se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere, atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant: quod clare ostendit, illos id, quod ipsimet dicunt non intelligere.	Scholium. There are those who imagine that God, like a human being, consists of a body and a mind and is subject to passions. But how far such people stray from the true knowledge of God is clear enough from what has already been demonstrated. I leave them aside, however; for all who have in any way contemplated the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. They prove this very well, too, from the fact that by body we understand any quantity having length, breadth and depth, bounded by some definite shape—and nothing more absurd than this could be said of God, that is, of a being absolutely infinite. Yet at the same time, by the other arguments with which they try to demonstrate this same point, they clearly show that they remove corporeal or extended substance itself entirely from the divine nature, and they hold that it was created by God. But by what divine power it could have been created they have no idea at all—which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves are saying.
	Ego saltem satis clare, meo quidem judicio, demonstravi (*vide Coroll. Prop.* 6 *et Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 8) nullam substantiam	I, at least, have demonstrated clearly enough—in my own judgment, anyway—that no substance can be produced or created by anything else (see the

LATIN

ab alio posse produci vel creari. Porro *Prop.* 14 ostendimus, præter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam; atque hinc conclusimus substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Verum, ad pleniorem explicationem, adversariorum argumenta refutabo, quæ omnia huc redeunt. *Primo*, quod substantia corporea, quatenus substantia, constat, ut putant, partibus; et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse, et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse, negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant ex quibus unum aut alterum afferam. Si substantia corporea, ajunt, est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquæque pars vel finita, vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum.

Si hoc, datur ergo infinitum duplo majus alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum. Porro, si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes æquantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit; ut et, si partibus mensuretur digitos æquantibus; ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies major alio infinito. Denique, si ex uno puncto infinitæ cujusdam quantitatis concipiatur, duas lineas, ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi; certum est, distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri, et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore. Cum igitur hæc absurda sequantur, ut putant, ex eo, quod quantitas infinita supponitur: inde concludunt, substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam, et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione.

Deus enim, inquiunt, cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest: atqui substantia corporea, quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest, sequitur ergo, ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Hæc sunt, quæ apud scriptores invenio argumenta, quibus ostendere conantur, substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse, nec ad eandem posse pertinere. Verum enim vero, si quis recte attendat, me ad hæc jam respondisse comperiet; quandoquidem hæc argumenta in eo tantum fundantur, quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi

ENGLISH

Corollary to Proposition 6 and Scholium 2 to Proposition 8). Further, in Proposition 14 we showed that except God no substance can be or be conceived; and from this we concluded that extended substance is one of God's infinite attributes. But to explain the matter more fully, I will refute my opponents' arguments, which all come down to the following. First, they say that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, consists, as they think, of parts; and for that reason they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. They explain this with many examples, of which I will cite one or two. If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let it be conceived as divided into two parts: each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.

If the latter, then there is an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is also absurd. Further, if an infinite quantity is measured in parts a foot long, it will have to consist of infinitely many such parts; and likewise if it is measured in parts an inch long; and so one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite. Finally, if from one point of some infinite quantity two lines, say AB and AC, are conceived to extend to infinity, a definite and determinate distance apart at the start, it is certain that the distance between B and C increases continually, and at last changes from determinate to indeterminable. Since, then, these absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing an infinite quantity, they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently does not pertain to God's essence. The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection.

For God, they say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be acted upon; but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can be acted upon; it follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence. These are the arguments I find in the writers, by which they try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature and cannot pertain to it. But in fact anyone who attends properly will find that I have already answered them, since these arguments rest solely

6 "Extended thing" and "thinking thing" (res extensa, res cogitans): Descartes's terms for body and mind, which he treated as distinct substances.

LATIN

supponunt, quod jam (*Prop.* 12, *cum Coroll. Prop.* 13) absurdum esse ostendi.

Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit omnia illa absurda (*siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo jam non disputo*), ex quibus concludere volunt, substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi, quod quantitas infinita supponatur: sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem, et ex partibus finitis conflari supponunt; quare ex absurdis, quæ inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt; quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis, et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est, quod nos supra (*Proposit.* 12, *etc.*) jam demonstravimus. Quare telum, quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera conjiciunt.

Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt, substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt, quam si quis ex eo, quod finxit circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit, circulum non habere centrum, ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam ductæ lineæ sunt æquales. Nam substantiam corpoream, quæ non nisi infinita, non nisi unica, et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (*vid. Prop.* 8, 5 *et* 12), eam ipsi ad concludendum, eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflari, et multiplicem esse et divisibilem concipiunt. Sic etiam alii, postquam fingunt lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta, quibus ostendant lineam non posse in infinitum dividi.

Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere, quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur, quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineæ denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes, qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent, et imprimis ii, qui negant dari vacuum. Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi, ut ejus partes realiter distinctæ essent; cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari, manentibus reliquis ut ante inter se connexis? Et cur omnes ita aptari debent, ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum, quæ realiter ab invicem distinctæ sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest.

ENGLISH

on the supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts, which I have already shown to be absurd (Proposition 12, with the Corollary to Proposition 13).

Next, anyone willing to weigh the matter properly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, which I do not now dispute) from which they want to conclude that extended substance is finite do not follow at all from supposing an infinite quantity, but from supposing that an infinite quantity is measurable and put together out of finite parts. So from the absurdities that follow they can conclude nothing except that an infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be put together out of finite parts. And this is exactly what we have already demonstrated above (Proposition 12, etc.). So the weapon they aim at us they are really hurling at themselves.

If, then, they still want to conclude from this absurdity of theirs that extended substance must be finite, they are doing, heaven knows, nothing different from someone who imagines that a circle has the properties of a square and then concludes that a circle has no center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, unique and indivisible (see Propositions 8, 5 and 12), they conceive—in order to conclude that it is finite—as put together out of finite parts, as multiple, and as divisible. So too others, after imagining that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments to show that a line cannot be divided to infinity.

And certainly it is no less absurd to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts than that a body is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines, finally, of points. All who know that clear reason is infallible must admit this, and above all those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided in such a way that its parts were really distinct, why could one part not be annihilated while the rest remained connected to one another as before? And why must they all fit together so that there is no vacuum? Surely, of things that are really distinct from one another, one can exist without the other and remain in its own state.[7]

LATIN

Cum igitur vacuum in Natura non detur (de quo alias), sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent, ne detur vacuum; sequitur hinc etiam, easdem non posse realiter distingui, hoc est, substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi. Si quis tamen jam quærat, cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? Ei respondeo, quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet, sive superficialiter, prout nempe ipsam imaginamur, vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectu fit.

Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus, prout in imaginatione est, quod sæpe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis, et ex partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam prout in intellectu est attendimus, et eam quatenus substantia est concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum, ut jam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica, et indivisibilis reperietur. Quod omnibus, qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit: præcipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur, quod materia ubique eadem est, nec partes in eadem distinguuntur, nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde ejus partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Ex. gr. aquam, quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus, ejusque partes ab invicem separari; at non quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur.

Porro, aqua, quatenus aqua, generatur et corrumpitur; at, quatenus substantia, nec generatur nec corrumpitur. Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto: quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur, quod materia, quatenus substantia, divisibilis sit et ex partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio, cur divina natura indigna esset: quandoquidem (*per Prop.* 14) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest, a qua ipsa pateretur. Omnia, inquam, in Deo sunt, et omnia, quæ fiunt, per solas leges infinitæ Dei naturæ fiunt, et ex necessitate ejus essentiæ (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur; quare nulla ratione dici potest, Deum ab alio pati, aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse, tametsi divisibilis supponatur, dummodo æterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impræsentiarum satis.

ENGLISH

Since, then, there is no vacuum in Nature (but of this elsewhere), and all the parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows that they cannot be really distinguished—that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be divided. If anyone should now ask why we are by nature so inclined to divide quantity, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: abstractly, or superficially, namely as we imagine it; or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone.

So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is substance, which is done with great difficulty, then, as we have already sufficiently demonstrated, it will be found to be infinite, unique and indivisible. This will be quite plain to all who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect—especially if one also attends to the fact that matter is everywhere the same, and that parts are not distinguished in it except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways. Hence its parts are distinguished only modally, not really. For example, we conceive that water, insofar as it is water, is divided and that its parts are separated from one another—but not insofar as it is corporeal substance; for in that respect it is neither separated nor divided.

Again, water, insofar as it is water, comes into being and passes away; but insofar as it is substance, it neither comes into being nor passes away. And with this I think I have answered the second argument as well, since it too rests on the assumption that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and made up of parts. And even if this were not so, I do not know why matter would be unworthy of the divine nature, since (by Proposition 14) outside God there can be no substance by which the divine nature could be acted upon. All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen happen through the laws of God's infinite nature alone, and follow (as I shall soon show) from the necessity of his essence. So there is no way in which it

7 Those who deny a vacuum: chiefly Descartes and his followers, who identified matter with extension and so held that empty space is impossible.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		can be said that God is acted upon by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, provided that it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But enough of this for the present.

EVERYTHING FOLLOWS FROM GOD'S NATURE

Infinitely many things follow from God's nature, and God acts from that nature alone, not from free will.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P16	PROPOSITIO XVI. *Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.*	Proposition 16. *From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).*
1P16D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio unicuique manifesta esse debet, si modo ad hoc attendat, quod ex data cujuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quæ revera ex eadem (hoc est, ipsa rei essentia) necessario sequuntur, et eo plures, quo plus realitatis rei definitio exprimit, hoc est, quo plus realitatis rei definitæ essentia involvit. Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat (*per Defin.* 6), quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex. ejusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. This proposition should be plain to everyone, provided he attends to the fact that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties that really do follow necessarily from it (that is, from the very essence of the thing); and it infers more properties the more reality the definition of the thing expresses, that is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Definition 6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity, therefore, there must necessarily follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect). QED
1P16C1	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc sequitur I°, Deum omnium rerum, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.	Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that God is the efficient cause of all things that can fall under an infinite intellect.
1P16C2	COROLLARIUM II. Sequitur II°, Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.	Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that God is a cause through himself, and not by accident.
1P16C3	COROLLARIUM III. Sequitur III°, Deum esse absolute causam primam.	Corollary 3. It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.
1P17	PROPOSITIO XVII. *Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus, et a nemine coactus agit.*	Proposition 17. *God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and is compelled by no one.*
1P17D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex sola divinæ naturæ necessitate, vel (quod idem est) ex solis ejusdem naturæ legibus, infinita absolute sequi, modo *Prop.* 16 ostendimus; et *Prop.* 15 demonstravimus, nihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse, sed omnia in Deo esse; quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest, a quo ad agendum determinetur vel cogatur,	Demonstration. We have just shown, in Proposition 16, that from the necessity of the divine nature alone—or (what is the same thing) from the laws of that nature alone—infinitely many things absolutely follow. And in Proposition 15 we demonstrated that nothing can be or be conceived without God, but that all things are in God. There-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	atque adeo Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus et a nemine coactus agit. *Q.E.D.*	fore there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act. And so God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and is compelled by no one. QED
1P17C1	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc sequitur: I° nullam dari causam, quæ Deum extrinsece vel intrinsece, præter ipsius naturæ perfectionem, incitet ad agendum.	Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, either from without or from within, that moves God to act, except the perfection of his own nature.
1P17C2	COROLLARIUM II. Sequitur: II° solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit (*per Prop.* 11 *et Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 14), et ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate agit (*per Prop. præced.*). Adeoque (*per Defin.* 7) solus est causa libera. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his own nature alone (by Proposition 11 and Corollary 1 of Proposition 14), and acts from the necessity of his own nature alone (by the preceding proposition). Therefore (by Definition 7) he alone is a free cause. QED
1P17S	SCHOLIUM. Alii putant, Deum esse causam liberam propterea quod potest, ut putant, efficere, ut ea, quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus, hoc est quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant, sive ut ab ipso non producantur. Sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent, quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, ejus tres angulos æquales esse duobus rectis; sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est absurdum. Porro infra absque ope hujus Propositionis ostendam, ad Dei naturam neque intellectum neque voluntatem pertinere. Scio equidem plures esse, qui putant se posse demonstrare, ad Dei naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere; nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese ajunt, quod Deo tribuere possunt, quam id, quod in nobis summa est perfectio.	Scholium. Others think that God is a free cause because—so they think—he can bring it about that the things we have said follow from his nature (that is, the things that are in his power) should not happen, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as saying that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause the effect should not follow—which is absurd. Further on I shall show, without the help of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will belongs to God's nature. I know, of course, that there are many who think they can demonstrate that the highest intellect and a free will belong to God's nature. For they say they know nothing more perfect that they could attribute to God than what is the highest perfection in us.
	Porro, tametsi Deum actu summe intelligentem concipiant, non tamen credunt, eum posse omnia quæ actu intelligit efficere ut existant, nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant. Si omnia, inquiunt, quæ in ejus intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil tum amplius creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotentiæ repugnare; ideoque maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere, nec aliud creantem præter id, quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit creare. Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto (*vid. Prop.* 16), a summa Dei potentia, sive infinita natura, infinita infinitis modis, hoc est omnia, necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi: eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab æterno et in æternum sequitur, ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis.	Moreover, although they conceive God as actually understanding in the highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring into existence everything he actually understands; for they think that in that way they would destroy God's power. If he had created everything that is in his intellect, they say, he would then have been unable to create anything more—and this they believe is inconsistent with God's omnipotence. So they have preferred to hold that God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will. But I think I have shown clearly enough (see Proposition 16) that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, in-

LATIN

ENGLISH

finitely many things in infinitely many ways—that is, all things—have necessarily flowed, or always follow with the same necessity; in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab æterno fuit, et in æternum in eadem actualitate manebit. Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe, meo quidem judicio, perfectior statuitur. Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri, Deum infinita creabilia intelligere, quæ tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias, si scilicet omnia; quæ intelligit, crearet, suam, juxta ipsos, exhauriret omnipotentiam, et se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant, ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quæ ejus potentia se extendit, quo absurdius, aut Dei omnipotentiæ magis repugnans, non video quid fingi possit.

So God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity, and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, in my judgment at least, God's omnipotence is established as far more perfect. Indeed, my opponents seem (if I may speak frankly) to deny God's omnipotence. For they are forced to admit that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create. Otherwise—if he created everything he understands—he would, on their view, exhaust his omnipotence and make himself imperfect. So in order to maintain that God is perfect, they are reduced to maintaining at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not see what could be invented more absurd than this, or more inconsistent with God's omnipotence.

Porro, ut de intellectu et voluntate, quos Deo communiter tribuimus, hic etiam aliquid dicam: si ad æternam Dei essentiam intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est, quam quod vulgo solent homines. Nam intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto cœlo differre deberent, nec in ulla re, præterquam in nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum cœleste, et canis, animal latrans. Quod sic demonstrabo.

Further, to say something here about the intellect and will that we commonly attribute to God: if intellect and will do belong to God's eternal essence, then something quite different must be understood by each of these attributes from what people usually understand. For the intellect and will that would constitute God's essence would have to differ from our intellect and will by the whole width of the heavens, and could agree with them in nothing except the name—no more, in fact, than the Dog, the sign in the heavens, agrees with the dog, the barking animal. I shall demonstrate this as follows.[8]

Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque placet), vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis, quando quidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 16); sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei intellectu existit objective. Quare Dei intellectus, quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum, tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ; quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse animadversum, qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem, et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt. Cum itaque

If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, be by nature later than the things it understands (as most people hold), or simultaneous with them, since God is prior in causality to all things (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 16). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists as such objectively in God's intellect. So God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is really the cause of things—both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have

8 The Dog in the sky is the constellation Canis Major, with its bright Dog Star, Sirius.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa, videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre, tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ.	been noticed also by those who have asserted that God's intellect, will and power are one and the same. Since, then, God's intellect is the only cause of things—namely (as we have shown), both of their essence and of their existence—it must necessarily differ from them, both with respect to essence and with respect to existence.[9]
	Nam causatum differt a sua causa præcise in eo, quod a causa habet. Ex. gr. homo est causa existentiæ non vero essentiæ alterius hominis; est enim hæc æterna veritas: et ideo secundum essentiam prorsus convenire possunt; in existendo autem differre debent; et propterea, si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit; sed si unius essentia destrui posset et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam alterius essentia. Quapropter res, quæ et essentiæ et existentiæ alicujus effectus est causa, a tali effectu differre debet, tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ.	For what is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from the cause. For example, one man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his essence; for that essence is an eternal truth. So the two can agree entirely in essence, but they must differ in existing. That is why, if the existence of one perishes, the other's existence will not perish on that account; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the other's essence would be destroyed too. Therefore a thing that is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of some effect must differ from that effect both with respect to essence and with respect to existence.
	Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiæ et existentiæ nostri intellectus causa: ergo Dei intellectus, quatenus divinam essentiam constituere concipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentiæ quam ratione existentiæ differt, nec in ulla re, præterquam in nomine, cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.	But God's intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with respect to essence and with respect to existence, and can agree with it in nothing except the name—as we set out to show. Concerning the will, one proceeds in the same way, as anyone can easily see.
1P18	PROPOSITIO XVIII. *Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.*	Proposition 18. *God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.*[10]
1P18D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnia quæ sunt, in Deo sunt et per Deum concipi debent (*per Prop.* 15); adeoque (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 16 *hujus*) Deus rerum, quæ in ipso sunt, est causa; quod est primum. Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia (*per Prop.* 14), hoc est (*per Defin.* 3) res, quæ extra Deum in se sit; quod erat secundum. Deus ergo est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. All things that are, are in God and must be conceived through God (by Proposition 15); and so (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 16 of this part) God is the cause of the things that are in him. That is the first point. Next, outside God there can be no substance (by Proposition 14), that is (by Definition 3), no thing that is in itself outside God. That was the second point. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. QED
1P19	PROPOSITIO XIX. *Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa sunt æterna.*	Proposition 19. *God, or all the attributes of God, are eternal.*

9 In the scholastic usage Spinoza follows, a thing exists "objectively" in an intellect when it is present there as the content of an idea; its "formal" essence is what it is in itself.
10 An immanent cause produces its effects within itself; a transitive cause produces them outside itself.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P19D	DEMONSTRATIO. Deus enim (*per Defin.* 6) est substantia, quæ (*per Prop.* 11) necessario existit, hoc est (*per Prop.* 7), ad cujus naturam pertinet existere, sive (quod idem est) ex cujus definitione sequitur ipsum existere, adeoque (*per Defin.* 8) est æternus. Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id, quod (*per Defin.* 4) divinæ substantiæ essentiam exprimit, hoc est id, quod ad substantiam pertinet: id ipsum, inquam, ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiæ (*ut jam ex Prop.* 7 *demonstravi*) pertinet æternitas; ergo unumquodque attributorum æternitatem involvere debet, adeoque omnia sunt æterna. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For God (by Definition 6) is substance, which (by Proposition 11) necessarily exists; that is (by Proposition 7), a substance to whose nature it belongs to exist, or (what is the same thing) from whose definition it follows that it exists; and so (by Definition 8) he is eternal. Next, by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Definition 4) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is, that which belongs to substance: that very thing, I say, the attributes themselves must involve. But eternity belongs to the nature of substance (as I have already demonstrated from Proposition 7). Therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and so all are eternal. QED
1P19S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Propositio quam clarissime etiam patet ex modo, quo (*Prop.* 11) Dei existentiam demonstravi; ex ea, inquam, demonstratione constat, Dei existentiam, sicut ejus essentiam, æternam esse veritatem. Deinde (*Prop.* 19 *Principiorum Cartesii*) alio etiam modo Dei æternitatem demonstravi, nec opus est eum hic repetere.	Scholium. This Proposition is also perfectly clear from the way in which I demonstrated God's existence (Proposition 11). From that demonstration, I say, it is established that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. I have also demonstrated God's eternity in another way (Proposition 19 of my *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy*), and there is no need to repeat that here.[11]
1P20	PROPOSITIO XX. *Dei existentia ejusque essentia unum et idem sunt.*	Proposition 20. *God's existence and his essence are one and the same.*
1P20D	DEMONSTRATIO. Deus (*per anteced. Prop.*) ejusque omnia attributa sunt æterna, hoc est (*per Defin.* 8), unumquodque ejus attributorum existentiam exprimit. Eadem ergo Dei attributa, quæ (*per Defin.* 4) Dei æternam essentiam explicant, ejus simul æternam existentiam explicant, hoc est, illud ipsum, quod essentiam Dei constituit, constituit simul ipsius existentiam, adeoque hæc et ipsius essentia unum et idem sunt. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. God and all his attributes are eternal (by the preceding proposition); that is (by Definition 8), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God that (by Definition 4) explain God's eternal essence at the same time explain his eternal existence. That is, the very thing that constitutes God's essence at the same time constitutes his existence; and so his existence and his essence are one and the same. QED
1P20C1	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc sequitur: I° Dei existentiam, sicut ejus essentiam, æternam esse veritatem.	Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.
1P20C2	COROLLARIUM II. Sequitur: II°, Deum, sive omnia Dei attributa esse immutabilia. Nam si ratione existentiæ mutarentur, deberent etiam (*per Prop. præced.*) ratione essentiæ mutari, hoc est (*ut per se notum*) ex veris falsa fieri, quod est absurdum.	Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that God, or all of God's attributes, are unchangeable. For if they changed with respect to existence, they would also (by the preceding proposition) have to change with respect to essence; that is (as is self-evident), from true they would become false—which is absurd.

11 Spinoza's *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* (1663) set out parts of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* in geometrical order.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P21	PROPOSITIO XXI. *Omnia quæ ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequuntur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt, sive per idem attributum æterna et infinita sunt.*	Proposition 21. *All things that follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always have existed and be infinite; in other words, through that same attribute they are eternal and infinite.*
1P21D	DEMONSTRATIO. Concipe, si fieri potest (siquidem neges), aliquid in aliquo Dei attributo ex ipsius absoluta natura sequi, quod finitum sit, et determinatam habeat existentiam sive durationem, ex. gr. ideam Dei in cogitatione. At cogitatio, quandoquidem Dei attributum supponitur, est necessario (*per Prop. 11*) sua natura infinita. Verum, quatenus ipsa ideam Dei habet, finita supponitur. At (*per Defin.* 2) finita concipi non potest nisi per ipsam cogitationem determinetur. Sed non per ipsam cogitationem, quatenus ideam Dei constituit; eatenus enim finita supponitur esse. Ergo per cogitationem, quatenus ideam Dei non constituit; quæ tamen (*per Prop.* 11) necessario existere debet. Datur igitur cogitatio non constituens ideam Dei, ac propterea ex ejus natura, quatenus est absoluta cogitatio, non sequitur necessario idea Dei.	Demonstration. Conceive, if you can (supposing you deny this), that in some attribute of God something follows from its absolute nature that is finite and has a determinate existence or duration—for example, the idea of God in thought. Now thought, since it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Proposition 11) infinite by its nature. But insofar as it has the idea of God, it is supposed finite. Yet (by Definition 2) it cannot be conceived as finite unless it is limited by thought itself. But not by thought itself insofar as it constitutes the idea of God, for to that extent it is supposed to be finite. Therefore by thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God—thought which nevertheless (by Proposition 11) must necessarily exist. There is, then, thought that does not constitute the idea of God, and so the idea of God does not necessarily follow from its nature insofar as it is absolute thought.
	(Concipitur enim ideam Dei constituens et non constituens.) Quod est contra hypothesin. Quare si idea Dei in cogitatione, aut aliquid (perinde est, quicquid sumatur, quandoquidem demonstratio universalis est) in aliquo Dei attributo ex necessitate absolutæ naturæ ipsius attributi sequatur, id debet necessario esse infinitum. Quod erat primum.	(For thought is conceived as both constituting and not constituting the idea of God.) This is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, if the idea of God in thought—or anything in any attribute of God (it makes no difference what is taken, since the demonstration is universal)—follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. That was the first point.
	Deinde id, quod ex necessitate naturæ alicujus attributi ita sequitur, non potest determinatam habere existentiam sive durationem. Nam, si neges, supponatur res, quæ ex necessitate naturæ alicujus attributi sequitur, dari in aliquo Dei attributo, ex. gr. idea Dei in cogitatione, eaque supponatur aliquando non exstitisse, vel non exstitura. Cum autem cogitatio Dei attributum supponatur, debet et necessario, et immutabilis existere (*per Prop.* 11 *et Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 20). Quare ultra limites durationis ideæ Dei (supponitur enim aliquando non exstitisse, aut non exstitura) cogitatio sine idea Dei existere debebit. Atqui hoc est contra hypothesin; supponitur enim, ex data cogitatione necessario sequi ideam Dei.	Next, what follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of some attribute cannot have a determinate existence or duration. For if you deny this, suppose that a thing following from the necessity of the nature of some attribute is given in some attribute of God—for example, the idea of God in thought—and suppose that at some time it did not exist, or will not exist. Now since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must exist both necessarily and unchangeably (by Proposition 11 and Corollary 2 of Proposition 20). So beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it is supposed at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist), thought will have to exist without the idea of God. But this is con-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		trary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that the idea of God necessarily follows from the given thought.
	Ergo idea Dei in cogitatione, aut aliquid, quod necessario ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequitur, non potest determinatam habere durationem; sed per idem attributum æternum est. Quod erat secundum. Nota, hoc idem esse affirmandum de quacunque re, quæ in aliquo Dei attributo ex Dei absoluta natura necessario sequitur.	Therefore the idea of God in thought, or anything that follows necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, but is eternal through that same attribute. That was the second point. Note that the same must be affirmed of any thing that follows necessarily, in some attribute of God, from God's absolute nature.
1P22	PROPOSITIO XXII. *Quicquid ex aliquo Dei attributo, quatenus modificatum est tali modificatione, quæ et necessario et infinita per idem existit, sequitur, debet quoque et necessario et infinitum existere.*	Proposition 22. *Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification that, through that attribute, exists both necessarily and as infinite, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite.*
1P22D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hujus Propositionis demonstratio procedit eodem modo ac demonstratio præcedentis.	Demonstration. The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding one.
1P23	PROPOSITIO XXIII. *Omnis modus, qui et necessario et infinitus existit, necessario sequi debuit, vel ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei, vel ex aliquo attributo modificato modificatione, quæ et necessario et infinita existit.*	Proposition 23. *Every mode that exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification that exists both necessarily and as infinite.*
1P23D	DEMONSTRATIO. Modus enim in alio est, per quod concipi debet (*per Defin.* 5), hoc est (*per Prop.* 15), in solo Deo est, et per solum Deum concipi potest. Si ergo modus concipitur necessario existere, et infinitus esse, utrumque hoc debet necessario concludi sive percipi per aliquod Dei attributum, quatenus idem concipitur infinitatem et necessitatem existentiæ, sive (*quod per Defin.* 8 *idem est*) æternitatem exprimere, hoc est (*per Defin.* 6 *et Prop.* 19), quatenus absolute consideratur. Modus ergo, qui et necessario et infinitus existit, ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequi debuit; hocque vel immediate (*de quo Prop.* 21), vel mediante aliqua modificatione, quæ ex ejus absoluta natura sequitur, hoc est (*per Prop. præced.*), quæ et necessario et infinita existit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For a mode is in another, through which it must be conceived (by Definition 5); that is (by Proposition 15), it is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone. If, then, a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, each of these must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God, insofar as that attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (what by Definition 8 is the same thing) eternity; that is (by Definition 6 and Proposition 19), insofar as it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, that exists both necessarily and as infinite must have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God—either immediately (on which see Proposition 21), or through the mediation of some modification that follows from its absolute nature, that is (by the preceding proposition), that exists both necessarily and as infinite. QED

GOD AS CAUSE OF ALL THINGS

God causes the essence and existence of things; finite things follow from finite causes; nothing is contingent.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P24	PROPOSITIO XXIV. *Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam.*	Proposition 24. *The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.*
1P24D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex Definitione I. Id enim, cujus natura (in se scilicet considerata) involvit existentiam, causa est sui, et ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit.	Demonstration. This is evident from Definition 1. For that whose nature (considered in itself, that is) involves existence is cause of itself, and exists from the necessity of its own nature alone.
1P24C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, Deum non tantum esse causam, ut res incipiant existere; sed etiam ut in existendo perseverent, sive (ut termino Scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. Nam, sive res existant sive non existant, quotiescunque ad earum essentiam attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere comperimus; adeoque earum essentia neque suæ existentiæ neque suæ durationis potest esse causa; sed tantum Deus, ad cujus solam naturam pertinet existere (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 14).	Corollary. From this it follows that God is the cause not only of things' beginning to exist, but also of their persevering in existence—or (to use a Scholastic term) that God is the cause of the being of things, their *causa essendi*. For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we attend to their essence we find that it involves neither existence nor duration. So their essence cannot be the cause either of their existence or of their duration; only God can, to whose nature alone it belongs to exist (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14).
1P25	PROPOSITIO XXV. *Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiæ, sed etiam essentiæ.*	Proposition 25. *God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.*
1P25D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si negas, ergo rerum essentiæ Deus non est causa; adeoque (*per Axioma 4*) potest rerum essentia sine Deo concipi: atqui hoc (*per Prop.* 15) est absurdum. Ergo rerum etiam essentiæ Deus est causa. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by Axiom 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this (by Proposition 15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause of the essence of things too. QED
1P25S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Propositio clarius sequitur ex Propositione 16. Ex ea enim sequitur, quod ex data natura divina, tam rerum essentia quam existentia debeat necessario concludi; et, ut verbo dicam, eo sensu, quo Deus dicitur causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti Corollario constabit.	Scholium. This Proposition follows more clearly from Proposition 16. For it follows from that proposition that, given the divine nature, both the essence and the existence of things must necessarily be inferred. In a word, in the same sense in which God is called cause of himself, he must also be called the cause of all things. This will become still clearer from the following corollary.
1P25C	COROLLARIUM. Res particulares nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demonstratio patet ex Propositione 15 et Definitione 5.	Corollary. Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way. The demonstration is evident from Proposition 15 and Definition 5.
1P26	PROPOSITIO XXVI. *Res, quæ ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata; et, quæ*	Proposition 26. *A thing that has been determined to do something was necessarily so determined by God;*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare.	*and a thing that has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to do anything.*
1P26D	DEMONSTRATIO. Id, per quod res determinatæ ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (*ut per se notum*); adeoque tam ejus essentiæ quam existentiæ Deus ex necessitate suæ naturæ est causa efficiens (*per Prop.* 25 *et* 16); quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam, quod secundo proponitur, clarissime sequitur. Nam si res, quæ a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars hujus falsa esset; quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.	Demonstration. That through which things are said to be determined to do something is necessarily something positive (as is self-evident). And so God, from the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (by Propositions 25 and 16). That was the first point. The second claim also follows very clearly from this. For if a thing not determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this proposition would be false—which is absurd, as we have shown.
1P27	PROPOSITIO XXVII. *Res, quæ a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest.*	Proposition 27. *A thing that has been determined by God to do something cannot render itself undetermined.*
1P27D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio patet ex Axiomate tertio.	Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Axiom 3.
1P28	PROPOSITIO XXVIII. *Quodcunque singulare, sive quævis res, quæ finita est, et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere, nec ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam: et rursus hæc causa non potest etiam existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia, quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum, et sic in infinitum.*	Proposition 28. *No singular thing—no thing, that is, which is finite and has a determinate existence—can exist or be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause too cannot exist or be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and so on to infinity.*
1P28D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (*per Prop.* 26 *et Coroll. Prop.* 24). At id, quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi produci non potuit: quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi sequitur, id infinitum et æternum est (*per Prop.* 21). Debuit ergo ex Deo, vel aliquo ejus attributo sequi, quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; præter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (*per Axiom.* 1 *et Defin.* 3 *et* 5); et modi (*per Coroll. Prop.* 25) nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo, vel aliquo ejus attributo, quatenus affectum est modificatione, quæ æterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (*per Prop.* 22).	Demonstration. Whatever is determined to exist and to act has been so determined by God (by Proposition 26 and the Corollary to Proposition 24). But what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Proposition 21). It must, therefore, have followed from God, or from some attribute of his, insofar as that is considered to be affected by some mode. For apart from substance and modes nothing is given (by Axiom 1 and Definitions 3 and 5), and modes (by the Corollary to Proposition 25) are nothing but affections of God's attributes. But neither could it have followed from God, or from some attribute of his, insofar as that is affected by a modification that is eternal and infinite (by Proposition 22).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Debuit ergo sequi, vel ad existendum et operandum determinari, a Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo, quatenus modificatum est modificatione quæ finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum. Deinde hæc rursus causa, sive hic modus (*per eandem rationem qua primam partem hujus jamjam demonstravimus*) debuit etiam determinari ab alia, quæ etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, et rursus hæc ultima (*per eandem rationem*) ab alia, et sic semper (*per eandem rationem*) in infinitum. *Q.E.D.*	It must, therefore, have followed from—or been determined to exist and to act by—God or some attribute of his insofar as it is modified by a modification that is finite and has a determinate existence. That was the first point. Next, this cause, or this mode, must in turn (by the same reasoning by which we have just demonstrated the first part of this proposition) also have been determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and this last in turn (by the same reasoning) by another; and so on forever (by the same reasoning) to infinity. QED
1P28S	SCHOLIUM. Cum quædam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt, videlicet ea, quæ ex absoluta ejus natura necessario sequuntur et alia, mediantibus his primis quæ tamen sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; hinc sequitur: 1° quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima; non vero in suo genere, ut ajunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (*per Prop.* 15 *et Coroll. Prop.* 24). Sequitur: 2° quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium, nisi forte ea de causa, ut scilicet has ab iis, quas immediate produxit, vel potius quæ ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur, distinguamus, Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus, quæ cum effectu nullo modo conjuncta est.	Scholium. Some things had to be produced by God immediately—namely, those that follow necessarily from his absolute nature—and others through the mediation of these first ones, though the others can neither be nor be conceived without God. From this it follows, first, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things immediately produced by him, and not merely proximate "in his own kind," as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by Proposition 15 and the Corollary to Proposition 24). It follows, secondly, that God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things—except perhaps in order to distinguish these from the things he has produced immediately, or rather from those that follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one that is in no way conjoined with its effect.
	At omnia, quæ sunt, in Deo sunt, et a Deo ita dependent, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint.	But all things that are, are in God, and depend on God in such a way that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
1P29	PROPOSITIO XXIX. *In rerum natura nullum datur contingens; sed omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.*	Proposition 29. *In nature there is nothing contingent; all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to act in a certain way.*
1P29D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid est, in Deo est (*per Prop.* 15): Deus autem non potest dici res contingens: Nam (*per Prop.* 11) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinæ naturæ ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (*per Prop.* 16), idque vel quatenus divina natura absolute (*per Prop.* 21), vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (*per Prop.* 27). Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa, quatenus simpliciter existunt (*per Coroll. Prop.* 24), sed etiam (*per Prop.* 26) quatenus ad	Demonstration. Whatever is, is in God (by Proposition 15). But God cannot be called a contingent thing, for (by Proposition 11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily, not contingently (by Proposition 16)—either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by Proposition 21), or insofar as it is considered as determined to act in a certain way (by Proposition 27). Further, God is the cause of these modes not

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	aliquid operandum determinati considerantur. Quod si a Deo (per eand.	only insofar as they simply exist (by the Corollary to Proposition 24), but also (by Proposition 26) insofar as they are considered as determined to do something. If they have not been determined by God (by the same
	Prop.*) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est, ut se ipsos determinent; et contra* (per Prop. *27) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est, ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant. Quare omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandum, nullumque datur contingens.* Q.E.D.	Proposition), it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; and conversely (by Proposition 27), if they have been determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves undetermined. Therefore all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but to exist and to act in a certain way; and there is nothing contingent. QED
1P29S	SCHOLIUM. Antequam ulterius pergam, hic, quid nobis per Naturam Naturantem, et quid per Naturam Naturatam intelligendum sit, explicare volo, vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus jam constare existimo, nempe, quod per Naturam Naturantem nobis intelligendum est id, quod in se est et per se concipitur, sive talia substantiæ attributa, quæ æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt, hoc est (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 14 *et Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 17), Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per Naturam Naturatam autem intelligo id omne, quod ex necessitate Dei naturæ, sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur ut res, quæ in Deo sunt, et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt.	Scholium. Before going further, I want to explain here—or rather to point out—what we must understand by *Natura naturans* and what by *Natura naturata*. For I think it is already established from what precedes that by *Natura naturans* we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance that express eternal and infinite essence; that is (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14 and Corollary 2 of Proposition 17), God insofar as he is considered as a free cause. By *Natura naturata*, on the other hand, I understand everything that follows from the necessity of God's nature, or of each of God's attributes; that is, all the modes of God's attributes, insofar as they are considered as things that are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God.[12]
1P30	PROPOSITIO XXX. *Intellectus, actu finitus aut actu infinitus, Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet, et nihil aliud.*	Proposition 30. *An intellect, whether actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.*
1P30D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (*per Axiom.* 6), hoc est (*ut per se notum*) id, quod in intellectu objective continetur, debet necessario in Natura dari: atqui in Natura (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 14) non nisi una substantia datur, nempe Deus; nec ullæ aliæ affectiones (*per Prop.* 15), quam quæ in Deo sunt, et quæ (*per eandem Prop.*) sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; ergo intellectus, actu finitus aut actu infinitus, Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet, et nihil aliud. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A true idea must agree with its object (by Axiom 6); that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be given in Nature. But in Nature (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14) there is only one substance, namely God; and there are no affections (by Proposition 15) other than those that are in God and that (by the same Proposition) can neither be nor be conceived without God. Therefore an intellect, whether actually finite or actu-

12 Literally "nature naturing" and "nature natured": scholastic terms for nature as active cause and nature as what that cause produces.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		ally infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else. QED
1P31	PROPOSITIO XXXI. *Intellectus actu, sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor, etc., ad Naturam Naturatam, non vero ad Naturantem referri debent.*	Proposition 31. *Actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.*
1P31D	DEMONSTRATIO. Per intellectum enim (*ut per se notum*) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem, sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis, scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc., differt, adeoque (*per Defin.* 5) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet; nempe (*per. Prop.* 15 et *Defin.* 6) per aliquod Dei attributum, quod æternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit; ac propterea (*per Schol. Prop.* 29) ad Naturam Naturatam, non vero Naturantem referri debet, ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. By intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which differs from other modes, such as desire, love, etc.; and so (by Definition 5) it must be conceived through absolute thought. That is (by Proposition 15 and Definition 6), it must be conceived through some attribute of God that expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, in such a way that without that attribute it can neither be nor be conceived. And therefore (by the Scholium to Proposition 29) it must be referred to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans*, as must the other modes of thinking. QED
1P31S	SCHOLIUM. Ratio, cur hic loquar de intellectu actu, non est, quia concedo, ullum dari intellectum potentia; sed, quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui, nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione, qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus, quod ad perfectiorem intellectionis cognitionem non conducat.	Scholium. The reason I speak here of actual intellect is not that I grant there is any potential intellect. Rather, because I want to avoid all confusion, I have chosen to speak only of what we perceive most clearly—namely, the very act of understanding, than which we perceive nothing more clearly. For we can understand nothing that does not lead to a more perfect knowledge of understanding.
1P32	PROPOSITIO XXXII. *Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera, sed tantum necessaria.*	Proposition 32. *The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.*
1P32D	DEMONSTRATIO. Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est, sicuti intellectus; adeoque (*per Prop.* 28) unaquæque volitio non potest existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, et hæc rursus ab alia, et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est, sed quatenus attributum habet, quod infinitam et æternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (*per Prop.* 23). Quocumque igitur modo, sive finita sive infinita, concipiatur, causam requirit, a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur; adeoque (*per Defin.* 7) non potest dici causa libera, sed tantum necessaria vel coacta. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The will is only a certain mode of thinking, like the intellect. And so (by Proposition 28) each volition can neither exist nor be determined to act unless it is determined by another cause, and this in turn by another, and so on to infinity. And if the will is supposed to be infinite, it too must be determined to exist and to act by God —not insofar as he is absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as he has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Proposition 23). In whatever way the will is conceived, then, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to act; and so (by Definition 7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one. QED
1P32C1	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc sequitur: I° Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.	Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that God does not act from freedom of the will.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P32C2	COROLLARIUM II. Sequitur: II° voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere, ut motus et quies, et absolute ut omnia naturalia, quæ (*per Prop.* 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget, a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et, quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere, quam propter ea, quæ ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur), dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere.	Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that will and intellect are related to God's nature as motion and rest are, and, absolutely, as are all natural things, which (by Proposition 29) must be determined by God to exist and to act in a certain way. For the will, like everything else, needs a cause by which it is determined to exist and to act in a certain way. And although infinitely many things follow from a given will or intellect, God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than he can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest because of what follows from motion and rest (for infinitely many things follow from these too).
	Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet, quam reliqua naturalia, sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet, ut motus et quies, et omnia reliqua, quæ ostendimus ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequi, et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.	So will does not belong to God's nature any more than other natural things do, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and to act in a certain way.

THINGS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE

God could not have produced things in any other way or order; Spinoza defines necessary, impossible and contingent.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1P33	PROPOSITIO XXXIII. *Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt.*	Proposition 33. *Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than they have been produced.*
1P33D	DEMONSTRATIO. Res enim omnes data Dei natura necessario secutæ sunt (*per Prop.* 16), et ex necessitate naturæ Dei determinatæ sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (*per Prop.* 29). Si itaque res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari, ut naturæ ordo alius esset; ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse, quam jam est; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 11) illa etiam deberet existere, et consequenter duo vel plures possent dari Dii, quod (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 14) est absurdum. Quapropter res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For all things have followed necessarily from God's given nature (by Proposition 16), and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature to exist and to act in a certain way (by Proposition 29). So if things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to act in another way, so that the order of nature would be different, then God's nature too could be other than it now is; and hence (by Proposition 11) that other nature would also have to exist, and consequently there could be two or more Gods—which (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14) is absurd. Therefore things could not have been produced in any other way or in any other order, etc. QED
1P33S1	SCHOLIUM I. Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi, nihil absolute in rebus dari, propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare jam paucis volo, quid nobis per Contingens erit intelligendum; sed prius, quid per Necessarium, et Impossibile. Res aliqua necessaria	Scholium 1. Since I have shown here, more clearly than the noonday sun, that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they could be called contingent, I now want to explain briefly what we should understand by *contingent*—but

LATIN

dicitur, vel ratione suæ essentiæ, vel ratione causæ. Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione, vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit vel quia nulla causa externa datur, ad talem rem producendam determinata. At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur, nisi respectu defectus nostræ cognitionis.

Res enim, cujus essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus, vel de qua probe scimus, eandem nullam contradictionem involvere et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus, propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet; ea nunquam, nec ut necessaria, nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest, ideoque eandem vel contingentem, vel possibilem vocamus.

1P33S2 SCHOLIUM II. Ex præcedentibus clare sequitur, res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas: quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutæ sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coëgit. Imo ex hujus contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi), Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia, si res alio modo fuissent productæ, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda, diversa ab ea, quam ex consideratione Entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere. Verum non dubito, quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant, nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint; idque nulla alia de causa, quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa, quæ a nobis (*Defin.* 7) tradita est, videlicet absolutam voluntatem.

Verum neque etiam dubito, si rem meditari vellent, nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem, qualem jam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam, sed ut magnum scientiæ obstaculum, plane rejiciant. Nec opus est, ut ea, quæ in Scholio Propositionis 17 dicta sunt, hic repetam. Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam, quod, quamvis concedatur, voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex ejus perfectione nihilominus sequatur, res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere, si prius consideremus id, quod

ENGLISH

first, what we should understand by *necessary* and *impossible*. A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For a thing's existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. A thing is also called impossible for these same reasons: namely, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause determined to produce such a thing. But a thing is called contingent for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge.

For take a thing whose essence we do not know to involve a contradiction, or which we know perfectly well involves no contradiction, but about whose existence we still can affirm nothing with certainty, because the order of causes is hidden from us. Such a thing can never seem to us either necessary or impossible; and so we call it either contingent or possible.

Scholium 2. From what has been said it clearly follows that things have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given, most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection; for it is his very perfection that has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from the contrary it would clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God is not supremely perfect: for if things had been produced in another way, we would have to attribute to God another nature, different from the one we have been compelled to attribute to him from considering a most perfect Being. I do not doubt, however, that many will hoot this view down as absurd, and will not be willing to set their minds to weighing it —and for no other reason than that they are used to attributing to God another kind of freedom, very different from the one we have set out (Definition 7): namely, an absolute will.

But I also do not doubt that, if they were willing to reflect on the matter and weigh properly the chain of our demonstrations, they would in the end reject outright the kind of freedom they now attribute to God—not only as idle, but as a great obstacle to knowledge. Nor is there any need for me to repeat here what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 17. Still, for their sake I shall show further that even if it is granted that will belongs to God's essence, it nonetheless follows from his perfection

LATIN

ipsimet concedunt, videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere, ut unaquæque res id quod est, sit. Nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset. Deinde quod omnia Dei decreta ab æterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt.

Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstantiæ argueretur. At cum in æterno non detur *quando*, *ante*, nec *post:* hinc, ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione, sequitur, Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse, nec unquam potuisse; sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse, nec sine ipsis esse posse. At dicent, quod, quamvis supponeretur, quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset, vel quod ab æterno aliud de Natura ejusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio. Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul, Deum posse sua mutare decreta. Nam si Deus de Natura ejusque ordine aliud, quam decrevit, decrevisset; hoc est, ut aliud de Natura voluisset et concepisset; alium necessario, quam jam habet intellectum, et aliam, quam jam habet voluntatem, habuisset.

Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet, absque ulla ejus essentiæ ejusque perfectionis mutatione; quid causæ est, cur jam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare, et nihilominus æque perfectus manere? Ejus enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem, in respectu suæ essentiæ et perfectionis, perinde est quomodocunque concipiatur.

Deinde omnes, quos vidi, Philosophi concedunt, nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia, sed tantum actu; cum autem et ejus intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur, ut etiam omnes concedunt, sequitur ergo hinc etiam, quod, si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset, et aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia necessario esset; ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi), si aliter res, quam jam sunt, a Deo productæ essent, Dei intellectus ejusque voluntas hoc est (ut conceditur) ejus essentia, alia esse deberet, quod est absurdum.

ENGLISH

that things could not have been created by God in any other way or order. This will be easy to show if we first consider what they themselves grant: namely, that it depends on God's decree and will alone that each thing is what it is—for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things; and next, that all of God's decrees have been ratified by God himself from eternity.

For otherwise he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since in eternity there is no *when*, no *before* and no *after*, it follows from God's perfection alone that God can never decree, and never could have decreed, anything other than he does; in other words, that God did not exist before his decrees, and cannot exist without them. But they will say that even if it were supposed that God had made another nature of things, or had decreed from eternity something else about Nature and its order, no imperfection in God would follow from this. But if they say this, they will at the same time be granting that God can change his decrees. For if God had decreed about Nature and its order something other than he did decree—that is, had willed and conceived something else about Nature—he would necessarily have had an intellect other than the one he now has, and a will other than the one he now has.

And if we may attribute to God another intellect and another will without any change in his essence and his perfection, what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees about created things and nonetheless remain equally perfect? For as far as his essence and perfection are concerned, it makes no difference how his intellect and will regarding created things and their order are conceived.

Further, all the philosophers I have come across grant that there is no potential intellect in God, but only actual intellect. And since, as they all also grant, neither his intellect nor his will is distinct from his essence, it follows from this too that if God had had another actual intellect and another will, his essence too would necessarily be different. And hence (as I concluded at the outset) if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, God's intellect and his will—that is (as is granted), his essence—would have to be different, which is absurd.

LATIN

Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint, et, hoc verum esse, ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur; nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest, ut credamus, quod Deus noluerit omnia, quæ in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione, qua ipsa intelligit, creare. At dicent, in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem; sed id, quod in ipsis est, propter quod perfectæ sunt aut imperfectæ, et bonæ aut malæ dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere: atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere, ut id, quod jam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio, et contra.

Verum quid hoc aliud esset, quam aperte affirmare, quod Deus, qui id, quod vult, necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest, ut res alio modo, quam intelligit, intelligat; quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum. Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum, hoc modo. Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntas aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus). Ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt. Fateor, hanc opinionem, quæ omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subjicit, et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare, quam illorum, qui statuunt, Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere.

Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere, quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus, tanquam ad exemplar, in operando attendit, vel ad quod, tanquam ad certum scopum, collineat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est, quam Deum fato subjicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiæ, quam earum existentiæ, primam et unicam liberam causam esse. Quare non est, ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.

1P34 PROPOSITIO XXXIV. *Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia.*

1P34D DEMONSTRATIO. Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiæ sequitur, Deum esse causam sui (*per Prop.* 11) et (*per Prop.* 16 *ejusque Coroll.*) omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei, qua ipse, et omnia, sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. *Q.E.D.*

ENGLISH

Since, therefore, things could not have been produced by God in any other way or order, and since the truth of this follows from God's supreme perfection, no sound reason can persuade us to believe that God did not will to create all the things that are in his intellect, with the very same perfection with which he understands them. But they will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things; that what is in them, on account of which they are called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends on God's will alone; and so, had God so willed, he could have brought it about that what is now perfection would be the greatest imperfection, and the reverse.

But what would this be but openly to assert that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, can by his will bring it about that he understands things otherwise than he understands them—which (as I have just shown) is a great absurdity? So I can turn the argument back against them, in this way. All things depend on God's power. For things to be able to be otherwise, then, God's will would necessarily also have to be otherwise. But God's will cannot be otherwise (as we have just shown most clearly from God's perfection). Therefore things cannot be otherwise either. I admit that this opinion—which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God, and holds that all things depend on his good pleasure—strays less from the truth than the view of those who hold that God does everything for the sake of the good.

For these people seem to posit something outside God, not dependent on God, to which God looks as to a model when he works, or at which he aims as at a fixed target. This is surely nothing other than subjecting God to fate—and nothing more absurd can be maintained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause both of the essence of all things and of their existence. So there is no reason for me to waste time refuting this absurdity.

Proposition 34. *God's power is his very essence.*

Demonstration. For from the necessity of God's essence alone it follows that God is the cause of himself (by Proposition 11) and (by Proposition 16 and its Corollary) of all things. Therefore God's power,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		by which he and all things are and act, is his very essence. QED
1P35	PROPOSITIO XXXV. *Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.*	Proposition 35. *Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily is.*
1P35D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (*per Prop. præced.*) in ejus essentia ita debet comprehendi, ut ex ea necessario sequatur, adeoque necessario est. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For whatever is in God's power must (by the preceding proposition) be so contained in his essence that it necessarily follows from it; and so it necessarily is. QED
1P36	PROPOSITIO XXXVI. *Nihil existit, ex cujus natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.*	Proposition 36. *Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.*
1P36D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (*per Coroll. Prop.* 25), hoc est (*per Prop.* 34), quicquid existit, Dei potentiam quæ omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit, adeoque (*per Prop.* 16) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence, of God in a certain and determinate way (by the Corollary to Proposition 25); that is (by Proposition 34), whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things; and so (by Proposition 16) some effect must follow from it. QED

APPENDIX: AGAINST FINAL CAUSES

Spinoza explains why people believe that nature and God act for ends, and argues that the belief is false.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
1App	APPENDIX. His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui, ut, quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera, et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint, et ab ipso ita pendeant, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prædeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis, sive absoluto beneplacito, sed ex absoluta Dei natura, sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, præjudicia, quæ impedire poterant, quo minus meæ demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi; sed quia non pauca adhuc restant præjudicia, quæ etiam, imo maxime impedire poterant, et possunt, quo minus homines rerum concatenationem eo, quo ipsam explicui, modo amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operæ pretium duxi.	Appendix. In the preceding pages I have explained the nature of God and his properties: that he necessarily exists; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature alone; that he is the free cause of all things, and how; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God—not, indeed, from freedom of will or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite power. Moreover, wherever the occasion arose, I have taken care to remove prejudices that could prevent my demonstrations from being grasped. But a good many prejudices still remain which could also—indeed most of all—prevent people from embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it, and still can. So I thought it worth the effort to submit them here to the scrutiny of reason.
	Et quoniam omnia, quæ hic indicare suscipio, præjudicia pendent ab hoc uno, quod scilicet communiter supponant homines, omnes res naturales ut ipsos, propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere, pro certo statuant: dicunt enim,	All the prejudices I undertake to point out here depend on this one: that people commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end; indeed, they hold it as certain that God himself directs all things to some

LATIN

Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem, ut ipsum coleret; Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo, quærendo scilicet *primo* causam, cur plerique hoc in præjudicio acquiescant, et omnes natura adeo propensi sint, ad idem amplectendum. *Deinde* ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et *tandem*, quomodo ex hoc orta sint præjudicia de *bono et malo*, *merito et peccato*, *laude et vituperio*, *ordine et confusione*, *pulchritudine et deformitate*, et de aliis hujus generis. Verum hæc ab humanæ mentis natura deducere, non est hujus loci.

Satis hic erit, si pro fundamento id capiam, quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso; nempe hoc, quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur, et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quærendi, cujus rei sunt conscii. Ex his enim sequitur, *primo*, quod homines se liberos esse opinentur, quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii, et de causis, a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur *secundo*, homines omnia propter finem agere; videlicet propter utile, quod appetunt; unde fit, ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant, et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi.

Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat, nisi ut ad semet se convertant, et ad fines, a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant, et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant. Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media, quæ ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant, ut ex. gr. oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, etc.; hinc factum, ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent. Et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt: hinc causam credendi habuerunt, aliquem alium esse, qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit.

ENGLISH

definite end. For they say that God made all things for the sake of man, and man so that he would worship God. I shall therefore consider this one prejudice first. I shall ask, *first*, why most people rest content in it, and why all are by nature so inclined to embrace it. *Next* I shall show that it is false; and *finally*, how from it there have arisen prejudices about *good and bad*, *merit and wrongdoing*, *praise and blame*, *order and confusion*, *beauty and ugliness*, and other things of this kind. This is not the place, however, to derive these things from the nature of the human mind.[13]

It will be enough here if I take as my foundation what everyone must acknowledge: namely, that all human beings are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek what is useful to themselves, and are conscious of this. From these it follows, *first*, that people think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not so much as dream of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them. It follows, *second*, that people do everything for the sake of an end—namely, for the sake of the useful thing they want. Hence they always seek to know only the final causes of things that have been done, and once they have heard them they are satisfied, since, of course, they have no cause for further doubt.

But if they cannot hear these causes from someone else, nothing remains for them but to turn to themselves and reflect on the ends by which they themselves are usually determined to do similar things; and so they necessarily judge another's mind by their own. Further, they find, both in themselves and outside themselves, a great many means that contribute considerably to obtaining what is useful to them—for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, and so on. Hence it has come about that they regard all natural things as means to their own advantage. And because they know that they found these means rather than prepared them, they had reason to believe that there was

13 Wrongdoing (*peccatum*): traditionally translated "sin"; Spinoza defines it in Part 4 without theology, as an offense against the laws of a state.

LATIN

Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt, easdem se ipsas fecisse; sed ex mediis, quæ sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt, dari aliquem, vel aliquos Naturæ rectores, humana præditos libertate, qui ipsis omnia curaverint, et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium, quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt; atque hinc statuerunt, Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere, ut homines sibi devinciant, et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum, ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit, ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret, et totam Naturam in usum cœcæ illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiæ dirigeret.

Atque ita hoc præjudicium in superstitionem versum, et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit, ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quæsiverunt ostendere, Naturam nihil frustra (hoc est, quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse, quam Naturam Deosque æque ac homines delirare. Vide quæso, quo res tandem evasit!

Inter tot Naturæ commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terræ motus, morbos, etc., atque hæc statuerunt propterea evenire, quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas, sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa; et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret, ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis æque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato præjudicio destiterunt: facilius enim iis fuit, hoc inter alia incognita, quorum usum ignorabant, ponere, et sic præsentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiæ retinere, quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare.

Unde pro certo statuerunt, Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare: quæ sane unica fuisset causa, ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret; nisi Mathesis, quæ non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum

ENGLISH

someone else who had prepared them for their use.

For once they had come to regard things as means, they could not believe that those things had made themselves. Instead, from the means they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they had to conclude that there is some ruler, or rulers, of Nature, endowed with human freedom, who had taken care of everything for them and made everything for their use. And since they had never heard anything about the mind of these rulers either, they had to judge it from their own. Hence they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of human beings, in order to bind human beings to themselves and be held by them in the highest honor. So it came about that each person devised, from his own way of thinking, different ways of worshipping God, so that God might love him above the rest and direct the whole of Nature to serve his blind desire and insatiable greed.

In this way the prejudice turned into superstition and struck deep roots in people's minds. This was why everyone strove with the greatest effort to understand and explain the final causes of all things. But in seeking to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is, nothing that is not of use to human beings), they seem to have shown only that Nature and the gods are as mad as human beings. Look, I ask you, at how things turned out in the end!

Among so many advantages in Nature they could not fail to find a good many disadvantages—storms, earthquakes, diseases, and so on. These, they maintained, happen because the gods are angry at wrongs done to them by human beings, or at acts of wrongdoing committed in their worship. And although experience protested daily, and showed by countless examples that advantages and disadvantages befall the pious and the impious alike, without distinction, they did not on that account abandon their ingrained prejudice. For it was easier for them to put this among the other unknown things whose use they did not know, and so keep their present and innate state of ignorance, than to tear down that whole structure and devise a new one.

Hence they held it as certain that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding. This alone would certainly have caused the truth to remain hidden from the human race forever, had

LATIN

essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset; et præter Mathesin aliæ etiam adsignari possunt causæ (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est), a quibus fieri potuit, ut homines communia hæc præjudicia animadverterent, et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur.

His satis explicui id, quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam, Naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere, et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare, tam ex fundamentis et causis, unde hoc præjudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi, quam ex *Propositione* 16 *et Corollariis Propositionis* 32, et præterea ex iis omnibus, quibus ostendi, omnia naturæ æterna quadam necessitate, summaque perfectione procedere. Hoc tamen adhuc addam, nempe, hanc de fine doctrinam Naturam omnino evertere. Nam id, quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat, et contra. Deinde id, quod natura prius est, facit posterius. Et denique id, quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum.

Nam (duobus prioribus omissis, quia per se manifesta sunt), ut ex *Propositionibus* 21, 22 *et* 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est, qui a Deo immediate producitur, et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget, ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res, quæ immediate a Deo productæ sunt, ea de causa factæ essent, ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimæ, quarum de causa priores factæ sunt, omnium præstantissimæ essent. Deinde hæc doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit: Nam, si Deus propter finem agit aliquid necessario appetit, quo caret.

Et quamvis Theologi et Metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiæ et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen, Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse; quia nihil ante creationem præter Deum assignare possunt, propter quod Deus ageret; adeoque necessario fateri coguntur, Deum iis, propter quæ media parare voluit, caruisse, eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum. Nec hic prætereundum est, quod hujus doctrinæ sectatores, qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum

ENGLISH

not mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown human beings another standard of truth. And besides mathematics, other causes can also be given (it would be superfluous to list them here) which could have enabled people to notice these common prejudices and be led to a true knowledge of things.

With this I have sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place. Now, to show that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions, does not take much. For I believe this is already clear enough, both from the foundations and causes from which I have shown this prejudice took its origin, and from Proposition 16 and the Corollaries of Proposition 32, and besides from all the passages in which I have shown that all things in nature proceed by a certain eternal necessity and with the highest perfection. I shall, however, add this further point: this doctrine about ends turns Nature completely upside down. For it regards as an effect what is in fact a cause, and vice versa. Next, it makes what is prior by nature posterior. And finally, it renders what is supreme and most perfect the most imperfect.

For (omitting the first two points, since they are self-evident), as is established by Propositions 21, 22 and 23, the most perfect effect is the one produced by God immediately, and the more intermediate causes a thing needs in order to be produced, the more imperfect it is. But if the things produced immediately by God had been made so that God might attain his end, then the last things —for whose sake the earlier ones were made— would necessarily be the most excellent of all. Further, this doctrine takes away God's perfection. For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something he lacks.

And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless admit that God did everything for his own sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, since they can point to nothing before creation, apart from God, for the sake of which God might act. So they are necessarily forced to admit that God lacked those things for whose sake he willed to prepare means, and that

LATIN

attulerunt modum argumentandi, reducendo scilicet, non ad impossibile, sed ad ignorantiam; quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinæ argumentandi medium. Nam si ex. gr. ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit, eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse.

Ni enim eum in finem, Deo id volente, ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiæ (sæpe enim multæ simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse, id ex eo, quod ventus flavit, et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas, ventum tum ortum, quia mare præcedenti die, tempore adhuc tranquillo, agitari inceperat; et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat; instabunt iterum, quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt, donec ad Dei voluntatem, hoc est ignorantiæ asylum, confugeris.

Sic etiam, ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt, et ex eo, quod tantæ artis causas ignorant, concludunt, eandem non mechanica, sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari, talique modo constitui, ut una pars alteram non lædat. Atque hinc fit, ut qui miraculorum causas veras quærit, quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hæretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis, quos vulgus tanquam Naturæ Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod, sublata ignorantia, stupor, hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendæque suæ auctoritatis medium, quod habent, tollitur. Sed hæc relinquo, et ad id, quod *tertio* loco hic agere constitui, pergo.

ENGLISH

he desired them, as is self-evident. Nor should I pass over the fact that the followers of this doctrine, who have wanted to show off their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, have brought in a new way of arguing to prove their doctrine: reduction not to the impossible but to ignorance—which shows that this doctrine had no other means of argument. For example, if a stone falls from a roof onto someone's head and kills him, they will demonstrate in this way that the stone fell in order to kill the man.[14]

"For if it did not fall for that end, by God's will, how could so many circumstances (and often many coincide at once) have come together by chance?" Perhaps you will answer that it happened because the wind was blowing and the man was passing that way. But they will press on: "Why was the wind blowing at that time? Why was the man passing that way at that very same time?" If you answer again that the wind rose then because the sea had begun to be stirred up the day before, while the weather was still calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will press on again—for there is no end to asking—"But why was the sea stirred up? Why was the man invited for that time?" And so they will not stop asking for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance.

Similarly, when they see the structure of the human body, they are dumbfounded, and because they do not know the causes of such artistry, they conclude that it was made not by mechanical but by divine or supernatural art, and constructed so that no part harms another. Hence it happens that anyone who seeks the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural things as a learned person rather than to gape at them like a fool, is everywhere held and denounced as a heretic and impious by those whom the common people revere as interpreters of Nature and the gods. For they know that once ignorance is removed, astonishment—the only means they have of arguing and of protecting their authority—is removed as well. But I leave these matters and go on to what I decided to treat here in the *third* place.

14 A scholastic distinction: an end sought to supply something one lacks, versus an end sought to make other things share in one's own goodness.

GOOD, BAD, ORDER AND BEAUTY

Notions such as good, bad, order and beauty are shown to be ways of imagining, not features of things.

LATIN

Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt, omnia, quæ fiunt, propter ipsos fieri; id in unaquaque re præcipuum judicare debuerunt, quod ipsis utilissimum, et illa omnia præstantissima æstimare, a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones, quibus rerum naturas explicarent, scilicet *Bonum*, *Malum*, *Ordinem*, *Confusionem*, *Calidum*, *Frigidum*, *Pulchritudinem* et *Deformitatem:* et quia se liberos existimant, inde hæ notiones ortæ sunt, scilicet *Laus* et *Vituperium*, *Peccatum* et *Meritum;* sed has infra, postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne, quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, *Bonum*, quod autem iis contrarium est, *Malum* vocaverunt.

Et quia ii, qui rerum naturam non intelligunt, nihil de rebus affirmant, sed res tantummodo imaginantur, et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo *Ordinem* in rebus esse firmiter credunt, rerum suæque naturæ ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositæ, ut, cum nobis per sensus repræsentantur, eas facile imaginari, et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas; si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas, sive *confusas* esse dicimus.

Et quoniam ea nobis præ cæteris grata sunt, quæ facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni præferunt, quasi ordo aliquid in Natura præter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse, et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt; nisi velint forte, Deum, humanæ imaginationi providentem, res omnes eo disposuisse modo, quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet, quod infinita reperiantur, quæ nostram imaginationem longe superant, et plurima, quæ ipsam, propter ejus imbecillitatem, confundunt. Sed de hac re satis.

Cæteræ deinde notiones etiam præter imaginandi modos, quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt, et tamen ab ignaris tanquam præcipua rerum attributa considerantur; quia, ut jam diximus, res omnes propter

ENGLISH

Once people had persuaded themselves that everything that happens happens for their sake, they had to judge that what is most important in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to value most highly all the things by which they were most agreeably affected. Hence they had to form these notions by which to explain the natures of things: *Good*, *Bad*, *Order*, *Confusion*, *Hot*, *Cold*, *Beauty* and *Ugliness*. And because they think themselves free, these further notions arose: *Praise* and *Blame*, *Wrongdoing* and *Merit*. These latter I shall explain below, after I have dealt with human nature; the former I shall briefly explain here. Everything that promotes health and the worship of God they called *Good*; what is contrary to these, *Bad*.

And because those who do not understand the nature of things affirm nothing about things but only imagine them, and take imagination for intellect, they firmly believe that there is *order* in things, ignorant as they are of things and of their own nature. For when things are so arranged that, when they are presented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them and consequently easily remember them, we say they are well ordered; if the opposite, we say they are badly ordered, or *confused*.

And since the things we can easily imagine are more pleasing to us than others, people prefer order to confusion—as if order were something in Nature apart from its relation to our imagination. They say that God created all things in order, and in this way, without knowing it, they attribute imagination to God—unless perhaps they mean that God, providing for human imagination, arranged all things in the way that people could most easily imagine them. Nor, perhaps, will it give them pause that infinitely many things are found that far surpass our imagination, and a great many that confuse it because of its weakness. But enough of this.

The other notions, too, are nothing but ways of imagining, by which the imagination is affected in various ways; and yet the ignorant regard them as

LATIN

ENGLISH

ipsos factas esse credunt; et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt, prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Ex gr. si motus, quem nervi ab objectis, per oculos repræsentatis, accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta, a quibus causatur, *pulchra* dicuntur, quæ autem contrarium motum cient, *deformia*. Quæ deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel fœtida vocant, quæ per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida, etc. Quæ autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lævia, etc.

the chief attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe that all things were made for their sake. They call the nature of a thing good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt, according to how they are affected by it. For example, if the motion that the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects that cause it are called *beautiful*, and those that excite the contrary motion *ugly*. Things that stimulate the sense through the nose they call fragrant or foul-smelling; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless, and so on; through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, and so on.

Et quæ denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum, vel harmoniam edere dicuntur, quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit, ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt Philosophi, qui sibi persuaserint, motus cœlestes harmoniam componere. Quæ omnia satis ostendunt, unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus), quod inter homines tot, quot experimur, controversiæ ortæ sint, ex quibus tandem Scepticismus.

And finally, things that stir the ears are said to produce noise, sound, or harmony—the last of which has driven people so far out of their wits that they have believed that God, too, delights in harmony. Nor are there lacking philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavens make up a harmony. All this shows well enough that each person has judged things according to the disposition of his brain—or rather, has taken the affections of the imagination for things themselves. So it is no wonder (to note this too in passing) that all the controversies we see have arisen among people, and from them, in the end, skepticism.[15]

Nam, quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant, et ideo id, quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de cæteris, quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est, Quot capita, tot sensus; Suo quemque sensu abundare; Non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina: quæ sententiæ satis ostendunt, homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare, resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illæ omnes teste Mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.

For although human bodies agree in many respects, they differ in a great many, and so what seems good to one seems bad to another; what is ordered to one, confused to another; what is pleasing to one is displeasing to another; and so on for the rest. I pass over these here, both because this is not the place to treat them expressly and because everyone has had enough experience of this. Everyone has these sayings on their lips: "So many heads, so many opinions"; "Everyone is full of his own view"; "Brains differ no less than palates." These sayings show well enough that people judge things according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they had understood things, those things would, as mathematics bears witness, at least have convinced them, even if they did not attract them.[16]

15 The Pythagorean "harmony of the spheres," the idea that the planets' motions produce music.
16 The second saying echoes the Latin Bible (Romans 14:5).

LATIN

Videmus itaque omnes notiones, quibus vulgus solet Naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi, nec ullius rei naturam, sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare; et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia, non rationis, sed imaginationis voco; atque adeo omnia argumenta, quæ contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimæ Dei naturæ sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in Natura ortæ? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad fœtorem, usque, rerum deformitas quæ nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum, etc. Sed, ut modo dixi, facile confutantur.

Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est æstimanda, nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectæ sunt, propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanæ naturæ conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem, qui quærunt, cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo, quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius Naturæ leges adeo amplæ fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quæ ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda, ut *Propositione* 16 demonstravi.

Hæc sunt, quæ hic notare suscepi, præjudicia. Si quædam hujus farinæ adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.

ENGLISH

We see, therefore, that all the notions by which the common people usually explain Nature are only ways of imagining, and indicate the nature of nothing, but only the constitution of the imagination. And because they have names as if they were beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings not of reason but of imagination. So all the arguments drawn against us from such notions can easily be repelled. For many people argue like this: if all things have followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, where then have so many imperfections in Nature come from —the corruption of things to the point of stench, the ugliness of things that provokes nausea, confusion, evil, wrongdoing, and so on? But, as I have just said, these are easily refuted.[17]

For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend human senses, or because they benefit human nature or are incompatible with it. To those who ask why God did not create all human beings so that they would be governed by the guidance of reason alone, I answer only this: because he did not lack material for creating all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed for producing all things that can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I demonstrated in Proposition 16.

These are the prejudices I undertook to point out here. If any others of this sort still remain, anyone can correct them with a little reflection.

17 "Beings of reason" (*entia rationis*) was the scholastic term for things that exist only in thought; Spinoza coins a parallel phrase.

Part II: Of the nature and origin of the mind

Spinoza argues that mind and body are one thing, and explains how we know.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2Pref	*Transeo jam ad ea explicanda, quæ ex Dei, sive Entis æterni et infiniti, essentia necessario debuerunt sequi. Non quidem omnia; infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi Prop.* 16 *Part. 1 demonstravimus: sed ea solummodo, quæ nos ad Mentis humanæ, ejusque summæ beatitudinis, cognitionem quasi manu ducere possunt.*	I now pass on to explaining those things that must necessarily have followed from the essence of God, or the eternal and infinite Being. Not all of them, indeed—for we have demonstrated in Proposition 16 of Part 1 that infinitely many things must follow from it in infinitely many ways—but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.
2D1	I. Per corpus intelligo modum, qui Dei essentiam, quatenus ut res extensa consideratur, certo et determinato modo exprimit; *vid. Coroll. Prop.* 25 *p. I.*	Definition 1. By body I understand a mode that expresses, in a certain and determinate way, God's essence insofar as it is considered as an extended thing (see the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1).
2D2	II. Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico, quo dato res necessario ponitur, et quo sublato res necessario tollitur; vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa id quod sine re, nec esse nec concipi potest.	Definition 2. I say that there belongs to the essence of a thing that which, if it is given, the thing is necessarily posited, and if it is taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which, conversely, can neither be nor be conceived without the thing.
2D3	III. Per ideam intelligo Mentis conceptum, quem Mens format propterea quod res est cogitans.	Definition 3. By idea I understand a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.
2D3Ex	EXPLICATIO. *Dico potius conceptum quam perceptionem, quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur, Mentem ab objecto pati; at conceptus actionem Mentis exprimere videtur.*	Explanation. I say concept rather than perception because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in relation to its object, whereas concept seems to express an action of the mind.
2D4	IV. Per ideam adæquatam intelligo ideam, quæ, quatenus in se sine relatione ad objectum consideratur, omnes veræ ideæ proprietates sive denominationes intrinsecas habet.	Definition 4. By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic marks, of a true idea.
2D4Ex	EXPLICATIO. *Dico intrinsecas, ut illam secludam, quæ extrinseca est, nempe convenientiam ideæ cum suo ideato.*	Explanation. I say intrinsic in order to exclude what is extrinsic, namely the agreement of the idea with its object.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2D5	V. Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio.	Definition 5. Duration is the indefinite continuation of existing.
2D5Ex	EXPLICATIO. *Dico indefinitam, quia per ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest, neque etiam a causa efficiente, quæ scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.*	Explanation. I say indefinite because it can in no way be determined by the very nature of the existing thing, nor yet by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the thing's existence but does not take it away.
2D6	VI. Per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo.	Definition 6. By reality and perfection I understand the same thing.
2D7	VII. Per res singulares intelligo res, quæ finitæ sunt, et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individua in una actione ita concurrant, ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.	Definition 7. By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if several individuals so concur in one action that all of them together are the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.
2A1	I. Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam, hoc est, ex Naturæ ordine tam fieri potest, ut hic et ille homo existat, quam ut non existat.	Axiom 1. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence; that is, in the order of Nature it can equally happen that this or that man exists and that he does not exist.
2A2	II. Homo cogitat.	Axiom 2. Man thinks.
2A3	III. Modi cogitandi, ut amor, cupiditas, vel quicunque nomine affectus animi insigniuntur, non dantur, nisi in eodem Individuo detur idea rei amatæ, desideratæ, etc. At idea dari potest, quamvis nullus alius detur cogitandi modus.	Axiom 3. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever else is called by the name of an affect of the mind, do not exist unless there is in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, and so on. But an idea can exist even though no other mode of thinking exists.
2A4	IV. Nos corpus quoddam multis modis affici sentimus.	Axiom 4. We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways.
2A5	V. Nullas res singulares, præter corpora et cogitandi modos, sentimus nec percipimus.	Axiom 5. We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking.
	Postulata vide post 13 *Propositionem*.	*For the Postulates, see after Proposition 13.*

GOD THINKS AND IS EXTENDED

Thought and extension are attributes of God, and God has an idea of his essence and its consequences.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P1	PROPOSITIO I. *Cogitatio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res cogitans.*	Proposition 1. *Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.*
2P1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Singulares cogitationes, sive hæc et illa cogitatio, modi sunt, qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimunt (*per Coroll. Prop.* 25, *p. I*). Competit ergo Deo (*per Defin.* 5 *p. I) attributum, cujus*	Demonstration. Singular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes that express God's nature in a certain and determinate way (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1). Therefore there belongs

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	conceptum singulares omnes cogitationes involvunt, per quod etiam concipiuntur. Est igitur Cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, quod Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit (vid. Defin. 6 p. I)*, sive Deus est res cogitans.* Q.E.D.	to God (by Definition 5 of Part 1) an attribute whose concept all singular thoughts involve, and through which they are also conceived. Thought, therefore, is one of God's infinite attributes, which expresses God's eternal and infinite essence (see Definition 6 of Part 1); or, God is a thinking thing. QED
2P1S	SCHOLIUM. Patet etiam hæc Propositio ex hoc, quod nos possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere. Nam quo plura ens cogitans potest cogitare, eo plus realitatis sive perfectionis idem continere concipimus; ergo ens, quod infinita infinitis modis cogitare potest, est necessario virtute cogitandi infinitum. Cum itaque, ad solam cogitationem attendendo, Ens infinitum concipiamus, est necessario (*per Defin.* 4 *et* 6 *p. I*). Cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, ut volebamus.	Scholium. This Proposition is also evident from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality, or perfection, we conceive it to contain. Therefore a being that can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways is necessarily infinite in its power of thinking. Since, then, by attending to thought alone we conceive an infinite Being, thought is necessarily (by Definitions 4 and 6 of Part 1) one of God's infinite attributes, as we wished to show.
2P2	PROPOSITIO II. *Extensio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res extensa.*	Proposition 2. *Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.*
2P2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hujus eodem modo procedit, ac demonstratio præcedentis Propositionis.	Demonstration. The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as that of the preceding proposition.
2P3	PROPOSITIO III. *In Deo datur necessario idea, tam ejus essentiæ, quam omnium, quæ ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.*	Proposition 3. *In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence.*
2P3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Deus enim (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) infinita infinitis modis cogitare, sive (*quod idem est, per Prop.* 16 *p. I*) ideam suæ essentiæ, et omnium, quæ necessario ex ea sequuntur, formare potest. Atqui omne id, quod in Dei potestate est, necessario est (*per Prop.* 35 *p. I*) ergo datur necessario talis idea, et (*per Prop.* 15, *p. I*) non nisi in Deo. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For God (by Proposition 1 of this part) can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways, or (what is the same, by Proposition 16 of Part 1) can form the idea of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from it. But everything that is in God's power necessarily is (by Proposition 35 of Part 1). Therefore such an idea necessarily exists, and (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) exists nowhere but in God. QED
2P3S	SCHOLIUM. Vulgus per Dei potentiam intelligit Dei liberam voluntatem, et jus in omnia, quæ sunt, quæque propterea communiter ut contingentia considerantur. Deum enim potestatem omnia destruendi habere dicunt, et in nihilum redigendi. Dei porro potentiam cum potentia Regum sæpissime comparant. Sed hoc in Corollario 1 et 2 Propositionis 32 partis I refutavimus, et Propositione 16 partis I ostendimus, Deum eadem necessitate agere, qua seipsum intelligit; hoc est, sicuti ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequitur (sicut omnes uno ore statuunt) ut Deus seipsum intelligat, eadem etiam	Scholium. By God's power the common people understand God's free will and his right over all things that exist, which are therefore commonly regarded as contingent. For they say that God has the power to destroy everything and reduce it to nothing. Further, they very often compare God's power with the power of kings. But we have refuted this in Corollaries 1 and 2 to Proposition 32 of Part 1, and in Proposition 16 of Part 1 we showed that God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself. That is, just as it follows

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	necessitate sequitur, ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde Propositione 34 partis I ostendimus, Dei potentiam nihil esse, præterquam Dei actuosam essentiam; adeoque tam nobis impossibile est concipere, Deum non agere, quam Deum non esse.	from the necessity of the divine nature (as everyone unanimously maintains) that God understands himself, so it follows with the same necessity that God does infinitely many things in infinitely many ways. Next, in Proposition 34 of Part 1 we showed that God's power is nothing but God's active essence; and so it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that God does not exist.
	Porro si hæc ulterius persequi liberet, possem hic etiam ostendere, potentiam illam, quam vulgus Deo affingit, non tantum humanam esse (quod ostendit Deum hominem, vel instar hominis a vulgo concipi), sed etiam impotentiam involvere. Sed nolo de eadem re toties sermonem instituere. Lectorem solummodo iterum atque iterum rogo, ut, quæ in prima parte, ex Propositione 16, usque ad finem, de hac re dicta sunt, semel atque iterum perpendat. Nam nemo ea, quæ volo, percipere recte poterit, nisi magnopere caveat, ne Dei potentiam cum humana Regum potentia vel jure confundat.	Further, if I cared to pursue this further, I could also show here that the power the common people ascribe to God is not only human (which shows that the common people conceive God as a man, or like a man) but also involves lack of power. But I do not want to talk about the same thing so many times. I only ask the reader, again and again, to weigh carefully, more than once, what has been said on this subject in Part 1, from Proposition 16 to the end. For no one will be able to perceive rightly what I mean unless he takes great care not to confuse God's power with the human power or right of kings.
2P4	PROPOSITIO IV. *Idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest.*	Proposition 4. *The idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be one.*
2P4D	DEMONSTRATIO. Intellectus infinitus nihil, præter Dei attributa ejusque affectiones, comprehendit (*per Prop.* 30 *p. I*). Atqui Deus est unicus (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 14 *p. I*). Ergo idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God's attributes and his affections (by Proposition 30 of Part 1). But God is unique (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 14 of Part 1). Therefore the idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be one. QED
2P5	PROPOSITIO V. *Esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, pro causa agnoscit, et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur. Hoc est, tam Dei attributorum, quam rerum singularium ideæ, non ipsa ideata sive res perceptas pro causa efficiente agnoscunt, sed ipsum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans.*	Proposition 5. *The formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained through another attribute. That is, the ideas both of God's attributes and of singular things recognize as their efficient cause not the objects of the ideas themselves, that is, the things perceived, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.*
2P5D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet quidem ex Propositione 3 hujus. Ibi enim concludebamus, Deum ideam suæ essentiæ, et omnium, quæ ex ea necessario sequuntur, formare posse ex hoc solo, nempe quod Deus est res cogitans, et non ex eo, quod sit suæ ideæ objectum. Quare esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans, pro causa agnoscit. Sed aliter hoc modo demonstratur. Esse formale	Demonstration. This is indeed evident from Proposition 3 of this part. For there we concluded that God can form the idea of his essence, and of everything that necessarily follows from it, solely from the fact that God is a thinking thing, and not from the fact that he is the object of his idea. Therefore the formal being of ideas recognizes

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	idearum modus est cogitandi (*ut per se notum*), hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 25 *p. I*) modus, qui Dei naturam quatenus est res cogitans certo modo exprimit, adeoque (*per Prop.* 10 *p. I*) nullius alterius attributi Dei conceptum involvit, et consequenter (*per Axiom.* 4 *p. I*) nullius alterius attributi nisi cogitationis est effectus: adeoque esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, etc.	God as its cause insofar as he is a thinking thing. But it can be demonstrated differently, in this way. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident), that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1), a mode that expresses in a certain way God's nature insofar as he is a thinking thing; and so (by Proposition 10 of Part 1) it involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) is the effect of no other attribute but thought. And so the formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, etc.
	Q.E.D.	QED
2P6	PROPOSITIO VI. *Cujuscunque attributi modi Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cujus modi sunt, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent.*	Proposition 6. *The modes of any attribute have God as their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other.*
2P6D	DEMONSTRATIO. Unumquodque enim attributum per se absque alio concipitur (*per Prop.* 10 *p. I*). Quare uniuscujusque attributi modi conceptum sui attributi, non autem alterius involvunt; adeoque (*per Axiom.* 4 *p. I*) Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cujus modi sunt, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For each attribute is conceived through itself, without any other (by Proposition 10 of Part 1). So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not of another; and so (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) they have God as their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other. QED
2P6C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod esse formale rerum, quæ modi non sunt cogitandi, non sequitur ideo ex divina natura, quia res prius cognovit; sed eodem modo eademque necessitate res ideatæ ex suis attributis consequuntur et concluduntur, ac ideas ex attributo Cogitationis consequi ostendimus.	Corollary. From this it follows that the formal being of things that are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God first knew those things. Rather, the objects of ideas follow and are derived from their own attributes in the same way and with the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.

THE ORDER OF IDEAS AND THE ORDER OF THINGS

Ideas follow the same order and connection as things; a mode and its idea are one thing.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P7	PROPOSITIO VII. *Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum.*	Proposition 7. *The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.*
2P7D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex *Ax.* 4 *p. I*. Nam cujuscunque causati idea a cognitione causæ, cujus est effectus, dependet.	Demonstration. This is evident from Axiom 4 of Part 1. For the idea of anything caused depends on knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.
2P7C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod Dei cogitandi potentia æqualis est ipsius actuali agendi potentiæ. Hoc	Corollary. From this it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	est, quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo objective.	That is, whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature all follows objectively in God from the idea of God, in the same order and with the same connection.
2P7S	SCHOLIUM. Hic, antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id, quod supra ostendimus; nempe quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiæ essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet, et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quæ jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa; quod quidam Hebræorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt, Deum, Dei intellectum, resque ab ipso intellectas, unum et idem esse. Ex. gr.	Scholium. Here, before we go any further, we must recall what we showed above: namely, that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting the essence of a substance belongs to one substance only, and consequently that thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. Some of the Hebrews seem to have seen this as if through a mist—those, namely, who maintain that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same. For example,[1]
	circulus in Natura existens, et idea circuli existentis, quæ etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res, quæ per diversa attributa explicatur; et ideo sive Naturam sub attributo Extensionis, sive sub attributo Cogitationis, sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem, sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem, hoc est easdem res, invicem sequi reperiemus. Nec ulla alia de causa dixi, quod Deus sit causa ideæ ex. gr.	a circle existing in Nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, explained through different attributes. And so, whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes—that is, the same things following one another. Nor did I say for any other reason that God is the cause of the idea of, say, a
	circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans, et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa, nisi quia esse formale ideæ circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum, tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium, et sic in infinitum, potest percipi; ita ut, quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius Naturæ, sive causarum connexionem, per solum Cogitationis attributum explicare debemus; et quatenus ut modi Extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius Naturæ per solum Extensionis attributum explicari debet, et idem de aliis attributis intelligo. Quare rerum, ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa quatenus infinitis constat attributis; nec impræsentiarum hæc clarius possum explicare.	circle only insofar as he is a thinking thing, and of the circle only insofar as he is an extended thing, than this: the formal being of the idea of a circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking as its proximate cause, and that one again through another, and so on to infinity. So as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of thought alone; and insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must likewise be explained through the attribute of extension alone. And I understand the same of the other attributes. Therefore God is really the cause of things as they are in themselves insofar as he consists of infinite attributes. For the present I cannot explain these matters more clearly.

1 Probably an allusion to Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* 1.68) and his followers, who held that in God the knower, the knowing and the known are one.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P8	PROPOSITIO VIII. *Ideæ rerum singularium, sive modorum, non existentium ita debent comprehendi in Dei infinita idea, ac rerum singularium, sive modorum, essentiæ formales in Dei attributis continentur.*	Proposition 8. *The ideas of singular things, or modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God's infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God's attributes.*
2P8D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio patet ex præcedenti; sed intelligitur clarius ex præcedenti Scholio.	Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from the preceding one, but it is understood more clearly from the preceding scholium.
2P8C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod, quamdiu res singulares non existunt, nisi quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, earum esse objectivum, sive ideæ, non existunt, nisi quatenus infinita Dei idea existit; et ubi res singulares dicuntur existere, non tantum quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, sed quatenus etiam durare dicuntur, earum ideæ etiam existentiam, per quam durare dicuntur, involvent.	Corollary. From this it follows that, as long as singular things do not exist except insofar as they are comprehended in God's attributes, their objective being, or their ideas, do not exist except insofar as God's infinite idea exists. And when singular things are said to exist not only insofar as they are comprehended in God's attributes, but also insofar as they are said to endure, their ideas too will involve the existence through which they are said to endure.
2P8S	SCHOLIUM. Si quis ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum desideret, nullum sane dare potero, quod rem, de qua hic loquor, utpote unicam, adæquate explicet; conabor tamen rem, ut fieri potest, illustrare. Nempe circulus talis est naturæ, ut omnium linearum rectarum, in eodem sese invicem secantium, rectangula sub segmentis sint inter se æqualia; quare in circulo infinita inter se æqualia rectangula continentur; attamen nullum eorum potest dici existere, nisi quatenus circulus existit, nec etiam alicujus horum rectangulorum idea potest dici existere, nisi quatenus in circuli idea comprehenditur. Concipiantur jam ex infinitis illis duo tantum, nempe E et D existere.	Scholium. If anyone wants an example to explain this matter more fully, I certainly cannot give one that adequately explains the thing I am speaking of here, since it is unique. Still, I shall try to illustrate it as far as possible. The circle is of such a nature that, for all straight lines intersecting one another within it, the rectangles formed from their segments are equal to one another. So a circle contains infinitely many rectangles equal to one another. Yet none of them can be said to exist except insofar as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist except insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Now let us conceive that, of those infinitely many rectangles, only two exist, namely E and D.[2]
	Sane eorum etiam ideæ jam non tantum existunt, quatenus solummodo in circuli idea comprehenduntur; sed etiam, quatenus illorum rectangulorum existentiam involvunt; quo fit, ut a reliquis reliquorum rectangulorum ideis distinguantur.	Their ideas, too, now certainly exist not only insofar as they are merely comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles. This is what distinguishes them from the other ideas of the other rectangles.
2P9	PROPOSITIO IX. *Idea rei singularis, actu existentis, Deum pro causa habet, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur, cujus etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alia tertia affectus est et sic in infinitum.*	Proposition 9. *The idea of a singular thing that actually exists has God as its cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing that actually exists; and*

2 Euclid, *Elements* 3.35: when two chords of a circle cross, the rectangle formed by the two parts of one equals that formed by the two parts of the other.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		of this idea, too, God is the cause insofar as he is affected by a third, and so on to infinity.
2P9D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea rei singularis, actu existentis, modus singularis cogitandi est, et a reliquis distinctus (*per Coroll. et Schol. Prop.* 8 *hujus*); adeoque (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*) Deum, quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*), quatenus est res absolute cogitans, sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur; et hujus etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus est, et sic in infinitum. Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum; ergo unius singularis ideæ alia idea, sive Deus, quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa, et hujus etiam, quatenus alia, affectus est, et sic in infinitum. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing that actually exists is a singular mode of thinking, distinct from the others (by the Corollary and Scholium to Proposition 8 of this part); and so (by Proposition 6 of this part) it has God as its cause only insofar as he is a thinking thing. Yet not (by Proposition 28 of Part 1) insofar as he is a thinking thing absolutely, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and of this mode, too, God is the cause insofar as he is affected by another mode of thinking, and so on to infinity. But the order and connection of ideas (by Proposition 7 of this part) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore the cause of one singular idea is another idea, or God insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea; and of this one, too, he is the cause insofar as he is affected by another, and so on to infinity. QED
2P9C	COROLLARIUM. Quicquid in singulari cujuscunque ideæ objecto contingit ejus datur in Deo cognitio, quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti ideam habet.	Corollary. Of whatever happens in the singular object of any idea, there is knowledge in God only insofar as he has the idea of that same object.
2P9CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus datur in Deo idea (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*) non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (*per præced. Prop.*); sed (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum; erit ergo cognitio ejus, quod in singulari aliquo objecto contingit, in Deo, quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti habet ideam. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Of whatever happens in the object of any idea, there is an idea in God (by Proposition 3 of this part), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing (by the preceding proposition). But (by Proposition 7 of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore knowledge of what happens in any singular object will be in God only insofar as he has the idea of that same object. QED
2P10	PROPOSITIO X. *Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiæ, sive substantia formam hominis non constituit.*	Proposition 10. *The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man; that is, substance does not constitute the form of man.*
2P10D	DEMONSTRATIO. Esse enim substantiæ involvit necessariam existentiam (*per Prop.* 7 *p. I*). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertineret esse substantiæ, data ergo substantia daretur necessario homo (*per Defin.* 2 *hujus*), et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (*per Ax.* 1 *hujus*) est absurdum. Ergo etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by Proposition 7 of Part 1). If, then, the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, it would follow that, given substance, man would necessarily be given (by Definition 2 of this part), and consequently man would necessarily exist—which (by Axiom 1 of this part) is absurd. Therefore, etc. QED
2P10S		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	SCHOLIUM. Demonstratur etiam hæc Propositio ex Propositione 5 p. I, nempe quod duæ ejusdem naturæ substantiæ non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id, quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substantiæ. Patet præterea hæc Propositio ex reliquis substantiæ proprietatibus, videlicet, quod substantia sit sua natura. infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc., ut facile unusquisque videre potest.	Scholium. This proposition is also demonstrated from Proposition 5 of Part 1, namely that there are not two substances of the same nature. Since many men can exist, what constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. The proposition is evident, moreover, from the other properties of substance—namely, that substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, and so on—as anyone can easily see.
2P10C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus.	Corollary. From this it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of God's attributes.
2P10CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam esse substantiæ (*per Prop. præced.*) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (*per Prop. 15 p. I*) aliquid, quod in Deo est, et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest, sive (*per Coroll. Prop. 25 p. I*) affectio, sive modus, qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.	Demonstration. For the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man (by the preceding proposition). It is therefore (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) something that is in God, and that can neither be nor be conceived without God; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1), an affection, or mode, which expresses God's nature in a certain and determinate way.
2P10CS	SCHOLIUM. Omnes sane concedere debent, nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est, quod Deus omnium rerum, tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ, unica est causa; hoc est, Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri, ut ajunt, sed etiam secundum esse. At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere dicunt, sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere, vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt, vel, quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cujus rei causam fuisse credo, quod ordinem Philosophandi non tenuerint.	Scholium. Everyone must surely grant that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all agree that God is the sole cause of all things, of their essence as well as of their existence; that is, God is the cause of things not only with respect to their coming to be, as they say, but also with respect to their being. Yet at the same time most people say that whatever a thing can neither be nor be conceived without pertains to that thing's essence. And so they believe either that the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or be conceived without God—or, what is more certain, they are not consistent with themselves. The cause of this, I believe, was that they did not keep to the proper order of philosophizing.[3]
	Nam naturam divinam, quam ante omnia contemplari debebant, quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam, et res, quæ sensuum objecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt; unde factum est, ut, dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint, quam de divina natura, et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint, quam de primis suis figmentis, quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant, utpote quæ ad	For they believed that the divine nature—which they should have contemplated before all else, since it is prior both in knowledge and in nature—comes last in the order of knowledge, and that the things called objects of the senses come before everything. So it happened that, while they were contemplating natural things, there was nothing they thought about less than the divine nature; and when afterwards they turned their minds to

3 "Cause of becoming" (causa secundum fieri) and "cause of being" (causa secundum esse) is a scholastic distinction.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	cognitionem divinæ naturæ nihil juvare poterant; adeoque nihil mirum, si sibi passim contradixerint. Sed hoc mitto.	contemplating the divine nature, there was nothing they could think about less than their own first fictions, on which they had built their knowledge of natural things, since these could be of no help toward knowledge of the divine nature. No wonder, then, that they contradicted themselves here and there. But I let this pass.
	Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit, causam reddere, cur non dixerim, id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere, sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; nimirum quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi, et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet; sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi, quo dato res ponitur, et quo sublato res tollitur: vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa id, quod sine re, nec esse nec concipi potest.	For my purpose here was only to explain why I did not say that whatever a thing can neither be nor be conceived without pertains to its essence. The reason is that singular things cannot be or be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence. What I did say is that that necessarily constitutes the essence of a thing which, if it is given, the thing is posited, and if it is taken away, the thing is taken away; or, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in turn can neither be nor be conceived without the thing.

THE MIND IS THE IDEA OF THE BODY

The human mind is the idea of an actually existing body, and nothing else.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P11	PROPOSITIO XI. *Primum, quod actuale Mentis humanæ esse constituit, nihil aliud est, quam idea rei alicujus singularis actu existentis.*	Proposition 11. *The first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing other than the idea of some singular thing actually existing.*
2P11D	DEMONSTRATIO. Essentia hominis (*per Coroll. præced. Prop.*) a certis Dei attributorum modis constituitur; nempe (*per Axioma* 2 *hujus*) a modis cogitandi, quorum omnium (*per Axiom.* 3 *hujus*) idea natura prior est, et ea data reliqui modi (quibus, scilicet idea natura prior est), in eodem debent esse individuo (*per idem Axioma*); atque adeo idea primum est, quod humanæ Mentis esse constituit. At non idea rei non existentis. Nam tum (*per Coroll. Prop.* 8 *hujus*) ipsa idea non potest dici existere; erit ergo idea rei actu existentis. At non rei infinitæ. Res namque infinita (*per Prop.* 21 *et* 22 *p. I*) debet semper necessario existere; atqui hoc (*per Axiom.* 1 *hujus*) est absurdum; ergo primum, quod esse humanæ Mentis actuale constituit, est idea rei singularis actu existentis.	Demonstration. The essence of man (by the Corollary to the preceding proposition) is constituted by certain modes of God's attributes, namely (by Axiom 2 of this part) by modes of thinking. Of all these (by Axiom 3 of this part) the idea is prior in nature, and when it is given, the other modes (those, that is, to which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same axiom). And so an idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of the human mind. But not the idea of a thing that does not exist. For then (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of this part) the idea itself could not be said to exist. It will therefore be the idea of a thing actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by Propositions 21 and 22 of Part 1) must always necessarily exist, and this (by Axiom 1 of this part) is absurd. Therefore the first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the idea of a singular thing actually existing.
	Q.E.D.	QED

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P11C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, Mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei; ac proinde cum dicimus, Mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Deus non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam humanæ Mentis explicatur, sive quatenus humanæ Mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam; et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere, non tantum quatenus naturam humanæ Mentis constituit, sed quatenus simul cum Mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus Mentem humanam rem ex parte, sive inadæquate percipere.	Corollary. From this it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Hence, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing other than that God—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, that is, insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind—has this or that idea. And when we say that God has this or that idea not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human mind, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing only in part, that is, inadequately.
2P11S	SCHOLIUM. Hic sine dubio Lectores hærebunt, multaque comminiscentur, quæ moram injiciant, et hac de causa ipsos rogo, ut lento gradu mecum pergant, nec de his judicium ferant, donec omnia perlegerint.	Scholium. Here, no doubt, readers will get stuck and will think up many objections to hold things up. For this reason I ask them to proceed slowly with me, step by step, and not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read everything through.
2P12	PROPOSITIO XII. *Quicquid in objecto ideæ humanam Mentem constituentis contingit, id ab humana Mente debet percipi, sive ejus rei dabitur in Mente necessario idea: Hoc est, si objectum ideæ humanam Mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere, quod a Mente non percipiatur.*	Proposition 12. *Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind; that is, there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind. In other words, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body that is not perceived by the mind.*
2P12D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid enim in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus rei datur necessario in Deo cognitio (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *hujus*), quatenus ejusdem objecti idea affectus consideratur, hoc est (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*), quatenus mentem alicujus rei constituit. Quicquid igitur in objecto ideæ humanam Mentem constituentis contingit, ejus datur necessario in Deo cognitio, quatenus naturam humanæ Mentis constituit, hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), ejus rei cognitio erit necessario in Mente, sive Mens id percipit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For whatever happens in the object of any idea, knowledge of it is necessarily in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as he is considered as affected by the idea of that same object; that is (by Proposition 11 of this part), insofar as he constitutes the mind of some thing. Therefore, whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind, knowledge of it is necessarily in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), knowledge of that thing will necessarily be in the mind, or the mind perceives it. QED
2P12S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Propositio patet etiam et clarius intelligitur ex Schol. Prop. 7 hujus, quod vide.	Scholium. This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly understood, from the Scholium to Proposition 7 of this part; see there.
2P13	PROPOSITIO XIII. *Objectum ideæ humanam Mentem constituentis est Corpus, sive certus extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud.*	Proposition 13. *The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body—that is, a certain mode of extension actually existing—and nothing else.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P13D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si enim Corpus non esset humanæ Mentis objectum, ideæ affectionum Corporis non essent in Deo (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *hujus*), quatenus Mentem nostram, sed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret; hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), ideæ affectionum Corporis non essent in nostra Mente. Atqui (*per Axiom.* 4 *hujus*) ideas affectionum Corporis habemus. Ergo objectum ideæ humanam Mentem constituentis est Corpus, idque (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*) actu existens. Deinde, si præter Corpus etiam aliud esset Mentis objectum, cum nihil (*per Prop.* 36 *p. I*) existat, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*) necessario alicujus ejus effectus idea in Mente nostra dari; atqui (*per Axiom.* 5 *hujus*) nulla ejus idea datur. Ergo objectum nostræ Mentis est Corpus existens et nihil aliud.	Demonstration. For if the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as he constitutes our mind, but insofar as he constitutes the mind of another thing; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in our mind. But (by Axiom 4 of this part) we do have ideas of the affections of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body (by Proposition 11 of this part) as actually existing. Next, if besides the body there were also another object of the mind, then, since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), there would necessarily have to be in our mind the idea of some effect of it (by Proposition 11 of this part). But (by Axiom 5 of this part) there is no idea of it. Therefore the object of our mind is the existing body and nothing else.
	Q.E.D.	QED
2P13C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, hominem Mente et Corpore constare, et Corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere.	Corollary. From this it follows that man consists of a mind and a body, and that the human body exists as we sense it.
2P13S	SCHOLIUM. Ex his non tantum intelligimus, Mentem humanam unitam esse Corpori, sed etiam, quid per Mentis et Corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adæquate, sive distincte, intelligere nemo poterit, nisi prius nostri Corporis naturam adæquate cognoscat. Nam ea, quæ hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt, nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua Individua pertinent, quæ omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt. Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea, cujus Deus est causa, eodem modo ac humani Corporis ideæ: atque adeo, quicquid de idea humani Corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est.	Scholium. From this we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body. But no one will be able to understand this union adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of our body. For what we have shown so far is entirely general, and does not pertain more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is of the human body. And so whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must necessarily be said of the idea of any thing.
	Attamen nec etiam negare possumus ideas inter se, ut ipsa objecta, differre unamque alia præstantiorem esse, plusque realitatis continere, prout objectum unius objecto alterius præstantius est, plusque realitatis continet; ac propterea ad determinandum, quid Mens humana reliquis intersit, quidque reliquis præstet, necesse nobis est ejus objecti, ut diximus, hoc est,	Still, we also cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves as their objects do, and that one is more excellent than another and contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the object of the other and contains more reality. Therefore, to determine how the human mind differs from the others and how it surpasses

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum, nec id ad ea, quæ demonstrare volo necesse est. Hoc tamen in genere dico, quo Corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus Mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum; et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent, et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum.	them, we must know, as we have said, the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. I cannot explain that nature here, nor is it necessary for what I want to demonstrate. This much, however, I say in general: the more a body is capable, compared with others, of acting or being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is capable, compared with others, of perceiving many things at once; and the more the actions of a body depend on itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in acting, the more its mind is capable of understanding distinctly.
	Atque ex his præstantiam unius mentis præ aliis cognoscere possumus: deinde causam etiam videre, cur nostri Corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem, et alia plura, quæ in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operæ pretium esse duxi, hæc ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est, pauca de natura corporum præmittere.	From this we can know the excellence of one mind over others; we can also see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things that I shall deduce from these in what follows. For this reason I have thought it worthwhile to explain and demonstrate these things more precisely, and for this it is necessary to set out first a few points about the nature of bodies.

A SHORT PHYSICS OF BODIES

Axioms and lemmas on motion, rest and composite bodies, ending with postulates about the human body.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2A1'	AXIOMA I. Omnia corpora vel moventur vel quiescunt.	Axiom 1. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
2A2'	AXIOMA II. Unumquodque corpus jam tardius jam celerius movetur.	Axiom 2. Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly.
2L1	LEMMA I. *Corpora ratione motus et quietis, celeritatis et tarditatis, et non ratione substantiæ ab invicem distinguuntur*.	Lemma 1. *Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.*
2L1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Primam partem hujus per se notam suppono. At quod ratione substantiæ non distinguantur corpora, patet tam ex *Prop.* 5 quam 8 *p. I.* Sed clarius ex iis, quæ in *Schol. Prop.* 15, *p. I* dicta sunt.	Demonstration. The first part of this I take to be self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished by reason of substance is evident both from Proposition 5 and from Proposition 8 of Part 1, but more clearly from what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 15 of Part 1.
2L2	LEMMA II. *Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt.*	Lemma 2. *All bodies agree in certain things.*
2L2D	DEMONSTRATIO. In his enim omnia corpora conveniunt, quod unius ejusdemque attributi conceptum involvunt (*per Defin.* 1 *hujus*). Deinde, quod jam tardius jam celerius, et absolute jam moveri jam quiescere possunt.	Demonstration. For all bodies agree in this: that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by Definition 1 of this part). Next, in that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and, without qualification, can now be in motion, now at rest.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2L3	LEMMA III. Corpus motum vel quiescens ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum.	Lemma 3. A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that one in turn by another, and so on to infinity.
2L3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Corpora (*per Defin.* 1 *hujus*) res singulares sunt, quæ (per *Lemma* 1) ratione motus et quietis ab invicem distinguuntur; adeoque (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*) unumquodque ad motum vel quietem necessario determinari debuit ab alia re singulari, nempe (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*) ab alio corpore, quod (*per Axiom.* 1) etiam vel movetur vel quiescit. At hoc etiam (*per eandem rationem*) moveri vel quiescere non potuit, nisi ab alio ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuisset, et hoc iterum (*per eandem rationem*) ab alio, et sic in infinitum. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Bodies (by Definition 1 of this part) are singular things which (by Lemma 1) are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest. And so (by Proposition 28 of Part 1) each must necessarily have been determined to motion or rest by another singular thing, namely (by Proposition 6 of this part) by another body, which (by Axiom 1) is also either in motion or at rest. But this body too (by the same reasoning) could not have been in motion or at rest unless it had been determined to motion or rest by another, and this one in turn (by the same reasoning) by another, and so on to infinity. QED
2L3C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, corpus motum tamdiu moveri, donec ab alio corpore ad quiescendum determinetur; et corpus quiescens tamdiu etiam quiescere, donec ab alio ad motum determinetur. Quod etiam per se notum est. Nam cum suppono, corpus ex. gr. A quiescere, nec ad alia corpora mota attendo, nihil de corpore A dicere potero, nisi quod quiescat. Quod si postea contingat, ut corpus A moveatur, id sane evenire non potuit ex eo, quod quiescebat; ex eo enim nil aliud sequi poterat, quam ut corpus A quiesceret. Si contra supponatur A moveri, quotiescunque ad A tantum attendimus, nihil de eodem affirmare poterimus, nisi quod moveatur.	Corollary. From this it follows that a body in motion continues to move until it is determined to rest by another body, and that a body at rest likewise continues at rest until it is determined to motion by another. This is also self-evident. For when I suppose that a body, say A, is at rest, and pay no attention to other bodies in motion, I can say nothing about body A except that it is at rest. If it then happens that body A moves, this surely could not have come about from its being at rest; for from that nothing else could follow than that body A remain at rest. If, on the other hand, A is supposed to be moving, then as long as we attend only to A, we can affirm nothing about it except that it is moving.
	Quod si postea contingat, ut A quiescat, id sane evenire etiam non potuit ex motu, quem habebat; ex motu enim nihil aliud sequi poterat, quam ut A moveretur; contingit itaque a re, quæ non erat in A, nempe a causa externa, a qua ad quiescendum determinatum fuit.	If it then happens that A comes to rest, this too surely could not have come about from the motion it had; for from its motion nothing else could follow than that A keep moving. It happens, therefore, from something that was not in A, namely from an external cause, by which it was determined to rest.
2A1"	AXIOMA I. Omnes modi, quibus corpus aliquod ab alio afficitur corpore, ex natura corporis affecti et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur; ita ut unum idemque corpus diversimode moveatur pro diversitate naturæ corporum moventium, et contra ut diversa corpora ab uno eodemque corpore diversimode moveantur.	Axiom 1. All the ways in which a body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the body affecting it. So one and the same body is moved in different ways according to the differing natures of the bodies moving it, and,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		conversely, different bodies are moved in different ways by one and the same body.
2A2"	AXIOMA II. Cum corpus motum alteri quiescenti, quod dimovere nequit, impingit, reflectitur, ut moveri pergat, et angulus lineæ motus reflectionis cum plano corporis quiescentis, cui impegit, æqualis erit angulo, quem linea motus incidentiæ cum eodem plano efficit.	Axiom 2. When a body in motion strikes another at rest which it cannot move, it is reflected so as to continue moving; and the angle that the line of the reflected motion makes with the surface of the body at rest which it struck will be equal to the angle that the line of the incident motion makes with that same surface.
	Atque hæc de corporibus simplicissimis, quæ scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur: jam ad composita ascendamus.	So much for the simplest bodies, those that are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness. Now let us move up to composite bodies.
2Def	DEFINITIO. *Cum corpora aliquot ejusdem aut diversæ magnitudinis a reliquis ita coercentur, ut invicem incumbant, vel si eodem aut diversis celeritatis gradibus moventur, ut motus suos invicem certa quadam ratione communicent, illa corpora invicem unita dicemus, et omnia simul unum corpus sive Individuum componere, quod a reliquis per hanc corporum unionem distinguitur.*	Definition. *When a number of bodies, of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or, if they are moving at the same or at different degrees of speed, that they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another, and that together they all compose one body, or individual, which is distinguished from others by this union of bodies.*
2A3"	AXIOMA III. Quo partes Individui, vel corporis compositi, secundum majores vel minores superficies sibi invicem incumbunt, eo difficilius vel facilius cogi possunt, ut situm suum mutent, et consequenter eo difficilius vel facilius effici potest, ut ipsum Individuum aliam figuram induat. Atque hinc corpora, quorum partes secundum magnas superficies invicem incumbunt, *dura*; quorum autem partes secundum parvas, *mollia*; et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, *fluida* vocabo.	Axiom 3. The larger or smaller the surfaces over which the parts of an individual, or composite body, lie upon one another, the harder or easier it is to force them to change their position, and consequently the harder or easier it is to bring it about that the individual itself takes on another shape. From this I shall call bodies whose parts lie upon one another over large surfaces *hard*; those whose parts do so over small surfaces, *soft*; and finally those whose parts move among one another, *fluid*.
2L4	LEMMA IV. *Si corporis, sive Individui, quod ex pluribus corporibus componitur, quædam corpora segregentur, et simul totidem alia ejusdem naturæ eorum loco succedant, retinebit Individuum suam naturam uti antea, absque ulla ejus formæ mutatione.*	Lemma 4. *If from a body, or individual, composed of many bodies, some bodies are removed, and at the same time as many others of the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form.*
2L4D	DEMONSTRATIO. Corpora enim (*per Lem.* 1) ratione substantiæ non distinguuntur; id autem, quod formam Individui constituit, in corporum unione (*per Defin. præc.*) consistit; atqui hæc (*per hypothesin*), tametsi corporum continua fiat mutatio, retinetur: retinebit ergo Individuum, tam ratione substantiæ quam modi, suam naturam uti ante. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For bodies are not distinguished by reason of substance (by Lemma 1), and what constitutes the form of an individual consists in a union of bodies (by the preceding definition). But this union (by hypothesis) is retained, even though there is a continual change of bodies. Therefore the individual will retain its nature as

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		before, with respect both to substance and to mode. QED
2L5	LEMMA V. Si partes, Individuum componentes, majores minoresve evadant, ea tamen proportione, ut omnes eandem ut antea ad invicem motus et quietis rationem servent, retinebit itidem Individuum suam naturam ut antea, absque ulla formæ mutatione.	Lemma 5. If the parts composing an individual become larger or smaller, but in such proportion that all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature as before, without any change of form.
2L5D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hujus eadem est ac præcedentis Lemmatis.	Demonstration. The demonstration of this is the same as that of the preceding lemma.
2L6	LEMMA VI. *Si corpora quædam, Individuum componentia, motum, quem versus unam partem habent, aliam versus flectere cogantur; at ita ut motus suos continuare possint, atque invicem eadem qua antea ratione communicare; retinebit itidem Individuum suam naturam, absque ulla formæ mutatione.*	Lemma 6. *If certain bodies composing an individual are compelled to turn the motion they have toward one direction toward another, but in such a way that they can continue their motions and communicate them to one another in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, without any change of form.*
2L6D	DEMONSTRATIO. Per se patet. Id enim omne retinere supponitur, quod in ejusdem definitione formam ipsius constituere diximus.	Demonstration. This is self-evident. For the individual is supposed to retain everything that, in its definition, we said constitutes its form.
2L7	LEMMA VII. *Retinet præterea Individuum sic compositum suam naturam, sive id secundum totum moveatur sive quiescat, sive versus hanc sive versus illam partem moveatur, dummodo unaquæque pars motum suum retineat, eumque uti antea reliquis communicet.*	Lemma 7. *Further, an individual so composed retains its nature whether it moves as a whole or is at rest, and whether it moves in this direction or that, provided each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before.*
2L7D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex ipsius definitione, quam vide ante Lem. 4.	Demonstration. This is evident from its definition, which see before Lemma 4.
2L7S	SCHOLIUM. His itaque videmus, qua ratione Individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, ejus nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque Individuum concepimus, quod non nisi ex corporibus, quæ solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur, hoc est, quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur. Quod si jam aliud concipiamus, ex pluribus diversæ naturæ Individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. Nam quandoquidem ejus unaquæque pars ex pluribus corporibus est composita; poterit ergo (*per Lem. præced.*) unaquæque pars, absque ulla ipsius naturæ mutatione, jam tardius jam celerius moveri, et consequenter motus suos citius vel tardius reliquis communicare. Quod si præterea tertium Individuorum genus, ex his secundis compositum, concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse reperiemus, absque ulla ejus formæ mutatione.	Scholium. From this, then, we see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways and still preserve its nature. So far we have conceived an individual composed only of bodies that are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is, one composed of the simplest bodies. If we now conceive another, composed of many individuals of different natures, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways and still preserve its nature. For since each of its parts is composed of many bodies, each part will be able (by the preceding lemma), without any change in its nature, to move now more slowly, now more quickly, and consequently to communicate its motions to the others more quickly or more slowly. And if we further conceive a third kind of individual, composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		it can be affected in many other ways, without any change of its form.
	Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus, totam Naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, hoc est omnia corpora, infinitis modis variant, absque ulla totius Individui mutatione. Atque hæc, si animus fuisset de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare et demonstrare debuissem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle, nec alia de causa hæc adferre, quam quia ex ipsis ea, quæ demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.	And if we go on in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of Nature is one individual, whose parts—that is, all bodies—vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as a whole. Had it been my intention to treat of body expressly, I would have had to explain and demonstrate these things at greater length. But I have already said that I intend something else, and that I bring these things forward for no other reason than that from them I can easily deduce what I have set out to demonstrate.
2Post1	I. Corpus humanum componitur ex plurimis (diversæ naturæ) individuis, quorum unumquodque valde compositum est.	Postulate 1. The human body is composed of a great many individuals (of different natures), each of which is highly composite.
2Post2	II. Individuorum, ex quibus Corpus humanum componitur, quædam fluida, quædam mollia, et quædam denique dura sunt.	Postulate 2. Of the individuals of which the human body is composed, some are fluid, some soft, and some, finally, hard.
2Post3	III. Individua Corpus humanum componentia, et consequenter ipsum humanum Corpus a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur.	Postulate 3. The individuals composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in a great many ways.
2Post4	IV. Corpus humanum indiget, ut conservetur, plurimis aliis corporibus, a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur.	Postulate 4. To be preserved, the human body needs a great many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated.
2Post5	V. Cum Corporis humani pars fluida a corpore externo determinatur, ut in aliam mollem sæpe impingat, ejus planum mutat, et veluti quædam corporis externi impellentis vestigia eidem imprimit.	Postulate 5. When a fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to strike frequently against another, soft part, it changes the surface of that part and, as it were, imprints on it certain traces of the external body that is driving it.
2Post6	VI. Corpus humanum potest corpora externa plurimis modis movere, plurimisque modis disponere.	Postulate 6. The human body can move external bodies in a great many ways, and arrange them in a great many ways.

IMAGINATION AND MEMORY

The mind perceives external bodies through the body's affections, imagines absent things as present, and links ideas in memory.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P14	PROPOSITIO XIV. *Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, quo ejus Corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.*	Proposition 14. *The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more ways its body can be disposed.*
2P14D	DEMONSTRATIO. Corpus enim humanum (*per Post.* 3 *et* 6) plurimis modis a corporibus externis afficitur,	Demonstration. For the human body (by Postulates 3 and 6) is affected in a great many ways by

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	disponiturque ad corpora externa plurimis modis afficiendum. At omnia, quæ in Corpore humano contingunt (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*), Mens humana percipere debet; est ergo Mens humana apta ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, etc. *Q.E.D.*	external bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in a great many ways. But the human mind must perceive everything that happens in the human body (by Proposition 12 of this part). The human mind is therefore capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, etc. QED
2P15	PROPOSITIO XV. *Idea, quæ esse formale humanæ Mentis constituit, non est simplex, sed ex plurimis ideis composita.*	Proposition 15. *The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of a great many ideas.*
2P15D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea, quæ esse formale humanæ Mentis constituit, est idea Corporis (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*), quod (*per Post.* 1) ex plurimis valde compositis Individuis componitur. At cujuscunque Individui, corpus componentis, datur necessario (*per Coroll. Prop.* 8 *hujus*) in Deo idea; ergo (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) idea Corporis humani ex plurimis hisce partium componentium ideis est composita. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of the body (by Proposition 13 of this part), which (by Postulate 1) is composed of a great many highly composite individuals. But of each individual composing the body there is necessarily an idea in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of this part). Therefore (by Proposition 7 of this part) the idea of the human body is composed of these many ideas of its component parts. QED
2P16	PROPOSITIO XVI. *Idea cujuscunque modi, quo Corpus humanum a corporibus externis afficitur, involvere debet naturam Corporis humani, et simul naturam corporis externi.*	Proposition 16. *The idea of any way in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body.*
2P16D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnes enim modi, quibus corpus aliquod afficitur, ex natura corporis affecti, et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur (*per Axiom.* 1 *post. Coroll. Lem.* 3): quare eorum idea (*per Axiom.* 4 *p. I*), utriusque corporis naturam necessario involvet; adeoque idea cujuscunque modi, quo Corpus humanum a corpore externo afficitur, Corporis humani et corporis externi naturam involvit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For all the ways in which a body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body (by Axiom 1 after the Corollary to Lemma 3). So the idea of them (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) will necessarily involve the nature of each body. And so the idea of any way in which the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. QED
2P16C1	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc sequitur primo, Mentem humanam plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura percipere.	Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of its own body.
2P16C2	COROLLARIUM II. Sequitur secundo, quod ideæ, quas corporum externorum habemus magis nostri corporis constitutionem quam corporum externorum naturam indicant; quod in Appendice partis primæ multis exemplis explicui.	Corollary 2. It follows, second, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies. I have explained this with many examples in the Appendix to Part 1.
2P17	PROPOSITIO XVII. *Si humanum Corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam Corporis alicujus externi involvit, Mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut sibi præsens*	Proposition 17. *If the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will regard that external body as actually*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	contemplabitur, donec Corpus afficiatur affectu, qui ejusdem corporis existentiam vel præsentiam secludat.	*existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body.*
2P17D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet. Nam quandiu Corpus humanum sic affectum est tamdiu Mens humana (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur; hoc est (*per Prop. præced.*) ideam habebit modi actu existentis, quæ naturam corporis externi involvit; hoc est ideam, quæ existentiam vel præsentiam naturæ corporis externi non secludit, sed ponit; adeoque Mens (*per Coroll.* 1 *præced.*) corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut præsens contemplabitur, donec afficiatur etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. This is evident. For as long as the human body is affected in this way, the human mind (by Proposition 12 of this part) will regard this affection of the body; that is (by the preceding proposition), it will have the idea of a mode actually existing which involves the nature of the external body—an idea that does not exclude but posits the existence or presence of the nature of the external body. And so the mind (by Corollary 1 of the preceding proposition) will regard the external body as actually existing, or as present, until it is affected, etc. QED
2P17C	COROLLARIUM. Mens corpora externa, a quibus Corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec præsentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit, velut præsentia essent.	Corollary. The mind will be able to regard external bodies by which the human body has once been affected as if they were present, even though they do not exist and are not present.
2P17CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Dum corpora externa Corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant, ut in molliores sæpe impingant, earum plana (*per Post.* 5) mutant; unde fit (*vide Axiom.* 2 *post Coroll. Lem.* 3) ut inde alio modo reflectantur quam antea solebant, et ut etiam postea, iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo, eodem modo reflectantur, ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsæ sunt; et consequenter, ut Corpus humanum, dum sic reflexæ moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo Mens (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*) iterum cogitabit; hoc est (*per Prop.* 17 *hujus*), Mens iterum corpus externum ut præsens contemplabitur; et hoc toties, quoties Corporis humani partes fluidæ spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent.	Demonstration. When external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they frequently strike against the softer parts, they change the surfaces of these (by Postulate 5). As a result (see Axiom 2 after the Corollary to Lemma 3) the fluid parts are reflected from them in a different way than they used to be before; and afterwards too, when by their own spontaneous motion they meet these new surfaces, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven toward those surfaces by the external bodies. Consequently, while they continue to move after being reflected in this way, they affect the human body in the same way, and the mind (by Proposition 12 of this part) will think of this again; that is (by Proposition 17 of this part), the mind will again regard the external body as present. And this will happen as often as the fluid parts of the human body meet those same surfaces by their own spontaneous motion.
	Quare, quamvis corpora externa, a quibus Corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, Mens tamen eadem toties ut præsentia contemplabitur, quoties hæc corporis actio repetetur. *Q.E.D.*	Therefore, even though the external bodies by which the human body was once affected do not exist, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present as often as this action of the body is repeated. QED
2P17S	SCHOLIUM. Videmus itaque qui fieri potest ut ea, quæ non sunt, veluti præsentia contemplemur, ut sæpe fit. Et fieri potest, ut hoc aliis de causis contingat; sed mihi hic	Scholium. We see, then, how it can happen that we regard things that do not exist as if they were present, as often happens. And it is possible that

LATIN

sufficit ostendisse unam, per quam rem sic possim explicare, ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem; nec tamen credo me a vera longe aberrare, quandoquidem omnia illa, quæ sumpsi, postulata vix quicquam continent, quod non constet experientia, de qua nobis non licet dubitare, postquam ostendimus Corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere (*vide Coroll. post Prop.* 13 *hujus*). Præterea (*ex Coroll. præced. et Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 16 *hujus*) clare intelligimus, quænam sit differentia inter ideam ex. gr. Petri, quæ essentiam Mentis ipsius Petri constituit, et inter ideam ipsius Petri quæ in alio homine, puta in Paulo est.

Illa enim essentiam Corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat, nec existentiam involvit, nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; hæc autem magis constitutionem Corporis Pauli quam Petri naturam indicat, et ideo, durante illa Corporis Pauli constitutione, Mens Pauli, quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi præsentem contemplabitur. Porro, ut verba usitata retineamus, Corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideæ corpora, externa velut nobis præsentia repræsentant, rerum imagines vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum Mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus. Atque hic, ut quid sit error indicare incipiam, notetis velim, Mentis imaginationes in se spectatas nihil erroris continere; sive Mentem ex eo, quod imaginatur, non errare; sed tantum quatenus consideratur carere idea, quæ existentiam illarum rerum, quas sibi præsentes imaginatur, secludat.

Nam si Mens, dum res non existentes ut sibi præsentes imaginatur, simul sciret, res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suæ naturæ, non vitio tribueret; præsertim si hæc imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet, hoc est (*per Defin.* 7 *p. I*), si hæc Mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.

2P18 PROPOSITIO XVIII. *Si Corpus humanum a duobus vel pluribus corporibus simul affectum fuerit semel, ubi Mens postea eorum aliquod imaginabitur, statim et aliorum recordabitur.*

ENGLISH

this comes about from other causes; but it is enough for me here to have shown one through which I can explain the matter just as if I had shown it through its true cause. Nor do I believe that I stray far from the true cause, since all the postulates I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established by experience—which we are not permitted to doubt, now that we have shown that the human body exists as we sense it (see the Corollary after Proposition 13 of this part). Further (from the preceding corollary and Corollary 2 of Proposition 16 of this part), we clearly understand the difference between, for example, the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter's own mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man, say in Paul.

For the former directly explains the essence of Peter's own body, and does not involve existence except as long as Peter exists. The latter indicates the constitution of Paul's body more than the nature of Peter; and so, while that constitution of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to it, even though Peter does not exist. Next, to keep to the usual words, we shall call the affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us the images of things, even though they do not reproduce the shapes of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines. And here, to begin to indicate what error is, I would like you to note that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error; that is, the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of the things it imagines to be present to it.

For if the mind, while it imagined nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things did not really exist, it would surely attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice—especially if this faculty of imagining depended on its nature alone, that is (by Definition 7 of Part 1), if this faculty of imagining in the mind were free.

Proposition 18. *If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others as well.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P18D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens (*per Coroll. præced.*) corpus aliquod ea de causa imaginatur, quia scilicet humanum Corpus a corporis externi vestigiis eodem modo afficitur disponiturque, ac affectum est, cum quædam ejus partes ab ipso corpore externo fuerunt impulsæ: sed (*per hypothesin*) Corpus tum ita fuit dispositum, ut Mens duo simul corpora imaginaretur, ergo jam etiam duo simul imaginabitur, atque Mens ubi alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The mind (by the preceding corollary) imagines a body because the human body is affected and disposed by the traces of the external body in the same way as it was affected when some of its parts were driven by that external body. But (by hypothesis) the body was at that time so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once. Therefore it will now also imagine two at once, and when the mind imagines either of them, it will immediately recollect the other as well. QED
2P18S	SCHOLIUM. Hinc clare intelligimus, quid sit *Memoria*. Est enim nihil aliud quam quædam concatenatio idearum, naturam rerum, quæ extra Corpus humanum sunt, involventium, quæ in Mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum Corporis humani. Dico *primo*, concatenationem esse illarum tantum idearum, quæ naturam, rerum quæ extra Corpus humanum sunt, involvunt; non autem idearum, quæ earundem rerum naturam explicant; sunt enim revera (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus*) ideæ affectionum Corporis humani, quæ tam hujus quam corporum externorum naturam involvunt. Dico *secundo*, hanc concatenationem fieri secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum Corporis humani, ut ipsam distinguerem a concatenatione idearum, quæ fit secundum ordinem intellectus, quo res per primas suas causas Mens percipit, et qui in omnibus hominibus idem est.	Scholium. From this we clearly understand what *memory* is. For it is nothing other than a certain linking of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body—a linking that occurs in the mind according to the order and linking of the affections of the human body. I say, *first*, that it is a linking only of those ideas that involve the nature of things outside the human body, not of ideas that explain the nature of those things. For these are in fact (by Proposition 16 of this part) ideas of affections of the human body, which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, *second*, that this linking occurs according to the order and linking of the affections of the human body, to distinguish it from the linking of ideas that occurs according to the order of the intellect—the order by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men.
	Atque hinc porro clare intelligimus, cur Mens ex cogitatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat, quæ nullam cum priore habet similitudinem; ut ex. gr. ex cogitatione vocis *pomi* homo Romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem, nec aliquid commune, nisi quod ejusdem hominis Corpus ab his duobus affectum sæpe fuit; hoc est, quod ipse homo sæpe vocem *pomum* audivit, dum ipsum fructum videret; et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet, prout rerum imagines uniuscujusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit. Nam miles ex. gr. visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis, et inde in cogitationem belli, etc. incidet. At rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri, etc.	And from this we further clearly understand why the mind passes immediately from the thought of one thing to the thought of another that has no likeness to the first. For example, from the thought of the word *pomum* a Roman will immediately pass to the thought of the fruit, which has no likeness to that articulate sound and nothing in common with it, except that the body of this same man has often been affected by the two—that is, that the man has often heard the word *pomum* while he was seeing the fruit itself. And so each person will pass from one thought to another according as habit has ordered the images of things in his body. A soldier, for example, seeing the tracks of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and from there to the thought of war, etc. But a

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, a field, etc.[4]
	incidet; et sic unusquisque, prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc vel alio modo jungere et concatenare, ex una in hanc vel in aliam incidet cogitationem.	And so each person, according as he has been accustomed to join and link the images of things in this way or that, will pass from one thought to this thought or to that.

WHAT THE MIND KNOWS OF ITSELF AND ITS BODY

The mind knows itself, its body and external bodies only through the body's affections, and so inadequately.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P19	PROPOSITIO XIX. *Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur.*	Proposition 19. *The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except through ideas of the affections by which the body is affected.*
2P19D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens enim humana est ipsa idea sive cognitio Corporis humani (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*), quæ (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*) in Deo quidem est, quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur; vel, quia (*per Post.* 4) Corpus humanum plurimis corporibus indiget, a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur; et ordo et connexio idearum idem est (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) ac ordo et connexio causarum; erit hæc idea in Deo, quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus consideratur. Deus itaque ideam Corporis humani habet, sive Corpus humanum cognoscit quatenus plurimis aliis ideis affectus est, et non quatenus naturam humanæ Mentis constituit, hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), Mens humana Corpus humanum non cognoscit.	Demonstration. For the human mind is the very idea, or knowledge, of the human body (by Proposition 13 of this part), which (by Proposition 9 of this part) is indeed in God insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing. Or rather, since (by Postulate 4) the human body needs a great many bodies by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated, and since the order and connection of ideas is the same (by Proposition 7 of this part) as the order and connection of causes, this idea will be in God insofar as he is considered as affected by the ideas of a great many singular things. God, therefore, has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, insofar as he is affected by a great many other ideas, and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), the human mind does not know the human body.
	At ideæ affectionum Corporis in Deo sunt, quatenus humanæ Mentis naturam constituit, sive Mens humana easdem affectiones percipit (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*); et consequenter (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus*) ipsum Corpus humanum, idque (*per Prop.* 17 *hujus*) ut actu existens; percipit ergo eatenus tantum Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus. *Q.E.D.*	But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is, the human mind perceives those affections (by Proposition 12 of this part), and consequently (by Proposition 16 of this part) the human body itself, and that (by Proposition 17 of this part) as actually existing. Only to that extent, therefore, does the human mind perceive the human body itself. QED
2P20	PROPOSITIO XX. *Mentis humanæ datur etiam in Deo idea sive cognitio, quæ in Deo eodem modo sequitur, et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea sive cognitio Corporis humani.*	Proposition 20. *There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God and is*

4 Pomum is Latin for "apple" or, more generally, "fruit."

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body.
2P20D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cogitatio attributum Dei est (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*); adeoque (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*) tam ejus quam omnium ejus affectionum, et consequenter (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*) Mentis etiam humanæ debet necessario in Deo dari idea. Deinde hæc Mentis idea sive cognitio non sequitur in Deo dari, quatenus infinitus, sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus est (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*). Sed ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*); sequitur ergo hæc Mentis idea sive cognitio in Deo, et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea sive cognitio Corporis. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Thought is an attribute of God (by Proposition 1 of this part). And so (by Proposition 3 of this part) there must necessarily be in God an idea both of thought and of all its affections, and consequently (by Proposition 11 of this part) of the human mind as well. Next, this idea, or knowledge, of the mind does not follow as being in God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by Proposition 9 of this part). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (by Proposition 7 of this part). Therefore this idea, or knowledge, of the mind follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. QED
2P21	PROPOSITIO XXI. *Hæc Mentis idea eodem modo unita est Menti, ac ipsa Mens unita est Corpori.*	Proposition 21. *This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.*
2P21D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mentem unitam esse Corpori ex eo ostendimus, quod scilicet Corpus Mentis sit objectum (*vide Prop.* 12 *et* 13 *hujus*): adeoque per eandem illam rationem idea Mentis cum suo obiecto, hoc est cum ipsa Mente, eodem modo unita esse debet, ac ipsa Mens unita est Corpori. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (see Propositions 12 and 13 of this part). And so, by that same reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind itself, in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. QED
2P21S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Propositio longe clarius intelligitur ex dictis in Schol. Prop. 7 hujus; ibi enim ostendimus Corporis ideam et Corpus, hoc est (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*) Mentem et Corpus, unum et idem esse Individuum, quod jam sub Cogitationis jam sub Extensionis attributo concipitur; quare Mentis idea et ipsa Mens una eademque est res, quæ sub uno eodemque attributo, nempe Cogitationis, concipitur. Mentis, inquam, idea et ipsa Mens in Deo eadem necessitate ex eadem cogitandi potentia sequuntur dari. Nam revera idea Mentis, hoc est idea ideæ, nihil aliud est quam forma ideæ, quatenus hæc ut modus cogitandi, absque relatione ad objectum consideratur; simul ac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit, se id scire, et simul scit, se scire, quod scit, et sic in infinitum.	Scholium. This proposition is understood far more clearly from what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 7 of this part. For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body—that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), the mind and the body—are one and the same individual, conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, conceived under one and the same attribute, namely Thought. The idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself follow in God with the same necessity from the same power of thinking. For in truth the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing other than the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its object. For as soon as someone knows something, by that very fact he knows that he knows it, and at the same time he knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Sed de his postea.	But more on this later.
2P22	PROPOSITIO XXII. *Mens humana non tantum Corporis affectiones sed etiam harum affectionum ideas percipit.*	Proposition 22. *The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body but also the ideas of these affections.*
2P22D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectionum idearum ideæ in Deo eodem modo sequuntur, et ad Deum eodem modo referuntur, ac ipsæ affectionum ideæ; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac Propositio 20 hujus. At ideæ affectionum Corporis in Mente humana sunt (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) in Deo, quatenus humanæ Mentis essentiam constituit; ergo harum idearum ideæ in Deo erunt, quatenus humanæ Mentis cognitionem sive ideam habet, hoc est (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*) in ipsa Mente humana, quæ propterea non tantum Corporis affectiones, sed earum etiam ideas percipit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The ideas of the ideas of affections follow in God and are related to God in the same way as the ideas of affections themselves; this is demonstrated in the same way as Proposition 20 of this part. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in the human mind (by Proposition 12 of this part), that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God insofar as he has the knowledge, or idea, of the human mind, that is (by Proposition 21 of this part), in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the affections of the body but also their ideas. QED
2P23	PROPOSITIO XXIII. *Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus Corporis affectionum ideas percipit.*	Proposition 23. *The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.*
2P23D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mentis idea sive cognitio (*per Prop.* 20 *hujus*) in Deo eodem modo sequitur, et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac Corporis idea sive cognitio. At quoniam (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*) Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit; hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) quoniam cognitio Corporis humani ad Deum non refertur, quatenus humanæ Mentis naturam constituit; ergo nec cognitio Mentis ad Deum refertur, quatenus essentiam Mentis humanæ constituit; atque adeo (*per idem Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) Mens humana eatenus se ipsam non cognoscit. Deinde affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur, ideæ naturam ipsius Corporis humani involvunt (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*) cum natura Mentis conveniunt; quare harum idearum cognitio cognitionem Mentis necessario involvet: at (per Prop.	Demonstration. The idea or knowledge of the mind follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea or knowledge of the body (by Proposition 20 of this part). But since the human mind does not know the human body itself (by Proposition 19 of this part)—that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), since knowledge of the human body is not related to God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind—neither is knowledge of the mind related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and so (by the same Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) the human mind, to that extent, does not know itself. Next, the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected involve the nature of the human body itself (by Proposition 16 of this part), that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), they agree with the nature of the mind; so knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve knowledge of the mind.
	præced.*) harum idearum cognitio in ipsa humana Mente est; ergo Mens humana eatenus tantum se ipsam novit.* Q.E.D.	But (by the preceding proposition) knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; therefore the human mind knows itself only to that extent. QED
2P24		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	PROPOSITIO XXIV. *Mens humana partium Corpus humanum componentium adæquatam cognitionem non involvit.*	Proposition 24. *The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts that compose the human body.*
2P24D	DEMONSTRATIO. Partes Corpus humanum componentes ad essentiam ipsius Corporis non pertinent, nisi quatenus motus suos certa quadam ratione invicem communicant (*vide Defin. post Coroll. Lemmat.* 3), et non quatenus ut Individua, absque relatione ad humanum Corpus, considerari possunt. Sunt enim partes humani Corporis (*per Post* 1) valde composita Individua, quorum partes (*per Lem.* 4) a Corpore humano, servata omnino ejusdem natura et forma, segregari possunt, motusque suos (*vide Axiom.* 1 *post Lem.* 3) aliis corporibus alia ratione communicare; adeoque (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*) cujuscunque partis idea sive cognitio in Deo erit, et quidem (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*) quatenus affectus consideratur alia idea rei singularis, quæ res singularis ipsa parte ordine Naturæ prior est (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*).	Demonstration. The parts that compose the human body pertain to the essence of the body itself only insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio (see the Definition after the Corollary to Lemma 3), and not insofar as they can be considered as individuals, without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body are highly composite individuals (by Postulate 1), whose parts (by Lemma 4) can be separated from the human body while its nature and form are wholly preserved, and can communicate their motions to other bodies in another ratio (see Axiom 1 after Lemma 3). And so (by Proposition 3 of this part) the idea or knowledge of any part will be in God—and indeed (by Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing, a singular thing that is prior to the part itself in the order of Nature (by Proposition 7 of this part).
	Quod idem præterea etiam de quacunque parte ipsius Individui Corpus humanum componentis est dicendum; adeoque cujuscunque partis Corpus humanum componentis cognitio in Deo est, quatenus plurimis rerum ideis affectus est, et non quatenus Corporis humani tantum habet ideam, hoc est (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*) ideam, quæ humanæ Mentis naturam constituit; atque adeo (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) humana Mens partium Corpus humanum componentium adæquatam cognitionem non involvit. *Q.E.D.*	The same must further be said of any part of an individual that composes the human body. And so knowledge of any part that composes the human body is in God insofar as he is affected by a great many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body, that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), the idea that constitutes the nature of the human mind. And so (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts that compose the human body. QED
2P25	PROPOSITIO XXV. *Idea cujuscunque affectionis Corporis humani adæquatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.*	Proposition 25. *The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body.*
2P25D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ideam affectionis Corporis humani eatenus corporis externi naturam involvere ostendimus (*vide Prop.* 16 *hujus*), quatenus externum ipsum humanum Corpus certo quodam modo determinat. At quatenus externum corpus Individuum est, quod ad Corpus humanum non refertur, ejus idea sive cognitio in Deo est (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*), quatenus Deus affectus consideratur alterius rei idea quæ (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) ipso corpore externo prior est natura. Quare corporis externi adæquata cognitio in Deo non est, quatenus ideam affectionis humani Corporis habet, sive idea affectionis	Demonstration. We have shown that the idea of an affection of the human body involves the nature of an external body to the extent that the external body determines the human body itself in some definite way (see Proposition 16 of this part). But insofar as the external body is an individual that is not related to the human body, its idea or knowledge is in God (by Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as God is considered as affected by the idea of another thing, which (by Proposition 7 of this

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Corporis humani adæquatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit. *Q.E.D.*	part) is prior in nature to the external body itself. So adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God insofar as he has the idea of the affection of the human body; in other words, the idea of an affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body. QED
2P26	PROPOSITIO XXVI. *Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit, nisi per ideas affectionum sui Corporis.*	Proposition 26. *The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.*
2P26D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si a corpore aliquo externo Corpus humanum nullo modo affectum est; ergo (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) nec idea Corporis humani, hoc est (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*) nec Mens humana, idea existentiæ illius corporis ullo etiam modo affecta est, sive existentiam illius corporis externi ullo modo percipit. At quatenus Corpus humanum a corpore aliquo externo aliquo modo afficitur, eatenus (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus cum Coroll. ejusdem*) corpus externum percipit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If the human body is in no way affected by some external body, then (by Proposition 7 of this part) neither is the idea of the human body—that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), the human mind—affected in any way by the idea of that body's existence; in other words, it does not perceive the existence of that external body in any way. But insofar as the human body is affected in some way by some external body, to that extent (by Proposition 16 of this part, with its Corollary) it perceives the external body. QED
2P26C	COROLLARIUM. Quatenus Mens humana corpus externum imaginatur, eatenus adæquatam ejus cognitionem non habet.	Corollary. Insofar as the human mind imagines an external body, it does not have adequate knowledge of it.
2P26CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Cum Mens humana per ideas affectionum sui Corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus (*vide Schol. Prop.* 17 *hujus*); nec Mens alia ratione (per Prop. præced.) corpora externa ut actu existentia imaginari potest. Atque adeo (*per Prop.* 25 *hujus*) quatenus Mens corpora externa imaginatur, eorum adæquatam cognitionem non habet. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the affections of its own body, we say that it imagines (see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part); nor can the mind imagine external bodies as actually existing in any other way (by the preceding proposition). And so (by Proposition 25 of this part), insofar as the mind imagines external bodies, it does not have adequate knowledge of them. QED
2P27	PROPOSITIO XXVII. *Idea cujuscunque affectionis Corporis humani adæquatam ipsius humani Corporis cognitionem non involvit.*	Proposition 27. *The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.*
2P27D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quælibet idea cujuscunque affectionis humani Corporis eatenus naturam Corporis humani involvit, quatenus ipsum humanum Corpus certo quodam modo affici consideratur (*vide Prop.* 16 *hujus*). At quatenus Corpus humanum Individuum est, quod multis aliis modis affici potest, ejus idea, etc. (*Vide Demonst. Prop.* 25 *hujus*).	Demonstration. Any idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the human body to the extent that the human body itself is considered to be affected in some definite way (see Proposition 16 of this part). But insofar as the human body is an individual that can be affected in many other ways, its idea, etc. (See the Demonstration of Proposition 25 of this part.)
2P28		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	PROPOSITIO XXVIII. *Ideæ affectionum Corporis humani, quatenus ad humanam Mentem tantum referuntur, non sunt claræ et distinctæ, sed confusæ.*	Proposition 28. *The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.*
2P28D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ideæ enim affectionum Corporis humani tam corporum externorum, quam ipsius humani Corporis naturam involvunt (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus*); nec tantum Corporis humani, sed ejus etiam partium naturam involvere debent; affectiones namque modi sunt (*per Post.* 3), quibus partes Corporis humani, et consequenter totum Corpus afficitur. At (*per Prop.* 24 *et* 25 *hujus*) corporum externorum adæquata cognitio, ut et partium Corpus humanum componentium, in Deo non est, quatenus humana Mente, sed quatenus aliis ideis affectus consideratur. Sunt ergo hæ affectionum ideæ, quatenus ad solam humanam Mentem referuntur, veluti consequentiæ absque præmissis, hoc est (*ut per se notum*) ideæ confusæ. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body itself (by Proposition 16 of this part); and they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts, since affections are modes (by Postulate 3) by which the parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body, are affected. But (by Propositions 24 and 25 of this part) adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts that compose the human body, is in God not insofar as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but insofar as he is considered as affected by other ideas. These ideas of affections, then, insofar as they are related to the human mind alone, are like conclusions without premises—that is (as is self-evident), confused ideas. QED
2P28S	SCHOLIUM. Idea, quæ naturam Mentis humanæ constituit, demonstratur eodem modo non esse, in se sola considerata, clara et distincta; ut etiam idea Mentis humanæ, et ideæ idearum affectionum Corporis humani, quatenus ad solam Mentem referuntur, quod unusquisque facile videre potest.	Scholium. It can be demonstrated in the same way that the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; and the same holds for the idea of the human mind, and for the ideas of the ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related to the mind alone—as anyone can easily see.
2P29	PROPOSITIO XXIX. *Idea ideæ cujuscunque affectionis Corporis humani adæquatam humanæ Mentis cognitionem non involvit.*	Proposition 29. *The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind.*
2P29D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea enim affectionis Corporis humani (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*) adæquatam ipsius Corporis cognitionem non involvit, sive ejus naturam adæquate non exprimit; hoc est (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*), cum natura Mentis non convenit adæquate; adeoque (*per Axiom.* 6 *p. I*) hujus ideæ idea adæquate humanæ Mentis naturam non exprimit, sive adæquatam ejus cognitionem non involvit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the idea of an affection of the human body (by Proposition 27 of this part) does not involve adequate knowledge of the body itself —in other words, it does not adequately express its nature; that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), it does not agree adequately with the nature of the mind. And so (by Axiom 6 of Part 1) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind; in other words, it does not involve adequate knowledge of it. QED
2P29C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, Mentem humanam, quoties ex communi Naturæ ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius, nec sui Corporis, nec corporum externorum adæquatam, sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem. Nam Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi	Corollary. From this it follows that whenever the human mind perceives things in the common order of Nature, it has adequate knowledge neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only confused and fragmentary know-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quatenus ideas affectionum Corporis percipit (*per Prop.* 23 *hujus*). Corpus autem suum (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*) non percipit, nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas, per quas etiam tantum (*per Prop.* 26 *hujus*) corpora externa percipit; atque adeo, quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (*per Prop.* 29 *hujus*), nec sui Corporis (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*), nec corporum externorum (*per Prop.* 25 *hujus*) habet adæquatam cognitionem, sed tantum (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus cum ejus Schol.*) mutilatam et confusam. *Q.E.D.*	ledge. For the mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body (by Proposition 23 of this part). And it does not perceive its own body (by Proposition 19 of this part) except through those very ideas of affections, and it is also only through them (by Proposition 26 of this part) that it perceives external bodies. And so, insofar as it has these ideas, it has adequate knowledge neither of itself (by Proposition 29 of this part), nor of its own body (by Proposition 27 of this part), nor of external bodies (by Proposition 25 of this part), but only (by Proposition 28 of this part, with its Scholium) fragmentary and confused knowledge. QED
2P29S	SCHOLIUM. Dico expresse, quod Mens nec sui ipsius, nec sui Corporis, nec corporum externorum adæquatam, sed confusam tantum et mutilatam cognitionem habeat, quoties ex communi Naturæ ordine res percipit; hoc est, quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum, et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet, quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum; quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.	Scholium. I say expressly that the mind has adequate knowledge neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only confused and fragmentary knowledge, whenever it perceives things in the common order of Nature—that is, whenever it is determined externally, by the chance encounters of things, to regard this or that; and not whenever it is determined internally, namely by regarding many things at once, to understand their agreements, differences and oppositions. For whenever it is disposed internally, in this or some other way, it then regards things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show below.

DURATION, FALSITY AND ERROR

We know the duration of things inadequately; falsity is a privation of knowledge, as in belief in free will.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P30	PROPOSITIO XXX. *Nos de duratione nostri Corporis nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.*	Proposition 30. *We can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.*
2P30D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nostri corporis duratio ab ejus essentia non dependet (*per Ax. I hujus*), nec etiam ab absoluta Dei natura (*per Prop.* 21 *p. I*). Sed (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*) ad existendum et operandum determinatur a talibus causis, quæ etiam ab aliis determinatæ sunt ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione, et hæ iterum ab aliis, et sic in infinitum. Nostri igitur Corporis duratio a communi Naturæ ordine et rerum constitutione pendet. Qua autem ratione res constitutæ sint, ejus rei adæquata cognitio datur in Deo, quatenus earum omnium ideas, et non quatenus tantum humani Corporis ideam habet (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *hujus*); quare cognitio durationis nostri Corporis est in Deo admodum inadæquata, quatenus	Demonstration. The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (by Axiom 1 of this part), nor even on the absolute nature of God (by Proposition 21 of Part 1). Rather (by Proposition 28 of Part 1), it is determined to exist and to act by causes of such a kind that they too are determined by others to exist and to act in a certain and determinate way, and these again by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body, therefore, depends on the common order of Nature and on the way things are constituted. But adequate knowledge of how things are constituted is in God insofar as he has the ideas of all of them, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	tantum naturam Mentis humanæ constituere consideratur; hoc est (per Coroll.	(by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part). So knowledge of the duration of our body is quite inadequate in God insofar as he is considered only to constitute the nature of the human mind;
	Prop. *11* hujus*), hæc cognitio est in nostra Mente admodum inadæquata.* Q.E.D.	that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), this knowledge is quite inadequate in our mind. QED
2P31	PROPOSITIO XXXI. *Nos de duratione rerum singularium, quæ extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.*	Proposition 31. *We can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things outside us.*
2P31D	DEMONSTRATIO. Unaquæque enim res singularis, sicuti humanum Corpus, ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione; et hæc iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in præcedenti Prop. demonstraverimus, nos de duratione nostri Corporis non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere; ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum, quod scilicet ejus non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For each singular thing, like the human body, must be determined to exist and to act in a certain and determinate way by another singular thing; and this again by another, and so on to infinity (by Proposition 28 of Part 1). Now since we demonstrated in the preceding proposition, from this common property of singular things, that we have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body, the same must be concluded about the duration of singular things: namely, that we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of it. QED
2P31C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adæquatam cognitionem habere possumus (*per Prop. præced.*), et hoc est id, quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum (*vide Schol.* 1 *Prop.* 33 *p. I*). Nam (*per Prop* 29 *p. I*) præter hoc nullum datur contingens.	Corollary. From this it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration (by the preceding proposition), and this is what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption (see Scholium 1 to Proposition 33 of Part 1). For (by Proposition 29 of Part 1) apart from this there is nothing contingent.
2P32	PROPOSITIO XXXII. *Omnes ideæ, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt.*	Proposition 32. *All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.*
2P32D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnes enim ideæ, quæ in Deo sunt, cum suis ideatis omnino conveniunt (*per Coroll. Prop.* 7 *hujus*), adeoque (*per Ax.* 6 *p. I*) omnes veræ sunt. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For all the ideas that are in God agree entirely with their objects (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part), and so (by Axiom 6 of Part 1) they are all true. QED
2P33	PROPOSITIO XXXIII. *Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsæ dicuntur.*	Proposition 33. *There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.*
2P33D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, modum positivum cogitandi, qui formam erroris sive falsitatis constituat. Hic cogitandi modus non potest esse in Deo (*per Prop. præced.*); extra Deum autem etiam nec esse nec concipi potest (*per Prop.* 15, *p. I*). Atque adeo nihil potest	Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if you can, a positive mode of thinking that constitutes the form of error, or falsity. This mode of thinking cannot be in God (by the preceding proposition); but outside God it can neither be nor be conceived (by Proposition 15 of Part 1). And so there can be

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	dari positivum in ideis, propter quod falsæ dicuntur. *Q.E.D.*	nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false. QED
2P34	PROPOSITIO XXXIV. *Omnis idea, quæ in nobis est absoluta, sive adæquata et perfecta vera est.*	Proposition 34. *Every idea that in us is absolute, that is, adequate and perfect, is true.*
2P34D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cum dicimus, dari in nobis ideam adæquatam et perfectam, nihil aliud dicimus (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), quam quod in Deo, quatenus nostræ Mentis essentiam constituit, detur idea adæquata et perfecta; et consequenter (*per Prop.* 32 *hujus*) nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod talis idea sit vera. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we are saying nothing other (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) than that there is an adequate and perfect idea in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our mind; and consequently (by Proposition 32 of this part) we are saying nothing other than that such an idea is true. QED
2P35	PROPOSITIO XXXV. *Falsitas consistit in cognitionis privatione, quam ideæ inadæquatæ, sive mutilatæ et confusæ involvunt.*	Proposition 35. *Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge that inadequate—that is, fragmentary and confused—ideas involve.*
2P35D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nihil in ideis positivum datur, quod falsitatis formam constituat (*per Prop.* 33 *hujus*); at falsitas in absoluta privatione consistere nequit (Mentes enim, non Corpora, errare nec falli dicuntur), neque etiam in absoluta ignorantia; diversa enim sunt ignorare et errare; quare in cognitionis privatione, quam rerum inadæquata cognitio, sive ideæ inadæquatæ et confusæ involvunt, consistit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. There is nothing positive in ideas that constitutes the form of falsity (by Proposition 33 of this part). But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for it is minds, not bodies, that are said to err or be deceived), nor yet in absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to err are different things. It consists, therefore, in the privation of knowledge that inadequate knowledge of things—that is, inadequate and confused ideas—involves. QED
2P35S	SCHOLIUM. In Scholio Prop. 17 hujus Partis explicui, qua ratione error in cognitionis privatione consistit; sed ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum dabo. Nempe falluntur homines, quod se liberos esse putant; quæ opinio in hoc solo consistit, quod suarum actionum sint conscii, et ignari causarum, a quibus determinantur. Hæc ergo est eorum libertatis idea, quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam. Nam quod ajunt, humanas actiones a voluntate pendere, verba sunt, quorum nullam habent ideam. Quid enim voluntas sit, et quomodo moveat Corpus, ignorant omnes; qui aliud jactant et animæ sedes et habitacula fingunt, vel risum vel nauseam movere solent.	Scholium. In the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part I explained in what way error consists in the privation of knowledge; but to explain the matter more fully I shall give an example. People are deceived in thinking themselves free—an opinion that consists solely in this: that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom: that they know no cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend on the will, these are words of which they have no idea. None of them knows what the will is, or how it moves the body; those who boast otherwise, and invent seats and dwelling places for the soul, usually provoke either laughter or disgust.
	Sic cum solem intuemur, eum ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur; qui error in hac sola imaginatione non consistit, sed in eo, quod dum ipsum sic imaginamur, veram ejus distantiam, et hujus imaginationis causam ignoramus. Nam tametsi postea cognoscamus eundem ultra 600 terræ diametros a nobis	In the same way, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. This error does not consist in this imagining alone, but in the fact that, while we imagine it so, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining. For even if we later come

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	distare, ipsum nihilominus prope adesse imaginabimur; non enim solem adeo propinquum imaginamur propterea, quod veram ejus distantiam ignoramus, sed propterea, quod affectio nostri Corporis essentiam solis involvit, quatenus ipsum Corpus ab eodem afficitur.	to know that it is more than 600 diameters of the earth away from us, we will nonetheless still imagine it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun to be so close because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as the body is affected by it.
2P36	PROPOSITIO XXXVI. *Ideæ inadæquatæ et confusæ eadem necessitate consequuntur, ac adæquatæ sive claræ ac distinctæ ideæ.*	Proposition 36. *Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.*
2P36D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ideæ omnes in Deo sunt (*per Prop.* 15 *p. I*); et, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, sunt veræ (*per Prop.* 32 *hujus*) et (*per Coroll. Prop.* 7 *hujus*) adæquatæ; adeoque nullæ inadæquatæ nec confusæ sunt, nisi quatenus ad singularem alicujus Mentem referuntur (*qua de re vide Prop.* 24 *et* 28 *hujus*): adeoque omnes, tam adæquatæ quam inadæquatæ eadem necessitate (*per Coroll. Prop.* 6 *hujus*) consequuntur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. All ideas are in God (by Proposition 15 of Part 1), and, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by Proposition 32 of this part) and (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part) adequate. And so none are inadequate or confused except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of some individual (on this see Propositions 24 and 28 of this part). And so all of them, adequate and inadequate alike, follow with the same necessity (by the Corollary to Proposition 6 of this part). QED

COMMON NOTIONS AND THE THREE KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE

Spinoza derives the common notions and distinguishes imagination, reason and intuitive knowledge.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P37	PROPOSITIO XXXVII. *Id, quod omnibus commune* (de his vide supra Lemma 2)*, quodque æque in parte ac in toto est, nullius rei singularis essentiam constituit.*	Proposition 37. *What is common to all things* (on these, see Lemma 2 above), *and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.*
2P37D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, id essentiam alicujus rei singularis constituere; nempe essentiam B. Ergo (*per Defin.* 2 *hujus*) id sine B non poterit esse neque concipi; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin: Ergo id ad essentiam B non pertinet, nec alterius rei singularis essentiam constituit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that it constitutes the essence of some singular thing—say, the essence of B. Then (by Definition 2 of this part) it will be unable either to be or to be conceived without B. But this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not pertain to the essence of B, nor does it constitute the essence of any other singular thing. QED
2P38	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII. *Illa, quæ omnibus communia, quæque æque in parte ac in toto sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adæquate.*	Proposition 38. *Those things that are common to all, and are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.*
2P38D	DEMONSTRATIO. Sit A aliquid, quod omnibus corporibus commune, quodque æque in parte cujuscunque corporis ac in toto est. Dico A non posse concipi nisi adæquate. Nam ejus idea (*per Coroll. Prop.* 7 *hujus*) erit necessario in Deo adæquata, tam quatenus ideam Corporis humani,	Demonstration. Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and is equally in the part of any body and in the whole. I say that A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part) will necessarily

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quam quatenus ideas habet ejusdem affectionum, quæ (*per Prop.* 16, 25 *et* 27 *hujus*) tam Corporis humani quam corporum externorum naturam ex parte involvunt; hoc est (*per Prop.* 12 *et* 13 *hujus*), hæc idea erit necessario in Deo adæquata, quatenus Mentem humanam constituit, sive quatenus ideas habet, quæ in Mente humana sunt; Mens igitur (*per Coroll. prop.* 11 *hujus*) A necessario adæquate percipit, idque tam quatenus se, quam quatenus suum, vel quodcunque externum corpus percipit, nec A alio modo potest concipi. *Q.E.D.*	be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of its affections, which (by Propositions 16, 25 and 27 of this part) partly involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. That is (by Propositions 12 and 13 of this part), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human mind, or insofar as he has the ideas that are in the human mind. The mind, therefore (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), necessarily perceives A adequately—and does so both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own body or any external body whatever—nor can A be conceived in any other way. QED
2P38C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, dari quasdam ideas, sive notiones, omnibus hominibus communes; nam (*per Lem.* II) omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quæ (*per Prop. præced.*) ab omnibus debent adæquate, sive clare et distincte percipi.	Corollary. From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all human beings. For (by Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by the preceding proposition) must be perceived by all adequately, that is, clearly and distinctly.
2P39	PROPOSITIO XXXIX. *Id, quod Corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis, a quibus Corpus humanum affici solet, commune est et proprium, quodque in cujuscunque horum parte æque ac in toto est, ejus etiam idea erit in Mente adæquata.*	Proposition 39. *If something is common to, and proper to, the human body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and is equally in the part of each of these and in the whole, its idea too will be adequate in the mind.*
2P39D	DEMONSTRATIO. Sit A id, quod Corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis commune est et proprium, quodque æque in humano Corpore ac in iisdem corporibus externis, et quod denique æque in cujuscunque corporis externi parte ac in toto est. Ipsius A dabitur in Deo idea adæquata (*per Coroll. Prop.* 7 *hujus*), tam quatenus ideam Corporis humani, quam quatenus positorum corporum externorum ideas habet. Ponatur jam humanum Corpus a corpore externo affici per id, quod cum eo habet commune, hoc est ab A: hujus affectionis idea proprietatem A involvet (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus*), atque adeo (per idem Coroll.	Demonstration. Let A be what is common and proper to the human body and certain external bodies, what is equally in the human body and in those external bodies, and what, finally, is equally in the part of each external body and in the whole. There will be an adequate idea of A itself in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part), both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of the external bodies posited. Now suppose that the human body is affected by an external body through what it has in common with it, that is, by A. The idea of this affection will involve the property A (by Proposition 16 of this part), and so
	Prop. 7 hujus*) idea hujus affectionis, quatenus proprietatem A involvit, erit in Deo adæquata, quatenus idea Corporis humani affectus est; hoc est* (per Prop. *13* hujus*) quatenus Mentis humanæ naturam constituit; adeoque* (per Coroll. Prop. *11* hujus*) hæc idea est etiam in Mente humana adæquata.* Q.E.D.	(by the same Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part) the idea of this affection, insofar as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God insofar as he is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. And so (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		this part) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. QED
2P39C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod Mens eo aptior est ad plura adæquate percipiendum, quo ejus Corpus plura habet cum aliis corporibus communia.	Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately, the more things its body has in common with other bodies.
2P40	PROPOSITIO XL. *Quæcunque ideæ in Mente sequuntur ex ideis, quæ in ipsa sunt adæquatæ, sunt etiam adæquatæ.*	Proposition 40. *Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in it are also adequate.*
2P40D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet. Nam cum dicimus, in Mente humana ideam sequi ex ideis, quæ in ipsa sunt adæquatæ, nihil aliud dicimus (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), quam quod in ipso Divino intellectu detur idea, cujus Deus est causa, non quatenus infinitus est, nec quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus est, sed quatenus tantum humanæ Mentis essentiam constituit.	Demonstration. This is evident. For when we say that an idea follows in the human mind from ideas that are adequate in it, we are saying nothing other (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) than that there is in the divine intellect itself an idea of which God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected by the ideas of a great many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human mind.
2P40S1	SCHOLIUM I. His causam Notionum, quæ *Communes* vocantur; quæque ratiocinii nostri fundamenta sunt, explicui. Sed aliæ quorundam axiomatum sive notionum causæ dantur, quas hac nostra methodo explicare e re foret; ex iis namque constaret, quænam notiones præ reliquis utiliores, quænam vero vix ullius usus essent. Deinde quænam communes, et quænam iis tantum, qui præjudiciis non laborant, claræ et distinctæ, et quænam denique male fundatæ sint. Præterea constaret, unde notiones illæ, quas *Secundas* vocant, et consequenter axiomata, quæ in iisdem fundantur, suam duxerunt originem, et alia, quæ circa hæc aliquando meditatus sum. Sed quoniam hæc alii dicavi Tractatui, et etiam, ne propter nimiam hujus rei prolixitatem fastidium crearem, hac re hic supersedere decrevi.	Scholium 1. With this I have explained the cause of the notions that are called *common*, and that are the foundations of our reasoning. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which it would be worthwhile to explain by this method of ours; for from them it would become clear which notions are more useful than the rest, and which are of scarcely any use; then, which are common, which are clear and distinct only to those who are free of prejudices, and finally which are ill-founded. It would also become clear where those notions they call *second* notions, and consequently the axioms founded on them, took their origin, along with other things I have at times thought about in connection with these matters. But since I have reserved these for another treatise, and also so as not to cause weariness by excessive length on this subject, I have decided to pass over the matter here.[5]
	Attamen ne quid horum omittam, quod scitu necessarium sit, causas breviter addam, ex quibus termini *Transcendentales* dicti suam duxerunt originem, ut Ens, Res, Aliquid. Hi termini ex hoc oriuntur, quod scilicet humanum Corpus, quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri (*quid imago sit explicui in Schol. Prop.* 17 *hujus*) in se distincte simul formandi; qui si excedatur, hæ imagines confundi incipient; et si hic imaginum numerus, quarum Corpus	Still, so as not to omit anything here that it is necessary to know, I shall briefly add the causes from which the so-called *transcendental* terms, such as Being, Thing and Something, took their origin. These terms arise from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is capable of forming distinctly in itself only a certain number of images at the same time (I explained what an image is in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part). If that

5 "Second notions" (or "second intentions") is a scholastic term for concepts of concepts, such as genus and species.

LATIN

est capax, ut eas in se simul distincte formet, longe excedatur, omnes inter se plane confundentur. Cum hoc ita se habeat, patet ex Coroll. Prop. 17 et Prop. 18 hujus, quod Mens humana tot corpora distincte simul imaginari poterit, quot in ipsius Corpore imagines possunt simul formari.

At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, Mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur, et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet, nempe sub attributo Entis, Rei, etc. Potest hoc etiam ex eo deduci, quod imagines non semper æque vigeant, et ex aliis causis his analogis, quas hic explicare non est opus; nam ad nostrum, ad quem collimamus, scopum unam tantum sufficit considerare. Nam omnes huc redeunt, quod hi termini ideas significent summo gradu confusas. Ex similibus deinde causis ortæ sunt notiones illæ, quas *Universales* vocant, ut Homo, Equus, Canis, etc. videlicet, quia in Corpore humano tot imagines ex. gr. hominum formantur simul, ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus, sed eo usque tamen superent, ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscujusque colorem magnitudinem, etc.)

eorumque determinatum numerum Mens imaginari nequeat, et id tantum, in quo omnes, quatenus Corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur; nam ab eo Corpus maxime, scilicet ab unoquoque singulari, affectum fuit; atque hoc nomine *hominis* exprimit, hocque de infinitis singularibus prædicat. Nam singularium determinatum numerum, ut diximus, imaginari nequit. Sed notandum, has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari, sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei, a qua Corpus affectum sæpius fuit, quamque facilius Mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Ex. gr.

qui sæpius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine *hominis* intelligent animal

ENGLISH

number is exceeded, these images will begin to be confused; and if the number of images the body is capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is far exceeded, they will all be completely confused with one another. This being so, it is evident from the Corollary to Proposition 17 and from Proposition 18 of this part that the human mind will be able to imagine distinctly at the same time as many bodies as there are images that can be formed at the same time in its own body.[6]

But when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind too will imagine all bodies confusedly, without any distinction, and will comprehend them as if under one attribute, namely under the attribute of Being, Thing, and so on. This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other causes analogous to these, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose we are aiming at, it is enough to consider just one. For they all come to this: that these terms signify ideas confused to the highest degree. From similar causes, next, have arisen those notions they call *universal*, such as Man, Horse, Dog, and so on. That is, so many images—of human beings, for example—are formed in the human body at once that they overwhelm the power of imagining, not entirely, to be sure, but to the point that the mind cannot imagine the slight differences between individuals (such as the color and size of each one, and so on)

or their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only that in which they all agree, insofar as the body is affected by them. For it is by this, as met with in each individual, that the body has been most affected; and this the mind expresses by the name *man*, and predicates it of infinitely many individuals. For, as we have said, it cannot imagine the determinate number of individuals. But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by everyone in the same way; they vary from person to person according to the thing by which the body has more often been affected, and which the mind more easily imagines or recollects. For example,

those who have more often regarded the stature of human beings with wonder will understand by

6 In scholastic philosophy the "transcendentals" are terms, such as being, thing, one, true and good, that apply to everything whatever and so transcend every category.

LATIN

erectæ staturæ; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt, nempe, hominem esse animal risibile; animal bipes sine plumis; animal rationale; et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit. Quare non mirum est quod inter Philosophos, qui res naturales per solas rerum imagines explicare voluerunt, tot sint ortæ controversiæ.

ENGLISH

the name *man* an animal of upright stature; while those who are accustomed to regard something else will form another common image of human beings—that man is an animal capable of laughter, a featherless two-footed animal, a rational animal; and so with the rest: each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his own body. It is no wonder, then, that so many controversies have arisen among philosophers who have wanted to explain natural things by mere images of things.[7]

2P40S2 SCHOLIUM II. Ex omnibus supra dictis clare apparet, nos multa percipere, et notiones universales formare I° ex singularibus, nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse, et sine ordine ad intellectum repræsentatis (*Vide Coroll. Prop.* 29 *hujus*): et ideo tales perceptiones cognitionem ab experientia vaga vocare consuevi; II° ex signis, ex. gr. ex eo, quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur, et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis, per quas res imaginamur (*Vide Schol. Prop.* 18 *hujus*). Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum *cognitionem primi generis*, opinionem, vel *Imaginationem* in posterum vocabo; III° denique ex eo, quod notiones communes, rerumque proprietatum ideas adæquatas habemus (*Vide Coroll. Prop.* 38 *et* 39 *cum ejus Coroll. et Prop.* 40 *hujus*); atque hunc *Rationem* et *secundi generis cognitionem* vocabo.

Scholium 2. From everything said above it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions (1) from singular things represented to the intellect through the senses in a fragmentary, confused and disorderly way (see the Corollary to Proposition 29 of this part)—and for that reason I have been in the habit of calling such perceptions knowledge from random experience; (2) from signs—for example, from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine the things (see the Scholium to Proposition 18 of this part). Both of these ways of regarding things I shall from now on call *knowledge of the first kind*, opinion, or *imagination*; (3) finally, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see the Corollary to Proposition 38, Proposition 39 with its Corollary, and Proposition 40 of this part); and this I shall call *reason* and *knowledge of the second kind*.[8]

Præter hæc duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud *tertium*, quod *Scientiam Intuitivam* vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adæquata idea essentiæ formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adæquatam cognitionem essentiæ rerum. Hæc omnia unius rei exemplo explicabo. Dantur ex. gr. tres numeri, ad quartum obtinendum, qui sit ad tertium ut secundus ad primum. Non dubitant mercatores secundum in tertium ducere, et productum per primum dividere; quia scilicet ea, quæ a magistro, absque ulla demonstratione audiverunt, nondum tradiderunt oblivioni, vel quia id sæpe in numeris simplicissimis experti sunt, vel ex vi Demonstrationis Prop. 19 lib. VII Euclid., nempe ex communi proprietate

Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall show in what follows, another, a *third* kind, which we shall call *intuitive knowledge*. This kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall explain all this by the example of a single thing. Suppose, for example, that three numbers are given, and we must find a fourth that is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first—either because they have not yet forgotten what they heard from their

7 Stock definitions from the tradition: "featherless biped" is attributed to Plato, and "rational animal" and "capable of laughter" come from the Aristotelian school.

8 "Random experience" renders *experientia vaga*: experience that wanders, unregulated by the intellect.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	proportionalium. At in numeris simplicissimis nihil horum opus est. Ex. gr.	teacher without any demonstration, or because they have often tried it with very simple numbers, or by force of the demonstration of Proposition 19 of Book 7 of Euclid, that is, from the common property of proportionals. But with the simplest numbers none of this is needed. For example,[9]
	datis numeris 1, 2, 3, nemo non videt, quartum numerum proportionalem esse 6, atque hoc multo clarius, quia ex ipsa ratione, quam primum ad secundum habere uno intuitu videmus, ipsum quartum concludimus.	given the numbers 1, 2 and 3, everyone sees that the fourth proportional number is 6—and this much more clearly, because we infer the fourth number from the very ratio which we see, at a single glance, the first to have to the second.
2P41	PROPOSITIO XLI. *Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera.*	Proposition 41. *Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.*
2P41D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ad primi generis cognitionem illas omnes ideas diximus in præced. Schol. pertinere, quæ sunt inadæquatæ et confusæ; atque adeo (*per Prop.* 35 *hujus*) hæc cognitio unica est falsitatis causa. Deinde ad cognitionem secundi et tertii illas pertinere diximus, quæ sunt adæquatæ; adeoque (*per Prop.* 34 *hujus*) est necessario vera. *Q.E.D.*.	Demonstration. We said in the preceding scholium that to knowledge of the first kind belong all those ideas that are inadequate and confused; and so (by Proposition 35 of this part) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. Next, we said that to knowledge of the second and third kinds belong those ideas that are adequate; and so (by Proposition 34 of this part) it is necessarily true. QED
2P42	PROPOSITIO XLII. *Secundi et tertii, et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.*	Proposition 42. *Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.*
2P42D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio per se patet. Qui enim inter verum et falsum scit distinguere, debet adæquatam veri et falsi habere ideam; hoc est (*per* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 *hujus*), verum et falsum secundo aut tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.	Demonstration. This Proposition is self-evident. For whoever knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and the false; that is (by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of this part), must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

TRUTH IS ITS OWN STANDARD

A true idea carries certainty with it; reason regards things as necessary; the mind has adequate knowledge of God.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P43	PROPOSITIO XLIII. *Qui veram habet ideam, simul scit se veram habere ideam, nec de rei veritate potest dubitare.*	Proposition 43. *Whoever has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.*
2P43D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea vera in nobis est illa, quæ in Deo, quatenus per naturam Mentis humanæ explicatur, est adæquata (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*). Ponamus itaque, dari	Demonstration. A true idea in us is one that is adequate in God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind (by the Corollary to

9 Euclid, *Elements* 7.19: if four numbers are proportional, the product of the first and fourth equals the product of the second and third.

LATIN

in Deo, quatenus per naturam Mentis humanæ explicatur, ideam adæquatam A. Hujus ideæ debet necessario dari etiam in Deo idea, quæ ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac idea A (*per Prop.* 20 *hujus, cujus Demonstratio universalis est*). At idea A ad Deum referri supponitur, quatenus per naturam Mentis humanæ explicatur; ergo etiam idea ideæ A ad Deum eodem modo debet referri; hoc est (per idem Coroll.

Prop. *11* hujus*), hæc adæquata idea ideæ A erit in ipsa Mente, quæ ideam adæquatam A habet; adeoque qui adæquatam habet ideam, sive (*per Prop. *34* hujus*) qui vere rem cognoscit, debet simul suæ cognitionis adæquatam habere ideam, sive veram cognitionem; hoc est (*ut per se manifestum*), debet simul esse certus.* Q.E.D.

2P43S SCHOLIUM. In Scholio Propositionis 21 hujus Partis explicui, quid sit idea ideæ; sed notandum, præcedentem Propositionem per se satis esse manifestam. Nam nemo, qui veram habet ideam, ignorat veram ideam summam certitudinem involvere; veram namque habere ideam nihil aliud significat quam perfecte sive optime rem cognoscere; nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest, nisi putet, ideam quid mutum instar picturæ in tabula, et non modum cogitandi esse, nempe ipsum intelligere; et, quæso, quis scire potest, se rem aliquam intelligere, nisi prius rem intelligat? hoc est, quis potest scire, se de aliqua re certum esse, nisi prius de ea re certus sit? Deinde quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest, quod norma sit veritatis?

Sane sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est. Atque his me ad has quæstiones respondisse puto, nempe: si idea vera, quatenus tantum dicitur cum suo ideato convenire, a falsa distinguitur; nihil ergo realitatis aut perfectionis idea vera habet præ falsa (quandoquidem per solam denominationem extrinsecam distinguuntur) et consequenter neque etiam homo, qui veras, præ illo, qui falsas tantum ideas habet? Deinde, unde fit, ut homines falsas habeant ideas? Et denique, unde aliquis certo scire potest, se ideas habere, quæ cum suis ideatis conveniant? Ad has, inquam, quæstiones me jam respondisse puto. Nam quod ad

ENGLISH

Proposition 11 of this part). Let us suppose, then, that there is in God, insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea, A. Of this idea there must necessarily also be in God an idea that is related to God in the same way as the idea A (by Proposition 20 of this part, whose demonstration is universal). But the idea A is supposed to be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind; therefore the idea of the idea A must also be related to God in the same way;

that is (by the same Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), this adequate idea of the idea A will be in the very mind that has the adequate idea A. And so whoever has an adequate idea—or (by Proposition 34 of this part) whoever truly knows a thing—must at the same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge; that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be certain. QED

Scholium. In the Scholium to Proposition 21 of this part I explained what the idea of an idea is. But it should be noted that the preceding proposition is sufficiently evident by itself. For no one who has a true idea is unaware that a true idea involves the highest certainty; for to have a true idea means nothing other than to know a thing perfectly, or in the best way. And surely no one can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking—namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands the thing? That is, who can know that he is certain about some thing unless he is first certain about that thing? Again, what can there be that is clearer and more certain than a true idea, to serve as the standard of truth?

Indeed, just as light makes both itself and darkness manifest, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false. And with this I think I have answered the following questions. If a true idea is distinguished from a false one only insofar as it is said to agree with its object, does a true idea then have no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished only by an extrinsic denomination)—and consequently does a person who has true ideas have none over one who has only false ones? Next, how does it come about that

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	differentiam inter ideam veram et falsam attinet, constat ex Propositione 35 hujus, illam ad hanc sese habere, ut ens ad non ens.	people have false ideas? And finally, how can someone know for certain that he has ideas that agree with their objects? To these questions, I say, I think I have now replied. For as far as the difference between a true and a false idea is concerned, it is established from Proposition 35 of this part that the one stands to the other as being to non-being.[10]
	Falsitatis autem causas a Propositione 19 usque ad 35 cum ejus Scholio clarissime ostendi. Ex quibus etiam apparet, quid homo, qui veras habet ideas, homini, qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit. Quod denique ultimum attinet, nempe, undenam homo scire potest se habere ideam, quæ cum suo ideato conveniat; id modo satis superque ostendi, ex hoc solo oriri, quod ideam habet, quæ cum suo ideato convenit, sive quod veritas sui sit norma. His adde, quod Mens nostra quatenus res vere percipit, pars et infiniti Dei intellectus (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *hujus*); adeoque tam necesse est, ut Mentis claræ et distinctæ ideæ veræ sint, ac Dei ideæ.	As for the causes of falsity, I have shown them very clearly from Proposition 19 through Proposition 35, with its Scholium. From these it is also evident how a person who has true ideas differs from one who has only false ones. Finally, as to the last question—namely, how a person can know that he has an idea that agrees with its object—I have just shown more than sufficiently that this arises solely from the fact that he has an idea that agrees with its object; in other words, that truth is its own standard. Add to this that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part); and so it is as necessary that the mind's clear and distinct ideas be true as that God's ideas are.
2P44	PROPOSITIO XLIV. *De natura Rationis non est, res ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias contemplari.*	Proposition 44. *It is of the nature of reason to regard things not as contingent but as necessary.*
2P44D	DEMONSTRATIO. De natura Rationis est, res vere percipere (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*) nempe (*per Ax.* 6 *p. I*) ut in se sunt, hoc est (*per Prop.* 29 *p. I*) non ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by Proposition 41 of this part), namely (by Axiom 6 of Part 1) as they are in themselves, that is (by Proposition 29 of Part 1), not as contingent but as necessary. QED
2P44C1	COROLLARIUM I. Hinc sequitur, a sola imaginatione pendere, quod res, tam respectu præteriti quam futuri, ut contingentes contemplemur.	Corollary 1. From this it follows that it depends on the imagination alone that we regard things, with respect to both the past and the future, as contingent.
2P44S	SCHOLIUM. Qua autem ratione hoc fiat, paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (*Prop.* 17 *hujus cum ejus Coroll.*), Mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi præsentes imaginari, nisi causæ occurrant, quæ earum præsentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (*Prop.* 18 *hujus*) ostendimus, quod, si Corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi Mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur, hoc est, ambo ut sibi præsentia	Scholium. How this comes about I shall explain briefly. We showed above (Proposition 17 of this part, with its Corollary) that the mind, even if things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines them as present to itself, unless causes occur that exclude their present existence. Next, we showed (Proposition 18 of this part) that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, then when the mind later imagines

10 An "extrinsic denomination" is a scholastic term for a description that applies to a thing only through its relation to something outside it.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	contemplabitur, nisi causæ occurrant, quæ eorum præsentem existentiam secludant. Præterea nemo dubitat, quin etiam tempus imaginemur, nempe ex eo, quod corpora alia aliis tardius, vel celerius, vel æque celeriter moveri imaginemur. Ponamus itaque puerum, qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum, et vespertina Simeonem, atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum.	either of them, it will immediately recollect the other as well—that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless causes occur that exclude their present existence. Moreover, no one doubts that we also imagine time—namely, from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or equally quickly. Let us suppose, then, a boy who yesterday, for the first time, saw Peter in the morning, Paul at noon and Simeon in the evening, and who today again sees Peter in the morning.
	Ex Propositione 18 hujus patet, quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem cæli, quam die præcedenti, viderit, partem percurrentem, sive diem integrum, et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum, et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur, hoc est, Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur; et contra, si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus præteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore præterito imaginando; atque hæc eo constantius, quo sæpius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit. Quod si aliquando contingat, ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Jacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino jam Simeonem, jam Jacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur.	From Proposition 18 of this part it is evident that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will at once imagine the sun passing through the same part of the sky as he saw it pass the day before—that is, a whole day—and together with the morning he will imagine Peter, with noon Paul, and with evening Simeon. That is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simeon in relation to future time. Conversely, if he sees Simeon in the evening, he will refer Paul and Peter to past time, imagining them together with past time; and he will do so the more constantly, the more often he has seen them in this same order. But if it should happen at some point that on another evening he sees James instead of Simeon, then on the following morning he will imagine together with the evening now Simeon, now James, but not both at once. For he is supposed to have seen only one or the other of them in the evening, not both at once.
	Fluctuabitur itaque ejus imaginatio, et cum futuro tempore vespertino jam hunc jam illum imaginabitur, hoc est, neutrum certo, sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque hæc imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit, si imaginatio rerum sit, quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus præteritum vel præsens contemplamur; et consequenter res, tam ad tempus præsens quam ad præteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.	His imagination will therefore waver, and with a future evening he will imagine now this one, now that one; that is, he will regard neither as certainly future, but each as contingently future. And this wavering of the imagination will be the same if the imagining concerns things that we regard in the same way in relation to past or present time; consequently we shall imagine things related to present time, as well as to past or future time, as contingent.
2P44C2	COROLLARIUM II. De natura Rationis est, res sub quadam æternitatis specie percipere.	Corollary 2. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things from a certain standpoint of eternity.[11]
2P44C2D	DEMONSTRATIO. De natura enim Rationis est, res ut necessarias, et non ut contingentes contemplari (*per Prop. præced.*). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (*per Prop.* 41	Demonstration. For it is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent (by the preceding proposition). And it perceives

11 Latin *sub specie aeternitatis*, literally "under an aspect of eternity": seeing things as following necessarily from God's eternal nature, without relation to time.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	hujus) vere, hoc est (*per Axiom.* 6 *p. I*) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (*per Prop.* 16 *p. I*) hæc rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei æternæ naturæ necessitas. Ergo de natura Rationis est, res sub hac æternitatis specie contemplari. Adde, quod fundamenta Rationis notiones sint (*per Prop.* 38 *hujus*), quæ illa explicant, quæ omnibus communia sunt, quæque (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant; quæque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione, sed sub quadam æternitatis specie debent concipi. *Q.E.D.*	this necessity of things truly (by Proposition 41 of this part), that is (by Axiom 6 of Part 1), as it is in itself. But (by Proposition 16 of Part 1) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God's eternal nature. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to regard things from this standpoint of eternity. Add that the foundations of reason are notions (by Proposition 38 of this part) that explain what is common to all things, and that (by Proposition 37 of this part) explain the essence of no singular thing; they must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, from a certain standpoint of eternity. QED
2P45	PROPOSITIO XLV. *Unaquæque cujuscunque corporis, vel rei singularis actu existentis, idea Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.*	Proposition 45. *Each idea of any body, or of any singular thing that actually exists, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.*
2P45D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea rei singularis, actu existentis, ipsius rei tam essentiam quam existentiam necessario involvit (*per Coroll. Prop.* 8 *hujus*): At res singulares (*per Prop.* 15 *p. I*) non possunt sine Deo concipi; sed, quia (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*) Deum pro causa habent, quatenus sub attributo consideratur, cujus res ipsæ modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideæ (*per Axiom.* 4 *p. I*) ipsarum attributi conceptum, hoc est (*per Defin.* 6 *p. I*) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing that actually exists necessarily involves both the essence and the existence of that thing (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of this part). But singular things (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) cannot be conceived without God. Rather, since they have God for their cause (by Proposition 6 of this part) insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the things themselves are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) the concept of their attribute, that is (by Definition 6 of Part 1), the eternal and infinite essence of God. QED
2P45S	SCHOLIUM. Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem, hoc est existentiam, quatenus abstracte concipitur, et tanquam quædam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existentiæ, quæ rebus singularibus tribuitur propterea, quod ex æterna necessitate Dei naturæ infinita infinitis modis sequuntur (*vide Prop.* 16 *p. I*). Loquor, inquam, de ipsa existentia rerum singularium, quatenus in Deo sunt. Nam, etsi unaquæque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum, vis tamen, qua unaquæque in existendo perseverat, ex æterna necessitate naturæ Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide Coroll. Prop. 24 p. I.	Scholium. By existence here I do not mean duration—that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly, as a kind of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (see Proposition 16 of Part 1). I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For although each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, the force by which each perseveres in existing nonetheless follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature. On this, see the Corollary to Proposition 24 of Part 1.
2P46	PROPOSITIO XLVI. *Cognitio æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei, quam unaquæque idea involvit est adæquata et perfecta.*	Proposition 46. *The knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence that each idea involves is adequate and perfect.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P46D	DEMONSTRATIO. Demonstratio præcedentis Propositionis universalis est, et, sive res ut pars sive ut totum consideretur, ejus idea, sive totius sit sive partis (*per Prop. præced.*), Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id, quod cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei dat, omnibus commune, et æque in parte ac in toto est, adeoque (*per Prop.* 38 *hujus*) erit hæc cognitio adæquata. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal: whether a thing is considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or of a part, will involve God's eternal and infinite essence (by the preceding proposition). So what gives knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence is common to all things, and is equally in the part and in the whole; and therefore (by Proposition 38 of this part) this knowledge will be adequate. QED
2P47	PROPOSITIO XLVII. *Mens humana adæquatam habet cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei.*	Proposition 47. *The human mind has adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence.*
2P47D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens humana ideas habet (*per Prop.* 22 *hujus*), ex quibus (*per Prop.* 23 *hujus*) se suumque Corpus (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*) et (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 16 *et per Prop.* 17 *hujus*) corpora externa, ut actu existentia, percipit; adeoque (*per Prop.* 45 *et* 46 *hujus*) cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei habet adæquatam. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The human mind has ideas (by Proposition 22 of this part) from which (by Proposition 23 of this part) it perceives itself, its body (by Proposition 19 of this part), and external bodies (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 16 and by Proposition 17 of this part) as actually existing. Therefore (by Propositions 45 and 46 of this part) it has adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence. QED
2P47S	SCHOLIUM. Hinc videmus, Dei infinitam essentiam ejusque æternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur, nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere, quæ adæquate cognoscamus, atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare de quo diximus in Scholio 2 Propositionis 40 hujus Partis, et de cujus præstantia et utilitate in quinta Parte erit nobis dicendi locus. Quod autem homines non æque claram Dei ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit, quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora, et quod nomen *Deus* junxerunt imaginibus rerum, quas videre solent, quod homines vix vitare possunt, quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt, quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus.	Scholium. From this we see that God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that from this knowledge we can deduce a great many things that we know adequately, and so form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of this part, and of whose excellence and usefulness we shall have occasion to speak in Part 5. That people do not have as clear a knowledge of God as they have of the common notions comes from this: they cannot imagine God as they imagine bodies, and they have joined the name *God* to the images of things they are used to seeing—something people can hardly avoid, since they are continually affected by external bodies. And indeed most errors consist in this alone: that we do not apply names to things correctly.
	Cum enim aliquis ait, lineas, quæ ex centro circuli ad ejusdem circumferentiam ducuntur, esse inæquales ille sane aliud, tum saltem, per circulum intelligit, quam Mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum Mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare, quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros, qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil	For when someone says that the lines drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he certainly understands by "circle," at least at that moment, something different from what mathematicians do. So too when people make a mistake in a calculation, they have some numbers in their mind and others on the paper. If you look to their mind, then, they certainly do not err; yet

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare, quem nuper audivi clamantem, suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini, quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur. Atque hinc pleræque oriuntur controversiæ, nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant, vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur.	they seem to err, because we think they have in mind the numbers that are on the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe they erred at all —just as I did not believe that a man was in error whom I recently heard shouting that his courtyard had flown into his neighbor's hen, because what was in his mind seemed clear enough to me. And this is where most controversies come from: people either do not explain their own mind correctly or misinterpret someone else's.
	Nam revera, dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant, ita ut, quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.	For in reality, when they contradict each other most, they are thinking either the same things or different things, so that what each takes to be errors and absurdities in the other are not.

THERE IS NO FREE WILL

The mind has no absolute will; each volition is an idea's own affirmation, so will and intellect are one.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
2P48	PROPOSITIO XLVIII. *In Mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas; sed Mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, et hæc iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum.*	Proposition 48. *In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will; rather, the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so on to infinity.*
2P48D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*) adeoque (*per Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 17 *p. I*) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera, sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest; sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*) determinari debet a causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, et hæc iterum ab alia, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by Proposition 11 of this part), and therefore (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 17 of Part 1) it cannot be a free cause of its actions; that is, it cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing. Rather, it must be determined to will this or that (by Proposition 28 of Part 1) by a cause, which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so on. QED
2P48S	SCHOLIUM. Eodem hoc modo demonstratur, in Mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi, etc. Unde sequitur, has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias, vel nihil esse præter entia Metaphysica, vel universalia, quæ ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam, vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant, ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem, vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem, cur homines se liberos esse putent, explicuimus in Appendice Partis primæ. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum, me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem, inquam, intelligo, qua Mens, quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat, et non cupiditatem, qua Mens res appetit vel aversatur.	Scholium. In the same way it is demonstrated that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, and so on. It follows that these and similar faculties are either wholly fictitious or nothing but metaphysical beings, that is, universals, which we are accustomed to form from particulars. So intellect and will are related to this or that idea, or to this or that volition, in the same way as stoniness is related to this or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul. The cause of people's thinking themselves free we explained in the Appendix to Part 1. But before I go further, I should note here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, not desire. I mean, I say, the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or what is false—not the desire

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		by which the mind seeks things or turns away from them.
	At postquam demonstravimus, has facultates notiones esse universales, quæ a singularibus, ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est, an ipsæ volitiones aliquid sint præter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum, inquam, est, an in Mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur præter illam quam idea, quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem Propositionem, ut et Definitionem 3 hujus, ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines, quales in fundo oculi, et, si placet, in medio cerebro formantur, sed Cogitationis conceptus intelligo.	Now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions, not distinguished from the singulars from which we form them, we must ask whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must ask, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation and negation other than the one that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. On this, see the following proposition, and also Definition 3 of this part, so that our thinking does not slip into pictures. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye or, if you like, in the middle of the brain, but concepts of Thought.
2P49	PROPOSITIO XLIX. *In Mente nulla datur volitio, sive affirmatio et negatio, præter illam, quam idea, quatenus idea est, involvit.*	Proposition 49. *There is in the mind no volition—that is, no affirmation or negation—besides the one that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves.*
2P49D	DEMONSTRATIO. In Mente (*per Prop. præced.*) nulla datur absoluta facultas volendi et nolendi, sed tantum singulares volitiones, nempe hæc et illa affirmatio, et hæc et illa negatio. Concipiamus itaque singularem aliquam volitionem, nempe modum cogitandi, quo Mens affirmat, tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis. Hæc affirmatio conceptum sive ideam trianguli involvit, hoc est, sine idea trianguli non potest concipi. Idem enim est, si dicam, quod A conceptum B debeat involvere ac quod A sine B non possit concipi. Deinde hæc affirmatio (*per Axiom.* 3 *hujus*) non potest etiam sine idea trianguli esse. Hæc ergo affirmatio sine idea trianguli nec esse nec concipi potest. Porro hæc trianguli idea hanc eandem affirmationem involvere debet, nempe quod tres ejus anguli æquentur duobus rectis.	Demonstration. There is in the mind (by the preceding proposition) no absolute faculty of willing and not willing, but only singular volitions, namely this or that affirmation and this or that negation. Let us conceive, then, some singular volition—say, the mode of thinking by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the concept, or idea, of a triangle; that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of a triangle. For it is the same whether I say that A must involve the concept of B or that A cannot be conceived without B. Next, this affirmation (by Axiom 3 of this part) also cannot be without the idea of a triangle. So this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle. Further, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely that its three angles are equal to two right angles.
	Quare et vice versa hæc trianguli idea sine hac affirmatione nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque (*per Defin.* 2 *hujus*) hæc affirmatio ad essentiam ideæ trianguli pertinet, nec aliud præter ipsam est. Et quod de hac volitione diximus (quandoquidem eam ad libitum sumpsimus), dicendum etiam est de quacunque volitione, nempe quod præter ideam nihil sit. *Q.E.D.*	So, conversely, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation; and therefore (by Definition 2 of this part) this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle and is nothing besides it. And what we have said of this volition (since we chose it at random) must also be said of any volition whatever: it is nothing besides the idea. QED
2P49C	COROLLARIUM. Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.	Corollary. Will and intellect are one and the same.

LATIN	ENGLISH
2P49CD DEMONSTRATIO. Voluntas et intellectus nihil præter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt (*per Prop.* 48 *hujus et ejusdem Schol.*). At singularis volitio et idea (*per Prop. præced.*) unum et idem sunt; ergo voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Will and intellect are nothing besides the singular volitions and ideas themselves (by Proposition 48 of this part and its Scholium). But a singular volition and a singular idea are one and the same (by the preceding proposition). Therefore will and intellect are one and the same. QED
2P49S SCHOLIUM. His causam, quæ communiter erroris esse statuitur, sustulimus. Supra autem ostendimus, falsitatem in sola privatione, quam ideæ mutilatæ et confusæ involvunt, consistere. Quare idea falsa, quatenus falsa est, certitudinem non involvit. Cum itaque dicimus, hominem in falsis acquiescere, nec de iis dubitare, non ideo ipsum certum esse sed tantum non dubitare dicimus, vel quod in falsis acquiescit, quia nullæ causæ dantur, quæ efficiant, ut ipsius imaginatio fluctuetur. Qua de re vide Scholium Propositionis 44 hujus Partis. Quantumvis igitur homo falsis adhærere supponatur, nunquam tamen ipsum certum esse dicemus. Nam per certitudinem quid positivum intelligimus (*vide Prop.* 43 *hujus cum ejusdem Schol.*) non vero dubitationis privationem. At per certitudinis privationem falsitatem intelligimus. Sed ad uberiorem explicationem præcedentis Propositionis quædam monenda supersunt.	Scholium. With this we have removed what is commonly held to be the cause of error. We showed above that falsity consists only in the privation that fragmentary and confused ideas involve. So a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that someone rests content with false things and does not doubt them, we are not saying that he is certain, only that he does not doubt—or that he rests content with false things because there are no causes that make his imagination waver. On this, see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this part. However firmly a person is supposed to cling to false things, then, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive (see Proposition 43 of this part with its Scholium), not the privation of doubt; whereas by the privation of certainty we understand falsity. But to explain the preceding proposition more fully, some points remain to be made.
Superest deinde, ut ad objectiones, quæ in nostram hanc doctrinam objici possunt, respondeam; et denique, ut omnem amoveam scrupulum, operæ pretium esse duxi, hujus doctrinæ quasdam utilitates indicare. Quasdam, inquam; nam præcipuæ ex iis, quæ in quinta Parte dicemus, melius intelligentur.	It then remains for me to reply to the objections that can be raised against this doctrine of ours; and finally, to remove every misgiving, I have thought it worthwhile to point out certain advantages of this doctrine. Certain ones, I say, for the chief of them will be better understood from what we shall say in Part 5.
Incipio igitur a primo, Lectoresque moneo, ut accurate distinguant inter Ideam, sive Mentis conceptum, et inter Imagines rerum, quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est, ut distinguant inter ideas et Verba quibus res significamus. Nam quia hæc tria, imagines scilicet, verba, et ideæ, a multis vel plane confunduntur, vel non satis accurate, vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam, scitu prorsus necessariam, tam ad speculationem quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam, plane ignorarunt.	I begin, then, with the first, and I urge my readers to distinguish carefully between an idea, or concept of the mind, and the images of the things we imagine. Next, they must distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because many people either confuse these three—images, words, and ideas—entirely, or distinguish them not accurately enough, or not cautiously enough, they have been wholly ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which it is absolutely necessary to know, both for speculation and for ordering one's life wisely.

LATIN	ENGLISH
Quippe, qui putant ideas consistere in imaginibus, quæ in nobis ex corporum occursu formantur, sibi persuadent, ideas illas rerum, quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas, sed tantum figmenta, quæ ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas aspiciunt, et, hoc præjudicio præoccupati, non vident ideam, quatenus idea est, affirmationem aut negationem involvere. Deinde, qui verba confundunt cum idea, vel cum ipsa affirmatione, quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id, quod sentiunt, velle; quando aliquid solis verbis contra id, quod sentiunt, affirmant aut negant.	For those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us by encounters with bodies persuade themselves that ideas of things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas, but only fictions that we invent by the free choice of the will. They look on ideas, then, as if they were mute pictures on a panel; and, preoccupied by this prejudice, they do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation that the idea involves, think they can will contrary to what they perceive, when they merely affirm or deny in words something contrary to what they perceive.
Hæc autem præjudicia exuere facile is poterit, qui ad naturam Cogitationis attendit, quæ Extensionis conceptum minime involvit, atque adeo clare intelliget, ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicujus imagine, neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt.	But anyone who attends to the nature of Thought, which does not in the least involve the concept of Extension, can easily shed these prejudices. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of any thing nor in words. For the essence of words and images is constituted by bodily motions alone, which do not in the least involve the concept of thought.
Atque hæc pauca de his monuisse sufficiat; quare ad prædictas objectiones transeo.	Let these few warnings on the subject suffice. I pass, then, to the objections mentioned above.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED, AND THE DOCTRINE'S USES

Spinoza states four objections to his account of the will, answers them, and lists the doctrine's benefits for life.

LATIN	ENGLISH
Harum *prima* est, quod constare putant, voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum, atque adeo ab eodem diversam esse. Ratio autem, cur putant, voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum, est, quia se experiri ajunt, se non majore assentiendi, sive affirmandi et negandi facultate indigere ad infinitis aliis rebus, quas non percipimus, assentiendum, quam jam habemus, at quidem majore facultate intelligendi. Distinguitur ergo voluntas ab intellectu, quod finitus hic sit, illa autem infinita.	The *first* of these is that people think it established that the will extends more widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from it. The reason they think the will extends more widely than the intellect is that, as they say, they know by experience that they need no greater faculty of assenting—that is, of affirming and denying—than the one they already have in order to assent to infinitely many other things that we do not perceive; whereas they would need a greater faculty of understanding. The will, then, is distinguished from the intellect in that the intellect is finite and the will infinite.
Secundo nobis objici potest, quod experientia nihil clarius videatur docere, quam quod nostrum judicium possumus suspendere, ne rebus, quas percipimus, assentiamur; quod hinc etiam confirmatur, quod nemo dicitur decipi, quatenus aliquid percipit, sed tantum quatenus	*Second*, it can be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend our judgment so as not to assent to the things we perceive. This is also confirmed by

LATIN

assentitur aut dissentitur. Ex. gr. qui equum alatum fingit, non ideo concedit dari equum alatum, hoc est, non ideo decipitur, nisi simul concedat, dari equum alatum; nihil igitur clarius videtur docere experientia, quam quod voluntas, sive facultas assentiendi, libera sit, et a facultate intelligendi diversa.

Tertio objici potest, quod una affirmatio non plus realitatis videtur continere quam alia; hoc est, non majore potentia indigere videmur ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod verum est, quam ad aliquid, quod falsum est, verum esse affirmandum; at unam ideam plus realitatis, sive perfectionis, quam aliam habere percipimus; quantum enim objecta alia aliis præstantiora, tantum etiam eorum ideæ aliæ aliis perfectiores sunt; ex quibus etiam constare videtur differentia inter voluntatem et intellectum.

Quarto objici potest, si homo non operatur ex libertate voluntatis, quid ergo fiet, si in æquilibrio sit, ut Buridani asina? famene et siti peribit? quod si concedam, viderer asinam vel hominis statuam, non hominem concipere; si autem negem, ergo seipsum determinabit, et consequenter eundi facultatem, et faciendi quicquid velit, habet. Præter hæc alia forsan possunt objici; sed quia inculcare non teneor, quid unusquisque somniare potest, ad has objectiones tantum respondere curabo, idque quam potero breviter.

Et quidem ad *primam* dico, me concedere, voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum, si per intellectum claras tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant; sed nego voluntatem latius se extendere quam perceptiones, sive concipiendi facultatem; nec sane video, cur facultas volendi potius dicenda est infinita quam sentiendi facultas; sicut enim infinita (unum tamen post aliud; nam infinita simul affirmare non possumus) eadem volendi facultate possumus affirmare, sic etiam infinita corpora (unum nempe post aliud) eadem sentiendi facultate possumus sentire sive percipere. Quod si dicant, infinita dari, quæ percipere non possumus? regero, nos ea ipsa

ENGLISH

the fact that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. For example, someone who invents a winged horse does not thereby grant that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not thereby deceived, unless at the same time he grants that a winged horse exists. Experience seems to teach nothing more clearly, then, than that the will, or the faculty of assenting, is free and different from the faculty of understanding.

Third, it can be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another; that is, we do not seem to need greater power to affirm that what is true is true than to affirm that something false is true. But we do perceive that one idea has more reality, or perfection, than another: for as some objects are more excellent than others, so too some of their ideas are more perfect than others. From this, too, the difference between will and intellect seems to be established.

Fourth, it can be objected: if a person does not act from freedom of the will, what will happen if he is in a state of equilibrium, like Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I grant that he will, I would seem to be conceiving an ass, or a statue of a man, not a man. If I deny it, then he will determine himself, and consequently has the faculty of going and of doing whatever he wants. Other objections could perhaps be raised besides these; but since I am not obliged to dwell on whatever anyone may dream up, I shall take care to answer only these, and as briefly as I can.[12]

To the *first*, I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they mean only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving. Nor do I see why the faculty of willing should be called infinite any more than the faculty of sensing. For just as we can affirm infinitely many things with the same faculty of willing (one after another, though, since we cannot affirm infinitely many at once), so too we can sense, or perceive, infinitely many bodies with the same faculty of sensing (one after another, that is). And if they say that there are infinitely many

12 A proverbial case, attached to the name of the 14th-century philosopher Jean Buridan, of an animal that starves between two equally attractive portions of food because nothing tips its choice.

LATIN

nulla cogitatione, et consequenter nulla volendi facultate posse assequi.

At dicunt, si Deus vellet efficere, ut ea etiam perciperemus, majorem quidem facultatem percipiendi deberet nobis dare, sed non majorem quam dedit volendi facultatem; quod idem est ac si dicerent, quod si Deus velit efficere, ut infinita alia entia intelligeremus, necesse quidem esset, ut nobis daret majorem intellectum, sed non universaliorem entis ideam, quam dedit, ad eadem infinita entia amplectendum. Ostendimus enim voluntatem ens esse universale, sive ideam, qua omnes singulares volitiones, hoc est id, quod iis omnibus commune est, explicamus. Cum itaque hanc omnium volitionum communem sive universalem ideam facultatem esse credant, minime mirum, si hanc facultatem ultra limites intellectus in infinitum se extendere dicant. Universale enim æque de uno ac de pluribus, ac de infinitis individuis dicitur.

Ad *secundam* objectionem respondeo negando, nos liberam habere potestatem judicium suspendendi. Nam cum dicimus, aliquem judicium suspendere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod videt, se rem non adæquate percipere. Est igitur judicii suspensio revera perceptio, et non libera voluntas. Quod ut clare intelligatur, concipiamus puerum, equum [alatum] imaginantem, nec aliud quicquam percipientem. Quandoquidem hæc imaginatio equi existentiam involvit (*per Coroll. Prop.* 17 *hujus*), nec puer quicquam percipit, quod equi existentiam tollat, ille necessario equum ut præsentem contemplabitur; nec de ejus existentia poterit dubitare, quamvis de eadem non sit certus.

Atque hoc quotidie in somnis experimur, nec credo aliquem esse, qui putet se, dum somniat, liberam habere potestatem suspendendi de iis, quæ somniat, judicium, efficiendique, ut ea, quæ se videre somniat, non somniet; et nihilominus contingit, ut etiam in somnis judicium suspendamus, nempe cum somniamus, nos somniare. Porro concedo neminem decipi quatenus percipit, hoc est, Mentis imaginationes in se consideratas nihil erroris involvere concedo (*vide Schol. Prop.* 17 *hujus*); sed nego, hominem nihil affirmare quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere, quam alas de equo affirmare?

ENGLISH

things we cannot perceive, I reply that we cannot reach them by any thought, and consequently not by any faculty of willing either.

But, they say, if God wanted to bring it about that we perceived these things as well, he would have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than the one he has given. This is the same as if they said that if God wanted to bring it about that we understood infinitely many other beings, he would indeed have to give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being than the one he has given, in order to embrace those same infinitely many beings. For we have shown that the will is a universal being, or idea, by which we explain all singular volitions—that is, what is common to all of them. Since, then, they believe that this common or universal idea of all volitions is a faculty, it is hardly surprising that they say this faculty extends to infinity, beyond the limits of the intellect. For a universal is predicated equally of one, of many, and of infinitely many individuals.

To the *second* objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we are saying nothing but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension of judgment, then, is really a perception, not free will. To understand this clearly, let us conceive a child who imagines a [winged] horse and perceives nothing else. Since this imagining of the horse involves the horse's existence (by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of this part), and the child perceives nothing that cancels the horse's existence, he will necessarily regard the horse as present; nor will he be able to doubt its existence, though he will not be certain of it.

We experience this every day in dreams. Nor do I believe there is anyone who thinks that while he is dreaming he has a free power of suspending judgment about what he dreams, and of bringing it about that he does not dream what he dreams he sees. And yet it does happen that even in dreams we suspend judgment—namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. Further, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives; that is, I grant that the imaginings of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error (see the Scholium to

LATIN

ENGLISH

Proposition 17 of this part). But I deny that a person affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what is perceiving a winged horse but affirming wings of a horse?

Si enim Mens præter equum alatum nihil aliud perciperet, eundem sibi præsentem contemplaretur, nec causam haberet ullam dubitandi de ejusdem existentia, nec ullam dissentiendi facultatem, nisi imaginatio equi alati juncta sit ideæ, quæ existentiam ejusdem equi tollit, vel quod percipit, ideam equi alati, quam habet, esse inadæquatam atque tum vel ejusdem equi existentiam necessario negabit, vel de eadem necessario dubitabit.

For if the mind perceived nothing besides the winged horse, it would regard the horse as present to itself, and would have no cause to doubt its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting—unless the imagining of the winged horse were joined to an idea that cancels the existence of that horse, or unless the mind perceived that the idea of the winged horse it has is inadequate. And then it will either necessarily deny that horse's existence or necessarily doubt it.

Atque his puto me ad *tertiam* etiam objectionem respondisse, nempe, quod voluntas universale quid sit, quod de omnibus ideis prædicatur, quodque id tantum significat, quod omnibus ideis commune est, nempe affirmationem, cujus propterea adæquata essentia, quatenus sic abstracte concipitur, debet esse in unaquaque idea, et hac ratione tantum in omnibus eadem; sed non quatenus consideratur essentiam ideæ constituere; nam eatenus singulares affirmationes æque inter se differunt, ac ipsæ ideæ. Ex. gr. affirmatio, quam idea circuli, ab illa, quam idea trianguli involvit, æque differt, ac idea circuli ab idea trianguli. Deinde absolute nego, nos æquali cogitandi potentia indigere ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod verum est, quam ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod falsum est.

With this I think I have also answered the *third* objection. The will is something universal, predicated of all ideas, which signifies only what is common to all ideas, namely affirmation. Its adequate essence, therefore, insofar as it is conceived abstractly in this way, must be in each idea, and only in this respect is it the same in all; but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the essence of the idea, for in that respect singular affirmations differ from one another as much as the ideas themselves do. For example, the affirmation that the idea of a circle involves differs from the one that the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Next, I flatly deny that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that what is true is true as to affirm that what is false is true.

Nam hæ duæ affirmationes, si mentem spectes, se habent ad invicem, ut ens ad non-ens; nihil enim in ideis positivum est, quod falsitatis formam constituit (*vide Prop.* 35 *hujus cum ejus Schol. et Schol. Prop.* 47 *hujus*). Quare hic apprime venit notandum, quam facile decipimur, quando universalia cum singularibus, et entia rationis et abstracta cum realibus confundimus.

For if you look to the mind, these two affirmations are related to each other as being to non-being; there is nothing positive in ideas that constitutes the form of falsity (see Proposition 35 of this part with its Scholium, and the Scholium to Proposition 47 of this part). Here, then, it is especially worth noting how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real things.

Quod denique ad *quartam* objectionem attinet, dico, me omnino concedere, quod homo in tali æquilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum, qui æque ab eo distant) fame et siti peribit. Si me rogant, an talis homo non potius asinus quam homo sit æstimandus? dico me nescire, ut etiam nescio, quanti æstimandus sit ille, qui se

Finally, as regards the *fourth* objection, I say that I fully grant that a person placed in such an equilibrium (one, that is, who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such-and-such food and such-and-such drink, equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me whether such a person should not be reckoned an ass rather than a man, I say that I do not know—

LATIN

pensilem facit, et quanti æstimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani, etc.

Superest tandem indicare, quantum hujus doctrinæ cognitio ad usum vitæ conferat, quod facile ex his animadvertemus. Nempe:

I° quatenus docet nos ex solo Dei nutu agere, divinæque naturæ esse participes, et eo magis, quo perfectiores actiones agimus, et quo magis magisque Deum intelligimus. Hæc ergo doctrina, præterquam quod animum omnimode quietum reddit, hoc etiam habet, quod nos docet, in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitudo consistit, nempe in sola Dei cognitione, ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur, quæ amor et pietas suadent. Unde clare intelligimus, quantum illi a vera virtutis æstimatione aberrant, qui pro virtute et optimis actionibus, tanquam pro summa servitute, summis præmiis a Deo decorari exspectant, quasi ipsa virtus Deique servitus non esset ipsa felicitas et summa libertas.

II° Quatenus docet, quomodo circa res fortunæ, sive quæ in nostra potestate non sunt, hoc est, circa res, quæ ex nostra natura non sequuntur, nos gerere debeamus; nempe utramque fortunæ faciem æquo animo expectare et ferre; nimirum quia omnia ab æterno Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur, ac ex essentia trianguli sequitur, quod tres ejus anguli sunt æquales duobus rectis.

III° Confert hæc doctrina ad vitam socialem, quatenus docet; neminem odio habere, contemnere, irridere, nemini irasci, invidere. Præterea quatenus docet, ut unusquisque suis sit contentus, et proximo auxilio, non ex muliebri misericordia, partialitate, neque superstitione, sed ex solo Rationis ductu, prout scilicet tempus et res postulat, ut in quarta Parte ostendam.

IV° Denique confert etiam hæc doctrina non parum ad communem societatem: quatenus docet, qua ratione cives gubernandi sint et ducendi, nempe non ut serviant, sed ut libere ea, quæ optima sunt, agant. Atque his quæ in hoc Schol. agere constitueram absolvi, et eo finem huic nostræ secundæ Parti impono; in qua puto me naturam

ENGLISH

just as I also do not know how to reckon someone who hangs himself, or how to reckon children, fools, those who have lost their minds, and so on.

It remains, finally, to show how much knowledge of this doctrine contributes to the conduct of life. We shall easily see this from the following points.

1. It teaches that we act by God's bidding alone, and that we share in the divine nature—the more so, the more perfect the actions we perform and the more and more we understand God. This doctrine, then, besides bringing complete peace of mind, has this further merit: it teaches us in what our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists—namely, in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only what love and piety urge. From this we understand clearly how far from a true estimate of virtue those people stray who, for their virtue and their best actions, expect to be decorated by God with the highest rewards, as if for the hardest servitude—as though virtue itself, and the service of God, were not happiness itself and the highest freedom.[13]

2. It teaches how we ought to conduct ourselves regarding matters of fortune, that is, things not in our power—things that do not follow from our nature: namely, to expect and bear both faces of fortune with an even mind. For all things follow from God's eternal decree with the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

3. This doctrine contributes to social life, in that it teaches us to hate no one, disdain no one, mock no one, be angry with no one, envy no one. Further, it teaches that each person should be content with what is his own, and should help his neighbor—not from sentimental pity, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason alone, as time and circumstance require, as I shall show in Part 4.

4. Finally, this doctrine also contributes no little to society as a whole, in that it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led: not so that they may be slaves, but so that they may freely do what is best. With this I have completed what I had re-

13 *Virtus*: for Spinoza virtue is the same as power—a thing's power to act from its own nature.

LATIN	ENGLISH
Mentis humanæ ejusque proprietates satis prolixe, et quantum rei difficultas fert, clare explicuisse, atque talia tradidisse, ex quibus multa præclara, maxime utilia, et cognitu necessaria concludi possunt, ut partim ex sequentibus constabit.	solved to treat in this scholium, and so I bring this Second Part of ours to a close. In it I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties at sufficient length, and as clearly as the difficulty of the subject allows, and have set out things from which many excellent conclusions can be drawn—highly useful and necessary to know—as will partly become clear from what follows.

Part III: Of the origin and nature of the affects

Spinoza treats the emotions as natural things with causes, deriving them from desire, joy and sadness.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3Pref	Plerique, qui de Affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus, quæ communes Naturæ leges sequuntur, sed de rebus, quæ extra Naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in Natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem Naturæ ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi, ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanæ deinde impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causam non communi Naturæ potentiæ, sed nescio cui naturæ humanæ vitio tribuunt, quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt, vel, quod plerumque fit, detestantur; et qui humanæ Mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur.	Most of those who have written about the affects and about how people live seem to treat not natural things, which follow the common laws of Nature, but things outside Nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in Nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs the order of Nature rather than follows it, that he has absolute power over his own actions, and that he is determined by nothing other than himself. Then they attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy not to the common power of Nature but to some flaw or other in human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, despise, or—as most often happens—curse; and whoever knows how to carp at the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more cleverly is regarded as practically divine.
	Non defuerunt tamen viri præstantissimi (quorum labori et industriæ nos multum debere fatemur), qui de recta vivendi ratione præclara multa scripserint, et plena prudentiæ consilia mortalibus dederint; verum Affectuum naturam et vires, et quid contra Mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo, quod sciam, determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit, Mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam. Affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare, simulque viam ostendere studuisse, qua Mens in Affectus absolutum habere possit imperium; sed, mea quidem sententia, nihil præter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo, qui hominum Affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt, quam intelligere.	Yet there has been no lack of eminent men (to whose labor and diligence we confess we owe much) who have written many excellent things about the right way of living and have given mortals advice full of prudence. But no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and strength of the affects, or what the mind, for its part, can do to moderate them. I know, of course, that the celebrated Descartes, although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, nevertheless tried to explain human affects through their first causes, and at the same time to show the way by which the mind can have absolute dominion over the affects. But in my opinion, at least, he showed nothing but the brilliance of his great intellect, as I shall demonstrate in its place. For I want to return to those who would rather curse or laugh at people's affects and actions than understand them.[1]
	His sine dubio mirum videbitur, quod hominum vitia et ineptias more Geometrico tractare aggrediar, et certa	To these people it will no doubt seem strange that I set out to treat human vices and follies in the

1 René Descartes (1596–1650), whose *Passions of the Soul* (1649) is the work in view here.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	ratione demonstrare velim ea, quæ Rationi repugnare, quæque vana, absurda, et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea hæc est ratio. Nihil in Natura fit, quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque Natura semper eadem, et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia; hoc est, Naturæ leges et regulæ, secundum quas omnia fiunt, et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eædem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi, nempe per leges et regulas Naturæ universales.	geometrical manner, and want to demonstrate by sure reasoning things they loudly proclaim to be contrary to reason, empty, absurd, and horrifying. But this is my reasoning. Nothing happens in Nature that can be attributed to a flaw in it; for Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same. That is, the laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form into another are everywhere and always the same. So there must also be one and the same way of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever: namely, through the universal laws and rules of Nature.
	Affectus itaque odii, iræ, invidiæ, etc., in se considerati ex eadem Naturæ necessitate et virtute consequuntur, ac reliqua singularia; ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt, per quas intelliguntur, certasque proprietates habent, cognitione nostra æque dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei, cujus sola contemplatione delectamur. De Affectuum itaque natura et viribus, ac Mentis in eosdem potentia, eadem Methodo agam, qua in præcedentibus de Deo et Mente egi, et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde, ac si quæstio de lineis, planis, aut de corporibus esset.	The affects of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, therefore follow from the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other singular things do. Accordingly, they have definite causes through which they are understood, and definite properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing whose mere contemplation delights us. I shall therefore treat the nature and strength of the affects, and the power of the mind over them, by the same method by which I treated God and the mind in the preceding parts; and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes, or bodies.

DEFINITIONS AND POSTULATES

Spinoza defines adequate cause, acting and being acted on, and affect.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3D1	I. Causam adæquatam appello eam, cujus effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi, Inadæquatam autem, seu partialem, illam voco, cujus effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit.	Definition 1. I call a cause adequate when its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it; I call it inadequate, or partial, when its effect cannot be understood through it alone.
3D2	II. Nos tum agere dico, cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cujus adæquata sumus causa, hoc est (*per Defin. præced.*) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit, vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cujus nos non nisi partialis sumus causa.	Definition 2. I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is (by the preceding Definition), when from our nature something follows, in us or outside us, that can be clearly and distinctly understood through our nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.
3D3		Definition 3. By affect I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	III. Per Affectum intelligo Corporis affectiones, quibus ipsius Corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coërcetur, et simul harum affectionum ideas.	increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections.
	Si itaque alicujus harum affectionum adæquata possimus esse causa, tum per Affectum actionem intelligo; alias passionem.	*So if we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then by affect I understand an action; otherwise, a passion.*
3Post1	I. Corpus humanum potest multis affici modis, quibus ipsius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, et etiam aliis, qui ejusdem agendi potentiam nec majorem nec minorem reddunt.	Postulate 1. The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways that make its power of acting neither greater nor less.
	Hoc Postulatum seu Axioma nititur Postulato 1 *et Lemmat.* 5 *et* 7, *quæ vide post Prop.* 13, *p. II.*	*This Postulate, or Axiom, rests on Postulate 1 and Lemmas 5 and 7, for which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2.*
3Post2	II. Corpus humanum multas pati potest mutationes et nihilominus retinere objectorum impressiones seu vestigia (*de quibus vide Post.* 5 *p. II*), et consequenter easdem rerum imagines (*quarum Defin. vide Schol. Prop.* 17 *p. II*).	Postulate 2. The human body can undergo many changes and nonetheless retain the impressions, or traces, of objects (on which see Postulate 5 of Part 2), and consequently the same images of things (for their definition, see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2).
3P1	PROPOSITIO I. *Mens nostra quædam agit, quædam vero patitur; nempe quatenus adæquatas habet ideas, eatenus quædam necessario agit, et quatenus ideas habet inadæquatas, eatenus necessario quædam patitur.*	Proposition 1. *Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others: namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things.*
3P1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cujuscunque humanæ Mentis ideæ aliæ adæquatæ sunt, aliæ autem mutilatæ et confusæ (*per Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 40 *p. II*). Ideæ autem, quæ in alicujus Mente sunt adæquatæ, sunt in Deo adæquatæ, quatenus ejusdem Mentis essentiam constituit (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *p. II*), et quæ deinde inadæquatæ sunt in Mente, sunt etiam in Deo (*per idem Coroll.*) adæquatæ, non quatenus ejusdem solummodo Mentis essentiam, sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum Mentes in se simul continet. Deinde ex data quacunque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet (*per Prop.* 36 *p. I*), cujus effectus Deus causa est adæquata (*vid. Defin.* 1 *hujus*), non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus data illa idea, affectus consideratur (*vid. Prop.* 9 *p. II*).	Demonstration. In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and others fragmentary and confused (by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Now the ideas that are adequate in someone's mind are adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of that mind (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2); and those that are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God (by the same Corollary), not insofar as he contains in himself only the essence of that mind, but insofar as he also contains in himself the minds of other things at the same time. Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), of which God is the adequate cause (see Definition 1 of this part)—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by that given idea (see Proposition 9 of Part 2).
	At ejus effectus, cujus Deus est causa, quatenus affectus est idea, quæ in alicujus Mente est adæquata, illa eadem Mens est causa adæquata (*per Coroll. Prop.* 11 *p. II*). Ergo Mens nostra (*per Defin.* 2 *hujus*) quatenus ideas habet	But of an effect of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected by an idea that is adequate in someone's mind, that same mind is the adequate cause (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	adæquatas, quædam necessario agit; Quod erat primum. Deinde quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea, quæ in Deo est adæquata, non quatenus Mentem unius hominis tantum, sed quatenus aliarum rerum Mentes simul cum ejusdem hominis Mente in se habet, ejus (*per idem Coroll. Prop.* 11 *p. II*) illius hominis Mens non est causa adæquata, sed partialis; ac proinde (*per Defin.* 2 *hujus*) Mens quatenus ideas inadæquatas habet, quædam necessario patitur; Quod erat secundum. Ergo Mens nostra, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Therefore our mind (by Definition 2 of this part), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts in some things. That was the first point. Next, whatever necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but insofar as he has in himself the minds of other things together with that man's mind—of this (by the same Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2) that man's mind is not the adequate cause but a partial one. And therefore (by Definition 2 of this part) the mind, insofar as it has inadequate ideas, is necessarily acted on in some things. That was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. QED
3P1C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, Mentem eo pluribus passionibus esse obnoxiam, quo plures ideas inadæquatas habet, et contra eo plura agere, quo plures habet adæquatas.	Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is subject to more passions the more inadequate ideas it has, and, conversely, acts more the more adequate ideas it has.

NEITHER MIND NOR BODY MOVES THE OTHER

Mind and body are one thing; belief in free decisions of the mind is a waking dream.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P2	PROPOSITIO II. *Nec Corpus Mentem ad cogitandum, nec Mens Corpus ad motum, neque ad quietem, nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.*	Proposition 2. *The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).*
3P2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnes cogitandi modi Deum quatenus res est cogitans, et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur, pro causa habent (*per Prop.* 6 *p. II*); id ergo, quod Mentem ad cogitandum determinat, modus Cogitandi est, et non Extensionis; hoc est (*per Defin.* 1 *p. II*), non est Corpus; Quod erat primum. Corporis deinde motus et quies ab alio oriri debet corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et absolute quicquid in corpore oritur, id a Deo oriri debuit, quatenus aliquo Extensionis modo, et non quatenus aliquo Cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (*per eand. Prop.* 6 *p. II*), hoc est, a Mente, quæ (*per Prop.* 11 *p. II*) modus cogitandi est, oriri non potest; Quod erat secundum. Ergo nec Corpus Mentem, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. All modes of thinking have God for their cause insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by another attribute (by Proposition 6 of Part 2). So what determines the mind to think is a mode of Thought, not of Extension; that is (by Definition 1 of Part 2), it is not a body. That was the first point. Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another; and, without qualification, whatever arises in a body must have arisen from God insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of Extension, and not insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of Thought (by the same Proposition 6 of Part 2); that is, it cannot arise from the mind, which (by Proposition 11 of Part 2) is a mode of thinking. That was the second point. Therefore neither can the body determine the mind, etc. QED
3P2S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc clarius intelliguntur ex iis, quæ in Scholio Propositionis 7 Partis II dicta sunt, quod scilicet	Scholium. This is understood more clearly from what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 7 of

LATIN

Mens et Corpus una eademque res sit, quæ jam sub Cogitationis, jam sub Extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit, ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit, sive Natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur; consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum Corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum Mentis; Quod etiam patet ex modo, quo Propositionem 12 Partis II demonstravimus.

At, quamvis hæc ita se habeant, ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo, nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad hæc æquo animo perpendendum; adeo firmiter persuasi sunt, Corpus ex solo Mentis nutu jam moveri, jam quiescere plurimaque agere, quæ a sola Mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent. Etenim, quid Corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem hucusque experientia docuit, quid Corpus ex solis legibus Naturæ, quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a Mente determinetur.

Nam nemo hucusque Corporis fabricam tam accurate novit, ut omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare, ut jam taceam, quod in Brutis plura observentur, quæ humanam sagacitatem longe superant, et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant, quæ vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit, ipsum Corpus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus multa posse, quæ ipsius Mens admiratur. Deinde nemo scit, qua ratione, quibusve mediis Mens moveat Corpus neque quot motus gradus possit Corpori tribuere, quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat. Unde sequitur, cum homines dicunt, hanc vel illam actionem Corporis oriri a Mente, quæ imperium in Corpus habet, eos nescire, quid dicant, nec aliud agere, quam speciosis verbis fateri, se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare.

At dicent, sive sciant, sive nesciant, quibus mediis Mens moveat Corpus, se tamen, experiri, quod, nisi Mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, Corpus iners esset. Deinde se experiri, in sola Mentis potestate esse, tam loqui quam tacere, et alia multa, quæ proinde a Mentis decreto pendere credunt. Sed, quod ad *primum* attinet,

ENGLISH

Part 2: namely, that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. Hence the order, or connection, of things is one, whether Nature is conceived under this attribute or under that; and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our body is by nature simultaneous with the order of the actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the way we demonstrated Proposition 12 of Part 2.

But although these things are so, and no reason for doubt remains, I scarcely believe that people can be brought to weigh them with an even mind unless I confirm the matter by experience—so firmly are they persuaded that the body now moves, now rests, at the mere bidding of the mind, and does a great many things that depend solely on the mind's will and its skill in devising. For no one has yet determined what the body can do; that is, experience has not yet taught anyone what the body can do by the laws of Nature alone, insofar as Nature is considered only as corporeal, and what it cannot do unless it is determined by the mind.

For no one has yet known the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions—not to mention that many things are observed in animals that far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep that they would not dare to do awake. This shows well enough that the body itself, by the laws of its own nature alone, can do many things at which its own mind marvels. Again, no one knows in what way, or by what means, the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how fast it can move it. It follows that when people say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and are doing nothing but confessing, in fine-sounding words, that they do not know the true cause of that action and feel no wonder at it.

But they will say that, whether or not they know by what means the mind moves the body, they nevertheless find by experience that unless the human mind were fit for thinking, the body would be inert. Next, they say, they find by experience that it is in the mind's power alone both to speak

LATIN

ipsos rogo, num experientia non etiam doceat, quod si contra Corpus iners sit, Mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum Corpus somno quiescit, Mens simul cum ipso sopita manet, nec potestatem habet, veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi.

Deinde omnes expertos esse credo, Mentem non semper æque aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem objecto, sed, prout Corpus aptius est, ut in eo hujus vel illius objecti imago excitetur, ita Mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud objectum contemplandum. At dicent, ex solis legibus Naturæ, quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse, ut causæ ædificiorum, picturarum rerumque hujusmodi, quæ sola humana arte fiunt possint deduci, nec Corpus humanum, nisi a Mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod ædificandum.

Verum ego jam ostendi, ipsos nescire, quid Corpus possit, quidve ex sola ipsius naturæ contemplatione possit deduci, ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis Naturæ legibus fieri, quæ nunquam credidissent posse fieri, nisi ex Mentis directione; ut sunt ea, quæ somnambuli in somnis agunt, quæque ipsi dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam Corporis humani fabricam; quæ artificio longissime superat omnes, quæ humana arte fabricatæ sunt, ut jam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex Natura, sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita sequi. Quod porro ad *secundum* attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanæ haberent, si æque in hominis potestate esset tam tacere quam loqui.

At experientia satis superque docet, homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam, nec minus posse quam appetitus moderari suos; unde factum, ut plerique credant, nos ea tantum libere agere, quæ leviter petimus, quia earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei, cujus frequenter recordamur, sed illa minime, quæ magno cum affectu petimus, et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit. Verum enim vero nisi experti essent, nos plura agere, quorum postea pœnitet, nosque sæpe, quando sc. contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil

ENGLISH

and to be silent, and to do many other things, which they therefore believe depend on the mind's decision. But as to the *first* point, I ask them whether experience does not also teach that if, on the other hand, the body is inert, the mind is at the same time unfit for thinking. For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind remains asleep along with it and does not have the power of thinking that it has when awake.

Next, I believe everyone has found by experience that the mind is not always equally fit for thinking about the same object; rather, the more fit the body is for the image of this or that object to be aroused in it, the more fit the mind is for contemplating this or that object. But they will say that the causes of buildings, paintings, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill alone, cannot be deduced solely from the laws of Nature considered only as corporeal; and that the human body would not be able to build a temple unless it were determined and guided by the mind.

But I have already shown that they do not know what the body can do, or what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, and that they themselves find by experience that a great many things happen by the laws of Nature alone which they would never have believed could happen except by the mind's direction—such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, which they themselves marvel at when awake. I add here the very structure of the human body, which far surpasses in craftsmanship all the things made by human skill—not to mention what I showed above: that infinitely many things follow from Nature, under whatever attribute it is considered. As for the *second* point, human affairs would certainly go far more happily if it were equally in a person's power to be silent as to speak.

But experience teaches more than enough that people have nothing less in their power than their tongue, and can do nothing less than moderate their appetites. That is why most people believe that we do freely only the things we pursue lightly, because the appetite for such things can easily be checked by the memory of something else that we frequently recall; but that we by no means act freely in the things we pursue with a strong affect, which cannot be calmed by the memory of something else. Indeed, had they not found by experi-

LATIN

impediret, quo minus crederent, nos omnia libere agere. Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle, et timidus fugam.

Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero Mentis decreto ea loqui, quæ postea sobrius vellet tacuisse; sic delirans, garrula, puer, et hujus farinæ plurimi, ex libero Mentis decreto credunt loqui, cum tamen loquendi impetum, quem habent, continere nequeant; ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare quam Ratio doceat, quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant, quia suarum actionum sunt conscii, et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari; et præterea, quod Mentis decreta nihil sint præter ipsos appetitus, quæ propterea varia sunt pro varia Corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur, et qui præterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint, nesciunt; qui autem nullo facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur.

Quæ omnia profecto clare ostendunt, Mentis tam decretum, quam appetitum et Corporis determinationem, simul esse natura, vel potius unam eandemque rem, quam, quando sub Cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, Decretum appellamus, et quando sub Extensionis attributo consideratur, et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, Determinationem vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex jam dicendis patebit. Nam aliud est, quod hic apprime notari vellem, nempe quod nos nihil ex Mentis decreto agere possumus, nisi ejus recordemur. Ex. gr. non possumus verbum loqui, nisi ejusdem recordemur. Deinde in libera Mentis potestate non est, rei alicujus recordari vel ejusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in Mentis potestate esse creditur, quod rem, cujus recordamur, vel tacere vel loqui ex solo Mentis decreto possumus.

Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero Mentis decreto loqui, nec tamen loquimur, vel, si

ENGLISH

ence that we do many things we later regret, and that we often—namely, when we are torn by contrary affects—see the better and follow the worse, nothing would prevent them from believing that we do everything freely. So the infant believes that it freely wants milk; the angry child, that he freely wants revenge; and the timid, flight.[2]

Again, the drunk believes that it is by a free decision of the mind that he says things which, when sober, he would later wish he had kept to himself. So too the delirious, the chatterbox, the child, and a great many people of this sort believe that they speak by a free decision of the mind, when in fact they cannot restrain the impulse to speak that they have. So experience itself teaches no less clearly than reason that people believe themselves free for this reason alone: that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. It teaches, moreover, that the decisions of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the body varies. For each person governs everything by his own affect; those who are, besides, torn by contrary affects do not know what they want; and those who have none are driven this way and that by the slightest impulse.

All these things surely show clearly that the decision of the mind, and the appetite and determination of the body, are simultaneous in nature—or rather, that they are one and the same thing, which we call a *decision* when it is considered under the attribute of Thought and explained through it, and a *determination* when it is considered under the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will be still clearer from what is about to be said. For there is another point I should particularly like noted here: that we can do nothing by a decision of the mind unless we remember it. For example, we cannot speak a word unless we remember it. And it is not in the free power of the mind to remember a thing or to forget it. So what is believed to be in the mind's power is only this: that we can, by the mind's decision alone, either keep silent about a thing we remember or speak of it.

But when we dream that we are speaking, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind; and yet we do not speak, or if we do, it hap-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	loquimur, id ex Corporis spontaneo motu fit. Somniamus deinde, nos quædam homines celare, idque eodem Mentis decreto, quo, dum vigilamus, ea, quæ scimus, tacemus. Somniamus denique nos ex Mentis decreto quædam agere, quæ, dum vigilamus, non audemus. Atque adeo pervelim scire, an in Mente duo decretorum genera dentur, Phantasticorum unum, et Liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est, hoc Mentis decretum, quod liberum, esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui, nec aliud esse præter illam affirmationem, quam idea, quatenus idea est, necessario involvit (*vide Propositionem.* 49 *p. II*).	pens from a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are hiding certain things from people, and by the same decision of the mind by which, when awake, we keep silent about what we know. Finally, we dream that from a decision of the mind we do certain things that we do not dare to do when awake. And so I should very much like to know whether there are in the mind two kinds of decisions—one kind fanciful and the other free. If one does not care to carry madness that far, it must necessarily be granted that this decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguished from the imagination itself, or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves (see Proposition 49 of Part 2).
	Atque adeo hæc Mentis decreta eadem necessitate in Mente oriuntur, ac ideæ rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt, se ex libero Mentis decreto loqui, vel tacere, vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.	And so these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist. Those, then, who believe that they speak, or keep silent, or do anything at all from a free decision of the mind are dreaming with their eyes open.
3P3	PROPOSITIO III. *Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adæquatis oriuntur; passiones autem a solis inadæquatis pendent.*	Proposition 3. *The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.*
3P3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Primum, quod Mentis essentiam constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea Corporis actu existentis (*per Prop.* 11 *et* 13 *p. II*), quæ (*per Prop.* 15 *p. II*) ex multis aliis componitur, quarum quædam (*per Coroll. Prop.* 38 *p. II*) sunt adæquatæ, quædam autem inadæquatæ (*per Coroll. Prop.* 29 *p. II*). Quicquid ergo ex Mentis natura sequitur, et cujus Mens causa est proxima, per quam id debet intelligi, necessario ex idea adæquata vel inadæquata sequi debet. At quatenus Mens (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) ideas habet inadæquatas, eatenus necessario patitur; ergo Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adæquatis sequuntur, et Mens propterea tantum patitur, quia ideas habet inadæquatas. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of an actually existing body (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2). This idea (by Proposition 15 of Part 2) is composed of many others, of which some (by the Corollary to Proposition 38 of Part 2) are adequate, and some inadequate (by the Corollary to Proposition 29 of Part 2). Whatever follows from the nature of the mind, then, and has the mind as its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from either an adequate or an inadequate idea. But insofar as the mind has inadequate ideas (by Proposition 1 of this part), to that extent it is necessarily acted on. Therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and the mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas. QED
3P3S	SCHOLIUM. Videmus itaque passiones ad Mentem non referri, nisi quatenus aliquid habet, quod negationem involvit, sive quatenus consideratur ut Naturæ pars, quæ	Scholium. We see, then, that passions are related to the mind only insofar as it has something that involves negation—that is, insofar as it is con-

2 "See the better and follow the worse" echoes Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 7.20–21, where Medea says she sees and approves the better course but follows the worse.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi; et hac ratione ostendere possem, passiones eodem modo ad res singulares ac ad Mentem referri, nec alia ratione posse percipi; sed meum institutum est, de sola Mente humana agere.	sidered as a part of Nature that cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself, without the other parts. In this way I could show that passions are related to singular things in the same way as to the mind, and cannot be perceived in any other way; but my purpose is to treat the human mind alone.

THE STRIVING TO PERSEVERE

Each thing strives to persevere in its being, and this striving is its actual essence.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P4	PROPOSITIO IV. *Nulla res, nisi a causa externa, potest destrui.*	Proposition 4. *No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause.*
3P4D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio per se patet; definitio enim cujuscunque rei ipsius rei essentiam affirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere. *Q.E.D.*.	Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For the definition of any thing affirms the thing's essence and does not deny it; that is, it posits the thing's essence and does not take it away. So as long as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it that can destroy it. QED
3P5	PROPOSITIO V. *Res eatenus contrariæ sunt naturæ, hoc est, eatenus in eodem subjecto esse nequeunt, quatenus una alteram potest destruere.*	Proposition 5. *Things are of a contrary nature—that is, cannot be in the same subject—to the extent that one can destroy the other.*
3P5D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si enim inter se convenire, vel in eodem subjecto simul esse possent, posset ergo in eodem subjecto aliquid dari, quod ipsum posset destruere, quod (*per Prop. præced.*) est absurdum. Ergo res etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For if they could agree with each other, or be in the same subject at the same time, then there could be something in the same subject that could destroy it, which (by the preceding Proposition) is absurd. Therefore things, etc. QED
3P6	PROPOSITIO VI. *Unaquæque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.*	Proposition 6. *Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.*[3]
3P6D	DEMONSTRATIO. Res enim singulares modi sunt, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur (*per Coroll. Prop.* 25 *p. I*); hoc est (*per Prop.* 34 *p. I*) res, quæ Dei potentiam, qua Deus est et agit, certo et determinato modo exprimunt; neque ulla res aliquid in se habet, a quo possit destrui, sive quod ejus existentiam tollat (*per Prop.* 4 *hujus*); sed contra ei omni, quod ejusdem existentiam potest tollere, opponitur (*per Prop. præced.*); adeoque quantum potest, et in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For singular things are modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1); that is (by Proposition 34 of Part 1), they are things that express, in a certain and determinate way, the power of God by which God is and acts. And no thing has in itself anything by which it can be destroyed, or that takes its existence away (by Proposition 4 of this part); on the contrary, it is opposed to everything that can take its existence away (by the preceding Proposition).

3 "As far as it can by its own power" renders *quantum in se est*, literally "as far as it is in itself." "Strives" renders *conatur*; the noun *conatus*, "striving," names this effort of each thing to persevere in its being.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		And so, as far as it can by its own power, it strives to persevere in its being. QED
3P7	PROPOSITIO VII. *Conatus, quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est præter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.*	Proposition 7. *The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.*
3P7D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex data cujuscunque rei essentia quædam necessario sequuntur (*per Prop.* 36 *p. I*), nec res aliud possunt, quam id, quod ex determinata earum natura necessario sequitur (*per Prop.* 29 *p. I*); quare cujuscunque rei potentia sive conatus, quo ipsa vel sola vel cum aliis quidquam agit vel agere conatur, hoc est (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*) potentia sive conatus, quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est præter ipsius rei datam sive actualem essentiam. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. From the given essence of any thing certain things necessarily follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), and things can do nothing other than what necessarily follows from their determinate nature (by Proposition 29 of Part 1). So the power or striving of any thing, by which it does or strives to do anything, either alone or with others—that is (by Proposition 6 of this part), the power or striving by which it strives to persevere in its being—is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself. QED
3P8	PROPOSITIO VIII. *Conatus, quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.*	Proposition 8. *The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.*
3P8D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si enim tempus limitatum involveret, quod rei durationem determinaret, tum ex sola ipsa potentia, qua res existit, sequeretur, quod res post limitatum illud tempus non posset existere, sed quod deberet destrui; atqui hoc (*per Prop.* 4 *hujus*) est absurdum: ergo conatus, quo res existit, nullum tempus definitum involvit; sed contra, quoniam (*per eandem Prop.* 4 *hujus*), si a nulla externa causa destruatur, eadem potentia, qua jam existit, existere perget semper, ergo hic conatus tempus indefinitum involvit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For if it involved a limited time, which determined the thing's duration, then it would follow from the very power by which the thing exists, taken alone, that after that limited time the thing could not exist, but would have to be destroyed. But this (by Proposition 4 of this part) is absurd. Therefore the striving by which a thing exists involves no definite time. On the contrary, since (by the same Proposition 4 of this part) if the thing is destroyed by no external cause, it will always go on existing by the same power by which it now exists, this striving involves an indefinite time. QED
3P9	PROPOSITIO IX. *Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione, et hujus sui conatus est conscia.*	Proposition 9. *The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ones, strives to persevere in its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this striving of its own.*
3P9D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mentis essentia ex ideis adæquatis et inadæquatis constituitur (*ut in Prop.* 3 *hujus ostendimus*); adeoque (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) tam quatenus has quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur; idque (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem Mens (*per Prop.* 23 *p. II*) per ideas affectionum Corporis necessario sui sit conscia est ergo (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) Mens sui conatus conscia. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in Proposition 3 of this part); and so (by Proposition 7 of this part) it strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has the latter and insofar as it has the former—and this (by Proposition 8 of this part) for an indefinite duration. But since the mind (by Proposition 23 of Part 2) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the affections of the body, the mind is therefore (by Pro-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		position 7 of this part) conscious of its striving. QED
3P9S	SCHOLIUM. Hic conatus, cum ad Mentem solam refertur, *Voluntas* appellatur, sed cum ad Mentem et Corpus simul refertur, vocatur *Appetitus*; qui proinde nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia, ex cujus natura ea, quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur; atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter Appetitum et Cupiditatem nulla est differentia, nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur, quatenus sui appetitus sunt conscii, et propterea sic definiri potest, nempe *Cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia*. Constat itaque ex his omnibus, nihil nos conari, velle, appetere, neque cupere, quia id bonum esse judicamus; sed contra, nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare, quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus, atque cupimus.	Scholium. This striving, when it is related to the mind alone, is called *will*; but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called *appetite*. Appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow the things that serve his preservation; and so man is determined to do those things. Next, there is no difference between appetite and desire, except that desire is generally related to people insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. So it can be defined as follows: *desire is appetite together with consciousness of it*. From all this it is clear, then, that we do not strive for, will, seek, or desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, seek it, and desire it.
3P10	PROPOSITIO X. *Idea, quæ Corporis nostri existentiam secludit, in nostra Mente dari nequit, sed eidem est contraria.*	Proposition 10. *An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.*
3P10D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid Corpus nostrum potest destruere, in eodem dari nequit (*per Prop.* 5 *hujus*), adeoque neque ejus rei idea potest in Deo dari, quatenus nostri Corporis ideam habet (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *p. I*); hoc est (*per Prop.* 11 *et* 13 *p. II*), ejus rei idea in nostra Mente dari nequit; sed contra, quoniam (*per Prop.* 11 *et* 13 *p. II*) primum, quod Mentis essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et præcipuum nostræ Mentis conatus est (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*), Corporis nostri existentiam affirmare; atque adeo idea, quæ Corporis nostri existentiam negat, nostræ Menti est contraria. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whatever can destroy our body cannot be in it (by Proposition 5 of this part). And so the idea of that thing cannot be in God insofar as he has the idea of our body (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of Part 1); that is (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2), the idea of that thing cannot be in our mind. On the contrary, since (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of an actually existing body, the first and principal striving of our mind is (by Proposition 7 of this part) to affirm the existence of our body. And so an idea that denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind. QED

JOY, SADNESS AND DESIRE

The mind passes to greater or lesser perfection; joy, sadness and desire are the three primary affects.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P11	PROPOSITIO XI. *Quicquid Corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet, ejusdem rei idea Mentis nostræ cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet.*	Proposition 11. *Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking.*
3P11D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio patet ex Propositione 7 Partis II, vel etiam ex Propositione 14, Partis II.	Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Proposition 7 of Part 2, or also from Proposition 14 of Part 2.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P11S	SCHOLIUM. Videmus itaque Mentem magnas posse pati mutationes, et jam ad majorem, jam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quæ quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ. Per *Lætitiam* itaque in sequentibus intelligam *passionem, qua Mens ad majorem perfectionem transit*. Per *Tristitiam* autem *passionem, qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem*. Porro *affectum Lætitiæ, ad Mentem et Corpus simul relatum, Titillationem* vel *Hilaritatem* voco; *Tristitiæ* autem *Dolorem* vel *Melancholiam*. Sed notandum, Titillationem et Dolorem ad hominem referri, quando una ejus pars præ reliquis est affecta, Hilaritatem autem et Melancholiam, quando omnes pariter sunt affectæ. Quid deinde *Cupiditas*, sit, in Scholio Propositionis 9, hujus Partis explicui; et præter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium nam; reliquos ex his tribus oriri in seqq. ostendam.	Scholium. We see, then, that the mind can undergo great changes, passing now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection; and these passions explain to us the affects of joy and sadness. In what follows, therefore, by *joy* I shall understand *the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection*; and by *sadness*, *the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection*. Further, the *affect of joy, when it is related to the mind and body together,* I call *localized pleasure* or *cheerfulness*; that of *sadness*, *pain* or *melancholy*. But it should be noted that localized pleasure and pain are related to a person when one part of him is affected more than the rest, whereas cheerfulness and melancholy are related to him when all parts are equally affected. What *desire* is, I explained in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part; and besides these three I recognize no other primary affect. For I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three.[4]
	Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius Propositionem 10 hujus Partis explicare, ut clarius intelligatur, qua ratione idea ideæ sit contraria.	But before going further, I should like to explain Proposition 10 of this part more fully here, so that it may be understood more clearly how one idea is contrary to another.
	In Scholio Propositionis 17 Partis II ostendimus, ideam, quæ Mentis essentiam constituit, Corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere, quamdiu ipsum Corpus existit. Deinde ex iis, quæ in Coroll. Prop. 8 Part. II et in ejusdem Schol. ostendimus, sequitur, præsentem nostræ Mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere, quod sc. Mens actualem Corporis existentiam involvit. Denique Mentis potentiam, qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (*vid. Prop.* 17 *et* 18, *p. II cum ejus Scholio*), quod ipsa actualem Corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur, Mentis præsentem existentiam ejusque imaginandi potentiam tolli, simulatque Mens præsentem Corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa, cur Mens hanc Corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa Mens (*per Prop.* 4 *hujus*), nec etiam, quod Corpus esse desinit.	In the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2 we showed that the idea that constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body for as long as the body itself exists. Next, from what we showed in the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part 2 and in its Scholium, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends on this alone: that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, we showed that the power of the mind by which it imagines things and remembers them also depends on this (see Propositions 17 and 18 of Part 2, with its Scholium): that it involves the actual existence of the body. From this it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause of the mind's ceasing to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (by Proposition 4 of this part), nor again the body's ceasing to be.
	Nam (*per Prop.* 6 *p. II*) causa, cur Mens Corporis existentiam affirmat, non est, quia Corpus existere	For (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) the cause of the mind's affirming the existence of the body is not

4 "Localized pleasure" renders *titillatio*: joy felt in one part of the body more than in the rest, as opposed to cheerfulness, which affects the whole.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	incepit: quare, per eandem rationem, nec ipsius Corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, quia Corpus esse desinit, sed (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*) hoc ab alia idea oritur, quæ nostri Corporis, et consequenter nostræ Mentis præsentem existentiam secludit, quæque adeo ideæ, quæ nostræ Mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.	that the body began to exist. So, by the same reasoning, the mind does not cease to affirm the body's existence because the body ceases to be. Rather (by Proposition 17 of Part 2), this arises from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea that constitutes the essence of our mind.
3P12	PROPOSITIO XII. *Mens, quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur, quæ Corporis agendi potentiam augent vel juvant.*	Proposition 12. *The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the body's power of acting.*
3P12D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quamdiu humanum Corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit, tamdiu Mens humana idem corpus ut præsens contemplabitur (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*), et consequenter (*per Prop.* 7 *p. II*), quamdiu Mens humana aliquod externum Corpus ut præsens contemplatur, hoc est (*per ejusdem Prop.* 17 *Schol.*) imaginatur, tamdiu humanum Corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam ejusdem corporis externi involvit; atque adeo, quamdiu Mens ea imaginatur, quæ Corporis nostri agendi potentiam augent vel juvant, tamdiu Corpus affectum est modis, qui ejusdem agendi potentiam augent vel juvant (*vid. Post.* 1 *hujus*); et consequenter (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*) tamdiu Mentis cogitandi potentia augetur vel juvatur; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 6 *vel* 9 *hujus*) Mens, quantum potest, eadem imaginari conatur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. As long as the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will regard that body as present (by Proposition 17 of Part 2); and consequently (by Proposition 7 of Part 2), as long as the human mind regards some external body as present—that is (by the Scholium to the same Proposition 17), imagines it—the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of that external body. And so, as long as the mind imagines things that increase or aid our body's power of acting, the body is affected in ways that increase or aid its power of acting (see Postulate 1 of this part); and consequently (by Proposition 11 of this part), for that long the mind's power of thinking is increased or aided. Hence (by Proposition 6 or 9 of this part) the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things. QED
3P13	PROPOSITIO XIII. *Cum Mens ea imaginatur, quæ Corporis agendi potentiam minuunt vel coercent, conatur, quantum potest, rerum recordari, quæ horum existentiam secludunt.*	Proposition 13. *When the mind imagines things that diminish or restrain the body's power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recall things that exclude their existence.*
3P13D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quamdiu Mens quicquam tale imaginatur, tamdiu Mentis et Corporis potentia minuitur vel coercetur (*ut in præced. Prop. demonstravimus*); et nihilominus id tamdiu imaginabitur, donec Mens aliud imaginetur, quod hujus præsentem existentiam secludat (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*); hoc est (ut modo ostendimus), Mentis et Corporis potentia tamdiu minuitur vel coercetur, donec Mens aliud imaginetur, quod hujus existentiam secludit quodque adeo Mens (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*), quantum potest, imaginari vel recordari conabitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. As long as the mind imagines anything of this kind, the power of both mind and body is diminished or restrained (as we demonstrated in the preceding Proposition). Nevertheless the mind will go on imagining it until it imagines something else that excludes its present existence (by Proposition 17 of Part 2). That is (as we have just shown), the power of mind and body is diminished or restrained until the mind imagines something else that excludes the existence of this thing—something which the mind (by Proposition 9 of this part) will therefore strive, as far as it can, to imagine or recall. QED

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P13C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod Mens ea imaginari aversatur, quæ ipsius et Corporis potentiam minuunt vel coercent.	Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is averse to imagining things that diminish or restrain its own power and the body's.
3P13S	SCHOLIUM. Ex his clare intelligimus, quid Amor, quidque Odium sit. Nempe *Amor* nihil aliud *est*, quam *Lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ; et* Odium *nihil aliud, quam* Tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ. *Videmus deinde, quod ille, qui amat, necessario conatur rem, quam amat, præsentem habere et conservare; et contra, qui odit, rem, quam odio habet, amovere et destruere conatur. Sed de his omnibus in seqq. prolixius.*	Scholium. From this we understand clearly what love and hatred are. *Love* is nothing but *joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause*, and *hatred* nothing but *sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause*. We see, further, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and to preserve the thing he loves; and, on the other hand, one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But of all this more fully in what follows.

HOW AFFECTS BECOME LINKED

By association and resemblance, anything can accidentally cause joy, sadness, love or hatred.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P14	PROPOSITIO XIV. *Si Mens duobus affectibus simul affecta semel fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero.*	Proposition 14. *If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is later affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.*
3P14D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si Corpus humanum a duobus corporibus simul affectum semel fuit, ubi Mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginatur, statim et alterius recordabitur (*per Prop.* 18 *p. II*). At Mentis imaginationes magis nostri Corporis affectus quam corporum externorum naturam indicant (*per Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 16 *p. II*): ergo si Corpus, et consequenter Mens (*vid. Defin.* 3 *hujus*), duobus affectibus semel affecta fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at the same time, then when the mind later imagines one of them, it will immediately recall the other as well (by Proposition 18 of Part 2). But the mind's imaginings indicate the affects of our body more than the nature of external bodies (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2). Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (see Definition 3 of this part), has once been affected by two affects, then when it is later affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other. QED
3P15	PROPOSITIO XV. *Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens causa Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, vel Cupiditatis.*	Proposition 15. *Anything whatever can be, accidentally, the cause of joy, sadness, or desire.*
3P15D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ponatur Mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet, qui ejus agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit, et altero, qui eandem vel auget vel minuit (*vide Post.* 1 *hujus*). Ex præcedenti Propositione patet, quod ubi Mens postea illo a sua vera causa, quæ (*per hypothesin*) per se ejus cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero, qui ipsius cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) Lætitia vel Tristitia afficietur; atque adeo illa res non per se, sed per accidens causa erit Lætitiæ vel	Demonstration. Suppose the mind is affected by two affects at the same time: one that neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, and another that either increases or diminishes it (see Postulate 1 of this part). From the preceding Proposition it is evident that when the mind is later affected by the first through its true cause—which (by hypothesis) of itself neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking—it will immediately be affected also by the second, which does increase or diminish its power of thinking;

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Tristitiæ. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest, rem illam posse per accidens causam esse Cupiditatis. *Q.E.D.*	that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), it will be affected by joy or sadness. And so that thing will be the cause of joy or sadness not through itself but accidentally. In this same way it can easily be shown that the thing can be, accidentally, the cause of desire. QED
3P15C	COROLLARIUM. Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam affectu Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ, cujus ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus.	Corollary. Merely from having regarded a thing with an affect of joy or sadness of which it is not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it.
3P15CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam ex hoc solo fit (*per Prop.* 14 *hujus*), ut Mens hanc rem postea imaginando, affectu Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ afficiatur, hoc est(*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), ut Mentis et Corporis potentia augeatur vel minuatur, etc. Et consequenter (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*), ut Mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel (*per Coroll.* 13 *hujus*) aversetur; hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), ut eandem amet vel odio habeat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For from this alone it comes about (by Proposition 14 of this part) that the mind, when it later imagines this thing, is affected by an affect of joy or sadness—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), that the power of mind and body is increased or diminished, etc. And consequently (by Proposition 12 of this part) it comes about that the mind desires to imagine the thing, or (by the Corollary to Proposition 13 of this part) is averse to it; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), that it loves or hates it. QED
3P15S	SCHOLIUM. Hinc intelligimus, qui fieri potest, ut quædam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita; sed tantum ex Sympathia (ut ajunt) et Antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea objecta, quæ nos Lætitia vel Tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo, quod aliquid simile habent objectis, quæ nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent, ut in seq. Prop. ostendam. Scio equidem Auctores, qui primi hæc nomina Sympathiæ et Antipathiæ introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates; sed nihilominus credo nobis licere, per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.	Scholium. From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate some things without any cause known to us, but only from sympathy (as they say) and antipathy. To this we must also refer those objects that affect us with joy or sadness merely because they have something similar to objects that usually affect us with those same affects, as I shall show in the next Proposition. I know, of course, that the authors who first introduced these names "sympathy" and "antipathy" meant them to signify certain occult qualities of things; but nonetheless I believe we may also understand by them qualities that are known, or manifest.
3P16	PROPOSITIO XVI. *Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile objecto, quod Mentem Lætitia vel Tristitia afficere solet; quamvis id, in quo res objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa; eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus.*	Proposition 16. *Merely from imagining that a thing has something similar to an object that usually affects the mind with joy or sadness, we shall love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.*
3P16D	DEMONSTRATIO. Id, quod simile est objecto in ipso objecto (*per hypothesin*) cum affectu Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ contemplati sumus; atque adeo (*per Prop.* 14 *hujus*), cum Mens ejus imagine afficietur, statim etiam hoc vel illo afficietur affectu, et consequenter res, quam hoc idem habere percipimus, erit (*per Prop.* 15 *hujus*) per accidens Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ causa; adeoque (*per præced. Coroll.*),	Demonstration. That which is similar to the object we have (by hypothesis) regarded in the object itself with an affect of joy or sadness. And so (by Proposition 14 of this part), when the mind is affected by its image, it will immediately also be affected by the one affect or the other; and con-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quamvis id, in quo objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum causa efficiens, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus. *Q.E.D.*	sequently the thing that we perceive to have this same feature will be (by Proposition 15 of this part) accidentally a cause of joy or sadness. And so (by the preceding Corollary), even though that in which it is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we shall still love it or hate it. QED
3P17	PROPOSITIO XVII. *Si rem, quæ nos Tristitiæ affectu afficere solet, aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri, quæ nos æque magno Lætitiæ affectu solet afficere, eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus.*	Proposition 17. *If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of sadness has something similar to another thing which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.*
3P17D	DEMONSTRATIO. Est enim (*per hypothesin*) hæc res per se Tristitiæ causa, et (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), quatenus eandem hoc affectu imaginamur, eandem odio habemus: et quatenus præterea aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri, quæ nos æque magno Lætitiæ affectu afficere solet, æque magno Lætitiæ conamine amabimus (*per Prop. præc.*); atque adeo eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For (by hypothesis) this thing is through itself a cause of sadness, and (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) insofar as we imagine it with this affect, we hate it. And insofar as we imagine, besides, that it has something similar to another thing that usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall love it with an equally great striving of joy (by the preceding Proposition). And so we shall hate it and at the same time love it. QED
3P17S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc *Mentis constitutio, quæ scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur, Animi* vocatur *Fluctuatio*, quæ proinde affectum respicit, ut dubitatio imaginationem (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 44 *p. II*); nec Animi Fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt, nisi secundum majus et minus. Sed notandum, me in Propositione præcedenti has animi fluctuationes ex causis deduxisse, quæ per se unius, et per accidens alterius affectus sunt causa; quod ideo feci, quia sic facilius ex præcedentibus deduci poterant; at non quod negem, animi fluctuationes plerumque oriri ab objecto, quod utriusque affectus sit efficiens causa. Nam Corpus humanum (*per Post.* 1 *p. II*) ex plurimis diversæ naturæ individuis componitur, atque adeo (*per Ax.* 1 *post Lem.* 3 *quod vide post Prop.* 13 p.	Scholium. This *constitution of the mind, which arises from two contrary affects,* is called *vacillation of mind*. It stands to affect as doubt stands to imagination (see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2); and vacillation of mind and doubt differ from each other only in degree. But it should be noted that in the preceding Proposition I deduced these vacillations of mind from causes that are the cause of one affect through themselves and of the other accidentally. I did this because in that way they could more easily be deduced from what went before—not because I deny that vacillations of mind usually arise from an object that is the efficient cause of both affects. For the human body (by Postulate 1 of Part 2) is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, and so
	II) ab uno eodemque corpore plurimis diversisque modis potest affici; et contra, quia una eademque res multis modis potest affici, multis ergo etiam diversisque modis unam eandemque Corporis partem afficere poterit. Ex quibus facile concipere possumus, unum idemque objectum posse esse causam multorum contrariorumque affectuum.	(by Axiom 1 after Lemma 3, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2) it can be affected in a great many different ways by one and the same body. And conversely, since one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many different ways. From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many contrary affects.

HOPE, FEAR AND THEIR KIN

Images of past and future things affect us as present ones do, producing hope, fear, confidence and despair.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P18	PROPOSITIO XVIII. *Homo ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ affectu afficitur, ac ex imagine rei præsentis.*	Proposition 18. *A person is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy and sadness as by the image of a present thing.*
3P18D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quamdiu homo rei alicujus imagine affectus est, rem ut præsentem, tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II cum ejusdem Coroll.*), nec ipsam ut præteritam aut futuram imaginatur nisi quatenus ejus imago juncta est imagini temporis præteriti aut futuri (*vide Schol. Prop.* 44 *p. II*). Quare rei imago, in se sola considerata, eadem est, sive ad tempus futurum vel præteritum, sive ad præsens referatur; hoc est (*per Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 16 *p. II*), Corporis constitutio seu affectus idem est, sive imago sit rei præteritæ vel futuræ, sive præsentis; atque adeo affectus Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ idem est, sive imago sit rei præteritæ aut futuræ, sive præsentis. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. As long as a person is affected by the image of a thing, he will regard the thing as present even if it does not exist (by Proposition 17 of Part 2 with its Corollary); and he does not imagine it as past or future except insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2). So the image of a thing, considered in itself alone, is the same whether it is related to future or past time or to the present; that is (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2), the constitution, or affect, of the body is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. And so the affect of joy and sadness is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. QED
3P18S1	SCHOLIUM I. Rem eatenus præteritam aut futuram hic voco, quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur. Ex. gr. quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit, aut reficiet, nos læsit aut lædet, etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur, eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus; hoc est, Corpus nullo affectu afficitur, qui rei existentiam secludat, atque adeo (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*) Corpus ejusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur, ac si res ipsa præsens adesset. Verum enim vero, quia plerumque fit, ut ii, qui plura sunt experti, fluctuent, quamdiu rem ut futuram vel præteritam contemplantur, deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 44 p.	Scholium 1. I call a thing past or future here insofar as we have been or shall be affected by it: for example, insofar as we have seen it or shall see it, it has refreshed us or will refresh us, it has harmed us or will harm us, and so on. For insofar as we imagine it in this way, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no affect that excludes the thing's existence, and so (by Proposition 17 of Part 2) the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. But since it generally happens that those who have had much experience vacillate as long as they regard a thing as future or past, and very often doubt its outcome
	II); hinc fit, ut affectus, qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur, donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.	(see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2), the result is that the affects arising from such images of things are not very constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until people become more certain of the thing's outcome.
3P18S2	SCHOLIUM II. Ex modo dictis intelligimus, quid sit Spes, Metus, Securitas, Desperatio, Gaudium, et Conscientiæ morsus. *Spes* namque nihil aliud *est*, quam *inconstans Lætitia, orta ex imagine rei futuræ vel præteritæ, de cujus eventu dubitamus. Metus* contra *inconstans Tristitia, ex rei*	Scholium 2. From what has just been said we understand what hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness, and remorse are. *Hope* is nothing but *an inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt. Fear*, on the oth-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	dubiæ imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur ex Spe fit *Securitas* et ex Metu *Desperatio*; nempe *Lætitia, vel Tristitia, orta ex imagine rei, quam metuimus, vel speravimus*. *Gaudium* deinde *est Lætitia orta ex imagine rei præteritæ, de cujus eventu dubitavimus*. *Conscientiæ* denique *morsus est Tristitia, opposita Gaudio*.	er hand, is *an inconstant sadness, also arising from the image of a doubtful thing*. Further, if the doubt is removed from these affects, hope becomes *confidence* and fear becomes *despair*—namely, *joy or sadness arising from the image of a thing we feared or hoped for*. *Gladness*, next, *is joy arising from the image of a past thing whose outcome we doubted*. Finally, *remorse is sadness opposite to gladness*.[5]

SHARING THE FORTUNES OF WHAT WE LOVE AND HATE

We rejoice or grieve as the things we love or hate are helped or harmed, and love or hate their causes.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P19	PROPOSITIO XIX. *Qui id, quod amat, destrui imaginatur, contristabitur; si contra autem conservari, lætabitur.*	Proposition 19. *One who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will be saddened; if, on the other hand, he imagines that it is being preserved, he will rejoice.*
3P19D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens, quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur, quæ Corporis agendi potentiam augent vel juvant (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) ea quæ amat. At imaginatio ab iis juvatur, quæ rei existentiam ponunt, et contra coercetur iis, quæ rei existentiam secludunt (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*); ergo rerum imagines, quæ rei amatæ existentiam ponunt, Mentis conatum, quo rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) Lætitia Mentem afficiunt; et quæ contra rei amatæ existentiam secludunt, eundem Mentis conatum coercent, hoc est (*per idem Schol.*) Tristitia Mentem afficiunt. Qui itaque id, quod amat, destrui imaginatur, contristabitur, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the body's power of acting (by Proposition 12 of this part), that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), the things it loves. But the imagination is aided by whatever posits the existence of a thing, and, on the other hand, is restrained by whatever excludes a thing's existence (by Proposition 17 of Part 2). Therefore images of things that posit the existence of the loved thing aid the striving by which the mind strives to imagine the loved thing—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), they affect the mind with joy. And those that, on the contrary, exclude the existence of the loved thing restrain that same striving of the mind —that is (by the same Scholium), they affect the mind with sadness. So one who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will be saddened, etc. QED
3P20	PROPOSITIO XX. *Qui id, quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, lætabitur.*	Proposition 20. *One who imagines that what he hates is being destroyed will rejoice.*
3P20D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens (*per* 13 *Prop. hujus*) ea imaginari conatur, quæ rerum existentiam, quibus Corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur, secludunt; hoc est (*per Schol. ejusdem Prop.*) ea imaginari conatur, quæ rerum, quas odio habet, existentiam secludunt; atque adeo rei imago, quæ existentiam ejus, quod Mens odio habet, secludit, hunc Mentis conatum juvat, hoc est (*per Schol.*	Demonstration. The mind (by Proposition 13 of this part) strives to imagine things that exclude the existence of the things by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained; that is (by the Scholium to the same Proposition), it strives to imagine things that exclude the existence of the things it hates. And so the image of a

5 "Remorse" renders *conscientiae morsus*, literally "the sting (or bite) of conscience."

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Prop. 11 *hujus*) Mentem Lætitia afficit. Qui itaque id, quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, lætabitur. *Q.E.D.*	thing that excludes the existence of what the mind hates aids this striving of the mind—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), it affects the mind with joy. So one who imagines that what he hates is being destroyed will rejoice. QED
3P21	PROPOSITIO XXI. *Qui id, quod amat, Lætitia vel Tristitia affectum imaginatur, Lætitia etiam vel Tristitia afficietur; et uterque hic affectus major aut minor erit in amante, prout uterque major aut minor est in re amata.*	Proposition 21. *One who imagines what he loves to be affected with joy or sadness will also be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or lesser in the lover as it is greater or lesser in the thing loved.*
3P21D	DEMONSTRATIO. Rerum imagines (*ut in Prop.* 19 *hujus demonstravimus*), quæ rei amatæ existentiam ponunt, Mentis conatum, quo ipsam rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant. Sed Lætitia existentiam rei lætæ ponit, et eo magis, quo Lætitiæ affectus major est: est enim (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) transitio ad majorem perfectionem: ergo imago Lætitiæ rei amatæ in amante ipsius Mentis conatum juvat, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) amantem Lætitia afficit, et eo majori, quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Quod erat primum. Deinde quatenus res aliqua Tristitia (afficitur, eatenus destruitur, et eo magis, quo majori afficitur Tristitia per idem Schol.	Demonstration. Images of things that posit the existence of the loved thing aid the striving by which the mind strives to imagine the loved thing itself (as we demonstrated in Proposition 19 of this part). But joy posits the existence of the joyful thing, and does so the more, the greater the affect of joy is; for it is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) a transition to a greater perfection. Therefore the image, in the lover, of the loved thing's joy aids the striving of his mind—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), it affects the lover with joy, and with a greater joy the greater this affect was in the loved thing. This was the first point. Next, insofar as a thing is affected with sadness, to that extent it is destroyed, and the more so the greater the sadness with which it is affected
	Prop. *11* hujus*); adeoque (*per Prop. *19* hujus*) qui id quod amat, Tristitia affici imaginatur, Tristitia etiam afficietur, et eo majori, quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit.* Q.E.D.	(by the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). And so (by Proposition 19 of this part) one who imagines that what he loves is affected with sadness will also be affected with sadness, and with a greater sadness the greater this affect was in the loved thing. QED
3P22	PROPOSITIO XXII. *Si aliquem imaginamur Lætitia afficere rem, quam amamus, Amore erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur Tristitia eandem afficere contra Odio etiam contra ipsum afficiemur.*	Proposition 22. *If we imagine someone affecting with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love toward him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him affecting it with sadness, we shall also be affected with hatred toward him.*
3P22D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui rem, quam amamus, Lætitia vel Tristitia afficit, ille nos Lætitia vel Tristitia etiam afficit, si nimirum rem amatam Lætitia illa vel Tristitia affectam imaginamur (*per præced. Prop.*). At hæc Lætitia vel Tristitia in nobis supponitur dari concomitante idea causæ externæ; ergo (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), si aliquem imaginamur Lætitia vel Tristitia afficere rem, quam amamus, erga eundem Amore vel Odio afficiemur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whoever affects a thing we love with joy or sadness also affects us with joy or sadness—provided, that is, that we imagine the loved thing affected with that joy or sadness (by the preceding Proposition). But this joy or sadness is supposed to be in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Therefore (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), if we imagine someone affecting a thing we love with joy or sadness, we

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		shall be affected with love or hatred toward him. QED
3P22S	SCHOLIUM. Propositio 21 nobis explicat, quid sit *Commiseratio*, quam definire possumus, quod *sit Tristitia orta ex alterius damno*. Quo autem nomine appellanda sit Lætitia, quæ ex alterius bono oritur, nescio. Porro *Amorem erga illum, qui alteri bene fecit, Favorem*, et contra *Odium erga illum, qui alteri male fecit, Indignationem* appellabimus. Denique notandum, nos non tantum misereri rei, quam amavimus (*ut in Prop.* 21 *ostendimus*): Sed etiam ejus, quam antea nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, modo eam nobis similem judicemus (et infra ostendam); Atque adeo ei etiam favere, qui simili bene fecit, et contra in eum indignari, qui simili damnum intulit.	Scholium. Proposition 21 explains to us what *pity* is, which we can define as *sadness arising from another's harm*. But by what name we should call the joy that arises from another's good, I do not know. Further, *love toward someone who has done good to another* we shall call *approval*; and, on the other hand, *hatred toward someone who has done harm to another* we shall call *indignation*. Finally, it should be noted that we pity not only a thing we have loved (as we showed in Proposition 21) but also one toward which we previously had no affect, provided we judge it to be like ourselves (as I shall show below). And so we also approve of one who has done good to someone like us, and, on the other hand, are indignant at one who has harmed someone like us.
3P23	PROPOSITIO XXIII. *Qui id, quod odio habet, Tristitia affectum imaginatur, lætabitur; si contra idem Lætitia affectum esse imaginetur, contristabitur; et uterque hic affectus major aut minor erit, prout ejus contrarius major aut minor est in eo, quod odio habet.*	Proposition 23. *One who imagines what he hates to be affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened. And each of these affects will be greater or lesser as its contrary is greater or lesser in what he hates.*
3P23D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus res odiosa Tristitia afficitur, eatenus destruitur, et eo magis, quo majori Tristitia afficitur (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*). Qui igitur (*per Prop.* 20 *hujus*) rem, quam odio habet, Tristitia affici imaginatur, Lætitia contra afficietur; et eo majori, quo majori Tristitia rem odiosam affectam esse imaginatur; Quod erat primum. Deinde Lætitia existentiam rei lætæ ponit (*per idem Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), et eo magis, quo major Lætitia concipitur. Si quis eum, quem odio habet, Lætitia affectum imaginatur, hæc imaginatio (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*) ejusdem conatum coercebit; hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), is, qui odio habet, Tristitia afficietur, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Insofar as a hated thing is affected with sadness, to that extent it is destroyed, and the more so the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). So one who (by Proposition 20 of this part) imagines that the thing he hates is affected with sadness will, on the contrary, be affected with joy —and with a greater joy the greater the sadness with which he imagines the hated thing to be affected. This was the first point. Next, joy posits the existence of the joyful thing (by the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), and does so the more, the greater the joy is conceived to be. If someone imagines one whom he hates affected with joy, this imagining (by Proposition 13 of this part) will restrain his striving; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), the one who hates will be affected with sadness, etc. QED
3P23S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Lætitia vix solida et absque ullo animi conflictu esse potest. Nam (ut statim in Propositione 27 hujus ostendam) quatenus rem sibi similem Tristitiæ affectu affici imaginatur, eatenus contristari debet; et	Scholium. This joy can hardly be solid and free of all conflict of mind. For (as I shall show shortly, in Proposition 27 of this part) insofar as one imagines a thing like oneself affected with sadness, to that extent one must be saddened; and the reverse, if

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	contra, si eandem Lætitia affici imaginetur. Sed hic ad solum Odium attendimus.	one imagines it affected with joy. But here we are attending to hatred alone.
3P24	PROPOSITIO XXIV. *Si aliquem imaginamur Lætitia afficere rem, quam odio habemus, Odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur Tristitia eandem rem afficere, Amore erga ipsum afficiemur.*	Proposition 24. *If we imagine that someone affects with joy a thing we hate, we will be affected with hatred toward him as well. If, on the other hand, we imagine that he affects that same thing with sadness, we will be affected with love toward him.*
3P24D	DEMONSTRATIO. Demonstratur eodem modo hæc Propositio, ac Propositio 22 hujus, quam vide.	Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Proposition 22 of this part; see that Proposition.
3P24S	SCHOLIUM. Hi et similes Odii affectus ad *Invidiam* referuntur, quæ propterea nihil aliud est, quam ipsum *Odium, quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere, ut malo alterius gaudeat, et contra ut ejusdem bono contristetur*.	Scholium. These and similar affects of hatred are related to *envy*, which is therefore nothing but *hatred itself, insofar as it is considered to dispose a person so that he rejoices at another's misfortune and, on the other hand, is saddened by that person's good fortune*.
3P25	PROPOSITIO XXV. *Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur, quod nos, vel rem amatam, Lætitia afficere imaginamur; et contra id omne negare, quod nos, vel rem amatam, Tristitia afficere imaginamur.*	Proposition 25. *We strive to affirm, of ourselves and of a thing we love, everything that we imagine affects us, or the loved thing, with joy; and, on the other hand, to deny everything that we imagine affects us, or the loved thing, with sadness.*
3P25D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quod rem amatam Lætitia vel Tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos Lætitia vel Tristitia afficit (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*). At Mens (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*) ea, quæ nos Lætitia afficiunt, quantum potest conatur imaginari, hoc est (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II et ejus Coroll.*) ut præsentia contemplari; et contra (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*), quæ nos Tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere; ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur, quod nos, vel rem amatam, Lætitia afficere imaginamur, et contra. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whatever we imagine affects a loved thing with joy or sadness affects us with joy or sadness (by Proposition 21 of this part). But the mind (by Proposition 12 of this part) strives, as far as it can, to imagine the things that affect us with joy—that is (by Proposition 17 of Part 2 and its Corollary), to regard them as present—and, on the other hand (by Proposition 13 of this part), to exclude the existence of the things that affect us with sadness. Therefore we strive to affirm, of ourselves and of a thing we love, everything that we imagine affects us, or the loved thing, with joy; and conversely. QED
3P26	PROPOSITIO XXVI. *Id omne de re, quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur, quod ipsam Tristitia afficere imaginamur, et id contra negare quod ipsam Lætitia afficere imaginamur.*	Proposition 26. *We strive to affirm, of a thing we hate, everything that we imagine affects it with sadness, and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine affects it with joy.*
3P26D	DEMONSTRATIO. Sequitur hæc Propositio ex Propositione 23, ut præcedens ex Propositione 21 hujus.	Demonstration. This Proposition follows from Proposition 23, as the preceding one follows from Proposition 21 of this part.
3P26S	SCHOLIUM. His videmus, facile contingere, ut homo de se deque re amata plus justo, et contra de re, quam odit, minus justo sentiat; quæ quidem imaginatio, quando ipsum hominem respicit, qui de se plus justo sentit,	Scholium. From these we see that it easily happens that a person thinks more highly than is just of himself and of a thing he loves, and, on the oth-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Superbia vocatur, et species Delirii est, quia homo oculis apertis somniat, se omnia illa posse, quæ sola imaginatione assequitur, quæque propterea veluti realia contemplatur, iisque exultat, quamdiu ea imaginari non potest, quæ horum existentiam secludunt, et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. *Est* igitur *Superbia Lætitia ex eo orta, quod homo de se plus justo sentit*. Deinde *Lætitia, quæ ex eo oritur, quod homo de alio plus justo sentit, Existimatio* vocatur; et illa denique *Despectus, quæ ex eo oritur, quod de alio minus justo sentit*.	er hand, less highly than is just of a thing he hates. When this imagining concerns the person himself who thinks more highly of himself than is just, it is called *pride*. It is a species of madness, because the person dreams with his eyes open that he can do all the things he attains by imagination alone; he therefore regards them as real and exults in them, as long as he cannot imagine the things that exclude their existence and limit his own power of acting. *Pride*, then, *is joy born of the fact that a person thinks more highly of himself than is just*. Next, *the joy that arises from a person's thinking more highly of another than is just* is called *overestimation*; and finally, *the joy that arises from thinking less highly of another than is just* is called *scorn*.

THE IMITATION OF THE AFFECTS

We feel what we imagine others like us feel, which breeds pity, ambition, glory and envy.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P27	PROPOSITIO XXVII. *Ex eo, quod rem nobis similem, et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.*	Proposition 27. *If we imagine that a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, is affected with some affect, we are by that very fact affected with a similar affect.*
3P27D	DEMONSTRATIO. Rerum imagines sunt Corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideæ corpora externa veluti nobis præsentia repræsentant (*per Schol. Prop.* 17 *p. II*); hoc est (*per Prop.* 16 *p. II*) quarum ideæ naturam nostri Corporis, et simul præsentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturæ nostri Corporis, tum idea corporis externi, quod imaginamur, affectionem nostri Corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi; et consequenter si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, hæc imaginatio affectionem nostri Corporis huic affectui similem exprimet; adeoque ex hoc, quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (*per Prop.* 23 *hujus*) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The images of things are affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us (by the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2); that is (by Proposition 16 of Part 2), affections whose ideas involve the nature of our body and, at the same time, the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, the nature of the external body is like the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body we imagine will involve an affection of our body like the affection of the external body. Consequently, if we imagine someone like us affected with some affect, this imagining will express an affection of our body like that affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to be affected with some affect, we are affected with an affect like its own. But if we hate a thing like us, then to that extent (by Proposition 23 of this part) we will be affected with an affect contrary to its own, not a similar one. QED
3P27S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc affectuum imitatio, quando ad Tristitiam refertur, vocatur *Commiseratio* (*de qua vide Schol. Prop.* 22 *hujus*); sed ad Cupiditatem relata *Æmulatio*, quæ proinde nihil aliud *est*, quam *alicujus rei Cupiditas, quæ in*	Scholium. This imitation of affects, when it concerns sadness, is called *pity* (on which see the Scholium to Proposition 22 of this part); but when it concerns desire it is called *emulation*, which

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios nobis similes eandem Cupiditatem habere imaginamur.	therefore *is* nothing but *the desire for a thing that is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same desire.*
3P27C1	COROLLARIUM I. Si aliquem, quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur Lætitia afficere rem nobis similem, Amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem Tristitia afficere, contra Odio erga ipsum afficiemur.	Corollary 1. If we imagine that someone toward whom we have had no affect affects a thing like us with joy, we will be affected with love toward him. If, on the other hand, we imagine that he affects it with sadness, we will be affected with hatred toward him.
3P27C1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hoc eodem modo ex Propositione præcedenti demonstratur, ac Propositio 22 hujus ex Propositione 21.	Demonstration. This is demonstrated from the preceding Proposition in the same way as Proposition 22 of this part is demonstrated from Proposition 21.
3P27C2	COROLLARIUM II. Rem cujus nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo, quod ipsius miseria nos Tristitia afficit.	Corollary 2. We cannot hate a thing we pity on account of the fact that its misery affects us with sadness.
3P27C2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (*per Prop.* 23 *hujus*) ex ipsius Tristitia lætaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.	Demonstration. For if we could hate it on that account, then (by Proposition 23 of this part) we would rejoice at its sadness, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
3P27C3	COROLLARIUM III. Rem, cujus nos miseret, a miseria quantum possumus liberare conabimur.	Corollary 3. We will strive, as far as we can, to free a thing we pity from its misery.
3P27C3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Id, quod rem, cujus nos miseret, Tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam Tristitia afficit (*per Prop. præced.*); adeoque omne id, quod ejus rei existentiam tollit, sive quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (*per Prop.* 13 *hujus*) hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 9 *hujus*), id destruere appetemus, sive ad id destruendum determinabimur; atque adeo rem, cujus miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whatever affects a thing we pity with sadness affects us too with a similar sadness (by the preceding Proposition). And so we will strive to think up whatever takes away that cause's existence, or destroys it (by Proposition 13 of this part); that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part), we will have an appetite to destroy it, or will be determined to destroy it. And so we will strive to free the thing we pity from its misery. QED
3P27C3S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi, qui ex eo oritur, quod rei, in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, *Benevolentia* vocatur quæ proinde nihil aliud *est*, quam *Cupiditas ex commiseratione orta*. Cæterum de Amore et Odio erga illum, qui rei, quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide Schol. Prop. 22 hujus.	Scholium. This will, or appetite, to do good, which arises from our pitying the thing on which we want to confer a benefit, is called *benevolence*, which therefore *is* nothing but *desire arising from pity*. As for love and hatred toward someone who has done good or harm to a thing we imagine to be like us, see the Scholium to Proposition 22 of this part.
3P28	PROPOSITIO XXVIII. *Id omne, quod ad Lætitiam conducere imaginamur, conamur promovere ut fiat; quod vero eidem repugnare, sive ad Tristitiam conducere imaginamur amovere vel destruere conamur.*	Proposition 28. *We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy; but whatever we imagine is opposed to it, or leads to sadness, we strive to remove or destroy.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P28D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quod ad Lætitiam conducere imaginamur, quantum possumus, imaginari conamur (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*); hoc est (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*), id quantum possumus conabimur ut præsens sive ut actu existens contemplari. Sed Mentis conatus seu potentia in cogitando æqualis, et simul, natura est cum Corporis conatu seu potentia in agendo (*ut clare sequitur ex Coroll. Prop.* 7 *et Coroll. Prop.* 11 *p. II*): ergo, ut id existat, absolute conamur, sive (*quod per Schol. Prop.* 9 *hujus idem est*) appetimus et intendimus; Quod erat primum. Deinde si id, quod Tristitiæ causam esse credimus, hoc est (per Schol.	Demonstration. Whatever we imagine leads to joy we strive, as far as we can, to imagine (by Proposition 12 of this part); that is (by Proposition 17 of Part 2), we will strive, as far as we can, to regard it as present, or as actually existing. But the mind's striving, or power, in thinking is equal to and by nature simultaneous with the body's striving, or power, in acting (as clearly follows from the Corollary to Proposition 7 and the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2). Therefore we strive without qualification for it to exist; that is (which, by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part, is the same thing), we have an appetite for it and aim at it. That was the first point. Next, if we imagine that what we believe to be the cause of sadness—that is
	Prop. *13* hujus*), si id, quod odio habemus, destrui imaginamur, lætabimur (*per Prop. *20* hujus*); adeoque idem (*per primam hujus partem*) conabimur destruere, sive (*per Prop. *13* hujus*) a nobis amovere, ne ipsum ut præsens contemplemur; Quod erat secundum. Ergo id omne, quod ad Lætitiam, etc.* Q.E.D.	(by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), what we hate—is destroyed, we will rejoice (by Proposition 20 of this part). And so (by the first part of this demonstration) we will strive to destroy it, or (by Proposition 13 of this part) to remove it from us, so as not to regard it as present. That was the second point. Therefore whatever we imagine leads to joy, etc. QED
3P29	PROPOSITIO XXIX. *Nos id omne etiam agere conabimur, quod homines cum Lætitia aspicere imaginamur, et contra id agere aversabimur, quod homines* aversari imaginamur.*	Proposition 29. *We will also strive to do whatever we imagine people look upon with joy, and, on the other hand, we will be averse to doing what we imagine people* are averse to.*
6		
3P29D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex eo, quod imaginamur homines aliquid amare vel odio habere, nos idem amabimus vel odio habebimus (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*); hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), eo ipso ejus rei præsentia lætabimur vel contristabimur; adeoque (*per præc. Prop.*) id omne, quod homines amare sive cum Lætitia aspicere imaginamur, conabimur agere, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. From the fact that we imagine people to love or hate something, we will love or hate the same thing (by Proposition 27 of this part); that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), we will by that very fact rejoice or be saddened at that thing's presence. And so (by the preceding Proposition) we will strive to do whatever we imagine people love, or look upon with joy, etc. QED
3P29S	SCHOLIUM. Hic conatus aliquid agendi, et etiam omittendi, ea sola de causa, ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur *Ambitio*, præsertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur, ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quædam agamus vel omittamus; alias *Humanitas* appellari solet. Deinde Lætitiam, qua alterius actionem, qua nos	Scholium. This striving to do something, and also to refrain from doing something, solely in order to please people, is called *ambition*, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the crowd that we do or omit certain things to our own harm or another's; otherwise it is usually called *courtesy*. Next,

* N. B. Intellige hic et in sqq. homines quos nullo affectu prosecuti sumus.

* N.B. Here and in what follows, understand by "people" those toward whom we have had no affect.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	conatus est delectari, imaginamur, *Laudem* voco; Tristitiam vero, qua contra ejusdem actionem aversamur, *Vituperium* voco.	the joy with which we imagine another's action by which he has striven to please us I call *praise*; and the sadness with which, on the contrary, we are averse to his action I call *blame*.
3P30	PROPOSITIO XXX. *Si quis aliquid egit, quod reliquos Lætitia afficere imaginatur, is Lætitia, concomitante idea sui tanquam causa, afficietur; sive se ipsum cum Lætitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit, quod reliquos Tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum Tristitia contra contemplabitur.*	Proposition 30. *If someone has done something that he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as its cause; that is, he will regard himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something that he imagines affects others with sadness, he will regard himself with sadness.*
3P30D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui se reliquos Lætitia vel Tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*) Lætitia vel Tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (*per Prop.* 19 *et* 23 *p. II*) sui sit conscius per affectiones, quibus ad agendum determinatur; ergo qui aliquid egit, quod ipse imaginatur reliquos Lætitia afficere, Lætitia cum conscientia sui tanquam causa afficietur, sive, seipsum cum Lætitia contemplabitur, et contra. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whoever imagines that he affects others with joy or sadness will by that very fact (by Proposition 27 of this part) be affected with joy or sadness. But since a person (by Propositions 19 and 23 of Part 2) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act, whoever has done something that he imagines affects others with joy will be affected with joy together with consciousness of himself as its cause; that is, he will regard himself with joy; and conversely. QED
3P30S	SCHOLIUM. Cum Amor (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) sit Lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ, et Odium Tristitia concomitante etiam idea causæ externæ; erit ergo hæc Lætitia et Tristitia Amoris et Odii species. Sed quia Amor et Odium ad objecta externa referuntur, ideo hos Affectus aliis nominibus significabimus; nempe Lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ *Gloriam*, et Tristitiam huic contrariam *Pudorem* appellabimus: Intellige, quando Lætitia vel Tristitia ex eo oritur, quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit; alias Lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ *Acquiescentiam in se ipso*, Tristitiam vero eidem contrariam *Pœnitentiam* vocabo. Deinde quia (*per Coroll.* 17 p.	Scholium. Since love (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is sadness accompanied likewise by the idea of an external cause, this joy and sadness will be species of love and hatred. But because love and hatred are related to external objects, we will signify these affects by other names. Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause we will call *glory*, and the sadness contrary to it *shame*—understand: when the joy or sadness arises from a person's believing that he is praised or blamed. Otherwise, I will call joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause *self-contentment*, and the sadness contrary to it *repentance*. Next, since[7]
	II*) fieri potest, ut Lætitia, qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit, et (*per Prop. *25* hujus) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari, quod se Lætitia afficere imaginatur; facile ergo fieri potest, ut gloriosus superbus sit, et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur, quando omnibus molestus est.	(by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of Part 2) it can happen that the joy with which someone imagines he affects others is only imaginary, and (by Proposition 25 of this part) each person strives to imagine of himself everything that he imagines affects him with joy, it can easily happen that one who glories is proud, and imagines that he is pleasing to everyone when he is a nuisance to everyone.

7 "Self-contentment" renders *acquiescentia in se ipso*, literally "resting content in oneself"; often translated "self-esteem."

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P31	PROPOSITIO XXXI. *Si aliquem imaginamur amare, vel cupere, vel odio habere aliquid, quod ipsi amamus, cupimus, vel odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id, quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur, vel contra, tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.*	Proposition 31. *If we imagine that someone loves, desires, or hates something that we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we will by that very fact love it, etc., more steadfastly. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the reverse, then we will suffer vacillation of mind.*
3P31D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex eo solo, quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (*per Prop. 27 hujus*). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus; accedit ergo Amori nova causa, a qua fovetur; atque adeo id, quod amamus, hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo, quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (*per eandem Prop.*). At si supponamus, nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur, sive (*vid. Schol. Prop. 17 hujus*) animi fluctuationem patiemur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone loves something, we will by that very fact love it (by Proposition 27 of this part). But we are supposing that we love it already, apart from this. So a new cause is added to our love, by which it is fostered; and so by this very fact we will love what we love more steadfastly. Next, from the fact that we imagine someone is averse to something, we will be averse to it (by the same Proposition). But if we suppose that we love that very thing at the same time, then at the same time we will both love it and be averse to it; that is (see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part), we will suffer vacillation of mind. QED
3P31C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc et ex Prop. 28 hujus sequitur, unumquemque quantum potest conari, ut unusquisque id, quod ipse amat, amet, et quod ipse odit, odio etiam habeat; unde illud Poetæ: *Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; / Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.*	Corollary. From this and from Proposition 28 of this part it follows that each person strives, as far as he can, to bring it about that everyone loves what he himself loves, and hates what he himself hates. Hence the Poet's lines: *As lovers, let us hope alike and fear alike; / he is made of iron who loves what another allows.*[8]
3P31S	SCHOLIUM. Hic conatus efficiendi, ut unusquisque probet id, quod ipse amat vel odio habet, revera est Ambitio (*vid. Schol. 29 hujus*); atque adeo videmus unumquemque ex natura appetere, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant; quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento, et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.	Scholium. This striving to bring it about that everyone approves what one loves or hates is in truth ambition (see the Scholium to Proposition 29 of this part). And so we see that each person by nature has an appetite for the others to live according to his own temperament. Since all have this appetite equally, they equally get in one another's way; and since all want to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another.
3P32	PROPOSITIO XXXII. *Si aliquem re aliqua, qua unus solus potiri potest, gaudere imaginamur conabimur efficere, ne ille illa re potiatur.*	Proposition 32. *If we imagine that someone enjoys a thing that only one person can possess, we will strive to bring it about that he does not possess it.*
3P32D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex eo solo, quod aliquem re aliqua gaudere imaginamur (*per Prop. 27 hujus cum ejusdem 1 Coroll.*), rem illam amabimus eaque gaudere cupiemus. At (*per hypothesin*) huic Lætitiæ obstare imaginamur, quod	Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone enjoys a thing (by Proposition 27 of this part with its Corollary 1), we will love that thing and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine that his enjoying this same thing

8 Ovid, *Amores* 2.19, lines 5 and 4, quoted in reverse order.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	ille eadem hac re gaudeat ergo (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*), ne ille eadem potiatur, conabimur. *Q.E.D.*	stands in the way of this joy of ours. Therefore (by Proposition 28 of this part) we will strive that he should not possess it. QED
3P32S	SCHOLIUM. Videmus itaque, cum hominum natura plerumque ita comparatum esse, ut eorum, quibus male est, misereantur, et quibus bene est, invideant, et (*per Prop. præc.*) eo majore odio, quo rem, qua alium potiri imaginantur, magis amant. Videmus deinde, ex eadem naturæ humanæ proprietate, ex qua sequitur, homines esse misericordes, sequi etiam, eosdem esse invidos et ambitiosos. Denique, si ipsam experientiam consulere velimus, ipsam hæc omnia docere experiemur; præsertim si ad priores nostræ ætatis annos attenderimus.	Scholium. We see, then, that human nature is generally so constituted that people pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well, and (by the preceding Proposition) with a hatred the greater, the more they love the thing they imagine another possesses. We see next that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that people are compassionate, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious. Finally, if we are willing to consult experience itself, we will find that it teaches all these things, especially if we attend to the first years of our life.
	Nam pueros, quia eorum corpus continuo veluti in æquilibrio est, ex hoc solo ridere vel flere experimur, quod alios ridere vel flere vident; et quicquid præterea vident alios facere, id imitari statim cupiunt, et omnia denique sibi cupiunt quibus alios delectari imaginantur; nimirum quia rerum imagines, uti diximus, sunt ipsæ humani Corporis affectiones, sive modi, quibus Corpus humanum a causis externis afficitur disponiturque ad hoc vel illud agendum.	For we find that children, because their body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry merely because they see others laugh or cry. Whatever else they see others do, they immediately desire to imitate; and, in short, they desire for themselves everything in which they imagine others take pleasure. This is, of course, because the images of things, as we have said, are the very affections of the human body, or the ways in which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed to do this or that.

LOVE RETURNED, JEALOUSY AND LONGING

Lovers seek love in return; a rival breeds jealousy; missing circumstances bring longing.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P33	PROPOSITIO XXXIII. *Cum rem nobis similem amamus, conamur, quantum possumus, efficere, ut nos contra amet.*	Proposition 33. *When we love a thing like ourselves, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return.*
3P33D	DEMONSTRATIO. Rem, quam amamus præ reliquis, quantum possumus, imaginari conamur (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*). Si igitur res nobis sit similis, ipsam præ reliquis Lætitia afficere conabimur (*per Prop.* 29 *hujus*), sive conabimur, quantum possumus, efficere, ut res amata Lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), ut nos contra amet. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A thing we love we strive, as far as we can, to imagine in preference to others (by Proposition 12 of this part). If, therefore, the thing is like us, we will strive to affect it with joy in preference to others (by Proposition 29 of this part); that is, we will strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that the loved thing is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), that it loves us in return. QED
3P34	PROPOSITIO XXXIV. *Quo majori affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.*	Proposition 34. *The greater the affect with which we imagine a loved thing to be affected toward us, the more we will glory.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P34D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nos (*per Prop. præced.*) conamur, quantum possumus, ut res amata. nos contra amet; hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), ut res amata Lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam majori Lætitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus juvatur; hoc est (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus cum ejus Schol.*), eo majore Lætitia afficimur. At cum ex eo lætemur, quod alium nobis similem Lætitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum Lætitia contemplamur (*per Prop.* 30 *hujus*): ergo quo majori affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo majori Lætitia nosmet contemplabimur, sive (*per Schol. Prop.* 30 *hujus*) eo magis gloriabimur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. We strive (by the preceding Proposition), as far as we can, to bring it about that a loved thing loves us in return; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), that the loved thing is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us. So the greater the joy with which we imagine the loved thing is affected on our account, the more this striving is assisted; that is (by Proposition 11 of this part with its Scholium), the greater the joy with which we are affected. But when we rejoice because we have affected another like us with joy, we regard ourselves with joy (by Proposition 30 of this part). Therefore the greater the affect with which we imagine a loved thing to be affected toward us, the greater the joy with which we will regard ourselves; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part), the more we will glory. QED
3P35	PROPOSITIO XXXV. *Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo Amicitiæ, quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, Odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur, et illi alteri invidebit.*	Proposition 35. *If someone imagines that a loved thing is joining another to itself by the same bond of friendship by which he alone used to possess it, or by a closer one, he will be affected with hatred toward the loved thing itself and will envy that other person.*
3P35D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quo quis majore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (*per præced. Prop.*), hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 30 *hujus*) lætabitur; adeoque (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*) conabitur, quantum potest, imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam; qui quidem conatus sive appetitus fomentatur, si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (*per Prop.* 31 *hujus*). At hic conatus sive appetitus ab ipsius rei amatæ imagine concomitante imagine illius, quem res amata sibi jungit coerceri supponitur; ergo (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) eo ipso Tristitia afficietur, concomitante idea rei amatæ tanquam causa, et simul imagine alterius, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), odio erga rem amatam afficietur, et simul erga illum alterum (per Coroll.	Demonstration. The greater the love with which someone imagines a loved thing to be affected toward him, the more he will glory (by the preceding Proposition); that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part), the more he will rejoice. And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine the loved thing bound to him as closely as possible. This striving, or appetite, is encouraged if he imagines that another desires the same thing for himself (by Proposition 31 of this part). But this striving, or appetite, is supposed to be checked by the image of the loved thing itself, accompanied by the image of the one whom the loved thing is joining to itself. Therefore (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) he will by that very fact be affected with sadness, accompanied by the idea of the loved thing as its cause and at the same time by the image of the other; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), he will be affected with hatred toward the loved thing, and at the same time toward that other person
	Prop. *15* hujus*), cui propterea (*per Prop. *23* hujus*), quod re amata delectatur, invidebit.* Q.E.D.	(by the Corollary to Proposition 15 of this part), whom, because he takes delight in the loved thing,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		he will therefore envy (by Proposition 23 of this part). QED
3P35S	SCHOLIUM. Hoc Odium erga rem amatam Invidiæ junctum *Zelotypia* vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio orta ex Amore et Odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui invidetur. Præterea hoc Odium erga rem amatam majus erit pro ratione Lætitiæ, qua Zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatæ Amore solebat affici, et etiam pro ratione affectus, quo erga illum, quem sibi rem amatam jungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*) odio habebit, quia ipsam id, quod ipse odio habet, Lætitia afficere imaginatur; et etiam (*per Coroll. Prop.* 15 *hujus*) ex eo, quod rei amatæ imaginem imagini ejus, quem odit, jungere cogitur.	Scholium. This hatred toward a loved thing, joined with envy, is called *jealousy*, which is therefore nothing but a vacillation of mind arising from love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of another who is envied. Moreover, this hatred toward the loved thing will be greater in proportion to the joy with which the jealous person used to be affected by the loved thing's reciprocal love, and also in proportion to the affect with which he was affected toward the one he imagines the loved thing is joining to itself. For if he hated that person, he will by that very fact hate the loved thing (by Proposition 24 of this part), because he imagines that it affects with joy what he himself hates; and also (by the Corollary to Proposition 15 of this part) because he is compelled to join the image of the loved thing to the image of the one he hates.
	Quæ ratio plerumque locum habet in Amore erga fæminam; qui enim imaginatur mulierem, quam amat, alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo, quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur, sed etiam, quia rei amatæ imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius jungere cogitur, eandem aversatur; ad quod denique accedit, quod Zelotypus non eodem vultu, quem res amata ei præbere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut jam ostendam.	This reason generally applies in love toward a woman. For a man who imagines that the woman he loves is giving herself to another will be saddened not only because his own appetite is checked; he is also averse to her, because he is compelled to join the image of the loved thing to the private parts and excretions of the other. To this, finally, is added the fact that the jealous man is not received by her with the same countenance she used to show him—another reason the lover is saddened, as I shall now show.
3P36	PROPOSITIO XXXVI. *Qui rei, qua semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis, ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est.*	Proposition 36. *One who recollects a thing in which he once took delight desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it.*
3P36D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid homo simul cum re, quæ ipsum delectavit, vidit, id omne (*per Prop.* 15 *hujus*) erit per accidens Lætitiæ causa; adeoque (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*) omni eo simul cum re, quæ ipsum delectavit, potiri cupiet, sive re cum omnibus iisdem circumstantiis potiri cupiet, ac cum primo eadem delectatus est. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whatever a person has seen together with a thing that delighted him will (by Proposition 15 of this part) be accidentally a cause of joy. And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) he will desire to possess all of it together with the thing that delighted him; that is, he will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it. QED
3P36C	COROLLARIUM. Si itaque unam ex iis circumstantiis deficere compererit, amans contristabitur.	Corollary. So if the lover finds that one of those circumstances is missing, he will be saddened.
3P36CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam quatenus aliquam circumstantiam deficere comperit, eatenus aliquid imaginatur, quod ejus rei existentiam secludit. Cum autem ejus rei sive	Demonstration. For insofar as he finds some circumstance missing, he imagines something that excludes that thing's existence. But since, out of

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	circumstantiæ (*per Prop. præc.*) sit præ amore cupidus, ergo (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*), quatenus eandem deficere imaginatur, contristabitur. *Q.E.D.*	love, he desires that thing, or circumstance (by the preceding Proposition), then (by Proposition 19 of this part), insofar as he imagines it missing, he will be saddened. QED
3P36S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Tristitia, quatenus absentiam ejus, quod amamus, respicit, *Desiderium* vocatur.	Scholium. This sadness, insofar as it concerns the absence of what we love, is called *longing*.
3P37	PROPOSITIO XXXVII. *Cupiditas, quæ præ Tristitia vel Lætitia præque Odio vel Amore oritur, eo est major, quo affectus major est.*	Proposition 37. *The desire that arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is greater the greater the affect is.*
3P37D	DEMONSTRATIO. Tristitia hominis agendi potentiam (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) minuit vel coercet, hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*), conatum, quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, minuit vel coercet; adeoque (*per Prop.* 5 *hujus*) huic conatui est contraria; et quicquid homo Tristitia affectus conatur est Tristitiam amovere. At (*per Tristitiæ Defin.*) quo Tristitia major est, eo majori parti hominis agendi potentiæ necesse est opponi; ergo quo major Tristitia est, eo majore agendi potentia conabitur homo contra Tristitiam amovere; hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 9 *hujus*), eo majore cupiditate sive appetitu conabitur Tristitiam amovere. Deinde, quoniam Lætitia (per idem Schol.	Demonstration. Sadness diminishes or checks a person's power of acting (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part); that is (by Proposition 7 of this part), it diminishes or checks the striving by which a person strives to persevere in his being. And so (by Proposition 5 of this part) it is contrary to this striving, and whatever a person affected with sadness strives for is to remove the sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater the sadness, the greater the part of the person's power of acting to which it must be opposed. Therefore the greater the sadness, the greater the power of acting with which the person will strive, in turn, to remove it; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part), the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the sadness. Next, since joy
	Prop. *11* hujus*) hominis agendi potentiam auget vel juvat, facile eadem via demonstratur, quod homo, Lætitia affectus, nihil aliud cupit quam eandem conservare, idque eo majore Cupiditate, quo Lætitia major erit. Denique, quoniam Odium et Amor sunt ipsi Tristitiæ vel Lætitiæ affectus, sequitur eodem modo, quod conatus, appetitus, sive Cupiditas, quæ præ Odio vel Amore oritur, major erit pro ratione Odii et Amoris.* Q.E.D.	(by the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) increases or assists a person's power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that a person affected with joy desires nothing but to preserve it, and with a desire the greater, the greater the joy. Finally, since hatred and love are themselves affects of sadness or of joy, it follows in the same way that the striving, appetite, or desire that arises from hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the hatred and love. QED
3P38	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII. *Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit, ita ut Amor plane aboleatur, eandem majore odio, ex pari causa, prosequetur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset, et eo majori, quo Amor antea major fuerat.*	Proposition 38. *If someone has begun to hate a thing he loved, so that his love is completely destroyed, then, given an equal cause, he will hate it with a greater hatred than if he had never loved it—and the greater, the greater his love had been before.*
3P38D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam si quis rem, quam amat, odio habere incipit, plures ejus appetitus coercentur, quam si eandem non amavisset. Amor namque Lætitia est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) quam homo, quantum potest (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*), conservare conatur; idque (*per idem Schol.*)	Demonstration. For if someone begins to hate a thing he loves, more of his appetites are checked than if he had not loved it. For love is a joy (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) which a person strives, as far as he can, to preserve (by

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	rem amatam ut præsentem contemplando, eandemque (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*) Lætitia, quantum potest, afficiendo; qui quidem conatus (*per Prop. præc.*) eo est major quo amor major est, ut et conatus efficiendi, ut res amata ipsum contra amet (*vid. Prop.* 33 *hujus*). At hi conatus odio erga rem amatam coercentur (*per Coroll. Prop.* 13 *et per Prop.* 23 *hujus*); ergo amans (per Schol.	Proposition 28 of this part); and he does so (by the same Scholium) by regarding the loved thing as present and by affecting it with joy as far as he can (by Proposition 21 of this part). This striving (by the preceding Proposition) is the greater, the greater the love, as is the striving to bring it about that the loved thing loves him in return (see Proposition 33 of this part). But these strivings are checked by hatred toward the loved thing (by the Corollary to Proposition 13 and by Proposition 23 of this part). Therefore the lover
	Prop. *11* hujus*) hac etiam de causa Tristitia afficietur, et eo majori, quo Amor major fuerat; hoc est, præter Tristitiam, quæ Odii fuit causa, alia ex eo oritur, quod rem amavit, et consequenter majore Tristitiæ affectu rem amatam contemplabitur, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop. *13* hujus*) majori odio prosequetur, quam si eandem non amavisset, et eo majori, quo amor major fuerat.* Q.E.D.	(by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) will for this reason too be affected with sadness, and the greater, the greater his love had been. That is, besides the sadness that was the cause of the hatred, another arises from the fact that he loved the thing; and consequently he will regard the loved thing with a greater affect of sadness—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), he will hate it with a greater hatred than if he had not loved it, and the greater, the greater his love had been. QED

DOING HARM AND DOING GOOD

Hatred seeks to harm and love to benefit; good and evil are judged by what we desire.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P39	PROPOSITIO XXXIX. *Qui aliquem Odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur, nisi ex eo majus sibi malum oriri timeat: et contra, qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.*	Proposition 39. *One who hates someone will strive to do him evil, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from it; and, on the other hand, one who loves someone will strive, by the same law, to do him good.*
3P39D	DEMONSTRATIO. Aliquem odio habere est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) aliquem ut Tristitiæ causam imaginari; adeoque (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*) is, qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius, sive (quod idem est) majus malum sibi timeat, idque se vitare posse credit, non inferendo ei, quem odit, malum, quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (*per eandem Prop.* 28 *hujus*) abstinere cupiet; idque (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*) majore conatu, quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea prævalebit, ut volebamus. Secundæ partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit. Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. To hate someone is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) to imagine him as a cause of sadness. And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) one who hates someone will strive to remove or destroy him. But if he fears from this something sadder, or (what is the same thing) a greater evil to himself, and believes he can avoid it by not doing to the one he hates the evil he was planning, he will desire to refrain from doing evil (by the same Proposition 28 of this part). And he will do so (by Proposition 37 of this part) with a greater striving than the one that held him to doing evil, so that this striving will prevail, as we maintained. The demonstration of the second part proceeds in the same way. Therefore one who hates someone, etc. QED

LATIN	ENGLISH
3P39S SCHOLIUM. Per *bonum* hic intelligo omne genus Lætitiæ, et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit, et, præcipue id, quod desiderio, qualecunque illud sit, satisfacit. Per *malum* autem omne Tristitiæ genus, et præcipue id, quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (*in Schol. Prop.* 9 *hujus*) ostendimus, nos nihil cupere, quia id bonum esse judicamus, sed contra id bonum vocamus, quod cupimus; et consequenter id, quod aversamur, malum appellamus; quare unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat seu æstimat, quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid pejus, et quid denique optimum, quidve pessimum sit. Sic Avarus argenti copiam optimum, ejus autem inopiam pessimum judicat Ambitiosus autem nihil æque ac Gloriam cupit, et contra nihil æque ac Pudorem reformidat.	Scholium. By *good* I here understand every kind of joy, and further whatever leads to it—especially whatever satisfies a longing, of whatever kind it may be. By *evil* I understand every kind of sadness, and especially whatever frustrates a longing. For we showed above (in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part) that we do not desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we call good what we desire, and consequently we call evil what we are averse to. So each person judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good and what is evil, what is better and what worse, and finally what is best and what worst. Thus the greedy person judges an abundance of money to be best, and a lack of it worst. The ambitious person desires nothing so much as glory, and on the other hand dreads nothing so much as shame.
Invido deinde nihil jucundius quam alterius infelicitas, et nihil molestius quam aliena felicitas; ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse judicat. Cæterum hic affectus, quo homo ita disponitur, ut id, quod vult, nolit, vel ut id, quod non vult, velit, *Timor* vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est, quam *metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum, quod futurum judicat, minore vitandum* (*Vid. Prop.* 28 *hujus*). Sed si malum, quod timet, Pudor sit, tum Timor appellatur *Verecundia*. Denique si Cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur Timore alterius mali, ita ut quid potius velit, nesciat, tum Metus vocatur *Consternatio*, præcipue si utrumque malum, quod timetur, ex maximis sit.	Then again, to the envious person nothing is more pleasant than another's unhappiness, and nothing more distressing than another's happiness. And so each person judges a thing good or evil, useful or useless, from his own affect. Moreover, the affect by which a person is so disposed that he does not will what he wills, or wills what he does not will, is called *timidity*, which is therefore nothing but *fear insofar as a person is disposed by it to avoid an evil he judges to be coming by means of a lesser evil* (see Proposition 28 of this part). But if the evil he fears is shame, then timidity is called *modesty*. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is checked by timidity regarding another evil, so that he does not know which he would rather will, then the fear is called *consternation*, especially if both of the evils feared are among the greatest.
3P40 PROPOSITIO XL. *Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit.*	Proposition 40. *One who imagines that he is hated by someone, and does not believe he has given that person any cause for hatred, will hate him in return.*
3P40D DEMONSTRATIO. Qui aliquem odio affectum imaginatur, eo ipso etiam odio afficietur (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), Tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ. At ipse (*per hypothesin*) nullam hujus Tristitiæ causam imaginatur præter illum qui, ipsum odio habet; ergo ex hoc, quod se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, Tristitia afficietur concomitante idea ejus, qui ipsum odio habet, sive (*per idem Schol.*) eundem odio habebit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. One who imagines someone affected with hatred will by that very fact also be affected with hatred (by Proposition 27 of this part), that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But (by hypothesis) he imagines no cause of this sadness except the one who hates him. Therefore, from the fact that he imagines he is hated by someone, he will be affected with sad-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		ness accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him; that is (by the same Scholium), he will hate him. QED
3P40S	SCHOLIUM. Quod si se justam Odii causam præbuisse imaginatur, tum (*per Prop.* 30 *hujus et ejusdem Schol.*) Pudore afficietur. Sed hoc (*per Prop.* 25 *hujus*) raro contingit. Præterea hæc Odii reciprocatio oriri etiam potest ex eo, quod Odium sequatur conatus malum inferendi ei, qui odio habetur (*per Prop.* 39 *hujus*). Qui igitur se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, eundem alicujus mali sive Tristitiæ causam imaginabitur; atque adeo Tristitia afficietur, seu Metu, concomitante idea ejus, qui ipsum odio habet, tanquam causa, hoc est, odio contra afficietur, ut supra.	Scholium. But if he imagines that he has given just cause for the hatred, then (by Proposition 30 of this part and its Scholium) he will be affected with shame. But this (by Proposition 25 of this part) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred is followed by a striving to do evil to the one who is hated (by Proposition 39 of this part). So one who imagines that he is hated by someone will imagine that person as the cause of some evil, or sadness; and so he will be affected with sadness, or fear, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him as its cause—that is, he will be affected with hatred in return, as above.
3P40C1	COROLLARIUM I. Qui, quem amat, odio erga se affectum imaginatur, Odio et Amore simul conflictabitur. Nam quatenus imaginatur, ab eodem se odio haberi, determinatur (*per Prop. præced.*) ad eundem contra odio habendum. At (*per hypothesin*) ipsum nihilominus amat: ergo Odio et Amore simul conflictabitur.	Corollary 1. One who imagines that someone he loves is affected with hatred toward him will be torn by hatred and love at once. For insofar as he imagines that he is hated by that person, he is determined (by the preceding Proposition) to hate him in return. But (by hypothesis) he loves him nonetheless. Therefore he will be torn by hatred and love at once.
3P40C2	COROLLARIUM II. Si aliquis imaginatur, ab aliquo, quem antea nullo affectu prosecutus est, malum aliquod præ Odio sibi illatum esse, statim idem malum eidem referre conabitur.	Corollary 2. If someone imagines that some evil has been done to him out of hatred by a person toward whom he previously had no affect, he will immediately strive to return the same evil to that person.
3P40C2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui aliquem Odio erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eum contra (*per præced. Prop.*) odio habebit, et (*per Prop.* 26 *hujus*) id omne comminisci conabitur, quod eundem possit Tristitia afficere, atque id eidem (*per Prop.* 39 *hujus*) inferre studebit. At (*per hypothesin*) primum, quod hujusmodi imaginatur, est malum sibi illatum; ergo idem statim eidem inferre conabitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. One who imagines someone affected with hatred toward him will hate him in return (by the preceding Proposition), and (by Proposition 26 of this part) will strive to think up everything that can affect that person with sadness, and will be eager to inflict it on him (by Proposition 39 of this part). But (by hypothesis) the first thing of this kind that he imagines is the evil done to himself. Therefore he will immediately strive to inflict the same evil on that person. QED
3P40C2S	SCHOLIUM. Conatus malum inferendi ei, quem odimus, *Ira* vocatur; conatus autem malum nobis illatum referendi *Vindicta* appellatur.	Scholium. The striving to do evil to one we hate is called *anger*; the striving to return an evil done to us is called *vengeance*.
3P41	PROPOSITIO XLI. *Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur, nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit* (quod per Coroll. Prop. 15 et per Prop. 16 hujus fieri potest), *eundem contra amabit.*	Proposition 41. *If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe he has given any cause for this* (which can happen by the Corollary

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		to Proposition 15 and by Proposition 16 of this part), *he will love that person in return.*
3P41D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio eadem via demonstratur ac præcedens. Cujus etiam Scholium vide.	Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one. See also its Scholium.
3P41S	SCHOLIUM. Quod si se justam Amoris causam præbuisse crediderit, gloriabitur (*per Prop.* 30 *hujus cum ejusdem Schol.*); quod quidem (*per Prop.* 25 *hujus*) frequentius contingit, et cujus contrarium evenire diximus, quando aliquis ab aliquo se odio haberi imaginatur (*vide Schol. Prop. præced.*). Porro hic reciprocus Amor, et consequenter (*per Prop.* 39 *hujus*) conatus benefaciendi ei, qui nos amat, quique (*per eandem Prop.* 39 *hujus*) nobis benefacere conatur, *Gratia* seu *Gratitudo* vocatur; atque adeo apparet, homines longe paratiores esse ad Vindictam, quam ad referendum beneficium.	Scholium. But if he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will glory (by Proposition 30 of this part with its Scholium). This happens rather often (by Proposition 25 of this part), and we have said that its opposite occurs when someone imagines he is hated by someone (see the Scholium to the preceding Proposition). Further, this reciprocal love, and consequently (by Proposition 39 of this part) the striving to do good to one who loves us and who (by the same Proposition 39 of this part) strives to do good to us, is called *gratitude*, or *thankfulness*. And so it is evident that people are far readier for vengeance than for repaying a kindness.
3P41C	COROLLARIUM. Qui ab eo, quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, Odio et Amore simul conflictabitur. Quod eadem via, qua primum præcedentis Coroll., demonstratur.	Corollary. One who imagines that he is loved by someone he hates will be torn by hatred and love at once. This is demonstrated in the same way as the first Corollary of the preceding Proposition.
3P41CS	SCHOLIUM. Quod si Odium prævaluerit, ei, a quo amatur, malum inferre conabitur; qui quidem affectus *Crudelitas* appellatur, præcipue si illum, qui amat, nullam Odii communem causam præbuisse creditur.	Scholium. But if hatred prevails, he will strive to do evil to the one by whom he is loved. This affect is called *cruelty*, especially if the one who loves is believed to have given none of the usual causes for hatred.
3P42	PROPOSITIO XLII. *Qui in aliquem, Amore aut spe Gloriæ motus, beneficium contulit, contristabitur, si viderit, beneficium ingrato animo accipi.*	Proposition 42. *One who has conferred a benefit on someone, moved by love or by hope of glory, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received ungratefully.*
3P42D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui rem aliquam sibi similem amat, conatur, quantum potest, efficere, ut ab ipsa contra ametur (*per Prop.* 33 *hujus*). Qui igitur præ amore in aliquem beneficium contulit, id facit desiderio, quo tenetur, ut contra ametur, hoc est (*per Prop.* 34 *hujus*) spe Gloriæ sive (*per Schol. Prop.* 30 *hujus*) Lætitiæ; adeoque (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*) hanc Gloriæ causam, quantum potest, imaginari, sive ut actu existentem contemplari conabitur. At (*per hypothesin*) aliud imaginatur, quod ejusdem causæ existentiam secludit: ergo (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*) eo ipso contristabitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. One who loves a thing like himself strives, as far as he can, to bring it about that he is loved by it in return (by Proposition 33 of this part). So one who has conferred a benefit on someone out of love does so from the longing that possesses him to be loved in return—that is (by Proposition 34 of this part), from hope of glory, or (by the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part) of joy. And so (by Proposition 12 of this part) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine this cause of glory, or to regard it as actually existing. But (by hypothesis) he imagines something else that excludes that cause's existence. Therefore (by Pro-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		position 19 of this part) he will by that very fact be saddened. QED

HATRED CONQUERED BY LOVE

Returned hatred grows, but hatred wholly overcome by love turns into a greater love.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P43	PROPOSITIO XLIII. *Odium reciproco odio augetur, et Amore contra deleri potest.*	Proposition 43. *Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love.*
3P43D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui eum, quem odit, Odio contra erga se affectum esse imaginatur eo ipso (*per Prop.* 40 *hujus*) novum Odium oritur, durante (*per hypothesin*) adhuc primo. Sed si contra eundem Amore erga se affectum esse imaginetur, quatenus hoc imaginatur, eatenus (*per Prop.* 30 *hujus*) se ipsum cum Lætitia contemplatur, et eatenus (*per Prop.* 29 *hujus*) eidem placere conabitur; hoc est (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*), eatenus conatur ipsum odio non habere, nullaque Tristitia afficere; qui quidem conatus (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*) major vel minor erit pro ratione affectus, ex quo oritur; atque adeo si major fuerit illo, qui ex Odio oritur et quo rem, quam odit (*per Prop.* 26 *hujus*), Tristitia afficere conatur, ei prævalebit, et odium ex animo delebit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If someone imagines that the one he hates is affected with hatred toward him in return, a new hatred arises by that very fact (by Proposition 40 of this part), while (by hypothesis) the first still endures. But if, on the contrary, he imagines that person to be affected with love toward him, then insofar as he imagines this, he regards himself with joy (by Proposition 30 of this part), and to that extent (by Proposition 29 of this part) will strive to please that person; that is (by Proposition 41 of this part), to that extent he strives not to hate him and not to affect him with any sadness. This striving (by Proposition 37 of this part) will be greater or less in proportion to the affect from which it arises. And so, if it is greater than the striving that arises from hatred, by which he strives to affect the thing he hates with sadness (by Proposition 26 of this part), it will prevail over it and wipe the hatred from his mind. QED
3P44	PROPOSITIO XLIV. *Odium, quod Amore plane vincitur, in Amorem transit; et Amor propterea major est, quam si Odium non præcessisset.*	Proposition 44. *Hatred that is completely conquered by love passes into love; and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it.*
3P44D	DEMONSTRATIO. Eodem modo procedit ac Propositionis 38 hujus. Nam qui rem, quam odit, sive quam cum Tristitia contemplari solebat, amare incipit, eo ipso, quod amat, lætatur, et huic Lætitiæ, quam Amor involvit (*vide ejus Defin. in Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*), illa etiam accedit quæ ex. eo oritur, quod conatus amovendi Tristitiam, quam Odium involvit (*ut in Prop.* 37 *hujus ostendimus*), prorsus juvatur, concomitante idea ejus, quem odio habuit, tanquam causa.	Demonstration. This proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of Proposition 38 of this part. For one who begins to love a thing he hates, or used to regard with sadness, rejoices by the very fact that he loves. And to this joy, which love involves (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), is added the joy that arises from the fact that the striving to remove the sadness that hatred involves (as we showed in Proposition 37 of this part) is wholly assisted, accompanied by the idea of the one he hated as its cause.
3P44S	SCHOLIUM. Quamvis res ita se habeat, nemo tamen conabitur rem aliquam odio habere, vel Tristitia affici, ut majori hac Lætitia fruatur; hoc est, nemo spe damnum recuperandi, damnum sibi inferri cupiet, nec ægrotare	Scholium. Although this is so, no one will strive to hate something, or to be affected with sadness, in order to enjoy this greater joy. That is, no one will desire to suffer a loss in the hope of recovering it,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	desiderabit spe convalescendi. Nam unusquisque suum esse conservare, et Tristitiam, quantum potest, amovere semper conabitur. Quod si contra concipi posset, hominem posse cupere aliquem odio habere, ut eum postea majori amore prosequatur, tum eundem odio habere semper desiderabit. Nam quo Odium majus fuerit, eo Amor erit major, atque adeo desiderabit semper, ut Odium magis magisque augeatur, et eadem de causa homo magis ac magis ægrotare conabitur, ut majori Lætitia ex restauranda valetudine postea fruatur; atque adeo semper ægrotare conabitur, quod (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*) est absurdum.	or long to be ill in the hope of getting well. For each person will always strive to preserve his being and to remove sadness as far as he can. If, on the contrary, it could be conceived that a person could desire to hate someone in order to love him all the more afterward, then he would always desire to hate him. For the greater the hatred had been, the greater the love will be, and so he will always desire that the hatred be increased more and more. For the same reason a person would strive to be more and more ill, in order afterward to enjoy a greater joy from the restoration of his health; and so he would always strive to be ill—which (by Proposition 6 of this part) is absurd.
3P45	PROPOSITIO XLV. *Si quis aliquem sibi similem Odio in rem sibi similem, quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.*	Proposition 45. *If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred toward a thing like himself that he loves, he will hate that person.*
3P45D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam res amata eum, qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (*per Prop.* 40 *hujus*): adeoque amans, qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam Odio hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) Tristitia, affectam esse imaginatur et consequenter (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*) contristatur, idque concomitante idea ejus, qui rem amatam odit, tanquam causa; hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) ipsum odio habebit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the loved thing hates in return the one who hates it (by Proposition 40 of this part). And so the lover, who imagines that someone hates the loved thing, by that very fact imagines the loved thing to be affected with hatred, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), with sadness; and consequently (by Proposition 21 of this part) he is saddened, and that accompanied by the idea of the one who hates the loved thing as its cause. That is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), he will hate him. QED
3P46	PROPOSITIO XLVI. *Si quis ab aliquo cujusdam classis sive nationis a sua diversæ, Lætitia vel Tristitia affectus fuerit, concomitante ejus idea, sub nomine universali classis vel nationis, tanquam causa: is non tantum illum, sed omnes ejusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.*	Proposition 46. *If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class or nation different from his own, accompanied by the idea of that person, under the universal name of the class or nation, as its cause, he will love or hate not only that person but everyone of the same class or nation.*
3P46D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hujus rei demonstratio patet ex Propositione 16 hujus Partis.	Demonstration. The demonstration of this is evident from Proposition 16 of this part.
3P47	PROPOSITIO XLVII. *Lætitia quæ ex eo oritur, quod scilicet rem, quam odimus, destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi Tristitia.*	Proposition 47. *The joy that arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed, or affected with some other evil, does not arise without some sadness of mind.*
3P47D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex Prop. 27 hujus. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem Tristitia affici imaginamur, eatenus contristamur.	Demonstration. This is evident from Proposition 27 of this part. For insofar as we imagine a thing like ourselves to be affected with sadness, to that extent we are saddened.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P47S	SCHOLIUM. Potest hæc Propositio etiam demonstrari ex Corollario Propositionis 17 Partis II. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut præsentem contemplamur, Corpusque eodem modo afficitur; quare quatenus rei memoria viget, eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum Tristitia contemplandum, quæ determinatio, manente adhuc rei imagine, coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum, quæ hujus existentiam secludunt, sed non tollitur: atque adeo homo eatenus tantum lætatur, quatenus hæc determinatio coercetur; et hinc fit, ut hæc Lætitia, quæ ex rei, quam odimus, malo oritur, toties repetatur, quoties ejusdem rei recordamur. Nam, uti diximus, quando ejusdem rei imago excitatur, quia hæc ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem Tristitia contemplandum, qua eandem contemplari solebat, cum ipsa existeret.	Scholium. This Proposition can also be demonstrated from the Corollary to Proposition 17 of Part 2. For whenever we recall a thing, even though it does not actually exist, we still regard it as present, and the body is affected in the same way. So insofar as the memory of the thing remains strong, a person is determined to regard it with sadness. While the image of the thing still remains, this determination is indeed restrained by the memory of those things that exclude its existence, but it is not removed. And so the person rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained. Hence it comes about that this joy, which arises from the misfortune of the thing we hate, is repeated as often as we recall that thing. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing is aroused, since it involves the existence of the thing itself, it determines the person to regard the thing with the same sadness with which he used to regard it when it existed.
	Sed quia ejusdem rei imagini alias junxit, quæ ejusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo hæc ad Tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur, et homo de novo lætatur, et hoc toties, quoties hæc repetitio fit. Atque hæc eadem est causa, cur homines lætantur, quoties alicujus jam præteriti mali recordantur, et cur pericula, a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur, et ad id metuendum determinantur; quæ determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis, quam hujus periculi ideæ junxerunt, cum ab eodem liberati sunt, quæque eos de novo securos reddit; atque adeo de novo lætantur.	But since he has joined to the image of the thing other images that exclude its existence, this determination to sadness is at once restrained, and the person rejoices anew—and this as often as the repetition occurs. And this is the same cause why people rejoice whenever they recall some evil now past, and why they enjoy telling of dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine some danger, they regard it as if it were still to come, and are determined to fear it. This determination is restrained anew by the idea of freedom that they joined to the idea of this danger when they were freed from it, and which makes them feel safe anew; and so they rejoice anew.

FREEDOM, OMENS AND SUPERSTITION

Believing things free intensifies love and hatred; chance associations make omens and superstitions.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P48	PROPOSITIO XLVIII. *Amor et Odium ex. gr. erga Petrum destruitur, si Tristitia, quam hoc, et Lætitia, quam ille involvit, ideæ alterius causæ jungatur; et eatenus uterque diminuitur, quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam.*	Proposition 48. *Love and hatred toward, for example, Peter are destroyed if the sadness that the latter involves, and the joy that the former involves, are joined to the idea of another cause; and each is diminished to the extent that we imagine that Peter was not the sole cause of either.*
3P48D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex sola Amoris et Odii definitione; quam vide in Schol. Prop. 13 hujus. Nam propter hoc solum Lætitia vocatur Amor, et Tristitia Odium erga	Demonstration. This is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part. For joy is

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Petrum, quia scilicet Petrus hujus vel illius affectus causa esse consideratur. Hoc itaque prorsus vel ex parte sublato, affectus quoque erga Petrum prorsus vel parte diminuitur. *Q.E.D.*	called love of Peter, and sadness hatred of Peter, solely because Peter is considered to be the cause of the one affect or the other. So when this is removed, wholly or in part, the affect toward Peter is also diminished, wholly or in part. QED
3P49	PROPOSITIO XLIX. *Amor et Odium erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, major ex pari causa uterque debet esse, quam erga necessariam.*	Proposition 49. *Love and hatred toward a thing we imagine to be free must both be greater, from an equal cause, than toward a thing we imagine to be necessary.*
3P49D	DEMONSTRATIO. Res, quam liberam esse imaginamur, debet (*per Defin.* 7 *p. I*) per se absque aliis percipi. Si igitur eandem Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ causam esse imaginemur, eo ipso (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) eandem amabimus vel odio habebimus, idque (*per Prop. præced.*) summo Amore vel Odio, qui ex dato affectu oriri potest. Sed si rem, quæ ejusdem affectus est causa ut necessariam imaginemur, tum (*per eandem Defin.* 7 *p. I*) ipsam non solam, sed cum aliis ejusdem affectus causam esse imaginabimur, atque adeo (*per Prop. præc.*) Amor et Odium erga ipsam minor erit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A thing we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself, without others (by Definition 7 of Part 1). So if we imagine it to be the cause of joy or sadness, by that very fact (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) we shall love or hate it, and that (by the preceding Proposition) with the greatest love or hatred that can arise from the given affect. But if we imagine the thing that is the cause of that affect as necessary, then (by the same Definition 7 of Part 1) we shall imagine it to be the cause of that affect not alone but together with others, and so (by the preceding Proposition) our love or hatred toward it will be less. QED
3P49S	SCHOLIUM. Hinc sequitur, homines, quia se liberos esse existimant, majore Amore vel odio se invicem prosequi, quam alia; ad quod accedit affectuum imitatio, de qua vide Prop. 27, 34, 40 et 43 hujus.	Scholium. It follows from this that people, because they think themselves free, pursue one another with greater love or hatred than they do other things. To this is added the imitation of the affects, on which see Propositions 27, 34, 40 and 43 of this part.
3P50	PROPOSITIO L. *Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens Spei aut Metus causa.*	Proposition 50. *Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.*
3P50D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio eadem via demonstratur, qua Propositio 15 hujus quam vide una cum Schol. 2 Propositionis 18 hujus.	Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Proposition 15 of this part, which see together with Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this part.
3P50S	SCHOLIUM. Res, quæ per accidens Spei aut Metus sunt causæ, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus hæc eadem omina sunt Spei aut Metus causa, eatenus (*per Defin. Spei et Metus, quam vide in Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 18 *hujus*) Lætitiæ aut Tristitiæ sunt causa, et consequenter (*per Coroll. Prop.* 15 *hujus*) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus, et (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*) tanquam media ad ea, quæ speramus adhibere, vel tanquam obstacula aut Metus causas amovere conamur. Præterea ex Propositione 25 hujus sequitur, nos natura ita esse constitutos, ut ea, quæ speramus, facile, quæ autem timemus, difficile credamus, et ut de iis plus minusve	Scholium. Things that are accidentally causes of hope or fear are called good or bad omens. And insofar as these omens are causes of hope or fear, to that extent (by the definition of hope and fear, which see in Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this part) they are causes of joy or sadness. Consequently (by the Corollary to Proposition 15 of this part) to that extent we love or hate them, and (by Proposition 28 of this part) we strive either to employ them as means to what we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Further, it follows from Proposition 25 of this part

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	justo sentiamus. Atque ex his ortæ sunt Superstitiones, quibus homines ubique conflictantur.	that we are so constituted by nature that we readily believe what we hope for, but believe with difficulty what we fear, and that we think more or less of these things than is just. And from these have arisen the superstitions by which people everywhere are troubled.
	Cæterum non puto operæ esse pretium, animi hic ostendere fluctuationes, quæ ex Spe et Metu oriuntur; quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur, non dari Spem sine Metu, neque Metum sine Spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus); et præterea quandoquidem, quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus, eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus; atque adeo quicquid de Amore et Odio diximus, facile unusquisque Spei et Metui applicare poterit.	For the rest, I do not think it worth the effort to show here the vacillations of mind that arise from hope and fear. For it follows from the mere definition of these affects that there is no hope without fear and no fear without hope (as we shall explain more fully in its proper place). Moreover, insofar as we hope for or fear something, to that extent we love or hate it. And so anyone will easily be able to apply to hope and fear whatever we have said of love and hatred.
3P51	PROPOSITIO LI. *Diversi homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode affici possunt, et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque objecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.*	Proposition 51. *Different people can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same person can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times.*
3P51D	DEMONSTRATIO. Corpus humanum (*per Post.* 3 *p. II*) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti; atque adeo (*per Axiom.* 1, *quod est post Lemma 3, quod vide post Prop.* 13 *p. II*) ab uno eodemque objecto possunt diversimode affici. Deinde (*per idem Postul.*) Corpus humanum potest jam hoc jam alio modo esse affectum; et consequenter (*per idem Axiom.*) ab uno eodemque objecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The human body (by Postulate 3 of Part 2) is affected by external bodies in a great many ways. So two people can be affected in different ways at the same time; and therefore (by Axiom 1, which comes after Lemma 3, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2) they can be affected in different ways by one and the same object. Again (by the same Postulate), the human body can be affected now in this way, now in another; and consequently (by the same Axiom) it can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times. QED
3P51S	SCHOLIUM. Videmus itaque fieri posse, ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat; et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat; et ut unus idemque homo jam amet, quod antea oderit, et ut jam audeat, quod antea timuit, etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat, quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, et quid pejus sit (*vide Schol. Prop.* 39 *hujus*), sequitur, homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse*; et hinc fit, ut cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur, et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Ex. gr.	Scholium. We see, then, that it can happen that what one person loves another hates, and what one fears another does not; and that one and the same person may now love what he formerly hated, and now dare what he formerly feared, and so on. Again, since each person judges from his own affect what is good, what is bad, what is better and what is worse (see the Scholium to Proposition 39 of this part), it follows that people can vary as much in judgment as in affect.* Hence it comes about that when we compare some people with others, we distinguish them solely by the difference of their affects, and call some fearless, others timid, and others by some other name. For example,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	illum ego *intrepidum* vocabo, qui malum contemnit, quod ego timere soleo; et si præterea ad hoc attendam, quod ejus Cupiditas malum inferendi ei, quem odit, et benefaciendi ei, quem amat, non coercetur timore mali, a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum *audacem* appellabo. Deinde ille mihi *timidus* videbitur, qui malum timet, quod ego contemnere soleo; et si insuper ad hoc attendam, quod ejus Cupiditas coercetur timore mali, quod me continere nequit, ipsum *pusillanimem* esse dicam; et sic unusquisque judicabit.	I shall call someone *fearless* who despises an evil that I usually fear. And if I further attend to the fact that his desire to do harm to someone he hates, and good to someone he loves, is not restrained by fear of an evil by which I am usually held back, I shall call him *daring*. Again, someone will seem *timid* to me who fears an evil that I usually despise. And if I further attend to the fact that his desire is restrained by fear of an evil that cannot hold me back, I shall say that he is *cowardly*. And this is how everyone will judge.
	Denique ex hac hominis natura et judicii inconstantia, ut et quod homo sæpe ex solo affectu de rebus judicat, et quod res, quas ad Lætitiam vel Tristitiam facere credit, quasque propterea (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*), ut fiant, promovere, vel amovere conatur, sæpe non nisi imaginariæ sint; ut jam taceam alia, quæ in 2 Parte ostendimus, de rerum incertitudine; facile concipimus, hominem posse sæpe in causa esse, tam ut contristetur, quam ut lætetur, sive ut tam Tristitia quam Lætitia afficiatur, concomitante idea sui tanquam causa; atque adeo facile intelligimus, quid Pœnitentia, et quid Acquiescentia in se ipso sit.	Finally, from this nature of human beings and the inconstancy of their judgment—and also because a person often judges things from affect alone, and because the things he believes make for joy or sadness, and which he therefore strives (by Proposition 28 of this part) to bring about or to remove, are often merely imaginary, to say nothing of the other points about the uncertainty of things that we showed in Part 2—we easily conceive that a person can often be the cause of his own sadness as well as of his own joy; that is, that he can be affected with both sadness and joy, accompanied by the idea of himself as its cause. And so we easily understand what repentance is, and what self-contentment is.
	Nempe *Pœnitentia est Tristitia concomitante idea sui*, et *Acquiescentia in se ipso est Lætitia concomitante idea sui, tanquam causa*, et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt, quia homines se liberos esse credunt (*vid. Prop.* 49 *hujus*).	Namely, *repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself*, and *self-contentment is joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as its cause*. These affects are extremely intense, because people believe themselves to be free (see Proposition 49 of this part).

9

WONDER, DISDAIN AND SELF-REGARD

Wonder and disdain, and the joy or sadness of the mind contemplating its own power.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P52	PROPOSITIO LII. *Objectum, quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus, vel quod nihil habere imaginamur, nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur, ac illud, quod aliquid singulare habere imaginamur.*	Proposition 52. *An object that we have previously seen together with others, or that we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, we shall not regard for as long as one that we imagine to have something singular.*
3P52D	DEMONSTRATIO. Simulatque objectum, quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (*per*	Demonstration. As soon as we imagine an object we have seen with others, we at once recall the others as well (by Proposition 18 of Part 2, and see also its Scholium), and so from regarding one we

LATIN

Prop. 18 *p. II, cujus etiam Schol. vide*), et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio objecti, quod nihil habere imaginamur, nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus, nos nihil in eo contemplari, quod antea cum aliis non viderimus. Verum cum supponimus, nos in objecto aliquo aliquid singulare, quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Mens, dum illud objectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat, in cujus contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest; atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo objectum, etc. *Q.E.D.*

3P52S SCHOLIUM. Hæc Mentis affectio, sive rei singularis imaginatio, quatenus sola in Mente versatur, vocatur *Admiratio*; quæ si ab objecto, quod timemus, moveatur, *Consternatio* dicitur, quia mali Admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet, ut de aliis cogitare non valeat, quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id, quod admiramur, sit hominis alicujus prudentia, industria, vel aliquid hujusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum Admiratio vocatur *Veneratio*; alias *Horror*, si hominis iram, invidiam, etc., admiramur. Deinde, si hominis, quem amamus, prudentiam, industriam, etc., admiramur, Amor eo ipso (*per Prop.* 12 *hujus*) major erit, et hunc Amorem Admirationi sive Venerationi junctum *Devotionem* vocamus.

Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus Odium, Spem, Securitatem, et alios Affectus Admirationi junctos; atque adeo plures Affectus deducere poterimus, quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet, Affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu, quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione.

Admirationi opponitur *Contemptus*, cujus tamen causa hæc plerumque est, quod sc. ex eo, quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere, etc., videmus, vel ex eo, quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet, similis rebus, quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus, etc. (*per Prop.* 15 *cum ejus Coroll. et Prop.* 27 *hujus*), determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum, etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei præsentia, vel accuratiore

ENGLISH

immediately pass to regarding another. And the same holds for an object that we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many. For by that very fact we suppose that we regard nothing in it that we have not previously seen with others. But when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular, which we have never seen before, we are saying nothing other than that the mind, while it regards that object, has nothing else in itself to whose regard it can pass from regarding that one; and so it is determined to regard that object alone. Therefore an object, etc. QED

Scholium. This affection of the mind, or imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it occupies the mind alone, is called *wonder*. If it is aroused by an object we fear, it is called *consternation*, because wonder at an evil keeps a person so suspended in regarding it alone that he cannot think of other things by which he might avoid that evil. But if what we wonder at is some person's prudence, diligence or something of the kind, then, because by that very fact we regard that person as far surpassing us, wonder is called *veneration*; otherwise it is called *horror*, if what we wonder at is a person's anger, envy and the like. Again, if we wonder at the prudence, diligence and so on of a person we love, our love will by that very fact be greater (by Proposition 12 of this part), and this love joined to wonder, or veneration, we call *devotion*.

In this way we can also conceive hatred, hope, confidence and other affects joined to wonder; and so we shall be able to deduce more affects than are usually indicated by the accepted words. From this it is clear that the names of the affects were devised more from their common usage than from accurate knowledge of them.

Opposed to wonder is *disdain*. Its cause, however, is usually this: from seeing someone wonder at, love or fear something, and so on, or from the fact that a thing at first sight appears like things we wonder at, love, fear and so on (by Proposition 15 of this part with its Corollary, and Proposition 27 of this part), we are determined to wonder at, love

9

* N.B. Posse hoc fieri, tametsi Mens humana pars esset divini intellectus, ostendimus in Coroll. Prop. 11 p. II.

* N.B. That this can happen even though the human mind is a part of the divine intellect we showed in the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	contemplatione, id omne de eadem negare cogamur, quod causa Admirationis, Amoris, Metus, etc. esse potest, tum Mens ex ipsa rei præsentia magis ad ea cogitandum, quæ in objecto non sunt, quam quæ in ipso sunt, determinata manet; cum tamen contra ex objecti præsentia id præcipue cogitare soleat, quod in objecto est.	or fear that same thing. But if, from the thing's presence or from a more accurate consideration of it, we are compelled to deny of it everything that can be a cause of wonder, love, fear and so on, then the mind, from the very presence of the thing, remains determined to think of what is not in the object rather than of what is in it—whereas, on the contrary, from an object's presence it usually thinks chiefly of what is in the object.
	Porro sicut Devotio ex rei, quam amamus, Admiratione, sic *Irrisio* ex rei, quam odimus vel metuimus, Contemptu oritur, et *Dedignatio* ex stultitiæ Contemptu, sicuti Veneratio ex Admiratione prudentiæ. Possumus denique, Amorem, Spem, Gloriam, et alios Affectus junctos Contemptui concipere atque inde alios præterea Affectus deducere, quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.	Further, just as devotion arises from wonder at a thing we love, so *mockery* arises from disdain for a thing we hate or fear, and *disparagement* from disdain for foolishness, just as veneration arises from wonder at prudence. Finally, we can conceive love, hope, glory and other affects joined to disdain, and from these deduce still other affects, which we are not in the habit of distinguishing from others by any single word.
3P53	PROPOSITIO LIII. *Cum Mens se ipsam, suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, lætatur; et eo magis, quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.*	Proposition 53. *When the mind regards itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and the more so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.*
3P53D	DEMONSTRATIO. Homo se ipsum non cognoscit, nisi per affectiones sui Corporis earumque ideas (*per Prop.* 19 *et* 23 *p. II*). Cum ergo fit, ut Mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad majorem perfectionem transire, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*), Lætitia affici supponitur et eo majori, quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A person does not know himself except through the affections of his body and their ideas (by Propositions 19 and 23 of Part 2). So when it happens that the mind can regard itself, it is by that very fact supposed to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), to be affected with joy—and with a greater joy the more distinctly it can imagine itself and its power of acting. QED
3P53C	COROLLARIUM. Hæc Lætitia magis magisque fovetur, quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur, eo majori Lætitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur, idque concomitante idea sui (*per Schol. Prop.* 29 *hujus*); atque adeo (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*) ipse majore Lætitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary. This joy is fostered more and more the more a person imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself praised by others, the greater the joy with which he imagines others to be affected by him, accompanied by the idea of himself (by the Scholium to Proposition 29 of this part); and so (by Proposition 27 of this part) he himself is affected with greater joy, accompanied by the idea of himself. QED
3P54	PROPOSITIO LIV. *Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur, quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.*	Proposition 54. *The mind strives to imagine only those things that posit its power of acting.*
3P54D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mentis conatus sive potentia est ipsa ipsius Mentis essentia (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*); Mentis autem essentia (*ut per se notum*) id tantum, quod Mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id, quod non est neque potest;	Demonstration. The striving, or power, of the mind is the very essence of the mind (by Proposition 7 of this part). But the essence of the mind (as is self-evident) affirms only what the mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do. So it

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur, quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive ponit. *Q.E.D.*	strives to imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting. QED
3P55	PROPOSITIO LV. *Cum Mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.*	Proposition 55. *When the mind imagines its lack of power, it is by that very fact saddened.*
3P55D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mentis essentia id tantum, quod Mens est et potest, affirmat, sive de natura Mentis est, ea tantummodo imaginari, quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (*per Prop. præced.*). Cum itaque dicimus, quod Mens, dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod, dum Mens aliquid imaginari conatur, quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic ejus conatus coercetur, sive (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) quod ipsa contristatur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The essence of the mind affirms only what the mind is and can do; in other words, it is of the nature of the mind to imagine only those things that posit its power of acting (by the preceding Proposition). So when we say that the mind, while it regards itself, imagines its lack of power, we are saying nothing other than that, while the mind strives to imagine something that posits its power of acting, this striving of it is restrained—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), that it is saddened. QED
3P55C1	COROLLARIUM. Hæc Tristitia magis ac magis fovetur, si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur, ac Coroll. Prop. 53 hujus.	Corollary. This sadness is fostered more and more if the mind imagines itself to be blamed by others. This is demonstrated in the same way as the Corollary to Proposition 53 of this part.
3P55S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Tristitia concomitante idea nostræ imbecillitatis *Humilitas* appellatur; Lætitia autem, quæ ex contemplatione nostri oritur, *Philautia*, vel *Acquiescentia in se ipso* vocatur. Et quoniam hæc toties repetitur, quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit, ut unusquisque facta sua narrare, suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat, et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur, homines natura esse invidos (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 24 *et Schol. Prop.* 32 *hujus*), sive ob suorum æqualium imbecillitatem gaudere, et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari.	Scholium. This sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called *humility*; but the joy that arises from regarding ourselves is called *philautia* [self-love] or *self-contentment*. And since this joy is repeated as often as a person regards his virtues, or his power of acting, it also comes about that everyone is eager to tell of his own deeds and to show off his strength of body and of mind alike, and that for this reason people are a nuisance to one another. From this it again follows that people are by nature envious (see the Scholium to Proposition 24 and the Scholium to Proposition 32 of this part); that is, they are glad at the weakness of their equals and, on the other hand, saddened by their virtue.
	Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur, toties Lætitia (*per Prop.* 53 *hujus*) afficitur, et eo majore, quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere, et easdem distinctius imaginatur; hoc est (*per illa, quæ in Schol.* 1 *Prop.* 40 *p. II dicta sunt*), quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit, quando aliquid in se contemplatur, quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id, quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit; et contra contristabitur, si suas, ad aliorum actiones comparatas, imbecilliores esse imaginetur; quam quidem Tristitiam (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*)	For whenever someone imagines his own actions, he is affected with joy (by Proposition 53 of this part), and the more so the more perfection he imagines his actions to express, and the more distinctly he imagines them—that is (by what was said in Scholium 1 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), the more he can distinguish them from others and regard them as singular things. So everyone will be most glad in regarding himself when he regards something in himself that he denies of others. But if he refers what he affirms of himself to the universal idea of human being or of animal, he will not be so glad; and, on the contrary, he will be

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	amovere conabitur, idque suorum æqualium actiones perperam interpretando, vel suas quantum potest adornando.	saddened if he imagines that his own actions, compared with those of others, are weaker. This sadness he will strive to remove (by Proposition 28 of this part), and he does so by misinterpreting the actions of his equals or by embellishing his own as much as he can.
	Apparet igitur, homines natura proclives esse ad Odium et Invidiam, ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et Invidiæ stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet, quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur, eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam, sequens addam Corollarium.	It is clear, then, that people are by nature inclined to hatred and envy—and upbringing itself adds to this. For parents usually spur their children to virtue only with the goad of honor and envy. But a doubt perhaps remains, since we not infrequently admire people's virtues and venerate them. To remove it, therefore, I shall add the following Corollary.
3P55C2	COROLLARIUM. Nemo virtutem alicui, nisi æquali, invidet.	Corollary. No one envies anyone's virtue except an equal's.
3P55C2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Invidia est ipsum Odium (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 24 *hujus*), sive (*per Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*) Tristitia, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) affectio, qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (*per Schol. Prop.* 9 *hujus*) nihil agere conatur neque cupit, nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest; ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem prædicari cupiet, quæ naturæ alterius est propria, et suæ aliena; adeoque ejus Cupiditas coerceri, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*) ipse contristari, nequit ex eo, quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur, et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit. At quidem suo æquali, qui cum ipso ejusdem naturæ supponitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Envy is hatred itself (see the Scholium to Proposition 24 of this part), or (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) sadness, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), an affection by which a person's power of acting, or striving, is restrained. But a person (by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part) strives to do, and desires, nothing except what can follow from his own given nature. So a person will not desire to have predicated of himself any power of acting, or (what is the same thing) virtue, that is proper to another's nature and foreign to his own. Hence his desire cannot be restrained—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), he himself cannot be saddened—by regarding some virtue in someone unlike himself, and consequently he will not be able to envy that person either. But he can envy his equal, who is supposed to be of the same nature as himself. QED
3P55C2S	SCHOLIUM. Cum igitur supra in Scholio Propositionis 52 hujus Partis dixerimus, nos hominem venerari ex eo, quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem, etc., admiramur, id fit (*ut ex ipsa Prop. patet*) quia has virtutes et singulariter inesse, et non ut nostræ naturæ communes imaginamur; adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus, quam arboribus altitudinem, et leonibus fortitudinem, etc.	Scholium. So when we said above, in the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part, that we venerate a person because we wonder at his prudence, strength of character and so on, this happens (as is evident from the Proposition itself) because we imagine these virtues to be in him singularly, and not as common to our nature. And so we shall no more envy him for them than we envy trees their height or lions their strength, and so on.
3P56	PROPOSITIO LVI. *Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, et Cupiditatis, et consequenter uniuscujusque affectus, qui ex his componitur, ut animi Fluctuationis, vel qui ab his derivatur nempe Amoris,*	Proposition 56. *There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire—and consequently of every affect composed of these, such as vacillation of mind, or derived*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Odii, Spei, Metus, etc., tot species dantur, quot sunt species objectorum, a quibus afficimur.	*from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear and so on—as there are species of objects by which we are affected.*
3P56D	DEMONSTRATIO. Lætitia et Tristitia, et consequenter affectus, qui ex his componuntur vel ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*); nos autem (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) necessario patimur, quatenus ideas habemus inadæquatas; et quatenus easdem habemus (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*), eatenus tantum patimur, hoc est (*vid. Schol.* 1 *Prop.* 40 *p. II*), eatenus tantum necessario patimur, quatenus imaginamur, sive (*vid. Prop.* 17 *p. II cum ejus Schol.*) quatenus afficimur affectu, qui naturam nostri Corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscujusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari, ut objecti, a quo afficimur, natura exprimatur. Nempe Lætitia, quæ ex objecto ex. gr.	Demonstration. Joy and sadness, and consequently the affects composed of them or derived from them, are passions (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). But we are necessarily acted on (by Proposition 1 of this part) insofar as we have inadequate ideas; and only insofar as we have them (by Proposition 3 of this part) are we acted on—that is (see Scholium 1 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), we are necessarily acted on only insofar as we imagine, or (see Proposition 17 of Part 2 with its Scholium) insofar as we are affected by an affection that involves both the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. So the nature of each passion must necessarily be explained in such a way that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. Thus the joy that arises from, say, object
	A oritur, naturam ipsius objecti A, et Lætitia, quæ ex objecto B oritur; ipsius objecti B naturam involvit; atque adeo hi duo Lætitiæ affectus natura sunt diversi, quia ex causis diversæ naturæ oriuntur. Sic etiam Tristitiæ affectus, qui ex uno objecto oritur, diversus natura est a Tristitia, quæ ab alia causa oritur; quod etiam de Amore, Odio, Spe, Metu, animi Fluctuatione, etc., intelligendum est: ac proinde Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, Amoris, Odii, etc., tot species necessario dantur, quot sunt species objectorum, a quibus afficimur. At Cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque essentia, seu natura, quatenus ex data quacunque ejus constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum (vid. Schol.	A involves the nature of object A itself, and the joy that arises from object B involves the nature of object B itself. So these two affects of joy are different in nature, because they arise from causes of different natures. So too the affect of sadness that arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness that arises from another cause. The same must be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation of mind and so on. Therefore there are necessarily as many species of joy, sadness, love, hatred and so on as there are species of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the very essence, or nature, of each person insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something by any given constitution of it
	Prop. *9* hujus*); ergo, prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, Amoris, Odii, etc., specie afficitur, hoc est, prout ejus natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita ejus Cupiditas alia atque alia esse, et natura unius a natura alterius Cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est, quantum affectus, a quibus unaquæque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species Cupiditatis, quot sunt species Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, Amoris, etc., et consequenter* (per jam ostensa*) quot sunt objectorum species, a quibus afficimur.* Q.E.D.	(see the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part). Therefore, according as each person is affected by external causes with this or that species of joy, sadness, love, hatred and so on—that is, according as his nature is constituted in this way or that—his desire must be now one, now another, and the nature of one desire must differ from the nature of another as much as the affects from which each arises differ from one another. So there are as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love and so on, and consequently (by what has already been shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected. QED
3P56S		

LATIN

SCHOLIUM. Inter affectuum species, quæ (*per Prop. præc.*) perplurimæ esse debent, insignes sunt *Luxuria*, *Ebrietas*, *Libido*, *Avaritia* et *Ambitio*, quæ non nisi Amoris vel Cupiditatis sunt notiones, quæ hujus utriusque affectus naturam explicant per objecta, ad quæ referuntur. Nam per Luxuriam, Ebrietatem, Libidinem, Avaritiam, et Ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus, quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriæ immoderatum Amorem vel Cupiditatem. Præterea hi affectus, quatenus eos per solum objectum, ad quod referuntur, ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam *Temperantia*, quam Luxuriæ, et *Sobrietas*, quam Ebrietati, et denique *Castitas*, quam Libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt, sed animi indicant potentiam, quæ hos affectus moderatur. Cæterum reliquas Affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt, quot objectorum species), nec, si possem, necesse est.

Nam ad id, quod intendimus, nempe ad affectuum vires, et Mentis in eosdem potentiam, determinandum, nobis sufficit, uniuscujusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit, inquam, nobis, Affectuum et Mentis communes proprietates intelligere, ut determinare possimus, qualis et quanta sit Mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis Affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum Amoris, Odii, vel Cupiditatis affectum, ex. gr. inter Amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere, et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare, non est opus.

3P57 PROPOSITIO LVII. *Quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.*

3P57D DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc Propositio patet ex Axiom. 1, quod vide post Lem. 3 Schol. Prop. 13, p. 2. At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus.

Omnes affectus ad Cupiditatem, Lætitiam, vel Tristitiam referuntur, ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. At Cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque natura seu essentia (*vide ejus Defin. in Schol. Prop.* 9 *hujus*); ergo

ENGLISH

Scholium. Among the species of affects, which (by the preceding Proposition) must be very many, the notable ones are *gluttony*, *drunkenness*, *lust*, *greed* and *ambition*. These are nothing but notions of love or desire that explain the nature of each of these two affects through the objects to which they are related. For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, greed and ambition we understand nothing other than an immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, sexual union, wealth and glory. Moreover, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from others only by the object to which they are related, have no contraries. For *temperance*, which we usually oppose to gluttony, *sobriety*, which we oppose to drunkenness, and finally *chastity*, which we oppose to lust, are not affects or passions; rather, they indicate a power of the mind that moderates these affects. For the rest, I cannot explain the remaining species of affects here (because there are as many as there are species of objects), nor, if I could, is it necessary.

For to achieve our purpose—namely, to determine the strength of the affects and the power of the mind over them—it is enough for us to have a general definition of each affect. It is enough for us, I say, to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can determine what sort of power, and how great, the mind has in moderating and restraining the affects. So although there is a great difference between this and that affect of love, hatred or desire—for example, between love of one's children and love of one's wife—we do not need to know these differences, or to investigate the nature and origin of the affects any further.

Proposition 57. *Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.*

Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Axiom 1, which see after Lemma 3 of the Scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 2. Nevertheless, we shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primary affects.

All affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But desire is the very nature, or essence, of each person (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposi-

LATIN

uniuscujusque individui Cupiditas a Cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat, quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Lætitia deinde et Tristitia passiones sunt, quibus uniuscujusque potentia seu conatus in suo esse perseverandi, augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus et ejus Schol.*). At per conatum in suo esse perseverandi, quatenus ad Mentem et Corpus simul refertur. Appetitum et Cupiditatem intelligimus (vide Schol.

Prop. *9* hujus*); ergo Lætitia et Tristitia est ipsa Cupiditas sive Appetitus, quatenus a causis externis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur, hoc est (*per idem Schol.*) est ipsa cujusque natura; atque adeo uniuscujusque Lætitia vel Tristitia a Lætitia vel Tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat, quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt et consequenter quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat, etc.* Q.E.D.

3P57S SCHOLIUM. Hinc sequitur, affectus animalium, quæ irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus, postquam Mentis novimus originem), ab affectibus hominum tantum differre, quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo Libidine procreandi; at ille Libidine equina, hic autem humana. Sic etiam Libidines et Appetitus insectorum, piscium, et avium, alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua, qua constat natura contentum vivat eaque gaudeat, vita tamen illa, qua unumquodque est contentum, et gaudium nihil aliud est, quam idea seu anima ejusdem individui, atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Denique ex præcedenti Propositione sequitur, non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium, quo ebrius ex. gr.

ducitur, et inter gaudium, quo potitur Philosophus, quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque hæc de affectibus, qui ad hominem referuntur, quatenus patitur. Superest, ut pauca addam de iis, qui ad eundem referuntur, quatenus agit.

ENGLISH

tion 9 of this part). Therefore the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other. Next, joy and sadness are passions by which each person's power, or striving to persevere in his being, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by Proposition 11 of this part and its Scholium). But by the striving to persevere in one's being, insofar as it is related to the mind and body together, we understand appetite and desire

(see the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part). Therefore joy and sadness are desire, or appetite, itself, insofar as it is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, by external causes; that is (by the same Scholium), they are the very nature of each person. And so the joy or sadness of each person also differs from the joy or sadness of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other; and consequently each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much, etc. QED

Scholium. From this it follows that the affects of the animals called irrational (for we can by no means doubt that brutes have feelings, now that we know the origin of the mind) differ from human affects as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both horse and human are indeed driven by the lust to procreate; but the one by an equine lust, the other by a human one. So too the lusts and appetites of insects, fish and birds must be different in each case. Therefore, although each individual lives content with the nature of which it consists, and rejoices in it, yet that life with which each is content, and that rejoicing, are nothing other than the idea, or soul, of that individual; and so the rejoicing of one differs in nature from the rejoicing of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, it follows from the preceding Proposition that there is no small difference between the rejoicing by which, say, a drunkard

is led and the rejoicing that a philosopher possesses—which I wished to mention here in passing. So much, then, for the affects that are related to a person insofar as he is acted on. It remains for me to add a few words about those that are related to him insofar as he acts.

THE ACTIVE AFFECTS

Joy and desire can arise from reason; strength of character divides into tenacity and nobility.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3P58	PROPOSITIO LVIII. *Præter Lætitiam et Cupiditatem, quæ passiones sunt, alii Lætitiæ et Cupiditatis affectus dantur, qui ad nos, quatenus agimus, referuntur.*	Proposition 58. *Besides the joy and desire that are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire that are related to us insofar as we act.*
3P58D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cum Mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, lætatur (*per Prop.* 53 *hujus*): Mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur, quando veram sive adæquatam ideam concipit (*per Prop.* 43 *p. II*). At Mens quasdam ideas adæquatas concipit (*per Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 40 *p. II*). Ergo eatenus etiam lætatur, quatenus ideas adæquatas concipit, hoc est (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) quatenus agit. Deinde Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*). At per conatum Cupiditatem intelligimus (*per ejusdem Schol.*); ergo Cupiditas ad nos refertur, etiam quatenus intelligimus, sive (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) quatenus agimus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices (by Proposition 53 of this part). But the mind necessarily regards itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by Proposition 43 of Part 2). And the mind does conceive some adequate ideas (by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Therefore it also rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by Proposition 1 of this part), insofar as it acts. Next, the mind strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ones (by Proposition 9 of this part). But by striving we understand desire (by the Scholium to the same Proposition). Therefore desire is also related to us insofar as we understand, or (by Proposition 1 of this part) insofar as we act. QED
3P59	PROPOSITIO LIX. *Inter omnes affectus, qui ad Mentem, quatenus agit, referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam qui ad Lætitiam vel Cupiditatem referuntur.*	Proposition 59. *Among all the affects that are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none except those that are related to joy or desire.*
3P59D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnes affectus ad Cupiditatem, Lætitiam, vel Tristitiam referuntur, ut eorum quas dedimus, definitiones ostendunt. Per Tristitiam autem intelligimus, quod Mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus et ejus Schol.*); adeoque Mens quatenus contristatur, eatenus ejus intelligendi, hoc est ejus agendi potentia (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque nulli Tristitiæ affectus ad Mentem referri possunt, quatenus agit; sed tantum affectus Lætitiæ et Cupiditatis qui (*per Prop. præc.*) eatenus etiam ad Mentem referuntur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. All affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But by sadness we understand that by which the mind's power of thinking is diminished or restrained (by Proposition 11 of this part and its Scholium). So insofar as the mind is saddened, to that extent its power of understanding—that is (by Proposition 1 of this part), its power of acting—is diminished or restrained. Hence no affects of sadness can be related to the mind insofar as it acts, but only affects of joy and desire, which (by the preceding Proposition) are to that extent also related to the mind. QED
3P59S	SCHOLIUM. Omnes actiones, quæ sequuntur ex affectibus, qui ad Mentem referuntur, quatenus intelligit ad *Fortitudinem* refero, quam in Animositatem et Generositatem distinguo. Nam per *Animositatem* intelligo *Cupiditatem, qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo Rationis dictamine conservare*.	Scholium. All the actions that follow from affects related to the mind insofar as it understands I refer to *strength of character*, which I divide into tenacity and nobility. For by *tenacity* I understand *the desire by which each person strives to preserve his being from the dictate of reason alone*.

LATIN

Per *Generositatem* autem *Cupiditatem* intelligo, *qua unusquisque ex solo Rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare, et sibi amicitia jungere*. Eas itaque actiones, quæ solum agentis utile intendunt, ad Animositatem, et quæ alterius etiam utile intendunt, ad Generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, Sobrietas, et Animi in periculis Præsentia, etc. Animositatis sunt species; Modestia autem, Clementia, etc., species Generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me præcipuos affectus, animique fluctuationes, quæ ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum, nempe Cupiditatis, Lætitiæ, et Tristitiæ oriuntur, explicuisse, perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet, nos a causis externis multis modis agitari, nosque perinde ut maris undæ, a contrariis ventis agitatæ, fluctuari, nostri eventus atque fati inscios. At dixi, me præcipuos tantum, non omnes, qui dari possunt, animi conflictus ostendisse.

Nam eadem via, qua supra, procedendo, facile possumus ostendere, Amorem esse junctum Pœnitentiæ, Dedignationi, Pudori, etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo, affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi, indeque tot variationes oriri, ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum præcipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit: nam reliqui, quos omisi, plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de Amore hoc notandum restat, quod scilicet sæpissime contingit, dum re, quam appetebamus, fruimur, ut Corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem, a qua aliter determinatur, et aliæ rerum imagines in eo excitantur, et simul Mens alia imaginari, aliaque cupere incipit. Ex. gr. cum aliquid, quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui, nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur, Corpusque aliter constituitur.

Si igitur, Corpore jam aliter disposito, ejusdem cibi imago, quia ipse præsens adest, fomentetur, et consequenter conatus etiam, sive Cupiditas, eundem comedendi; huic Cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit, et consequenter cibi, quem appetebamus, præsentia odiosa erit, et hoc est quod Fastidium et Tædium vocamus. Cæterum Corporis

ENGLISH

By *nobility*, on the other hand, I understand *the desire by which each person, from the dictate of reason alone, strives to aid other people and join them to himself in friendship*. So those actions that aim only at the advantage of the agent I refer to tenacity, and those that aim at the advantage of another as well I refer to nobility. Thus temperance, sobriety, presence of mind in danger and so on are species of tenacity, whereas modesty, mercy and so on are species of nobility. And with this I think I have explained the principal affects and vacillations of mind that arise from the combination of the three primary affects—namely desire, joy and sadness—and have shown them through their first causes. From this it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds, we toss to and fro, unaware of our outcome and our fate. But I said that I have shown only the principal conflicts of mind, not all that there can be.

For by proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is joined to repentance, disparagement, shame and so on. Indeed, I believe it is clear to everyone from what has already been said that the affects can be combined with one another in so many ways, and so many variations arise from them, that they cannot be defined by any number. But for my purpose it is enough to have listed only the principal ones; for the rest, which I have omitted, would be more a matter of curiosity than of use. Yet this remains to be noted about love: it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing we wanted, the body acquires from that enjoyment a new constitution by which it is determined differently; other images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine something whose taste usually delights us, we desire to enjoy it—that is, to eat it. But while we are enjoying it in this way, the stomach is filled and the body is constituted differently.

If, then, when the body is now differently disposed, the image of the same food is kept alive because the food itself is present, and consequently also the striving, or desire, to eat it, this new constitution will oppose that desire, or striving. Consequently the presence of the food we wanted will

LATIN

affectiones externas, quæ in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus, etc., neglexi, quia ad solum Corpus absque ulla ad Mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quædam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam, et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.

ENGLISH

be odious, and this is what we call disgust and weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the external affections of the body that are observed in the affects, such as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter and so on, because they are related to the body alone, without any relation to the mind. Finally, certain points must be noted about the definitions of the affects; I shall therefore repeat them here in order, inserting what is to be observed in each.

THE DEFINITIONS OF THE AFFECTS

Spinoza restates in order the definitions of forty-eight affects, with explanations.

LATIN

3DefAff1 I. *Cupiditas* est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.

3DefAff1Exp EXPLICATIO. Diximus supra in Scholio Propositionis 9 hujus Partis, Cupiditatem esse appetitum cum ejusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam, quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem Scholio etiam monui, me revera inter humanum appetitum et Cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius, sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque; atque adeo, ne tautologiam committere viderer, Cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui, sed eandem ita definire studui, ut omnes humanæ naturæ conatus, quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis, vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere, Cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam, quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum; sed ex hac definitione (*per Prop.* 23 p.

II*) non sequeretur, quod Mens possit suæ Cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur, ut hujus conscientiæ causam involverem, necesse fuit (*per eandem Prop.*) addere,* quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata, etc. Nam per affectionem humanæ essentiæ quamcunque ejusdem essentiæ constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata, sive quod ipsa per solum Cogitationis, sive per solum Extensionis attributum concipiatur, sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur Cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscunque conatus, impetus, appetitus, et volitiones, qui pro varia ejusdem hominis constitutione varii, et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi

ENGLISH

Definition 1. *Desire* is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something by any given affection of it.

Explanation. We said above, in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part, that desire is appetite together with consciousness of it, and that appetite is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is determined to do the things that serve its preservation. But in the same Scholium I also pointed out that in reality I recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a person is conscious of his appetite or not, the appetite remains one and the same. So, lest I seem to commit a tautology, I did not want to explain desire through appetite, but took care to define it in such a way as to include together all the strivings of human nature that we signify by the names appetite, will, desire or impulse. For I could have said that desire is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something. But from this definition

(by Proposition 23 of Part 2) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire, or appetite. So, in order to include the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same Proposition) to add *insofar as it is determined by any given affection of it*, etc. For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it is innate, or whether it is conceived through the attribute of Thought alone or through the attribute of Extension alone, or finally whether it is related to both at once. Here, then, by the name of desire I understand any strivings, im-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	sunt, ut homo diversimode trahatur, et, quo se vertat, nesciat.	pulses, appetites and volitions of a person, which vary with the person's varying constitution, and are not infrequently so opposed to one another that he is pulled in different directions and does not know where to turn.
3DefAff2	II. *Lætitia* est hominis transitio a minore ad majorem perfectionem.	Definition 2. *Joy* is a person's passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.
3DefAff3	III. *Tristitia* est hominis transitio a majore ad minorem perfectionem.	Definition 3. *Sadness* is a person's passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.
3DefAff3Exp	EXPLICATIO. Dico transitionem. Nam Lætitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione, ad quam transit, nasceretur, ejusdem absque Lætitiæ affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex Tristitiæ affectu, qui huic est contrarius. Nam quod Tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit, quatenus alicujus perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus, quod Tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat; nam privatio nihil est, Tristitiæ autem affectus actus est, qui propterea nullus alius esse potest, quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem hoc est, actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (*vide Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus*).	Explanation. I say *passage*. For joy is not perfection itself. If a person were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy. This appears more clearly from the affect of sadness, which is its contrary. For no one can deny that sadness consists in the passage to a lesser perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself, since a person cannot be saddened insofar as he shares in some perfection. Nor can we say that sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection. For privation is nothing, whereas the affect of sadness is an act, which therefore can be nothing other than the act of passing to a lesser perfection—that is, the act by which a person's power of acting is diminished or restrained (see the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part).
	Cæterum definitiones Hilaritatis, Titillationis, Melancholiæ, et Doloris omitto, quia ad Corpus potissimum referuntur, et non nisi Lætitiæ aut Tristitiæ sunt species.	As for the rest, I omit the definitions of cheerfulness, localized pleasure, melancholy and pain, because they relate chiefly to the body and are only species of joy or sadness.
3DefAff4	IV. *Admiratio* est rei alicujus imaginatio, in qua Mens defixa propterea manet, quia hæc singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem (*vide Prop.* 52 *hujus cum ejusdem Schol.*)	Definition 4. *Wonder* is an imagining of some thing in which the mind remains fixed, because this singular imagining has no connection with the others (see Proposition 52 of this part, with its Scholium).
3DefAff4Exp	EXPLICATIO. In Scholio Propositionis 18 Partis II ostendimus, quænam sit causa cur Mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat, videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatæ et ita ordinatæ sunt, ut alia aliam sequatur; quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est, sed Mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur, donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novæ imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturæ est ac reliquæ; et hac de causa ego Admirationem inter affectus non numero, nec causam video, cur id facerem, quandoquidem hæc Mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva, quæ Mentem ab aliis	Explanation. In the Scholium to Proposition 18 of Part 2 we showed the cause why the mind, from contemplating one thing, immediately falls to thinking of another: namely, because the images of those things are linked together and so ordered that one follows another. This cannot be conceived when the image of a thing is new; instead, the mind will be held in contemplating that thing until it is determined by other causes to think of other things. So the imagining of a new thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others; and for this reason I do not count wonder among the affects. Nor do I see any reason why I

LATIN	ENGLISH
distrahat, oritur, sed tantum ex eo, quod causa, cur Mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit.	should, since this distraction of the mind does not arise from any positive cause that distracts it from other things, but only from the absence of the cause by which the mind is determined, from contemplating one thing, to think of others.
Tres igitur (*ut in Schol. Prop.* 11 *hujus monui*) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco, nempe Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, et Cupiditatis; nec alia de causa verba de Admiratione feci, quam quia usu factum est, ut quidam affectus, qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant, quando ad objecta, quæ admiramur, referuntur; quæ quidem ratio me ex æquo movet, ut etiam Contemptus definitionem his adjungam.	Therefore (as I pointed out in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) I recognize only three primitive, or primary, affects: joy, sadness and desire. My only reason for saying anything about wonder is that custom has brought it about that certain affects derived from the three primitive ones are usually designated by other names when they relate to objects we wonder at. The same reason moves me equally to add here the definition of disdain as well.
3DefAff5 V. *Contemptus* est rei alicujus imaginatio, quæ Mentem adeo parum tangit, ut ipsa Mens ex rei præsentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum, quæ in ipsa re non sunt, quam quæ in ipsa sunt (*vide Schol. Prop.* 52 *hujus*).	Definition 5. *Disdain* is an imagining of some thing that touches the mind so little that the mind is moved by the thing's presence to imagine what is not in the thing rather than what is in it (see the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part).
Definitiones Venerationis et Dedignationis missas hic facio, quia nulli, quod sciam, affectus ex his nomen trahunt.	I pass over here the definitions of veneration and disparagement, because no affects, as far as I know, take their names from them.
3DefAff6 VI. *Amor* est Lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.	Definition 6. *Love* is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
3DefAff6Exp EXPLICATIO. Hæc Definitio satis clare Amoris essentiam explicat; illa vero Auctorum, qui definiunt *Amorem esse voluntatem amantis se jungendi rei amatæ*, non Amoris essentiam, sed ejus proprietatem exprimit, et, quia Amoris essentia non satis ab Auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque ejus proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt; et hinc factum, ut eorum definitionem admodum obscuram esse omnes judicaverint.	Explanation. This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough. The definition given by those authors who define love as *the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved* expresses not the essence of love but a property of it. And because these authors did not see the essence of love clearly enough, they could not have any clear concept of its property either; hence everyone has judged their definition to be quite obscure.
Verum notandum, cum dico, proprietatem esse in amante, se voluntate jungere rei amatæ, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum, vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus Propositione 48 partis II), nec etiam Cupiditatem sese jungendi rei amatæ, quando abest, vel perseverandi in ipsius præsentia, quando adest; potest namque amor absque hac aut illa Cupiditate concipi; sed per voluntatem me Acquiescentiam intelligere, quæ est in Amante ob rei amatæ præsentiam, a qua Lætitia amantis corroboratur, aut saltem fovetur.	It should be noted, however, that when I say it is a property of the lover to join himself by will to the thing loved, I do not understand by "will" a consent, or a deliberation of the mind, that is, a free decree (for we demonstrated in Proposition 48 of Part 2 that this is a fiction). Nor do I mean a desire to join oneself to the thing loved when it is absent, or to remain in its presence when it is present; for love can be conceived without either of these desires. By "will" I understand the contentment that is in the lover on account of the presence of the

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		thing loved, by which the lover's joy is strengthened, or at least encouraged.
3DefAff7	VII. *Odium* est Tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.	Definition 7. *Hatred* is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
3DefAff7Ex	EXPLICATIO. Quæ hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in præcedentis Definitionis Explicatione facile percipiuntur (*vide præterea Schol. Prop.* 13 *hujus*).	Explanation. What should be noted here is easily perceived from what was said in the Explanation of the preceding definition (see also the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part).
3DefAff8	VIII. *Propensio* est Lætitia concomitante idea alicujus rei, quæ per accidens causa est Lætitiæ.	Definition 8. *Attraction* is joy accompanied by the idea of some thing that is accidentally the cause of joy.
3DefAff9	IX. *Aversio* est Tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei, quæ per accidens causa est Tristitiæ (*de his vide Prop.* 15 *Schol. hujus*).	Definition 9. *Aversion* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing that is accidentally the cause of sadness (on these, see the Scholium to Proposition 15 of this part).
3DefAff10	X. *Devotio* est Amor erga eum, quem admiramur.	Definition 10. *Devotion* is love toward one whom we wonder at.
3DefAff10Ex	EXPLICATIO. Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate, ostendimus Propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat, ut id, quod admiramur, sæpe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus; atque adeo videmus, Devotionis affectum facile in simplicem Amorem degenerare.	Explanation. We showed in Proposition 52 of this part that wonder arises from the novelty of a thing. So if it happens that we often imagine what we wonder at, we shall cease to wonder at it; and so we see that the affect of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.
3DefAff11	XI. *Irrisio* est Lætitia orta ex eo, quod aliquid, quod contemnimus, in re quam odimus, inesse imaginamur.	Definition 11. *Mockery* is joy arising from our imagining that something we disdain is present in a thing we hate.
3DefAff11Ex	EXPLICATIO. Quatenus rem, quam odimus, contemnimus, eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (*vide Schol. Prop.* 52 *hujus*), et eatenus (*per Prop.* 20 *hujus*) lætamur. Sed quoniam supponimus, hominem id, quod irridet, odio tamen habere, sequitur, hanc Lætitiam solidam non esse (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 47 *hujus*).	Explanation. Insofar as we disdain a thing we hate, we deny existence to it (see the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part), and to that extent (by Proposition 20 of this part) we rejoice. But since we suppose that a person nevertheless hates what he mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid (see the Scholium to Proposition 47 of this part).
3DefAff12	XII. *Spes* est inconstans Lætitia, orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ, de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.	Definition 12. *Hope* is an inconstant joy, arising from the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt.
3DefAff13	XIII. *Metus* est inconstans Tristitia, orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ, de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus (*vide de his Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 18 *hujus*).	Definition 13. *Fear* is an inconstant sadness, arising from the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt (on these, see Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this part).
3DefAff13Ex	EXPLICATIO. Ex his definitionibus sequitur, non dari Spem sine Metu, neque Metum sine Spe. Qui enim Spe	

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur, quod rei futuræ existentiam secludit; atque adeo eatenus contristari (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*), et consequenter, dum Spe pendet, metuere, ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in Metu est, hoc est, de rei, quam odit, eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur, quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit; atque adeo (*per Prop.* 20 *hujus*) lætatur, et consequenter eatenus Spem habet, ne eveniat.	Explanation. From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear, and no fear without hope. For whoever hangs on hope and doubts a thing's outcome is supposed to imagine something that excludes the existence of the future thing; and so to that extent he is saddened (by Proposition 19 of this part), and consequently, while he hangs on hope, he fears that the thing may not happen. Whoever, on the other hand, is in fear—that is, doubts the outcome of a thing he hates—also imagines something that excludes the existence of that thing; and so (by Proposition 20 of this part) he rejoices, and consequently to that extent he has hope that it will not happen.
3DefAff14	XIV. *Securitas* est Lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.	Definition 14. *Confidence* is joy arising from the idea of a future or past thing concerning which the cause of doubt has been removed.
3DefAff15	XV. *Desperatio* est Tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.	Definition 15. *Despair* is sadness arising from the idea of a future or past thing concerning which the cause of doubt has been removed.
3DefAff15Ex	EXPLICATIO. Oritur itaque ex Spe Securitas, et ex Metu Desperatio, quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur; quod fit, quia homo rem præteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut præsentem contemplatur, vel quia alia imaginatur, quæ existentiam earum rerum secludunt, quæ ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (*per Coroll. Prop.* 31 *p. II*) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest, ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (*vide Schol. Prop.* 49 *p. II*) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere; atque adeo fieri potest, ut ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ affectu afficiamur, ac ex rei præsentis imagine, ut in Propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem Scholiis vide.	Explanation. Confidence, then, arises from hope, and despair from fear, when the cause of doubt about a thing's outcome is removed. This happens because a person imagines the past or future thing as being there and contemplates it as present, or because he imagines other things that exclude the existence of the things that cast doubt into his mind. For although we can never be certain about the outcome of singular things (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of Part 2), it can still happen that we do not doubt their outcome. For we have shown (see the Scholium to Proposition 49 of Part 2) that not doubting a thing is one thing, and having certainty of it another. And so it can happen that we are affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy or sadness as by the image of a present thing, as we demonstrated in Proposition 18 of this part; see it together with its Scholia.
3DefAff16	XVI. *Gaudium* est Lætitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ, quæ præter Spem evenit.	Definition 16. *Gladness* is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped.
3DefAff17	XVII. *Conscientiæ morsus* est Tristitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ, quæ præter Spem evenit.	Definition 17. *Remorse* is sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out worse than we had hoped.
3DefAff18		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	XVIII. *Commiseratio* est Tristitia concomitante idea mali, quod alteri, quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 22 *et Schol.* 27 *hujus*).	Definition 18. *Pity* is sadness accompanied by the idea of an evil that has befallen another whom we imagine to be like us (see the Scholium to Proposition 22 and the Scholium to Proposition 27 of this part).
3DefAff18Ex	EXPLICATIO. Inter Commiserationem et Misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia, nisi forte, quod Commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, Misericordia autem ejus habitum.	Explanation. There seems to be no difference between pity and compassion, except perhaps that pity concerns the affect as a single occurrence, while compassion concerns the settled disposition to it.
3DefAff19	XIX. *Favor* est Amor erga aliquem, qui alteri benefecit.	Definition 19. *Approval* is love toward someone who has done good to another.
3DefAff20	XX. *Indignatio* est Odium erga aliquem, qui alteri malefecit.	Definition 20. *Indignation* is hatred toward someone who has done harm to another.
3DefAff20Ex	EXPLICATIO. Hæc nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est, verborum significationem, sed rerum naturam explicare, easque iis vocabulis indicare, quorum significatio, quam ex usu habent, a significatione, qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Cæterum horum affectuum causam vide in Corollario 1 Propositionis 27 et Scholio Propositionis 22 hujus Partis.	Explanation. I know that in common usage these words mean something else. But my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to designate them by words whose customary meaning is not wholly at odds with the meaning in which I wish to use them. Let it suffice to have pointed this out once. As for the cause of these affects, see Corollary 1 to Proposition 27 and the Scholium to Proposition 22 of this part.
3DefAff21	XXI. *Existimatio* est de aliquo præ Amore plus justo sentire.	Definition 21. *Overestimation* is thinking more highly of someone than is right, out of love.
3DefAff22	XXII. *Despectus* est de aliquo præ Odio minus justo sentire.	Definition 22. *Scorn* is thinking less highly of someone than is right, out of hatred.
3DefAff22Ex	EXPLICATIO. Est itaque Existimatio Amoris, et Despectus Odii effectus sive proprietas; atque adeo potest *Existimatio* etiam definiri, quod sit *Amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de re amata plus justo sentiat*, et contra *Despectus*, quod sit. *Odium, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de eo, quem odio habet, minus justo sentiat (vide de his Schol. Prop. 26 hujus).*	Explanation. Overestimation, then, is an effect, or property, of love, and scorn of hatred. So overestimation can also be defined as *love insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks more highly than is right of the thing loved*; and, conversely, scorn as *hatred insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks less highly than is right of the one he hates* (on these, see the Scholium to Proposition 26 of this part).
3DefAff23	XXIII. *Invidia* est Odium, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur, et contra, ut ex alterius malo gaudeat.	Definition 23. *Envy* is hatred insofar as it so affects a person that he is saddened by another's happiness and, conversely, rejoices at another's misfortune.
3DefAff23Ex	EXPLICATIO. Invidiæ opponitur communiter Misericordia, quæ proinde, invita vocabuli significatione, sic definiri potest:	Explanation. Envy is commonly opposed by compassion, which, therefore, in spite of the word's usual meaning, can be defined as follows:
3DefAff24		

LATIN	ENGLISH
XXIV. *Misericordia* est Amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex bono alterius gaudeat, et contra ut ex alterius malo contristetur.	Definition 24. *Compassion* is love insofar as it so affects a person that he rejoices at another's good and, conversely, is saddened by another's misfortune.
3DefAff24Ex EXPLICATIO. Cæterum de Invidia vide Schol. Prop. 24 et Schol. Prop. 32 hujus. Atque hi affectus Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ sunt, quos idea rei externæ comitatur tanquam causa per se vel per accidens. Hinc ad alios transeo, quos idea rei internæ comitatur tanquam causa.	Explanation. On envy, see further the Scholium to Proposition 24 and the Scholium to Proposition 32 of this part. These, then, are the affects of joy and sadness that are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as their cause, either directly or accidentally. From here I pass to the others, which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as their cause.
3DefAff25 XXV. *Acquiescentia in se ipso* est Lætitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur.	Definition 25. *Self-contentment* is joy arising from a person's contemplating himself and his own power of acting.
3DefAff26 XXVI. *Humilitas* est Tristitia orta ex eo, quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur.	Definition 26. *Humility* is sadness arising from a person's contemplating his own lack of power, or weakness.
3DefAff26Ex EXPLICATIO. Acquiescentia in se ipso Humilitati opponitur, quatenus per eandem intelligimus Lætitiam, quæ ex eo oritur, quod nostram agendi potentiam contemplamur; sed quatenus per ipsam etiam intelligimus Lætitiam concomitante idea alicujus facti, quod nos ex Mentis libero decreto fecisse credimus, tum Pœnitentiæ opponitur, quæ a nobis sic definitur:	Explanation. Self-contentment is opposed to humility insofar as we understand by it the joy that arises from contemplating our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it joy accompanied by the idea of some deed that we believe we did by a free decree of the mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we define as follows:
3DefAff27 XXVII. *Pœnitentia* est Tristitia concomitante idea alicujus facti, quod nos ex libero Mentis decreto fecisse credimus.	Definition 27. *Repentance* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed that we believe we did by a free decree of the mind.
3DefAff27Ex EXPLICATIO. Horum affectuum causas ostendimus in Schol. Prop. 51 hujus, et Prop. 53, 54 et 55 hujus, ejusque Schol. De libero autem Mentis decreto vide Schol. Prop. 35 p. II. Sed hic præterea notandum venit, mirum non esse, quod omnes omnino actus, qui ex consuetudine *pravi* vocantur, sequatur Tristitia, et illos, qui *recti* dicuntur, Lætitia. Nam hoc ab educatione potissimum pendere, facile ex supra dictis intelligimus. Parentes nimirum, illos exprobrando, liberosque propter eosdem sæpe objurgando, hos contra suadendo et laudando, effecerunt, ut Tristitiæ commotiones illis, Lætitiæ vero his jungerentur. Quod ipsa etiam experientia comprobatur. Nam consuetudo et Religio non est omnibus eadem, sed contra, quæ apud alios sacra, apud alios profana, et quæ apud alios honesta, apud alios turpia sunt.	Explanation. We have shown the causes of these affects in the Scholium to Proposition 51 of this part, and in Propositions 53, 54 and 55 of this part and the Scholium to the last. On the free decree of the mind, see the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 2. But it should also be noted here that it is no wonder that sadness follows absolutely all the acts customarily called *wrong*, and joy those called *right*. For we easily understand from what was said above that this depends chiefly on upbringing. Parents, by condemning the former and often scolding their children for them, and by recommending and praising the latter, have brought it about that stirrings of sadness are joined to the one kind and stirrings of joy to the other. Experience itself confirms this. For custom and religion are not the same for everyone; on the contrary,

LATIN

ENGLISH

what is sacred for some is profane for others, and what is honorable for some is shameful for others.

Prout igitur unusquisque educatus est, ita facti alicujus pœnitet, vel eodem gloriatur.

So each person repents of a deed, or glories in it, according to how he has been brought up.

3DefAff28 XXVIII. *Superbia* est de se præ Amore sui plus justo sentire.

Definition 28. *Pride* is thinking more highly of oneself than is right, out of self-love.

3DefAff28Ex EXPLICATIO. Differt igitur Superbia ab Existimatione, quod hæc ad objectum externum, Superbia autem ad ipsum hominem, de se plus justo sentientem, referatur. Cæterum, ut Existimatio Amoris, sic Superbia Philautiæ effectus vel proprietas est, quæ propterea etiam definiri potest, quod sit *Amor sui, sive Acquiescentia in se ipso, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de se plus justo sentiat* (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 26 *hujus*). Huic affectui non datur contrarius. Nam nemo de se, præ Odio sui, minus justo sentit; imo nemo de se minus justo sentit, quatenus imaginatur, se hoc vel illud non posse. Nam quicquid homo imaginatur se non posse, id necessario imaginatur, et hac imaginatione ita disponitur, ut id agere revera non possit, quod se non posse imaginatur.

Explanation. Pride, then, differs from overestimation in that the latter relates to an external object, whereas pride relates to the person himself, who thinks more highly of himself than is right. Moreover, as overestimation is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of *philautia* [self-love]. It can therefore also be defined as *self-love, or self-contentment, insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks more highly of himself than is right* (see the Scholium to Proposition 26 of this part). There is no affect contrary to this one. For no one thinks less highly of himself than is right out of hatred of himself; indeed, no one thinks less highly of himself than is right insofar as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a person imagines he cannot do, he necessarily imagines; and by this imagining he is so disposed that he really cannot do what he imagines he cannot do.

Quamdiu enim imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse, tamdiu ad agendum non est determinatus, et consequenter tamdiu impossibile ei est, ut id agat. Verumenimvero si ad illa attendamus, quæ a sola opinione pendent, concipere poterimus fieri posse, ut homo de se minus justo sentiat; fieri enim potest, ut aliquis, dum tristis imbecillitatem contemplatur suam, imaginetur, se ab omnibus contemni, idque dum reliqui nihil minus cogitant, quam ipsum contemnere. Potest præterea homo de se minus justo sentire, si aliquid de se in præsenti neget cum relatione ad futurum tempus, cujus est incertus; ut quod neget, se nihil certi posse concipere, nihilque nisi prava vel turpia posse cupere vel agere, etc.

For as long as he imagines he cannot do this or that, he is not determined to act, and consequently for that long it is impossible for him to do it. Yet if we attend to what depends on opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive that it can happen that a person thinks less highly of himself than is right. For it can happen that someone, while sadly contemplating his own weakness, imagines that he is despised by everyone, even while the others are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Further, a person can think less highly of himself than is right if he denies something of himself in the present in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain: for example, if he denies that he can conceive anything certain, or that he can desire or do anything but what is wrong or shameful, and so on.

Possumus deinde dicere, aliquem de se minus justo sentire, cum videmus, ipsum ex nimio pudoris metu ea non audere, quæ alii ipsi æquales audent. Hunc igitur affectum possumus Superbiæ opponere, quem Abjectionem vocabo; nam ut ex Acquiescentia in se ipso

Again, we can say that someone thinks less highly of himself than is right when we see that, from an excessive fear of shame, he does not dare what others who are his equals dare. We can, therefore, oppose this affect to pride; I shall call it self-abasement. For as pride arises from self-contentment,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Superbia, sic ex Humilitate Abjectio oritur, quæ proinde a nobis sic definitur.	so self-abasement arises from humility; and so we define it as follows.
3DefAff29	XXIX. *Abjectio* est de se præ Tristitia minus justo sentire.	Definition 29. *Self-abasement* is thinking less highly of oneself than is right, out of sadness.
3DefAff29Exp	EXPLICATIO. Solemus tamen sæpe Superbiæ Humilitatem opponere, sed tum magis ad utriusque effectus quam naturam attendimus. Solemus namque illum superbum vocare, qui nimis gloriatur (*vid. Schol. Prop.* 30 *hujus*), qui non nisi virtutes suas, et aliorum non nisi vitia narrat, qui omnibus præferri vult, et qui denique ea gravitate et ornatu incedit, quo solent alii, qui longe supra ipsum sunt positi. Contra illum humilem vocamus, qui sæpius erubescit, qui sua vitia fatetur, et aliorum virtutes narrat, qui omnibus cedit, et qui denique submisso capite ambulat, et se ornare negligit. Cæterum hi affectus, nempe Humilitas et Abjectio, rarissimi sunt.	Explanation. Yet we often oppose humility to pride; but then we attend more to the effects of the two than to their nature. For we usually call proud someone who boasts too much (see the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part), who tells of nothing but his own virtues and nothing but others' vices, who wants to be preferred to everyone, and who, finally, goes about with the dignity and finery usual among those placed far above him. On the other hand, we call humble someone who often blushes, who confesses his own vices and tells of others' virtues, who gives way to everyone, and who, finally, walks with head bowed and neglects to adorn himself. These affects, however—humility and self-abasement—are very rare.
	Nam natura humana, in se considerata, contra eosdem quantum potest, nititur (*vide Prop.* 13 *et* 54 *hujus*); et ideo, qui maxime creduntur abjecti et humiles esse, maxime plerumque ambitiosi et invidi sunt.	For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see Propositions 13 and 54 of this part); and so those who are most believed to be self-abased and humble are usually the most ambitious and envious.
3DefAff30	XXX. *Gloria* est Lætitia concomitante idea alicujus nostræ actionis, quam alios laudare imaginamur.	Definition 30. *Glory* is joy accompanied by the idea of some action of ours that we imagine others praise.
3DefAff31	XXXI. *Pudor* est Tristitia concomitante idea alicujus actionis, quam alios vituperare imaginamur.	Definition 31. *Shame* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some action that we imagine others blame.
3DefAff31Exp	EXPLICATIO. De his vide Scholium Propositionis 30 hujus Partis. Sed hic notanda est differentia, quæ est inter Pudorem et Verecundiam. Est enim Pudor Tristitia, quæ sequitur factum, cujus pudet. Verecundia autem est Metus seu Timor Pudoris, quo homo continetur, ne aliquid turpe committat. Verecundiæ opponi solet Impudentia, quæ revera affectus non est, ut suo loco ostendam; sed affectuum nomina (ut jam monui) magis eorum usum quam naturam respiciunt. Atque his Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ affectus, quos explicare proposueram, absolvi. Pergo itaque ad illos, quos ad Cupiditatem refero.	Explanation. On these, see the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part. But here the difference between shame and modesty should be noted. Shame is the sadness that follows a deed one is ashamed of; modesty is the fear, or timidity, of shame, by which a person is restrained from committing something shameful. Shamelessness is usually opposed to modesty; but it is not really an affect, as I shall show in its place. The names of the affects, however (as I have already pointed out), concern their usage more than their nature. With this I have finished the affects of joy and sadness that I had set out to explain. I proceed, then, to those that I relate to desire.[10]

AFFECTS OF DESIRE

Definitions of longing, emulation, gratitude, anger, ambition and the other affects related to desire.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3DefAff32	XXXII. *Desiderium* est Cupiditas sive Appetitus re aliqua potiundi, quæ ejusdem rei memoria fovetur, et simul aliarum rerum memoria, quæ ejusdem rei appetendæ existentiam secludunt, coercetur.	Definition 32. *Longing* is a desire, or appetite, to possess some thing, which is encouraged by the memory of that thing and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things that exclude the existence of the thing wanted.
3DefAff32Exp	EXPLICATIO. Cum alicujus rei recordamur, ut jam sæpe diximus, eo ipso disponimur ad eandem eodem affectu contemplandum, ac si res præsens adesset; sed hæc dispositio, seu conatus, dum vigilamus, plerumque cohibetur ab imaginibus rerum, quæ existentiam ejus, cujus recordamur, secludunt. Quando itaque rei meminimus, quæ nos aliquo Lætitiæ genere afficit, eo ipso conamur eandem, cum eodem Lætitiæ affectu ut præsentem contemplari, qui quidem conatus statim cohibetur memoria rerum, quæ illius existentiam secludunt. Quare desiderium revera Tristitia est, quæ Lætitiæ opponitur illi, quæ ex absentia rei, quam odimus, oritur, de qua vide Scholium Propositionis 47 hujus partis. Sed quia nomen *Desiderium* Cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad Cupiditatis affectus refero.	Explanation. When we remember some thing, as we have often said already, we are by that very fact disposed to contemplate it with the same affect as if it were present. But while we are awake, this disposition, or striving, is usually checked by the images of things that exclude the existence of what we remember. So when we remember a thing that affected us with some kind of joy, by that very fact we strive to contemplate it as present with the same affect of joy—a striving that is immediately checked by the memory of things that exclude its existence. Longing, therefore, is really a sadness, opposed to the joy that arises from the absence of a thing we hate (on which see the Scholium to Proposition 47 of this part). But because the name *longing* seems to concern desire, I relate this affect to the affects of desire.
3DefAff33	XXXIII. *Æmulatio* est alicujus rei Cupiditas, quæ nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios eandem Cupiditatem habere imaginamur.	Definition 33. *Emulation* is the desire for some thing that is generated in us because we imagine that others have the same desire.
3DefAff33Exp	EXPLICATIO. Qui fugit, quia alios fugere, vel qui timet, quia alios timere videt; vel etiam ille, qui ex eo, quod aliquem manum suam combussisse videt, manum ad se contrahit, corpusque movet, quasi ipsius manus combureretur; eum imitari quidem alterius affectum, sed non eundem æmulari dicemus; non quia aliam æmulationis, aliam imitationis novimus causam, sed quia usu factum est, ut illum tantum vocemus æmulum, qui id, quod honestum utile, vel jucundum esse judicamus, imitatur. Cæterum de Æmulationis causa vide Propositionem 27 hujus Partis cum ejus Scholio. Cur autem huic affectui plerumque juncta sit Invidia, de eo *vide Propositionem 32 hujus cum ejusdem Scholio*.	Explanation. Someone who flees because he sees others flee, or who is afraid because he sees others afraid; or again, someone who, seeing that another has burned his hand, draws back his own hand and moves his body as if his own hand were burning—such a person we shall say imitates another's affect, but not that he emulates it. This is not because we know one cause for emulation and another for imitation, but because custom has brought it about that we call someone an emulator only when he imitates what we judge honorable, useful or pleasant. As for the cause of emulation, see Proposition 27 of this part with its Scholium. And on why envy is usually joined to this affect, *see Proposition 32 of this part with its Scholium*.

10 Spinoza distinguishes *pudor*, "shame," felt after the act, from *verecundia*, "modesty," the sense of shame that holds one back beforehand.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
3DefAff34	XXXIV. *Gratia* seu *Gratitudo* est Cupiditas, seu Amoris studium, quo ei benefacere conamur, qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit. *Vide Prop.* 39 *cum Schol. Prop.* 41 *hujus.*	Definition 34. *Gratitude*, or *thankfulness*, is a desire, or eagerness of love, by which we strive to benefit one who has conferred a benefit on us from a like affect of love. *See Proposition 39, with the Scholium to Proposition 41 of this part.*
3DefAff35	XXXV. *Benevolentia* est Cupiditas benefaciendi ei, cujus nos miseret. *Vide Schol. Prop.* 27 *hujus.*	Definition 35. *Benevolence* is a desire to benefit one whom we pity. *See the Scholium to Proposition 27 of this part.*
3DefAff36	XXXVI. *Ira* est Cupiditas, qua ex Odio incitamur ad illi, quem odimus, malum inferendum. *Vide Prop.* 39 *hujus.*	Definition 36. *Anger* is a desire by which, out of hatred, we are driven to do evil to one we hate. *See Proposition 39 of this part.*
3DefAff37	XXXVII. *Vindicta* est Cupiditas, qua ex reciproco Odio concitamur ad malum inferendum ei, qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit *Vide* 2 *Coroll. Prop.* 40 *hujus cum ejusdem Schol.*	Definition 37. *Vengeance* is a desire by which, out of reciprocal hatred, we are roused to do evil to one who, from a like affect, has done us harm. *See Corollary 2 to Proposition 40 of this part, with its Scholium.*
3DefAff38	XXXVIII. *Crudelitas* seu *Sævitia* est *Cupiditas*, qua aliquis concitatur ad malum inferendum ei, quem amamus, vel cujus nos miseret.	Definition 38. *Cruelty*, or *savagery*, is a *desire* by which someone is roused to do evil to one whom we love or pity.
3DefAff38Ex	EXPLICATIO. Crudelitati opponitur Clementia, quæ passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.	Explanation. Opposed to cruelty is mercy, which is not a passion but a power of the mind by which a person governs anger and vengeance.
3DefAff39	XXXIX. *Timor* est Cupiditas majus, quod metuimus, malum minore vitandi. *Vide Schol. Prop.* 39 *hujus.*	Definition 39. *Timidity* is a desire to avoid a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser one. *See the Scholium to Proposition 39 of this part.*
3DefAff40	XL. *Audacia* est Cupiditas, qua aliquis incitatur ad aliquid agendum cum periculo, quod ejus æquales subire metuunt.	Definition 40. *Daring* is a desire by which someone is driven to do something at a risk that his equals are afraid to face.
3DefAff41	XLI. *Pusillanimitas* dicitur de eo, cujus Cupiditas coercetur timore periculi, quod ejus æquales subire audent.	Definition 41. *Cowardice* is said of someone whose desire is restrained by fear of a danger that his equals dare to face.
3DefAff41Ex	EXPLICATIO. Est igitur Pusillanimitas nihil aliud, quam Metus alicujus mali, quod plerique non solent metuere; quare ipsam ad Cupiditatis affectus non refero. Eandem tamen hic explicare volui, quia, quatenus ad Cupiditatem attendimus, affectui Audaciæ revera opponitur.	Explanation. Cowardice, then, is nothing but fear of some evil that most people do not usually fear; so I do not relate it to the affects of desire. Yet I wanted to explain it here, because, insofar as we attend to desire, it really is opposed to the affect of daring.
3DefAff42	XLII. *Consternatio* dicitur de eo, cujus Cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali, quod timet.	Definition 42. *Consternation* is said of someone whose desire to avoid an evil is restrained by wonder at the evil he fears.
3DefAff42Ex	EXPLICATIO. Est itaque Consternatio Pusillanimitatis species. Sed quia Consternatio ex duplici Timore oritur,	Explanation. Consternation, then, is a species of cowardice. But because consternation arises from

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	ideo commodius definiri potest, quod sit *Metus, qui hominem stupefactum aut fluctuantem ita continet, ut is malum amovere non possit*. Dico *stupefactum*, quatenus ejus Cupiditatem malum amovendi admiratione coerceri intelligimus. *Fluctuantem* autem dico, quatenus concipimus eandem Cupiditatem coerceri Timore alterius mali, quod ipsum æque cruciat: unde fit, ut, quodnam ex duobus avertat, nesciat. De his vide Schol. Prop. 39 et Schol. Prop. 52 hujus. Cæterum de Pusillanimitate et Audacia vide *Schol. Prop.* 51 *hujus*.	a double fear, it can more conveniently be defined as *a fear that holds a person so stunned or wavering that he cannot ward off the evil*. I say *stunned* insofar as we understand his desire to ward off the evil to be restrained by wonder. And I say *wavering* insofar as we conceive that same desire to be restrained by fear of another evil that torments him equally, so that he does not know which of the two to avert. On these, see the Scholium to Proposition 39 and the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part. As for cowardice and daring, see *the Scholium to Proposition 51 of this part*.
3DefAff43	XLIII. *Humanitas* seu *Modestia* est Cupiditas ea faciendi, quæ hominibus placent, et omittendi, quæ displicent.	Definition 43. *Courtesy*, or *modesty*, is a desire to do what pleases people and to refrain from what displeases them.
3DefAff44	XLIV. *Ambitio* est immodica gloriæ Cupiditas.	Definition 44. *Ambition* is an excessive desire for glory.
3DefAff44Exp	EXPLICATIO. Ambitio est Cupiditas, qua omnes affectus (*per Prop.* 27 *et* 31 *hujus*) foventur et corroborantur; et ideo hic affectus vix superari potest. Nam quamdiu homo aliqua Cupiditate tenetur, hac simul necessario tenetur. *Optimus quisque*, inquit Cicero, *maxime gloria ducitur. Philosophi etiam libris, quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt*, etc.	Explanation. Ambition is a desire by which all the affects are encouraged and strengthened (by Propositions 27 and 31 of this part); and so this affect can hardly be overcome. For as long as a person is held by any desire, he is necessarily held by this one as well. *All the best people*, says Cicero, *are most led by glory. Even philosophers put their names on the books they write about despising glory*, etc.[11]
3DefAff45	XLV. *Luxuria* est immoderata convivandi Cupiditas, vel etiam Amor.	Definition 45. *Gluttony* is an immoderate desire for, or even love of, feasting.
3DefAff46	XLVI. *Ebrietas* est immoderata potandi Cupiditas et Amor.	Definition 46. *Drunkenness* is an immoderate desire for and love of drinking.
3DefAff47	XLVII. *Avaritia* est immoderata divitiarum Cupiditas et Amor.	Definition 47. *Greed* is an immoderate desire for and love of riches.
3DefAff48	XLVIII. *Libido* est etiam Cupiditas et Amor in commiscendis corporibus.	Definition 48. *Lust* is also a desire for and love of the joining of bodies.
3DefAff48Exp	EXPLICATIO. Sive hæc coeundi Cupiditas moderata sit, sive non sit, Libido appellari solet. Porro hi quinque affectus (*ut in Schol. Prop.* 56 *hujus monui*) contrarios non habent. Nam Modestia species est Ambitionis, de qua vide *Schol. Prop.* 29 *hujus*. Temperantiam deinde, Sobrietatem, et Castitatem Mentis potentiam, non autem passionem indicare, jam etiam monui. Et tametsi fieri potest, ut homo avarus, ambitiosus, vel timidus a nimio cibo, potu, et coitu, abstineat; Avaritia tamen, Ambitio et Timor luxuriæ, ebrietati, vel libidini non sunt contrarii. Nam	Explanation. Whether this desire for intercourse is moderate or not, it is usually called lust. Further, these five affects (as I pointed out in the Scholium to Proposition 56 of this part) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition (on which see *the Scholium to Proposition 29 of this part*). And I have also already pointed out that temperance, sobriety and chastity indicate a power of the mind, not a passion. And although it can happen

11 Cicero (106–43 BC), Roman orator and philosopher; the quotation is from his speech *Pro Archia* (26).

LATIN

avarus in cibum et potum alienum se ingurgitare plerumque desiderat. Ambitiosus autem, modo speret fore clam, in nulla re sibi temperabit, et si inter ebrios vivat et libidinosos, ideo quia ambitiosus est, proclivior erit ad eadem vitia.

Timidus denique id, quod non vult, facit. Nam quamvis mortis vitandæ causa divitias in mare projiciat, manet tamen avarus et si libidinosus tristis est, quod sibi morem gerere nequeat, non desinit propterea libidinosus esse. Et absolute hi affectus non tam ipsos actus convivandi, potandi, etc., respiciunt, quam ipsum Appetitum et Amorem. Nihil igitur his affectibus opponi potest, præter Generositatem et Animositatem, de quibus in seqq.

Definitiones Zelotypiæ et reliquarum animi fluctuationum silentio prætermitto, tam quia ex compositione affectuum, quos jam definivimus oriuntur, quam quia pleræque nomina non habent; quod ostendit ad usum vitæ sufficere, easdem in genere tantummodo noscere. Cæterum ex Definitionibus affectuum, quos explicuimus, liquet eos omnes a Cupiditate, Lætitia, vel Tristitia oriri, seu potius nihil præter hos tres esse, quorum unusquisque variis nominibus appellari solet propter varias eorum relationes et denominationes extrinsecas. Si jam ad hos primitivos, et ad ea, quæ de natura Mentis supra diximus, attendere velimus, affectus, quatenus ad solam Mentem referuntur, sic definire poterimus.

ENGLISH

that a greedy, ambitious or timid person abstains from too much food, drink and sex, still greed, ambition and timidity are not contrary to gluttony, drunkenness or lust. For the greedy person usually longs to gorge himself on other people's food and drink. And the ambitious person, provided he hopes it will stay secret, will restrain himself in nothing; and if he lives among drunkards and the lustful, he will be all the more inclined to those same vices precisely because he is ambitious.

Finally, the timid person does what he does not want to do. For even if he throws his riches into the sea to avoid death, he still remains greedy; and if the lustful person is sad because he cannot indulge himself, he does not on that account cease to be lustful. And, in general, these affects concern not so much the acts of feasting, drinking and so on themselves, as the appetite and love itself. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these affects except nobility and tenacity, of which more below.

I pass over in silence the definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind, both because they arise from the combination of affects we have already defined and because most of them have no names—which shows that for the practice of life it is enough to know them only in general. For the rest, it is clear from the definitions of the affects we have explained that they all arise from desire, joy or sadness—or rather, that they are nothing but these three, each of which is usually called by various names on account of its various relations and extrinsic denominations. If we now wish to attend to these primitive affects, and to what we said above about the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define the affects, insofar as they are related to the mind alone, as follows.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE AFFECTS

An affect, as a passion of the mind, is a confused idea affirming a change in the body's force of existing.

LATIN

3DefAffGen AFFECTUUM GENERALIS DEFINITIO. Affectus, qui animi Pathema dicitur, est confusa idea qua Mens majorem vel minorem sui Corporis, vel alicujus ejus partis, existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat, et qua data ipsa Mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur.

ENGLISH

General Definition of the Affects. An affect, which is called a *pathema* [passion] of the mind, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, once it is given,

LATIN

ENGLISH

the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than that.

3DefAffGenExpl

EXPLICATIO. Dico primo. Affectum seu passionem animi esse *confusam ideam*. Nam Mentem eatenus tantum pati ostendimus (*vide Prop.* 3 *hujus*), quatenus ideas inadæquatas sive confusas habet. Dico deinde, *qua Mens majorem vel minorem sui Corporis, vel alicujus ejus partis, existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat*. Omnes enim corporum ideæ, quas habemus, magis nostri Corporis actualem constitutionem (*per Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 16 *p. II*), quam corporis externi naturam indicant; at hæc, quæ affectus formam constituit, Corporis, vel alicujus ejus partis, constitutionem indicare vel exprimere debet, quam ipsum Corpus vel aliqua ejus pars habet, ex eo, quod ipsius agendi potentia sive existendi vis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur.

Explanation. I say, first, that an affect, or passion of the mind, is *a confused idea*. For we have shown (see Proposition 3 of this part) that the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or confused, ideas. I say next, *by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before*. For all the ideas of bodies that we have indicate the actual constitution of our own body (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2) more than the nature of the external body. But the idea that constitutes the form of an affect must indicate or express a constitution of the body, or of some part of it, which the body itself, or some part of it, has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.

Sed notandum, cum dico, *majorem vel minorem existendi vim, quam antea*, me non intelligere, quod Mens præsentem, Corporis constitutionem cum præterita comparat, sed quod idea, quæ affectus formam constituit, aliquid de Corpore affirmat, quod plus minusve realitatis revera involvit, quam antea. Et quia essentia Mentis in hoc consistit (*per Prop.* 11 *et* 13 *p. II*), quod sui Corporis actualem existentiam affirmat, et nos per perfectionem ipsam rei essentiam intelligimus; sequitur ergo, quod Mens ad majorem minoremve perfectionem transit, quando ei aliquid de suo Corpore, vel aliqua ejus parte, affirmare contingit, quod plus minusve realitatis involvit, quam antea.

But it should be noted that when I say *a greater or lesser force of existing than before*, I do not mean that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with a past one, but that the idea that constitutes the form of the affect affirms something of the body that really involves more or less reality than before. And since the essence of the mind consists in this (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and since by perfection we understand the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something of its body, or of some part of it, that involves more or less reality than before.

Cum igitur supra dixerim, Mentis cogitandi potentiam augeri vel minui, nihil aliud intelligere volui, quam quod Mens ideam sui Corporis, vel alicujus ejus partis, formaverit, quæ plus minusve realitatis exprimit, quam de suo Corpore affirmaverat. Nam idearum præstantia, et actualis cogitandi potentia, ex objecti præstantia, æstimatur. Addidi denique, *et qua data ipsa Mens ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur*, ut præter Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ naturam, quam prima definitionis pars explicat, Cupiditatis etiam naturam exprimerem.

So when I said above that the mind's power of thinking is increased or diminished, I meant nothing other than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or of some part of it, that expresses more or less reality than it had affirmed of its body before. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking, are measured by the excellence of the object. Finally, I added *and by which, once it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than that*, so as to express, besides the nature of joy and sadness, which the first part of the definition explains, the nature of desire as well.

Part IV: Of human bondage, or the powers of the affects

Spinoza shows how the emotions rule us and what reason prescribes for a good life.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4Pref	PRÆFATIO. *Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus Servitutem voco; homo enim affectibus obnoxius sui juris non est, sed fortunæ; in cujus potestate ita est, ut sæpe coactus sit, quanquam meliora sibi videat, deteriora tamen sequi. Hujus rei causam, et quid præterea affectus boni vel mali habent, in hac Parte demonstrare proposui. Sed antequam incipiam, pauca de perfectione et imperfectione, deque bono et malo præfari lubet.*	Preface. Human lack of power in governing and restraining the affects I call bondage. For a person subject to the affects is not his own master but is under the control of fortune, in whose power he is to such an extent that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course for himself, still to follow the worse. In this Part I have set out to demonstrate the cause of this, and what good or bad the affects have besides. But before I begin, I should like to say a few words first about perfection and imperfection, and about good and evil.
	Qui rem aliquam facere constituit, eamque perfecit, rem suam perfectam esse, non tantum ipse, sed etiam unusquisque, qui mentem Auctoris illius operis et scopum recte noverit, aut se novisse crediderit, dicet. Ex. gr. si quis aliquod opus (quod suppono nondum esse peractum) viderit, noveritque scopum Auctoris illius operis esse domum ædificare, is domum imperfectam esse dicet, et contra perfectam, simulatque opus ad finem, quem hujus Auctor eidem dare constituerat, perductum viderit. Verum si quis opus aliquod videt, cujus simile nunquam viderat, nec mentem opificis novit, is sane scire non poterit, opusne illud perfectum an imperfectum sit. Atque hæc videtur prima fuisse horum vocabulorum significatio. Sed postquam homines ideas universales formare, et domuum, ædificiorum, turrium, etc.	When someone has resolved to make something and has finished it, he will say that his thing is perfect—and not only he, but everyone who rightly knows, or believes he knows, the mind and aim of the author of that work. For example, if someone sees some work (which I suppose is not yet completed) and knows that its author's aim is to build a house, he will say that the house is imperfect; and, on the other hand, that it is perfect as soon as he sees the work brought to the end its author had resolved to give it. But if someone sees a work the like of which he had never seen, and does not know the maker's intention, he certainly cannot know whether that work is perfect or imperfect. And this seems to have been the first meaning of these words. But after people began to form universal ideas, and to devise models of houses, buildings, towers, etc.,[1]
	exemplaria excogitare, et alia rerum exemplaria aliis præferre inceperunt, factum est, ut unusquisque id perfectum vocaret, quod cum universali idea, quam ejusmodi rei formaverat, videret convenire, et id contra imperfectum, quod cum concepto suo exemplari minus convenire videret, quanquam ex opificis sententia consummatum plane esset. Nec alia videtur esse ratio, cur res naturales etiam, quæ scilicet humana manu non sunt factæ, perfectas aut imperfectas vulgo appellent;	and to prefer some models of things to others, it came about that each person called perfect what he saw agree with the universal idea he had formed of that kind of thing, and imperfect, on the other hand, what he saw agree less with the model he had conceived, even though in its maker's judgment it had been fully completed. Nor does there seem to be any other reason why people also commonly call natural things—those, namely, not

1 Latin *perfectus* literally means "completed" or "carried through"; Spinoza is recovering this original sense of the word.

LATIN

solent namque homines tam rerum naturalium quam artificialium ideas formare universales, quas rerum veluti exemplaria habent, et quas Naturam (quam nihil nisi alicujus finis causa agere existimant) intueri credunt sibique exemplaria proponere.

Cum itaque aliquid in Natura fieri vident, quod cum concepto exemplari, quod rei ejusmodi habent, minus convenit, ipsam Naturam tum defecisse vel peccavisse remque illam imperfectam reliquisse credunt. Videmus itaque homines consuevisse, res naturales perfectas aut imperfectas vocare, magis ex præjudicio quam ex earum vera cognitione. Ostendimus enim in Primæ Partis Appendice, Naturam propter finem non agere; æternum namque illud et infinitum Ens, quod Deum seu. Naturam appellamus eadem, qua existit, necessitate agit. Ex qua enim naturæ necessitate existit, ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus *(Prop. 16 p. I).* Ratio igitur, seu causa, cur Deus seu Natura agit, et cur existit, una eademque est. Ut ergo nullius finis causa existit, nullius etiam finis causa agit; sed ut existendi, sic et agendi principium, vel finem, habet nullum.

Causa autem, quæ finalis dicitur, nihil est præter ipsum humanum appetitum, quatenus is alicujus rei veluti principium seu causa primaria consideratur. Ex. gr. cum dicimus habitationem causam fuisse finalem hujus aut illius domus, nihil tum sane intelligimus aliud, quam quod homo ex eo, quod vitæ domesticæ commoda imaginatus est, appetitum habuit ædificandi domum. Quare habitatio, quatenus ut finalis causa consideratur, nihil est præter hunc singularem appetitum, qui revera causa est efficiens; quæ ut prima consideratur, quia homines suorum appetituum causas communiter ignorant. Sunt namque, ut jam sæpe dixi, suarum quidem actionum et appetituum conscii, sed ignari causarum, a quibus ad aliquid appetendum determinantur.

Quod præterea vulgo ajunt, Naturam aliquando deficere vel peccare, resque interea imperfectas producere, inter commenta numero, de quibus in Appendice Partis Primæ egi. Perfectio igitur et imperfectio revera modi solummodo cogitandi sunt, nempe notiones, quas fingere solemus ex eo, quod ejusdem speciei aut generis individua ad invicem comparamus: et hac de causa supra

ENGLISH

made by human hand—perfect or imperfect. For people are accustomed to form universal ideas of natural things as well as of artificial ones, which they treat as models of things; and they believe that Nature (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to these ideas and sets them before itself as models.

So when they see something happen in Nature that agrees less with the model they have conceived of that kind of thing, they believe that Nature itself has then fallen short or erred, and left that thing imperfect. We see, then, that people have grown accustomed to calling natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of them. For we showed in the Appendix to Part 1 that Nature does not act for the sake of an end: that eternal and infinite being we call God, or Nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists. For we have shown that it acts from the same necessity of nature from which it exists (Proposition 16 of Part 1). The reason, or cause, why God, or Nature, acts and why it exists is therefore one and the same. So, as it exists for the sake of no end, it also acts for the sake of no end; rather, as it has no principle or end of existing, so it has none of acting.

What is called a final cause, however, is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered the principle, or primary cause, of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, we surely understand nothing but that a person, because he imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So habitation, insofar as it is considered a final cause, is nothing but this singular appetite, which is really an efficient cause, and which is considered as first because people are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites. For, as I have often said already, they are conscious of their actions and appetites but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to want something.

As for what people commonly say besides—that Nature sometimes fails or errs and produces imperfect things—I count this among the fictions I dealt with in the Appendix to Part 1. Perfection and imperfection, then, are really only modes of thinking: that is, notions we are accustomed to fashion because we compare individuals of the

LATIN

(Defin. 6 p. II) dixi, me per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligere. Solemus enim omnia Naturæ individua ad unum genus, quod generalissimum appellatur, revocare; nempe ad notionem Entis, quæ ad omnia absolute Naturæ individua pertinet.

Quatenus itaque Naturæ individua ad hoc genus revocamus, et ad invicem comparamus, et alia plus entitatis seu realitatis quam alia habere comperimus, eatenus alia aliis perfectiora esse dicimus; et quatenus iisdem aliquid tribuimus, quod negationem involvit, ut terminus, finis, impotentia, etc., eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus, quia nostram Mentem non æque afficiunt ac illa, quæ perfecta vocamus, et non quod ipsis aliquid, quod suum sit, deficiat, vel quod Natura peccaverit. Nihil enim naturæ alicujus rei competit, nisi id, quod ex necessitate naturæ causæ efficientis sequitur, et quicquid ex necessitate naturæ causæ efficientis sequitur, id necessario fit.

Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus, in se scilicet consideratis, indicant, nec aliud sunt præter cogitandi modos, seu notiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus. Nam una eademque res potest eodem tempore bona et mala, et etiam indifferens esse. Ex. gr. musica bona est Melancholico, mala Lugenti; Surdo autem neque bona neque mala. Verum, quamvis se res ita habeat, nobis tamen hæc vocabula retinenda sunt. Nam quia ideam hominis, tanquam naturæ humanæ exemplar, quod intueamur formare cupimus, nobis ex usu erit, hæc eadem vocabula eo, quo dixi, sensu retinere. Per bonum itaque in seqq. intelligam id, quod certo scimus medium esse, ut ad exemplar humanæ naturæ, quod nobis proponimus, magis magisque accedamus.

Per malum autem id, quod certo scimus impedire, quo minus idem exemplar referamus. Deinde homines perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus, quatenus ad hoc idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt. Nam apprime notandum est, cum dico, aliquem a minore ad majorem perfectionem transire, et contra, me non intelligere,

ENGLISH

same species or genus with one another. And for this reason I said above (Definition 6 of Part 2) that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing. For we are accustomed to refer all the individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the most general: namely, to the notion of being, which belongs absolutely to all the individuals in Nature.

Insofar, then, as we refer the individuals of Nature to this genus and compare them with one another, and find that some have more being, or reality, than others, to that extent we say that some are more perfect than others. And insofar as we attribute to them something that involves negation—such as limit, end, lack of power, etc.—to that extent we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind as much as those we call perfect, and not because they lack something that is theirs, or because Nature has erred. For nothing belongs to the nature of any thing except what follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause happens necessarily.

As for good and evil, they too indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form because we compare things with one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for someone who is melancholy, bad for someone in mourning, and neither good nor bad for someone who is deaf. But although this is how things stand, we must still keep these words. For since we desire to form an idea of the human being as a model of human nature for us to look to, it will be useful for us to keep these same words in the sense I have described. In what follows, then, by good I shall understand what we know with certainty to be a means by which we may come ever closer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves.

By evil, on the other hand, I shall understand what we know with certainty prevents us from reproducing that same model. Next, we shall say that people are more perfect or more imperfect insofar as they come nearer to or stay further from this

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quod ex una essentia seu forma in aliam mutatur; Equus namque ex. gr. tam destruitur, si in hominem, quam si in insectum mutetur; sed quod ejus agendi potentiam, quatenus hæc per ipsius naturam intelligitur, augeri vel minui concipimus. Deinde per perfectionem in genere realitatem, uti dixi, intelligam; hoc est, rei cujuscunque essentiam, quatenus certo modo existit et operatur, nulla ipsius durationis habita ratione.	same model. For it must be especially noted that when I say someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, or the reverse, I do not mean that he is changed from one essence, or form, into another—for a horse, for example, is destroyed as much if it is changed into a human being as if it is changed into an insect—but that we conceive his power of acting, insofar as it is understood through his nature, to be increased or diminished. Next, by perfection in general I shall understand, as I have said, reality: that is, the essence of any thing insofar as it exists and acts in a certain way, without regard to its duration.
	Nam nulla res singularis potest ideo dici perfectior, quia plus temporis in existendo perseveravit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit; quandoquidem rerum essentia nullum certum et determinatum existendi tempus involvit; sed res quæcunque, sive ea perfectior sit, sive minus, eadem vi, qua existere incipit, semper in existendo perseverare poterit, ita ut omnes hac in re æquales sint.	For no singular thing can be called more perfect on the ground that it has persisted in existing for a longer time. The duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing. Rather, any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist, so that in this respect all things are equal.

DEFINITIONS AND THE AXIOM

Spinoza defines good, bad, contingent, possible and virtue, and states that every thing can be destroyed by a stronger one.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4D1	I. Per bonum id intelligam, quod certo scimus nobis esse utile.	Definition 1. By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.
4D2	II. Per malum autem id, quod certo scimus impedire, quo minus boni alicujus simus compotes.	Definition 2. By bad, on the other hand, I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good.
	(De his præcedentem vide præfationem sub finem.)	(On these, see the end of the preceding Preface.)
4D3	III. Res singulares voco contingentes, quatenus dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus, quod earum existentiam necessario ponat, vel quod ipsam necessario secludat.	Definition 3. I call singular things contingent insofar as, when we attend only to their essence, we find nothing that necessarily posits their existence or that necessarily excludes it.
4D4	IV. Easdem res singulares voco possibiles, quatenus, dum ad causas, ex quibus produci debent, attendimus, nescimus, an ipsæ determinatæ sint ad easdem producendum.	Definition 4. I call the same singular things possible insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them.
	(In Schol. 1 Prop. 33 p. I inter possibile et contingens nullam feci differentiam, quia ibi non opus erat hæc accurate distinguere.)	(In Scholium 1 to Proposition 33 of Part 1 I drew no distinction between the possible and the contin-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		gent, because there was no need to distinguish them precisely there.)
4D5	V. Per contrarios affectus in seqq. intelligam eos, qui hominem diversum trahunt, quamvis ejusdem sint generis, ut luxuries et avaritia, quæ amoris sunt species; nec natura, sed per accidens sunt contrarii.	Definition 5. By contrary affects I shall understand, in what follows, those that pull a person in different directions even though they are of the same kind—such as gluttony and greed, which are species of love. They are contrary not by nature but by accident.
4D6	VI. Quid per affectum erga rem futuram, præsentem, et præteritam, intelligam, explicui in Schol. 1 et 2 Prop. 18 p. III, quod vide.	Definition 6. What I understand by an affect toward a future, present or past thing I have explained in Scholia 1 and 2 to Proposition 18 of Part 3; see there.
	(Sed venit hic præterea notandum, quod ut loci, sic etiam temporis distantiam non nisi usque ad certum quendam limitem possumus distincte imaginari; hoc est, sicut omnia illa objecta, quæ ultra ducentos pedes a nobis distant, seu quorum distantia a loco, in quo sumus, illam superat, quam distincte imaginamur, æque longe a nobis distare, et perinde, ac si in eodem plano essent, imaginari solemus; sic etiam objecta, quorum existendi tempus longiore a præsenti intervallo abesse imaginamur, quam quod distincte imaginari solemus, omnia æque longe a præsenti distare imaginamur, et ad unum quasi temporis momentum referimus.)	(But it should be noted here, in addition, that we can distinctly imagine distance in time, as in space, only up to a certain limit. That is, just as we usually imagine all objects that are more than two hundred feet away from us—that is, whose distance from where we are exceeds what we can distinctly imagine—to be equally far from us, as if they were all on the same plane, so too we imagine all objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by a longer interval than we usually imagine distinctly as being equally far from the present, and we refer them, as it were, to a single moment of time.)
4D7	VII. Per finem, cujus causa aliquid facimus, appetitum intelligo.	Definition 7. By the end for the sake of which we do something, I understand appetite.
4D8	VIII. Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo; hoc est (per Prop. 7 p. III), virtus, quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus potestatem habet quædam efficiendi, quæ per solas ipsius naturæ leges possunt intelligi.	Definition 8. By virtue and power I understand the same thing. That is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), virtue, insofar as it is related to a human being, is the very essence or nature of that human being, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things that can be understood through the laws of his own nature alone.
4A	AXIOMA. Nulla res singularis in rerum Natura datur, qua potentior et fortior non detur alia. Sed quacunque data datur alia potentior, a qua illa data potest destrui.	Axiom. There is no singular thing in Nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Given any thing whatever, there is another more powerful by which the given thing can be destroyed.
4P1	PROPOSITIO I. *Nihil, quod idea falsa positivum habet, tollitur præsentia veri, quatenus verum.*	Proposition 1. *Nothing positive that a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true.*
4P1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Falsitas in sola privatione cognitionis, quam ideæ inadæquatæ involvunt, consistit (*per Prop.* 35	Demonstration. Falsity consists only in the privation of knowledge that inadequate ideas involve

LATIN

p. II) nec ipsæ aliquid habent positivum, propter quod falsæ dicuntur (*per Prop.* 33 *p. II*); sed contra, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt (*per Prop.* 32 *p. II*). Si igitur id, quod idea falsa positivum habet, præsentia veri, quatenus verum est, tolleretur, tolleretur ergo idea vera a se ipsa, quod (*per Prop.* 4 *p. III*) est absurdum. Ergo nihil quod idea etc. *Q.E.D.*

4P1S SCHOLIUM. Intelligitur hæc Propositio clarius ex 2 Coroll. Prop. 16 p. II. Nam imaginatio idea est, quæ magis Corporis humani præsentem constitutionem, quam corporis externi naturam indicat; non quidem distincte, sed confuse; unde fit, ut Mens errare dicatur. Ex. gr. cum solem intuemur, eundem ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur; in quo tamdiu fallimur, quamdiu veram ejus distantiam ignoramus; sed cognita ejusdem distantia tollitur quidem error, sed non imaginatio, hoc est idea solis, quæ ejusdem naturam eatenus tantum explicat, quatenus Corpus ab eodem afficitur; adeoque, quamvis veram ejusdem distantiam noscamus, ipsum nihilominus prope nobis adesse imaginabimur. Nam ut in Schol. Prop. 35 p.

II diximus, non ea de causa solem adeo propinquum imaginamur, quia ejus veram distantiam ignoramus; sed quia Mens eatenus magnitudinem solis concipit, quatenus Corpus ab eodem afficitur. Sic cum solis radii, aquæ superficiei incidentes, ad nostros oculos reflectuntur, eundem perinde, ac si in aqua esset imaginamur, tametsi verum ejus locum noverimus; et sic reliquæ imaginationes, quibus Mens fallitur, sive eæ naturalem Corporis constitutionem, sive quod ejusdem agendi potentiam augeri vel minui indicant, vero non sunt contrariæ, nec ejusdem præsentia evanescunt.

Fit quidem, cum falso aliquod malum timemus, ut timor evanescat audito vero nuntio; sed contra etiam fit, cum malum, quod certe venturum est, timemus, ut timor etiam evanescat audito falso nuntio; atque adeo imaginationes non præsentia veri, quatenus verum, evanescunt, sed quia aliæ occurrunt iis fortiores, quæ rerum, quas imaginamur, præsentem existentiam secludunt ut Prop. 17 p. II ostendimus.

ENGLISH

(by Proposition 35 of Part 2), and these ideas have nothing positive on account of which they are called false (by Proposition 33 of Part 2). On the contrary, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by Proposition 32 of Part 2). So if what a false idea has that is positive were removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (by Proposition 4 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive that a false idea has, etc. QED

Scholium. This Proposition is understood more clearly from Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2. For an imagination is an idea that indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external body—not distinctly, indeed, but confusedly; and this is why the mind is said to err. For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. In this we are deceived only as long as we do not know its true distance. When its distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination—that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only insofar as the body is affected by it. And so, even though we know its true distance, we shall nonetheless imagine it as near to us.

For, as we said in the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 2, we do not imagine the sun to be so near because we do not know its true distance, but because the mind conceives the size of the sun only insofar as the body is affected by it. So too, when the sun's rays fall on the surface of water and are reflected to our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, even though we know its true location. And in the same way the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived—whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or that its power of acting is increased or diminished—are not contrary to the true, and do not vanish in its presence.

It does happen, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear vanishes when we hear the true news. But the opposite also happens: when we fear an evil that is certainly coming, the fear also vanishes when we hear false news. And so imaginations do not vanish through the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, but because others stronger than they occur that exclude the present existence of

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		the things we imagine, as we showed in Proposition 17 of Part 2.
4P2	PROPOSITIO II. *Nos eatenus patimur, quatenus Naturæ sumus pars, quæ per se absque aliis non potest concipi.*	Proposition 2. *We are acted on insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived through itself without the others.*
4P2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nos tum pati dicimur, cum aliquid in nobis oritur, cujus non nisi partialis sumus causa (*per Defin. 2 p. III*) hoc est (*per Defin. 1 p. III*) aliquid, quod ex solis legibus nostræ naturæ deduci nequit. Patimur igitur, quatenus Naturæ sumus pars, quæ per se absque aliis nequit concipi. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. We are said to be acted on when something arises in us of which we are only a partial cause (by Definition 2 of Part 3), that is (by Definition 1 of Part 3), something that cannot be deduced from the laws of our own nature alone. Therefore we are acted on insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived through itself without the others. QED
4P3	PROPOSITIO III. *Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.*	Proposition 3. *The force by which a human being perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.*
4P3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex Axiomate hujus. Nam dato homine datur aliquid aliud, puta A, potentius, et dato A datur deinde aliud, puta B, ipso A potentius, et hoc in infinitum; ac proinde potentia hominis potentia alterius rei definitur, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. This is evident from the Axiom of this part. For given a human being, there is something else, say A, more powerful; and given A, there is in turn something else, say B, more powerful than A; and so on to infinity. Accordingly, the power of a human being is limited by the power of another thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. QED
4P4	PROPOSITIO IV. *Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit Naturæ pars, et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi quæ per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adæquata sit causa.*	Proposition 4. *It is impossible that a human being should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be able to undergo no changes except those that can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.*
4P4D	DEMONSTRATIO. Potentia, qua res singulares, et consequenter homo suum esse conservat, est ipsa Dei sive Naturæ potentia (*per Coroll. Prop.* 24 *p. I*), non quatenus infinita est, sed quatenus per humanam actualem essentiam explicari potest (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*). Potentia itaque hominis, quatenus per ipsius actualem essentiam explicatur, pars est infinitæ Dei seu Naturæ potentiæ, hoc est (*per Prop.* 34 *p. I*) essentiæ; Quod erat primum. Deinde si fieri posset, ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes, nisi quæ per solam ipsius hominis naturam possint intelligi, sequeretur (*per Prop.* 4 *et* 6 p.	Demonstration. The power by which singular things, and consequently human beings, preserve their being is the very power of God, or Nature (by the Corollary to Proposition 24 of Part 1)—not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the actual essence of a human being (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). So the power of a human being, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power, that is (by Proposition 34 of Part 1), of the essence, of God, or Nature. That was the first point. Next, if it were possible that a human being could undergo no changes except those that can be understood through the nature of that human being alone, it would follow

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	III*), ut non posset perire, sed ut semper necessario existeret; atque hoc sequi deberet ex causa, cujus potentia finita aut infinita sit; nempe vel ex sola hominis potentia, qui scilicet potis esset, ut a se removeret reliquas mutationes, quæ a causis externis oriri possent; vel infinita Naturæ potentia, a qua omnia singularia ita dirigerentur, ut homo nullas alias posset pati mutationes, nisi quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. At primum (*per Prop. præc., cujus demonstratio universalis est, et ad omnes res singulares applicari potest*) est absurdum. Ergo, si fieri posset, ut homo nullas pateretur mutationes, nisi quæ per solam ipsius hominis naturam possent intelligi, et consequenter (*sicut jam ostendimus*) ut semper necessario existeret; id sequi deberet ex Dei infinita potentia, et consequenter (*per Prop. 16 p.*	(by Propositions 4 and 6 of Part 3) that he could not perish, but would always necessarily exist. And this would have to follow from a cause whose power is either finite or infinite: namely, either from the power of the human being alone, who would then be able to keep away from himself all the other changes that could arise from external causes; or from the infinite power of Nature, by which all singular things would be so directed that the human being could undergo no changes except those that serve his preservation. But the first is absurd (by the preceding Proposition, whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things). Therefore, if it were possible that a human being underwent no changes except those that could be understood through his own nature alone, and consequently (as we have already shown) that he always necessarily existed, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God. And consequently
	I*) ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, quatenus alicujus hominis idea affectus consideratur, totius Naturæ ordo, quatenus ipsa sub Extensionis et Cogitationis attributis concipitur, deduci deberet; atque adeo (*per Prop. 21 p. I*) sequeretur, ut homo esset infinitus, quod (*per I part. hujus demonstrationis*) est absurdum. Fieri itaque nequit, ut homo nullas alias patiatur mutationes, nisi quarum ipse adæquata sit causa.* Q.E.D.	(by Proposition 16 of Part 1) the order of the whole of Nature, insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of Extension and Thought, would have to be deduced from the necessity of the divine nature insofar as it is considered as affected by the idea of some human being. And so (by Proposition 21 of Part 1) it would follow that the human being was infinite, which (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. It is therefore impossible that a human being should undergo no changes other than those of which he himself is the adequate cause. QED
4P4C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, hominem necessario passionibus esse semper obnoxium, communemque Naturæ ordinem sequi et eidem parere, seseque eidem quantum rerum natura exigit accommodare.	Corollary. From this it follows that a human being is necessarily always subject to passions, that he follows the common order of Nature and obeys it, and that he accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.
4P5	PROPOSITIO V. *Vis et incrementum cujuscunque passionis, ejusque in existendo perseverantia non definitur potentia, qua nos in existendo perseverare conamur, sed causæ externæ potentia cum nostra comparata.*	Proposition 5. *The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.*
4P5D	DEMONSTRATIO. Passionis essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam explicari (*per Defin. 1 et 2 p. III*), hoc est (*per Prop. 7 p. III*), passionis potentia definiri nequit potentia, qua in nostro esse perseverare conamur, sed (*ut*	Demonstration. The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3); that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Prop. 16 *p. II ostensum est*) definiri necessario debet potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata. *Q.E.D.*	our being, but (as was shown in Proposition 16 of Part 2) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. QED
4P6	PROPOSITIO VI. *Vis alicujus passionis, seu affectus, reliquas hominis actiones, seu potentiam, superare potest, ita ut affectus pertinaciter homini adhæreat.*	Proposition 6. *The force of some passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a human being, so that the affect clings stubbornly to the person.*
4P6D	DEMONSTRATIO. Vis et incrementum cujuscunque passionis, ejusque in existendo perseverantia, definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata (*per Prop. præced.*); adeoque (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*) hominis potentiam superare potest, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by the preceding Proposition); and so (by Proposition 3 of this part) it can surpass the power of a human being, etc. QED
4P7	PROPOSITIO VII. *Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectu coercendo.*	Proposition 7. *An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect that is contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained.*
4P7D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus, quatenus ad Mentem refertur, est idea, qua Mens majorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat (*per generalem Affectuum Definitionem, quæ reperitur sub finem Tertiæ Partis*). Cum igitur Mens aliquo affectu conflictatur, Corpus afficitur simul affectione, qua ejus agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur. Porro hæc Corporis affectio (*per Prop.* 5 *hujus*) vim a sua causa accipit perseverandi in suo esse; quæ proinde nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi a causa corporea (*per Prop.* 6 *p. II*) quæ corpus afficiat affectione illi contraria (*per Prop.* 5 *p. III*) et fortiore (*per axioma hujus*); atque adeo (*per Prop.* 12 *p. II*). Mens afficietur idea affectionis fortioris et contrariæ priori, hoc est (per general.	Demonstration. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body than before (by the General Definition of the Affects, found at the end of Part 3). So when the mind is assailed by some affect, the body is at the same time affected with an affection by which its power of acting is increased or diminished. Further, this affection of the body (by Proposition 5 of this part) receives from its cause the force to persevere in its being; so it can be neither restrained nor removed except by a bodily cause (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) that affects the body with an affection contrary to it (by Proposition 5 of Part 3) and stronger (by the Axiom of this part). And so (by Proposition 12 of Part 2) the mind will be affected with the idea of an affection stronger than, and contrary to, the former one; that is,
	Affectuum Defin.*), Mens afficietur affectu fortiori et contrario priori, qui scilicet prioris existentiam secludet vel tollet; ac proinde affectus nec tolli nec coerceri potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem.* Q.E.D.	(by the General Definition of the Affects) the mind will be affected with an affect stronger than, and contrary to, the former one—one, that is, that will exclude or remove the existence of the former. Accordingly, an affect can be neither removed nor restrained except by a contrary and stronger affect. QED
4P7C	COROLLARIUM. Affectus, quatenus ad Mentem refertur nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per ideam Corporis affectionis contrariæ et fortioris affectione, qua patimur. Nam affectus, quo patimur, nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per affectum eodem fortiorem eique contrarium (*per Prop. præced.*) hoc est (*per gener. Affect. Defin.*), nisi per	Corollary. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, can be neither restrained nor removed except by the idea of an affection of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the affection by which we are acted on. For the affect by which we are acted on can be neither restrained nor removed ex-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	ideam Corporis affectionis fortioris et contrariæ affectioni, qua patimur.	cept by an affect stronger than it and contrary to it (by the preceding Proposition), that is (by the General Definition of the Affects), except by the idea of an affection of the body stronger than, and contrary to, the affection by which we are acted on.

WHY KNOWING THE GOOD IS NOT ENOUGH

True knowledge of good and bad restrains the affects only as an affect, so present desires often overpower it.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P8	PROPOSITIO VIII. *Cognitio boni et mali nihil aliud est, quam Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ affectus, quatenus ejus sumus conscii.*	Proposition 8. *Knowledge of good and bad is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.*
4P8D	DEMONSTRATIO. Id bonum aut malum vocamus, quod nostro esse conservando prodest vel obest (*per Defin.* 1 *et* 2 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*), quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet. Quatenus itaque (*per Defin. Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ, quas vide in Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*) rem aliquam nos Lætitia vel Tristitia afficere percipimus, eandem bonam aut malam vocamus; atque adeo boni et mali cognitio nihil aliud est, quam Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ idea, quæ ex ipso Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ affectu necessario sequitur (*per Prop.* 22 *p. II*). At hæc idea eodem modo unita est affectui, ac Mens unita est Corpori (*per Prop.* 21 *p. II*); hoc est (ut in Schol. ejusdem Prop.	Demonstration. We call good or bad what is useful or harmful to preserving our being (by Definitions 1 and 2 of this part), that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. So insofar as we perceive that some thing affects us with joy or sadness (by the definitions of joy and sadness, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), we call it good or bad. And so knowledge of good and bad is nothing but the idea of joy or sadness that necessarily follows from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by Proposition 22 of Part 2). But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body (by Proposition 21 of Part 2); that is,
	ostensum*), hæc idea ab ipso affectu, sive (*per Gen. Affect. Defin.*) ab idea Corporis affectionis, revera non distinguitur, nisi solo conceptu; ergo hæc cognitio boni et mali nihil est aliud, quam ipse affectus, quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii.* Q.E.D.	(as was shown in the Scholium to the same Proposition) this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or (by the General Definition of the Affects) from the idea of the affection of the body, except by a distinction of concept alone. Therefore this knowledge of good and bad is nothing but the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. QED
4P9	PROPOSITIO IX. *Affectus, cujus causam in præsenti nobis adesse imaginamur, fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur.*	Proposition 9. *An affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is stronger than if we imagined that cause not to be with us.*
4P9D	DEMONSTRATIO. Imaginatio est idea, qua Mens rem ut præsentem contemplatur (*vide ejus Defin. in Scholio propositionis.* 17 *p. II*), quæ tamen magis Corporis humani constitutionem, quam rei externæ naturam indicat (*per Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 16 *p. II*). Est igitur affectus (*per gen. Affect. Defin.*) imaginatio, quatenus corporis constitutionem indicat. At imaginatio (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*) intensior est, quamdiu nihil imaginamur, quod rei externæ præsentem	Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind regards a thing as present (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2), but which indicates the constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2). An affect, then (by the General Definition of the Affects), is an imagination insofar as it indicates

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	existentiam secludit; ergo etiam affectus, cujus causam in præsenti nobis adesse imaginamur, intensior seu fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur. *Q.E.D.*	the constitution of the body. But an imagination (by Proposition 17 of Part 2) is more intense as long as we imagine nothing that excludes the present existence of the external thing. Therefore an affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is also more intense, or stronger, than if we imagined that cause not to be with us. QED
4P9S	SCHOLIUM. Cum supra in Propositione 18 partis III dixerim, nos ex rei futuræ vel præteritæ imagine eodem affectu affici, ac si res, quam imaginamur præsens esset, expresse monui, id verum esse, quatenus ad solam ipsius rei imaginem attendimus; est enim ejusdem naturæ, sive res ut præsentes imaginati simus sive non simus: sed non negavi, eandem debiliorem reddi, quando alias res nobis præsentes contemplamur quæ rei futuræ præsentem existentiam secludunt; quod tum monere neglexi, quia in hac Parte de affectuum viribus agere constitueram.	Scholium. When I said above, in Proposition 18 of Part 3, that we are affected by the image of a future or past thing with the same affect as if the thing we imagine were present, I expressly warned that this is true insofar as we attend only to the image of the thing itself; for the image is of the same nature whether or not we have imagined the things as present. But I did not deny that it is rendered weaker when we regard other things present to us that exclude the present existence of the future thing. I neglected to point this out at the time, because I had decided to treat the strength of the affects in this Part.
4P9C	COROLLARIUM. Imago rei futuræ vel præteritæ, hoc est rei, quam cum relatione ad tempus futurum vel præteritum secluso præsenti contemplamur, cæteris paribus, debilior est imagine rei præsentis; et consequenter affectus erga rem futuram vel præteritam, cæteris paribus, remissior est affectu erga rem præsentem.	Corollary. The image of a future or past thing—that is, of a thing we regard in relation to future or past time, the present being excluded—is weaker, other things being equal, than the image of a present thing. Consequently, an affect toward a future or past thing is, other things being equal, milder than an affect toward a present thing.
4P10	PROPOSITIO X. *Erga rem futuram, quam cito affuturam imaginamur, intensius afficimur, quam si ejus existendi tempus longius a præsenti distare imaginaremur; et memoria rei, quam non diu præteriisse imaginamur, intensius etiam afficimur, quam si eandem diu præteriisse imaginaremur.*	Proposition 10. *We are affected more intensely toward a future thing that we imagine will soon be here than if we imagined its time of existing to be further from the present. And we are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing that we imagine to have passed not long ago than if we imagined it to have passed long ago.*
4P10D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus enim rem cito affuturam, vel non diu præteriisse imaginamur, eo ipso aliquid imaginamur, quod rei præsentiam minus secludit, quam si ejusdem futurum existendi tempus longius a præsenti distare, vel quod dudum præterierit, imaginaremur (*ut per se notum*); adeoque (*per præced. Prop.*) eatenus intensius erga eandem afficiemur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For insofar as we imagine that a thing will soon be here, or has not long passed, by that very fact we imagine something that excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined that its future time of existing was further from the present, or that it had passed long ago (as is self-evident). And so (by the preceding Proposition) to that extent we shall be affected more intensely toward it. QED
4P10S	SCHOLIUM. Ex iis, quæ ad Definitionem 6 hujus Partis notavimus, sequitur, nos erga objecta, quæ a præsenti longiore temporis intervallo distant, quam quod	Scholium. From what we noted at Definition 6 of this part, it follows that toward objects separated from the present by a longer interval of time than

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	imaginando determinare possumus, quamvis ab invicem longo temporis intervallo distare intelligamus, æque tamen remisse affici. *Q.E.D.*	we can determine by imagining, we are affected equally mildly, even though we understand that they are separated from one another by a long interval of time. QED
4P11	PROPOSITIO XI. *Affectus erga rem, quam ut necessariam imaginamur, cæteris paribus, intensior est, quam erga possibilem vel contingentem, sive non necessariam.*	Proposition 11. *An affect toward a thing that we imagine as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than one toward a thing that is possible or contingent, that is, not necessary.*
4P11D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus rem aliquam necessariam esse imaginamur, eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus, et contra rei existentiam negamus, quatenus eandem non necessariam esse imaginamur (*per Schol.* 1 *Prop.* 33 *p. I*); ac proinde (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*) affectus erga rem necessariam, cæteris paribus, intensior est, quam erga non necessariam. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing to be necessary, we affirm its existence; and conversely, we deny a thing's existence insofar as we imagine it not to be necessary (by Scholium 1 to Proposition 33 of Part 1). Accordingly (by Proposition 9 of this part), an affect toward a necessary thing is, other things being equal, more intense than one toward a thing that is not necessary. QED
4P12	PROPOSITIO XII. *Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in præsenti non existere, et quam ut possibilem imaginamur, cæteris paribus, intensior est, quam erga contingentem.*	Proposition 12. *An affect toward a thing that we know does not exist in the present, and that we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than one toward a contingent thing.*
4P12D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur, quæ rei existentiam ponat (*per Defin.* 3 *hujus*): sed contra (*secundum hypothesin*) quædam imaginamur, quæ ejusdem præsentem existentiam secludunt. At quatenus rem in futurum possibilem esse imaginamur, eatenus quædam imaginamur, quæ ejusdem existentiam ponunt (*per Defin.* 4 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 18 *p. III*), quæ Spem vel Metum fovent; atque adeo affectus erga rem possibilem vehementior est. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by any image of another thing that posits the thing's existence (by Definition 3 of this part); on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, we imagine certain things that posit its existence (by Definition 4 of this part), that is (by Proposition 18 of Part 3), things that encourage hope or fear. And so an affect toward a possible thing is more intense. QED
4P12C	COROLLARIUM. Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in præsenti non existere, et quam ut contingentem imaginamur, multo remissior est, quam si rem in præsenti nobis adesse imaginaremur.	Corollary. An affect toward a thing that we know does not exist in the present, and that we imagine as contingent, is much milder than if we imagined the thing to be with us in the present.
4P12CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus erga rem, quam in præsenti existere imaginamur, intensior est, quam si eandem ut futuram imaginaremur (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *hujus*), et multo vehementior est quam, si tempus futurum a præsenti multum distare imaginaremur (*per Prop.* 10 *hujus*). Est itaque affectus erga rem, cujus existendi tempus longe a præsenti distare imaginamur, multo remissior, quam si eandem ut præsentem imaginaremur; et nihilominus (*per Prop. præced.*) intensior est, quam si eandem rem ut contingentem imaginaremur; atque adeo affectus erga	Demonstration. An affect toward a thing we imagine to exist in the present is more intense than if we imagined it as future (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part), and much more intense than if we imagined the future time to be far distant from the present (by Proposition 10 of this part). So an affect toward a thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is much milder than if we imagined it as present; and nevertheless (by the preceding Proposition) it is more intense than if we imagined

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	rem contingentem multo remissior erit, quam si rem in præsenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. *Q.E.D.*	the same thing as contingent. And so an affect toward a contingent thing will be much milder than if we imagined the thing to be with us in the present. QED
4P13	PROPOSITIO XIII. *Affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in præsenti non existere, cæteris paribus, remissior est, quam affectus erga rem præteritam.*	Proposition 13. *An affect toward a contingent thing that we know does not exist in the present is, other things being equal, milder than an affect toward a past thing.*
4P13D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur, quæ rei existentiam ponat (*per Defin.* 3 *hujus*), sed contra (*secundum hypothesin*) quædam imaginamur, quæ ejusdem præsentem existentiam secludunt. Verum quatenus eandem cum relatione ad tempus præteritum imaginamur, eatenus aliquid imaginari supponimur, quod ipsam ad memoriam redigit, sive quod rei imaginem excitat (*vide Prop.* 18 *p. II cum ejusdem Schol.*) ac proinde eatenus efficit, ut ipsam, ac si præsens esset, contemplemur (*per Coroll. Prop.* 17 *p. II*). Atque adeo (*per Prop.* 9 *hujus*) affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in præsenti non existere, cæteris paribus, remissior erit, quam affectus erga rem præteritam. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by any image of another thing that posits the thing's existence (by Definition 3 of this part); on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine it in relation to past time, we are supposed to imagine something that brings it back to memory, or that arouses the image of the thing (see Proposition 18 of Part 2, with its Scholium), and so to that extent causes us to regard it as if it were present (by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of Part 2). And so (by Proposition 9 of this part) an affect toward a contingent thing that we know does not exist in the present will be, other things being equal, milder than an affect toward a past thing. QED
4P14	PROPOSITIO XIV. *Vera boni et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coercere potest, sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur.*	Proposition 14. *No affect can be restrained by true knowledge of good and bad insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.*
4P14D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus est idea, qua Mens majorem vel minorem sui Corporis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat (*per gen. Aff. Defin.*); atque adeo (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) nihil positivum habet, quod præsentia veri tolli possit; et consequenter vera boni et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coercere potest. At quatenus affectus est (*vide Prop.* 8 *hujus*), si fortior affectu coercendo sit, eatenus tantum (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) affectum coercere poterit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. An affect is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body than before (by the General Definition of the Affects). And so (by Proposition 1 of this part) it has nothing positive that could be removed by the presence of the true. Consequently, true knowledge of good and bad, insofar as it is true, can restrain no affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see Proposition 8 of this part), it will be able to restrain an affect only if it is stronger than the affect to be restrained, and only to that extent (by Proposition 7 of this part). QED
4P15	PROPOSITIO XV. *Cupiditas, quæ ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, multis aliis Cupiditatibus, quæ ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur, oriuntur, restingui vel coerceri potest.*	Proposition 15. *A desire that arises from true knowledge of good and bad can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires that arise from the affects by which we are assailed.*
4P15D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus hæc (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) affectus est, oritur necessario Cupiditas (*per* 1 *Affect. Def.*), quæ eo est major,	Demonstration. From true knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge is an affect (by Proposition 8 of this part), there necessarily arises a

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quo affectus, ex quo oritur, major est (*per Prop.* 37 *p. III*). Sed quia hæc Cupiditas (*per hypothesin*) ex eo, quod aliquid vere intelligimus, oritur, sequitur ergo ipsa in nobis, quatenus agimus (*per Prop.* 1 *p. III*), atque adeo per solam nostram essentiam debet intelligi (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*); et consequenter (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*), ejus vis et incrementum sola humana potentia definiri debet.	desire (by Definition 1 of the Affects), which is greater in proportion as the affect from which it arises is greater (by Proposition 37 of Part 3). But since this desire (by hypothesis) arises from our understanding something truly, it follows in us insofar as we act (by Proposition 1 of Part 3), and so must be understood through our essence alone (by Definition 2 of Part 3). Consequently (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), its force and growth must be defined by human power alone.
	Porro Cupiditates, quæ ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur oriuntur, eo etiam majores sunt, quo hi affectus vehementiores erunt; atque adeo earum vis et incrementum (*per Prop.* 5 *hujus*) potentia causarum externarum definiri debet, quæ, si cum nostra comparetur, nostram potentiam indefinite superat (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*): atque adeo Cupiditates, quæ ex similibus affectibus oriuntur, vehementiores esse possunt illa, quæ ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, ac proinde (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) eandem coercere vel restinguere poterunt. *Q.E.D.*	Further, the desires that arise from the affects by which we are assailed are also greater in proportion as those affects are more violent. And so their force and growth (by Proposition 5 of this part) must be defined by the power of external causes, which, if compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses our power (by Proposition 3 of this part). And so the desires that arise from such affects can be more violent than the one that arises from true knowledge of good and bad, and accordingly (by Proposition 7 of this part) they will be able to restrain or extinguish it. QED
4P16	PROPOSITIO XVI. *Cupiditas, quæ ex cognitione boni et mali, quatenus hæc cognitio futurum respicit, oritur, facilius rerum Cupiditate, quæ in præsentia suaves sunt, coerceri vel restingui potest.*	Proposition 16. *A desire that arises from knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for things that are pleasant in the present.*
4P16D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus erga rem, quam futuram imaginamur, remissior est, quam erga præsentem (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *hujus*). At Cupiditas, quæ ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, tametsi hæc cognitio circa res, quæ in præsentia bonæ sunt, versetur, restingui vel coerceri potest aliqua temeraria Cupiditate (*per Prop. præced., cujus demonstratio. universalis est*); ergo Cupiditas, quæ ex eadem cognitione, quatenus hæc futurum respicit, oritur, facilius coerceri vel restingui poterit, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. An affect toward a thing we imagine as future is milder than one toward a present thing (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part). But a desire that arises from true knowledge of good and bad, even when this knowledge concerns things that are good in the present, can be extinguished or restrained by some rash desire (by the preceding Proposition, whose demonstration is universal). Therefore a desire that arises from the same knowledge, insofar as it looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished, etc. QED
4P17	PROPOSITIO XVII. *Cupiditas, quæ oritur ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus hæc circa res contingentes versatur, multo adhuc facilius coerceri potest Cupiditate rerum, quæ præsentes sunt.*	Proposition 17. *A desire that arises from true knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge concerns contingent things, can be restrained still more easily by a desire for things that are present.*
4P17D	DEMONSTRATIO. Propositio hæc eodem modo ac Prop. præced. demonstratur ex Coroll. Prop. 12 hujus.	Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one, from the Corollary to Proposition 12 of this part.
4P17S		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	SCHOLIUM. His me causam ostendisse credo, cur homines opinione magis quam vera Ratione commoveantur, et cur vera boni et mali cognitio animi commotiones excitet, et sæpe omni libidinis generi cedat; unde illud Poëtæ natum, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*. Quod idem etiam Ecclesiastes in mente habuisse videtur, cum dixit, *Qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem*. Atque hæc non eum in finem dico, ut inde concludam, præstabilius esse ignorare quam scire, vel quod stulto intelligens in moderandis affectibus nihil intersit, sed ideo quia necesse est, nostræ naturæ tam potentiam quam impotentiam noscere, ut determinare possimus, quid Ratio in moderandis affectibus possit, et quid non possit; et in hac Parte de sola humana impotentia me acturum dixi. Nam de rationis in affectus potentia separatim agere constitui.	Scholium. With this I believe I have shown the cause why people are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why true knowledge of good and bad stirs up disturbances of the mind and often gives way to every kind of lust. Hence the Poet's saying: *I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse.* Ecclesiastes also seems to have had the same thing in mind when he said, *He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.* I do not say these things in order to conclude that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or that in moderating the affects there is no difference between a fool and a person of understanding. I say them because it is necessary to know both the power and the lack of power of our nature, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects, and what it cannot. And I said that in this Part I would treat only of human lack of power; for I have decided to treat the power of reason over the affects separately.[2]
4P18	PROPOSITIO XVIII. *Cupiditas, quæ ex Lætitia oritur, cæteris paribus, fortior est Cupiditate, quæ ex Tristitia oritur.*	Proposition 18. *A desire that arises from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than a desire that arises from sadness.*
4P18D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia (*per* 1 *Affect. Defin.*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) conatus, quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur. Quare Cupiditas, quæ ex Lætitia oritur, ipso Lætitiæ affectu (*per Defin. Lætitiæ, quam vide in Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*) juvatur vel augetur; quæ autem contra ex Tristitia oritur, ipso Tristitiæ affectu (*per idem Schol.*) minuitur vel coercetur; atque adeo vis Cupiditatis, quæ ex Lætitia oritur, potentia humana simul et potentia causæ externæ, quæ autem ex Tristitia, sola humana potentia definiri debet; ac proinde hac illa fortior est. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Desire is the very essence of a human being (by Definition 1 of the Affects), that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the striving by which a human being strives to persevere in his being. So a desire that arises from joy is aided or increased by the affect of joy itself (by the definition of joy, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), whereas one that arises from sadness is diminished or restrained by the affect of sadness itself (by the same Scholium). And so the force of a desire that arises from joy must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas that of one arising from sadness must be defined by human power alone. Accordingly, the former is stronger than the latter. QED

THE DICTATES OF REASON

Spinoza sums up what reason prescribes and argues that virtue consists in seeking one's own advantage.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P18S	SCHOLIUM. His paucis humanæ impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causas, et cur homines Rationis præcepta non servent, explicui. Superest jam, ut ostendam, quid id	Scholium. In these few words I have explained the causes of human lack of power and inconstancy, and why people do not observe the precepts of

2 The Poet is Ovid; the second quotation is Ecclesiastes 1:18.

LATIN

sit, quod Ratio nobis præscribit, et quinam affectus cum Rationis humanæ regulis conveniant, quinam contra iisdem contrarii sint. Sed antequam hæc prolixo nostro Geometrico ordine demonstrare incipiam, lubet ipsa Rationis dictamina hic prius breviter ostendere, ut ea, quæ sentio, facilius ab unoquoque percipiantur. Cum Ratio nihil contra Naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa, ut unusquisque seipsum amet, suum utile, quod revera utile est, quærat, et id omne, quod hominem ad majorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat, et absolute, ut unusquisque suum esse, quantum in se est, conservare conetur. Quod quidem tam necessario verum est, quam quod totum sit sua parte majus (*Vide Prop.* 4 p.

III*). Deinde, quandoquidem virtus* (per Defin. *8* hujus*) nihil aliud est, quam ex legibus propriæ naturæ agere, et nemo suum esse* (per Prop. *7* p. III*) conservare conetur, nisi ex propriæ suæ naturæ legibus; hinc sequitur* primo*, virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum proprium esse conservandi, et felicitatem in eo consistere, quod homo suum esse conservare potest.* Secundo *sequitur, virtutem propter se esse appetendam, nec quicquam, quod ipsa præstabilius aut quod utilius nobis sit, dari, cujus causa deberet appeti.* Tertio denique sequitur, eos, qui se interficiunt, animo esse impotentes, eosque a causis externis, suæ naturæ repugnantibus, prorsus vinci.

Porro ex Postulato 4 partis II, sequitur nos efficere nunquam posse, ut nihil extra nos indigeamus ad nostrum esse conservandum, et ut ita vivamus, ut nullum commercium cum rebus, quæ extra nos sunt, habeamus; et, si præterea nostram Mentem spectemus, sane noster intellectus imperfectior esset, si Mens sola esset, nec quicquam præter se ipsam intelligeret. Multa igitur extra nos dantur, quæ nobis utilia, quæque propterea appetenda sunt. Ex his nulla præstantiora excogitari possunt, quam ea, quæ cum nostra natura prorsus conveniunt. Si enim duo ex. gr. ejusdem prorsus naturæ individua invicem junguntur, individuum componunt singulo duplo potentius.

Homini igitur nihil homine utilius; nihil, inquam, homines præstantius ad suum esse conservandum optare

ENGLISH

reason. It now remains for me to show what it is that reason prescribes to us, which affects agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the other hand, are contrary to them. But before I begin to demonstrate these things in our lengthy geometrical order, I should like first to set out the dictates of reason themselves briefly here, so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone. Since reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, it demands that each person love himself; that he seek his own advantage—what is really useful to him; that he want whatever really leads a human being to greater perfection; and, absolutely, that each person strive to preserve his own being as far as he can. This is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part

(see Proposition 4 of Part 3). Next, since virtue (by Definition 8 of this part) is nothing but acting from the laws of one's own nature, and no one strives to preserve his being (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) except from the laws of his own nature, it follows, *first*, that the foundation of virtue is the very striving to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in a person's being able to preserve his being. It follows, *second*, that virtue is to be wanted for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent than it, or more useful to us, for the sake of which it should be wanted. It follows, *third* and finally, that those who kill themselves are weak in mind, and are completely overcome by external causes that are opposed to their nature.

Further, it follows from Postulate 4 of Part 2 that we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being, or that we live without having any dealings with things outside us. And if, besides, we consider our mind, our intellect would surely be more imperfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing except itself. There are, then, many things outside us that are useful to us and that are therefore to be sought. Of these, none more excellent can be devised than those that agree entirely with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to each other, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one alone.

To a human being, then, nothing is more useful than a human being. Nothing, I say, can people

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	possunt, quam quod omnes in omnibus ita conveniant, ut omnium Mentes et Corpora unam quasi Mentem unumque Corpus componant, et omnes simul, quantum possunt, suum esse conservare conentur, omnesque simul omnium commune utile sibi quærant; ex quibus sequitur, homines, qui Ratione gubernantur, hoc est homines, qui ex ductu Rationis suum utile quærunt, nihil sibi appetere, quod reliquis hominibus non cupiant, atque adeo eosdem justos, fidos, atque honestos esse.	wish for that is more excellent for preserving their being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body; that all together should strive, as far as they can, to preserve their being; and that all together should seek for themselves the common advantage of all. From this it follows that people who are governed by reason—that is, people who seek their own advantage under the guidance of reason—want nothing for themselves that they do not desire for other people, and so are just, faithful and honorable.
	Hæc illa Rationis dictamina sunt, quæ hic paucis ostendere proposueram, antequam eadem prolixiore ordine demonstrare inciperem; quod ea de causa feci, ut, si fieri posset, eorum attentionem mihi conciliarem, qui credunt, hoc principium, quod scilicet unusquisque suum utile quærere tenetur, impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis esse fundamentum. Postquam igitur rem sese contra habere breviter ostenderim, pergo ad eandem eadem via, qua huc usque progressi sumus, demonstrandum.	These are the dictates of reason that I proposed to set out briefly here before beginning to demonstrate them in a more lengthy order. I have done this in order to win, if possible, the attention of those who believe that this principle—that each person is bound to seek his own advantage—is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety. Now that I have briefly shown that the matter is quite otherwise, I go on to demonstrate it by the same path by which we have proceeded so far.
4P19	PROPOSITIO XIX. *Id unusquisque ex legibus suæ naturæ necessario appetit vel aversatur, quod bonum vel malum esse judicat.*	Proposition 19. *From the laws of his own nature each person necessarily wants, or is averse to, what he judges to be good or bad.*
4P19D	DEMONSTRATIO. Boni et mali cognitio est (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) ipse Lætitiæ vel Tristitiæ affectus, quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 28 *p. III*) id unusquisque necessario appetit, quod bonum, et contra id aversatur, quod malum esse judicat. Sed hic appetitus nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia seu natura (*per Defin. App., quam vide in Schol. Prop.* 9 *p. III et* 1 *Aff. Defin.*). Ergo unusquisque ex solis suæ naturæ legibus id necessario appetit vel aversatur, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Knowledge of good and bad (by Proposition 8 of this part) is the very affect of joy or sadness insofar as we are conscious of it; accordingly (by Proposition 28 of Part 3), each person necessarily wants what he judges to be good, and conversely is averse to what he judges to be bad. But this appetite is nothing but the very essence, or nature, of a human being (by the definition of appetite, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of Part 3, and by Definition 1 of the Affects). Therefore each person, from the laws of his own nature alone, necessarily wants or is averse to, etc. QED
4P20	PROPOSITIO XX. *Quo magis unusquisque suum utile quærere, hoc est suum esse conservare, conatur et potest, eo magis virtute præditus est; et contra, quatenus unusquisque suum utile, hoc est suum esse, conservare negligit eatenus est impotens.*	Proposition 20. *The more each person strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage—that is, to preserve his being—the more he is endowed with virtue; and conversely, insofar as each person neglects to preserve his own advantage, that is, his being, he lacks power.*
4P20D	DEMONSTRATIO. Virtus est ipsa humana potentia, quæ sola hominis essentia definitur (*per Defin.* 8 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) quæ solo conatu, quo homo in suo esse	Demonstration. Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by the essence of a human being alone (by Definition 8 of this part), that is (by Pro-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	perseverare conatur, definitur. Quo ergo unusquisque magis suum esse conservare conatur et potest eo magis virtute præditus est, et consequenter (*per Prop.* 4 *et* 6 *p. III*), quatenus aliquis suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens. *Q.E.D.*	position 7 of Part 3), which is defined solely by the striving by which a human being strives to persevere in his being. So the more each person strives, and is able, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; and consequently (by Propositions 4 and 6 of Part 3), insofar as someone neglects to preserve his being, he lacks power. QED
4P20S	SCHOLIUM. Nemo igitur, nisi a causis externis et suæ naturæ contrariis victus suum utile appetere, sive suum esse conservare, negligit. Nemo, inquam, ex necessitate suæ naturæ, sed a causis externis coactus, alimenta aversatur, vel se ipsum interficit, quod multis modis fieri potest; nempe interficit aliquis se ipsum coactus ab alio, qui ejus dexteram, qua ensem casu prehenderat, contorquet, et cogit versus cor ipsum gladium dirigere; vel quod ex mandato Tyranni, ut Seneca, cogatur venas aperire suas, hoc est, majus malum minore vitare cupiat; vel denique ex eo, quod causæ latentes externæ ejus imaginationem ita disponunt, et Corpus ita afficiunt, ut id aliam naturam priori contrariam induat, et cujus idea in Mente dari nequit (*per Prop.* 10 *p. III*).	Scholium. No one, therefore, neglects to want his own advantage, or to preserve his being, unless he is overcome by external causes contrary to his nature. No one, I say, turns away from food or kills himself from the necessity of his own nature, but only when compelled by external causes. This can happen in many ways. Someone may kill himself because he is compelled by another, who twists the right hand in which he happened to have grasped a sword and forces him to direct the blade against his own heart. Or, like Seneca, he may be compelled by a tyrant's command to open his veins—that is, he may desire to avoid a greater evil by a lesser. Or, finally, hidden external causes may so dispose his imagination, and so affect his body, that it takes on another nature contrary to its former one, a nature of which there cannot be an idea in the mind (by Proposition 10 of Part 3).[3]
	At quod homo ex necessitate suæ naturæ conetur non existere, vel in aliam formam mutari, tam est impossibile quam quod ex nihilo aliquid fiat, ut unusquisque mediocri meditatione videre potest.	But that a human being should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something should come from nothing, as anyone can see with a little reflection.
4P21	PROPOSITIO XXI. *Nemo potest cupere beatum esse, bene agere, et bene vivere, qui simul non cupiat esse, agere, et vivere, hoc est, actu existere.*	Proposition 21. *No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live—that is, to actually exist.*
4P21D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hujus Propositionis demonstratio, seu potius res ipsa, per se patet, et etiam ex Cupiditatis definitione. Est enim cupiditas (*per* 1 *Aff. Defin.*) beate seu bene vivendi, agendi, etc., ipsa hominis essentia, hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) conatus, quo unusquisque suum esse conservare conatur. Ergo nemo potest cupere, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The demonstration of this Proposition, or rather the thing itself, is evident through itself, and also from the definition of desire. For the desire to live blessedly or well, to act well, etc., is (by Definition 1 of the Affects) the very essence of a human being, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the striving by which each person strives to preserve his being. Therefore no one can desire, etc. QED
4P22	PROPOSITIO XXII. *Nulla virtus potest prior hac (nempe conatu sese conservandi) concipi.*	Proposition 22. *No virtue can be conceived prior to this one (namely, the striving to preserve oneself).*

3 The Stoic philosopher Seneca was ordered by the emperor Nero, his former pupil, to take his own life in AD 65.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P22D	DEMONSTRATIO. Conatus sese conservandi est ipsa rei essentia (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*). Si igitur aliqua virtus posset hac, nempe hoc conatu, prior concipi, conciperetur ergo (*per Defin.* 8 *hujus*) ipsa rei essentia se ipsa prior, quod (*ut per se notum*) est absurdum. Ergo nulla virtus, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The striving to preserve itself is the very essence of a thing (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). So if some virtue could be conceived prior to this one, namely to this striving, then (by Definition 8 of this part) the very essence of the thing would be conceived prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. QED
4P22C	COROLLARIUM. Conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum. Nam hoc principio nullum aliud potest prius concipi (*per Prop. præced.*), et absque ipso (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*) nulla virtus potest concipi.	Corollary. The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue. For no other principle can be conceived prior to this one (by the preceding Proposition), and without it (by Proposition 21 of this part) no virtue can be conceived.
4P23	PROPOSITIO XXIII. *Homo, quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod ideas habet inadæquatas, non potest absolute dici, ex virtute agere; sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit.*	Proposition 23. *A human being, insofar as he is determined to do something by having inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue; he can be said to do so only insofar as he is determined by the fact that he understands.*
4P23D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus homo ad agendum determinatur ex eo, quod inadæquatas habet ideas eatenus (*per Prop.* 1 *p. III*) patitur, hoc est (*per Defin.* 1 *et* 2 *p. III*) aliquid agit, quod per solam ejus essentiam non potest percipi, hoc est (*per Defin.* 8 *hujus*) quod ex ipsius virtute non sequitur. At quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit, eatenus (*per eandem Prop.* 1 *p. III*) agit, hoc est (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*) aliquid agit, quod per solam ipsius essentiam percipitur, sive (*per Defin.* 8 *hujus*) quod ex ipsius virtute adæquate sequitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Insofar as a human being is determined to act by having inadequate ideas, to that extent (by Proposition 1 of Part 3) he is acted on; that is (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3), he does something that cannot be perceived through his essence alone, that is (by Definition 8 of this part), something that does not follow from his virtue. But insofar as he is determined to do something by the fact that he understands, to that extent (by the same Proposition 1 of Part 3) he acts; that is (by Definition 2 of Part 3), he does something that is perceived through his essence alone, or (by Definition 8 of this part) that follows adequately from his virtue. QED
4P24	PROPOSITIO XXIV. *Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud in nobis est, quam ex ductu Rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare (hæc tria idem significant idque) ex fundamento proprium utile quærendi.*	Proposition 24. *In us, to act absolutely from virtue is nothing other than to act, to live, and to preserve our being (these three mean the same thing) under the guidance of reason, on the foundation of seeking our own advantage.*
4P24D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex virtute absolute agere, nihil aliud est (*per Defin.* 8 *hujus*), quam ex legibus propriæ naturæ agere. At nos eatenus tantummodo agimus, quatenus intelligimus (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*); ergo ex virtute agere, nihil aliud in nobis est, quam ex ductu Rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare idque (*per Coroll. Prop.* 22 *hujus*) ex fundamento suum utile quærendi. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing other (by Definition 8 of this part) than to act from the laws of one's own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (by Proposition 3 of Part 3). Therefore, in us, to act from virtue is nothing other than to act, to live, and to preserve our being under the guidance of reason, and to do so

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		(by the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part) on the foundation of seeking our own advantage. QED
4P25	PROPOSITIO XXV. *Nemo suum esse alterius rei causa conservare conatur.*	Proposition 25. *No one strives to preserve their being for the sake of anything else.*
4P25D	DEMONSTRATIO. Conatus, quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, sola ipsius rei essentia definitur (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*); eaque sola data, non autem ex alterius rei essentia, necessario sequitur (*per Prop.* 6 *p. III*), ut unusquisque suum esse conservare conetur. Patet præterea hæc Propositio ex Coroll. Prop. 22 hujus Partis. Nam si homo alterius rei causa suum esse conservare conaretur, tum res illa primum esset virtutis fundamentum (*ut per se notum*) quod (*per prædictum Coroll.*) est absurdum. Ergo nemo suum esse, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is defined by the essence of the thing itself alone (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). From this essence alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) that each one strives to preserve its being. This Proposition is also evident from the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part. For if a person strove to preserve their being for the sake of some other thing, that thing would then be the first foundation of virtue (as is self-evident), which (by that Corollary) is absurd. Therefore no one strives to preserve their being, etc. QED
4P26	PROPOSITIO XXVI. *Quicquid ex Ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere; nec Mens, quatenus Ratione utitur, aliud sibi utile esse judicat, nisi id, quod ad intelligendum conducit.*	Proposition 26. *Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing other than to understand; and the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judges nothing to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding.*
4P26D	DEMONSTRATIO. Conatus sese conservandi nihil est præter ipsius rei essentiam (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*), quæ, quatenus talis existit, vim habere concipitur ad perseverandum in existendo (*per Prop.* 6 *p. III*), et ea agendum, quæ ex data sua natura necessario sequuntur (*vide Defin. Appetitus in Schol. Prop.* 9 *p. III*). At Rationis essentia nihil aliud est quam Mens nostra, quatenus clare et distincte intelligit (*vide ejus Defin. in* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 *p. II*). Ergo (*per Prop.* 40 *p. II*) quicquid ex Ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere. Deinde quoniam hic Mentis conatus, quo Mens, quatenus ratiocinatur, suum esse conatur conservare, nihil aliud est quam intelligere (*per primam partem hujus*); est ergo hic intelligendi conatus (per Coroll.	Demonstration. The striving to preserve oneself is nothing but the essence of the thing itself (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived to have the force to persevere in existing (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) and to do the things that necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Definition of Appetite in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of Part 3). But the essence of reason is nothing other than our mind insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see its definition in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Therefore (by Proposition 40 of Part 2) whatever we strive for from reason is nothing other than to understand. Next, since this striving of the mind, by which the mind, insofar as it reasons, strives to preserve its being, is nothing other than understanding (by the first part of this demonstration), this striving to understand is
	Prop. *22* hujus*) primum et unicum virtutis fundamentum; nec alicujus finis causa (*per Prop. *25* hujus*) res intelligere conabimur: sed contra Mens, quatenus ratiocinatur, nihil sibi bonum esse concipere poterit nisi id, quod ad intelligendum conducit (*per Defin. *1* hujus*).* Q.E.D.	(by the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part) the first and only foundation of virtue. Nor will we strive to understand things for the sake of some end (by Proposition 25 of this part). On the contrary, the mind, insofar as it reasons, will be able to conceive nothing as good for itself except what

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		leads to understanding (by Definition 1 of this part). QED
4P27	PROPOSITIO XXVII. *Nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse, nisi id, quod ad intelligendum revera conducit, vel quod impedire potest, quo minus intelligamus.*	Proposition 27. *We know nothing to be certainly good or bad except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding.*
4P27D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens, quatenus ratiocinatur, nihil aliud appetit quam intelligere, nec aliud sibi utile esse judicat nisi id, quod ad intelligendum conducit (*per Prop. præced.*). At mens (*per Prop.* 41 *et* 43 *p. II, cujus etiam Schol. vide*) rerum certitudinem non habet, nisi quatenus ideas habet adæquatas, sive (*quod per Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 40 *p. II idem est*) quatenus ratiocinatur. Ergo nihil certo scimus bonum esse nisi id, quod ad intelligendum revera conducit; et contra id malum, quod impedire potest, quo minus intelligamus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The mind, insofar as it reasons, wants nothing other than to understand, and judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding (by the preceding Proposition). But the mind (by Propositions 41 and 43 of Part 2; see also the Scholium to the latter) has certainty about things only insofar as it has adequate ideas, or (what is the same thing, by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2) insofar as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be certainly good except what really leads to understanding, and, on the other hand, nothing to be certainly bad except what can prevent us from understanding. QED
4P28	PROPOSITIO XXVIII. *Summum Mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et Summa Mentis virtus Deum cognoscere.*	Proposition 28. *The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.*
4P28D	DEMONSTRATIO. Summum, quod Mens intelligere potest, Deus est, hoc est (*per Defin.* 6 *p. I*) Ens absolute infinitum, et sine quo (*per Prop.* 15 *p. I*) nihil esse neque concipi potest; adeoque (*per Prop.* 26 *et* 27 *hujus*) summum Mentis utile, sive (*per Defin.* 1 *hujus*) bonum, est Dei cognitio. Deinde Mens, quatenus intelligit, eatenus tantum agit (*per Prop.* 1 *et* 3 *p. III*), et eatenus tantum (*per Prop.* 23 *hujus*) potest absolute dici, quod ex virtute agit. Est igitur Mentis absoluta virtus intelligere. At summum, quod Mens intelligere potest, Deus est (*ut jamjam demonstravimus*); Ergo Mentis summa virtus est Deum intelligere seu cognoscere. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The highest thing the mind can understand is God, that is (by Definition 6 of Part 1), an absolutely infinite being, without whom (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) nothing can either be or be conceived. And so (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part) the mind's highest advantage, or (by Definition 1 of this part) its highest good, is the knowledge of God. Next, only insofar as the mind understands does it act (by Propositions 1 and 3 of Part 3), and only to that extent (by Proposition 23 of this part) can it be said absolutely to act from virtue. The mind's absolute virtue, then, is to understand. But the highest thing the mind can understand is God (as we have just demonstrated). Therefore the mind's highest virtue is to understand, or know, God. QED

WHAT AGREES WITH OUR NATURE IS GOOD

Things are good for us insofar as they share our nature; passions make people differ and conflict.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P29	PROPOSITIO XXIX. *Res quæcunque singularis, cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa nostram agendi potentiam nec juvare nec coercere potest, et absolute res nulla potest nobis bona aut mala esse, nisi commune aliquid nobiscum habeat.*	Proposition 29. *No singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can either aid or restrain our power of acting; and absolutely, nothing can be good*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		or bad for us unless it has something in common with us.
4P29D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cujuscunque rei singularis, et consequenter (*per Coroll. Prop.* 10 *p. II*) hominis, potentia, qua existit et operatur, non determinatur nisi ab alia re singulari (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*), cujus natura (*per Prop.* 6 *p. II*) per idem attributum debet intelligi, per quod natura humana concipitur. Nostra igitur agendi potentia, quomodocunque ea concipiatur, determinari, et consequenter juvari vel coerceri, potest potentia alterius rei singularis, quæ aliquid commune nobiscum habet, et non potentia rei cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa; et quia id bonum aut malum vocamus, quod causa est Lætitiæ aut Tristitiæ (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 p.	Demonstration. The power of any singular thing, and consequently (by the Corollary to Proposition 10 of Part 2) of a human being, by which it exists and acts, is determined only by another singular thing (by Proposition 28 of Part 1), whose nature (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) must be understood through the same attribute through which human nature is conceived. So our power of acting, however it is conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or restrained, by the power of another singular thing that has something in common with us, and not by the power of a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours. Now we call good or bad what is the cause of joy or sadness (by Proposition 8 of this part), that is
	III*) quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet; ergo res, cujus natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nobis neque bona neque mala esse potest.* Q.E.D.	(by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Therefore a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can be neither good nor bad for us. QED
4P30	PROPOSITIO XXX. *Res nulla per id, quod cum nostra natura commune habet, potest esse mala, sed quatenus nobis mala est, eatenus est nobis contraria.*	Proposition 30. *Nothing can be bad through what it has in common with our nature; rather, insofar as it is bad for us, it is contrary to us.*
4P30D	DEMONSTRATIO. Id malum vocamus, quod causa est Tristitiæ (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) hoc est (*per ejus Definit., quam vide in Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*), quod nostram agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet. Si igitur res aliqua per id, quod nobiscum habet commune, nobis esset mala; posset ergo res id ipsum, quod nobiscum commune habet, minuere vel coercere, quod (*per Prop.* 4 *p. III*) est absurdum. Nulla igitur res per id, quod nobiscum commune habet, potest nobis esse mala, sed contra quatenus mala est, hoc est (*ut jamjam ostendimus*), quatenus nostram agendi potentiam minuere vel coercere potest, eatenus (*per Prop.* 5 *p. III*) nobis est contraria. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. We call bad what is the cause of sadness (by Proposition 8 of this part), that is (by the definition of sadness, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), what diminishes or restrains our power of acting. So if some thing were bad for us through what it has in common with us, it could diminish or restrain the very thing it has in common with us, which (by Proposition 4 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore nothing can be bad for us through what it has in common with us. On the contrary, insofar as it is bad—that is (as we have just shown), insofar as it can diminish or restrain our power of acting—it is (by Proposition 5 of Part 3) contrary to us. QED
4P31	PROPOSITIO XXXI. *Quatenus res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, eatenus necessario bona est.*	Proposition 31. *Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good.*
4P31D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus enim res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, non potest (*per Prop. præced.*) esse mala. Erit ergo necessario vel bona vel indifferens. Si hoc ponatur, nempe quod neque bona sit neque mala; nihil ergo (*per Defin.* 1 *hujus*) ex ipsius natura sequetur, quod	Demonstration. For insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot be bad (by the preceding Proposition). It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. Suppose the latter: that it is neither good nor bad. Then (by Definition 1 of this

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	nostræ naturæ conservationi inservit, hoc est (*per hypothesin*) quod ipsius rei naturæ conservationi inservit; sed hoc est absurdum (*per Prop.* 6 *p. III*), erit ergo, quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, necessario bona. *Q.E.D.*	part) nothing will follow from its nature that serves the preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), that serves the preservation of the nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (by Proposition 6 of Part 3). Therefore, insofar as it agrees with our nature, it will necessarily be good. QED
4P31C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod, quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo nobis est utilior seu magis bona, et contra, quo res aliqua nobis est utilior, eatenus cum nostra natura magis convenit. Nam quatenus cum nostra natura non convenit, erit necessario a nostra natura diversa, vel eidem contraria. Si diversa, tum (*per Prop.* 29 *hujus*) neque bona neque mala esse poterit; si autem contraria, erit ergo etiam ei contraria, quæ cum nostra natura convenit, hoc est (*per Prop. præced.*) contraria bono seu mala. Nihil igitur, nisi quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, potest esse bonum, atque adeo, quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo est utilior et contra. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary. From this it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or better, it is for us; and conversely, the more useful a thing is to us, the more it agrees with our nature. For insofar as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be either different from our nature or contrary to it. If different, then (by Proposition 29 of this part) it can be neither good nor bad. If contrary, it will also be contrary to what agrees with our nature, that is (by the preceding Proposition), contrary to the good—in other words, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature; and so the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is, and conversely. QED
4P32	PROPOSITIO XXXII. *Quatenus homines passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt eatenus dici quod natura conveniant.*	Proposition 32. *Insofar as people are subject to passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree in nature.*
4P32D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quæ natura convenire dicuntur, potentia convenire intelliguntur (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*); non autem impotentia seu negatione, et consequenter (*vide Schol. Prop.* 3 *p. III*) neque etiam passione; quare homines, quatenus passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt dici, quod natura conveniant. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Things said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), not in lack of power, or negation, and consequently (see the Scholium to Proposition 3 of Part 3) not in passion either. Therefore people, insofar as they are subject to passions, cannot be said to agree in nature. QED
4P32S	SCHOLIUM. Res etiam per se patet; qui enim ait, album et nigrum in eo solummodo convenire, quod neutrum sit rubrum, is absolute affirmat, album et nigrum nulla in re convenire. Sic etiam si quis ait, lapidem et hominem in hoc tantum convenire, quod uterque sit finitus, impotens, vel quod ex necessitate suæ naturæ non existit, vel denique quod a potentia causarum externarum indefinite superatur: is omnino affirmat lapidem et hominem nulla in re convenire; quæ enim in sola negatione, sive in eo, quod non habent, conveniunt, ea revera nulla in re conveniunt.	Scholium. The matter is also evident in itself. Someone who says that white and black agree only in this, that neither is red, is asserting outright that white and black agree in nothing. So too, if someone says that a stone and a human being agree only in this, that each is finite and lacking in power, or that neither exists by the necessity of its own nature, or, finally, that each is indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, that person is asserting outright that a stone and a human being agree in nothing. For things that agree only in a negation—that is, in what they do not have—in reality agree in nothing.
4P33		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	PROPOSITIO XXXIII. *Homines natura discrepare possunt, quatenus affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur; et eatenus etiam unus idemque homo varius est et inconstans.*	Proposition 33. *People can differ in nature insofar as they are torn by affects that are passions; and to that extent one and the same person is also changeable and inconstant.*
4P33D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectuum natura seu essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam seu naturam explicari (*per Defin.* 1 et 2 *p. III*); sed potentia, hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) natura, causarum externarum, cum nostra comparata, definiri debet; unde fit, ut uniuscujusque affectus tot species dentur, quot sunt species objectorum, a quibus afficimur (*vide Prop.* 56 *p. III*) et ut homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode afficiantur (*vide Prop.* 51 *p. III*), atque eatenus natura discrepent; et denique ut unus idemque homo (*per eandem Prop.* 51 *p. III*) erga idem objectum diversimode afficiatur, atque eatenus varius sit, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature, alone (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3). It must be defined by the power, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the nature, of external causes compared with our own. Hence there are as many kinds of each affect as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected (see Proposition 56 of Part 3); different people are affected in different ways by one and the same object (see Proposition 51 of Part 3), and to that extent differ in nature; and, finally, one and the same person (by the same Proposition 51 of Part 3) is affected in different ways toward the same object, and to that extent is changeable, etc. QED
4P34	PROPOSITIO XXXIV. *Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt invicem esse contrarii.*	Proposition 34. *Insofar as people are torn by affects that are passions, they can be contrary to one another.*
4P34D	DEMONSTRATIO. Homo ex. gr. Petrus potest esse causa, ut Paulus contristetur, propterea quod aliquid habet simile rei, quam Paulus odit (*per Prop.* 16 *p. III*); vel propterea quod Petrus solus re aliqua potitur, quam ipse Paulus etiam amat (*vide Prop.* 32 *p. III cum ejusdem Schol.*), vel ob alias causas (*harum præcipuas vide in Schol. Prop.* 55 *p. III*); atque adeo inde fiet (*per Defin.* 7 *Affect.*), ut Paulus Petrum odio habeat: et consequenter facile fiet (*per Prop.* 40 *p. III cum ejus Schol.*), ut Petrus Paulum contra odio habeat, atque adeo (*per Prop.* 39 *p. III*) ut invicem malum inferre conentur, hoc est (*per Prop.* 30 *hujus*), ut invicem sint contrarii. At affectus Tristitiæ semper passio est (*per Prop.* 59 p.	Demonstration. A person—Peter, say—can be the cause of Paul's being saddened, because Peter has something similar to a thing Paul hates (by Proposition 16 of Part 3); or because Peter alone possesses something that Paul also loves (see Proposition 32 of Part 3, with its Scholium); or for other reasons (for the chief of these, see the Scholium to Proposition 55 of Part 3). From this it will come about (by Definition 7 of the Affects) that Paul hates Peter. Consequently it will easily come about (by Proposition 40 of Part 3, with its Scholium) that Peter hates Paul in return, and so (by Proposition 39 of Part 3) that they strive to harm each other, that is (by Proposition 30 of this part), that they are contrary to one another. But the affect of sadness is always a passion
	III*); ergo homines, quatenus conflictantur affectibus, qui passiones sunt, possunt invicem esse contrarii.* Q.E.D.	(by Proposition 59 of Part 3). Therefore people, insofar as they are torn by affects that are passions, can be contrary to one another. QED
4P34S	SCHOLIUM. Dixi, quod Paulus odio Petrum habeat, quia imaginatur, id eundem possidere, quod ipse Paulus etiam amat; unde prima fronte videtur sequi, quod hi duo ex eo, quod idem amant, et consequenter ex eo, quod natura conveniunt, sibi invicem damno sint; atque adeo, si hoc verum est, falsæ essent Propositio 30 et 31 hujus Partis. Sed si rem æqua lance examinare velimus, hæc omnia	Scholium. I said that Paul hates Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses what Paul himself also loves. At first sight it seems to follow from this that these two harm each other because they love the same thing, and consequently because they agree in nature. If that were true, Propositions 30 and 31 of this part would be false. But if

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	convenire omnino videbimus. Nam hi duo non sunt invicem molesti, quatenus natura conveniunt, hoc est quatenus uterque idem amat, sed quatenus ab invicem discrepant. Nam quatenus uterque idem amat, eo ipso utriusque amor fovetur (*per Prop.* 31 *p. III*), hoc est (*per Defin.* 6 *Affect.*), eo ipso utriusque Lætitia fovetur.	we are willing to weigh the matter fairly, we shall see that everything here is entirely consistent. For these two are not troublesome to each other insofar as they agree in nature, that is, insofar as each loves the same thing, but insofar as they differ from each other. For insofar as each loves the same thing, the love of each is thereby strengthened (by Proposition 31 of Part 3), that is (by Definition 6 of the Affects), the joy of each is thereby strengthened.
	Quare longe abest, ut quatenus idem amant, et natura conveniunt, invicem molesti sint. Sed hujus rei causa, ut dixi, nulla alia est, quam quia natura discrepare supponuntur. Supponimus namque, Petrum ideam habere rei amatæ jam possessæ, et Paulum contra ideam rei amatæ amissæ. Unde fit ut hic Tristitia, et ille contra Lætitia afficiatur, atque eatenus invicem contrarii sint. Et ad hunc modum ostendere facile possumus, reliquas odii causas ab hoc solo pendere, quod homines natura discrepant, et non ab eo, in quo conveniunt.	So it is far from true that they are troublesome to each other insofar as they love the same thing and agree in nature. The cause of their conflict, as I said, is nothing other than that they are supposed to differ in nature. For we are supposing that Peter has the idea of the loved thing as already possessed, and Paul, on the contrary, the idea of the loved thing as lost. That is why Paul is affected with sadness and Peter with joy, and to that extent they are contrary to one another. In the same way we can easily show that the other causes of hatred depend solely on the fact that people differ in nature, and not on what they agree in.

PEOPLE AGREE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON

Only people who live by reason always agree, so nothing is more useful to a human being than another rational person.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P35	PROPOSITIO XXXV. *Quatenus homines ex ductu Rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum natura semper necessario conveniunt.*	Proposition 35. *Only insofar as people live under the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature.*
4P35D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi (*per Prop.* 33 *hujus*) et invicem contrarii (*per Prop. præced.*). Sed eatenus homines tantum agere dicuntur, quatenus ex ductu Rationis vivunt (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*); atque adeo quicquid ex humana natura, quatenus Ratione definitur, sequitur, id (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*) per solam humanam naturam, tanquam per proximam suam causam, debet intelligi. Sed quia unusquisque ex suæ naturæ legibus id appetit, quod bonum, et id amovere conatur, quod malum esse judicat (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*); et cum præterea id, quod ex dictamine Rationis bonum aut malum esse judicamus, necessario bonum aut malum sit (*per Prop.* 41 p.	Demonstration. Insofar as people are torn by affects that are passions, they can be different in nature (by Proposition 33 of this part) and contrary to one another (by the preceding Proposition). But people are said to act only insofar as they live under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 3 of Part 3). Accordingly, whatever follows from human nature insofar as it is defined by reason must (by Definition 2 of Part 3) be understood through human nature alone, as through its proximate cause. Now each person, by the laws of their own nature, wants what they judge to be good and strives to remove what they judge to be bad (by Proposition 19 of this part). Moreover, what we judge to be good or bad by the dictate of reason is necessarily good or bad

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	II*); Ergo homines, quatenus ex ductu Rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt, quæ humanæ naturæ et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est* (per Coroll. Prop. *31* hujus*) quæ cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt; atque adeo homines etiam inter se quatenus ex ductu Rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt.* Q.E.D.	(by Proposition 41 of Part 2). Therefore, only insofar as people live under the guidance of reason do they necessarily do the things that are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each person, that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of this part), the things that agree with the nature of each person. And so people also necessarily always agree with one another insofar as they live under the guidance of reason. QED
4P35C1	COROLLARIUM I. Nihil singulare in rerum Natura datur, quod homini sit utilius quam homo, qui ex ductu Rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est, quod cum sua natura maxime convenit (*per Coroll. Prop.* 31 *hujus*), hoc est (*ut per se notum*) homo. At homo ex legibus suæ naturæ absolute agit, quando ex ductu Rationis vivit (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*), et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convenit (*per Prop. præced.*); ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary 1. There is no singular thing in Nature more useful to a human being than a human being who lives under the guidance of reason. For what is most useful to a human being is what most agrees with their nature (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of this part), that is (as is self-evident), a human being. But a human being acts absolutely from the laws of their own nature when they live under the guidance of reason (by Definition 2 of Part 3), and only to that extent do they always necessarily agree with the nature of another human being (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore, among singular things, nothing is more useful to a human being than a human being, etc. QED
4P35C2	COROLLARIUM II. Cum maxime unusquisque homo suum sibi utile quærit, tum maxime homines sunt sibi invicem utiles. Nam quo magis unusquisque suum utile quærit, et se conservare conatur, eo magis virtute præditus est (*per Prop.* 20 *hujus*), sive, quod idem est (*per Defin.* 8 *hujus*), eo majore potentia præditus est ad agendum ex suæ naturæ legibus, hoc est (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) ad vivendum ex ductu Rationis. At homines tum maxime natura conveniunt, cum ex ductu Rationis vivunt (*per Prop. præced.*); ergo (*per præc. Coroll.*) tum maxime homines erunt sibi invicem utiles, cum maxime unusquisque suum utile sibi quærit. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary 2. When each person most seeks their own advantage, then people are most useful to one another. For the more each seeks their own advantage and strives to preserve themselves, the more they are endowed with virtue (by Proposition 20 of this part), or, what is the same thing (by Definition 8 of this part), the greater the power with which they are endowed to act from the laws of their own nature, that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), to live under the guidance of reason. But people most agree in nature when they live under the guidance of reason (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore (by the preceding Corollary) people will be most useful to one another when each most seeks their own advantage. QED
4P35S	SCHOLIUM. Quæ modo ostendimus, ipsa etiam experientia quotidie tot tamque luculentis testimoniis testatur, ut omnibus fere in ore sit: hominem homini Deum esse. Fit tamen raro, ut homines ex ductu Rationis vivant; sed cum iis ita comparatum est, ut plerumque invidi, atque invicem molesti sint. At nihilominus vitam solitariam vix transigere queunt, ita ut plerisque illa definitio, quod homo sit animal sociale, valde arriserit; et revera res ita se habet, ut ex hominum communi societate multo plura commoda oriantur, quam damna.	Scholium. What we have just shown is confirmed daily by experience itself, with so many and such clear testimonies that it is on almost everyone's lips: "One human being is a god to another." Yet it rarely happens that people live under the guidance of reason. Instead, they are so constituted that for the most part they are envious and troublesome to one another. Nevertheless, they can scarcely lead a solitary life, so that most

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		people have warmly welcomed the definition of a human being as a social animal. And in truth, things are such that far more advantages than harms arise from the common society of human beings.[4]
	Rideant igitur, quantum velint, res humanas Satyrici, easque detestentur Theologi, et laudent, quantum possunt, Melancholici vitam incultam et agrestem, hominesque contemnant, et admirentur bruta; experientur tamen, homines mutuo auxilio ea, quibus indigent, multo facilius sibi parare, et non nisi junctis viribus pericula, quæ ubique imminent, vitare posse; ut jam taceam, quod multo præstabilius sit, et cognitione nostra magis dignum, hominum, quam brutorum facta contemplari. Sed de his alias prolixius.	So let the satirists laugh at human affairs as much as they like, let the theologians curse them, and let the melancholics praise, as much as they can, a rough and rustic life, scorn human beings and admire the beasts. People will still find that by mutual help they can provide themselves far more easily with what they need, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers that threaten on every side. Not to mention that it is far better, and more worthy of our knowledge, to contemplate the deeds of human beings than those of beasts. But I shall treat these matters more fully elsewhere.
4P36	PROPOSITIO XXXVI. *Summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est, eoque omnes æque gaudere possunt.*	Proposition 36. *The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally.*
4P36D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex virtute agere est ex ductu Rationis agere (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*) et quicquid ex Ratione conamur agere, est intelligere (*per Prop.* 26 *hujus*); atque adeo (*per Prop.* 28 *hujus*) summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, est Deum cognoscere, hoc est (*per Prop.* 47 *p. II et ejusdem Schol.*) bonum, quod omnibus hominibus commune est, et ab omnibus hominibus, quatenus ejusdem sunt naturæ, possideri æque potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. To act from virtue is to act under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 24 of this part), and whatever we strive to do from reason is to understand (by Proposition 26 of this part). And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) the highest good of those who pursue virtue is to know God, that is (by Proposition 47 of Part 2 and its Scholium), a good that is common to all human beings and can be possessed equally by all human beings insofar as they are of the same nature. QED
4P36S	SCHOLIUM. Si quis autem roget, quid si summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, non esset omnibus commune? an non inde, ut supra (*vide Prop.* 34 *hujus*), sequeretur, quod homines, qui ex ductu Rationis vivunt, hoc est (*per Prop.* 35 *hujus*) homines, quatenus natura conveniunt, essent invicem contrarii? Is hoc sibi responsum habeat, non ex accidenti, sed ex ipsa natura Rationis oriri, ut hominis summum bonum omnibus sit commune, nimirum quia ex ipsa humana essentia, quatenus Ratione definitur, deducitur; et quia homo nec esse nec concipi posset, si potestatem non haberet gaudendi hoc summo bono. Pertinet namque (*per Prop.* 47 *p. II*) ad Mentis humanæ essentiam, adæquatam habere cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei.	Scholium. But suppose someone asks: what if the highest good of those who pursue virtue were not common to all? Would it not follow from this, as above (see Proposition 34 of this part), that people who live under the guidance of reason—that is (by Proposition 35 of this part), people insofar as they agree in nature—would be contrary to one another? Let them take this as their answer: it is not by accident but from the very nature of reason that the highest good of human beings is common to all—namely, because it is deduced from the very essence of a human being insofar as that essence is defined by reason, and because a human being could neither be nor be conceived if they did not

4 The proverb "Homo homini deus" ("man is a god to man") is the counterpart of the better-known "man is a wolf to man." The "social animal" echoes Aristotle's definition of the human being as a political animal.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		have the power to enjoy this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human mind (by Proposition 47 of Part 2) to have an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence.
4P37	PROPOSITIO XXXVII. *Bonum, quod unusquisque, qui sectatur virtutem, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet, et eo magis, quo majorem Dei habuerit cognitionem.*	Proposition 37. *The good that each person who pursues virtue wants for themselves they will also desire for other people, and all the more, the greater the knowledge of God they have.*
4P37D	DEMONSTRATIO. Homines quatenus ex ductu Rationis vivunt, sunt homini utilissimi (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 35 *hujus*); atque adeo (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*) ex ductu Rationis conabimur necessario efficere, ut homines ex ductu Rationis vivant. At bonum, quod unusquisque, qui ex Rationis dictamine vivit, hoc est (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*) qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, est intelligere (*per Prop.* 26 *hujus*); ergo bonum, quod unusquisque, qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet. Deinde Cupiditas, quatenus ad Mentem refertur, est ipsa Mentis essentia (*per* 1 *Affect. Defin.*); Mentis autem essentia in cognitione consistit (*per Prop.* 11 *p. II*), quæ Dei cognitionem involvit (*per Prop.* 47 *p. II*), et sine qua (*per Prop.* 15 p.	Demonstration. People are most useful to a human being insofar as they live under the guidance of reason (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 35 of this part). And so (by Proposition 19 of this part), under the guidance of reason, we will necessarily strive to bring it about that people live under the guidance of reason. But the good that each person who lives by the dictate of reason—that is (by Proposition 24 of this part), who pursues virtue—wants for themselves is to understand (by Proposition 26 of this part). Therefore the good that each person who pursues virtue wants for themselves they will also desire for other people. Next, desire, insofar as it is related to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (by Definition 1 of the Affects). But the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Proposition 11 of Part 2), which involves the knowledge of God (by Proposition 47 of Part 2), without which
	I*), nec esse nec concipi potest; adeoque quo Mentis essentia majorem Dei cognitionem involvit, eo Cupiditas, qua is, qui virtutem sectatur, bonum, quod sibi appetit, alteri cupit, etiam major erit.* Q.E.D.	(by Proposition 15 of Part 1) it can neither be nor be conceived. And so, the greater the knowledge of God that the mind's essence involves, the greater also will be the desire by which someone who pursues virtue desires for another the good they want for themselves. QED
4P37D2	ALITER. Bonum, quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit, si viderit, alios idem amare (*per Prop.* 31 *p. III*); atque adeo (*per Coroll. ejusdem Prop.*) conabitur, ut reliqui idem ament; et quia hoc bonum (*per Prop. præced.*) omnibus commune est, eoque omnes gaudere possunt, conabitur ergo (*per eandem rationem*), ut omnes eodem gaudeant, et (*per Prop.* 37 *p. III*) eo magis, quo hoc bono magis fruetur. *Q.E.D.*	Alternatively. A person will love more constantly the good they want and love for themselves if they see that others love the same thing (by Proposition 31 of Part 3). And so (by the Corollary to that Proposition) they will strive to bring it about that others love the same thing. And since this good (by the preceding Proposition) is common to all, and all can enjoy it, they will therefore strive (for the same reason) to bring it about that all enjoy it, and (by Proposition 37 of Part 3) all the more, the more they themselves enjoy this good. QED
4P37S1	SCHOLIUM I. Qui ex solo affectu conatur, ut reliqui ament, quod ipse amat, et ut reliqui ex suo ingenio vivant, solo impetu agit, et ideo odiosus est, præcipue iis,	Scholium 1. Someone who strives, from affect alone, to make others love what they themselves love, and to make others live according to their

LATIN

quibus alia placent, quique propterea etiam student, et eodem impetu conantur, ut reliqui contra ex ipsorum ingenio vivant. Deinde quoniam summum, quod homines ex affectu appetunt, bonum sæpe tale est, ut unus tantum ejus possit esse compos, hinc fit, ut qui amant, mente sibi non constent, et dum laudes rei, quam amant, narrare gaudent, timeant credi. At qui reliquos conatur Ratione ducere, non impetu, sed humaniter et benigne agit, et sibi mente maxime constat. Porro quicquid cupimus et agimus, cujus causa sumus, quatenus Dei habemus ideam, sive quatenus Deum cognoscimus, ad *Religionem* refero.

Cupiditatem autem bene faciendi, quæ ex eo ingeneratur, quod ex Rationis ductu vivimus, *Pietatem* voco. Cupiditatem deinde, qua homo, qui ex ductu Rationis vivit, tenetur, ut reliquos sibi amicitia jungat, *Honestatem* voco et id *honestum*, quod homines, qui ex ductu Rationis vivunt, laudant et id contra *turpe*, quod conciliandæ amicitiæ repugnat . Præter hæc civitatis etiam quænam sint fundamenta ostendi.

Differentia deinde inter veram virtutem et impotentiam facile ex supra dictis percipitur; nempe quod vera virtus nihil aliud sit, quam ex solo Rationis ductu vivere; atque adeo impotentia in hoc solo consistit, quod homo a rebus, quæ extra ipsum sunt, duci se patiatur, et ab iis ad ea agendum determinetur, quæ rerum externarum communis constitutio, non autem ea, quæ ipsa ipsius natura, in se sola considerata, postulat. Atque hæc illa sunt, quæ in Scholio Propositionis 18 hujus Partis demonstrare promisi, ex quibus apparet, legem illam de non mactandis brutis magis vana superstitione et muliebri misericordia, quam sana Ratione fundatam esse.

Docet quidem ratio nostrum utile quærendi necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere; sed non cum brutis, aut rebus, quarum natura a natura humana est diversa; sed idem jus, quod illa in nos habent, nos in ea habere. Imo quia uniuscujusque jus virtute seu potentia uniuscujusque definitur, longe majus homines in bruta, quam hæc in homines jus habent. Nec tamen nego bruta

ENGLISH

own temperament, acts from mere impulse and is therefore hateful—especially to those who like other things, and who therefore also try, from the same impulse, to make others live according to their temperament instead. Again, since the highest good that people want from affect is often such that only one person can possess it, those who love are inwardly at odds with themselves: while they delight in singing the praises of what they love, they are afraid of being believed. But someone who strives to lead others by reason acts not from impulse but kindly and generously, and is wholly at one with themselves in mind. Further, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I refer to *religion*.

The desire to do good that arises from our living under the guidance of reason I call *piety*. The desire by which a person who lives under the guidance of reason is bound to join others to themselves in friendship I call *honor*; and I call *honorable* what people who live under the guidance of reason praise, and, on the other hand, *base* what is opposed to forming friendship. Besides this, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are.[5]

The difference between true virtue and lack of power is also easily perceived from what has been said above: namely, that true virtue is nothing other than living by the guidance of reason alone; and so lack of power consists solely in this, that a person allows themselves to be led by things outside them, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what their own nature, considered in itself alone, demands. These are the things I promised in the Scholium to Proposition 18 of this part to demonstrate. From them it is clear that the law against slaughtering animals is founded more on empty superstition and sentimental pity than on sound reason.

Reason indeed teaches that, in seeking our own advantage, we should form bonds with human beings, but not with beasts, or with things whose nature is different from human nature; we have the same right over them that they have over us. Indeed, since the right of each is defined by the virtue, or power, of each, human beings have far

5 "Honor" renders *honestas*: the quality of being decent or honorable, rather than a matter of reputation.

LATIN	ENGLISH
sentire; sed nego, quod propterea non liceat nostræ utilitati consulere, et iisdem ad libitum uti, eademque tractare prout nobis magis convenit; quandoquidem nobiscum natura non conveniunt, et eorum affectus ab affectibus humanis sunt natura diversi (*vide Schol. Prop.* 57 *p. III*). Superest ut explicem quid justum, quid injustum, quid peccatum, et quid denique meritum sit. Sed de his vide seq. Scholium.	greater right over beasts than beasts have over human beings. I do not deny that beasts feel. But I do deny that this makes it wrong for us to consult our own advantage, to use them at will, and to treat them as best suits us, since they do not agree with us in nature and their affects are different in nature from human affects (see the Scholium to Proposition 57 of Part 3). It remains for me to explain what is just, what unjust, what wrongdoing, and, finally, what merit is. On these, see the following Scholium.

THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE CIVIL STATE

Spinoza explains natural right, the founding of the state, and wrongdoing, merit, justice and injustice as civil notions.

LATIN	ENGLISH
4P37S2 SCHOLIUM II. In appendice Partis primæ explicare promisi, quid laus et vituperium, quid meritum et peccatum, quid justum et injustum sit. Laudem et vituperium quod attinet, in Scholio Propositionis 29 partis III explicui; de reliquis autem hic jam erit dicendi locus. Sed prius pauca de *statu hominis naturali et civili* dicenda sunt.	Scholium 2. In the Appendix to Part 1 I promised to explain what praise and blame, merit and wrongdoing, and justice and injustice are. As for praise and blame, I explained them in the Scholium to Proposition 29 of Part 3. The place to speak of the rest is here. But first a few things must be said about *the natural and civil state of human beings*.
Existit unusquisque summo Naturæ jure, et consequenter summo Naturæ jure unusquisque ea agit, quæ ex suæ naturæ necessitate sequuntur; atque adeo summo Naturæ jure unusquisque judicat, quid bonum, quid malum sit, suæque utilitati ex suo ingenio consulit (*vide Prop.* 19 *et* 20 *hujus*), seseque vindicat (*vide Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 40 *p. III*), et id, quod amat, conservare, et id, quod odio habet, destruere conatur (*vide Prop.* 28 *p. III*). Quod si homines ex ductu Rationis viverent, potiretur unusquisque (*per Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 35 *hujus*) hoc suo jure absque ullo alterius damno. Sed quia affectibus sunt obnoxii (per Coroll.	Each person exists by the supreme right of Nature, and consequently, by the supreme right of Nature, each does what follows from the necessity of their own nature. And so, by the supreme right of Nature, each person judges what is good and what is bad, consults their own advantage according to their own temperament (see Propositions 19 and 20 of this part), avenges themselves (see Corollary 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 3), and strives to preserve what they love and to destroy what they hate (see Proposition 28 of Part 3). If people lived under the guidance of reason, each would enjoy this right of theirs (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 35 of this part) without any harm to anyone else. But because they are subject to affects
Prop. *4* hujus*), qui potentiam seu virtutem humanam longe superant (*per Prop. *6* hujus*) ideo sæpe diversi trahuntur (*per Prop. *33* hujus*), atque sibi invicem sunt contrarii (*per Prop. *34* hujus*), mutuo dum auxilio indigent (*per Schol. Prop. *35* hujus*). Ut igitur homines concorditer vivere et sibi auxilio esse possint, necesse est, ut jure suo naturali cedant, et se invicem securos reddant, se nihil acturos, quod possit in alterius damnum cedere. Qua autem ratione hoc fieri possit, ut scilicet homines, qui affectibus necessario sunt obnoxii (*per Coroll.	(by the Corollary to Proposition 4 of this part), which far surpass human power, or virtue (by Proposition 6 of this part), they are often pulled in different directions (by Proposition 33 of this part) and are contrary to one another (by Proposition 34 of this part), even while they need one another's help (by the Scholium to Proposition 35 of this part). So, in order for people to be able to live in harmony and help one another, they must give up

LATIN

Prop. *4* hujus*), atque inconstantes et varii (*per Prop. *33* hujus), possint se invicem securos reddere, et fidem invicem habere, patet ex Propositione 7 hujus partis et Propositione 39 partis III.

Nempe quod nullus affectus coerceri potest, nisi affectu fortiore et contrario affectui coercendo, et quod unusquisque ab inferendo damno abstinet timore majoris damni. Hac igitur lege Societas firmari poterit, si modo ipsa sibi vindicet jus, quod unusquisque habet, sese vindicandi, et de bono et malo judicandi; quæque adeo potestatem habeat communem vivendi rationem præscribendi, legesque ferendi, easque non Ratione, quæ affectus coercere nequit (*per Schol. Prop.* 17 *hujus*), sed minis firmandi.

Hæc autem Societas, legibus et potestate sese conservandi firmata, *Civitas* appellatur, et qui ipsius jure defenduntur, *Cives*; ex quibus facile intelligimus, nihil in statu naturali dari, quod ex omnium consensu bonum aut malum sit; quandoquidem unusquisque, qui, in statu est naturali, suæ tantummodo utilitati consulit, et ex suo ingenio, et quatenus suæ utilitatis tantum habet rationem, quid bonum quidve malum sit, decernit, et nemini, nisi sibi soli, obtemperare lege ulla tenetur. Atque adeo in statu naturali peccatum concipi nequit; at quidem in statu Civili, ubi et communi consensu decernitur, quid bonum quidve malum sit, et unusquisque Civitati obtemperare tenetur.

Est itaque *peccatum* nihil aliud quam inobedientia, quæ propterea solo Civitatis jure punitur, et contra obedientia Civi *meritum* ducitur, quia eo ipso dignus judicatur, qui Civitatis commodis gaudeat. Deinde in statu naturali nemo ex communi consensu alicujus rei est Dominus, nec in Natura aliquid datur, quod possit dici hujus hominis esse, et non illius; sed omnia omnium sunt; ac proinde in statu naturali nulla potest concipi voluntas unicuique suum tribuendi, aut alicui id, quod ejus sit, eripiendi; hoc est, in statu naturali nihil fit, quod *justum* aut *injustum* possit dici; at quidem in statu civili, ubi ex communi consensu decernitur, quid hujus, quidve illius sit. Ex

ENGLISH

their natural right and assure one another that they will do nothing that could result in harm to another. How this can come about—how people who are necessarily subject to affects (by the Corollary to Proposition 4 of this part), and are inconstant and changeable (by Proposition 33 of this part), can assure one another and have trust in one another—is evident from Proposition 7 of this part and Proposition 39 of Part 3.

It is this: that no affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than, and contrary to, the affect to be restrained, and that each person refrains from doing harm for fear of a greater harm. By this law, then, a society can be established, provided it claims for itself the right that each person has of avenging themselves and of judging what is good and bad, and therefore has the power to prescribe a common way of life, to make laws, and to secure them not by reason, which cannot restrain the affects (by the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part), but by threats.

A society of this kind, secured by laws and by the power of preserving itself, is called a *state*, and those who are protected by its right are called *citizens*. From this we readily understand that in the state of nature there is nothing that is good or bad by common agreement, since each person in the state of nature consults only their own advantage, decides what is good and what is bad according to their own temperament and only insofar as they take their own advantage into account, and is bound by no law to obey anyone but themselves. And so in the state of nature wrongdoing cannot be conceived. It can, however, in the civil state, where what is good and what is bad is decided by common agreement, and each person is bound to obey the state.

Wrongdoing, therefore, is nothing other than disobedience, which for that reason is punished only by the right of the state; and obedience, on the other hand, is counted as *merit* in a citizen, because by that very fact they are judged worthy to enjoy the advantages of the state. Again, in the state of nature no one is owner of anything by common agreement, and there is nothing in Nature that can be said to belong to this person rather than that one; everything belongs to everyone. Accordingly, in the state of nature no will can be conceived to give each person their own, or to

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quibus apparet, justum et injustum, peccatum et meritum, notiones esse extrinsecas; non autem attributa, quæ Mentis naturam explicent.	take from someone what is theirs; that is, in the state of nature nothing happens that can be called *just* or *unjust*. This can happen, however, in the civil state, where what belongs to this person and what to that one is decided by common agreement. From this it is evident that just and unjust, wrongdoing and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes that explain the nature of the mind.
	Sed de his satis.	But enough of this.
4P38	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII. *Id, quod Corpus humanum ita disponit, ut pluribus modis possit affici, vel quod idem aptum reddit ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, homini est utile; et eo utilius, quo Corpus ab eo aptius redditur, ut pluribus modis afficiatur, aliaque corpora afficiat; et contra id noxium est, quod Corpus ad hæc minus aptum reddit.*	Proposition 38. *Whatever so disposes the human body that it can be affected in more ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in more ways, is useful to a human being; and the more useful, the more capable the body is thereby rendered of being affected in more ways and of affecting other bodies; and, on the other hand, whatever renders the body less capable of these things is harmful.*
4P38D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quo corpus ad hæc aptius redditur, eo Mens aptior ad percipiendum redditur (*per Prop.* 14 *p. II*); adeoque id, quod Corpus hac ratione disponit, aptumque ad hæc reddit, est necessario bonum seu utile (*per Prop.* 26 *et* 27 *hujus*), et eo utilius, quo Corpus ad hæc aptius potest reddere; et contra (*per eandem Prop.* 14 *p. II inversam, et Prop.* 26 *et* 27 *hujus*) noxium, si corpus ad hæc minus aptum reddat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The more capable the body is rendered of these things, the more capable of perceiving the mind is rendered (by Proposition 14 of Part 2). And so whatever disposes the body in this way and renders it capable of these things is necessarily good, or useful (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part), and the more useful, the more capable of these things it can render the body. And, on the other hand (by the converse of the same Proposition 14 of Part 2, and by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part), it is harmful if it renders the body less capable of these things. QED
4P39	PROPOSITIO XXXIX. *Quæ efficiunt, ut motus et quietis ratio, quam Corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, bona sunt; et ea contra mala, quæ efficiunt, ut Corporis humani partes aliam ad invicem motus et quietis habeant rationem.*	Proposition 39. *Whatever brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest that the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved is good; and, on the other hand, whatever brings it about that the parts of the human body have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another is bad.*
4P39D	DEMONSTRATIO. Corpus humanum indiget, ut conservetur, plurimis aliis corporibus (*per Postul.* 4 *p. II*). At id, quod formam humani Corporis constituit, in hoc consistit, quod ejus partes motus suos certa quadam Ratione sibi invicem communicent (*per Defin. ante Lem.* 4, *quam vide post Prop.* 13 *p. II*). Ergo quæ efficiunt, ut motus et quietis ratio, quam Corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, eadem humani Corporis formam conservant, et consequenter efficiunt (*per Post.* 3 *et* 6 *p. II*), ut Corpus humanum multis modis affici, et ut idem corpora externa multis modis afficere possit, adeoque (*per Prop. præced.*) bona sunt. Deinde, quæ efficiunt, ut	Demonstration. To be preserved, the human body needs a great many other bodies (by Postulate 4 of Part 2). But what constitutes the form of the human body consists in this: that its parts communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed proportion (by the Definition before Lemma 4, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2). Therefore whatever brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest that the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved also preserves the form of the human body, and consequently brings it about (by Postulates 3 and 6 of

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Corporis humani partes aliam motus et quietis rationem obtineant, eadem (per eandem Defin. p.	Part 2) that the human body can be affected in many ways, and can affect external bodies in many ways; and so (by the preceding Proposition) it is good. Next, whatever brings it about that the parts of the human body acquire a different proportion of motion and rest
	II*), efficiunt, ut corpus humanum aliam formam induat, hoc est (*ut per se notum, et in fine præfationis hujus partis monuimus*), ut Corpus humanum destruatur, et consequenter ut omnino ineptum reddatur, ne possit pluribus modis affici, ac proinde (*per Prop. præc.*) mala sunt.* Q.E.D.	(by the same Definition in Part 2) brings it about that the human body takes on a different form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we pointed out at the end of the Preface to this part), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently that it is rendered entirely incapable of being affected in more ways; and so (by the preceding Proposition) it is bad. QED
4P39S	SCHOLIUM. Quantum hæc Menti obesse vel prodesse possunt, in Quinta Parte explicabitur. Sed hic notandum, quod Corpus tum mortem obire intelligam, quando ejus partes ita disponuntur, ut aliam motus et quietis rationem ad invicem obtineant. Nam negare non audeo, Corpus humanum, retenta sanguinis circulatione, et aliis, propter quæ Corpus vivere existimatur, posse nihilominus in aliam naturam a sua prorsus diversam mutari. Nam nulla ratio me cogit, ut statuam Corpus non mori, nisi mutetur in cadaver; quin ipsa experientia aliud suadere videtur.	Scholium. How far these things can harm or benefit the mind will be explained in Part 5. But here it should be noted that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another. For I do not dare to deny that the human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and the other things on account of which it is thought to be alive, can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely different from its own. For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse. Indeed, experience itself seems to suggest otherwise.
	Fit namque aliquando, ut homo tales patiatur mutationes, ut non facile eundem illum esse dixerim; ut de quodam Hispano Poeta narrare audivi, qui morbo correptus fuerat, et quamvis ex eo convaluerit, mansit tamen præteritæ suæ vitæ tam oblitus, ut Fabulas et Tragœdias, quas fecerat, suas non crediderit esse; et sane pro infante adulto haberi potuisset, si vernaculæ etiam linguæ fuisset oblitus. Et si hoc incredibile videtur quid de infantibus dicemus? Quorum naturam homo provectæ ætatis a sua tam diversam esse credit, ut persuaderi non posset, se unquam infantem fuisse, nisi ex aliis de se conjecturam faceret. Sed ne superstitiosis materiam suppeditem movendi novas quæstiones, malo hæc in medio relinquere.	For it sometimes happens that a person undergoes such changes that I would hardly say they were the same person. I have heard a story of this kind about a certain Spanish poet who had been struck by illness. Though he recovered from it, he remained so forgetful of his past life that he did not believe the plays and tragedies he had written were his own; and he could surely have been taken for a grown-up infant if he had forgotten his native language as well. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? People of advanced age believe the nature of infants to be so different from their own that they could not be persuaded they had ever been infants themselves, if they did not infer it from the example of others. But so as not to give the superstitious material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave these matters unresolved.[6]

6 The poet is often identified with Luis de Góngora (1561–1627), who suffered memory loss after an illness in the year before his death.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P40	PROPOSITIO XL. *Quæ ad hominum communem Societatem conducunt, sive quæ efficiunt, ut homines concorditer vivant, utilia sunt, et illa contra mala, quæ discordiam in Civitatem inducunt.*	Proposition 40. *Whatever leads to the common society of human beings, or brings it about that people live in harmony, is useful; and, on the other hand, whatever brings discord into the state is bad.*
4P40D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam quæ efficiunt, ut homines concorditer vivant, simul efficiunt, ut ex ductu Rationis vivant (*per Prop.* 35 *hujus*), atque adeo (*per Prop.* 26 *et* 27 *hujus*) bona sunt, et (*per eandem rationem*) illa contra mala sunt, quæ discordias concitant. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For whatever brings it about that people live in harmony at the same time brings it about that they live under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 35 of this part), and so (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part) is good; and (by the same reasoning) whatever stirs up discord is, on the contrary, bad. QED
4P41	PROPOSITIO XLI. *Lætitia directe mala non est, sed bona; Tristitia autem contra directe est mala.*	Proposition 41. *Joy is not directly bad, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly bad.*
4P41D	DEMONSTRATIO. Lætitia (*per Prop.* 11 *p. III cum ejusdem Schol.*) est affectus, quo corporis agendi potentia augetur vel juvatur; Tristitia autem contra est affectus, quo corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque (*per Prop.* 38 *hujus*) Lætitia directe bona est, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Joy (by Proposition 11 of Part 3, with its Scholium) is an affect by which the body's power of acting is increased or aided; sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained. And so (by Proposition 38 of this part) joy is directly good, etc. QED
4P42	PROPOSITIO XLII. *Hilaritas excessum habere nequit, sed semper bona est; et contra Melancholia semper mala.*	Proposition 42. *Cheerfulness cannot be excessive; it is always good. Melancholy, on the other hand, is always bad.*
4P42D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hilaritas (*vide ejus Defin. in Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*) est Lætitia, quæ quatenus ad Corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod Corporis omnes partes pariter sint affectæ; hoc est (*per Prop.* 11 *p. III*) quod Corporis agendi potentia augetur vel juvatur, ita ut omnes ejus partes eandem ad invicem motus et quietis rationem obtineant; atque adeo (*per Prop.* 39 *hujus*) Hilaritas semper est bona, nec excessum habere potest. At Melancholia (*cujus etiam Defin. vide in eodem Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*) est Tristitia, quæ quatenus ad Corpus refertur, in hoc solo consistit, quod Corporis agendi potentia absolute minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque (*per Prop.* 38 *hujus*) semper est mala. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Cheerfulness (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3) is joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this: that all the parts of the body are equally affected. That is (by Proposition 11 of Part 3), the body's power of acting is increased or aided in such a way that all its parts maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another. And so (by Proposition 39 of this part) cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive. But melancholy (see its definition too in the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3) is sadness which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists solely in this: that the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained absolutely. And so (by Proposition 38 of this part) it is always bad. QED
4P43	PROPOSITIO XLIII. *Titillatio excessum habere potest, et mala esse; Dolor autem eatenus potest esse bonus, quatenus Titillatio seu Lætitia est mala.*	Proposition 43. *Localized pleasure can be excessive and bad; pain, on the other hand, can be good to the extent that localized pleasure, or joy, is bad.*
4P43D	DEMONSTRATIO. Titillatio est Lætitia, quæ, quatenus ad Corpus refertur, in hoc consistit quod una vel aliquot ejus	Demonstration. Localized pleasure is joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this:

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	partes præ reliquis afficiuntur (*vide ejus Defin. in Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*); cujus affectus potentia tanta esse potest, ut reliquas Corporis actiones superet (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*), eique pertinaciter adhæreat, atque adeo impediat quo minus Corpus aptum sit, ut plurimis aliis modis afficiatur; adeoque (*per Prop.* 38 *hujus*) mala esse potest. Deinde Dolor, qui contra Tristitia est, in se solo consideratus, non potest esse bonus (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*).	that one or a few of its parts are affected more than the rest (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3). The power of this affect can be so great that it overcomes the body's other actions (by Proposition 6 of this part) and clings to the body stubbornly, and so prevents the body from being capable of being affected in a great many other ways. And so (by Proposition 38 of this part) it can be bad. Next, pain, which is on the contrary a form of sadness, cannot be good when considered in itself alone (by Proposition 41 of this part).
	Verum quia ejus vis et incrementum definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata (*per Prop.* 5 *hujus*) possumus ergo hujus affectus infinitos virium concipere gradus et modos (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*); atque adeo eundem talem concipere qui Titillationem possit coercere, ut excessum non habeat, et eatenus (*per primam partem Prop. hujus*) efficere, ne Corpus minus aptum reddatur; ac proinde eatenus erit bonus. *Q.E.D.*	But because its force and growth are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by Proposition 5 of this part), we can conceive infinitely many degrees and ways of this affect's strength (by Proposition 3 of this part). And so we can conceive it as being such that it can restrain localized pleasure so that it is not excessive, and to that extent (by the first part of this Proposition) keep the body from being made less capable. Consequently, to that extent it will be good. QED
4P44	PROPOSITIO XLIV. *Amor et cupiditas excessum habere possunt.*	Proposition 44. *Love and desire can be excessive.*
4P44D	DEMONSTRATIO. Amor est Lætitia (*per Defin.* 6 *Affect.*) concomitante idea causæ externæ; Titillatio igitur (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*) concomitante idea causæ externæ Amor est; atque adeo Amor (*per Prop. præced.*) excessum habere potest. Deinde Cupiditas eo est major, quo affectus, ex quo oritur major est (*per Prop.* 37 *p. III*). Quare ut affectus (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*) reliquas hominis actiones superare potest; sic etiam Cupiditas, quæ ex eodem affectu oritur, reliquas Cupiditates superare, ac proinde eundem excessum habere poterit, quem in præcedenti Propositione Titillationem habere ostendimus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Definition 6 of the Affects). So localized pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3); and so love (by the preceding Proposition) can be excessive. Next, desire is greater the greater the affect from which it arises (by Proposition 37 of Part 3). So just as an affect (by Proposition 6 of this part) can overcome a person's other actions, so too the desire that arises from that same affect can overcome the other desires, and consequently can have the same excess that we showed, in the preceding Proposition, localized pleasure has. QED
4P44S	SCHOLIUM. Hilaritas, quam bonam esse dixi, concipitur facilius quam observatur. Nam affectus, quibus quotidie conflictamur, referuntur plerumque ad aliquam Corporis partem, quæ præ reliquis afficitur; ac proinde affectus ut plurimum excessum habent, et Mentem in sola unius objecti contemplatione ita detinent, ut de aliis cogitare nequeat; et quamvis homines pluribus affectibus obnoxii sint, atque adeo rari reperiantur, qui semper uno eodemque affectu conflictentur, non desunt tamen, quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhæreat.	Scholium. Cheerfulness, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affects by which we are assailed every day are generally related to some part of the body that is affected more than the rest. Consequently, the affects are for the most part excessive, and hold the mind so fixed on the contemplation of a single object that it cannot think of others. And although people are subject to many affects, so that few are

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Videmus enim homines aliquando ab uno objecto ita affici, ut quamvis præsens non sit, ipsum tamen coram habere credant; quod quando homini non dormienti accidit, eundem delirare dicimus vel insanire; nec minus insanire creduntur, qui Amore ardent, quique noctes atque dies solam amasiam vel meretricem somniant, quia risum movere solent.	found who are always assailed by one and the same affect, there are nonetheless some to whom one and the same affect clings stubbornly. For we sometimes see people so affected by one object that, even though it is not present, they believe they have it before them. When this happens to someone who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those who burn with love, and who dream night and day only of their mistress or a courtesan, thought any less mad, since they usually make people laugh.
	At cum avarus de nulla alia re, quam de lucro vel de nummis cogitet, et ambitiosus de gloria, etc., hi non creduntur delirare, quia molesti solent esse, et Odio digni æstimantur. Sed revera Avaritia, Ambitio, Libido, etc. delirii species sunt, quamvis inter morbos non numerentur.	But when a greedy person thinks of nothing but profit or money, and an ambitious one of nothing but glory, and so on, they are not thought to be delirious, because they are usually troublesome and are judged to deserve hatred. In truth, however, greed, ambition, lust and the like are kinds of madness, even though they are not counted among the diseases.

HATRED, LAUGHTER, HOPE AND FEAR

Hatred is always bad, laughter and moderate pleasures are good, and hope and fear show a weak mind.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P45	PROPOSITIO XLV. *Odium nunquam potest esse bonum.*	Proposition 45. *Hatred can never be good.*
4P45D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hominem, quem odimus, destruere conamur (*per Prop.* 39 *p. III*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*) aliquid conamur, quod malum est; Ergo, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. We strive to destroy the person we hate (by Proposition 39 of Part 3); that is (by Proposition 37 of this part), we strive for something that is bad. Therefore, etc. QED
4P45S	SCHOLIUM. Nota, me hic et in seqq. per Odium illud tantum intelligere, quod est erga homines.	Scholium. Note that here and in what follows I mean by hatred only hatred toward human beings.
4P45C1	COROLLARIUM I. Invidia, Irrisio, Contemptus, Ira, Vindicta, et reliqui affectus, qui ad Odium referuntur vel ex eodem oriuntur, mali sunt; quod etiam ex Prop. 39 p. III et Prop. 37 hujus patet.	Corollary 1. Envy, mockery, disdain, anger, vengeance, and the other affects that are related to hatred or arise from it, are bad. This is also evident from Proposition 39 of Part 3 and Proposition 37 of this part.
4P45C2	COROLLARIUM II. Quicquid ex eo, quod odio affecti sumus, appetimus, turpe et in Civitate injustum est. Quod etiam patet ex Prop. 39 p. III et ex Defin. turpis et injusti, quas vide in Scholiis Prop. 37 hujus.	Corollary 2. Whatever we want because we are affected by hatred is base, and, in a state, unjust. This is also evident from Proposition 39 of Part 3 and from the definitions of the base and the unjust, which see in the Scholia to Proposition 37 of this part.
4P45C2S	SCHOLIUM. Inter Irrisionem (quam in I Coroll. malam esse dixi) et risum magnam agnosco differentiam. Nam risus, ut et jocus, mera est Lætitia; adeoque, modo	Scholium. Between mockery (which I said in Corollary 1 is bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, like joking, is pure joy;

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	excessum non habeat, per se bonus est (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*). Nihil profecto nisi torva et tristis superstitio delectari prohibet. Nam qui magis decet famem et sitim extinguere, quam melancholiam expellere? Mea hæc est ratio, et sic animum induxi meum. Nullum numen, nec alius, nisi invidus, mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur, nec nobis lacrimas, singultus, metum, et alia hujusmodi, quæ animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit; sed contra, quo majore Lætitia afficimur, eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus, hoc est, eo nos magis de natura divina participare necesse est.	and so, provided it is not excessive, it is good in itself (by Proposition 41 of this part). Nothing but grim and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves. For why is it more fitting to relieve hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy? This is my reasoning, and this is how I have made up my mind. No deity, and no one else except the envious, takes pleasure in my weakness and my troubles, or counts our tears, sobs, fear and other such things—signs of a weak mind—as virtue. On the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass; that is, the more we necessarily share in the divine nature.
	Rebus itaque uti, et iis, quantum fieri potest, delectari (non quidem ad nauseam usque, nam hoc delectari non est), viri est sapientis. Viri, inquam, sapientis est, moderato et suavi cibo et potu se reficere et recreare, ut et odoribus, plantarum virentium amœnitate, ornatu, musica, ludis exercitatoriis, theatris, et aliis hujusmodi, quibus unusquisque absque ullo alterius damno uti potest. Corpus namque humanum ex plurimis diversæ naturæ partibus componitur, quæ continuo novo alimento indigent et vario, ut totum Corpus ad omnia, quæ ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, æque aptum sit, et consequenter ut Mens etiam æque apta sit ad plura simul intelligendum.	To make use of things, then, and to take as much delight in them as possible (not to the point of disgust, of course, for that is not delight) is the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with ornament, music, sports, theaters, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without harm to anyone else. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which continually need new and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things that can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind too may be equally capable of understanding many things at once.
	Hoc itaque vivendi institutum et cum nostris principiis et cum communi praxi optime convenit; quare si quæ alia, hæc vivendi ratio optima est, et omnibus modis commendanda; nec opus est de his clarius neque prolixius agere.	This way of life, then, agrees best both with our principles and with common practice. So if any way of living is the best, this one is, and it is to be commended in every way. Nor is there any need to treat these matters more clearly or at greater length.
4P46	PROPOSITIO XLVI. *Qui ex ductu Rationis vivit, quantum potest conatur, alterius in ipsum Odium, Iram, Contemptum, etc., Amore contra, sive Generositate compensare.*	Proposition 46. *One who lives under the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay another's hatred, anger, disdain and so on toward him with love instead, that is, with nobility.*
4P46D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnes Odii affectus mali sunt (*per Coroll.* 1 *præc. Prop.*); adeoque, qui ex ductu Rationis vivit, quantum potest conabitur efficere, ne Odii affectibus conflictetur (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*), et consequenter (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*) conabitur, ne etiam alius eosdem patiatur affectus. At Odium Odio reciproco augetur, et Amore contra extingui potest (*per Prop.* 43 *p. III*), ita ut Odium in Amorem transeat (*per Prop.* 44 *p. III*); Ergo qui ex ductu	Demonstration. All affects of hatred are bad (by Corollary 1 to the preceding Proposition). So one who lives under the guidance of reason will strive, as far as he can, not to be assailed by affects of hatred (by Proposition 19 of this part), and consequently (by Proposition 37 of this part) will strive that no one else suffer those affects either. But hatred is increased by hatred in return, and

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Rationis vivit; alterius Odium, etc. Amore contra compensare conabitur, hoc est Generositate (*cujus Defin. vide in Schol. Prop.* 59 *p. III*). *Q.E.D.*	can, on the contrary, be extinguished by love (by Proposition 43 of Part 3), so that hatred passes into love (by Proposition 44 of Part 3). Therefore one who lives under the guidance of reason will strive to repay another's hatred, etc., with love instead, that is, with nobility (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3). QED
4P46S	SCHOLIUM. Qui injurias reciproco Odio vindicare vult, misere profecto vivit. At qui contra studet Odium Amore expugnare, ille sane lætus et secure pugnat, æque facile pluribus hominibus ac uni resistit, et fortunæ auxilio quam minime indiget. Quos vero vincit, ii læti cedunt, non quidem ex defectu, sed ex incremento virium; quæ omnia adeo clare ex solis Amoris et Intellectus definitionibus sequuntur, ut opus non sit eadem sigillatim demonstrare.	Scholium. Whoever wants to avenge wrongs by hatred in return lives wretchedly indeed. But whoever strives instead to conquer hatred with love fights joyfully and securely; he resists many people as easily as one, and has the least possible need of fortune's help. And those he conquers yield joyfully, not from a lack of strength but from an increase in it. All these things follow so clearly from the definitions of love and of the intellect alone that there is no need to demonstrate them one by one.
4P47	PROPOSITIO XLVII. *Spei et Metus affectus non possunt esse per se boni.*	Proposition 47. *The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves.*
4P47D	DEMONSTRATIO. Spei et Metus affectus sine Tristitia non dantur. Nam Metus est (*per* 13 *Affect. Defin.*) Tristitia, et Spes (*vide Explicationem* 12 *et* 13 *Affect. Defin.*) non datur sine Metu; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*) hi affectus non possunt esse per se boni, sed tantum quatenus Lætitiæ excessum coercere possunt (*per Prop.* 43 *hujus*). *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. There are no affects of hope and fear without sadness. For fear is sadness (by Definition 13 of the Affects), and there is no hope without fear (see the Explanation of Definitions 12 and 13 of the Affects). Consequently (by Proposition 41 of this part), these affects cannot be good in themselves, but only insofar as they can restrain an excess of joy (by Proposition 43 of this part). QED
4P47S	SCHOLIUM. Huc accedit, quod hi affectus cognitionis defectum et Mentis impotentiam indicant; et hac de causa etiam Securitas, Desperatio, Gaudium et Conscientiæ morsus animi impotentis sunt signa. Nam, quamvis Securitas et Gaudium affectus sint Lætitiæ, Tristitiam tamen eosdem præcessisse supponunt, nempe Spem et Metum. Quo itaque magis ex ductu Rationis vivere conamur, eo magis Spe minus pendere, et Metu nosmet liberare, et fortunæ quantum possumus, imperare conamur, nostrasque actiones certo Rationis consilio dirigere.	Scholium. Add to this that these affects indicate a lack of knowledge and a weakness of mind; and for the same reason confidence, despair, gladness and remorse are also signs of a weak mind. For although confidence and gladness are affects of joy, they presuppose that sadness—namely hope and fear—has preceded them. So the more we strive to live under the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear, to command fortune as far as we can, and to direct our actions by the sure counsel of reason.
4P48	PROPOSITIO XLVIII. *Affectus Existimationis et Despectus semper mali sunt.*	Proposition 48. *The affects of overestimation and scorn are always bad.*
4P48D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hi enim affectus (*per* 21 *et* 22 *Affect. Defin.*) rationi repugnant; adeoque (*per Prop.* 26 *et* 27 *hujus*) mali sunt. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For these affects (by Definitions 21 and 22 of the Affects) are contrary to reason, and

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		so (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part) they are bad. QED
4P49	PROPOSITIO XLIX. *Existimatio facile hominem, qui existimatur, superbum reddit.*	Proposition 49. *Overestimation easily makes the person who is overestimated proud.*
4P49D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si videmus aliquem de nobis plus justo præ amore sentire, facile gloriabimur (*per Schol. Prop.* 41 *p. III*), sive Lætitia afficiemur (*per* 30 *Affect. Defin.*); et id boni, quod de nobis prædicari audimus, facile credemus (*per Prop.* 25 *p. III*); atque adeo de nobis præ amore nostri plus justo sentiemus, hoc est (*per Defin.* 28 *Affect.*) facile superbiemus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If we see that someone, out of love, thinks more highly of us than is just, we will easily exult (by the Scholium to Proposition 41 of Part 3), that is, be affected with joy (by Definition 30 of the Affects); and we will easily believe whatever good we hear said of us (by Proposition 25 of Part 3). And so, out of love of ourselves, we will think more highly of ourselves than is just; that is (by Definition 28 of the Affects), we will easily become proud. QED

PITY, HUMILITY, REPENTANCE AND PRIDE

Spinoza judges which affects agree with reason, from pity and approval to self-contentment, humility, pride and shame.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P50	PROPOSITIO L. *Commiseratio in homine, qui ex ductu Rationis vivit, per se mala et inutilis est.*	Proposition 50. *In a person who lives under the guidance of reason, pity is in itself bad and useless.*
4P50D	DEMONSTRATIO. Commiseratio enim (*per* 18 *Affect. Defin.*) Tristitia est; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*) per se mala; bonum autem, quod ex ea sequitur, quod scilicet hominem, cujus nos miseret, a miseria liberare conamur (*per Coroll.* 3 *Prop.* 27 *p. III*), ex solo Rationis dictamine facere cupimus (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*); nec nisi ex solo Rationis dictamine aliquid, quod certo scimus bonum esse, agere possumus (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*); atque adeo commiseratio in homine, qui ex ductu Rationis vivit, per se mala est et inutilis. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For pity (by Definition 18 of the Affects) is sadness, and consequently (by Proposition 41 of this part) is bad in itself. But the good that follows from it—namely, that we strive to free the person we pity from his misery (by Corollary 3 to Proposition 27 of Part 3)—we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone (by Proposition 37 of this part); and only from the dictate of reason alone can we do anything that we know for certain to be good (by Proposition 27 of this part). And so, in a person who lives under the guidance of reason, pity is in itself bad and useless. QED
4P50C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod homo, qui ex dictamine Rationis vivit, conatur quantum potest, efficere, ne commiseratione tangatur.	Corollary. From this it follows that a person who lives by the dictate of reason strives, as far as he can, not to be touched by pity.
4P50S	SCHOLIUM. Qui recte novit, omnia ex naturæ divinæ necessitate sequi, et secundum æternas Naturæ leges et regulas fieri, is sane nihil reperiet quod Odio, Risu aut Contemptu dignum sit, nec cujusquam miserebitur sed quantum humana fert virtus, conabitur *bene agere*, ut ajunt, *et lætari*. Huc accedit, quod is, qui Commiserationis affectu facile tangitur, et alterius miseria vel lacrimis movetur, sæpe aliquid agit, cujus postea ipsum pœnitet; tam quia ex affectu nihil agimus, quod certo scimus bonum esse, quam quia facile falsis lacrimis decipimur.	Scholium. One who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come about according to the eternal laws and rules of Nature, will surely find nothing worthy of hatred, mockery or disdain, nor will he pity anyone; but, as far as human virtue allows, he will strive to *act well*, as they say, *and rejoice*. Add to this that one who is easily touched by the affect of pity, and moved by another's misery or tears, often does something he later regrets—both because

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Atque hic expresse loquor de homine, qui ex ductu Rationis vivit. Nam qui nec Ratione nec Commiseratione movetur, ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur, nam (*per Prop.* 27 *p. III*) homini dissimilis esse videtur.	from an affect we do nothing that we know for certain to be good, and because we are easily deceived by false tears. And here I am speaking expressly of a person who lives under the guidance of reason. For one who is moved neither by reason nor by pity to help others is rightly called inhuman, since (by Proposition 27 of Part 3) he seems to be unlike a human being.
4P51	PROPOSITIO LI. *Favor Rationi non repugnat, sed cum eadem convenire et ab eadem oriri potest.*	Proposition 51. *Approval is not contrary to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.*
4P51D	DEMONSTRATIO. Est enim Favor Amor erga illum, qui alteri benefecit (*per* 19 *Affect. Defin.*); atque adeo ad Mentem referri potest, quatenus hæc agere dicitur (*per Prop.* 59 *p. III*); hoc est (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*), quatenus intelligit; ac proinde cum Ratione convenit, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For approval is love toward someone who has benefited another (by Definition 19 of the Affects), and so it can be related to the mind insofar as the mind is said to act (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), insofar as it understands. Consequently, it agrees with reason, etc. QED
4P51D2	ALITER. Qui ex ductu Rationis vivit, bonum, quod sibi appetit, alteri etiam cupit (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*); quare ex eo, quod ipse aliquem videt alteri benefacere, ipsius benefaciendi conatus juvatur, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 11 *p. III*) lætabitur, idque (*ex hypothesi*) concomitante idea illius, qui alteri benefecit; ac proinde (*per* 19 *Affect. Defin.*) ei favet. *Q.E.D.*	Alternatively. One who lives under the guidance of reason desires for others too the good he wants for himself (by Proposition 37 of this part). So from seeing someone benefit another, his own striving to do good is aided; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), he will rejoice, and (by hypothesis) with the accompanying idea of the one who benefited the other. Consequently (by Definition 19 of the Affects), he approves of him. QED
4P51S	SCHOLIUM. Indignatio, prout ipsa a nobis definitur (*vide* 20 *Affect. Defin.*), est necessario mala (*per Prop.* 45 *hujus*); sed notandum, quod, quando summa potestas desiderio, quo tenetur, tutandæ pacis civem punit, qui alteri injuriam fecit, eandem civi indignari non dico, quia non Odio percita ad perdendum civem, sed pietate mota eundem punit.	Scholium. Indignation, as we define it (see Definition 20 of the Affects), is necessarily bad (by Proposition 45 of this part). But it should be noted that when the sovereign power, out of the desire it has to safeguard peace, punishes a citizen who has wronged another, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen. For it punishes him not because it is roused by hatred to ruin him, but because it is moved by piety.
4P52	PROPOSITIO LII. *Acquiescentia in se ipso ex Ratione oriri potest, et ea sola acquiescentia, quæ ex Ratione oritur, summa est, quæ potest dari.*	Proposition 52. *Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only the self-contentment that arises from reason is the greatest there can be.*
4P52D	DEMONSTRATIO. Acquiescentia in se ipso est Lætitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur (*per* 25 *Affect. Defin.*). At vera hominis agendi potentia seu virtus est ipsa Ratio (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*), quam homo clare et distincte contemplatur (*per Prop.* 40 *et* 43 *p. II*); Ergo Acquiescentia in se ipso ex Ratione oritur. Deinde nihil homo dum se ipsum contemplatur, clare et distincte, sive adæquate percipit, nisi ea, quæ ex ipsius	Demonstration. Self-contentment is joy arising from a person's contemplating himself and his own power of acting (by Definition 25 of the Affects). But a person's true power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), which he contemplates clearly and distinctly (by Propositions 40 and 43 of Part 2). Therefore self-contentment arises from reason. Next, while a per-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	agendi potentia sequuntur (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) quæ ex ipsius intelligendi potentia sequuntur; adeoque ex sola hac contemplatione summa, quæ dari potest Acquiescentia oritur. *Q.E.D.*	son contemplates himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except what follows from his own power of acting (by Definition 2 of Part 3), that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), what follows from his own power of understanding. And so from this contemplation alone arises the greatest self-contentment there can be. QED
4P52S	SCHOLIUM. Est revera Acquiescentia in se ipso summum, quod sperare possumus. Nam (*ut Prop.* 25 *hujus ostendimus*) nemo suum esse alicujus finis causa conservare conatur; et quia hæc Acquiescentia magis magisque fovetur et corroboratur laudibus (*per Coroll. Prop.* 53 *p. III*), et contra (*per Coroll. Prop.* 55 *p. III*) vituperio magis magisque turbatur, ideo gloria maxime ducimur, et vitam cum probro vix ferre possumus.	Scholium. Self-contentment really is the highest thing we can hope for. For (as we showed in Proposition 25 of this part) no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of some end. And because this self-contentment is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (by the Corollary to Proposition 53 of Part 3) and, on the contrary, more and more disturbed by blame (by the Corollary to Proposition 55 of Part 3), we are led above all by glory, and can scarcely bear a life of disgrace.
4P53	PROPOSITIO LIII. *Humilitas virtus non est, sive ex Ratione non oritur.*	Proposition 53. *Humility is not a virtue; that is, it does not arise from reason.*
4P53D	DEMONSTRATIO. Humilitas est Tristitia, quæ ex eo oritur, quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur (*per* 26 *Affect. Defin.*). Quatenus autem homo se ipsum vera Ratione cognoscit, eatenus suam essentiam intelligere supponitur, hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) suam potentiam. Quare si homo, dum se ipsum contemplatur, aliquam suam impotentiam percipit, id non ex eo est, quod se intelligit sed (*ut Prop.* 55 *p. III ostendimus*) ex eo, quod ipsius agendi potentia coercetur. Quod si supponamus, hominem suam impotentiam concipere ex eo, quod aliquid se potentius intelligit, cujus cognitione suam agendi potentiam determinat, tum nihil aliud concipimus, quam quod homo se ipsum distincte intelligit, sive (*per Prop.* 26 *hujus*) quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur.	Demonstration. Humility is sadness arising from a person's contemplating his own lack of power (by Definition 26 of the Affects). But insofar as a person knows himself by true reason, to that extent he is supposed to understand his own essence, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), his own power. So if, while contemplating himself, a person perceives some lack of power in himself, this comes not from his understanding himself but (as we showed in Proposition 55 of Part 3) from his power of acting being restrained. And if we suppose that a person conceives his lack of power because he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines the limits of his own power of acting, then we conceive nothing other than that he understands himself distinctly, that is (by Proposition 26 of this part), that his power of acting is aided.
	Quare Humilitas, seu Tristitia quæ ex eo oritur, quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur, non ex vera contemplatione seu Ratione oritur, nec virtus, sed passio est. *Q.E.D.*	So humility—the sadness that arises from a person's contemplating his own lack of power—does not arise from true contemplation, or reason; it is not a virtue but a passion. QED
4P54	PROPOSITIO LIV. *Pœnitentia virtus non est, sive ex Ratione non oritur; sed is, quem facti pœnitet, bis miser seu impotens est.*	Proposition 54. *Repentance is not a virtue; that is, it does not arise from reason. Rather, one who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or twice powerless.*
4P54D		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	DEMONSTRATIO. Hujus prima pars demonstratur ut præced. Propositio. Secunda autem ex sola hujus affectus Definitione (*vide* 27 *Affect. Defin.*) patet. Nam primo prava Cupiditate, dein Tristitia vinci se patitur.	Demonstration. The first part of this is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding Proposition. The second part is evident from the mere definition of this affect (see Definition 27 of the Affects). For such a person lets himself be defeated first by a wrongful desire, and then by sadness.
4P54S	SCHOLIUM. Quia homines raro ex dictamine Rationis vivunt, ideo hi duo affectus, nempe Humilitas et Pœnitentia, et præter hos Spes et Metus, plus utilitatis quam damni afferunt; atque adeo, quandoquidem peccandum est, in istam partem potius peccandum. Nam, si homines animo impotentes æque omnes superbirent, nullius rei ipsos puderet, nec ipsi quicquam metuerent, qui vinculis conjungi constringique possent? Terret vulgus, nisi metuat; quare non mirum, quod Prophetæ, qui non paucorum, sed communi utilitati consuluerunt, tantopere Humilitatem, Pœnitentiam et Reverentiam commendaverint. Et revera, qui hisce affectibus sunt obnoxii, multo facilius quam alii duci possunt ut tandem ex ductu Rationis vivant, hoc est, ut liberi sint, et beatorum vita fruantur.	Scholium. Because people seldom live by the dictate of reason, these two affects, humility and repentance—and, besides them, hope and fear—bring more benefit than harm. So, since we must err, it is better to err in that direction. For if people who are weak in mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, how could they be united and held together by any bonds? The crowd is fearsome unless it is afraid. So it is no wonder that the prophets, who looked to the common good and not to that of a few, commended humility, repentance and reverence so strongly. And in truth, those who are subject to these affects can be led far more easily than others to live at last under the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.[7]
4P55	PROPOSITIO LV. *Maxima Superbia vel Abjectio est maxima sui ignorantia.*	Proposition 55. *The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of oneself.*
4P55D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex Defin. 28 et 29 Affect.	Demonstration. This is evident from Definitions 28 and 29 of the Affects.
4P56	PROPOSITIO LVI. *Maxima Superbia vel Abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat.*	Proposition 56. *The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest weakness of mind.*
4P56D	DEMONSTRATIO. Primum virtutis fundamentum est suum esse conservare (*per Coroll. Prop.* 22 *hujus*), idque ex ductu Rationis (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*). Qui igitur se ipsum ignorat, omnium virtutum fundamentum, et consequenter omnes virtutes ignorat. Deinde ex virtute agere nihil aliud est, quam ex ductu Rationis agere (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*); et qui ex ductu Rationis agit, scire necessario debet, se ex ductu Rationis agere (*per Prop.* 43 *p. II*). Qui itaque se ipsum, et consequenter (*ut jam jam ostendimus*) omnes virtutes, maxime ignorat, is minime ex virtute agit, hoc est (*ut ex Defin.* 8 *hujus patet*), maxime animo est impotens atque adeo (*per Prop. præced.*) maxima superbia vel Abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The first foundation of virtue is to preserve one's own being (by the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part), and to do so under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 24 of this part). So one who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently of all the virtues. Next, to act from virtue is nothing other than to act under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 24 of this part), and one who acts under the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he acts under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 43 of Part 2). So one who is most ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) of all the virtues, acts least from virtue; that is (as is evident from Definition 8 of this part), he is weakest in mind. And so (by the pre-

7 "The crowd is fearsome unless it is afraid" echoes Tacitus, *Annals* 1.29.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		ceding Proposition) the greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest weakness of mind. QED
4P56C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc clare sequitur, superbos et abjectos maxime affectibus esse obnoxios.	Corollary. From this it clearly follows that the proud and the self-abasing are the most subject to affects.
4P56S	SCHOLIUM. Abjectio tamen facilius corrigi potest quam superbia; quandoquidem hæc Lætitiæ, illa autem Tristitiæ est affectus, atque adeo (*per Prop.* 18 *hujus*) hæc illa fortior est.	Scholium. Yet self-abasement can be corrected more easily than pride, since pride is an affect of joy and self-abasement an affect of sadness; and so (by Proposition 18 of this part) the former is stronger than the latter.
4P57	PROPOSITIO LVII. *Superbus parasitorum seu adulatorum præsentiam amat, generosorum autem odit.*	Proposition 57. *The proud person loves the presence of hangers-on or flatterers, but hates the presence of the noble-minded.*
4P57D	DEMONSTRATIO. Superbia est Lætitia orta ex eo, quod homo de se plus justo sentit (*per Defin.* 28 et 6 *Affect.*); quam opinionem homo superbus, quantum potest, fovere conabitur (*vide Schol. Prop.* 13 *p. III*); adeoque superbi parasitorum vel adulatorum (*horum Definitiones omisi, quia nimis noti sunt*) præsentiam amabunt, et generosorum, qui de ipsis ut par est, sentiunt, fugient. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Pride is joy arising from a person's thinking more highly of himself than is just (by Definitions 28 and 6 of the Affects). The proud person will strive, as far as he can, to foster this opinion (see the Scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 3). And so the proud will love the presence of hangers-on or flatterers (I have left out definitions of these, because they are all too well known), and will shun the presence of the noble-minded, who think of them as is fitting. QED
4P57S	SCHOLIUM. Nimis longum foret hic omnia Superbiæ mala enumerare, quandoquidem omnibus affectibus obnoxii sunt superbi; sed nullis minus, quam affectibus Amoris et Misericordiæ. Sed hic minime tacendum est, quod ille etiam superbus vocetur, qui de reliquis minus justo sentit, atque adeo hoc sensu Superbia definienda est, quod sit Lætitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se supra reliquos esse putat. Et Abjectio huic Superbiæ contraria definienda esset Tristitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se infra reliquos esse credit. At hoc posito facile concipimus, superbum necessario esse invidum (*vide Schol. Prop.* 55 *p. III*), et eos maxime odio habere, qui maxime ob virtutes laudantur; nec facile eorum Odium Amore aut beneficio vinci (*vide Schol. Prop.* 41 p. III); et eorum tantummodo præsentia delectari, qui animo ejus impotenti morem gerunt, et ex stulto insanum faciunt.	Scholium. It would take too long to list here all the evils of pride, since the proud are subject to all the affects—but to none less than the affects of love and compassion. But here it must by no means be passed over that a person is also called proud who thinks less of others than is just. So in this sense pride should be defined as joy arising from the false opinion that one is above others. And the self-abasement opposite to this pride would have to be defined as sadness arising from the false opinion that one is below others. With this established, we easily conceive that the proud person is necessarily envious (see the Scholium to Proposition 55 of Part 3), that he hates most those who are most praised for their virtues, and that his hatred of them is not easily overcome by love or kindness (see the Scholium to Proposition 41 of Part 3), and that he takes delight only in the presence of those who humor his weak mind and drive a fool out of his mind.

LATIN

Abjectio quamvis Superbiæ sit contraria, est tamen abjectus superbo proximus. Nam, quandoquidem ejus Tristitia ex eo oritur, quod suam impotentiam ex aliorum potentia seu virtute judicat, levabitur ergo ejus Tristitia, hoc est lætabitur, si ejus imaginatio in alienis vitiis contemplandis occupetur, unde illud proverbium natum: *solamen miseris socios habuisse malorum*; et contra eo magis contristabitur, quo se magis infra reliquos esse crediderit; unde fit, ut nulli magis ad Invidiam sint proni, quam Abjecti; et ut isti maxime hominum facta observare conentur ad carpendum magis, quam ad eadem corrigendum, et ut tandem solam Abjectionem laudent, eaque glorientur; sed ita, ut tamen abjecti videantur.

Atque hæc ex hoc affectu tam necessario sequuntur, quam ex natura trianguli, quod ejus tres anguli æquales sint duobus rectis; et jam dixi, me hos et similes affectus malos vocare, quatenus ad solam humanam utilitatem attendo. Sed Naturæ leges communem Naturæ ordinem, cujus homo pars est, respiciunt; quod hic in transitu monere volui, ne quis putaret me hic hominum vitia et absurda facta narrare, non autem rerum naturam et proprietates demonstrare voluisse. Nam, ut in Præfatione Partis tertiæ dixi, humanos affectus eorumque proprietates perinde considero, ac reliqua naturalia. Et sane humani affectus, si non humanam, Naturæ saltem potentiam et artificium non minus indicant, quam multa alia, quæ admiramur, quorumque contemplatione delectamur.

Sed pergo de affectibus ea notare, quæ hominibus utilitatem adferunt, vel quæ iisdem damnum inferunt.

4P58 PROPOSITIO LVIII. *Gloria Rationi non repugnat, sed ab ea oriri potest.*

4P58D DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex 30 Affect. Defin. et ex definitione Honesti, quam vide in Schol. 1 Prop. 37 hujus.

4P58S SCHOLIUM. Vana, quæ dicitur, Gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso, quæ sola vulgi opinione fovetur; eaque cessante, cessat ipsa acquiescentia, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 52 *hujus*) summum bonum, quod unusquisque amat; unde fit, ut qui vulgi opinione gloriatur, quotidiana cura anxius

ENGLISH

Although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, the self-abasing person is nonetheless very close to the proud one. For since his sadness arises from judging his own lack of power by the power, or virtue, of others, his sadness will be relieved—that is, he will rejoice—if his imagination is occupied in contemplating other people's faults. Hence the proverb arose: *it is a comfort to the wretched to have had companions in misfortune*. And on the other hand, he will be saddened the more, the further below others he believes himself to be. So it happens that no one is more prone to envy than the self-abasing; that they, above all, strive to watch people's deeds more in order to find fault with them than to correct them; and that in the end they praise only self-abasement and glory in it—but in such a way that they still seem self-abasing.

These things follow from this affect as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. And I have already said that I call these and similar affects bad only insofar as I attend to human advantage alone. But the laws of Nature have regard to the common order of Nature, of which the human being is a part. I wanted to point this out here in passing, so that no one would think I meant here to recount people's vices and absurd deeds, rather than to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the Preface to Part 3, I consider human affects and their properties just like other natural things. And indeed human affects, if they do not show human power, at least show the power and skill of Nature no less than many other things we wonder at and delight in contemplating.

But I go on to note those things about the affects that bring people benefit, or that do them harm.

Proposition 58. *Glory is not contrary to reason, but can arise from it.*

Demonstration. This is evident from Definition 30 of the Affects and from the definition of the honorable, which see in Scholium 1 to Proposition 37 of this part.

Scholium. What is called vain glory is self-contentment fostered only by the opinion of the crowd; and when that opinion ceases, the self-contentment itself ceases—that is (by the Scholium to Pro-

LATIN

nitatur, faciat, experiatur, ut famam conservet. Est namque vulgus varius et inconstans, atque adeo, nisi conservetur fama, cito abolescit; imo quia omnes vulgi captare applausus cupiunt, facile unusquisque alterius famam reprimit; ex quo, quandoquidem de summo, quod æstimatur, bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem quocunque modo opprimendi, et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis, quod alteri obfuit, quam quod sibi profuit. Est igitur hæc gloria seu acquiescentia revera vana, quia nulla est.

ENGLISH

position 52 of this part), the highest good that each person loves. Hence one who glories in the opinion of the crowd strives, anxious with daily care, acts and tries everything to preserve his reputation. For the crowd is fickle and inconstant, and so a reputation quickly fades unless it is kept up. Indeed, because everyone wants to win the applause of the crowd, each readily suppresses the reputation of another. And from this, since the contest is over what is judged the highest good, there arises an enormous lust to crush one another by any means whatever; and whoever at last comes out the victor glories more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself. This glory, or self-contentment, is therefore truly vain, because it is nothing.

Quæ de Pudore notanda sunt, colliguntur facile ex iis, quæ de Misericordia et Pœnitentia diximus. Hoc tantum addo, quod ut Commiseratio, sic etiam Pudor, quamvis non sit virtus, bonus tamen est, quatenus indicat, homini, qui Pudore suffunditur, cupiditatem inesse honeste vivendi; sicut dolor, qui eatenus bonus dicitur, quatenus indicat, partem læsam nondum esse putrefactam; quare, quamvis homo, quem facti alicujus pudet, revera sit tristis, est tamen perfectior impudenti, qui nullam habet honeste vivendi cupiditatem.

What should be noted about shame is easily gathered from what we have said about compassion and repentance. I add only this: that like pity, shame too, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good insofar as it indicates that the person suffused with shame has a desire to live honorably —just as pain is called good insofar as it indicates that the injured part is not yet decayed. So although a person who is ashamed of something he has done is really sad, he is nevertheless more perfect than a shameless person, who has no desire to live honorably.

Atque hæc sunt, quæ de affectibus Lætitiæ et Tristitiæ notare susceperam. Ad Cupiditates quod attinet, hæ sane bonæ aut malæ sunt, quatenus ex bonis aut malis affectibus oriuntur. Sed omnes revera, quatenus ex affectibus, qui passiones sunt, in nobis ingenerantur, cœcæ sunt (*ut facile colligitur ex iis, quæ in Schol. Prop. 44 hujus diximus*), nec ullius usus essent, si homines facile duci possent, ut ex solo Rationis dictamine viverent, ut jam paucis ostendam.

These, then, are the things I had undertaken to note about the affects of joy and sadness. As for desires, they are of course good or bad insofar as they arise from good or bad affects. But all of them, insofar as they are generated in us by affects that are passions, are really blind (as is easily gathered from what we said in the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this part), and would be of no use if people could easily be led to live by the dictate of reason alone, as I shall now briefly show.

REASON CAN DO WHAT PASSION DOES

Every action a passion prompts can be done from reason, which prefers the greater good and the lesser evil.

LATIN

4P59 PROPOSITIO LIX. *Ad omnes actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo a Ratione determinari.*

ENGLISH

Proposition 59. *To all the actions to which we are determined by an affect that is a passion, we can be determined by reason without that affect.*

4P59D

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex Ratione agere nihil aliud est (*per Prop.* 3 *et Defin.* 2 *p. III*), quam ea agere, quæ ex necessitate nostræ naturæ, in se sola consideratæ, sequuntur. At Tristitia eatenus mala, est quatenus hanc agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet (*per Prop.* 41 *hujus*); ergo ex hoc affectu ad nullam actionem possumus determinari, quam non possemus agere, si Ratione duceremur. Præterea Lætitia eatenus mala est, quatenus impedit, quo minus homo ad agendum sit aptus (*per Prop.* 43 *et* 44 *hujus*); atque adeo eatenus etiam ad nullam actionem determinari possumus, quam non possemus agere, si Ratione duceremur.	Demonstration. To act from reason is nothing other (by Proposition 3 and Definition 2 of Part 3) than to do the things that follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. But sadness is bad to the extent that it diminishes or restrains this power of acting (by Proposition 41 of this part). Therefore by this affect we can be determined to no action that we could not do if we were led by reason. Further, joy is bad to the extent that it prevents a person from being capable of acting (by Propositions 43 and 44 of this part); and so to that extent, too, we can be determined to no action that we could not do if we were led by reason.
	Denique quatenus Lætitia bona est, eatenus cum Ratione convenit (consistit enim in eo, quod hominis agendi potentia augetur vel juvatur); nec passio est, nisi quatenus hominis agendi potentia non eo usque augetur, ut se suasque actiones adæquate concipiat (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III cum ejus Schol.*); Quare si homo Lætitia affectus ad tantam perfectionem duceretur, ut se suasque actiones adæquate conciperet, ad easdem actiones, ad quas jam ex affectibus, qui passiones sunt, determinatur, aptus, imo aptior esset. At omnes affectus ad Lætitiam, Tristitiam, vel Cupiditatem referuntur (*vide explicationem quartæ Aff. Defin.*), et Cupiditas (*per* 1 *Affect. Defin.*) nihil aliud est, quam ipse agendi conatus; ergo ad omnes actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo sola Ratione duci. *Q.E.D.*	Finally, insofar as joy is good, it agrees with reason (for it consists in a person's power of acting being increased or aided); and it is a passion only insofar as a person's power of acting is not increased to the point where he conceives himself and his actions adequately (by Proposition 3 of Part 3, with its Scholium). So if a person affected with joy were led to such perfection that he conceived himself and his actions adequately, he would be capable—indeed more capable—of the same actions to which he is now determined by affects that are passions. But all affects are related to joy, sadness or desire (see the Explanation of Definition 4 of the Affects), and desire (by Definition 1 of the Affects) is nothing other than the very striving to act. Therefore to all the actions to which we are determined by an affect that is a passion, we can be led by reason alone, without that affect. QED
4P59D2	ALITER. Actio quæcunque eatenus dicitur mala, quatenus ex eo oritur, quod Odio aut aliquo malo affectu affecti sumus (*vide Coroll.* 1 *Prop.* 45 *hujus*). At nulla actio, in se sola considerata, bona aut mala est (*ut in Præfatione hujus ostendimus*), sed una eademque actio jam bona jam mala est; ergo ad eandem actionem, quæ jam mala est, sive quæ ex aliquo malo affectu oritur, Ratione duci possumus (*per Prop.* 19 *hujus*). *Q.E.D.*	Alternatively. Any action is called bad insofar as it arises from our being affected by hatred or some bad affect (see Corollary 1 to Proposition 45 of this part). But no action, considered in itself alone, is good or bad (as we showed in the Preface to this part); rather, one and the same action is now good, now bad. Therefore we can be led by reason to the same action that is now bad, that is, that arises from some bad affect (by Proposition 19 of this part). QED
4P59S	SCHOLIUM. Explicantur hæc clarius exemplo. Nempe verberandi actio, quatenus physice consideratur, et ad hoc tantum attendimus, quod homo brachium tollit, manum claudit, totumque brachium vi deorsum movet, virtus est, quæ ex Corporis humani fabrica concipitur. Si itaque homo, Ira vel Odio commotus, determinatur ad	Scholium. This is explained more clearly by an example. The action of striking, insofar as it is considered physically, and we attend only to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist and moves his whole arm forcefully downward, is a power, which is conceived from the structure of

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	claudendam manum vel brachium movendum, id, ut in Parte secunda ostendimus, fit, quia una eademque actio potest jungi quibuscunque rerum imaginibus; atque adeo tam ex iis imaginibus rerum, quas confuse, quam quas clare et distincte concipimus, ad unam eandemque actionem determinari possumus. Apparet itaque, quod omnis Cupiditas, quæ ex affectu, qui passio est, oritur, nullius esset usus, si homines Ratione duci possent. Videamus jam, cur Cupiditas, quæ ex affectu, qui passio est, oritur, cœca a nobis appellatur.	the human body. So if a man, moved by anger or hatred, is determined to clench his fist or move his arm, this happens, as we showed in Part 2, because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things whatever. And so we can be determined to one and the same action both by images of things that we conceive confusedly and by those we conceive clearly and distinctly. It is evident, then, that every desire that arises from an affect that is a passion would be of no use if people could be led by reason. Let us now see why a desire that arises from an affect that is a passion is called blind by us.
4P60	PROPOSITIO LX. *Cupiditas, quæ oritur ex Lætitia vel Tristitia, quæ ad unam vel ad aliquot, non autem ad omnes Corporis partes refertur, rationem utilitatis totius hominis non habet.*	Proposition 60. *A desire that arises from a joy or sadness related to one or a few parts of the body, but not to all, takes no account of the advantage of the whole person.*
4P60D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ponatur ex. gr. Corporis pars A vi alicujus causæ externæ ita corroborari, ut reliquis prævaleat (*per Prop.* 6 *hujus*). Hæc pars vires suas amittere propterea non conabitur, ut reliquæ Corporis partes suo fungantur officio; deberet enim vim seu potentiam habere vires suas amittendi, quod (*per Prop.* 6 *p. III*) est absurdum. Conabitur itaque illa pars, et consequenter (*per Prop.* 7 *et* 12 *p. III*) Mens etiam, illum statum conservare; adeoque Cupiditas, quæ ex tali affectu Lætitiæ oritur, rationem totius non habet. Quod si contra supponatur pars A coerceri, ut reliquæ prævaleant, eodem modo demonstratur, quod nec Cupiditas, quæ ex Tristitia oritur, rationem totius habeat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Suppose, for example, that part A of the body is so strengthened by the force of some external cause that it prevails over the rest (by Proposition 6 of this part). This part will not, on that account, strive to lose its strength so that the other parts of the body may perform their function. For it would have to have a force, or power, of losing its own strength, which (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) is absurd. So that part, and consequently (by Propositions 7 and 12 of Part 3) the mind as well, will strive to preserve that state. And so the desire that arises from such an affect of joy takes no account of the whole. If, on the other hand, part A is supposed to be restrained so that the others prevail, it is demonstrated in the same way that the desire arising from sadness also takes no account of the whole. QED
4P60S	SCHOLIUM. Cum itaque Lætitia plerumque (*per Schol. Prop.* 44 *hujus*) ad unam Corporis partem referatur, cupimus ergo plerumque nostrum esse conservare, nulla habita Ratione integræ nostræ valetudinis; ad quod accedit, quod Cupiditates, quibus maxime tenemur (*per Coroll. Prop.* 9 *hujus*) temporis tantum præsentis, non autem futuri habent rationem.	Scholium. Since joy, then, is generally related to one part of the body (by the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this part), we generally desire to preserve our being without taking any account of our health as a whole. Add to this that the desires by which we are most gripped (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part) take account only of the present, and not of the future.
4P61	PROPOSITIO LXI. *Cupiditas, quæ ex Ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit.*	Proposition 61. *A desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive.*
4P61D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cupiditas (*per* 1 *Affect. Defin.*), absolute considerata, est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus	Demonstration. Desire (by Definition 1 of the Affects), considered absolutely, is the very essence

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quocunque modo determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum; adeoque Cupiditas, quæ ex Ratione oritur, hoc est (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) quæ in nobis ingeneratur quatenus agimus, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus determinata concipitur ad agendum ea, quæ per solam hominis essentiam adæquate concipiuntur (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*). Si itaque hæc Cupiditas excessum habere posset, posset ergo humana natura in se sola considerata, se ipsam excedere, sive plus posset quam potest, quod manifesta est contradictio; ac proinde hæc Cupiditas excessum habere nequit. *Q.E.D.*	of a human being, insofar as it is conceived as determined in any way whatever to do something. And so a desire that arises from reason—that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), one that is generated in us insofar as we act—is the very essence, or nature, of a human being, insofar as it is conceived as determined to do the things that are adequately conceived through the human essence alone (by Definition 2 of Part 3). So if this desire could be excessive, human nature, considered in itself alone, could exceed itself, that is, could do more than it can—which is a plain contradiction. Consequently, this desire cannot be excessive. QED
4P62	PROPOSITIO LXII. *Quatenus Mens ex Rationis dictamine res concipit, æque afficitur, sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ, sive præsentis.*	Proposition 62. *Insofar as the mind conceives things by the dictate of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.*
4P62D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quicquid Mens ducente Ratione concipit, id omne sub eadem æternitatis seu necessitatis specie concipit (*per Coroll.* 2 *Prop.* 44 *p. II*), eademque certitudine afficitur (*per Prop.* 43 *p. II et ejus Schol.*). Quare, sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ, sive præsentis, Mens eadem necessitate rem concipit, eademque certitudine afficitur; et, sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ, sive præsentis, erit nihilominus æque vera (*per Prop.* 41 *p. II*); hoc est (*per Defin.* 4 *p. II*), habebit nihilominus semper easdem ideæ adæquatæ proprietates; atque adeo, quatenus Mens ex Rationis dictamine res concipit, eodem modo afficitur, sive idea sit rei futuræ vel præteritæ, sive præsentis. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives all of it from the same standpoint of eternity, or of necessity (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 44 of Part 2), and is affected with the same certainty (by Proposition 43 of Part 2 and its Scholium). So whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certainty. And whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, it will nonetheless be equally true (by Proposition 41 of Part 2); that is (by Definition 4 of Part 2), it will nonetheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea. And so, insofar as the mind conceives things by the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one. QED
4P62S	SCHOLIUM. Si nos de rerum duratione adæquatam cognitionem habere, earumque existendi tempora Ratione determinare possemus, eodem affectu res futuras ac præsentes contemplaremur, et bonum, quod Mens ut futurum conciperet, perinde ac præsens appeteret, et consequenter bonum præsens minus pro majore bono futuro necessario negligeret, et quod in præsenti bonum esset, sed causa futuri alicujus mali, minime appeteret, ut mox demonstrabimus. Sed nos de duratione rerum (*per Prop.* 31 *p. II*) non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus, et rerum existendi tempora (*per Schol. Prop.* 44 p.	Scholium. If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine by reason the times of their existence, we would regard future things with the same affect as present ones. The mind would want a good it conceived as future just as if it were present; consequently, it would necessarily pass over a lesser present good for a greater future one, and would not want in the least something good in the present but the cause of some future evil—as we shall soon demonstrate. But we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (by Proposition 31 of Part 2), and we determine the times of things' existence

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	II) sola imaginatione determinamus, quæ non æque afficitur imagine rei præsentis ac futuræ; unde fit, ut vera boni et mali cognitio, quam habemus, non nisi abstracta sive universalis sit, et judicium, quod de rerum ordine et causarum nexu facimus, ut determinare possimus, quid nobis in præsenti bonum aut malum sit, sit potius imaginarium quam reale. Atque adeo mirum non est, si Cupiditas, quæ ex boni et mali cognitione, quatenus hæc futurum prospicit, oritur, facilius rerum Cupiditate, quæ in præsentia suaves sunt, coerceri potest, de quo vide Propositionem 16 hujus Partis.	(by the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2) only by the imagination, which is not affected equally by the image of a present thing and by that of a future one. That is why the true knowledge of good and bad that we have is only abstract or universal, and why the judgment we make about the order of things and the connection of causes, in order to determine what is good or bad for us in the present, is imaginary rather than real. And so it is no wonder if a desire that arises from the knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this looks to the future, can be restrained rather easily by a desire for things that are pleasant at present. On this, see Proposition 16 of this part.
4P63	PROPOSITIO LXIII. *Qui Metu ducitur, et bonum, ut malum vitet, agit, is Ratione non ducitur.*	Proposition 63. *Someone who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.*
4P63D	DEMONSTRATIO. Omnes affectus, qui ad Mentem, quatenus agit, hoc est (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) qui ad Rationem referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam affectus Lætitiæ et Cupiditatis (*per Prop.* 59 *p. III*); atque adeo (*per* 13 *Affect. Defin.*) qui Metu ducitur, et bonum timore mali agit, is Ratione non ducitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. All the affects that are related to the mind insofar as it acts, that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), that are related to reason, are none other than affects of joy and desire (by Proposition 59 of Part 3). And so (by Definition 13 of the Affects) someone who is led by fear, and does good out of dread of evil, is not led by reason. QED
4P63S	SCHOLIUM. Superstitiosi, qui vitia exprobrare magis quam virtutes docere norunt, et qui homines non Ratione ducere, sed Metu ita continere student, ut malum potius fugiant quam virtutes ament, nil aliud intendunt, quam ut reliqui æque ac ipsi fiant miseri; et ideo non mirum, si plerumque molesti et odiosi sint hominibus.	Scholium. The superstitious, who know better how to reproach vices than to teach virtues, and who are eager not to lead people by reason but to hold them in check by fear, so that they flee evil rather than love virtue, aim at nothing but to make others as wretched as they are themselves. So it is no wonder that they are generally troublesome and hateful to people.
4P63C	COROLLARIUM. Cupiditate, quæ ex Ratione oritur, bonum directe sequimur, et malum indirecte fugimus.	Corollary. By a desire that arises from reason, we follow the good directly and shun evil indirectly.
4P63CD	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam Cupiditas, quæ ex Ratione oritur, ex solo Lætitiæ affectu, quæ passio non est, oriri potest (*per Prop.* 59 *p. III*), hoc est ex Lætitia, quæ excessum habere nequit (*per Prop.* 61 *hujus*), non autem ex Tristitia; ac proinde hæc Cupiditas (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) ex cognitione boni, non autem mali oritur; atque adeo ex ductu Rationis bonum directe appetimus, et eatenus tantum malum fugimus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For a desire that arises from reason can arise only from an affect of joy that is not a passion (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), that is, from a joy that cannot be excessive (by Proposition 61 of this part), and not from sadness. Therefore this desire (by Proposition 8 of this part) arises from the knowledge of good, not of evil. And so under the guidance of reason we want the good directly, and only to that extent do we shun evil. QED
4P63CS	SCHOLIUM. Explicatur hoc Corollarium exemplo ægri et sani. Comedit æger id, quod aversatur, timore mortis; sanus autem cibo gaudet, et vita sic melius fruitur, quam si mortem timeret, eamque directe vitare cuperet. Sic	Scholium. This Corollary is explained by the example of the sick and the healthy. The sick person eats what he dislikes, out of fear of death; the

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	judex, qui non Odio aut Ira, etc., sed solo Amore salutis publicæ reum mortis damnat, sola Ratione ducitur.	healthy person, by contrast, enjoys his food, and in this way enjoys life better than if he feared death and desired directly to avoid it. So too a judge who condemns an accused person to death, not from hatred or anger and the like, but solely from love of the public welfare, is led by reason alone.
4P64	PROPOSITIO LXIV. *Cognitio mali cognitio est inadæquata.*	Proposition 64. *The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.*
4P64D	DEMONSTRATIO. Cognitio mali (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) est ipsa Tristitia, quatenus ejusdem sumus conscii. Tristitia autem est transitio ad minorem perfectionem (*per* 3 *Affect. Defin.*), quæ propterea per ipsam hominis essentiam intelligi nequit (*per Prop.* 6 *et* 7 *p. III*); ac proinde (*per Defin.* 2 *p. III*) passio est, quæ (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) ab ideis inadæquatis pendet; et consequenter (*per Prop.* 29 *p. II*) ejus cognitio, nempe mali cognitio, est inadæquata. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The knowledge of evil (by Proposition 8 of this part) is sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. But sadness is a passage to a lesser perfection (by Definition 3 of the Affects), which therefore cannot be understood through the very essence of a human being (by Propositions 6 and 7 of Part 3). Hence (by Definition 2 of Part 3) it is a passion, which (by Proposition 3 of Part 3) depends on inadequate ideas. Consequently (by Proposition 29 of Part 2) the knowledge of it, namely the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. QED
4P64C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod si Mens humana non nisi adæquatas haberet ideas, nullam mali formaret notionem.	Corollary. From this it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.
4P65	PROPOSITIO LXV. *De duobus bonis majus, et de duobus malis minus ex Rationis ductu sequemur.*	Proposition 65. *Under the guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.*
4P65D	DEMONSTRATIO. Bonum, quod impedit, quo minus majore bono fruamur, est revera malum; malum enim et bonum (*ut in Præfat. hujus ostendimus*) de rebus dicitur, quatenus easdem ad invicem comparamus; et (per eandem rationem) malum minus revera bonum est; quare (*per Coroll. Prop.* 63 *hujus*) ex Rationis ductu bonum tantum majus, et malum minus, appetemus seu sequemur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A good that prevents us from enjoying a greater good is in reality an evil. For evil and good are said of things insofar as we compare them with one another (as we showed in the Preface to this part). And (by the same reasoning) a lesser evil is in reality a good. Therefore (by the Corollary to Proposition 63 of this part) under the guidance of reason we shall want, or follow, only the greater good and the lesser evil. QED
4P65C	COROLLARIUM. Malum minus pro majore bono ex Rationis ductu sequemur, et bonum minus, quod causa est majoris mali, negligemus. Nam malum, quod hic dicitur minus, revera bonum est, et bonum contra malum; quare (*per Coroll. Prop.* 63 *hujus*) illud appetemus, et hoc negligemus. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary. Under the guidance of reason, we shall follow a lesser evil for the sake of a greater good, and pass over a lesser good that is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil here called lesser is in reality a good, and the good, conversely, an evil. Therefore (by the Corollary to Proposition 63 of this part) we shall want the former and pass over the latter. QED
4P66		Proposition 66. *Under the guidance of reason, we shall want a greater future good in preference to a less-*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	PROPOSITIO LXVI. *Bonum majus futurum præ minore præsenti, et malum præsens minus præ majore futuro, ex Rationis ductu appetemus.*	*er present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.*
4P66D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si Mens rei futuræ adæquatam posset habere cognitionem, eodem affectu erga rem futuram ac erga præsentem afficeretur (*per Prop.* 62 *hujus*); quare quatenus ad ipsam Rationem attendimus, ut in hac Propositione nos facere supponimus, res eadem est, sive majus bonum vel malum futurum, sive præsens supponatur; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 65 *hujus*) bonum futurum majus præ minore præsenti, etc. appetemus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If the mind could have adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be affected by the same affect toward a future thing as toward a present one (by Proposition 62 of this part). So insofar as we attend to reason itself, as we suppose we are doing in this Proposition, the case is the same whether the greater good or evil is supposed to be future or present. Hence (by Proposition 65 of this part) we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, etc. QED
4P66C	COROLLARIUM. Malum præsens minus, quod est causa majoris futuri boni, ex Rationis ductu appetemus; et bonum præsens minus, quod causa est majoris futuri mali, negligemus. Hoc Coroll. se habet ad præced. Prop. ut Coroll. Prop. 65 ad ipsam Prop. 65.	Corollary. Under the guidance of reason, we shall want a lesser present evil that is the cause of a greater future good, and pass over a lesser present good that is the cause of a greater future evil. This Corollary stands to the preceding Proposition as the Corollary to Proposition 65 stands to Proposition 65 itself.

THE FREE MAN

Spinoza describes the free person, who thinks of life rather than death, acts in good faith and lives best in a state.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4P66S	SCHOLIUM. Si igitur hæc cum iis conferantur, quæ in hac Parte usque ad Propositionem 18 de affectuum viribus ostendimus, facile videbimus, quid homo, qui solo affectu seu opinione, homini qui Ratione ducitur, intersit. Ille enim, velit nolit, ea, quæ maxime ignorat, agit; hic autem nemini, nisi sibi, morem gerit, et ea tantum agit, quæ in vita prima esse novit, quæque propterea maxime cupit; et ideo illum servum, hunc autem liberum voco, de cujus ingenio et vivendi Ratione pauca adhuc notare libet.	Scholium. If, then, these things are compared with what we have shown in this part, up to Proposition 18, about the strength of the affects, we shall easily see how a person who is led by affect alone, or by opinion, differs from one who is led by reason. The first, whether he will or not, does things of which he is utterly ignorant. The second complies with no one's wishes but his own, and does only the things he knows to be most important in life, and which he therefore desires most. So I call the first a slave, and the second free. About the free man's character and way of life I should like to note a few more things.
4P67	PROPOSITIO LXVII. *Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat; et ejus sapientia non mortis, sed vitæ meditatio est.*	Proposition 67. *A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.*
4P67D	DEMONSTRATIO. Homo liber, hoc est qui ex solo Rationis dictamine vivit, mortis Metu non ducitur (*per Prop.* 63 *hujus*), sed bonum directe cupit (*per Coroll. ejusdem Prop.*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*) agere, vivere, suum esse conservare ex fundamento proprium utile quærendi;	Demonstration. A free man, that is, one who lives by the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear of death (by Proposition 63 of this part), but desires the good directly (by the Corollary to the same Proposition), that is (by Proposition 24 of this part), he desires to act, to live, and to preserve his

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	atque adeo nihil minus quam de morte cogitat, sed ejus sapientia vitæ est meditatio. *Q.E.D.*	being on the basis of seeking his own advantage. And so he thinks of nothing less than of death; rather, his wisdom is a meditation on life. QED
4P68	PROPOSITIO LXVIII. *Si homines liberi nascerentur, nullum boni et mali formarent conceptum, quamdiu liberi essent.*	Proposition 68. *If people were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.*
4P68D	DEMONSTRATIO. Illum liberum esse dixi, qui sola ducitur Ratione; qui itaque liber nascitur, et liber manet, non nisi adæquatas ideas habet; ac proinde mali conceptum habet nullum (*per Coroll. Prop.* 64 *hujus*), et consequenter (nam bonum et malum correlata sunt) neque boni. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone. Someone who is born free, then, and remains free, has only adequate ideas, and so has no concept of evil (by the Corollary to Proposition 64 of this part). Consequently (since good and evil are correlatives) he has no concept of good either. QED
4P68S	SCHOLIUM. Hujus Propositionis hypothesin falsam esse, nec posse concipi, nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam, seu potius ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus, sed quatenus tantummodo causa est, cur homo existat, patet ex 4 Propositione hujus Partis. Atque hoc, et alia quæ jam demonstravimus, videntur a Mose significari in illa primi hominis historia. In ea enim nulla alia Dei potentia concipitur, quam illa, qua hominem creavit, hoc est potentia, qua hominis solummodo utilitati consuluit; atque eatenus narratur, quod Deus homini libero prohibuerit, ne de arbore cognitionis boni et mali comederet, et quod, simulac de ea comederet, statim mortem metueret potius quam vivere cuperet.	Scholium. It is evident from Proposition 4 of this part that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false, and cannot be conceived except insofar as we attend to human nature alone—or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite, but only insofar as he is the cause of a human being's existing. This, and other things we have already demonstrated, seem to be what Moses meant in that story of the first man. For in it no power of God is conceived other than the power by which he created man, that is, a power by which he looked only to man's advantage. And in keeping with this, the story tells that God forbade free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it he would at once fear death rather than desire to live.[8]
	Deinde, quod inventa ab homine uxore, quæ cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat, cognovit nihil posse in Natura dari, quod ipsi posset illa esse utilius; sed quod, postquam bruta sibi similia esse credidit, statim eorum affectus imitari inceperit (*vide Prop.* 27 *p. III*), et libertatem suam amittere; quam Patriarchæ postea recuperaverunt, ducti Spiritu Christi, hoc est Dei idea, a qua sola pendet, ut homo liber sit, et ut bonum, quod sibi cupit, reliquis hominibus cupiat, ut supra (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*) demonstravimus.	Next, it tells that when the man had found a wife who agreed completely with his own nature, he knew that nothing could exist in Nature that could be more useful to him than she was. But after he came to believe that the animals were like himself, he at once began to imitate their affects (see Proposition 27 of Part 3) and to lose his freedom—a freedom that the Patriarchs later recovered, led by the Spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God. On this idea alone it depends that a person should be free, and that he should desire for the rest of humankind the good he desires for himself, as we have demonstrated above (by Proposition 37 of this part).[9]
4P69		

8 The story of Adam in Genesis 2–3, which tradition ascribed to Moses as author of the first five books of the Bible.
9 The Patriarchs: Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the ancestors of Israel in Genesis.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	PROPOSITIO LXIX. *Hominis liberi virtus æque magna cernitur in declinandis quam in superandis periculis.*	Proposition 69. *The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.*
4P69D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi affectu contrario, et fortiore affectu coercendo (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*). At cœca Audacia et Metus affectus sunt, qui æque magni possunt concipi (*per Prop.* 5 *et* 3 *hujus*): Ergo æque magna animi virtus, seu fortitudo (*hujus Definitionem vide in Schol. Prop.* 59 *p. III*) requiritur ad Audaciam quam ad Metum coercendum; hoc est (*per Defin.* 40 *et* 41 *Affect.*), homo liber eadem animi virtute pericula declinat, qua eadem superare tentat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect that is contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained (by Proposition 7 of this part). But blind daring and fear are affects that can be conceived as equally great (by Propositions 5 and 3 of this part). Therefore an equally great virtue of mind, or strength of character (for its definition, see the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3), is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear. That is (by Definitions 40 and 41 of the Affects), a free man avoids dangers by the same virtue of mind by which he tries to overcome them. QED
4P69C	COROLLARIUM. Homini igitur libero æque magnæ Animositati fuga in tempore, ac pugna ducitur: sive homo liber eadem Animositate, seu animi præsentia, qua certamen, fugam eligit.	Corollary. In a free man, then, timely flight is counted as showing tenacity just as great as fighting; or, a free man chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, with which he chooses combat.
4P69S	SCHOLIUM. Quid Animositas sit, vel quid per ipsam intelligam, in Scholio Prop. 59 p. III explicui. Per periculum autem id omne intelligo, quod potest esse causa alicujus mali, nempe Tristitiæ, Odii, Discordiæ etc.	Scholium. What tenacity is, or what I understand by it, I explained in the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3. By danger I understand anything that can be the cause of some evil, such as sadness, hatred, discord and so on.
4P70	PROPOSITIO LXX. *Homo liber, qui inter ignaros vivit, eorum, quantum potest, beneficia declinare studet.*	Proposition 70. *A free man who lives among the ignorant strives, as far as he can, to decline their favors.*
4P70D	DEMONSTRATIO. Unusquisque ex suo ingenio judicat, quid bonum sit (*vide Schol. Prop.* 39 *p. III*); ignarus igitur, qui in aliquem beneficium contulit, id ex suo ingenio æstimabit, et si minoris ab eo, cui datum est, æstimari videt, contristabitur (*per Prop.* 42 *p. III*). At homo liber reliquos homines amicitia sibi jungere (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*), nec paria hominibus beneficia ex eorum affectu referre, sed se et reliquos libero Rationis judicio ducere, et ea tantum agere studet, quæ ipse prima esse novit: Ergo homo liber, ne ignaris odio sit, et ne eorum appetitui, sed soli Rationi obsequatur, eorum beneficia, quantum potest, declinare conabitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Each person judges by his own temperament what is good (see the Scholium to Proposition 39 of Part 3). So an ignorant man who has done someone a favor will value it by his own temperament, and if he sees that the one who received it values it less, he will be saddened (by Proposition 42 of Part 3). But a free man strives to join other people to himself in friendship (by Proposition 37 of this part), and not to repay people with favors that are equal in their eyes, as measured by their affects; rather, he strives to lead himself and others by the free judgment of reason, and to do only the things he himself knows to be most important. Therefore a free man, so as not to be hated by the ignorant, and so as to comply not with their appetite but with reason alone, will try, as far as he can, to decline their favors. QED
4P70S	SCHOLIUM. Dico *quantum potest*. Nam quamvis homines ignari sint, sunt tamen homines, qui in necessitatibus	Scholium. I say *as far as he can*. For although people are ignorant, they are still people, who in

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	humanum auxilium, quo nullum præstabilius est, adferre queunt; atque adeo sæpe fit, ut necesse sit ab iisdem beneficium accipere, et consequenter iisdem contra ex eorum ingenio congratulari; ad quod accedit, quod etiam in declinandis beneficiis cautio esse debet, ne videamur eosdem contemnere, vel præ Avaritia remunerationem timere, atque ita dum eorum Odium fugimus, eo ipso in eorum offensionem incurramus. Quare in declinandis beneficiis ratio utilis et honesti habenda est.	times of need can bring human help—and nothing is more valuable than that. So it often happens that it is necessary to accept a favor from them, and consequently to thank them in return in a way that suits their temperament. Add to this that even in declining favors we must take care not to seem to despise the givers, or to be afraid, out of greed, of having to repay them; for then, while fleeing their hatred, we would by that very act incur their offense. So in declining favors we must take account of what is useful and what is honorable.
4P71	PROPOSITIO LXXI. *Soli homines liberi erga invicem gratissimi sunt.*	Proposition 71. *Only free people are truly grateful to one another.*
4P71D	DEMONSTRATIO. Soli homines liberi sibi invicem utilissimi sunt, et maxima amicitiæ necessitudine invicem junguntur (*per Prop.* 35 *hujus, et* 1 *ejus Coroll.*) parique amoris studio sibi invicem benefacere conantur (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*); adeoque (*per* 34 *Affect. Defin.*) soli homines liberi erga se invicem gratissimi sunt. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Only free people are most useful to one another, and are joined to one another by the closest bond of friendship (by Proposition 35 of this part and its Corollary 1), and strive with equal eagerness of love to do one another good (by Proposition 37 of this part). And so (by Definition 34 of the Affects) only free people are truly grateful to one another. QED
4P71S	SCHOLIUM. Gratia, quam homines qui cœca Cupiditate ducuntur, invicem habent, mercatura seu aucupium potius, quam gratia plerumque est. Porro ingratitudo affectus non est. Est tamen ingratitudo turpis, quia plerumque hominem nimio Odio, Ira, vel Superbia, vel Avaritia, etc., affectum esse indicat. Nam qui præ stultitia dona compensare nescit, ingratus non est, et multo minus ille, qui donis non movetur meretricis, ut ipsius libidini inserviat, nec furis, ut ipsius furta celet, vel alterius similis. Nam hic contra animum habere constantem ostendit, qui scilicet se nullis donis ad suam vel communem perniciem patitur corrumpi.	Scholium. The gratitude that people led by blind desire have toward one another is for the most part a business deal, or a snare, rather than gratitude. Further, ingratitude is not an affect. Yet ingratitude is shameful, because it generally shows that a person is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, greed or the like. For someone who does not know how to repay gifts because of his foolishness is not ungrateful—and much less someone who is not moved by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by those of a thief to conceal his thefts, or by those of anyone else of that kind. On the contrary, he shows that he has a steadfast mind, one that will not let itself be corrupted by any gifts to his own ruin or the common ruin.
4P72	PROPOSITIO LXXII. *Homo liber nunquam dolo malo, sed semper cum fide agit.*	Proposition 72. *A free man never acts deceitfully, but always in good faith.*
4P72D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si liber homo quicquam dolo malo, quatenus liber est, ageret, id ex dictamine Rationis ageret (nam eatenus tantum liber a nobis appellatur): atque adeo dolo malo agere virtus esset (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*), et consequenter (*per eandem Prop.*) unicuique ad suum esse conservandum consultius esset, dolo malo agere; hoc est (*ut per se notum*), hominibus consultius esset, verbis solummodo convenire, re autem invicem esse contrarios,	Demonstration. If a free man, insofar as he is free, did anything deceitfully, he would do it from the dictate of reason (for only to that extent do we call him free). And so acting deceitfully would be a virtue (by Proposition 24 of this part), and consequently (by the same Proposition) it would be wiser for everyone, in order to preserve his being,

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	quod (*per Coroll. Prop.* 31 *hujus*) est absurdum. Ergo homo liber etc. *Q.E.D.*	to act deceitfully. That is (as is self-evident), it would be wiser for people to agree only in words and to be contrary to one another in fact—which (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of this part) is absurd. Therefore a free man, and so on. QED
4P72S	SCHOLIUM. Si jam quæratur, quid si homo se perfidia a præsenti mortis periculo posset liberare, an non ratio suum esse conservandi omnino suadet, ut perfidus sit? Respondebitur eodem modo, quod si Ratio id suadeat, suadet ergo id omnibus hominibus, atque adeo Ratio omnino suadet hominibus, ne nisi dolo malo paciscantur, vires conjungere et jura habere communia, hoc est, ne revera jura habeant communia, quod est absurdum.	Scholium. Suppose it is now asked: what if a person could free himself by treachery from a present danger of death? Would not the principle of preserving his own being plainly advise him to be treacherous? The reply will be the same: if reason advised this, it would advise it to all people. And so reason would plainly advise people to make agreements to join forces and have common laws only deceitfully—that is, in effect, not to have common laws at all. This is absurd.
4P73	PROPOSITIO LXXIII. *Homo, qui Ratione ducitur, magis in Civitate, ubi ex communi decreto vivit, quam in solitudine, ubi sibi soli obtemperat, liber est.*	Proposition 73. *A person who is led by reason is freer in a state, where he lives by the common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself.*
4P73D	DEMONSTRATIO. Homo, qui Ratione ducitur, non ducitur Metu ad obtemperandum (*per Prop.* 63 *hujus*) sed, quatenus suum esse ex Rationis dictamine conservare conatur, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 66 *hujus*) quatenus libere vivere conatur, communis vitæ et utilitatis rationem tenere (*per Prop.* 37 *hujus*), et consequenter (*ut in Schol.* 2 *Prop.* 37 *hujus ostendimus*) ex communi Civitatis decreto vivere cupit. Cupit ergo homo, qui Ratione ducitur, ut liberius vivat, communia Civitatis jura tenere. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. A person who is led by reason is not led to obey by fear (by Proposition 63 of this part). But insofar as he strives to preserve his being by the dictate of reason, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 66 of this part), insofar as he strives to live freely, he desires to take account of the common life and the common advantage (by Proposition 37 of this part), and consequently (as we showed in Scholium 2 to Proposition 37 of this part) to live by the common decision of the state. Therefore a person who is led by reason desires, in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state. QED
4P73S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc et similia, quæ de vera hominis libertate ostendimus, ad Fortitudinem, hoc est (*per Schol. Prop.* 59 *p. III*) ad Animositatem et Generositatem referuntur. Nec operæ pretium duco, omnes Fortitudinis proprietates hic separatim demonstrare, et multo minus, quod vir fortis neminem odio habeat, nemini irascatur, invideat, indignetur, neminem despiciat, minimeque superbiat. Nam hæc, et omnia, quæ ad veram vitam et Religionem spectant, facile ex Propositione 37 et 46 hujus Partis convincuntur; nempe quod Odium Amore contra vincendum sit, et quod unusquisque, qui Ratione ducitur, bonum, quod sibi appetit, reliquis etiam ut sit, cupiat.	Scholium. These and similar things that we have shown concerning a person's true freedom are related to strength of character, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3), to tenacity and nobility. I do not think it worthwhile to demonstrate all the properties of strength of character separately here, and much less that a strong person hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is not in the least proud. For these things, and everything that concerns true life and religion, are easily established from Propositions 37 and 46 of this part: namely, that hatred is to be conquered by love in return, and that everyone who is led by reason desires that the good he wants for himself should be had by others too.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	Ad quod accedit id, quod in Scholio Propositionis 50 hujus Partis, et aliis in locis notavimus: quod scilicet vir fortis hoc apprime consideret, nempe quod omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequantur, ac proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat, et quicquid præterea impium, horrendum, injustum, et turpe videtur, ex eo oritur, quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate, et confuse concipit; et hac de causa apprime conatur res, ut in se sunt, concipere, et veræ cognitionis impedimenta amovere, ut sunt Odium, Ira, Invidia, Irrisio, Superbia, et reliqua hujusmodi, quæ in præcedentibus notavimus; atque adeo, quantum potest, conatur uti diximus, bene agere et lætari. Quousque autem humana virtus ad hæc consequenda se extendat, et quid possit, in sequenti Parte demonstrabo.	To this is added what we noted in the Scholium to Proposition 50 of this part, and in other places: that a strong person considers this above all, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Hence whatever he thinks troublesome and evil, and whatever, besides, seems impious, horrible, unjust and shameful, arises from his conceiving things themselves in a disturbed, fragmentary and confused way. For this reason he strives above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, mockery, pride and the rest of this kind that we have noted in the preceding pages. And so, as far as he can, he strives, as we have said, to act well and to rejoice. How far human virtue extends in attaining these things, and what it can do, I shall demonstrate in the following Part.

APPENDIX: THE RIGHT WAY OF LIVING

Spinoza gathers the teachings of Part 4 into thirty-two short chapters on how to live.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4App	APPENDIX. *Quæ in hac Parte de recta vivendi Ratione tradidi, non sunt ita disposita ut uno aspectu videri possint, sed disperse a me demonstrata sunt, prout scilicet unum ex alio facilius deducere potuerim. Eadem igitur hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui.*	Appendix. The things I have set out in this part concerning the right way of living are not arranged so that they can be seen at a glance, but have been demonstrated by me piecemeal, as I found I could more easily deduce one from another. So I have proposed to gather them together here and reduce them to main headings.
4App1	CAPUT I. Omnes nostri conatus, seu Cupiditates, ex necessitate nostræ naturæ ita sequuntur, ut vel per ipsam solam, tanquam per proximam suam causam, possint intelligi, vel quatenus Naturæ sumus pars, quæ per se absque aliis individuis non potest adæquate concipi.	Chapter 1. All our strivings, or desires, follow from the necessity of our nature in such a way that they can be understood either through it alone, as through their proximate cause, or insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived adequately through itself without other individuals.
4App2	CAPUT II. Cupiditates, quæ ex nostra natura ita sequuntur, ut per ipsam solam possit intelligi, sunt illæ, quæ ad Mentem referuntur, quatenus hæc ideis adæquatis constare concipitur; reliquæ vero Cupiditates ad Mentem non referuntur, nisi quatenus res inadæquate concipit, et quarum vis et incrementum non humana, sed rerum, quæ extra nos sunt, potentia definiri debet; et ideo illæ recte actiones, hæ autem passiones vocantur; illæ namque nostram potentiam semper indicant, et hæ contra nostram impotentiam et mutilatam cognitionem.	Chapter 2. The desires that follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood through it alone are those related to the mind insofar as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The other desires are related to the mind only insofar as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and growth must be defined not by human power but by the power of things outside us. So the former are rightly called actions, and the latter passions; for the former always indicate our power, and the latter, by contrast, our lack of power and our fragmentary knowledge.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4App3	CAPUT III. Nostræ actiones, hoc est Cupiditates illæ, quæ hominis potentia seu Ratione definiuntur, semper bonæ sunt, reliquæ autem tam bonæ quam malæ possunt esse.	Chapter 3. Our actions, that is, those desires that are defined by human power, or reason, are always good; the others can be either good or bad.
4App4	CAPUT IV. In vita itaque apprime utile est, intellectum seu Rationem, quantum possumus, perficere, et in hoc uno summa hominis felicitas seu beatitudo consistit; quippe beatitudo nihil aliud est, quam ipsa animi acquiescentia, quæ ex Dei intuitiva cognitione oritur: at intellectum perficere nihil etiam aliud est, quam Deum, Deique attributa et actiones, quæ ex ipsius naturæ necessitate consequuntur, intelligere. Quare hominis, qui Ratione ducitur, finis ultimus, hoc est summa Cupiditas, qua reliquas omnes moderari studet, est illa, qua fertur ad se, resque omnes, quæ sub ipsius intelligentiam cadere possunt, adæquate concipiendum.	Chapter 4. In life, therefore, it is useful above all to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and in this one thing consists a person's highest happiness, or blessedness. For blessedness is nothing but the very contentment of mind that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God. And to perfect the intellect is likewise nothing but to understand God, and God's attributes and actions, which follow from the necessity of his nature. So the ultimate end of a person who is led by reason—that is, the highest desire, by which he strives to moderate all the others—is the one by which he is moved to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall within his understanding.[10]
4App5	CAPUT V. Nulla igitur vita rationalis est sine intelligentia; et res eatenus tantum bonæ sunt, quatenus hominem juvant, ut Mentis vita fruatur, quæ intelligentia definitur. Quæ autem contra impediunt, quo minus homo Rationem perficere et rationali vita frui possit, eas solummodo malas esse dicimus.	Chapter 5. So there is no rational life without understanding; and things are good only insofar as they help a person to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined by understanding. Those, on the other hand, that prevent a person from perfecting reason and enjoying a rational life—those alone we call evil.
4App6	CAPUT VI. Sed quia omnia illa, quorum homo efficiens est causa, necessario bona sunt, nihil ergo mali homini evenire potest, nisi a causis externis; nempe quatenus pars est totius Naturæ, cujus legibus humana natura obtemperare, et cui infinitis modis pœne sese accommodare cogitur.	Chapter 6. But because all the things of which a person is the efficient cause are necessarily good, nothing evil can happen to a person except from external causes: namely, insofar as he is a part of the whole of Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is compelled to adapt itself in almost infinitely many ways.
4App7	CAPUT VII. Nec fieri potest, ut homo non sit Naturæ pars, et communem ejus ordinem non sequatur; sed si inter talia individua versetur, quæ cum ipsius hominis natura conveniunt, eo ipso hominis agendi potentia juvabitur et fovebitur. At si contra inter talia sit, quæ cum ipsius natura minime conveniunt, vix absque magna ipsius mutatione iisdem sese accommodare poterit.	Chapter 7. It cannot happen that a person is not a part of Nature and does not follow its common order. But if he lives among individuals that agree with his own nature, his power of acting will by that very fact be aided and fostered. If, on the other hand, he is among individuals that agree very little with his nature, he will hardly be able to adapt himself to them without a great change in himself.
4App8	CAPUT VIII. Quicquid in rerum Natura datur, quod judicamus malum esse, sive posse impedire, quo minus existere et vita rationali frui queamus, id a nobis	Chapter 8. Whatever there is in Nature that we judge to be evil, or able to prevent us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we may remove from

10 "Contentment of mind" renders *animi acquiescentia* (in Part 5 also *Mentis acquiescentia*): the settled satisfaction of a mind at rest in itself.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	removere ea via, quæ securior videtur, licet; et quicquid contra datur, quod judicamus bonum sive utile esse ad nostrum esse conservandum, et vita rationali fruendum, id ad nostrum usum capere, et eo quocunque modo uti nobis licet; et absolute id unicuique summo Naturæ jure facere licet, quod ad ipsius utilitatem conferre judicat.	us in whatever way seems safer. And whatever there is, on the other hand, that we judge to be good, or useful for preserving our being and enjoying a rational life, we may take for our use and use in any way whatever. And absolutely, everyone may, by the highest right of Nature, do whatever he judges will contribute to his own advantage.
4App9	CAPUT IX. Nihil magis cum natura alicujus rei convenire potest, quam reliqua ejusdem speciei individua; adeoque (*per Caput VII*) nihil homini ad suum esse conservandum, et vita rationali fruendum utilius datur quam homo, qui Ratione ducitur. Deinde, quia inter res singulares nihil novimus, quod homine, qui Ratione ducitur, sit præstantius, nulla ergo re magis potest unusquisque ostendere, quantum arte et ingenio valeat, quam in hominibus ita educandis, ut tandem ex proprio Rationis imperio vivant.	Chapter 9. Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species. And so (by Chapter 7) nothing is more useful to a person for preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than a person who is led by reason. Further, since among singular things we know nothing more excellent than a person who is led by reason, there is no way in which anyone can better show how much he is worth in skill and talent than by so educating people that at last they live under the command of their own reason.
4App10	CAPUT X. Quatenus homines Invidia aut aliquo Odii affectu in se invicem feruntur, eatenus invicem contrarii sunt, et consequenter eo magis timendi, quo plus possunt quam reliqua Naturæ individua.	Chapter 10. Insofar as people are moved against one another by envy or by some affect of hatred, they are contrary to one another; and consequently they are to be feared all the more, as they have more power than the other individuals of Nature.
4App11	CAPUT XI. Animi tamen non armis sed Amore et Generositate vincuntur.	Chapter 11. Yet minds are conquered not by arms but by love and nobility.
4App12	CAPUT XII. Hominibus apprime utile est consuetudines jungere, seseque iis vinculis astringere, quibus aptius de se omnibus unum efficiant, et absolute ea agere, quæ firmandis amicitiis inserviunt.	Chapter 12. It is useful to people above all to form associations and to bind themselves by those ties that best make one out of all of them, and absolutely to do whatever serves to strengthen friendships.
4App13	CAPUT XIII. Sed ad hæc ars et vigilantia requiritur. Sunt enim homines varii (nam rari sunt, qui ex Rationis præscripto vivunt), et tamen plerumque invidi, et magis ad vindictam quam ad Misericordiam proclives. Unumquemque igitur ex ipsius ingenio ferre et sese continere, ne eorum affectus imitetur, singularis animi potentiæ opus est.	Chapter 13. But this requires skill and watchfulness. For people are changeable (since those who live by the prescription of reason are few), and yet they are generally envious, and more inclined to revenge than to compassion. To bear with each of them according to his own temperament, and to restrain oneself from imitating their affects, therefore takes a singular power of mind.
	At qui contra homines carpere, et vitia potius exprobrare quam virtutes docere, et hominum animos non firmare sed frangere norunt, ii et sibi et reliquis molesti sunt; unde multi, præ nimia scilicet animi impatientia, falsoque religionis studio, inter bruta potius quam inter homines vivere maluerunt; ut pueri vel adolescentes, qui	But those who, on the contrary, know how to carp at people, and to reproach vices rather than teach virtues, and to break people's minds rather than strengthen them, are troublesome both to themselves and to others. That is why many, from excessive impatience of mind and a false zeal for re-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	parentum jurgia æquo animo ferre nequeunt, militatum confugiunt, et incommoda belli et imperium tyrannidis præ domesticis commodis et paternis admonitionibus eligunt, et quidvis oneris sibi imponi patiuntur, dummodo parentes ulciscantur.	ligion, have preferred to live among the beasts rather than among people. They are like boys or youths who cannot calmly bear their parents' scolding and run away to join the army; they choose the hardships of war and the rule of a tyrant over the comforts of home and a father's admonitions, and let any burden at all be laid on them, provided they can take revenge on their parents.
4App14	CAPUT XIV. Quamvis igitur homines omnia plerumque ex sua libidine moderentur, ex eorum tamen communi societate multo plura commoda quam damna sequuntur. Quare satius est, eorum injurias æquo animo ferre, et studium iis adhibere, quæ concordiæ et amicitiæ conciliandæ inserviunt.	Chapter 14. So although people generally govern everything by their own whim, far more advantages than disadvantages follow from their common society. So it is better to bear their wrongs calmly, and to devote our efforts to whatever serves to bring about concord and friendship.
4App15	CAPUT XV. Quæ concordiam gignunt sunt illa, quæ ad justitiam, æquitatem, et honestatem referuntur. Nam homines præter id, quod injustum et iniquum est, etiam ægre ferunt, quod turpe habetur, sive quod aliquis receptos civitatis mores aspernatur. Amori autem conciliando illa apprime necessaria sunt, quæ ad Religionem et Pietatem spectant. De quibus vide Schol. 1 et 2 Prop. 37 et Schol. Prop. 46 et Schol. Prop. 73 p. IV.	Chapter 15. The things that produce concord are those related to justice, fairness and honor. For besides what is unjust and unfair, people also take it badly when something is held to be shameful, or when someone scorns the accepted customs of the state. But to win love, the things most necessary are those that concern religion and piety. On these, see Scholia 1 and 2 to Proposition 37, the Scholium to Proposition 46, and the Scholium to Proposition 73 of Part 4.
4App16	CAPUT XVI. Solet præterea concordia ex Metu plerumque gigni, sed sine fide. Adde, quod Metus ex animi impotentia oritur, et propterea ad Rationis usum non pertinet; ut nec Commiseratio, quamvis Pietatis speciem præ se ferre videatur.	Chapter 16. Besides, concord is commonly produced by fear, but without good faith. Add that fear arises from weakness of mind, and therefore has no place in the exercise of reason; nor does pity, although it seems to present an appearance of piety.
4App17	CAPUT XVII. Vincuntur præterea homines etiam largitate, præcipue ii qui non habent, unde comparare possint illa, quæ ad vitam sustentandam necessaria sunt. Attamen unicuique indigenti auxilium ferre, vires et utilitatem viri privati longe superat. Divitiæ namque viri privati longe impares sunt ad id suppeditandum. Unius præterea viri facultas limitatior est, quam ut omnes sibi possit amicitia jungere; quare pauperum cura integræ societati incumbit, et ad communem tantum utilitatem spectat.	Chapter 17. People are also won over by generosity, especially those who lack the means to obtain what is necessary to sustain life. Yet to bring aid to every needy person far surpasses the resources and the interest of a private individual. For the wealth of a private individual is far from adequate to supply it. Moreover, one person's capacity is too limited for him to be able to bind everyone to himself in friendship. So care of the poor falls on society as a whole, and concerns only the common advantage.
4App18	CAPUT XVIII. In beneficiis accipiendis et gratia referenda alia prorsus debet esse cura, de qua vide Schol. Prop. 70 et Schol. Prop. 71 p. IV.	Chapter 18. In accepting favors and in returning thanks, quite a different kind of care must be taken; on this, see the Scholium to Proposition 70 and the Scholium to Proposition 71 of Part 4.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
4App19	CAPUT XIX. Amor præterea meretricius, hoc est generandi libido, quæ ex forma oritur, et absolute omnis Amor, qui aliam causam præter animi libertatem agnoscit, facile in Odium transit; nisi, quod pejus est, species delirii sit, atque tum magis discordia quam concordia fovetur. Vid. Schol. Prop. 31 p. III.	Chapter 19. Further, purely sensual love—that is, the lust to procreate that arises from physical beauty—and absolutely every love that recognizes any cause other than freedom of mind, easily turns into hatred; unless, which is worse, it is a kind of madness, and then discord is fostered more than concord. See the Scholium to Proposition 31 of Part 3.
4App20	CAPUT XX. Ad matrimonium quod attinet, certum est, ipsum cum Ratione convenire, si Cupiditas miscendi corpora non ex sola forma, sed etiam ex Amore liberos procreandi et sapienter educandi ingeneretur; et præterea si utriusque, viri scilicet et fœminæ, Amor non solam formam, sed animi præcipue libertatem pro causa habeat.	Chapter 20. As regards marriage, it is certain that it agrees with reason, if the desire for bodily union is generated not by physical beauty alone but also by the love of having children and bringing them up wisely; and if, moreover, the love of each—namely of both husband and wife—has as its cause not physical beauty alone, but chiefly freedom of mind.
4App21	CAPUT XXI. Gignit præterea adulatio concordiam; sed fœdo servitutis crimine, vel perfidia; nulli quippe magis adulatione capiuntur quam superbi, qui primi esse volunt, nec sunt.	Chapter 21. Flattery, too, produces concord, but by the foul vice of servility, or by treachery. For none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who want to be first and are not.
4App22	CAPUT XXII. Abjectioni falsa pietatis et religionis species inest. Et quamvis Abjectio Superbiæ sit contraria, est tamen abjectus superbo proximus. Vide Schol. Prop. 57 p. IV.	Chapter 22. There is a false appearance of piety and religion in self-abasement. And although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, the self-abasing person is nevertheless very close to the proud one. See the Scholium to Proposition 57 of Part 4.
4App23	CAPUT XXIII. Confert præterea concordiæ Pudor in iis tantum, quæ celari non possunt. Deinde, quia ipse Pudor species est Tristitiæ, ad Rationis usum non spectat.	Chapter 23. Shame, too, contributes to concord, but only in matters that cannot be hidden. Then, because shame is itself a kind of sadness, it has no place in the exercise of reason.
4App24	CAPUT XXIV. Cæteri Tristitiæ erga homines affectus directe justitiæ, æquitati, honestati, pietati, et religioni opponuntur; et, quamvis Indignatio æquitatis speciem præ se ferre videatur, ibi tamen sine lege vivitur, ubi unicuique de factis alterius judicium ferre, et suum vel alterius jus vindicare licet.	Chapter 24. The other affects of sadness toward people are directly opposed to justice, fairness, honor, piety and religion. And although indignation seems to present an appearance of fairness, still, where everyone is permitted to pass judgment on the deeds of another and to avenge his own right or another's, people live without law.
4App25	CAPUT XXV. Modestia, hoc est Cupiditas hominibus placendi, quæ ex Ratione determinatur, ad Pietatem (ut in Schol. 1 Prop. 37 p. IV diximus) refertur. Sed si ex affectu oriatur, Ambitio est sive Cupiditas, qua homines falsa Pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant. Nam qui reliquos consilio aut re juvare cupit, ut simul summo fruantur bono, is apprime studebit eorum sibi Amorem conciliare; non autem eos in	Chapter 25. Modesty, that is, the desire to please people, when it is determined by reason, is related to piety (as we said in Scholium 1 to Proposition 37 of Part 4). But if it arises from an affect, it is ambition, or the desire by which people, under a false show of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For someone who desires to help others by advice or by deed, so that they may enjoy the highest good together, will strive above all to win

LATIN	ENGLISH
admirationem traducere, ut disciplina ex ipso habeat vocabulum, nec ullas absolute Invidiæ causas dare.	their love, and not to lead them to admire him so that a system of teaching may be named after him, nor to give any cause for envy at all.
In communibus deinde colloquiis cavebit hominum vitia referre, et de humana impotentia non nisi parce loqui curabit: at largiter de humana virtute seu potentia, et qua via possit perfici; ut sic homines, non ex Metu aut aversione, sed solo Lætitiæ affectu moti ex Rationis præscripto, quantum in se est, conentur vivere.	Next, in ordinary conversation he will take care not to tell of people's vices, and will be careful to speak only sparingly of human weakness—but at length of human virtue, or power, and of how it can be perfected. In this way people, moved not by fear or aversion but solely by the affect of joy, may strive to live, as far as they can, by the prescription of reason.
4App26 CAPUT XXVI. Præter homines nihil singulare in Natura novimus, cujus Mente gaudere, et quod nobis amicitia aut aliquo consuetudinis genere jungere possumus; adeoque quicquid in rerum Natura extra homines datur, id nostræ utilitatis ratio conservare non postulat, sed pro ejus vario usu conservare, destruere, vel quocunque modo ad nostrum usum adaptare nos docet.	Chapter 26. Apart from human beings, we know no singular thing in Nature whose mind we can enjoy, and which we can join to ourselves in friendship or in any kind of association. And so whatever there is in Nature apart from human beings, the principle of our advantage does not require us to preserve it. Instead, according to its various uses, it teaches us to preserve it, destroy it, or adapt it to our use in any way whatever.
4App27 CAPUT XXVII. Utilitas, quam ex rebus, quæ extra nos sunt, capimus, est, præter experientiam et cognitionem, quam acquirimus ex eo, quod easdem observamus, et ex his formis in alias mutamus, præcipua corporis conservatio; et hac Ratione res illæ imprimis utiles sunt, quæ Corpus ita alere et nutrire possunt, ut ejus omnes partes officio suo recte fungi queant. Nam quo Corpus aptius est, ut pluribus modis possit affici, et corpora externa pluribus modis afficere, eo Mens ad cogitandum est aptior (vide Prop. 38 et 39 p. IV). At hujus notæ perpauca in Natura esse videntur; quare ad Corpus, ut requiritur, nutriendum, necesse est, multis naturæ diversæ alimentis uti.	Chapter 27. The advantage we derive from things outside us, apart from the experience and knowledge we acquire by observing them and changing them from one form into another, is chiefly the preservation of the body. On this account the things most useful are those that can feed and nourish the body so that all its parts can perform their function properly. For the more capable the body is of being affected in many ways, and of affecting external bodies in many ways, the more capable the mind is of thinking (see Propositions 38 and 39 of Part 4). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in Nature. So to nourish the body as it requires, we must use many foods of different kinds.
Quippe humanum Corpus ex plurimis diversæ naturæ partibus componitur, quæ continuo alimento indigent, et vario, ut totum Corpus ad omnia, quæ ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, æque aptum sit, et consequenter ut Mens etiam æque apta sit ad plura concipiendum.	For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which need continual and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of everything that can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind too may be equally capable of conceiving many things.
4App28 CAPUT XXVIII. Ad hæc autem comparandum vix uniuscujusque vires sufficerent, nisi homines operas mutuas traderent. Verum omnium rerum compendium pecunia attulit, unde factum, ut ejus imago Mentem vulgi maxime occupare soleat; quia vix ullam Lætitiæ speciem	Chapter 28. But to provide these things, each person's strength would hardly suffice unless people exchanged services with one another. Money, however, has come to stand as a summary of all things. That is why its image usually occupies the

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	imaginari possunt, nisi concomitante nummorum idea tanquam causa.	minds of ordinary people more than anything else: they can hardly imagine any kind of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.
4App29	CAPUT XXIX. Sed hoc vitium eorum tantum est, qui non ex indigentia, nec propter necessitates nummos quærunt, sed quia lucri artes didicerunt, quibus se magnifice efferunt. Cæterum Corpus ex consuetudine pascunt, sed parce, quia tantum de suis bonis se perdere credunt, quantum sui Corporis conservationi impendunt. At qui verum nummorum usum norunt, et divitiarum modum ex sola indigentia moderantur, paucis contenti vivunt.	Chapter 29. But this is a vice only in those who seek money not out of need, or for the necessities of life, but because they have learned the arts of gain, and make a great show of themselves by them. For the rest, they feed the body out of habit, but sparingly, because they believe that whatever they spend on preserving their body is so much of their goods lost. But those who know the true use of money, and set the measure of their wealth by need alone, live content with little.
4App30	CAPUT XXX. Cum igitur res illæ sint bonæ, quæ Corporis partes juvant, ut suo officio fungantur, et Lætitia in eo consistat, quod hominis potentia, quatenus Mente et Corpore constat, juvatur vel augetur; sunt ergo illa omnia, quæ Lætitiam afferunt, bona. Attamen, quoniam contra non eum in finem res agunt, ut nos Lætitia afficiant, nec earum agendi potentia ex nostra utilitate temperatur, et denique quoniam Lætitia plerumque ad unam Corporis partem potissimum refertur; habent ergo plerumque Lætitiæ affectus (nisi Ratio et vigilantia adsit), et consequenter Cupiditates etiam, quæ ex iisdem generantur, excessum; ad quod accedit, quod ex affectu id primum habeamus, quod in præsentia suave est, nec futura æquali animi affectu æstimare possumus. Vide Schol. Prop. 44 et Schol. Prop. 60 p. IV.	Chapter 30. Since, then, the things that are good are those that help the parts of the body to perform their function, and since joy consists in this, that a person's power, insofar as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all things that bring joy are good. Yet, since things do not act with the aim of affecting us with joy, and their power of acting is not tempered to suit our advantage, and finally since joy is generally related chiefly to one part of the body, it follows that affects of joy (unless reason and watchfulness are present), and consequently also the desires generated by them, are for the most part excessive. Add to this that, from affect, we give first place to what is pleasant at present, and cannot value future things with an equal affect of mind. See the Scholium to Proposition 44 and the Scholium to Proposition 60 of Part 4.
4App31	CAPUT XXXI. At superstitio id contra videtur statuere bonum esse, quod Tristitiam, et id contra malum quod Lætitiam affert. Sed, ut jam diximus (vide Schol. Prop. 45 p. IV), nemo, nisi invidus, mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur. Nam quo majore Lætitia afficimur, eo ad majorem perfectionem transimus, et consequenter eo magis de natura divina participamus; nec Lætitia unquam mala esse potest, quam nostræ utilitatis vera ratio moderatur. At qui contra Metu ducitur, et bonum, ut malum vitet, agit, is Ratione non ducitur.	Chapter 31. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to hold that what brings sadness is good, and what brings joy is evil. But, as we have already said (see the Scholium to Proposition 45 of Part 4), no one but an envious person takes pleasure in my weakness and misfortune. For the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently the more we participate in the divine nature. Nor can joy ever be evil when it is governed by the true principle of our advantage. But someone who, by contrast, is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.
4App32	CAPUT XXXII. Sed humana potentia admodum limitata est, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite	Chapter 32. But human power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external

LATIN

superatur; atque adeo potestatem absolutam non habemus, res, quæ extra nos sunt, ad nostrum usum aptandi. Attamen ea, quæ nobis eveniunt contra id, quod nostræ utilitatis ratio postulat, æquo animo feremus, si conscii simus, nos functos nostro officio fuisse, et potentiam, quam habemus, non potuisse se eo usque extendere, ut eadem vitare possemus; nosque partem totius Naturæ esse, cujus ordinem sequimur. Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri, quæ intelligentia definitur, hoc est pars melior nostri, in eo plane acquiescet, et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur.

Nam, quatenus intelligimus, nihil appetere nisi id, quod necessarium est, nec absolute, nisi in veris, acquiescere possumus; adeoque quatenus hæc recte intelligimus, eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine totius Naturæ convenit.

ENGLISH

causes. So we do not have absolute power to adapt the things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear calmly whatever happens to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the power we have could not have extended so far as to enable us to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the whole of Nature, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be entirely content with it, and will strive to persevere in that contentment.

For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing but what is necessary, and cannot be content with anything, absolutely, except what is true. And so, insofar as we understand these things rightly, the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of Nature.

Part V: Of the power of the intellect, or of human freedom

Spinoza explains how understanding frees us from the emotions and leads to blessedness.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5Pref	PRÆFATIO. Transeo tandem ad alteram Ethices partem, quæ est de modo sive via, quæ ad Libertatem ducit. In hac ergo de potentia Rationis agam, ostendens quid ipsa Ratio in affectus possit, et deinde, quid Mentis Libertas seu Beatitudo sit; ex quibus videbimus, quantum sapiens potior sit ignaro. Quomodo autem et qua via debeat Intellectus perfici, et qua deinde arte Corpus sit curandum, ut possit suo officio recte fungi, huc non pertinet; hoc enim ad Medicinam, illud autem ad Logicam spectat. Hic igitur, ut dixi, de sola Mentis seu Rationis potentia agam, et ante omnia quantum et quale imperium in affectus habeat ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum, ostendam. Nam nos in ipsos imperium absolutum non habere, jam supra demonstravimus.	Preface. I pass at last to the remaining part of the *Ethics*, which concerns the manner, or way, that leads to freedom. In it, then, I shall treat of the power of reason, showing what reason itself can do against the affects, and then what freedom of mind, or blessedness, is. From this we shall see how much more capable the wise person is than the ignorant. How, and in what way, the intellect should be perfected, and further, by what art the body should be cared for so that it can perform its function properly, do not belong here; for the latter belongs to medicine, the former to logic. Here, then, as I have said, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason, and above all I shall show how much, and what kind of, dominion it has over the affects, to restrain and moderate them. For we have already demonstrated above that we do not have absolute dominion over them.
	Stoici tamen putarunt, eosdem a nostra voluntate absolute pendere, nosque iis absolute imperare posse. Attamen ab experientia reclamante, non vero ex suis principiis, coacti sunt fateri, usum et studium non parvum requiri ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum; quod quidam exemplo duorum canum (si recte memini), unius scilicet domestici, alterius venatici conatus est ostendere nempe quia usu efficere tandem potuit, ut domesticus venari venaticus contra a leporibus sectandis abstinere assuesceret. Huic opinioni non parum favet Cartesius. Nam statuit, Animam seu Mentem unitam præcipue esse cuidam parti cerebri, glandulæ scilicet pineali dictæ, cujus ope Mens motus omnes, qui in Corpore excitantur, et objecta externa sentit, quamque Mens eo solo, quod vult, varie movere potest.	The Stoics, however, thought that the affects depend absolutely on our will, and that we can command them absolutely. Yet they were compelled—by the protest of experience, not by their own principles—to admit that no small practice and effort are needed to restrain and moderate them. Someone tried to show this by the example of two dogs (if I remember rightly), one a house dog and the other a hunting dog: by training he was at last able to make the house dog accustomed to hunting, and the hunting dog, by contrast, to refrain from chasing hares. Descartes lends no little support to this opinion. For he maintains that the soul, or mind, is united chiefly to a certain part of the brain, namely the so-called pineal gland. By means of this gland the mind senses all the motions aroused in the body, as well as external objects, and the mind can move it in various ways simply by willing.[1]
	Hanc glandulam in medio cerebri ita suspensam esse statuit, ut minimo spirituum animalium motu, possit	He maintains that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be

LATIN

moveri. Deinde statuit, quod hæc glans tot variis modis in medio cerebro suspendatur, quot variis modis spiritus animales in eandem impingunt, et quod præterea tot varia vestigia in eadem imprimantur, quot varia objecta externa ipsos spiritus animales versus eandem propellunt; unde fit ut si glans postea ab Animæ voluntate, illam diversimode movente, hoc aut illo modo suspendatur, quo semel fuit suspensa a spiritibus, hoc aut illo modo agitatis, tum ipsa glans ipsos spiritus animales eodem modo propellet et determinabit, ac antea a simili glandulæ suspensione repulsi fuerant. Præter ea statuit, unamquamque Mentis voluntatem Natura esse unitam certo cuidam glandis motui. Ex. gr.

si quis voluntatem habet objectum remotum intuendi, hæc voluntas efficiet, ut pupilla dilatetur; sed si de sola dilatanda pupilla cogitet, nihil proderit ejus rei habere voluntatem, quia Natura non junxit motum glandis, qui inservit impellendis spiritibus versus nervum Opticum modo conveniente dilatandæ vel contrahendæ pupillæ, cum voluntate eandem dilatandi vel contrahendi, sed demum cum voluntate intuendi objecta remota vel proxima. Denique statuit, quod, etsi unusquisque motus hujus glandulæ videatur connexus esse per Naturam singulis ex nostris cogitationibus ab initio nostræ vitæ, aliis tamen per habitum possunt jungi; quod probare conatur art. 50 p. *1* de Pass. Animæ. Ex his concludit, nullam esse tam imbecillem Animam, quæ non possit, cum bene dirigitur, acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas Passiones.

Nam hæ, ut ab eo definiuntur, sunt *perceptiones, aut sensus, aut commotiones animæ, quæ ad eam speciatim referuntur, quæque NB. producuntur, conservantur, et corroborantur, per aliquem motum spirituum* (vide articulum *27* p. *1* Pass. Anim.). At quandoquidem cuilibet voluntati possumus jungere motum quemcunque glandis, et consequenter spirituum; et determinatio voluntatis a sola nostra potestate pendet; si igitur nostram voluntatem certis et

ENGLISH

moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits. He further maintains that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many different ways as there are different ways in which the animal spirits strike against it, and, moreover, that as many different traces are imprinted on it as there are different external objects driving those animal spirits toward it. The result is this: if the gland is later suspended, by the will of the soul moving it in various ways, in this or that way in which it was once suspended by the spirits when they were agitated in this or that way, then the gland itself will drive and determine the animal spirits in the same way in which they had earlier been driven back by a similar suspension of the gland. Beyond this, he maintains that each volition of the mind is united by Nature to some definite motion of the gland.[2]

For example, if someone has the will to look at a distant object, this will brings it about that the pupil dilates. But if he thinks only of dilating the pupil, it will do him no good to will it, because Nature has joined the motion of the gland that serves to drive the spirits toward the optic nerve in the way suited to dilating or contracting the pupil not with the will to dilate or contract it, but only with the will to look at distant or nearby objects. Finally, he maintains that although each motion of this gland seems to have been connected by Nature, from the beginning of our life, with particular thoughts of ours, these motions can nevertheless be joined to other thoughts through habit; he tries to prove this in article 50 of Part 1 of *The Passions of the Soul*. From all this he concludes that there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when it is well directed, acquire absolute power over its passions.

For passions, as he defines them, are "perceptions, or feelings, or emotions of the soul, which are referred to it in particular, and which (NB) are produced, preserved and strengthened by some motion of the spirits" (see article 27 of Part 1 of *The Passions of the Soul*). Now, since we can join any motion whatever of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, to any volition, and since the de-

1 The Stoics: the ancient Greek and Roman school that taught that the passions arise from false judgments and can be eliminated by the wise.

2 In the physiology of Descartes's day, "animal spirits" were very fine, fast-moving particles of the blood, thought to carry motion through the brain and nerves; the pineal gland is a small gland near the center of the brain.

LATIN

firmis judiciis, secundum quæ nostræ vitæ actiones dirigere volumus, determinemus, et motus passionum, quas habere volumus, hisce judiciis jungamus, imperium acquiremus absolutum in nostras Passiones. Hæc est clarissimi hujus Viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis conjicio) quam ego vix credidissem a tanto Viro prolatam esse, si minus acuta fuisset.

Profecto mirari satis non possum, quod vir Philosophus, qui firmiter statuerat, nihil deducere, nisi ex principiis per se notis, et nihil affirmare, nisi quod clare et distincte perciperet, et qui toties Scholasticos reprehenderat, quod per occultas qualitates res obscuras voluerint explicare, Hypothesin sumat omni occulta qualitate occultiorem. Quid, quæso, per Mentis et Corporis unionem intelligit? quem, inquam, clarum et distinctum conceptum habet cogitationis arctissime unitæ cuidam quantitatis portiunculæ? Vellem sane, ut hanc unionem per proximam suam causam explicuisset. Sed ille Mentem a Corpore adeo distinctam conceperat, ut nec hujus unionis, nec ipsius Mentis ullam singularem causam assignare potuerit, sed necesse ipsi fuerit, ad causam totius Universi, hoc est ad Deum, recurrere.

Deinde pervelim scire, quot motus gradus potest glandulæ isti pineali Mens tribuere, et quanta cum vi eandem suspensam tenere potest. Nam nescio an hæc glans tardius vel celerius a Mente circumagatur, quam a spiritibus animalibus, et an motus Passionum, quos firmis judiciis arcte junximus, non possint ab iisdem iterum a causis corporeis disjungi; ex quo sequeretur, ut, quamvis Mens firmiter proposuerit contra pericula ire atque huic decreto motus audaciæ junxerit, viso tamen periculo glans ita suspendatur, ut Mens non nisi de fuga possit cogitare; et sane, cum nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter Mentis et Corporis potentiam seu vires; et consequenter hujus vires nequaquam viribus illius determinari possunt.

ENGLISH

termination of the will depends on our power alone, it follows that if we determine our will by firm and definite judgments according to which we want to direct the actions of our life, and join to these judgments the motions of the passions we want to have, we shall acquire absolute dominion over our passions. This is the view of this most illustrious man (so far as I can gather from his words). I would scarcely have believed that so great a man had put it forward, had it been less ingenious.

Indeed, I cannot wonder enough that a philosopher who had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from principles known through themselves, and to affirm nothing except what he perceived clearly and distinctly, and who had so often reproached the Scholastics for wanting to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should adopt a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality. What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct concept, I say, does he have of a thought most closely united to some tiny portion of quantity? I truly wish he had explained this union through its proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind as so distinct from the body that he could assign no particular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, and he had to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God.

Next, I should very much like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can impart to that pineal gland, and with how much force it can hold it suspended. For I do not know whether this gland is driven around more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, or whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely joined to firm judgments, cannot be disjoined from them again by bodily causes. If they can, it would follow that although the mind had firmly resolved to face dangers, and had joined the motions of daring to this decision, yet at the sight of danger the gland might be suspended in such a way that the mind could think of nothing but flight. And surely, since there is no proportion between will and motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or strength, of the mind and that of the body; consequently the strength of the body can by no means be determined by the strength of the mind.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	His adde, quod nec hæc glans ita in medio cerebro sita reperiatur, ut tam facile totque modis circumagi possit, et quod non omnes nervi ad cavitates usque cerebri protendantur. Denique omnia, quæ de voluntate ejusque libertate asserit, omitto, quandoquidem hæc falsa esse satis superque ostenderim. Igitur quia Mentis potentia, ut supra ostendi, sola intelligentia definitur, affectuum remedia, quæ omnes experiri quidem, sed non accurate observare nec distincte videre credo, sola Mentis cognitione determinabimus, et ex eadem illa omnia, quæ ad ipsius beatitudinem spectant, deducemus.	Add to this that this gland is not found to be situated in the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be driven around so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend as far as the cavities of the brain. Finally, I pass over everything he asserts about the will and its freedom, since I have shown more than enough that it is false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, we shall determine the remedies for the affects—which everyone, I believe, experiences, but does not accurately observe or distinctly see—by the knowledge of the mind alone; and from that same knowledge we shall deduce everything that concerns its blessedness.

THE FIRST REMEDIES FOR THE AFFECTS

Understanding an affect clearly, and seeing things as necessary, reduces the power of the passions.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5A1	I. Si in eodem subjecto duæ contrariæ actiones excitentur, debebit necessario vel in utraque, vel in una sola mutatio fieri, donec desinant contrariæ esse.	Axiom 1. If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will necessarily have to take place either in both or in one of them alone, until they cease to be contrary.
5A2	II. Effectus potentia definitur potentia ipsius causæ quatenus ejus essentia per ipsius causæ essentiam explicatur vel definitur.	Axiom 2. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, insofar as the effect's essence is explained or defined through the essence of its cause.
	Patet hoc Axioma ex Prop. 7 p. 3.	This Axiom is evident from Proposition 7 of Part 3.
5P1	PROPOSITIO I. *Prout cogitationes, rerumque ideæ, ordinantur et concatenantur in Mente, ita Corporis affectiones, seu rerum imagines, ad amussim ordinantur et concatenantur in Corpore.*	Proposition 1. *Just as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected in the body in exactly the same way.*
5P1D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ordo et connexio idearum idem est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. II*), ac ordo et connexio rerum, et vice versa ordo et connexio rerum idem est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 6 *et* 7 *p. II*), ac ordo et connexio idearum. Quare, sicuti ordo et connexio idearum in Mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum Corporis (*per Prop.* 18 *p. II*), sic vice versa (*per Prop.* 2 *p. III*) ordo et connexio affectionum Corporis fit, prout cogitationes, rerumque ideæ ordinantur et concatenantur in Mente. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The order and connection of ideas is the same (by Proposition 7 of Part 2) as the order and connection of things; and conversely, the order and connection of things is the same (by the Corollaries to Propositions 6 and 7 of Part 2) as the order and connection of ideas. Therefore, just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind comes about according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by Proposition 18 of Part 2), so conversely (by Proposition 2 of Part 3) the order and connection of the affections of the body comes about as thoughts and the ideas

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		of things are ordered and connected in the mind. QED
5P2	PROPOSITIO II. *Si animi commotionem seu affectum a causæ externæ cogitatione amoveamus, et aliis jungamus cogitationibus, tum Amor seu Odium erga causam externam, ut et animi fluctuationes, quæ ex his affectibus oriuntur, destruentur.*	Proposition 2. *If we separate an emotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred toward the external cause, as well as the vacillations of mind that arise from these affects, will be destroyed.*
5P2D	DEMONSTRATIO. Id enim, quod formam Amoris vel Odii constituit, est Lætitia vel Tristitia, concomitante idea causæ externæ (*per Defin.* 6 *et* 7 *Affect.*): hac igitur sublata, Amoris vel Odii forma simul tollitur; adeoque hi affectus et qui ex his oriuntur, destruuntur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For what constitutes the form of love or hatred is joy or sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Definitions 6 and 7 of the Affects). When this idea is removed, therefore, the form of love or hatred is removed along with it; and so these affects, and those that arise from them, are destroyed. QED
5P3	PROPOSITIO III. *Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.*	Proposition 3. *An affect that is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.*
5P3D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus, qui passio est, idea est confusa (*per gener. Affect. Defin.*). Si itaque ipsius affectus claram et distinctam formemus ideam, hæc idea ab ipso affectu, quatenus ad solam Mentem refertur, non nisi ratione distinguetur (*per Prop.* 21 *p. II cum ejusdem Schol.*); adeoque (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) affectus desinet esse passio. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. An affect that is a passion is a confused idea (by the General Definition of the Affects). So if we form a clear and distinct idea of this affect, this idea will be distinguished from the affect itself, insofar as the affect is related to the mind alone, only by a distinction of reason (by Proposition 21 of Part 2, with its Scholium). And so (by Proposition 3 of Part 3) the affect will cease to be a passion. QED
5P3C	COROLLARIUM. Affectus igitur eo magis in nostra potestate est, et Mens ab eo minus patitur, quo nobis est notior.	Corollary. The better we know an affect, then, the more it is within our power, and the less the mind is acted on by it.
5P4	PROPOSITIO IV. *Nulla est Corporis affectio, cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum.*	Proposition 4. *There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.*
5P4D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quæ omnibus communia sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adæquate (*per Prop.* 38 *p. II*); adeoque (*per Prop.* 12 *et Lemma 2, quod habetur post Schol. Prop.* 13 *p. II*) nulla est Corporis affectio, cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. What is common to all things can only be conceived adequately (by Proposition 38 of Part 2); and so (by Proposition 12 of Part 2 and Lemma 2, which comes after the Scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 2) there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. QED
5P4C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, nullum esse affectum, cujus non possumus aliquem clarum et distinctum formare conceptum. Est namque affectus Corporis affectionis idea (*per gen. Affect. Defin.*), quæ propterea (*per Prop. præced.*) aliquem clarum et distinctum involvere debet conceptum.	Corollary. From this it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. For an affect is the idea of an affection of the body (by the General Definition of the Affects), and that idea must therefore (by the pre-

LATIN

ENGLISH

ceding Proposition) involve some clear and distinct concept.

5P4S SCHOLIUM. Quandoquidem nihil datur, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur (*per Prop.* 36 *p. I*), et quicquid ex idea, quæ in nobis est adæquata, sequitur, id omne clare et distincte intelligimus (*per Prop.* 40 *p. II*); hinc sequitur, unumquemque potestatem habere se suosque affectus, si non absolute, ex parte saltem clare et distincte intelligendi, et consequenter efficiendi, ut ab iisdem minus patiatur. Huic igitur rei præcipue danda est opera, ut unumquemque affectum, quantum fieri potest, clare et distincte cognoscamus; ut sic Mens ex affectu ad illa cogitandum determinetur, quæ clare et distincte percipit, et in quibus plane acquiescit; atque adeo, ut ipse affectus a cogitatione causæ externæ separetur, et veris jungatur cogitationibus; ex quo fiet, ut non tantum Amor, Odium, etc.

Scholium. There is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), and whatever follows from an idea that is adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (by Proposition 40 of Part 2). Hence it follows that each of us has the power to understand himself and his affects clearly and distinctly—if not absolutely, then at least in part—and consequently to bring it about that he is less acted on by them. We must therefore take special pains to know each affect, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, so that the mind may be determined by the affect to think of those things it perceives clearly and distinctly and in which it is fully at rest; and so that the affect itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts.

destruantur (*per Prop.* 2 *hujus*), sed ut etiam appetitus seu Cupiditates, quæ ex tali affectu oriri solent, excessum habere nequeant (*per Prop.* 61 *p. IV*). Nam apprime notandum est, unum eundemque esse appetitum, per quem homo tam agere quam pati dicitur. Ex. gr. cum natura humana ita comparatum esse ostendimus, ut unusquisque appetat, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant (*vide Schol. Prop.* 31 *p. III*); qui quidem appetitus in homine, qui Ratione non ducitur, passio est, quæ Ambitio vocatur, nec multum a Superbia discrepat; et contra in homine, qui ex Rationis dictamine vivit, actio seu virtus est, quæ Pietas appellatur (*vide Schol.* 1 *Prop.* 37 *p. IV et II Demonstrat. ejusdem Prop.*).

The result will be not only that love, hatred, and so on are destroyed (by Proposition 2 of this part), but also that the appetites, or desires, that usually arise from such an affect cannot be excessive (by Proposition 61 of Part 4). For it must above all be noted that it is one and the same appetite through which a person is said both to act and to be acted on. For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that each of us wants others to live according to his own temperament (see the Scholium to Proposition 31 of Part 3). In a person who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion, called ambition, which differs little from pride; in a person who lives by the dictate of reason, on the other hand, it is an action, or virtue, called piety (see Scholium 1 to Proposition 37 of Part 4, and the second Demonstration of the same Proposition).

Et hoc modo omnes appetitus seu Cupiditates eatenus tantum passiones sunt, quatenus ex ideis inadæquatis oriuntur; atque eædem virtuti accensentur quando ab ideis adæquatis excitantur vel generantur. Nam omnes Cupiditates, quibus ad aliquid agendum determinamur, tam oriri possunt ab adæquatis quam ab inadæquatis ideis (*vide Prop.* 59 *p. IV*). Atque hoc (ut eo, unde digressus sum, revertar) affectuum remedio, quod scilicet in eorum vera cognitione consistit, nullum præstantius aliud, quod a nostra potestate pendeat, excogitari potest, quandoquidem nulla alia Mentis potentia datur, quam cogitandi et adæquatas ideas formandi, ut supra (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*) ostendimus.

In this way all appetites, or desires, are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas; and the same desires are counted as virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to do anything can arise from adequate ideas as well as from inadequate ones (see Proposition 59 of Part 4). And (to return to the point from which I digressed) no more excellent remedy for the affects, among those that depend on our power, can be devised than this one, which consists in a true knowledge of them. For the mind has no other power

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		than that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (by Proposition 3 of Part 3).
5P5	PROPOSITIO V. *Affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter, et non ut necessariam neque ut possibilem, neque ut contingentem imaginamur, cæteris paribus, omnium est maximus.*	Proposition 5. *Other things being equal, an affect toward a thing that we imagine simply—not as necessary, nor as possible, nor as contingent—is the greatest of all.*
5P5D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, major est quam erga necessariam (*per Prop.* 49 *p. III*), et consequenter adhuc major quam erga illam, quam ut possibilem vel contingentem imaginamur (*per Prop.* 11 *p. IV*). At rem aliquam ut liberam imaginari nihil aliud esse potest, quam quod rem simpliciter imaginamur, dum causas, a quibus ipsa ad agendum determinata fuit, ignoramus (*per illa, quæ in Schol. Prop.* 35 *p. II ostendimus*); ergo affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter imaginamur, cæteris paribus major est, quam erga necessariam, possibilem, vel contingentem, et consequenter maximus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. An affect toward a thing we imagine to be free is greater than one toward a necessary thing (by Proposition 49 of Part 3), and consequently greater still than one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent (by Proposition 11 of Part 4). But to imagine a thing as free can be nothing other than to imagine it simply, while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to act (by what we showed in the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 2). Therefore an affect toward a thing we imagine simply is, other things being equal, greater than one toward a thing that is necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently it is the greatest. QED
5P6	PROPOSITIO VI. *Quatenus Mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit, eatenus majorem in affectus potentiam habet, seu minus ab iisdem patitur.*	Proposition 6. *Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has greater power over the affects, or is less acted on by them.*
5P6D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens res omnes necessarias esse intelligit (*per Prop.* 29 *p. I*), et infinito causarum nexu determinari ad existendum et operandum (*per Prop.* 28 *p. I*); adeoque (*per Prop. præced.*) eatenus efficit, ut ab affectibus, qui ex iis oriuntur, minus patiatur, et (*per Prop.* 48 *p. III*) minus erga ipsas afficiatur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The mind understands that all things are necessary (by Proposition 29 of Part 1) and are determined to exist and to act by an infinite chain of causes (by Proposition 28 of Part 1). And so (by the preceding Proposition) to that extent it brings it about that it is less acted on by the affects that arise from these things, and (by Proposition 48 of Part 3) that it is less affected toward them. QED
5P6S	SCHOLIUM. Quo hæc cognitio, quod scilicet res necessariæ sint, magis circa res singulares, quas distinctius et magis vivide imaginamur, versatur, eo hæc Mentis in affectus potentia major est; quod ipsa etiam experientia testatur. Videmus enim Tristitiam boni alicujus, quod periit, mitigari, simulac homo, qui id perdidit, considerat, bonum illud servari nulla ratione potuisse. Sic etiam videmus, quod nemo miseretur infantis, propterea quod nescit loqui, ambulare, ratiocinari, et quod denique tot annos quasi sui inscius vivat. At si plerique adulti, et unus aut alter infans nascerentur, tum unumquemque misereret infantum; quia tum ipsam infantiam non ut rem naturalem et necessariam, sed ut Naturæ vitium seu peccatum	Scholium. The more this knowledge—that things are necessary—concerns singular things, which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects, as experience itself also testifies. For we see that sadness over some good that has perished is lessened as soon as the person who lost it considers that there was no way it could have been saved. So too we see that no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, or reason, or because, in short, it lives so many years as if unaware of itself. But if most people were born adults, and only one or two were born in-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	consideraret; et ad hunc modum plura alia notare possemus.	fants, then everyone would pity infants, because they would then regard infancy itself not as a natural and necessary thing but as a defect, or fault, of Nature. And we could note many other things of this sort.
5P7	PROPOSITIO VII. *Affectus, qui ex Ratione oriuntur vel excitantur, si ratio temporis habeatur, potentiores sunt iis, qui ad res singulares referuntur, quas ut absentes contemplamur.*	Proposition 7. *Affects that arise from, or are aroused by, reason are, if we take time into account, more powerful than those related to singular things that we regard as absent.*
5P7D	DEMONSTRATIO. Rem aliquam ut absentem non contemplamur ex affectu, quo eandem imaginamur, sed ex eo, quod Corpus alio afficitur affectu, qui ejusdem rei existentiam secludit (*per Prop.* 17 *p. II*). Quare affectus, qui ad rem quam ut absentem contemplamur, refertur, ejus naturæ non est, ut reliquas hominis actiones et potentiam superet (*de quibus vide Prop.* 6 *p. IV*), sed contra ejus naturæ est, ut ab iis affectionibus, quæ existentiam externæ ejus causæ secludunt, coerceri aliquo modo possit (*per Prop.* 9 *p. IV*). At affectus, qui ex Ratione oritur, refertur necessario ad communes rerum proprietates (*vide Rationis defin. in* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 p. II*), quas semper ut præsentes contemplamur (nam nihil dari potest, quod earum præsentem existentiam secludat), et quas semper eodem modo imaginamur (*per Prop. *38* p. II*). Quare talis affectus idem semper manet; et consequenter (*per Ax. *1* hujus*) affectus, qui eidem sunt contrarii, quique a suis causis externis non foventur, eidem magis magisque sese accommodare debebunt, donec non amplius sint contrarii; et eatenus affectus, qui ex Ratione oritur, est potentior.* Q.E.D.	Demonstration. We do not regard a thing as absent because of the affect by which we imagine it, but because the body is affected by another affect that excludes the existence of that thing (by Proposition 17 of Part 2). So the affect related to a thing we regard as absent is not of such a nature as to overcome a person's other actions and power (on which see Proposition 6 of Part 4). On the contrary, it is of such a nature that it can in some way be restrained by the affections that exclude the existence of its external cause (by Proposition 9 of Part 4). But an affect that arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing that excludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in the same way (by Proposition 38 of Part 2). Such an affect therefore always remains the same; and consequently (by Axiom 1 of this part) the affects contrary to it, which are not nourished by their external causes, will have to accommodate themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary. To that extent an affect that arises from reason is more powerful. QED
5P8	PROPOSITIO VIII. *Quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul concurrentibus excitatur, eo major est.*	Proposition 8. *The more causes there are that concur at once in arousing an affect, the greater it is.*
5P8D	DEMONSTRATIO. Plures causæ simul plus possunt quam si pauciores essent (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*): adeoque (*per Prop.* 5 *p. IV*), quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul excitatur, eo fortior est. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Many causes together can do more than if they were fewer (by Proposition 7 of Part 3); and so (by Proposition 5 of Part 4) the more causes there are that arouse an affect at once, the stronger it is. QED
5P8S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc Propositio patet etiam ex Axiomate 2 hujus Partis.	Scholium. This Proposition is also evident from Axiom 2 of this part.
5P9	PROPOSITIO IX. *Affectus, qui ad plures et diversas causas refertur, quas Mens cum ipso affectu simul contemplatur, minus noxius est, et minus per ipsum patimur, et erga*	Proposition 9. *An affect related to many different causes, which the mind regards together with the affect*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	unamquamque causam minus afficimur, quam alius æque magnus affectus, qui ad unam solam vel pauciores causas refertur.	*itself, is less harmful, and we are less acted on by it and less affected toward each cause, than by another affect, equally great, that is related to only one cause or to fewer causes.*
5P9D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus eatenus tantum malus seu noxius est, quatenus Mens ab eo impeditur, quo minus possit cogitare (*per Prop.* 26 *et* 27 *p. IV*): adeoque ille affectus, a quo Mens ad plura simul objecta contemplandum determinatur, minus noxius est, quam alius æque magnus affectus, qui Mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum objectorum contemplatione ita detinet, ut de aliis cogitare nequeat; Quod erat primum. Deinde, quia Mentis essentia, hoc est (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) potentia, in sola cogitatione consistit (*per Prop.* 11 *p. II*), ergo Mens per affectum, a quo ad plura simul contemplandum determinatur, minus patitur, quam per æque magnum affectum, qui Mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum objectorum contemplatione occupatam tenet; Quod erat secundum. Denique hic affectus (*per Prop.* 48 p.	Demonstration. An affect is bad, or harmful, only insofar as it hinders the mind from being able to think (by Propositions 26 and 27 of Part 4). So an affect by which the mind is determined to regard many objects at once is less harmful than another affect, equally great, that so holds the mind in regarding only one or a few objects that it cannot think of others. That was the first point. Next, since the essence of the mind, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), its power, consists in thought alone (by Proposition 11 of Part 2), the mind is less acted on through an affect by which it is determined to regard many things at once than through an equally great affect that keeps the mind occupied in regarding only one or a few objects. That was the second point.
	III*), quatenus ad plures causas externas refertur, est etiam erga unamquamque minor.* Q.E.D.	Finally (by Proposition 48 of Part 3), this affect, insofar as it is related to many external causes, is also less toward each one of them. QED
5P10	PROPOSITIO X. *Quamdiu affectibus, qui nostræ naturæ sunt contrarii, non conflictamur, tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi Corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum.*	Proposition 10. *So long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, we have the power to order and connect the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.*
5P10D	DEMONSTRATIO. Affectus, qui nostræ naturæ sunt contrarii, hoc est (*per Prop.* 30 *p. IV*) qui mali sunt, eatenus mali sunt, quatenus impediunt, quo minus Mens intelligat (*per Prop.* 27 *p. IV*). Quamdiu igitur affectibus, qui nostræ naturæ contrarii sunt, non conflictamur, tamdiu Mentis potentia, qua res intelligere conatur (*per Prop.* 26 *p. IV*), non impeditur, atque adeo tamdiu potestatem habet claras et distinctas ideas formandi, et alias ex aliis deducendi (*vide 2 Schol. Prop.* 40 *et Schol. Prop.* 47 *p. II*); et consequenter (*per Prop.* 1 *hujus*) tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi affectiones Corporis secundum ordinem ad intellectum. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Affects contrary to our nature, that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4), affects that are bad, are bad to the extent that they hinder the mind from understanding (by Proposition 27 of Part 4). So long, therefore, as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, the power of the mind by which it strives to understand things (by Proposition 26 of Part 4) is not hindered; and for that long it has the power to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce some from others (see Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 and the Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part 2). Consequently (by Proposition 1 of this part), for that long we have the power to order and connect the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. QED

RULES OF LIFE

Spinoza advises memorizing sound rules of life and applying them, so that reason is ready when affects arise.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P10S	SCHOLIUM. Hac potestate recte ordinandi et concatenandi Corporis affectiones efficere possumus, ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur. Nam (*per Prop.* 7 *hujus*) major vis requiritur ad affectus, secundum ordinem ad intellectum ordinatos et concatenatos, coercendum, quam incertos et vagos. Optimum igitur, quod efficere possumus, quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est, rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vitæ dogmata concipere, eaque memoriæ mandare, et rebus particularibus, in vita frequenter obviis, continuo applicare, ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur, et nobis in promptu sint semper. Ex. gr. inter vitæ dogmata posuimus (*vide Prop.* 46 *p. IV, cum ejusdem Schol.*), Odium Amore seu Generositate vincendum, non autem reciproco Odio compensandum.	Scholium. By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the body we can bring it about that we are not easily affected by bad affects. For (by Proposition 7 of this part) a greater force is required to restrain affects ordered and connected according to the order of the intellect than to restrain those that are uncertain and random. The best thing we can do, then, so long as we lack perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of living, or fixed rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the particular situations we frequently meet in life, so that our imagination may be widely affected by them and they may always be ready to hand. For example, among the rules of life we have laid down (see Proposition 46 of Part 4, with its Scholium) that hatred is to be conquered by love, or nobility, and not repaid with hatred in return.
	Ut autem hoc Rationis præscriptum semper in promptu habeamus, ubi usus erit, cogitandæ et sæpe meditandæ sunt communes hominum injuriæ, et quomodo et qua via Generositate optime propulsentur; sic enim imaginem injuriæ imaginationi hujus dogmatis jungemus et nobis (*per Prop.* 18 *p. II*), in promptu semper erit, ubi nobis injuria afferetur. Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis, ac etiam boni, quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur, et præterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi acquiescentia oriatur (*per Prop.* 52 p.	But in order to have this precept of reason always ready to hand when it is needed, we should think about, and often meditate on, the common wrongs people do, and how and by what means they are best warded off by nobility. For in this way we shall join the image of a wrong to the imagining of this rule, and it will always be ready to hand (by Proposition 18 of Part 2) when a wrong is done to us. If we also keep ready to hand the principle of our true advantage, and also of the good that follows from mutual friendship and common society; and further, that the highest contentment of mind arises from the right way of living
	IV*), et quod homines, ut reliqua, ex naturæ necessitate agant: tum injuria, sive Odium, quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit, et facile superabitur; vel si Ira, quæ ex maximis injuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen, quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione, longe minore temporis spatio, quam si hæc non ita præmeditata habuissemus, ut patet ex Propositione 6, 7 et 8 hujus Partis. De Animositate ad Metum deponendum eodem modo cogitandum est; enumeranda scilicet sunt et sæpe imaginanda communia vitæ pericula, et quomodo animi præsentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt. Sed notandum, quod nobis in ordinandis nostris cogitationibus et imaginibus, semper attendendum est (*per Coroll. Prop. *63* p. IV et Prop. *59* p.	(by Proposition 52 of Part 4), and that people, like other things, act from the necessity of nature—then the wrong, or the hatred that usually arises from it, will occupy the smallest part of the imagination and will easily be overcome. Or if the anger that usually arises from the greatest wrongs is not so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without vacillation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than if we had not meditated on these things beforehand in this way, as is evident from Propositions 6, 7 and 8 of this part. We should think in the same way about tenacity, for setting fear aside: we should list and

LATIN

ENGLISH

often imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character. But it should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images we must always attend

III) ad illa, quæ in unaquaque re bona sunt, ut sic semper ex Lætitiæ affectu ad agendum determinemur. Ex. gr. si quis videt, se nimis Gloriam sectari, de ejus recto usu cogitet, et in quem finem sectanda sit, et quibus mediis acquiri possit; sed non de ipsius abusu, et vanitate, et hominum inconstantia, vel aliis hujusmodi, de quibus nemo, nisi ex animi ægritudine, cogitat; talibus enim cogitationibus maxime ambitiosi se maxime afflictant, quando de assequendo honore, quem ambiunt, desperant; et, dum Iram evomunt, sapientes videri volunt. Quare certum est, eos gloriæ maxime esse cupidos, qui de ipsius abusu et mundi vanitate maxime clamant. Nec hoc ambitiosis proprium, sed omnibus commune est, quibus fortuna est adversa, et qui animo impotentes sunt.

(by the Corollary to Proposition 63 of Part 4 and Proposition 59 of Part 3) to what is good in each thing, so that in this way we are always determined to act by an affect of joy. For example, if someone sees that he pursues glory too much, let him think about its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired—but not about its misuse and emptiness, the fickleness of people, and other such things, which no one thinks about except from sickness of mind. For it is with such thoughts that the most ambitious torment themselves most, when they despair of attaining the honor they are striving for; and while they spew out their anger, they want to seem wise. So it is certain that those who cry out most about the misuse of glory and the vanity of the world are the ones most greedy for glory. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious; it is common to all whose fortune is adverse and who lack strength of mind.

Nam pauper etiam, avarus de abusu pecuniæ et divitum vitiis non cessat loqui; quo nihil aliud efficit, quam se afflictare et aliis ostendere, se non tantum paupertatem suam, sed etiam aliorum divitias iniquo animo ferre. Sic etiam, qui male ab amasia excepti sunt, nihil aliud cogitant, quam de mulierum inconstantia et fallaci animo, et reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis; quæ omnia statim oblivioni tradunt, simulac ab amasia iterum recipiuntur. Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo Libertatis amore moderari studet, is quantum potest nitetur, virtutes earumque causas noscere, et animum gaudio, quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere: at minime hominum vitia contemplari, hominesque obtrectare, et falsa libertatis specie gaudere.

For a poor man who is also greedy never stops talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich—by which he achieves nothing except to torment himself and to show others that he resents not only his own poverty but also other people's wealth. So too, those who have been badly received by the woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy and deceitfulness of women, and their other much-sung faults—all of which they immediately consign to oblivion as soon as she receives them again. Whoever, therefore, is eager to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of freedom alone will strive, as far as he can, to come to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the gladness that arises from true knowledge of them—but by no means to dwell on people's vices, to disparage people, or to delight in a false appearance of freedom.

Atque hæc qui diligenter observabit (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, næ ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex Rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.

Whoever observes these things diligently (for they are not difficult) and practices them will surely, within a short space of time, be able to direct his actions for the most part by the command of reason.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P11	PROPOSITIO XI. *Quo imago aliqua ad plures res refertur, eo frequentior est seu sæpius viget, et Mentem magis occupat.*	Proposition 11. *The more things an image is related to, the more frequent it is, or the more often it is active, and the more it occupies the mind.*
5P11D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quo enim imago seu affectus ad plures res refertur, eo plures dantur causæ, a quibus excitari et foveri potest, quas omnes Mens (*per hypothesin*) ex ipso affectu simul contemplatur; atque adeo affectus eo frequentior est, seu sæpius viget, et (*per Prop.* 8 *hujus*) Mentem magis occupat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the more things an image, or affect, is related to, the more causes there are by which it can be aroused and nourished—all of which the mind (by hypothesis) regards together with the affect itself. And so the affect is the more frequent, or is the more often active, and (by Proposition 8 of this part) occupies the mind more. QED
5P12	PROPOSITIO XII. *Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus, quæ ad res referuntur, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, junguntur quam aliis.*	Proposition 12. *The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things we understand clearly and distinctly than to other images.*
5P12D	DEMONSTRATIO. Res, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, vel rerum communes proprietates sunt, vel quæ ex iis deducuntur (*vide Rationis defin. in* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 *p. II*), et consequenter sæpius (*per Prop. præced.*) in nobis excitantur; adeoque facilius fieri potest, ut res alias simul cum his, quam cum aliis contemplemur, et consequenter (*per Prop.* 18 *p. II*) ut facilius cum his quam cum aliis jungantur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The things we understand clearly and distinctly are either common properties of things or things deduced from them (see the definition of reason in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), and consequently (by the preceding Proposition) they are aroused in us more often. So it can more easily happen that we regard other things together with these than together with others, and consequently (by Proposition 18 of Part 2) that other things are more easily joined with these than with others. QED
5P13	PROPOSITIO XIII. *Quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis juncta est, eo sæpius viget.*	Proposition 13. *The more other images an image is joined to, the more often it is active.*
5P13D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nam, quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis juncta est, eo (*per Prop.* 18 *p. II*) plures causæ dantur, a quibus excitari potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the more other images an image is joined to, the more causes there are (by Proposition 18 of Part 2) by which it can be aroused. QED

THE LOVE OF GOD AND THE REMEDIES SUMMED UP

The mind can relate all bodily affections to God, producing a love of God; Spinoza lists the remedies.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P14	PROPOSITIO XIV. *Mens efficere potest, ut omnes Corporis affectiones, seu rerum imagines ad Dei ideam referantur.*	Proposition 14. *The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.*
5P14D	DEMONSTRATIO. Nulla est Corporis affectio, cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possit Mens formare conceptum (*per Prop.* 4 *hujus*); adeoque efficere potest (*per Prop.* 15 *p. I*), ut omnes ad Dei ideam referuntur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by Proposition 4 of this part). And so it can bring it about (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) that all of them are related to the idea of God. QED

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P15	PROPOSITIO XV. *Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amat, et eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit.*	Proposition 15. *Whoever understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God—and the more so, the more he understands himself and his affects.*
5P15D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, lætatur (*per Prop.* 53 *p. III*), idque concomitante idea Dei (*per Prop. præced.*); atque adeo (*per* 6 *Affect. Defin.*) Deum amat, et (*per eandem rationem*) eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whoever understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly feels joy (by Proposition 53 of Part 3), and this joy is accompanied by the idea of God (by the preceding Proposition). And so (by Definition 6 of the Affects) he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) the more so, the more he understands himself and his affects. QED
5P16	PROPOSITIO XVI. *Hic erga Deum Amor Mentem maxime occupare debet.*	Proposition 16. *This love toward God must occupy the mind most of all.*
5P16D	DEMONSTRATIO. Est enim hic Amor junctus omnibus Corporis affectionibus (*per Prop.* 14 *hujus*), quibus omnibus fovetur (*per Prop.* 15 *hujus*); atque adeo (*per Prop.* 11 *hujus*) Mentem maxime occupare debet. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For this love is joined to all the affections of the body (by Proposition 14 of this part) and is nourished by all of them (by Proposition 15 of this part). And so (by Proposition 11 of this part) it must occupy the mind most of all. QED
5P17	PROPOSITIO XVII. *Deus expers est passionum, nec ullo Lætitiæ aut Tristitiæ affectu afficitur.*	Proposition 17. *God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.*
5P17D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ideæ omnes, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt (*per Prop.* 32 *p. II*), hoc est (*per Defin.* 4 *p. II*) adæquatæ; atque adeo (*per Affect. gen. Defin.*) Deus expers est passionum. Deinde Deus neque ad majorem neque ad minorem perfectionem transire potest (*per 2 Coroll. Prop.* 20 *p. I*); adeoque (*per* 2 *et* 3 *Affect. Defin.*) nullo Lætitiæ neque Tristitiæ affectu afficitur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by Proposition 32 of Part 2), that is (by Definition 4 of Part 2), adequate; and so (by the General Definition of the Affects) God is without passions. Next, God can pass neither to a greater nor to a lesser perfection (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 20 of Part 1); and so (by Definitions 2 and 3 of the Affects) he is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness. QED
5P17C	COROLLARIUM. Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat neque odio habet. Nam Deus (*per Prop. præced.*) nullo Lætitiæ neque Tristitiæ affectu afficitur, et consequenter (*per* 6 *et* 7 *Affect. Defin.*) neminem etiam amat neque odio habet.	Corollary. Strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one. For God (by the preceding Proposition) is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness, and consequently (by Definitions 6 and 7 of the Affects) he also loves no one and hates no one.
5P18	PROPOSITIO XVIII. *Nemo potest Deum odio habere.*	Proposition 18. *No one can hate God.*
5P18D	DEMONSTRATIO. Idea Dei, quæ in nobis est, est adæquata et perfecta (*per Prop.* 46 *et* 47 *p. II*); adeoque quatenus Deum contemplamur eatenus agimus (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*); et consequenter (*per Prop.* 59 *p. III*) nulla potest dari Tristitia concomitante idea Dei, hoc est (*per* 7 *Affect. Defin.*), nemo Deum odio habere potest. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The idea of God that is in us is adequate and perfect (by Propositions 46 and 47 of Part 2). So insofar as we contemplate God, to that extent we act (by Proposition 3 of Part 3); and consequently (by Proposition 59 of Part 3) there can be no sadness accompanied by the idea of God—that is (by Definition 7 of the Affects), no one can hate God. QED

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P18C	COROLLARIUM. Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit.	Corollary. Love toward God cannot be turned into hatred.
5P18S	SCHOLIUM. At objici potest, quod, dum Deum omnium rerum causam intelligimus, eo ipso Deum Tristitiæ causam consideramus. Sed ad hoc respondeo, quod quatenus Tristitiæ causas intelligimus, eatenus (*per Prop.* 3 *hujus*) ipsa desinit esse passio, hoc est (*per Prop.* 59 *p. III*), eatenus desinit esse Tristitia; atque adeo, quatenus Deum Tristitiæ causam esse intelligimus, eatenus lætamur.	Scholium. But it may be objected that, in understanding God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of sadness. To this I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of sadness, to that extent (by Proposition 3 of this part) it ceases to be a passion, that is (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), to that extent it ceases to be sadness. And so, insofar as we understand God to be the cause of sadness, to that extent we feel joy.
5P19	PROPOSITIO XIX. *Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet.*	Proposition 19. *Whoever loves God cannot strive to have God love him in return.*
5P19D	DEMONSTRATIO. Si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo (*per Coroll. Prop.* 17 *hujus*), ut Deus, quem amat, non esset Deus, et consequenter (*per Prop.* 19 *p. III*) contristari cuperet, quod (*per Prop.* 28 *p. III*) est absurdum. Ergo, qui Deum amat etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. If a person strove for this, he would desire (by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of this part) that God, whom he loves, not be God; and consequently (by Proposition 19 of Part 3) he would desire to be saddened, which (by Proposition 28 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore whoever loves God, etc. QED
5P20	PROPOSITIO XX. *Hic erga Deum Amor, neque Invidiæ neque Zelotypiæ affectu inquinari potest; sed eo magis fovetur, quo plures homines eodem Amoris vinculo cum Deo junctos imaginamur.*	Proposition 20. *This love toward God cannot be tainted by an affect of envy or of jealousy; rather, it is the more nourished, the more people we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love.*
5P20D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hic erga Deum Amor summum bonum est, quod ex dictamine Rationis appetere possumus (*per Prop.* 28 *p. IV*), et omnibus hominibus commune est (*per Prop.* 36 *p. IV*), et omnes ut eodem gaudeant cupimus (*per Prop.* 37 *p. IV*); atque adeo (*per* 23 *Affect. Defin.*) Invidiæ affectu maculari nequit, neque etiam (*per Prop.* 18 *hujus, et defin. Zelotypiæ, quam vide in Schol. Prop.* 35 *p. III*) Zelotypiæ affectu; sed contra (*per Prop.* 31 *p. III*) eo magis foveri debet, quo plures homines eodem gaudere imaginamur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. This love toward God is the highest good that we can seek from the dictate of reason (by Proposition 28 of Part 4); it is common to all people (by Proposition 36 of Part 4); and we desire that all should enjoy it (by Proposition 37 of Part 4). And so (by Definition 23 of the Affects) it cannot be stained by an affect of envy, nor (by Proposition 18 of this part, and the definition of jealousy, for which see the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 3) by an affect of jealousy. On the contrary (by Proposition 31 of Part 3), it must be the more nourished, the more people we imagine to enjoy it. QED
5P20S	SCHOLIUM. Possumus hoc eodem modo ostendere, nullum dari affectum, qui huic Amori directe sit contrarius, a quo hic ipse Amor possit destrui, atque adeo concludere possumus hunc, erga Deum Amorem omnium affectuum est constantissimum, nec, quatenus ad Corpus refertur, posse destrui, nisi cum ipso Corpore. Cujus	Scholium. In the same way we can show that there is no affect directly contrary to this love by which this love itself could be destroyed; and so we can conclude that this love toward God is the most constant of all the affects, and that, insofar as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed except together with the body itself. What its nature is in-

LATIN

autem naturæ sit, quatenus ad solam Mentem refertur, postea videbimus.

Atque his omnia affectuum remedia, sive id omne, quod Mens, in se sola considerata, adversus affectus potest, comprehendi; ex quibus apparet, Mentis in affectus potentiam consistere, I° in ipsa affectuum cognitione (*vide Schol. Prop.* 4 *hujus*); II° in eo, quod affectus a cogitatione causæ externæ, quam confuse imaginamur, separat (*vide Prop.* 2 *cum eodem Schol. Prop.* 4 *hujus*); III° in tempore, quo affectiones, quæ ad res, quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant, quæ ad res referuntur, quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus (*vide Prop.* 7 *hujus*); IV° in multitudine causarum, a quibus affectiones, quæ ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur (*vide Prop.* 9 *et* 11 *hujus*); V° denique in ordine, quo Mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest (vide Schol.

Prop. *10* et insuper Prop. *12, 13 et 14* hujus*). Sed ut hæc Mentis in affectus potentia melius intelligatur, venit apprime notandum, quod affectus a nobis magni appellantur, quando unius hominis affectum cum affectu alterius comparamus, et unum magis quam alium eodem affectu conflictari videmus; vel quando unius ejusdemque hominis affectus ad invicem comparamus, eundemque uno affectu magis quam alio affici sive moveri comperimus. Nam (*per Prop. *5* p. IV) vis cujuscunque affectus definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata.

At Mentis potentia sola cognitione definitur, impotentia autem seu passio a sola cognitionis privatione, hoc est ab eo, per quod ideæ dicuntur inadæquatæ, æstimatur; ex quo sequitur, Mentem illam maxime pati, cujus maximam partem ideæ inadæquatæ constituunt ita ut, magis per id, quod patitur, quam per id, quod agit, dignoscatur; et illam contra maxime agere, cujus maximam partem ideæ adæquatæ constituunt, ita ut, quamvis huic tot inadæquatæ ideæ quam illi insint, magis tamen per illas, quæ humanæ virtuti tribuuntur, quam per has, quæ humanam impotentiam arguunt, dignoscatur. Deinde notandum, animi ægritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio Amore erga rem, quæ multis variationibus est obnoxia, et cujus nunquam compotes esse possumus.

ENGLISH

sofar as it is related to the mind alone, we shall see later.

With this I have covered all the remedies for the affects—that is, all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects. From this it is clear that the mind's power over the affects consists: first, in the very knowledge of the affects (see the Scholium to Proposition 4 of this part); second, in its separating the affects from the thought of an external cause that we imagine confusedly (see Proposition 2, with the same Scholium to Proposition 4 of this part); third, in time, by which the affections related to things we understand surpass those related to things we conceive confusedly, or in fragmentary fashion (see Proposition 7 of this part); fourth, in the multitude of causes by which the affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are nourished (see Propositions 9 and 11 of this part); fifth, and finally, in the order in which the mind can arrange its affects and connect them with one another (see the Scholium to Proposition 10, and also Propositions 12, 13 and 14 of this part). But for this power of the mind over the affects to be better understood, it must above all be noted that we call affects great when we compare one person's affect with another's and see that one is troubled more than the other by the same affect; or when we compare the affects of one and the same person with one another and find that he is affected, or moved, more by one affect than by another. For (by Proposition 5 of Part 4) the force of any affect is defined by the power of its external cause compared with our own.

But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone, while its lack of power, or passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge—that is, by what makes ideas be called inadequate. From this it follows that the mind most acted on is the one whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it is known more by what it undergoes than by what it does; and, conversely, that the mind that acts most is the one whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, even if it contains as many inadequate ideas as the other, it is nevertheless known more by the ideas ascribed to human virtue than by those that betray human lack of power. Next, it must be noted

LATIN

ENGLISH

that sicknesses of the mind and misfortunes have their origin chiefly in excessive love toward a thing that is subject to many changes and that we can never fully possess.

Nam nemo de re ulla, nisi quam amat, sollicitus anxiusve est; neque injuriæ, suspiciones, inimicitiæ, etc. oriuntur, nisi ex Amore erga res, quarum nemo potest revera esse compos. Ex his itaque facile concipimus, quid clara et distincta cognitio, et præcipue tertium illud cognitionis genus (*de quo vide Schol. Prop.* 47 *p. II*) cujus fundamentum est ipsa Dei cognitio, in affectus potest; quos nempe, quatenus passiones sunt, si non absolute tollit (*vide Prop.* 3 *cum Schol. Prop.* 4 *hujus*), saltem efficit, ut minimam Mentis partem constituant (*vide Prop.* 14 *hujus*). Deinde Amorem gignit erga rem immutabilem et æternam (*vide Prop.* 15 *hujus*), et cujus revera sumus compotes (*vide Prop.* 45 p.

For no one is troubled or anxious about anything except what he loves; and wrongs, suspicions, enmities, and so on arise only from love toward things that no one can truly possess. From this, then, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge can do against the affects—above all that third kind of knowledge (on which see the Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part 2) whose foundation is the very knowledge of God. Insofar as the affects are passions, if it does not remove them absolutely (see Proposition 3, with the Scholium to Proposition 4 of this part), it at least brings it about that they make up the smallest part of the mind (see Proposition 14 of this part). Next, it begets love toward a thing immutable and eternal (see Proposition 15 of this part), a thing we truly possess

II*); qui propterea nullis vitiis, quæ in communi Amore insunt, inquinari, sed semper major ac major esse potest (*per Prop. *15* hujus*), et Mentis maximam partem occupare (*per Prop. *16* hujus), lateque afficere. Atque his omnia, quæ præsentem hanc vitam spectant, absolvi. Nam quod in hujus Scholii principio dixi, me his paucis omnia affectuum remedia amplexum esse, facile poterit unusquisque videre, qui ad hæc, quæ in hoc Scholio diximus, et simul ad Mentis ejusque affectuum definitiones, et denique ad Propositiones 1 et 3 Partis III attenderit. Tempus igitur jam est, ut ad illa transeam, quæ ad Mentis durationem sine relatione ad Corpus pertinent.

(see Proposition 45 of Part 2). This love therefore cannot be tainted by any of the faults inherent in ordinary love, but can always grow greater and greater (by Proposition 15 of this part), occupy the greatest part of the mind (by Proposition 16 of this part), and affect it extensively. With this I have completed everything that concerns this present life. For anyone who attends to what we have said in this Scholium, together with the definitions of the mind and its affects, and finally Propositions 1 and 3 of Part 3, will easily be able to see what I said at the beginning of this Scholium: that in these few words I have embraced all the remedies for the affects. It is time now, then, to pass to what pertains to the mind's duration without relation to the body.

THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND

Something of the mind is eternal, and the third kind of knowledge depends on the mind insofar as it is eternal.

LATIN

ENGLISH

5P21 PROPOSITIO XXI. *Mens nihil imaginari potest, neque rerum præteritarum recordari, nisi durante Corpore.*

Proposition 21. *The mind can imagine nothing, nor recall past things, except while the body endures.*

5P21D DEMONSTRATIO. Mens actualem sui Corporis existentiam non exprimit, neque etiam Corporis affectiones ut actuales concipit, nisi durante Corpore (*per Coroll. Prop.* 8 *p. II*); et consequenter (*per Prop.* 26 *p. II*) nullum corpus ut

Demonstration. The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it conceive the body's affections as actual, except while the body endures (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	actu existens concipit, nisi durante suo Corpore; ac proinde nihil imaginari (*vide Imaginat. defin. in Schol. Prop.* 17 *p. II*) neque rerum præteritarum recordari potest, nisi durante Corpore (*vide defin. Memoriæ in Schol. Prop.* 18 *p. II*). *Q.E.D.*	2); and consequently (by Proposition 26 of Part 2) it conceives no body as actually existing except while its own body endures. Therefore it can imagine nothing (see the definition of imagination in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2), and recollect nothing past, except while the body endures (see the definition of memory in the Scholium to Proposition 18 of Part 2). QED
5P22	PROPOSITIO XXII. *In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quæ hujus et illius Corporis humani essentiam sub æternitatis specie exprimit.*	Proposition 22. *Nevertheless, in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body from the standpoint of eternity.*
5P22D	DEMONSTRATIO. Deus non tantum est causa hujus et illius Corporis humani existentiæ, sed etiam essentiæ (*per Prop.* 25 *p. I*); quæ propterea per ipsam Dei essentiam necessario debet concipi (*per Axiom.* 4 *p. I*), idque æterna quadam necessitate (*per Prop.* 16 *p. I*); qui quidem conceptus necessario in Deo dari debet (*per Prop.* 3 *p. II*). *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body but also of its essence (by Proposition 25 of Part 1). That essence must therefore necessarily be conceived through God's very essence (by Axiom 4 of Part 1), and this by a certain eternal necessity (by Proposition 16 of Part 1). And this concept must necessarily be in God (by Proposition 3 of Part 2). QED
5P23	PROPOSITIO XXIII. *Mens humana non potest cum Corpore absolute destrui, sed ejus aliquid remanet, quod æternum est.*	Proposition 23. *The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with the body; something of it remains, which is eternal.*
5P23D	DEMONSTRATIO. In Deo datur necessario conceptus seu idea, quæ Corporis humani essentiam exprimit (*per Prop. præced.*), quæ propterea aliquid necessario est, quod ad essentiam Mentis humanæ pertinet (*per Prop.* 13 *p. II*). Sed Menti humanæ nullam durationem, quæ tempore definiri potest, tribuimus, nisi quatenus Corporis actualem existentiam, quæ per durationem explicatur et tempore definiri potest, exprimit; hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 8 *p. II*), ipsi durationem non tribuimus, nisi durante Corpore. Cum tamen aliquid nihilominus sit id, quod æterna quadam necessitate per ipsam Dei essentiam concipitur (*per Prop. præced.*), erit necessario hoc aliquid, quod ad Mentis essentiam pertinet, æternum. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, that expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding Proposition); it is therefore necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind (by Proposition 13 of Part 2). But we ascribe to the human mind no duration that can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration and can be defined by time; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part 2), we ascribe duration to it only while the body endures. Since, however, that which is conceived with a certain eternal necessity through God's very essence is nonetheless something (by the preceding Proposition), this something that pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal. QED
5P23S	SCHOLIUM. Est, uti diximus, hæc idea quæ Corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus, qui ad Mentis essentiam pertinet, quique necessario æternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante Corpus exstitisse, quandoquidem nec in Corpore ulla ejus vestigia dari, nec æternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest. At nihilominus sentimus experimurque, nos	Scholium. This idea, which expresses the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity, is, as we have said, a definite mode of thinking that pertains to the essence of the mind and is necessarily eternal. Yet it cannot happen that we remember having existed before the body, since there can be no traces of this in the body, and eternity cannot

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	æternos esse. Nam Mens non minus res illas sentit, quas intelligendo concipit, quam quas in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi, quibus res videt observatque, sunt ipsæ demonstrationes. Quamvis itaque non recordemur, nos ante Corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen, Mentem nostram, quatenus Corporis essentiam sub æternitatis specie involvit, æternam esse, et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri, sive per durationem explicari, non posse.	be defined by time or have any relation to time. Nevertheless, we feel and know by experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding no less than those it has in memory. The eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves. So although we do not remember having existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of it cannot be defined by time, or explained through duration.
	Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare, ejusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest, quatenus actualem Corporis existentiam involvit; et eatenus tantum potentiam habet rerum existentiam tempore determinandi, easque sub duratione concipiendi.	Our mind, then, can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a definite time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body; and only to that extent does it have the power to determine the existence of things by time and to conceive them under duration.
5P24	PROPOSITIO XXIV. *Quo magis res singulares intelligimus, eo magis Deum intelligimus.*	Proposition 24. *The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.*
5P24D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet ex Coroll. Prop. 25 p. I.	Demonstration. This is evident from the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1.
5P25	PROPOSITIO XXV. *Summus Mentis conatus summaque virtus est, res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere.*	Proposition 25. *The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.*
5P25D	DEMONSTRATIO. Tertium cognitionis genus procedit ab adæquata idea quorundam Dei attributorum ad adæquatam cognitionem essentiæ rerum (*vide hujus defin. in* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 *p. II*); et quo magis hoc modo res intelligimus, eo magis (*per Prop. præced.*) Deum intelligimus; ac proinde (*per Prop.* 28 *p. IV*) summa Mentis virtus, hoc est (*per Defin.* 8 *p. IV*) Mentis potentia seu natura, sive (*per Prop.* 7 *p. III*) summus conatus, est, res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2); and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore (by Proposition 28 of Part 4) the highest virtue of the mind—that is (by Definition 8 of Part 4), the mind's power or nature, or (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) its highest striving—is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. QED
5P26	PROPOSITIO XXVI. *Quo Mens aptior est ad res tertio cognitionis genere intelligendum, eo magis cupit, res eodem hoc cognitionis genere intelligere.*	Proposition 26. *The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.*
5P26D	DEMONSTRATIO. Patet. Nam quatenus concipimus, Mentem aptam esse ad res hoc cognitionis genere intelligendum, eatenus eandem determinatam concipimus ad res eodem cognitionis genere	Demonstration. This is evident. For insofar as we conceive the mind to be capable of understanding things by this kind of knowledge, to that extent we

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	intelligendum; et consequenter (*per* 1 *Affect. Defin.*), quo Mens ad hoc aptior est, eo magis hoc cupit. *Q.E.D.*	conceive it as determined to understand things by this same kind of knowledge; and consequently (by Definition 1 of the Affects), the more capable of this the mind is, the more it desires it. QED
5P27	PROPOSITIO XXVII. *Ex hoc tertio cognitionis genere summa, quæ dari potest, Mentis acquiescentia, oritur.*	Proposition 27. *From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest contentment of mind there can be.*
5P27D	DEMONSTRATIO. Summa Mentis virtus est Deum cognoscere (*per Prop.* 28 *p. IV*), sive res tertio cognitionis genere intelligere (*per Prop.* 25 *hujus*); quæ quidem virtus eo major est, quo Mens hoc cognitionis genere magis res cognoscit (*per Prop.* 24 *hujus*); adeoque qui res hoc cognitionis genere cognoscit, is ad summam humanam perfectionem transit, et consequenter (*per* 2 *Affect. Defin.) summa Lætitia afficitur, idque (*per Prop. *43* p. II*) concomitante idea sui suæque virtutis; ac proinde (*per *25* Affect. Defin.*) ex hoc cognitionis genere summa quæ dari potest, oritur acquiescentia.* Q.E.D.	Demonstration. The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (by Proposition 28 of Part 4), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (by Proposition 25 of this part); and this virtue is greater the more the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge (by Proposition 24 of this part). So whoever knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection, and consequently (by Definition 2 of the Affects) is affected with the highest joy, accompanied (by Proposition 43 of Part 2) by the idea of himself and of his own virtue. Therefore (by Definition 25 of the Affects) from this kind of knowledge arises the highest contentment there can be. QED
5P28	PROPOSITIO XXVIII. *Conatus seu Cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere oriri non potest ex primo, at quidem ex secundo cognitionis genere.*	Proposition 28. *The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second.*
5P28D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hæc propositio per se patet. Nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel per se vel per aliud, quod per se concipitur, intelligimus hoc est, ideæ, quæ in nobis claræ et distinctæ sunt, sive quæ ad tertium cognitionis genus referuntur (*vide* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 *p. II*), non possunt sequi ex ideis mutilatis et confusis, quæ (*per idem Schol.*) ad primum cognitionis genus referuntur, sed ex ideis adæquatis, sive (*per idem Schol.*) ex secundo et tertio cognitionis genere; ac proinde (*per* 1 *Affect. Defin.*) Cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere non potest oriri ex primo, at quidem ex secundo. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself or through something else that is conceived through itself. That is, the ideas that are clear and distinct in us, or that are referred to the third kind of knowledge (see Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), cannot follow from fragmentary and confused ideas, which (by the same Scholium) are referred to the first kind of knowledge, but only from adequate ideas, that is (by the same Scholium), from the second and third kinds of knowledge. Therefore (by Definition 1 of the Affects) the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind, but it can from the second. QED
5P29	PROPOSITIO XXIX. *Quicquid Mens sub specie æternitatis intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit, quod Corporis præsentem actualem existentiam concipit, sed ex eo, quod Corporis essentiam concipit sub specie æternitatis.*	Proposition 29. *Whatever the mind understands from the standpoint of eternity, it understands not because it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it conceives the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity.*
5P29D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quatenus Mens præsentem sui Corporis existentiam concipit, eatenus durationem concipit, quæ	Demonstration. Insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it conceives dura-

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	tempore determinari potest, et eatenus tantum potentiam habet concipiendi res cum relatione ad tempus (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus et Prop.* 26 *p. II*). At æternitas per durationem explicari nequit (*per Defin.* 8 *p. I et ipsius explicationem). Ergo Mens eatenus potestatem non habet concipiendi res sub specie æternitatis; sed quia de natura Rationis est, res sub specie æternitatis concipere* (per *2 Coroll. Prop.* 44 *p. II*), et ad Mentis naturam etiam pertinet, Corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis concipere (*per Prop.* 23 *hujus*), et præter hæc duo nihil aliud ad Mentis essentiam pertinet (*per Prop.* 13 p.	tion, which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by Proposition 21 of this part and Proposition 26 of Part 2). But eternity cannot be explained through duration (by Definition 8 of Part 1 and its explanation). Therefore to that extent the mind does not have the power of conceiving things from the standpoint of eternity. But it is of the nature of reason to conceive things from the standpoint of eternity (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 44 of Part 2), and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity (by Proposition 23 of this part), and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind
	II*); Ergo hæc potentia concipiendi res sub specie æternitatis ad Mentem non pertinet, nisi quatenus Corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis concipit.* Q.E.D.	(by Proposition 13 of Part 2). Therefore this power of conceiving things from the standpoint of eternity pertains to the mind only insofar as it conceives the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity. QED
5P29S	SCHOLIUM. Res duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur: vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere, vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri, et ex naturæ divinæ necessitate consequi concipimus. Quæ autem hoc secundo modo ut veræ seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub æternitatis specie concipimus, et earum ideæ æternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt, ut Propositione 45 Partis II ostendimus, cujus etiam Scholium vide.	Scholium. Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a definite time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. The things that are conceived in this second way as true, or real, we conceive from the standpoint of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Proposition 45 of Part 2 (see also its Scholium).
5P30	PROPOSITIO XXX. *Mens nostra, quatenus se et Corpus sub æternitatis specie cognoscit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque se in Deo esse et per Deum concipi.*	Proposition 30. *Insofar as our mind knows itself and the body from the standpoint of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.*
5P30D	DEMONSTRATIO. Æternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus hæc necessariam involvit existentiam (*per Defin.* 8 *p. I*). Res igitur sub specie æternitatis concipere est res concipere, quatenus per Dei essentiam ut entia realia concipiuntur, sive quatenus per Dei essentiam involvunt existentiam; adeoque Mens nostra, quatenus se et Corpus sub specie æternitatis concipit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Eternity is God's very essence insofar as this involves necessary existence (by Definition 8 of Part 1). To conceive things from the standpoint of eternity, therefore, is to conceive them insofar as they are conceived through God's essence as real beings, that is, insofar as through God's essence they involve existence. Hence, insofar as our mind conceives itself and the body from the standpoint of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc. QED
5P31	PROPOSITIO XXXI. *Tertium cognitionis genus pendet a Mente, tanquam a formali causa, quatenus Mens ipsa æterna est.*	Proposition 31. *The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P31D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mens nihil sub æternitatis specie concipit, nisi quatenus sui Corporis essentiam sub æternitatis specie concipit (*per Prop.* 29 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 21 et 23 *hujus*), nisi quatenus æterna est; adeoque (*per Prop. præced.*), quatenus æterna est, Dei habet cognitionem; quæ quidem cognitio est necessario adæquata (*per Prop.* 46 *p. II*); ac proinde Mens, quatenus æterna est, ad illa omnia cognoscendum est apta, quæ ex data hac Dei cognitione consequi possunt (*per Prop.* 40 *p. II*), hoc est ad res tertio cognitionis genere cognoscendum (*vide hujus defin. in* 2 *Schol. Prop.* 40 *p. II*), cujus propterea Mens (*per Defin.* 1 *p. III*), quatenus æterna est, causa est adæquata seu formalis. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The mind conceives nothing from the standpoint of eternity except insofar as it conceives the essence of its body from the standpoint of eternity (by Proposition 29 of this part), that is (by Propositions 21 and 23 of this part), except insofar as it is eternal. Hence (by the preceding Proposition), insofar as it is eternal, it has knowledge of God, and this knowledge is necessarily adequate (by Proposition 46 of Part 2). Therefore the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all the things that can follow from this given knowledge of God (by Proposition 40 of Part 2), that is, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see its definition in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Of this kind of knowledge, therefore, the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause (by Definition 1 of Part 3). QED
5P31S	SCHOLIUM. Quo igitur unusquisque hoc cognitionis genere plus pollet, eo melius sui et Dei conscius est, hoc est, eo est perfectior et beatior, quod adhuc clarius ex seqq. patebit. Sed hic notandum, quod, tametsi jam certi sumus, Mentem æternam esse, quatenus res sub æternitatis specie concipit, nos tamen, ut ea, quæ ostendere volumus, facilius explicentur et melius intelligantur, ipsam, tanquam jam inciperet esse, et res sub æternitatis specie intelligere jam inciperet, considerabimus, ut huc usque fecimus; quod nobis absque ullo erroris periculo facere licet, modo nobis cautio sit nihil concludere, nisi ex perspicuis præmissis.	Scholium. The more each of us is capable of this kind of knowledge, then, the more fully is he conscious of himself and of God—that is, the more perfect and the more blessed he is, as will be still more clearly evident from what follows. But it should be noted here that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things from the standpoint of eternity, we shall nevertheless, as we have done so far, consider it as though it were only now beginning to be, and only now beginning to understand things from the standpoint of eternity, so that what we wish to show may be more easily explained and better understood. We may do this without any danger of error, provided we take care to conclude nothing except from evident premises.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD

Intuitive knowledge gives rise to an eternal intellectual love of God, which is part of God's love for himself.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P32	PROPOSITIO XXXII. *Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur, et quidem concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa.*	Proposition 32. *Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause.*
5P32D	DEMONSTRATIO. Ex hoc cognitionis genere summa, quæ dari potest, Mentis acquiescentia, hoc est (*per* 25 *Affect. Defin.*) Lætitia, oritur, eaque concomitante idea sui (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*), et consequenter (*per Prop.* 30 *hujus*) concomitante etiam idea Dei tanquam causa. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. From this kind of knowledge arises the highest contentment of mind there can be, that is (by Definition 25 of the Affects), joy; and this joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself (by Proposition 27 of this part), and consequently (by

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		Proposition 30 of this part) also by the idea of God, as its cause. QED
5P32C	COROLLARIUM. Ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur necessario Amor Dei intellectualis. Nam ex hoc cognitionis genere oritur (*per Prop. præced.*) Lætitia concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa, hoc est (*per* 6 *Affect. Defin.*) Amor Dei, non quatenus ipsum ut præsentem imaginamur (*per Prop.* 29 *hujus*), sed quatenus Deum æternum esse intelligimus; et hoc est, quod Amorem Dei intellectualem voco.	Corollary. From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises (by the preceding Proposition) joy accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is (by Definition 6 of the Affects), love of God—not insofar as we imagine him as present (by Proposition 29 of this part), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call the intellectual love of God.
5P33	PROPOSITIO XXXIII. *Amor Dei intellectualis, qui ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur, est æternus.*	Proposition 33. *The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.*
5P33D	DEMONSTRATIO. Tertium enim cognitionis genus (*per Prop.* 31 *hujus, et Axiom.* 3 *p. I*) est æternum; adeoque (*per idem Axiom. p. I*) Amor, qui ex eodem oritur, est etiam necessario æternus. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. For the third kind of knowledge is eternal (by Proposition 31 of this part and Axiom 3 of Part 1); and therefore (by the same Axiom of Part 1) the love that arises from it is also necessarily eternal. QED
5P33S	SCHOLIUM. Quamvis hic erga Deum Amor principium non habuerit (*per Prop. præced.*), habet tamen omnes Amoris perfectiones, perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in Coroll. Prop. præc. finximus. Nec ulla hic est differentia, nisi quod Mens easdem has perfectiones, quas eidem jam accedere finximus, æternas habuerit, idque concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa æterna. Quod si Lætitia in transitione ad majorem perfectionem consistit, Beatitudo sane in eo consistere debet, quod Mens ipsa perfectione sit prædita.	Scholium. Although this love toward God has had no beginning (by the preceding Proposition), it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come into being, as we pretended in the Corollary to the preceding Proposition. Nor is there any difference here, except that the mind has possessed eternally these same perfections that we pretended were now accruing to it, and has possessed them accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this: that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.
5P34	PROPOSITIO XXXIV. *Mens non nisi durante Corpore obnoxia est affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur.*	Proposition 34. *Only while the body endures is the mind subject to the affects that are related to passions.*
5P34D	DEMONSTRATIO. Imaginatio est idea, qua Mens rem aliquam ut præsentem contemplatur (*vide ejus defin. in Schol. Prop.* 17 *p. II*); quæ tamen magis Corporis humani præsentem constitutionem, quam rei externæ naturam indicat (*per* 2 *Coroll. Prop.* 16 *p. II*). Est igitur affectus (*per gen. Affect. Defin.*) imaginatio, quatenus Corporis præsentem constitutionem indicat; atque adeo (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*) Mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind regards some thing as present (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2); yet it indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2). An affect, then (by the General Definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body. And so (by Proposition 21 of this part) only while the body endures is the mind subject to the affects that are related to passions. QED

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P34C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, nullum Amorem præter Amorem intellectualem esse æternum.	Corollary. From this it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal.
5P34S	SCHOLIUM. Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus, eos suæ Mentis æternitatis esse quidem conscios, sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere, eamque imaginationi seu memoriæ tribuere, quam post mortem remanere credunt.	Scholium. If we attend to the common opinion of people, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse it with duration and ascribe it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death.
5P35	PROPOSITIO XXXV. *Deus se ipsum Amore intellectuali infinito amat.*	Proposition 35. *God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.*
5P35D	DEMONSTRATIO. Deus est absolute infinitus (*per Defin.* 6 *p. I*), hoc est (*per Defin.* 6 *p. II*), Dei natura gaudet infinita perfectione, idque (*per Prop.* 3 *p. II*) concomitante idea sui, hoc est (*per Prop.* 11 *et Defin.* 1 *p. I*) idea suæ causæ; et hoc est, quod in Coroll. Prop. 32, hujus Amorem intellectualem esse diximus.	Demonstration. God is absolutely infinite (by Definition 6 of Part 1); that is (by Definition 6 of Part 2), God's nature enjoys infinite perfection, and this accompanied (by Proposition 3 of Part 2) by the idea of himself, that is (by Proposition 11 and Definition 1 of Part 1), by the idea of his own cause. And this is what, in the Corollary to Proposition 32 of this part, we said was intellectual love.
5P36	PROPOSITIO XXXVI. *Mentis Amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei Amor, quo Deus se ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per essentiam humanæ Mentis, sub specie æternitatis consideratam, explicari potest; hoc est, Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum amat.*	Proposition 36. *The mind's intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered from the standpoint of eternity. That is, the mind's intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.*
5P36D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hic Mentis Amor ad Mentis actiones referri debet (*per Coroll. Prop.* 32 *hujus, et per Prop.* 3 *p. III*); qui proinde actio est, qua Mens se ipsam contemplatur, concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa (*per Prop.* 32 *hujus et ejus Coroll.*), hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 25 *p. I et Coroll. Prop.* 11 *p. II*) actio, qua Deus, quatenus per Mentem humanam explicari potest, seipsum contemplatur, concomitante idea sui; atque adeo (*per Prop. præced.*) hic Mentis Amor pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus seipsum amat. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. This love of the mind must be related to the actions of the mind (by the Corollary to Proposition 32 of this part, and by Proposition 3 of Part 3). It is, therefore, an action by which the mind contemplates itself, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (by Proposition 32 of this part and its Corollary); that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1 and the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2), an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself. And so (by the preceding Proposition) this love of the mind is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself. QED
5P36C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, quod Deus, quatenus seipsum amat, homines amat, et consequenter, quod Amor Dei erga homines, et Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis, unum et idem sit.	Corollary. From this it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves human beings, and consequently that the love of God toward human beings and the mind's intellectual love of God are one and the same.
5P36S		

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	SCHOLIUM. Ex his clare intelligimus, qua in re nostra salus, seu Beatitudo, seu Libertas consistit; nempe in constanti et æterno erga Deum Amore, sive in Amore Dei erga homines. Atque hic Amor seu Beatitudo in Sacris codicibus Gloria appellatur, nec immerito. Nam sive hic Amor ad Deum referatur, sive ad Mentem, recte animi Acquiescentia quæ revera a Gloria (*per* 25 *et* 30 *Affect. Defin.*) non distinguitur, appellari potest. Nam quatenus ad Deum refertur, est (*per Prop.* 35 *hujus*) Lætitia, liceat hoc adhuc vocabulo uti, concomitante idea sui, ut et quatenus ad Mentem refertur (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*). Deinde quia Nostræ Mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit, cujus principium et fundamentum Deus est (*per Prop.* 15 *p. I et Schol. Prop.* 47 p.	Scholium. From this we clearly understand in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists: namely, in a constant and eternal love of God, or in God's love toward human beings. And this love, or blessedness, is called glory in the Sacred Scriptures—and not without reason. For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called contentment of mind, which is in truth not distinguished from glory (by Definitions 25 and 30 of the Affects). For insofar as it is related to God, it is (by Proposition 35 of this part) joy—if we may still use this word—accompanied by the idea of himself; and so it is, too, insofar as it is related to the mind (by Proposition 27 of this part). Again, since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, of which God is the beginning and foundation (by Proposition 15 of Part 1 and the Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part 2),[3]
	II*), hinc perspicuum nobis fit, quomodo et qua ratione Mens nostra secundum essentiam et existentiam ex natura divina sequatur, et continuo a Deo pendeat; quod hic notare operæ pretium duxi, ut hoc exemplo ostenderem, quantum rerum singularium cognitio, quam intuitivam sive tertii generis appellavi* (vide *2* Schol. Prop. *40* p. II), polleat, potiorque sit cognitione universali, quam secundi generis esse dixi. Nam quamvis in Prima Parte generaliter ostenderim, omnia (et consequenter Mentem etiam humanam) a Deo secundum essentiam, et existentiam pendere; illa tamen demonstratio, tametsi legitima sit et extra dubitationis aleam posita, non ita tamen Mentem nostram afficit, quam quando id ipsum ex ipsa essentia rei cujuscunque singularis quam a Deo pendere dicimus, concluditur.	it becomes clear to us how, and in what manner, our mind follows from the divine nature with respect both to essence and to existence, and continually depends on God. I thought it worthwhile to note this here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things that I have called intuitive, or of the third kind (see Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge that I have said is of the second kind. For although I showed in general terms in Part 1 that all things (and consequently the human mind as well) depend on God with respect both to essence and to existence, that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond the hazard of doubt, still does not affect our mind in the same way as when this same conclusion is drawn from the very essence of some singular thing that we say depends on God.
5P37	PROPOSITIO XXXVII. *Nihil in Natura datur, quod huic Amori intellectuali sit contrarium, sive quod ipsum possit tollere.*	Proposition 37. *There is nothing in Nature that is contrary to this intellectual love, or that can take it away.*
5P37D	DEMONSTRATIO. Hic intellectualis Amor ex Mentis natura necessario sequitur, quatenus ipsa, ut æterna veritas, per Dei naturam consideratur (*per Prop.* 33 *et* 29 *hujus*). Si quid ergo daretur, quod huic Amori esset contrarium, id contrarium esset vero; et consequenter id, quod hunc Amorem posset tollere, efficeret, ut id, quod	Demonstration. This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, insofar as the mind is considered, as an eternal truth, through God's nature (by Propositions 33 and 29 of this part). If, then, there were anything contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the true; and con-

3 Glory: Spinoza likely has in mind biblical passages that speak of the "glory" of God and of the righteous.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	verum est, falsum esset; quod (*ut per se notum*) est absurdum. Ergo nihil in natura datur, etc. *Q.E.D.*	sequently whatever could take this love away would bring it about that what is true should be false—which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in Nature, etc. QED
5P37S	SCHOLIUM. Partis Quartæ Axioma res singulares respicit, quatenus cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum considerantur; de quo neminem dubitare credo.	Scholium. The Axiom of Part 4 concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a definite time and place. I believe no one doubts this.

DEATH, VIRTUE AND BLESSEDNESS

The more the mind understands, the less it fears death; blessedness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself.

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P38	PROPOSITIO XXXVIII. *Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere Mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur, et mortem minus timet.*	Proposition 38. *The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects that are evil, and the less it fears death.*
5P38D	DEMONSTRATIO. Mentis essentia in cognitione consistit (*per Prop.* 11 *p. II*); quo igitur Mens plures res cognoscit secundo et tertio cognitionis genere, eo major ejus pars remanet (*per Prop.* 29 *et* 23 *hujus*), et consequenter (*per Prop. præced.*) eo major ejus pars non tangitur ab affectibus, qui nostræ naturæ sunt contrarii, hoc est (*per Prop.* 30 *p. IV*) qui mali sunt. Quo itaque Mens plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere intelligit, eo major ejus pars illæsa manet, et consequenter minus ab affectibus patitur, etc. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Proposition 11 of Part 2). The more things the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, then, the greater the part of it that remains (by Propositions 29 and 23 of this part), and consequently (by the preceding Proposition) the greater the part of it that is untouched by affects contrary to our nature, that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4), by affects that are evil. So the more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains unharmed, and consequently the less it is acted on by affects, etc. QED
5P38S	SCHOLIUM. Hinc intelligimus id, quod in Schol. Prop. 39 p. IV attigi, et quod in hac Parte explicare promisi; nempe quod mors eo minus est noxia, quo Mentis clara et distincta cognitio major est, et consequenter, quo Mens magis Deum amat. Deinde quia (*per Prop.* 27 *hujus*) ex tertio cognitionis genere summa, quæ dari potest, oritur acquiescentia, hinc sequitur, Mentem humanam posse ejus naturæ esse, ut id, quod ejus cum Corpore perire ostendimus (*vide Prop.* 21 *hujus*), in respectu ad id, quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti. Sed de his mox prolixius.	Scholium. From this we understand what I touched on in the Scholium to Proposition 39 of Part 4, and what I promised to explain in this part: namely, that death is less harmful the greater the mind's clear and distinct knowledge, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Again, since (by Proposition 27 of this part) the highest contentment there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows that the human mind can be of such a nature that the part of it that we have shown perishes with the body (see Proposition 21 of this part) is of no importance in comparison with what remains of it. But of this more fully shortly.
5P39	PROPOSITIO XXXIX. *Qui Corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is Mentem habet, cujus maxima pars est æterna.*	Proposition 39. *Whoever has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.*

	LATIN	ENGLISH
5P39D	DEMONSTRATIO. Qui Corpus ad plurima agendum aptum habet, is minime affectibus, qui mali sunt, conflictatur (*per Prop.* 38 *p. IV*), hoc est (*per Prop.* 30 *p. IV*) affectibus, qui naturæ nostræ sunt contrarii; atque adeo (*per Prop.* 10 *hujus*) potestatem habet ordinandi et concatenandi Corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum, et consequenter efficiendi (*per Prop.* 14 *hujus*), ut omnes Corporis affectiones ad Dei ideam referantur; ex quo fiet (*per Prop.* 15 *hujus*), ut erga Deum afficiatur Amore, qui (*per Prop.* 16 *hujus*) Mentis maximam partem occupare sive constituere debet, ac proinde (*per Prop.* 33 *hujus*) Mentem habet cujus maxima pars est æterna. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. Whoever has a body capable of doing a great many things is least troubled by affects that are evil (by Proposition 38 of Part 4), that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4), by affects contrary to our nature. And so (by Proposition 10 of this part) he has the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and consequently of bringing it about (by Proposition 14 of this part) that all the affections of the body are related to the idea of God. From this it will come about (by Proposition 15 of this part) that he is affected with a love toward God that (by Proposition 16 of this part) must occupy, or constitute, the greatest part of the mind. Therefore (by Proposition 33 of this part) he has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. QED
5P39S	SCHOLIUM. Quia corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est, quin ejus naturæ possint esse, ut ad Mentes referantur, quæ magnam sui et Dei habeant cognitionem, et quarum maxima seu præcipua pars est æterna, atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant. Sed ut hæc clarius intelligantur, animadvertendum hic est, quod nos in continua vivimus variatione, et prout in melius sive in pejus mutamur, eo felices aut infelices dicimur. Qui enim ex infante vel puero in cadaver transiit, infelix dicitur, et contra id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vitæ spatium Mente sana in Corpore sano percurrere potuerimus.	Scholium. Because human bodies are capable of a great many things, there is no doubt that they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds that have great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose greatest, or chief, part is eternal—so that they hardly fear death. But for this to be understood more clearly, it should be noted here that we live in continual change, and are called happy or unhappy according as we change for the better or the worse. For someone who has passed from infancy or childhood to being a corpse is called unhappy; and, on the other hand, it is counted as happiness if we have been able to run through the whole span of life with a sound mind in a sound body.[4]
	Et revera qui Corpus habet, ut infans vel puer, ad paucissima aptum, et maxime pendens a causis externis, Mentem habet, quæ in se sola considerata nihil fere sui nec Dei nec rerum sit conscia; et contra, qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, Mentem habet, quæ in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia; In hac vita igitur apprime conamur, ut Corpus infantiæ in aliud, quantum ejus natura patitur, eique conducit, mutetur quod ad plurima aptum sit, quodque ad Mentem referatur, quæ sui et Dei et rerum plurimum sit conscia; atque ita ut id omne, quod ad ipsius memoriam vel imaginationem refertur, in respectu ad intellectum vix alicujus sit momenti, ut in Schol. Prop. præced. jam dixi.	And in fact, whoever has a body capable of very few things, like an infant's or a child's, and very greatly dependent on external causes, has a mind that, considered in itself alone, is conscious of almost nothing of itself, of God, or of things. On the other hand, whoever has a body capable of a great many things has a mind that, considered in itself alone, is very conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, then, we strive above all that the body of infancy may change, as far as its nature allows and it is conducive to it, into another body that is capable of a great many things and is related to a mind very highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things—and conscious in such a way that everything related to its memory or imagina-

4 "A sound mind in a sound body" echoes the Roman poet Juvenal's *mens sana in corpore sano* (Satires 10.356).

	LATIN	ENGLISH
		tion is of hardly any importance in comparison with the intellect, as I have already said in the Scholium to the preceding Proposition.
5P40	PROPOSITIO XL. *Quo unaquæque res plus perfectionis habet, eo magis agit et minus patitur et contra, quo magis agit, eo perfectior est.*	Proposition 40. *The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.*
5P40D	DEMONSTRATIO. Quo unaquæque res perfectior est, eo plus habet realitatis (*per Defin.* 6 *p. II*), et consequenter (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III cum ejus Schol.*) eo magis agit et minus patitur; quæ quidem demonstratio inverso ordine eodem modo procedit, ex quo sequitur, ut res contra eo sit perfectior, quo magis agit. *Q.E.D.*	Demonstration. The more perfect each thing is, the more reality it has (by Definition 6 of Part 2), and consequently (by Proposition 3 of Part 3 with its Scholium) the more it acts and the less it is acted on. This demonstration proceeds in the same way in reverse order, from which it follows that, conversely, a thing is more perfect the more it acts. QED
5P40C	COROLLARIUM. Hinc sequitur, partem Mentis, quæ remanet, quantacunque ea sit, perfectiorem esse reliqua. Nam pars Mentis æterna (*per Prop.* 23 *et* 29 *hujus*) est intellectus, per quem solum nos agere dicimur (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III*); illa autem, quam perire ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio (*per Prop.* 21 *hujus*), per quam solam dicimur pati (*per Prop.* 3 *p. III et gen. Affect. Defin.*); atque adeo (*per Prop. præced.*) illa, quantacunque ea sit, hac est perfectior. *Q.E.D.*	Corollary. From this it follows that the part of the mind that remains, however great or small it may be, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (by Propositions 23 and 29 of this part) is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act (by Proposition 3 of Part 3); but the part that we have shown perishes is the imagination itself (by Proposition 21 of this part), through which alone we are said to be acted on (by Proposition 3 of Part 3 and the General Definition of the Affects). And so (by the preceding Proposition) the former, however great or small it may be, is more perfect than the latter. QED
5P40S	SCHOLIUM. Hæc sunt, quæ de Mente, quatenus sine relatione ad Corporis existentiam consideratur, ostendere constitueram: ex quibus, et simul ex Prop. 21 p. I et aliis, apparet, quod Mens nostra, quatenus intelligit æternus cogitandi modus sit, qui alio æterno cogitandi modo determinatur, et hic iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum; ita ut omnes simul Dei æternum et infinitum intellectum constituant.	Scholium. These are the things I had resolved to show concerning the mind insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body. From them, together with Proposition 21 of Part 1 and other passages, it is evident that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this in turn by another, and so on to infinity; so that all of them together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.
5P41	PROPOSITIO XLI. *Quamvis nesciremus, Mentem nostram æternam esse, Pietatem tamen, et Religionem, et absolute omnia, quæ ad Animositatem et Generositatem referri ostendimus in quarta Parte, prima haberemus.*	Proposition 41. *Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely everything that we showed in Part 4 to be related to tenacity and nobility.*
5P41D	DEMONSTRATIO. Primum et unicum virtutis seu recte vivendi Rationis fundamentum (*per Coroll. Prop.* 22 *et per Prop.* 24 *p. IV*) est suum utile quærere. Ad illa autem	Demonstration. The first and only foundation of virtue, or of the right way of living (by the Corollary to Proposition 22 and by Proposition 24 of

	LATIN	ENGLISH
	determinandum, quæ Ratio utilia esse dictat, nullam rationem habuimus Mentis æternitatis, quam demum in hac quinta Parte novimus. Quamvis igitur tum temporis ignoraverimus, Mentem esse æternam, illa tamen, quæ ad Animositatem et Generositatem referri ostendimus, prima habuimus; atque adeo, quamvis etiam nunc hoc ipsum ignoraremus, eadem tamen Rationis præscripta prima haberemus. *Q.E.D.*	Part 4), is to seek one's own advantage. But in determining what reason dictates to be useful, we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to know only in this fifth part. So although at that time we were ignorant that the mind is eternal, we still regarded as of first importance the things we showed to be related to tenacity and nobility. Therefore, even if we were ignorant of this very thing now as well, we would still regard these same precepts of reason as of first importance. QED
5P41S	SCHOLIUM. Communis vulgi persuasio alia videtur esse. Nam plerique videntur credere, se eatenus liberos esse, quatenus libidini parere licet, et eatenus de suo jure cedere, quatenus ex legis divinæ præscripto vivere tenentur. Pietatem igitur et Religionem, et absolute omnia, quæ ad animi Fortitudinem referuntur, onera esse credunt, quæ post mortem deponere, et pretium servitutis, nempe Pietatis et Religionis, accipere sperant; nec hac Spe sola, sed etiam et præcipue Metu ne diris scilicet suppliciis post mortem puniantur, inducuntur, ut ex legis divinæ præscripto, quantum eorum fert tenuitas et impotens animus, vivant.	Scholium. The common conviction of the multitude seems to be different. For most people seem to believe that they are free insofar as they are permitted to obey their lust, and that they give up part of their rights insofar as they are bound to live according to the precepts of the divine law. Piety and religion, then, and absolutely everything related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to lay down after death, receiving the reward of their bondage—that is, of their piety and religion. Nor is it by this hope alone, but also, and chiefly, by fear —fear, that is, of being punished with dreadful torments after death—that they are induced to live according to the precepts of the divine law, as far as their feebleness and weak mind allow.
	Et nisi hæc Spes et Metus hominibus inessent, at contra si crederent, Mentes cum Corpore interire, nec restare miseris, Pietatis onere confectis, vivere longius; ad ingenium redirent, et ex libidine omnia moderari, et fortunæ potius quam sibi parere vellent. Quæ mihi non minus absurda videntur, quam si quis, propterea quod non credit, se posse bonis alimentis Corpus in æternum nutrire, venenis potius et lethiferis se exsaturare vellet; vel, quia videt Mentem non esse æternam seu immortalem, ideo amens mavult esse et sine Ratione vivere: quæ adeo absurda sunt, ut vix recenseri mereantur.	And if people did not have this hope and fear in them, but believed instead that minds perish with the body, and that no longer life remains for the wretched, worn out by the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations. They would want to govern everything by lust, and to obey fortune rather than themselves. This seems to me no less absurd than if someone, because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food for all eternity, should prefer to stuff himself with poisons and deadly things; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind and to live without reason. These things are so absurd that they hardly deserve to be mentioned.
5P42	PROPOSITIO XLII. *Beatitudo non est virtutis præmium, sed ipsa virtus; nec eadem gaudemus, quia libidines coercemus, sed contra, quia eadem gaudemus, ideo libidines coercere possumus.*	Proposition 42. *Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, it is because we enjoy it that we are able to restrain our lusts.*
5P42D		

LATIN	ENGLISH
DEMONSTRATIO. Beatitudo in Amore erga Deum consistit (*per Prop.* 36 *hujus, et ejus Schol.*), qui quidem Amor ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur (*per Coroll. Prop.* 32 *hujus*); atque adeo hic Amor (*per Prop.* 59 *et* 3 *p. III*) ad Mentem, quatenus agit, referri debet; ac proinde (*per Defin.* 8 *p. IV*) ipsa virtus est; Quod erat primum. Deinde quo Mens hoc Amore divino seu beatitudine magis gaudet, eo plus intelligit (*per Prop.* 32 *hujus*), hoc est (*per Coroll. Prop.* 3 *hujus*), eo majorem in affectus habet potentiam, et (*per Prop.* 38 *hujus*) eo minus ab affectibus qui mali sunt, patitur; atque adeo ex eo, quod Mens hoc Amore divino seu Beatitudine gaudet, potestatem habet libidines coercendi.	Demonstration. Blessedness consists in love toward God (by Proposition 36 of this part and its Scholium), and this love arises from the third kind of knowledge (by the Corollary to Proposition 32 of this part). And so this love (by Propositions 59 and 3 of Part 3) must be related to the mind insofar as it acts; therefore (by Definition 8 of Part 4) it is virtue itself. That was the first point. Next, the more the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, the more it understands (by Proposition 32 of this part), that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 3 of this part), the greater the power it has over the affects, and (by Proposition 38 of this part) the less it is acted on by affects that are evil. So, because the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts.
Et quia humana potentia ad coercendos affectus in solo intellectu consistit, ergo nemo beatitudine gaudet, quia affectus coercuit, sed contra potestas libidines coercendi ex ipsa beatitudine oritur. *Q.E.D.*	And since human power to restrain the affects consists in the intellect alone, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained the affects; on the contrary, the power to restrain lusts arises from blessedness itself. QED
5P42S SCHOLIUM. His omnia, quæ de Mentis in affectus potentia, quæque de Mentis Libertate ostendere volueram, absolvi. Ex quibus apparet, quantum Sapiens polleat, potiorque sit ignaro, qui sola libidine agitur. Ignarus enim, præterquam quod a causis externis multis modis agitatur, nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit præterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur, sed sui et Dei et rerum æterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit, sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur. Si jam via, quam ad hæc ducere ostendi, perardua videatur, inveniri tamen potest. Et sane arduum debet esse, quod adeo raro reperitur.	Scholium. With this I have completed everything I wished to show concerning the mind's power over the affects and the mind's freedom. From it, it is evident how much the wise person can do, and how much more powerful he is than the ignorant one, who is driven by lust alone. For the ignorant person, besides being troubled in many ways by external causes and never possessing true contentment of mind, also lives as if unconscious of himself, of God, and of things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases also to be. The wise person, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely disturbed in spirit; conscious, by a certain eternal necessity, of himself, of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true contentment of mind. If the way I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, it can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is found so rarely must be hard.
Qui enim posset fieri, si salus in promptu esset, et sine magno labore reperiri posset, ut ab omnibus fere negligeretur? Sed omnia præclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt.	For how could it happen, if salvation were ready to hand and could be found without great labor, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.