On the Problem of Empathy

EDITH STEIN
1891–1942

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Zum Problem der Einfühlung

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited



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INTRODUCTION

Edith Stein (1891–1942) studied with Edmund Husserl at Göttingen and followed him to Freiburg, where she became his assistant. *On the Problem of Empathy* is the dissertation she defended there in 1916 and printed in 1917, with Husserl as examiner. She published only its second, third and fourth parts; the first, a history of the theories of empathy, was left out.

Her question is how other people's experiences are given to us at all. A friend tells me his brother has died, and I see his grief. I do not feel it as my own, I do not infer it from his face, and I am not merely imagining it: Stein argues that empathy is a distinct kind of act, an experience of someone else's experience, which is present to me without being lived through by me. From there she asks what this means for our grasp of the other person's body as a living, sensing body, for our knowledge of ourselves, which, she argues, depends on seeing ourselves as others see us, and finally for the understanding of persons, their values and their history.

The book argues with Theodor Lipps, Max Scheler and Hugo Münsterberg, and its account of the living body and of intersubjectivity anticipates much later phenomenology. Stein later became a Carmelite nun. She was murdered at Auschwitz in 1942 and was canonized in 1998.

Preface

Vorwort
Why only parts II–IV of the dissertation are printed, and what they owe to Husserl.

V.1 The complete work from which the following pages are taken began with a purely historical account of the problems that have arisen one after another in the existing literature on empathy: aesthetic empathy, empathy as a source of knowledge of foreign experience, ethical empathy, and so on. I found that these problems, which I kept apart in my account, were mixed up with one another in the way they were treated. I also found that the epistemological, the purely descriptive, and the genetic-psychological sides of these problems were not distinguished from one another. I saw in this confusion the reason why no satisfactory solution has so far been reached. It seemed necessary to me first to isolate the basic problem from which all the others can be understood, and to subject it to a thorough investigation. This positive work also seemed to me necessary as a foundation for taking a critical position on the results reached so far.[1] I recognized this basic problem as the question of empathy as the experience of foreign subjects and their experience. This question is treated in the following pages. I am well aware that the positive results I present are only a small contribution to what remains to be done here. Moreover, particular circumstances have prevented me from thoroughly revising the work once more before publication. Since I submitted it to the faculty, I

1 *Einfühlung*, rendered "empathy" throughout, means literally "feeling-into"; it was the key term of Theodor Lipps's aesthetics.

have become private assistant to my revered teacher, Professor Husserl. In this capacity I have gained insight into the manuscripts for Part II of his "Ideas," which in part deal with the same questions. If I were to take up my topic again, I could of course not avoid making use of the new stimulus I have received from them.[2] Admittedly, the way my work poses its problem and its method grew entirely out of stimulus I received from Professor Husserl. It is therefore highly questionable in any case how much of the following pages I may claim as my "intellectual property." Nevertheless, I can say that the results I now present were reached through my own work. I could no longer claim this if I were to make changes now.

2 Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) supervised this dissertation; Stein worked as his assistant in Freiburg from 1916 to 1918, preparing the manuscripts of *Ideas* II, which were published only in 1952.

II. The Essence of Acts of Empathy

Das Wesen der Einfühlungsakte
The method of the phenomenological reduction; empathy compared with perception, memory, expectation and fantasy; Lipps on empathy, sympathy and "oneness of feeling"; imitation, association and analogy as explanations; Scheler and Münsterberg.

§ 1. DIE METHODE DER UNTERSUCHUNG.

2.1.1 All dispute about empathy rests on a tacit presupposition: foreign subjects and their experience are given to us. The discussion concerns how this givenness comes about, what its effects are, and whether it is justified. But the most immediate task is to consider this givenness itself, in itself, and to investigate its essence. The attitude in which we do this is that of the "phenomenological reduction." The goal of phenomenology is clarification, and thereby the ultimate grounding, of all knowledge. To reach this goal, it excludes from its considerations everything that is in any way "doubtable," everything that can in any way be eliminated.[1] To begin with, it makes no use of any results of any science. This is self-evident. A science that aims to be the ultimate clarification of all scientific knowledge must not in turn rely on an already existing science, but must ground itself in itself. Does it then rely on natural experience? By no means. For natural experience itself, like its continuation in nat-

1 The phenomenological reduction is Husserl's method of suspending every positing of existence, so that only what is given to consciousness remains as the object of investigation.

ural-scientific research, is subject to many different interpretations (in materialist or idealist philosophy, for example), and so proves to be in need of clarification itself. So the whole world that surrounds us falls under the exclusion or reduction: the physical world as well as the psychophysical, physical bodies as well as the souls of humans and animals (including the psychophysical person of the investigator himself). What can still remain once everything has been struck out, the whole world and the very subject who experiences it? In truth, an infinite field

2.1.2 of pure research still remains. For let us consider carefully what that exclusion means. I can doubt whether the thing I see before me exists. A deception is possible, and so I must exclude the positing of its existence and may make no use of it. But there is something I cannot exclude, something not subject to any doubt: my experiencing of the thing (the grasping of it in perception, in memory, or in whatever other way), together with its correlate, the full "thing-phenomenon" (the object that gives itself as the same in many different series of perceptions or memories). This phenomenon is preserved in its whole character and can be made the object of our consideration. (It is difficult to see how the positing of existence can be suspended and yet the full character of perception be preserved. One can illustrate this possibility with the case of hallucination. Suppose someone suffers from hallucinations and has insight into his condition. He is, say, in a room with a healthy person, thinks he notices a door in the wall, and wants to walk through it. When the other person draws his attention to it, he recognizes that he is hallucinating again. He no longer believes that the door is there. But he can still transpose himself into the "crossed-out" perception, and he could well study the essence of perception in it, including the positing of existence, even though he no longer goes along with that positing.) So the whole "world-phenomenon" remains after the positing of the world has been suspended. And these "phenomena" are the object of phenomenology. But it is not enough to grasp them as individual phenom-

ena and to explicate everything implied in them by following up the tendencies contained in the simple having of the phenomenon. We must press on to their essence. Every phenomenon is an exemplary basis for a consideration of essence. The phenomenology of perception is not content to describe the individual perception. It seeks to fathom what "perception as such" is in its essence, and it gains this knowledge from the individual case through ideating abstraction.[2] It remains to be shown what it means to say that my experiencing cannot be excluded. That I, this empirical I, with this name and station, endowed with such and such properties, exist is not beyond doubt. My whole past could have been dreamed, could be a deception of memory. It is therefore subject to the exclusion and remains an object of consideration only as a phenomenon. But "I," the experiencing subject that considers the world and its own person as phenomena—'I' am in the experiencing, and only in it, and am as beyond doubt and as impossible to strike out as the experiencing itself. Now we must apply this way of considering things to our case. The world in which I live is not only a world of physical bodies. Besides me, there are also experiencing subjects in it, and I know of their experiencing. This knowledge is not beyond doubt. Here in particular we are subject to so many kinds of deception that we are sometimes inclined to despair of the possibility of any knowledge at all in this domain —but the phenomenon of foreign psychic life is there and beyond doubt, and it is this phenomenon that we now want to examine a little more closely. This does not yet prescribe a single direction for our investigation. We could start from the full concrete phenomenon that we have before us in our world of experience: the phenomenon of a psychophysical individual, which is clearly distinct from a physical thing. It does not give

2 STEIN'S NOTE. I cannot hope to make the aim and method of phenomenology fully clear, in a few brief words, to anyone unfamiliar with them. For all the questions that arise, I must refer to Husserl's fundamental work, the "Ideas."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Book I (1913).

itself as a physical body but as a sensing living body to which an I belongs—an I that senses, thinks, feels, and wills. This I's living body is not merely fitted into my phenomenal world; the I is itself the center of orientation of such a phenomenal world, stands over against it, and enters into interaction with me. And we could investigate how everything that appears to us over and above the mere physical body given in outer perception is constituted in consciousness. We could also consider the individual concrete lived experiences of these individuals. We would then see that various modes of givenness occur here, and we could pursue them further. It would turn out that there are modes of givenness other than the givenness "in symbolic relation" worked out by *Lipps*. I know not only what is expressed in facial expressions and gestures, but also something of what is hidden behind them. I see, for instance, that someone puts on a sad face but is not really grieving. Or again: I hear someone make a thoughtless remark and see him blush at it. Then I not only understand the remark and see shame in the blush. I also recognize that he sees the remark as thoughtless, and that he is ashamed *because* he made it.[3] Neither this motivation nor his judgment about his remark is expressed by any "sensory appearance." These various modes of givenness would have to be investigated, and any relations of founding that may hold among them brought out. But another, more radical approach is possible. All these ways in which foreign experience is given point back to a basic kind of act in which foreign experience is grasped. Setting aside all the historical traditions attached to the word, we will call these acts *empathy*. Our first task will be to grasp and describe these acts in the greatest generality of essence.

3 Theodor Lipps (1851–1914), Munich psychologist and philosopher, whose aesthetics and psychology made empathy a central concept.

§ 2. DESCRIPTION OF EMPATHY COMPARED WITH OTHER ACTS

A friend tells me his brother has died; Stein asks what kind of awareness grasps his pain.

2.2.1 Their distinctive character will stand out most clearly if we set them against other acts of pure consciousness (the field of our considerations once the reduction described above has been carried out). Let us take an example to illustrate the essence of the act of empathy. A friend comes in to me and tells me that he has lost his brother, and I become aware of his pain. What kind of awareness is this? I do not want to go into what it is based on, or what I gather the pain from. Perhaps his face is pale and distraught, his voice toneless and strained; perhaps he also expresses his pain in words. All these are of course topics for investigation, but they are not what concerns me here. What I want to know is not by what paths I arrive at it, but what it is itself, this awareness.

a) OUTER PERCEPTION AND EMPATHY

Empathy is not outer perception, though like perception it has its object itself there.

2.2.2 It hardly needs saying that I have no outer perception of the pain. "Outer perception" is a name for the acts in which spatio-temporal, thingly being and occurrence come to givenness for me in person. Such being stands before me as itself there, here and now, turning this or that side toward me. The side turned toward me is there in person, or primordially, in a specific sense, compared with the sides turned away from me, which are co-perceived. The pain is not a thing and is not given to me in this way—not even when I become aware of it 'in' the pained expression, which I perceive outwardly and with which it is given "as one." The comparison with the far sides of a seen thing

suggests itself.[4] But the comparison is only a very loose one. In continued perception I can bring ever new sides of the thing to primordial givenness; in principle, any side can take on this privileged mode of givenness. The pained expression—more precisely, the change in the face that I, empathizing, apprehend as a pained expression—I can consider from as many sides as I like. In principle I can never arrive at an 'orientation' in which the pain itself, rather than the expression, is primordially given. So empathy does not have the character of outer perception. But it does have something in common with it: its object is itself there, here and now. We have come to know outer perception as a primordially giving act. If empathy is not outer perception, that does not yet mean that it lacks this character of being "primordial."

B) PRIMORDIALITY AND NON-PRIMORDIALITY

Stein separates the primordiality of present acts from the primordiality of what they give.

2.2.3 Things other than the outer world are also given to us primordially. Ideation, in which we grasp essential states of affairs intuitively, is also primordially giving. So is, for example, insight into a geometrical axiom, and so is value-ception. Finally, and above all, our own lived experiences, as they come to givenness in reflection, have the character of primordiality. That empathy is not ideation is trivial—after all, it is a matter of grasping something that exists hic et nunc [here and now]. (Whether empathy can be the basis for ideation, for gaining knowledge of the essence of lived experiences, is another question.) The question remains: does empathy possess the primordiality of our own experiencing? Before we can set about answering this question, we must differentiate the sense of primordiality further.[5] All our

4 *Originär*, rendered "primordial," is the same word Husserl uses for what is given itself, in person (often translated "originary").

5 "Value-ception" renders *Wertnehmen*, coined on the model of *Wahrnehmen* (perception): the primordial taking-in of a value.

own present lived experiences as such are primordial—what could be more primordial than experiencing itself?[6] But not all lived experiences are primordially *giving*, primordial in their content. Memory, expectation, and phantasy do not have their object before them as present in person; they only presentify it. And the character of presentification is an immanent essential moment of these acts, not a determination taken from their objects. Finally, there is the question of how our own lived experiences themselves are given. For every lived experience there is the possibility of primordial givenness, that is, the possibility of being there in person, itself, for the reflecting gaze of the I that lives in it. There is also the possibility of a non-primordial mode of givenness of our own lived experiences: in memory, expectation, and phantasy. Now we can take up the question again: does empathy have primordiality, and in what sense?

C) MEMORY, EXPECTATION, PHANTASY AND EMPATHY

Empathy is primordial as a present act but non-primordial in content, an experiencing act of its own kind.

2.2.4 We recognize a far-reaching analogy between acts of empathy and the acts in which what we ourselves have lived through is given non-primordially. The memory of a joy is primordial as an act of presentifying carried out now, but its content —the joy—is non-primordial. It has the full character of joy, so that I could study that character in it. But it is not there primordially and in person; it is there as having once been alive (and this "once," the point in time of the past lived experience, may or may not be determinate). The non-primordiality of the now

6 STEIN'S NOTE. Using the term "primordial" for the act side of experiencing may seem odd. I use it because I believe that what we have here really is the same character that the term designates in the correlate. I deliberately avoid the expression "actual lived experience," the one I would normally use for this, because I need it for another phenomenon (for the "act in the specific sense," the lived experience in the form of the "cogito" [I think], of "being-directed-toward"), and I want to avoid the equivocation.

points back to the primordiality of the then. The then has the character of a former "now." Memory therefore has the character of positing, and what is remembered has the character of being. There is, further, a twofold possibility. The I, the subject of the act of memory, can look back in this act of presentification at the past joy. It then has the joy as an intentional object, and with it and in it the joy's subject, the I of the past. The I of now and the I of then then stand over against each other as subject and object. No coincidence of the two takes place, although there is a consciousness of sameness. But this consciousness of sameness is not an explicit identification, and there remains, besides, the difference between the primordial remembering I and the non-primordial remembered I. Memory can then take on other modalities of enactment. The unitary act of presentification in which what is remembered emerges before me as a whole implies tendencies. Once these tendencies are unfolded, they reveal the "features" contained in it, in their temporal course, just as the remembered whole of lived experience was once primordially constituted.[7] This process of unfolding can take place passively, "in me," or I can carry it out actively, step by step. Further, I can carry out the passive or the active course of memory quite unreflectively, without having the present I, the subject of the act of memory, in view at all. Or else I can explicitly transpose myself back to that point in time in the continuous stream of lived experience and let the sequence of lived experiences of that time come awake again, living in the remembered lived experience instead of being turned toward it as an object. Yet memory always remains presentification, and its subject non-primordial, in contrast to the subject who carries out the memory. The re-producing enactment of the former lived experience is the fulfilling clarification of what was at first only vaguely intended. At the end of the process stands a new

7 STEIN'S NOTE. Admittedly, running through past lived experiences mostly yields an "abrégé" [abridgment] of the original course of lived experience (in a few minutes we can recapitulate the events of years)—a phenomenon that would deserve an investigation of its own.

objectivation: the past experiencing, which first emerged before me as a whole and which I then laid out by transposing myself into it, I finally gather together again in an "apperceptive grasp." Memory (in its various forms of enactment) can have many gaps. Thus I may presentify a past situation in memory without being able to remember my inner attitude toward that situation. When I now transpose myself back into that situation, a surrogate for the missing memory appears: a picture of my past attitude. This picture, however, does not present itself as a presentification of something past, but as a completion of the memory image demanded by the sense of the whole. It can have the character of doubt, of conjecture, of probability, but never the character of being. The case of expectation is so closely parallel that there is hardly any need to discuss it separately. Free phantasy, on the other hand, calls for a few more remarks. Here too we find the various possibilities of enactment: the emergence of a lived experience of phantasy as a whole, and the step-by-step fulfillment of the tendencies implied in it. Living in the lived experience of phantasy, I find no temporal distance, filled out by a continuity of lived experience, between the phantasying I and the phantasied I (unless we are dealing precisely with a phantasied memory or expectation). But here too a distinction must be made: the I that creates the world of phantasy is primordial; the I that lives in it is non-primordial. Phantasied lived experiences differ from remembered ones in that they do not give themselves as presentifications of actual lived experiences, but as a non-primordial form of present lived experiences. Here "present" does not point to a now of objective time, but to the experienced now, which in this case can be objectivated only in a "neutral"[8] now of phantasy time. This neutralized (that is, non-positing) form of present-memory (the presentification of something actual now but not given in person) has its counterpart in a neutralized retrospective and anticipatory memory, that is, a phantasy of the past and of the future, a presentification of non-actual past and future lived experiences. It is also possible that,

8 STEIN'S NOTE. On the concept of neutralization, cf. Husserl's "Ideas," p. 222 ff.

looking into the realm of phantasy (as also in memory and expectation), I find myself in it, that is, an I that I acknowledge as myself, although no connecting continuity of lived experience constitutes the unity—as it were my mirror image (think, for example, of the experience Goethe relates in "Poetry and Truth": how, coming away from his farewell to Friederike at Sesenheim, he meets himself on the road in his future form). But this case seems to me not a genuine phantasy of one's own lived experiences. It seems rather an analogue of empathy, intelligible only on the basis of empathy. Now, then, to empathy itself. Here too we are dealing with an act that is primordial as a present lived experience but non-primordial in its content. And this content is a lived experience that can in turn occur in various forms of enactment, as in memory, expectation, and phantasy.[9] When it emerges before me all at once, it stands over against me as an object (for example, the grief I "read in" the other's face). But when I follow up the tendencies implied in it (when I try to bring the mood the other is in to clear givenness for myself), it is no longer an object in the proper sense. It has drawn me into itself. I am now no longer turned toward it, but, in it, turned toward its object; I am with its subject, in its place. Only after the clarification achieved in this enactment does it

9 In Book 11 of his autobiography *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Goethe recounts riding away from Friederike Brion in Sesenheim (1771) and seeing himself riding toward him in clothes he would actually wear eight years later.

face me again as an object.[10] So in all the cases of presentification of lived experiences we have considered, we have three levels of enactment, or modalities of enactment, since in a concrete case one does not always pass through all the levels but is often content with one of the lower ones: 1. the emergence of the lived experience; 2. the fulfilling explication; 3. the comprehensive objectification of the explicated lived experience. At the first and third levels, presentification is the non-primordial parallel to perception; at the second level, it is the parallel to the enactment of the lived experience. But the subject of the empathized lived experience—and this is what is fundamentally new compared with memory, expectation, and phantasy of one's own lived experiences—is not the same subject that carries out the empathy, but another. The two are separate. They are not connected, as they are in those other cases, by a consciousness of sameness, a continuity of lived experience. And while I live in that joy of the other, I feel no primordial joy. It does not well up alive from my I. Nor does it bear the character of having once been alive, like remembered joy. Still less is it merely phantasied, without actual life. Rather, that other subject has primordiality, although I do not experience this primordiality; his joy, welling up from him, is primordial joy, although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-primordial experiencing I feel, as it were, led by a primordial experiencing that I do not experience and that is nonetheless there, making itself known in my

10 STEIN'S NOTE. It has been emphasized several times, for example by Dessoir (Beiträge, p. 477), that the "objectivation" of the empathized experiencing, which stands out in contrast to my own experiencing, belongs to the apprehension of foreign experience. When, on the other hand, Lange (Wesen der Kunst, p. 139 ff.) distinguishes between the "subjective illusion of movement," the movement we believe we are performing when faced with an object, and the "objective" illusion, the movement we ascribe to the object (a depicted rider, for instance), these are not two ways of looking at things that have nothing whatever to do with each other, on which one could build quite opposite theories (the aesthetics of empathy and the aesthetics of illusion). They are the two stages, or forms of enactment, of empathy that we have described.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Max Dessoir (1867–1947) and Konrad Lange (1855–1921) were German aestheticians; Lange's *Das Wesen der Kunst* (1901) based aesthetic pleasure on "conscious self-deception," or illusion.

non-primordial experiencing. So in *empathy we have a kind of experiencing act sui generis* [of its own kind]. To bring out these acts in their distinctive character was the task that had to be accomplished before any other question (whether such experience is valid, by what route it comes about) could be tackled. And we have conducted this investigation in the purest generality. The empathy we have considered and tried to describe is experience of foreign consciousness in general, no matter what kind of subject the experiencing subject is, or what kind of subject it is whose consciousness is experienced. We have spoken only of the pure I, of the subject of experiencing—on the side of the subject as on the side of the object. Nothing else was drawn into the investigation. This is what the experience is like that an I in general has of another I in general. This is how a human being grasps the psychic life of his fellow human being. But it is also how, as a believer, he grasps the love, the anger, the commandment of his God; and God can grasp the human being's life in no other way. God, as possessing perfect knowledge, will not be deceived about the lived experiences of human beings, as human beings deceive one another about their lived experiences. But even for him their lived experiences do not become his own, nor do they take on the same kind of givenness.

§ 3. OTHER DESCRIPTIONS OF EMPATHY, ESPECIALLY LIPPS'S, AND FURTHER ANALYSIS

Stein tests her results against Lipps's description of empathy.

2.3.1 Of course, this general bringing-out of the essence "empathy in general" accomplishes little. We must now investigate how this essence is differentiated as experience of psychophysical individuals and their experience, of personality, and so on. But the results already reached allow us to criticize some historical theories of the experience of foreign consciousness, and with the help of this criticism the analysis carried out so far can be completed in several directions. The description *Lipps* gives of the lived experience of empathy agrees with ours on many

points. (We leave aside his causal-genetic hypothesis about how empathy comes about—the theory of inner imitation—which in his work is almost everywhere mixed up with pure description.) He does not, to be sure, conduct his investigation in pure generality. He keeps to the example of the psychophysical individual and to the case of "symbolic givenness." But the results he reaches can in part be generalized.

A) POINTS OF AGREEMENT

Lipps's "inner participation" and the "character of demand" agree with Stein's account.

2.3.2 He describes empathy as an "inner participation" in foreign lived experiences. This probably amounts to what we described as the higher level of enactment of empathy, where we are "with" the foreign subject and, with it, turned toward its object. He stresses the objectivity, or the 'character of demand,' of empathy, and in doing so he expresses the same thing as we do when we call it a kind of experiencing act. He also points to the kinship of empathy with memory and expectation. But here we come at once to a point where our paths part.

B) THE TENDENCY TO FULL EXPERIENCING

Against Lipps, a remembered or empathized experience never becomes one's own primordial experience.

2.3.3 He says that every lived experience I know of—the remembered and the expected as well as the empathized—"tends" to become a fully lived one, and does become so if nothing in me resists it. At the same time, the I that was hitherto an object, whether it is my own past or future I or the foreign I, becomes the experienced I. And he likewise calls this full experiencing of the foreign lived experience empathy. Indeed, he sees full empathy only in this, and regards the other as its imperfect preliminary stage. It agrees with our view that in that second form of memory, expectation, and empathy, the subject of the remembered, expected, or empathized lived experience is not

an object in the proper sense. But we deny that full coincidence with the remembering, expecting, or empathizing I takes place, that the two become one. Lipps confuses two things: being drawn into the lived experience that was first given as an object, and fulfilling the tendencies implied in it, on the one hand, and the transition from non-primordial to primordial experiencing, on the other. A memory is completely fulfilled and verified when one has followed up all the tendencies to explication and has established the continuity of lived experience up to the present. But this does not turn the remembered lived experience into a primordial one. My present stance toward the remembered state of affairs is completely independent of the remembered stance. I can remember a perception and now be convinced that I was deceived at the time. I can remember my discomfort in an embarrassing situation and now be highly amused by that situation. In this case the memory is no less complete than if I took the same stance again as I did then. We grant that a switch from the remembered, expected, or empathized lived experience to one's own primordial lived experience is possible. But we deny that memory, expectation, or empathy is still present once that tendency has been fulfilled. Let us look at the case more closely. I vividly presentify a past joy, say over an examination I passed. I transpose myself into it, that is, in it I turn toward the joyful event and *fill out* the picture of it for myself in all its gladness—and suddenly I notice that I, the primordial remembering I, am full of joy. I remember the joyful event and take primordial joy in the remembered event—but the remembered joy and the remembered I have vanished, or at most persist alongside the primordial joy and the primordial I. This primordial joy in past events is of course also possible directly, through the mere presentification of the event, without my remembering the joy I felt then and without first passing from the remembered to the primordial lived experience. Finally, there is the possibility that I take primordial joy in the past joy, and here the difference between the two stands out especially clearly. Now the parallel lived experience of empathy:

my friend comes in to me beaming with joy and tells me that he has passed his examination. Empathizing, I grasp his joy, and by transposing myself into it, I grasp the gladness of the event and now take primordial joy in it myself. This joy too is possible without my first grasping the other's joy. When the examination candidate comes into the family circle, who have been waiting in suspense, and announces the happy result, they will first rejoice primordially in this result. Only when they have themselves "rejoiced enough" will they turn to his joy and perhaps—the third possibility—rejoice in his joy.[11] But what gives us his joy is neither the primordial joy in the event nor the primordial joy in his joy. It is that non-primordial act which we earlier called empathy and described in detail. Suppose, on the other hand, that we put ourselves in the place of the foreign I in the way described earlier for memory, by displacing it and surrounding ourselves with its situation. We then arrive at a lived experience "corresponding" to this situation. And when we then give the foreign I back its place and ascribe that lived experience to it, we arrive at a knowledge of its experience. (According to Adam *Smith*, this is how foreign experience is given.) This procedure can step in as a supplement where empathy fails, but it is not itself experience. This surrogate for empathy could well be counted among the "assumptions," but empathy itself could not, as *Meinong* would have it.[12][13] And if empathy is to have the sense we have strictly defined—experience of foreign consciousness—then only the non-primordial lived experience that

11 STEIN'S NOTE. Groethuysen has called such feelings, which relate to the feelings of others, "sympathy" (Das Mitgefühl, p. 233). Our "feeling-with," which is directed not at the foreign feelings but at their correlate, must be strictly distinguished from this. In feeling-with, I do not rejoice over the other's joy, but over what he rejoices over.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Bernhard Groethuysen (1880–1946), a student of Dilthey, published a study of sympathy, "Das Mitgefühl," in 1904.

12 STEIN'S NOTE. Über Annahmen [On Assumptions], p. 233 ff.

13 Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) explains sympathy as imagining ourselves in the other's situation; Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) treated empathy as a form of "assumption" in his *Über Annahmen* (On Assumptions, 1902).

makes a primordial one known is empathy; neither the primordial nor the "assumed" lived experience is.

C) EMPATHY AND FEELING-WITH

Feeling-with is my own joy over what the other rejoices in, distinct from grasping his joy.

2.3.4 Suppose the empathy—that is, the grasping of the other's joy—persists alongside the primordial joy in the joyful event, and suppose further that I am conscious of the event as joyful properly for him (it may also be joyful for me, for example if his passing the examination is a precondition for a journey we will take together, and I rejoice in it for its value as a means). Then we can call the primordial act in question joy-with or, more generally, *feeling-with*.[14] Joy felt-with and empathized joy need by no means be the same in content (in quality they are, of course, not the same, since one is a primordial and the other a non-primordial lived experience). The joy of the person most closely concerned will in general be more intense than the joy-with of the others, and usually more lasting too. But it is also possible for the joy-with of the others to be more intense—perhaps because they are by nature capable of more intense feelings than he is; perhaps because they are "altruists," for whom "values for others" eo ipso [by that very fact] mean more than "values for themselves"; or perhaps, finally, because the event has lost value through circumstances unknown to him.[15] The joy of empathy, by contrast, is in any case by its claim—and in the ideal case (where no deception occurs) in fact—equal in every respect to the joy grasped. It has the same content and only a different mode of givenness.

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14 STEIN'S NOTE. For the same view of how empathizing (or, as he says, feeling-after) and feeling-with are to be understood, see *Scheler*, "Sympathiegefühle," p. 4 f.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Max Scheler (1874–1928), *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle* (1913); his *Nachfühlen*, "feeling-after," is the grasping of another's feeling without sharing it.

15 *Mitfühlen*, rendered "feeling-with," is sympathy in the strict sense: a feeling directed at what the other is glad or sad about, not at the other's feeling.

D) NEGATIVE EMPATHY

Lipps's "negative empathy" is a general conflict between competing acts, not something peculiar to empathy.

2.3.5 *Lipps* called the primordial lived experience we have described, which can follow on the empathized one, full positive empathy. He set against it a negative empathy: the case in which that tendency of the lived experience of empathy to pass over into one's own primordial experiencing cannot be realized, because "something in me" resists it—a momentary lived experience of my own, or the kind of personality I have. We want to investigate this more closely too, and again in pure generality. In this generality, "personality," like a qualitatively developed present I, is a transcendence; it is itself subject to the exclusion and comes into consideration for us only as a phenomenon. Let us suppose the following case. At the moment when my friend gives me the happy news, I am wholly filled with grief over a loss, and this grief does not allow a feeling-with of the joy I grasp empathically to arise. A conflict arises (and this, again, is to be understood not as real but as phenomenal). Two stages must be distinguished here. The I that lives wholly in its grief perhaps at first has that lived experience of empathy as a "background experience"—comparable to the peripheral parts of the visual field, which are seen and yet are not intentional objects in the full sense, objects we are actually turned toward. And the I now feels pulled, as it were, in two directions, since both lived experiences claim to be a "cogito" in the specific sense—that is, acts in which the I lives and directs itself to the object—and try to draw the I into themselves. The experience of being torn consists in precisely this. At first, then, the conflict is between one's own actual lived experience and the lived experience of empathy. It is further possible for the I to be drawn into the lived experience of empathy and to turn, in it, toward the joyful object, while at the same time that other pull does not cease and no actual joy can arise. In both cases, however, it seems to me

that we are dealing not with a specific peculiarity of empathizing or of feeling-with, but with one of the typical forms of transition from one "cogito" to another in general. There are many kinds of such transition. A cogito can live itself out fully, and I can then glide over "quite of my own accord" into another. Again, while I am living in one cogito, another can emerge and draw me into itself without meeting resistance. Finally, the tendencies implied in a cogito not yet fully carried out can oppose and inhibit the transition to a new cogito. And all this is just as possible in perceiving, remembering, theoretical reflection, and so on, as in empathizing.

E) EMPATHY AND THE FEELING OF ONENESS

I am not one with the acrobat I watch; a "we" arises through empathy, not instead of it.

2.3.6 I would also like to examine a little more closely that unity of one's own I and the foreign I in empathy which we have already rejected. As long as empathy is full empathy, Lipps says (that is, precisely what we can no longer recognize as empathy), there is no separation between one's own I and the foreign I; the two are one. I am, for example, one with the acrobat whose movements I inwardly go through with him as I watch. Only when I step out of full empathy and reflect on my 'real I' does the separation occur. Then the lived experiences that do not come from me appear as belonging to "the other" and as lying in his movements.[16] If this description were accurate, the difference between foreign and one's own experiencing, and between the foreign and one's own I, would really be abolished. It would arise only through being bound to different "real I's," that is, psychophysical individuals. And it would remain completely unintelligible what makes my living body mine and the foreign living body foreign, since I live 'in' the one just as I do in the other

16 *Einsfühlen* / *Einsfühlung*, rendered "feeling-one" / "feeling of oneness," plays on *Einfühlung*: it names the merging of one's own I with the other's that Lipps claimed for full empathy.

and experience the movements of the one just as I do those of the other. But this claim is not only refuted by its consequences; it is an evidently false description. I am not one with the acrobat, but only 'with' him. I do not really perform his movement, but only quasi-perform it—that is, not only do I not perform the movements outwardly, which *Lipps* too stresses; what corresponds "inwardly" to the movements of the living body—the lived experience of "I move"—is in me not a primordial but a non-primordial one. And in these non-primordial movements I feel myself led, guided by his movements, whose primordiality makes itself known in my non-primordial ones and which are there for me only in them (again understood as experienced movements, since the mere movement of the physical body is also perceived outwardly). Primordiality belongs to every movement that the spectator makes—for example, when he picks up the program he has dropped—even though he may not "know" anything about it because he is living entirely in empathy. But if he reflects in each case (which requires his I to carry out the transition from the one cogito to the other), he finds primordial givenness in the one case and non-primordial givenness in the other—and not simple non-primordiality, but a non-primordiality in which a foreign primordiality makes itself known. What misled *Lipps* into his description was a confusion: he took the self-forgetfulness with which I can give myself over to any object for an absorption of the I into the object. Empathy, then, is not a feeling of oneness, if this is taken in the strict sense. But this does not yet mean that there is no such thing as feeling-one at all. Let us go back to that feeling-with with foreign experience. We said that in experiencing-with, the I is turned toward the object of the foreign experience; that at the same time it has the foreign experience present to it through empathy; and that the empathizing act and the act of feeling-with need not coincide in content. We can now modify this case a little. A special edition of the newspaper reports that the fortress has fallen—and all of us who hear it are seized by enthusiasm, joy, jubilation. We all feel 'the same' feeling. Have the barriers that separ-

ate one I from another fallen here? Has the I freed itself from its monadic character? Not entirely! I feel my joy, and empathizing I grasp the joy of the others and see: it is the same. And as I see this, that character of non-primordiality of the foreign joy seems to vanish. Feature by feature, after all, that shadowy joy coincides with my own joy, alive in person; and they feel theirs just as vividly as I feel mine. What they feel, I now have intuitively before me. It takes on body and life in my feeling, and out of the "I" and the "you" rises the "we," as a subject of a higher level.[17] And this other possibility also exists. We do rejoice over the same event, but it is not yet quite the same joy that fills us. The joyful event has perhaps disclosed itself more richly to the other. Empathizing, I grasp this difference; empathizing, I reach the "sides" of what is joyful that remained closed to my own joy. Now my joy is kindled by them, and only now does full coincidence with the empathized joy occur. The same may happen to the others, and so, empathizing, we enrich our feeling, and "we" now feel a different joy from the one that 'I' and "you" and "he" feel in isolation. But "I" and "you" and 'he' are preserved in the "we." The subject of feeling-one is not an "I" but a "we." And it is not through feeling-one that we learn of others, but through empathizing. Through empathy, the feeling of oneness and the enrichment of one's own experiencing become possible.

F) THE ITERABILITY OF EMPATHY: REFLEXIVE SYMPATHY

Empathy can be iterated, and when it returns to me it is Lipps's "reflexive sympathy."

2.3.7 There is one more feature of *Lipps's* description that I would like to bring out: what he calls "reflexive sympathy," and what I would call the iterability of empathy, or more precisely a special case of iterability. Empathy shares this property with many

17 STEIN'S NOTE. Scheler sharply emphasizes the phenomenon that different persons can have strictly the same feeling (Sympathiegefühle, pp. 9 and 31), and he stresses that the different subjects are preserved in it. But he does not take into account that the subject of the unitary act is not the plurality of individuals but the higher unity constituted out of them.

kinds of act. There is not only reflection but also reflection on reflection, and so on, as an ideal possibility in inf. [in infinitum: to infinity]. In the same way there is a willing of willing, a being pleased by being pleased, and so on. All presentifications are likewise iterable: I can remember a memory, expect an expectation, phantasy a phantasy. And so I can also empathize empathies. That is, among the acts of another that I grasp empathically there can also be acts of empathy, in which the other grasps the acts of someone else. This 'someone else' may be a third person —or myself. In the second case we have "reflexive sympathy": my original lived experience returns to me as an empathized one. What significance this phenomenon has in the interaction between individuals need not concern us here, since we are dealing only with the general essence of empathy, not with its effects.

§ 4. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATION VIEW AND THE ACTUALITY VIEW

Stein shows that the question whether empathy merely represents or actually feels is badly posed.

2.4.1 Our description of acts of empathy may perhaps also give us an approach to the much-discussed question whether empathy has the character of representation or of actuality. *Geiger* already stresses that this is not one unambiguous question, and that several points have to be distinguished here:[18] (1) Are the empathized lived experiences primordial or not? (2) Are the foreign lived experiences given as objects—as something standing over against me—or in the manner of lived experience? (3) Are they given intuitively or non-intuitively (and if intuitively, with the character of perception or of presentification)? After the preceding discussions we can answer the first question with a flat no.

18 STEIN'S NOTE. Das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung, pp. 33 ff.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), Munich phenomenologist, "Über das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung" ("On the Essence and Meaning of Empathy"), a lecture of 1910 printed in 1911.

The second question, on our account of empathy, again cannot simply be answered. It lies in the essence of these acts to have precisely that two-sidedness: an experiencing of my own in which another's experiencing announces itself.[19] And those different levels of enactment are possible: being directed toward the foreign lived experience, and feeling oneself led by it, redeeming in empathic explication what was at first only vaguely meant. In the second case one cannot speak of objecthood in the strict sense, although the foreign lived experience is nonetheless "there" for me. The third question also calls for somewhat closer treatment. We have already seen what distinguishes empathy from perception and what it shares with it. Perception has its object before it as given in person—empathy does not. But both have their object itself there; both meet it directly at the place where it belongs, where it is anchored in the context of being, without having to bring it close by means of a representative. This "meeting" on the subject's part also belongs to mere knowing. But knowing exhausts itself in this meeting; it is nothing more. It reaches its object but does not "have" it; it stands before it but does not see it. Knowing is blind and empty, and it is not something that rests in itself: it always points back to some experiencing, seeing acts. And the experience to which knowledge of foreign experiencing points back is called empathy. I know of another's grief: that is, either I have grasped this grief empathically but no longer dwell in this "intuiting" act and now content myself with empty knowing; or I know of this grief on the basis of a communication. In that case it is not given to me intuitively, though it is given so to the one who communicates it. If that is the grieving person himself, it is given to him primordially in reflection; if it is a third person, he grasps it non-primordially in empathy—and of this experience of his I in turn have experience, that is, I grasp it empathically. A closer analysis of the relation between "empathy" and "knowledge of foreign experiencing" is probably not needed at this point; it is

19 The dispute was whether empathized feelings are merely represented (vorgestellt) to the empathizer or are actually felt by him.

enough that the two have been marked off from each other. The result of our discussion is this: the disputed question was badly posed, and so no answer that took its stand on the question's own ground could be right. *Witasek*, for example, who defends the representation view with particular vigor,[20] entirely disregards the differences we have stressed. Along with the presentifical character of empathy, he takes its object character to be proven as well. A further equivocation on "representation" (= intellectual as opposed to emotional lived experience) leads him to the absurd conclusion of denying that empathized feelings have emotional character. This result, to be sure, is also supported by a special argument: empathy cannot be a matter of feelings, because the "feeling-presupposition" (the 'something' to which they could refer) is missing.[21] The feeling-presupposition of the subject who has the feelings would come into consideration for the subject of empathy only if empathy were a matter of transposing oneself into the other. That it cannot be this is proved—not, say, by an analysis of the lived experience of empathy, but by a logical review of the possible interpretations that come into question for the case of self-transposal. It could be either the judgment or the assumption that the empathizing subject is identical with the subject observed, or finally the fiction that it is in that subject's situation. None of this can be demonstrated in aesthetic empathy—ergo it is not self-transposal. Unfortunately the disjunction is simply not complete, and unfortunately it lacks precisely the possibility that fits the case at hand: to transpose oneself into another means to co-enact his experiencing, as we have described it. *Witasek's* claim that empathy is the intuitive representing of the experiencing in question holds only for the stage at which the empathized lived experiences are objectified, not for the stage of fulfilling explication. And for this latter case, in turn, the question "Intuitive in

20 STEIN'S NOTE. Zur psychologischen Analyse der ästhetischen Anschauung [On the Psychological Analysis of Aesthetic Intuition].

21 Stephan Witasek (1870–1915), Austrian psychologist of the Graz school, wrote on the psychology of aesthetic experience.

the manner of perception or of representation (i.e., non-primordially)?" cannot be answered, because empathy, as we have shown, is neither of the two in the usual sense. It simply refuses to be filed in one of psychology's existing pigeonholes, and demands to be studied in its own essence.

§ 5. GENETIC THEORIES OF HOW FOREIGN CONSCIOUSNESS IS GRASPED

Stein turns to theories that explain how empathy arises in a psychophysical individual.

2.5.1 Philosophical research, as we have seen, has already grappled with the problem of foreign consciousness in many ways. But its question, How do we experience foreign consciousness?, has almost always taken this turn: How does the experience of other such individuals come about in a psychophysical individual? This gave rise to the theories of imitation, of inference by analogy, and of associative empathy.

A) ON THE RELATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Phenomenology asks what empathy is; genetic psychology must presuppose that answer and lead back to it.

2.5.2 It may not be superfluous to make clear how investigations of this kind relate to ours. Our position was this: there is the phenomenon 'foreign experiencing' and, correlatively, "experience of foreign experiencing." Whether such foreign experiencing actually exists, whether this experience is valid experience, can for the time being be left open. In the phenomenon we have something indubitable, in which all knowledge and certainty must ultimately be anchored: the true object of πρώτη φιλοσοφία [first philosophy]. To grasp the phenomenon in its pure essence, detached from all the contingencies of appearing, is therefore the first task to be solved in this field as in every other. What is foreign experiencing as regards its givenness?

What does experience of foreign experiencing look like?[22] This I must know before I can ask: how does this experience come about? That the first question cannot in principle be answered by a genetic-psychological causal investigation[23] goes without saying. Such an investigation already presupposes the being whose becoming it seeks to fathom—its essence as well as its existence, its "what" as well as its "that." It must therefore be preceded not only by the investigation of what experience of foreign experiencing is, but also by the establishment of this experience's legitimacy. And if it believes it can accomplish both itself, this claim is wholly unwarranted and must be strictly rejected. This by no means denies its right to exist. Rather, its task has already been formulated quite definitely and unambiguously: it has to investigate how knowledge of other such individuals arises in a real psychophysical individual. Once the difference between the tasks that phenomenology and genetic psychology have to perform for the problem of empathy has been rigorously worked out, this still by no means proclaims that the two are completely independent of each other. True, in considering the phenomenological method we saw that it presupposes no science whatever, and in particular no factual science; so it is not bound to any result of genetic psychology either. On the other hand, it does not occur to phenomenology to encroach on the rights of psychology: it presumes to make no statement about the course of the process it investigates. Psychology, however, is entirely bound to the results of phenomen-

22 "First philosophy" is Aristotle's name for the most fundamental science, the study of being as such.

23 STEIN'S NOTE. By a genetic-psychological investigation we do not mean here an investigation of the developmental stages of the psychic individual. The description of the stages of psychic development (the types of the child, the youth, and so on) we count, rather, as part of descriptive psychology. For us, genetic psychology means the same as causally explanatory psychology. On its orientation toward the exact natural-scientific concept of causality, see below, p. 56. In our case two questions must be distinguished: (1) What is the psychological mechanism that comes into play in the lived experience of empathy? (2) How did the individual acquire this mechanism in the course of its development? In the existing genetic theories the two are not always strictly kept apart.

ology. What empathy is in its essence is for phenomenology to investigate. This general essence of empathy must be preserved wherever empathy is realized. The process of this realization is investigated by genetic psychology. Genetic psychology presupposes the phenomenon of empathy—and once its task is solved, it must lead back to it. A genetic theory that finds, at the end of the process of origination it describes, something other than what it set out to explain the origin of stands condemned. In the results of the phenomenological investigation, therefore, we have a criterion for the usefulness of genetic theories.

B) THE IMITATION THEORY

Imitation and emotional contagion yield feelings of my own, not the givenness of another's.

2.5.3 Let us now proceed, then, to test the existing genetic theories against our results. The theory by which *Lipps* tries to explain the experience of foreign psychic life (in his writings, admittedly, it appears as part of the description) is the doctrine of imitation, which we already know. A gesture that I see arouses in me the drive to imitate it, and I do so—if not outwardly, then "inwardly." Now I also have the drive to express all my lived experiences, and lived experience and expression are so closely bound up with each other that the occurrence of the one brings the other in its train. So along with that gesture the corresponding lived experience is also gone through. But since it is lived "in" the foreign gesture, it appears to me not as mine but as the other's. We do not want to go into all the objections that can be raised against this theory and that have already been raised,

rightly or wrongly.[24] For our critique we shall use only what we have already worked out ourselves. On that basis we must say: the theory distinguishes my own experiencing from foreign experiencing only by their being bound to different living bodies, whereas in truth the two differ in themselves. By the route indicated I do not arrive at the phenomenon of the foreign lived experience, but at a lived experience of my own, called up in me by the foreign gesture I see. The difference between the phenomenon to be explained and the phenomenon explained is enough to refute the "explanation." To make this difference clear, we can analyze a case of the second kind. That feelings are aroused in us by "phenomena of expression" we see is a familiar occurrence. When a child sees another crying, it cries too; when I see the people I live with creeping about with gloomy faces, I too fall into a bad mood. To get rid of a sorrow, I seek out cheerful company. In such cases we speak of emotional contagion or transference of feeling. It is obvious that the actual feelings aroused in us have no cognitive function: in them, unlike in empathy, no foreign experiencing announces itself to us. We may leave aside the question whether such transference of feeling does not presuppose the grasping of the foreign feeling in question. After all, only phenomena of expression have such an effect on us, whereas the same change in a face, if it is taken as a pathological twitch, may well prompt imitation but cannot arouse any feeling in us. What is certain is that when we are filled with such "transferred" feelings, we live in them and thus in ourselves, and are prevented from turning toward the foreign experiencing or immersing ourselves in it—the characteristic

24 STEIN'S NOTE. Scheler deals with the critique of the imitation theory (Sympathiegefühle, pp. 6 ff.). He raises these objections to it: (1) imitation presupposes grasping the expression as expression, that is, precisely what it means to explain; (2) we also understand phenomena of expression that we cannot imitate, for example the expressive movements of animals; (3) we grasp when an expression is inadequate, which would be impossible if the grasping came about solely by imitating the expression; (4) we also understand lived experiences we do not know from earlier experience of our own (for example, *fear of death*), which would be impossible if understanding consisted in reproducing, through imitation, earlier lived experiences of our own. These are all objections that will hardly be refuted.

attitude of empathy.[25] Had we not grasped the foreign experiencing in some other way, we could not bring it to givenness at all. At most we could infer its presence from the presence in us of the feeling, which, since it lacks a motive, needs an explanation. But that would give us only knowledge, not a "givenness" of the foreign lived experience as in empathy. It is also possible for the transference itself to be lived through: I feel how the feeling that I at first have before me as a foreign feeling flows over onto me (this will be the case, for example, when I seek out cheerful company to cheer myself up). Here too the difference between grasping a feeling and taking it over shows itself clearly. Transference of feeling, incidentally, differs in every case not only from empathy but also from feeling-with and feeling-one, which are built on empathic immersion in the foreign experiencing.[26] From what has been said it should be sufficiently clear that the imitation theory must be rejected as a genetic explanation of empathy.

C) THE ASSOCIATION THEORY

Association yields at best an inference from my own past rage, not experience of the other's.

2.5.4 The association theory enters as a rival to the imitation theory. The visual image of the foreign gesture reproduces the visual image of one's own gesture; this reproduces the kinesthetic image, and that in turn the feeling with which it was formerly connected. That this feeling is now lived not as one's own but as foreign is due to the fact that (1) it stands over against us as an object, (2) it is not motivated by preceding lived experiences of our own, and (3) it finds no expression in a gesture. Here too we shall again raise only one question: does the

25 STEIN'S NOTE. For a more detailed analysis of emotional contagion, see Scheler (Sympathiegefühle, pp. 11 ff.). The only point on which we differ is his view that emotional contagion presupposes no knowledge whatever of the foreign experiencing.

26 STEIN'S NOTE. Where there is talk of "mass suggestion," it would need to be investigated which of the two is present, or to what extent both are.

phenomenon of empathy stand at the end of the developmental process? And again the answer is: no. By the route indicated we land at a feeling of our own, and we are handed reasons why we should regard it not as our own but as foreign. (We can dispense with refuting these reasons at this point.) From these reasons we could then draw the inference: this is another's lived experience. But in empathizing we draw no inferences; we have the lived experience given as foreign, with the character of experience. To illustrate the contrast, let us picture a case of the kind that, according to the association theory, would have to be typical of grasping foreign psychic life. I see someone stamp his foot. I recall how I myself once stamped my foot; at the same time the rage that filled me then presents itself to me, and I say to myself: that is how enraged the other is now. In that case I do not have the other's rage itself given; I infer its existence and try to bring it close to myself through an intuitive representative—my own rage.[27] Empathy, by contrast, as an experiencing act, posits being immediately and reaches its object directly—without a representative. So the association theory does not give us the genesis of empathy either. I know that not all association psychologists will feel themselves hit by the type of associative explanation just discussed (as *Prandtl* defends it).[28] Association—so we read, for example, in Paul *Stern*—is not merely the linking of individual representations by virtue of which one reproduces another, but the unity of a context of experience, through which that context always comes before us as a whole. The outer and the inner of an individual also form such a context of experience. But now several questions arise. Association is surely supposed to mean more than the *descriptive* unity of the context of experience. It is surely supposed to explain how this unity comes about—roughly: what is given to consciousness together

27 STEIN'S NOTE. Scheler points out that, in contrast to feeling-after (our empathy), which can be the foundation of feeling-with, dwelling in reproduced lived experiences of one's own inhibits the emergence of genuine feeling-with (Sympathiegefühle, pp. 24 f.).

28 Antonín Prandtl, author of *Die Einfühlung* (1910), an associationist account of empathy.

links up into a whole, which is reproduced as such. But then what distinguishes, for example, the unity of the objects in my visual field (which can also come up before me again as a whole) from the unity of one object?[29] Here, surely, the single word 'association' cannot settle everything. Further: for such a context of experience to arise, its parts must surely have been given together at some time. But when have I had the inner and the outer of a human being given together? Such cases do in fact occur. I see in someone an expression that I do not understand at first—for example, that he puts his hand over his eyes. When I ask, I learn that at that moment he was thinking hard about something. This thinking, which I presentify to myself empathically, now enters into an "associative connection" with the perceived posture, and when I notice that posture again, I see it as a "thoughtful" posture. In this case of repetition, empathy is then indeed founded on association. But this association itself could come about only with the help of an act of empathy, and so it is not sufficient as an explanatory principle for empathy.[30] Besides, it can only ever convey the knowledge: this is how he looks when he is thinking. It cannot convey the understanding of this posture as the expression of an inner state, which I gain by empathically transposing myself into him: He is thinking, he is turned toward a problem and wants to protect his train of thought from disturbing distractions, and so he covers his eyes and shuts himself off from the outer world.[31] From this association theory we must distinguish the fusion theory as we find it in *Volkelt*. There the felt content is not linked with the intuition

29 Paul Stern, author of *Einfühlung und Assoziation in der neueren Ästhetik* (*Empathy and Association in Recent Aesthetics*, 1898).

30 STEIN'S NOTE. It is an exaggeration in the opposite direction when Biese asserts: "associations rest on our capacity and compulsion to relate everything to ourselves as human beings, to adapt ourselves in body and soul to objects." (Das Assoziationsprinzip und der Anthropomorphismus in der Ästhetik.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Alfred Biese (1856–1930), literary historian; the title means "The Principle of Association and Anthropomorphism in Aesthetics" (1890).

31 STEIN'S NOTE. On the intelligibility of phenomena of expression, see below, Part III, p. 71.

but fused into it.[32] This, of course, is not a genetic explanation but only a description of the lived experience of empathy. We shall return to this phenomenon later, and shall then see that it offers a way of clarifying how certain lived experiences of empathy arise.[33] From this clarification to an "exact explanation" of the kind the association theory wants to give is admittedly still a long way, and it remains a question whether any road leads there at all. This question can be decided only once the old, much-discussed and yet still so disputed concept of association has been adequately clarified. We therefore agree with *Volkelt* when he argues, against *Siebeck*, that the unity of something sensuous with its psychic content cannot be explained by mere association.[34] On the other hand, one must agree with *Siebeck* when he finds no satisfactory genetic explanation of empathy in *Volkelt*.[35][36]

D) THE THEORY OF INFERENCE BY ANALOGY

Inference by analogy ignores the phenomenon and gives only probable knowledge where empathy fails.

2.5.5 Before *Lipps* attacked it, the almost universally accepted doctrine of how the experience of foreign psychic life arises was the theory of inference by analogy. The standpoint of this theory (as defended, for example, by J. *Stuart Mill*) is as follows. There is an evidence of outer perception and an evidence of inner perception, and we can get beyond the domain of facts that these two supply only by inferences. Applied to the present case: I know the foreign physical body and its modifications; I know my own

32 Johannes Volkelt (1848–1930), German philosopher and a leading theorist of aesthetic empathy.

33 STEIN'S NOTE. See Part III, p. 65.

34 STEIN'S NOTE. "Symbolbegriff," pp. 76 ff.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Volkelt, *Der Symbol-Begriff in der neuesten Ästhetik* (*The Concept of the Symbol in Recent Aesthetics*, 1876).

35 STEIN'S NOTE. Die ästhetische Illusion und ihre psychologische Begründung [Aesthetic Illusion and Its Psychological Grounding], pp. 10 ff.

36 Hermann Siebeck (1842–1920), German philosopher who wrote on aesthetics and the history of psychology.

physical body and its modifications, and in the second case I know that they are conditions and consequences of my lived experiences (which are likewise given).[37] Now since in the one case the sequence of physical appearances is possible only through an intermediate link—the lived experience—I assume the presence of such an intermediate link also where only the physical appearances are given to me. Here too we again set aside all the other objections that press themselves on us and ask only our old question. And whereas with the other theories we were able to show that they do not lead to the phenomenon of experience of foreign consciousness, here we see the still stranger fact that this phenomenon is simply ignored. According to this theory (I do not of course mean that its proponents actually believed this), we see around us nothing but physical bodies without soul or life. After what has been said earlier, there is no *need* for another word to refute the doctrine of inference by analogy as a genetic theory.[38] Nevertheless I would like to dwell on it a little longer, to relieve it of the odium of complete absurdity that clings to it—if one looks at it from one side only. For one thing, it cannot be denied that there is such a thing as inference by analogy in knowing foreign experiencing. It is quite possible that an expression of another reminds me of one of my own, and that I ascribe to it in the other the same meaning it usually has in me. Only, in that case the grasping of the other as another I, and of the expression of the living body as expression of something psychic, is presupposed. Inference by analogy steps in where empathy perhaps fails, and it yields not experience but a more or less probable knowledge of the foreign

37 John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) argued, notably in *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (1865), that we know other minds by analogy with our own.

38 STEIN'S NOTE. Among the objections that have been raised against the theory of inference by analogy is, for example, that it is entirely silent about what the analogy between one's own and the foreign physical body, on which the inference rests, is supposed to consist in. A serious attempt to determine this I *find* only in Fechner, "Zur Seelenfrage," pp. 49 f. and 63.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), founder of psychophysics; *Zur Seelenfrage* (*On the Question of the Soul*, 1861).

lived experience.[39] Further, what the theory really intends is not to give a genetic explanation—although it also presents itself as one, and therefore had to be included here—but to show that our knowledge of foreign consciousness is valid. It wants to state the form in which knowledge of foreign consciousness is "possible." But the value of such an empty form, not oriented to the essence of the knowledge itself, is more than doubtful. We shall not go into the further question of how far inference by analogy in particular would be suited to providing such a grounding. The result of our critical excursus, then, is this: none of the existing genetic theories is able to explain empathy. And we can well guess why: before one sets out to describe something in terms of its origin, one must know what it is.

§ 6. SCHELER'S THEORY OF THE GRASPING OF FOREIGN CONSCIOUSNESS

Stein examines Scheler's claim that others' experiences are inwardly perceived just as one's own are.

2.6.1 There is one more theory of foreign consciousness against which we must measure empathy, and it differs considerably from all those discussed so far. According to *Scheler*,[40] the foreign I with its experiencing is perceived inwardly, just as one's own is. (We need not go into his polemic against the theory of empathy here, since it is not directed against what we call empathy.) Originally there is "an undifferentiated stream of experiencing," out of which "one's own" and 'foreign' lived experiences only gradually crystallize. As examples, he cites the following: that we can live a thought as our own, or as foreign, or even as neither; further, that originally we do not find ourselves isolated but set into a world of psychic experiencing; that at first we live far less our own lived experiences than those of our surroundings; and finally, that of our own lived experi-

39 STEIN'S NOTE. On the legitimate sense of talk about analogizing, see Part III, p. 66.

40 STEIN'S NOTE. See especially the appendix to the Sympathiegefühle.

ences we perceive only what moves along paths already marked out—in particular, what there is already a current expression for.[41] This theory, which boldly opposes all previous views, has something extremely seductive about it. Yet a precise examination of all the concepts used here is needed if we are to reach some clarity. So we ask first: what is inner perception? *Scheler* answers: inner perception is not self-perception (we can also perceive ourselves—that is, our living body—outwardly). Rather, it is distinguished from outer perception as a direction of acts: it is the kind of act in which the psychic comes to givenness for us. The distinction between these two kinds of perception is not meant to be a definitional one, resting on the difference between the objects given in each. On the contrary, the difference between the physical and the psychic is supposed to be graspable only through the fundamentally different ways in which they come to givenness.[42] However, *Scheler's* critique of earlier attempts to mark off the psychic and the physical from each other by distinguishing features[43] does not seem to me to show that this is solely a matter of an essential difference in givenness, and not a separation of objects of different *kinds of being*, to which, by essential law, a different kind of *givenness* corresponds. In this sense we could accept "inner perception" as the title for intuitive acts of a determinate kind (what precisely is to be understood by it will occupy us in a moment) without thereby coming into conflict with our doctrine of empathy. Within this genus, "inner perception," the acts in which foreign experiencing comes to givenness and those in which one's own does could be differentiated. But this does not yet give us sufficient clarity. What do 'own' and "foreign" mean in the context in which Scheler uses them? If one takes his talk of an undifferentiated stream of lived experience seriously, it is impossible to see

41 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Sympathiegefühle, pp. 124 ff.; Idole, p. 31.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Scheler, "Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis" ("The Idols of Self-Knowledge," 1915).

42 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, p. 52.

43 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 42 ff.

how a differentiation could come about within it. That stream of lived experience itself, however, is an idea that cannot be carried through at all; for every lived experience is, after all, essentially the lived experience of an I, and cannot be separated from it even phenomenally. Only because *Scheler* recognizes no pure I and always understands "I" to mean "psychic individual" can he speak of an experiencing that precedes the constitution of the I's. Naturally he does not succeed in exhibiting such an I-less experiencing. All the cases he cites presuppose one's own I as well as the foreign I, and in no way serve as evidence for his theory. They make good sense only once one leaves the phenomenal sphere. 'Own' and 'foreign' then mean: belonging to different individuals, that is, to different substantial, qualitatively formed psychic subjects. These individuals and their lived experiences are supposed to be accessible to inner perception in the same way. "I feel not my own feelings but foreign ones" then means: the feelings have penetrated from the foreign individual into my individual. "I find myself originally surrounded by a world of psychic happening" means: just as I find my living body integrated into the world of my outer experience, against the background of the spatial world extending infinitely on all sides, so my psychic individual finds itself integrated into the world of inner experience, an infinite world of psychic individuals and psychic life. All this is surely unassailable. But here we are on quite different ground from that of our own reflections. This whole world of inner perception—our own individual and all the others—we have excluded from the field of our investigations, just as we have the outer world. They do not belong to the sphere of absolute givenness, pure consciousness, but are transcendent to it. In that sphere, however, the 'I' has a different meaning: it is nothing but the subject of experiencing, which lives in the experiencing. So understood, the question whether a lived experience is "mine" or another's becomes meaningless. What I feel—primordially feel—it is I who feel it, regardless of what role this feeling plays in the totality of my individual experiencing and how it arose (whether through emotional con-

tagion, for example, or not).[44] These lived experiences of my own—the pure lived experiences of the pure I—are given to me in reflection, the turning back in which the I turns away from the object and looks at its experiencing of this object. What, then, distinguishes reflection from inner perception, or more precisely from inner self-perception? Reflection is always an actual turning toward an actual experiencing, whereas inner perception can itself be non-actual, and in principle it also takes in the halo of non-actualities that, together with that actual experiencing, first make up my present experiencing. There is, further, a way of looking at my lived experiences in which I no longer regard them as such, but as things in which something transcendent announces itself: my individual and its properties. In my memories my power of memory announces itself to me, in my acts of outer perception the acuity of my senses (here, of course, not understood as sense organs), in my willing and acting my energy, and so on. And in these properties my individual, so constituted, announces itself to me. This way of looking we can call inner self-perception. That *Scheler's* "inner perception" is the apperception of the "self" in the sense of the individual and its lived experiences within the context of individual experiencing—for this we have firm indications. Among the objects of inner perception he counts complexes of lived experience that come to givenness in a unified act of intuition, for example "my childhood."[45] (I would not, admittedly, speak of perception here, but of one of those "Erinnerungsabrégés" [memory abridgments] to which we pointed earlier, whose analysis must be reserved for a phenomenology of presentifying consciousness.) It is said, further, that in inner perception the "totality of our I" is given to us, just as in the act of outer perception the whole of nature is given, not individual sensory qualit-

44 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Idole, p. 153.

45 STEIN'S NOTE. Ressentiment, pp. 42 ff.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Scheler, "Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil" ("On Ressentiment and Moral Value-Judgment," 1912).

ies.[46] Inner perception could not be more clearly marked as the apperception of something transcendent, even though the difference between the unity of the manifold in inner and in outer perception (the "being outside one another" and the "being within one another") is stressed.[47] This I is fundamentally different from the pure I, the subject of actual experiencing. The unities that are constituted in inner perception are fundamentally different from the unity of an enacted lived experience. And the inner perception that gives us those complexes of lived experience is fundamentally different from *reflection*, in which we grasp the absolute being of an actual experiencing. *Scheler* himself draws a distinction between reflection and inner perception,[48] denying to inner perception, in contrast to reflection, any grasping of acts. All the stranger, then, that the difference between his concept of "inner perception" and *Husserl's* has escaped him, and that he polemicizes against the priority Husserl grants his inner perception over outer perception.[49] It was precisely the possibility of several interpretations that led Husserl to exchange the term "inner perception," as the designation for the absolute givenness of experiencing, for the expression 'reflection.'[50] Husserl too will grant inner perception in *Scheler's* sense no priority in evidence over outer perception. The difference between reflection and inner perception also shows itself quite clearly when we consider the deceptions of inner perception that Scheler's "doctrine of idols" brings out. If I am deceived about my feelings for another person, this cannot mean that I reflectively grasp an act of love that is in truth not there. There is no such "deception of reflection." If I grasp an

46 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 63, 118 ff.

47 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 114 f.

48 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 45 ff.; Philos. d. Lebens, pp. 173 and 215. It would take us too far afield to discuss here his concept of act as well, which apparently does not coincide with Husserl's.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Scheler, "Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens" ("Attempts at a Philosophy of Life," 1913), an essay on Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson.

49 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 71 f. (note).

50 STEIN'S NOTE. On the essence of reflection, see especially Ideas, pp. 72 ff.

actual stirring of love in reflection, I have something absolute that cannot in any way be explained away. It is possible that I am deceived in the object of my love—that is, that the person is in truth different from how I believed I grasped them in that act, and that I loved a phantom. Then the love was nonetheless genuine. It is also possible that the love does not last—as one expected—but very soon comes to an end. Even then there is no reason to say that it was not genuine while it lasted. But Scheler does not have such deceptions in view. The first kind of "idols" he lists is the tendency to deception whereby, living in the feelings of our surroundings, we take them for our own while never bringing our own feelings to clarity at all; and whereby we take feelings "picked up from reading" for our own—the young girl, for example, believes she feels Juliet's love.[51] Here, it seems to me, further distinctions and more thorough analyses are needed. Suppose I have taken over from my surroundings hatred and contempt for the members of a particular race or party— for example, as the child of a conservative family, against Jews and Social Democrats, or, having grown up with liberal views, against the "Junkers." Then this is an entirely genuine and honest hatred; only it is built not on a primordial but on an empathized value-ception, and is possibly heightened by emotional contagion to a degree that stands in no proper relation to the disvalue felt. So I am not deceived when I grasp my hatred. The deceptions that may be present here are, on the one hand, a deception about value (in that I believe I grasp a disvalue that does not exist at all), and, on the other, a deception about my person, when I imagine that I harbor those feelings on the basis of my own insight and take my captivity to inherited prejudices for "firmness of conviction."[52] In the second case I really do have a deception of inner perception, but certainly not

51 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 112 ff.

52 The Junkers were the Prussian landed nobility, a favorite target of liberal criticism in Imperial Germany.

a deception of reflection.[53] About the absence of the founding primordial value-ception I can have no reflective clarity, because I cannot reflect on an act that is not there. But if I perform such an act and bring it to givenness for myself, then I gain clarity, and with it the possibility of unmasking the earlier deception by comparison with this case. It is no different with feelings "picked up from reading." When the schoolboy in love believes he feels Romeo's passion within himself, this too does not mean that he thinks he has a stronger feeling than is actually there. He really does feel passionately, because he has fanned his little spark into a flame with the borrowed fire—a flame that, to be sure, goes out as soon as that influence ceases. Here too the "ungenuineness" consists in the lack of a founding primordial value-ception, and in the resulting disproportion between the feeling on the one hand and its subject and object on the other. And the youth's deception consists in ascribing Romeo's passionateness to himself, not in believing that he has a strong feeling.

UNNOTICED FEELINGS AND HIDDEN MOTIVES

Overlooked feelings and mixed motives belong to inner perception, not to deceptions of reflection.

2.6.2 Now the other direction of deception, by which feelings that are really present fail to come to givenness for us. If I do not perceive a feeling that is in fact present because it moves outside the traditional paths, I do not see how one can speak of deception here. Being directed toward one's own lived experiences is an attitude alien to the natural attitude. Special circumstances are needed to draw attention to them. And if I fail to notice a feeling because no one has made me aware that there is "such a thing," this is entirely natural, and no more to be called a deception than failing to hear a noise around me or overlooking an

53 STEIN'S NOTE. I also consider it imprecise to call the false valuation of my lived experience and of myself that can be built on this deception a deception of perception, as Scheler in part does.

object in my visual field.[54] Of a deception of reflection there can be no question at all, for "reflection" is, after all, the grasping of a lived experience, and that a lived experience I grasp does not escape me is trivial. The case is different when the lived experience in question does not escape me, but I take it to be imagined because it does not fit my surroundings. Here, however, it seems to me that what is really going on is that I do not want to admit it to myself and would like to get rid of it altogether—not that I take it to be non-primordial and am really deceived.

2.6.3 If we are deceived about the motives of our action,[55] we again do not reflectively perceive a motive that is not there. Rather, either we have no clearly conscious motive at all from which our action issues in lived experience, or, besides the motive that stands before our eyes, others are at work that we cannot clearly bring to givenness, because they are not actual but "background lived experiences." For the reflecting gaze to be able to turn to them, every lived experience must, namely, take on the form of the specific "cogito." If, for example, I believe I am acting out of pure patriotism when I join the army as a war volunteer, and do not notice that a thirst for adventure, vanity, or dissatisfaction with my present situation are also in play, then those secondary motives, being not yet or no longer actual, escape my reflecting gaze. And I succumb to a deception of inner perception and of value if I accept that action as it presents itself to me and take it as announcing a noble character. That people are generally inclined to ascribe to themselves better motives than they actually have, and that they never become aware of many stirrings of feeling at all,[56] rests on the

54 STEIN'S NOTE. There are, admittedly, still differences here. What is perceived non-actually, unlike the unperceived feeling, is after all already perceived, already an object. The feeling, on the other hand, has the advantage that even when it is not perceived, not grasped, it is still in a certain way conscious: one is "inwardly aware" of it. This special mode of existence of feelings has been sharply analyzed by Geiger in "Bewußtsein von Gefühlen," pp. 152 ff.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Moritz Geiger, "Das Bewußtsein von Gefühlen" ("The Consciousness of Feelings," 1911).

55 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 137 ff.

56 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 144 ff.

fact that these are already felt as disvaluable in the mode of non-actuality, and so are never allowed to become actual. But they do not thereby cease to exist and to have effects. It is on this contrast between actuality and non-actuality, too, that the possibility rests of past and future events being felt as valuable or disvaluable when they themselves are no longer or not yet "presented."[57] An actual value-ception is then built on a non-actual memory or expectation. That we would have here a pure value-ception without founding theoretical acts is hardly tenable. There are no such lived experiences contradicting the essence of the experiencing of value. It is also a matter of "background lived experiences" when Scheler says that the same lived experience can be perceived more or less exactly.[58] A suffering that "vanishes entirely from our view or is present only as a quite general pressure" while we laugh and joke is a non-actual experiencing that persists in the background while the I lives in other actualities. Only by virtue of the contexts of perception into which it enters can one say of a lived experience that it "presents itself" in different ways. A lived experience grasped in reflection has—however figuratively one speaks—no 'sides.' Finally, the contrast we have shown also lets us understand why Scheler distinguishes between "peripheral" lived experiences, which replace one another in succession, and "central" ones, which are given as a unity and in which the unity of the I reveals itself. Succession, in the sense of one actual lived experience replacing another, we find in every layer. But there are lived experiences that vanish as soon as they have died away (a sensual pain, a sensual pleasure, an act of perception), and others that persist in the mode of non-actuality. These latter form the unities by virtue of which we can also look back perceptually into the past (a love, a hatred, a friendship), and they constitute those complex formations that can come to givenness for us in one act of intuition: my childhood, my student years, and so

57 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, pp. 130 ff.
58 STEIN'S NOTE. Idole, p. 75.

on.[59] The difference between reflection, in which actual experiencing is given to us absolutely, and inner perception in general —together with the complex unities built up from it and the individual I that announces itself in them—should now have been shown.[60] We can already see the kinship between inner perception and empathy: just as one's own individual announces itself in one's own perceived lived experiences, so the foreign individual announces itself in the empathized ones. But we also see the difference: in the one case the constituting lived experiences are given primordially, in the other non-primordially. If I live a feeling as another's, I have it given, on the one hand, primordially, as now my own, and, on the other, non-primordially—empathically, as originally foreign. And it is precisely the non-primordiality of empathized lived experiences that leads me to reject the common title "inner perception" for the grasping of one's own and of foreign experiencing.[61] If one wants to stress what the two have in common, one had better say "inner intuition." Under this heading would then also fall the non-primordial givenness of one's own lived experiences: memory, expectation, phantasy. But I have yet another reason to protest against including empathy in inner perception. The parallel between the two really holds only for the level of empathy at which I have the foreign experiencing over against me. The level at which I am with the foreign I and explicate its experiencing by living it after it appears rather as a parallel to primordial

59 STEIN'S NOTE. Bergson too is probably taking his bearings from this persistence of lived experiences when he says that the past is preserved, that everything we have lived through endures into the present, even if only part of it is conscious at any given time. (Évolution créatrice [Creative Evolution], p. 5.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Henri Bergson (1859–1941), French philosopher; *L'Évolution créatrice* appeared in 1907.

60 STEIN'S NOTE. The stages of simple noticing, qualitative noticing and analyzing observation that Geiger establishes in the work cited apply only to inner perception, not to reflection.

61 STEIN'S NOTE. Scheler himself stresses that the foreign lived experiences we grasp have the character of presentification (Sympathiegefühle, p. 5), but he does not pursue the point and does not return to it at the decisive place (in the appendix).

experiencing itself than to the givenness of that experiencing in inner perception.

§ 7. MÜNSTERBERG'S THEORY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF FOREIGN CONSCIOUSNESS

Münsterberg's restriction of empathy to acts of will is rejected; the individual must be studied first.

2.7.1 It seems to me even harder with *Münsterberg* than with Scheler to extract the phenomenal content of his theory of foreign consciousness. Our experience of foreign subjects is supposed to consist in the understanding of foreign acts of will. His characterization of these acts of understanding, in which the "foreign willing enters into mine" and yet remains the other's, agrees with our analysis. But it is not clear why it should be restricted to acts of will, for, as we saw, it holds for every kind of act of empathy. Now Münsterberg takes "acts of will" in an extended sense: he includes under them all "position-takings," because of the "demand" that clings to them for whoever grasps them. But even extended in this way, we cannot accept his thesis.[62] An empathized mood is experience of foreign consciousness in the same sense as an empathized position-taking, and, like it, includes a grasping of the foreign subject. What distinguishes position-takings is that the demand inherent in them contains an opposition between the one subject and the other, which is missing in other cases. Münsterberg believes that here he has an immediate awareness of foreign subjects that precedes the constitution of individuals. To find access to these lines of thought, we must first have traced the constitution of the individual. And that is to be our next task.

62 Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916), German psychologist and philosopher of values who taught at Harvard from 1892.

III. The Constitution of the Psychophysical Individual (§§ 1–4)

Die Konstitution des psychophysischen Individuums
The pure I, the stream of consciousness, the soul; I and living body: the givenness of the body, the body and feelings, psychophysical causality, expression, will.

3.0.1 What we have accomplished so far was a description of the essence of acts of empathy, and a critique of the historical theories of foreign consciousness as far as that description made such a critique possible. The far larger task still lies ahead of us: the treatment of empathy as a problem of constitution. That is, we must answer the question of how the objectivities that the traditional theories of empathy speak of—psychophysical individual, personality and the like—are built up in consciousness. We cannot hope, within the framework of a short study, to reach even an approximately complete solution to this question. The purpose of this work would be fulfilled if we succeeded in showing which paths must be taken to reach that goal. We would also have to show that previous investigations of empathy could lead to no satisfactory result because—apart from a few attempts—they bypassed those fundamental questions. In Lipps, who has after all done by far the most for our problem, this comes out quite clearly. He is as if spellbound by the phenomenon of the expression of lived experiences, and he keeps returning to it, wherever he may start from. The wealth of questions that come before the treatment of this problem—the whole investigation of the bearer of these phenomena of expression—he dismisses in a few words. By virtue of an "inexplicable arrangement of our

spirit," or of a "natural instinct," we think of a conscious life as bound to certain physical bodies. That amounts to nothing other than proclaiming a miracle, declaring the bankruptcy of scientific inquiry. And if no science may do that, philosophy least of all may do it, for unlike all the others it has no further domain onto which it could shift unsolved questions. Here the task is to give a final account and to gain final clarity. But once we have achieved what we set up earlier as a requirement—the constitution of transcendent objects in what is immanently given, pure consciousness—then we have final clarity, and no question remains open. That is the goal of phenomenology. Let us now approach the constitution of the individual. The first thing is to become clear about what is to be understood by it.

§ 1. THE PURE I

The pure I has no qualities; its selfhood stands out only against another I.

3.1.1 So far we have always spoken of the pure I as the subject of experiencing, otherwise indescribable and without qualities. In various authors—in Lipps, for example—we have found the view that this I is not an "individual" one, and only becomes one in contrast to the "you" and the 'he.' What does this individuality mean? At first, only that it is "itself" and no other. This "selfhood" is lived, and is the foundation of everything that is 'mine.' Of course, it comes to stand out against an other only when an other is given. At first this other is not qualitatively distinct from it—since both are without qualities—but distinct only in that it is precisely an "other." And this otherness makes itself known in the manner of givenness. It shows itself to be other than I by being given to me otherwise than "I" am: that is why it is "you." But it experiences itself as I experience myself, and that is why the "you" is an "other I." *So* the I *undergoes* no individualization by having another confront it. Rather, its individuality—or, as we prefer to say (because we must save the term 'individuality'

for something else), its selfhood—comes to stand out against the otherness of the other.

§ 2. THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The I as the unity of a stream of consciousness gives a second sense of individuality.

3.2.1 We can take the I in a second sense, as the unity of a stream of consciousness. We started from the I as the subject of an actual lived experience. But when we reflect on this lived experience, we find it not as an isolated one but against the background of a stream of such lived experiences, given with greater or lesser clarity and distinctness. The I of this lived experience has not always been in it; it has wandered over into it, or been drawn into it, from another one, and so on. Running back through these lived experiences, I come step by step, again and again, to a lived experience in which this now-living I once lived. This holds even when I can no longer grasp that lived experience directly, but must bring it into view through remembering presentification. It is precisely this bond of all the lived experiences of the stream to the presently living pure I that makes up the unity of this stream, a unity that can nowhere be breached. Now "other" streams of consciousness confront the 'same' stream of consciousness: those of the "you" and the "he" confront that of the "I." Their selfhood and otherness are grounded in those of the subject to which they belong. But they are not only "other" but also "different," since each has its own peculiar content of lived experience. Every single lived experience of a stream is specially characterized by its position in the whole nexus of lived experience. It is therefore marked as the lived experience of this I and no other, not only by its belonging to the I but also qualitatively. By virtue of their content of lived experience, then, streams of consciousness are qualitatively distinct. Yet even with this qualitative particularization we have not reached what is commonly understood by an individual I or an individual. The stream of consciousness, characterized as

'itself and no other' and as having a peculiar make-up, yields a quite definitely delimited and good sense of individuality. Qualitative peculiarity without selfhood would not suffice for individualization. For one can also arrive at a qualitative difference in the stream of consciousness by imagining the one given stream modified—just as it does in fact constantly change qualitatively as experiencing goes on. Its bond to the same I does not cease because of this; it becomes another stream only by belonging to another I. Selfhood and qualitative difference together—individuality in the second sense, then—constitute a further stage in the progress toward the 'individual I' of ordinary speech: that is, a psychophysical unity of a peculiar structure.

§ 3. THE SOUL

The soul is a substantial unity that makes itself known in lived experiences.

3.3.1 To begin with, leaving aside the living body and psychophysical relations, we can consider the individual unity of the psyche as such. Our unitary, self-contained stream of consciousness is not our soul. Rather—as we already found when considering inner perception—something underlying our lived experiences is given to us in them, and makes itself and its persisting properties known in them as their identical "bearer": this is the substantial soul. We have also already come to know individual properties of the soul of this kind: the sharpness of our senses, which makes itself known in our outer perceptions, and the energy that makes itself known in our acting. The tension or slackness of our acts of will makes known the liveliness and strength, or the weakness, of our will; its perseverance shows itself in their lasting. In the intensity of our feelings our passionateness betrays itself; in the ease with which they arise, the excitability of our heart; and so on. There is no need to pursue these relations further. We recognize the soul as a substantial unity which—quite analogously to the physical thing—is built up

from categorial elements. The series of categories of which its elements appear as individual particularizations runs parallel to the series of categories of lived experience. Among these categorial elements there are also some that point beyond the isolated soul to connections with other psychic and physical unities, to effects that it exerts and undergoes. Among the psychic categories, too, we find "causality" and "changeability." This substantial unity is "my" soul if the lived experiences in which it makes itself known are "my" lived experiences, acts in which my pure I lives. The peculiar structure of the unity of the soul depends on the peculiar content of the stream of lived experience. And conversely—as we must say once the soul has been constituted for us—the content of the stream of lived experience depends on the structure of the soul. If there were streams of consciousness identical in content[1], there would also be souls of the same kind, or particularizations of the ideally same soul. However, we do not have the full phenomenon of the psychic (and of the individual soul) if we consider it in isolation.

§ 4. I AND LIVING BODY

Stein takes the step from the psychic to the psychophysical and asks what the living body is.

3.4.1 To reach greater clarity here, we must take a step that we have put off until the course of the investigation demanded it: the step from the psychic to the psychophysical. The separation we have made was artificial, for a soul is necessarily always a soul in a living body. What is the living body? How, and as what, is it given to us?

A) THE GIVENNESS OF THE LIVING BODY

The living body is given through sensation, always "here," at the zero point of orientation.

3.4.2 Once again we start from the sphere that forms the basis of all our investigations: pure consciousness. How is my living

body constituted for me in consciousness? For one thing, I have my physical body given in acts of outer perception. But suppose for a moment that we had it given only in this way: then a most peculiar object is built up for us. It is a real thing, a physical body, whose motivated series of appearances show strange gaps. It withholds its back from me even more stubbornly than the moon does. It teases me by inviting me to look at it from ever new sides, and as soon as I try to accept the invitation, it hides those sides from me. True, what escapes the eye is within reach of the touching hand; but precisely this relation of seeing and touching is different here from what it is with all other things. Every other thing I see says to me: touch me, I really am what I claim to be, I can be grasped, I am no phantom. And every thing I touch calls out to me: open your eyes, and you will see me. Touch and sight (understood in the sense in which one can speak of senses in the pure sphere) call on each other as witnesses, but they do not shift the responsibility onto each other. Over against this unique imperfection of the externally perceived physical body stands another peculiarity. I can approach every other thing and move away from it; I can turn toward it and away from it, whereupon it vanishes from my sight. This approaching and moving away, the movement of my physical body and of the other things, is documented in a change in the series of appearances of those things. As long as we hold on to our fiction—that our physical body is constituted only in outer perception and not in its own peculiar way as a living body—there is no telling how we could come to distinguish the two cases (the movement of other things and the movement of my physical body), or indeed to grasp the movement of our own physical body at all. So, speaking more precisely, we must say this. Every other object is given to me in an infinitely variable manifold of appearances and of changing positions relative to me, and there are also cases in which it is not given to me at all. But this one object is given to me in series of appearances that can vary only within very narrow limits. It is there all the time,

1 STEIN'S NOTE. It can, admittedly, be shown that this is excluded in principle.

with unflagging obtrusiveness, as long as I have my eyes open at all, and always within the same close reach, as no other object is: it is always "here," while all other objects are always "there." Here, however, we have already reached the limit of our fiction and find ourselves compelled to drop it. For even if we shut our eyes tight and stretch our hands far away from us, indeed let no limb touch another, so that we can neither grasp nor see the living body—even then we do not get rid of it. Even then it stands there, inescapably, fully "in person" (in German *Leibhaftigkeit*: hence the name), and we find ourselves inseparably bound to it. Precisely this boundness, this belonging to me, could never be constituted in outer perception. A living body perceived only externally would only ever be a physical body of a special kind, even a unique one, but never "my living body." Let us now see how this new givenness comes about. Among the really inherent components of consciousness, that domain of being which cannot be struck out, we find sensations, as a particularization of the highest category, 'lived experience.'[2] The sensation of pressure, of pain or of cold is something just as absolutely given as the lived experience of judging, willing, perceiving and so on. Yet sensation has a peculiar character as against all these acts. It does not issue from the pure I as they do, and never takes the form of the "cogito," in which the I directs itself toward an object; so I can never find the I in it by reflecting on it. Instead, it is always "somewhere," spatially localized, at a distance from the I—perhaps very close to it, but never in it. And this "where" is not an empty place in space but a space-filling something. All these somethings at which my sensations occur join together into a unity, the unity of my living body; they are themselves places on the living body. Within this unitary givenness, through which the living body is there for me as a whole at all times, differences show themselves. The various parts of the living body that are constituted for me through sensation are at

2 *Leibhaftigkeit*, Husserl's term for givenness "in person," is formed from *Leib*, "living body"; Stein suggests the word owes its name to this inescapable presence of the body.

different distances from me. Thus my trunk is closer to me than my limbs, and I can say with good sense that I bring my hands closer or move them away. When I speak of distance from "me," that is an imprecise way of putting it. I cannot really establish a distance from the 'I,' which is after all non-spatial and cannot be localized. Rather, I relate the parts of my living body, and beyond them everything spatial outside it, to a "zero point of orientation" which my living body surrounds. This zero point cannot be localized with geometrical exactness at a place in my physical body. Moreover, it is not the same for all data: for visual data it lies in the head, for tactile data in the central body. As for the I, it has no distance from the zero point, and everything given as distant from the zero point is given as distant from the I as well. This distance of the parts of the body from me is, however, fundamentally different from the distance of other things from one another and from me. Two things in space have a definite distance from each other; they can approach each other and finally touch, and then the distance disappears. They may even fill the same part of space—if they are not material, impenetrable things but, for example, the objects of different people's visual hallucinations. A thing can likewise approach me, its distance from me can decrease, and finally it can touch—not me, but my physical body. Then its distance from my physical body, but not from me, has become = 0. Nor has it become just as great as the distance of the touched part of the body from the zero point. I could by no means say that the stone I hold in my hand is as far from the zero point as the hand itself, or "only a tiny little bit farther." The distance of the parts of my living body from me is utterly incommensurable with the distance of foreign physical bodies from me. The living body as a whole is at the zero point of orientation; all physical bodies are outside it. "Bodily space" and "external space" are completely different from each other. Perceiving only externally, I would never arrive at the first; with "bodily perception" alone, I would never arrive at the second. But my living body is constituted in two ways—as sensing (bodily perceived) living body and as externally perceived physical

body of the outer world—and in this double givenness it is experienced as the same. Because of this, it gets a place in external space and fills a part of that space. A few more things must be said about the relation of sensation and "bodily perception." The analysis of sensations usually comes up in another context. Sensations are usually regarded as what "gives" us the outer world. In this sense one separates "sensation" and "what is sensed," or "content of sensation" and "sensation as function" (in Stumpf's sense)—for example, the red that is seen and the having of this red.[3] I cannot go along with this. The red of the object is "perceived," and I must distinguish between perception and what is perceived.[4] In analyzing perceptions I am led to "sense data," and I may come to regard the perception of qualities as the "objectification of sense data." But this does not turn qualities into sensations or sensations into qualities—nor, for that matter, into giving acts. As components of outer perception, sensations are elements that cannot be analyzed further. If we now consider sensation from its side turned toward the living body, we find an entirely analogous phenomenological state of affairs. I can no more speak of a "sensed" living body than of a "sensed" object of the outer world; here too an objectifying apprehension is needed. When my fingertip touches the table, I have to distinguish three things. First, the sensation of touch, the tactile datum, which cannot be broken down further. Second, the hardness of the table and the correlative act of outer perception. Third, the touching fingertip and the correlative act of "bodily perception." What makes the connection between sensation and bodily perception especially intimate is the fact that the living body is given as sensing, and the sensations as on

3 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Österreich, "Phänomenologie des Ich," p. 122 f., against Husserl, Logical Investigations II, p. 359 ff.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Traugott Konstantin Oesterreich (1880–1949), German psychologist and philosopher, author of *Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen* (1910).

4 Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), German psychologist and philosopher, Husserl's teacher; the distinction comes from his *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen* (Appearances and Psychic Functions, 1907).

the living body. It would exceed the scope of this work to examine every kind of sensation for its significance for bodily perception. But there is one point we must still raise. We said that the "externally perceived" and the "bodily perceived" living body are given as the same. This needs closer elucidation. I not only see my hand and perceive the same hand bodily as sensing; I also "see" the fields of sensation of the hand that have been constituted for me in bodily perception. And conversely, when I attentively single out parts of my living body, I at the same time have an "image" of the part of the body in question. Each is co-given with the other, though not perceived. We have an exact analogue in the domain of outer perception. We do not just see the table and touch its hardness; we also "see" its hardness. The garments in van Dyck's paintings are not only *silky in their sheen* but also silky *smooth* and silky soft. Psychologists call this phenomenon *fusion*, and mostly trace it back to "mere association."[5] That "mere" betrays the psychologistic tendency to regard explaining as explaining away, and to present the explained phenomenon as a "subjective construct" without "objective significance." We cannot adopt this view. A phenomenon remains a phenomenon. It is very nice if one can also explain it, but the explanation adds nothing to it and takes nothing away. The visibility of tactile qualities would therefore remain, and lose nothing of its dignity, if it could be explained by associations. We do not, however, think such an explanation possible, because it contradicts the "phenomenon" of association. The typical, lived form of association is "something reminds me of something." Thus, for example, the sight of the edge of the table is associated with the memory that I once bumped into it. But the sharpness of this edge is not remembered; it is seen. To give an even more instructive example: I *see* the hardness of the sugar, and know or remember that it is sweet. I do not remember that it is hard (or only incidentally), and I do not see that it is sweet. The scent of a flower, on the other hand, really is sweet, and does not remind

5 Anthony van Dyck (1599–1641), Flemish painter celebrated for his rendering of silk and satin in portraits.

me of a sweet taste. Here perspectives open up for a phenomenology of the senses and of sense perceptions, which, however, we cannot pursue here. At this point we are interested only in the application to our case. The seen living body does not remind us that it can be the scene of manifold sensations. Nor is it merely a physical body occupying the same space as the living body given in bodily perception as sensing. Rather, it is given as a sensing living body. So far we have considered the living body only at rest. Now we can go a step further. Let us examine the case in which I move myself (that is, my living body as a whole) through space. As long as we disregarded the constitution of the living body, this was not a phenomenon with a character of its own; it was indistinguishable from a kaleidoscopic shifting of the surrounding outer world. Now something entirely new is added: the lived experience of "I move," the apperception of one's own movement, built up on manifold sensations, which is something completely different from the externally perceived movement of a physical body. The grasping of one's own movement and the grasping of the change in the outer world are now joined in the form of "if ... then": "If I move, then the picture of my surroundings shifts." This holds for the perception of a single spatial thing as much as for the nexus of the spatial world, and for the movement of parts of the living body as much as for that of the whole living body. When my hand rests on a rotating ball, this ball and its movement are given to me in a series of changing tactile data. These combine in *one* continuous intention and can be gathered up in an "apperceptive grasp," a unitary act of outer perception. I have the same sequence of data when my hand glides over the ball at rest; but now the lived experience of 'I move' is added as something new, and it enters, together with the apperception of the ball, into that form of "if ... then." The case is analogous with visual data. Being at rest myself, I can perceive the changing appearances of a rolling ball. And I can have the same sequence of "adumbrations of the ball" when the ball is at rest and I move my head, or even just my eyes (which in turn comes to givenness for me in a "bodily

perception"). In this way the parts of the living body are constituted as movable organs, and the perception of the spatial world as dependent on the behavior of these organs. But this does not yet explain how movement of the living body comes to be apprehended as movement of a physical body. When I move a limb of my living body, I have, besides the bodily awareness of my own movement, an outer (visual or tactile) perception of the movements of the physical body, documented in the changed appearances of the limb. And just as the bodily perceived limb and the externally perceived limb are apprehended as the same, so an identifying coincidence also occurs between the bodily movement and the movement of the physical body: the living body that moves itself becomes a moved physical body. Further, the "I move" is "co-seen" in the movement of a part of the body, and the unseen movement of the physical body is co-grasped in the lived experience of "I move."

LEAVING THE BODY IN PHANTASY

In phantasy I can leave my body behind, but a living body without an I is impossible.

3.4.3 The bond of the I to the sensing living body still needs some clarification. The impossibility of getting rid of it showed us the way to its special givenness. This bond cannot be shaken; the ties that attach us to the living body are indissoluble. Nevertheless, certain freedoms are allowed us. All objects of the outer world are given to me at a certain distance. They are always 'there' and I am always "here"; they are grouped around me, around my 'here.' This grouping is not rigid and unchangeable. The objects approach me and move away from me and from one another, and I myself have it in my power to rearrange them, by moving things nearer or farther, or by letting them change places—or else by changing my 'here' instead of their "there," choosing another "standpoint." With every step forward a new little piece of the world opens up to me, or the old one shows itself to me from a new side. In all this I always take my living

body with me. Not only I but it too is always "here," and the various "distances" of its parts from me are only variations within this here. Now, however, I can also carry out the "rearrangement" of my surroundings 'merely in thought' instead of in reality: I can phantasize. For example, in phantasy I can let the pieces of furniture in my room wander about and "imagine" how it would look then. Just as well, I can set out in phantasy on my own wanderings through the world. I can "in thought" get up from my desk, go into a corner of the room and look at it from there. And when I do this, I do not take my living body with me. The I that stands there in the corner perhaps has a phantasy body, that is, one seen—if I may put it this way—in "bodily phantasy." It can, besides, look at the body as physical body at the desk, which it has left, just as it looks at the other things in the room; this, admittedly, is also a presentified object, that is, one given in presentifying outer intuition. And finally, the real living body has not vanished either: I am in fact still sitting at the desk, unseparated from my living body. So my I has doubled.[6] And even if the real I does not get free of the living body, the possibility of "getting out of one's own skin," at least in phantasy, has been demonstrated. An I without a living body is possible.[7] A living body without an I, on the other hand, is utterly impossible. To phantasize my living body abandoned by the I is no longer to phantasize my living body, but a physical body resembling it feature for feature: my corpse. (When I leave my living body, it becomes for me a physical body like others. And if I think of it as moved away from me—instead of my leaving it—this moving away is not a "moving oneself" but a pure

6 STEIN'S NOTE. I believe that the experience of the "double" is to be understood from here: for example, in Heine's well-known poem in which the poet walks down the street to his beloved's house and sees himself standing in front of it. It is the twofold way of having had oneself given in memory or in phantasy. To what extent there is in both cases actually a having of "oneself" will be discussed later. Cf. Part II of this work, p. 9, and below, p. 71.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Heinrich Heine's untitled poem "Still ist die Nacht" from *Die Heimkehr* (1823–24), known as "Der Doppelgänger" in Schubert's setting.

7 STEIN'S NOTE. It would of course have to be investigated what kind of I that could be, and whether a world could be given to it, and what kind of world.

movement of a physical body.) This can be shown in yet another way. A "dead" limb, a limb without sensations, is not part of my living body. A foot that has "gone to sleep" hangs on me like a foreign body that I cannot shake off. It lies outside the spatial zone of my living body, into which it is taken back at the moment of "waking up." Every movement I make with it in that state has the character of "I move an object": that is, through my living movement I bring about a mechanical one, and the foot's movement is not itself given as a living bodily movement. The living body is essentially constituted by sensations, and sensations are really inherent components of consciousness and as such belong to the I. How, then, could there be a living body that was not the living body of an I?[8] Another question is whether a sensing I without a living body would be conceivable, that is, whether there could be sensations in which no living body was constituted. This question does not seem to me easy to answer, since—as I have already indicated—the sensations of the different sensory domains are not involved in the same way in building up the living body. One would therefore have to examine, first, whether in the case of sensations that are clearly experienced at places on the living body—sensations of touch, temperature and pain—this localization belongs to them necessarily and inseparably. In that case they would be possible only for a bodily I. For visual and auditory sensations and so on, a special analysis then seems to me to be required. We need not decide these questions here. A phenomenology of outer perception will not be able to avoid them. In any case, with sensations the unity of I and living body has already been constituted for us, even if not yet the full extent of their mutual relations. The causal relation of the psychic and the physical, too, already meets us in the domain of sensations. Purely physical processes—a foreign body penetrating my skin, the bearer of a certain quantity of heat

8 STEIN'S NOTE. One would, admittedly, still have to consider whether a consciousness that exhibited only sense data and no I-acts of any kind would have to be regarded as I-less. In that case one could also speak of an "ensouled" but I-less living body. But I do not believe that such a view could be maintained.

touching the surface of my body—become the phenomenal cause of sensations (sensations of pain or of temperature) and prove to be "stimuli." We shall meet such phenomenal causal relations often as we now follow the connections between soul and living body further.

B) THE LIVING BODY AND THE FEELINGS

Sensual feelings and general feelings are felt both in the body and in the I.

3.4.4 Feeling-sensations, or sensual feelings, cannot be separated from the sensations that found them. The pleasantness of a tasty dish, the torment of a sensual pain, the comfort of a soft garment are felt where the food is tasted, where the pain bores, where the garment clings to the surface of the body. But sensual feelings are not only there; they are at the same time in me, they issue from my I. The general feelings occupy a hybrid position similar to that of the sensual feelings. Freshness and listlessness do not only fill the I; I also "feel them in every limb." When 'I' feel listless, it is not only every spiritual act—every joy, every sorrow, every activity of thinking—that is listless and colorless, but also every bodily action, every movement I carry out.[9] Along with me, my living body is listless, and every part of it. Here again that phenomenon of fusion appears which we have already come to know. I do not merely see the movement of my hand and at the same time feel its listlessness; I see the listless movement and the listlessness of the hand. The general feelings are always experienced as coming from the living body, as a furthering or paralyzing influence that the state of the living body exerts on the course of experiencing (even when these general feelings arise in connection with a "spiritual feeling"). "General feelings" that are not of a bodily nature are moods, and for that very reason we separate them off as a genus of their own from the general feelings proper. Cheerfulness and gloom do not fill

9 "General feeling" (*Gemeingefühl*) is the older psychological term for diffuse feelings of the whole body, such as freshness or fatigue.

the living body. It is not cheerful or gloomy in the way it is fresh or listless, and even a purely spiritual being could be subject to moods. This is not yet to say, however, that the general feelings of the soul and those of the body run alongside each other without touching. Rather, I feel a mutual "influence" between them. For example, I take a trip to recover, arrive in a sunny, lovely landscape, and feel how, faced with these surroundings, a cheerful mood wants to take hold of me but cannot arise, because I feel listless and worn out. "Here I shall be cheerful as soon as I have rested." This knowledge may be a result of "earlier experience"; but it always has its foundation in the phenomenon of lived experiences of the soul and of the body working against each other.

C) SOUL AND LIVING BODY; PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSALITY

Feelings act causally on the body, yet joy and grief are conceivable without one.

3.4.5 This dependence of lived experiences on influences of the living body is an essential characteristic of what belongs to the soul. Everything psychic is consciousness bound to a living body. Within this domain, the essentially psychic lived experiences (the body-bound sensations and so on) are distinguished from those that bear the psychic character only non-essentially: the "realizations" of spiritual life.[10] The soul, as the substantial unity that makes itself known in the individual psychic lived experiences, is founded on the living body and forms with it the "psychophysical individual"—as the phenomenon of "psychophysical causality" described above, and the essence of sensations, show. We now have to consider the character of the so-called "spiritual feelings." The very name tells us that they are regarded as non-essentially psychic, as not bound to the living body (even if the psychologists in question may not be willing to own this consequence). And no one who brings their pure

10 STEIN'S NOTE. The discussions in the following part will bring greater clarity on this point.

essence to givenness will claim that a subject without a living body could not experience joy, grief or aesthetic valuing. Against this stands the view of many eminent psychologists, who see feelings as "complexes of organic sensations." Absurd as this definition appears as long as one considers feelings in their pure essence, in the concrete psychic nexus we find phenomena which, while they do not justify it, can still make it intelligible. With joy our "heart stands still," it "contracts" with pain, it pounds with anxious expectation, and our breath catches. The examples can be multiplied at will. But everywhere we are dealing with cases of psychophysical causality, with effects that the lived experience, in its psychic realization, exerts on the functions of the living body. The moment one thinks the living body away, these phenomena vanish, but the spiritual act remains. One will have to grant that God rejoices over the repentance of a sinner without feeling palpitations or other "organic sensations." (This is a consideration one can make independently of belief in the existence of God.) One may be convinced that no feeling is possible in reality without such sensations, and that no being exists that experiences feelings in their purity. Nonetheless, feelings can be grasped in their purity, and those accompanying phenomena are experienced precisely as such—neither as feelings nor as components of feelings. The same can be shown for cases of purely psychic causality. With fright "my mind stands still," that is,[11] I feel a paralyzing effect on my acts of thinking. Or I am "confused" with joy, do not know what I am doing, and perform pointless actions. A pure spirit can also be frightened, but its mind does not stand still. It feels joy and sorrow in all their depth, but they have no effect. I can carry these considerations further. "Observing" myself, I also discover causal relations between my lived experiences and the capacities and properties of the soul that make themselves known in them. Capacities can be developed and sharpened by being exercised, but they can also be used up and blunted. Thus my

11 An allusion to Luke 15:7 and 15:10, on the joy in heaven over one sinner who repents.

"gift for observation" grows when I do work in natural science; my "power of discrimination," for example for colors, grows when I occupy myself with sorting threads of finely graded shades of color; my "capacity for enjoyment" grows when I gear my life to enjoyment. Every capacity can be increased by "training." On the other hand, there is a certain degree of "habituation" at which this turns into the opposite effect. An "object of enjoyment" that is set before me again and again becomes "too much" for me, and finally arouses surfeit, disgust and the like. In all these cases there is, phenomenally, an action of the psychic on the psychic. But the question is what kind of "action" this is, and whether it is at all possible to get from this phenomenon of causality to the exact natural-scientific concept of causality and to universal causal lawfulness. Exact natural science is built on this concept, whereas descriptive natural science deals only with the phenomenal concept of causality. But the exact concept of causality and complete causal determination are also the presupposition of an exact causal-genetic psychology, of the kind being striven for on the model of the modern science of physical nature. In our context we must be content to point to these problems without being able to undertake their solution[12].

D) THE PHENOMENON OF EXPRESSION

Expression issues from feeling through a connection of meaning, not of cause.

3.4.6 Considering the causal effects of feelings has taken us further than we foresaw. Still, we have not yet exhausted what the study of feelings teaches us. Alongside the accompanying phenomena of feelings that have occupied us, a new phenomenon appears: the expression of feelings. I blush with shame, I clench my fist in anger, I frown in annoyance, I groan with pain, I shout for joy. The relation of feeling and expression is entirely different from that of feeling and physical accompanying phe-

12 STEIN'S NOTE. For more on causality see below, p. 80.

nomenon. Here I do not notice physical lived experiences issuing causally from psychic ones, still less a mere simultaneity of the two. Rather, as I live through the feeling, I feel how it ends in an expression, or releases an expression from itself.[13] Feeling, in its pure essence, is something not closed in on itself; it is, as it were, charged with an energy that must be discharged. This discharge is possible in various ways. One kind of discharge is familiar to us: feelings release from themselves—or, as one says, motivate—acts of will and actions. Exactly the same relation holds between feeling and expressive appearance. The same feeling that motivates an act of will can also motivate an expressive appearance. And the feeling prescribes, according to its sense, which expression and which act of will it can motivate[14]. By its essence it must always motivate something; it must always come to "expression"—only, various forms of expression are possible. The objection readily suggests itself here that in life feelings very often arise without motivating an act of will or a bodily expression. We "civilized people," as is well known, must "control ourselves" and hold back the bodily expression of

13 STEIN'S NOTE. To prevent misunderstandings, I stress that I take "expression" in the sense used above and verbal expression to be fundamentally different things. I cannot show the difference at this point, but I want to draw attention to it from the outset, in order to make the equivocation harmless.

14 STEIN'S NOTE. We need not go into the question here whether expressive movements are to be understood as actions (originally purposive ones, as Darwin thinks, or unintended and purposeless ones, as Klages attempts to show) (Die Ausdrucksbewegung und ihre diagnostische Verwertung, p. 293). Klages, at any rate, also stresses the close connection between expressive appearance and action. According to him, all naive doing and making issues from experiencing just as easily and involuntarily as expressive movement does, and this instinctive form of acting is for him the original one, displaced only gradually by voluntary action (p. 336). In his famous treatise "On the Expression of the Emotions," Darwin gives a description, based on fine observation, of the bodily phenomena that correspond to certain affects, and tries to bring out the psychophysical mechanism by which these bodily processes come about. He takes no account of the descriptive difference between expression and accompanying phenomenon, nor does he seriously ask himself what makes those processes expressions of the affects that produce them.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Ludwig Klages (1872–1956), German psychologist and philosopher of expression; Darwin's work is *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872).

our feelings; likewise, we are restricted in our actions and thus at the same time in our acts of will. Now, admittedly, there is still the escape of "venting" oneself in a wish. The employee may neither show his superior by contemptuous looks that he takes him for a scoundrel or a fool, nor resolve to get rid of him; but he can still secretly wish that the devil would take him. Or one can carry out in phantasy the actions one is prevented from carrying out in reality. Someone born into narrow circumstances has an urge to act that cannot be fulfilled in reality; it lives itself out as he wins battles in imagination and performs wonders of bravery. Creating the other world, in which I can do what is denied me here, is itself a form of expression. Thus the man dying of thirst in the desert—as Gebsattel reports[15]—sees before him oases with gushing springs, or lakes, that refresh him. The joy that fills us does not stay in contemplative devotion to the object that gladdens us. It expresses itself, among other ways, in our surrounding ourselves entirely with what gladdens: seeking it out in our real surroundings, or summoning it up through remembering or freely phantasizing presentification, and disregarding everything else that does not fit, until our state of feeling harmonizes perfectly with our surroundings. This peculiar kind of expression would need thorough clarification. It is not enough to establish—as psychologists mostly do—that feelings influence the 'reproduction of ideas,' and how often this happens. But there is yet another possibility of expression, or rather[16] a surrogate for one, and it is to this that the "controlled" person withdraws, the one who for social, aesthetic or ethical reasons wears an unmoved countenance. The feeling can release from itself an act of reflection that makes the feeling itself its object. In this act of reflection the lived experience "ends," just as it does in an act of will or a bodily expression. People commonly say that reflection weakens feeling, and that

15 STEIN'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. [illegible].

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The page reference is garbled in the source text.

16 Viktor Emil von Gebsattel (1883–1976), German psychiatrist and phenomenologically minded psychologist.

the reflective person is incapable of intense feelings. This conclusion is entirely unjustified. In "passionate" expression the feeling "ends" just as it does in "cool" reflection; the kind of expression says nothing about the intensity of the feeling expressed. The result of our consideration so far is this: feeling, by its essence, demands an expression, and the various kinds of expression are various essential possibilities.[17] Between feeling and expression there is a connection of essence and meaning, not a causal connection. And like the other possible forms, bodily expression too is experienced as proceeding from the feeling and as determined by it in its sense. Now I not only feel how the feeling flows into the expression and "discharges" itself in it; I also have this expression given at the same time in a bodily perception. The smile in which my joy, as I live it, utters itself is at the same time given to me as a distortion of my lips. Living in the joy, I experience its expression too in the mode of actuality; the simultaneous bodily perception takes place in the mode of non-actuality—I am, as people say, not conscious of it. If I then turn my attention to the perceived change in my living body, it appears to me as brought about by the feeling. So, alongside the lived unity of meaning, a causal connection between feeling and expression is constituted. Expression makes use of psychophysical causality in order to realize itself in a psychophysical individual. In bodily perception the lived unity of lived experience and expression is taken apart, and the expression is separated off as a relatively independent phenomenon. It thereby also becomes producible on its own. I can bring about a distortion of the mouth that resembles a smile "closely enough to be mistaken for it," and yet is not a smile. Independently of the will, too, the same perceptual phenomena show themselves as different expressive phenomena. I blush with anger, with shame and

17 STEIN'S NOTE. J. Cohn uses the term "expression" in yet another, still wider sense (Ästhetik, p. 56): namely, for everything "outer" in which we perceive an inner life. But this lacks what we take to be specific to expression: its being motivated.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Jonas Cohn (1869–1947), German philosopher; the reference is to his *Allgemeine Ästhetik* (General Aesthetics, 1901).

with exertion; in every case I have the same perception that "the blood is rising to my face." But I experience the same process once as an expression of anger, once as an expression of shame, and once not as an expression at all but as a causal consequence of the exertion. We said that it takes an attentive glance to make the bodily perceived expression into an intentional object in the pregnant sense. The felt expression, too, though experienced in the mode of actuality, still needs a special turning of the glance in order to become a grasped object—a turning of the glance that is not a transition from non-actuality to actuality. This is a peculiarity of all non-theoretical acts and their correlates.[18] That I can objectify the lived expressive phenomena and grasp them as *expression* is a further condition of the possibility of producing them at will. Yet a bodily change that resembles an expression is still not given as the same. Frowning out of annoyance and frowning in order to feign *annoyance* are clearly distinguishable in themselves, even when I pass from bodily perception to outer perception. Inasmuch as expressive phenomena appear as an outflow of feelings, they are at the same time the expression of the properties of the soul that make themselves known in those feelings: the furious glance, for example, betrays a violent temperament. A consideration of the lived experiences of will is to conclude this investigation.

E) WILL AND LIVING BODY

The will masters the body through the psychophysical mechanism, but its creative act is not causal.

3.4.7 Lived experiences of the will are also highly significant for the constitution of the psychophysical unity. First, by virtue of their physical concomitants (sensations of tension and the like), which we shall not examine more closely, since they are already familiar from the feelings. The bodily phenomena of expression that also come into consideration seem to me to be the expression not of the act of will itself but of the emotional components

18 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Husserl's Ideas, p. 66.

contained in the complex lived experience of willing. I sit quietly, weighing two practical possibilities against each other. Now I have made the choice and taken the decision: I throw back my head and jump up briskly. These movements are not an expression of the decision of the will. They express the resulting feeling of resoluteness, of activity, of restlessness that fills me. The will itself has no expression in this sense. But like feeling, the will is not self-contained either; it needs to work itself out. Just as feeling releases from itself, or motivates, the act of will (or another possible "expression" in the wider sense), so the will manifests itself in action. Acting is always the creation of something not yet present. To the "fiat!" [let it be done!] of the decision of the will there correspond the "fieri" [coming to be] of what is willed and the "facere" [making] of the willing subject in the action. This action can be a physical one: I decide to climb a mountain and carry out the decision. The action appears as wholly called forth by the will and as the fulfillment of the willing. But it is the action as a whole that is willed, not every step. What I will is the climbing of the mountain. Whatever is "necessary" for this takes care of itself, as it were, "of its own accord." The will makes use of the psychophysical mechanism in order to fulfill itself, to realize what is willed, just as feeling uses it to realize its expression. At the same time, though, the mastery over the mechanism—at least the "switching on of the machine"—is experienced. In some cases it is experienced step by step, when it is also a matter of overcoming a reluctance. If I grow tired halfway up, the tiredness becomes a source of reluctance against the movement. This reluctance takes hold of my feet, and they refuse to serve my will. Willing and striving work against each other and struggle for mastery over the organism. If the will gains the mastery, then, in some cases, every step is now willed individually, and the bringing about of the movement is experienced in the overcoming of the counteraction. The same thing happens in the purely psychic domain. I decide to take an examination, and then I get through the necessary preparation as if of its own accord. Or else my strength flags

before the goal, and every piece of thinking that is required must now be called into being by an act of will, overcoming a violent counter-striving. Thus the will rules over the soul as it does over the living body, though not absolutely and not without meeting refusals to obey. A limit is set to it by the world of objects that discloses itself in experiencing. Turning toward the object (one that is perceived, felt, or otherwise given as present) lies within the province of willing; grasping an object that is not present does not. That does not mean that the world of objects itself is withdrawn from the province of my will. I can bring about a change in the world of objects, but I cannot bring about its perception by an act of will if it is not itself present. The will suffers a further limitation through the power of counteracting strivings, which are themselves partly bound to the living body (when they have sensual feelings as their source) and partly not. Is this working of willing and striving on soul and living body psychophysical causality? Or do we have here the much-discussed causality from freedom, the breach in the "gapless" causal chain? Action is always the creation of something that is not. This process can unfold in a causal sequence, but the initiation of the process, the will's actual intervention, is experienced not as causal but as an efficacy of its own kind.[19] This is not to say that the will has nothing to do with causality. When we feel how a tiredness born of the living body inhibits the rise of an act of will, we find the will causally conditioned. When we feel how a victorious will overcomes the tiredness and even makes it vanish, we find it causally effective. Since it accomplishes all its works by means of a causally regulated instrument, its fulfillment too is tied to causal conditions. But what is properly creative in the act of will is no causal effect. All those causal relations are inessential to the will: it casts them off as soon as it is no longer the will of a psychophysical individual, and yet it remains will. Striving, too, shows a similar structure, and the emergence of an action from a striving does not appear

19 Allusion to Kant's "causality through freedom" in the Third Antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

as a causal sequence either. The difference is that in striving the I is drawn into the action rather than stepping freely into it, and that no creative force lives itself out in it. Every act that is creative in the proper sense is an action of the will. What willing and striving have in common is the ability to make use of psychophysical causality. Yet only of the willing I can it be said that it is master of the living body.

III. The Constitution of the Psychophysical Individual (§ 5)

Übergang zum fremden Individuum
The transition to the foreign individual: the other's body as sensing body and as center of orientation, empathy as a condition of knowing oneself, the intersubjective world, life, causality and expression, the correction and the illusions of empathy.

§ 5. Übergang zum fremden Individuum.

3.5.1 We have given an account, at least in outline, of what is to be understood by an individual I, or individual. It is a unified object in which the unity of consciousness of an I and a physical body are inseparably joined, each of them taking on a new character: the physical body appears as the living body, consciousness as the soul, of the unified individual. The unity is documented in the fact that certain processes are given as belonging at once to the soul and to the living body (sensations, general feelings). It is documented further in the causal connection of physical and psychic processes, and in the causal relation between the soul and the real external world that this connection mediates. The psychophysical individual as a whole is a member of the nexus of nature. As against the physical body, the living body is characterized by the following: it is the bearer of fields of sensation; it is located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world; it is itself freely movable and built up of movable organs; it is the field of expression for the lived experiences

of the I that belongs to it, and the instrument of that I's will.[1] We have gained all these characteristics from considering our own individual. The task now is to show how the foreign individual is built up for us.

A) THE FIELDS OF SENSATION OF THE FOREIGN LIVING BODY

The other's sensing hand is co-given with the seen body and fulfilled in empathy.

3.5.2 Let us begin by considering what allows the foreign living body to be apprehended as a living body, what distinguishes it from other physical bodies. First, then: how are the fields of sensation given to us? Of our own we have—as we saw—a primordial givenness in the "bodily perception."[2] We also have them "co-given" in the outer perception of our physical body, in that wholly peculiar way in which something not perceived can be there itself together with what is perceived. And it is in this same way that the fields of sensation of the other are there for me, and that the foreign living body is "seen" as a living body. We encountered this kind of givenness, which we shall call "*co-primordiality*," in the perception of things.[3] With the seen side of a spatial thing, the sides turned away and the interior are co-given; in short, the whole thing is "seen." But (as we have also already said) this givenness from one side implies tendencies to proceed onward to new givennesses. As we follow them, the previously averted sides are perceived in the strict sense, and what was co-primordial before is given primordially. Such a fulfill-

1 STEIN'S NOTE. It may seem strange that we have not drawn at all on the concept that usually stands in first place in other definitions of the individual or organism: the concept of purpose. I have not done so in order not to burden the account with a discussion of the concept of purpose as well, but also for substantive reasons. I do not believe that one can speak of an immediately experienced subordination of psychophysical happening to a unified purpose. But in that case the concept of purpose does not come into consideration for the empathic grasping of a foreign individual either.

2 STEIN'S NOTE. See above, pp. 46 ff.

3 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Part II of this work, p. 5.

ment of what is intended or anticipated is also possible in the "co-seeing" of one's own fields of sensation—only not in progressing outer perception but in the transition from outer perception to bodily perception.[4] The co-seeing of foreign fields of sensation implies tendencies too, but here their primordial fulfillment is excluded in principle. Neither in progressing outer perception nor in the transition to bodily perception can I bring them to primordial givenness. The only fulfillment possible here is empathic presentification. I can bring those fields of sensation to givenness otherwise than in the mode of empty representation, of co-primordiality; I can make them intuitive to myself—but precisely not with the character of perception, only by presentifying them, as we described it in our account of acts of empathy. They owe their character of being 'there itself' to the physical body given in person, with which they are given. This becomes clearer still if, instead of the fields of sensation, we consider the actual sensations themselves. The hand resting on the table does not lie there like the book beside it. It "presses" against the table (more or less strongly); it lies there limp or stretched; and I 'see' this sensation of pressure and tension in the mode of co-primordiality. As I pursue the tendencies to fulfillment contained in this "co-apprehension," my hand moves (not really but "as it were") into the place of the foreign hand, into it, takes up its position and posture, and now senses its sensations—not primordially and not as my own, but "along with" it, exactly in the manner of empathy, whose essence we earlier delimited over against one's own experiencing and every other kind of presentification. While I transfer myself into it in this way, the foreign hand is continually perceived as a member of the foreign physical body, and my own is given as a member of my own living body. So the empathized sensations, in continual contrast to my own, stand out as foreign (even if I am not directed to this contrast in the manner of attending to it).

4 Stein's coinage (*Konoriginarität*): the way something not itself perceived is given along with, and is there together with, what is primordially perceived.

B) THE CONDITIONS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SENSUAL EMPATHY

I can empathize only with bodies of my own type; the further from it, the emptier empathy becomes.

3.5.3 The possibility of sensual empathy (to be precise, one would have to say "feeling-in of sensations") is guaranteed by several things: by the apprehension of one's own living body as a physical body and of one's own physical body as a living body, by virtue of the fusion of outer perception and bodily perception;[5] by the possible change of this body's position in space; and finally by the possibility of modifying its real constitution in phantasy while holding fast to its type. If the size (length, breadth, span, etc.) of my hand were given to me as something unalterably fixed, then any attempt to empathize with a hand of different constitution would have to founder on the resistance between the two. In fact, however, empathy with men's and children's hands, which are very different from mine, succeeds quite well.[6] My physical body and its limbs, that is, are not given as a fixed type but as the contingent realization of a type that is variable within fixed limits. On the other hand, this type must be preserved. Only bodies of this type can I empathize with; only they can I apprehend as living bodies. This does not yet give a sharp delimitation. There are types of differing levels of generality, and to them correspond different levels of the possibility of empathy. The type 'human body' does not delimit the range of my objects of empathy—more precisely, of what can be given to me as a living body. It does, however, delimit a range within which a quite definite degree of empathic fulfillment is possible. In the case of empathy with the foreign hand, there is the pos-

5 STEIN'S NOTE. It may perhaps be possible to arrive at a genetic explanation of empathy from the phenomenon of fusion. Only one must go back to one's own experiencing, and not simply speak of a fusion of the foreign exterior with one's own experiencing. Cf. Part II, p. 28.

6 German *Einempfindung*, literally "feeling-in of sensation," coined on the model of *Einfühlung* ("feeling-into").

sibility of a fulfillment that is very extensive, if not "adequate": what I sense non-primordially can coincide feature by feature with the other's primordial sensing. If by comparison I consider, say, a dog's paw, here too I have not a merely physical thing but a sensing member of a living body. Here too a certain transferring of myself into it is still possible—for instance the feeling-in of a pain when the animal is hurt. But other things—certain postures and movements, for instance—are given to us only as empty representations, without the possibility of fulfillment. And the further we move from the type "human being," the smaller the number of possibilities of fulfillment becomes. In apprehending foreign living bodies as belonging to the same type as mine, we find a good sense for talk of the "analogizing" involved in grasping another. This analogizing, to be sure, has little to do with "inferences by analogy." The "association by similarity" that Volkelt, among others, singles out as important for empathy also turns out to be the grasping of a particular instance of a known type.[7] In order to understand a movement (e.g., a gesture of pride), I must first "link" it with other similar movements known to me. On our view this means: I must find a known type in it.[8] Here are themes for large investigations. We must content ourselves with what has been said, as a pointer to the "transcendental" questions that arise here, without being able to enter into a closer discussion of them.

c) The result of sensual empathy and its neglect in the literature

Sensual empathy already gives a foreign I, a layer that Volkelt and Lipps passed over.

3.5.4 At the end of the process of empathy there stands, in our case as elsewhere, a new objectivation. By virtue of it we find the

7 STEIN'S NOTE. System der Ästhetik I, pp. 241 ff.

"sensing hand" facing us, as at the beginning (it is in fact there the whole time—unlike what happens in progressing outer perception—only not in the mode of attention), but now with a new dignity, because what was emptily represented has found its fulfillment. With the constitution of the stratum of sensation of the foreign physical body (which, strictly speaking, we may no longer call a 'physical body'), a foreign I is already given as well, thanks to the essential belonging of sensations to an I—even if not necessarily a "waking" I that can become conscious of itself. This fundamental stratum of constitution has (as we already remarked) always been left aside until now. *Volkelt* discusses the "feeling-in of sensations" on various occasions. But he characterizes it briefly as the reproduction of sensations, without investigating its own essence. He does not take into account its significance for the constitution of the individual, but considers it only as an aid toward bringing about what he alone calls empathy: the empathy of feelings and especially of moods. He will not call the feeling-in of sensations empathy, because empathy would be "something downright paltry and pitiful" if it stopped at sensations. We certainly do not want to ask that of it. On the other hand, after what we have shown, we cannot rate sensations quite so low. And finally, no emotional motives should induce us to separate what essentially belongs together. The grasping of foreign lived experiences—be they sensations, feelings, or anything else—is a unified, typical (if variously differentiated) modification of consciousness, and it needs a unified name. For this we have chosen the term "empathy," which is already customary for one part of the phenomena belonging here. If one wants to keep this term for the narrower domain, one would have to coin a new expression for the wider one.

3.5.5 Lipps at one point contrasts sensations with feelings, saying: I do not see the sensation of cold in the person who is freez-

8 STEIN'S NOTE. As was mentioned on an earlier occasion, Fechner (Zur Seelenfrage, pp. 49 f., 63) tried to set out the general type that forms the basis of every assumption of ensoulment (in his case we may not speak of empathy). We cannot go into an examination of the particular determinations he gives. Nor do I want to decide here whether he is justified in including the plant kingdom in this type.

ing, but the discomfort he feels. That this discomfort is aroused by sensations is only the result of reflection. We understand very well how Lipps comes to this assertion: it is the consequence of his one-sided focus on the "symbol," the phenomenon of "expression." For him only the lived experiences expressed by a look, a gesture, or the like are "visible," intuitively given. And sensations are indeed not expressed. But to claim that for this reason they are not given to us directly at all, but only as the founding substratum of emotional states, is surely a strong assertion. Anyone who does not see from another's "gooseflesh" or nose blue with cold that he is freezing, but must first reflect that the discomfort he feels is probably a "shivering," must suffer from strange anomalies of apprehension. This shivering discomfort, by the way, need not be built on sensations of cold at all. It can also occur, for example, as a psychic concomitant of a state of agitation. On the other hand, I can very well "freeze without freezing," that is, have sensations of cold without feeling in the least uncomfortable. Our knowledge of foreign sensations would thus be in a bad way if we could reach them only by the detour of the emotional states built on them.

D) THE FOREIGN LIVING BODY AS CENTER OF ORIENTATION OF THE SPATIAL WORLD

Empathy gives me the other's orientation, and with it a subject who perceives a world.

3.5.6 We come to the second constituens [constituent] of the living body: its position at the zero point of orientation. This cannot be separated from the givenness of the spatial external world. The body of the other individual, as a mere physical body, is a spatial thing like others. It is given at a particular place in space, at a particular distance from me, the center of spatial orientation, and in particular spatial relations to the rest of the spatial world. Now when I apprehend it as a sensing living body and empathic-

ally transfer myself into it, I gain a new picture[9] of the spatial world and a new zero point of orientation. It is not that I shift my zero point there. I retain my "primordial" zero point and my 'primordial' orientation, while I gain the other one empathically, non-primordially. On the other hand, what I gain is not an orientation in phantasy, not a phantasy picture of the spatial world. Co-primordiality belongs to it, as it does to the empathized sensations, because the living body to which it is related is at the same time a perceived physical body, and because it is given as primordial for the other I, though non-primordial for me. With orientation we have taken a tremendous step forward in the constitution of the foreign individual. For with it, the whole wealth of outer perceptions in which the spatial world is constituted according to essential laws is empathized into the I that belongs to the sensing living body. From a subject that has sensations it has become one that performs acts. And with that, all the determinations that result from the immanent consideration of the essence of perceptual consciousness apply to it.[10] Thus the statements about the essentially possible different modes in which acts are performed, about the actuality and non-actuality of acts of perception and of what is perceived, also hold for it. The outwardly perceiving I can in principle perceive in the manner of the "cogito," that is, in the mode of a specific "being directed" at an object, and with this the possibility of reflection on the act performed is given at the same time. Which form of performance is present in any given case is, of course, not yet prescribed by empathy with a perceiving consciousness as such; for that, particular clues are needed from case to case. But the essential possibilities present in the individual case are fixed a priori.

9 STEIN'S NOTE. The term "picture" gives a poor picture of the apprehension of the spatial world, for we have no picture that represents the world to us; we have the world itself, seen from one side.

10 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. the analyses in Husserl's "Ideas," pp. 48 f., 60 ff.

E) THE OTHER'S PICTURE OF THE WORLD AS A MODIFICATION OF ONE'S OWN

The other's world varies with his body and can enrich my own picture of the world.

3.5.7 The picture of the world that I empathize into the other is not only a modification of mine because of the different orientation; it also varies with the apprehended constitution of his living body. For a person without eyes, the entire optical givenness of the world drops away. There is indeed a picture of the world corresponding to his orientation, but if I ascribe it to him, I succumb to a gross deception of empathy. For him the world is constituted only through the remaining senses. Thanks to my habits of intuition and thought, practiced all my life, it will perhaps be actually impossible for me to achieve the empathic fulfillment of his world, which is given in empty representations. But these empty representations, and the lack of intuitive fulfillment, are given to me. This will hold to an even higher degree for empathy by someone lacking a sense into someone who has all the senses. Here we see the possibility of enriching one's own picture of the world through that of others: the significance of empathy for the experience of the real external world. This significance makes itself felt in yet another respect.

F) EMPATHY AS THE CONDITION OF CONSTITUTING ONE'S OWN INDIVIDUAL

Only through others do I see my body as one body among others.

3.5.8 From the zero point of orientation gained in empathy, I must regard my own zero point as one point in space among many, no longer as a zero point. And at the same time—and only in this way—I learn to see my living body as a physical body like others. In primordial experience, by contrast, it is given to me only as a living body and, besides (in outer perception), as an incomplete

physical body, different from all others.[11] In "iterated empathy"[12] I apprehend that physical body again as a living body. Only thus am I given to myself in the full sense as a psychophysical individual, for which being founded on a physical body is, after all, constitutive. This iterated empathy is at the same time the condition of the possibility of that mirror-image-like givenness of myself in memory and phantasy that we came across several times[13] (and presumably also of the apprehension of mirror images itself, which we shall not go into further here). As long as only one zero point is given to me, with my physical body at this zero point, there is indeed the possibility of shifting my zero point together with my body. There is also the possibility of a shift in phantasy, which then conflicts with the real zero point and the orientation belonging to it (and this possibility, as we saw, is a condition of the possibility of empathy). But there is not the possibility of freely looking at myself as at another physical body. When in a childhood memory I see myself at the top of a tree, or in phantasy on the shore of the Bosporus, I see myself as I see another, or rather as another sees me. And this is made possible for me by empathy. But its significance reaches further still.

G) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REAL EXTERNAL WORLD IN INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

A world seen from several standpoints at once proves independent of any single consciousness.

3.5.9 The world I behold in phantasy is, by virtue of its conflict with my primordial orientation, a non-existent world (though I need not, while living in phantasy, bring this non-existence to givenness). The world I behold empathically is an existing world, posited as being, like the world I perceive primordially. The perceived world and the world given empathically are the

11 STEIN'S NOTE. See above, pp. 44 ff.
12 STEIN'S NOTE. See Part II, pp. 18 f.
13 STEIN'S NOTE. See above, p. 9.

same world, seen differently. But they are not merely the same world seen from different sides, as when, perceiving primordially, I pass from one standpoint to another, running through continuous manifolds of appearance, each earlier one motivating the later, each following one replacing the one before. The wandering over from my standpoint to the other's does proceed in the same way, but the new one does not take the place of the old: I hold both fast at the same time. The same world presents itself not merely now in this way and then in another, but in both ways at once. And it presents itself differently not only depending on the standpoint of the moment, but also depending on the constitution of the observer. The appearance of the world thereby proves to be dependent on individual consciousness, but the world that appears—which remains the same however and to whomever it appears—proves to be independent of consciousness. Locked within the confines of my individuality, I could not get beyond "the world as it appears to me." At any rate it would be conceivable that the possibility of its independent existence, which might still be given as a possibility, would always remain unverified. But as soon as I cross those confines with the help of empathy and arrive at a second and a third appearance of the same world, independent of my perception, that possibility is verified. Thus empathy, as the foundation of intersubjective experience, becomes the condition of the possibility of a knowledge of the existing external world, as *Husserl*[14] presents it, and *Royce*[15] in similar fashion. We can now also take a position on other attempts at a constitution of the individual that we meet in the literature on empathy. We now see that *Lipps* is fully right to assert that one's own individual, like the plurality of I's, comes about on the basis of the perception of foreign physical bodies in which we find (by means of empathy) a life of consciousness.[16] We do in fact consider ourselves as an indi-

14 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. "Ideas," pp. 279 and 317.
15 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature."
16 Josiah Royce (1855–1916), American idealist philosopher; the essay cited in note 2 appeared in 1895.

vidual, as "an I among many," only once we have learned to consider ourselves on the "analogy" of another. The deficiency of his theory lies in his contenting himself with such brief pointers. He stopped short—the foreign individual's physical body in one hand, its individual lived experiences in the other (restricted, moreover, to those given in a "symbolic relation")—without showing how the two come together, without demonstrating what empathy accomplishes for the constitution of the individual. We can now also come to terms with the view of *Münsterberg*,[17] to which we earlier found no real access. His arguments, reproduced earlier, come down to this (if we understand him rightly). We have, separately and side by side, on the one hand the acts of the other subjects, given in co-experiencing; on the other hand the foreign physical bodies and the spatial world given in a particular constellation with them (Münsterberg speaks of "ideas"—a view whose refutation would take us too far afield here). Only when the content of the statements with which the other subjects approach me proves to depend on the position of their bodies in the spatio-temporal world are the subjects and their acts bound to the bodies. On the basis of our plain demonstrations, we must reject this ingenious theory as an untenable construction. A physical body considered merely as such could never be apprehended as the "ordering principle" of the other objects. On the other hand, the other subjects' statements about their phenomenal world would have to remain unintelligible (at least in the sense of a full, fulfilling understanding, as distinct from a merely empty understanding of words) if there were not the possibility of empathy, of transferring oneself into their orientation. Statements can step in to supplement where empathy fails, and may then serve as clues for further empathy. But they cannot replace it in principle; rather, what they achieve presupposes what empathy achieves. Finally: even if it were conceivable, on the basis of mere statements, to arrive at the idea of a grouping of the spatial world around a particular physical body and to assign the subject of those state-

17 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Part II, pp. 39 f.

ments to this body, it is quite impossible to see how one could get from here to the phenomenon of the unified psychophysical individual, which we do, after all, indisputably have. And just as little, of course, will it do to apprehend one's own living body as a physical body on whose "situation" the "content of our ideas" depends.

H) THE FOREIGN LIVING BODY AS BEARER OF FREE MOVEMENT

Living self-movement is empathized only into bodies already apprehended as living bodies.

3.5.10 We have come to know the foreign living body as the bearer of fields of sensation and as the center of orientation of the spatial world, and we now find a further constituens in its free mobility. The movements of an individual are not given to us as mere mechanical movements. There are, to be sure, cases of this kind too—just as with one's own movements. When I grasp one hand with the other and lift it, the movement of the lifted hand is given to me as mechanical, just like that of a physical body I lift. The sensations running their course at the same time constitute the consciousness of a change in position of a part of my living body, but not the lived experience of "I move." I do, on the other hand, have this lived experience in the moving hand—both that of self-movement and that of imparting it to the other hand. Since this self-movement is at the same time outwardly perceived as mechanical movement, and both are apprehended as the same movement (as we explained earlier), it is also "seen" as self-movement. The distinction between "living" and "mechanical" movement here intersects with that between "self-movement" and "co-movement"; neither can be reduced to the other. This is shown, first, by the fact that every "living" movement is at the same time mechanical movement. On the other hand, self-movement is not just living self-movement, since there is also mechanical self-movement: when a rolling ball in its motion strikes another and "carries it along," we have the phenomenon of mechanical self-movement and co-movement. We

must now ask whether there is also living co-movement. I believe this will have to be denied. When I travel through a landscape on a train, or let myself be pushed across the ice rink without making gliding movements myself, the movement (if we disregard everything that is not co-movement) is given to me only in the change of appearances of the spatial surroundings. It can just as well be apprehended as movement of the landscape as movement of my body. Hence the familiar "optical illusions": the trees and telegraph poles flying past; the stage trick that, by moving the scenery, gives us the illusion of covering a distance; and so on. Co-movement, then, is to be apprehended only as mechanical, not as living. Accordingly, every living movement seems to be self-movement. From co-movement, however, "imparted" movement must still be distinguished. When a rolling ball does not "carry along" the ball at rest but by the impact "gives" it a movement of its own (perhaps itself coming to a stop), we have the phenomenon of an imparted mechanical movement. Now such an imparted movement can be not merely perceived as mechanical but also experienced as living—not, however, as "I move," but as "being moved." When I receive a push and fall down, or am hurled down a slope, I experience the movement as living, but not as "active," arising from an "impulse"; I experience it as "passive," imparted. The same differences as in one's own movements are found in foreign movements as well. When I see someone driving past in a carriage, his movement does not appear to me as different in principle from that of the "resting" parts of the carriage. It is mechanical co-movement, which I perceive outwardly, not empathize. Quite distinct from this, of course, is his apprehension of this movement, which I presentify to myself empathically by transferring myself into his orientation. It is quite different with the movement he performs when, for example, he stands up in the carriage. I 'see' a movement of the type of my self-movement; I apprehend it as self-movement; I follow the tendency to fulfillment of the "co-perceived" self-movement by going through it empathically along with him, in the way that is by now suffi-

ciently familiar; and in conclusion I perform the objectivation in which it confronts me as the movement of the other individual. Thus the foreign living body with its organs presents itself to me as movable. And free mobility is closely bound up with the other constituents of the individual. We must already apprehend this body as a living body in order to empathize living movement into it. We shall never apprehend the self-movement of a physical body as living movement (even if we may perhaps make its difference from an imparted movement or a co-movement intuitive to ourselves by a quasi-empathy, for instance by 'inwardly going through' the movement of the struck and the striking ball). The other features of the balls forbid us to ascribe the presentified living movements to them.[18] On the other hand, rigid immobility conflicts with the phenomenon of the sensing living body and of the living organism in general.[19] The idea of a completely immobile living being cannot be carried through; to be held fast and motionless in one spot means at the same time to "turn to stone." Spatial orientation is even less separable from free mobility. First, if self-movement were absent, the manifolds of perception would be so restricted that the constitution of a spatial world (even an individual one) would be called into question. Second, the possibility of transferring oneself into the foreign living body would be lost, and with it the possibility of a fulfilling empathy and of gaining its orientation. Free movement, then, belongs quite inalienably to the structure of the individual.

18 STEIN'S NOTE. Since every living body is at the same time a physical body, and every living movement at the same time a mechanical movement, it is possible to consider physical bodies and their movements "as if" they were living bodies; and empathy of movement into physical bodies plays a large role in the literature on aesthetic empathy.

19 STEIN'S NOTE. Even if plants do not have the free movement of animal subjects, the phenomenon of growth belongs essentially to them, and this includes movement that is not merely mechanical. In addition there is the turning toward the light and *other* living movements that they perform.

I) THE PHENOMENA OF LIFE

Growth, health, freshness and listlessness are grasped empathically, even in plants.

3.5.11 We must now consider a group of phenomena that take part in the structure of the individual in a special way, since they appear in the living body and yet also as lived experiences of the soul. I should like to call them the specific phenomena of life: growth, development and aging, health and sickness, freshness and listlessness (the general feelings, as we said, or the way of "feeling oneself in one's body," as Scheler likes to put it), living and dying. *Scheler* has protested against the theory of empathy in general, and quite especially against the "explanation" of the phenomena of life by empathy.[20] That would be quite justified if empathy were a genetic process, and if explanation contained that tendency, of which we spoke earlier, to explain away what is to be explained. Apart from that, I see no possibility of detaching the phenomena of life from the other constituents of the individual, or of showing any way of grasping them other than an empathic one. In considering the general feelings as one's own experiencing, we saw how they "fill" living body and soul and lend a particular coloring to every spiritual act and every bodily process, and how they are then "co-seen" in the living body—in the same way as the fields of sensation. So too we "see" in a person's gait and bearing, in his every movement, his "way of feeling himself," freshness, listlessness, and the like; and we bring this co-intended foreign experiencing to fulfillment by empathically carrying it out along with him. Now, we see such freshness and listlessness not only in human beings and animals but also in plants. And here too we have the possibility of empathic fulfillment. Admittedly, what I grasp here is a considerable modification of my own life. The general feeling of a plant does not appear as a coloring of its acts, for there is not the slightest indication that any such acts exist. Accordingly I have

20 STEIN'S NOTE. Sympathiegefühle, p. 121.

no right to ascribe to the plant a "waking" I and a reflective consciousness of its life-feelings. Further, the constituents of animal beings otherwise known to us are lacking. Whether the plant has sensations is at least doubtful,[21] and so it is unwarranted empathy when we believe we are inflicting pain on a tree that we cut down with an axe. Nor is the plant a center of orientation of the spatial world, nor freely movable, although—in contrast to everything inorganic—it is capable of living movement. On the other hand, the lack of these constituents does not entitle us to reinterpret those that are present as well, and to separate the plant's phenomena of life from ours. Whether we should regard the phenomena of life as essentially psychic, or only as the essential foundation of psychic existence, I wish to leave undecided.[22] That within the psychic nexus they have the character of lived experience can hardly be disputed. Now it may be thought that in the general feeling I have chosen a rather convenient example of the psychic nature of the phenomena of life. Yet this nature must also be demonstrable in the others. Scheler himself has pointed us to the "experiencing of life."[23] If he wants to call only the "lived," completed, finished lived experiences "psychic," that seems to me a definition not drawn from the essence of the psychic. The present psychic (the primordial, as we called it) is something becoming; it is experiencing. What has become, what has been lived and is finished, sinks back into the stream of the past. We leave it behind as we step into new experiencing; it loses its primordiality, but it remains "the same lived experience." It is now alive, later dead—but not now non-psychic (characteristically, there is no positive expression for this) and later psychic. Just so, hardening wax is first liquid and then solid, yet remains this wax, the same physical body. There is no non-psychic individual experiencing (the pure experien-

21 STEIN'S NOTE. Certain phenomena suggest attributing to it sensitivity to light and perhaps a certain sensitivity to touch, but I should not like to make any decision on this.

22 STEIN'S NOTE. In that case they would also be conceivable as non-psychic, and plants as living beings without souls.

23 STEIN'S NOTE. Philosophie des Lebens, pp. 172 ff.

cing we deal with in the reduction is non-psychic both as becoming and as having become); soul cannot be separated from life. *Scheler* has stressed that there is an experiencing of the ascent and decline of life.[24] An experiencing—not a having as an object, not an ascertaining of distinguishable stages of development. The continuum of life is itself given to us as such, not as a composite of connecting stretches between distinguished points. And the ascent to these points is itself given to us too: the development, not only its results. (To be sure, we usually "become conscious" of this development—that is, make it an object—only when we perceive its result: of a decrease in our strength, for instance, when we notice that we are weak; and correspondingly, in the "higher life of the soul," of the fading of an inclination when we find that it is no longer there; and so on.) And it is no mere figure of speech when we compare our development with that of a plant. It is a genuine analogy in the sense defined earlier, as the grasping of membership in the same type. Things are no different with one's bodily "condition." "Feeling ill" has little to do with "pains." With painful bodily injuries, for example—a complicated fracture of the arm and the like—one can feel quite healthy; and without any pain one can feel very wretched. And this "condition" I see in the other and bring to givenness for myself by empathically transferring myself into him. To the attentive observer, manifold individual features of the unified picture of an illness reveal themselves that remain hidden to a fleeting glance. This is what the physician's "trained eye" has over the layman. He makes his diagnosis on the basis of this picture and believes he "sees" the carcinoma in the sallow, sunken cheeks, the tuberculosis in the hectic flush and the unnatural gleam of the eyes. For this he is no longer indebted to empathy, but to his knowledge that this "clinical picture" is produced by the action of the pathogen in question. But the clinical picture itself, the distinction of the manifold types of illness that forms the basis of all diagnostics, is provided for him by his gift for empathy. Through his focus on this group of phenomena and

24 STEIN'S NOTE. Philosophie des Lebens.

through long practice, this gift has been cultivated to a high degree of differentiation—though here, admittedly, it mostly stops at the first level of empathy and does not go on to transfer itself into the morbid state. And the gardener's relation to the plants whose thriving he cares for is no different from the physician's relation to the patients whose well-being is entrusted to him. He sees them full of fresh vigor or ailing, recovering or wasting away. Empathically he informs himself about their condition; in causal consideration he investigates the causes of that condition and finds means to influence it.

K) CAUSALITY[1] IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Causal relations in and around the individual are grasped through empathy; Scheler's new psychic causality is examined.

3.5.12 The possibility of such a causal view is itself, in turn, founded on empathy. The physical body of the foreign individual as such is given as a member of physical nature, in causal relations to other physical objects. If you push it, you impart a movement to it. By blows and pressure you can change its shape. If you light it differently, its color changes, and so on. But these causal relations do not settle the matter. The foreign body is, as we know, seen not as a physical body but as a living body. We see that besides physical effects it also undergoes and exerts others. When we prick a hand with a needle, this is not the same as driving a nail into a wall, although as a mechanical process it is the same, namely the driving in of a wedge. The hand feels pain when it is pricked, and we see this. It takes an artificial disregarding of this, a reduction of the phenomenon, before we can see what it has in common with the other case. We "see" this effect because we see the hand as sensing, because we empathically transpose ourselves into it and take every physical action upon it as a 'stimulus' that produces a psychic effect. Besides these effects of external causes, we grasp effects within the individual itself. We see, for example, a child romping about lively and then becoming tired and cross. We then take the tiredness

and bad mood as effects of the movement. We have already seen how the movements come to givenness for us as living movements, and how the tiredness does. The "bad mood," too, we grasp empathically (as we shall soon see). Nor do we, say, infer the causal sequence from the data obtained: it, too, is experienced empathically. In the same way we empathically grasp interpsychic causality. Suppose that, ourselves immune to the infectious material, we observe the process of emotional contagion among other individuals. At the actor's words "only sobbing is heard, and the women weep," for instance, we at once hear a suppressed sobbing from every corner of the auditorium. Transposing ourselves into these sentimental hearts, we feel with them their being seized by the mood depicted, and so gain a picture of the causal process taking place there. Finally, we also perceive an effect of the individual on the external world: in every action that produces a change in physical nature, the instinctive action as well as the voluntary one. When I observe the "reaction" to a stimulus, for example how a stone flying toward someone is deflected from its path by a "mechanical" defensive movement, I see a causal process into which psychic intermediate links are inserted. Transposing myself into the other, I take that object as a stimulus and experience the triggering of the counter-movement. (Such processes may run their course unnoticed, but to call them "unconscious" or even 'purely physiological' is entirely unjustified.) And I experience the deflection of the stone from its path as an effect of the reactive action. Suppose I see someone act on the basis of a decision of will, for example lift a heavy load and carry it off on a bet. Then I empathically grasp the action's issuing from the act of will, which appears here as the primum movens [prime mover] of the causal process, not as an intermediate link in a series of physical causes. We have phenomenally given the effect of the psychic on the physical, and also of the psychic on the psychic without the mediation of a physical intermediate link (for example in the case of an emotional contagion that is not brought about by bodily expression, even if it is mediated by a

form of expression as the condition for apprehending the lived experience).[25] But whether physically mediated or purely psychic, what we have here is an operation of the same structure as the phenomenal causal relations in physical nature. Now in *Scheler* (in agreement with *Bergson*) we meet the view that in the psychic we encounter a wholly new kind of causality, one that does not exist in the physical domain.[26] This new kind of efficacy is supposed to consist in several things. Every past lived experience can in principle act on every future one without mediating links (and so also without being reproduced). Likewise, future events can act on present experiencing. And, in a more far-reaching formulation, psychic causality consists not in each lived experience's being conditioned by the preceding one but in its dependence on the totality of experiencing, on the whole of the individual life. If we keep for the moment to the last formulation, it is entirely reasonable to assume that every lived experience is conditioned by the whole series of preceding lived experiences. But so is every physical process conditioned by the whole preceding causal chain. There is a difference in principle: in the physical domain "like causes have like effects," whereas it can be shown that in the psychic domain the occurrence of "like causes" is excluded by essence. But if one keeps strictly to the relation between the causing and the caused lived experience, hardly any new kind of operation can be demonstrated. Let us try to make clear to ourselves, with examples, what is at issue here.[27] A decision of will, a task set for me, guides the course of my action long after it was actually performed, without its being represented to me, "conscious," in my present action. Does that mean that a past, completed lived

25 STEIN'S NOTE. On the question of causality, cf. p. 22 above.

26 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. "Idole," p. 124 f., "Philosophie des Lebens," p. 218 ff., "Rentenhysterie," p. 236 f.; cf. Part II above, p. 37.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Scheler's essay "Zur Psychologie der sogenannten Rentenhysterie" ("On the Psychology of So-Called Pension Hysteria"), collected in his *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze* (1915).

27 STEIN'S NOTE. In what follows we leave aside whether the "efficacy" appears in the form of causality or of motivation.

experience determines my present lived experience from that point in time? By no means. That act of will, which long remained unfulfilled, has not in this time "fallen into oblivion," sunk back into the stream of the past, become "lived life," to speak with *Scheler*. It has only passed from the mode of actuality into that of non-actuality, from activity into passivity. It belongs to the essence of consciousness that at every moment of experiencing, the cogito, the act in which the I lives, is surrounded by a halo of background lived experiences. These are non-actualities that are no longer, or not yet, cogito. They are therefore also not accessible to reflection, and must first pass through the form of the cogito (which they can take on at any time) in order to be grasped. Though not actual, they are nonetheless present, primordial, and by virtue of this effective. The unfulfilled act of will is not dead. It lives on in the background of consciousness until its time comes and it can be realized; then its operation begins. So it is not something past that acts on the present, but something that reaches into the present. We fully agree, then, that no reproduction of the act of will sets the action going. We go even further and say that a reproduction would not be capable of it at all. A forgotten act of will cannot act. Nor is a "reproduced" act of will a living one: it is a presentified one, and as such incapable of bringing about an action, just as in a dark room the phantasy of a burning lamp cannot give me the light I need for reading. It must first be lived again, lived through anew, in order to be able to act. It is no different with future events that "cast their shadows before them." *Scheler* cites the example of James.[28] Under the influence of the unpleasant logic lecture he had to give in the afternoon, James spent the whole day beforehand doing nothing but superfluous things, just so as to find no time for the tiresome preparation, and yet without "thinking of it." Every expectation of a threatening event represents this type.[29] One turns one's attention to another object in order to escape

28 STEIN'S NOTE. Psychologie, p. 224.

29 William James (1842–1910), American psychologist and philosopher; Stein cites the German translation of his *Psychology: Briefer Course*.

the anxiety, but it does not vanish. It persists "in the background" and influences our whole behavior. As non-actual experiencing, which is no specific directedness, it does not have its object, the expected event, fully present. Yet it always tends to pass over into actual experiencing and to draw the I into itself. The I, for its part, always resists giving itself up to this cogito, and takes refuge in other actual lived experiences, whose pure course is nonetheless hindered by that background experience. Here too, then, it is not something future but something present that is effective. And finally, as regards the efficacy of the whole of life on every moment of existence, we must say this: anything that lives on into the present can be effective, no matter how far from the 'now' the starting point of the effective lived experience lies. Even early childhood experiences can last on into my present, although the abundance of later events has pushed them into the background. This can be shown clearly in our sentiments toward other persons. I do not "forget" my friends when I am not thinking of them. They then belong to the unnoticed horizon of the present of my world, and my love for them lives even when I do not live in it, and influences my actual feeling and acting. Out of love for a person I can refrain from actions that would displease them, without "being conscious" of it. So too a resentment toward a person that was implanted in me in my childhood can weigh as a pressure on my later life, even though it has been pushed wholly into the background and I no longer think of that person at all. Then, when I meet that person again, it can pass into actuality and discharge itself in an action. Or it can at least be brought to reflective clarity and thereby rendered ineffective. By contrast, what belongs to my past, what is temporarily or forever forgotten and can come to givenness for me only in the character of presentification (through recollection or the accounts of others), exerts no effect on me whatsoever. A remembered love is no primordial feeling and can exert no influence on me. If I do something to please someone for the sake of a past affection, the willing is built on a positive stance toward this past affection, not on the

presentified feeling. All that has been said shows that the cases *Scheler* adduces demonstrate no difference in the phenomenal structure of operation in the physical and the psychic domains. In the domain of the psychic we have found no "action at a distance." And in the domain of mechanical causality, too, we find a parallel storing up of latent forces and an operation of hidden forces, such as we have come to know here. An accumulated quantity of electrical energy, for example, "acts" only at the moment of discharge. Finally, we also encounter analogous states of affairs in bodily processes. The appearance of symptoms of disease is preceded by an 'incubation period' of the pathogens, during which no effect of their presence shows itself. On the other hand, changes in an organism can often be detected long before their cause can be uncovered. Despite the sameness of the causal phenomenon stressed here, there are profound differences between physical and psychic causality; this is not to be denied. But demonstrating them would require a precise study of the differing structure of psychic and physical reality.

[1] "Causality" here means the relation of dependence as intuitively grasped, not as it can be determined with the exactness of physics.

L) THE FOREIGN LIVING BODY AS BEARER OF PHENOMENA OF EXPRESSION

Stein distinguishes indication, symbol and sign, in debate with Lipps and following Husserl.

3.5.13 We have come to know the foreign living body as the bearer of a life of the soul, inasmuch as we "view" it in a particular way. One group of phenomena is still missing, which opens up a further region of the psyche to us in a peculiarly characterized way. When I "see" shame 'in' a blush, annoyance in a frown, anger in a clenched fist, that is yet another phenomenon than when I see the layer of sensation in the foreign living body, or co-perceive the sensations and life-feelings of the other individual. In the latter case I grasp the one along with the other; in the former I see the one through the other. In the new phenomenon, what

belongs to the soul is not merely co-perceived with the bodily but expressed through it. The lived experience and its expression stand in a connection that we find described by Fr. Th. Vischer, and quite especially by Lipps, as a symbolic connection.[30] The differing positions Lipps took on this problem at different times may illustrate it for us here. As late as the first edition of the "Fundamental Questions of Ethics" (1899), he says that the manifestations of life are signs, which are interpreted by awakening in us the memory of our own lived experiences.[31] In the writings from 1903 on, this account is vehemently attacked and the view of manifestations of life as "signs" energetically rejected. This holds for the two volumes of the Aesthetics, the Guide to Psychology from its very first edition on, the new edition of the Fundamental Questions of Ethics, and other shorter writings. In the interval falls the appearance of *Husserl's* "Logical Investigations."[32] Using the relation of word and meaning, the First Investigation had shown that there are phenomenal unities that cannot be made intelligible in the least by pointing to an association. These discussions may have prompted Lipps to revise his views. From then on he distinguishes between "sign" and "expression" or "symbol." That something is a sign means: something perceived tells me that something else exists. Thus smoke is a sign of fire. Symbol means: in something perceived there lies something else, namely something of the soul, which is co-grasped in it (with an eye to his theory he also says "co-experienced" here). An example that *Lipps* likes to give for the

30 STEIN'S NOTE. If "co-perceiving" does not exhaustively characterize the phenomenon of expression, it is nevertheless important for it. The lived experiences that we grasp in expressive appearances are fused with them. Volkelt in particular has stressed this (System der Ästhetik I, pp. 254 f., 307). The limbs of the living body, the features of the face themselves, seem ensouled; the soul seems to be visible, for example cheerfulness in the smile, joy in the shining eyes. The unity of lived experience and expression is so intimate that language often designates the one through the other: to be carried away, downcast, uplifted (cf. Klages, Die Ausdrucksbewegung und ihre diagnostische Verwertung, p. 284 f.).

31 STEIN'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 13.

32 Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807–1887), German aesthetician; his son Robert Vischer coined the term "Einfühlung."

"symbolic relation" may clarify the difference. How are sadness and a sad look related, on the one hand, and fire and smoke, on the other? Both cases[33] have something in common: an object of outer perception leads on to something that is not perceived in the same way. Nonetheless, a different kind of givenness is present. The smoke that indicates fire to me is my "theme," the object of my actual attention. It awakens in me tendencies to move on within a wider context, a flowing off of interest in a definite direction. The transition from one theme to the other takes place in the typical form of motivation: *if* the one is, then the other is too. (Already here there is more than mere association, "the smoke reminds me of fire," although here too we may be led back to associations.) The "being-co-given" of sadness in the sad look is different. The sad look is really not a theme at all that leads over to another. It is one with the sadness, though in such a way that it can itself recede entirely into the background. The look is the outside of the sadness; the two form a natural unity. The difference also becomes clear from the fact that in particular cases lived experiences really are given after the type of indication. I notice a facial expression I know well on a good acquaintance and conclude: when he looks like that, he is out of sorts. Such cases, however, appear as deviations from the normal case, the givenness of a symbol, and they moreover already presuppose a certain givenness of symbols.[34] What indication and symbol have in common is that both point beyond themselves without willing to or being supposed to (as we shall see, this distinguishes both from the genuine sign). Still, there are differences. If I stay turned toward the smoke and watch it rise and disperse, that is no less 'natural' than if I pass on to the fire. If I think away the tendencies that would lead me in that direction, I no longer have the full object of perception, but I still

33 STEIN'S NOTE. The terms "sign" and "expression" are out of place here, as will appear later. We shall therefore speak of "indication" and "symbol."—The following discussions of the concepts "indication," "sign" and "expression" closely follow Husserl's treatment in his seminar in the winter semester of 1913–14.

34 STEIN'S NOTE. Lipps presumably has these in mind when he admits "experience" as a supplement to empathy.

have the same object, an object of the same kind. If, on the other hand, I regard the sad look as a mere contortion of the face, I no longer have the same object at all, nor even an object of the same kind. This is connected with the different possibilities of fulfillment in the two cases. In the one case, what is emptily represented is fulfilled in further outer perception. In the other, it is fulfilled through a (here necessary) μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [shift into another kind], the transition to empathically transposing oneself. The connection between what is perceived and what is emptily represented proves to be one that can be lived through, an intelligible one. It may also be that the symbol does not yet point in a definite direction. It then still remains a pointing into emptiness: what I see is incomplete, something else belongs to it, only I don't yet know what. What *Lipps* understands by symbol should be clear from these remarks. But this does not yet mean that everything he takes to be a symbol really is one, or that the division between 'indication' and "symbol" is already sufficient. For him, symbols are gestures, movements, resting forms, natural sounds, and words. Since he evidently uses "gestures" here for involuntary manifestations, the term fits. For purposive manifestations the account already falls short: there we enter the sphere of signs. For the time being I should like to leave aside the "resting forms" (facial features, the shape of the hand, and the like), the "expression of personality," and confine myself to the expression of actual lived experiences. As for the movements in which a 'kind of inner activity' or a "way of feeling oneself" is supposed to lie, various things may be meant. Something of a person's personality can lie in their whole outward habitus, in their way of moving and in their bearing. That would have to be treated together with the "resting forms," and can be dropped here. Lipps also has in mind that a movement can appear light, free and elastic, or ponderous and inhibited. That belongs to the series of phenomena of life whose givenness we have already considered. Finally, feelings other than general feelings can also be co-grasped with movements. I can, for example, tell from a person's gait and bearing that they

are sad. But then what is present is not a symbolic relation but indication. The sadness does not belong to the movement as it belongs to the sad look; it is not expressed in it. Affective sounds, on the other hand, stand entirely on the same level as visible expressive movements. Fear is one with the cry of fear as sadness is with the look. And the givenness of fear differs from that of a carriage announcing itself to me by the rolling of its wheels, just as the givenness of sadness in the look differs from that of fire through smoke. Close to affective sounds stands the material that goes into the sounds of words: in the sound of the voice there can lie cheerfulness or dejection, calm or agitation, friendliness or rebuff. Here too a symbolic relation is present, but it is overlaid by what belongs to the word as such. It is, however, a complete aberration to call the word itself a symbol. It is equally wrong to claim that an act of apprehending lies in the word, and the speaker's act of judgment in the sentence, as sadness lies in the speaker's look, and that the understanding of language rests on this.[35] To show this requires a closer examination of the givenness of the word (as heard and understood). At the same time we can discuss the essence of the sign in general, of which there has already been talk several times. Signs are, for example, sailors' signals, or the flag that announces that the king is in the palace. The sounds of words, like signals, are not themselves the theme. They are only a point of passage to the theme, namely to what they designate. They awaken a tendency to move on, which appears inhibited when they are themselves made the theme. In the normal case of understanding (especially with words) the transition is so instantaneous that one can hardly speak of a tendency. But it becomes visible when one dwells on a word of a foreign language that is not understood at first but merely contains the pointer to the meaning. The complete receding of what is "perceived by the senses" separates the sign from the indication, which becomes "theme" with its full material content. On the other hand, the sign is also not to be put on the same level as the symbol, for what is designated is

35 STEIN'S NOTE. Cf. Ästhetik II, p. 2; Psychologische Untersuchungen II, p. 448.

not *co-perceived* as what is grasped in the symbol is. There is something else besides. The signal carries a moment of ought, of demand, which ultimately finds its fulfillment in the representation of whoever designated it as a sign. Every signal is fixed by convention and intended by someone for someone. This falls away in the pure symbol: the sad look is not "supposed" to mean sadness, nor the blush shame. Symbol-character and signal-character are united in a certain way in the purposive manifestation that uses the symbol as a sign. In a frown I now grasp not only disapproval: the frown also wants to make it known, and is meant to. The intention grasped gives the whole phenomenon a new character. This intention may itself still be given in a symbolic relation (in a glance, say), or it may emerge from the situation as a whole.

WORD AND SIGNAL

Words carry meaning while signals merely point, and words can be understood without regard to the speaker.

How do things stand, then, with the word? Is that moment of ought found here too, as with the signal? Evidently the word can stand before us as communicated, either to me or to someone else, or as merely "thought aloud." How these characters attach to the word may be left open for now. In any case, they are irrelevant to understanding the words. The words "there's a fire" mean the same to me whether they are merely called out, addressed to me, or addressed to someone else. Indeed, nothing at all of these differences need be co-given. That someone speaks the words no doubt belongs to the givenness. But the speaking person is grasped not in the words but together with them. And this, too, at first plays no role in the meaning of the words, only as a signpost to their intuitive fulfillment: to fulfill the sense of a statement of perception, for example, I must transpose myself into the speaking person's orientation. So the words can be considered entirely by themselves, without regard to the speaker and all that goes on in the speaker. What, then,

distinguishes word and signal? On the one side we have the signal's physical body, the state of affairs or process, and the bridge that convention has built between the two, which makes itself felt as that "is supposed to indicate." The state of affairs itself remains entirely untouched by the fact that the signal designates it. On the other side, to begin with, what corresponds to the signal's physical body is not a *physical word-body* but a *living word-body*. The sound of the word is not something that could exist on its own and has received the function of a sign from outside, in addition to what it is. It is always the bearer of meaning, and in exactly the same way whether it is actually heard or imagined. A signal, by contrast, requires reality. If it is imagined, its sign function is merely imagined too, whereas there is no such thing as an imagined word-meaning. The word's living body and its soul form a living unity, which nonetheless permits each a relatively independent development.[36] A signal cannot develop. Once it has received its designation, it carries it on unchanged, and the function that an act of choice has attached to it, an act of choice can take away again. Further, it exists only by virtue of the act of creation performed on it. But once it exists, it is detached from and independent of that act, like any product of human craft. It can perish, and its function cease with it, without its 'creator' being involved in any way. If a storm sweeps away all the signposts in the Riesengebirge, hikers will go astray. Yet the Riesengebirge Association, which created this system of signs and believes it still to be in perfect order, cannot be held responsible.[37] Nothing of the kind is possible with the word. It is always borne by a consciousness (which, of course, is not that of the person speaking hic et nunc). It lives "by the grace" of a spirit, that is, not by virtue of the spirit's act of creation but in living dependence on it. The bearer of this spirit can be an individual subject, but also a community of possibly chan-

36 STEIN'S NOTE. A change of sound with constant meaning, a change of meaning with a constant sound-image.

37 The Riesengebirge (Giant Mountains) lie on the border of Silesia and Bohemia; the local hiking club marked and signposted its trails.

ging subjects bound into a unity by a continuity of lived experience. Finally, the chief difference: words point to the object through the medium of meaning, whereas the signal has no meaning at all, only the function of signifying. And words do not, like the signal, simply point to the state of affairs. What enters into them is not the state of affairs but its logical-categorial formation. Words do not designate but express, and what is expressed is no longer what it was before.[38] This holds, of course, also when what is expressed is something psychic. If someone tells me he is sad, I understand the sense of the words. The sadness I now know of is not a "living" sadness standing before me as a datum of perception. It resembles the sadness grasped in the symbol as little as, say, the table I hear spoken of resembles the back of the table I see. In the one case I am in the apophantic sphere, the domain of propositions and meanings; in the other I am in immediate intuitive contact with the sphere of objects. Meaning is always something universal. In order to grasp which object is meant hic et nunc, there must always be a givenness of the intuitive basis on which the experiences of meaning are built. In the symbol there is no such intermediate layer between the expressed lived experience and the expressive change of the living body. But there is something common to both cases, by virtue of which the term "expression" forces itself upon us again and again for both. It is precisely this: that the one constitutes the unity of an object with the other; that the expression, detached from its connection with what is expressed, is no longer the same object (in contrast to the signal's physical body); that the expression issues from the lived experience[39] and is materially fitted to what is expressed. These relations are present singly in bodily expression and, in a certain sense, twice over in verbal expression (word—meaning—object, and correlatively: having the object, logical meaning or

38 STEIN'S NOTE. We may leave undiscussed here the cases in which signals function like words or words are used as signals.

39 STEIN'S NOTE. Klages stresses the "expressive" character of language and its original predominance over the function of communication (op. cit., p. 342).

signifying, and linguistic designating). The function of expressing, by virtue of which I grasp the expressed lived experience in the expression, is always fulfilled in the experience of the expression's issuing from what is expressed. We described this at an earlier point (already using "expression" in an extended sense there). In the case of understanding, this experiencing is not primordial but empathized. Here, admittedly, we must distinguish between verbal and bodily expression. The understanding of bodily expression is built on the grasping of the foreign living body, already apprehended as the living body of an I. I transpose myself into the foreign living body and carry out the lived experience that was already emptily co-given to me with the look in question, and I experience how it ends in that expression. With the word, as we saw, it is possible to disregard the speaking individual. In the understanding transition from word to meaning, I myself have a primordial grasp of the meaning, this ideal object. As long as I remain in this sphere, I have no need of the foreign individual and need not empathically carry out his lived experiences along with him. An intuitive fulfillment of what is meant through primordial experiencing is also possible. I can myself bring to givenness the state of affairs about which the sentence asserts something. When I hear the words 'it's raining,' I understand them without regard to the fact that someone is saying them to me. And I bring this understanding to intuitive fulfillment by looking out of the window myself. Only if I want to have the intuition on which the speaker bases his statement, and his full experience of expression, do I need empathy. It should now be clear that one does not arrive at the lived experience by going in the direction that leads directly from the sound of the word to the meaning. Insofar as the word has an ideal meaning, it is not a symbol. But what if still other paths led out from the word? The gateway to meaning is the pure type of the word. But this always meets us (except perhaps in the solitary life of the soul) in some earthly garb: in speech, writing or print. This garment may go unnoticed, but it can also push itself forward (for example, when it does not reproduce the

contours of the word clearly). It then draws interest to itself, and with it, at the same time, to the speaking person.[40] The person appears as uttering or communicating the words, possibly communicating them to me. In the latter case the words are "supposed" to point me to something. They are now no longer merely an expression for something objective, but at the same time the utterance or intimation of the person's sense-giving acts and of the lived experiences underlying them, a perception, for example. The transition to the speaking person and his acts can also start not from the sound of the words but from their sense. A question, a request, a command is always addressed to someone and therefore refers to the relation between speaker and hearer; so do all occasional expressions. Here the speaker's intentions really do serve the understanding of the words. From them we grasp, not what the words mean in general, but what is meant by them hic et nunc.[41] Yet even in their intimating function the words cannot be called a symbol. First, they are neither the sole nor even the chief foundation for grasping the lived experiences in question. Second, these experiences are grasped not in the words but only starting from them, and they also present themselves in an entirely different way from experiences given symbolically. At most one could say that in speaking, the act of uttering oneself comes to light with the same liveliness as an affect in an expressive movement, but not the intimated lived experiences themselves. It is also worth noting that intonation and stress belong to the word as expression (the emphasis on the essential parts of what is said, the rise of the voice in a question, and the like), and can have an intimating function only secondarily.

40 STEIN'S NOTE. For simplicity's sake, written and printed words will be left aside.

41 "Occasional expressions" is Husserl's term (Logical Investigations I, § 26) for words like "I," "here" and "now," whose meaning shifts with the occasion of speech.

MOTIVATION

The lived issuing of one experience from another, called motivation, makes expression intelligible.

These relations would, of course, need closer investigation.[42] After this characterization of the givenness of symbols, let us make clear to ourselves once more what distinguishes it from the mere "being-co-given" of the psychic considered so far. We then see that at the level of empathic transposing of oneself, the outwardly perceived is experienced as issuing from what was "co-perceived" at the first level. This issuing was lacking in the cases considered earlier. The appearance of a sensing hand does not issue from the sensing as laughter issues from cheerfulness. This issuing, on the other hand, is specifically different from causal sequence. As we said earlier, the relation between shame and blushing is different from that between exertion and blushing. The causal relation always announces itself only in the form of "if … then," so that the givenness of one occurrence (whether psychic or physical) motivates a progression to the givenness of the other. Here, by contrast, the issuing of one experiencing from another is lived in the purest immanence, without the detour through the sphere of objects. We will call this lived issuing 'motivation.' Everything that is traditionally called 'motivation' turns out to be a special case of this motivation: the motivation of action by willing, of willing by a feeling; but equally the issuing of expression from lived experience. The motivation in perception that Husserl speaks of,[43] the gliding over from one givenness of the object to another, is also to be understood in

42 STEIN'S NOTE. Unlike Lipps, Dohrn, in his treatise on artistic representation, which builds on Lipps, sharply brings out the difference between language as the expression of a meaning and as the utterance or intimation of an experiential content (op. cit., p. 55 ff.). Following on from this, he characterized the genres of poetry as different forms of utterance.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Wolf Dohrn (1878–1914), *Die künstlerische Darstellung als Problem der Ästhetik* (Artistic Representation as a Problem of Aesthetics, 1907).

43 STEIN'S NOTE. Ideas, p. 89.

this way. Many attempts have been made to present motivation as the causality of the psychic. This view cannot be maintained, for, as we saw, there is also psychic causality, and it differs clearly from motivation. Motivation, on the other hand, belongs essentially to the sphere of lived experience: nowhere else is there such a connection. We are accustomed to call the motivational relation, in contrast to the causal one, intelligible or meaningful. Understanding means nothing other than experiencing (not: having as an object) the transition from one part to another within a whole of lived experience. And all objective sense, all sense of objects, is constituted solely in lived experiences of this kind. An action is an intelligible unity, a unity of sense, because the partial experiences that constitute it stand in a connection that can be lived through. In the same sense, lived experience and expression form an intelligible whole. An expression I understand, whereas a sensation I can merely bring to givenness. Thus the phenomenon of expression leads me into the meaningful connections of the psychic, and in this I gain at the same time an important means of correcting acts of empathy.

M) THE CORRECTION OF ACTS OF EMPATHY

Whatever breaks a unity of meaning rests on deception, and further empathy corrects it.

3.5.14 Whatever would cancel the unity of a sense must rest on deception. If, on seeing a wound, I empathize pain in the injured person, I usually look into his face to have my experience confirmed by the expression of suffering. If instead I perceive a cheerful or indifferent look, I tell myself that he must not be in pain after all. For pains, by their sense, motivate unpleasant feelings that become visible in an expression. Further examination (consisting of new acts of empathy and possibly inferences built on them) can also lead me to a different correction. Perhaps the sensual feeling is indeed present, but its expression is deliberately held back. Or perhaps the person does feel the pain,

but owing to a perversion of his feeling does not suffer from it and instead enjoys it. Further, penetrating into meaningful connections helps me apprehend "equivocal" expressions correctly. Whether a blush means shame or anger, or is the result of physical exertion, is decided by the other circumstances, which lead me to empathize the one or the other. If the person has just said something foolish, the empathized connection of motivation presents itself to me immediately: insight into his foolishness—shame—blushing. If at the same time he clenches his fist or lets out a curse, I see that he is angry. If he has just bent down or run fast, I empathize a causal connection instead of a motivational one. All this happens immediately, without any need in the particular case for a "differential diagnosis." I no more call on the other cases for comparison than, in understanding a sentence, I need to consider which of the possible meanings belongs to an equivocal word in the given context. The correction of acts of empathy also explains the understanding of what is hidden behind a look, which we spoke of earlier. For one thing, the "genuine" expression is intrinsically distinct from the "false" one: the conventional smile, for example, from the truly amiable one. The living smile is likewise distinct from the one that has, as it were, frozen, and is still held fast when the actual stirring from which it springs has already faded. But I can also see through an expression imitated "deceptively." If someone assures me of his concern in the most heartfelt tone while eyeing me coldly and indifferently, or with intrusive curiosity, I do not believe him. The concordance of empathy in the unity of a sense also makes it possible to understand expressive appearances that I do not know from my own experiencing, and that perhaps cannot be experienced in it at all. An outburst of anger is an intelligible whole of sense, within which all the individual moments become intelligible to me, even those hitherto unknown, for example an enraged laugh. So too a dog's wagging tail becomes for me an intelligible expression of joy when its gaze and the rest of its behavior betray such feelings and its situation warrants them.

N) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PSYCHIC INDIVIDUAL AND THE CORRECTION OF EMPATHY

The character built up in empathy becomes a standard for judging further acts of empathy.

3.5.15 But the possibility of correction goes further. I apprehend not only individual lived experiences and individual meaningful connections. I also take them (as I take my own experiences in inner perception) as manifestations of individual properties and of their bearer. In a friendly glance I grasp not only an actual stirring but friendliness as a habitual property. In an outburst of anger a "violent temperament" reveals itself to me, in the penetration of a complicated connection, acuteness, and so on. These properties may be constituted for me in a whole series of mutually confirming and correcting acts of empathy. But once I have gained in this way a picture of the foreign "character" (as the unity of these properties), that character in turn serves me as a basis for assessing further acts of empathy. If I am told of dishonorable conduct by someone I have come to know as upright, I will not believe it. And just as there are meaningful connections between individual lived experiences, so there are between personal properties. There are essentially compatible and essentially incompatible properties: a truly kind person cannot be vindictive, a compassionate one cannot be cruel, an open-hearted one cannot be "diplomatic," and so on. Thus in every property we grasp the unity of a character, as in every property of a thing we grasp the unity of a thing. And in it we possess a motivation of future experiences. In this way the individual is constituted for us, in all its elements, in acts of empathy.

o) The Deceptions of Empathy

Deceptions arise when we take our individual makeup rather than our type as the basis.

3.5.16 As in every kind of experience, deceptions are possible here too. But, as everywhere, here too deceptions can be unmasked only by experiencing acts of the same kind, or by inferences that ultimately go back to such acts as their basis. We have already seen several times from what sources such deceptions can spring. If, in empathizing, we take our individual makeup rather than our type as the basis, we arrive at false results.[44] This happens when we ascribe our color impressions to a color-blind person, our capacity for judgment to a child, our aesthetic receptivity to a member of a foreign culture. If empathy meant only this way of apprehending foreign psychic life, it would rightly have to be rejected, as Scheler does. But here Scheler has fallen into the very error he charged other theories with: taking the case of deception for the normal case. That deception, however, can, as we said, be removed only by empathy in turn. If I empathize my enjoyment of a Beethoven symphony into an unmusical person, this deception will vanish as soon as I look into his face and meet there an expression of the deadliest boredom. In principle, the inference by analogy contains the same source of error. Here too one's own factual (not typical) makeup forms the starting point. Since I otherwise proceed logically, I arrive not at a deception (that is, a supposed primordial givenness of something that is in fact not present) but at a fallacy based on the false premise. The result is the same in both cases: missing what is really present. Even "common sense" does not regard "inferring from oneself to others" as a serviceable means of gaining knowledge of foreign psychic life. To guard against

44 STEIN'S NOTE. Roetteken (Poetik, p. 22) also draws attention to this kind of deception of empathy (namely as a case of deception in the domain of otherwise reliable experience).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Hubert Roetteken, *Poetik* (1902), a theory of literature drawing on the psychology of empathy.

such errors and deceptions, empathy needs constant guidance by outer perception; the constitution of the foreign individual is thoroughly founded on the constitution of the physical body. The givenness of a physical body of a particular makeup in outer perception is therefore a presupposition for the givenness of a psychophysical individual. On the other hand, outer perception alone does not take us a single step beyond the physical body. Rather, as we saw, the individual as such is constituted wholly and entirely in acts of empathy. Thanks to this founding of soul on living body, empathy with psychophysical individuals is possible only for a subject of the same type. A pure I, for example, for which no living body of its own and no psychophysical relations are primordially constituted, might perhaps have all kinds of objects given to it. But it could not perceive ensouled living bodies, living individuals. What here is facticity and what is essential necessity is, admittedly, very hard to decide and would require an investigation of its own.

P) THE OTHER'S INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ONE'S OWN

We learn to see ourselves as others see us, and others can correct our self-deceptions.

3.5.17 At a lower level, when we considered the living body as the center of orientation, we saw that the constitution of the foreign individual was a condition for the full constitution of one's own. Something similar is found in the higher layers too. To consider ourselves in inner perception, that is, to consider our psychic I and its properties, means to see ourselves as we see another and as another sees us. The subject's original, naive attitude is to be absorbed in its experiencing without making it an object. We love and hate, will and act, rejoice and grieve, and give expression to all this. All of it is in a certain sense conscious to us without being grasped, without being an object. We do not reflect on it, we do not make it an object of attention, let alone of observation and then of evaluation, and we do not examine it for the sort of 'character' it reveals. All this, by contrast, we do

with foreign psychic life, which, because it is bound to the perceived physical body, stands before our eyes as an object from the outset. Now, in apprehending it as "my like," I come to consider myself as an object like it. In one way, this happens in "reflexive sympathy": I empathically grasp the acts in which my individual is constituted for the other. From the other's "standpoint" I look through my bodily expression to the "higher psychic life" that makes itself known in it, and to the properties of soul that betray themselves in it. In this way I gain the "picture" the other has of me, or, more precisely, the appearances in which I present myself to the other. Just as the same natural object is given in as many manifolds of appearance as there are perceiving subjects, so I can have as many 'apprehensions' of my psychic individual as there are apprehending subjects.[45] Of course, as soon as empathic fulfillment comes about, the iterated acts of empathy in which I grasp my experiencing can come into conflict with my primordial experiencing, and that "apprehension" can thereby turn out to be a deception. And it is possible in principle that all the apprehensions of myself that I come to know are wrong. Fortunately, however, I am able to bring my experiencing to givenness not merely in iterated empathy but primordially, in inner perception. I then have my lived experiences given immediately, not by means of their expression or in bodily appearances. I now also grasp my properties primordially, not empathically. This attitude is, as we said, alien to the natural attitude, and it is empathy that prompts us to adopt it. But this is not an essential necessity. The possibility of inner perception exists independently of empathy as well. So in this context empathy appears not as a constituens but only as an important aid for grasping one's own individual. (Contrast the apprehension of one's own living body as a physical body like others, which would not be possible without empathy.) And it proves to be such an aid in another respect as

45 STEIN'S NOTE. So James is not so wrong after all when he says that a person has as many "social selves" as there are individuals who know him (Psychologie, p. 178). Only the term "social self" we do not wish to accept.

well. Inner perception, as Scheler has shown us, harbors the possibility of deception. As a corrective to such deceptions, empathy now offers itself to us, alongside further confirming or conflicting acts of perception. It is possible for someone else to "judge me more correctly" than I judge myself and to give me clarity about myself. He notices, for example, that I look around for applause while doing a kindness, whereas I myself believe I am acting out of pure compassion. Thus empathy and inner perception work hand in hand to give me to myself.

IV. Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual Persons

Einfühlung als Verstehen geistiger Personen
Spirit and the human sciences; the spiritual subject; the person constituted in feelings and values; soul and person; Dilthey; personal types; whether spirit is founded on the body.

§ 1. BEGRIFF DES GEISTES UND DER GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN.

4.1.1 The individual I whose constitution has occupied us so far we have regarded as a member of nature. The living body was one physical body among others, and the soul was founded on it, undergoing and exerting effects, placed in the causal nexus. Everything psychic was a natural occurrence, and consciousness was reality. But this conception cannot be carried through consistently. Already in the constitution of the psychophysical individual, something that goes beyond this framework shone through at several points. Consciousness showed itself to us not only as a causally conditioned occurrence but at the same time as constituting objects. With this it steps out of the nexus of nature and stands over against it: consciousness as the correlate of the world of objects is not nature but *spirit*. We do not presume to tackle the wealth of new problems that arises here, let alone to solve them.[1] But neither can we pass these problems by if we want to take a position on the questions that confront us in

1 *Geist* is rendered "spirit" throughout. *Geisteswissenschaften*, usually translated "human sciences" (history, philology, art history, law), is kept as "sciences of spirit" because Stein grounds them in *Geist*.

the history of the literature on empathy, the questions of how we understand foreign personalities. How the two are connected we shall see later. First we want to establish how far spirit has already crept into our constitution of the psychophysical individual. As soon as we apprehended the foreign living body as the center of orientation of the spatial world, we accepted the I belonging to it as a spiritual subject. In doing so we ascribed to it an object-constituting consciousness and regarded the outer world as its correlate, and all outer perception is carried out in spiritual acts. Likewise, with every *act of empathy* in the literal sense (a "feeling-into"), that is, with every grasping of a feeling act, we have already entered the realm of spirit. For just as physical nature is constituted in acts of perception, so a new realm of objects is constituted in feeling: the world of values. In joy the subject has something joyful over against it, in fear something fearsome, in anxiety something threatening. Even moods have their objective correlate: for the cheerful the world is bathed in a rosy glow, for the gloomy it is gray on gray. And all this is given to us along with the feeling acts, as belonging to them. Access to these lived experiences was granted to us primarily by the phenomena of expression. Since we regarded these phenomena as arising from the lived experiences, we have here at the same time a reaching of spirit into the physical world, a "becoming visible" of spirit in the living body. This is made possible by the psychic reality that belongs to acts as lived experiences of a psychophysical individual, a reality that includes efficacy upon physical nature. This is revealed still more strikingly in the domain of the will. The act of will not only has an objective correlate over against it, namely what is willed. In releasing the action from itself, it also gives this correlate reality; it becomes creative. Our whole "world of culture," everything "human hands" have formed, all objects of use, all works of craft, technology, and art, are correlates of spirit that have become reality. Natural science (physics, chemistry, and biology in the broadest sense, as the science of living beings, which also includes empirical psychology) describes natural objects and seeks to explain

their real genesis causally. The ontology of nature seeks to uncover the essence and the categorial structure of these objects.[2] And philosophy of nature, or, to avoid this disreputable word, the phenomenology of nature, shows how objects of this kind are constituted in consciousness. It thereby sheds clarifying light on the procedure of those "dogmatic" sciences, which give themselves no account of their methods and do not need to. The sciences of spirit (cultural sciences) describe the works of spirit. But they are not content with that. As "history" in the broadest sense, including the history of culture, literature, language, art, and so on, they trace, mostly without separating it from the description,[3] the genesis of these works, their birth from spirit. They do this not by explaining causally but by re-living understanding. (When scholars in the sciences of spirit do explain causally, they are using the method of natural science. That is admissible for the process by which cultural products arise only insofar as this process is a natural occurrence. Thus there is a physiology and a psychology of language, which investigate, for example, which organs are involved in producing sounds and which psychic processes lead to a word being replaced by a similar-sounding one. These inquiries have their value; only one should not believe that they are the proper tasks of linguistics or of the history of language.)[4] In tracing the genesis of spiritual works, spirit finds itself at work. More precisely, one spiritual subject empathically seizes another and brings that subject's activity to givenness for itself. Only very recently has the clarification of the method of the sciences of spirit been seriously undertaken. It is true that the great scholars in these sciences have gone the right way and (as some remarks by Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt, for example, show) have also been

2 STEIN'S NOTE. On the relation of fact and essence, and of sciences of fact and sciences of essence, see Husserl's "Ideas," Chapter I.

3 *Naturphilosophie* had fallen into disrepute through the speculative philosophy of nature of Schelling and the Romantics.

4 "Re-living understanding" (*nachlebendes Verstehen*) takes up Dilthey's *Nacherleben*, the re-living of another's experience on which understanding in history rests.

"well aware of the right way," though without clear insight. But while it is possible to proceed correctly without insight into one's procedure, a mistaken conception of one's own tasks must necessarily lead to bad consequences in the practice of science itself.[5] In the past, unreasonable demands were made on natural science. It was supposed to make natural occurrence "intelligible" (for instance, by showing nature to be the creation of the divine spirit), and as long as it did not resist this, it could not properly develop. Today the opposite danger exists. People are not content merely to explain causally; they set up causal explanation as the scientific ideal pure and simple. That would be harmless if this view remained confined to natural scientists. One could readily allow them the satisfaction of looking down on the "unscientific" (because not "exact") sciences of spirit, if enthusiasm for the method of natural science had not seized the scholars of these sciences themselves. They do not want to lag behind in exactness, and so the sciences of spirit have in many cases become subservient and lost sight of their own aims. We find the view that psychology[6] is the foundation of history represented in the textbooks of historical method, and its study is urgently recommended to young historians (for example by Bernheim, who is regarded as an authority on methodology). Now, it is not to be claimed that psychological knowledge can be of no use at all to the historian. But it helps him to know what lies outside his domain; it does not supply him with his proper objects. I must explain psychologically wherever I can no longer understand.[7] But wherever I do so, I proceed as a natural scientist and not as a historian. Suppose I establish that a historical personality, as a result of an illness, showed certain psychic dis-

5 Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) and Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897), leading historians of the nineteenth century. The quoted phrase echoes Goethe's *Faust*, "Prologue in Heaven": a good man in his dark striving "is well aware of the right way."
6 STEIN'S NOTE. Where objection is raised to this view here, "psychology" of course always means the natural-scientific psychology that prevails today.
7 STEIN'S NOTE. This is a view that *Scheler* advocates very energetically.

turbances, for example[8] a failure of memory. Then I am recording a natural event of the past, which *is* no more a historical *occurrence* than the eruption of Vesuvius that destroyed Pompeii. I can explain this natural event from laws (provided I have such laws), but that does not make it in the least intelligible. What is to be "understood" is only how such natural events, when they occur, motivate the actions of the persons concerned, and as "motivating factors" they also acquire historical significance. But then they are no longer apprehended as natural facts to be explained from natural laws. If I were to "explain" the whole life of the past, I would have done a good piece of natural-scientific work. But I would have rooted spirit out of the past completely and gained not a grain of historical knowledge. If historians consider it their task to establish and explain psychological facts of the past, then there is no longer any science of history. Dilthey names Taine's historical works as a cautionary example of the consequences of this view. Wilhelm Dilthey's life's aim was to give the sciences of spirit their true foundation. He emphasized that explanatory psychology was not capable of this, and he wanted to put a "descriptive and analytic psychology" in its place.[9] We believe that this does not hit on the right word, for descriptive psychology, too, is a science of the soul as nature. It can shed as little light on the procedure of the sciences of spirit as on that of the natural sciences.[10] Clarity about the method of the sciences of spirit, as about that of the natural sciences, comes from reflective investigation of the scientific consciousness in question, such as phenomenology aims at. Dilthey did not attain complete clarity here. It is true that he too sees the

8 Ernst Bernheim (1850–1942), author of the standard *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode* (Textbook of Historical Method, 1889).

9 STEIN'S NOTE. Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Dilthey's essay of 1894, "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology."

10 Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), German philosopher of history and of the human sciences; Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893), French historian and critic who sought to explain history and literature by natural causes (race, milieu, moment).

way to an epistemological foundation in "self-reflection."[11] And by turning his gaze reflectively on the procedure of the sciences of spirit, he recognized it as re-living understanding (or, as we can say, as empathic grasping) of the spiritual life of the past.[12] But as the subject of this understanding he finds the human being as nature, the life-totality of the psychophysical individual.[13] Hence the science that deals with this subject, descriptive psychology, is on the one hand the presupposition of the sciences of spirit, and on the other what gives them unity. For these sciences deal with the individual branches in which that totality lives itself out: art, custom, law, and so on. But with this, the difference in principle between nature and spirit is abolished. The exact sciences of nature, too, present themselves as a unity: each of them has as its object an abstract part of the concrete whole "natural object." The soul and the psychophysical individual are natural objects too. Constituting this object required empathy, and with it, to a certain degree, one's own individual was presupposed. But spiritual understanding, which we shall characterize more closely, is to be distinguished from this empathy.[14] From Dilthey's misleading arguments, however, we learn that besides the clarification of method there must be an objective foundation of the sciences of spirit: an ontology of spirit corresponding to the ontology of nature. Natural things have a structure subject to essential laws; empirical spatial forms, for example, are realizations of ideal geometric figures. Just so, there is also an essential structure of spirit, and there are ideal types, of which historical personalities appear as empirical realizations. If empathy is the experiential consciousness in which foreign persons come to givenness for us, it is at the same time the exemplary basis for arriving at these ideal types, just as

11 STEIN'S NOTE. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, p. 11.
12 STEIN'S NOTE. Op. cit., pp. 136 f.
13 STEIN'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 47.
14 STEIN'S NOTE. Geiger already emphasized, in his survey article mentioned earlier (p. 48), that re-living understanding is to be distinguished from empathizing as the mere having-present of something psychic. Naturally, he could not undertake a closer analysis at that point.

experience of nature is the basis for eidetic knowledge of nature. So from our considerations we must find an access to these problems too.

§ 2. THE SPIRITUAL SUBJECT

Spiritual acts are linked by motivation and subject to laws of reason.

4.2.1 Let us first try to establish what we have already gained for knowledge of the spiritual subject in constituting the psychophysical individual. We found it to be an I in whose acts a world of objects is constituted, and which itself creates objects by virtue of its will. Not every subject sees the world from the same 'side' or has it given in the same sequence of appearances; each has its own peculiar "view of the world." If we take this into account, we have already gained an individual characteristic of spiritual subjects. Yet something in us resists recognizing this strangely substrate-less "spiritual subject" as what is commonly called a person. Admittedly, we can complete its characterization further on the basis of our earlier discussion. Spiritual acts do not stand side by side without relation, like a bundle of rays with the pure I as their point of intersection. Rather, one is experienced as emerging from another, and the I glides from one to the other: this is what we earlier called "motivation." This "meaningful connection" of lived experiences, which looked so strange amid the psychic and psychophysical causal relations and had no parallel in physical nature, is to be credited entirely to spirit. Motivation is the lawfulness of spiritual life. The nexus of lived experiences of spiritual subjects is a meaningful whole that is lived (primordially or empathically), and as such it is intelligible. It is precisely this meaningful emergence that distinguishes motivation from psychic causality, and the empathic understanding of spiritual connections from the empathic grasping of psychic ones. A feeling motivates an expression in accordance with its meaning, and this meaning delimits a range of possible expressions, just as the meaning of part of a sentence prescribes its possible completions (formal and material). This

says nothing other than that spiritual acts are subject to a general lawfulness of reason. As there are laws of reason for thinking, so there are for feeling, willing, and acting, and they find expression in a priori sciences: alongside logic stand axiology, ethics, and practics. This rational lawfulness is to be distinguished from essential lawfulness. It lies in the essence of willing that it is motivated by a feeling. An unmotivated willing is therefore an absurdity: no subject of any kind is conceivable that would will something that did not stand before it as valuable. It lies in the *meaning* of willing (which posits something as to be realized) that it is directed toward what is possible, that is, realizable: one can reasonably will only what is possible. But there are unreasonable people who do not care whether what they have recognized as valuable is realizable or not. They will it purely for the sake of its value and strain to make the impossible possible. Pathological psychic life shows that a great deal that contradicts laws of reason is really possible. We then speak of a derangement of spirit. Psychic lawfulness may remain completely intact in such cases. On the other hand, there are psychic illnesses in which the laws of reason of spirit remain fully in force, for example anesthesia, aphasia, and the like. We recognize a radical difference between spiritual and psychic anomalies.[15] In cases of the second kind, understanding of foreign psychic life is not disturbed at all; one only has to empathize altered causal relations. In illnesses of the spirit, by contrast, understanding is abolished, since only a causal sequence can be empathized, not a meaningful emergence of lived experiences from one another. Finally, there is a further series of pathological cases in which neither the psychic mechanism nor rational lawfulness seems to be broken. These present themselves as modifications of experiencing within the framework of the laws of reason, for example a depression following a catastrophic event. Here not only the part of psychic life spared by the illness

15 *Geistesgestörtheit*, the ordinary German word for insanity, literally means "derangement of spirit"; Stein's distinction from merely psychic illness depends on this literal sense.

but the symptom of the illness itself is intelligible.[16] We gather from these considerations that *the spiritual subject is by its essence subject to laws of reason, and that its lived experiences stand in intelligible connections.*

§ 3. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PERSON IN LIVED EXPERIENCES OF FEELING

In feeling I experience myself, in layers of differing depth.

4.3.1 But we cannot be content with this either; with this too we have not yet reached what is called a person. Rather, we must see that something besides the world of objects considered so far is constituted in spiritual acts. It is an old psychological tradition that the "I" is constituted in feelings.[17] We want to see what can be meant by this "I," and whether we can produce evidence for this claim. In the language of traditional psychology, one distinguishes sensations, in which I sense 'something' (a view we do not endorse), from feelings, in which I feel "myself"; or, alternatively, acts from states of the I. What sense can this distinction have? We have seen that all acts are I-experiences, since in each of them, on reflection, one comes upon the pure I. Further, feeling too, as feeling of something, is a giving act; and on the other hand every act is also to be regarded as a state of the psychic I, once that I has been constituted. Nevertheless, there is a deeply incisive difference within the sphere of experiencing. In "theoretical acts," acts of perceiving, representing, relating or inferring thought, and so on, I am directed toward an object in such a way that the I and the acts are not

16 STEIN'S NOTE. Similar distinctions have been made within modern psychopathology itself. See Jaspers, "Über kausale und verständliche Zusammenhänge."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), then a psychiatrist in Heidelberg; his 1913 paper on causal and "intelligible" connections between life history and psychosis in dementia praecox.

17 STEIN'S NOTE. For evidence of this view from the writings of noted psychologists, see Österreich, "Phänomenologie des Ich," pp. 8 ff.; see also Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie, p. 52.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Paul Natorp (1854–1924), Neo-Kantian philosopher of the Marburg school; his *Allgemeine Psychologie* appeared in 1912.

there at all. It is always possible to cast a reflective glance at them, since while they are being performed they are always ready to be perceived. But it is just as possible that this does not happen, that the I is wholly absorbed in contemplating the object. It would be conceivable that a subject living only in theoretical acts would have a world of objects over against it without ever becoming aware of its self and its consciousness, without "being there" for itself. But as soon as this *subject* not only perceives, thinks, and so on, but also feels, this is no longer possible. For in feeling it experiences not only objects but itself; it experiences its feelings as coming from the "depth of its I." This also means that the I that experiences "itself" here is not the pure I, for the pure I has no depth. The I that is experienced in feeling, however, has layers of differing depth, which reveal themselves as feelings spring from them. Some have wanted to distinguish between "feeling" [*Fühlen*] and "a feeling" [*Gefühl*]. I do not believe that these two terms pick out different kinds of lived experience, but only different "directions" of the same lived experience. Feeling is the lived experience insofar as it gives us an object or something about the object. A feeling is the same act insofar as it appears as coming from the I or as revealing a layer of the I. Here a special turn of regard is still needed to make the feelings, their bursting forth from the I, and this I itself into an object in the pregnant sense. This turning-toward is specifically different from reflection, because it does not bring before my eyes something that previously was not there for me at all. On the other hand, it is specifically different from the transition from a "background experience" to the specific cogito. A background experience is an act in which an object stands over against me but is not the preferred object of my attention; the cogito is the act in which I am directed toward the object in the proper sense. For turning toward the feeling and so on is not a transition from one givenness of an object to another,

but the objectification of something subjective.[18] Further, in feelings we experience ourselves not only as existing but as constituted in such and such a way; feelings make our personal properties known to us. We have already spoken of enduring properties of the soul that make themselves known in lived experiences. We gave examples of such enduring properties, among others memory, which makes itself known in our acts of remembering, and passionateness, which makes itself known in our feelings. A closer look shows that this juxtaposition is highly superficial. These are by no means properties of equal standing, either ontologically (in their place in the essential structure of the soul) or phenomenologically (in their constitution in consciousness). Living in remembering and turned toward the remembered object, we would never arrive at anything like "memory." Only in inner perception, in new acts in which the remembering that was previously not there for us is "given," does it also present itself as a manifestation of the soul and of its property (or "faculty"). In "overflowing joy" or "harrowing pain," by contrast, I become aware of my passionateness and of the place it occupies in the I in the very performance of these feelings, without their being "given" in new acts. I do not perceive it; I experience it. An objectivation of these experienced properties, as of the feelings, is nevertheless possible, and it is absolutely necessary if, for example, anything is to be stated about them. These objectifying acts are again giving acts (perceiving, or merely indicating or intending acts), and in them the experienced and the perceived I come into overlapping coincidence. We would have to go through all the kinds of lived experience to arrive at a complete picture. Here this can only be done by way of suggestion. Sensations yield nothing for the experienced I. The pressure, the warmth, the stimulus of light that I sense are nothing in which I experience myself; they in no way well up from my I. Made into objects, however, they "make

18 STEIN'S NOTE. Incidentally, the same turn is needed to "objectify" the correlate of a feeling act (see Husserl's "Ideas," p. 66). It takes place, for example, in the transition from value-ception, the primordial feeling of a value, to the value judgment.

known" to me "sensitivity" as an enduring property of the soul. The so-called "feeling-sensations" or "sensual feelings," the *pleasure* in a tactile impression, sensual pain, already reach into the sphere of the I. I experience the pleasure and the pain at the surface of my I, and in them I experience at the same time my "sensual receptivity" as the uppermost or outermost layer of my I.[19] Then there is a kind of feelings that are in a special sense an "experiencing of oneself": general feelings and moods. I separate general feelings from moods on account of their "being bound to the living body," which, however, will not be discussed here. General feelings and moods occupy a special position in the realm of consciousness, for they are not giving acts but are visible only as "colorings" of giving acts. At the same time, they are distinguished by having no definite place in the I. They are not experienced at the surface or in the depth of the I, and they reveal no layers of the I. Instead they flood through it entirely and fill it, permeating all its layers, or at least able to permeate them. They have something of the omnipresence of light. And as an experienced property too, cheerfulness of character, for example, is not localized anywhere in the I but is poured out over all of it like a bright glow. And every actual lived experience has something of this "overall illumination" about it, and is bathed in it.

VALUES AND THE DEPTH OF THE PERSON

The order of values corresponds to the depth of feelings and to the layers of the person.

4.3.2 We now come to feelings in the pregnant sense. These feelings, as we said earlier, are always feeling of something. In every

feeling I am directed toward an object; something about the object is given to me; a layer of the object is constituted for me. But for this layer of the object to be constituted, I must first have the object; it must be given to me, and that happens in theoretical acts. All feeling therefore requires theoretical acts for its structure. Thus in joy at a good deed, the goodness of this deed, its positive value, stands over against me. But in order to rejoice at this deed, I must first know of it: the knowing is founding for the joy. This knowing, which underlies the feeling of value, can also be replaced by an intuitive grasping in perception or representation. It belongs to the domain of acts that can be grasped only in reflection, and it has no I-depth whatever. The feeling built upon it, by contrast, always reaches into the substance of the I and is experienced as coming from it, even when it is wholly immersed in the felt value. Annoyance at the loss of a piece of jewelry reaches less deep, or comes from a more superficial layer, than pain at the loss of the same object as a keepsake of a beloved person, and less deep still than pain at the loss of that person. Here essential connections open up between the order of rank of values,[20] the order of depth of feelings of value, and the order of layers of the person revealed in them. Every advance into the realm of values is thus at the same time a campaign of conquest into the realm of one's own personality. This correlation makes possible a rational lawfulness of feelings and of their anchoring in the I, and a decision about "right" and "wrong" in this domain. Someone who is "overwhelmed" by the loss of his fortune, that is, struck at the core of his I, feels

19 STEIN'S NOTE. I cannot fully agree with Geiger when he denies sensual feelings all "participation of the I" (Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses, pp. 613 f.). If one distinguishes, as one must, between the sensation, its agreeableness, and the pleasure it gives me, I do not see how the I-moment can be struck out of this pleasure. Admittedly, I thereby lose Geiger's distinction between pleasure and enjoyment, insofar as it rests on the participation of the I. Nor can I accept that there is no negative counterpart to enjoying (as displeasure is to pleasure, or disliking to liking). It seems to me that a closer analysis should be able to bring out *suffering* as the negative counterpart of enjoying.

20 STEIN'S NOTE. On the order of rank of values, see Scheler, "Der Formalismus in der Ethik usw.," pp. 488 ff.

"unreasonably." He inverts the order of rank of values, or he lacks any feeling insight into the higher values, and lacks the correlative personal layers. The feeling acts in which personal layers reveal themselves also include the sentiments of love and hate, gratitude, vindictiveness, resentment, and so on: feelings that have other persons as their object. These feelings too are anchored in different layers of the I (love, for example, in a deeper one than affection). On the other hand, they have personal values as their correlate. Suppose these values are not derived values, belonging to the person as one who realizes or grasps other values, but intrinsic values. Suppose they come to givenness in acts rooted at a different depth from the feeling of non-personal values, and so unveil layers that cannot be experienced in any other way. Then the grasping of foreign persons is constitutive of one's own person. Now in the act of love we have a seizing or intending of personal value that is not a valuing for the sake of something else. We do not love a person because they do good; their value does not consist in their doing good (even if it perhaps comes to light in that). Rather, they themselves are valuable, and we love them "for their own sake." And the capacity for love that expresses itself in our love is rooted at a different depth from the capacity for moral valuing that is experienced in valuing the deed. There are essential connections between the feeling of a value and the feeling of the value of its reality (for the reality of a value is itself a value), and between their respective I-depths. The depth of a feeling of value determines the depth of a feeling that is built upon grasping the existence of this value, though that depth is not the same. Pain at the loss of a beloved person is not as deep as love for this person, if the loss means that the person ceases to exist. Just as the personal value outlasts the person's existence, and love outlasts joy in the existence of the beloved, so the personal value is also higher than the value of its reality, and the corresponding feeling of value is rooted more deeply.[21] But "loss of the

21 STEIN'S NOTE. On the relation between the height and the duration of values, see *Scheler*, op. cit., pp. 492 ff.

person" may mean the annulment of the person and of the personal value (possibly while the empirical person in question goes on existing, in the case where "one has been mistaken about someone"). Then pain at the loss is equivalent to the annulment of love and is rooted at the same depth.—The grasping of values is itself a positive value. But to become aware of this value, one must direct oneself toward this grasping. The feeling of value is indeed there in the turning toward the value, but it is not an object, and it must first be made an object so that its value can be felt. In such a feeling of the value of a feeling of value (joy in my joy), I become aware of myself in a twofold way, as subject and as object. The original and the reflected feeling of value will in turn take hold at different depths. Thus I can enjoy a work of art and at the same time enjoy my enjoyment of the work of art; "reasonably," the enjoyment of the work of art will be the deeper. We regard the "inversion" of this relation as a "perversion." This is not to say that the unreflected feeling must be the deeper one in every case. I can feel a slight Schadenfreude at someone else's misfortune and suffer deeply over this slight Schadenfreude, and rightly so. The order of depth does not depend directly on the opposition between reflected and unreflected, but again on the order of rank of the values felt. The positive valuing of a positive value is of lower value than the positive value itself. The positive valuing of a negative value is of lower value than the negative value itself. Preferring the positive valuing to the positive value is therefore axiologically unreasonable, and placing the (unjustified) positive value behind the negative value is axiologically reasonable. From what has been said, the value of one's own person seems to be constituted only reflexively, not in the direct direction of experiencing. But deciding this requires further investigations. Not only the grasping but also the realizing of a value is a value. Let us look at this realizing somewhat more closely, not with respect to its side of willing and acting, but only with respect to its components of feeling. In realizing a value, the value to be realized stands before my eyes, and this feeling of value plays the role already

indicated in the constitution of personality. But together with this feeling of value there is a wholly naive and unreflected joy in 'creating,' in which the creating itself is felt as a value. At the same time, in this creating I experience my creative power and myself as the one endowed with this power, and I experience these as valuable in themselves. The power that I experience in creating, and the might that I experience together with it, or also by itself, in being able to create, are independent personal values, and to begin with wholly independent of the value to be realized. The naive "feeling of self-worth" of this creative power shows itself even in realizing a negative value, and in the experience of being able to realize one. Then, to be sure, a competition of values arises, and the positive intrinsic value of the power can be absorbed by the negative instrumental value attaching to it. In any case we have here an example of unreflected "self-feelings," in which the person experiences itself as valuable. But before we pass to the domain of lived experiences of will, whose threshold we have already crossed, we must follow the significance of feelings for the constitution of personality in yet another "dimension." Feelings have the peculiarity not only of being rooted at a certain depth of the I, but also of filling it to a greater or lesser extent. What is meant by this we have already come to know in moods. We can say that every feeling has a certain mood component inherent in it, by virtue of which it spreads through the I from its place of origin and fills it. A slight resentment, starting from a peripheral layer, can fill me "through and through." But it can also meet a deep joy that bars its further advance to the center; this joy, for its part, advances victoriously from the center to the periphery and fills all the overlying layers. Feelings appear, to keep to the old image, as different sources of light, on whose position and luminosity the resulting illumination depends. The image of light and color can illustrate the relation of feeling and mood in yet another respect. Mood components can belong to feelings essentially or occasionally, just as colors have a specific brightness besides their higher or lower degrees of brightness. Thus there is a serious joy and a

cheerful joy; but apart from that, a "light" character is specific to joy. From these relations between mood and feeling, on the other hand, we can gain further insight into the essence of moods. I can experience not only a mood and myself in it, but also its penetration into me. I can, for example, experience it as coming from a particular lived experience: I experience how 'something' puts me out of sorts. This "something" is always the correlate of a feeling act: the failure of a message to arrive, which annoys me; the scratchy violin note, which displeases me; the bad deed, which outrages me. The "range" of the mood aroused then depends on the I-depth of the feeling act, and correlatively on the height of the value felt. The layer to which I may "reasonably" let it penetrate is prescribed. —To the depth and range of feelings is added, as a third dimension, their duration. They fill the I not only in its depth and breadth but also in its "length," in its experienced time, by persisting in it. And here too there is something like a specific duration of feeling that depends on depth. How long a feeling (or a mood) "may" persist in me, fill me, or dominate me is also subject to laws of reason. This dependence of the personal structure on laws of reason, which we have now pointed out several times, clearly separates it from the soul, which is subject not to laws of reason but to natural laws. The intensity of feelings is to be distinguished from their depth, range, and duration. A slight ill humor can last a long time and can fill me to a greater or lesser degree. Further, I can feel a high value less intensely than a lower one and thereby be led astray into realizing the lower instead of the higher. "Led astray": this implies that rational lawfulness is being violated here. Properly speaking, the stronger feeling belongs to the greater value, and it is this feeling that then sets the will in motion. In fact, however, this is not always so. The smallest accident in our surroundings tends, as has often been remarked, to excite us far more violently than a catastrophe on another continent, even though we do not fail to recognize which event has the greater significance. Is this because in the one case we lack the intuitive basis for a primordial value-ception, or is emo-

tional contagion at work in the other? In any case, this seems to be an effect of psychophysical organization. It can be seen with insight that a definite intensity belongs to every feeling, and it can still be understood that the stronger feeling steers the will. But the actual strength of a feeling can no longer be understood, only explained causally. It might perhaps be shown that each individual has a total measure of psychic power, and that this determines the intensity each single lived experience may claim. Thus the duration that belongs to a feeling according to laws of reason may exceed an individual's "psychic powers." The feeling will then either die out before its time or bring about a "psychic collapse." (In the first case one will speak of a "normal" disposition, in the second of an "abnormal" or pathological one. The "norm" in question here is that of biological utility, not a norm of the laws of reason. It is not the feeling that is pathological but succumbing to it.) But this is not the place to go into this question further. The analysis of lived experiences of will still remains for us to carry out. We must also examine the strivings related to them for any significance they may have for the constitution of personality. According to *Pfänder*, they seem to have such significance.[22] "The *strivings* and counter-strivings that arise in the I," he explains,[23] "do not after all have the same position in this I. For this I possesses a peculiar structure: the I-center proper, or I-core, is surrounded by the I-body. And strivings can arise within the I but outside the I-center, in the I-body, and so be experienced, in this sense, as eccentric strivings." The distinction between I-core and I-body seems to correspond to our distinction between central and peripheral personal layers. Central and eccentric strivings would accordingly break forth from different layers and have different I-depth. This description, however, does not seem correct to me. The true sense of the justified distinction between central and eccentric strivings seems to me to be quite different. As far as I can see, they are

22 Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941), leading figure of the Munich circle of phenomenologists; Stein cites his "Motive und Motivation" (1911).
23 STEIN'S NOTE. Motiv und Motivation, p. 169.

different modes in which the act of striving is performed. Central striving is striving in the form of the cogito; eccentric strivings are the corresponding "background experiences." This does not yet show that striving has no I-depth at all. When a noise I hear awakens in me the striving to turn toward it, I do indeed not find that, unreflectively, I experience in this striving anything other than the pure I on which the "pull" is exerted, or that the striving rises up from any depth. On the other hand, there are sometimes experienced 'sources' of striving from which it issues:[24] a discomfort, a dissatisfaction, or the like. By virtue of its origin in such a source, striving secondarily acquires depth and constitutive significance for the personality (namely, when its source first becomes visible in the striving). Further, the vehemence and persistence of a striving then also prove to depend on the I-depth of its source, and thus to be open to a rational lawfulness. Pure striving, by contrast, which does not well up from a feeling as experienced, is neither reasonable nor unreasonable.—In contrast to striving, willing, according to Pfänder, is always centered in the I.[25] We agree with this, translating it into our own view: the decision of the will is always carried out in the form of the "cogito." With this, as we already know, nothing has yet been said about the will as an "experiencing of oneself." According to *Pfänder*, "if it is to be a genuine act of will, one's own I must not merely be thought but must itself be grasped immediately and made the subject-object of the practical resolutions. Immediate self-consciousness thus belongs to willing, but not to striving. The act of will is thus a practical act of resolving, filled with a definite volitional meaning, which proceeds from the I-center and, penetrating to the I itself, determines it to a definite future conduct. It is an act of self-determination, in the sense that the I is both the subject and the object of the act." We cannot fully agree with this analysis either. The object of the act of will is what is willed, or what is meant in willing. A self-determination to future conduct lies (as

24 STEIN'S NOTE. Pfänder, op. cit., p. 168.
25 STEIN'S NOTE. Pfänder, op. cit., p. 174.

experienced) only in willing a future action, not in simply willing a state of affairs to be realized. In simple willing, therefore, the I is not an object, but it is always experienced on the side of the subject: "I" will give being to what is not. At first this is only the pure I. But every willing is built upon a feeling, and every willing is also bound up with that feeling of "being able to realize." In every free, undoubting "I will" there lies an "I can"; only a timid "I would like to, though" is compatible with an "I cannot"; "I will, but I cannot" is nonsense. For these reasons every willing reaches into the personal structure in a twofold way and reveals its depths. —The position of *theoretical* acts still needs closer examination. At first they seemed to us wholly irrelevant to the structure of personality, not rooted in it at all. Yet we have now encountered them several times, and we may suspect that they must be drawn in in many ways. Every feeling act (and of course every act of will as well) is built upon a theoretical act, so a purely feeling subject is an impossibility. From this side, however, theoretical acts appear only as conditions of personality, not as its constituents, and I do not believe either that, for example, simple acts of perception have any higher significance. It is different with specific acts of cognition. Knowing is itself a value, and indeed a value graded according to its object. The reflecting act in which knowing comes to givenness can therefore always become the basis of a value-ception, and so knowing, like every felt value, becomes relevant for the structure of personality. Yet this domain of value does not open itself only to the reflective glance. Not only knowledge already gained but (perhaps to an even greater extent) knowledge not yet realized is felt as a value. This feeling of value is the source of all striving for knowledge, the "mainspring" of all will to know. An object presents itself to me, dark, veiled, unclear. It stands there as something to be unveiled, demanding clarification. This clarifying and unveiling, and its result, clear and distinct knowledge, stand before me as a value insistently felt, and draw me irresistibly into themselves. It is a domain of value of its own that opens up here, and a layer of personality of its own that corresponds to

it. It is a very deep layer, often taken for the core layer as such; and for a certain personal type, the specifically "scholarly natures," it is in fact their essential core. But still more can be drawn from the analysis of knowing. We spoke of striving for knowledge and willing to know: the process of knowing is itself action, is deed. I feel not only the value of the knowledge to be realized and joy in the knowledge realized. In realizing it I also feel that power and might which we found in other willing and acting.

THE PERSON AND THE WORLD OF VALUES

The person is a unity of meaning correlated with a world of values; types follow from this.

4.3.3 We have thus sketched the constitution of the personality in outline. We find in it a unity of meaning that builds itself up entirely in experiencing, and that is further distinguished by being subject to the laws of reason. We found a thoroughgoing correlation of person and world, or more precisely of person and world of values. For our purposes it is enough to have shown this correlation. It follows that a fully worked-out theory of the person (to which, of course, we lay no claim here) is not possible without a prior theory of value, and that it can be obtained from such a theory of value. To the full hierarchy of values there would correspond the ideal person, who feels all values adequately and in accordance with their order of rank. The absence of certain domains of value, or alterations in the order of rank of values, as well as differences in the intensity of the experiencing of values and in the preference for one of the possible forms of expression (bodily expression, willing and acting, etc.), would yield other personal types. A worked-out theory of types would perhaps be that ontological foundation of the sciences of spirit to which Dilthey's efforts were devoted.

§ 4. THE GIVENNESS OF THE FOREIGN PERSON

The foreign person is constituted in spiritual acts experienced empathically.

4.4.1 We have still to establish how the constitution of the foreign person stands out from that of one's own person, and also how the person differs from the psychophysical individual whose constitution we dealt with earlier. After all the preceding investigations, the first task no longer seems to present any great difficulty. As one's own person is constituted in one's own primordial spiritual acts, so the foreign person is constituted in acts experienced empathically. I experience every action of another as issuing from a willing, and this in turn from a feeling. With this I am given at the same time a layer of his person and a domain of values that are in principle experienceable for him; and this domain in turn meaningfully motivates the expectation of possible future acts of will and actions. A single action, then, and likewise a single bodily expression—a glance or a smile—can give me an insight into the core of the person. Further questions that arise can be answered once we have discussed the relation between 'soul' and 'person.'

§ 5. SOUL AND PERSON

Personal properties form an unchangeable core that unfolds, or fails to, under natural influences.

4.5.1 We have encountered enduring properties in both. But the qualities of the soul are constituted for inner perception and for empathy insofar as these make lived experiences into objects, whereas the personal qualities disclose themselves in original experiencing or in empathically putting oneself into another's place—even if, as with the lived experiences in question themselves, a special turn of regard is still needed to make a mere "becoming aware" into a grasping. There are characteristics (or "dispositions") that in principle can only be perceived, not lived through: memory, for instance, which manifests itself to the

grasping regard in my memories. These, then, belong to the soul in a specific sense. Naturally the personal properties too—the goodness, the readiness for sacrifice, the energy that I experience in my actions—become properties of the soul when they are perceived in a psychophysical individual. But they are also conceivable as properties of a purely spiritual subject, and they retain their own essence even within the context of the psychophysical organization. Their special position shows itself in the fact that they stand outside the causal nexus. We found the soul, its lived experiences and all its characteristics to be dependent on all sorts of circumstances, open to influence by one another as well as by the states and the constitution of the living body, and finally integrated into the whole nexus of physical and psychic reality. Under the constant action of such influences the individual develops with all its characteristics. This human being is constituted as he is because he was exposed to such and such influences; under other circumstances he would have developed differently. His 'nature' has something empirically contingent about it; one can think of it as modified in many ways. But this variability is not unlimited; here we come up against limits. Not only must the categorial structure of the soul as soul be preserved; within its individual form, too, we meet an unchangeable core: the personal structure. I can imagine Caesar in a village instead of in Rome, and I can imagine him transposed into the twentieth century. His historically established individuality would certainly undergo many changes then, but just as certainly he will remain Caesar. The personal structure marks off a range of possible variations within which its real expression can develop "according to circumstances." Capacities of the soul—so we said earlier—can be developed through use and, on the other hand, blunted. Through practice I can be "educated" to enjoy works of art, and on the other hand frequent repetition can spoil that enjoyment for me. But it is only by virtue of my psychophysical organization that I am subject to the "power of habit." A purely spiritual subject feels a value and in doing so experiences the corresponding layer of its essence.

This feeling can become neither deeper nor less deep. A value that is closed to it remains so; a value that it feels is not lost to it. And a psychophysical individual, too, can never be led by habituation to a value for which it lacks the corresponding personal layer. The layers of the person cannot 'develop' or "regress"; they can only come to be disclosed, or not, in the course of psychic development. This holds for "intersubjective" as well as for "intrasubjective" causality. The person as such is not subject to emotional contagion; rather, contagion serves to veil the true content of the personality. The circumstances of life in which an individual grows up can produce in him an aversion to certain actions (authoritarian moral education!) that corresponds to no original personal property and can be removed by other 'influences.' Someone who has been brought up on moral principles and acts in accordance with them will, when he turns his gaze "into himself," perceive with satisfaction a "virtuous" human being. Until one day, in an action that breaks forth from deep within him, he *experiences* himself as someone of an entirely different kind than he had believed himself to be until then. One can speak of a *development* of the person under the influence of the circumstances of life (of a "significance of milieu for character," which Dilthey too assumes[26]) only insofar as the real environment is the object of the person's experiencing of values and determines which layers come to be disclosed and which possible actions become actual. Thus the psychophysical empirical person can be a more or less perfect realization of the spiritual person. It is conceivable that a human being's life is a perfect process of the unfolding of his personality; but it is also possible that psychophysical development does not permit a full unfolding— and that in various ways. Someone who dies in childhood or falls victim to paralysis cannot fully unfold "himself." An empirical contingency—the weakness of the organism—destroys the meaning of life (if we see that meaning in the unfolding of the person), just as, on the other hand, a strong organism keeps life going when its meaning has already

26 STEIN'S NOTE. Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität, p. 327.

been fulfilled and the person has fully unfolded. The incompleteness here resembles the fragmentary character of a work of art of which one part has been fully worked out while of the rest only the raw material has survived. But even with a durable organism a deficient unfolding is possible: someone who never meets a person worthy of love or of hatred may never experience the depths in which love and hatred are rooted. For someone who has never seen a work of art, who has never got beyond the walls of the big city, the enjoyment of nature and of art, and his receptivity to it, may remain closed forever. A person "unfinished" in this way resembles a sketch never carried out. Finally, it is also conceivable that the personality does not unfold at all. Someone who does not himself feel values, but acquires all his feelings only by contagion from others, cannot experience 'himself'; he cannot become a personality, but at most a semblance of one. Only in this last case can we say that no spiritual person is present. In all the other cases we must not equate the non-unfolding of the person with non-existence; rather, the spiritual person exists even when it is not unfolded. We can call the psychophysical *individual*, as the realization of the spiritual person, the "empirical person." As "nature" it is subject to causal laws, as "spirit" to laws of meaning. That meaningful connection among the properties of the soul of which we spoke earlier—by virtue of which grasping one of them rationally motivates the passage to another—likewise belongs to them only as personal properties. The finest receptivity to ethical values and a will that leaves them wholly out of account and lets itself be guided only by sensual drives do not fit together in the unity of a meaning; they are unintelligible. And so to understand an action means, too, not merely to carry it out empathic-

ally as a single lived experience, but to experience it as issuing meaningfully from the overall structure of the person.[27]

§ 6. THE EXISTENCE OF SPIRIT

History must understand spirit and establish what of it has become real.

4.6.1 Simmel has said that the intelligibility of characters guarantees their objectivity, that it constitutes "historical truth." This truth, to be sure, would not differ from poetic truth. A creature of free imagination can also be an intelligible person. Historical objects must in addition have reality. Some point of contact must be there; some trait of the historical character must be given to me, in order to establish the meaningful connection it opens up to me as a historical fact. But once I have got hold of such a trait, in whatever way, I have something that exists, not a mere product of phantasy. In empathically understanding the foreign spiritual individual I also have the possibility of bringing to givenness his conduct under certain circumstances, conduct that is not attested. Such action is required by the structure of his person, of which I am certain.[28] If he in fact acted otherwise, then disruptive influences of the psychophysical organization prevented his person from living itself out freely. But the very possibility of such disruptive influences deprives that determination of the character of a statement about empirical existence, and I may not pass it off as a statement of fact. Yet a mere statement of facts on its own is still far less 'historically true.' The most exact record of everything Frederick the Great did from the day of his birth to his last breath does not give us a spark of the spirit that intervened to reshape the destinies of

27 STEIN'S NOTE. Meyer too (Stilgesetz der Poetik, p. 29 f.) draws attention to the "necessity" that belongs to re-experiencing, *without*, however, keeping lawfulness of meaning and causal lawfulness apart.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Richard M. Meyer (1860–1914), German literary historian; *Das Stilgesetz der Poetik* (The Law of Style in Poetics, 1901).

28 Georg Simmel (1858–1918), German philosopher and sociologist, who wrote on the philosophy of history.

Europe—whereas the understanding gaze takes hold of that spirit in a casual remark, in a short letter.[29] The mere stringing together of facts turns meaningful happening into blind, causally regulated happening, and neglects the world of spirit, which is no less real and no less knowable than the natural world. Because human beings belong to both realms, the history of humanity must take both into account. It is to understand the formations of spirit and spiritual life, and to establish what of them has become reality. And it can call on natural science to help explain what has not come to be, or has come to be otherwise, than the laws of spirit demanded.[30]

§ 7. DILTHEY. A) THE BEING AND VALUE OF THE PERSON

Stein accepts Dilthey's union of fact and norm but separates rational lawfulness from value.

4.7.1 We have already stressed how close our view is to Dilthey's, although he did not carry out the fundamental separation of nature and spirit. He too recognizes the rational lawfulness of spiritual life. He puts it by saying that in the sciences of spirit being and ought, fact and norm, are inseparably bound up,[31] and that the connections of life are unities of value that carry within themselves the standard by which they are to be judged. But a distinction must still be drawn between rational lawfulness and value. Spiritual acts combine, as they are lived, into connections of a definite general form. These forms can be brought to givenness in a reflective attitude and expressed in theoretical propositions, which can also be turned into equivalent propositions of ought. Thanks to this formal lawfulness,

29 Frederick II of Prussia (1712–1786), king from 1740.

30 STEIN'S NOTE. E. v. Hartmann, in his Aesthetics, characterized the relation between the psychophysical and the spiritual individual in a way similar to what we have tried to show here (II, pp. 190 ff., 200 ff.). For him every individual is an empirical realization of an "individual idea."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906), German philosopher, author of *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* and a two-volume *Ästhetik* (1886–87).

31 STEIN'S NOTE. Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität, p. 300.

spiritual acts are subject to being judged "correct" or "incorrect." The lived unity of an action consists, for example, in a value-ception motivating an act of will which—as soon as the possibility of realizing it is given—translates itself into practice. Formulated as a theoretical proposition, this yields the general law of reason: whoever feels a value and can realize it, does so. Turned normatively: if you feel a value and can realize it, then do so.[32] Every action that conforms to this law is rational, or correct. But this establishes nothing as yet about the material value of the action. Only the formal conditions of a valuable action are fulfilled. What material value belongs to it, the laws of reason do not say. In the same way, the intelligible structures of lived experience are objects of a possible evaluation, but they are not already constituted as objects of value in empathic grasping (apart from that special class of unreflected experiences of one's own value to which we drew attention).[33]

B) PERSONAL TYPES AND THE CONDITIONS OF EMPATHY WITH PERSONS

My own structure limits what I can fulfill in empathy, but not what I can understand.

4.7.2 *Persons.*

4.7.3 Dilthey further sees, as we saw, structures of lived experience of a typical character in personalities. Here too we agree with him. Thanks to the correlation of values, experiencing of values, and layers of the person, all possible types of persons can be constructed a priori from a universal knowledge of values, and empirical persons appear as realizations of these types. On the other hand, every empathic grasping of a personality

32 STEIN'S NOTE. We need not go into the corresponding ontic lawfulness to which the correlates of those acts—states of affairs of value and of ought—are subject (what is of value ought to be).

33 STEIN'S NOTE. See above, p. 115 f.

means gaining such a type.[34] Now, in Dilthey and others we encountered the view that the understanding of foreign individuality is bound to one's own, that our *structure of lived experience* marks off the domain of what is intelligible to us. This is, at a higher level, a repetition of what we showed, in connection with the constitution of the psychophysical individual, to be a possible deception of empathy but not something belonging to the essence of empathy: that one's individual constitution is made the basis for experiencing other individuals. There, to be sure, we could argue that it is the typical rather than the individual constitution that is the basis of "analogizing." How are we to manage here, where each individual person is itself already a type? Well, in the realm of spirit, as in that of nature, there are types of different levels of generality. There the most general type, "living organism," marked off the range of possibilities of empathy; the further down we went, the greater became the number of phenomena shared by type. Things are *not* much different here. The individual structure of lived experience is an "eidetic singularity," the lowest difference of superordinate general types: age, sex, occupation, social rank, nation, epoch are general structures of lived experience of this kind, under which the individual one falls. Thus the Gretchen type represents for us, among other things, the type of the German middle-class girl of the sixteenth century; that is, the individual type is constituted by its "participation" in more general ones. And the highest type, which marks off the domain of the intelligible, is that of the spiritual person, or of the value-experiencing subject in general. Every subject in which I empathically grasp a value-ception I regard as a person whose lived experiences join together into an intelligible whole of meaning. How much of its structure of lived experience I can bring to *fulfilling* intuition depends on my own.[35] In principle, all foreign experiencing that

34 STEIN'S NOTE. The typical character of the personal structure does not contradict the fact that every individual and every one of its concrete lived experiences is something absolutely unique, because the content of several streams of consciousness cannot in principle be the same.

35 Gretchen: the young woman seduced by Faust in Goethe's *Faust*, Part One.

could be derived from my own personal structure can be fulfilled, even where that structure has not yet come to real unfolding. Empathically I can experience values and discover corresponding layers of my person that my primordial experiencing has not yet given occasion to disclose. Someone who has never himself looked danger in the eye can nevertheless, in empathically presentifying another's situation, experience himself as brave or cowardly. What conflicts with my own structure of lived experience, on the other hand, I cannot bring to fulfillment; but I can still have it given in the manner of an empty representation. I can myself be an unbeliever and still understand that another sacrifices to his faith everything he possesses in earthly goods. I see that he acts in this way and, empathizing, I ascribe to him as the motive of his action a value-ception whose correlate is not accessible to me, and I attribute to him a personal layer that I do not myself possess. In this way I empathically gain the type of the "homo religiosus" [religious human being], which is foreign to my essence, and I understand it, even though what newly confronts me there will always remain unfulfilled. When others, again, gear their whole lives to acquiring material goods that I think little of, and let everything else take second place, I see that higher domains of value into which I have insight are closed to them; and I understand them too, although they belong to a different type. We now see with what right Dilthey can say: "the faculty of apprehension at work in the sciences of spirit is the whole human being." Only someone who experiences himself as a person, as a meaningful whole, can understand other persons. And we understand just as well why Ranke wished to "extinguish" his self in order to see things "as they were." The 'self' is the individual structure of lived experience; in it the great master of understanding recognizes the source of deception from which danger threatens us. If we take it as our standard, we lock ourselves into the prison of our own particularity: others become riddles to us, or, what is worse

still, we remodel them after our own image and so falsify historical truth.[36]

§ 8. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMPATHY FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF ONE'S OWN PERSON

Empathy with others unfolds what slumbers in us and shows us our own worth and lack.

4.8.1 What has been said also shows what significance knowledge of the foreign personality has for our "self-knowledge." It not only teaches us, as we saw earlier, to make ourselves into an object. As empathy with "kindred natures," that is, with persons of our own type, it brings to unfolding what "slumbers" in us; and as empathy with personal structures of a different kind, it makes clear to us what we are not, and in what we are more or less than others. With this, alongside *self-knowledge*, we are given at the same time an important aid to *self-evaluation*. Since the experiencing of values is foundational for one's own value, the new values gained in empathy at the same time open our view onto unknown values of our own person. When, empathizing, we come upon domains of value closed to us, we become aware of a lack or a disvalue of our own. Every grasping of persons of a different kind can become the foundation of a comparison of values. And since in the act of preferring or placing after, values often come to givenness that would remain unnoticed on their own, we sometimes learn to assess ourselves rightly by experiencing ourselves as of higher or lower value in comparison with others.

36 STEIN'S NOTE. Admittedly, Dilthey too at first conceives the concept of type not as a spiritual but as a psychic one. This comes out very clearly in his account of the poetic type, which consists largely in a particular character of the psychophysical organization: sharpness and vividness of perceptions and memories, intensity of experiencing, and the like (Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters, p. 344 ff.). Other features that he emphasizes, by contrast, show the peculiarity of a typical personal structure: for instance, the expression of experiencing in the creative activity of phantasy (Über die Einbildungskraft der Dichter, p. 66 f.).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Two essays by Dilthey: "The Poet's Imagination" (1887) and the earlier "On the Imagination of Poets" (1878).

§ 9. IS SPIRIT FOUNDED ON THE PHYSICAL BODY?

Stein asks whether spirit can meet spirit without bodies and leaves the question open.

4.9.1 We still have an important question to discuss. We came to the spiritual person by way of the psychophysical individual; in its constitution we came upon spirit. Within the context of spiritual life we moved freely, without recourse to bodiliness. Once we had entered this labyrinth, we found our way by the guiding thread of 'meaning'; but so far we have come to know no other access than the one we used: expression perceptible to the senses, in facial expressions and the like, or in actions. Could it be an essential necessity that spirit can enter into communication with spirit only through the medium of bodiliness? I, as a psychophysical individual, in fact obtain knowledge of the spiritual life of other individuals in no other way. Admittedly, I know about many people, living and dead, whom I have never seen. But I know about them from others whom I do see, or through the mediation of their works, which I perceive with my senses and which they produced by virtue of their psychophysical organization. The spirit of the past confronts us in many forms, but always bound to a physical body: the word written, printed or carved in stone, spatial form become stone or metal. But does not living community unite me immediately, without bodily mediation, with the spirits of the present, and tradition with those of the past? Certainly I feel at one with others and let their feelings become motives of my willing; but this does not give me the others—it already presupposes their givenness. (And whatever enters into me from others—from the living or the dead—without my knowing it, I regard as my own, and it establishes no communication between spirits.) But how do matters stand with purely spiritual persons, the idea of whom, after all, involves no contradiction? Is no communication of any kind conceivable between them? There have been people who believed they experienced the working of divine grace in a sud-

den transformation of their person, and others who felt themselves guided in their actions by a guardian spirit (one need not think specifically of Socrates' δαιμόνιον [daimonion], which is presumably not to be taken quite so literally).[37] Whether genuine experience is present here, or that unclarity about one's own motives which we found in considering the "idols of self-knowledge"—who is to decide? But with the illusions of such experience, is not the essential possibility of genuine experience in this domain already given as well? In any case, the study of religious consciousness seems to me the most suitable means of answering our question, just as, conversely, its answer is of the highest interest for the religious domain. For now, however, I leave the answering of the question raised here to further research, and content myself with a "non liquet" [it is not clear].

37 The inner divine sign that, according to Plato's *Apology*, warned Socrates against certain actions.