Ethics

BARUCH SPINOZA
1632–1677

Ethics

Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata

Translated from the Latin with AI (Claude) and edited



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Ethics · Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677)

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INTRODUCTION

Baruch Spinoza's *Ethics*, published just after his death in 1677, is laid out like Euclid's geometry: definitions, axioms, propositions and proofs. Its conclusions are among the boldest in philosophy.

There is only one substance, which Spinoza calls "God or Nature"; mind and body are the same thing seen two ways; everything happens by necessity; and freedom is not free will but understanding. From this he builds an account of the emotions and of how a person can move from bondage to them toward a calm, lasting joy: the "intellectual love of God."

The book has five parts. Readers new to it often start with the prefaces, the appendix to Part I, and the scholia, where Spinoza steps out of the geometry and speaks plainly.

Part I: Of God

Spinoza argues that there is only one substance, God or Nature, and that everything follows from it by necessity.

1D1 Definition 1. By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.

1D2 Definition 2. A thing is said to be finite in its own kind when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. In the same way, a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.

1D3 Definition 3. By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing from which it must be formed.

1D4 Definition 4. By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence.

1D5 Definition 5. By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another, through which it is also conceived.[1]

1D6 Definition 6. By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

1D6Ex Explanation. I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind. For of whatever is infinite only in its own kind, we

1 "Affections" (affectiones): states or modifications of a thing—not to be confused with affectus, "affects," the emotions treated in Part 3.

can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite belongs whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.

1D7 Definition 7. That thing will be called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. That thing, on the other hand, will be called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce effects in a fixed and determinate way.

1D8 Definition 8. By eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of an eternal thing.

1D8Ex Explanation. For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of the thing, and therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, even if duration is conceived as lacking a beginning and an end.

1A1 Axiom 1. Everything that is, is either in itself or in another.

1A2 Axiom 2. What cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.

1A3 Axiom 3. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and conversely, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible for an effect to follow.

1A4 Axiom 4. Knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of its cause, and involves it.

1A5 Axiom 5. Things that have nothing in common with each other also cannot be understood through each other; that is, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

1A6 Axiom 6. A true idea must agree with its object.[2]

1A7 Axiom 7. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.

2 "Its object" renders ideatum, Spinoza's term for the thing of which an idea is the idea.

ONE SUBSTANCE FOR EACH ATTRIBUTE

Spinoza proves that a substance cannot be produced by another, that it exists, and that it is infinite.

1P1 Proposition 1. *Substance is by nature prior to its affections.*

1P1D Demonstration. This is evident from Definitions 3 and 5.

1P2 Proposition 2. *Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with each other.*

1P2D Demonstration. This too is evident from Definition 3. For each must be in itself and must be conceived through itself; that is, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

1P3 Proposition 3. *When things have nothing in common with each other, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.*

1P3D Demonstration. If they have nothing in common with each other, then (by Axiom 5) they cannot be understood through each other either; and so (by Axiom 4) one cannot be the cause of the other. QED

1P4 Proposition 4. *Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.*

1P4D Demonstration. Everything that is, is either in itself or in another (by Axiom 1); that is (by Definitions 3 and 5), outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections. There is nothing, then, outside the intellect through which several things can be distinguished from one another except substances—or, what is the same thing (by Definition 4), their attributes—and their affections. QED

1P5 Proposition 5. *In the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.*

1P5D Demonstration. If there were several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference of attributes or by a difference of affections (by the preceding proposition). If only by a difference of attributes, then it will be granted that there is only one of the same attribute. But

if by a difference of affections, then, since a substance is by nature prior to its affections (by Proposition 1), let the affections be set aside and the substance be considered in itself—that is (by Definition 3 and Axiom 6), considered truly—and it cannot be conceived as distinguished from another. That is (by the preceding proposition), there cannot be several substances, but only one. QED

1P6 Proposition 6. *One substance cannot be produced by another substance.*

1P6D Demonstration. In the nature of things there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by the preceding proposition), that is (by Proposition 2), two substances that have something in common with each other. And so (by Proposition 3) one cannot be the cause of the other; that is, one cannot be produced by the other. QED

1P6C Corollary. From this it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in the nature of things there is nothing except substances and their affections, as is evident from Axiom 1 and Definitions 3 and 5. But it cannot be produced by a substance (by the preceding proposition). Therefore a substance cannot be produced by anything else at all. QED

1P6CD2 Alternatively. This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of the contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, knowledge of it would have to depend on knowledge of its cause (by Axiom 4); and so (by Definition 3) it would not be a substance.

1P7 Proposition 7. *It pertains to the nature of substance to exist.*

1P7D Demonstration. A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by the Corollary to the preceding proposition); it will therefore be the cause of itself; that is (by Definition 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist. QED

1P8 Proposition 8. *Every substance is necessarily infinite.*

1P8D Demonstration. A substance of one attribute exists only as a single, unique substance (by Proposition 5), and it pertains to its nature to exist (by Proposition 7). It will therefore be of its

nature to exist either as finite or as infinite. But not as finite. For then (by Definition 2) it would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature, which would also have to exist necessarily (by Proposition 7); and so there would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by Proposition 5). It exists, therefore, as infinite. QED

1P8S1 Scholium 1. Since being finite is in truth partly a negation, and being infinite is the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from Proposition 7 alone that every substance must be infinite.

1P8S2 Scholium 2. I do not doubt that all who judge things confusedly, and are not accustomed to know things through their first causes, find it difficult to grasp the demonstration of Proposition 7. This is, of course, because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced. So it happens that they ascribe to substances the beginning they see natural things have. For those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything. Without any resistance of mind they picture trees speaking just as readily as people, and imagine that people are formed from stones as readily as from seed, and that any forms whatever change into any others. So too those who confuse the divine nature with human nature easily attribute human affects to God, especially as long as they are also ignorant of how affects are produced in the mind. But if people paid attention to the nature of substance, they would not doubt the truth of Proposition 7 in the least. Indeed, this proposition[3] would be an axiom for everyone, and would be counted among the common notions. For by substance they would understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of any other thing; and by modifications, that which is in another, and whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which

3 Affect (affectus): an emotion together with its bodily counterpart; the subject of Part 3. People formed from stones: an allusion to the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha, who repopulated the earth by throwing stones.

they are. That is why we can have true ideas of modifications that do not exist: although they do not actually exist outside the intellect, their essence is nevertheless so contained in another that they can be conceived through it. But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect except in the substances themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.[4] So if someone said that he had a clear and distinct—that is, a true—idea of a substance, and yet doubted whether such a substance exists, that would, heaven knows, be the same as saying that he had a true idea and yet doubted whether it was false (as becomes plain to anyone who pays enough attention). Or if someone maintains that a substance is created, he maintains at the same time that a false idea has become true—and nothing more absurd than that can be conceived. So it must necessarily be admitted that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth. And from this we can conclude in another way that there is only one substance of the same nature, which I have thought it worthwhile to show here. To do this in order, the following must be noted. I. The true definition of each thing involves and expresses nothing except the nature of the thing defined. From this there follows II: namely, that no definition involves or expresses any fixed number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing other than the simple nature of a triangle, not any fixed number of triangles. III. It must be noted that for each existing thing there is necessarily some definite cause on account of which it exists. IV. Finally, it must be noted that this cause, on account of which a thing exists, must either be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (namely, because it pertains to its nature to exist) or lie outside it. With these points established, it follows that if some fixed number of individuals exists in nature, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals exist, and why neither more nor fewer. If, for example, twenty people

4 Common notions: truths evident to every mind and shared by all; Spinoza develops the idea in Part 2.

exist in the nature of things (for the sake of greater clarity, I suppose that they exist at the same time and that no others existed in Nature before them), it will not be enough (if, that is, we are to give the reason why twenty people exist) to show the cause of human nature in general. It will further be necessary to show the cause why neither more nor fewer than twenty exist, since (by Note III) there must necessarily be a cause why each one exists. But this cause (by Notes II and III) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of a human being does not involve the number twenty. And so (by Note IV) the cause why these twenty people exist, and consequently why each one of them exists, must necessarily lie outside each one. We must therefore conclude without qualification that everything whose nature allows several individuals of it to exist must necessarily have an external cause in order to exist. Now, since it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (by what has already been shown in this scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently its existence must be inferred from its definition alone. But from its definition (as we have already shown from Notes II and III) the existence of several substances cannot follow. It therefore follows necessarily from it that only one substance of the same nature exists, as was proposed.

1P9 Proposition 9. *The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.*

1P9D Demonstration. This is evident from Definition 4.

1P10 Proposition 10. *Each attribute of a single substance must be conceived through itself.*

1P10D Demonstration. For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (by Definition 4); and so (by Definition 3) it must be conceived through itself. QED

1P10S Scholium. From this it is clear that although two attributes may be conceived as really distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—we still cannot conclude from this that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of

the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another; rather, each expresses the reality or being of substance. So it is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance. On the contrary, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has that express necessity, or eternity, and infinity. Consequently, nothing is clearer either than that a being absolutely infinite must necessarily be defined (as we did in Definition 6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. But if someone now asks by what sign, then, we shall be able to recognize a difference between substances, let him read the following propositions. They show that in the nature of things only one substance exists, and that it is absolutely infinite; so that sign would be sought in vain.

GOD EXISTS NECESSARILY

Three proofs that God, a substance of infinite attributes, must exist, and why substance cannot be divided.

1P11 Proposition 11. *God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.*

1P11D Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that God does not exist. Then (by Axiom 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Proposition 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. QED

1P11D2 Alternatively. For each thing a cause or reason must be assigned, both for why it exists and for why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; and if it does not exist, there must also be a reason or cause that prevents it from existing, or that takes its existence away. This reason or cause must be contained either in the nature of the thing or outside it. For example, the very nature of

a square circle shows the reason why it does not exist: namely, that it involves a contradiction. Why a substance, by contrast, does exist likewise follows from its nature alone, since that nature involves existence (see Proposition 7). But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not, does not follow from their nature, but from the order of the whole of corporeal nature. For from that order it must follow either that the triangle necessarily exists now, or that it is impossible for it to exist now. These things are self-evident. From them it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause that prevents it from existing. So if there can be no reason or cause that prevents God from existing, or that takes his existence away, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily exists. But if there were such a reason or cause, it would have to be either in God's very nature or outside it, that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, that very fact would grant that God exists. But a substance of another nature would have nothing in common with God (by Proposition 2), and so could neither posit his existence nor take it away. Since, then, a reason or cause that took away the divine existence cannot lie outside the divine nature, it would necessarily have to lie —if indeed God does not exist—in his nature itself, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to affirm this of a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd. Therefore there is no cause or reason, either in God or outside God, that takes away his existence; and hence God necessarily exists. QED

1P11D3 Alternatively. To be able not to exist is lack of power; and conversely, to be able to exist is power (as is self-evident). So if what now necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite; and this (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore either nothing exists, or a being absolutely infinite also necessarily exists. But we exist, either in ourselves or in something else that necessarily exists (see Axiom 1 and Proposition 7). Therefore a being absolutely infinite—that is (by Definition 6), God—necessarily exists. QED

1P11S Scholium. In this last demonstration I chose to show God's existence a posteriori, so that the demonstration would be grasped more easily—not because God's existence does not follow a priori from this same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more strength it has of itself to exist; and so a being absolutely infinite, or God, has of itself an absolutely infinite power of existing, and for that reason exists absolutely. Yet perhaps many will not easily be able to see the force of this demonstration, because they are used to contemplating only things that come about from external causes. Among these, they see that things which come about quickly—that is, which exist easily—also perish easily; and conversely they judge that things are harder to bring about—that is, less easy to bring into existence—the more they conceive to belong to them.[5] But to free them from these prejudices, I do not need to show here in what sense the saying *what comes about quickly perishes quickly* is true, nor whether, with respect to the whole of nature, all things are equally easy or not. It is enough simply to note that I am speaking here not of things that come about from external causes, but only of substances, which (by Proposition 6) cannot be produced by any external cause. For in the case of things that come about from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, whatever perfection or reality they have is owed entirely to the power of the external cause; and so their existence arises solely from the perfection of the external cause, not from their own. By contrast, whatever perfection a substance has is owed to no external cause; so its existence too must follow from its nature alone, which is therefore nothing other than its essence. Perfection, then, does not take away a thing's existence but, on the contrary, posits it; imperfection, on the other hand, takes it away. And so there is nothing whose existence we can be more certain of than the existence of a being absolutely infinite, or perfect—that is, God. For since his essence excludes all imper-

5 A posteriori: arguing from effects (here, from our own existence); a priori: arguing from the nature of the thing itself.

fection and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it removes every reason for doubting his existence and gives the highest certainty about it. This, I believe, will be plain to anyone who pays even moderate attention.

1P12 Proposition 12. *No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.*

1P12D Demonstration. For the parts into which a substance so conceived would be divided will either retain the nature of substance or not. If the first, then (by Proposition 8) each part will have to be infinite and (by Proposition 6) the cause of itself, and (by Proposition 5) will have to consist of a different attribute; and so several substances could be formed from one, which (by Proposition 6) is absurd. Besides, the parts (by Proposition 2) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Definition 4 and Proposition 10) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which no one can doubt is absurd. But if the second is supposed—namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance—then, when the whole substance had been divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and cease to be, which (by Proposition 7) is absurd.

1P13 Proposition 13. *A substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.*

1P13D Demonstration. For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of a substance absolutely infinite or not. If the first, there will be several substances of the same nature, which (by Proposition 5) is absurd. If the second is supposed, then (as above) a substance absolutely infinite could cease to be, which (by Proposition 11) is also absurd.

1P13C Corollary. From these it follows that no substance—and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance—is divisible.

1P13S Scholium. That substance is indivisible is understood more simply from this alone: that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing can be understood except a finite substance, which (by Proposition 8) implies an obvious contradiction.

WHATEVER IS, IS IN GOD

God is the only substance, and Spinoza answers the objection that extended substance is unworthy of God.

1P14 Proposition 14. *Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.*

1P14D Demonstration. God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Definition 6), and he necessarily exists (by Proposition 11). So if there were any substance besides God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and thus two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by Proposition 5) is absurd. And so no substance outside God can be, and consequently none can be conceived either. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore outside God no substance can be or be conceived. QED

1P14C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows very clearly, first, that God is unique: that is (by Definition 6), in the nature of things there is only one substance, and it is absolutely infinite, as we already hinted in the Scholium to Proposition 10.

1P14C2 Corollary 2. It follows, second, that the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of God or (by Axiom 1) affections of God's attributes.[6]

1P15 Proposition 15. *Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.*

1P15D Demonstration. Except God, no substance is or can be conceived (by Proposition 14), that is (by Definition 3), no thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Definition 5) can neither be nor be conceived without substance; so they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But there is nothing except sub-

6 "Extended thing" and "thinking thing" (res extensa, res cogitans): Descartes's terms for body and mind, which he treated as distinct substances.

stances and modes (by Axiom 1). Therefore nothing can be or be conceived without God. QED

1P15S Scholium. There are those who imagine that God, like a human being, consists of a body and a mind and is subject to passions. But how far such people stray from the true knowledge of God is clear enough from what has already been demonstrated. I leave them aside, however; for all who have in any way contemplated the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. They prove this very well, too, from the fact that by body we understand any quantity having length, breadth and depth, bounded by some definite shape—and nothing more absurd than this could be said of God, that is, of a being absolutely infinite. Yet at the same time, by the other arguments with which they try to demonstrate this same point, they clearly show that they remove corporeal or extended substance itself entirely from the divine nature, and they hold that it was created by God. But by what divine power it could have been created they have no idea at all—which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves are saying. I, at least, have demonstrated clearly enough—in my own judgment, anyway—that no substance can be produced or created by anything else (see the Corollary to Proposition 6 and Scholium 2 to Proposition 8). Further, in Proposition 14 we showed that except God no substance can be or be conceived; and from this we concluded that extended substance is one of God's infinite attributes. But to explain the matter more fully, I will refute my opponents' arguments, which all come down to the following. First, they say that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, consists, as they think, of parts; and for that reason they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. They explain this with many examples, of which I will cite one or two. If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let it be conceived as divided into two parts: each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then there is an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is also absurd. Further, if an

infinite quantity is measured in parts a foot long, it will have to consist of infinitely many such parts; and likewise if it is measured in parts an inch long; and so one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite. Finally, if from one point of some infinite quantity two lines, say AB and AC, are conceived to extend to infinity, a definite and determinate distance apart at the start, it is certain that the distance between B and C increases continually, and at last changes from determinate to indeterminable. Since, then, these absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing an infinite quantity, they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently does not pertain to God's essence. The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. For God, they say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be acted upon; but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can be acted upon; it follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence. These are the arguments I find in the writers, by which they try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature and cannot pertain to it. But in fact anyone who attends properly will find that I have already answered them, since these arguments rest solely on the supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts, which I have already shown to be absurd (Proposition 12, with the Corollary to Proposition 13). Next, anyone willing to weigh the matter properly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, which I do not now dispute) from which they want to conclude that extended substance is finite do not follow at all from supposing an infinite quantity, but from supposing that an infinite quantity is measurable and put together out of finite parts. So from the absurdities that follow they can conclude nothing except that an infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be put together out of finite parts. And this is exactly what we have already demonstrated above (Proposition 12, etc.). So the weapon they aim at us they are really hurling at themselves. If, then, they still want to conclude from this absurdity of theirs that extended substance must be finite, they are doing, heaven knows, nothing different

from someone who imagines that a circle has the properties of a square and then concludes that a circle has no center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, unique and indivisible (see Propositions 8, 5 and 12), they conceive—in order to conclude that it is finite—as put together out of finite parts, as multiple, and as divisible. So too others, after imagining that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments to show that a line cannot be divided to infinity. And certainly it is no less absurd to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts than that a body is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines, finally, of points. All who know that clear reason is infallible must admit this, and above all those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided in such a way that its parts were really distinct, why could one part not be annihilated while the rest remained connected to one another as before? And why must they all fit together so that there is no vacuum? Surely, of things that are really distinct from one another, one can exist without the other and remain in its own state.[7] Since, then, there is no vacuum in Nature (but of this elsewhere), and all the parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows that they cannot be really distinguished—that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be divided. If anyone should now ask why we are by nature so inclined to divide quantity, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: abstractly, or superficially, namely as we imagine it; or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is substance, which is done with great difficulty, then, as we have already sufficiently demonstrated, it will be found to be infinite, unique and indivisible. This will be quite

7 Those who deny a vacuum: chiefly Descartes and his followers, who identified matter with extension and so held that empty space is impossible.

plain to all who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect—especially if one also attends to the fact that matter is everywhere the same, and that parts are not distinguished in it except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways. Hence its parts are distinguished only modally, not really. For example, we conceive that water, insofar as it is water, is divided and that its parts are separated from one another—but not insofar as it is corporeal substance; for in that respect it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, comes into being and passes away; but insofar as it is substance, it neither comes into being nor passes away. And with this I think I have answered the second argument as well, since it too rests on the assumption that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and made up of parts. And even if this were not so, I do not know why matter would be unworthy of the divine nature, since (by Proposition 14) outside God there can be no substance by which the divine nature could be acted upon. All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen happen through the laws of God's infinite nature alone, and follow (as I shall soon show) from the necessity of his essence. So there is no way in which it can be said that God is acted upon by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, provided that it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But enough of this for the present.

EVERYTHING FOLLOWS FROM GOD'S NATURE

Infinitely many things follow from God's nature, and God acts from that nature alone, not from free will.

1P16 Proposition 16. *From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).*

1P16D Demonstration. This proposition should be plain to everyone, provided he attends to the fact that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties that

really do follow necessarily from it (that is, from the very essence of the thing); and it infers more properties the more reality the definition of the thing expresses, that is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Definition 6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity, therefore, there must necessarily follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect). QED

1P16C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that God is the efficient cause of all things that can fall under an infinite intellect.

1P16C2 Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that God is a cause through himself, and not by accident.

1P16C3 Corollary 3. It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.

1P17 Proposition 17. *God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and is compelled by no one.*

1P17D Demonstration. We have just shown, in Proposition 16, that from the necessity of the divine nature alone—or (what is the same thing) from the laws of that nature alone—infinitely many things absolutely follow. And in Proposition 15 we demonstrated that nothing can be or be conceived without God, but that all things are in God. Therefore there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act. And so God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and is compelled by no one. QED

1P17C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, either from without or from within, that moves God to act, except the perfection of his own nature.

1P17C2 Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his own nature alone (by Proposition 11 and Corollary 1 of Proposition 14), and acts from the necessity of his own nature alone (by the preceding proposition). Therefore (by Definition 7) he alone is a free cause. QED

1P17S Scholium. Others think that God is a free cause because—so they think—he can bring it about that the things we have said follow from his nature (that is, the things that are in his power) should not happen, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as saying that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause the effect should not follow—which is absurd. Further on I shall show, without the help of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will belongs to God's nature. I know, of course, that there are many who think they can demonstrate that the highest intellect and a free will belong to God's nature. For they say they know nothing more perfect that they could attribute to God than what is the highest perfection in us. Moreover, although they conceive God as actually understanding in the highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring into existence everything he actually understands; for they think that in that way they would destroy God's power. If he had created everything that is in his intellect, they say, he would then have been unable to create anything more—and this they believe is inconsistent with God's omnipotence. So they have preferred to hold that God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will. But I think I have shown clearly enough (see Proposition 16) that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many ways—that is, all things—have necessarily flowed, or always follow with the same necessity; in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity, and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, in my judgment at least, God's omnipotence is established as far more perfect. Indeed, my opponents seem (if I may speak frankly) to deny God's omnipotence. For they are forced to admit that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create. Otherwise—if he created

everything he understands—he would, on their view, exhaust his omnipotence and make himself imperfect. So in order to maintain that God is perfect, they are reduced to maintaining at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not see what could be invented more absurd than this, or more inconsistent with God's omnipotence. Further, to say something here about the intellect and will that we commonly attribute to God: if intellect and will do belong to God's eternal essence, then something quite different must be understood by each of these attributes from what people usually understand. For the intellect and will that would constitute God's essence would have to differ from our intellect and will by the whole width of the heavens, and could agree with them in nothing except the name—no more, in fact, than the Dog, the sign in the heavens, agrees with the dog, the barking animal. I shall demonstrate this as follows.[8] If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, be by nature later than the things it understands (as most people hold), or simultaneous with them, since God is prior in causality to all things (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 16). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists as such objectively in God's intellect. So God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is really the cause of things—both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been noticed also by those who have asserted that God's intellect, will and power are one and the same. Since, then, God's intellect is the only cause of things—namely (as we have shown), both of their essence and of their existence—it must necessarily differ from them, both with respect to essence and with respect to existence.[9] For what is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from the cause. For example, one man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his

8 The Dog in the sky is the constellation Canis Major, with its bright Dog Star, Sirius.

9 In the scholastic usage Spinoza follows, a thing exists "objectively" in an intellect when it is present there as the content of an idea; its "formal" essence is what it is in itself.

essence; for that essence is an eternal truth. So the two can agree entirely in essence, but they must differ in existing. That is why, if the existence of one perishes, the other's existence will not perish on that account; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the other's essence would be destroyed too. Therefore a thing that is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of some effect must differ from that effect both with respect to essence and with respect to existence. But God's intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with respect to essence and with respect to existence, and can agree with it in nothing except the name—as we set out to show. Concerning the will, one proceeds in the same way, as anyone can easily see.

1P18 Proposition 18. *God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.*[10]

1P18D Demonstration. All things that are, are in God and must be conceived through God (by Proposition 15); and so (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 16 of this part) God is the cause of the things that are in him. That is the first point. Next, outside God there can be no substance (by Proposition 14), that is (by Definition 3), no thing that is in itself outside God. That was the second point. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. QED

1P19 Proposition 19. *God, or all the attributes of God, are eternal.*

1P19D Demonstration. For God (by Definition 6) is substance, which (by Proposition 11) necessarily exists; that is (by Proposition 7), a substance to whose nature it belongs to exist, or (what is the same thing) from whose definition it follows that it exists; and so (by Definition 8) he is eternal. Next, by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Definition 4) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is, that which belongs to substance: that very thing, I say, the attributes themselves

10 An immanent cause produces its effects within itself; a transitive cause produces them outside itself.

must involve. But eternity belongs to the nature of substance (as I have already demonstrated from Proposition 7). Therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and so all are eternal. QED

1P19S Scholium. This Proposition is also perfectly clear from the way in which I demonstrated God's existence (Proposition 11). From that demonstration, I say, it is established that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. I have also demonstrated God's eternity in another way (Proposition 19 of my *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy*), and there is no need to repeat that here.[11]

1P20 Proposition 20. *God's existence and his essence are one and the same.*

1P20D Demonstration. God and all his attributes are eternal (by the preceding proposition); that is (by Definition 8), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God that (by Definition 4) explain God's eternal essence at the same time explain his eternal existence. That is, the very thing that constitutes God's essence at the same time constitutes his existence; and so his existence and his essence are one and the same. QED

1P20C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

1P20C2 Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that God, or all of God's attributes, are unchangeable. For if they changed with respect to existence, they would also (by the preceding proposition) have to change with respect to essence; that is (as is self-evident), from true they would become false—which is absurd.

1P21 Proposition 21. *All things that follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always have existed and be infinite; in other words, through that same attribute they are eternal and infinite.*

1P21D Demonstration. Conceive, if you can (supposing you deny this), that in some attribute of God something follows from its

11 Spinoza's *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* (1663) set out parts of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* in geometrical order.

absolute nature that is finite and has a determinate existence or duration—for example, the idea of God in thought. Now thought, since it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Proposition 11) infinite by its nature. But insofar as it has the idea of God, it is supposed finite. Yet (by Definition 2) it cannot be conceived as finite unless it is limited by thought itself. But not by thought itself insofar as it constitutes the idea of God, for to that extent it is supposed to be finite. Therefore by thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God—thought which nevertheless (by Proposition 11) must necessarily exist. There is, then, thought that does not constitute the idea of God, and so the idea of God does not necessarily follow from its nature insofar as it is absolute thought. (For thought is conceived as both constituting and not constituting the idea of God.) This is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, if the idea of God in thought—or anything in any attribute of God (it makes no difference what is taken, since the demonstration is universal)—follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. That was the first point.

Next, what follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of some attribute cannot have a determinate existence or duration. For if you deny this, suppose that a thing following from the necessity of the nature of some attribute is given in some attribute of God—for example, the idea of God in thought—and suppose that at some time it did not exist, or will not exist. Now since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must exist both necessarily and unchangeably (by Proposition 11 and Corollary 2 of Proposition 20). So beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it is supposed at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist), thought will have to exist without the idea of God. But this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that the idea of God necessarily follows from the given thought. Therefore the idea of God in thought, or anything that follows necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, but is eternal through that same attribute. That was the second

point. Note that the same must be affirmed of any thing that follows necessarily, in some attribute of God, from God's absolute nature.

1P22 Proposition 22. *Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification that, through that attribute, exists both necessarily and as infinite, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite.*

1P22D Demonstration. The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding one.

1P23 Proposition 23. *Every mode that exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification that exists both necessarily and as infinite.*

1P23D Demonstration. For a mode is in another, through which it must be conceived (by Definition 5); that is (by Proposition 15), it is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone. If, then, a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, each of these must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God, insofar as that attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (what by Definition 8 is the same thing) eternity; that is (by Definition 6 and Proposition 19), insofar as it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, that exists both necessarily and as infinite must have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God—either immediately (on which see Proposition 21), or through the mediation of some modification that follows from its absolute nature, that is (by the preceding proposition), that exists both necessarily and as infinite. QED

GOD AS CAUSE OF ALL THINGS

God causes the essence and existence of things; finite things follow from finite causes; nothing is contingent.

1P24 Proposition 24. *The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.*

1P24D Demonstration. This is evident from Definition 1. For that whose nature (considered in itself, that is) involves existence is cause of itself, and exists from the necessity of its own nature alone.

1P24C Corollary. From this it follows that God is the cause not only of things' beginning to exist, but also of their persevering in existence—or (to use a Scholastic term) that God is the cause of the being of things, their *causa essendi*. For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we attend to their essence we find that it involves neither existence nor duration. So their essence cannot be the cause either of their existence or of their duration; only God can, to whose nature alone it belongs to exist (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14).

1P25 Proposition 25. *God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.*

1P25D Demonstration. If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by Axiom 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this (by Proposition 15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause of the essence of things too. QED

1P25S Scholium. This Proposition follows more clearly from Proposition 16. For it follows from that proposition that, given the divine nature, both the essence and the existence of things must necessarily be inferred. In a word, in the same sense in which God is called cause of himself, he must also be called the cause of all things. This will become still clearer from the following corollary.

1P25C Corollary. Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way. The demonstration is evident from Proposition 15 and Definition 5.

1P26 Proposition 26. *A thing that has been determined to do something was necessarily so determined by God; and a thing that has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to do anything.*

1P26D Demonstration. That through which things are said to be determined to do something is necessarily something positive

(as is self-evident). And so God, from the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (by Propositions 25 and 16). That was the first point. The second claim also follows very clearly from this. For if a thing not determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this proposition would be false—which is absurd, as we have shown.

1P27 Proposition 27. *A thing that has been determined by God to do something cannot render itself undetermined.*

1P27D Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Axiom 3.

1P28 Proposition 28. *No singular thing—no thing, that is, which is finite and has a determinate existence—can exist or be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause too cannot exist or be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and so on to infinity.*

1P28D Demonstration. Whatever is determined to exist and to act has been so determined by God (by Proposition 26 and the Corollary to Proposition 24). But what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Proposition 21). It must, therefore, have followed from God, or from some attribute of his, insofar as that is considered to be affected by some mode. For apart from substance and modes nothing is given (by Axiom 1 and Definitions 3 and 5), and modes (by the Corollary to Proposition 25) are nothing but affections of God's attributes. But neither could it have followed from God, or from some attribute of his, insofar as that is affected by a modification that is eternal and infinite (by Proposition 22). It must, therefore, have followed from—or been determined to exist and to act by—God or some attribute of his insofar as it is modified by a modification that is finite and has a determinate existence. That was the first point. Next, this cause, or this mode, must in turn (by the same reasoning by which we have

just demonstrated the first part of this proposition) also have been determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and this last in turn (by the same reasoning) by another; and so on forever (by the same reasoning) to infinity. QED

1P28S Scholium. Some things had to be produced by God immediately—namely, those that follow necessarily from his absolute nature—and others through the mediation of these first ones, though the others can neither be nor be conceived without God. From this it follows, first, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things immediately produced by him, and not merely proximate "in his own kind," as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by Proposition 15 and the Corollary to Proposition 24). It follows, secondly, that God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things—except perhaps in order to distinguish these from the things he has produced immediately, or rather from those that follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one that is in no way conjoined with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, and depend on God in such a way that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

1P29 Proposition 29. *In nature there is nothing contingent; all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to act in a certain way.*

1P29D Demonstration. Whatever is, is in God (by Proposition 15). But God cannot be called a contingent thing, for (by Proposition 11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily, not contingently (by Proposition 16)—either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by Proposition 21), or insofar as it is considered as determined to act in a certain way (by Proposition 27). Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (by the Corollary to Proposition 24), but also (by Proposition 26) insofar as they are considered as determined to do something. If they have not been determined

by God (by the same Proposition), it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; and conversely (by Proposition 27), if they have been determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves undetermined. Therefore all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but to exist and to act in a certain way; and there is nothing contingent. QED

1P29S Scholium. Before going further, I want to explain here—or rather to point out—what we must understand by *Natura naturans* and what by *Natura naturata*. For I think it is already established from what precedes that by *Natura naturans* we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance that express eternal and infinite essence; that is (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14 and Corollary 2 of Proposition 17), God insofar as he is considered as a free cause. By *Natura naturata*, on the other hand, I understand everything that follows from the necessity of God's nature, or of each of God's attributes; that is, all the modes of God's attributes, insofar as they are considered as things that are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God.[12]

1P30 Proposition 30. *An intellect, whether actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.*

1P30D Demonstration. A true idea must agree with its object (by Axiom 6); that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be given in Nature. But in Nature (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14) there is only one substance, namely God; and there are no affections (by Proposition 15) other than those that are in God and that (by the same Proposition) can neither be nor be conceived without God. Therefore an intellect, whether actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else. QED

12 Literally "nature naturing" and "nature natured": scholastic terms for nature as active cause and nature as what that cause produces.

1P31 Proposition 31. *Actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.*

1P31D Demonstration. By intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which differs from other modes, such as desire, love, etc.; and so (by Definition 5) it must be conceived through absolute thought. That is (by Proposition 15 and Definition 6), it must be conceived through some attribute of God that expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, in such a way that without that attribute it can neither be nor be conceived. And therefore (by the Scholium to Proposition 29) it must be referred to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans*, as must the other modes of thinking. QED

1P31S Scholium. The reason I speak here of actual intellect is not that I grant there is any potential intellect. Rather, because I want to avoid all confusion, I have chosen to speak only of what we perceive most clearly—namely, the very act of understanding, than which we perceive nothing more clearly. For we can understand nothing that does not lead to a more perfect knowledge of understanding.

1P32 Proposition 32. *The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.*

1P32D Demonstration. The will is only a certain mode of thinking, like the intellect. And so (by Proposition 28) each volition can neither exist nor be determined to act unless it is determined by another cause, and this in turn by another, and so on to infinity. And if the will is supposed to be infinite, it too must be determined to exist and to act by God—not insofar as he is absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as he has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Proposition 23). In whatever way the will is conceived, then, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to act; and so (by Definition 7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one. QED

1P32C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that God does not act from freedom of the will.

1P32C2 Corollary 2. It follows, secondly, that will and intellect are related to God's nature as motion and rest are, and, absolutely, as are all natural things, which (by Proposition 29) must be determined by God to exist and to act in a certain way. For the will, like everything else, needs a cause by which it is determined to exist and to act in a certain way. And although infinitely many things follow from a given will or intellect, God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than he can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest because of what follows from motion and rest (for infinitely many things follow from these too). So will does not belong to God's nature any more than other natural things do, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and to act in a certain way.

THINGS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE

God could not have produced things in any other way or order; Spinoza defines necessary, impossible and contingent.

1P33 Proposition 33. *Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than they have been produced.*

1P33D Demonstration. For all things have followed necessarily from God's given nature (by Proposition 16), and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature to exist and to act in a certain way (by Proposition 29). So if things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to act in another way, so that the order of nature would be different, then God's nature too could be other than it now is; and hence (by Proposition 11) that other nature would also have to exist, and consequently there could be two or more Gods—which (by Corollary 1 of Proposition 14) is absurd. Therefore things could

not have been produced in any other way or in any other order, etc. QED

1P33S1 Scholium 1. Since I have shown here, more clearly than the noonday sun, that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they could be called contingent, I now want to explain briefly what we should understand by *contingent*—but first, what we should understand by *necessary* and *impossible*. A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For a thing's existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. A thing is also called impossible for these same reasons: namely, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause determined to produce such a thing. But a thing is called contingent for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge. For take a thing whose essence we do not know to involve a contradiction, or which we know perfectly well involves no contradiction, but about whose existence we still can affirm nothing with certainty, because the order of causes is hidden from us. Such a thing can never seem to us either necessary or impossible; and so we call it either contingent or possible.

1P33S2 Scholium 2. From what has been said it clearly follows that things have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given, most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection; for it is his very perfection that has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from the contrary it would clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God is not supremely perfect: for if things had been produced in another way, we would have to attribute to God another nature, different from the one we have been compelled to attribute to him from considering a most perfect Being. I do not doubt, however, that many will hoot this view down as absurd, and will not be willing to set their minds to weighing it —and for no other reason than that they are used to attributing to God another kind of freedom, very different from the one we have set out (Definition 7): namely, an absolute will. But I also do

not doubt that, if they were willing to reflect on the matter and weigh properly the chain of our demonstrations, they would in the end reject outright the kind of freedom they now attribute to God—not only as idle, but as a great obstacle to knowledge. Nor is there any need for me to repeat here what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 17. Still, for their sake I shall show further that even if it is granted that will belongs to God's essence, it nonetheless follows from his perfection that things could not have been created by God in any other way or order. This will be easy to show if we first consider what they themselves grant: namely, that it depends on God's decree and will alone that each thing is what it is—for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things; and next, that all of God's decrees have been ratified by God himself from eternity. For otherwise he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since in eternity there is no *when*, no *before* and no *after*, it follows from God's perfection alone that God can never decree, and never could have decreed, anything other than he does; in other words, that God did not exist before his decrees, and cannot exist without them. But they will say that even if it were supposed that God had made another nature of things, or had decreed from eternity something else about Nature and its order, no imperfection in God would follow from this. But if they say this, they will at the same time be granting that God can change his decrees. For if God had decreed about Nature and its order something other than he did decree—that is, had willed and conceived something else about Nature—he would necessarily have had an intellect other than the one he now has, and a will other than the one he now has. And if we may attribute to God another intellect and another will without any change in his essence and his perfection, what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees about created things and nonetheless remain equally perfect? For as far as his essence and perfection are concerned, it makes no difference how his intellect and will regarding created things and their order are conceived. Further, all the philosophers I have come across grant that there is no potential intel-

lect in God, but only actual intellect. And since, as they all also grant, neither his intellect nor his will is distinct from his essence, it follows from this too that if God had had another actual intellect and another will, his essence too would necessarily be different. And hence (as I concluded at the outset) if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, God's intellect and his will—that is (as is granted), his essence—would have to be different, which is absurd.

Since, therefore, things could not have been produced by God in any other way or order, and since the truth of this follows from God's supreme perfection, no sound reason can persuade us to believe that God did not will to create all the things that are in his intellect, with the very same perfection with which he understands them. But they will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things; that what is in them, on account of which they are called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends on God's will alone; and so, had God so willed, he could have brought it about that what is now perfection would be the greatest imperfection, and the reverse. But what would this be but openly to assert that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, can by his will bring it about that he understands things otherwise than he understands them—which (as I have just shown) is a great absurdity? So I can turn the argument back against them, in this way. All things depend on God's power. For things to be able to be otherwise, then, God's will would necessarily also have to be otherwise. But God's will cannot be otherwise (as we have just shown most clearly from God's perfection). Therefore things cannot be otherwise either. I admit that this opinion—which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God, and holds that all things depend on his good pleasure—strays less from the truth than the view of those who hold that God does everything for the sake of the good. For these people seem to posit something outside God, not dependent on God, to which God looks as to a model when he works, or at which he aims as at a fixed target. This is surely nothing other than subjecting God to fate—and nothing more absurd can be

maintained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause both of the essence of all things and of their existence. So there is no reason for me to waste time refuting this absurdity.

1P34 Proposition 34. *God's power is his very essence.*

1P34D Demonstration. For from the necessity of God's essence alone it follows that God is the cause of himself (by Proposition 11) and (by Proposition 16 and its Corollary) of all things. Therefore God's power, by which he and all things are and act, is his very essence. QED

1P35 Proposition 35. *Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily is.*

1P35D Demonstration. For whatever is in God's power must (by the preceding proposition) be so contained in his essence that it necessarily follows from it; and so it necessarily is. QED

1P36 Proposition 36. *Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.*

1P36D Demonstration. Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence, of God in a certain and determinate way (by the Corollary to Proposition 25); that is (by Proposition 34), whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things; and so (by Proposition 16) some effect must follow from it. QED

APPENDIX: AGAINST FINAL CAUSES

Spinoza explains why people believe that nature and God act for ends, and argues that the belief is false.

1App Appendix. In the preceding pages I have explained the nature of God and his properties: that he necessarily exists; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature alone; that he is the free cause of all things, and how; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God—not, indeed, from freedom of will or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or

infinite power. Moreover, wherever the occasion arose, I have taken care to remove prejudices that could prevent my demonstrations from being grasped. But a good many prejudices still remain which could also—indeed most of all—prevent people from embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it, and still can. So I thought it worth the effort to submit them here to the scrutiny of reason. All the prejudices I undertake to point out here depend on this one: that people commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end; indeed, they hold it as certain that God himself directs all things to some definite end. For they say that God made all things for the sake of man, and man so that he would worship God. I shall therefore consider this one prejudice first. I shall ask, *first*, why most people rest content in it, and why all are by nature so inclined to embrace it. *Next* I shall show that it is false; and *finally*, how from it there have arisen prejudices about *good and bad*, *merit and wrongdoing*, *praise and blame*, *order and confusion*, *beauty and ugliness*, and other things of this kind. This is not the place, however, to derive these things from the nature of the human mind.[13] It will be enough here if I take as my foundation what everyone must acknowledge: namely, that all human beings are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek what is useful to themselves, and are conscious of this. From these it follows, *first*, that people think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not so much as dream of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them. It follows, *second*, that people do everything for the sake of an end—namely, for the sake of the useful thing they want. Hence they always seek to know only the final causes of things that have been done, and once they have heard them they are satisfied, since, of course, they have no cause for further doubt. But if they cannot hear these causes from someone else, nothing remains for them but

13 Wrongdoing (*peccatum*): traditionally translated "sin"; Spinoza defines it in Part 4 without theology, as an offense against the laws of a state.

to turn to themselves and reflect on the ends by which they themselves are usually determined to do similar things; and so they necessarily judge another's mind by their own. Further, they find, both in themselves and outside themselves, a great many means that contribute considerably to obtaining what is useful to them—for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, and so on. Hence it has come about that they regard all natural things as means to their own advantage. And because they know that they found these means rather than prepared them, they had reason to believe that there was someone else who had prepared them for their use. For once they had come to regard things as means, they could not believe that those things had made themselves. Instead, from the means they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they had to conclude that there is some ruler, or rulers, of Nature, endowed with human freedom, who had taken care of everything for them and made everything for their use. And since they had never heard anything about the mind of these rulers either, they had to judge it from their own. Hence they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of human beings, in order to bind human beings to themselves and be held by them in the highest honor. So it came about that each person devised, from his own way of thinking, different ways of worshipping God, so that God might love him above the rest and direct the whole of Nature to serve his blind desire and insatiable greed. In this way the prejudice turned into superstition and struck deep roots in people's minds. This was why everyone strove with the greatest effort to understand and explain the final causes of all things. But in seeking to show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is, nothing that is not of use to human beings), they seem to have shown only that Nature and the gods are as mad as human beings. Look, I ask you, at how things turned out in the end! Among so many advantages in Nature they could not fail to find a good many disadvantages—storms, earthquakes, diseases, and so on. These, they maintained, happen because the gods are

angry at wrongs done to them by human beings, or at acts of wrongdoing committed in their worship. And although experience protested daily, and showed by countless examples that advantages and disadvantages befall the pious and the impious alike, without distinction, they did not on that account abandon their ingrained prejudice. For it was easier for them to put this among the other unknown things whose use they did not know, and so keep their present and innate state of ignorance, than to tear down that whole structure and devise a new one. Hence they held it as certain that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding. This alone would certainly have caused the truth to remain hidden from the human race forever, had not mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown human beings another standard of truth. And besides mathematics, other causes can also be given (it would be superfluous to list them here) which could have enabled people to notice these common prejudices and be led to a true knowledge of things.

With this I have sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place. Now, to show that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions, does not take much. For I believe this is already clear enough, both from the foundations and causes from which I have shown this prejudice took its origin, and from Proposition 16 and the Corollaries of Proposition 32, and besides from all the passages in which I have shown that all things in nature proceed by a certain eternal necessity and with the highest perfection. I shall, however, add this further point: this doctrine about ends turns Nature completely upside down. For it regards as an effect what is in fact a cause, and vice versa. Next, it makes what is prior by nature posterior. And finally, it renders what is supreme and most perfect the most imperfect. For (omitting the first two points, since they are self-evident), as is established by Propositions 21, 22 and 23, the most perfect effect is the one produced by God immediately, and the more intermediate causes a thing needs in order to be produced, the more imperfect it is. But if

the things produced immediately by God had been made so that God might attain his end, then the last things—for whose sake the earlier ones were made—would necessarily be the most excellent of all. Further, this doctrine takes away God's perfection. For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless admit that God did everything for his own sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, since they can point to nothing before creation, apart from God, for the sake of which God might act. So they are necessarily forced to admit that God lacked those things for whose sake he willed to prepare means, and that he desired them, as is self-evident. Nor should I pass over the fact that the followers of this doctrine, who have wanted to show off their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, have brought in a new way of arguing to prove their doctrine: reduction not to the impossible but to ignorance—which shows that this doctrine had no other means of argument. For example, if a stone falls from a roof onto someone's head and kills him, they will demonstrate in this way that the stone fell in order to kill the man.[14] "For if it did not fall for that end, by God's will, how could so many circumstances (and often many coincide at once) have come together by chance?" Perhaps you will answer that it happened because the wind was blowing and the man was passing that way. But they will press on: "Why was the wind blowing at that time? Why was the man passing that way at that very same time?" If you answer again that the wind rose then because the sea had begun to be stirred up the day before, while the weather was still calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will press on again—for there is no end to asking—"But why was the sea stirred up? Why was the man invited for that time?" And so they will not stop asking for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance.

14 A scholastic distinction: an end sought to supply something one lacks, versus an end sought to make other things share in one's own goodness.

Similarly, when they see the structure of the human body, they are dumbfounded, and because they do not know the causes of such artistry, they conclude that it was made not by mechanical but by divine or supernatural art, and constructed so that no part harms another. Hence it happens that anyone who seeks the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural things as a learned person rather than to gape at them like a fool, is everywhere held and denounced as a heretic and impious by those whom the common people revere as interpreters of Nature and the gods. For they know that once ignorance is removed, astonishment—the only means they have of arguing and of protecting their authority—is removed as well. But I leave these matters and go on to what I decided to treat here in the *third* place.

GOOD, BAD, ORDER AND BEAUTY

Notions such as good, bad, order and beauty are shown to be ways of imagining, not features of things.

Once people had persuaded themselves that everything that happens happens for their sake, they had to judge that what is most important in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to value most highly all the things by which they were most agreeably affected. Hence they had to form these notions by which to explain the natures of things: *Good*, *Bad*, *Order*, *Confusion*, *Hot*, *Cold*, *Beauty* and *Ugliness*. And because they think themselves free, these further notions arose: *Praise* and *Blame*, *Wrongdoing* and *Merit*. These latter I shall explain below, after I have dealt with human nature; the former I shall briefly explain here. Everything that promotes health and the worship of God they called *Good*; what is contrary to these, *Bad*. And because those who do not understand the nature of things affirm nothing about things but only imagine them, and take imagination for intellect, they firmly believe that there is *order* in things, ignorant as they are of things and of their own nature. For when things are so arranged that, when they are presented to us

through the senses, we can easily imagine them and consequently easily remember them, we say they are well ordered; if the opposite, we say they are badly ordered, or *confused*. And since the things we can easily imagine are more pleasing to us than others, people prefer order to confusion—as if order were something in Nature apart from its relation to our imagination. They say that God created all things in order, and in this way, without knowing it, they attribute imagination to God—unless perhaps they mean that God, providing for human imagination, arranged all things in the way that people could most easily imagine them. Nor, perhaps, will it give them pause that infinitely many things are found that far surpass our imagination, and a great many that confuse it because of its weakness. But enough of this. The other notions, too, are nothing but ways of imagining, by which the imagination is affected in various ways; and yet the ignorant regard them as the chief attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe that all things were made for their sake. They call the nature of a thing good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt, according to how they are affected by it. For example, if the motion that the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects that cause it are called *beautiful*, and those that excite the contrary motion *ugly*. Things that stimulate the sense through the nose they call fragrant or foul-smelling; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless, and so on; through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, and so on. And finally, things that stir the ears are said to produce noise, sound, or harmony—the last of which has driven people so far out of their wits that they have believed that God, too, delights in harmony. Nor are there lacking philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavens make up a harmony. All this shows well enough that each person has judged things according to the disposition of his brain—or rather, has taken the affections of the imagination for things themselves. So it is no wonder (to note this too in passing) that all the controversies we see have arisen among people, and from them, in the end,

skepticism.[15] For although human bodies agree in many respects, they differ in a great many, and so what seems good to one seems bad to another; what is ordered to one, confused to another; what is pleasing to one is displeasing to another; and so on for the rest. I pass over these here, both because this is not the place to treat them expressly and because everyone has had enough experience of this. Everyone has these sayings on their lips: "So many heads, so many opinions"; "Everyone is full of his own view"; "Brains differ no less than palates." These sayings show well enough that people judge things according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they had understood things, those things would, as mathematics bears witness, at least have convinced them, even if they did not attract them.[16]

We see, therefore, that all the notions by which the common people usually explain Nature are only ways of imagining, and indicate the nature of nothing, but only the constitution of the imagination. And because they have names as if they were beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings not of reason but of imagination. So all the arguments drawn against us from such notions can easily be repelled. For many people argue like this: if all things have followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, where then have so many imperfections in Nature come from—the corruption of things to the point of stench, the ugliness of things that provokes nausea, confusion, evil, wrongdoing, and so on? But, as I have just said, these are easily refuted.[17] For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend human senses, or because they benefit human nature or are incompatible with it. To those who ask why God did not create all human beings so that they would be governed by the guidance of reason alone, I

15 The Pythagorean "harmony of the spheres," the idea that the planets' motions produce music.

16 The second saying echoes the Latin Bible (Romans 14:5).

17 "Beings of reason" (*entia rationis*) was the scholastic term for things that exist only in thought; Spinoza coins a parallel phrase.

answer only this: because he did not lack material for creating all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed for producing all things that can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I demonstrated in Proposition 16.

These are the prejudices I undertook to point out here. If any others of this sort still remain, anyone can correct them with a little reflection.

Part II: Of the nature and origin of the mind

Spinoza argues that mind and body are one thing, and explains how we know.

2Pref I now pass on to explaining those things that must necessarily have followed from the essence of God, or the eternal and infinite Being. Not all of them, indeed—for we have demonstrated in Proposition 16 of Part 1 that infinitely many things must follow from it in infinitely many ways—but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.

2D1 Definition 1. By body I understand a mode that expresses, in a certain and determinate way, God's essence insofar as it is considered as an extended thing (see the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1).

2D2 Definition 2. I say that there belongs to the essence of a thing that which, if it is given, the thing is necessarily posited, and if it is taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which, conversely, can neither be nor be conceived without the thing.

2D3 Definition 3. By idea I understand a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.

2D3Ex Explanation. I say concept rather than perception because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in relation to its object, whereas concept seems to express an action of the mind.

2D4 Definition 4. By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic marks, of a true idea.

2D4Ex Explanation. I say intrinsic in order to exclude what is extrinsic, namely the agreement of the idea with its object.

2D5 Definition 5. Duration is the indefinite continuation of existing.

2D5Ex Explanation. I say indefinite because it can in no way be determined by the very nature of the existing thing, nor yet by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the thing's existence but does not take it away.

2D6 Definition 6. By reality and perfection I understand the same thing.

2D7 Definition 7. By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if several individuals so concur in one action that all of them together are the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.

2A1 Axiom 1. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence; that is, in the order of Nature it can equally happen that this or that man exists and that he does not exist.

2A2 Axiom 2. Man thinks.

2A3 Axiom 3. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever else is called by the name of an affect of the mind, do not exist unless there is in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, and so on. But an idea can exist even though no other mode of thinking exists.

2A4 Axiom 4. We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways.

2A5 Axiom 5. We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking.

For the Postulates, see after Proposition 13.

GOD THINKS AND IS EXTENDED

Thought and extension are attributes of God, and God has an idea of his essence and its consequences.

2P1 Proposition 1. *Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.*

2P1D Demonstration. Singular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes that express God's nature in a certain and determinate way (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1). Therefore there belongs to God (by Definition 5 of Part 1) an attribute whose concept all singular thoughts involve, and through which they are also conceived. Thought, therefore, is one of God's infinite attributes, which expresses God's eternal and infinite essence (see Definition 6 of Part 1); or, God is a thinking thing. QED

2P1S Scholium. This Proposition is also evident from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality, or perfection, we conceive it to contain. Therefore a being that can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways is necessarily infinite in its power of thinking. Since, then, by attending to thought alone we conceive an infinite Being, thought is necessarily (by Definitions 4 and 6 of Part 1) one of God's infinite attributes, as we wished to show.

2P2 Proposition 2. *Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.*

2P2D Demonstration. The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as that of the preceding proposition.

2P3 Proposition 3. *In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence.*

2P3D Demonstration. For God (by Proposition 1 of this part) can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways, or (what is the same, by Proposition 16 of Part 1) can form the idea of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from it. But everything that is in God's power necessarily is (by Proposition

35 of Part 1). Therefore such an idea necessarily exists, and (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) exists nowhere but in God. QED

2P3S Scholium. By God's power the common people understand God's free will and his right over all things that exist, which are therefore commonly regarded as contingent. For they say that God has the power to destroy everything and reduce it to nothing. Further, they very often compare God's power with the power of kings. But we have refuted this in Corollaries 1 and 2 to Proposition 32 of Part 1, and in Proposition 16 of Part 1 we showed that God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself. That is, just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as everyone unanimously maintains) that God understands himself, so it follows with the same necessity that God does infinitely many things in infinitely many ways. Next, in Proposition 34 of Part 1 we showed that God's power is nothing but God's active essence; and so it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that God does not exist. Further, if I cared to pursue this further, I could also show here that the power the common people ascribe to God is not only human (which shows that the common people conceive God as a man, or like a man) but also involves lack of power. But I do not want to talk about the same thing so many times. I only ask the reader, again and again, to weigh carefully, more than once, what has been said on this subject in Part 1, from Proposition 16 to the end. For no one will be able to perceive rightly what I mean unless he takes great care not to confuse God's power with the human power or right of kings.

2P4 Proposition 4. *The idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be one.*

2P4D Demonstration. The infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God's attributes and his affections (by Proposition 30 of Part 1). But God is unique (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 14 of Part 1). Therefore the idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be one. QED

2P5 Proposition 5. *The formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not*

insofar as he is explained through another attribute. That is, the ideas both of God's attributes and of singular things recognize as their efficient cause not the objects of the ideas themselves, that is, the things perceived, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.

2P5D Demonstration. This is indeed evident from Proposition 3 of this part. For there we concluded that God can form the idea of his essence, and of everything that necessarily follows from it, solely from the fact that God is a thinking thing, and not from the fact that he is the object of his idea. Therefore the formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause insofar as he is a thinking thing. But it can be demonstrated differently, in this way. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident), that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1), a mode that expresses in a certain way God's nature insofar as he is a thinking thing; and so (by Proposition 10 of Part 1) it involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) is the effect of no other attribute but thought. And so the formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, etc. QED

2P6 Proposition 6. *The modes of any attribute have God as their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other.*

2P6D Demonstration. For each attribute is conceived through itself, without any other (by Proposition 10 of Part 1). So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not of another; and so (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) they have God as their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other. QED

2P6C Corollary. From this it follows that the formal being of things that are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God first knew those things. Rather, the objects of ideas follow and are derived from their own attributes in the same way and with the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.

THE ORDER OF IDEAS AND THE ORDER OF THINGS

Ideas follow the same order and connection as things; a mode and its idea are one thing.

2P7 Proposition 7. *The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.*

2P7D Demonstration. This is evident from Axiom 4 of Part 1. For the idea of anything caused depends on knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.

2P7C Corollary. From this it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting. That is, whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature all follows objectively in God from the idea of God, in the same order and with the same connection.

2P7S Scholium. Here, before we go any further, we must recall what we showed above: namely, that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting the essence of a substance belongs to one substance only, and consequently that thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. Some of the Hebrews seem to have seen this as if through a mist—those, namely, who maintain that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same. For example,[1] a circle existing in Nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, explained through different attributes. And so, whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes—that is, the same things following one another. Nor did I say for any other reason that God is the cause of the idea of, say, a circle only inso-

1 Probably an allusion to Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* 1.68) and his followers, who held that in God the knower, the knowing and the known are one.

far as he is a thinking thing, and of the circle only insofar as he is an extended thing, than this: the formal being of the idea of a circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking as its proximate cause, and that one again through another, and so on to infinity. So as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of thought alone; and insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must likewise be explained through the attribute of extension alone. And I understand the same of the other attributes. Therefore God is really the cause of things as they are in themselves insofar as he consists of infinite attributes. For the present I cannot explain these matters more clearly.

2P8 Proposition 8. *The ideas of singular things, or modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God's infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God's attributes.*

2P8D Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from the preceding one, but it is understood more clearly from the preceding scholium.

2P8C Corollary. From this it follows that, as long as singular things do not exist except insofar as they are comprehended in God's attributes, their objective being, or their ideas, do not exist except insofar as God's infinite idea exists. And when singular things are said to exist not only insofar as they are comprehended in God's attributes, but also insofar as they are said to endure, their ideas too will involve the existence through which they are said to endure.

2P8S Scholium. If anyone wants an example to explain this matter more fully, I certainly cannot give one that adequately explains the thing I am speaking of here, since it is unique. Still, I shall try to illustrate it as far as possible. The circle is of such a nature that, for all straight lines intersecting one another within it, the rectangles formed from their segments are equal to one another. So a circle contains infinitely many rectangles equal to

one another. Yet none of them can be said to exist except insofar as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist except insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Now let us conceive that, of those infinitely many rectangles, only two exist, namely E and D.[2] Their ideas, too, now certainly exist not only insofar as they are merely comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles. This is what distinguishes them from the other ideas of the other rectangles.

2P9 Proposition 9. *The idea of a singular thing that actually exists has God as its cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing that actually exists; and of this idea, too, God is the cause insofar as he is affected by a third, and so on to infinity.*

2P9D Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing that actually exists is a singular mode of thinking, distinct from the others (by the Corollary and Scholium to Proposition 8 of this part); and so (by Proposition 6 of this part) it has God as its cause only insofar as he is a thinking thing. Yet not (by Proposition 28 of Part 1) insofar as he is a thinking thing absolutely, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and of this mode, too, God is the cause insofar as he is affected by another mode of thinking, and so on to infinity. But the order and connection of ideas (by Proposition 7 of this part) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore the cause of one singular idea is another idea, or God insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea; and of this one, too, he is the cause insofar as he is affected by another, and so on to infinity. QED

2P9C Corollary. Of whatever happens in the singular object of any idea, there is knowledge in God only insofar as he has the idea of that same object.

2P9CD Demonstration. Of whatever happens in the object of any idea, there is an idea in God (by Proposition 3 of this part), not

2 Euclid, *Elements* 3.35: when two chords of a circle cross, the rectangle formed by the two parts of one equals that formed by the two parts of the other.

insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing (by the preceding proposition). But (by Proposition 7 of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore knowledge of what happens in any singular object will be in God only insofar as he has the idea of that same object. QED

2P10 Proposition 10. *The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man; that is, substance does not constitute the form of man.*

2P10D Demonstration. For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by Proposition 7 of Part 1). If, then, the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, it would follow that, given substance, man would necessarily be given (by Definition 2 of this part), and consequently man would necessarily exist—which (by Axiom 1 of this part) is absurd. Therefore, etc. QED

2P10S Scholium. This proposition is also demonstrated from Proposition 5 of Part 1, namely that there are not two substances of the same nature. Since many men can exist, what constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. The proposition is evident, moreover, from the other properties of substance—namely, that substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, and so on—as anyone can easily see.

2P10C Corollary. From this it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of God's attributes.

2P10CD Demonstration. For the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man (by the preceding proposition). It is therefore (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) something that is in God, and that can neither be nor be conceived without God; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1), an affection, or mode, which expresses God's nature in a certain and determinate way.

2P10CS Scholium. Everyone must surely grant that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all agree that God is the sole cause of all things, of their essence as well as of their existence; that is, God is the cause of things not only with respect to

their coming to be, as they say, but also with respect to their being. Yet at the same time most people say that whatever a thing can neither be nor be conceived without pertains to that thing's essence. And so they believe either that the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or be conceived without God—or, what is more certain, they are not consistent with themselves. The cause of this, I believe, was that they did not keep to the proper order of philosophizing.[3] For they believed that the divine nature—which they should have contemplated before all else, since it is prior both in knowledge and in nature—comes last in the order of knowledge, and that the things called objects of the senses come before everything. So it happened that, while they were contemplating natural things, there was nothing they thought about less than the divine nature; and when afterwards they turned their minds to contemplating the divine nature, there was nothing they could think about less than their own first fictions, on which they had built their knowledge of natural things, since these could be of no help toward knowledge of the divine nature. No wonder, then, that they contradicted themselves here and there. But I let this pass. For my purpose here was only to explain why I did not say that whatever a thing can neither be nor be conceived without pertains to its essence. The reason is that singular things cannot be or be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence. What I did say is that that necessarily constitutes the essence of a thing which, if it is given, the thing is posited, and if it is taken away, the thing is taken away; or, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in turn can neither be nor be conceived without the thing.

3 "Cause of becoming" (causa secundum fieri) and "cause of being" (causa secundum esse) is a scholastic distinction.

THE MIND IS THE IDEA OF THE BODY

The human mind is the idea of an actually existing body, and nothing else.

2P11 Proposition 11. *The first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing other than the idea of some singular thing actually existing.*

2P11D Demonstration. The essence of man (by the Corollary to the preceding proposition) is constituted by certain modes of God's attributes, namely (by Axiom 2 of this part) by modes of thinking. Of all these (by Axiom 3 of this part) the idea is prior in nature, and when it is given, the other modes (those, that is, to which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same axiom). And so an idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of the human mind. But not the idea of a thing that does not exist. For then (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of this part) the idea itself could not be said to exist. It will therefore be the idea of a thing actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by Propositions 21 and 22 of Part 1) must always necessarily exist, and this (by Axiom 1 of this part) is absurd. Therefore the first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the idea of a singular thing actually existing. QED

2P11C Corollary. From this it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Hence, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing other than that God—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, that is, insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind—has this or that idea. And when we say that God has this or that idea not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human mind, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing only in part, that is, inadequately.

2P11S Scholium. Here, no doubt, readers will get stuck and will think up many objections to hold things up. For this reason I ask them to proceed slowly with me, step by step, and not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read everything through.

2P12 Proposition 12. *Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind; that is, there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind. In other words, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body that is not perceived by the mind.*

2P12D Demonstration. For whatever happens in the object of any idea, knowledge of it is necessarily in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as he is considered as affected by the idea of that same object; that is (by Proposition 11 of this part), insofar as he constitutes the mind of some thing. Therefore, whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind, knowledge of it is necessarily in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), knowledge of that thing will necessarily be in the mind, or the mind perceives it. QED

2P12S Scholium. This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly understood, from the Scholium to Proposition 7 of this part; see there.

2P13 Proposition 13. *The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body—that is, a certain mode of extension actually existing—and nothing else.*

2P13D Demonstration. For if the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as he constitutes our mind, but insofar as he constitutes the mind of another thing; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in our mind. But (by Axiom 4 of this part) we do have ideas of the affections of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body (by Proposi-

tion 11 of this part) as actually existing. Next, if besides the body there were also another object of the mind, then, since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), there would necessarily have to be in our mind the idea of some effect of it (by Proposition 11 of this part). But (by Axiom 5 of this part) there is no idea of it. Therefore the object of our mind is the existing body and nothing else. QED

2P13C Corollary. From this it follows that man consists of a mind and a body, and that the human body exists as we sense it.

2P13S Scholium. From this we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body. But no one will be able to understand this union adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of our body. For what we have shown so far is entirely general, and does not pertain more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is of the human body. And so whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must necessarily be said of the idea of any thing. Still, we also cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves as their objects do, and that one is more excellent than another and contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the object of the other and contains more reality. Therefore, to determine how the human mind differs from the others and how it surpasses them, we must know, as we have said, the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. I cannot explain that nature here, nor is it necessary for what I want to demonstrate. This much, however, I say in general: the more a body is capable, compared with others, of acting or being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is capable, compared with others, of perceiving many things at once; and the more the actions of a body depend on itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in acting, the more its mind is capable of understanding distinctly. From this we can know the excellence of one mind over

others; we can also see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things that I shall deduce from these in what follows. For this reason I have thought it worthwhile to explain and demonstrate these things more precisely, and for this it is necessary to set out first a few points about the nature of bodies.

A SHORT PHYSICS OF BODIES

Axioms and lemmas on motion, rest and composite bodies, ending with postulates about the human body.

2A1' Axiom 1. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

2A2' Axiom 2. Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly.

2L1 Lemma 1. *Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.*

2L1D Demonstration. The first part of this I take to be self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished by reason of substance is evident both from Proposition 5 and from Proposition 8 of Part 1, but more clearly from what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 15 of Part 1.

2L2 Lemma 2. *All bodies agree in certain things.*

2L2D Demonstration. For all bodies agree in this: that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by Definition 1 of this part). Next, in that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and, without qualification, can now be in motion, now at rest.

2L3 Lemma 3. A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that one in turn by another, and so on to infinity.

2L3D Demonstration. Bodies (by Definition 1 of this part) are singular things which (by Lemma 1) are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest. And so (by Proposition 28 of Part 1) each must necessarily have been determined to

motion or rest by another singular thing, namely (by Proposition 6 of this part) by another body, which (by Axiom 1) is also either in motion or at rest. But this body too (by the same reasoning) could not have been in motion or at rest unless it had been determined to motion or rest by another, and this one in turn (by the same reasoning) by another, and so on to infinity. QED

[2L3C] Corollary. From this it follows that a body in motion continues to move until it is determined to rest by another body, and that a body at rest likewise continues at rest until it is determined to motion by another. This is also self-evident. For when I suppose that a body, say A, is at rest, and pay no attention to other bodies in motion, I can say nothing about body A except that it is at rest. If it then happens that body A moves, this surely could not have come about from its being at rest; for from that nothing else could follow than that body A remain at rest. If, on the other hand, A is supposed to be moving, then as long as we attend only to A, we can affirm nothing about it except that it is moving. If it then happens that A comes to rest, this too surely could not have come about from the motion it had; for from its motion nothing else could follow than that A keep moving. It happens, therefore, from something that was not in A, namely from an external cause, by which it was determined to rest.

[2A1"] Axiom 1. All the ways in which a body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the body affecting it. So one and the same body is moved in different ways according to the differing natures of the bodies moving it, and, conversely, different bodies are moved in different ways by one and the same body.

[2A2"] Axiom 2. When a body in motion strikes another at rest which it cannot move, it is reflected so as to continue moving; and the angle that the line of the reflected motion makes with the surface of the body at rest which it struck will be equal to

the angle that the line of the incident motion makes with that same surface.

So much for the simplest bodies, those that are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness. Now let us move up to composite bodies.

2Def Definition. *When a number of bodies, of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or, if they are moving at the same or at different degrees of speed, that they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another, and that together they all compose one body, or individual, which is distinguished from others by this union of bodies.*

2A3" Axiom 3. The larger or smaller the surfaces over which the parts of an individual, or composite body, lie upon one another, the harder or easier it is to force them to change their position, and consequently the harder or easier it is to bring it about that the individual itself takes on another shape. From this I shall call bodies whose parts lie upon one another over large surfaces *hard*; those whose parts do so over small surfaces, *soft*; and finally those whose parts move among one another, *fluid*.

2L4 Lemma 4. *If from a body, or individual, composed of many bodies, some bodies are removed, and at the same time as many others of the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form.*

2L4D Demonstration. For bodies are not distinguished by reason of substance (by Lemma 1), and what constitutes the form of an individual consists in a union of bodies (by the preceding definition). But this union (by hypothesis) is retained, even though there is a continual change of bodies. Therefore the individual will retain its nature as before, with respect both to substance and to mode. QED

2L5 Lemma 5. If the parts composing an individual become larger or smaller, but in such proportion that all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature as before, without any change of form.

2L5D Demonstration. The demonstration of this is the same as that of the preceding lemma.

2L6 Lemma 6. *If certain bodies composing an individual are compelled to turn the motion they have toward one direction toward another, but in such a way that they can continue their motions and communicate them to one another in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, without any change of form.*

2L6D Demonstration. This is self-evident. For the individual is supposed to retain everything that, in its definition, we said constitutes its form.

2L7 Lemma 7. *Further, an individual so composed retains its nature whether it moves as a whole or is at rest, and whether it moves in this direction or that, provided each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before.*

2L7D Demonstration. This is evident from its definition, which see before Lemma 4.

2L7S Scholium. From this, then, we see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways and still preserve its nature. So far we have conceived an individual composed only of bodies that are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is, one composed of the simplest bodies. If we now conceive another, composed of many individuals of different natures, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways and still preserve its nature. For since each of its parts is composed of many bodies, each part will be able (by the preceding lemma), without any change in its nature, to move now more slowly, now more quickly, and consequently to communicate its motions to the others more quickly or more slowly. And if we further conceive a third kind of individual, composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, without any change of its form. And if we go on in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of Nature is one individual, whose parts—that is, all bodies—vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as a whole. Had it been my intention to treat of body expressly, I would have had to explain and

demonstrate these things at greater length. But I have already said that I intend something else, and that I bring these things forward for no other reason than that from them I can easily deduce what I have set out to demonstrate.

2Post1 Postulate 1. The human body is composed of a great many individuals (of different natures), each of which is highly composite.

2Post2 Postulate 2. Of the individuals of which the human body is composed, some are fluid, some soft, and some, finally, hard.

2Post3 Postulate 3. The individuals composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in a great many ways.

2Post4 Postulate 4. To be preserved, the human body needs a great many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated.

2Post5 Postulate 5. When a fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to strike frequently against another, soft part, it changes the surface of that part and, as it were, imprints on it certain traces of the external body that is driving it.

2Post6 Postulate 6. The human body can move external bodies in a great many ways, and arrange them in a great many ways.

IMAGINATION AND MEMORY

The mind perceives external bodies through the body's affections, imagines absent things as present, and links ideas in memory.

2P14 Proposition 14. *The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more ways its body can be disposed.*

2P14D Demonstration. For the human body (by Postulates 3 and 6) is affected in a great many ways by external bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in a great many ways. But the human mind must perceive everything that happens in the human body (by Proposition 12 of this part). The human mind is

therefore capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, etc. QED

2P15 Proposition 15. *The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of a great many ideas.*

2P15D Demonstration. The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of the body (by Proposition 13 of this part), which (by Postulate 1) is composed of a great many highly composite individuals. But of each individual composing the body there is necessarily an idea in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of this part). Therefore (by Proposition 7 of this part) the idea of the human body is composed of these many ideas of its component parts. QED

2P16 Proposition 16. *The idea of any way in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body.*

2P16D Demonstration. For all the ways in which a body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body (by Axiom 1 after the Corollary to Lemma 3). So the idea of them (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) will necessarily involve the nature of each body. And so the idea of any way in which the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. QED

2P16C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of its own body.

2P16C2 Corollary 2. It follows, second, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies. I have explained this with many examples in the Appendix to Part 1.

2P17 Proposition 17. *If the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will regard that external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body.*

2P17D Demonstration. This is evident. For as long as the human body is affected in this way, the human mind (by Proposition 12 of this part) will regard this affection of the body; that is (by the preceding proposition), it will have the idea of a mode actually existing which involves the nature of the external body—an idea that does not exclude but posits the existence or presence of the nature of the external body. And so the mind (by Corollary 1 of the preceding proposition) will regard the external body as actually existing, or as present, until it is affected, etc. QED

2P17C Corollary. The mind will be able to regard external bodies by which the human body has once been affected as if they were present, even though they do not exist and are not present.

2P17CD Demonstration. When external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they frequently strike against the softer parts, they change the surfaces of these (by Postulate 5). As a result (see Axiom 2 after the Corollary to Lemma 3) the fluid parts are reflected from them in a different way than they used to be before; and afterwards too, when by their own spontaneous motion they meet these new surfaces, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven toward those surfaces by the external bodies. Consequently, while they continue to move after being reflected in this way, they affect the human body in the same way, and the mind (by Proposition 12 of this part) will think of this again; that is (by Proposition 17 of this part), the mind will again regard the external body as present. And this will happen as often as the fluid parts of the human body meet those same surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Therefore, even though the external bodies by which the human body was once affected do not exist, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present as often as this action of the body is repeated. QED

2P17S Scholium. We see, then, how it can happen that we regard things that do not exist as if they were present, as often happens. And it is possible that this comes about from other causes; but it is enough for me here to have shown one through which I can explain the matter just as if I had shown it through its true

cause. Nor do I believe that I stray far from the true cause, since all the postulates I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established by experience—which we are not permitted to doubt, now that we have shown that the human body exists as we sense it (see the Corollary after Proposition 13 of this part). Further (from the preceding corollary and Corollary 2 of Proposition 16 of this part), we clearly understand the difference between, for example, the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter's own mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man, say in Paul. For the former directly explains the essence of Peter's own body, and does not involve existence except as long as Peter exists. The latter indicates the constitution of Paul's body more than the nature of Peter; and so, while that constitution of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to it, even though Peter does not exist. Next, to keep to the usual words, we shall call the affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us the images of things, even though they do not reproduce the shapes of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines. And here, to begin to indicate what error is, I would like you to note that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error; that is, the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of the things it imagines to be present to it. For if the mind, while it imagined nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things did not really exist, it would surely attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice—especially if this faculty of imagining depended on its nature alone, that is (by Definition 7 of Part 1), if this faculty of imagining in the mind were free.

2P18 Proposition 18. *If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others as well.*

2P18D Demonstration. The mind (by the preceding corollary) imagines a body because the human body is affected and dis-

posed by the traces of the external body in the same way as it was affected when some of its parts were driven by that external body. But (by hypothesis) the body was at that time so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once. Therefore it will now also imagine two at once, and when the mind imagines either of them, it will immediately recollect the other as well. QED

2P18S Scholium. From this we clearly understand what *memory* is. For it is nothing other than a certain linking of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body—a linking that occurs in the mind according to the order and linking of the affections of the human body. I say, *first*, that it is a linking only of those ideas that involve the nature of things outside the human body, not of ideas that explain the nature of those things. For these are in fact (by Proposition 16 of this part) ideas of affections of the human body, which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, *second*, that this linking occurs according to the order and linking of the affections of the human body, to distinguish it from the linking of ideas that occurs according to the order of the intellect—the order by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men. And from this we further clearly understand why the mind passes immediately from the thought of one thing to the thought of another that has no likeness to the first. For example, from the thought of the word *pomum* a Roman will immediately pass to the thought of the fruit, which has no likeness to that articulate sound and nothing in common with it, except that the body of this same man has often been affected by the two—that is, that the man has often heard the word *pomum* while he was seeing the fruit itself. And so each person will pass from one thought to another according as habit has ordered the images of things in his body. A soldier, for example, seeing the tracks of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and from there to the thought of war, etc. But a farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a

plow, a field, etc.[4] And so each person, according as he has been accustomed to join and link the images of things in this way or that, will pass from one thought to this thought or to that.

WHAT THE MIND KNOWS OF ITSELF AND ITS BODY

The mind knows itself, its body and external bodies only through the body's affections, and so inadequately.

2P19 Proposition 19. *The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except through ideas of the affections by which the body is affected.*

2P19D Demonstration. For the human mind is the very idea, or knowledge, of the human body (by Proposition 13 of this part), which (by Proposition 9 of this part) is indeed in God insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing. Or rather, since (by Postulate 4) the human body needs a great many bodies by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated, and since the order and connection of ideas is the same (by Proposition 7 of this part) as the order and connection of causes, this idea will be in God insofar as he is considered as affected by the ideas of a great many singular things. God, therefore, has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, insofar as he is affected by a great many other ideas, and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is, the human mind perceives those affections (by Proposition 12 of this part), and consequently (by Proposition 16 of this part) the human body itself, and that (by Proposition 17 of this part) as actually existing. Only to that extent, therefore, does the human mind perceive the human body itself. QED

4 Pomum is Latin for "apple" or, more generally, "fruit."

2P20 Proposition 20. *There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body.*

2P20D Demonstration. Thought is an attribute of God (by Proposition 1 of this part). And so (by Proposition 3 of this part) there must necessarily be in God an idea both of thought and of all its affections, and consequently (by Proposition 11 of this part) of the human mind as well. Next, this idea, or knowledge, of the mind does not follow as being in God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by Proposition 9 of this part). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (by Proposition 7 of this part). Therefore this idea, or knowledge, of the mind follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. QED

2P21 Proposition 21. *This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.*

2P21D Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (see Propositions 12 and 13 of this part). And so, by that same reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind itself, in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. QED

2P21S Scholium. This proposition is understood far more clearly from what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 7 of this part. For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body—that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), the mind and the body—are one and the same individual, conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, conceived under one and the same attribute, namely Thought. The idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself follow in God with the same necessity from the same power of thinking. For in truth the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing other than the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its object. For

as soon as someone knows something, by that very fact he knows that he knows it, and at the same time he knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But more on this later.

2P22 Proposition 22. *The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body but also the ideas of these affections.*

2P22D Demonstration. The ideas of the ideas of affections follow in God and are related to God in the same way as the ideas of affections themselves; this is demonstrated in the same way as Proposition 20 of this part. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in the human mind (by Proposition 12 of this part), that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God insofar as he has the knowledge, or idea, of the human mind, that is (by Proposition 21 of this part), in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the affections of the body but also their ideas. QED

2P23 Proposition 23. *The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.*

2P23D Demonstration. The idea or knowledge of the mind follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea or knowledge of the body (by Proposition 20 of this part). But since the human mind does not know the human body itself (by Proposition 19 of this part)—that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), since knowledge of the human body is not related to God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind—neither is knowledge of the mind related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and so (by the same Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) the human mind, to that extent, does not know itself. Next, the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected involve the nature of the human body itself (by Proposition 16 of this part), that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), they agree with the nature of the mind; so knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve knowledge of the mind. But (by the preceding pro-

position) knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself; therefore the human mind knows itself only to that extent. QED

2P24 Proposition 24. *The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts that compose the human body.*

2P24D Demonstration. The parts that compose the human body pertain to the essence of the body itself only insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio (see the Definition after the Corollary to Lemma 3), and not insofar as they can be considered as individuals, without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body are highly composite individuals (by Postulate 1), whose parts (by Lemma 4) can be separated from the human body while its nature and form are wholly preserved, and can communicate their motions to other bodies in another ratio (see Axiom 1 after Lemma 3). And so (by Proposition 3 of this part) the idea or knowledge of any part will be in God—and indeed (by Proposition 9 of this part) insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a singular thing, a singular thing that is prior to the part itself in the order of Nature (by Proposition 7 of this part). The same must further be said of any part of an individual that composes the human body. And so knowledge of any part that composes the human body is in God insofar as he is affected by a great many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body, that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), the idea that constitutes the nature of the human mind. And so (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts that compose the human body. QED

2P25 Proposition 25. *The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body.*

2P25D Demonstration. We have shown that the idea of an affection of the human body involves the nature of an external body to the extent that the external body determines the human body itself in some definite way (see Proposition 16 of this part). But insofar as the external body is an individual that is not related to the human body, its idea or knowledge is in God (by Proposition

9 of this part) insofar as God is considered as affected by the idea of another thing, which (by Proposition 7 of this part) is prior in nature to the external body itself. So adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God insofar as he has the idea of the affection of the human body; in other words, the idea of an affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body. QED

2P26 Proposition 26. *The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.*

2P26D Demonstration. If the human body is in no way affected by some external body, then (by Proposition 7 of this part) neither is the idea of the human body—that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), the human mind—affected in any way by the idea of that body's existence; in other words, it does not perceive the existence of that external body in any way. But insofar as the human body is affected in some way by some external body, to that extent (by Proposition 16 of this part, with its Corollary) it perceives the external body. QED

2P26C Corollary. Insofar as the human mind imagines an external body, it does not have adequate knowledge of it.

2P26CD Demonstration. When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the affections of its own body, we say that it imagines (see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part); nor can the mind imagine external bodies as actually existing in any other way (by the preceding proposition). And so (by Proposition 25 of this part), insofar as the mind imagines external bodies, it does not have adequate knowledge of them. QED

2P27 Proposition 27. *The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.*

2P27D Demonstration. Any idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the human body to the extent that the human body itself is considered to be affected in some definite way (see Proposition 16 of this part). But insofar as the human body is an individual that can be affected in many other

ways, its idea, etc. (See the Demonstration of Proposition 25 of this part.)

2P28 Proposition 28. *The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.*

2P28D Demonstration. For the ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body itself (by Proposition 16 of this part); and they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts, since affections are modes (by Postulate 3) by which the parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body, are affected. But (by Propositions 24 and 25 of this part) adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts that compose the human body, is in God not insofar as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but insofar as he is considered as affected by other ideas. These ideas of affections, then, insofar as they are related to the human mind alone, are like conclusions without premises—that is (as is self-evident), confused ideas. QED

2P28S Scholium. It can be demonstrated in the same way that the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; and the same holds for the idea of the human mind, and for the ideas of the ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related to the mind alone—as anyone can easily see.

2P29 Proposition 29. *The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind.*

2P29D Demonstration. For the idea of an affection of the human body (by Proposition 27 of this part) does not involve adequate knowledge of the body itself—in other words, it does not adequately express its nature; that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), it does not agree adequately with the nature of the mind. And so (by Axiom 6 of Part 1) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind; in other words, it does not involve adequate knowledge of it. QED

2P29C Corollary. From this it follows that whenever the human mind perceives things in the common order of Nature, it has adequate knowledge neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only confused and fragmentary knowledge. For the mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body (by Proposition 23 of this part). And it does not perceive its own body (by Proposition 19 of this part) except through those very ideas of affections, and it is also only through them (by Proposition 26 of this part) that it perceives external bodies. And so, insofar as it has these ideas, it has adequate knowledge neither of itself (by Proposition 29 of this part), nor of its own body (by Proposition 27 of this part), nor of external bodies (by Proposition 25 of this part), but only (by Proposition 28 of this part, with its Scholium) fragmentary and confused knowledge. QED

2P29S Scholium. I say expressly that the mind has adequate knowledge neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only confused and fragmentary knowledge, whenever it perceives things in the common order of Nature—that is, whenever it is determined externally, by the chance encounters of things, to regard this or that; and not whenever it is determined internally, namely by regarding many things at once, to understand their agreements, differences and oppositions. For whenever it is disposed internally, in this or some other way, it then regards things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show below.

DURATION, FALSITY AND ERROR

We know the duration of things inadequately; falsity is a privation of knowledge, as in belief in free will.

2P30 Proposition 30. *We can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.*

2P30D Demonstration. The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (by Axiom 1 of this part), nor even on the absolute nature of God (by Proposition 21 of Part 1). Rather (by

Proposition 28 of Part 1), it is determined to exist and to act by causes of such a kind that they too are determined by others to exist and to act in a certain and determinate way, and these again by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body, therefore, depends on the common order of Nature and on the way things are constituted. But adequate knowledge of how things are constituted is in God insofar as he has the ideas of all of them, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part). So knowledge of the duration of our body is quite inadequate in God insofar as he is considered only to constitute the nature of the human mind; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), this knowledge is quite inadequate in our mind. QED

2P31 Proposition 31. *We can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things outside us.*

2P31D Demonstration. For each singular thing, like the human body, must be determined to exist and to act in a certain and determinate way by another singular thing; and this again by another, and so on to infinity (by Proposition 28 of Part 1). Now since we demonstrated in the preceding proposition, from this common property of singular things, that we have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body, the same must be concluded about the duration of singular things: namely, that we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of it. QED

2P31C Corollary. From this it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration (by the preceding proposition), and this is what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption (see Scholium 1 to Proposition 33 of Part 1). For (by Proposition 29 of Part 1) apart from this there is nothing contingent.

2P32 Proposition 32. *All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.*

2P32D Demonstration. For all the ideas that are in God agree entirely with their objects (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part), and so (by Axiom 6 of Part 1) they are all true. QED

2P33 Proposition 33. *There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.*

2P33D Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if you can, a positive mode of thinking that constitutes the form of error, or falsity. This mode of thinking cannot be in God (by the preceding proposition); but outside God it can neither be nor be conceived (by Proposition 15 of Part 1). And so there can be nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false. QED

2P34 Proposition 34. *Every idea that in us is absolute, that is, adequate and perfect, is true.*

2P34D Demonstration. When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we are saying nothing other (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) than that there is an adequate and perfect idea in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our mind; and consequently (by Proposition 32 of this part) we are saying nothing other than that such an idea is true. QED

2P35 Proposition 35. *Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge that inadequate—that is, fragmentary and confused—ideas involve.*

2P35D Demonstration. There is nothing positive in ideas that constitutes the form of falsity (by Proposition 33 of this part). But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for it is minds, not bodies, that are said to err or be deceived), nor yet in absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to err are different things. It consists, therefore, in the privation of knowledge that inadequate knowledge of things—that is, inadequate and confused ideas—involves. QED

2P35S Scholium. In the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part I explained in what way error consists in the privation of knowledge; but to explain the matter more fully I shall give an example. People are deceived in thinking themselves free—an opinion that consists solely in this: that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are

determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom: that they know no cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend on the will, these are words of which they have no idea. None of them knows what the will is, or how it moves the body; those who boast otherwise, and invent seats and dwelling places for the soul, usually provoke either laughter or disgust. In the same way, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. This error does not consist in this imagining alone, but in the fact that, while we imagine it so, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining. For even if we later come to know that it is more than 600 diameters of the earth away from us, we will nonetheless still imagine it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun to be so close because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as the body is affected by it.

2P36 Proposition 36. *Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.*

2P36D Demonstration. All ideas are in God (by Proposition 15 of Part 1), and, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by Proposition 32 of this part) and (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part) adequate. And so none are inadequate or confused except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of some individual (on this see Propositions 24 and 28 of this part). And so all of them, adequate and inadequate alike, follow with the same necessity (by the Corollary to Proposition 6 of this part). QED

COMMON NOTIONS AND THE THREE KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE

Spinoza derives the common notions and distinguishes imagination, reason and intuitive knowledge.

2P37 Proposition 37. *What is common to all things* (on these, see Lemma 2 above), *and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.*

2P37D Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that it constitutes the essence of some singular thing—say, the essence of B. Then (by Definition 2 of this part) it will be unable either to be or to be conceived without B. But this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not pertain to the essence of B, nor does it constitute the essence of any other singular thing. QED

2P38 Proposition 38. *Those things that are common to all, and are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.*

2P38D Demonstration. Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and is equally in the part of any body and in the whole. I say that A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part) will necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of its affections, which (by Propositions 16, 25 and 27 of this part) partly involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. That is (by Propositions 12 and 13 of this part), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human mind, or insofar as he has the ideas that are in the human mind. The mind, therefore (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), necessarily perceives A adequately—and does so both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own body or any external body whatever—nor can A be conceived in any other way. QED

2P38C Corollary. From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all human beings. For (by Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by the preceding proposition) must be perceived by all adequately, that is, clearly and distinctly.

2P39 Proposition 39. *If something is common to, and proper to, the human body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and is equally in the part of each of these and in the whole, its idea too will be adequate in the mind.*

2P39D Demonstration. Let A be what is common and proper to the human body and certain external bodies, what is equally in the human body and in those external bodies, and what, finally, is equally in the part of each external body and in the whole. There will be an adequate idea of A itself in God (by the Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part), both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of the external bodies posited. Now suppose that the human body is affected by an external body through what it has in common with it, that is, by A. The idea of this affection will involve the property A (by Proposition 16 of this part), and so (by the same Corollary to Proposition 7 of this part) the idea of this affection, insofar as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God insofar as he is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (by Proposition 13 of this part), insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. And so (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. QED

2P39C Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately, the more things its body has in common with other bodies.

2P40 Proposition 40. *Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in it are also adequate.*

2P40D Demonstration. This is evident. For when we say that an idea follows in the human mind from ideas that are adequate in it, we are saying nothing other (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part) than that there is in the divine intellect itself an idea of which God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected by the ideas of a great many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human mind.

2P40S1 Scholium 1. With this I have explained the cause of the notions that are called *common,* and that are the foundations of our reasoning. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which it would be worthwhile to explain by this method of ours; for from them it would become clear which notions are

more useful than the rest, and which are of scarcely any use; then, which are common, which are clear and distinct only to those who are free of prejudices, and finally which are ill-founded. It would also become clear where those notions they call *second* notions, and consequently the axioms founded on them, took their origin, along with other things I have at times thought about in connection with these matters. But since I have reserved these for another treatise, and also so as not to cause weariness by excessive length on this subject, I have decided to pass over the matter here.[5] Still, so as not to omit anything here that it is necessary to know, I shall briefly add the causes from which the so-called *transcendental* terms, such as Being, Thing and Something, took their origin. These terms arise from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is capable of forming distinctly in itself only a certain number of images at the same time (I explained what an image is in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part). If that number is exceeded, these images will begin to be confused; and if the number of images the body is capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is far exceeded, they will all be completely confused with one another. This being so, it is evident from the Corollary to Proposition 17 and from Proposition 18 of this part that the human mind will be able to imagine distinctly at the same time as many bodies as there are images that can be formed at the same time in its own body.[6] But when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind too will imagine all bodies confusedly, without any distinction, and will comprehend them as if under one attribute, namely under the attribute of Being, Thing, and so on. This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other causes analogous to these, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose we are aiming at, it is enough to consider just one. For

5 "Second notions" (or "second intentions") is a scholastic term for concepts of concepts, such as genus and species.

6 In scholastic philosophy the "transcendentals" are terms, such as being, thing, one, true and good, that apply to everything whatever and so transcend every category.

they all come to this: that these terms signify ideas confused to the highest degree. From similar causes, next, have arisen those notions they call *universal*, such as Man, Horse, Dog, and so on. That is, so many images—of human beings, for example—are formed in the human body at once that they overwhelm the power of imagining, not entirely, to be sure, but to the point that the mind cannot imagine the slight differences between individuals (such as the color and size of each one, and so on) or their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only that in which they all agree, insofar as the body is affected by them. For it is by this, as met with in each individual, that the body has been most affected; and this the mind expresses by the name *man*, and predicates it of infinitely many individuals. For, as we have said, it cannot imagine the determinate number of individuals. But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by everyone in the same way; they vary from person to person according to the thing by which the body has more often been affected, and which the mind more easily imagines or recollects. For example, those who have more often regarded the stature of human beings with wonder will understand by the name *man* an animal of upright stature; while those who are accustomed to regard something else will form another common image of human beings—that man is an animal capable of laughter, a featherless two-footed animal, a rational animal; and so with the rest: each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his own body. It is no wonder, then, that so many controversies have arisen among philosophers who have wanted to explain natural things by mere images of things.[7]

2P40S2 Scholium 2. From everything said above it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions (1) from singular things represented to the intellect through the senses in a fragmentary, confused and disorderly way (see the Corollary to Proposition 29 of this part)—and for that reason I have been in the habit of calling such perceptions knowledge from

7 Stock definitions from the tradition: "featherless biped" is attributed to Plato, and "rational animal" and "capable of laughter" come from the Aristotelian school.

random experience; (2) from signs—for example, from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine the things (see the Scholium to Proposition 18 of this part). Both of these ways of regarding things I shall from now on call *knowledge of the first kind*, opinion, or *imagination*; (3) finally, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see the Corollary to Proposition 38, Proposition 39 with its Corollary, and Proposition 40 of this part); and this I shall call *reason* and *knowledge of the second kind*.[8] Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall show in what follows, another, a *third* kind, which we shall call *intuitive knowledge*. This kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall explain all this by the example of a single thing. Suppose, for example, that three numbers are given, and we must find a fourth that is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first—either because they have not yet forgotten what they heard from their teacher without any demonstration, or because they have often tried it with very simple numbers, or by force of the demonstration of Proposition 19 of Book 7 of Euclid, that is, from the common property of proportionals. But with the simplest numbers none of this is needed. For example,[9] given the numbers 1, 2 and 3, everyone sees that the fourth proportional number is 6—and this much more clearly, because we infer the fourth number from the very ratio which we see, at a single glance, the first to have to the second.

2P41 Proposition 41. *Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.*

2P41D Demonstration. We said in the preceding scholium that to knowledge of the first kind belong all those ideas that are inad-

8 "Random experience" renders *experientia vaga*: experience that wanders, unregulated by the intellect.

equate and confused; and so (by Proposition 35 of this part) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. Next, we said that to knowledge of the second and third kinds belong those ideas that are adequate; and so (by Proposition 34 of this part) it is necessarily true. QED

2P42 Proposition 42. *Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.*

2P42D Demonstration. This Proposition is self-evident. For whoever knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and the false; that is (by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of this part), must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

TRUTH IS ITS OWN STANDARD

A true idea carries certainty with it; reason regards things as necessary; the mind has adequate knowledge of God.

2P43 Proposition 43. *Whoever has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.*

2P43D Demonstration. A true idea in us is one that is adequate in God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part). Let us suppose, then, that there is in God, insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea, A. Of this idea there must necessarily also be in God an idea that is related to God in the same way as the idea A (by Proposition 20 of this part, whose demonstration is universal). But the idea A is supposed to be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind; therefore the idea of the idea A must also be related to God in the same way; that is (by the same Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part), this adequate idea of the idea A will be in the very mind that has the adequate idea A. And so whoever has an adequate idea—or (by Proposition 34 of this part) whoever truly knows a thing—must at the same time

9 Euclid, *Elements* 7.19: if four numbers are proportional, the product of the first and fourth equals the product of the second and third.

have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge; that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be certain. QED

2P43S Scholium. In the Scholium to Proposition 21 of this part I explained what the idea of an idea is. But it should be noted that the preceding proposition is sufficiently evident by itself. For no one who has a true idea is unaware that a true idea involves the highest certainty; for to have a true idea means nothing other than to know a thing perfectly, or in the best way. And surely no one can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking—namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands the thing? That is, who can know that he is certain about some thing unless he is first certain about that thing? Again, what can there be that is clearer and more certain than a true idea, to serve as the standard of truth? Indeed, just as light makes both itself and darkness manifest, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false. And with this I think I have answered the following questions. If a true idea is distinguished from a false one only insofar as it is said to agree with its object, does a true idea then have no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished only by an extrinsic denomination)—and consequently does a person who has true ideas have none over one who has only false ones? Next, how does it come about that people have false ideas? And finally, how can someone know for certain that he has ideas that agree with their objects? To these questions, I say, I think I have now replied. For as far as the difference between a true and a false idea is concerned, it is established from Proposition 35 of this part that the one stands to the other as being to non-being.[10] As for the causes of falsity, I have shown them very clearly from Proposition 19 through Proposition 35, with its Scholium. From these it is also evident how a person who has true ideas differs

10 An "extrinsic denomination" is a scholastic term for a description that applies to a thing only through its relation to something outside it.

from one who has only false ones. Finally, as to the last question—namely, how a person can know that he has an idea that agrees with its object—I have just shown more than sufficiently that this arises solely from the fact that he has an idea that agrees with its object; in other words, that truth is its own standard. Add to this that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of this part); and so it is as necessary that the mind's clear and distinct ideas be true as that God's ideas are.

2P44 Proposition 44. *It is of the nature of reason to regard things not as contingent but as necessary.*

2P44D Demonstration. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by Proposition 41 of this part), namely (by Axiom 6 of Part 1) as they are in themselves, that is (by Proposition 29 of Part 1), not as contingent but as necessary. QED

2P44C1 Corollary 1. From this it follows that it depends on the imagination alone that we regard things, with respect to both the past and the future, as contingent.

2P44S Scholium. How this comes about I shall explain briefly. We showed above (Proposition 17 of this part, with its Corollary) that the mind, even if things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines them as present to itself, unless causes occur that exclude their present existence. Next, we showed (Proposition 18 of this part) that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, then when the mind later imagines either of them, it will immediately recollect the other as well—that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless causes occur that exclude their present existence. Moreover, no one doubts that we also imagine time—namely, from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or equally quickly. Let us suppose, then, a boy who yesterday, for the first time, saw Peter in the morning, Paul at noon and Simeon in the evening, and who today again sees Peter in the morning. From Proposition 18 of this part it is evident that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will at once imagine the sun passing through the same part of the sky as he

saw it pass the day before—that is, a whole day—and together with the morning he will imagine Peter, with noon Paul, and with evening Simeon. That is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simeon in relation to future time. Conversely, if he sees Simeon in the evening, he will refer Paul and Peter to past time, imagining them together with past time; and he will do so the more constantly, the more often he has seen them in this same order. But if it should happen at some point that on another evening he sees James instead of Simeon, then on the following morning he will imagine together with the evening now Simeon, now James, but not both at once. For he is supposed to have seen only one or the other of them in the evening, not both at once. His imagination will therefore waver, and with a future evening he will imagine now this one, now that one; that is, he will regard neither as certainly future, but each as contingently future. And this wavering of the imagination will be the same if the imagining concerns things that we regard in the same way in relation to past or present time; consequently we shall imagine things related to present time, as well as to past or future time, as contingent.

2P44C2 Corollary 2. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things from a certain standpoint of eternity.[11]

2P44C2D Demonstration. For it is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent (by the preceding proposition). And it perceives this necessity of things truly (by Proposition 41 of this part), that is (by Axiom 6 of Part 1), as it is in itself. But (by Proposition 16 of Part 1) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God's eternal nature. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to regard things from this standpoint of eternity. Add that the foundations of reason are notions (by Proposition 38 of this part) that explain what is common to all things, and that (by Proposition 37 of this part) explain the essence of no singular thing; they must therefore be conceived

11 Latin *sub specie aeternitatis*, literally "under an aspect of eternity": seeing things as following necessarily from God's eternal nature, without relation to time.

without any relation to time, from a certain standpoint of eternity. QED

2P45 Proposition 45. *Each idea of any body, or of any singular thing that actually exists, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.*

2P45D Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing that actually exists necessarily involves both the essence and the existence of that thing (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of this part). But singular things (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) cannot be conceived without God. Rather, since they have God for their cause (by Proposition 6 of this part) insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the things themselves are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (by Axiom 4 of Part 1) the concept of their attribute, that is (by Definition 6 of Part 1), the eternal and infinite essence of God. QED

2P45S Scholium. By existence here I do not mean duration—that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly, as a kind of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (see Proposition 16 of Part 1). I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For although each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, the force by which each perseveres in existing nonetheless follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature. On this, see the Corollary to Proposition 24 of Part 1.

2P46 Proposition 46. *The knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence that each idea involves is adequate and perfect.*

2P46D Demonstration. The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal: whether a thing is considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or of a part, will involve God's eternal and infinite essence (by the preceding proposition). So what gives knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence is common to all things, and is equally in the part and in the whole; and therefore (by Proposition 38 of this part) this knowledge will be adequate. QED

2P47 Proposition 47. *The human mind has adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence.*

2P47D Demonstration. The human mind has ideas (by Proposition 22 of this part) from which (by Proposition 23 of this part) it perceives itself, its body (by Proposition 19 of this part), and external bodies (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 16 and by Proposition 17 of this part) as actually existing. Therefore (by Propositions 45 and 46 of this part) it has adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence. QED

2P47S Scholium. From this we see that God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that from this knowledge we can deduce a great many things that we know adequately, and so form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of this part, and of whose excellence and usefulness we shall have occasion to speak in Part 5. That people do not have as clear a knowledge of God as they have of the common notions comes from this: they cannot imagine God as they imagine bodies, and they have joined the name *God* to the images of things they are used to seeing—something people can hardly avoid, since they are continually affected by external bodies. And indeed most errors consist in this alone: that we do not apply names to things correctly. For when someone says that the lines drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he certainly understands by "circle," at least at that moment, something different from what mathematicians do. So too when people make a mistake in a calculation, they have some numbers in their mind and others on the paper. If you look to their mind, then, they certainly do not err; yet they seem to err, because we think they have in mind the numbers that are on the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe they erred at all—just as I did not believe that a man was in error whom I recently heard shouting that his courtyard had flown into his neighbor's hen, because what was in his mind seemed clear enough to me. And this is where most controversies come from: people either do

not explain their own mind correctly or misinterpret someone else's. For in reality, when they contradict each other most, they are thinking either the same things or different things, so that what each takes to be errors and absurdities in the other are not.

THERE IS NO FREE WILL

The mind has no absolute will; each volition is an idea's own affirmation, so will and intellect are one.

2P48 Proposition 48. *In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will; rather, the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so on to infinity.*

2P48D Demonstration. The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by Proposition 11 of this part), and therefore (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 17 of Part 1) it cannot be a free cause of its actions; that is, it cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing. Rather, it must be determined to will this or that (by Proposition 28 of Part 1) by a cause, which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so on. QED

2P48S Scholium. In the same way it is demonstrated that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, and so on. It follows that these and similar faculties are either wholly fictitious or nothing but metaphysical beings, that is, universals, which we are accustomed to form from particulars. So intellect and will are related to this or that idea, or to this or that volition, in the same way as stoniness is related to this or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul. The cause of people's thinking themselves free we explained in the Appendix to Part 1. But before I go further, I should note here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, not desire. I mean, I say, the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or what is false—not the desire by which the mind seeks things or turns away from them. Now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions, not dis-

tinguished from the singulars from which we form them, we must ask whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. We must ask, I say, whether there is in the mind any affirmation and negation other than the one that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. On this, see the following proposition, and also Definition 3 of this part, so that our thinking does not slip into pictures. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye or, if you like, in the middle of the brain, but concepts of Thought.

2P49 Proposition 49. *There is in the mind no volition—that is, no affirmation or negation—besides the one that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves.*

2P49D Demonstration. There is in the mind (by the preceding proposition) no absolute faculty of willing and not willing, but only singular volitions, namely this or that affirmation and this or that negation. Let us conceive, then, some singular volition—say, the mode of thinking by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the concept, or idea, of a triangle; that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of a triangle. For it is the same whether I say that A must involve the concept of B or that A cannot be conceived without B. Next, this affirmation (by Axiom 3 of this part) also cannot be without the idea of a triangle. So this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle. Further, this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So, conversely, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation; and therefore (by Definition 2 of this part) this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle and is nothing besides it. And what we have said of this volition (since we chose it at random) must also be said of any volition whatever: it is nothing besides the idea. QED

2P49C Corollary. Will and intellect are one and the same.

2P49CD Demonstration. Will and intellect are nothing besides the singular volitions and ideas themselves (by Proposition 48 of

this part and its Scholium). But a singular volition and a singular idea are one and the same (by the preceding proposition). Therefore will and intellect are one and the same. QED

2P49S Scholium. With this we have removed what is commonly held to be the cause of error. We showed above that falsity consists only in the privation that fragmentary and confused ideas involve. So a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that someone rests content with false things and does not doubt them, we are not saying that he is certain, only that he does not doubt—or that he rests content with false things because there are no causes that make his imagination waver. On this, see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this part. However firmly a person is supposed to cling to false things, then, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive (see Proposition 43 of this part with its Scholium), not the privation of doubt; whereas by the privation of certainty we understand falsity. But to explain the preceding proposition more fully, some points remain to be made. It then remains for me to reply to the objections that can be raised against this doctrine of ours; and finally, to remove every misgiving, I have thought it worthwhile to point out certain advantages of this doctrine. Certain ones, I say, for the chief of them will be better understood from what we shall say in Part 5.

I begin, then, with the first, and I urge my readers to distinguish carefully between an idea, or concept of the mind, and the images of the things we imagine. Next, they must distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because many people either confuse these three—images, words, and ideas—entirely, or distinguish them not accurately enough, or not cautiously enough, they have been wholly ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which it is absolutely necessary to know, both for speculation and for ordering one's life wisely. For those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us by encounters with bodies persuade themselves that ideas of things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas, but

only fictions that we invent by the free choice of the will. They look on ideas, then, as if they were mute pictures on a panel; and, preoccupied by this prejudice, they do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation that the idea involves, think they can will contrary to what they perceive, when they merely affirm or deny in words something contrary to what they perceive. But anyone who attends to the nature of Thought, which does not in the least involve the concept of Extension, can easily shed these prejudices. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of any thing nor in words. For the essence of words and images is constituted by bodily motions alone, which do not in the least involve the concept of thought.

Let these few warnings on the subject suffice. I pass, then, to the objections mentioned above.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED, AND THE DOCTRINE'S USES

Spinoza states four objections to his account of the will, answers them, and lists the doctrine's benefits for life.

The *first* of these is that people think it established that the will extends more widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from it. The reason they think the will extends more widely than the intellect is that, as they say, they know by experience that they need no greater faculty of assenting—that is, of affirming and denying—than the one they already have in order to assent to infinitely many other things that we do not perceive; whereas they would need a greater faculty of understanding. The will, then, is distinguished from the intellect in that the intellect is finite and the will infinite.

Second, it can be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend our judgment so as not to assent to the things we perceive. This is also confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he per-

ceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. For example, someone who invents a winged horse does not thereby grant that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not thereby deceived, unless at the same time he grants that a winged horse exists. Experience seems to teach nothing more clearly, then, than that the will, or the faculty of assenting, is free and different from the faculty of understanding.

Third, it can be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another; that is, we do not seem to need greater power to affirm that what is true is true than to affirm that something false is true. But we do perceive that one idea has more reality, or perfection, than another: for as some objects are more excellent than others, so too some of their ideas are more perfect than others. From this, too, the difference between will and intellect seems to be established.

Fourth, it can be objected: if a person does not act from freedom of the will, what will happen if he is in a state of equilibrium, like Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I grant that he will, I would seem to be conceiving an ass, or a statue of a man, not a man. If I deny it, then he will determine himself, and consequently has the faculty of going and of doing whatever he wants. Other objections could perhaps be raised besides these; but since I am not obliged to dwell on whatever anyone may dream up, I shall take care to answer only these, and as briefly as I can.[12]

To the *first*, I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they mean only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving. Nor do I see why the faculty of willing should be called infinite any more than the faculty of sensing. For just as we can affirm infinitely many things with the same faculty of willing (one after another, though, since we cannot affirm infinitely many at once), so too

12 A proverbial case, attached to the name of the 14th-century philosopher Jean Buridan, of an animal that starves between two equally attractive portions of food because nothing tips its choice.

we can sense, or perceive, infinitely many bodies with the same faculty of sensing (one after another, that is). And if they say that there are infinitely many things we cannot perceive, I reply that we cannot reach them by any thought, and consequently not by any faculty of willing either. But, they say, if God wanted to bring it about that we perceived these things as well, he would have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than the one he has given. This is the same as if they said that if God wanted to bring it about that we understood infinitely many other beings, he would indeed have to give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being than the one he has given, in order to embrace those same infinitely many beings. For we have shown that the will is a universal being, or idea, by which we explain all singular volitions —that is, what is common to all of them. Since, then, they believe that this common or universal idea of all volitions is a faculty, it is hardly surprising that they say this faculty extends to infinity, beyond the limits of the intellect. For a universal is predicated equally of one, of many, and of infinitely many individuals.

To the *second* objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we are saying nothing but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension of judgment, then, is really a perception, not free will. To understand this clearly, let us conceive a child who imagines a [winged] horse and perceives nothing else. Since this imagining of the horse involves the horse's existence (by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of this part), and the child perceives nothing that cancels the horse's existence, he will necessarily regard the horse as present; nor will he be able to doubt its existence, though he will not be certain of it. We experience this every day in dreams. Nor do I believe there is anyone who thinks that while he is dreaming he has a free power of suspending judgment about what he dreams, and of bringing it about that he does not dream what he dreams he sees. And yet it does happen that even in

dreams we suspend judgment—namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. Further, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives; that is, I grant that the imaginings of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error (see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part). But I deny that a person affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what is perceiving a winged horse but affirming wings of a horse? For if the mind perceived nothing besides the winged horse, it would regard the horse as present to itself, and would have no cause to doubt its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting—unless the imagining of the winged horse were joined to an idea that cancels the existence of that horse, or unless the mind perceived that the idea of the winged horse it has is inadequate. And then it will either necessarily deny that horse's existence or necessarily doubt it.

With this I think I have also answered the *third* objection. The will is something universal, predicated of all ideas, which signifies only what is common to all ideas, namely affirmation. Its adequate essence, therefore, insofar as it is conceived abstractly in this way, must be in each idea, and only in this respect is it the same in all; but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the essence of the idea, for in that respect singular affirmations differ from one another as much as the ideas themselves do. For example, the affirmation that the idea of a circle involves differs from the one that the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Next, I flatly deny that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that what is true is true as to affirm that what is false is true. For if you look to the mind, these two affirmations are related to each other as being to non-being; there is nothing positive in ideas that constitutes the form of falsity (see Proposition 35 of this part with its Scholium, and the Scholium to Proposition 47 of this part). Here, then, it is especially worth noting how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real things.

Finally, as regards the *fourth* objection, I say that I fully grant that a person placed in such an equilibrium (one, that is, who

perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such-and-such food and such-and-such drink, equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me whether such a person should not be reckoned an ass rather than a man, I say that I do not know—just as I also do not know how to reckon someone who hangs himself, or how to reckon children, fools, those who have lost their minds, and so on.

It remains, finally, to show how much knowledge of this doctrine contributes to the conduct of life. We shall easily see this from the following points.

1. It teaches that we act by God's bidding alone, and that we share in the divine nature—the more so, the more perfect the actions we perform and the more and more we understand God. This doctrine, then, besides bringing complete peace of mind, has this further merit: it teaches us in what our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists—namely, in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only what love and piety urge. From this we understand clearly how far from a true estimate of virtue those people stray who, for their virtue and their best actions, expect to be decorated by God with the highest rewards, as if for the hardest servitude—as though virtue itself, and the service of God, were not happiness itself and the highest freedom.[13]

2. It teaches how we ought to conduct ourselves regarding matters of fortune, that is, things not in our power—things that do not follow from our nature: namely, to expect and bear both faces of fortune with an even mind. For all things follow from God's eternal decree with the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

3. This doctrine contributes to social life, in that it teaches us to hate no one, disdain no one, mock no one, be angry with no one, envy no one. Further, it teaches that each person should be content with what is his own, and should help his neighbor—not

13 *Virtus*: for Spinoza virtue is the same as power—a thing's power to act from its own nature.

from sentimental pity, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason alone, as time and circumstance require, as I shall show in Part 4.

4. Finally, this doctrine also contributes no little to society as a whole, in that it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led: not so that they may be slaves, but so that they may freely do what is best. With this I have completed what I had resolved to treat in this scholium, and so I bring this Second Part of ours to a close. In it I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties at sufficient length, and as clearly as the difficulty of the subject allows, and have set out things from which many excellent conclusions can be drawn—highly useful and necessary to know—as will partly become clear from what follows.

Part III: Of the origin and nature of the affects

Spinoza treats the emotions as natural things with causes, deriving them from desire, joy and sadness.

3Pref Most of those who have written about the affects and about how people live seem to treat not natural things, which follow the common laws of Nature, but things outside Nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in Nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs the order of Nature rather than follows it, that he has absolute power over his own actions, and that he is determined by nothing other than himself. Then they attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy not to the common power of Nature but to some flaw or other in human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, despise, or—as most often happens—curse; and whoever knows how to carp at the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more cleverly is regarded as practically divine. Yet there has been no lack of eminent men (to whose labor and diligence we confess we owe much) who have written many excellent things about the right way of living and have given mortals advice full of prudence. But no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and strength of the affects, or what the mind, for its part, can do to moderate them. I know, of course, that the celebrated Descartes, although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, nevertheless tried to explain human affects through their first causes, and at the same time to show the way by which the mind can have absolute dominion over the affects. But in my opinion, at least,

he showed nothing but the brilliance of his great intellect, as I shall demonstrate in its place. For I want to return to those who would rather curse or laugh at people's affects and actions than understand them.[1] To these people it will no doubt seem strange that I set out to treat human vices and follies in the geometrical manner, and want to demonstrate by sure reasoning things they loudly proclaim to be contrary to reason, empty, absurd, and horrifying. But this is my reasoning. Nothing happens in Nature that can be attributed to a flaw in it; for Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same. That is, the laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form into another are everywhere and always the same. So there must also be one and the same way of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever: namely, through the universal laws and rules of Nature. The affects of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, therefore follow from the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other singular things do. Accordingly, they have definite causes through which they are understood, and definite properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing whose mere contemplation delights us. I shall therefore treat the nature and strength of the affects, and the power of the mind over them, by the same method by which I treated God and the mind in the preceding parts; and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes, or bodies.

DEFINITIONS AND POSTULATES

Spinoza defines adequate cause, acting and being acted on, and affect.

3D1 Definition 1. I call a cause adequate when its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it; I call it inadequate, or partial, when its effect cannot be understood through it alone.

1 René Descartes (1596–1650), whose *Passions of the Soul* (1649) is the work in view here.

3D2 Definition 2. I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is (by the preceding Definition), when from our nature something follows, in us or outside us, that can be clearly and distinctly understood through our nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.

3D3 Definition 3. By affect I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections.

So if we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then by affect I understand an action; otherwise, a passion.

3Post1 Postulate 1. The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways that make its power of acting neither greater nor less.

This Postulate, or Axiom, rests on Postulate 1 and Lemmas 5 and 7, for which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2.

3Post2 Postulate 2. The human body can undergo many changes and nonetheless retain the impressions, or traces, of objects (on which see Postulate 5 of Part 2), and consequently the same images of things (for their definition, see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2).

3P1 Proposition 1. *Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others: namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things.*

3P1D Demonstration. In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and others fragmentary and confused (by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Now the ideas that are adequate in someone's mind are adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of that mind (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2); and those that are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God (by the same Corollary), not insofar as he contains in himself only the essence of that mind, but insofar as he

also contains in himself the minds of other things at the same time. Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), of which God is the adequate cause (see Definition 1 of this part)—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by that given idea (see Proposition 9 of Part 2). But of an effect of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected by an idea that is adequate in someone's mind, that same mind is the adequate cause (by the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2). Therefore our mind (by Definition 2 of this part), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts in some things. That was the first point. Next, whatever necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but insofar as he has in himself the minds of other things together with that man's mind—of this (by the same Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2) that man's mind is not the adequate cause but a partial one. And therefore (by Definition 2 of this part) the mind, insofar as it has inadequate ideas, is necessarily acted on in some things. That was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. QED

3P1C Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is subject to more passions the more inadequate ideas it has, and, conversely, acts more the more adequate ideas it has.

NEITHER MIND NOR BODY MOVES THE OTHER

Mind and body are one thing; belief in free decisions of the mind is a waking dream.

3P2 Proposition 2. *The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).*

3P2D Demonstration. All modes of thinking have God for their cause insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by another attribute (by Proposition 6 of Part 2). So what determines the mind to think is a mode of Thought, not of Extension; that is (by Definition 1 of Part 2), it is not a body. That

was the first point. Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another; and, without qualification, whatever arises in a body must have arisen from God insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of Extension, and not insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of Thought (by the same Proposition 6 of Part 2); that is, it cannot arise from the mind, which (by Proposition 11 of Part 2) is a mode of thinking. That was the second point. Therefore neither can the body determine the mind, etc. QED

3P2S Scholium. This is understood more clearly from what was said in the Scholium to Proposition 7 of Part 2: namely, that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. Hence the order, or connection, of things is one, whether Nature is conceived under this attribute or under that; and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our body is by nature simultaneous with the order of the actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the way we demonstrated Proposition 12 of Part 2. But although these things are so, and no reason for doubt remains, I scarcely believe that people can be brought to weigh them with an even mind unless I confirm the matter by experience—so firmly are they persuaded that the body now moves, now rests, at the mere bidding of the mind, and does a great many things that depend solely on the mind's will and its skill in devising. For no one has yet determined what the body can do; that is, experience has not yet taught anyone what the body can do by the laws of Nature alone, insofar as Nature is considered only as corporeal, and what it cannot do unless it is determined by the mind. For no one has yet known the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions—not to mention that many things are observed in animals that far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep that they would not dare to do awake. This shows well enough that the body itself, by the laws of its own nature alone, can do many

things at which its own mind marvels. Again, no one knows in what way, or by what means, the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how fast it can move it. It follows that when people say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and are doing nothing but confessing, in fine-sounding words, that they do not know the true cause of that action and feel no wonder at it. But they will say that, whether or not they know by what means the mind moves the body, they nevertheless find by experience that unless the human mind were fit for thinking, the body would be inert. Next, they say, they find by experience that it is in the mind's power alone both to speak and to be silent, and to do many other things, which they therefore believe depend on the mind's decision. But as to the *first* point, I ask them whether experience does not also teach that if, on the other hand, the body is inert, the mind is at the same time unfit for thinking. For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind remains asleep along with it and does not have the power of thinking that it has when awake. Next, I believe everyone has found by experience that the mind is not always equally fit for thinking about the same object; rather, the more fit the body is for the image of this or that object to be aroused in it, the more fit the mind is for contemplating this or that object. But they will say that the causes of buildings, paintings, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill alone, cannot be deduced solely from the laws of Nature considered only as corporeal; and that the human body would not be able to build a temple unless it were determined and guided by the mind. But I have already shown that they do not know what the body can do, or what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, and that they themselves find by experience that a great many things happen by the laws of Nature alone which they would never have believed could happen except by the mind's direction—such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, which they themselves marvel at when awake. I add here the very structure

of the human body, which far surpasses in craftsmanship all the things made by human skill—not to mention what I showed above: that infinitely many things follow from Nature, under whatever attribute it is considered. As for the *second* point, human affairs would certainly go far more happily if it were equally in a person's power to be silent as to speak. But experience teaches more than enough that people have nothing less in their power than their tongue, and can do nothing less than moderate their appetites. That is why most people believe that we do freely only the things we pursue lightly, because the appetite for such things can easily be checked by the memory of something else that we frequently recall; but that we by no means act freely in the things we pursue with a strong affect, which cannot be calmed by the memory of something else. Indeed, had they not found by experience that we do many things we later regret, and that we often—namely, when we are torn by contrary affects—see the better and follow the worse, nothing would prevent them from believing that we do everything freely. So the infant believes that it freely wants milk; the angry child, that he freely wants revenge; and the timid, flight.[2] Again, the drunk believes that it is by a free decision of the mind that he says things which, when sober, he would later wish he had kept to himself. So too the delirious, the chatterbox, the child, and a great many people of this sort believe that they speak by a free decision of the mind, when in fact they cannot restrain the impulse to speak that they have. So experience itself teaches no less clearly than reason that people believe themselves free for this reason alone: that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. It teaches, moreover, that the decisions of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the body varies. For each person governs everything by his own affect; those who are, besides, torn by contrary affects do not know what they want; and those who

2 "See the better and follow the worse" echoes Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 7.20–21, where Medea says she sees and approves the better course but follows the worse.

have none are driven this way and that by the slightest impulse. All these things surely show clearly that the decision of the mind, and the appetite and determination of the body, are simultaneous in nature—or rather, that they are one and the same thing, which we call a *decision* when it is considered under the attribute of Thought and explained through it, and a *determination* when it is considered under the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. This will be still clearer from what is about to be said. For there is another point I should particularly like noted here: that we can do nothing by a decision of the mind unless we remember it. For example, we cannot speak a word unless we remember it. And it is not in the free power of the mind to remember a thing or to forget it. So what is believed to be in the mind's power is only this: that we can, by the mind's decision alone, either keep silent about a thing we remember or speak of it. But when we dream that we are speaking, we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind; and yet we do not speak, or if we do, it happens from a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream that we are hiding certain things from people, and by the same decision of the mind by which, when awake, we keep silent about what we know. Finally, we dream that from a decision of the mind we do certain things that we do not dare to do when awake. And so I should very much like to know whether there are in the mind two kinds of decisions—one kind fanciful and the other free. If one does not care to carry madness that far, it must necessarily be granted that this decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguished from the imagination itself, or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves (see Proposition 49 of Part 2). And so these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist. Those, then, who believe that they speak, or keep silent, or do anything at all from a free decision of the mind are dreaming with their eyes open.

3P3 Proposition 3. *The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.*

3P3D Demonstration. The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of an actually existing body (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2). This idea (by Proposition 15 of Part 2) is composed of many others, of which some (by the Corollary to Proposition 38 of Part 2) are adequate, and some inadequate (by the Corollary to Proposition 29 of Part 2). Whatever follows from the nature of the mind, then, and has the mind as its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from either an adequate or an inadequate idea. But insofar as the mind has inadequate ideas (by Proposition 1 of this part), to that extent it is necessarily acted on. Therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and the mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas. QED

3P3S Scholium. We see, then, that passions are related to the mind only insofar as it has something that involves negation—that is, insofar as it is considered as a part of Nature that cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself, without the other parts. In this way I could show that passions are related to singular things in the same way as to the mind, and cannot be perceived in any other way; but my purpose is to treat the human mind alone.

THE STRIVING TO PERSEVERE

Each thing strives to persevere in its being, and this striving is its actual essence.

3P4 Proposition 4. *No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause.*

3P4D Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For the definition of any thing affirms the thing's essence and does not deny it; that is, it posits the thing's essence and does not take it away. So as long as we attend only to the thing itself,

and not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it that can destroy it. QED

3P5 Proposition 5. *Things are of a contrary nature—that is, cannot be in the same subject—to the extent that one can destroy the other.*

3P5D Demonstration. For if they could agree with each other, or be in the same subject at the same time, then there could be something in the same subject that could destroy it, which (by the preceding Proposition) is absurd. Therefore things, etc. QED

3P6 Proposition 6. *Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.*[3]

3P6D Demonstration. For singular things are modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1); that is (by Proposition 34 of Part 1), they are things that express, in a certain and determinate way, the power of God by which God is and acts. And no thing has in itself anything by which it can be destroyed, or that takes its existence away (by Proposition 4 of this part); on the contrary, it is opposed to everything that can take its existence away (by the preceding Proposition). And so, as far as it can by its own power, it strives to persevere in its being. QED

3P7 Proposition 7. *The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.*

3P7D Demonstration. From the given essence of any thing certain things necessarily follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), and things can do nothing other than what necessarily follows from their determinate nature (by Proposition 29 of Part 1). So the power or striving of any thing, by which it does or strives to do anything, either alone or with others—that is (by Proposition 6 of this part), the power or striving by which it strives to persevere in its being—is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself. QED

3P8 Proposition 8. *The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.*

3 "As far as it can by its own power" renders *quantum in se est*, literally "as far as it is in itself." "Strives" renders *conatur*; the noun *conatus*, "striving," names this effort of each thing to persevere in its being.

3P8D Demonstration. For if it involved a limited time, which determined the thing's duration, then it would follow from the very power by which the thing exists, taken alone, that after that limited time the thing could not exist, but would have to be destroyed. But this (by Proposition 4 of this part) is absurd. Therefore the striving by which a thing exists involves no definite time. On the contrary, since (by the same Proposition 4 of this part) if the thing is destroyed by no external cause, it will always go on existing by the same power by which it now exists, this striving involves an indefinite time. QED

3P9 Proposition 9. *The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ones, strives to persevere in its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this striving of its own.*

3P9D Demonstration. The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in Proposition 3 of this part); and so (by Proposition 7 of this part) it strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has the latter and insofar as it has the former—and this (by Proposition 8 of this part) for an indefinite duration. But since the mind (by Proposition 23 of Part 2) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the affections of the body, the mind is therefore (by Proposition 7 of this part) conscious of its striving. QED

3P9S Scholium. This striving, when it is related to the mind alone, is called *will*; but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called *appetite*. Appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow the things that serve his preservation; and so man is determined to do those things. Next, there is no difference between appetite and desire, except that desire is generally related to people insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. So it can be defined as follows: *desire is appetite together with consciousness of it*. From all this it is clear, then, that we do not strive for, will, seek, or desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, seek it, and desire it.

3P10 Proposition 10. *An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.*

3P10D Demonstration. Whatever can destroy our body cannot be in it (by Proposition 5 of this part). And so the idea of that thing cannot be in God insofar as he has the idea of our body (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of Part 1); that is (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2), the idea of that thing cannot be in our mind. On the contrary, since (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of an actually existing body, the first and principal striving of our mind is (by Proposition 7 of this part) to affirm the existence of our body. And so an idea that denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind. QED

JOY, SADNESS AND DESIRE

The mind passes to greater or lesser perfection; joy, sadness and desire are the three primary affects.

3P11 Proposition 11. *Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking.*

3P11D Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Proposition 7 of Part 2, or also from Proposition 14 of Part 2.

3P11S Scholium. We see, then, that the mind can undergo great changes, passing now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection; and these passions explain to us the affects of joy and sadness. In what follows, therefore, by *joy* I shall understand *the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection*; and by *sadness*, *the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection*. Further, the *affect of joy, when it is related to the mind and body together,* I call *localized pleasure* or *cheerfulness*; that of *sadness*, *pain* or *melancholy*. But it should be noted that localized pleasure and pain are related to a person when one part of him is affected more than the rest, whereas cheerfulness and melancholy are related to him when all parts are equally affected. What *desire* is, I explained in the

Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part; and besides these three I recognize no other primary affect. For I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three.[4] But before going further, I should like to explain Proposition 10 of this part more fully here, so that it may be understood more clearly how one idea is contrary to another.

In the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2 we showed that the idea that constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body for as long as the body itself exists. Next, from what we showed in the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part 2 and in its Scholium, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends on this alone: that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, we showed that the power of the mind by which it imagines things and remembers them also depends on this (see Propositions 17 and 18 of Part 2, with its Scholium): that it involves the actual existence of the body. From this it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause of the mind's ceasing to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (by Proposition 4 of this part), nor again the body's ceasing to be. For (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) the cause of the mind's affirming the existence of the body is not that the body began to exist. So, by the same reasoning, the mind does not cease to affirm the body's existence because the body ceases to be. Rather (by Proposition 17 of Part 2), this arises from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea that constitutes the essence of our mind.

3P12 Proposition 12. *The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the body's power of acting.*

3P12D Demonstration. As long as the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will regard that body as present (by Proposition 17 of Part

4 "Localized pleasure" renders *titillatio*: joy felt in one part of the body more than in the rest, as opposed to cheerfulness, which affects the whole.

2); and consequently (by Proposition 7 of Part 2), as long as the human mind regards some external body as present—that is (by the Scholium to the same Proposition 17), imagines it—the human body is affected in a way that involves the nature of that external body. And so, as long as the mind imagines things that increase or aid our body's power of acting, the body is affected in ways that increase or aid its power of acting (see Postulate 1 of this part); and consequently (by Proposition 11 of this part), for that long the mind's power of thinking is increased or aided. Hence (by Proposition 6 or 9 of this part) the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things. QED

3P13 Proposition 13. *When the mind imagines things that diminish or restrain the body's power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recall things that exclude their existence.*

3P13D Demonstration. As long as the mind imagines anything of this kind, the power of both mind and body is diminished or restrained (as we demonstrated in the preceding Proposition). Nevertheless the mind will go on imagining it until it imagines something else that excludes its present existence (by Proposition 17 of Part 2). That is (as we have just shown), the power of mind and body is diminished or restrained until the mind imagines something else that excludes the existence of this thing—something which the mind (by Proposition 9 of this part) will therefore strive, as far as it can, to imagine or recall. QED

3P13C Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is averse to imagining things that diminish or restrain its own power and the body's.

3P13S Scholium. From this we understand clearly what love and hatred are. *Love* is nothing but *joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause*, and *hatred* nothing but *sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause*. We see, further, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and to preserve the thing he loves; and, on the other hand, one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But of all this more fully in what follows.

HOW AFFECTS BECOME LINKED

By association and resemblance, anything can accidentally cause joy, sadness, love or hatred.

3P14 Proposition 14. *If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is later affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.*

3P14D Demonstration. If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at the same time, then when the mind later imagines one of them, it will immediately recall the other as well (by Proposition 18 of Part 2). But the mind's imaginings indicate the affects of our body more than the nature of external bodies (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2). Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (see Definition 3 of this part), has once been affected by two affects, then when it is later affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other. QED

3P15 Proposition 15. *Anything whatever can be, accidentally, the cause of joy, sadness, or desire.*

3P15D Demonstration. Suppose the mind is affected by two affects at the same time: one that neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, and another that either increases or diminishes it (see Postulate 1 of this part). From the preceding Proposition it is evident that when the mind is later affected by the first through its true cause—which (by hypothesis) of itself neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking—it will immediately be affected also by the second, which does increase or diminish its power of thinking; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), it will be affected by joy or sadness. And so that thing will be the cause of joy or sadness not through itself but accidentally. In this same way it can easily be shown that the thing can be, accidentally, the cause of desire. QED

3P15C Corollary. Merely from having regarded a thing with an affect of joy or sadness of which it is not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it.

3P15CD Demonstration. For from this alone it comes about (by Proposition 14 of this part) that the mind, when it later imagines this thing, is affected by an affect of joy or sadness—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), that the power of mind and body is increased or diminished, etc. And consequently (by Proposition 12 of this part) it comes about that the mind desires to imagine the thing, or (by the Corollary to Proposition 13 of this part) is averse to it; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), that it loves or hates it. QED

3P15S Scholium. From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate some things without any cause known to us, but only from sympathy (as they say) and antipathy. To this we must also refer those objects that affect us with joy or sadness merely because they have something similar to objects that usually affect us with those same affects, as I shall show in the next Proposition. I know, of course, that the authors who first introduced these names "sympathy" and "antipathy" meant them to signify certain occult qualities of things; but nonetheless I believe we may also understand by them qualities that are known, or manifest.

3P16 Proposition 16. *Merely from imagining that a thing has something similar to an object that usually affects the mind with joy or sadness, we shall love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.*

3P16D Demonstration. That which is similar to the object we have (by hypothesis) regarded in the object itself with an affect of joy or sadness. And so (by Proposition 14 of this part), when the mind is affected by its image, it will immediately also be affected by the one affect or the other; and consequently the thing that we perceive to have this same feature will be (by Proposition 15 of this part) accidentally a cause of joy or sadness. And so (by the preceding Corollary), even though that in which it is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we shall still love it or hate it. QED

3P17 Proposition 17. *If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of sadness has something similar to another*

thing which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.

3P17D Demonstration. For (by hypothesis) this thing is through itself a cause of sadness, and (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) insofar as we imagine it with this affect, we hate it. And insofar as we imagine, besides, that it has something similar to another thing that usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall love it with an equally great striving of joy (by the preceding Proposition). And so we shall hate it and at the same time love it. QED

3P17S Scholium. This *constitution of the mind, which arises from two contrary affects,* is called *vacillation of mind*. It stands to affect as doubt stands to imagination (see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2); and vacillation of mind and doubt differ from each other only in degree. But it should be noted that in the preceding Proposition I deduced these vacillations of mind from causes that are the cause of one affect through themselves and of the other accidentally. I did this because in that way they could more easily be deduced from what went before—not because I deny that vacillations of mind usually arise from an object that is the efficient cause of both affects. For the human body (by Postulate 1 of Part 2) is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, and so (by Axiom 1 after Lemma 3, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2) it can be affected in a great many different ways by one and the same body. And conversely, since one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many different ways. From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many contrary affects.

HOPE, FEAR AND THEIR KIN

Images of past and future things affect us as present ones do, producing hope, fear, confidence and despair.

3P18 Proposition 18. *A person is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy and sadness as by the image of a present thing.*

3P18D Demonstration. As long as a person is affected by the image of a thing, he will regard the thing as present even if it does not exist (by Proposition 17 of Part 2 with its Corollary); and he does not imagine it as past or future except insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2). So the image of a thing, considered in itself alone, is the same whether it is related to future or past time or to the present; that is (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2), the constitution, or affect, of the body is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. And so the affect of joy and sadness is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. QED

3P18S1 Scholium 1. I call a thing past or future here insofar as we have been or shall be affected by it: for example, insofar as we have seen it or shall see it, it has refreshed us or will refresh us, it has harmed us or will harm us, and so on. For insofar as we imagine it in this way, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no affect that excludes the thing's existence, and so (by Proposition 17 of Part 2) the body is affected by the image of the thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. But since it generally happens that those who have had much experience vacillate as long as they regard a thing as future or past, and very often doubt its outcome (see the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2), the result is that the affects arising from such images of things are not very constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until people become more certain of the thing's outcome.

3P18S2 Scholium 2. From what has just been said we understand what hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness, and remorse are. *Hope* is nothing but *an inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt*. *Fear*, on the other hand, is *an inconstant sadness, also arising from the image of a doubtful thing*. Further, if the doubt is removed from these affects, hope becomes *confidence* and fear becomes *despair*—namely, *joy or sadness arising from the image of a thing we feared or hoped for*. *Gladness*, next, *is joy arising from the image of a past thing whose outcome we doubted*. Finally, *remorse is sadness opposite to gladness*.[5]

SHARING THE FORTUNES OF WHAT WE LOVE AND HATE

We rejoice or grieve as the things we love or hate are helped or harmed, and love or hate their causes.

3P19 Proposition 19. *One who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will be saddened; if, on the other hand, he imagines that it is being preserved, he will rejoice.*

3P19D Demonstration. The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the body's power of acting (by Proposition 12 of this part), that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), the things it loves. But the imagination is aided by whatever posits the existence of a thing, and, on the other hand, is restrained by whatever excludes a thing's existence (by Proposition 17 of Part 2). Therefore images of things that posit the existence of the loved thing aid the striving by which the mind strives to imagine the loved thing—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), they affect the mind with joy. And those that, on the contrary, exclude the existence of the loved thing restrain that same striving of the mind—that is (by the same Scholium), they affect the mind with sadness. So one who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will be saddened, etc. QED

5 "Remorse" renders *conscientiae morsus*, literally "the sting (or bite) of conscience."

3P20 Proposition 20. *One who imagines that what he hates is being destroyed will rejoice.*

3P20D Demonstration. The mind (by Proposition 13 of this part) strives to imagine things that exclude the existence of the things by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained; that is (by the Scholium to the same Proposition), it strives to imagine things that exclude the existence of the things it hates. And so the image of a thing that excludes the existence of what the mind hates aids this striving of the mind—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), it affects the mind with joy. So one who imagines that what he hates is being destroyed will rejoice. QED

3P21 Proposition 21. *One who imagines what he loves to be affected with joy or sadness will also be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or lesser in the lover as it is greater or lesser in the thing loved.*

3P21D Demonstration. Images of things that posit the existence of the loved thing aid the striving by which the mind strives to imagine the loved thing itself (as we demonstrated in Proposition 19 of this part). But joy posits the existence of the joyful thing, and does so the more, the greater the affect of joy is; for it is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) a transition to a greater perfection. Therefore the image, in the lover, of the loved thing's joy aids the striving of his mind—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), it affects the lover with joy, and with a greater joy the greater this affect was in the loved thing. This was the first point. Next, insofar as a thing is affected with sadness, to that extent it is destroyed, and the more so the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). And so (by Proposition 19 of this part) one who imagines that what he loves is affected with sadness will also be affected with sadness, and with a greater sadness the greater this affect was in the loved thing. QED

3P22 Proposition 22. *If we imagine someone affecting with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love toward him. If, on the*

other hand, we imagine him affecting it with sadness, we shall also be affected with hatred toward him.

3P22D Demonstration. Whoever affects a thing we love with joy or sadness also affects us with joy or sadness—provided, that is, that we imagine the loved thing affected with that joy or sadness (by the preceding Proposition). But this joy or sadness is supposed to be in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Therefore (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), if we imagine someone affecting a thing we love with joy or sadness, we shall be affected with love or hatred toward him. QED

3P22S Scholium. Proposition 21 explains to us what *pity* is, which we can define as *sadness arising from another's harm*. But by what name we should call the joy that arises from another's good, I do not know. Further, *love toward someone who has done good to another* we shall call *approval*; and, on the other hand, *hatred toward someone who has done harm to another* we shall call *indignation*. Finally, it should be noted that we pity not only a thing we have loved (as we showed in Proposition 21) but also one toward which we previously had no affect, provided we judge it to be like ourselves (as I shall show below). And so we also approve of one who has done good to someone like us, and, on the other hand, are indignant at one who has harmed someone like us.

3P23 Proposition 23. *One who imagines what he hates to be affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened. And each of these affects will be greater or lesser as its contrary is greater or lesser in what he hates.*

3P23D Demonstration. Insofar as a hated thing is affected with sadness, to that extent it is destroyed, and the more so the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). So one who (by Proposition 20 of this part) imagines that the thing he hates is affected with sadness will, on the contrary, be affected with joy—and with a greater joy the greater the sadness with which he imagines the hated thing to be affected. This was the first point. Next, joy posits the existence of the joyful thing (by the same Scholium to Proposition 11

of this part), and does so the more, the greater the joy is conceived to be. If someone imagines one whom he hates affected with joy, this imagining (by Proposition 13 of this part) will restrain his striving; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), the one who hates will be affected with sadness, etc. QED

3P23S Scholium. This joy can hardly be solid and free of all conflict of mind. For (as I shall show shortly, in Proposition 27 of this part) insofar as one imagines a thing like oneself affected with sadness, to that extent one must be saddened; and the reverse, if one imagines it affected with joy. But here we are attending to hatred alone.

3P24 Proposition 24. *If we imagine that someone affects with joy a thing we hate, we will be affected with hatred toward him as well. If, on the other hand, we imagine that he affects that same thing with sadness, we will be affected with love toward him.*

3P24D Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Proposition 22 of this part; see that Proposition.

3P24S Scholium. These and similar affects of hatred are related to *envy*, which is therefore nothing but *hatred itself, insofar as it is considered to dispose a person so that he rejoices at another's misfortune and, on the other hand, is saddened by that person's good fortune*.

3P25 Proposition 25. *We strive to affirm, of ourselves and of a thing we love, everything that we imagine affects us, or the loved thing, with joy; and, on the other hand, to deny everything that we imagine affects us, or the loved thing, with sadness.*

3P25D Demonstration. Whatever we imagine affects a loved thing with joy or sadness affects us with joy or sadness (by Proposition 21 of this part). But the mind (by Proposition 12 of this part) strives, as far as it can, to imagine the things that affect us with joy—that is (by Proposition 17 of Part 2 and its Corollary), to regard them as present—and, on the other hand (by Proposition 13 of this part), to exclude the existence of the things that affect us with sadness. Therefore we strive to affirm, of ourselves and

of a thing we love, everything that we imagine affects us, or the loved thing, with joy; and conversely. QED

3P26 Proposition 26. *We strive to affirm, of a thing we hate, everything that we imagine affects it with sadness, and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine affects it with joy.*

3P26D Demonstration. This Proposition follows from Proposition 23, as the preceding one follows from Proposition 21 of this part.

3P26S Scholium. From these we see that it easily happens that a person thinks more highly than is just of himself and of a thing he loves, and, on the other hand, less highly than is just of a thing he hates. When this imagining concerns the person himself who thinks more highly of himself than is just, it is called *pride*. It is a species of madness, because the person dreams with his eyes open that he can do all the things he attains by imagination alone; he therefore regards them as real and exults in them, as long as he cannot imagine the things that exclude their existence and limit his own power of acting. *Pride*, then, *is joy born of the fact that a person thinks more highly of himself than is just*. Next, *the joy that arises from a person's thinking more highly of another than is just* is called *overestimation*; and finally, *the joy that arises from thinking less highly of another than is just* is called *scorn*.

THE IMITATION OF THE AFFECTS

We feel what we imagine others like us feel, which breeds pity, ambition, glory and envy.

3P27 Proposition 27. *If we imagine that a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, is affected with some affect, we are by that very fact affected with a similar affect.*

3P27D Demonstration. The images of things are affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us (by the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2); that is (by Proposition 16 of Part 2), affections whose ideas involve the nature of our body and, at the same time, the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, the nature of the external body

is like the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body we imagine will involve an affection of our body like the affection of the external body. Consequently, if we imagine someone like us affected with some affect, this imagining will express an affection of our body like that affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to be affected with some affect, we are affected with an affect like its own. But if we hate a thing like us, then to that extent (by Proposition 23 of this part) we will be affected with an affect contrary to its own, not a similar one. QED

3P27S Scholium. This imitation of affects, when it concerns sadness, is called *pity* (on which see the Scholium to Proposition 22 of this part); but when it concerns desire it is called *emulation*, which therefore *is* nothing but *the desire for a thing that is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same desire*.

3P27C1 Corollary 1. If we imagine that someone toward whom we have had no affect affects a thing like us with joy, we will be affected with love toward him. If, on the other hand, we imagine that he affects it with sadness, we will be affected with hatred toward him.

3P27C1D Demonstration. This is demonstrated from the preceding Proposition in the same way as Proposition 22 of this part is demonstrated from Proposition 21.

3P27C2 Corollary 2. We cannot hate a thing we pity on account of the fact that its misery affects us with sadness.

3P27C2D Demonstration. For if we could hate it on that account, then (by Proposition 23 of this part) we would rejoice at its sadness, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

3P27C3 Corollary 3. We will strive, as far as we can, to free a thing we pity from its misery.

3P27C3D Demonstration. Whatever affects a thing we pity with sadness affects us too with a similar sadness (by the preceding Proposition). And so we will strive to think up whatever takes away that cause's existence, or destroys it (by Proposition 13 of this part); that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part),

we will have an appetite to destroy it, or will be determined to destroy it. And so we will strive to free the thing we pity from its misery. QED

3P27C3S Scholium. This will, or appetite, to do good, which arises from our pitying the thing on which we want to confer a benefit, is called *benevolence*, which therefore *is* nothing but *desire arising from pity*. As for love and hatred toward someone who has done good or harm to a thing we imagine to be like us, see the Scholium to Proposition 22 of this part.

3P28 Proposition 28. *We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy; but whatever we imagine is opposed to it, or leads to sadness, we strive to remove or destroy.*

3P28D Demonstration. Whatever we imagine leads to joy we strive, as far as we can, to imagine (by Proposition 12 of this part); that is (by Proposition 17 of Part 2), we will strive, as far as we can, to regard it as present, or as actually existing. But the mind's striving, or power, in thinking is equal to and by nature simultaneous with the body's striving, or power, in acting (as clearly follows from the Corollary to Proposition 7 and the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2). Therefore we strive without qualification for it to exist; that is (which, by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part, is the same thing), we have an appetite for it and aim at it. That was the first point. Next, if we imagine that what we believe to be the cause of sadness—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), what we hate—is destroyed, we will rejoice (by Proposition 20 of this part). And so (by the first part of this demonstration) we will strive to destroy it, or (by Proposition 13 of this part) to remove it from us, so as not to regard it as present. That was the second point. Therefore whatever we imagine leads to joy, etc. QED

3P29 Proposition 29. *We will also strive to do whatever we imagine people look upon with joy, and, on the other hand, we will be averse to doing what we imagine people*[6] *are averse to.*

6 SPINOZA'S NOTE. N.B. Here and in what follows, understand by "people" those toward whom we have had no affect.

3P29D Demonstration. From the fact that we imagine people to love or hate something, we will love or hate the same thing (by Proposition 27 of this part); that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), we will by that very fact rejoice or be saddened at that thing's presence. And so (by the preceding Proposition) we will strive to do whatever we imagine people love, or look upon with joy, etc. QED

3P29S Scholium. This striving to do something, and also to refrain from doing something, solely in order to please people, is called *ambition*, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the crowd that we do or omit certain things to our own harm or another's; otherwise it is usually called *courtesy*. Next, the joy with which we imagine another's action by which he has striven to please us I call *praise*; and the sadness with which, on the contrary, we are averse to his action I call *blame*.

3P30 Proposition 30. *If someone has done something that he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as its cause; that is, he will regard himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something that he imagines affects others with sadness, he will regard himself with sadness.*

3P30D Demonstration. Whoever imagines that he affects others with joy or sadness will by that very fact (by Proposition 27 of this part) be affected with joy or sadness. But since a person (by Propositions 19 and 23 of Part 2) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act, whoever has done something that he imagines affects others with joy will be affected with joy together with consciousness of himself as its cause; that is, he will regard himself with joy; and conversely. QED

3P30S Scholium. Since love (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is sadness accompanied likewise by the idea of an external cause, this joy and sadness will be species of love and hatred. But because love and hatred are related to external objects, we will signify these affects by other names. Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause we will call *glory*, and the

sadness contrary to it *shame*—understand: when the joy or sadness arises from a person's believing that he is praised or blamed. Otherwise, I will call joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause *self-contentment,* and the sadness contrary to it *repentance*. Next, since[7] (by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of Part 2) it can happen that the joy with which someone imagines he affects others is only imaginary, and (by Proposition 25 of this part) each person strives to imagine of himself everything that he imagines affects him with joy, it can easily happen that one who glories is proud, and imagines that he is pleasing to everyone when he is a nuisance to everyone.

3P31 Proposition 31. *If we imagine that someone loves, desires, or hates something that we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we will by that very fact love it, etc., more steadfastly. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the reverse, then we will suffer vacillation of mind.*

3P31D Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone loves something, we will by that very fact love it (by Proposition 27 of this part). But we are supposing that we love it already, apart from this. So a new cause is added to our love, by which it is fostered; and so by this very fact we will love what we love more steadfastly. Next, from the fact that we imagine someone is averse to something, we will be averse to it (by the same Proposition). But if we suppose that we love that very thing at the same time, then at the same time we will both love it and be averse to it; that is (see the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part), we will suffer vacillation of mind. QED

3P31C Corollary. From this and from Proposition 28 of this part it follows that each person strives, as far as he can, to bring it about that everyone loves what he himself loves, and hates what he himself hates. Hence the Poet's lines: *As lovers, let us hope alike and fear alike; / he is made of iron who loves what another allows.*[8]

3P31S Scholium. This striving to bring it about that everyone approves what one loves or hates is in truth ambition (see the

7 "Self-contentment" renders *acquiescentia in se ipso,* literally "resting content in oneself"; often translated "self-esteem."

Scholium to Proposition 29 of this part). And so we see that each person by nature has an appetite for the others to live according to his own temperament. Since all have this appetite equally, they equally get in one another's way; and since all want to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another.

3P32 Proposition 32. *If we imagine that someone enjoys a thing that only one person can possess, we will strive to bring it about that he does not possess it.*

3P32D Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone enjoys a thing (by Proposition 27 of this part with its Corollary 1), we will love that thing and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine that his enjoying this same thing stands in the way of this joy of ours. Therefore (by Proposition 28 of this part) we will strive that he should not possess it. QED

3P32S Scholium. We see, then, that human nature is generally so constituted that people pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well, and (by the preceding Proposition) with a hatred the greater, the more they love the thing they imagine another possesses. We see next that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that people are compassionate, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious. Finally, if we are willing to consult experience itself, we will find that it teaches all these things, especially if we attend to the first years of our life. For we find that children, because their body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry merely because they see others laugh or cry. Whatever else they see others do, they immediately desire to imitate; and, in short, they desire for themselves everything in which they imagine others take pleasure. This is, of course, because the images of things, as we have said, are the very affections of the human body, or the ways in which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed to do this or that.

8 Ovid, *Amores* 2.19, lines 5 and 4, quoted in reverse order.

LOVE RETURNED, JEALOUSY AND LONGING

Lovers seek love in return; a rival breeds jealousy; missing circumstances bring longing.

3P33 Proposition 33. *When we love a thing like ourselves, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return.*

3P33D Demonstration. A thing we love we strive, as far as we can, to imagine in preference to others (by Proposition 12 of this part). If, therefore, the thing is like us, we will strive to affect it with joy in preference to others (by Proposition 29 of this part); that is, we will strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that the loved thing is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), that it loves us in return. QED

3P34 Proposition 34. *The greater the affect with which we imagine a loved thing to be affected toward us, the more we will glory.*

3P34D Demonstration. We strive (by the preceding Proposition), as far as we can, to bring it about that a loved thing loves us in return; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), that the loved thing is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us. So the greater the joy with which we imagine the loved thing is affected on our account, the more this striving is assisted; that is (by Proposition 11 of this part with its Scholium), the greater the joy with which we are affected. But when we rejoice because we have affected another like us with joy, we regard ourselves with joy (by Proposition 30 of this part). Therefore the greater the affect with which we imagine a loved thing to be affected toward us, the greater the joy with which we will regard ourselves; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part), the more we will glory. QED

3P35 Proposition 35. *If someone imagines that a loved thing is joining another to itself by the same bond of friendship by which he alone used to possess it, or by a closer one, he will be affected with hatred toward the loved thing itself and will envy that other person.*

3P35D Demonstration. The greater the love with which someone imagines a loved thing to be affected toward him, the more he will glory (by the preceding Proposition); that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part), the more he will rejoice. And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine the loved thing bound to him as closely as possible. This striving, or appetite, is encouraged if he imagines that another desires the same thing for himself (by Proposition 31 of this part). But this striving, or appetite, is supposed to be checked by the image of the loved thing itself, accompanied by the image of the one whom the loved thing is joining to itself. Therefore (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) he will by that very fact be affected with sadness, accompanied by the idea of the loved thing as its cause and at the same time by the image of the other; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), he will be affected with hatred toward the loved thing, and at the same time toward that other person (by the Corollary to Proposition 15 of this part), whom, because he takes delight in the loved thing, he will therefore envy (by Proposition 23 of this part). QED

3P35S Scholium. This hatred toward a loved thing, joined with envy, is called *jealousy*, which is therefore nothing but a vacillation of mind arising from love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of another who is envied. Moreover, this hatred toward the loved thing will be greater in proportion to the joy with which the jealous person used to be affected by the loved thing's reciprocal love, and also in proportion to the affect with which he was affected toward the one he imagines the loved thing is joining to itself. For if he hated that person, he will by that very fact hate the loved thing (by Proposition 24 of this part), because he imagines that it affects with joy what he himself hates; and also (by the Corollary to Proposition 15 of this part) because he is compelled to join the image of the loved thing to the image of the one he hates. This reason generally applies in love toward a woman. For a man who imagines that the woman he loves is giving herself to another will be

saddened not only because his own appetite is checked; he is also averse to her, because he is compelled to join the image of the loved thing to the private parts and excretions of the other. To this, finally, is added the fact that the jealous man is not received by her with the same countenance she used to show him—another reason the lover is saddened, as I shall now show.

3P36 Proposition 36. *One who recollects a thing in which he once took delight desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it.*

3P36D Demonstration. Whatever a person has seen together with a thing that delighted him will (by Proposition 15 of this part) be accidentally a cause of joy. And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) he will desire to possess all of it together with the thing that delighted him; that is, he will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it. QED

3P36C Corollary. So if the lover finds that one of those circumstances is missing, he will be saddened.

3P36CD Demonstration. For insofar as he finds some circumstance missing, he imagines something that excludes that thing's existence. But since, out of love, he desires that thing, or circumstance (by the preceding Proposition), then (by Proposition 19 of this part), insofar as he imagines it missing, he will be saddened. QED

3P36S Scholium. This sadness, insofar as it concerns the absence of what we love, is called *longing*.

3P37 Proposition 37. *The desire that arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is greater the greater the affect is.*

3P37D Demonstration. Sadness diminishes or checks a person's power of acting (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part); that is (by Proposition 7 of this part), it diminishes or checks the striving by which a person strives to persevere in his being. And so (by Proposition 5 of this part) it is contrary to this striving, and whatever a person affected with sadness strives for is to remove the sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater the sadness, the greater the part of the person's power of

acting to which it must be opposed. Therefore the greater the sadness, the greater the power of acting with which the person will strive, in turn, to remove it; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part), the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the sadness. Next, since joy (by the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) increases or assists a person's power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that a person affected with joy desires nothing but to preserve it, and with a desire the greater, the greater the joy. Finally, since hatred and love are themselves affects of sadness or of joy, it follows in the same way that the striving, appetite, or desire that arises from hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the hatred and love. QED

3P38 Proposition 38. *If someone has begun to hate a thing he loved, so that his love is completely destroyed, then, given an equal cause, he will hate it with a greater hatred than if he had never loved it—and the greater, the greater his love had been before.*

3P38D Demonstration. For if someone begins to hate a thing he loves, more of his appetites are checked than if he had not loved it. For love is a joy (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) which a person strives, as far as he can, to preserve (by Proposition 28 of this part); and he does so (by the same Scholium) by regarding the loved thing as present and by affecting it with joy as far as he can (by Proposition 21 of this part). This striving (by the preceding Proposition) is the greater, the greater the love, as is the striving to bring it about that the loved thing loves him in return (see Proposition 33 of this part). But these strivings are checked by hatred toward the loved thing (by the Corollary to Proposition 13 and by Proposition 23 of this part). Therefore the lover (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) will for this reason too be affected with sadness, and the greater, the greater his love had been. That is, besides the sadness that was the cause of the hatred, another arises from the fact that he loved the thing; and consequently he will regard the loved thing with a greater affect of sadness—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), he will hate it with a

greater hatred than if he had not loved it, and the greater, the greater his love had been. QED

DOING HARM AND DOING GOOD

Hatred seeks to harm and love to benefit; good and evil are judged by what we desire.

3P39 Proposition 39. *One who hates someone will strive to do him evil, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from it; and, on the other hand, one who loves someone will strive, by the same law, to do him good.*

3P39D Demonstration. To hate someone is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) to imagine him as a cause of sadness. And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) one who hates someone will strive to remove or destroy him. But if he fears from this something sadder, or (what is the same thing) a greater evil to himself, and believes he can avoid it by not doing to the one he hates the evil he was planning, he will desire to refrain from doing evil (by the same Proposition 28 of this part). And he will do so (by Proposition 37 of this part) with a greater striving than the one that held him to doing evil, so that this striving will prevail, as we maintained. The demonstration of the second part proceeds in the same way. Therefore one who hates someone, etc. QED

3P39S Scholium. By *good* I here understand every kind of joy, and further whatever leads to it—especially whatever satisfies a longing, of whatever kind it may be. By *evil* I understand every kind of sadness, and especially whatever frustrates a longing. For we showed above (in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part) that we do not desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we call good what we desire, and consequently we call evil what we are averse to. So each person judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good and what is evil, what is better and what worse, and finally what is best and what worst. Thus the greedy person judges an abundance of money to be best, and a lack of it worst. The ambitious person

desires nothing so much as glory, and on the other hand dreads nothing so much as shame. Then again, to the envious person nothing is more pleasant than another's unhappiness, and nothing more distressing than another's happiness. And so each person judges a thing good or evil, useful or useless, from his own affect. Moreover, the affect by which a person is so disposed that he does not will what he wills, or wills what he does not will, is called *timidity*, which is therefore nothing but *fear insofar as a person is disposed by it to avoid an evil he judges to be coming by means of a lesser evil* (see Proposition 28 of this part). But if the evil he fears is shame, then timidity is called *modesty*. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is checked by timidity regarding another evil, so that he does not know which he would rather will, then the fear is called *consternation*, especially if both of the evils feared are among the greatest.

3P40 Proposition 40. *One who imagines that he is hated by someone, and does not believe he has given that person any cause for hatred, will hate him in return.*

3P40D Demonstration. One who imagines someone affected with hatred will by that very fact also be affected with hatred (by Proposition 27 of this part), that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But (by hypothesis) he imagines no cause of this sadness except the one who hates him. Therefore, from the fact that he imagines he is hated by someone, he will be affected with sadness accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him; that is (by the same Scholium), he will hate him. QED

3P40S Scholium. But if he imagines that he has given just cause for the hatred, then (by Proposition 30 of this part and its Scholium) he will be affected with shame. But this (by Proposition 25 of this part) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred is followed by a striving to do evil to the one who is hated (by Proposition 39 of this part). So one who imagines that he is hated by someone will imagine that person as the cause of some evil, or sadness; and so he will be affected with sadness, or fear, accompanied by the

idea of the one who hates him as its cause—that is, he will be affected with hatred in return, as above.

3P40C1 Corollary 1. One who imagines that someone he loves is affected with hatred toward him will be torn by hatred and love at once. For insofar as he imagines that he is hated by that person, he is determined (by the preceding Proposition) to hate him in return. But (by hypothesis) he loves him nonetheless. Therefore he will be torn by hatred and love at once.

3P40C2 Corollary 2. If someone imagines that some evil has been done to him out of hatred by a person toward whom he previously had no affect, he will immediately strive to return the same evil to that person.

3P40C2D Demonstration. One who imagines someone affected with hatred toward him will hate him in return (by the preceding Proposition), and (by Proposition 26 of this part) will strive to think up everything that can affect that person with sadness, and will be eager to inflict it on him (by Proposition 39 of this part). But (by hypothesis) the first thing of this kind that he imagines is the evil done to himself. Therefore he will immediately strive to inflict the same evil on that person. QED

3P40C2S Scholium. The striving to do evil to one we hate is called *anger*; the striving to return an evil done to us is called *vengeance*.

3P41 Proposition 41. *If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe he has given any cause for this* (which can happen by the Corollary to Proposition 15 and by Proposition 16 of this part)*, he will love that person in return.*

3P41D Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one. See also its Scholium.

3P41S Scholium. But if he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will glory (by Proposition 30 of this part with its Scholium). This happens rather often (by Proposition 25 of this part), and we have said that its opposite occurs when someone imagines he is hated by someone (see the Scholium to the preceding Proposition). Further, this reciprocal love, and consequently (by Proposition 39 of this part) the striving to do good

to one who loves us and who (by the same Proposition 39 of this part) strives to do good to us, is called *gratitude*, or *thankfulness*. And so it is evident that people are far readier for vengeance than for repaying a kindness.

3P41C Corollary. One who imagines that he is loved by someone he hates will be torn by hatred and love at once. This is demonstrated in the same way as the first Corollary of the preceding Proposition.

3P41CS Scholium. But if hatred prevails, he will strive to do evil to the one by whom he is loved. This affect is called *cruelty*, especially if the one who loves is believed to have given none of the usual causes for hatred.

3P42 Proposition 42. *One who has conferred a benefit on someone, moved by love or by hope of glory, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received ungratefully.*

3P42D Demonstration. One who loves a thing like himself strives, as far as he can, to bring it about that he is loved by it in return (by Proposition 33 of this part). So one who has conferred a benefit on someone out of love does so from the longing that possesses him to be loved in return—that is (by Proposition 34 of this part), from hope of glory, or (by the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part) of joy. And so (by Proposition 12 of this part) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine this cause of glory, or to regard it as actually existing. But (by hypothesis) he imagines something else that excludes that cause's existence. Therefore (by Proposition 19 of this part) he will by that very fact be saddened. QED

HATRED CONQUERED BY LOVE

Returned hatred grows, but hatred wholly overcome by love turns into a greater love.

3P43 Proposition 43. *Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love.*

3P43D Demonstration. If someone imagines that the one he hates is affected with hatred toward him in return, a new hatred

arises by that very fact (by Proposition 40 of this part), while (by hypothesis) the first still endures. But if, on the contrary, he imagines that person to be affected with love toward him, then insofar as he imagines this, he regards himself with joy (by Proposition 30 of this part), and to that extent (by Proposition 29 of this part) will strive to please that person; that is (by Proposition 41 of this part), to that extent he strives not to hate him and not to affect him with any sadness. This striving (by Proposition 37 of this part) will be greater or less in proportion to the affect from which it arises. And so, if it is greater than the striving that arises from hatred, by which he strives to affect the thing he hates with sadness (by Proposition 26 of this part), it will prevail over it and wipe the hatred from his mind. QED

3P44 Proposition 44. *Hatred that is completely conquered by love passes into love; and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it.*

3P44D Demonstration. This proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of Proposition 38 of this part. For one who begins to love a thing he hates, or used to regard with sadness, rejoices by the very fact that he loves. And to this joy, which love involves (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), is added the joy that arises from the fact that the striving to remove the sadness that hatred involves (as we showed in Proposition 37 of this part) is wholly assisted, accompanied by the idea of the one he hated as its cause.

3P44S Scholium. Although this is so, no one will strive to hate something, or to be affected with sadness, in order to enjoy this greater joy. That is, no one will desire to suffer a loss in the hope of recovering it, or long to be ill in the hope of getting well. For each person will always strive to preserve his being and to remove sadness as far as he can. If, on the contrary, it could be conceived that a person could desire to hate someone in order to love him all the more afterward, then he would always desire to hate him. For the greater the hatred had been, the greater the love will be, and so he will always desire that the hatred be increased more and more. For the same reason a person would

strive to be more and more ill, in order afterward to enjoy a greater joy from the restoration of his health; and so he would always strive to be ill—which (by Proposition 6 of this part) is absurd.

3P45 Proposition 45. *If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred toward a thing like himself that he loves, he will hate that person.*

3P45D Demonstration. For the loved thing hates in return the one who hates it (by Proposition 40 of this part). And so the lover, who imagines that someone hates the loved thing, by that very fact imagines the loved thing to be affected with hatred, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), with sadness; and consequently (by Proposition 21 of this part) he is saddened, and that accompanied by the idea of the one who hates the loved thing as its cause. That is (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part), he will hate him. QED

3P46 Proposition 46. *If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class or nation different from his own, accompanied by the idea of that person, under the universal name of the class or nation, as its cause, he will love or hate not only that person but everyone of the same class or nation.*

3P46D Demonstration. The demonstration of this is evident from Proposition 16 of this part.

3P47 Proposition 47. *The joy that arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed, or affected with some other evil, does not arise without some sadness of mind.*

3P47D Demonstration. This is evident from Proposition 27 of this part. For insofar as we imagine a thing like ourselves to be affected with sadness, to that extent we are saddened.

3P47S Scholium. This Proposition can also be demonstrated from the Corollary to Proposition 17 of Part 2. For whenever we recall a thing, even though it does not actually exist, we still regard it as present, and the body is affected in the same way. So insofar as the memory of the thing remains strong, a person is determined to regard it with sadness. While the image of the thing still remains, this determination is indeed restrained by

the memory of those things that exclude its existence, but it is not removed. And so the person rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained. Hence it comes about that this joy, which arises from the misfortune of the thing we hate, is repeated as often as we recall that thing. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing is aroused, since it involves the existence of the thing itself, it determines the person to regard the thing with the same sadness with which he used to regard it when it existed. But since he has joined to the image of the thing other images that exclude its existence, this determination to sadness is at once restrained, and the person rejoices anew—and this as often as the repetition occurs. And this is the same cause why people rejoice whenever they recall some evil now past, and why they enjoy telling of dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine some danger, they regard it as if it were still to come, and are determined to fear it. This determination is restrained anew by the idea of freedom that they joined to the idea of this danger when they were freed from it, and which makes them feel safe anew; and so they rejoice anew.

FREEDOM, OMENS AND SUPERSTITION

Believing things free intensifies love and hatred; chance associations make omens and superstitions.

3P48 Proposition 48. *Love and hatred toward, for example, Peter are destroyed if the sadness that the latter involves, and the joy that the former involves, are joined to the idea of another cause; and each is diminished to the extent that we imagine that Peter was not the sole cause of either.*

3P48D Demonstration. This is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part. For joy is called love of Peter, and sadness hatred of Peter, solely because Peter is considered to be the cause of the one affect or the other. So when this is removed, wholly or in

part, the affect toward Peter is also diminished, wholly or in part. QED

3P49 Proposition 49. *Love and hatred toward a thing we imagine to be free must both be greater, from an equal cause, than toward a thing we imagine to be necessary.*

3P49D Demonstration. A thing we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself, without others (by Definition 7 of Part 1). So if we imagine it to be the cause of joy or sadness, by that very fact (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) we shall love or hate it, and that (by the preceding Proposition) with the greatest love or hatred that can arise from the given affect. But if we imagine the thing that is the cause of that affect as necessary, then (by the same Definition 7 of Part 1) we shall imagine it to be the cause of that affect not alone but together with others, and so (by the preceding Proposition) our love or hatred toward it will be less. QED

3P49S Scholium. It follows from this that people, because they think themselves free, pursue one another with greater love or hatred than they do other things. To this is added the imitation of the affects, on which see Propositions 27, 34, 40 and 43 of this part.

3P50 Proposition 50. *Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.*

3P50D Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Proposition 15 of this part, which see together with Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this part.

3P50S Scholium. Things that are accidentally causes of hope or fear are called good or bad omens. And insofar as these omens are causes of hope or fear, to that extent (by the definition of hope and fear, which see in Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this part) they are causes of joy or sadness. Consequently (by the Corollary to Proposition 15 of this part) to that extent we love or hate them, and (by Proposition 28 of this part) we strive either to employ them as means to what we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Further, it follows from Proposition 25 of this part that we are so constituted by nature that we

readily believe what we hope for, but believe with difficulty what we fear, and that we think more or less of these things than is just. And from these have arisen the superstitions by which people everywhere are troubled. For the rest, I do not think it worth the effort to show here the vacillations of mind that arise from hope and fear. For it follows from the mere definition of these affects that there is no hope without fear and no fear without hope (as we shall explain more fully in its proper place). Moreover, insofar as we hope for or fear something, to that extent we love or hate it. And so anyone will easily be able to apply to hope and fear whatever we have said of love and hatred.

3P51 Proposition 51. *Different people can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same person can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times.*

3P51D Demonstration. The human body (by Postulate 3 of Part 2) is affected by external bodies in a great many ways. So two people can be affected in different ways at the same time; and therefore (by Axiom 1, which comes after Lemma 3, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2) they can be affected in different ways by one and the same object. Again (by the same Postulate), the human body can be affected now in this way, now in another; and consequently (by the same Axiom) it can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times. QED

3P51S Scholium. We see, then, that it can happen that what one person loves another hates, and what one fears another does not; and that one and the same person may now love what he formerly hated, and now dare what he formerly feared, and so on. Again, since each person judges from his own affect what is good, what is bad, what is better and what is worse (see the Scholium to Proposition 39 of this part), it follows that people can vary as much in judgment as in affect.[9] Hence it comes

9 SPINOZA'S NOTE. N.B. That this can happen even though the human mind is a part of the divine intellect we showed in the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2.

about that when we compare some people with others, we distinguish them solely by the difference of their affects, and call some fearless, others timid, and others by some other name. For example, I shall call someone *fearless* who despises an evil that I usually fear. And if I further attend to the fact that his desire to do harm to someone he hates, and good to someone he loves, is not restrained by fear of an evil by which I am usually held back, I shall call him *daring*. Again, someone will seem *timid* to me who fears an evil that I usually despise. And if I further attend to the fact that his desire is restrained by fear of an evil that cannot hold me back, I shall say that he is *cowardly*. And this is how everyone will judge. Finally, from this nature of human beings and the inconstancy of their judgment—and also because a person often judges things from affect alone, and because the things he believes make for joy or sadness, and which he therefore strives (by Proposition 28 of this part) to bring about or to remove, are often merely imaginary, to say nothing of the other points about the uncertainty of things that we showed in Part 2—we easily conceive that a person can often be the cause of his own sadness as well as of his own joy; that is, that he can be affected with both sadness and joy, accompanied by the idea of himself as its cause. And so we easily understand what repentance is, and what self-contentment is. Namely, *repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself*, and *self-contentment is joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as its cause*. These affects are extremely intense, because people believe themselves to be free (see Proposition 49 of this part).

WONDER, DISDAIN AND SELF-REGARD

Wonder and disdain, and the joy or sadness of the mind contemplating its own power.

3P52 Proposition 52. *An object that we have previously seen together with others, or that we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, we shall not regard for as long as one that we imagine to have something singular.*

[3P52D] Demonstration. As soon as we imagine an object we have seen with others, we at once recall the others as well (by Proposition 18 of Part 2, and see also its Scholium), and so from regarding one we immediately pass to regarding another. And the same holds for an object that we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many. For by that very fact we suppose that we regard nothing in it that we have not previously seen with others. But when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular, which we have never seen before, we are saying nothing other than that the mind, while it regards that object, has nothing else in itself to whose regard it can pass from regarding that one; and so it is determined to regard that object alone. Therefore an object, etc. QED

[3P52S] Scholium. This affection of the mind, or imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it occupies the mind alone, is called *wonder*. If it is aroused by an object we fear, it is called *consternation*, because wonder at an evil keeps a person so suspended in regarding it alone that he cannot think of other things by which he might avoid that evil. But if what we wonder at is some person's prudence, diligence or something of the kind, then, because by that very fact we regard that person as far surpassing us, wonder is called *veneration*; otherwise it is called *horror*, if what we wonder at is a person's anger, envy and the like. Again, if we wonder at the prudence, diligence and so on of a person we love, our love will by that very fact be greater (by Proposition 12 of this part), and this love joined to wonder, or veneration, we call *devotion*. In this way we can also conceive hatred, hope, confidence and other affects joined to wonder; and so we shall be able to deduce more affects than are usually indicated by the accepted words. From this it is clear that the names of the affects were devised more from their common usage than from accurate knowledge of them.

Opposed to wonder is *disdain*. Its cause, however, is usually this: from seeing someone wonder at, love or fear something, and so on, or from the fact that a thing at first sight appears like things we wonder at, love, fear and so on (by Proposition 15 of

this part with its Corollary, and Proposition 27 of this part), we are determined to wonder at, love or fear that same thing. But if, from the thing's presence or from a more accurate consideration of it, we are compelled to deny of it everything that can be a cause of wonder, love, fear and so on, then the mind, from the very presence of the thing, remains determined to think of what is not in the object rather than of what is in it—whereas, on the contrary, from an object's presence it usually thinks chiefly of what is in the object. Further, just as devotion arises from wonder at a thing we love, so *mockery* arises from disdain for a thing we hate or fear, and *disparagement* from disdain for foolishness, just as veneration arises from wonder at prudence. Finally, we can conceive love, hope, glory and other affects joined to disdain, and from these deduce still other affects, which we are not in the habit of distinguishing from others by any single word.

3P53 Proposition 53. *When the mind regards itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and the more so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.*

3P53D Demonstration. A person does not know himself except through the affections of his body and their ideas (by Propositions 19 and 23 of Part 2). So when it happens that the mind can regard itself, it is by that very fact supposed to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), to be affected with joy—and with a greater joy the more distinctly it can imagine itself and its power of acting. QED

3P53C Corollary. This joy is fostered more and more the more a person imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself praised by others, the greater the joy with which he imagines others to be affected by him, accompanied by the idea of himself (by the Scholium to Proposition 29 of this part); and so (by Proposition 27 of this part) he himself is affected with greater joy, accompanied by the idea of himself. QED

3P54 Proposition 54. *The mind strives to imagine only those things that posit its power of acting.*

[3P54D] Demonstration. The striving, or power, of the mind is the very essence of the mind (by Proposition 7 of this part). But the essence of the mind (as is self-evident) affirms only what the mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do. So it strives to imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting. QED

[3P55] Proposition 55. *When the mind imagines its lack of power, it is by that very fact saddened.*

[3P55D] Demonstration. The essence of the mind affirms only what the mind is and can do; in other words, it is of the nature of the mind to imagine only those things that posit its power of acting (by the preceding Proposition). So when we say that the mind, while it regards itself, imagines its lack of power, we are saying nothing other than that, while the mind strives to imagine something that posits its power of acting, this striving of it is restrained—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), that it is saddened. QED

[3P55C1] Corollary. This sadness is fostered more and more if the mind imagines itself to be blamed by others. This is demonstrated in the same way as the Corollary to Proposition 53 of this part.

[3P55S] Scholium. This sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called *humility*; but the joy that arises from regarding ourselves is called *philautia* [self-love] or *self-contentment*. And since this joy is repeated as often as a person regards his virtues, or his power of acting, it also comes about that everyone is eager to tell of his own deeds and to show off his strength of body and of mind alike, and that for this reason people are a nuisance to one another. From this it again follows that people are by nature envious (see the Scholium to Proposition 24 and the Scholium to Proposition 32 of this part); that is, they are glad at the weakness of their equals and, on the other hand, saddened by their virtue. For whenever someone imagines his own actions, he is affected with joy (by Proposition 53 of this part), and the more so the more perfection he imagines his actions to express, and the more distinctly he imagines them —that is (by what was said in Scholium 1 to Proposition 40 of

Part 2), the more he can distinguish them from others and regard them as singular things. So everyone will be most glad in regarding himself when he regards something in himself that he denies of others. But if he refers what he affirms of himself to the universal idea of human being or of animal, he will not be so glad; and, on the contrary, he will be saddened if he imagines that his own actions, compared with those of others, are weaker. This sadness he will strive to remove (by Proposition 28 of this part), and he does so by misinterpreting the actions of his equals or by embellishing his own as much as he can. It is clear, then, that people are by nature inclined to hatred and envy—and upbringing itself adds to this. For parents usually spur their children to virtue only with the goad of honor and envy. But a doubt perhaps remains, since we not infrequently admire people's virtues and venerate them. To remove it, therefore, I shall add the following Corollary.

3P55C2 Corollary. No one envies anyone's virtue except an equal's.

3P55C2D Demonstration. Envy is hatred itself (see the Scholium to Proposition 24 of this part), or (by the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part) sadness, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), an affection by which a person's power of acting, or striving, is restrained. But a person (by the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part) strives to do, and desires, nothing except what can follow from his own given nature. So a person will not desire to have predicated of himself any power of acting, or (what is the same thing) virtue, that is proper to another's nature and foreign to his own. Hence his desire cannot be restrained—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part), he himself cannot be saddened—by regarding some virtue in someone unlike himself, and consequently he will not be able to envy that person either. But he can envy his equal, who is supposed to be of the same nature as himself. QED

3P55C2S Scholium. So when we said above, in the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part, that we venerate a person because we wonder at his prudence, strength of character and so on, this

happens (as is evident from the Proposition itself) because we imagine these virtues to be in him singularly, and not as common to our nature. And so we shall no more envy him for them than we envy trees their height or lions their strength, and so on.

3P56 Proposition 56. *There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire—and consequently of every affect composed of these, such as vacillation of mind, or derived from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear and so on—as there are species of objects by which we are affected.*

3P56D Demonstration. Joy and sadness, and consequently the affects composed of them or derived from them, are passions (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). But we are necessarily acted on (by Proposition 1 of this part) insofar as we have inadequate ideas; and only insofar as we have them (by Proposition 3 of this part) are we acted on—that is (see Scholium 1 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), we are necessarily acted on only insofar as we imagine, or (see Proposition 17 of Part 2 with its Scholium) insofar as we are affected by an affection that involves both the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. So the nature of each passion must necessarily be explained in such a way that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. Thus the joy that arises from, say, object A involves the nature of object A itself, and the joy that arises from object B involves the nature of object B itself. So these two affects of joy are different in nature, because they arise from causes of different natures. So too the affect of sadness that arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness that arises from another cause. The same must be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation of mind and so on. Therefore there are necessarily as many species of joy, sadness, love, hatred and so on as there are species of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the very essence, or nature, of each person insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something by any given constitution of it (see the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part). Therefore, according as each person is affected by external causes with this or that species of joy,

sadness, love, hatred and so on—that is, according as his nature is constituted in this way or that—his desire must be now one, now another, and the nature of one desire must differ from the nature of another as much as the affects from which each arises differ from one another. So there are as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love and so on, and consequently (by what has already been shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected. QED

3P56S Scholium. Among the species of affects, which (by the preceding Proposition) must be very many, the notable ones are *gluttony*, *drunkenness*, *lust*, *greed* and *ambition*. These are nothing but notions of love or desire that explain the nature of each of these two affects through the objects to which they are related. For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, greed and ambition we understand nothing other than an immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, sexual union, wealth and glory. Moreover, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from others only by the object to which they are related, have no contraries. For *temperance*, which we usually oppose to gluttony, *sobriety*, which we oppose to drunkenness, and finally *chastity*, which we oppose to lust, are not affects or passions; rather, they indicate a power of the mind that moderates these affects. For the rest, I cannot explain the remaining species of affects here (because there are as many as there are species of objects), nor, if I could, is it necessary. For to achieve our purpose—namely, to determine the strength of the affects and the power of the mind over them—it is enough for us to have a general definition of each affect. It is enough for us, I say, to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can determine what sort of power, and how great, the mind has in moderating and restraining the affects. So although there is a great difference between this and that affect of love, hatred or desire—for example, between love of one's children and love of one's wife—we do not need to know these differences, or to investigate the nature and origin of the affects any further.

3P57 Proposition 57. *Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.*

3P57D Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Axiom 1, which see after Lemma 3 of the Scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 2. Nevertheless, we shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primary affects.

All affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But desire is the very nature, or essence, of each person (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part). Therefore the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other. Next, joy and sadness are passions by which each person's power, or striving to persevere in his being, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by Proposition 11 of this part and its Scholium). But by the striving to persevere in one's being, insofar as it is related to the mind and body together, we understand appetite and desire (see the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part). Therefore joy and sadness are desire, or appetite, itself, insofar as it is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, by external causes; that is (by the same Scholium), they are the very nature of each person. And so the joy or sadness of each person also differs from the joy or sadness of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other; and consequently each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much, etc. QED

3P57S Scholium. From this it follows that the affects of the animals called irrational (for we can by no means doubt that brutes have feelings, now that we know the origin of the mind) differ from human affects as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both horse and human are indeed driven by the lust to procreate; but the one by an equine lust, the other by a human one. So too the lusts and appetites of insects, fish and birds must be different in each case. Therefore, although each individual lives content with the nature of which it consists, and

rejoices in it, yet that life with which each is content, and that rejoicing, are nothing other than the idea, or soul, of that individual; and so the rejoicing of one differs in nature from the rejoicing of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, it follows from the preceding Proposition that there is no small difference between the rejoicing by which, say, a drunkard is led and the rejoicing that a philosopher possesses—which I wished to mention here in passing. So much, then, for the affects that are related to a person insofar as he is acted on. It remains for me to add a few words about those that are related to him insofar as he acts.

THE ACTIVE AFFECTS

Joy and desire can arise from reason; strength of character divides into tenacity and nobility.

3P58 Proposition 58. *Besides the joy and desire that are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire that are related to us insofar as we act.*

3P58D Demonstration. When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices (by Proposition 53 of this part). But the mind necessarily regards itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by Proposition 43 of Part 2). And the mind does conceive some adequate ideas (by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Therefore it also rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by Proposition 1 of this part), insofar as it acts. Next, the mind strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ones (by Proposition 9 of this part). But by striving we understand desire (by the Scholium to the same Proposition). Therefore desire is also related to us insofar as we understand, or (by Proposition 1 of this part) insofar as we act. QED

3P59 Proposition 59. *Among all the affects that are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none except those that are related to joy or desire.*

3P59D Demonstration. All affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But by sadness we understand that by which the mind's power of thinking is diminished or restrained (by Proposition 11 of this part and its Scholium). So insofar as the mind is saddened, to that extent its power of understanding—that is (by Proposition 1 of this part), its power of acting—is diminished or restrained. Hence no affects of sadness can be related to the mind insofar as it acts, but only affects of joy and desire, which (by the preceding Proposition) are to that extent also related to the mind. QED

3P59S Scholium. All the actions that follow from affects related to the mind insofar as it understands I refer to *strength of character*, which I divide into tenacity and nobility. For by *tenacity* I understand *the desire by which each person strives to preserve his being from the dictate of reason alone*.

By *nobility*, on the other hand, I understand *the desire by which each person, from the dictate of reason alone, strives to aid other people and join them to himself in friendship*. So those actions that aim only at the advantage of the agent I refer to tenacity, and those that aim at the advantage of another as well I refer to nobility. Thus temperance, sobriety, presence of mind in danger and so on are species of tenacity, whereas modesty, mercy and so on are species of nobility. And with this I think I have explained the principal affects and vacillations of mind that arise from the combination of the three primary affects—namely desire, joy and sadness—and have shown them through their first causes. From this it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds, we toss to and fro, unaware of our outcome and our fate. But I said that I have shown only the principal conflicts of mind, not all that there can be. For by proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is joined to repentance, disparagement, shame and so on. Indeed, I believe it is clear to everyone from what has already been said that the affects can be combined with one another in so many ways, and so many variations arise from them, that they cannot

be defined by any number. But for my purpose it is enough to have listed only the principal ones; for the rest, which I have omitted, would be more a matter of curiosity than of use. Yet this remains to be noted about love: it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing we wanted, the body acquires from that enjoyment a new constitution by which it is determined differently; other images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine something whose taste usually delights us, we desire to enjoy it—that is, to eat it. But while we are enjoying it in this way, the stomach is filled and the body is constituted differently. If, then, when the body is now differently disposed, the image of the same food is kept alive because the food itself is present, and consequently also the striving, or desire, to eat it, this new constitution will oppose that desire, or striving. Consequently the presence of the food we wanted will be odious, and this is what we call disgust and weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the external affections of the body that are observed in the affects, such as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter and so on, because they are related to the body alone, without any relation to the mind. Finally, certain points must be noted about the definitions of the affects; I shall therefore repeat them here in order, inserting what is to be observed in each.

THE DEFINITIONS OF THE AFFECTS

Spinoza restates in order the definitions of forty-eight affects, with explanations.

3DefAff1 Definition 1. *Desire* is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something by any given affection of it.

3DefAff1Ex Explanation. We said above, in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of this part, that desire is appetite together with consciousness of it, and that appetite is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is determined to do the things that serve its

preservation. But in the same Scholium I also pointed out that in reality I recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a person is conscious of his appetite or not, the appetite remains one and the same. So, lest I seem to commit a tautology, I did not want to explain desire through appetite, but took care to define it in such a way as to include together all the strivings of human nature that we signify by the names appetite, will, desire or impulse. For I could have said that desire is the very essence of a human being insofar as it is conceived as determined to do something. But from this definition (by Proposition 23 of Part 2) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire, or appetite. So, in order to include the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same Proposition) to add *insofar as it is determined by any given affection of it*, etc. For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it is innate, or whether it is conceived through the attribute of Thought alone or through the attribute of Extension alone, or finally whether it is related to both at once. Here, then, by the name of desire I understand any strivings, impulses, appetites and volitions of a person, which vary with the person's varying constitution, and are not infrequently so opposed to one another that he is pulled in different directions and does not know where to turn.

3DefAff2 Definition 2. *Joy* is a person's passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.

3DefAff3 Definition 3. *Sadness* is a person's passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.

3DefAff3Ex Explanation. I say *passage*. For joy is not perfection itself. If a person were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy. This appears more clearly from the affect of sadness, which is its contrary. For no one can deny that sadness consists in the passage to a lesser perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself, since a person cannot be saddened insofar as he shares in some perfection. Nor can we say that sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection. For privation is nothing, whereas the affect

of sadness is an act, which therefore can be nothing other than the act of passing to a lesser perfection—that is, the act by which a person's power of acting is diminished or restrained (see the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part). As for the rest, I omit the definitions of cheerfulness, localized pleasure, melancholy and pain, because they relate chiefly to the body and are only species of joy or sadness.

3DefAff4 Definition 4. *Wonder* is an imagining of some thing in which the mind remains fixed, because this singular imagining has no connection with the others (see Proposition 52 of this part, with its Scholium).

3DefAff4Ex Explanation. In the Scholium to Proposition 18 of Part 2 we showed the cause why the mind, from contemplating one thing, immediately falls to thinking of another: namely, because the images of those things are linked together and so ordered that one follows another. This cannot be conceived when the image of a thing is new; instead, the mind will be held in contemplating that thing until it is determined by other causes to think of other things. So the imagining of a new thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others; and for this reason I do not count wonder among the affects. Nor do I see any reason why I should, since this distraction of the mind does not arise from any positive cause that distracts it from other things, but only from the absence of the cause by which the mind is determined, from contemplating one thing, to think of others. Therefore (as I pointed out in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of this part) I recognize only three primitive, or primary, affects: joy, sadness and desire. My only reason for saying anything about wonder is that custom has brought it about that certain affects derived from the three primitive ones are usually designated by other names when they relate to objects we wonder at. The same reason moves me equally to add here the definition of disdain as well.

3DefAff5 Definition 5. *Disdain* is an imagining of some thing that touches the mind so little that the mind is moved by the thing's

presence to imagine what is not in the thing rather than what is in it (see the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part).

I pass over here the definitions of veneration and disparagement, because no affects, as far as I know, take their names from them.

3DefAff6 Definition 6. *Love* is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

3DefAff6Ex Explanation. This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough. The definition given by those authors who define love as *the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved* expresses not the essence of love but a property of it. And because these authors did not see the essence of love clearly enough, they could not have any clear concept of its property either; hence everyone has judged their definition to be quite obscure. It should be noted, however, that when I say it is a property of the lover to join himself by will to the thing loved, I do not understand by "will" a consent, or a deliberation of the mind, that is, a free decree (for we demonstrated in Proposition 48 of Part 2 that this is a fiction). Nor do I mean a desire to join oneself to the thing loved when it is absent, or to remain in its presence when it is present; for love can be conceived without either of these desires. By "will" I understand the contentment that is in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by which the lover's joy is strengthened, or at least encouraged.

3DefAff7 Definition 7. *Hatred* is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

3DefAff7Ex Explanation. What should be noted here is easily perceived from what was said in the Explanation of the preceding definition (see also the Scholium to Proposition 13 of this part).

3DefAff8 Definition 8. *Attraction* is joy accompanied by the idea of some thing that is accidentally the cause of joy.

3DefAff9 Definition 9. *Aversion* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing that is accidentally the cause of sadness (on these, see the Scholium to Proposition 15 of this part).

3DefAff10 Definition 10. *Devotion* is love toward one whom we wonder at.

3DefAff10Ex Explanation. We showed in Proposition 52 of this part that wonder arises from the novelty of a thing. So if it happens that we often imagine what we wonder at, we shall cease to wonder at it; and so we see that the affect of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.

3DefAff11 Definition 11. *Mockery* is joy arising from our imagining that something we disdain is present in a thing we hate.

3DefAff11Ex Explanation. Insofar as we disdain a thing we hate, we deny existence to it (see the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part), and to that extent (by Proposition 20 of this part) we rejoice. But since we suppose that a person nevertheless hates what he mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid (see the Scholium to Proposition 47 of this part).

3DefAff12 Definition 12. *Hope* is an inconstant joy, arising from the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt.

3DefAff13 Definition 13. *Fear* is an inconstant sadness, arising from the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt (on these, see Scholium 2 to Proposition 18 of this part).

3DefAff13Ex Explanation. From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear, and no fear without hope. For whoever hangs on hope and doubts a thing's outcome is supposed to imagine something that excludes the existence of the future thing; and so to that extent he is saddened (by Proposition 19 of this part), and consequently, while he hangs on hope, he fears that the thing may not happen. Whoever, on the other hand, is in fear—that is, doubts the outcome of a thing he hates—also imagines something that excludes the existence of that thing; and so (by Proposition 20 of this part) he rejoices, and consequently to that extent he has hope that it will not happen.

3DefAff14 Definition 14. *Confidence* is joy arising from the idea of a future or past thing concerning which the cause of doubt has been removed.

3DefAff15 Definition 15. *Despair* is sadness arising from the idea of a future or past thing concerning which the cause of doubt has been removed.

3DefAff15Ex Explanation. Confidence, then, arises from hope, and despair from fear, when the cause of doubt about a thing's outcome is removed. This happens because a person imagines the past or future thing as being there and contemplates it as present, or because he imagines other things that exclude the existence of the things that cast doubt into his mind. For although we can never be certain about the outcome of singular things (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of Part 2), it can still happen that we do not doubt their outcome. For we have shown (see the Scholium to Proposition 49 of Part 2) that not doubting a thing is one thing, and having certainty of it another. And so it can happen that we are affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy or sadness as by the image of a present thing, as we demonstrated in Proposition 18 of this part; see it together with its Scholia.

3DefAff16 Definition 16. *Gladness* is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped.

3DefAff17 Definition 17. *Remorse* is sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out worse than we had hoped.

3DefAff18 Definition 18. *Pity* is sadness accompanied by the idea of an evil that has befallen another whom we imagine to be like us (see the Scholium to Proposition 22 and the Scholium to Proposition 27 of this part).

3DefAff18Ex Explanation. There seems to be no difference between pity and compassion, except perhaps that pity concerns the affect as a single occurrence, while compassion concerns the settled disposition to it.

3DefAff19 Definition 19. *Approval* is love toward someone who has done good to another.

3DefAff20 Definition 20. *Indignation* is hatred toward someone who has done harm to another.

3DefAff20Ex Explanation. I know that in common usage these words mean something else. But my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to designate them by words whose customary meaning is not wholly at odds with the meaning in which I wish to use them. Let it suffice to have pointed this out once. As for the cause of these affects, see Corollary 1 to Proposition 27 and the Scholium to Proposition 22 of this part.

3DefAff21 Definition 21. *Overestimation* is thinking more highly of someone than is right, out of love.

3DefAff22 Definition 22. *Scorn* is thinking less highly of someone than is right, out of hatred.

3DefAff22Ex Explanation. Overestimation, then, is an effect, or property, of love, and scorn of hatred. So overestimation can also be defined as *love insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks more highly than is right of the thing loved*; and, conversely, scorn as *hatred insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks less highly than is right of the one he hates* (on these, see the Scholium to Proposition 26 of this part).

3DefAff23 Definition 23. *Envy* is hatred insofar as it so affects a person that he is saddened by another's happiness and, conversely, rejoices at another's misfortune.

3DefAff23Ex Explanation. Envy is commonly opposed by compassion, which, therefore, in spite of the word's usual meaning, can be defined as follows:

3DefAff24 Definition 24. *Compassion* is love insofar as it so affects a person that he rejoices at another's good and, conversely, is saddened by another's misfortune.

3DefAff24Ex Explanation. On envy, see further the Scholium to Proposition 24 and the Scholium to Proposition 32 of this part. These, then, are the affects of joy and sadness that are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as their cause, either directly or accidentally. From here I pass to the others, which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as their cause.

3DefAff25 Definition 25. *Self-contentment* is joy arising from a person's contemplating himself and his own power of acting.

3DefAff26 Definition 26. *Humility* is sadness arising from a person's contemplating his own lack of power, or weakness.

3DefAff26Ex Explanation. Self-contentment is opposed to humility insofar as we understand by it the joy that arises from contemplating our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it joy accompanied by the idea of some deed that we believe we did by a free decree of the mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we define as follows:

3DefAff27 Definition 27. *Repentance* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed that we believe we did by a free decree of the mind.

3DefAff27Ex Explanation. We have shown the causes of these affects in the Scholium to Proposition 51 of this part, and in Propositions 53, 54 and 55 of this part and the Scholium to the last. On the free decree of the mind, see the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 2. But it should also be noted here that it is no wonder that sadness follows absolutely all the acts customarily called *wrong*, and joy those called *right*. For we easily understand from what was said above that this depends chiefly on upbringing. Parents, by condemning the former and often scolding their children for them, and by recommending and praising the latter, have brought it about that stirrings of sadness are joined to the one kind and stirrings of joy to the other. Experience itself confirms this. For custom and religion are not the same for everyone; on the contrary, what is sacred for some is profane for others, and what is honorable for some is shameful for others. So each person repents of a deed, or glories in it, according to how he has been brought up.

3DefAff28 Definition 28. *Pride* is thinking more highly of oneself than is right, out of self-love.

3DefAff28Ex Explanation. Pride, then, differs from overestimation in that the latter relates to an external object, whereas pride relates to the person himself, who thinks more highly of himself than is right. Moreover, as overestimation is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of *philautia* [self-love]. It can therefore also be defined as *self-love, or self-content-*

ment, insofar as it so affects a person that he thinks more highly of himself than is right (see the Scholium to Proposition 26 of this part). There is no affect contrary to this one. For no one thinks less highly of himself than is right out of hatred of himself; indeed, no one thinks less highly of himself than is right insofar as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a person imagines he cannot do, he necessarily imagines; and by this imagining he is so disposed that he really cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For as long as he imagines he cannot do this or that, he is not determined to act, and consequently for that long it is impossible for him to do it. Yet if we attend to what depends on opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive that it can happen that a person thinks less highly of himself than is right. For it can happen that someone, while sadly contemplating his own weakness, imagines that he is despised by everyone, even while the others are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Further, a person can think less highly of himself than is right if he denies something of himself in the present in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain: for example, if he denies that he can conceive anything certain, or that he can desire or do anything but what is wrong or shameful, and so on. Again, we can say that someone thinks less highly of himself than is right when we see that, from an excessive fear of shame, he does not dare what others who are his equals dare. We can, therefore, oppose this affect to pride; I shall call it self-abasement. For as pride arises from self-contentment, so self-abasement arises from humility; and so we define it as follows.

3DefAff29 Definition 29. *Self-abasement* is thinking less highly of oneself than is right, out of sadness.

3DefAff29Ex Explanation. Yet we often oppose humility to pride; but then we attend more to the effects of the two than to their nature. For we usually call proud someone who boasts too much (see the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part), who tells of nothing but his own virtues and nothing but others' vices, who wants to be preferred to everyone, and who, finally, goes about with the dignity and finery usual among those placed far above

him. On the other hand, we call humble someone who often blushes, who confesses his own vices and tells of others' virtues, who gives way to everyone, and who, finally, walks with head bowed and neglects to adorn himself. These affects, however—humility and self-abasement—are very rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see Propositions 13 and 54 of this part); and so those who are most believed to be self-abased and humble are usually the most ambitious and envious.

3DefAff30 Definition 30. *Glory* is joy accompanied by the idea of some action of ours that we imagine others praise.

3DefAff31 Definition 31. *Shame* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some action that we imagine others blame.

3DefAff31Ex Explanation. On these, see the Scholium to Proposition 30 of this part. But here the difference between shame and modesty should be noted. Shame is the sadness that follows a deed one is ashamed of; modesty is the fear, or timidity, of shame, by which a person is restrained from committing something shameful. Shamelessness is usually opposed to modesty; but it is not really an affect, as I shall show in its place. The names of the affects, however (as I have already pointed out), concern their usage more than their nature. With this I have finished the affects of joy and sadness that I had set out to explain. I proceed, then, to those that I relate to desire.[10]

AFFECTS OF DESIRE

Definitions of longing, emulation, gratitude, anger, ambition and the other affects related to desire.

3DefAff32 Definition 32. *Longing* is a desire, or appetite, to possess some thing, which is encouraged by the memory of that thing and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things that exclude the existence of the thing wanted.

3DefAff32Ex Explanation. When we remember some thing, as we have often said already, we are by that very fact disposed to con-

template it with the same affect as if it were present. But while we are awake, this disposition, or striving, is usually checked by the images of things that exclude the existence of what we remember. So when we remember a thing that affected us with some kind of joy, by that very fact we strive to contemplate it as present with the same affect of joy—a striving that is immediately checked by the memory of things that exclude its existence. Longing, therefore, is really a sadness, opposed to the joy that arises from the absence of a thing we hate (on which see the Scholium to Proposition 47 of this part). But because the name *longing* seems to concern desire, I relate this affect to the affects of desire.

3DefAff33 Definition 33. *Emulation* is the desire for some thing that is generated in us because we imagine that others have the same desire.

3DefAff33Ex Explanation. Someone who flees because he sees others flee, or who is afraid because he sees others afraid; or again, someone who, seeing that another has burned his hand, draws back his own hand and moves his body as if his own hand were burning—such a person we shall say imitates another's affect, but not that he emulates it. This is not because we know one cause for emulation and another for imitation, but because custom has brought it about that we call someone an emulator only when he imitates what we judge honorable, useful or pleasant. As for the cause of emulation, see Proposition 27 of this part with its Scholium. And on why envy is usually joined to this affect, *see Proposition 32 of this part with its Scholium*.

3DefAff34 Definition 34. *Gratitude*, or *thankfulness*, is a desire, or eagerness of love, by which we strive to benefit one who has conferred a benefit on us from a like affect of love. *See Proposition 39, with the Scholium to Proposition 41 of this part.*

3DefAff35 Definition 35. *Benevolence* is a desire to benefit one whom we pity. *See the Scholium to Proposition 27 of this part.*

10 Spinoza distinguishes *pudor*, "shame," felt after the act, from *verecundia*, "modesty," the sense of shame that holds one back beforehand.

3DefAff36 Definition 36. *Anger* is a desire by which, out of hatred, we are driven to do evil to one we hate. *See Proposition 39 of this part.*

3DefAff37 Definition 37. *Vengeance* is a desire by which, out of reciprocal hatred, we are roused to do evil to one who, from a like affect, has done us harm. *See Corollary 2 to Proposition 40 of this part, with its Scholium.*

3DefAff38 Definition 38. *Cruelty*, or *savagery*, is a *desire* by which someone is roused to do evil to one whom we love or pity.

3DefAff38Ex Explanation. Opposed to cruelty is mercy, which is not a passion but a power of the mind by which a person governs anger and vengeance.

3DefAff39 Definition 39. *Timidity* is a desire to avoid a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser one. *See the Scholium to Proposition 39 of this part.*

3DefAff40 Definition 40. *Daring* is a desire by which someone is driven to do something at a risk that his equals are afraid to face.

3DefAff41 Definition 41. *Cowardice* is said of someone whose desire is restrained by fear of a danger that his equals dare to face.

3DefAff41Ex Explanation. Cowardice, then, is nothing but fear of some evil that most people do not usually fear; so I do not relate it to the affects of desire. Yet I wanted to explain it here, because, insofar as we attend to desire, it really is opposed to the affect of daring.

3DefAff42 Definition 42. *Consternation* is said of someone whose desire to avoid an evil is restrained by wonder at the evil he fears.

3DefAff42Ex Explanation. Consternation, then, is a species of cowardice. But because consternation arises from a double fear, it can more conveniently be defined as *a fear that holds a person so stunned or wavering that he cannot ward off the evil*. I say *stunned* insofar as we understand his desire to ward off the evil to be restrained by wonder. And I say *wavering* insofar as we conceive that same desire to be restrained by fear of another evil that tor-

ments him equally, so that he does not know which of the two to avert. On these, see the Scholium to Proposition 39 and the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part. As for cowardice and daring, see *the Scholium to Proposition 51 of this part*.

3DefAff43 Definition 43. *Courtesy*, or *modesty*, is a desire to do what pleases people and to refrain from what displeases them.

3DefAff44 Definition 44. *Ambition* is an excessive desire for glory.

3DefAff44Ex Explanation. Ambition is a desire by which all the affects are encouraged and strengthened (by Propositions 27 and 31 of this part); and so this affect can hardly be overcome. For as long as a person is held by any desire, he is necessarily held by this one as well. *All the best people*, says Cicero, *are most led by glory. Even philosophers put their names on the books they write about despising glory*, etc.[11]

3DefAff45 Definition 45. *Gluttony* is an immoderate desire for, or even love of, feasting.

3DefAff46 Definition 46. *Drunkenness* is an immoderate desire for and love of drinking.

3DefAff47 Definition 47. *Greed* is an immoderate desire for and love of riches.

3DefAff48 Definition 48. *Lust* is also a desire for and love of the joining of bodies.

3DefAff48Ex Explanation. Whether this desire for intercourse is moderate or not, it is usually called lust. Further, these five affects (as I pointed out in the Scholium to Proposition 56 of this part) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition (on which see *the Scholium to Proposition 29 of this part*). And I have also already pointed out that temperance, sobriety and chastity indicate a power of the mind, not a passion. And although it can happen that a greedy, ambitious or timid person abstains from too much food, drink and sex, still greed, ambition and timidity are not contrary to gluttony, drunkenness or lust. For the greedy person usually longs to gorge himself on other people's food and drink. And the ambitious person,

11 Cicero (106–43 BC), Roman orator and philosopher; the quotation is from his speech *Pro Archia* (26).

provided he hopes it will stay secret, will restrain himself in nothing; and if he lives among drunkards and the lustful, he will be all the more inclined to those same vices precisely because he is ambitious. Finally, the timid person does what he does not want to do. For even if he throws his riches into the sea to avoid death, he still remains greedy; and if the lustful person is sad because he cannot indulge himself, he does not on that account cease to be lustful. And, in general, these affects concern not so much the acts of feasting, drinking and so on themselves, as the appetite and love itself. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these affects except nobility and tenacity, of which more below.

I pass over in silence the definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind, both because they arise from the combination of affects we have already defined and because most of them have no names—which shows that for the practice of life it is enough to know them only in general. For the rest, it is clear from the definitions of the affects we have explained that they all arise from desire, joy or sadness—or rather, that they are nothing but these three, each of which is usually called by various names on account of its various relations and extrinsic denominations. If we now wish to attend to these primitive affects, and to what we said above about the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define the affects, insofar as they are related to the mind alone, as follows.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE AFFECTS

An affect, as a passion of the mind, is a confused idea affirming a change in the body's force of existing.

3DefAffGen General Definition of the Affects. An affect, which is called a *pathema* [passion] of the mind, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, once it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than that.

3DefAffGenEx Explanation. I say, first, that an affect, or passion of the mind, is *a confused idea*. For we have shown (see Proposition 3 of this part) that the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or confused, ideas. I say next, *by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before*. For all the ideas of bodies that we have indicate the actual constitution of our own body (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2) more than the nature of the external body. But the idea that constitutes the form of an affect must indicate or express a constitution of the body, or of some part of it, which the body itself, or some part of it, has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained. But it should be noted that when I say *a greater or lesser force of existing than before*, I do not mean that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with a past one, but that the idea that constitutes the form of the affect affirms something of the body that really involves more or less reality than before. And since the essence of the mind consists in this (by Propositions 11 and 13 of Part 2), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and since by perfection we understand the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something of its body, or of some part of it, that involves more or less reality than before. So when I said above that the mind's power of thinking is increased or diminished, I meant nothing other than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or of some part of it, that expresses more or less reality than it had affirmed of its body before. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking, are measured by the excellence of the object. Finally, I added *and by which, once it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than that*, so as to express, besides the nature of joy and sadness, which the first part of the definition explains, the nature of desire as well.

Part IV: Of human bondage, or the powers of the affects

Spinoza shows how the emotions rule us and what reason prescribes for a good life.

4Pref Preface. Human lack of power in governing and restraining the affects I call bondage. For a person subject to the affects is not his own master but is under the control of fortune, in whose power he is to such an extent that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course for himself, still to follow the worse. In this Part I have set out to demonstrate the cause of this, and what good or bad the affects have besides. But before I begin, I should like to say a few words first about perfection and imperfection, and about good and evil.

When someone has resolved to make something and has finished it, he will say that his thing is perfect—and not only he, but everyone who rightly knows, or believes he knows, the mind and aim of the author of that work. For example, if someone sees some work (which I suppose is not yet completed) and knows that its author's aim is to build a house, he will say that the house is imperfect; and, on the other hand, that it is perfect as soon as he sees the work brought to the end its author had resolved to give it. But if someone sees a work the like of which he had never seen, and does not know the maker's intention, he certainly cannot know whether that work is perfect or imperfect. And this seems to have been the first meaning of these words. But after people began to form universal ideas, and to

devise models of houses, buildings, towers, etc.,[1] and to prefer some models of things to others, it came about that each person called perfect what he saw agree with the universal idea he had formed of that kind of thing, and imperfect, on the other hand, what he saw agree less with the model he had conceived, even though in its maker's judgment it had been fully completed. Nor does there seem to be any other reason why people also commonly call natural things—those, namely, not made by human hand—perfect or imperfect. For people are accustomed to form universal ideas of natural things as well as of artificial ones, which they treat as models of things; and they believe that Nature (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to these ideas and sets them before itself as models. So when they see something happen in Nature that agrees less with the model they have conceived of that kind of thing, they believe that Nature itself has then fallen short or erred, and left that thing imperfect. We see, then, that people have grown accustomed to calling natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of them. For we showed in the Appendix to Part 1 that Nature does not act for the sake of an end: that eternal and infinite being we call God, or Nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists. For we have shown that it acts from the same necessity of nature from which it exists (Proposition 16 of Part 1). The reason, or cause, why God, or Nature, acts and why it exists is therefore one and the same. So, as it exists for the sake of no end, it also acts for the sake of no end; rather, as it has no principle or end of existing, so it has none of acting. What is called a final cause, however, is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered the principle, or primary cause, of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, we surely understand nothing but that a person, because he imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So habitation,

1 Latin *perfectus* literally means "completed" or "carried through"; Spinoza is recovering this original sense of the word.

insofar as it is considered a final cause, is nothing but this singular appetite, which is really an efficient cause, and which is considered as first because people are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites. For, as I have often said already, they are conscious of their actions and appetites but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to want something. As for what people commonly say besides—that Nature sometimes fails or errs and produces imperfect things—I count this among the fictions I dealt with in the Appendix to Part 1. Perfection and imperfection, then, are really only modes of thinking: that is, notions we are accustomed to fashion because we compare individuals of the same species or genus with one another. And for this reason I said above (Definition 6 of Part 2) that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing. For we are accustomed to refer all the individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the most general: namely, to the notion of being, which belongs absolutely to all the individuals in Nature. Insofar, then, as we refer the individuals of Nature to this genus and compare them with one another, and find that some have more being, or reality, than others, to that extent we say that some are more perfect than others. And insofar as we attribute to them something that involves negation—such as limit, end, lack of power, etc.—to that extent we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind as much as those we call perfect, and not because they lack something that is theirs, or because Nature has erred. For nothing belongs to the nature of any thing except what follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause happens necessarily.

As for good and evil, they too indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form because we compare things with one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for someone who is melancholy, bad for someone in mourning, and neither good nor bad for someone who is deaf.

But although this is how things stand, we must still keep these words. For since we desire to form an idea of the human being as a model of human nature for us to look to, it will be useful for us to keep these same words in the sense I have described. In what follows, then, by good I shall understand what we know with certainty to be a means by which we may come ever closer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, on the other hand, I shall understand what we know with certainty prevents us from reproducing that same model. Next, we shall say that people are more perfect or more imperfect insofar as they come nearer to or stay further from this same model. For it must be especially noted that when I say someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, or the reverse, I do not mean that he is changed from one essence, or form, into another—for a horse, for example, is destroyed as much if it is changed into a human being as if it is changed into an insect—but that we conceive his power of acting, insofar as it is understood through his nature, to be increased or diminished. Next, by perfection in general I shall understand, as I have said, reality: that is, the essence of any thing insofar as it exists and acts in a certain way, without regard to its duration. For no singular thing can be called more perfect on the ground that it has persisted in existing for a longer time. The duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing. Rather, any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist, so that in this respect all things are equal.

DEFINITIONS AND THE AXIOM

Spinoza defines good, bad, contingent, possible and virtue, and states that every thing can be destroyed by a stronger one.

4D1 Definition 1. By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.

4D2 Definition 2. By bad, on the other hand, I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good.

(On these, see the end of the preceding Preface.)

4D3 Definition 3. I call singular things contingent insofar as, when we attend only to their essence, we find nothing that necessarily posits their existence or that necessarily excludes it.

4D4 Definition 4. I call the same singular things possible insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them.

(In Scholium 1 to Proposition 33 of Part 1 I drew no distinction between the possible and the contingent, because there was no need to distinguish them precisely there.)

4D5 Definition 5. By contrary affects I shall understand, in what follows, those that pull a person in different directions even though they are of the same kind—such as gluttony and greed, which are species of love. They are contrary not by nature but by accident.

4D6 Definition 6. What I understand by an affect toward a future, present or past thing I have explained in Scholia 1 and 2 to Proposition 18 of Part 3; see there.

(But it should be noted here, in addition, that we can distinctly imagine distance in time, as in space, only up to a certain limit. That is, just as we usually imagine all objects that are more than two hundred feet away from us—that is, whose distance from where we are exceeds what we can distinctly imagine—to be equally far from us, as if they were all on the same plane, so too we imagine all objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by a longer interval than we usually imagine distinctly as being equally far from the present, and we refer them, as it were, to a single moment of time.)

4D7 Definition 7. By the end for the sake of which we do something, I understand appetite.

4D8 Definition 8. By virtue and power I understand the same thing. That is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), virtue, insofar as it is related to a human being, is the very essence or nature of that human being, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things that can be understood through the laws of his own nature alone.

4A Axiom. There is no singular thing in Nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Given any thing whatever, there is another more powerful by which the given thing can be destroyed.

4P1 Proposition 1. *Nothing positive that a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true.*

4P1D Demonstration. Falsity consists only in the privation of knowledge that inadequate ideas involve (by Proposition 35 of Part 2), and these ideas have nothing positive on account of which they are called false (by Proposition 33 of Part 2). On the contrary, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by Proposition 32 of Part 2). So if what a false idea has that is positive were removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (by Proposition 4 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive that a false idea has, etc. QED

4P1S Scholium. This Proposition is understood more clearly from Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2. For an imagination is an idea that indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external body—not distinctly, indeed, but confusedly; and this is why the mind is said to err. For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. In this we are deceived only as long as we do not know its true distance. When its distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination—that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only insofar as the body is affected by it. And so, even though we know its true distance, we shall nonetheless imagine it as near to us. For, as we said in the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 2, we do not imagine the sun to be so near because we do not know its true dis-

tance, but because the mind conceives the size of the sun only insofar as the body is affected by it. So too, when the sun's rays fall on the surface of water and are reflected to our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, even though we know its true location. And in the same way the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived—whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or that its power of acting is increased or diminished—are not contrary to the true, and do not vanish in its presence. It does happen, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear vanishes when we hear the true news. But the opposite also happens: when we fear an evil that is certainly coming, the fear also vanishes when we hear false news. And so imaginations do not vanish through the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, but because others stronger than they occur that exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in Proposition 17 of Part 2.

4P2 Proposition 2. *We are acted on insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived through itself without the others.*

4P2D Demonstration. We are said to be acted on when something arises in us of which we are only a partial cause (by Definition 2 of Part 3), that is (by Definition 1 of Part 3), something that cannot be deduced from the laws of our own nature alone. Therefore we are acted on insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived through itself without the others. QED

4P3 Proposition 3. *The force by which a human being perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.*

4P3D Demonstration. This is evident from the Axiom of this part. For given a human being, there is something else, say A, more powerful; and given A, there is in turn something else, say B, more powerful than A; and so on to infinity. Accordingly, the power of a human being is limited by the power of another thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. QED

4P4 Proposition 4. *It is impossible that a human being should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be able to undergo no changes*

except those that can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

4P4D Demonstration. The power by which singular things, and consequently human beings, preserve their being is the very power of God, or Nature (by the Corollary to Proposition 24 of Part 1)—not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the actual essence of a human being (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). So the power of a human being, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power, that is (by Proposition 34 of Part 1), of the essence, of God, or Nature. That was the first point. Next, if it were possible that a human being could undergo no changes except those that can be understood through the nature of that human being alone, it would follow (by Propositions 4 and 6 of Part 3) that he could not perish, but would always necessarily exist. And this would have to follow from a cause whose power is either finite or infinite: namely, either from the power of the human being alone, who would then be able to keep away from himself all the other changes that could arise from external causes; or from the infinite power of Nature, by which all singular things would be so directed that the human being could undergo no changes except those that serve his preservation. But the first is absurd (by the preceding Proposition, whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things). Therefore, if it were possible that a human being underwent no changes except those that could be understood through his own nature alone, and consequently (as we have already shown) that he always necessarily existed, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God. And consequently (by Proposition 16 of Part 1) the order of the whole of Nature, insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of Extension and Thought, would have to be deduced from the necessity of the divine nature insofar as it is considered as affected by the idea of some human being. And so (by Proposition 21 of Part 1) it would follow that the human being was infinite, which (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. It is therefore impossible that a human being should

undergo no changes other than those of which he himself is the adequate cause. QED

4P4C Corollary. From this it follows that a human being is necessarily always subject to passions, that he follows the common order of Nature and obeys it, and that he accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.

4P5 Proposition 5. *The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.*

4P5D Demonstration. The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3); that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in our being, but (as was shown in Proposition 16 of Part 2) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. QED

4P6 Proposition 6. *The force of some passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a human being, so that the affect clings stubbornly to the person.*

4P6D Demonstration. The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by the preceding Proposition); and so (by Proposition 3 of this part) it can surpass the power of a human being, etc. QED

4P7 Proposition 7. *An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect that is contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained.*

4P7D Demonstration. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body than before (by the General Definition of the Affects, found at the end of Part 3). So when the mind is assailed by some affect, the body is at the same time affected with an affection by which its power of acting is increased or diminished. Further, this affection of the body (by Proposition 5 of this part) receives from its cause the force to persevere in its

being; so it can be neither restrained nor removed except by a bodily cause (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) that affects the body with an affection contrary to it (by Proposition 5 of Part 3) and stronger (by the Axiom of this part). And so (by Proposition 12 of Part 2) the mind will be affected with the idea of an affection stronger than, and contrary to, the former one; that is, (by the General Definition of the Affects) the mind will be affected with an affect stronger than, and contrary to, the former one—one, that is, that will exclude or remove the existence of the former. Accordingly, an affect can be neither removed nor restrained except by a contrary and stronger affect. QED

4P7C Corollary. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, can be neither restrained nor removed except by the idea of an affection of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the affection by which we are acted on. For the affect by which we are acted on can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect stronger than it and contrary to it (by the preceding Proposition), that is (by the General Definition of the Affects), except by the idea of an affection of the body stronger than, and contrary to, the affection by which we are acted on.

WHY KNOWING THE GOOD IS NOT ENOUGH

True knowledge of good and bad restrains the affects only as an affect, so present desires often overpower it.

4P8 Proposition 8. *Knowledge of good and bad is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.*

4P8D Demonstration. We call good or bad what is useful or harmful to preserving our being (by Definitions 1 and 2 of this part), that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. So insofar as we perceive that some thing affects us with joy or sadness (by the definitions of joy and sadness, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), we call it good or bad. And so knowledge of good and bad is nothing but the idea of joy or sadness that necessarily follows from the affect of joy or sadness itself

(by Proposition 22 of Part 2). But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body (by Proposition 21 of Part 2); that is, (as was shown in the Scholium to the same Proposition) this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or (by the General Definition of the Affects) from the idea of the affection of the body, except by a distinction of concept alone. Therefore this knowledge of good and bad is nothing but the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. QED

4P9 Proposition 9. *An affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is stronger than if we imagined that cause not to be with us.*

4P9D Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind regards a thing as present (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2), but which indicates the constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2). An affect, then (by the General Definition of the Affects), is an imagination insofar as it indicates the constitution of the body. But an imagination (by Proposition 17 of Part 2) is more intense as long as we imagine nothing that excludes the present existence of the external thing. Therefore an affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is also more intense, or stronger, than if we imagined that cause not to be with us. QED

4P9S Scholium. When I said above, in Proposition 18 of Part 3, that we are affected by the image of a future or past thing with the same affect as if the thing we imagine were present, I expressly warned that this is true insofar as we attend only to the image of the thing itself; for the image is of the same nature whether or not we have imagined the things as present. But I did not deny that it is rendered weaker when we regard other things present to us that exclude the present existence of the future thing. I neglected to point this out at the time, because I had decided to treat the strength of the affects in this Part.

4P9C Corollary. The image of a future or past thing—that is, of a thing we regard in relation to future or past time, the present

being excluded—is weaker, other things being equal, than the image of a present thing. Consequently, an affect toward a future or past thing is, other things being equal, milder than an affect toward a present thing.

4P10 Proposition 10. *We are affected more intensely toward a future thing that we imagine will soon be here than if we imagined its time of existing to be further from the present. And we are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing that we imagine to have passed not long ago than if we imagined it to have passed long ago.*

4P10D Demonstration. For insofar as we imagine that a thing will soon be here, or has not long passed, by that very fact we imagine something that excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined that its future time of existing was further from the present, or that it had passed long ago (as is self-evident). And so (by the preceding Proposition) to that extent we shall be affected more intensely toward it. QED

4P10S Scholium. From what we noted at Definition 6 of this part, it follows that toward objects separated from the present by a longer interval of time than we can determine by imagining, we are affected equally mildly, even though we understand that they are separated from one another by a long interval of time. QED

4P11 Proposition 11. *An affect toward a thing that we imagine as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than one toward a thing that is possible or contingent, that is, not necessary.*

4P11D Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing to be necessary, we affirm its existence; and conversely, we deny a thing's existence insofar as we imagine it not to be necessary (by Scholium 1 to Proposition 33 of Part 1). Accordingly (by Proposition 9 of this part), an affect toward a necessary thing is, other things being equal, more intense than one toward a thing that is not necessary. QED

4P12 Proposition 12. *An affect toward a thing that we know does not exist in the present, and that we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than one toward a contingent thing.*

4P12D Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by any image of another thing that posits the thing's existence (by Definition 3 of this part); on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, we imagine certain things that posit its existence (by Definition 4 of this part), that is (by Proposition 18 of Part 3), things that encourage hope or fear. And so an affect toward a possible thing is more intense. QED

4P12C Corollary. An affect toward a thing that we know does not exist in the present, and that we imagine as contingent, is much milder than if we imagined the thing to be with us in the present.

4P12CD Demonstration. An affect toward a thing we imagine to exist in the present is more intense than if we imagined it as future (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part), and much more intense than if we imagined the future time to be far distant from the present (by Proposition 10 of this part). So an affect toward a thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is much milder than if we imagined it as present; and nevertheless (by the preceding Proposition) it is more intense than if we imagined the same thing as contingent. And so an affect toward a contingent thing will be much milder than if we imagined the thing to be with us in the present. QED

4P13 Proposition 13. *An affect toward a contingent thing that we know does not exist in the present is, other things being equal, milder than an affect toward a past thing.*

4P13D Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by any image of another thing that posits the thing's existence (by Definition 3 of this part); on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine it in relation to past time, we are supposed to imagine something that brings it back to memory, or that arouses the image of the thing (see Proposition 18 of Part 2, with its Scholium), and so to that extent causes us to regard it as if it were present (by the Corollary to Proposi-

tion 17 of Part 2). And so (by Proposition 9 of this part) an affect toward a contingent thing that we know does not exist in the present will be, other things being equal, milder than an affect toward a past thing. QED

4P14 Proposition 14. *No affect can be restrained by true knowledge of good and bad insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.*

4P14D Demonstration. An affect is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body than before (by the General Definition of the Affects). And so (by Proposition 1 of this part) it has nothing positive that could be removed by the presence of the true. Consequently, true knowledge of good and bad, insofar as it is true, can restrain no affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see Proposition 8 of this part), it will be able to restrain an affect only if it is stronger than the affect to be restrained, and only to that extent (by Proposition 7 of this part). QED

4P15 Proposition 15. *A desire that arises from true knowledge of good and bad can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires that arise from the affects by which we are assailed.*

4P15D Demonstration. From true knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge is an affect (by Proposition 8 of this part), there necessarily arises a desire (by Definition 1 of the Affects), which is greater in proportion as the affect from which it arises is greater (by Proposition 37 of Part 3). But since this desire (by hypothesis) arises from our understanding something truly, it follows in us insofar as we act (by Proposition 1 of Part 3), and so must be understood through our essence alone (by Definition 2 of Part 3). Consequently (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), its force and growth must be defined by human power alone. Further, the desires that arise from the affects by which we are assailed are also greater in proportion as those affects are more violent. And so their force and growth (by Proposition 5 of this part) must be defined by the power of external causes, which, if compared with our own, indefinitely surpasses our power (by Proposition 3 of this part). And so the desires that arise from

such affects can be more violent than the one that arises from true knowledge of good and bad, and accordingly (by Proposition 7 of this part) they will be able to restrain or extinguish it. QED

4P16 Proposition 16. *A desire that arises from knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for things that are pleasant in the present.*

4P16D Demonstration. An affect toward a thing we imagine as future is milder than one toward a present thing (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part). But a desire that arises from true knowledge of good and bad, even when this knowledge concerns things that are good in the present, can be extinguished or restrained by some rash desire (by the preceding Proposition, whose demonstration is universal). Therefore a desire that arises from the same knowledge, insofar as it looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished, etc. QED

4P17 Proposition 17. *A desire that arises from true knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this knowledge concerns contingent things, can be restrained still more easily by a desire for things that are present.*

4P17D Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one, from the Corollary to Proposition 12 of this part.

4P17S Scholium. With this I believe I have shown the cause why people are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why true knowledge of good and bad stirs up disturbances of the mind and often gives way to every kind of lust. Hence the Poet's saying: *I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse.* Ecclesiastes also seems to have had the same thing in mind when he said, *He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.* I do not say these things in order to conclude that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or that in moderating the affects there is no difference between a fool and a person of understanding. I say them because it is necessary to know both the power and the lack of power of our nature, so that we can determine what reason can

do in moderating the affects, and what it cannot. And I said that in this Part I would treat only of human lack of power; for I have decided to treat the power of reason over the affects separately.[2]

4P18 Proposition 18. *A desire that arises from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than a desire that arises from sadness.*

4P18D Demonstration. Desire is the very essence of a human being (by Definition 1 of the Affects), that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the striving by which a human being strives to persevere in his being. So a desire that arises from joy is aided or increased by the affect of joy itself (by the definition of joy, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), whereas one that arises from sadness is diminished or restrained by the affect of sadness itself (by the same Scholium). And so the force of a desire that arises from joy must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas that of one arising from sadness must be defined by human power alone. Accordingly, the former is stronger than the latter. QED

THE DICTATES OF REASON

Spinoza sums up what reason prescribes and argues that virtue consists in seeking one's own advantage.

4P18S Scholium. In these few words I have explained the causes of human lack of power and inconstancy, and why people do not observe the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what it is that reason prescribes to us, which affects agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the other hand, are contrary to them. But before I begin to demonstrate these things in our lengthy geometrical order, I should like first to set out the dictates of reason themselves briefly here, so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone. Since reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, it demands that each person love himself; that he seek his own advantage—what is really useful to him; that he want whatever really leads a human being to greater perfection; and, absolutely, that each person strive to

2 The Poet is Ovid; the second quotation is Ecclesiastes 1:18.

preserve his own being as far as he can. This is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part (see Proposition 4 of Part 3). Next, since virtue (by Definition 8 of this part) is nothing but acting from the laws of one's own nature, and no one strives to preserve his being (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) except from the laws of his own nature, it follows, *first*, that the foundation of virtue is the very striving to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in a person's being able to preserve his being. It follows, *second*, that virtue is to be wanted for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent than it, or more useful to us, for the sake of which it should be wanted. It follows, *third* and finally, that those who kill themselves are weak in mind, and are completely overcome by external causes that are opposed to their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate 4 of Part 2 that we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being, or that we live without having any dealings with things outside us. And if, besides, we consider our mind, our intellect would surely be more imperfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing except itself. There are, then, many things outside us that are useful to us and that are therefore to be sought. Of these, none more excellent can be devised than those that agree entirely with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to each other, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one alone. To a human being, then, nothing is more useful than a human being. Nothing, I say, can people wish for that is more excellent for preserving their being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body; that all together should strive, as far as they can, to preserve their being; and that all together should seek for themselves the common advantage of all. From this it follows that people who are governed by reason—that is, people who seek their own advantage under the guidance of reason—want nothing for themselves that they do not desire for other people, and so are just, faithful and honorable.

These are the dictates of reason that I proposed to set out briefly here before beginning to demonstrate them in a more lengthy order. I have done this in order to win, if possible, the attention of those who believe that this principle—that each person is bound to seek his own advantage—is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety. Now that I have briefly shown that the matter is quite otherwise, I go on to demonstrate it by the same path by which we have proceeded so far.

4P19 Proposition 19. *From the laws of his own nature each person necessarily wants, or is averse to, what he judges to be good or bad.*

4P19D Demonstration. Knowledge of good and bad (by Proposition 8 of this part) is the very affect of joy or sadness insofar as we are conscious of it; accordingly (by Proposition 28 of Part 3), each person necessarily wants what he judges to be good, and conversely is averse to what he judges to be bad. But this appetite is nothing but the very essence, or nature, of a human being (by the definition of appetite, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of Part 3, and by Definition 1 of the Affects). Therefore each person, from the laws of his own nature alone, necessarily wants or is averse to, etc. QED

4P20 Proposition 20. *The more each person strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage—that is, to preserve his being—the more he is endowed with virtue; and conversely, insofar as each person neglects to preserve his own advantage, that is, his being, he lacks power.*

4P20D Demonstration. Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by the essence of a human being alone (by Definition 8 of this part), that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), which is defined solely by the striving by which a human being strives to persevere in his being. So the more each person strives, and is able, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; and consequently (by Propositions 4 and 6 of Part 3), insofar as someone neglects to preserve his being, he lacks power. QED

4P20S Scholium. No one, therefore, neglects to want his own advantage, or to preserve his being, unless he is overcome by external causes contrary to his nature. No one, I say, turns away from food or kills himself from the necessity of his own nature,

but only when compelled by external causes. This can happen in many ways. Someone may kill himself because he is compelled by another, who twists the right hand in which he happened to have grasped a sword and forces him to direct the blade against his own heart. Or, like Seneca, he may be compelled by a tyrant's command to open his veins—that is, he may desire to avoid a greater evil by a lesser. Or, finally, hidden external causes may so dispose his imagination, and so affect his body, that it takes on another nature contrary to its former one, a nature of which there cannot be an idea in the mind (by Proposition 10 of Part 3).[3] But that a human being should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something should come from nothing, as anyone can see with a little reflection.

4P21 Proposition 21. *No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live—that is, to actually exist.*

4P21D Demonstration. The demonstration of this Proposition, or rather the thing itself, is evident through itself, and also from the definition of desire. For the desire to live blessedly or well, to act well, etc., is (by Definition 1 of the Affects) the very essence of a human being, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the striving by which each person strives to preserve his being. Therefore no one can desire, etc. QED

4P22 Proposition 22. *No virtue can be conceived prior to this one (namely, the striving to preserve oneself).*

4P22D Demonstration. The striving to preserve itself is the very essence of a thing (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). So if some virtue could be conceived prior to this one, namely to this striving, then (by Definition 8 of this part) the very essence of the thing would be conceived prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. QED

4P22C Corollary. The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue. For no other principle can be con-

ceived prior to this one (by the preceding Proposition), and without it (by Proposition 21 of this part) no virtue can be conceived.

4P23 Proposition 23. *A human being, insofar as he is determined to do something by having inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue; he can be said to do so only insofar as he is determined by the fact that he understands.*

4P23D Demonstration. Insofar as a human being is determined to act by having inadequate ideas, to that extent (by Proposition 1 of Part 3) he is acted on; that is (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3), he does something that cannot be perceived through his essence alone, that is (by Definition 8 of this part), something that does not follow from his virtue. But insofar as he is determined to do something by the fact that he understands, to that extent (by the same Proposition 1 of Part 3) he acts; that is (by Definition 2 of Part 3), he does something that is perceived through his essence alone, or (by Definition 8 of this part) that follows adequately from his virtue. QED

4P24 Proposition 24. *In us, to act absolutely from virtue is nothing other than to act, to live, and to preserve our being (these three mean the same thing) under the guidance of reason, on the foundation of seeking our own advantage.*

4P24D Demonstration. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing other (by Definition 8 of this part) than to act from the laws of one's own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (by Proposition 3 of Part 3). Therefore, in us, to act from virtue is nothing other than to act, to live, and to preserve our being under the guidance of reason, and to do so (by the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part) on the foundation of seeking our own advantage. QED

4P25 Proposition 25. *No one strives to preserve their being for the sake of anything else.*

4P25D Demonstration. The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is defined by the essence of the thing

3 The Stoic philosopher Seneca was ordered by the emperor Nero, his former pupil, to take his own life in AD 65.

itself alone (by Proposition 7 of Part 3). From this essence alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) that each one strives to preserve its being. This Proposition is also evident from the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part. For if a person strove to preserve their being for the sake of some other thing, that thing would then be the first foundation of virtue (as is self-evident), which (by that Corollary) is absurd. Therefore no one strives to preserve their being, etc. QED

4P26 Proposition 26. *Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing other than to understand; and the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judges nothing to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding.*

4P26D Demonstration. The striving to preserve oneself is nothing but the essence of the thing itself (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived to have the force to persevere in existing (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) and to do the things that necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Definition of Appetite in the Scholium to Proposition 9 of Part 3). But the essence of reason is nothing other than our mind insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see its definition in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Therefore (by Proposition 40 of Part 2) whatever we strive for from reason is nothing other than to understand. Next, since this striving of the mind, by which the mind, insofar as it reasons, strives to preserve its being, is nothing other than understanding (by the first part of this demonstration), this striving to understand is (by the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part) the first and only foundation of virtue. Nor will we strive to understand things for the sake of some end (by Proposition 25 of this part). On the contrary, the mind, insofar as it reasons, will be able to conceive nothing as good for itself except what leads to understanding (by Definition 1 of this part). QED

4P27 Proposition 27. *We know nothing to be certainly good or bad except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding.*

4P27D Demonstration. The mind, insofar as it reasons, wants nothing other than to understand, and judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding (by the preceding Proposition). But the mind (by Propositions 41 and 43 of Part 2; see also the Scholium to the latter) has certainty about things only insofar as it has adequate ideas, or (what is the same thing, by Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2) insofar as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be certainly good except what really leads to understanding, and, on the other hand, nothing to be certainly bad except what can prevent us from understanding. QED

4P28 Proposition 28. *The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.*

4P28D Demonstration. The highest thing the mind can understand is God, that is (by Definition 6 of Part 1), an absolutely infinite being, without whom (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) nothing can either be or be conceived. And so (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part) the mind's highest advantage, or (by Definition 1 of this part) its highest good, is the knowledge of God. Next, only insofar as the mind understands does it act (by Propositions 1 and 3 of Part 3), and only to that extent (by Proposition 23 of this part) can it be said absolutely to act from virtue. The mind's absolute virtue, then, is to understand. But the highest thing the mind can understand is God (as we have just demonstrated). Therefore the mind's highest virtue is to understand, or know, God. QED

WHAT AGREES WITH OUR NATURE IS GOOD

Things are good for us insofar as they share our nature; passions make people differ and conflict.

4P29 Proposition 29. *No singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can either aid or restrain our power of acting; and absolutely, nothing can be good or bad for us unless it has something in common with us.*

4P29D Demonstration. The power of any singular thing, and consequently (by the Corollary to Proposition 10 of Part 2) of a human being, by which it exists and acts, is determined only by another singular thing (by Proposition 28 of Part 1), whose nature (by Proposition 6 of Part 2) must be understood through the same attribute through which human nature is conceived. So our power of acting, however it is conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or restrained, by the power of another singular thing that has something in common with us, and not by the power of a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours. Now we call good or bad what is the cause of joy or sadness (by Proposition 8 of this part), that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Therefore a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can be neither good nor bad for us. QED

4P30 Proposition 30. *Nothing can be bad through what it has in common with our nature; rather, insofar as it is bad for us, it is contrary to us.*

4P30D Demonstration. We call bad what is the cause of sadness (by Proposition 8 of this part), that is (by the definition of sadness, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), what diminishes or restrains our power of acting. So if some thing were bad for us through what it has in common with us, it could diminish or restrain the very thing it has in common with us, which (by Proposition 4 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore nothing can be bad for us through what it has in common with us. On the contrary, insofar as it is bad—that is (as we have just shown), insofar as it can diminish or restrain our power of acting—it is (by Proposition 5 of Part 3) contrary to us. QED

4P31 Proposition 31. *Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good.*

4P31D Demonstration. For insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot be bad (by the preceding Proposition). It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. Suppose the latter: that it is neither good nor bad. Then (by Definition 1 of

this part) nothing will follow from its nature that serves the preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), that serves the preservation of the nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (by Proposition 6 of Part 3). Therefore, insofar as it agrees with our nature, it will necessarily be good. QED

4P31C Corollary. From this it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or better, it is for us; and conversely, the more useful a thing is to us, the more it agrees with our nature. For insofar as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be either different from our nature or contrary to it. If different, then (by Proposition 29 of this part) it can be neither good nor bad. If contrary, it will also be contrary to what agrees with our nature, that is (by the preceding Proposition), contrary to the good—in other words, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature; and so the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is, and conversely. QED

4P32 Proposition 32. *Insofar as people are subject to passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree in nature.*

4P32D Demonstration. Things said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), not in lack of power, or negation, and consequently (see the Scholium to Proposition 3 of Part 3) not in passion either. Therefore people, insofar as they are subject to passions, cannot be said to agree in nature. QED

4P32S Scholium. The matter is also evident in itself. Someone who says that white and black agree only in this, that neither is red, is asserting outright that white and black agree in nothing. So too, if someone says that a stone and a human being agree only in this, that each is finite and lacking in power, or that neither exists by the necessity of its own nature, or, finally, that each is indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, that person is asserting outright that a stone and a human being agree in nothing. For things that agree only in a negation—that is, in what they do not have—in reality agree in nothing.

4P33 Proposition 33. *People can differ in nature insofar as they are torn by affects that are passions; and to that extent one and the same person is also changeable and inconstant.*

4P33D Demonstration. The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature, alone (by Definitions 1 and 2 of Part 3). It must be defined by the power, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), the nature, of external causes compared with our own. Hence there are as many kinds of each affect as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected (see Proposition 56 of Part 3); different people are affected in different ways by one and the same object (see Proposition 51 of Part 3), and to that extent differ in nature; and, finally, one and the same person (by the same Proposition 51 of Part 3) is affected in different ways toward the same object, and to that extent is changeable, etc. QED

4P34 Proposition 34. *Insofar as people are torn by affects that are passions, they can be contrary to one another.*

4P34D Demonstration. A person—Peter, say—can be the cause of Paul's being saddened, because Peter has something similar to a thing Paul hates (by Proposition 16 of Part 3); or because Peter alone possesses something that Paul also loves (see Proposition 32 of Part 3, with its Scholium); or for other reasons (for the chief of these, see the Scholium to Proposition 55 of Part 3). From this it will come about (by Definition 7 of the Affects) that Paul hates Peter. Consequently it will easily come about (by Proposition 40 of Part 3, with its Scholium) that Peter hates Paul in return, and so (by Proposition 39 of Part 3) that they strive to harm each other, that is (by Proposition 30 of this part), that they are contrary to one another. But the affect of sadness is always a passion (by Proposition 59 of Part 3). Therefore people, insofar as they are torn by affects that are passions, can be contrary to one another. QED

4P34S Scholium. I said that Paul hates Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses what Paul himself also loves. At first sight it seems to follow from this that these two harm each other because they love the same thing, and consequently because

they agree in nature. If that were true, Propositions 30 and 31 of this part would be false. But if we are willing to weigh the matter fairly, we shall see that everything here is entirely consistent. For these two are not troublesome to each other insofar as they agree in nature, that is, insofar as each loves the same thing, but insofar as they differ from each other. For insofar as each loves the same thing, the love of each is thereby strengthened (by Proposition 31 of Part 3), that is (by Definition 6 of the Affects), the joy of each is thereby strengthened. So it is far from true that they are troublesome to each other insofar as they love the same thing and agree in nature. The cause of their conflict, as I said, is nothing other than that they are supposed to differ in nature. For we are supposing that Peter has the idea of the loved thing as already possessed, and Paul, on the contrary, the idea of the loved thing as lost. That is why Paul is affected with sadness and Peter with joy, and to that extent they are contrary to one another. In the same way we can easily show that the other causes of hatred depend solely on the fact that people differ in nature, and not on what they agree in.

PEOPLE AGREE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF REASON

Only people who live by reason always agree, so nothing is more useful to a human being than another rational person.

4P35 Proposition 35. *Only insofar as people live under the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature.*

4P35D Demonstration. Insofar as people are torn by affects that are passions, they can be different in nature (by Proposition 33 of this part) and contrary to one another (by the preceding Proposition). But people are said to act only insofar as they live under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 3 of Part 3). Accordingly, whatever follows from human nature insofar as it is defined by reason must (by Definition 2 of Part 3) be understood through human nature alone, as through its proximate cause. Now each person, by the laws of their own nature, wants what they judge to be good and strives to remove what they

judge to be bad (by Proposition 19 of this part). Moreover, what we judge to be good or bad by the dictate of reason is necessarily good or bad (by Proposition 41 of Part 2). Therefore, only insofar as people live under the guidance of reason do they necessarily do the things that are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each person, that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of this part), the things that agree with the nature of each person. And so people also necessarily always agree with one another insofar as they live under the guidance of reason. QED

4P35C1 Corollary 1. There is no singular thing in Nature more useful to a human being than a human being who lives under the guidance of reason. For what is most useful to a human being is what most agrees with their nature (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of this part), that is (as is self-evident), a human being. But a human being acts absolutely from the laws of their own nature when they live under the guidance of reason (by Definition 2 of Part 3), and only to that extent do they always necessarily agree with the nature of another human being (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore, among singular things, nothing is more useful to a human being than a human being, etc. QED

4P35C2 Corollary 2. When each person most seeks their own advantage, then people are most useful to one another. For the more each seeks their own advantage and strives to preserve themselves, the more they are endowed with virtue (by Proposition 20 of this part), or, what is the same thing (by Definition 8 of this part), the greater the power with which they are endowed to act from the laws of their own nature, that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), to live under the guidance of reason. But people most agree in nature when they live under the guidance of reason (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore (by the preceding Corollary) people will be most useful to one another when each most seeks their own advantage. QED

4P35S Scholium. What we have just shown is confirmed daily by experience itself, with so many and such clear testimonies that

it is on almost everyone's lips: "One human being is a god to another." Yet it rarely happens that people live under the guidance of reason. Instead, they are so constituted that for the most part they are envious and troublesome to one another. Nevertheless, they can scarcely lead a solitary life, so that most people have warmly welcomed the definition of a human being as a social animal. And in truth, things are such that far more advantages than harms arise from the common society of human beings.[4] So let the satirists laugh at human affairs as much as they like, let the theologians curse them, and let the melancholics praise, as much as they can, a rough and rustic life, scorn human beings and admire the beasts. People will still find that by mutual help they can provide themselves far more easily with what they need, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers that threaten on every side. Not to mention that it is far better, and more worthy of our knowledge, to contemplate the deeds of human beings than those of beasts. But I shall treat these matters more fully elsewhere.

4P36 Proposition 36. *The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally.*

4P36D Demonstration. To act from virtue is to act under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 24 of this part), and whatever we strive to do from reason is to understand (by Proposition 26 of this part). And so (by Proposition 28 of this part) the highest good of those who pursue virtue is to know God, that is (by Proposition 47 of Part 2 and its Scholium), a good that is common to all human beings and can be possessed equally by all human beings insofar as they are of the same nature. QED

4P36S Scholium. But suppose someone asks: what if the highest good of those who pursue virtue were not common to all? Would it not follow from this, as above (see Proposition 34 of this part), that people who live under the guidance of reason—that is (by Proposition 35 of this part), people insofar as they agree in

4 The proverb "Homo homini deus" ("man is a god to man") is the counterpart of the better-known "man is a wolf to man." The "social animal" echoes Aristotle's definition of the human being as a political animal.

nature—would be contrary to one another? Let them take this as their answer: it is not by accident but from the very nature of reason that the highest good of human beings is common to all—namely, because it is deduced from the very essence of a human being insofar as that essence is defined by reason, and because a human being could neither be nor be conceived if they did not have the power to enjoy this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human mind (by Proposition 47 of Part 2) to have an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence.

4P37 Proposition 37. *The good that each person who pursues virtue wants for themselves they will also desire for other people, and all the more, the greater the knowledge of God they have.*

4P37D Demonstration. People are most useful to a human being insofar as they live under the guidance of reason (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 35 of this part). And so (by Proposition 19 of this part), under the guidance of reason, we will necessarily strive to bring it about that people live under the guidance of reason. But the good that each person who lives by the dictate of reason—that is (by Proposition 24 of this part), who pursues virtue—wants for themselves is to understand (by Proposition 26 of this part). Therefore the good that each person who pursues virtue wants for themselves they will also desire for other people. Next, desire, insofar as it is related to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (by Definition 1 of the Affects). But the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Proposition 11 of Part 2), which involves the knowledge of God (by Proposition 47 of Part 2), without which (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) it can neither be nor be conceived. And so, the greater the knowledge of God that the mind's essence involves, the greater also will be the desire by which someone who pursues virtue desires for another the good they want for themselves. QED

4P37D2 Alternatively. A person will love more constantly the good they want and love for themselves if they see that others love the same thing (by Proposition 31 of Part 3). And so (by the Corollary to that Proposition) they will strive to bring it about that others love the same thing. And since this good (by the pre-

ceding Proposition) is common to all, and all can enjoy it, they will therefore strive (for the same reason) to bring it about that all enjoy it, and (by Proposition 37 of Part 3) all the more, the more they themselves enjoy this good. QED

4P37S1 Scholium 1. Someone who strives, from affect alone, to make others love what they themselves love, and to make others live according to their own temperament, acts from mere impulse and is therefore hateful—especially to those who like other things, and who therefore also try, from the same impulse, to make others live according to their temperament instead. Again, since the highest good that people want from affect is often such that only one person can possess it, those who love are inwardly at odds with themselves: while they delight in singing the praises of what they love, they are afraid of being believed. But someone who strives to lead others by reason acts not from impulse but kindly and generously, and is wholly at one with themselves in mind. Further, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I refer to *religion*. The desire to do good that arises from our living under the guidance of reason I call *piety*. The desire by which a person who lives under the guidance of reason is bound to join others to themselves in friendship I call *honor*; and I call *honorable* what people who live under the guidance of reason praise, and, on the other hand, *base* what is opposed to forming friendship. Besides this, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are.[5] The difference between true virtue and lack of power is also easily perceived from what has been said above: namely, that true virtue is nothing other than living by the guidance of reason alone; and so lack of power consists solely in this, that a person allows themselves to be led by things outside them, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what their own nature, considered in itself alone, demands. These are the things I promised in the Scholium to

5 "Honor" renders *honestas*: the quality of being decent or honorable, rather than a matter of reputation.

Proposition 18 of this part to demonstrate. From them it is clear that the law against slaughtering animals is founded more on empty superstition and sentimental pity than on sound reason. Reason indeed teaches that, in seeking our own advantage, we should form bonds with human beings, but not with beasts, or with things whose nature is different from human nature; we have the same right over them that they have over us. Indeed, since the right of each is defined by the virtue, or power, of each, human beings have far greater right over beasts than beasts have over human beings. I do not deny that beasts feel. But I do deny that this makes it wrong for us to consult our own advantage, to use them at will, and to treat them as best suits us, since they do not agree with us in nature and their affects are different in nature from human affects (see the Scholium to Proposition 57 of Part 3). It remains for me to explain what is just, what unjust, what wrongdoing, and, finally, what merit is. On these, see the following Scholium.

THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE CIVIL STATE

Spinoza explains natural right, the founding of the state, and wrongdoing, merit, justice and injustice as civil notions.

4P37S2 Scholium 2. In the Appendix to Part 1 I promised to explain what praise and blame, merit and wrongdoing, and justice and injustice are. As for praise and blame, I explained them in the Scholium to Proposition 29 of Part 3. The place to speak of the rest is here. But first a few things must be said about *the natural and civil state of human beings*.

Each person exists by the supreme right of Nature, and consequently, by the supreme right of Nature, each does what follows from the necessity of their own nature. And so, by the supreme right of Nature, each person judges what is good and what is bad, consults their own advantage according to their own temperament (see Propositions 19 and 20 of this part), avenges themselves (see Corollary 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 3), and strives to preserve what they love and to destroy what they

hate (see Proposition 28 of Part 3). If people lived under the guidance of reason, each would enjoy this right of theirs (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 35 of this part) without any harm to anyone else. But because they are subject to affects (by the Corollary to Proposition 4 of this part), which far surpass human power, or virtue (by Proposition 6 of this part), they are often pulled in different directions (by Proposition 33 of this part) and are contrary to one another (by Proposition 34 of this part), even while they need one another's help (by the Scholium to Proposition 35 of this part). So, in order for people to be able to live in harmony and help one another, they must give up their natural right and assure one another that they will do nothing that could result in harm to another. How this can come about—how people who are necessarily subject to affects (by the Corollary to Proposition 4 of this part), and are inconstant and changeable (by Proposition 33 of this part), can assure one another and have trust in one another—is evident from Proposition 7 of this part and Proposition 39 of Part 3. It is this: that no affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than, and contrary to, the affect to be restrained, and that each person refrains from doing harm for fear of a greater harm. By this law, then, a society can be established, provided it claims for itself the right that each person has of avenging themselves and of judging what is good and bad, and therefore has the power to prescribe a common way of life, to make laws, and to secure them not by reason, which cannot restrain the affects (by the Scholium to Proposition 17 of this part), but by threats. A society of this kind, secured by laws and by the power of preserving itself, is called a *state*, and those who are protected by its right are called *citizens*. From this we readily understand that in the state of nature there is nothing that is good or bad by common agreement, since each person in the state of nature consults only their own advantage, decides what is good and what is bad according to their own temperament and only insofar as they take their own advantage into account, and is bound by no law to obey anyone but themselves. And so in the state of nature wrongdoing cannot be con-

ceived. It can, however, in the civil state, where what is good and what is bad is decided by common agreement, and each person is bound to obey the state. *Wrongdoing*, therefore, is nothing other than disobedience, which for that reason is punished only by the right of the state; and obedience, on the other hand, is counted as *merit* in a citizen, because by that very fact they are judged worthy to enjoy the advantages of the state. Again, in the state of nature no one is owner of anything by common agreement, and there is nothing in Nature that can be said to belong to this person rather than that one; everything belongs to everyone. Accordingly, in the state of nature no will can be conceived to give each person their own, or to take from someone what is theirs; that is, in the state of nature nothing happens that can be called *just* or *unjust*. This can happen, however, in the civil state, where what belongs to this person and what to that one is decided by common agreement. From this it is evident that just and unjust, wrongdoing and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes that explain the nature of the mind. But enough of this.

4P38 Proposition 38. *Whatever so disposes the human body that it can be affected in more ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in more ways, is useful to a human being; and the more useful, the more capable the body is thereby rendered of being affected in more ways and of affecting other bodies; and, on the other hand, whatever renders the body less capable of these things is harmful.*

4P38D Demonstration. The more capable the body is rendered of these things, the more capable of perceiving the mind is rendered (by Proposition 14 of Part 2). And so whatever disposes the body in this way and renders it capable of these things is necessarily good, or useful (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part), and the more useful, the more capable of these things it can render the body. And, on the other hand (by the converse of the same Proposition 14 of Part 2, and by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part), it is harmful if it renders the body less capable of these things. QED

4P39 Proposition 39. *Whatever brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest that the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved is good; and, on the other hand, whatever brings it about that the parts of the human body have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another is bad.*

4P39D Demonstration. To be preserved, the human body needs a great many other bodies (by Postulate 4 of Part 2). But what constitutes the form of the human body consists in this: that its parts communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed proportion (by the Definition before Lemma 4, which see after Proposition 13 of Part 2). Therefore whatever brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest that the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved also preserves the form of the human body, and consequently brings it about (by Postulates 3 and 6 of Part 2) that the human body can be affected in many ways, and can affect external bodies in many ways; and so (by the preceding Proposition) it is good. Next, whatever brings it about that the parts of the human body acquire a different proportion of motion and rest (by the same Definition in Part 2) brings it about that the human body takes on a different form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we pointed out at the end of the Preface to this part), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently that it is rendered entirely incapable of being affected in more ways; and so (by the preceding Proposition) it is bad. QED

4P39S Scholium. How far these things can harm or benefit the mind will be explained in Part 5. But here it should be noted that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another. For I do not dare to deny that the human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and the other things on account of which it is thought to be alive, can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely different from its own. For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse. Indeed, experience itself seems to suggest otherwise. For it sometimes happens that a

person undergoes such changes that I would hardly say they were the same person. I have heard a story of this kind about a certain Spanish poet who had been struck by illness. Though he recovered from it, he remained so forgetful of his past life that he did not believe the plays and tragedies he had written were his own; and he could surely have been taken for a grown-up infant if he had forgotten his native language as well. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? People of advanced age believe the nature of infants to be so different from their own that they could not be persuaded they had ever been infants themselves, if they did not infer it from the example of others. But so as not to give the superstitious material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave these matters unresolved.[6]

4P40 Proposition 40. *Whatever leads to the common society of human beings, or brings it about that people live in harmony, is useful; and, on the other hand, whatever brings discord into the state is bad.*

4P40D Demonstration. For whatever brings it about that people live in harmony at the same time brings it about that they live under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 35 of this part), and so (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part) is good; and (by the same reasoning) whatever stirs up discord is, on the contrary, bad. QED

4P41 Proposition 41. *Joy is not directly bad, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly bad.*

4P41D Demonstration. Joy (by Proposition 11 of Part 3, with its Scholium) is an affect by which the body's power of acting is increased or aided; sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained. And so (by Proposition 38 of this part) joy is directly good, etc. QED

4P42 Proposition 42. *Cheerfulness cannot be excessive; it is always good. Melancholy, on the other hand, is always bad.*

6 The poet is often identified with Luis de Góngora (1561–1627), who suffered memory loss after an illness in the year before his death.

4P42D Demonstration. Cheerfulness (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3) is joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this: that all the parts of the body are equally affected. That is (by Proposition 11 of Part 3), the body's power of acting is increased or aided in such a way that all its parts maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another. And so (by Proposition 39 of this part) cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive. But melancholy (see its definition too in the same Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3) is sadness which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists solely in this: that the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained absolutely. And so (by Proposition 38 of this part) it is always bad. QED

4P43 Proposition 43. *Localized pleasure can be excessive and bad; pain, on the other hand, can be good to the extent that localized pleasure, or joy, is bad.*

4P43D Demonstration. Localized pleasure is joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this: that one or a few of its parts are affected more than the rest (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3). The power of this affect can be so great that it overcomes the body's other actions (by Proposition 6 of this part) and clings to the body stubbornly, and so prevents the body from being capable of being affected in a great many other ways. And so (by Proposition 38 of this part) it can be bad. Next, pain, which is on the contrary a form of sadness, cannot be good when considered in itself alone (by Proposition 41 of this part). But because its force and growth are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by Proposition 5 of this part), we can conceive infinitely many degrees and ways of this affect's strength (by Proposition 3 of this part). And so we can conceive it as being such that it can restrain localized pleasure so that it is not excessive, and to that extent (by the first part of this Proposition) keep the body from being made less capable. Consequently, to that extent it will be good. QED

4P44 Proposition 44. *Love and desire can be excessive.*

4P44D Demonstration. Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Definition 6 of the Affects). So localized pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3); and so love (by the preceding Proposition) can be excessive. Next, desire is greater the greater the affect from which it arises (by Proposition 37 of Part 3). So just as an affect (by Proposition 6 of this part) can overcome a person's other actions, so too the desire that arises from that same affect can overcome the other desires, and consequently can have the same excess that we showed, in the preceding Proposition, localized pleasure has. QED

4P44S Scholium. Cheerfulness, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affects by which we are assailed every day are generally related to some part of the body that is affected more than the rest. Consequently, the affects are for the most part excessive, and hold the mind so fixed on the contemplation of a single object that it cannot think of others. And although people are subject to many affects, so that few are found who are always assailed by one and the same affect, there are nonetheless some to whom one and the same affect clings stubbornly. For we sometimes see people so affected by one object that, even though it is not present, they believe they have it before them. When this happens to someone who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those who burn with love, and who dream night and day only of their mistress or a courtesan, thought any less mad, since they usually make people laugh. But when a greedy person thinks of nothing but profit or money, and an ambitious one of nothing but glory, and so on, they are not thought to be delirious, because they are usually troublesome and are judged to deserve hatred. In truth, however, greed, ambition, lust and the like are kinds of madness, even though they are not counted among the diseases.

HATRED, LAUGHTER, HOPE AND FEAR

Hatred is always bad, laughter and moderate pleasures are good, and hope and fear show a weak mind.

4P45 Proposition 45. *Hatred can never be good.*

4P45D Demonstration. We strive to destroy the person we hate (by Proposition 39 of Part 3); that is (by Proposition 37 of this part), we strive for something that is bad. Therefore, etc. QED

4P45S Scholium. Note that here and in what follows I mean by hatred only hatred toward human beings.

4P45C1 Corollary 1. Envy, mockery, disdain, anger, vengeance, and the other affects that are related to hatred or arise from it, are bad. This is also evident from Proposition 39 of Part 3 and Proposition 37 of this part.

4P45C2 Corollary 2. Whatever we want because we are affected by hatred is base, and, in a state, unjust. This is also evident from Proposition 39 of Part 3 and from the definitions of the base and the unjust, which see in the Scholia to Proposition 37 of this part.

4P45C2S Scholium. Between mockery (which I said in Corollary 1 is bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, like joking, is pure joy; and so, provided it is not excessive, it is good in itself (by Proposition 41 of this part). Nothing but grim and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves. For why is it more fitting to relieve hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy? This is my reasoning, and this is how I have made up my mind. No deity, and no one else except the envious, takes pleasure in my weakness and my troubles, or counts our tears, sobs, fear and other such things—signs of a weak mind—as virtue. On the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass; that is, the more we necessarily share in the divine nature. To make use of things, then, and to take as much delight in them as possible (not to the point of disgust, of course, for that is not delight) is the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to

refresh and restore himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with ornament, music, sports, theaters, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without harm to anyone else. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which continually need new and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things that can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind too may be equally capable of understanding many things at once. This way of life, then, agrees best both with our principles and with common practice. So if any way of living is the best, this one is, and it is to be commended in every way. Nor is there any need to treat these matters more clearly or at greater length.

4P46 Proposition 46. *One who lives under the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay another's hatred, anger, disdain and so on toward him with love instead, that is, with nobility.*

4P46D Demonstration. All affects of hatred are bad (by Corollary 1 to the preceding Proposition). So one who lives under the guidance of reason will strive, as far as he can, not to be assailed by affects of hatred (by Proposition 19 of this part), and consequently (by Proposition 37 of this part) will strive that no one else suffer those affects either. But hatred is increased by hatred in return, and can, on the contrary, be extinguished by love (by Proposition 43 of Part 3), so that hatred passes into love (by Proposition 44 of Part 3). Therefore one who lives under the guidance of reason will strive to repay another's hatred, etc., with love instead, that is, with nobility (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3). QED

4P46S Scholium. Whoever wants to avenge wrongs by hatred in return lives wretchedly indeed. But whoever strives instead to conquer hatred with love fights joyfully and securely; he resists many people as easily as one, and has the least possible need of fortune's help. And those he conquers yield joyfully, not from a lack of strength but from an increase in it. All these things fol-

low so clearly from the definitions of love and of the intellect alone that there is no need to demonstrate them one by one.

4P47 Proposition 47. *The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves.*

4P47D Demonstration. There are no affects of hope and fear without sadness. For fear is sadness (by Definition 13 of the Affects), and there is no hope without fear (see the Explanation of Definitions 12 and 13 of the Affects). Consequently (by Proposition 41 of this part), these affects cannot be good in themselves, but only insofar as they can restrain an excess of joy (by Proposition 43 of this part). QED

4P47S Scholium. Add to this that these affects indicate a lack of knowledge and a weakness of mind; and for the same reason confidence, despair, gladness and remorse are also signs of a weak mind. For although confidence and gladness are affects of joy, they presuppose that sadness—namely hope and fear—has preceded them. So the more we strive to live under the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear, to command fortune as far as we can, and to direct our actions by the sure counsel of reason.

4P48 Proposition 48. *The affects of overestimation and scorn are always bad.*

4P48D Demonstration. For these affects (by Definitions 21 and 22 of the Affects) are contrary to reason, and so (by Propositions 26 and 27 of this part) they are bad. QED

4P49 Proposition 49. *Overestimation easily makes the person who is overestimated proud.*

4P49D Demonstration. If we see that someone, out of love, thinks more highly of us than is just, we will easily exult (by the Scholium to Proposition 41 of Part 3), that is, be affected with joy (by Definition 30 of the Affects); and we will easily believe whatever good we hear said of us (by Proposition 25 of Part 3). And so, out of love of ourselves, we will think more highly of ourselves than is just; that is (by Definition 28 of the Affects), we will easily become proud. QED

PITY, HUMILITY, REPENTANCE AND PRIDE

Spinoza judges which affects agree with reason, from pity and approval to self-contentment, humility, pride and shame.

4P50 Proposition 50. *In a person who lives under the guidance of reason, pity is in itself bad and useless.*

4P50D Demonstration. For pity (by Definition 18 of the Affects) is sadness, and consequently (by Proposition 41 of this part) is bad in itself. But the good that follows from it—namely, that we strive to free the person we pity from his misery (by Corollary 3 to Proposition 27 of Part 3)—we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone (by Proposition 37 of this part); and only from the dictate of reason alone can we do anything that we know for certain to be good (by Proposition 27 of this part). And so, in a person who lives under the guidance of reason, pity is in itself bad and useless. QED

4P50C Corollary. From this it follows that a person who lives by the dictate of reason strives, as far as he can, not to be touched by pity.

4P50S Scholium. One who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come about according to the eternal laws and rules of Nature, will surely find nothing worthy of hatred, mockery or disdain, nor will he pity anyone; but, as far as human virtue allows, he will strive to *act well*, as they say, *and rejoice*. Add to this that one who is easily touched by the affect of pity, and moved by another's misery or tears, often does something he later regrets—both because from an affect we do nothing that we know for certain to be good, and because we are easily deceived by false tears. And here I am speaking expressly of a person who lives under the guidance of reason. For one who is moved neither by reason nor by pity to help others is rightly called inhuman, since (by Proposition 27 of Part 3) he seems to be unlike a human being.

4P51 Proposition 51. *Approval is not contrary to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.*

4P51D Demonstration. For approval is love toward someone who has benefited another (by Definition 19 of the Affects), and so it can be related to the mind insofar as the mind is said to act (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), insofar as it understands. Consequently, it agrees with reason, etc. QED

4P51D2 Alternatively. One who lives under the guidance of reason desires for others too the good he wants for himself (by Proposition 37 of this part). So from seeing someone benefit another, his own striving to do good is aided; that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 11 of Part 3), he will rejoice, and (by hypothesis) with the accompanying idea of the one who benefited the other. Consequently (by Definition 19 of the Affects), he approves of him. QED

4P51S Scholium. Indignation, as we define it (see Definition 20 of the Affects), is necessarily bad (by Proposition 45 of this part). But it should be noted that when the sovereign power, out of the desire it has to safeguard peace, punishes a citizen who has wronged another, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen. For it punishes him not because it is roused by hatred to ruin him, but because it is moved by piety.

4P52 Proposition 52. *Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only the self-contentment that arises from reason is the greatest there can be.*

4P52D Demonstration. Self-contentment is joy arising from a person's contemplating himself and his own power of acting (by Definition 25 of the Affects). But a person's true power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), which he contemplates clearly and distinctly (by Propositions 40 and 43 of Part 2). Therefore self-contentment arises from reason. Next, while a person contemplates himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except what follows from his own power of acting (by Definition 2 of Part 3), that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), what follows from his own power of understanding. And so from this contemplation alone arises the greatest self-contentment there can be. QED

4P52S Scholium. Self-contentment really is the highest thing we can hope for. For (as we showed in Proposition 25 of this part) no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of some end. And because this self-contentment is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (by the Corollary to Proposition 53 of Part 3) and, on the contrary, more and more disturbed by blame (by the Corollary to Proposition 55 of Part 3), we are led above all by glory, and can scarcely bear a life of disgrace.

4P53 Proposition 53. *Humility is not a virtue; that is, it does not arise from reason.*

4P53D Demonstration. Humility is sadness arising from a person's contemplating his own lack of power (by Definition 26 of the Affects). But insofar as a person knows himself by true reason, to that extent he is supposed to understand his own essence, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), his own power. So if, while contemplating himself, a person perceives some lack of power in himself, this comes not from his understanding himself but (as we showed in Proposition 55 of Part 3) from his power of acting being restrained. And if we suppose that a person conceives his lack of power because he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines the limits of his own power of acting, then we conceive nothing other than that he understands himself distinctly, that is (by Proposition 26 of this part), that his power of acting is aided. So humility—the sadness that arises from a person's contemplating his own lack of power—does not arise from true contemplation, or reason; it is not a virtue but a passion. QED

4P54 Proposition 54. *Repentance is not a virtue; that is, it does not arise from reason. Rather, one who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or twice powerless.*

4P54D Demonstration. The first part of this is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding Proposition. The second part is evident from the mere definition of this affect (see Definition 27 of the Affects). For such a person lets himself be defeated first by a wrongful desire, and then by sadness.

4P54S Scholium. Because people seldom live by the dictate of reason, these two affects, humility and repentance—and, besides them, hope and fear—bring more benefit than harm. So, since we must err, it is better to err in that direction. For if people who are weak in mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, how could they be united and held together by any bonds? The crowd is fearsome unless it is afraid. So it is no wonder that the prophets, who looked to the common good and not to that of a few, commended humility, repentance and reverence so strongly. And in truth, those who are subject to these affects can be led far more easily than others to live at last under the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.[7]

4P55 Proposition 55. *The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of oneself.*

4P55D Demonstration. This is evident from Definitions 28 and 29 of the Affects.

4P56 Proposition 56. *The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest weakness of mind.*

4P56D Demonstration. The first foundation of virtue is to preserve one's own being (by the Corollary to Proposition 22 of this part), and to do so under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 24 of this part). So one who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently of all the virtues. Next, to act from virtue is nothing other than to act under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 24 of this part), and one who acts under the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he acts under the guidance of reason (by Proposition 43 of Part 2). So one who is most ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) of all the virtues, acts least from virtue; that is (as is evident from Definition 8 of this part), he is weakest in mind. And so (by the preceding Proposition) the greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest weakness of mind. QED

7 "The crowd is fearsome unless it is afraid" echoes Tacitus, *Annals* 1.29.

4P56C Corollary. From this it clearly follows that the proud and the self-abasing are the most subject to affects.

4P56S Scholium. Yet self-abasement can be corrected more easily than pride, since pride is an affect of joy and self-abasement an affect of sadness; and so (by Proposition 18 of this part) the former is stronger than the latter.

4P57 Proposition 57. *The proud person loves the presence of hangers-on or flatterers, but hates the presence of the noble-minded.*

4P57D Demonstration. Pride is joy arising from a person's thinking more highly of himself than is just (by Definitions 28 and 6 of the Affects). The proud person will strive, as far as he can, to foster this opinion (see the Scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 3). And so the proud will love the presence of hangers-on or flatterers (I have left out definitions of these, because they are all too well known), and will shun the presence of the noble-minded, who think of them as is fitting. QED

4P57S Scholium. It would take too long to list here all the evils of pride, since the proud are subject to all the affects—but to none less than the affects of love and compassion. But here it must by no means be passed over that a person is also called proud who thinks less of others than is just. So in this sense pride should be defined as joy arising from the false opinion that one is above others. And the self-abasement opposite to this pride would have to be defined as sadness arising from the false opinion that one is below others. With this established, we easily conceive that the proud person is necessarily envious (see the Scholium to Proposition 55 of Part 3), that he hates most those who are most praised for their virtues, and that his hatred of them is not easily overcome by love or kindness (see the Scholium to Proposition 41 of Part 3), and that he takes delight only in the presence of those who humor his weak mind and drive a fool out of his mind.

Although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, the self-abasing person is nonetheless very close to the proud one. For since his sadness arises from judging his own lack of power by the power, or virtue, of others, his sadness will be relieved—that

is, he will rejoice—if his imagination is occupied in contemplating other people's faults. Hence the proverb arose: *it is a comfort to the wretched to have had companions in misfortune*. And on the other hand, he will be saddened the more, the further below others he believes himself to be. So it happens that no one is more prone to envy than the self-abasing; that they, above all, strive to watch people's deeds more in order to find fault with them than to correct them; and that in the end they praise only self-abasement and glory in it—but in such a way that they still seem self-abasing. These things follow from this affect as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. And I have already said that I call these and similar affects bad only insofar as I attend to human advantage alone. But the laws of Nature have regard to the common order of Nature, of which the human being is a part. I wanted to point this out here in passing, so that no one would think I meant here to recount people's vices and absurd deeds, rather than to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the Preface to Part 3, I consider human affects and their properties just like other natural things. And indeed human affects, if they do not show human power, at least show the power and skill of Nature no less than many other things we wonder at and delight in contemplating. But I go on to note those things about the affects that bring people benefit, or that do them harm.

4P58 Proposition 58. *Glory is not contrary to reason, but can arise from it.*

4P58D Demonstration. This is evident from Definition 30 of the Affects and from the definition of the honorable, which see in Scholium 1 to Proposition 37 of this part.

4P58S Scholium. What is called vain glory is self-contentment fostered only by the opinion of the crowd; and when that opinion ceases, the self-contentment itself ceases—that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 52 of this part), the highest good that each person loves. Hence one who glories in the opinion of the crowd strives, anxious with daily care, acts and tries everything

to preserve his reputation. For the crowd is fickle and inconstant, and so a reputation quickly fades unless it is kept up. Indeed, because everyone wants to win the applause of the crowd, each readily suppresses the reputation of another. And from this, since the contest is over what is judged the highest good, there arises an enormous lust to crush one another by any means whatever; and whoever at last comes out the victor glories more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself. This glory, or self-contentment, is therefore truly vain, because it is nothing.

What should be noted about shame is easily gathered from what we have said about compassion and repentance. I add only this: that like pity, shame too, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good insofar as it indicates that the person suffused with shame has a desire to live honorably—just as pain is called good insofar as it indicates that the injured part is not yet decayed. So although a person who is ashamed of something he has done is really sad, he is nevertheless more perfect than a shameless person, who has no desire to live honorably.

These, then, are the things I had undertaken to note about the affects of joy and sadness. As for desires, they are of course good or bad insofar as they arise from good or bad affects. But all of them, insofar as they are generated in us by affects that are passions, are really blind (as is easily gathered from what we said in the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this part), and would be of no use if people could easily be led to live by the dictate of reason alone, as I shall now briefly show.

REASON CAN DO WHAT PASSION DOES

Every action a passion prompts can be done from reason, which prefers the greater good and the lesser evil.

4P59 Proposition 59. *To all the actions to which we are determined by an affect that is a passion, we can be determined by reason without that affect.*

4P59D Demonstration. To act from reason is nothing other (by Proposition 3 and Definition 2 of Part 3) than to do the things that follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. But sadness is bad to the extent that it diminishes or restrains this power of acting (by Proposition 41 of this part). Therefore by this affect we can be determined to no action that we could not do if we were led by reason. Further, joy is bad to the extent that it prevents a person from being capable of acting (by Propositions 43 and 44 of this part); and so to that extent, too, we can be determined to no action that we could not do if we were led by reason. Finally, insofar as joy is good, it agrees with reason (for it consists in a person's power of acting being increased or aided); and it is a passion only insofar as a person's power of acting is not increased to the point where he conceives himself and his actions adequately (by Proposition 3 of Part 3, with its Scholium). So if a person affected with joy were led to such perfection that he conceived himself and his actions adequately, he would be capable—indeed more capable—of the same actions to which he is now determined by affects that are passions. But all affects are related to joy, sadness or desire (see the Explanation of Definition 4 of the Affects), and desire (by Definition 1 of the Affects) is nothing other than the very striving to act. Therefore to all the actions to which we are determined by an affect that is a passion, we can be led by reason alone, without that affect. QED

4P59D2 Alternatively. Any action is called bad insofar as it arises from our being affected by hatred or some bad affect (see Corollary 1 to Proposition 45 of this part). But no action, considered in itself alone, is good or bad (as we showed in the Preface to this part); rather, one and the same action is now good, now bad. Therefore we can be led by reason to the same action that is now bad, that is, that arises from some bad affect (by Proposition 19 of this part). QED

4P59S Scholium. This is explained more clearly by an example. The action of striking, insofar as it is considered physically, and we attend only to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his

fist and moves his whole arm forcefully downward, is a power, which is conceived from the structure of the human body. So if a man, moved by anger or hatred, is determined to clench his fist or move his arm, this happens, as we showed in Part 2, because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things whatever. And so we can be determined to one and the same action both by images of things that we conceive confusedly and by those we conceive clearly and distinctly. It is evident, then, that every desire that arises from an affect that is a passion would be of no use if people could be led by reason. Let us now see why a desire that arises from an affect that is a passion is called blind by us.

4P60 Proposition 60. *A desire that arises from a joy or sadness related to one or a few parts of the body, but not to all, takes no account of the advantage of the whole person.*

4P60D Demonstration. Suppose, for example, that part A of the body is so strengthened by the force of some external cause that it prevails over the rest (by Proposition 6 of this part). This part will not, on that account, strive to lose its strength so that the other parts of the body may perform their function. For it would have to have a force, or power, of losing its own strength, which (by Proposition 6 of Part 3) is absurd. So that part, and consequently (by Propositions 7 and 12 of Part 3) the mind as well, will strive to preserve that state. And so the desire that arises from such an affect of joy takes no account of the whole. If, on the other hand, part A is supposed to be restrained so that the others prevail, it is demonstrated in the same way that the desire arising from sadness also takes no account of the whole. QED

4P60S Scholium. Since joy, then, is generally related to one part of the body (by the Scholium to Proposition 44 of this part), we generally desire to preserve our being without taking any account of our health as a whole. Add to this that the desires by which we are most gripped (by the Corollary to Proposition 9 of this part) take account only of the present, and not of the future.

4P61 Proposition 61. *A desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive.*

4P61D Demonstration. Desire (by Definition 1 of the Affects), considered absolutely, is the very essence of a human being, insofar as it is conceived as determined in any way whatever to do something. And so a desire that arises from reason—that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), one that is generated in us insofar as we act—is the very essence, or nature, of a human being, insofar as it is conceived as determined to do the things that are adequately conceived through the human essence alone (by Definition 2 of Part 3). So if this desire could be excessive, human nature, considered in itself alone, could exceed itself, that is, could do more than it can—which is a plain contradiction. Consequently, this desire cannot be excessive. QED

4P62 Proposition 62. *Insofar as the mind conceives things by the dictate of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.*

4P62D Demonstration. Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives all of it from the same standpoint of eternity, or of necessity (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 44 of Part 2), and is affected with the same certainty (by Proposition 43 of Part 2 and its Scholium). So whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certainty. And whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, it will nonetheless be equally true (by Proposition 41 of Part 2); that is (by Definition 4 of Part 2), it will nonetheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea. And so, insofar as the mind conceives things by the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one. QED

4P62S Scholium. If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine by reason the times of their existence, we would regard future things with the same affect as present ones. The mind would want a good it conceived as future just as if it were present; consequently, it would necessar-

ily pass over a lesser present good for a greater future one, and would not want in the least something good in the present but the cause of some future evil—as we shall soon demonstrate. But we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (by Proposition 31 of Part 2), and we determine the times of things' existence (by the Scholium to Proposition 44 of Part 2) only by the imagination, which is not affected equally by the image of a present thing and by that of a future one. That is why the true knowledge of good and bad that we have is only abstract or universal, and why the judgment we make about the order of things and the connection of causes, in order to determine what is good or bad for us in the present, is imaginary rather than real. And so it is no wonder if a desire that arises from the knowledge of good and bad, insofar as this looks to the future, can be restrained rather easily by a desire for things that are pleasant at present. On this, see Proposition 16 of this part.

4P63 Proposition 63. *Someone who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.*

4P63D Demonstration. All the affects that are related to the mind insofar as it acts, that is (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), that are related to reason, are none other than affects of joy and desire (by Proposition 59 of Part 3). And so (by Definition 13 of the Affects) someone who is led by fear, and does good out of dread of evil, is not led by reason. QED

4P63S Scholium. The superstitious, who know better how to reproach vices than to teach virtues, and who are eager not to lead people by reason but to hold them in check by fear, so that they flee evil rather than love virtue, aim at nothing but to make others as wretched as they are themselves. So it is no wonder that they are generally troublesome and hateful to people.

4P63C Corollary. By a desire that arises from reason, we follow the good directly and shun evil indirectly.

4P63CD Demonstration. For a desire that arises from reason can arise only from an affect of joy that is not a passion (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), that is, from a joy that cannot be excessive (by Proposition 61 of this part), and not from sadness. Therefore this

desire (by Proposition 8 of this part) arises from the knowledge of good, not of evil. And so under the guidance of reason we want the good directly, and only to that extent do we shun evil. QED

4P63CS Scholium. This Corollary is explained by the example of the sick and the healthy. The sick person eats what he dislikes, out of fear of death; the healthy person, by contrast, enjoys his food, and in this way enjoys life better than if he feared death and desired directly to avoid it. So too a judge who condemns an accused person to death, not from hatred or anger and the like, but solely from love of the public welfare, is led by reason alone.

4P64 Proposition 64. *The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.*

4P64D Demonstration. The knowledge of evil (by Proposition 8 of this part) is sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. But sadness is a passage to a lesser perfection (by Definition 3 of the Affects), which therefore cannot be understood through the very essence of a human being (by Propositions 6 and 7 of Part 3). Hence (by Definition 2 of Part 3) it is a passion, which (by Proposition 3 of Part 3) depends on inadequate ideas. Consequently (by Proposition 29 of Part 2) the knowledge of it, namely the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. QED

4P64C Corollary. From this it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.

4P65 Proposition 65. *Under the guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.*

4P65D Demonstration. A good that prevents us from enjoying a greater good is in reality an evil. For evil and good are said of things insofar as we compare them with one another (as we showed in the Preface to this part). And (by the same reasoning) a lesser evil is in reality a good. Therefore (by the Corollary to Proposition 63 of this part) under the guidance of reason we shall want, or follow, only the greater good and the lesser evil. QED

4P65C Corollary. Under the guidance of reason, we shall follow a lesser evil for the sake of a greater good, and pass over a lesser

good that is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil here called lesser is in reality a good, and the good, conversely, an evil. Therefore (by the Corollary to Proposition 63 of this part) we shall want the former and pass over the latter. QED

4P66 Proposition 66. *Under the guidance of reason, we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.*

4P66D Demonstration. If the mind could have adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be affected by the same affect toward a future thing as toward a present one (by Proposition 62 of this part). So insofar as we attend to reason itself, as we suppose we are doing in this Proposition, the case is the same whether the greater good or evil is supposed to be future or present. Hence (by Proposition 65 of this part) we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, etc. QED

4P66C Corollary. Under the guidance of reason, we shall want a lesser present evil that is the cause of a greater future good, and pass over a lesser present good that is the cause of a greater future evil. This Corollary stands to the preceding Proposition as the Corollary to Proposition 65 stands to Proposition 65 itself.

THE FREE MAN

Spinoza describes the free person, who thinks of life rather than death, acts in good faith and lives best in a state.

4P66S Scholium. If, then, these things are compared with what we have shown in this part, up to Proposition 18, about the strength of the affects, we shall easily see how a person who is led by affect alone, or by opinion, differs from one who is led by reason. The first, whether he will or not, does things of which he is utterly ignorant. The second complies with no one's wishes but his own, and does only the things he knows to be most important in life, and which he therefore desires most. So I call the first a slave, and the second free. About the free man's character and way of life I should like to note a few more things.

4P67 Proposition 67. *A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.*

4P67D Demonstration. A free man, that is, one who lives by the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear of death (by Proposition 63 of this part), but desires the good directly (by the Corollary to the same Proposition), that is (by Proposition 24 of this part), he desires to act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own advantage. And so he thinks of nothing less than of death; rather, his wisdom is a meditation on life. QED

4P68 Proposition 68. *If people were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.*

4P68D Demonstration. I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone. Someone who is born free, then, and remains free, has only adequate ideas, and so has no concept of evil (by the Corollary to Proposition 64 of this part). Consequently (since good and evil are correlatives) he has no concept of good either. QED

4P68S Scholium. It is evident from Proposition 4 of this part that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false, and cannot be conceived except insofar as we attend to human nature alone—or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite, but only insofar as he is the cause of a human being's existing. This, and other things we have already demonstrated, seem to be what Moses meant in that story of the first man. For in it no power of God is conceived other than the power by which he created man, that is, a power by which he looked only to man's advantage. And in keeping with this, the story tells that God forbade free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it he would at once fear death rather than desire to live.[8] Next, it tells that when the man had found a wife who agreed completely with his own nature, he knew that nothing could exist in Nature that could be more useful to him than she was. But after he came to believe that the animals were like himself, he at once

8 The story of Adam in Genesis 2–3, which tradition ascribed to Moses as author of the first five books of the Bible.

began to imitate their affects (see Proposition 27 of Part 3) and to lose his freedom—a freedom that the Patriarchs later recovered, led by the Spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God. On this idea alone it depends that a person should be free, and that he should desire for the rest of humankind the good he desires for himself, as we have demonstrated above (by Proposition 37 of this part).[9]

4P69 Proposition 69. *The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.*

4P69D Demonstration. An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect that is contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained (by Proposition 7 of this part). But blind daring and fear are affects that can be conceived as equally great (by Propositions 5 and 3 of this part). Therefore an equally great virtue of mind, or strength of character (for its definition, see the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3), is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear. That is (by Definitions 40 and 41 of the Affects), a free man avoids dangers by the same virtue of mind by which he tries to overcome them. QED

4P69C Corollary. In a free man, then, timely flight is counted as showing tenacity just as great as fighting; or, a free man chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, with which he chooses combat.

4P69S Scholium. What tenacity is, or what I understand by it, I explained in the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3. By danger I understand anything that can be the cause of some evil, such as sadness, hatred, discord and so on.

4P70 Proposition 70. *A free man who lives among the ignorant strives, as far as he can, to decline their favors.*

4P70D Demonstration. Each person judges by his own temperament what is good (see the Scholium to Proposition 39 of Part 3). So an ignorant man who has done someone a favor will value it by his own temperament, and if he sees that the one who received it values it less, he will be saddened (by Proposition 42 of Part 3). But a free man strives to join other people to himself

9 The Patriarchs: Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the ancestors of Israel in Genesis.

in friendship (by Proposition 37 of this part), and not to repay people with favors that are equal in their eyes, as measured by their affects; rather, he strives to lead himself and others by the free judgment of reason, and to do only the things he himself knows to be most important. Therefore a free man, so as not to be hated by the ignorant, and so as to comply not with their appetite but with reason alone, will try, as far as he can, to decline their favors. QED

4P70S Scholium. I say *as far as he can*. For although people are ignorant, they are still people, who in times of need can bring human help—and nothing is more valuable than that. So it often happens that it is necessary to accept a favor from them, and consequently to thank them in return in a way that suits their temperament. Add to this that even in declining favors we must take care not to seem to despise the givers, or to be afraid, out of greed, of having to repay them; for then, while fleeing their hatred, we would by that very act incur their offense. So in declining favors we must take account of what is useful and what is honorable.

4P71 Proposition 71. *Only free people are truly grateful to one another.*

4P71D Demonstration. Only free people are most useful to one another, and are joined to one another by the closest bond of friendship (by Proposition 35 of this part and its Corollary 1), and strive with equal eagerness of love to do one another good (by Proposition 37 of this part). And so (by Definition 34 of the Affects) only free people are truly grateful to one another. QED

4P71S Scholium. The gratitude that people led by blind desire have toward one another is for the most part a business deal, or a snare, rather than gratitude. Further, ingratitude is not an affect. Yet ingratitude is shameful, because it generally shows that a person is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, greed or the like. For someone who does not know how to repay gifts because of his foolishness is not ungrateful—and much less someone who is not moved by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by those of a thief to conceal his thefts, or by those of

anyone else of that kind. On the contrary, he shows that he has a steadfast mind, one that will not let itself be corrupted by any gifts to his own ruin or the common ruin.

4P72 Proposition 72. *A free man never acts deceitfully, but always in good faith.*

4P72D Demonstration. If a free man, insofar as he is free, did anything deceitfully, he would do it from the dictate of reason (for only to that extent do we call him free). And so acting deceitfully would be a virtue (by Proposition 24 of this part), and consequently (by the same Proposition) it would be wiser for everyone, in order to preserve his being, to act deceitfully. That is (as is self-evident), it would be wiser for people to agree only in words and to be contrary to one another in fact—which (by the Corollary to Proposition 31 of this part) is absurd. Therefore a free man, and so on. QED

4P72S Scholium. Suppose it is now asked: what if a person could free himself by treachery from a present danger of death? Would not the principle of preserving his own being plainly advise him to be treacherous? The reply will be the same: if reason advised this, it would advise it to all people. And so reason would plainly advise people to make agreements to join forces and have common laws only deceitfully—that is, in effect, not to have common laws at all. This is absurd.

4P73 Proposition 73. *A person who is led by reason is freer in a state, where he lives by the common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself.*

4P73D Demonstration. A person who is led by reason is not led to obey by fear (by Proposition 63 of this part). But insofar as he strives to preserve his being by the dictate of reason, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 66 of this part), insofar as he strives to live freely, he desires to take account of the common life and the common advantage (by Proposition 37 of this part), and consequently (as we showed in Scholium 2 to Proposition 37 of this part) to live by the common decision of the state. Therefore a person who is led by reason desires, in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state. QED

4P73S Scholium. These and similar things that we have shown concerning a person's true freedom are related to strength of character, that is (by the Scholium to Proposition 59 of Part 3), to tenacity and nobility. I do not think it worthwhile to demonstrate all the properties of strength of character separately here, and much less that a strong person hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is not in the least proud. For these things, and everything that concerns true life and religion, are easily established from Propositions 37 and 46 of this part: namely, that hatred is to be conquered by love in return, and that everyone who is led by reason desires that the good he wants for himself should be had by others too. To this is added what we noted in the Scholium to Proposition 50 of this part, and in other places: that a strong person considers this above all, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Hence whatever he thinks troublesome and evil, and whatever, besides, seems impious, horrible, unjust and shameful, arises from his conceiving things themselves in a disturbed, fragmentary and confused way. For this reason he strives above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, mockery, pride and the rest of this kind that we have noted in the preceding pages. And so, as far as he can, he strives, as we have said, to act well and to rejoice. How far human virtue extends in attaining these things, and what it can do, I shall demonstrate in the following Part.

APPENDIX: THE RIGHT WAY OF LIVING

Spinoza gathers the teachings of Part 4 into thirty-two short chapters on how to live.

4App Appendix. The things I have set out in this part concerning the right way of living are not arranged so that they can be seen at a glance, but have been demonstrated by me piecemeal, as I found I could more easily deduce one from another. So I have

proposed to gather them together here and reduce them to main headings.

4App1 Chapter 1. All our strivings, or desires, follow from the necessity of our nature in such a way that they can be understood either through it alone, as through their proximate cause, or insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be conceived adequately through itself without other individuals.

4App2 Chapter 2. The desires that follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood through it alone are those related to the mind insofar as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The other desires are related to the mind only insofar as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and growth must be defined not by human power but by the power of things outside us. So the former are rightly called actions, and the latter passions; for the former always indicate our power, and the latter, by contrast, our lack of power and our fragmentary knowledge.

4App3 Chapter 3. Our actions, that is, those desires that are defined by human power, or reason, are always good; the others can be either good or bad.

4App4 Chapter 4. In life, therefore, it is useful above all to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and in this one thing consists a person's highest happiness, or blessedness. For blessedness is nothing but the very contentment of mind that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God. And to perfect the intellect is likewise nothing but to understand God, and God's attributes and actions, which follow from the necessity of his nature. So the ultimate end of a person who is led by reason—that is, the highest desire, by which he strives to moderate all the others—is the one by which he is moved to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall within his understanding.[10]

4App5 Chapter 5. So there is no rational life without understanding; and things are good only insofar as they help a person to

10 "Contentment of mind" renders *animi acquiescentia* (in Part 5 also *Mentis acquiescentia*): the settled satisfaction of a mind at rest in itself.

enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined by understanding. Those, on the other hand, that prevent a person from perfecting reason and enjoying a rational life—those alone we call evil.

4App6 Chapter 6. But because all the things of which a person is the efficient cause are necessarily good, nothing evil can happen to a person except from external causes: namely, insofar as he is a part of the whole of Nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is compelled to adapt itself in almost infinitely many ways.

4App7 Chapter 7. It cannot happen that a person is not a part of Nature and does not follow its common order. But if he lives among individuals that agree with his own nature, his power of acting will by that very fact be aided and fostered. If, on the other hand, he is among individuals that agree very little with his nature, he will hardly be able to adapt himself to them without a great change in himself.

4App8 Chapter 8. Whatever there is in Nature that we judge to be evil, or able to prevent us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we may remove from us in whatever way seems safer. And whatever there is, on the other hand, that we judge to be good, or useful for preserving our being and enjoying a rational life, we may take for our use and use in any way whatever. And absolutely, everyone may, by the highest right of Nature, do whatever he judges will contribute to his own advantage.

4App9 Chapter 9. Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species. And so (by Chapter 7) nothing is more useful to a person for preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than a person who is led by reason. Further, since among singular things we know nothing more excellent than a person who is led by reason, there is no way in which anyone can better show how much he is worth in skill and talent than by so educating people that at last they live under the command of their own reason.

4App10 Chapter 10. Insofar as people are moved against one another by envy or by some affect of hatred, they are contrary to one another; and consequently they are to be feared all the

more, as they have more power than the other individuals of Nature.

4App11 Chapter 11. Yet minds are conquered not by arms but by love and nobility.

4App12 Chapter 12. It is useful to people above all to form associations and to bind themselves by those ties that best make one out of all of them, and absolutely to do whatever serves to strengthen friendships.

4App13 Chapter 13. But this requires skill and watchfulness. For people are changeable (since those who live by the prescription of reason are few), and yet they are generally envious, and more inclined to revenge than to compassion. To bear with each of them according to his own temperament, and to restrain oneself from imitating their affects, therefore takes a singular power of mind. But those who, on the contrary, know how to carp at people, and to reproach vices rather than teach virtues, and to break people's minds rather than strengthen them, are troublesome both to themselves and to others. That is why many, from excessive impatience of mind and a false zeal for religion, have preferred to live among the beasts rather than among people. They are like boys or youths who cannot calmly bear their parents' scolding and run away to join the army; they choose the hardships of war and the rule of a tyrant over the comforts of home and a father's admonitions, and let any burden at all be laid on them, provided they can take revenge on their parents.

4App14 Chapter 14. So although people generally govern everything by their own whim, far more advantages than disadvantages follow from their common society. So it is better to bear their wrongs calmly, and to devote our efforts to whatever serves to bring about concord and friendship.

4App15 Chapter 15. The things that produce concord are those related to justice, fairness and honor. For besides what is unjust and unfair, people also take it badly when something is held to be shameful, or when someone scorns the accepted customs of the state. But to win love, the things most necessary are those that concern religion and piety. On these, see Scholia 1 and 2 to

Proposition 37, the Scholium to Proposition 46, and the Scholium to Proposition 73 of Part 4.

4App16 Chapter 16. Besides, concord is commonly produced by fear, but without good faith. Add that fear arises from weakness of mind, and therefore has no place in the exercise of reason; nor does pity, although it seems to present an appearance of piety.

4App17 Chapter 17. People are also won over by generosity, especially those who lack the means to obtain what is necessary to sustain life. Yet to bring aid to every needy person far surpasses the resources and the interest of a private individual. For the wealth of a private individual is far from adequate to supply it. Moreover, one person's capacity is too limited for him to be able to bind everyone to himself in friendship. So care of the poor falls on society as a whole, and concerns only the common advantage.

4App18 Chapter 18. In accepting favors and in returning thanks, quite a different kind of care must be taken; on this, see the Scholium to Proposition 70 and the Scholium to Proposition 71 of Part 4.

4App19 Chapter 19. Further, purely sensual love—that is, the lust to procreate that arises from physical beauty—and absolutely every love that recognizes any cause other than freedom of mind, easily turns into hatred; unless, which is worse, it is a kind of madness, and then discord is fostered more than concord. See the Scholium to Proposition 31 of Part 3.

4App20 Chapter 20. As regards marriage, it is certain that it agrees with reason, if the desire for bodily union is generated not by physical beauty alone but also by the love of having children and bringing them up wisely; and if, moreover, the love of each—namely of both husband and wife—has as its cause not physical beauty alone, but chiefly freedom of mind.

4App21 Chapter 21. Flattery, too, produces concord, but by the foul vice of servility, or by treachery. For none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who want to be first and are not.

4App22 Chapter 22. There is a false appearance of piety and religion in self-abasement. And although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, the self-abasing person is nevertheless very close to the proud one. See the Scholium to Proposition 57 of Part 4.

4App23 Chapter 23. Shame, too, contributes to concord, but only in matters that cannot be hidden. Then, because shame is itself a kind of sadness, it has no place in the exercise of reason.

4App24 Chapter 24. The other affects of sadness toward people are directly opposed to justice, fairness, honor, piety and religion. And although indignation seems to present an appearance of fairness, still, where everyone is permitted to pass judgment on the deeds of another and to avenge his own right or another's, people live without law.

4App25 Chapter 25. Modesty, that is, the desire to please people, when it is determined by reason, is related to piety (as we said in Scholium 1 to Proposition 37 of Part 4). But if it arises from an affect, it is ambition, or the desire by which people, under a false show of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For someone who desires to help others by advice or by deed, so that they may enjoy the highest good together, will strive above all to win their love, and not to lead them to admire him so that a system of teaching may be named after him, nor to give any cause for envy at all. Next, in ordinary conversation he will take care not to tell of people's vices, and will be careful to speak only sparingly of human weakness—but at length of human virtue, or power, and of how it can be perfected. In this way people, moved not by fear or aversion but solely by the affect of joy, may strive to live, as far as they can, by the prescription of reason.

4App26 Chapter 26. Apart from human beings, we know no singular thing in Nature whose mind we can enjoy, and which we can join to ourselves in friendship or in any kind of association. And so whatever there is in Nature apart from human beings, the principle of our advantage does not require us to preserve it. Instead, according to its various uses, it teaches us to preserve it, destroy it, or adapt it to our use in any way whatever.

4App27 Chapter 27. The advantage we derive from things outside us, apart from the experience and knowledge we acquire by observing them and changing them from one form into another, is chiefly the preservation of the body. On this account the things most useful are those that can feed and nourish the body so that all its parts can perform their function properly. For the more capable the body is of being affected in many ways, and of affecting external bodies in many ways, the more capable the mind is of thinking (see Propositions 38 and 39 of Part 4). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in Nature. So to nourish the body as it requires, we must use many foods of different kinds. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which need continual and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of everything that can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind too may be equally capable of conceiving many things.

4App28 Chapter 28. But to provide these things, each person's strength would hardly suffice unless people exchanged services with one another. Money, however, has come to stand as a summary of all things. That is why its image usually occupies the minds of ordinary people more than anything else: they can hardly imagine any kind of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.

4App29 Chapter 29. But this is a vice only in those who seek money not out of need, or for the necessities of life, but because they have learned the arts of gain, and make a great show of themselves by them. For the rest, they feed the body out of habit, but sparingly, because they believe that whatever they spend on preserving their body is so much of their goods lost. But those who know the true use of money, and set the measure of their wealth by need alone, live content with little.

4App30 Chapter 30. Since, then, the things that are good are those that help the parts of the body to perform their function, and since joy consists in this, that a person's power, insofar as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all things that

bring joy are good. Yet, since things do not act with the aim of affecting us with joy, and their power of acting is not tempered to suit our advantage, and finally since joy is generally related chiefly to one part of the body, it follows that affects of joy (unless reason and watchfulness are present), and consequently also the desires generated by them, are for the most part excessive. Add to this that, from affect, we give first place to what is pleasant at present, and cannot value future things with an equal affect of mind. See the Scholium to Proposition 44 and the Scholium to Proposition 60 of Part 4.

4App31 Chapter 31. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to hold that what brings sadness is good, and what brings joy is evil. But, as we have already said (see the Scholium to Proposition 45 of Part 4), no one but an envious person takes pleasure in my weakness and misfortune. For the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently the more we participate in the divine nature. Nor can joy ever be evil when it is governed by the true principle of our advantage. But someone who, by contrast, is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.

4App32 Chapter 32. But human power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. So we do not have absolute power to adapt the things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear calmly whatever happens to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the power we have could not have extended so far as to enable us to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the whole of Nature, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be entirely content with it, and will strive to persevere in that contentment. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing but what is necessary, and cannot be content with anything, absolutely, except what is true. And so, insofar as we understand these things rightly, the striving of

the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of Nature.

Part V: Of the power of the intellect, or of human freedom

Spinoza explains how understanding frees us from the emotions and leads to blessedness.

5Pref Preface. I pass at last to the remaining part of the *Ethics*, which concerns the manner, or way, that leads to freedom. In it, then, I shall treat of the power of reason, showing what reason itself can do against the affects, and then what freedom of mind, or blessedness, is. From this we shall see how much more capable the wise person is than the ignorant. How, and in what way, the intellect should be perfected, and further, by what art the body should be cared for so that it can perform its function properly, do not belong here; for the latter belongs to medicine, the former to logic. Here, then, as I have said, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason, and above all I shall show how much, and what kind of, dominion it has over the affects, to restrain and moderate them. For we have already demonstrated above that we do not have absolute dominion over them. The Stoics, however, thought that the affects depend absolutely on our will, and that we can command them absolutely. Yet they were compelled—by the protest of experience, not by their own principles—to admit that no small practice and effort are needed to restrain and moderate them. Someone tried to show this by the example of two dogs (if I remember rightly), one a house dog and the other a hunting dog: by training he was at last able to make the house dog accustomed to hunting, and the hunting dog, by contrast, to refrain from chasing hares. Descartes lends no little support to this opinion. For he main-

tains that the soul, or mind, is united chiefly to a certain part of the brain, namely the so-called pineal gland. By means of this gland the mind senses all the motions aroused in the body, as well as external objects, and the mind can move it in various ways simply by willing.[1] He maintains that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits. He further maintains that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many different ways as there are different ways in which the animal spirits strike against it, and, moreover, that as many different traces are imprinted on it as there are different external objects driving those animal spirits toward it. The result is this: if the gland is later suspended, by the will of the soul moving it in various ways, in this or that way in which it was once suspended by the spirits when they were agitated in this or that way, then the gland itself will drive and determine the animal spirits in the same way in which they had earlier been driven back by a similar suspension of the gland. Beyond this, he maintains that each volition of the mind is united by Nature to some definite motion of the gland.[2] For example, if someone has the will to look at a distant object, this will brings it about that the pupil dilates. But if he thinks only of dilating the pupil, it will do him no good to will it, because Nature has joined the motion of the gland that serves to drive the spirits toward the optic nerve in the way suited to dilating or contracting the pupil not with the will to dilate or contract it, but only with the will to look at distant or nearby objects. Finally, he maintains that although each motion of this gland seems to have been connected by Nature, from the beginning of our life, with particular thoughts of ours, these motions can nevertheless be joined to other thoughts through habit; he tries to prove this in article 50 of Part 1 of *The Passions of the Soul*. From all this he concludes

1 The Stoics: the ancient Greek and Roman school that taught that the passions arise from false judgments and can be eliminated by the wise.

2 In the physiology of Descartes's day, "animal spirits" were very fine, fast-moving particles of the blood, thought to carry motion through the brain and nerves; the pineal gland is a small gland near the center of the brain.

that there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when it is well directed, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions, as he defines them, are "perceptions, or feelings, or emotions of the soul, which are referred to it in particular, and which (NB) are produced, preserved and strengthened by some motion of the spirits" (see article 27 of Part 1 of *The Passions of the Soul*). Now, since we can join any motion whatever of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, to any volition, and since the determination of the will depends on our power alone, it follows that if we determine our will by firm and definite judgments according to which we want to direct the actions of our life, and join to these judgments the motions of the passions we want to have, we shall acquire absolute dominion over our passions. This is the view of this most illustrious man (so far as I can gather from his words). I would scarcely have believed that so great a man had put it forward, had it been less ingenious. Indeed, I cannot wonder enough that a philosopher who had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from principles known through themselves, and to affirm nothing except what he perceived clearly and distinctly, and who had so often reproached the Scholastics for wanting to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should adopt a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality. What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct concept, I say, does he have of a thought most closely united to some tiny portion of quantity? I truly wish he had explained this union through its proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind as so distinct from the body that he could assign no particular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, and he had to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God. Next, I should very much like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can impart to that pineal gland, and with how much force it can hold it suspended. For I do not know whether this gland is driven around more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, or whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely joined to firm judgments, cannot be dis-

joined from them again by bodily causes. If they can, it would follow that although the mind had firmly resolved to face dangers, and had joined the motions of daring to this decision, yet at the sight of danger the gland might be suspended in such a way that the mind could think of nothing but flight. And surely, since there is no proportion between will and motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or strength, of the mind and that of the body; consequently the strength of the body can by no means be determined by the strength of the mind. Add to this that this gland is not found to be situated in the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be driven around so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend as far as the cavities of the brain. Finally, I pass over everything he asserts about the will and its freedom, since I have shown more than enough that it is false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, we shall determine the remedies for the affects—which everyone, I believe, experiences, but does not accurately observe or distinctly see—by the knowledge of the mind alone; and from that same knowledge we shall deduce everything that concerns its blessedness.

THE FIRST REMEDIES FOR THE AFFECTS

Understanding an affect clearly, and seeing things as necessary, reduces the power of the passions.

5A1 Axiom 1. If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will necessarily have to take place either in both or in one of them alone, until they cease to be contrary.

5A2 Axiom 2. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, insofar as the effect's essence is explained or defined through the essence of its cause.

This Axiom is evident from Proposition 7 of Part 3.

5P1 Proposition 1. *Just as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or*

the images of things, are ordered and connected in the body in exactly the same way.

5P1D Demonstration. The order and connection of ideas is the same (by Proposition 7 of Part 2) as the order and connection of things; and conversely, the order and connection of things is the same (by the Corollaries to Propositions 6 and 7 of Part 2) as the order and connection of ideas. Therefore, just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind comes about according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by Proposition 18 of Part 2), so conversely (by Proposition 2 of Part 3) the order and connection of the affections of the body comes about as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind. QED

5P2 Proposition 2. *If we separate an emotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred toward the external cause, as well as the vacillations of mind that arise from these affects, will be destroyed.*

5P2D Demonstration. For what constitutes the form of love or hatred is joy or sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Definitions 6 and 7 of the Affects). When this idea is removed, therefore, the form of love or hatred is removed along with it; and so these affects, and those that arise from them, are destroyed. QED

5P3 Proposition 3. *An affect that is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.*

5P3D Demonstration. An affect that is a passion is a confused idea (by the General Definition of the Affects). So if we form a clear and distinct idea of this affect, this idea will be distinguished from the affect itself, insofar as the affect is related to the mind alone, only by a distinction of reason (by Proposition 21 of Part 2, with its Scholium). And so (by Proposition 3 of Part 3) the affect will cease to be a passion. QED

5P3C Corollary. The better we know an affect, then, the more it is within our power, and the less the mind is acted on by it.

5P4 Proposition 4. *There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.*

5P4D Demonstration. What is common to all things can only be conceived adequately (by Proposition 38 of Part 2); and so (by Proposition 12 of Part 2 and Lemma 2, which comes after the Scholium to Proposition 13 of Part 2) there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. QED

5P4C Corollary. From this it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. For an affect is the idea of an affection of the body (by the General Definition of the Affects), and that idea must therefore (by the preceding Proposition) involve some clear and distinct concept.

5P4S Scholium. There is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by Proposition 36 of Part 1), and whatever follows from an idea that is adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (by Proposition 40 of Part 2). Hence it follows that each of us has the power to understand himself and his affects clearly and distinctly—if not absolutely, then at least in part—and consequently to bring it about that he is less acted on by them. We must therefore take special pains to know each affect, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, so that the mind may be determined by the affect to think of those things it perceives clearly and distinctly and in which it is fully at rest; and so that the affect itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts. The result will be not only that love, hatred, and so on are destroyed (by Proposition 2 of this part), but also that the appetites, or desires, that usually arise from such an affect cannot be excessive (by Proposition 61 of Part 4). For it must above all be noted that it is one and the same appetite through which a person is said both to act and to be acted on. For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that each of us wants others to live according to his own temperament (see the Scholium to Proposition 31 of Part 3). In a person who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion, called ambition, which differs little from pride; in a person who lives by the dictate of reason, on the other hand, it is an action, or virtue, called piety (see Scholium 1 to Proposition

37 of Part 4, and the second Demonstration of the same Proposition). In this way all appetites, or desires, are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas; and the same desires are counted as virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to do anything can arise from adequate ideas as well as from inadequate ones (see Proposition 59 of Part 4). And (to return to the point from which I digressed) no more excellent remedy for the affects, among those that depend on our power, can be devised than this one, which consists in a true knowledge of them. For the mind has no other power than that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (by Proposition 3 of Part 3).

5P5 Proposition 5. *Other things being equal, an affect toward a thing that we imagine simply—not as necessary, nor as possible, nor as contingent—is the greatest of all.*

5P5D Demonstration. An affect toward a thing we imagine to be free is greater than one toward a necessary thing (by Proposition 49 of Part 3), and consequently greater still than one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent (by Proposition 11 of Part 4). But to imagine a thing as free can be nothing other than to imagine it simply, while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to act (by what we showed in the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 2). Therefore an affect toward a thing we imagine simply is, other things being equal, greater than one toward a thing that is necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently it is the greatest. QED

5P6 Proposition 6. *Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has greater power over the affects, or is less acted on by them.*

5P6D Demonstration. The mind understands that all things are necessary (by Proposition 29 of Part 1) and are determined to exist and to act by an infinite chain of causes (by Proposition 28 of Part 1). And so (by the preceding Proposition) to that extent it brings it about that it is less acted on by the affects that arise

from these things, and (by Proposition 48 of Part 3) that it is less affected toward them. QED

5P6S Scholium. The more this knowledge—that things are necessary—concerns singular things, which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects, as experience itself also testifies. For we see that sadness over some good that has perished is lessened as soon as the person who lost it considers that there was no way it could have been saved. So too we see that no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, or reason, or because, in short, it lives so many years as if unaware of itself. But if most people were born adults, and only one or two were born infants, then everyone would pity infants, because they would then regard infancy itself not as a natural and necessary thing but as a defect, or fault, of Nature. And we could note many other things of this sort.

5P7 Proposition 7. *Affects that arise from, or are aroused by, reason are, if we take time into account, more powerful than those related to singular things that we regard as absent.*

5P7D Demonstration. We do not regard a thing as absent because of the affect by which we imagine it, but because the body is affected by another affect that excludes the existence of that thing (by Proposition 17 of Part 2). So the affect related to a thing we regard as absent is not of such a nature as to overcome a person's other actions and power (on which see Proposition 6 of Part 4). On the contrary, it is of such a nature that it can in some way be restrained by the affections that exclude the existence of its external cause (by Proposition 9 of Part 4). But an affect that arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing that excludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in the same way (by Proposition 38 of Part 2). Such an affect therefore always remains the same; and consequently (by Axiom 1 of this part) the affects contrary to it, which are not nourished by their

external causes, will have to accommodate themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary. To that extent an affect that arises from reason is more powerful. QED

5P8 Proposition 8. *The more causes there are that concur at once in arousing an affect, the greater it is.*

5P8D Demonstration. Many causes together can do more than if they were fewer (by Proposition 7 of Part 3); and so (by Proposition 5 of Part 4) the more causes there are that arouse an affect at once, the stronger it is. QED

5P8S Scholium. This Proposition is also evident from Axiom 2 of this part.

5P9 Proposition 9. *An affect related to many different causes, which the mind regards together with the affect itself, is less harmful, and we are less acted on by it and less affected toward each cause, than by another affect, equally great, that is related to only one cause or to fewer causes.*

5P9D Demonstration. An affect is bad, or harmful, only insofar as it hinders the mind from being able to think (by Propositions 26 and 27 of Part 4). So an affect by which the mind is determined to regard many objects at once is less harmful than another affect, equally great, that so holds the mind in regarding only one or a few objects that it cannot think of others. That was the first point. Next, since the essence of the mind, that is (by Proposition 7 of Part 3), its power, consists in thought alone (by Proposition 11 of Part 2), the mind is less acted on through an affect by which it is determined to regard many things at once than through an equally great affect that keeps the mind occupied in regarding only one or a few objects. That was the second point. Finally (by Proposition 48 of Part 3), this affect, insofar as it is related to many external causes, is also less toward each one of them. QED

5P10 Proposition 10. *So long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, we have the power to order and connect the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.*

5P10D Demonstration. Affects contrary to our nature, that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4), affects that are bad, are bad to the

extent that they hinder the mind from understanding (by Proposition 27 of Part 4). So long, therefore, as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, the power of the mind by which it strives to understand things (by Proposition 26 of Part 4) is not hindered; and for that long it has the power to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce some from others (see Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 and the Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part 2). Consequently (by Proposition 1 of this part), for that long we have the power to order and connect the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. QED

RULES OF LIFE

Spinoza advises memorizing sound rules of life and applying them, so that reason is ready when affects arise.

5P10S Scholium. By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the body we can bring it about that we are not easily affected by bad affects. For (by Proposition 7 of this part) a greater force is required to restrain affects ordered and connected according to the order of the intellect than to restrain those that are uncertain and random. The best thing we can do, then, so long as we lack perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of living, or fixed rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the particular situations we frequently meet in life, so that our imagination may be widely affected by them and they may always be ready to hand. For example, among the rules of life we have laid down (see Proposition 46 of Part 4, with its Scholium) that hatred is to be conquered by love, or nobility, and not repaid with hatred in return. But in order to have this precept of reason always ready to hand when it is needed, we should think about, and often meditate on, the common wrongs people do, and how and by what means they are best warded off by nobility. For in this way we shall join the image of a wrong to the imagining of this rule, and it will always be ready to hand (by Proposition 18 of Part 2) when a wrong is done to us. If we also keep ready to

hand the principle of our true advantage, and also of the good that follows from mutual friendship and common society; and further, that the highest contentment of mind arises from the right way of living (by Proposition 52 of Part 4), and that people, like other things, act from the necessity of nature—then the wrong, or the hatred that usually arises from it, will occupy the smallest part of the imagination and will easily be overcome. Or if the anger that usually arises from the greatest wrongs is not so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without vacillation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than if we had not meditated on these things beforehand in this way, as is evident from Propositions 6, 7 and 8 of this part. We should think in the same way about tenacity, for setting fear aside: we should list and often imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character. But it should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images we must always attend (by the Corollary to Proposition 63 of Part 4 and Proposition 59 of Part 3) to what is good in each thing, so that in this way we are always determined to act by an affect of joy. For example, if someone sees that he pursues glory too much, let him think about its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired—but not about its misuse and emptiness, the fickleness of people, and other such things, which no one thinks about except from sickness of mind. For it is with such thoughts that the most ambitious torment themselves most, when they despair of attaining the honor they are striving for; and while they spew out their anger, they want to seem wise. So it is certain that those who cry out most about the misuse of glory and the vanity of the world are the ones most greedy for glory. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious; it is common to all whose fortune is adverse and who lack strength of mind. For a poor man who is also greedy never stops talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich—by which he achieves nothing except to torment himself and to show others that he resents not only his own poverty but also other

people's wealth. So too, those who have been badly received by the woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy and deceitfulness of women, and their other much-sung faults—all of which they immediately consign to oblivion as soon as she receives them again. Whoever, therefore, is eager to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of freedom alone will strive, as far as he can, to come to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the gladness that arises from true knowledge of them—but by no means to dwell on people's vices, to disparage people, or to delight in a false appearance of freedom. Whoever observes these things diligently (for they are not difficult) and practices them will surely, within a short space of time, be able to direct his actions for the most part by the command of reason.

5P11 Proposition 11. *The more things an image is related to, the more frequent it is, or the more often it is active, and the more it occupies the mind.*

5P11D Demonstration. For the more things an image, or affect, is related to, the more causes there are by which it can be aroused and nourished—all of which the mind (by hypothesis) regards together with the affect itself. And so the affect is the more frequent, or is the more often active, and (by Proposition 8 of this part) occupies the mind more. QED

5P12 Proposition 12. *The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things we understand clearly and distinctly than to other images.*

5P12D Demonstration. The things we understand clearly and distinctly are either common properties of things or things deduced from them (see the definition of reason in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), and consequently (by the preceding Proposition) they are aroused in us more often. So it can more easily happen that we regard other things together with these than together with others, and consequently (by Proposition 18 of Part 2) that other things are more easily joined with these than with others. QED

5P13 Proposition 13. *The more other images an image is joined to, the more often it is active.*

5P13D Demonstration. For the more other images an image is joined to, the more causes there are (by Proposition 18 of Part 2) by which it can be aroused. QED

THE LOVE OF GOD AND THE REMEDIES SUMMED UP

The mind can relate all bodily affections to God, producing a love of God; Spinoza lists the remedies.

5P14 Proposition 14. *The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.*

5P14D Demonstration. There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by Proposition 4 of this part). And so it can bring it about (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) that all of them are related to the idea of God. QED

5P15 Proposition 15. *Whoever understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God—and the more so, the more he understands himself and his affects.*

5P15D Demonstration. Whoever understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly feels joy (by Proposition 53 of Part 3), and this joy is accompanied by the idea of God (by the preceding Proposition). And so (by Definition 6 of the Affects) he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) the more so, the more he understands himself and his affects. QED

5P16 Proposition 16. *This love toward God must occupy the mind most of all.*

5P16D Demonstration. For this love is joined to all the affections of the body (by Proposition 14 of this part) and is nourished by all of them (by Proposition 15 of this part). And so (by Proposition 11 of this part) it must occupy the mind most of all. QED

5P17 Proposition 17. *God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.*

5P17D Demonstration. All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by Proposition 32 of Part 2), that is (by Definition 4

of Part 2), adequate; and so (by the General Definition of the Affects) God is without passions. Next, God can pass neither to a greater nor to a lesser perfection (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 20 of Part 1); and so (by Definitions 2 and 3 of the Affects) he is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness. QED

5P17C Corollary. Strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one. For God (by the preceding Proposition) is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness, and consequently (by Definitions 6 and 7 of the Affects) he also loves no one and hates no one.

5P18 Proposition 18. *No one can hate God.*

5P18D Demonstration. The idea of God that is in us is adequate and perfect (by Propositions 46 and 47 of Part 2). So insofar as we contemplate God, to that extent we act (by Proposition 3 of Part 3); and consequently (by Proposition 59 of Part 3) there can be no sadness accompanied by the idea of God—that is (by Definition 7 of the Affects), no one can hate God. QED

5P18C Corollary. Love toward God cannot be turned into hatred.

5P18S Scholium. But it may be objected that, in understanding God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of sadness. To this I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of sadness, to that extent (by Proposition 3 of this part) it ceases to be a passion, that is (by Proposition 59 of Part 3), to that extent it ceases to be sadness. And so, insofar as we understand God to be the cause of sadness, to that extent we feel joy.

5P19 Proposition 19. *Whoever loves God cannot strive to have God love him in return.*

5P19D Demonstration. If a person strove for this, he would desire (by the Corollary to Proposition 17 of this part) that God, whom he loves, not be God; and consequently (by Proposition 19 of Part 3) he would desire to be saddened, which (by Proposition 28 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore whoever loves God, etc. QED

5P20 Proposition 20. *This love toward God cannot be tainted by an affect of envy or of jealousy; rather, it is the more nourished, the more people we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love.*

5P20D Demonstration. This love toward God is the highest good that we can seek from the dictate of reason (by Proposition 28 of Part 4); it is common to all people (by Proposition 36 of Part 4); and we desire that all should enjoy it (by Proposition 37 of Part 4). And so (by Definition 23 of the Affects) it cannot be stained by an affect of envy, nor (by Proposition 18 of this part, and the definition of jealousy, for which see the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 3) by an affect of jealousy. On the contrary (by Proposition 31 of Part 3), it must be the more nourished, the more people we imagine to enjoy it. QED

5P20S Scholium. In the same way we can show that there is no affect directly contrary to this love by which this love itself could be destroyed; and so we can conclude that this love toward God is the most constant of all the affects, and that, insofar as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed except together with the body itself. What its nature is insofar as it is related to the mind alone, we shall see later.

With this I have covered all the remedies for the affects—that is, all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects. From this it is clear that the mind's power over the affects consists: first, in the very knowledge of the affects (see the Scholium to Proposition 4 of this part); second, in its separating the affects from the thought of an external cause that we imagine confusedly (see Proposition 2, with the same Scholium to Proposition 4 of this part); third, in time, by which the affections related to things we understand surpass those related to things we conceive confusedly, or in fragmentary fashion (see Proposition 7 of this part); fourth, in the multitude of causes by which the affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are nourished (see Propositions 9 and 11 of this part); fifth, and finally, in the order in which the mind can arrange its affects and connect them with one another (see the Scholium to Proposition 10, and also Propositions 12, 13 and 14 of this part). But for this power of the mind over the affects to be better understood, it must above all be noted that we call affects great when we compare one person's affect with another's and see

that one is troubled more than the other by the same affect; or when we compare the affects of one and the same person with one another and find that he is affected, or moved, more by one affect than by another. For (by Proposition 5 of Part 4) the force of any affect is defined by the power of its external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone, while its lack of power, or passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge—that is, by what makes ideas be called inadequate. From this it follows that the mind most acted on is the one whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it is known more by what it undergoes than by what it does; and, conversely, that the mind that acts most is the one whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, even if it contains as many inadequate ideas as the other, it is nevertheless known more by the ideas ascribed to human virtue than by those that betray human lack of power. Next, it must be noted that sicknesses of the mind and misfortunes have their origin chiefly in excessive love toward a thing that is subject to many changes and that we can never fully possess. For no one is troubled or anxious about anything except what he loves; and wrongs, suspicions, enmities, and so on arise only from love toward things that no one can truly possess. From this, then, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge can do against the affects—above all that third kind of knowledge (on which see the Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part 2) whose foundation is the very knowledge of God. Insofar as the affects are passions, if it does not remove them absolutely (see Proposition 3, with the Scholium to Proposition 4 of this part), it at least brings it about that they make up the smallest part of the mind (see Proposition 14 of this part). Next, it begets love toward a thing immutable and eternal (see Proposition 15 of this part), a thing we truly possess (see Proposition 45 of Part 2). This love therefore cannot be tainted by any of the faults inherent in ordinary love, but can always grow greater and greater (by Proposition 15 of this part), occupy the greatest part of the mind (by Proposition 16 of this part), and affect it extensively. With this I

have completed everything that concerns this present life. For anyone who attends to what we have said in this Scholium, together with the definitions of the mind and its affects, and finally Propositions 1 and 3 of Part 3, will easily be able to see what I said at the beginning of this Scholium: that in these few words I have embraced all the remedies for the affects. It is time now, then, to pass to what pertains to the mind's duration without relation to the body.

THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND

Something of the mind is eternal, and the third kind of knowledge depends on the mind insofar as it is eternal.

5P21 Proposition 21. *The mind can imagine nothing, nor recall past things, except while the body endures.*

5P21D Demonstration. The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it conceive the body's affections as actual, except while the body endures (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part 2); and consequently (by Proposition 26 of Part 2) it conceives no body as actually existing except while its own body endures. Therefore it can imagine nothing (see the definition of imagination in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2), and recollect nothing past, except while the body endures (see the definition of memory in the Scholium to Proposition 18 of Part 2). QED

5P22 Proposition 22. *Nevertheless, in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body from the standpoint of eternity.*

5P22D Demonstration. God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body but also of its essence (by Proposition 25 of Part 1). That essence must therefore necessarily be conceived through God's very essence (by Axiom 4 of Part 1), and this by a certain eternal necessity (by Proposition 16 of Part 1). And this concept must necessarily be in God (by Proposition 3 of Part 2). QED

5P23 Proposition 23. *The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with the body; something of it remains, which is eternal.*

5P23D Demonstration. In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, that expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding Proposition); it is therefore necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind (by Proposition 13 of Part 2). But we ascribe to the human mind no duration that can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration and can be defined by time; that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 8 of Part 2), we ascribe duration to it only while the body endures. Since, however, that which is conceived with a certain eternal necessity through God's very essence is nonetheless something (by the preceding Proposition), this something that pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal. QED

5P23S Scholium. This idea, which expresses the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity, is, as we have said, a definite mode of thinking that pertains to the essence of the mind and is necessarily eternal. Yet it cannot happen that we remember having existed before the body, since there can be no traces of this in the body, and eternity cannot be defined by time or have any relation to time. Nevertheless, we feel and know by experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding no less than those it has in memory. The eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves. So although we do not remember having existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of it cannot be defined by time, or explained through duration. Our mind, then, can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a definite time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body; and only to that extent does it have the power to determine the existence of things by time and to conceive them under duration.

5P24 Proposition 24. *The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.*

5P24D Demonstration. This is evident from the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1.

5P25 Proposition 25. *The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.*

5P25D Demonstration. The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2); and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore (by Proposition 28 of Part 4) the highest virtue of the mind—that is (by Definition 8 of Part 4), the mind's power or nature, or (by Proposition 7 of Part 3) its highest striving—is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. QED

5P26 Proposition 26. *The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.*

5P26D Demonstration. This is evident. For insofar as we conceive the mind to be capable of understanding things by this kind of knowledge, to that extent we conceive it as determined to understand things by this same kind of knowledge; and consequently (by Definition 1 of the Affects), the more capable of this the mind is, the more it desires it. QED

5P27 Proposition 27. *From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest contentment of mind there can be.*

5P27D Demonstration. The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (by Proposition 28 of Part 4), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (by Proposition 25 of this part); and this virtue is greater the more the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge (by Proposition 24 of this part). So whoever knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection, and consequently (by Definition 2 of the Affects) is affected with the highest joy, accompanied (by Proposition 43 of Part 2) by the idea of himself and of his own virtue. Therefore

(by Definition 25 of the Affects) from this kind of knowledge arises the highest contentment there can be. QED

5P28 Proposition 28. *The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second.*

5P28D Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself or through something else that is conceived through itself. That is, the ideas that are clear and distinct in us, or that are referred to the third kind of knowledge (see Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), cannot follow from fragmentary and confused ideas, which (by the same Scholium) are referred to the first kind of knowledge, but only from adequate ideas, that is (by the same Scholium), from the second and third kinds of knowledge. Therefore (by Definition 1 of the Affects) the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind, but it can from the second. QED

5P29 Proposition 29. *Whatever the mind understands from the standpoint of eternity, it understands not because it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it conceives the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity.*

5P29D Demonstration. Insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it conceives duration, which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by Proposition 21 of this part and Proposition 26 of Part 2). But eternity cannot be explained through duration (by Definition 8 of Part 1 and its explanation). Therefore to that extent the mind does not have the power of conceiving things from the standpoint of eternity. But it is of the nature of reason to conceive things from the standpoint of eternity (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 44 of Part 2), and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity (by Proposition 23 of this part), and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind (by Proposition 13 of Part 2). Therefore this power of conceiving things from the standpoint of

eternity pertains to the mind only insofar as it conceives the essence of the body from the standpoint of eternity. QED

5P29S Scholium. Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a definite time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. The things that are conceived in this second way as true, or real, we conceive from the standpoint of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Proposition 45 of Part 2 (see also its Scholium).

5P30 Proposition 30. *Insofar as our mind knows itself and the body from the standpoint of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.*

5P30D Demonstration. Eternity is God's very essence insofar as this involves necessary existence (by Definition 8 of Part 1). To conceive things from the standpoint of eternity, therefore, is to conceive them insofar as they are conceived through God's essence as real beings, that is, insofar as through God's essence they involve existence. Hence, insofar as our mind conceives itself and the body from the standpoint of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc. QED

5P31 Proposition 31. *The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.*

5P31D Demonstration. The mind conceives nothing from the standpoint of eternity except insofar as it conceives the essence of its body from the standpoint of eternity (by Proposition 29 of this part), that is (by Propositions 21 and 23 of this part), except insofar as it is eternal. Hence (by the preceding Proposition), insofar as it is eternal, it has knowledge of God, and this knowledge is necessarily adequate (by Proposition 46 of Part 2). Therefore the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all the things that can follow from this given knowledge of God (by Proposition 40 of Part 2), that is, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see its definition in Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2). Of this kind of knowledge, therefore,

the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause (by Definition 1 of Part 3). QED

5P31S Scholium. The more each of us is capable of this kind of knowledge, then, the more fully is he conscious of himself and of God—that is, the more perfect and the more blessed he is, as will be still more clearly evident from what follows. But it should be noted here that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things from the standpoint of eternity, we shall nevertheless, as we have done so far, consider it as though it were only now beginning to be, and only now beginning to understand things from the standpoint of eternity, so that what we wish to show may be more easily explained and better understood. We may do this without any danger of error, provided we take care to conclude nothing except from evident premises.

THE INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD

Intuitive knowledge gives rise to an eternal intellectual love of God, which is part of God's love for himself.

5P32 Proposition 32. *Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause.*

5P32D Demonstration. From this kind of knowledge arises the highest contentment of mind there can be, that is (by Definition 25 of the Affects), joy; and this joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself (by Proposition 27 of this part), and consequently (by Proposition 30 of this part) also by the idea of God, as its cause. QED

5P32C Corollary. From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises (by the preceding Proposition) joy accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is (by Definition 6 of the Affects), love of God—not insofar as we imagine him as present (by Proposition 29 of this part), but insofar as we understand

God to be eternal. And this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

5P33 Proposition 33. *The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.*

5P33D Demonstration. For the third kind of knowledge is eternal (by Proposition 31 of this part and Axiom 3 of Part 1); and therefore (by the same Axiom of Part 1) the love that arises from it is also necessarily eternal. QED

5P33S Scholium. Although this love toward God has had no beginning (by the preceding Proposition), it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come into being, as we pretended in the Corollary to the preceding Proposition. Nor is there any difference here, except that the mind has possessed eternally these same perfections that we pretended were now accruing to it, and has possessed them accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this: that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.

5P34 Proposition 34. *Only while the body endures is the mind subject to the affects that are related to passions.*

5P34D Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind regards some thing as present (see its definition in the Scholium to Proposition 17 of Part 2); yet it indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Corollary 2 to Proposition 16 of Part 2). An affect, then (by the General Definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body. And so (by Proposition 21 of this part) only while the body endures is the mind subject to the affects that are related to passions. QED

5P34C Corollary. From this it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal.

5P34S Scholium. If we attend to the common opinion of people, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse it with duration and ascribe it

to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death.

5P35 Proposition 35. *God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.*

5P35D Demonstration. God is absolutely infinite (by Definition 6 of Part 1); that is (by Definition 6 of Part 2), God's nature enjoys infinite perfection, and this accompanied (by Proposition 3 of Part 2) by the idea of himself, that is (by Proposition 11 and Definition 1 of Part 1), by the idea of his own cause. And this is what, in the Corollary to Proposition 32 of this part, we said was intellectual love.

5P36 Proposition 36. *The mind's intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself—not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered from the standpoint of eternity. That is, the mind's intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.*

5P36D Demonstration. This love of the mind must be related to the actions of the mind (by the Corollary to Proposition 32 of this part, and by Proposition 3 of Part 3). It is, therefore, an action by which the mind contemplates itself, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (by Proposition 32 of this part and its Corollary); that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 25 of Part 1 and the Corollary to Proposition 11 of Part 2), an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself. And so (by the preceding Proposition) this love of the mind is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself. QED

5P36C Corollary. From this it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves human beings, and consequently that the love of God toward human beings and the mind's intellectual love of God are one and the same.

5P36S Scholium. From this we clearly understand in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists: namely, in a constant and eternal love of God, or in God's love toward human beings. And this love, or blessedness, is called glory in the Sac-

red Scriptures—and not without reason. For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called contentment of mind, which is in truth not distinguished from glory (by Definitions 25 and 30 of the Affects). For insofar as it is related to God, it is (by Proposition 35 of this part) joy—if we may still use this word—accompanied by the idea of himself; and so it is, too, insofar as it is related to the mind (by Proposition 27 of this part). Again, since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, of which God is the beginning and foundation (by Proposition 15 of Part 1 and the Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part 2),[3] it becomes clear to us how, and in what manner, our mind follows from the divine nature with respect both to essence and to existence, and continually depends on God. I thought it worthwhile to note this here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things that I have called intuitive, or of the third kind (see Scholium 2 to Proposition 40 of Part 2), can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge that I have said is of the second kind. For although I showed in general terms in Part 1 that all things (and consequently the human mind as well) depend on God with respect both to essence and to existence, that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond the hazard of doubt, still does not affect our mind in the same way as when this same conclusion is drawn from the very essence of some singular thing that we say depends on God.

5P37 Proposition 37. *There is nothing in Nature that is contrary to this intellectual love, or that can take it away.*

5P37D Demonstration. This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, insofar as the mind is considered, as an eternal truth, through God's nature (by Propositions 33 and 29 of this part). If, then, there were anything contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the true; and consequently whatever could take this love away would bring it about that

3 Glory: Spinoza likely has in mind biblical passages that speak of the "glory" of God and of the righteous.

what is true should be false—which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in Nature, etc. QED

5P37S Scholium. The Axiom of Part 4 concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a definite time and place. I believe no one doubts this.

DEATH, VIRTUE AND BLESSEDNESS

The more the mind understands, the less it fears death; blessedness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself.

5P38 Proposition 38. *The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects that are evil, and the less it fears death.*

5P38D Demonstration. The essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Proposition 11 of Part 2). The more things the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, then, the greater the part of it that remains (by Propositions 29 and 23 of this part), and consequently (by the preceding Proposition) the greater the part of it that is untouched by affects contrary to our nature, that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4), by affects that are evil. So the more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains unharmed, and consequently the less it is acted on by affects, etc. QED

5P38S Scholium. From this we understand what I touched on in the Scholium to Proposition 39 of Part 4, and what I promised to explain in this part: namely, that death is less harmful the greater the mind's clear and distinct knowledge, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Again, since (by Proposition 27 of this part) the highest contentment there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows that the human mind can be of such a nature that the part of it that we have shown perishes with the body (see Proposition 21 of this part) is of no importance in comparison with what remains of it. But of this more fully shortly.

5P39 Proposition 39. *Whoever has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.*

5P39D Demonstration. Whoever has a body capable of doing a great many things is least troubled by affects that are evil (by Proposition 38 of Part 4), that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4), by affects contrary to our nature. And so (by Proposition 10 of this part) he has the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and consequently of bringing it about (by Proposition 14 of this part) that all the affections of the body are related to the idea of God. From this it will come about (by Proposition 15 of this part) that he is affected with a love toward God that (by Proposition 16 of this part) must occupy, or constitute, the greatest part of the mind. Therefore (by Proposition 33 of this part) he has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. QED

5P39S Scholium. Because human bodies are capable of a great many things, there is no doubt that they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds that have great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose greatest, or chief, part is eternal—so that they hardly fear death. But for this to be understood more clearly, it should be noted here that we live in continual change, and are called happy or unhappy according as we change for the better or the worse. For someone who has passed from infancy or childhood to being a corpse is called unhappy; and, on the other hand, it is counted as happiness if we have been able to run through the whole span of life with a sound mind in a sound body.[4] And in fact, whoever has a body capable of very few things, like an infant's or a child's, and very greatly dependent on external causes, has a mind that, considered in itself alone, is conscious of almost nothing of itself, of God, or of things. On the other hand, whoever has a body capable of a great many things has a mind that, considered in itself alone, is very conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, then, we strive above all that the body of infancy may change, as far

4 "A sound mind in a sound body" echoes the Roman poet Juvenal's *mens sana in corpore sano* (Satires 10.356).

as its nature allows and it is conducive to it, into another body that is capable of a great many things and is related to a mind very highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things—and conscious in such a way that everything related to its memory or imagination is of hardly any importance in comparison with the intellect, as I have already said in the Scholium to the preceding Proposition.

5P40 Proposition 40. *The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.*

5P40D Demonstration. The more perfect each thing is, the more reality it has (by Definition 6 of Part 2), and consequently (by Proposition 3 of Part 3 with its Scholium) the more it acts and the less it is acted on. This demonstration proceeds in the same way in reverse order, from which it follows that, conversely, a thing is more perfect the more it acts. QED

5P40C Corollary. From this it follows that the part of the mind that remains, however great or small it may be, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (by Propositions 23 and 29 of this part) is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act (by Proposition 3 of Part 3); but the part that we have shown perishes is the imagination itself (by Proposition 21 of this part), through which alone we are said to be acted on (by Proposition 3 of Part 3 and the General Definition of the Affects). And so (by the preceding Proposition) the former, however great or small it may be, is more perfect than the latter. QED

5P40S Scholium. These are the things I had resolved to show concerning the mind insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body. From them, together with Proposition 21 of Part 1 and other passages, it is evident that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this in turn by another, and so on to infinity; so that all of them together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.

5P41 Proposition 41. *Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion,*

and absolutely everything that we showed in Part 4 to be related to tenacity and nobility.

5P41D Demonstration. The first and only foundation of virtue, or of the right way of living (by the Corollary to Proposition 22 and by Proposition 24 of Part 4), is to seek one's own advantage. But in determining what reason dictates to be useful, we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to know only in this fifth part. So although at that time we were ignorant that the mind is eternal, we still regarded as of first importance the things we showed to be related to tenacity and nobility. Therefore, even if we were ignorant of this very thing now as well, we would still regard these same precepts of reason as of first importance. QED

5P41S Scholium. The common conviction of the multitude seems to be different. For most people seem to believe that they are free insofar as they are permitted to obey their lust, and that they give up part of their rights insofar as they are bound to live according to the precepts of the divine law. Piety and religion, then, and absolutely everything related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to lay down after death, receiving the reward of their bondage—that is, of their piety and religion. Nor is it by this hope alone, but also, and chiefly, by fear—fear, that is, of being punished with dreadful torments after death—that they are induced to live according to the precepts of the divine law, as far as their feebleness and weak mind allow. And if people did not have this hope and fear in them, but believed instead that minds perish with the body, and that no longer life remains for the wretched, worn out by the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations. They would want to govern everything by lust, and to obey fortune rather than themselves. This seems to me no less absurd than if someone, because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food for all eternity, should prefer to stuff himself with poisons and deadly things; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, he should prefer to be out

of his mind and to live without reason. These things are so absurd that they hardly deserve to be mentioned.

5P42 Proposition 42. *Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, it is because we enjoy it that we are able to restrain our lusts.*

5P42D Demonstration. Blessedness consists in love toward God (by Proposition 36 of this part and its Scholium), and this love arises from the third kind of knowledge (by the Corollary to Proposition 32 of this part). And so this love (by Propositions 59 and 3 of Part 3) must be related to the mind insofar as it acts; therefore (by Definition 8 of Part 4) it is virtue itself. That was the first point. Next, the more the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, the more it understands (by Proposition 32 of this part), that is (by the Corollary to Proposition 3 of this part), the greater the power it has over the affects, and (by Proposition 38 of this part) the less it is acted on by affects that are evil. So, because the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts. And since human power to restrain the affects consists in the intellect alone, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained the affects; on the contrary, the power to restrain lusts arises from blessedness itself. QED

5P42S Scholium. With this I have completed everything I wished to show concerning the mind's power over the affects and the mind's freedom. From it, it is evident how much the wise person can do, and how much more powerful he is than the ignorant one, who is driven by lust alone. For the ignorant person, besides being troubled in many ways by external causes and never possessing true contentment of mind, also lives as if unconscious of himself, of God, and of things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases also to be. The wise person, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely disturbed in spirit; conscious, by a certain eternal necessity, of himself, of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true contentment of mind. If the way I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, it can nevertheless be

found. And indeed what is found so rarely must be hard. For how could it happen, if salvation were ready to hand and could be found without great labor, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.