The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

MAX WEBER
1864–1920

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited



FORAGE
forage.com

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism · Max Weber (1864–1920)

Translated from the German with AI (Claude) and edited. Reading edition, Forage, September 2026. forage.com/weber/protestant-ethic

German text: Weber's revised text of 1920, first published in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, vol. I (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920), pp. 17–206, as digitized by zeno.org (www.zeno.org/Soziologie/M/Weber,+Max/Schriften+zur+Religionssoziologie/Die+protestantische+Ethik+und+der+Geist+des+Kapitalismus) from the unchanged 8th printing of 1986 (public domain). The original journal version of 1904–05 is not used. English: translated from the German with AI (Claude), then edited for accuracy and consistency. Not reviewed by a human specialist. Free to reuse under CC BY-SA 4.0. The small numbers set in the text are chapter, section and paragraph ("II.1.14" is Chapter II, section 1, paragraph 14); Weber's notes are numbered [1], [2]… within each section. Where the original uses a term now considered offensive, a neutral term is shown in brackets instead.

The original text is in the public domain. This translation is free to share and adapt under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0): creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0

Set in Source Serif 4.

CONTENTS

Introduction vii

I.1 Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification 1
Schooling and the choice of occupation 6
Minorities and economic rationalism 8
Unworldliness or joy in the world? 9
Piety and business sense 11

I.2 The "Spirit" of Capitalism 17
Benjamin Franklin's sermon 18
The duty to work in a calling 25
Greed is not the difference 26
Traditionalism among workers 56
Traditionalism among entrepreneurs 61
The new spirit breaks in 64
Living for one's business 66
From tolerated to commanded 69
Rationalism takes many forms 98

I.3 Luther's Conception of the Calling 101
Luther's new valuation of work 110
Luther's traditionalism 114
Turning to Calvinism 122
Unintended consequences 125

II.1 The Religious Foundations of Worldly Asceticism 129
The doctrine of predestination 134
The loneliness of the believer 149
Impersonal love of neighbor 155
Am I one of the elect? 179
Vessel or instrument 202
Salvation by works as a system 207

No magic, no confession 224
The rational asceticism of the monks 227
Asceticism leaves the monastery 229
The Bible, and the Old Testament above all 233
Keeping accounts with God 234
Why predestination comes first 236
Reformed Pietism 253
German Pietism: Spener and Francke 293
Zinzendorf and the Moravian Brethren 298
Pietism weighed against Calvinism 303
Methodism 306
The Baptist sects 311
Waiting for the Spirit 370
Church discipline and the sects 373
Asceticism in the world: a summary 375

II.2 Asceticism and the Spirit of Capitalism 377
Baxter on wealth and wasted time 379
Labor as ascetic means and as life's purpose 384
The providential division of labor 388
The businessman and the Old Testament 394
Against spontaneous enjoyment 403
The steward of possessions 410
Saving and acquisition 412
Wealth undermines asceticism 417
The utilitarian heir 420
Work as a calling for the worker 422
The casing as hard as steel 425
The limits of this study 428

INTRODUCTION

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is the founding classic of modern sociology. Max Weber first published it as two long essays in 1904–05 and revised it shortly before his death in 1920, for the first volume of his *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*. This is the text given here.

Weber starts from a puzzle: why were Protestants so prominent in modern business? His answer does not lie in greed, which is as old as humanity, but in a peculiar ethic that treats work in a "calling" as a duty and the methodical pursuit of profit as a virtue. He traces it to the Reformation's idea of the calling and above all to Calvinist predestination, which drove believers to seek proof of their salvation in a disciplined, sober, hard-working life. This "worldly asceticism," he argues, helped create the rational conduct of life on which modern capitalism was built, even though no one intended that result.

The book ends with one of the most famous images in social thought: the Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to. Religion has fled, and the modern economic order has become a "casing as hard as steel," the "iron cage" of the English translation, inhabited by "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart." Weber's extensive notes, where he answers his critics and ranges across theology and economic history, make up more than half of the text and are included in full.

I.1 Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification

I. Das Problem—1. Konfession und soziale Schichtung
Why Protestants predominate among business owners, skilled workers and technical staff, and why this calls for explanation.

---

[1] Published in Jaffé's "Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik" [Archive for Social Science and Social Policy] (J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen), vols. XX and XXI (1904 and 1905 respectively). From the extensive literature on it I single out only the most detailed critiques: *F. Rachfahl*, Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus [Calvinism and Capitalism], Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, 1909, nos. 39–43. In reply, my article: Antikritisches zum "Geist" des Kapitalismus [An Anticritique on the "Spirit" of Capitalism], "Archiv" vol. XXX, 1910. Against this, Rachfahl again, op. cit. (Nochmals Kalvinismus und Kapitalismus [Calvinism and Capitalism Once More]), 1910, nos. 22–25, and in reply my "Antikritisches Schlußwort" [Anticritical Last Word], "Archiv" vol. XXXI. (Brentano, in the critique I am about to cite, apparently did not know these last arguments of mine, since he does not cite them along with the others.)[1]

I have included nothing in this edition from the polemic against Rachfahl, which was inevitably rather unproductive. Rachfahl, a scholar I otherwise esteem as well, had ventured here into a field he had not really mastered. I have merely added the (very few) supplementary quotations from my anticritique, and I have tried, by inserting sentences or notes, to rule out every conceivable misunderstanding in future.—Further: *W. Sombart* in his book "Der Bourgeois" (Munich and Leipzig 1913), to which I return in the notes below. Finally: Lujo *Brentano* in Excursus II in the appendix to his Munich ceremonial address (at the Academy of

1 Edgar Jaffé (1866–1921), economist, who acquired the Archiv in 1903 and edited it together with Weber and Werner Sombart.

Sciences, 1913) on Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus [The Beginnings of Modern Capitalism] (published separately, and expanded by excursuses, Munich 1916).[2]

I shall also return to this critique in separate notes as occasion arises.—I invite anyone who (contrary to expectation) should take an interest in the matter to satisfy himself by comparison that I have deleted, reinterpreted or weakened *not a single sentence* of my essay that contained any substantively essential assertion, and that I have added no substantively *divergent* assertions. There was no reason whatever to do so, and as the argument proceeds, those who still have doubts will be compelled to convince themselves of this in the end.—The two scholars last named are in even sharper dispute with each other than with me. Brentano's critique of W.

Sombart's work Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben [The Jews and Economic Life] I consider well founded in substance in many respects, but nonetheless very unjust in many ways—quite apart from the fact that Brentano, too, has probably not recognized what is decisive about the Jewish problem, which is left entirely aside here for the time being (more on this later).

From the theological side, this work prompted numerous valuable individual suggestions, and its reception was on the whole friendly and, even where views differed on particular points, very objective. I value this all the more because I would not have been surprised by a certain antipathy toward the way these matters must inevitably be treated here. What the theologian devoted to his religion finds *valuable* in it naturally cannot receive its due here. We are dealing with aspects of the life of religions that are often—when religiously *evaluated*—quite superficial and crude. But these aspects, to be sure, *also* existed, and often, precisely because they were crude and superficial, they also had the strongest outward effect.

—Instead of citing it repeatedly on every individual point, I shall here once more briefly refer to the great book by *E. Troeltsch*, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen [The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Groups] (Tübingen 1912). Besides its rich content in other respects, it is also a most welcome supplement to, and confirmation of, what is argued here on our problem. It deals with the universal history of the ethics of Western Christianity from its own, very wide-

2 Werner Sombart (1863–1941), economist and historian of capitalism, and Lujo Brentano (1844–1931), economist and liberal social reformer, were among the chief critics of Weber's thesis.

ranging points of view. The author is concerned more with the *doctrine* of religion, I more with its practical *effect*.[3]

I.1.1 A glance at the occupational statistics of a country of mixed religious composition tends, with striking frequency[4], to reveal a phenomenon that has repeatedly been discussed with vigor in the Catholic press and literature[5] and at the Catholic congresses in Germany: the overwhelmingly *Protestant* character of capital ownership and entrepreneurship, as well as of the upper, skilled strata of the workforce, and especially of the higher-level technically or commercially trained personnel of modern enterprises[6]. We find this phenomenon expressed in the figures of religious statistics not only where a difference in confession coincides with a difference of nationality, and thus of level of cultural development—as in eastern Germany between Germans and Poles—but almost everywhere capitalist development, in the period of its flowering, had a free hand to restruc-

3 Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923), Protestant theologian and historian of Christianity, Weber's friend and colleague at Heidelberg.

4 WEBER'S NOTE. The divergent cases are explained—not always, but often—by the fact that the religious affiliation of an industry's workforce naturally depends *first and foremost* on the confession of its location, or of the area from which its workforce is recruited. This circumstance often distorts, at first glance, the picture presented by some religious statistics—those of the Rhine Province, for instance. Moreover, the figures are of course conclusive only if the individual occupations are broken down and counted in great detail. Otherwise very large entrepreneurs may be lumped together with "master craftsmen" working on their own in the category of "head of establishment." Above all, however, *present-day* "high capitalism" in general, especially as regards the broad unskilled lower stratum of its workforce, has become independent of the influences that confession *could* have had in the past. More on this later.

5 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., e.g., *Schell*, Der Katholizismus als Prinzip des Fortschrittes [Catholicism as a Principle of Progress], Würzburg 1897, p. 31.—v. *Hertling*, Das Prinzip des Katholizismus und die Wissenschaft [The Principle of Catholicism and Science], Freiburg 1899, p. 58.

6 WEBER'S NOTE. One of my students some time ago worked through the most detailed statistical material we possess on these matters: the religious statistics of *Baden*. Cf. *Martin Offenbacher*, Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden [Confession and Social Stratification: A Study of the Economic Situation of Catholics and Protestants in Baden], Tübingen and Leipzig 1901 (vol. IV, no. 5 of the Volkswirtschaftliche Abhandlungen der badischen Hochschulen). The facts and figures presented below by way of illustration are all taken from this work.

ture the population socially according to its needs and to organize it occupationally; and the more this was the case, the more clearly we find it. Now, admittedly, the relatively far stronger participation of Protestants—that is, a participation exceeding their percentage of the total population—in the ownership of capital[7], in management and in the upper levels of work in large modern industrial and commercial enterprises[8] can be traced in part to historical reasons[9]. These lie far in the past, and in them religious affiliation appears not as the *cause* of economic phenomena but, to a certain extent, as their *consequence*. Participation in those economic functions presupposes in part the ownership of capital, in part a costly education, and in part—most often—both; today it is tied to the possession of inherited wealth, or at least of a certain affluence. Now, precisely a large number of the richest regions of the Empire, those most favored by nature or by their location on trade routes, and the most economically developed—and in particular the majority of the rich *cities*—had turned to Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and the after-effects of this still benefit Protestants today in the economic struggle for existence. But this raises the historical question: what was the reason for this especially strong predisposition of the most economically developed regions toward a revolution in the church? And here the answer is by no means as simple as one might at first think. Certainly, the casting off of economic traditionalism appears to be a factor that must have greatly reinforced the inclination to doubt religious tradition as well, and to rebel against traditional authorities in general. But one must bear in mind something that is often forgotten today: that the Reformation meant not so much the *elimination* of the church's control over life altogether as the replacement of its

7 WEBER'S NOTE. In Baden in 1895, for example, the capital assessed for the tax on *capital income* came to 954,060 marks per 1,000 Protestants, and to 589,000 marks per 1,000 Catholics. The Jews, to be sure, with over 4 million per 1,000, are far out in front. (Figures from Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 21.)

8 WEBER'S NOTE. On this, compare the whole of Offenbacher's discussion.

9 WEBER'S NOTE. On this, too, more detailed discussion for Baden in the first two chapters of Offenbacher's work.

previous form by *another*. It meant, in fact, the replacement of an extremely comfortable control—one scarcely felt in practice at the time, and in many cases little more than a formality—by a regulation of the whole conduct of life that penetrated to the greatest conceivable degree into every sphere of domestic and public life, a regulation that was infinitely burdensome and meant in earnest. The rule of the Catholic Church—"punishing the heretic, but lenient to the sinner," as it was even more in the past than it is today—is tolerated at present even by peoples with a thoroughly modern economic physiognomy, and it was likewise tolerated by the richest, most economically developed regions the world knew around the turn from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century. The rule of Calvinism, as it was in force in the sixteenth century in Geneva and Scotland, around the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in large parts of the Netherlands, and in the seventeenth in New England and for a time in England itself, would be for us the most utterly intolerable form of ecclesiastical control of the individual that could exist. That is exactly how it was felt at the time by broad strata of the old patriciate, too, in Geneva as well as in Holland and England. What the reformers who arose in the most economically developed countries in particular found to criticize was not too much but too little ecclesiastical and religious control of life. How is it, then, that at that time precisely these most economically developed countries—and, as we shall see, within them precisely the "bourgeois" middle classes that were then rising economically—not only submitted to that Puritan tyranny, previously unknown to them, but developed in its defense a heroism such as *bourgeois* classes *as such* have seldom known before and never since: "the last of our heroisms," as Carlyle says, not without reason?[10]

10 Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), Scottish historian and essayist, an admirer of Cromwell and the Puritans.

SCHOOLING AND THE CHOICE OF OCCUPATION

Catholic parents favor humanist schools, and Catholic journeymen stay in the crafts while Protestants move into factories.

I.1.2 But further, and above all: even if, as I have said, the greater participation of Protestants in the ownership of capital and in leading positions in the modern economy can today be understood in part simply as a consequence of their historically inherited, and on average better, endowment with property, there are, on the other hand, phenomena in which the causal relationship is undoubtedly *not* of this kind. Among them, to mention only a few, are the following. First, there is the difference—demonstrable quite generally, in Baden as in Bavaria and, for example, in Hungary—in the *kind* of higher education that Catholic parents, as opposed to Protestant parents, tend to give their children. That the percentage of Catholics among the pupils and graduates of the "higher" schools lags considerably, on the whole, behind their share of the total population[11] may indeed be attributed in large part to the inherited differences in wealth already mentioned. But *among* Catholic graduates, too, the percentage of those who come from the modern institutions designed and suited specifically for preparation for technical studies and for industrial and commercial occupations—for a middle-class business life in general—namely the Realgymnasien, Realschulen, higher Bürgerschulen, etc., again lags strik-

11 WEBER'S NOTE. In 1895 the population of Baden was 37.0 percent Protestant, 61.3 percent Catholic and 1.5 percent Jewish. But the religious affiliation of pupils in 1885/91 at the schools beyond the elementary level, attendance at which is *not* compulsory, was as follows (after Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 16):

(Protestants – Catholics – Jews) Gymnasien 43% – 46% – 9.5% / Realgymnasien *69* – 31 – 9 / Oberrealschulen *52* – 41 – 7 / Realschulen 49 – 40 – 11 / higher Bürgerschulen 51 – 37 – 12 / Average 48% – 42% – 10%

Exactly the same phenomena in Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Alsace-Lorraine and Hungary (see the figures in Offenbacher, op. cit., pp. 18 f.).

ingly *further* behind that of Protestants[12], while Catholics prefer the preparation offered by the humanist Gymnasien. This is a phenomenon that is not explained by those differences; on the contrary, it must itself be invoked to explain the slight participation of Catholics in capitalist acquisition.[13] Even more striking, however, is an observation that helps us understand the lesser participation of Catholics in the skilled *work*force of modern large-scale industry. It is a well-known phenomenon that the factory draws its skilled labor to a large extent from the young generation of the crafts, leaving to the crafts the training of its workers and withdrawing them once they are trained. This phenomenon appears to a considerably greater degree among Protestant than among Catholic journeymen. In other words, among journeymen the Catholics show the stronger inclination to remain in the crafts, and so become *master* craftsmen relatively more often, while the Protestants flow off into the factories to a relatively greater extent, there to fill the upper ranks of the skilled workforce and of industrial management staff[14]. In these cases the causal relationship is undoubtedly such that the *distinctive mental character instilled by upbringing*—here, the direction of education shaped by the religious atmosphere of the home region and the parental home—has determined the choice of occupation and the subsequent course of working life.

12 WEBER'S NOTE. See the figures in the previous note. According to them, total Catholic attendance at secondary schools, which lags a third behind the Catholic share of the population, exceeds that share by a few percent *only* in the Gymnasien (mainly as preparation for the study of theology). With a view to later discussion, it may also be pointed out as characteristic that in Hungary the *Reformed* display the typical features of Protestant secondary-school attendance to an even greater degree (Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 19, note at end).

13 Types of German secondary school emphasizing modern languages, mathematics and science, as opposed to the humanist Gymnasium, centered on Latin and Greek.

14 WEBER'S NOTE. See the evidence in Offenbacher, op. cit., p. 54, and the tables at the end of the work.

MINORITIES AND ECONOMIC RATIONALISM

Unlike other minorities, German Catholics show no push toward business, so the cause must lie in the confessions themselves.

I.1.3 The lesser participation of Catholics in modern business life in Germany is all the more striking because it runs counter to what has been observed at all times[15], and still is today: that national or religious minorities who stand as the "ruled" opposite another group as the "ruling" one tend, *through* their voluntary or involuntary exclusion from politically influential positions, to be driven especially strongly onto the path of acquisition, and that their most gifted members seek to satisfy in this sphere the ambition that can find no outlet in the service of the state. This was unmistakably the case with the Poles in Russia and in eastern Prussia, who are undoubtedly making economic progress—in contrast to Galicia, where they are the ruling group—and earlier with the Huguenots in France under Louis XIV, the Nonconformists and Quakers in England, and—last but not least—the Jews for two thousand years. But among the Catholics in Germany we see nothing of such an effect, or at least nothing that strikes the eye; and in the past, too, unlike the Protestants, they showed no particularly marked *economic* development, either in Holland or in England, in the times when they were persecuted or merely tolerated. Rather, the fact is that the Protestants (especially certain tendencies among them, to be treated separately later) have shown a specific inclination toward economic rationalism, *both* as a ruling *and* as a ruled stratum, *both* as a majority *and* as a minority—an inclination that could not and cannot be observed in the same way among Catholics in

15 WEBER'S NOTE. Particularly well in the passages of Sir W. Petty's writings that will be cited several times later.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Sir William Petty (1623–1687), English economist and pioneer of statistics ("political arithmetic").

either situation[16]. The reason for the difference in behavior must therefore be sought mainly in the enduring inner character of the confessions, and *not* only in their external historical and political situation at any given time[17].

UNWORLDLINESS OR JOY IN THE WORLD?

Weber rejects the popular contrast between otherworldly Catholics and materialistic Protestants as too vague to explain anything.

I.1.4 The first task, then, would be to investigate which elements of the distinctive character of the confessions have worked, and in part still work, in the direction described above. On a superficial view, and on the basis of certain modern impressions, one might be tempted to formulate the contrast as follows: the greater "unworldliness" of Catholicism, the ascetic features of

16 WEBER'S NOTE. For Petty's occasional use of *Ireland* as an example has a very simple reason: there the Protestant stratum was present only as absentee landlords. If the example were meant to assert more, it would (as is well known) have been mistaken, as the position of the "Scotch-Irish" proves. The typical relationship between capitalism and Protestantism existed in Ireland just as it did elsewhere. (On the "Scotch-Irish" in Ireland see C. A. Hanna, The Scotch-Irish, 2 vols., New York, Putnam.)

17 WEBER'S NOTE. This of course does not rule out that the latter, too, has had extremely important consequences. In particular, it does not contradict the fact, to be discussed later, that for the development of the whole atmosphere of life in many Protestant sects it was of decisive importance—affecting their participation in economic life as well—that they represented small and therefore homogeneous minorities. This was the case, for instance, with the *strict* Calvinists practically everywhere outside Geneva and New England, even where they held political power.—That *emigrants* of all the religions of the earth—Indian, Arab, Chinese, Syrian, Phoenician, Greek, Lombard, "Cawerzian"—migrated from highly developed countries to others as bearers of *commercial training* was an entirely universal phenomenon and has nothing to do with our problem. (Brentano, in the essay on "Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus" that will often be cited, points to his own family. But *bankers* of foreign origin, as the principal bearers of commercial experience and connections, have existed at *all* times and in all countries. They are not a peculiarity of *modern* capitalism, and—see later—they were regarded by the Protestants with ethical suspicion. It was different with the Protestant families from Locarno who migrated to Zurich—the Muralts, Pestalozzis, etc.—who very soon came to be among the bearers of a specifically *modern* capitalist (*industrial*) development in Zurich.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The Cawerzen (Cahorsins) were medieval moneylenders, named after the town of Cahors in southern France.

its highest ideals, must train its adherents to greater indifference toward the goods of this world. And this explanation does in fact correspond to the popular scheme by which the two confessions are usually judged today. On the Protestant side, this view is used to criticize those (real or alleged) ascetic ideals of the Catholic conduct of life; on the Catholic side, the reply is the charge of "materialism," said to result from Protestantism's secularization of all the contents of life. A modern writer, too, thought it right to formulate the contrast, as it appears in the attitudes of the two confessions toward business life, as follows: "The Catholic... is quieter; endowed with less of the acquisitive drive, he sets more store by as secure a course of life as possible, even with a smaller income, than by a risky, exciting life that might bring honors and riches. The popular saying jokingly puts it: either eat well or sleep soundly. In the present case the Protestant likes to eat well, while the Catholic wants to sleep soundly[18]." Indeed, "wanting to eat well" may characterize the motivation of the part of the Protestant population in *Germany* that is more indifferent to the church, and *for the present*, incompletely but at least partly correctly. But it is not only that things were very different in the past: for the English, Dutch and American Puritans, as is well known, the very opposite of "joy in the world" was characteristic—and indeed, as we shall see, this was one of their traits most important for us. Beyond that, French Protestantism, for example, long preserved—and to a certain extent preserves to this day—the character that was stamped everywhere on the Calvinist churches in general, and especially on those "under the cross," in the period of the religious wars. It has nonetheless—or, as we shall have to ask further on: perhaps precisely because of this? —been, as is well known, one of the most important bearers of France's industrial and capitalist development, and has remained so on the small scale that persecution allowed. If one wishes to call this seriousness and the strong predominance of religious interests in the conduct of life "unworldliness," *then* the French *Calvinists* were and are at least

18 WEBER'S NOTE. Dr. *Offenbacher*, op. cit., p. 68.

as unworldly as, say, the North German *Catholics*, for whom their Catholicism is undoubtedly a matter of the heart to a degree unmatched by any other people on earth. And *both* then differ in the same direction from the predominant religious party in their country: from the Catholics of France, who in their lower strata are greatly given to enjoying life and in their upper strata are downright hostile to religion, and from the Protestants of Germany, who today are absorbed in worldly business life and in their upper strata are predominantly indifferent to religion[19]. Hardly anything shows as clearly as this parallel that such vague notions as the (alleged!) "unworldliness" of Catholicism, the (alleged!) materialistic "joy in the world" of Protestantism, and many similar ones are of no use here—if only because, in this generality, they are simply not accurate, partly even today and partly at least for the past. If one nevertheless wanted to work with them, *then*—besides the remarks already made—a number of other observations that immediately suggest themselves would even prompt the question whether the whole contrast between unworldliness, asceticism and churchly piety on the one hand, and participation in capitalist business life on the other, ought not in fact to be turned around into an inner *affinity*.

PIETY AND BUSINESS SENSE

Calvinists, Quakers, Mennonites and Pietists combine intense piety with conspicuous commercial success.

I.1.5 It is in fact striking—to begin with some entirely external factors—how large the number of representatives of precisely the most inward forms of Christian piety has been who came from merchant circles. Pietism in particular owes a strikingly

19 WEBER'S NOTE. Exceptionally subtle remarks on the characteristic peculiarities of the confessions in Germany and France, and on the way these contrasts intersect with other cultural elements in the struggle between nationalities in Alsace, in the excellent study by *W. Wittich*, Deutsche und französische Kultur im Elsaß [German and French Culture in Alsace] (Illustrierte Elsäss. Rundschau, 1900; also published as an offprint).

large number of its most earnest adherents to this background. One might think here of a kind of contrast effect produced by "mammonism" on inward natures ill suited to the merchant's vocation; and certainly, as with Francis of Assisi, so with many of those Pietists, the process of "conversion" very often presented itself in this way, subjectively, to the convert himself. Similarly, one might then try to explain the phenomenon—likewise strikingly frequent, down to Cecil Rhodes—that capitalist entrepreneurs on the grandest scale come from parsonages as a reaction against an ascetic upbringing in youth. This mode of explanation fails, however, where a virtuoso capitalist business sense *coincides*, in the same persons and groups, with the most intense forms of a piety that pervades and regulates the whole of life. And these cases are by no means isolated; they are positively a distinguishing feature of whole groups among the historically most important Protestant churches and sects. Calvinism in particular displays this combination *wherever it has appeared*[20]. Little as it was tied to any particular single class in any country during the spread of the Reformation (as indeed none of the Protestant confessions was), it is nonetheless characteristic, and in a certain sense "typical," that in the French Huguenot churches, for example, monks and people engaged in industry and trade (merchants, craftsmen) were soon especially strongly represented in number among the converts, and

20 WEBER'S NOTE. What is meant, of course, is: *on condition* that the *possibility* of capitalist development existed in the region in question *at all*.

remained so, particularly in times of persecution[21]. Already the Spaniards knew that "heresy" (i.e., the Calvinism of the Dutch) "promotes the commercial spirit," and this corresponds entirely to the views that Sir W. Petty put forward in his discussion of the reasons for the capitalist rise of the Netherlands. Gothein[22] rightly calls the Calvinist diaspora the "nursery of the capitalist economy"[23].[24] One might, of course, regard as decisive here the superiority of the French and Dutch economic culture from which this diaspora mostly came, or else the powerful influence of exile and of being torn out of traditional relationships of

21 WEBER'S NOTE. See on this, e.g., Dupin de St. André, L'ancienne église réformée de Tours. Les membres de l'église (Bull. de la soc. de l'hist. du Protest. 4. s. t. 10). Here again one might—and this thought will suggest itself especially to Catholic critics—regard the craving for *emancipation* from monastic, or generally ecclesiastical, control as the driving motive. But this is contradicted not only by the judgment of contemporaries, hostile ones included (Rabelais among them). There are also, for example, the scruples of conscience of the first national synods of the Huguenots (e.g., 1st Synod, C. partic., qu. 10 in Aymon, Synod. Nat. p. 10) over whether a *banker* might become an elder of a church, and the discussion of the permissibility of taking interest that recurred constantly at the national synods, despite Calvin's unequivocal position, prompted by inquiries from scrupulous members of congregations. These show, to be sure, the strong participation of the circles with an interest in the matter, but *at the same time* surely also that the wish to be able to practice "usuraria pravitas" [usurious depravity] without the control of confession *cannot* have been decisive. (The same—see below—in Holland. The canonical *prohibition of interest*, to say this expressly, plays no role whatsoever in *these* investigations.)

22 WEBER'S NOTE. Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Schwarzwaldes [Economic History of the Black Forest], vol. I, p. 67.

23 WEBER'S NOTE. Following on from this, the brief remarks of *Sombart*, Der moderne Kapitalismus [Modern Capitalism], 1st ed., p. 380. Later, unfortunately, in what is in my opinion by far the weakest of his major works as regards these sections (Der Bourgeois, Munich 1913), Sombart defended a completely mistaken "thesis," to which I shall return on occasion. He did so under the influence of a work by *F. Keller* (Unternehmung und Mehrwert [Enterprise and Surplus Value], Schriften der Görres-Gesellschaft, no. 12), which likewise, despite many good remarks (though not new ones in *this* respect), remains *below* the level of other modern Catholic apologetic works.

24 Eberhard Gothein (1853–1923), German economic and cultural historian.

life[25]. But in France itself, as is known from Colbert's struggles, matters stood exactly the same in the seventeenth century. Even Austria—not to speak of other countries—on occasion directly imported Protestant manufacturers. Not all Protestant denominations, however, seem to have had an equally strong effect in this direction. Calvinism apparently did so in Germany, too; the "Reformed" confession[26] seems, in the Wupper valley as elsewhere, to have been more conducive to the development of the capitalist spirit than other confessions. More conducive than, for example, Lutheranism, as comparison both on the large scale and in detail, especially in the Wupper valley, seems to show[27]. For Scotland, Buckle—and among English poets, Keats in particular—have stressed these connections[28]. Even more glar-

25 WEBER'S NOTE. For it is firmly established that the mere fact of changing one's home region to work is among the most powerful means of intensifying work (cf. also p. 23 n. 2).—The same Polish girl who at home could not be roused from her traditionalist inertia by any earning opportunities, however favorable, seems to change her whole nature and can be exploited to an unlimited degree when she works away from home as a seasonal migrant laborer in Saxony. Exactly the same phenomenon appeared among Italian migrant workers. That the decisive factor here is by no means only the educative influence of entering a higher "cultural milieu"—however much this naturally plays a part—is shown by the fact that the same phenomenon occurs even where—as in agriculture—the *kind* of work is exactly the same as at home, and where housing in migrant workers' barracks and the like even entails a temporary descent to a standard of living that would never be tolerated at home. The mere fact of working in surroundings entirely different from the accustomed ones breaks traditionalism here, and it is this that "educates." It hardly needs pointing out how much of America's economic development rests on such effects. For antiquity, the very similar significance of the Babylonian exile for the Jews is, one might say, palpable in the inscriptions, and the same holds, for example, for the Parsees.—But for the Protestants, as is already shown by the unmistakable difference in economic character between the Puritan New England colonies and Catholic Maryland, the Episcopalian South and interdenominational Rhode Island, the influence of their religious character quite obviously plays a role as an *independent* factor, similar to that of, say, the Jains in India.

26 WEBER'S NOTE. As is well known, in most of its forms it is a more or less *moderated* Calvinism or Zwinglianism.

27 WEBER'S NOTE. In almost purely Lutheran Hamburg, the *only* fortune going back as far as the seventeenth century is that of a well-known *Reformed* family (kindly pointed out to me by Prof. A. Wahl).

28 WEBER'S NOTE. So what is "new" is not the assertion of this connection here—Laveleye, Matthew Arnold and others have already dealt with it—but, on the contrary, the entirely unfounded doubts cast on it. The task is to *explain* it.

ing, and here too we need only recall it, is the connection between the religious regulation of life and the most intense development of business sense in a whole number of precisely those sects whose "detachment from life" has become as proverbial as their wealth: in particular the *Quakers* and the *Mennonites*. The role that the former played in England and North America fell to the latter in the Netherlands and Germany. That in East Prussia even Frederick William I tolerated the Mennonites as indispensable bearers of industry, despite their absolute refusal to do military service, is only one of the numerous well-known facts that illustrate this—though, given the peculiar character of this king, probably one of the strongest. Finally, that the combination of intense piety with an equally well-developed business sense and success held for the *Pietists* as well[29] is well known enough—one need only recall conditions in the Rhineland and in Calw—so in these merely provisional remarks the examples need not be piled up any further. For even these few examples all show one thing: the "spirit of work," of "progress," or whatever else it may be called, whose awakening one is inclined to ascribe to Protestantism, must not be understood, as is customary today, as "joy in the world" or in any other "Enlightenment" sense. The old Protestantism of Luther, Calvin, Knox and Voët had precious little to do with what is today called "progress." It was directly hostile to whole aspects of modern life that even the most extreme confessionalist today would not want to do without.[30] If, then, an inner affinity between certain expressions of the old Protestant spirit and

29 WEBER'S NOTE. This of course does not rule out that official Pietism, like other religious tendencies as well, later opposed certain "advances" in the capitalist economic system—e.g., the transition from domestic industry to the factory system—out of patriarchal sentiments. As we shall often see, one must sharply distinguish between what a religious tendency *strove for* as an ideal and what its influence actually *brought about* in the conduct of life of its adherents. (Examples, calculated by me, of the specific aptitude for work of Pietist workers in a Westphalian factory can be found in the essay "Zur Psychophysik der gewerblichen Arbeit" [On the Psychophysics of Industrial Work], Archiv f. Soz., vol. XXVIII, p. 263 and elsewhere.)
30 Gisbertus Voetius (Voët, 1589–1676), strict Dutch Reformed theologian at Utrecht.

modern capitalist culture is to be found at all, we must, whether we like it or not, try to look for it *not* in its (alleged) more or less materialistic, or at any rate anti-ascetic, "joy in the world," but rather in its purely *religious* features.—Montesquieu says of the English (Esprit des lois, book XX, chap. 7) that they had "gone furthest of all the peoples of the world in three important things: in piety, in commerce and in freedom." Might their superiority in the sphere of acquisition—and, a matter belonging to another context, their aptitude for free political institutions—perhaps be connected with the record in piety that Montesquieu credits them with?

I.1.6 When we pose the question in this way, a whole number of possible relationships at once rise up before us, dimly sensed. Our task will now have to be to *formulate* what we glimpse here only indistinctly as clearly as is at all possible, given the inexhaustible diversity contained in every historical phenomenon. To do so, however, we must of necessity leave the realm of the vague general notions with which we have been operating so far, and try to penetrate the characteristic features and the differences of those great religious worlds of thought that are given to us historically in the various forms of the Christian religion.

I.1.7 Before that, however, a few remarks are needed: first, on the particular nature of the object whose historical explanation is at issue; then, on the sense in which such an explanation is possible at all within the framework of these studies.

I.2 The "Spirit" of Capitalism

I. Das Problem—2. Der »Geist« des Kapitalismus
Benjamin Franklin's maxims, the duty to one's calling, and the struggle of the capitalist spirit against economic traditionalism.

I.2.1 The title of this study uses the somewhat pretentious-sounding concept of the "*spirit* of capitalism." What is to be understood by it? As soon as one attempts to give anything like a "definition" of it, certain difficulties appear that lie in the very nature of the purpose of the investigation.

I.2.2 If any object can be found at all for which the use of that term can have any meaning, it can only be a "*historical individual*": that is, a complex of connections in historical reality that we combine conceptually into a whole from the point of view of their *cultural significance*.[1]

I.2.3 But such a historical concept, since its content refers to a phenomenon that is significant in its individual *uniqueness*, cannot be defined (that is, "delimited") according to the scheme "genus proximum, differentia specifica" [nearest genus, specific difference]. Rather, it must be gradually *composed* from its individual components, which are to be drawn from historical reality. The final conceptual grasp of it therefore cannot come at the beginning; it must come at the *end* of the investigation. In other words, only in the course of the discussion, and as its essential result, will it become clear how what we understand here by the

1 Weber's term, adapted from the philosopher Heinrich Rickert, for a unique historical configuration studied for its significance rather than as a case of a general law.

"spirit" of capitalism is best formulated—that is, most adequately for the points of view that interest us here. These points of view, in turn (of which more will be said), are by no means the only possible ones from which the historical phenomena we are considering can be analyzed. Other points of view would here, as with any historical phenomenon, yield other features as the "essential" ones—from which it follows at once that what one can or must understand by the "spirit" of capitalism is by no means necessarily *only* what will present itself to *us* as essential to it for our conception. This lies in the very nature of "historical concept formation," which for its methodological purposes seeks not to box reality into abstract generic concepts but to fit it into concrete genetic relationships whose coloring is always, and inevitably, specifically *individual*.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S SERMON

Weber illustrates the spirit of capitalism with Franklin's maxims on time, credit and money.

I.2.4 If, nevertheless, the object whose analysis and historical explanation are at issue is to be pinned down, what we can offer is therefore not a conceptual definition but, at least for the time being, only a provisional *illustration* of what is meant here by the "spirit" of capitalism. Such an illustration is indeed indispensable if we are to reach an understanding about the object of the investigation. For this purpose we turn to a document of that "spirit" that contains what matters here in the first instance in almost classical purity, and that at the same time has the advantage of being free of *any* direct connection with religion—and thus, for our theme, "free of presuppositions":

I.2.5 "Remember, that *time is money*. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labor, and goes abroad, or sits idle in his room, one half of that day, though he spends but sixpence on his pleasure, ought not to reckon that the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides.

I.2.6 Remember, that *credit is money*. If a man lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much as I can make of it during that time. This amounts to a considerable sum where a man has good and large credit, and makes good use of it.

I.2.7 Remember, that money is *of a prolific, generating nature*. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on. Five shillings turned is six, turned again it is seven shillings and threepence, and so on, till it becomes a hundred pounds sterling. The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding sow destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that kills a five-shilling piece *murders* (!) all that it might have produced: whole scores of pounds sterling.

I.2.8 Remember, that—as the proverb says—*the good paymaster* is lord of every man's purse. He that is known to pay punctually at the time he promises may at any time borrow all the money his friends can spare.

I.2.9 This is sometimes of great use. After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to *the raising of a young man in the world* than punctuality and justice in all his dealings. Therefore never keep borrowed money an hour beyond the time you promised, lest your friend's annoyance shut up his purse to you forever.

I.2.10 The most trifling actions that affect a man's *credit* are to be regarded. The sound of your hammer at five in the morning or at eight at night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy for six months; but if he sees you at a billiard table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you should be at work, he sends for his money the next morning, and demands it before you have it at your disposal.

I.2.11 It shows, besides, that you are mindful of what you owe; it makes you *appear* a careful as well as an *honest man*, and that increases your *credit*.

I.2.12 Beware of thinking all your own that you possess, and of living accordingly. It is a mistake that many people who have

credit fall into. To prevent this, keep an exact account of your expenses and your income. If you take the pains, for once, to attend to particulars, it will have this good effect: you will discover how wonderfully small expenses mount up to large sums, and will discern what might have been, and may for the future be, saved....

I.2.13 For £6 a year you may have the use of £100, provided you are a man of known prudence and honesty. He that spends a groat a day idly spends idly about £6 a year, which is the price for the use of £100. He that wastes idly a groat's worth of his time each day (and that may be only a few minutes), one day with another, loses the privilege of using £100 a year. He that idly wastes 5 shillings' worth of time loses 5 shillings, and might as well throw 5 shillings into the sea. He that loses 5 shillings loses not only that sum, but all that might have been earned with it by using it in trade—which, by the time a young man reaches old age, will amount to a quite considerable sum."

I.2.14 It is *Benjamin Franklin*[2] who preaches to us in these sentences—the same ones that Ferdinand Kürnberger, in his "picture of American culture"[3], sparkling with wit and venom, mocks as the supposed confession of faith of Yankeedom. No one will doubt that it is the "spirit of capitalism" that speaks from him in a characteristic way, though this is not to claim that *everything* one might understand by this "spirit" is contained in it. Let us dwell a little longer on this passage, whose worldly wis-

2 WEBER'S NOTE. The closing passage is from Necessary Hints to Those That Would Be Rich (written 1736); the rest is from Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748), Works, ed. Sparks, vol. II, p. 87.

3 WEBER'S NOTE. "Der Amerikamüde" [The Man Weary of America] (Frankfurt 1855), which is, as is well known, a poetic paraphrase of *Lenau's* impressions of America. As a work of art the book would be rather hard going today. But as a document of the contrasts (now long faded) between German and American sensibility, it is quite simply unsurpassed: one may also say, between that inner life which, since the German mysticism of the Middle Ages, has remained *common* to German Catholics and Protestants in spite of everything, and Puritan-capitalist energy.—Kürnberger's somewhat free translation of Franklin's tracts has been corrected here against the original.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Nikolaus Lenau (1802–1850), Austrian poet who emigrated to America in 1832 and returned disillusioned the following year.

dom Kürnberger's "Amerikamüde" [The Man Weary of America] sums up as: "They make tallow out of cattle, and money out of men." What then stands out as peculiar in this "philosophy of avarice" is the ideal of the *creditworthy* man of honor, and above all the idea of the individual's *duty* toward the interest in increasing his capital, an interest presupposed as an end in itself. Indeed, what is preached here is not simply a technique for living but a peculiar "ethic," the violation of which is treated not merely as foolishness but as a kind of dereliction of duty: this above all belongs to the essence of the matter. It is not *only* "business sense" that is taught here—such things are found often enough elsewhere; it is an *ethos* that expresses itself, and it is precisely in *this* quality that it interests us.

I.2.15 Jakob Fugger had a business colleague who had retired and urged him to do the same, since he had now made enough and ought to let others make money too. Fugger rebuked this as "faint-heartedness" and replied that "he (Fugger) was of a very different mind, and wanted to make money as long as he could."[4] The "spirit" of this remark plainly *differs* from Franklin's. What Fugger expresses as the outflow of commercial daring and of a personal, morally indifferent inclination[5] takes on, in Franklin, the character of an *ethically* colored maxim for the conduct of life. It is in this specific sense that the concept "spirit

4 WEBER'S NOTE. Sombart placed this quotation as a motto at the head of the section on the "Genesis of Capitalism" (Der moderne Kapitalismus, 1st ed., vol. I, p. 193; cf. ibid., p. 390).

5 WEBER'S NOTE. This of course means neither that Jakob Fugger was a morally indifferent or irreligious man, nor that Benjamin Franklin's ethics are *entirely* exhausted by those sentences. There was surely no need for Brentano's quotations (Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus [The Beginnings of Modern Capitalism], Munich 1916, pp. 150 f.) to protect this well-known philanthropist from being misjudged in the way Brentano seems to think me capable of. The problem is, on the contrary, precisely this: how could such a philanthropist present *these very sentences* (whose particularly characteristic wording Brentano has neglected to reproduce) in the style of a *moralist*?

of capitalism" is used here.[6] Of *modern* capitalism, naturally. For, given the question we are asking, it goes without saying that we are speaking here only of this Western European and American capitalism.[7] "Capitalism" existed in China, India and Babylon, in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. *But, as we shall see, it lacked precisely that peculiar ethos.*

I.2.16 To be sure, all of Franklin's moral admonitions are given a utilitarian turn. Honesty is *useful* because it brings credit; so are punctuality, industry and moderation; and *that is why* they are virtues. From this it would follow, among other things, that where, for example, the mere *appearance* of honesty does the same service, the appearance would suffice, and any unnecessary surplus of this virtue would, in Franklin's eyes, have to look like unproductive waste, and so be objectionable. And indeed: anyone who reads in his autobiography the account of his "conversion" to those virtues,[8] or, above all, his remarks on how useful it is, for winning general recognition, to maintain strictly the *appearance* of modesty, of deliberately playing down one's own

6 WEBER'S NOTE. This is the basis for the way the problem is posed here, which differs from Sombart's. The very considerable practical significance of the difference will emerge later. It should be said right away that Sombart has by no means ignored this ethical side of the capitalist entrepreneur. Only, in his line of thought it appears as something produced by capitalism, whereas for our purposes here we must consider the opposite hypothesis. A definitive position can be taken only at the end of the investigation. For Sombart's view cf. op. cit., I, pp. 357, 380, etc. His line of thought here takes up the brilliant pictures in Simmel's "Philosophie des Geldes" [Philosophy of Money] (last chapter). I shall come back further on to the polemic against me that he has advanced in his "Bourgeois." At this point any detailed discussion must be deferred for now.

7 Jakob Fugger "the Rich" (1459–1525), Augsburg merchant and banker, chief financier of the Habsburgs.

8 WEBER'S NOTE. In German translation: "I finally became convinced that *truth, honesty* and *sincerity* in dealings between man and man were of the utmost importance *for our happiness in life*, and from that moment I resolved to practice them all my life, *and also wrote the resolution in my journal*. Revelation as such, however, in fact carried no weight with me; but I was of the opinion that, although certain actions were not bad merely *because* revealed doctrine forbids them, or good *because* it prescribes them, yet—all circumstances considered—those actions had probably been forbidden to us only *because* they are harmful by their nature, or commanded *because* they are beneficial."

merits,[9] must necessarily conclude that for Franklin those virtues, like all virtues, are virtues *only insofar* as they are useful to the individual in concreto [in the concrete case], and that the surrogate of mere appearance is enough wherever it does the same service—a consequence that is indeed inescapable for strict utilitarianism. What Germans are accustomed to feel as "hypocrisy" in the virtues of Americanism seems here to be caught in flagranti [red-handed]. —But in truth things are by no means so simple. It is not only Benjamin Franklin's own character, as it comes to light precisely in the honesty of his autobiography, which is uncommon enough, that shows that something other than a dressing-up of purely egocentric maxims is present here after all. So does the fact that he traces the very realization of the "usefulness" of virtue back to a revelation from God, who meant in this way to lead him to virtue. Above all, rather, the "summum bonum" [highest good] of this "ethic"—the acquisition of money, and ever more money, combined with the strictest avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment—is so completely stripped of all eudaemonistic, let alone hedonistic, considerations, and conceived so purely as an end in itself, that, measured against the "happiness" or "utility" of the individual, it appears at any rate as something wholly transcendent and utterly irra-

9 WEBER'S NOTE. "I put myself out of sight as much as possible and presented it"—that is, the founding of a library, which he had initiated—"as the undertaking of a 'number of friends,' who had asked me to go round and propose it to those people whom they considered lovers of reading. In this way my business went on more smoothly, and afterwards I always made use of this method on such occasions and, from my frequent successes, can sincerely recommend it. The small present sacrifice of self-love that one makes in doing so will later be amply repaid. If it remains unknown *for a while* to whom the real merit belongs, someone vainer than the person concerned will be encouraged to claim the merit, and then envy itself will be inclined to do the former justice by plucking out those usurped feathers and returning them to their rightful owner."

tional.[10] Man is oriented toward acquisition as the purpose of his life; acquisition is no longer oriented toward man as the means of satisfying his material needs. This reversal of what we would call the "natural" state of affairs, utterly senseless to unprejudiced feeling, is quite evidently as unconditionally a leitmotif of capitalism as it is alien to anyone who has not been touched by its breath. But at the same time it contains a train of feeling that touches closely on certain religious ideas. For if one asks *why* "money should be made out of people," Benjamin Franklin, though himself a Deist without any denominational color, answers in his autobiography with a verse from the Bible that, as he says, his strictly Calvinist father drummed into him again and again in his youth: "If you see a man diligent *in his calling*, he shall stand before kings."[11] Within the modern economic order, the acquisition of money—provided it is done legally—is the result and the expression of proficiency in a *calling*. And *this proficiency*, as is now not hard to see, is the real alpha and omega of Franklin's morality, as it meets us in the passage quoted and in all his writings without exception.[12]

10 WEBER'S NOTE. Brentano (pp. 125, 127, n. 1) takes this remark as an occasion to criticize the later discussion of the "rationalization and disciplining" that worldly asceticism imposed on human beings: this, he says, would then be a "rationalization" toward an "irrational conduct of life." That is indeed the case. A thing is never "irrational" in itself, but only from a particular "rational" *point of view*. For the irreligious person every religious conduct of life is "irrational," and for the hedonist every ascetic one, even though, measured by *its own* ultimate value, it may be a "rationalization." If this essay would contribute to anything, it is to uncovering the many-sidedness of the concept of the "rational," which only seems unambiguous.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. "Worldly asceticism" (innerweltliche Askese): asceticism practiced within the world, in everyday life and work, as opposed to the monastery.

11 WEBER'S NOTE. Prov. 22:29. Luther translates "in seinem Geschäft" [in his business], the older English Bible translations "business." See on this p. 63, n. 1.

12 WEBER'S NOTE. Against Brentano's (op. cit., pp. 150 f.) detailed but somewhat imprecise defense of Franklin, whose ethical qualities I am supposed to have misjudged, I simply refer to this remark, which in my opinion should have been enough to make that defense unnecessary.

THE DUTY TO WORK IN A CALLING

The sense of obligation toward one's calling is characteristic of capitalist culture, which today enforces it through the market.

I.2.17 Indeed, there is that peculiar idea of the *duty in a calling*, so familiar to us today and yet in truth so far from self-evident: an obligation that the individual is supposed to feel, and does feel, toward the content of his "vocational" activity, no matter what it consists of, and in particular no matter whether, to unprejudiced feeling, it must appear as the mere exploitation of his labor power or even just of his material possessions (as "capital"). It is this idea that is characteristic of the "social ethic" of capitalist culture, and in a certain sense even constitutive of it. Not that it grew *only* on the soil of capitalism; we shall rather try later to trace it back into the past. Still less, of course, is it being claimed that for *present-day* capitalism the subjective adoption of this ethical maxim by its individual bearers—say, the entrepreneurs or the workers in modern capitalist enterprises—is a condition of its continued existence. Today's capitalist economic order is an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which is given to him, at least as an individual, as a casing he has to live in and in practice cannot alter. It forces on the individual, insofar as he is caught up in the web of the market, the norms of his economic action. The manufacturer who persistently acts against these norms is eliminated economically just as unfailingly as the worker who cannot or will not adapt to them is thrown out on the street, unemployed.

I.2.18 Present-day capitalism, then, having come to rule economic life, educates and creates for itself, by way of economic *selection*, the economic subjects—entrepreneurs and workers—that it needs. But it is precisely here that one can put one's finger on the limits of the concept of "selection" as a means of explaining historical phenomena. For the kind of conduct of life and conception of one's calling adapted to the peculiar character of capitalism to be "selected"—that is, to be able to win out over

others—it evidently had first to come into being, and not in single isolated individuals but as a way of looking at things carried by *groups* of people. It is this origin, then, that really needs explaining. Only later shall we discuss in more detail the notion of naive historical materialism that such "ideas" come into being as the "reflection" or "superstructure" of economic situations. At this point it is probably enough for our purpose to note the following. In Benjamin Franklin's native land (Massachusetts), at any rate, the "capitalist spirit" (in the sense we have adopted here) undoubtedly existed *before* "capitalist development." (Complaints were already being made in 1632 about the specific phenomena of profit-hungry calculation in New England, as opposed to other parts of America.) In the neighboring colonies, for example—the later Southern states of the Union—it had remained far less developed, and this despite the fact that these were called into being by great capitalists for *business* purposes, whereas the New England colonies were founded for *religious* reasons by preachers and graduates together with small tradesmen, craftsmen and yeomen. In *this* case, at any rate, the causal relation is the reverse of what the "materialist" standpoint would have to postulate.

GREED IS NOT THE DIFFERENCE

The hunger for gold is as old as history; capitalism needed disciplined acquisition, not unscrupulous greed.

But in general the youth of such ideas is thornier than the theorists of the "superstructure" assume, and their development does not unfold like that of a flower. The capitalist spirit, in the sense we have so far arrived at for this concept, had to assert itself in hard struggle against a world of hostile powers. An outlook such as found expression in the quoted passages of Benjamin Franklin, and won the applause of an entire people, would have been

proscribed in antiquity as in the Middle Ages[13] as the expression of the most sordid avarice and of an utterly undignified cast of mind. And so it still regularly is today by all those social groups that are least caught up in, or least adapted to, the specifically modern capitalist economy. This is not because "the acquisitive drive" was still something unknown or undeveloped in the precapitalist epochs, as has so often been said; nor because the "auri sacra fames" [accursed hunger for gold], the greed for money, was then—or is today—*weaker* outside bourgeois capitalism than within the specifically capitalist sphere, as the illusion of modern romantics pictures it. The difference between the capitalist and the precapitalist "spirit" does not lie at this point. The *greed* of the Chinese mandarin, of the ancient Roman aristocrat, of the modern large landowner stands up to any compar-

ison.[14] And the "auri sacra fames" of the Neapolitan cab driver or barcajuolo [boatman], still more that of the Asian practitioner

of similar trades, and equally that of the craftsman in southern European or Asian countries, expresses itself, as anyone can

14 "Auri sacra fames" is from Virgil, Aeneid 3.57.

find out for himself, far more *insistently*, and above all more unscrupulously, than that of, say, an Englishman in the same

situation.[15] The universal reign of *absolute* unscrupulousness in asserting self-interest in the acquisition of money was precisely

a quite specific characteristic of those countries whose bourgeois-capitalist development—measured by the standards of

15 WEBER'S NOTE. Unfortunately Brentano, too, op. cit., first lumps together every kind of striving for acquisition (whether warlike or peaceful), and then presents as the specific feature of "capitalist" acquisitive striving (as opposed, e.g., to feudal) only its orientation toward *money* (instead of land). Any further distinction—which alone could lead to clear concepts—he not only rejects; he also makes (p. 131) the claim, incomprehensible to me, that the concept of the "spirit" of (modern!) capitalism formed here for the purposes of this investigation already takes into its premises what is to be proved.

Western development—had remained "backward." As every manufacturer knows, the lack of "coscienziosità" [conscientious-

ness] among the workers[16] of such countries—Italy, for instance, as opposed to Germany—has been one of the chief obstacles to

their capitalist development, and to some extent still is. Capitalism cannot use as a worker the practical exponent of undiscip-

16 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. Sombart's remarks, apt in every respect, in Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert [The German Economy in the Nineteenth Century], p. 123, top. In general, I hardly need to stress how much the following studies owe in their formulation to the mere fact that Sombart's great works, with their sharp formulations, exist—even, *and especially*, where they take other paths—although in all their decisive points of view they go back to much older work. Even someone who feels provoked again and again by Sombart's views to the most decided disagreement, and rejects some of his theses outright, has a duty to be aware of this.

lined “liberum arbitrium” [free will], any more than, as we have already been able to learn from Franklin, it can use the busi-

nessman who is utterly unscrupulous in his outward dealings. The difference, then, does not lie in how strongly some "drive"

for money is developed. The auri sacra fames is as old as the history of humankind known to us. But we shall see that those who

gave themselves up to it without reserve as a *drive*—like that Dutch captain who "would sail through hell for gain, even if it

singed his sails"—were *by no means* the representatives of the outlook from which the specifically modern capitalist "spirit"

broke forth as a *mass phenomenon*—and that is what matters. Ruthless acquisition, inwardly bound by no norm, has existed in

every period of history, wherever and however it was in fact possible at all. Like war and piracy, free trade unbound by

norms was also unrestricted in relations with members of other tribes, with outsiders; here the "external morality" permitted

what was frowned upon in dealings "among brothers." Outwardly, capitalist acquisition as "adventure" was at home in

every economic system that knew money-like objects of wealth and offered chances of putting them to profitable use—through

the commenda, tax farming, state loans, the financing of wars, of princely courts, of officials. In the same way, that inward

adventurer's outlook which mocks the limits set by ethics was to be found everywhere. The absolute and conscious ruthlessness

of the pursuit of profit often stood right next to the strictest bondage to tradition. And as tradition crumbled and free acquis-

ition penetrated, more or less thoroughly, into the interior of social groups as well, what usually followed was not an ethical

affirmation and shaping of this new thing. It was usually merely *tolerated* in practice, treated either as ethically indifferent or as

unwelcome but unfortunately unavoidable. This was the normal position not only of all ethical doctrine but also—and this mat-

ters much more—of the practical behavior of the average person in the precapitalist epoch: "precapitalist" in the sense that the

rational use of capital in the form of *enterprises* and the rational capitalist organization of *labor* had not yet become dominant

forces in orienting economic action. Yet this very behavior was one of the strongest inner obstacles that people's adaptation to

sects of the Middle Ages, Wyclif, the Bohemian Brethren (an echo of the Hussite movement), the Skoptsy and Stundists in Russia, and numerous monastic orders. The decisive point of the difference is (to anticipate) this: a religiously anchored ethic sets quite specific *psychological premiums* (*not* of an economic character) on the behavior it produces, premiums that remain highly effective as long as religious faith stays alive—and a mere doctrine of the art of living like Alberti's precisely does *not* have these at its disposal. Only insofar as these premiums take effect—and above all in the *direction* in which they take effect, which often (this is the decisive point) diverges widely from the *doctrine* of the theologians (itself, after all, only "doctrine")—does such an ethic gain an autonomous influence on the conduct of life and thereby on the economy. This, to say it plainly, is after all the whole point of this essay, and I would not have expected it to be so completely overlooked. I shall speak elsewhere about the relatively "capital-friendly" theological ethicists of the late Middle Ages (Antoninus of Florence and Bernardino of Siena in particular), whom Sombart has likewise badly misunderstood. In any case, L. B. Alberti absolutely did not belong to this circle. Only the concept of "industria" did he take over from monastic lines of thought, through whatever intermediaries. Alberti, Pandolfini and their like represent that outlook which, despite all official obedience, was already inwardly emancipated from traditional churchliness and, for all its attachment to the prevailing Christian ethic, largely oriented toward ancient, "pagan" models—an outlook whose significance for the development of modern economic theory (and also of modern economic policy) I have, in Brentano's opinion, "ignored." That I do not treat *this* causal chain *here* is, to be sure, perfectly true: it simply does not belong in a treatise on "the *Protestant Ethic* and the Spirit of Capitalism." Far from denying its significance—as will no doubt emerge on another occasion—I was, however, and still am, for good reasons, of the view that its sphere and direction of influence were quite *different* from those of the Protestant ethic (whose forerunners, by no means entirely unimportant in practice, were the sects and the Wycliffite-Hussite ethic). It influenced *not* the *conduct of life* (of the emerging bourgeoisie), but the policy of statesmen and princes; and these two causal chains, which partly converge but by no means everywhere, need first of all to be kept cleanly apart. As for Benjamin Franklin, his tracts on private economy—at one time used as school reading in America—do in fact belong, on *this* point, to the category that was influential for the *practice* of life, unlike Alberti's voluminous work, which hardly became known beyond scholarly circles. But I have expressly cited him here as a man who stood just as far beyond the Puritan regimentation of life, which had by then faded, as did the English "Enlightenment" in general, whose relations to Puritanism have often been described.

the preconditions of an orderly bourgeois-capitalist economy

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472), Florentine humanist, architect and theorist of art; his Libri della famiglia is a dialogue on household and family.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Agnolo Pandolfini (1360–1446), Florentine statesman; a reworked version of Alberti's household dialogue was long attributed to him.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. "Idolatry of the creature" (Kreaturvergötterung): the Puritan charge of honoring any created thing—person, family, possessions—in place of God.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. John Wyclif (c. 1330–1384), English theologian and critic of the church, whose followers were known as Lollards. The Skoptsy were a Russian sect that practiced castration; the Stundists were a Russian evangelical movement influenced by German Pietism.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Antoninus of Florence (1389–1459), Dominican archbishop of Florence, and Bernardino of Siena (1380–1444), Franciscan preacher, both wrote extensively on the ethics of trade and money.

ran into everywhere.

TRADITIONALISM AMONG WORKERS

Higher piece rates make traditionalist workers work less, since they want only to earn their customary wage.

I.2.19 The opponent with which the "spirit" of capitalism—in the sense of a particular, norm-bound style of life appearing in the guise of an "ethic"—had to struggle first and foremost remained that kind of feeling and behavior that may be called *traditionalism*. Here too any attempt at a conclusive "definition" must be suspended. Instead we shall make clear what is meant—again, of course, only provisionally—by means of a few special cases, beginning from below, with the workers.

I.2.20 One of the technical means that the modern entrepreneur usually employs to get the greatest possible output from "his" workers, to increase the intensity of work, is the *piece rate*. In agriculture, for example, one situation that imperatively demands the greatest possible increase in the intensity of work is usually bringing in the harvest, since, especially in uncertain weather, extraordinarily high chances of profit or loss often hang on speeding it up as much as possible. Accordingly, the piece-rate system is generally used here. And since the entrepreneur's interest in speeding up the harvest generally tends to grow as yields and the intensity of operation increase, attempts have naturally been made again and again to interest the workers in raising their output by *raising* the piece rates, which gave them the chance to earn, within a short span of time, what was for them an unusually high wage. But here peculiar difficulties appeared. Raising the piece rates strikingly often resulted not in more but in less work being done in the same span of time, because the workers responded to the increase not by raising but by lowering their daily output. The man who, for example, at 1 mark per Morgen of grain mowed had so far mowed 2½

Morgen a day and so earned 2½ marks[17] a day did not, after the rate per Morgen was raised by 25 pfennigs, mow some 3 Morgen in view of the high earning opportunity, as had been hoped, so as to earn 3.75 marks—which would have been perfectly possible. He mowed only 2 Morgen a day, because in this way he still earned 2½ marks, as before, and, in the words of the Bible, "was content." The extra earnings attracted him less than the reduced work. He did not ask: how much can I earn in a day if I do the maximum possible amount of work? He asked: how much must I work to earn the amount—2½ marks—that I earned before and that covers my *traditional* needs? This is precisely an example of the behavior that is to be called "traditionalism": a person does not "by nature" want to earn money and more money, but simply to live—to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as that requires. Wherever modern capitalism began its work of increasing the "productivity" of human labor by increasing its intensity, it came up against the infinitely stubborn resistance of this leitmotif of precapitalist economic labor. And it still comes up against it everywhere today, the more so the more "backward" (from the capitalist standpoint) the workforce on which it has to depend. Now—to return to our example—since the appeal to the "acquisitive sense" through higher wage rates failed, it was very tempting to try exactly the opposite means: to force the worker, by *lowering* wage rates, to produce *more* than before in order to keep his previous earnings. In any case, to unprejudiced observation low wages and high profits seemed—and still seem today—to be correlated, and everything paid out in higher wages seemed necessarily to mean a corresponding reduction in profit. Capitalism has indeed taken that path again and again from the very beginning, and for centuries it was an article of faith that low wages were "productive," that is, that they increased output; that, as Pieter de la Cour had already said—thinking on this point, as we shall

17 The Morgen was an old German measure of land, varying by region (roughly a quarter of a hectare in Prussia).

see, entirely in the spirit of the old Calvinism—the people work only because and as long as they are poor.[18]

I.2.21 But the effectiveness of this apparently so well-tried means has limits.[19] Certainly capitalism requires for its development the existence of population surpluses that it can hire cheaply on the labor market. But too large a "reserve army," though it may under some circumstances favor its quantitative spread, hampers its qualitative development, especially the transition to forms of enterprise that make intensive use of labor. Low wages are by no means identical with cheap labor. Even from a purely quantitative point of view, output falls in all circumstances when wages are physiologically insufficient, and in the long run such a wage often means nothing less than a "selection of the unfittest." Today the average Silesian, working at full stretch, mows little more than two-thirds as much land in the same time as the better-paid and better-fed Pomeranian or Mecklenburger; and the Pole, the further east he comes from, performs physically less compared with the German. And even in purely business terms, low wages fail as a support for capitalist development wherever the manufacture of products requires any kind of qualified (skilled) labor, or, say, the operation of costly and easily damaged machines, or in general any considerable degree of keen attention and initiative. Here low wages do not pay, and their effect turns into the opposite of what was intended. For here not only is a developed sense of responsibil-

18 Pieter de la Court (1618–1685), Dutch merchant and writer on economics and politics.

19 WEBER'S NOTE. We shall of course not go into the question of *where* these limits lie, any more than we shall take a position on the well-known theory of the connection between high wages and high output, first put forward by Brassey, and formulated and defended theoretically by Brentano and, at once historically and constructively, by Schulze-Gävernitz. The discussion was reopened by Hasbach's penetrating studies (Schmollers Jahrbuch 1903, pp. 385–391 and 417 f.) and has not been definitively settled. For us it is enough here to note the fact, which no one doubts and which cannot be doubted, that low wages and high profit, low wages and favorable chances of industrial development, at any rate do not simply coincide—that, in general, mere mechanical monetary operations do not bring about the "education" for capitalist culture, and with it the possibility of a capitalist economy. All the examples chosen are purely illustrative.

ity absolutely indispensable, but, more generally, an outlook that, at least *during* work, frees itself from the constant question of how the customary wage can still be earned with a maximum of comfort and a minimum of effort, and pursues the work as if it were an absolute end in itself—a "calling." Such an outlook, however, is nothing given by nature. Nor can it be produced directly either by high wages or by low ones; it can only be the product of a long and drawn-out process of education. *Today* capitalism, once in the saddle, finds it relatively easy to recruit its workers in all industrial countries and, within each country, in all industrial regions. In the past it was in every single case an extremely difficult problem.[20] And even today it does not always, at least, reach its goal without the support of a powerful helper that, as we shall see further on, stood at its side in the period of its formation. What is meant can again be made clear by an example. A picture of backward, traditionalist forms of work is particularly often presented today by *women* workers, especially unmarried ones. In particular, their absolute lack of ability and willingness to give up inherited and once-learned ways of working in favor of other, more practical ones, to adapt to new forms of work, to learn, and to concentrate their minds or even to use them at all, is an almost universal complaint of employers who employ girls, especially German girls. Explanations of how they might make their work easier, and above all more profitable, usually meet with complete incomprehension

20 WEBER'S NOTE. The establishment of *even capitalist* trades has therefore often not been possible without extensive migrations from regions of older culture. However correct *Sombart's* remarks are on the contrast between the craftsman's personal "skills" and trade secrets and the scientifically objectified technology of modern times, for the period in which capitalism arose the difference hardly exists. Indeed, the (so to speak) ethical qualities of the capitalist worker (and to some extent also of the entrepreneur) often had a higher "scarcity value" than the craftsman's skills, rigidified in centuries of traditionalism. And even present-day industry is by no means yet simply independent, in its choice of locations, of such qualities in the population, acquired through long tradition and education in intensive work. It is in keeping with the whole range of today's scientific ideas that, where this dependence is observed, it is readily attributed to inherited racial qualities rather than to tradition and education—in my opinion with very doubtful justification.

among them; raising the piece rates bounces off the wall of habit without effect. Things are regularly different—and this is a point not unimportant for our discussion—only with girls who have had a specifically religious upbringing, especially girls from a Pietist background. One often hears it said, and occasional calculations confirm it,[21] that by far the best chances for economic education are found in this category. The ability to concentrate one's thoughts, as well as the absolutely central attitude of feeling "obligated to one's work," are found here particularly often combined with strict economy, which *reckons* at all with earnings and their level, and with a sober self-control and moderation that greatly increase efficiency. The ground for that conception of work as an end in itself, as a "calling," such as capitalism demands, is most favorable here, and the chance of overcoming traditionalist sloppiness is greatest *as a result of* religious upbringing. This observation from the present of capitalism alone[22] shows us once again that it is at any rate worthwhile to *ask* how these connections between capitalist adaptability and religious factors may have taken shape in the time of its youth. For many individual phenomena allow us to infer that they existed then too in a similar form. The loathing and persecution that, for example, Methodist workers met with from their fellow workers in the eighteenth century were by no means directed only or even mainly at their religious eccentricities—England had seen plenty of those, and more striking ones—as the destruction of their tools, which recurs so often in the reports, already suggests. They were directed at their specific "willingness to work," as one would say today.

21 WEBER'S NOTE. See the work cited above, p. 29 n. 1.

22 WEBER'S NOTE. The foregoing remarks could be misunderstood. A well-known type of businessman tends to exploit, in his own way, the principle that "religion must be preserved for the people." Broad sections of the clergy, especially the Lutheran clergy, once tended, and not rarely, to put themselves at such men's disposal as a "black police," out of a general sympathy for authority, whenever strikes were to be branded as sin, trade unions as promoters of "covetousness," and so on. These are things with which the phenomena under discussion here have nothing to do. The factors touched on in the text are not isolated facts but very frequent ones, and, as we shall see, ones that recur in a typical way.

TRADITIONALISM AMONG ENTREPRENEURS

A business can be capitalist in form yet traditionalist in spirit, as the leisurely old putting-out system shows.

I.2.22 But let us turn first to the present once more, and this time to the entrepreneurs, in order to make clear the significance of "traditionalism" here too.

I.2.23 In his discussions of the genesis of capitalism,[23] Sombart has distinguished "satisfaction of needs" and "acquisition" as the two great "leitmotifs" between which economic history has moved. Which of them prevails depends on what becomes decisive for the kind and direction of economic activity: the extent of personal *need*, or else the pursuit of *profit*, independent of the limits of need, together with the *possibility* of making a profit. What he calls the "system of the need-satisfaction economy" seems at first glance to coincide with what has been described here as "economic traditionalism." That is indeed the case *if* one equates the concept of "need" with "*traditional need*." If not, however, then broad masses of economic enterprises drop out of the realm of "acquisitive" economies and belong to the realm of "need-satisfaction economies," even though the form of their organization obliges us to regard them as "capitalist," even in the sense of the definition of "capital" that Sombart gives elsewhere in his work.[24] For even enterprises that private entrepreneurs run through the turnover of capital (= money or goods with a money value) for the sake of profit, by buying means of production and selling the products, and that are thus undoubtedly "capitalist undertakings," can nonetheless bear a "traditionalist" character. In the course of more recent economic history too, this has been the case not merely by way of exception but positively as a rule, interrupted again and again by ever new and ever more powerful irruptions of the "capitalist spirit." The "capitalist" form of an enterprise and the spirit in

23 WEBER'S NOTE. Der moderne Kapitalismus, vol. I, 1st ed., p. 62.
24 WEBER'S NOTE. Op. cit., p. 195.

which it is run do generally stand in a relation of "adequacy" to each other, but not in one of "lawlike" dependence. Nonetheless, we provisionally use the expression "spirit of (modern) *capitalism*"[25] here for the attitude that seeks legitimate profit systematically and rationally, *as a calling*, in the manner illustrated by the example of Benjamin Franklin. We do so for a historical reason: this attitude found its most adequate form in the modern capitalist enterprise, while the capitalist enterprise, for its part, found in this attitude its most adequate spiritual driving force.

I.2.24 In themselves, however, the two can very well diverge. Benjamin Franklin was filled with the "capitalist spirit" at a time when his printing business did not differ in form in any way from any craftsman's workshop. And we shall see that on the threshold of the modern era the bearers of the attitude we have called the "spirit of capitalism" here were by no means solely or even predominantly the capitalist entrepreneurs of the merchant patriciate. They were far more the rising strata of the industrial middle class.[26] In the nineteenth century too, its classic representatives are not the genteel gentlemen of Liverpool

25 WEBER'S NOTE. Of the *modern* rational *enterprise* specific to the West, of course. It does not refer to the capitalism of usurers, war contractors, farmers of offices and taxes, great merchant entrepreneurs and financial magnates, which has been widespread in the world for three millennia, from China, India, Babylon, Hellas, Rome and Florence down to the present. See the Introduction.

26 WEBER'S NOTE. It is simply that, and this is the only point to be stressed here, there is a priori no reason at all to assume that the technique of the capitalist enterprise, on the one hand, and the spirit of "work in a calling," which usually lends capitalism its expansive energy, on the other, must have found their *original* breeding ground in the same social strata. The same holds for the social connections of religious ideas. Calvinism was historically one of the agents of education into the "capitalist spirit." But the great holders of money, in the Netherlands for example, were, for reasons to be discussed later, predominantly not adherents of Calvinism of the strictest observance but Arminians. The *middle* and *petty* bourgeoisie, rising to become entrepreneurs, was here and elsewhere the "typical" bearer of capitalist ethics and of the Calvinist church. But precisely this fits quite well with what has been argued here. Great holders of money and traders have existed at all times. A rational capitalist organization of industrial bourgeois labor, however, arose only in the development from the Middle Ages to the modern era.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Arminians: followers of the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609), who rejected the strict Calvinist doctrine of predestination.

and Hamburg with their inherited mercantile fortunes. They are the parvenus of Manchester or Rhineland-Westphalia, who often rose from quite humble circumstances. And things were similar as early as the sixteenth century: the *industries* then newly arising were for the most part created, in the main, by parvenus.[27]

I.2.25 Running, say, a bank, or a wholesale export business, or even a fairly large retail store, or finally a large putting-out business for goods produced by domestic industry is certainly possible only in the form of a capitalist enterprise. Nevertheless, all of them can be run in a strictly traditionalist spirit. The business of the great banks of issue is not even *permitted* to be run in any other way. The overseas trade of whole epochs rested on monopolies and regulations of a strictly traditional character. In retail trade (and I am not speaking here of the small idlers without capital who today clamor for state aid), the revolution that is putting an end to the old traditionalism is still in full swing. It is the same upheaval that burst the old forms of the putting-out system, to which modern homework, after all, is related only in form. How this revolution proceeds and what it means may again be illustrated by a particular case, familiar as these things are.

I.2.26 Until about the middle of the last century, the life of a putter-out, at least in some branches of the Continental textile industry,[28] was a fairly leisurely one by our present standards. One may imagine its course roughly as follows. The peasants came with their cloth, often (in the case of linen) still made predominantly or entirely from raw material they had produced themselves, to the town where the putters-out lived. After a careful, often official, inspection of the quality, they were paid the customary prices for it. For sales over any greater distance, the putters-out's customers were middlemen, who likewise

27 WEBER'S NOTE. See on this the good Zurich dissertation by J. Maliniak (1913).
28 WEBER'S NOTE. The picture that follows has been compiled "ideal-typically" from conditions in various individual branches in various places. For the illustrative purpose it serves here, it is of course immaterial that in none of the examples I have in mind did the process unfold exactly as described.

traveled in. They mostly bought not yet from samples but according to traditional qualities, from stock, or else they placed orders, and then long in advance, whereupon orders were passed on, where necessary, to the peasants. Traveling in person to visit customers happened seldom if at all, and then at long intervals; otherwise correspondence sufficed, and, gradually more and more, the sending of samples. Moderate office hours: perhaps five or six a day, at times considerably fewer, and more in the busy season, where there was one. Tolerable earnings, enough for a respectable conduct of life and, in good times, for putting by a small fortune. On the whole, relatively good relations among competitors, with a high degree of agreement on business principles. A lengthy daily visit to the "Ressource," the club, and in addition, as the case might be, an early-evening glass, a social circle, and a leisurely pace of life altogether.

I.2.27 It was a "capitalist" *form* of organization in every respect: whether one looks at the purely mercantile, businesslike character of the entrepreneurs, or at the fact that the intervention of capital turned over in the business was indispensable, or finally at the objective side of the economic process or at the method of bookkeeping. But it was a "traditionalist" economy if one looks at the *spirit* that animated the entrepreneurs. The traditional standard of living, the traditional level of profit, the traditional amount of work, the traditional way of running the business and of dealing with the workers and with the essentially traditional circle of customers, and the traditional way of winning customers and selling: these governed the conduct of business. They lay, one may well say, at the basis of the "ethos" of this circle of entrepreneurs.

THE NEW SPIRIT BREAKS IN

A young putter-out rationalizes the business, and the comfortable old ways collapse under competition.

I.2.28 Now at some point this comfortable state of affairs was suddenly disrupted, and often without any fundamental change in

the *form* of organization, such as a transition to the closed factory, to the mechanical loom and the like. What happened was often simply this. Some young man from one of the putting-out families involved moved from the town into the countryside. He carefully selected the weavers he needed, steadily tightened their dependence and his control over them, and so trained them from peasants into workers. At the same time, he took sales entirely into his own hands by approaching the final buyers, the retail shops, as directly as possible. He solicited customers personally and visited them regularly every year. Above all, he knew how to adapt the quality of the products exclusively to their needs and wishes, to make it "to their taste," and at the same time he began to put into practice the principle "low price, large turnover." Then what always and everywhere follows from such a process of "rationalization" happened once again: whoever did not rise had to sink. The idyll collapsed under the bitter competitive struggle that now began. Considerable fortunes were made, and they were not put out at interest but reinvested in the business again and again. The old, easygoing and comfortable standard of living gave way to hard sobriety: among those who joined in and came out on top, because they *wanted* not to consume but to acquire, and among those who stayed with the old ways, because they *had* to cut back.[29] And, what matters most here, in such cases it was as a rule *not* an influx of new *money* that brought about this upheaval. In several cases known to me, the entire revolutionary process was set in motion with a few thousand in capital borrowed from relatives. It was the new *spirit* that had moved in, the "spirit of modern capitalism" itself. The question of the driving forces behind the expansion of modern capitalism is not in the first place a question about the origin of the stocks of money available for capitalist use, but above all about the development of the capitalist spirit. Where it comes to life and is able to take effect, it *procures* the stocks of

29 WEBER'S NOTE. For this reason too, it is no accident that this first period of incipient rationalism, the first wingbeats of German industry for example, goes hand in hand with a complete decline in the style of the objects of everyday use.

money as the means for its work, not the other way around.[30] But its arrival was usually not a peaceful one. A flood of mistrust, occasionally of hatred, above all of moral indignation, regularly rose against the first innovator; often (I know of several such cases) a regular legend began to form about mysterious shadows in his past. Hardly anyone is impartial enough to notice what is true of such an entrepreneur of the "new style." Only an unusually firm character can keep him from losing his sober self-control and from moral as well as economic shipwreck. Besides clarity of vision and energy, it is above all quite definite and highly developed "ethical" qualities that win him, in such innovations, the absolutely indispensable trust of customers and workers, and that preserve in him the resilience to overcome countless obstacles. Above all, it is these qualities that made possible at all the infinitely more intensive work now demanded of the entrepreneur, which is incompatible with the comfortable enjoyment of life. Only they are ethical qualities of a specifically different *kind* from those adequate to the traditionalism of the past.

I.2.29 Likewise, it was as a rule not reckless and unscrupulous speculators, economic adventurers such as are met with in every epoch of economic history, or simply "great moneyed men" who brought about this turn. Outwardly inconspicuous, it was nonetheless decisive for permeating economic life with this new spirit. It was the work of men raised in the hard school of life, weighing and venturing at once, above all *sober* and *steady*, keen and wholly devoted to the matter at hand, men with strictly bourgeois views and "principles."

LIVING FOR ONE'S BUSINESS

The modern entrepreneur exists for his business, not the reverse: an irrational life by any standard of happiness.

I.2.30 One will be inclined to believe that these *personal* moral qualities have in themselves nothing whatever to do with any

ethical maxims, let alone religious ideas. On this view, the adequate basis for such a businesslike conduct of life would be essentially something negative: the capacity to *free oneself* from inherited tradition, and thus liberal "Enlightenment" most of all. And indeed this is, in general, entirely the case *today*. Not only is there as a rule no connection between conduct of life and religious starting points; where a connection does exist, it tends, at least in Germany, to be a negative one. Such natures, filled with the "capitalist spirit," tend *today* to be indifferent to the church, if not actually hostile to it. The thought of the pious boredom of paradise holds little attraction for their active nature; religion appears to them as a means of drawing people away from work on this earth. One might ask them about the "meaning" of their restless chase, which never takes pleasure in its own possessions and must therefore seem so meaningless precisely when life is oriented purely to this world. If they knew any answer at all, they would sometimes reply: "provision for children and grandchildren." More often, and more accurately (since that motive is obviously not peculiar to them but operated just as much among "traditionalist" people), they would reply quite simply that business, with its constant work, had become "indispensable to life" for them. That is in fact the only accurate motivation. At the same time, it expresses what is so *irrational* about this conduct of life, seen from the standpoint of personal happiness: a conduct of life in which man exists for the sake of his business, not the other way around. Of course, a feeling for the power and prestige that the mere fact of possession confers plays its part here too. Where the imagination of a whole people has once been turned toward the purely quantitatively large, as in the United States, this romanticism of numbers works with irresistible magic on the "poets" among businessmen. But otherwise, on the whole, it is not the truly leading entrepreneurs, and above all not the lastingly successful ones, who let themselves be captivated by it. And the final putting into

30 WEBER'S NOTE. This is not to say that movements in the stock of precious metals are economically irrelevant.

port in entailed estates and a patent of nobility, with sons whose conduct at university and in the officer corps tries to make people forget their origins, as was the usual life course of German capitalist parvenu families, is altogether an epigonal product of decadence. The "ideal type" of the capitalist entrepreneur,[31] as it has been represented among us too by some outstanding examples, has nothing in common with such showing off, whether coarse or refined. He shuns display and unnecessary expense, as he shuns the conscious enjoyment of his power and the acceptance, rather uncomfortable to him, of outward signs of the social esteem he enjoys. His conduct of life, in other words, often bears a certain ascetic trait, such as comes out clearly in Franklin's "sermon" quoted earlier, and we shall have to go into the historical significance of this phenomenon, which is important for us. In particular, it is by no means rare but quite common to find in him a degree of cool modesty that is essentially more sincere than the reserve that Benjamin Franklin so cleverly recommends. He "gets nothing" out of his wealth for himself personally, except the irrational feeling of having "fulfilled his calling" well.

I.2.31 But *that* is precisely what seems so incomprehensible and puzzling, so sordid and contemptible, to precapitalist man. That anyone could make it the sole purpose of his life's work to sink one day into the grave weighed down with a great material burden of money and goods seems to him explicable only as the product of perverse drives: the "auri sacra fames" [accursed hunger for gold].

31 WEBER'S NOTE. This is only meant to say: the type of entrepreneur that *we* are making the object of our study here, not some empirical average (on the concept of the "ideal type," see my discussion in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, vol. XIX, no. 1).

FROM TOLERATED TO COMMANDED

Medieval doctrine at best tolerated profit-seeking; the question is how it became a moral calling.

I.2.32 In the present, under our political, private-law and commercial institutions, and given the forms of enterprise and the structure peculiar to our economy, this "spirit" of capitalism could, as has been said, be understood as a pure product of adaptation. The capitalist economic order needs this devotion to the "calling" of making money. It is a way of relating to external goods that is so adequate to that structure, and so bound up with the conditions of victory in the economic struggle for existence, that *today* there can indeed no longer be any question of a necessary connection between that "chrematistic" conduct of life and any unified "worldview."[32] In particular, it no longer needs the support of approval from any religious powers. It feels the influence of church norms on economic life, so far as that is still perceptible at all, to be just as much a hindrance as state regulation of it. The interests of commercial and social policy then usually determine the "worldview." Whoever does not adapt his conduct of life to the conditions of capitalist success goes under or fails to rise. But these are phenomena of an age in which modern capitalism, having triumphed, has emancipated itself from its old supports. Just as it once burst the old forms of medieval economic regulation only in alliance with the emerging power of the modern state, the same could, let us say provisionally, have been the case with its relations to religious powers. Whether, and in what sense, this actually *was* the case is precisely what is to be investigated here. For it hardly needs proving that this conception of making money as an end in itself to which man is obliged, as a "calling," ran counter to the moral sensibility of whole epochs. Consider the dictum "Deo placere vix potest" [he can scarcely please God], applied to the activity of the merchant,

32 Chrematistic: from Aristotle's term for the art of money-making, which he distinguished from household management.

which passed into canon law and was held at the time to be

genuine (as was the Gospel passage on interest[33]). Consider, too, Thomas Aquinas's designation of the pursuit of profit as turpitudo [baseness], a term applied even to profit-making that was unavoidable and therefore ethically permissible. Compared with the radically anti-chrematistic views of fairly broad circles, these already represented a high degree of *accommodation* on the part of Catholic doctrine to the interests of the moneyed powers of the Italian cities, which were so closely allied politic-

ally with the church.[34] And even where the doctrine accommodated itself still further, as notably in Antoninus of Florence, the

feeling never entirely vanished that activity aimed at acquisition as an end in itself was at bottom a pudendum [something

34 WEBER'S NOTE. The words "μηδὲν ἀπελπίξοντες" (Luke 6:35) [hoping for nothing in return] and the Vulgate's rendering "nihil inde sperantes" [hoping for nothing from it] are probably (according to A. Merx) corrupted from μηδένα ἀπελπίξοντες (= *neminem* desperantes) [despairing of *no one*]. They thus commanded lending to *every* brother, including the poor one, without speaking of interest at all. The dictum Deo placere vix potest is now said to be of Arian origin (which, as regards substance, is immaterial to us).

shameful], which one was compelled to tolerate only by the orders of life as they happened to exist. Some moralists of the

time, above all of the nominalist school, accepted the developed beginnings of capitalist business forms as given and sought to

prove them permissible: trade above all as necessary, and the "industria" [diligence] developed in it as a legitimate source of

profit and ethically unobjectionable. This did not go uncontested. But the "spirit" of capitalist acquisition was rejected by

the prevailing doctrine as turpitudo, or at least it could not be valued by that doctrine as ethically positive. A "moral" outlook

like Benjamin Franklin's would have been simply unthinkable. This was above all the view of the capitalist circles involved

themselves. If they stood on the ground of church tradition, their life's work was at best something morally indifferent, toler-

ated, but nonetheless questionable for salvation, if only because of the constant danger of colliding with the church's prohibition

of usury. As the sources show, quite considerable sums flowed to church institutions on the death of rich people as “conscience

money," and in some cases back to former debtors as "usura" [usury] unjustly taken from them. Only the patrician circles

already inwardly detached from tradition took a different view, apart from heretical movements or those regarded as dubious.

But even skeptical and unchurchly natures tended to settle with the church by lump sums, to be on the safe side.[35] This was, after

all, better insurance against the uncertainties of the state after death, and (at least according to the very widespread laxer view)

outward submission to the commandments of the church was sufficient for salvation. Precisely here the *non*moral or even

downright *im*moral quality that, in the participants' *own* view, attached to their activity comes out clearly. How, then, did this

conduct, at best morally tolerated, become a "calling" in Benjamin Franklin's sense? How is it historically explicable that in

the center of the capitalist development of the world of that time, in Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the

money and capital market of all the great political powers, something was regarded as morally dubious or at best tolerable,

which could count as the content of a morally praiseworthy, indeed obligatory, conduct of life in the backwoods, petty-bour-

geois conditions of eighteenth-century Pennsylvania? There the economy, for sheer lack of money, constantly threatened to col-

lapse into barter; there was scarcely a trace of larger industrial enterprises, and only the first beginnings of banks were to be

seen. To speak *here* of a "reflection" of "material" conditions in the "ideal superstructure" would be sheer nonsense.—From

what circle of ideas, then, did it come that an activity outwardly aimed purely at *profit* was classed under the category of a "call-

and loss were graded according to the class of risk; and, given the character of interest on loans to entrepreneurs, they *had* to be. None of these was affected (or only according to a few rigorous canonists). But later, when fixed-interest capital investments as well as discounting became possible and customary, they did encounter quite perceptible difficulties from the prohibition of interest (later too): ing," toward which the individual felt himself *obligated*? For it ing, toward which one's individual interest himself *obligated*? For it (blacklists!). At the same time, the canonists' treatment of the prohibition of interest was normally *purely* juristic and formal, and certainly without any of the "capital-protecting" tendency K. imputes to them. Finally, *insofar* as positions on capitalism as such can be ascertained at all, two things had a decisive influence. On the one hand, there was a traditionalist, mostly rather dimly felt aversion to the spreading, *impersonal* power of capital, which was therefore hard to bring under ethical norms (as Luther's remarks on the Fuggers and on money-dealing still reflect). On the other hand, there was the need for accommodation.—But that does not belong here, for, as I have said, the prohibition of interest and its fate have for us at most symptomatic significance, and even that only to a limited extent.

The economic ethics of the Scotist theologians, and especially of certain fifteenth-century mendicant theologians, above all Bernardino of Siena and Antoninus of Florence, that is, of monastic writers with a specifically rational-*ascetic* orientation, undoubtedly deserves a chapter to itself and cannot be dealt with in passing in our context. Otherwise I would have to anticipate here, in an anticritique, what I have to say only when presenting Catholic economic ethics in its *positive* relation to capitalism. These writers strive, and in this they are forerunners of a number of Jesuits, to justify the entrepreneurial profit of the *merchant* as ethically *permissible*, as a reward for his "industria" (and K., of course, cannot claim more than that either).

The concept and the esteem of "industria" are of course *ultimately* taken from monastic asceticism. So, probably, is the concept of masserizia [thrift], which, according to Alberti's own statement, put into the mouth of Gianozzo, passed from clerical usage into his own. Monastic ethics as a forerunner of the worldly-ascetic denominations of Protestantism will be discussed in more detail only later (in antiquity, beginnings of similar conceptions are found among the Cynics, in late Hellenistic epitaphs and, arising from entirely different conditions, in Egypt). What is *completely lacking* (as in Alberti) is precisely what is decisive for us: the conception, characteristic of ascetic Protestantism, as we shall see later, of *proving* one's own salvation, the certitudo salutis [certainty of salvation], in a calling. It is, in other words, the psychological *premiums* that this religiosity placed on "industria," and which Catholicism necessarily had to lack, since its means of salvation were different. In effect, these writers offer ethical *doctrine*, not practical individual motives conditioned by interests in salvation. Moreover, what they offer is *accommodation* (as is very easy to see), not, as in worldly asceticism, arguments derived from central religious positions. (Antoninus and Bernardino, incidentally, have long since received better treatment than at the hands of F. Keller.) And even these accommodations remained contested down to the present. Nonetheless, the *symptomatic* significance of these monastic ethical conceptions is by no means to be rated at zero. But the real "beginnings" of a religious ethic that flows into the *modern* concept of the *calling* lay with the sects and with heterodoxy, above all with Wyclif. His significance, to be sure, is very greatly overestimated by Brodnitz (Englische Wirtschaftsgeschichte [English Economic History]), who thinks his influence was so strong that Puritanism found nothing left to do. None of this can (or should) be gone into here. For it is not possible to set out here in passing that, and to what extent, the Christian ethics of the Middle Ages *actually* already helped create the preconditions of the capitalist spirit.

was this idea that gave the conduct of life of the entrepreneur of the "new style" its ethical foundation and support.

RATIONALISM TAKES MANY FORMS

The capitalist spirit is not simply a product of rationalism, because life can be rationalized in very different directions.

I.2.33 "Economic rationalism" has been described, notably by Sombart in often felicitous and effective discussions, as the basic motive of the modern economy as such. This is undoubtedly right if it is taken to mean that expansion of the productivity of labor which, by organizing the production process from *scientific* points of view, has freed it from its bondage to the naturally given "organic" limits of the human person. This process of rationalization in technology and economics undoubtedly also conditions an important part of the "ideals of life" of modern bourgeois society. Work in the service of a rational organization of the supply of material goods to humanity has undoubtedly always been present to the representatives of the "capitalist spirit" as one of the guiding purposes of their life's work. One need only read, for example, Franklin's account of his efforts in the service of the civic improvements of Philadelphia to grasp this very obvious truth with one's own hands. And the joy and pride of having "given work" to numerous people, of having helped to create the economic "flourishing" of one's home town, in that sense of the word, oriented to figures for population and trade, which capitalism simply attaches to it: all this naturally belongs to the specific and undoubtedly "idealistically" intended joy in life of modern entrepreneurs. And it is likewise, of course, one of the fundamental characteristics of the capitalist private economy that it is rationalized on the basis of strictly *arithmetical* calculation, and directed systematically and soberly toward the economic success it seeks. In this it contrasts with the peasant's hand-to-mouth existence, with the privileged routine of the old guild craftsman, and with the "adven-

turer capitalism" that was oriented toward political opportunity and irrational speculation.

I.2.34 It would therefore seem that the development of the "capitalist spirit" is most simply understood as a partial phenomenon within the overall development of rationalism, and that it must be derivable from rationalism's fundamental position on the ultimate problems of life. Protestantism would then come into historical consideration only insofar as it had played a role as, say, a "preparatory crop" for purely rationalistic views of life. But as soon as one seriously makes the attempt, it becomes clear that so simple a formulation of the problem will not do, if only because the history of rationalism by *no means* shows a development that advances *in parallel* in the individual spheres of life. The rationalization of private law, for example, if one takes it to mean the conceptual simplification and organization of legal material, reached its highest form to date in the Roman law of late antiquity. It remained most backward in some of the most economically rationalized countries, notably in England, where the renaissance of Roman law foundered at the time on the power of the great guilds of lawyers, whereas its dominion has always continued in the Catholic regions of southern Europe. Purely this-worldly rational philosophy in the eighteenth century by no means found its home solely, or even predominantly, in the countries where capitalism was most highly developed. Voltaireanism is still today the common property of broad upper strata and, what matters more in practice, middle strata precisely in the Romance Catholic countries. If, further, one understands by "practical rationalism" that kind of conduct of life which consciously relates the world to the this-worldly interests of the *individual self* and judges it from that standpoint, then this style of life was, and still is, all the more a typical characteristic of the peoples of the "liberum arbitrium" [free will], as it is in the flesh and blood of the Italian and the Frenchman. And we have already been able to satisfy ourselves that this is by no means the soil in which that relation of man to his "calling" as a task, such as capitalism needs, has chiefly flourished. For one

can "rationalize" life from very different ultimate points of view and in very different directions. This simple proposition, which is often forgotten, ought to stand at the head of every study that deals with "rationalism." "Rationalism" is a historical concept that contains within itself a world of contradictions. We shall have to investigate precisely what spirit gave birth to that concrete form of "rational" thought and life from which there grew that idea of the "calling" and that devotion to *work* in a calling which, as we saw, is so irrational from the standpoint of purely eudaemonistic self-interest. This devotion was, and still is, one of the most characteristic components of our capitalist culture. What interests *us* here is precisely the origin of that *irrational* element which lies in this, as in every, concept of the "calling."

I.3 Luther's Conception of the Calling

I. Das Problem—3. Luthers Berufskonzeption. Aufgabe der Untersuchung
The word "Beruf" in Luther's Bible, the limits of Lutheranism, and the plan of the inquiry.

I.3.1 Now it is unmistakable that already in the German *word* "Beruf," and perhaps still more clearly in the English "calling," a religious idea, that of a *task* set by God, at least *also* resonates, and becomes more perceptible the more emphatically we stress the word in a concrete case. And if we now trace the word historically and through the languages of the civilized world, it turns out, first, that the predominantly Catholic peoples have no expression of similar coloring for what we call "Beruf" (in the sense of a position in life, a defined field of work), any more than

classical antiquity had,[1] whereas one exists among *all* predom-

inantly Protestant peoples.[2] It turns out, further, that no ethnically conditioned peculiarity of the languages concerned is

involved here, such as the expression of a "Germanic national spirit." Rather, the word in its present sense comes from the

2 Beruf is rendered "calling" throughout ("vocation" where the modern job sense is plain); Weber argues that its religious sense goes back to Luther's Bible translation.

translations of the Bible, and indeed from the spirit of the translators, *not* from the spirit of the original.[3] In Luther's translation of

the Bible it seems to have been used, entirely in our present sense, for the first time in a passage of Jesus Sirach (11:20 and

21).[4] It then very soon took on its present meaning in the secular language of all Protestant peoples. Before that, no trace of any

such sense of the word could be observed in the secular literature of *any* of them, nor, so far as can be seen, in the literature of

activity within the division of labor, which is (normally) at the same time his source of income and thus the lasting economic basis of his existence) is expressed, besides the colorless "opus" [work], with a coloring at least akin to the ethical content of the German word, either by officium (from opificium, thus originally ethically colorless; later, notably in Seneca, De beneficiis IV, 18, = Beruf), or by munus, derived from the compulsory services of the old civic community, or finally by professio. This last word, characteristically, probably derives in this meaning likewise from public-law duties, namely the citizens' old tax declarations. Later it is used especially for the "liberal professions" in the modern sense (thus: professio bene dicendi [the profession of speaking well]), and in *this* narrower field it takes on an overall meaning fairly similar in every respect to our word "Beruf." This holds also in the more inward sense of the word, as when Cicero says of someone: non intelligit quid profiteatur [he does not understand what he professes], in the sense of "he does not recognize his true calling." Only, of course, it is conceived entirely in this-worldly terms, without any *religious* coloring. This is all the more the case, of course, with "ars," which is used in the imperial period for "craft."—The *Vulgate* translates the above passages in Jesus Sirach once as "opus" and the other time (v. 21) as "locus" [place], which in this case would mean something like "social position." The addition "mandaturam tuorum" [of your commandments] comes from an *ascetic* such as Jerome, as Brentano quite rightly points out. But here, as elsewhere, he fails to note that *precisely this* is characteristic of the *ascetic* provenance of the concept: otherworldly before the Reformation, worldly after it. It is uncertain, moreover, from which text Jerome's translation was made; an influence of the old liturgical meaning of the word מלאכה does not seem ruled out.—In the Romance languages, only the Spanish "vocacion," in the sense of an *inner* "calling" to something, carried over from clerical office, has a coloring partly corresponding to the sense of the German word; but it is never used of a "calling" in the outward sense. In the Romance translations of the Bible, the Spanish vocacion and the Italian vocazione and chiamamento are otherwise used, in a meaning partly corresponding to the Lutheran and Calvinist usage to be discussed shortly, *only* to translate the New Testament κλῆσις [calling], the call through the Gospel to eternal salvation, where the Vulgate has "vocatio." (Strangely, Brentano, op. cit., thinks that this circumstance, which I myself cited *in support of* my view, speaks *for* the existence of the concept of the "calling" in its post-Reformation meaning even before. But there is no question of that at all. κλῆσις *had* to be translated as "vocatio"; but where and when would it have been used in the Middle Ages in our present sense? The fact of this translation, and the *absence* of the worldly meaning of the word *despite* it, is precisely what proves the point.) "Chiamamento" is used in this way, for example, in the fifteenth-century Italian translation of the Bible printed in the Collezione di opere inedite e rare [Collection of unpublished and rare works], Bologna 1887, alongside "vocazione," which the modern Italian translations of the Bible use. By contrast, the words used in the Romance languages for "Beruf" in the *outward*, worldly sense of regular gainful activity bear no religious stamp whatsoever, as appears from the lexical material and from a kind and detailed account by my esteemed friend Professor Baist (Freiburg). This is so whether, like those derived from ministerium or officium, they originally had a certain ethical coloring, or whether, like those derived from ars, professio and implicare (impiego), they lacked even this from the start. The passages in Jesus Sirach mentioned at the beginning, where Luther has "Beruf," are translated as follows: French, v. 20 office [office, duty], v. 21 labeur [labor] (Calvinist translation); Spanish, v. 20 obra [work], v. 21 lugar [place] (following the Vulgate); new translations: "posto" [post] (Protestant). The Protestants of the Romance countries, being in the minority, did not succeed, or rather did not even try, in exercising the kind of language-creating influence that Luther was able to exercise on the German chancery language, which was still less academically rationalized.

preaching, except in one of the German mystics, whose influ-

ence on Luther is well known.[5]

LUTHER'S NEW VALUATION OF WORK

The Reformation made fulfilling one's duties in a worldly calling the highest form of moral activity.

I.3.2 And like the meaning of the word, the *idea* too is new and a product of the Reformation; this should, on the whole, be well known. Not that certain beginnings of the valuation of everyday worldly work that is present in this concept of the calling had not already existed in the Middle Ages, and even in (*late* Hellenistic) antiquity; of that we shall speak later. But one thing, at any rate, was unconditionally new at first: the valuation of fulfilling one's duty within worldly callings as the highest content that the moral activity of the individual could take on at all. It was this that inevitably led to the notion of the religious significance of everyday worldly work, and that first produced the concept of the calling in this sense. The concept of the "calling" thus expresses the central dogma of all Protestant denominations. This dogma rejects the Catholic division of the Christian moral commandments into "praecepta" [precepts] and "consilia" [counsels]. As the only means of living in a way pleasing to God, it recognizes not the surpassing of worldly morality through monastic asceticism, but exclusively the fulfillment of the duties within the world that arise from the individual's position in life, which thereby becomes precisely his "calling."

I.3.3 In Luther[6] this idea develops over the first decade of his activity as a reformer. At first, entirely in keeping with the predominant medieval tradition as represented, for instance, by

5 Jesus Sirach: the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sira, also called Ecclesiasticus, a book of the Apocrypha.

6 WEBER'S NOTE. On what follows, cf. the instructive account by *K. Eger*, "Die Anschauung Luthers vom Beruf" [Luther's View of the Calling] (Giessen 1900). Its only gap, perhaps, lies in the analysis of the concept of "lex naturae" [natural law], which in his work, as in that of almost all other theological writers, is not yet sufficiently clear (on this see E. Troeltsch in his review of Seeberg's Dogmengeschichte [History of Dogma], Gött. Gel. Anz. 1902, and now above all the relevant parts of his "Soziallehren" [Social Teachings] of the Christian churches).

Thomas Aquinas[7], worldly work, though willed by God, belongs for him to the creaturely realm. It is the indispensable natural basis of the life of faith, in itself morally indifferent, like eating

7 WEBER'S NOTE. For when Thomas Aquinas presents the division of human beings into estates and occupations as the work of divine *providence*, what he means is the objective *cosmos* of society. But that the *individual* turns to a particular concrete "calling" (as we would say; Thomas says ministerium or officium) has its reason in "causae naturales" [natural causes]. Quaest. quodlibetal. VII art. 17c: "Haec autem diversificatio hominum in diversis officiis contingit primo ex divina providentia, quae ita hominum *status distribuit*, ... secundo etiam *ex causis naturalibus*, ex quibus *contingit*, quod in diversis hominibus sunt diversae *inclinationes ad diversa officia* ..." [This diversification of human beings into different offices comes about, first, from divine providence, which so *distributes the states* of men ...; second, also *from natural causes*, from which it *comes about* that different people have different *inclinations to different offices* ...]. In just the same way Pascal's valuation of the "calling," for example, starts from the proposition that it is *chance* that decides the choice of a calling (on Pascal, cf. A. Köster, Die Ethik Pascals, 1907). Of the "organic" religious ethics, only the most self-contained of them all, the Indian, differs in this respect. The contrast between the Thomist concept of the calling and the Protestant one (including the later Lutheran concept, which is otherwise closely related, especially in its emphasis on providence) is so plain that the quotation above may suffice for now, since we shall return later to an assessment of the Catholic way of seeing things. On Thomas, see *Maurenbrecher*, Th. v. Aquinos Stellung zum Wirtschaftsleben seiner Zeit, 1898. Incidentally, where Luther seems to agree with Thomas in details, it is probably the general doctrine of scholasticism as a whole, rather than Thomas in particular, that influenced him. For, according to the evidence Denifle has presented, he in fact seems to have known Thomas only inadequately (see *Denifle*, Luther und Luthertum, 1903, p. 501, and on this *Köhler*, Ein Wort zu Denifles Luther, 1904, p. 25 f.).

and drinking[8]. But as the idea of "sola fide" [by faith alone] is carried through more clearly to its consequences, and with the opposition this entails, stressed ever more sharply, to the Catholic "evangelical counsels" of monasticism, "dictated by the devil," the importance of the calling grows. The monastic conduct of life is now not only, as a matter of course, entirely worthless for justification before God; he also regards it as the product of an egoistic lovelessness that withdraws from its duties in the world. In contrast to this, worldly work in a calling appears as the outward expression of love of one's neighbor. This is justified, in a manner admittedly highly remote from reality and in almost grotesque contrast to Adam Smith's well-known statements[9], in particular by pointing out that the division of labor forces each individual to work for *others*. But this justification, essentially scholastic as one can see, soon disappears again. What remains, stressed with increasing emphasis, is the insistence that fulfilling one's duties within the world is in all circumstances the only way to please God, that it and it alone is God's

8 WEBER'S NOTE. In "Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen" [On the Freedom of a Christian], 1. the "twofold nature" of man is first used to construct the duties within the world in the sense of the lex naturae (here = the natural order of the world). These duties follow from the fact (Erlangen ed. 27, p. 188) that man is *in fact* bound to his body and to the social community.—2. In this situation (p. 196), and this is a *second* justification attached to the first, he will, if he is a believing Christian, resolve to *repay* God's gracious decision, made out of pure love, by love of his neighbor. With this very loose connection between "faith" and "love" there intersects, 3. (p. 190), the old ascetic justification of work as a means of giving the "inner" man mastery over the body. —4. Working, therefore, so the text continues in connection with this, was a *drive* that *Adam* already possessed (before the Fall), implanted in him by God, and which he followed "solely to please God"; here the idea of the "lex naturae" (here = natural morality) again comes into play in a different form.—Finally, 5. (pp. 161 and 199), following Matt. 7:18 f., there appears the idea that competent work in a calling is, and must be, the consequence of the new life brought about by faith, without, however, the decisive Calvinist idea of "proof" being developed from it.—The powerful mood that carries the treatise explains its use of heterogeneous conceptual elements.

9 WEBER'S NOTE. "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the baker or the farmer that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own advantage; we address ourselves not to their love of their neighbor but to their selfishness, and never speak to them of our needs, but always only of their advantage." (W. of N. I, 2.)

will, and that therefore every permitted calling is of absolutely equal worth before God[10].

I.3.4 That this moral qualification of worldly life in a calling was one of the most momentous achievements of the Reformation, and thus specifically of Luther, is indeed beyond doubt and may by now count as a commonplace[11]. This view is worlds away from the deep hatred with which *Pascal*'s contemplative temper rejected the valuation of activity in the world, which in his deepest conviction could be explained only by vanity or cunning[12]. It is further still, of course, from the broad-minded utilitarian *accommodation* to the world carried out by Jesuit probabilism. But how the practical significance of this achievement of

10 WEBER'S NOTE. Omnia enim per te operabitur (Deus), mulgebit per te vaccam et servilissima quaeque opera faciet, ac maxima pariter et minima ipsi grata erunt. [For (God) will do all things through you; he will milk the cow through you and do even the most servile tasks, and the greatest and the least alike will be pleasing to him.] (Exegesis of Genesis, Op. lat. exeg. ed. Elsperger VII, 213.) The idea is found before Luther in Tauler, who in principle puts the spiritual and the worldly "call" on an equal footing in value. German mysticism and Luther share the opposition to Thomism. In the formulations, this opposition shows itself in the following. Thomas, chiefly in order to be able to hold on to the moral value of contemplation, but also from the standpoint of the mendicant friar, found himself obliged to interpret the Pauline saying "whoever does not work shall not eat" as meaning that work, which is indeed indispensable lege naturae [by natural law], is imposed on humankind as a species, but not on every individual. The gradation in the valuation of work, rising upward from the "opera servilia" [servile works] of the peasants, is connected with the specific character of the mendicant orders, which for material reasons were bound to the town as their place of residence. It was equally foreign to the German mystics and to the peasant's son Luther, who, while valuing the callings equally among themselves, emphasized the division into estates as willed by God. —For the decisive passages in Thomas, see Maurenbrecher, Th. v. Aquinos Stellung zum Wirtschaftsleben seiner Zeit (Leipzig 1898, p. 65 f.).

11 WEBER'S NOTE. All the more astonishing, then, that some scholars believe such a new creation could pass over human *action* without leaving a trace. I confess I do not understand that.

12 WEBER'S NOTE. "Vanity is so deeply rooted in the human heart that a camp follower, a kitchen boy, a porter boasts and wants to have his admirers ..." (Faugère's edition I, 208; cf. Köster, op. cit., p. 17, p. 136 ff.) On the fundamental position of Port-Royal and of Jansenism on the "calling," to which we shall briefly return later, cf. now the excellent work by Dr. *Paul Honigsheim*, "Die Staats- und Soziallehren der französischen Jansenisten im 17. Jahrhundert" [The Political and Social Teachings of the French Jansenists in the 17th Century] (Heidelberg dissertation in history, 1914, a partial printing of a comprehensive work on the "prehistory of the French Enlightenment"; cf. especially p. 138 ff. of the partial printing).

Protestantism is to be conceived in detail is, on the whole, probably more dimly sensed than clearly recognized.[13]

LUTHER'S TRADITIONALISM

Luther's idea of the calling grew ever more traditionalist and has no affinity with the capitalist spirit.

I.3.5 First of all, it hardly needs stating that Luther cannot be claimed to have any inner affinity with the "capitalist spirit" in the sense in which we have so far used this term, or, for that matter, in any sense at all. Even those church circles that are most eager to praise that "deed" of the Reformation are today, on the whole, by no means friends of capitalism in any sense. And Luther himself would undoubtedly have rejected, still more sharply, any affinity with an outlook such as appears in Franklin. Naturally, one must not cite his complaints about the great merchants, the Fuggers[14] and the like, as a symptom here. For the struggle against the legally or factually *privileged* position of individual great trading companies in the 16th and 17th centuries can best be compared with the modern campaign against the trusts, and, like that campaign, is not in itself an expression of a traditionalist outlook. The Puritans, as well as the Huguenots, waged a bitter struggle against these: against the Lombards, the "trapezites," and the monopolists, great speculators and bankers favored by Anglicanism and by the kings and parliaments of

13 Probabilism, a moral doctrine associated with the Jesuits, held that one may follow any opinion supported by a respectable authority, even if the opposing opinion is more probable.

14 WEBER'S NOTE. With regard to the Fuggers he says that it cannot "be right and godly if in one man's lifetime such great and royal wealth should be heaped up in one pile." That, then, is essentially the peasant's mistrust of capital. Likewise (Gr. Sermon v. Wucher [Great Sermon on Usury], Erlangen ed. 20, p. 109), he considers the purchase of annuities morally dubious because it "is a new, cleverly invented thing"—that is, because it is economically *opaque* to him, much as futures trading, say, is to the modern clergyman.

England and France[15]. After the battle of Dunbar (Sept. 1650) Cromwell wrote to the Long Parliament: "Please do away with the abuses of all professions; and if there is one that makes many poor in order to make a few rich, that does not benefit a commonwealth." Yet on the other hand one will find him filled with a quite specifically "capitalist" way of thinking[16].[17] By contrast, Luther's numerous statements against usury and the taking of interest in general reveal unambiguously a conception of

15 WEBER'S NOTE. The contrast is aptly developed by H. Levy (in his work "Die Grundlagen des ökonomischen Liberalismus in der Geschichte der englischen Volkswirtschaft" [The Foundations of Economic Liberalism in the History of the English Economy], Jena 1912). Cf. also, for example, the petition of the Levellers in Cromwell's army against monopolies and companies of 1653, in Gardiner, Commonwealth II, p. 179. The Laudian regime, by contrast, strove for a "Christian-social" economic organization directed by king and church, from which the king expected political advantages and fiscal advantages from monopolies. It was precisely against this that the Puritans' struggle was directed.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. William Laud (1573–1645), Archbishop of Canterbury under Charles I, whose church policy the Puritans bitterly opposed.

16 WEBER'S NOTE. What is meant by this here may be illustrated by the manifesto to the Irish with which Cromwell opened his war of annihilation against them in January 1650, and which was his reply to the manifestos of the Irish (Catholic) clergy of Clonmacnoise of 4 and 13 December 1649. The key sentences read: "Englishmen had good inheritances (in Ireland, that is) which many of them *purchased with their money*... they had good leases from Irishmen for long time to come, *great stocks thereupon*, houses and plantations erected *at their cost and charge*.... You broke the union.... at a time when Ireland was in perfect peace and when through the *example of English industry, through commerce and traffic*, that which was in the nations hands was better to them than if all Ireland had been in their possession... *Is God, will God be with you*? I am confident he will not." This manifesto, reminiscent of English editorials at the time of the Boer War, is characteristic not because the capitalist "interest" of the English is presented here as the legal ground for the war. That could, of course, just as well have been used as an argument in, say, a negotiation between Venice and Genoa over the extent of their spheres of interest in the East (a point which, although I made it here myself, Brentano, op. cit., p. 142, strangely holds against me). Rather, what is specific about the document lies precisely in this: Cromwell, addressing the Irish themselves and invoking *God*, bases the *moral* justification for their subjugation on the fact that English *capital* had trained the Irish to *work*—and he does so, as anyone who knows his character is aware, with the deepest subjective conviction.—(Apart from Carlyle, the manifesto is printed in excerpt and analyzed in Gardiner's Hist. of the Commonw. I, p. 163 f., and can also be found in German translation in Hönig's Cromwell.)

17 Lombards were Italian merchant bankers and pawnbrokers; "trapezites" (from the Greek trapeza, a money changer's table) were money changers and bankers.

the nature of capitalist acquisition that is downright "backward" (from the capitalist standpoint) compared with late scholasticism[18]. The argument that money is unproductive, which had already been overcome by Antoninus of Florence, for example, naturally belongs here. But we need not go into details here at all. For above all, the idea of the "calling" in the *religious* sense could take very different forms in its consequences for the conduct of life within the world.—The achievement of the Reformation as such was at first only this: in contrast to the Catholic view, the moral emphasis on work within the world, ordered in callings, and the religious *premium* placed on it, swelled mightily. How the idea of the "calling," which expressed this, was developed further depended on the more specific form that piety now took as it unfolded in the individual Reformation churches. The authority of the Bible, from which Luther believed he had derived the idea of the calling, was in itself, on the whole, more favorable to a traditionalist turn. The Old Testament in particular knew nothing at all, in genuine prophecy, of surpassing worldly morality, and elsewhere knew it only in quite isolated rudiments and beginnings. It shaped a quite similar religious idea strictly in this sense: let each stick to his "livelihood" and let the godless strive after profit. That is the sense of all the passages that deal directly with worldly occupations. Only the Talmud stands partly on different ground here, though not fundamentally either. *Jesus*'s personal position is characterized in classic purity by the typically ancient Eastern petition "Give us *this day* our daily bread." And the element of radical rejection of the world, as expressed in the "μαμωνᾶς τῆς ἀδικίας" [mammon of unrighteousness], ruled out any *direct* link between the modern idea of the calling and him personally[19]. The apostolic age of Christianity that finds expression in the New Testament, and Paul in particular, regards worldly life in a call-

18 WEBER'S NOTE. This is not yet the place to discuss it more fully. Cf. the writers cited in the next note but one.

19 WEBER'S NOTE. See the remarks in *Jülicher*'s fine book on the "Gleichnisreden Jesu" [The Parables of Jesus], vol. II, p. 636, p. 108 f.

ing either with indifference or likewise in an essentially traditionalist way, because of the eschatological expectations that filled those first generations of Christians. Since everyone is waiting for the coming of the Lord, let each remain in the estate and the worldly occupation in which the "call" of the Lord found him, and work as before: that way he will not be a burden to the brethren as a poor man—and it is, after all, only a little while longer. Luther read the Bible through the lens of his overall mood at any given time, and in the course of his development between about 1518 and about 1530 this mood not only remained traditionalist but became ever more traditionalist[20].

I.3.6 In the first years of his activity as a reformer, owing to his essentially creaturely valuation of the calling, the view that prevailed in him regarding the *kind* of activity within the world was inwardly akin to the Pauline eschatological indifference

20 WEBER'S NOTE. On what follows, cf. again above all the account in *Eger*, op. cit. Reference may also be made here to *Schneckenburger*'s fine work, which is still not outdated today (Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffes [Comparative Account of the Lutheran and Reformed Doctrinal Systems], edited by Güder, Stuttgart 1855). (*Luthardt*'s Ethik Luthers, p. 84 of the first edition, the only one available to me, gives no real account of the *development*.) Cf. further *Seeberg*'s Dogmengeschichte, vol. II, p. 262, bottom.—The article "Beruf" in the Realenzyklopädie f. prot. Theol. u. Kirche is worthless: instead of a scholarly analysis of the concept and its genesis, it contains all sorts of rather shallow remarks on everything under the sun, the women's question and the like.—From the economic literature on Luther, let me mention here only the works of Schmoller (Gesch. der nationalökon. Ansichten in Deutschland während der Reformationszeit, Z. f. Staatswiss. XVI, 1860), Wiskemann's prize essay (1861), and the work of Frank G. Ward (Darstellung und Würdigung von Luthers Ansichten vom Staat und seinen wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben, Conrads Abh. XXI, Jena 1898). The literature on Luther occasioned by the Reformation anniversary, some of it excellent, has, as far as I can see, brought nothing decisively new on *this* particular point. On Luther's (and Lutheran) social ethics, the relevant parts of *Troeltsch*'s "Soziallehren" should of course be consulted above all.

expressed in 1 Cor. 7[21]. One can be saved in any estate; on the short pilgrimage of life it is pointless to attach weight to the *kind* of calling. And the pursuit of material gain beyond one's own needs must therefore count as a symptom that one is not in a state of grace, and, since it seems possible only at the expense of others, as downright reprehensible[22]. As he became increasingly entangled in the affairs of the world, his valuation of the importance of work in a calling rose accordingly. At the same time, however, the individual's concrete calling increasingly becomes for him a special command of God to that person to fulfill *this* concrete position to which divine providence has assigned him. After the struggles with the "enthusiasts" and the peasant disturbances, the objective historical order in which God has placed the individual becomes for Luther more and more a direct emanation of the divine will[23]. The ever stronger emphasis he now places on providence, even in the particular events of life, then leads increasingly to a traditionalist coloring in keeping with the idea of "dispensation": the individual should in principle *remain* in the calling and estate in which God has once

21 WEBER'S NOTE. Exposition of the 7th chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1523, Erlangen ed. 51, p. 1 f. Here Luther still applies the idea of the freedom of "every calling" before God, in the sense of this passage, in such a way that 1. *human ordinances* are to be rejected by it (monastic vows, the prohibition of mixed marriages, etc.), and 2. the fulfillment of the obligations one has taken on toward one's neighbor within the world (in itself *indifferent* before God) is enjoined as a commandment of *love of neighbor*. In truth, however, the characteristic arguments, e.g. on pp. 55, 56, concern the dualism of the *lex naturae* as against righteousness before God.

22 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. the passage from "Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher" [On Trade and Usury] (1524), which Sombart rightly placed as a motto at the head of his account of the "spirit of handicraft" (= traditionalism): "Therefore you must resolve to seek nothing but your adequate living in such trade, and accordingly reckon and estimate costs, trouble, labor and risk, and then set the price of the goods yourself, raising or lowering it, so that you have from it the wage for such labor and trouble." The principle is formulated entirely in the Thomist sense.

23 WEBER'S NOTE. Already in the letter to H. v. Sternberg with which he dedicated his exegesis of Psalm 117 to him in 1530, the "estate" of the (lesser) nobility counts as instituted by God, despite its moral depravity (Erlangen ed. 40, p. 282, bottom). The letter (p. 282, top) clearly shows the decisive significance that the Müntzer disturbances had had for the development of this view. Cf. also Eger, op. cit., p. 150.

placed him, and keep his earthly striving within the limits of this given position in life.[24] If economic traditionalism was at first the result of Pauline indifference, it later became the outgrowth of an ever more intense belief in providence[25], which identifies unconditional obedience to God[26] with unconditional submission to one's given situation. In this way Luther never arrived at a connection between work in a calling and *religious* principles that rested on a fundamentally new basis, or indeed on any basis of principle at all[27]. The purity of *doctrine* as the church's only infallible criterion, which after the struggles of the 1520s stood ever more immovably fixed for him, in itself already hampered the development of new points of view in the ethical sphere.

---

24 "Enthusiasts" (Schwarmgeister) was Luther's dismissive term for radical reformers such as Thomas Müntzer and the Zwickau prophets.

25 WEBER'S NOTE. In the exposition of Psalm 111, vv. 5 and 6 (Erlangen ed. 40, pp. 215 and 216), too, the starting point in 1530 is the polemic against surpassing the worldly order through monasteries and the like. But now the lex naturae (as opposed to positive law, as fabricated by emperors and jurists) is directly *identical* with "God's righteousness." It is instituted by God and includes, in particular, the division of the people into *estates* (p. 215, para. 2, end); only the equal worth of the estates before *God* is sharply emphasized.

26 WEBER'S NOTE. As taught in particular in the writings "Von Konzilien und Kirchen" [On the Councils and the Church] (1539) and "Kurzes Bekenntnis vom heiligen Sakrament" [Short Confession on the Holy Sacrament] (1545).

27 WEBER'S NOTE. How far the idea of the Christian's *proving* himself in his work in a calling and in his conduct of life, which is so important for us and dominates Calvinism, remains in the background in Luther is shown by the passage in "Von Konzilien und Kirchen" (1539, Erlangen ed. 25, p. 376, bottom): "Besides these seven principal parts" (by which one recognizes the true church) "there are now *more outward signs* by which one recognizes the holy Christian church ... if we are not lewd and drunkards, proud, arrogant, ostentatious, but chaste, modest, sober ...." According to Luther, these signs are not as certain as "those above" (pure doctrine, prayer, etc.), "because some heathens too have practiced such works and sometimes even appear holier than Christians." —Calvin personally, as will be discussed further on, took a position only slightly different; Puritanism, however, did differ. In any case, in Luther the Christian serves God only "invocatione" [in his calling], not "*per* vocationem" [*through* his calling] (Eger, p. 117 ff.).—For the idea of *proof* in particular, on the other hand (though more in its Pietist than in its Calvinist form), at least some beginnings can be found in the German mystics (see, for example, the passage from Suso quoted in Seeberg, Dogmengesch., p. 195, top, and likewise the statements of Tauler cited earlier), albeit given a purely psychological turn.

I.3.7 Thus in Luther the concept of the calling remained bound to tradition[28]. The calling is what a person has to *accept* as divine dispensation, what he must "resign himself" to. This coloring drowns out the other idea, which is also present, that work in a

28 WEBER'S NOTE. His final position is then probably set down in some passages of his exegesis of Genesis (in the Op. lat. exeget. ed. Elsperger):

Vol. IV p. 109: Neque haec fuit levis *tentatio*, intentum esse suae vocationi et de aliis non esse curiosum.... [Nor was this a slight *trial*: to be intent on one's own calling and not to be curious about others....] Paucissimi sunt, qui sua sorte vivant contenti... [Very few live content with their lot...] (p. 111 eod.) Nostrum autem est, ut vocanti *Deo pareamus*... [But it is ours to *obey God* when he calls...] (p. 112) Regula igitur haec servanda est, ut unusquisque *maneat in sua vocatione et suo dono contentus vivat*, de aliis autem non sit curiosus. [This rule, therefore, is to be kept: that each should *remain in his calling and live content with his gift*, and not be curious about others.] In its *result*, this corresponds entirely to the formulation of traditionalism in Thomas Aquinas (th. V, 2 gen. 118 art. I c): Unde necesse est, quod bonum hominis circa ea consistat in quadam mensura, dum scilicet homo.. quaerit habere exteriores divitias, prout sunt *necessariae ad vitam ejus secundum suam conditionem*. [Hence it is necessary that man's good in respect of these things should consist in a certain measure, namely insofar as man.. seeks to have external riches as they are *necessary for his life according to his condition*.] Et ideo in excessu hujus mensurae consistit *peccatum*, dum scilicet aliquis supra debitum modum vult eas vel acquirere vel retinere, quod pertinet ad avaritiam. [And therefore *sin* consists in exceeding this measure, namely when someone wishes to acquire or retain them beyond the due limit, which pertains to avarice.] Thomas grounds the sinfulness of an acquisitive drive that exceeds the measure set by one's own needs, as befits one's station, in the lex naturae [natural law], as it becomes manifest in the *purpose* (ratio) of external goods; Luther grounds it in God's providence. On the relation between faith and calling in Luther see also vol. VII p. 225:... quando es fidelis, tum placent Deo etiam physica, carnalia, animalia, officia, sive edas, sive bibas, sive vigiles, sive dormias, quae mere corporalia et animalia sunt. *Tanta res est fides*... [when you are faithful, then even physical, carnal, animal tasks please God, whether you eat or drink, wake or sleep, which are merely bodily and animal. *So great a thing is faith*...] Verum est quidem, placere *Deo etiam in impiis sedulitatem et industriam in officio* [It is true indeed that *diligence and industry in one's office please God even in the ungodly*] (this *activity* in working life is a virtue *lege naturae* [by natural law]). Sed obstat incredulitas et vana gloria, ne possint opera sua referre ad gloriam Dei [But unbelief and vainglory stand in the way, so that they cannot refer their works to the glory of God] (echoing Calvinist turns of phrase).... *Merentur* igitur etiam impiorum bona opera in hac quidem vita praemia sua [Thus even the good works of the ungodly *earn* their rewards, in this life at least] (in contrast to Augustine's "vitia specie virtutum palliata" [vices cloaked in the guise of virtues]) sed non numerantur, non colliguntur in altero. [but they are not counted, not gathered up in the other life.]

calling is a task, or rather *the* task, set by God[29]. And the development of orthodox Lutheranism underlined this trait still further. Something negative, then, was at first the only ethical yield here: the elimination of the surpassing of worldly duties by ascetic ones, combined, however, with the preaching of obedience to the authorities and of resignation to one's given situation in life[30]. —As will be discussed further when we deal with medieval religious ethics, the ground for the idea of the calling in this Lutheran form had already been extensively prepared by the German mystics. This was due notably to Tauler's equal valuation, in principle, of spiritual and worldly callings, and to the *lower* valuation of the traditional forms of ascetic merit through works[31], which followed from the solely decisive importance the mystics gave to the soul's ecstatic-contemplative reception of the divine spirit. In a certain sense, Lutheranism even represents a step backward compared with the mystics. In Luther, and still more in his church, the psychological foundations for a rational vocational ethic had become rather uncertain compared with those of the mystics (whose views on this point are in several respects reminiscent partly of Pietist, partly of Quaker psychology of faith[32]). And this was so, as will yet be shown, precisely

29 WEBER'S NOTE. In the Kirchenpostille [Church Postil] (Erl. ed. 10, pp. 233, 235/6) we read: "*Everyone* is called to some calling." He is to attend to *this* calling (on p. 236 it is even called a "command") and serve God in it. God takes pleasure not in the achievement but in the *obedience* it contains.

30 WEBER'S NOTE. This fits with what modern entrepreneurs sometimes claim—a counter-image *to* what was said above about the effect of Pietism on the economic efficiency of women workers: that, for example, cottage-industry workers who are strict Lutheran churchgoers *today*, in Westphalia for instance, not infrequently think in an especially traditionalist way. They are said to be averse to changes in their methods of work—even without any transition to the factory system—despite the lure of higher earnings, and to justify this by pointing to the hereafter, where everything will be evened out anyway. It becomes clear that the mere fact of *attachment to the church* and of belief is not yet of any essential significance for the conduct of life as a whole. It is much more concrete religious contents of life whose effects played their part in the period when capitalism was coming into being and —to a more limited extent—still do.

31 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. Tauler, Basel ed. fol. 161 f.

32 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. Tauler's peculiarly evocative sermon, op. cit., and fol. 17. 18 v. 20.

because the tendency toward ascetic self-discipline was suspect to him as salvation by works, and therefore had to recede more and more into the background in his church.

TURNING TO CALVINISM

The ending of Paradise Lost shows a Puritan turn toward the world foreign to both medieval and Lutheran piety.

I.3.8 The mere idea of the "calling" in the Lutheran sense, then—and this alone was to be established here[33]—was, as far as we can see so far, of at most problematic relevance for what *we* are looking for. This is not in the least to say that the Lutheran form of the reorganization of religious life had no practical significance for the objects of our inquiry. Quite the contrary. It is only that this significance evidently cannot be derived *directly* from the attitude of *Luther* and his church toward the worldly calling, and is in general not as easy to grasp as may perhaps be the case with other forms of Protestantism. It is therefore advisable for us to consider first those forms of Protestantism in which a connection between practical life and the religious starting point can be established more easily than in Lutheranism. The striking role of *Calvinism* and of the Protestant *sects* in the history of capitalist development has already been mentioned. Just as Luther found a "different spirit" alive in Zwingli than in himself, so did his spiritual descendants, specifically in Calvinism. And Catholicism, all the more, has always regarded Calvinism, down to the present day, as its real adversary. At first, of course, this has purely political reasons. If the Reformation is inconceivable without Luther's entirely personal religious development, and was permanently shaped in spirit by his personality, his work would nonetheless not have endured outwardly without Calvinism.—But the abhorrence shared by Catholics and Lutherans is

33 WEBER'S NOTE. Since at this point that is the sole purpose of these remarks on Luther, they content themselves with so meager a preliminary sketch, which naturally cannot be in any way satisfactory from the standpoint of an appreciation of Luther.

also grounded in the ethical peculiarity of Calvinism. Even the most superficial glance shows that here a quite different relationship between religious life and earthly action has been established than in either Catholicism or Lutheranism. This comes out even in literature that uses only specifically religious motifs. Take, for instance, the end of the Divina Commedia, where the poet in Paradise, in the desireless contemplation of God's mysteries, is left without words. Set beside it the end of the poem that people have grown used to calling "the Divine Comedy of Puritanism." Milton ends the last book of "Paradise Lost," after describing the *expulsion* from Paradise, as follows:

I.3.9 "They turned and looked upon the eastern side
Of Paradise—so lately their blessed seat—
Awash with fearsome blazing flames,
The gate itself surrounded by gigantic forms
With fiery weapons in their hands.
They felt the tears slowly trickling down—
And yet they soon dried their cheeks:
Before them lay the great wide world,
Where they could choose their place of rest,
The providence of the Lord their guide.
With slow and hesitant step they wandered
Hand in hand out of Eden on their way."[34]

I.3.10 And shortly before, Michael had said to Adam:

I.3.11 "..... Only add deeds to your knowledge;
Then add faith, virtue and patience
And temperance, and that love
Which will one day be praised as Christian,
And be the soul of all the virtues.
Then you will not be loath to leave this Paradise,
For you bear within you one far more blessed."

I.3.12 Everyone senses at once that this most powerful expression of the earnest Puritan turn toward the world—that is, of

valuing life within the world as a *task*—would have been impossible in the mouth of a medieval writer. But it is just as little congenial to Lutheranism, as expressed, say, in the chorales of Luther and Paul Gerhardt. Here we must replace this vague feeling with a somewhat more precise conceptual *formulation* and ask about the inner reasons for these differences. Appealing to "national character" is not only, in general, a mere confession of *ignorance*; in our case it is also entirely untenable. To ascribe a uniform "national character" to the English of the seventeenth century would simply be historically incorrect.[35] "Cavaliers" and "Roundheads" did not see each other simply as two parties but as radically different kinds of human being, and anyone who looks closely must agree with them[36]. On the other hand, no difference of character between the English merchant adventurers and the old merchants of the Hanseatic League can be found—just as, in general, no deeper difference between English and German character at the end of the Middle Ages can be established than one directly explained by their different political fates[37]. It was only the power of religious movements—not

34 John Milton (1608–1674). Weber quotes the close of Paradise Lost (book XII) in German; Milton's italicized lines run: "The world was all before them, where to choose / Their place of rest, and Providence their guide."

35 Paul Gerhardt (1607–1676), the most celebrated hymn writer of German Lutheranism.

36 WEBER'S NOTE. Anyone who shared the Levellers' construction of history would, admittedly, be in the fortunate position of reducing this, too, to racial differences: as representatives of the Anglo-Saxons, they believed they were defending their "birthright" against the descendants of William the Conqueror and the Normans. It is astonishing enough that no one has yet interpreted the plebeian "Roundheads" for us as round-headed in the anthropometric sense!

37 WEBER'S NOTE. In particular English national pride, a consequence of Magna Carta and the great wars. The remark so typical today, "She looks like an English girl," on seeing a beautiful foreign girl, is reported as early as the fifteenth century.

they alone, but they first—that created the differences we feel today[38].

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The Reformers sought salvation, not ethical reform, so their cultural effects were largely unforeseen.

I.3.13 If, accordingly, in investigating the relations between the old Protestant ethic and the development of the capitalist spirit, we start from the creations of Calvin, of Calvinism and of the other "Puritan" sects, this must not be taken to mean that we expect to find, in any of the founders or representatives of these religious communities, the awakening of what we here call the "capitalist spirit" as in any sense the *goal* of his life's work. We can hardly believe that the pursuit of worldly goods, conceived as an end in itself, actually counted as an ethical value for any of them. Above all, one thing must be kept firmly in mind once and for all: programs of ethical reform were never the central concern of any of the Reformers—among whom, for our purposes, we must also count men such as Menno, George Fox and Wesley. They were not founders of societies for "ethical culture," nor advocates of humanitarian efforts at social reform or of cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul, and that alone, was the pivot of their life and work. Their ethical aims and the practical effects of their teaching were all anchored here, and were only *consequences* of purely religious motives.[39] We must therefore be prepared to find that the cultural effects of the Reformation were to a large extent—perhaps even, from our particular points

38 WEBER'S NOTE. These differences have of course persisted in England as well. The "squirearchy" in particular remained the bearer of "merry old England" down to the present, and the whole period since the Reformation can be understood as a struggle between the two types of Englishness. On this point I agree with *M. J. Bonn*'s remarks (in the "Frankf. Zeitung") on the fine book by v. *Schulze-Gävernitz* on British imperialism. Cf. H. Levy in A. f. Soz.-Wiss. 46, 3.

39 Menno Simons (1496–1561), founder of the Mennonites; George Fox (1624–1691), founder of the Quakers; John Wesley (1703–1791), founder of Methodism. "Ethical culture" alludes to the Ethical Culture movement (New York 1876; German Society for Ethical Culture 1892), which sought morality without religion.

of view, predominantly—unforeseen and indeed *unintended* consequences of the Reformers' work, often far removed from, or even directly opposed to, everything they themselves had in mind.

I.3.14 Thus the following study might, in its admittedly modest way, also contribute to illustrating the manner in which "ideas" become effective in history at all. But so that misunderstandings do not arise from the outset about the sense in which any such effect of purely ideal motives is being asserted here, a few brief indications on this point may be permitted by way of conclusion to these introductory remarks.

I.3.15 Studies of this kind—as should above all be expressly noted—are in no way an attempt to *evaluate* the intellectual content of the Reformation in any sense, whether in terms of social policy or of religion. For our purposes we are always dealing with aspects of the Reformation that must appear peripheral, even external, to the genuinely religious consciousness. For all we are undertaking is to make somewhat clearer the thread that religious motives have woven into the fabric of the development of our modern culture—a culture specifically oriented toward "this world," which has grown out of countless individual historical motives. We are asking, then, only what, among certain characteristic contents of this culture, might possibly be *attributed* to the influence of the Reformation as a historical cause. In doing so, we must of course free ourselves from the view that the Reformation can be deduced from economic shifts as "necessary in terms of historical development." Countless historical constellations that fit not only into no "economic law" but into no economic point of view of any kind—purely political events in particular—had to work together for the newly created churches to be able to survive at all. On the other hand, however, we have no intention whatsoever of defending so foolishly doctrinaire a thesis[40] as, say, that the "capitalist spirit" (always

40 WEBER'S NOTE. Strangely, it is precisely this thesis that has been imputed to me again and again—despite these and the following remarks, which have been left unchanged and are, in my opinion, sufficiently clear.

in the provisional sense in which the term is used here) *could* have arisen *only* as the outgrowth of certain influences of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as an *economic system* is a product of the Reformation. The mere fact that certain important *forms* of capitalist business enterprise are notoriously considerably *older* than the Reformation would stand in the way of such a view once and for all. Rather, the only thing to be established is whether, and to what extent, religious influences *played a part* in the qualitative shaping and the quantitative expansion of that "spirit" across the world, and which concrete *aspects* of the *culture* resting on a capitalist basis go back to them. Given the enormous tangle of mutual influences between the material foundations, the forms of social and political organization and the intellectual content of the cultural epochs of the Reformation, the only way to proceed is to investigate first whether, and at what points, certain "elective affinities" can be discerned between particular forms of religious belief and the vocational ethic.[41] This will at the same time clarify, as far as possible, the manner and general *direction* in which the religious movement, as a result of such elective affinities, influenced the development of material culture. *Only then*, once this has been established with reasonable clarity, could an attempt be made to estimate to what degree the historical origins of modern cultural contents are to be attributed to those religious motives, and to what extent to others.

41 Weber borrows the term from Goethe's novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (1809), which took it from chemistry.

II.1 The Religious Foundations of Worldly Asceticism

II. Die Berufsethik des asketischen Protestantismus—1. Die religiösen Grundlagen der innerweltlichen Askese
Calvinism and predestination, Pietism, Methodism and the Baptist sects as sources of a methodical life in the world.

II.1.1 The historical bearers of ascetic Protestantism (in the sense in which the term is used here) are essentially of four kinds: 1. Calvinism *in the form* it took in the main areas of its dominance in Western Europe, particularly in the course of the seventeenth century; 2. Pietism; 3. Methodism; 4. the sects that grew out of the Baptist movement[1]. None of these movements stood absolutely apart from the others, and even their separation from the non-ascetic churches of the Reformation is not strictly carried through. Methodism arose only in the middle of the eighteenth[2]

1 WEBER'S NOTE. We do not treat Zwinglianism separately, since after a brief period of great power it rapidly lost significance.—"Arminianism," whose *doctrinal* peculiarity consisted in rejecting the dogma of predestination in its rigorous formulation, and which rejected "worldly asceticism," was constituted as a sect only in Holland (and the United States). In this chapter it is of no interest to us, or only of the negative interest that it was the confession of the merchant patriciate in Holland (see later on this). Its dogmatics prevailed in the Anglican Church and in most Methodist denominations. Its "Erastian" (i.e. upholding the sovereignty of the state in church matters too) stance, however, was that of *all* authorities with purely political interests—of the Long Parliament in England just as much as of Elizabeth and of the Dutch States General, and above all of Oldenbarnevelt.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), leading Dutch statesman, executed after the Calvinist victory at the Synod of Dort.

2 Weber's "Täufer" covers the whole Anabaptist tradition (Mennonites, the later Baptists, Quakers), not only the Baptist churches in the narrow sense.

century, within the English state church. Its founders intended it to be not so much a new church as a reawakening of the ascetic spirit within the old one, and it became separated from the Anglican Church only in the course of its development, especially when it spread to America. Pietism first grew up on Calvinist soil in England and especially in Holland, remained linked to orthodoxy by quite imperceptible transitions, and then, toward the end of the seventeenth century, through the work of Spener, made its entry into Lutheranism, its doctrinal foundations partly reworked.[3] It remained a movement *within* the church. Only the tendency associated with Zinzendorf (the "Herrnhuter"), partly shaped by echoes of Hussite and Calvinist influences in the Moravian Brethren, was pushed—like Methodism, against its will—into a peculiar kind of sect formation. Calvinism and the Baptist movement stood sharply opposed at the beginning of their development, but in the Baptist denominations of the later seventeenth century they came into close contact, and already in the Independent sects of England and Holland at the beginning of that century the transition was gradual. As Pietism shows, the transition to Lutheranism is also gradual; and the same holds between Calvinism and the Anglican Church, which in its outward character and in the spirit of its most consistent adherents is akin to Catholicism.[4] The ascetic movement that was called "Puritanism" in the broadest sense of this ambiguous word[5] did, in the mass of its followers and particularly in its consistent champions, attack the foundations of Anglicanism; but here too the antagonisms sharpened only

3 Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), Lutheran pastor and founder of German Pietism.

4 Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700–1760) refounded the Moravian Brethren on his estate at Herrnhut in Saxony.

5 WEBER'S NOTE. On the development of the concept of "Puritanism" see, to name one among many, Sanford in the "Studies and Reflections of the Great Rebellion," p. 65 f. Wherever we use the term here at all, we always use it in the sense it had acquired in the popular language of the seventeenth century: the ascetically oriented religious movements in Holland and England, irrespective of their programs of church government and their dogmas, thus including the "Independents," Congregationalists, Baptists, Mennonites and Quakers.

gradually in the course of the struggle. And even if, for the time being, we leave entirely aside questions of church constitution and organization, which do not concern us here for now—indeed, all the more so then—the situation remains the same. The doctrinal differences, even the most important ones, such as those over the doctrines of predestination and justification, merged into one another in the most varied combinations; and as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century they regularly, though not without exception, prevented the maintenance of church communion. Above all, the phenomena of *moral* conduct of life that are important to us are found in similar form among the adherents of the most diverse denominations that emerged from one of the four sources listed above, or from a combination of several of them. We shall see that similar ethical maxims could be linked with different doctrinal foundations. The influential literary aids to pastoral care, above all the casuistic compendia of the various confessions, also influenced one another over time, and one finds great similarities among them despite notoriously very different practices in the conduct of life. It might therefore almost seem that we would do best to ignore both the doctrinal foundations and the ethical theory entirely and to keep purely to moral practice, as far as it can be ascertained. —But that is simply not the case. The various doctrinal roots of ascetic morality did, it is true, die off after terrible struggles. But their original anchoring in those dogmas not only left powerful traces in the later "undogmatic" ethic; *only* knowledge of the original body of ideas enables us to understand how that morality was bound up with the thought of the *hereafter*, which absolutely dominated the most inward people of that time. Without the overriding power of that thought, *no* moral renewal that seriously affected practical life was set in motion in those days. For what matters to us[6] is, of course, not what was

6 WEBER'S NOTE. This has been very badly misunderstood in discussions of these questions. Sombart in particular, but also Brentano, constantly cite the ethical writers (mostly ones they came to know through me) as if they were codifications of rules of life, without *ever* asking which of these rules carried the premiums of *salvation*, the only premiums that were psychologically effective.

taught theoretically and officially in the ethical compendia of the time—however certainly this, too, had practical significance through the influence of church discipline, pastoral care and preaching. It is something quite different: identifying those psychological *impulses*, created by religious belief and the practice of religious life, that gave direction to the conduct of life and held the individual to it. These impulses, however, sprang to a large degree precisely from the particular character of religious beliefs as well. People of that time brooded over seemingly abstract dogmas to an extent that, in turn, becomes intelligible only when we see their connection with practical religious

interests. The path through some doctrinal considerations[7]—which must seem as laborious to the reader without theology as it will seem hasty and superficial to the theologically educated—is unavoidable. In taking it, we can admittedly only proceed by presenting the religious ideas in an "ideal-typically" compiled

7 WEBER'S NOTE. I hardly need to stress that this sketch, insofar as it moves in the purely doctrinal field, relies throughout on the formulations of the literature on church history and the history of dogma—that is, on "secondhand" sources—and to that extent claims no "originality" whatsoever. Naturally I have tried as far as I could to immerse myself in the sources of the history of the Reformation. But to ignore in the process the intensive and subtle theological work of many decades, instead of letting oneself be *guided* by it toward an understanding of the sources—as is quite unavoidable—would have been gross presumption. I must hope that the enforced brevity of the sketch has not led to incorrect formulations, and that I have at least avoided misunderstandings of any material importance. For anyone familiar with the most important theological literature, the account certainly contains something "new" only insofar as everything is naturally geared to the points of view that matter to *us*. Some of these—precisely some of decisive importance, such as the *rational character of asceticism* and its significance for the modern "style of life"—naturally lay further from the concerns of theological writers. Since this essay appeared, these aspects, and the sociological side of the matter in general, have been treated systematically in the work by *E. Troeltsch* already cited above—whose "Gerhard und Melanchthon" and numerous reviews in the Gött. Gel. Anz. already contain many precursors of his great work. —If only for reasons of space, not everything consulted has been cited, but in each case *only* those works that the relevant part of the text follows or builds on. Not infrequently these are older authors, where the points of view of interest here lay closer to them. The wholly inadequate funding of German libraries means that in the "provinces" one can obtain the most important source texts and studies only on loan from Berlin or other large libraries, and only for a few short weeks. This applies, for instance, to Voët, Baxter, Tyerman's Wesley, all the Methodist, Baptist and Quaker writers, and many writers of the early period generally who are not included in the Corpus Reformatorum. For any *detailed* study, visits to English and especially American libraries are often indispensable. For the following sketch, what was obtainable in Germany naturally had to suffice (and could suffice) on the whole.—In America, for some time now, the universities' characteristic and deliberate disavowal of their own "sectarian" past has meant that libraries acquire little, or often nothing at all, that is new in literature of this kind. This is one particular feature of that general tendency toward the "secularization" of American life which, before long, will have dissolved the historically inherited national character and completely and definitively changed the meaning of many of the country's fundamental institutions. One has to go out into the countryside, to the small orthodox sect colleges.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Richard Baxter (1615–1691), English Puritan pastor and prolific devotional writer, Weber's chief witness for Puritan ethics; Luke Tyerman wrote a standard life of John Wesley.

consistency, of a kind only rarely found in historical reality. For precisely *because* it is impossible to draw sharp boundaries in historical reality, we can hope to come upon their specific effects only by examining their *most consistent* forms.—

THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION

Weber sets out the Calvinist doctrine of predestination in the words of the Westminster Confession.

II.1.2 The faith[8] over which the great political and cultural struggles were fought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the most highly developed capitalist countries—the Netherlands, England, France—and to which we therefore turn first,

8 WEBER'S NOTE. In what follows we are *initially* not interested at all in the origin, antecedents and history of development of the ascetic movements; we take their body of ideas as a given, as it was when fully developed.

was *Calvinism*[9]. Its most characteristic dogma was considered then, and is generally still considered today, to be the doctrine of *predestination*. It has, to be sure, been debated whether it is "the most essential" dogma of the Reformed Church or an "appendage." Judgments about the essentialness of a historical phenomenon, however, are either judgments of value and of faith—namely when what is meant is what alone is "of interest" in it, or what alone is of lasting "value." Or what is meant is what is *causally* significant because of its influence on other historical processes: then we are dealing with judgments of historical attribution. If, as must be done here, we start from this latter point of view, and thus ask about the significance to be assigned to that dogma according to its *effects* on cultural history, these

must certainly be rated highly[10]. The cultural struggle waged by Oldenbarnevelt was shattered on it; the split in the English

church became unbridgeable under James I once Crown and Puritanism differed doctrinally as well—precisely over this doc-

10 WEBER'S NOTE. With regard to the following sketch, it should be emphatically pointed out from the start that we are considering here *not* the personal views of *Calvin* but *Calvinism*—and that, too, in *the form* into which it developed at the end of the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth in the great regions of its dominant influence, which were at the same time bearers of capitalist culture. Germany is left *entirely aside* for the time being, since pure Calvinism nowhere *dominated* large regions here. "Reformed" is of course by no means identical with "Calvinist."

trine; and in general it was *this doctrine*, first and foremost, that was seen as the element in Calvinism dangerous to the state and

was combated by the authorities[11]. The great synods of the seventeenth century, above all Dordrecht and Westminster, and

numerous smaller ones besides, made its elevation to canonical validity the centerpiece of their work. It served countless heroes

11 WEBER'S NOTE. Even the declaration on the 17th Article of the Anglican confession agreed between the University of Cambridge and the Archbishop of Canterbury—the so-called Lambeth Articles of 1595, which (in contrast to the official version) expressly taught predestination to death as well—was not ratified by the Queen. It was precisely the radicals who laid decisive weight on explicit predestination to death, not merely on the "permission" of damnation, as the milder doctrine had it (so, for example, the Hanserd Knollys Confession).

of the "ecclesia militans" [church militant] as a firm support, and in the eighteenth as in the nineteenth century it caused

church schisms and supplied the battle cry at great revivals. We cannot pass it by. Since its content can no longer be assumed to

be known to every educated person today, let us first learn it authentically from the propositions of the "Westminster Confes-

sion" of 1647, which on this point was simply repeated by both

9 WEBER'S NOTE. On Calvin and Calvinism in general, among the best sources of information, alongside the fundamental work of Kampschulte, is the account by Erich Marcks (in his "Coligny"). Campbell, The Puritans in Holland, England and America (2 vols.), is not always critical or free of bias. A strongly anti-Calvinist partisan work is Pierson's Studien over Johan Calvijn. For the Dutch development one should consult, besides Motley, the Dutch classics, especially *Groen van Prinsterer*, Geschied. v. h. Vaderland;—La Hollande et l'influence de Calvin (1864);—Le parti antirévolutionnaire et confessionnel dans l'église des P. B. (1860: for *modern* Holland);—also, above all, *Fruin's* Tien jaren uit den tachtigjarigen oorlog and especially *Naber's* Calvinist of Libertijnsch; in addition *W. J. F. Nuyens*, Gesch. der kerkel. an pol. geschillen in de Rep. de Ver. Prov. (Amst. 1886); *A. Köhler*, Die niederl. ref. Kirche (Erlangen 1856) for the nineteenth century. For France, besides Polenz, now *Baird*, Rise of the Huguenots. For England, besides Carlyle, Macaulay, Masson and—last but not least—Ranke, now above all the various works of Gardiner and Firth to be cited later; also, e.g., *Taylor*, A retrospect of the religious life in England (1854), and the excellent book by *Weingarten* on "Die englischen Revolutions-Kirchen" [The English Revolutionary Churches]; in addition the article on the English "moralists" by *E. Troeltsch* in the Realenzyklopädie für Protest. Theol. u. Kirche, 3rd ed., and—of course—his "Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen" [The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Groups], and Ed. *Bernstein*'s excellent essay in the "Geschichte des Sozialismus" (Stuttgart 1895, vol. I p. 506 f.). The best bibliography (over 7,000 entries) is in *Dexter*, Congregationalism of the last 300 years (admittedly concerned mainly—though not exclusively—with questions of *church government*). The book stands far above Price (Hist. of Nonconformism), Skeats and other accounts. For Scotland, e.g., *Sack*, K. von Schottland (1844), and the literature on John Knox. For the American colonies, the work of *Doyle*, The English in America, stands out from the numerous specialized studies. Further: Daniel Wait *Howe*, The Puritan Republic (Indianapolis, The Bowen-Merrill-Cy publishers); *J. Brown*, The pilgrim fathers of New England and their Puritan successors (3d ed. Revell). Further references at the appropriate place. For the differences in *doctrine*, the following account is particularly indebted to *Schneckenburger*'s series of lectures, cited earlier. —Ritschl's fundamental work, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung [The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation] (3 vols., cited here from the 3rd edition), shows in its heavy intermixture of historical account and value judgments the pronounced individuality of its author, which, for all the magnificence of his intellectual acuity, does not always give the user complete confidence in its "objectivity." Where, for example, he rejects Schneckenburger's account, I have often remained doubtful whether he was justified, little as I otherwise presume to a judgment of my own. Moreover, what counts for him as "Lutheran" doctrine, out of the great variety of religious ideas and moods already present in Luther himself, often seems to be determined by value judgments: it is what is of *lasting value* in Lutheranism for Ritschl. It is Lutheranism as (according to R.) it *ought* to be, not always as it *was*. That the works of Karl Müller, Seeberg and others have been used *throughout* hardly needs special mention.—If in what follows I have imposed on the reader, as *on myself*, the penance of a malignant swelling of footnotes, the decisive reason was the need to make possible at least a provisional check of the ideas in this sketch, especially for *non*-theological readers, partly by indicating a number of further points of view that follow from them.

Independent and Baptist confessions of faith[12]:

II.1.3 Chapter 9 (Of Free Will), No. 3: Man, by his fall into the state of sin, has wholly lost all ability of his will to anything spiritually good that brings salvation with it, so much so that a natural man, being altogether turned away from the good and dead in sin, is not able to convert himself or even to prepare himself for it.

II.1.4 Chapter 3 (Of God's Eternal Decree), No. 3: By his decree, for the manifestation of his glory, God has determined (predestinated) some men..... to everlasting life, and ordained (foreordained) others to everlasting death. No. 5: Those of mankind who are determined to life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, has chosen in Christ to everlasting glory—and this out of mere free grace and love, not as though the foresight of faith or good works, or of perseverance in either of them, or anything else in the creatures, had moved him to it as a condition or cause, but all to the praise of his glorious grace. No. 7: It pleased God, according to the unsearchable counsel of his will, by which he grants or withholds grace as he pleases, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by the rest of mankind and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.

II.1.5 Chapter 10 (Of Effectual Calling), No. 1: It pleases God to call effectually all those whom he has determined to life, and them only, at his appointed and fitting time, by his Word and Spirit... taking away their heart of stone and giving them a heart of flesh, renewing their wills and, by his almighty power, determining them to that which is good.....

II.1.6 Chapter 5 (Of Providence), No. 6: As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God, as a righteous judge, blinds and

12 WEBER'S NOTE. For the wording of the Calvinist creeds cited here and below, see Karl Müller, Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche [The Confessional Writings of the Reformed Church]. Leipzig 1903. Further references at the appropriate place.

hardens for former sins, he not only withholds from them his grace, by which their understanding might have been enlightened and their hearts moved, but sometimes also withdraws the gifts they had, and brings them into contact with such objects as their corruption makes an occasion of sin; and, moreover, he gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world and the power of Satan, whereby it comes about that they harden themselves, even by the same means that God uses to soften others[13].

II.1.7 "I may go to hell, but such a God will never compel my respect"—this, as is well known, was Milton's verdict on the doctrine[14]. But what matters to us here is not an evaluation but the historical position of the dogma. We can dwell only briefly on the question of how this doctrine arose and into which contexts of thought in Calvinist theology it fitted. Two paths to it were possible. The phenomenon of the religious feeling of redemption is linked—precisely in the most active and passionate of those great men of prayer whom the history of Christianity has seen again and again since Augustine—with the sure sense of owing everything to the exclusive working of an objective power, and not the slightest thing to one's own worth. The

13 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. the Savoy and the (American) Hanserd Knollys Declarations. On the predestinarianism of the Huguenots see, among others, Polenz I 545 ff.

14 WEBER'S NOTE. On Milton's theology see the article by Eibach in the Theol. Studien und Kritiken 1879 (Macaulay's essay on it, occasioned by Sumner's translation of the "Doctrina Christiana," rediscovered in 1823, Tauchnitz Ed. 185 p. 1 f., is superficial); for all further detail, of course, Masson's principal English work in six volumes, somewhat too schematically organized, and Stern's German biography of Milton, which rests on it.—Milton early began to grow beyond the doctrine of predestination in the form of the double decree, arriving finally at the wholly free Christianity of his old age. In his detachment from all ties to his own time he can in a certain sense be compared with Sebastian Franck. Only Milton was a practical, positive nature, Franck an essentially critical one. Milton is a "Puritan" only in that broader sense of a *rational* orientation of life within the world toward the divine will, which constituted the lasting legacy of Calvinism to posterity. In a quite similar sense one could call Franck a "Puritan." As "loners," both remain outside our detailed consideration.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Sebastian Franck (1499–1542), German spiritualist writer and independent critic of all the confessional churches.

powerful mood of joyful certainty in which the tremendous spasm of the sense of sin is released in them breaks over them seemingly without any mediation. It destroys any possibility of imagining that this unheard-of gift of grace could be owed to any cooperation of one's own, or could be connected with achievements or qualities of one's own faith and will. In those times of his highest religious genius, when Luther was able to write his "Freiheit eines Christenmenschen" [On the Freedom of a Christian], God's "secret decree" also stood most firmly for him as the absolutely sole and groundless source of his state of grace[15]. He did not formally abandon it later either—but not only did the idea never gain a central place for him; it receded more and more into the background the more "realpolitical" he necessarily became as a responsible church politician. Melanchthon quite deliberately avoided including the "dangerous and obscure" doctrine in the Augsburg Confession, and for the church fathers of Lutheranism it was dogmatically settled that grace can be lost (amissibilis) and can be regained through penitent humility and faithful trust in God's word and the sacraments. With Calvin[16] the process ran exactly the other way: the significance of the doctrine grew perceptibly in the course of his polemical disputes with doctrinal opponents. It is fully developed only in the third edition of his "Institutio," and gains its central position only posthumously, in the great cultural

15 WEBER'S NOTE. "Hic est fidei summus gradus: credere Deum esse clementem, qui tam paucos salvat,—justum, qui sua voluntate nos damnabiles facit" [This is the highest degree of faith: to believe that God is merciful, who saves so few—just, who by his own will makes us damnable]—so runs the famous passage in the treatise de servo arbitrio [On the Bondage of the Will].

16 WEBER'S NOTE. At bottom, both Luther and Calvin—see Ritschl's remarks in the Geschichte des Pietismus and Köstlin s.v. "Gott" in R. f. Prot. Theol. und K., 3rd ed.—knew a double God: the revealed, gracious and kindly Father of the N.T.—for he dominates the first books of the Institutio Christiana—and behind him the "Deus absconditus" [hidden God] as a despot ruling at will. With Luther the God of the New Testament kept the upper hand entirely, because he increasingly avoided *reflection* on the metaphysical as useless and dangerous; with Calvin the idea of the transcendent deity gained power over life. In the popular development of Calvinism, admittedly, this idea could not hold its ground—but it was not the heavenly Father of the New Testament who now took its place, but the Jehovah of the Old.

struggles that the Synods of Dordrecht and Westminster sought to settle. For Calvin the "decretum horribile" [dreadful decree] is *not*, as for Luther, something *experienced* but something *thought out*. Its significance therefore grew with every further increase in the logical consistency of his religious interest, which was directed toward God alone and not toward human beings[17]. God does not exist for the sake of human beings; human beings exist for the sake of God. Everything that happens—including the fact, beyond doubt for Calvin, that only a small portion of humankind is called to salvation—can have meaning solely as a means to the end of the self-glorification of God's majesty. To apply standards of earthly "justice" to his sovereign dispositions is meaningless and an affront to his majesty[18], since he, and he alone, is *free*, that is, subject to no law; and his decrees can be comprehensible to us, or known to us at all, only insofar as he has seen fit to communicate them to us. Only to these fragments of eternal truth can we hold. Everything else—the *meaning* of our individual fate—is surrounded by dark mysteries that it is impossible and presumptuous to fathom. If the damned were to complain that their fate was undeserved, it would be much as if animals were to protest that they had not been born human. For all creatures are separated from God by an unbridgeable gulf and deserve from him nothing but eternal death, insofar as he has not decided otherwise for the glorification of his majesty. All we know is that some people are saved and others remain damned. To assume that human merit or guilt helps determine this fate would be to regard God's absolutely free decisions, fixed from eternity, as alterable by human influence: an impossible thought. The humanly understandable "Father in heaven" of the New Testament, who rejoices over the return of the sinner as a woman rejoices over the coin she has found again, has here become a transcendent being beyond all human understanding,

17 WEBER'S NOTE. On what follows, cf. *Scheibe*, Calvins Prädestinationslehre [Calvin's Doctrine of Predestination], Halle 1897. On Calvinist theology in general: *Heppe*, Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche [Dogmatics of the Evangelical Reformed Church], Elberfeld 1861.

18 WEBER'S NOTE. Corpus Reformatorum vol. 77, p. 186 ff.

who from eternity, according to wholly inscrutable decrees, has allotted each individual his fate and disposed of even the smallest thing in the cosmos[19]. Since his decrees stand unalterably fixed, God's grace is as impossible to lose for those to whom he grants it as it is unattainable for those to whom he denies it.

THE LONELINESS OF THE BELIEVER

Predestination left each believer alone before God, without priest, sacrament, church or any magical means of salvation.

II.1.8 In its pathos-laden inhumanity, this doctrine was bound to have one consequence above all for the mood of a generation that surrendered to its grandiose consistency: a feeling of unprecedented inner *loneliness of the single individual*[20]. In what was, for people of the Reformation era, the most decisive concern of life, eternal salvation, a person was forced to go his way alone, toward a destiny fixed from all eternity. No one could help him. No preacher—for only the elect can understand the word of God spiritualiter [spiritually]. No sacrament—for although the sacraments are ordained by God to increase his glory and must therefore be kept inviolably, they are no means of obtaining God's grace. Subjectively, they are only "externa subsidia" [external aids] to faith. No church—for the principle "extra ecclesiam nulla salus" [outside the church there is no salvation] does hold, in the sense that whoever keeps away from

19 WEBER'S NOTE. The account of Calvinist doctrine given above can be read in much the form presented here in, for example, Hoornbeek's Theologia practica (Utrecht 1663), bk. II, ch. 1: de praedestinatione [on predestination]. Characteristically, the section comes *directly* after the one headed De Deo [On God]. H.'s scriptural basis is chiefly the first chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians.—We need not analyze here the various inconsistent attempts to combine the responsibility of the individual with God's predestination and providence, and to save the empirical "freedom" of the will. These attempts began as early as Augustine's first elaboration of the doctrine.

20 WEBER'S NOTE. "The deepest community (with God) is found not in institutions or corporations or churches, but in the secrets of a solitary heart": this is how Dowden, in his fine book "Puritan and Anglican" (p. 234), formulates the decisive point. This deep inner loneliness of the individual arose in exactly the same way among the Jansenists of Port-Royal, who were predestinarians.

the true church can never belong to those chosen by God[21]. But the reprobate also belong to the (outward) church. Indeed, they *ought* to belong to it and be subjected to its discipline—not so as to attain salvation thereby, which is impossible, but because they too must be compelled to keep God's commandments, for his glory. Finally, too—no God: for even Christ died only for the elect[22], to whom God had decreed from eternity to credit his sacrificial death. This was the absolutely decisive point of difference from Catholicism: the complete elimination of salvation through the church and its *sacraments*, which in Lutheranism had by no means yet been carried through to all its consequences. That great process in the history of religion, the *disenchantment* of the world[23], which began with ancient Jewish prophecy and, together with Hellenic scientific thought, rejected all *magical* means of seeking salvation as superstition and sacrilege, here reached its conclusion. The genuine Puritan even rejected every trace of religious ceremony at the grave and buried those closest to him without song or ceremony. He did this so that no "superstition" whatever could arise, no trust in saving

21 WEBER'S NOTE. Contra qui hujusmodi coetum (namely, a church in which pure doctrine, sacraments and church discipline exist) contemnunt… salutis suae certi esse non possunt; et qui in illo contemtu perseverat electus non est. [But those who despise such a congregation… cannot be certain of their salvation; and whoever persists in that contempt is not elect.] Olevian, de subst. foed. p. 222.

22 WEBER'S NOTE. "It is said, to be sure, that God sent his Son to redeem the human race—but that was not his purpose; he wanted only to help some out of the Fall…. and I tell you that God died only for the chosen…" (sermon preached at Broek in 1609, in Rogge, Wtenbogaert II p. 9. Cf. Nuyens op. cit. II p. 232.) The grounds given for Christ's mediation in the Hanserd Knollys Confession are also convoluted. It is assumed practically everywhere that God did not really need this means at all.

23 WEBER'S NOTE. On this process see the essays on the "Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen" [The Economic Ethics of the World Religions]. As will be shown there, even the special position of ancient Israelite ethics, compared with the Egyptian and Babylonian ethics closely related to it in content, and its development from the time of the prophets onward, rested entirely on this basic fact: the rejection of sacramental magic as a path to salvation.

effects of a magical-sacramental kind[24]. There was no magical means, and indeed no means at all, of bestowing God's grace on anyone to whom God had decided to deny it.[25] This inner isolation of the individual combined with the stark doctrine that God is absolutely remote and everything purely creaturely is worthless. On the one hand, it accounts for Puritanism's absolutely negative attitude toward all sensuous and *emotional* elements in culture and in subjective religiosity, because they are useless for salvation and promote sentimental illusions and the superstition that idolizes the creature. Hence also its fundamental turning away from all sensuous culture whatsoever[26]. On the other hand, it forms one of the roots of that disillusioned and pessimistically tinged individualism[27] which still makes itself felt today in the "national character" and the institutions of peoples with a

24 WEBER'S NOTE. Likewise, on the most consistent view, baptism was binding only by virtue of a positive command, but was not necessary for salvation. *That is why* the strictly Puritan Scottish and English Independents were able to put into practice the principle that the children of obvious *reprobates* (e.g., children of drunkards) should not be baptized. The Synod of Edam of 1586 (Art. 32, 1) recommended that an adult who desired baptism but was not yet "ripe" for communion should be baptized only if his conduct was blameless and he made the request "sonder superstitie" [without superstition].

25 Weber's term *Entzauberung* (literally "de-magicking") refers here to the elimination of magic as a means of salvation.

26 WEBER'S NOTE. This negative relation to "sensuous culture" is, as Dowden op. cit. has finely shown, nothing less than a constitutive element of Puritanism.

27 WEBER'S NOTE. The term "individualism" covers the most heterogeneous things imaginable. What is meant by it *here* will, I hope, become clear from the hints that follow. In another sense of the word, Lutheranism has been called "individualistic" because it does *not* know an ascetic regulation of life. Dietrich Schäfer, for example, uses the word in yet another, quite different sense. In his essay Zur Beurteilung des Wormser Konkordats [On Assessing the Concordat of Worms] (Abh. d. Berl. Akad. 1905), he calls the *Middle Ages* the age of "pronounced individuality," because irrational factors then had an importance for the events *relevant* to the historian that they no longer have today. He is right, but so, perhaps, are those against whom he sets his observations, for the two sides mean something quite different when they speak of "individuality" and "individualism." —Jacob Burckhardt's brilliant formulations are in part outdated today, and a thorough, historically oriented analysis of the concept would be of the highest scholarly value, especially now. It is, of course, the exact opposite of this when the play instinct leads certain historians to "define" the concept in the style of a poster, merely so that they can stick it on a historical epoch as a label.

Puritan past. It stands in striking contrast to the entirely different lens through which the "Enlightenment" later viewed human beings[28]. In the period that concerns us, we clearly find traces of this influence of the doctrine of predestination in elementary features of people's conduct of life and outlook on life. We find them even where its validity as dogma was already fading, for it was, after all, only the *most extreme* form of that *exclusive* trust in *God* whose analysis is what matters here. One example is the warning, strikingly frequent in English Puritan literature especially, against any trust in human help and human friendship[29]. Even the gentle Baxter advises deep distrust even of one's closest friend. Bailey recommends outright trusting no one and letting no one know anything comprom-

28 WEBER'S NOTE. And likewise in contrast—naturally a less sharp one—to later Catholic doctrine. Pascal's deep pessimism, on the other hand, which also rests on the doctrine of predestination, is of Jansenist origin, and the world-fleeing individualism that proceeds from it by no means agrees with the official Catholic position. On this see Honigsheim's study of the French Jansenists, cited on p. 72, n. 2.
29 WEBER'S NOTE. Exactly the same is true of the Jansenists.

ising: God alone should be one's confidant[30].[31] In the most striking contrast to Lutheranism, and in connection with this attitude toward life, private confession quietly disappeared in the areas of fully developed Calvinism. Calvin himself had had misgivings about it only because it could be misread as a sacrament. This was an event of the greatest consequence: first, as a symptom of the way this religiosity worked; but then also as a psychological stimulus to the development of its ethical attitude. The means of periodically "discharging" the emotionally charged sense of guilt[32] was removed. We shall have more to say about the consequences for everyday moral practice. But the consequences for people's religious situation as a whole are obvious. The Calvinist's communion with his God took place in

30 WEBER'S NOTE. Bailey, Praxis pietatis (German ed., Leipzig 1724) p. 187. Ph. *J. Spener*, too, in his "Theologische Bedenken" [Theological Opinions] (cited here from the 3rd ed., Halle 1712), takes a similar position: a friend rarely gives his advice with regard to the glory of God, but mostly from carnal (not necessarily selfish) motives.—"He"—the "knowing man"—"is blind in no man's cause, but best sighted in his own. He confines himself to the circle of his own affairs, and thrusts not his fingers in needless fires... He sees the falseness of it (of the world) and therefore learns to trust himself ever, others so far, as not to be damaged by their disappointment," philosophizes Th. Adams (Works of the Puritan Divines p. LI.) — Bailey (Praxis pietatis, op. cit. p. 176) further recommends that every morning, before going out among people, one should imagine that one is entering a wild forest full of dangers, and ask God for the "cloak of *caution* and righteousness."—This feeling runs through all the ascetic denominations without exception, and among some Pietists it led directly to a kind of hermit's life within the world. Even Spangenberg, in the (Moravian) Idea fidei fratrum p. 382, emphatically recalls Jer. 17:5: "Cursed is the man who trusts in man."—To gauge the peculiar misanthropy of this outlook on life, one should also note, for instance, Hoornbeek's comments (Theol. pract. I p. 882) on the duty to *love one's enemies*: Denique hoc magis nos ulciscimur, quo proximum, inultum nobis, *tradimus ultori Deo*... [In short, we take all the more revenge the more we *hand over* our neighbor, unavenged by us, *to God the avenger*...] Quo quis plus se ulciscitur, eo minus id pro ipso agit Deus [The more a man avenges himself, the less God does it for him]. This is the same "deferral of revenge" found in the post-exilic parts of the O.T.: a refined intensification and internalization of the feeling of revenge compared with the old "an eye for an eye." On "love of one's neighbor" see also below, p. 100, n. 3.

31 Lewis Bayly (d. 1631), Welsh bishop, author of the devotional best-seller The Practice of Piety (Praxis pietatis); Weber spells his name "Bailey."

32 WEBER'S NOTE. Admittedly, the confessional by no means acted *only* in this way. The formulations of, e.g., Muthmann, Z. f. Rel. Psych. I, no. 2, p. 65, are far too simple for the highly complicated psychological problem of confession.

deep inner isolation, although belonging to the true church was necessary for salvation[33]. Anyone who wants to feel the specific effects[34] of this peculiar atmosphere should turn to by far the most widely read book in all Puritan literature, Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress"[35]. There he should read how "Christian" behaves once he has realized that he is living in the "City of Destruction" and the call has reached him to set out without delay on the pilgrimage to the Celestial City.[36] His wife and children cling to him—but, putting his fingers in his ears and crying "Life, eternal life!" he rushes off across the fields. No sophistication could render better than the naive feeling of the tinker writing in his prison—who in doing so won the applause of a believing world—the mood of the Puritan believer, at bottom occupied only with himself and thinking only of his own salvation. It comes out in the unctuous conversations, somewhat reminiscent of Gottfried Keller's "Gerechte Kammacher" [The Just Combmakers], that he holds with fellow seekers along the way. Only when he himself is safe does it occur to him that it would be nice to have his family with him now too.[37] —It is the same tormenting fear of death and of what comes after that we feel so

33 WEBER'S NOTE. It is precisely *this* combination that is so important for judging the psychological foundations of Calvinist social *organizations*. They *all* rest on inwardly "individualistic" motives, "instrumentally rational" or "value-rational" ones. The individual never enters into them *emotionally*. "God's glory" and *one's own salvation* always remain *above* the "threshold of consciousness." This still stamps certain characteristic features on social organization among peoples with a Puritan past today.

34 WEBER'S NOTE. The *anti-authoritarian* basic tendency of the doctrine, which at bottom devalued any and every concern of church and state for ethics and the salvation of souls as pointless, led again and again to its prohibition, notably by the Dutch States General. The result was always the formation of conventicles (as after 1614).

35 WEBER'S NOTE. On Bunyan cf. Froude's biography in Morley's series (English Men of Letters), and also Macaulay's (superficial) sketch (Miscell. Works II p. 227).—B. is indifferent to the denominational differences within Calvinism, but is himself a strict Calvinist Baptist.

36 John Bunyan (1628–1688), Baptist preacher and tinker by trade, wrote The Pilgrim's Progress (1678) partly while imprisoned for unlicensed preaching.

37 Gottfried Keller (1819–1890), Swiss writer; his novella "Die drei gerechten Kammacher" satirizes three self-righteous journeymen.

pervasively everywhere in Alphonsus Liguori, as Döllinger has portrayed him. It is worlds away from that spirit of proud this-worldliness to which Machiavelli gives expression when he praises those Florentine citizens who, in their struggle against pope and interdict, "held love of their native city higher than fear for the salvation of their souls." And it is, of course, even further removed from feelings like those Richard Wagner puts into Siegmund's mouth before his fight to the death: "Greet Wotan for me, greet Valhalla for me… But of Valhalla's brittle joys, truly, speak not to me."[38] Only, the *effects* of this fear are so characteristically different in Bunyan and in Liguori. The same fear that drives the latter to every conceivable self-abasement spurs the former to a restless and systematic struggle with life. Where does this difference come from?

IMPERSONAL LOVE OF NEIGHBOR

Calvinist love of neighbor becomes impersonal work for the rational ordering of society, to God's glory.

II.1.9 It seems at first a puzzle how the undoubted superiority of Calvinism in social organization could be connected with that tendency to free the individual inwardly from the close ties in

38 Alphonsus Liguori (1696–1787), Catholic moral theologian, sharply criticized by the historian Ignaz von Döllinger; the Wagner lines are from *Die Walküre*, Act II.

which the world holds him[39]. Yet, strange as it may seem at first, it is precisely this superiority that follows from the specific coloring that Christian "love of one's neighbor" was bound to take on under the pressure of the individual's inner isolation through

the Calvinist faith. It follows, first of all, dogmatically[40]. The world exists to serve God's self-glorification—and for that alone.

The elect Christian exists to increase God's glory in the world, for his part, by carrying out God's commandments—and for that

40 WEBER'S NOTE. We shall often have occasion to speak of the relation between dogmatic and practical-psychological "consequences." That the two are not identical hardly needs pointing out.

alone. But God wills the social achievement of the Christian, *because* he wills that social life be shaped according to his com-

mandments and arranged so as to serve that purpose. The social[41] work of the Calvinist in the world is solely work "in

majorem gloriam *Dei*" [for the greater glory of *God*]. Work in a *calling*, which serves the this-worldly life of the community as a

whole, therefore bears this character too. Already in Luther we found work in a calling, with its division of labor, derived from

"love of one's neighbor." But what in his case remained a tentative, purely theoretical construction now became a characteristic

part of the Calvinists' ethical system. "Love of one's neighbor" may serve only the glory of *God*[42], not that of the *creature*[43]. It

therefore expresses itself *first and foremost* in fulfilling the tasks of the *calling* given by the lex naturae [law of nature], and in

doing so it takes on a peculiarly matter-of-fact, *im*personal character: that of a service to the rational ordering of the social cos-

mos around us. For this cosmos, according both to the revelation of the Bible and to natural insight, is evidently tailored to

serve the "*utility*" of the human race. Its wonderfully purposeful design and arrangement thus show that work in the service of

this impersonal social utility promotes God's glory and is therefore willed by God. Others wore themselves out on the problem

of theodicy and all those questions about the "meaning" of the world and of life. For the Puritan, their complete elimination

was entirely self-evident, as it was—for quite different reasons—for the Jew, and, incidentally, in a certain sense for non-mystical

Christian religiosity in general. To this economy of forces Calvinism added a further feature working in the same direc-

tion. The split between the "individual" and "ethics" (in Søren Kierkegaard's sense) did not exist for Calvinism, even though in

religious matters it left the individual entirely to himself. This is not the place to analyze the reasons for this, or the significance

of these points for the political and economic rationalism of Calvinism.[44] Here lies the source of the *utilitarian* character of

Calvinist ethics, and important peculiarities of the Calvinist conception of the calling also sprang from it[45].—For now, how-

39 WEBER'S NOTE. It is natural to point to the Calvinist idea that admission into a *community* conforming to God's precepts is necessary for salvation, an idea that follows from the requirement of "incorporation into the body of Christ" (Calvin, Instit. III, 11, 10). This idea is undoubtedly of great importance for the *social* character of Reformed Christianity. From *our* particular points of view, however, the crux of the problem lies somewhat elsewhere. That dogmatic idea could also have developed in a church of a purely institutional character, and, as is well known, it did. In itself it lacks the psychological force to awaken community-building *initiative*, let alone to give it such force as Calvinism possessed. This community-building tendency of Calvinism had its effect precisely *outside* the church congregations prescribed by God as well, in the "world." What is decisive here is precisely the belief that the Christian proves his state of grace by *activity* "in majorem Dei gloriam" [for the greater glory of God] (see below). The sharp abhorrence of idolatry of the creature and of all attachment to *personal* relations with people was bound to steer this energy imperceptibly into the channels of matter-of-fact (impersonal) activity. The Christian who cares about proving his state of grace works for the purposes of *God*, and these can only be *impersonal*. In Puritan ethics, as in every ascetic ethic, any purely emotional—that is, not rationally grounded—*personal* relation between one human being and another very easily falls under suspicion of being idolatry of the creature. As regards *friendship*, this is shown—besides what has already been said earlier—by, for example, the following warning, clearly enough: It is an irrational act and not fit for a rational creature to love any one farther than *reason* will allow us... It very often taketh up mens minds so as to *hinder* their *love of God*. (Baxter, Christian Directory IV p. 253). We shall meet such arguments again and again. The Calvinist is inspired by the thought that God, in shaping the world, including the social order, must will what is *objectively purposeful* as a means of glorifying himself: not the creature for its own sake, but the *ordering* of the creaturely under his will. The urge to action of the saints, released by the doctrine of predestination, therefore flows entirely into the effort to rationalize the world. This applies in particular to the idea that "*public*" utility, or "the good *of the many*," should be placed above all "personal" or "private" welfare of individuals. Baxter formulates it (Christian Directory IV p. 262, with a somewhat forced citation of Rom. 9:3) quite in the spirit of later liberal rationalism. Little as it was new in itself, for Puritanism it followed from the rejection of idolatry of the creature.—The traditional American abhorrence of personal *service* is probably also connected, after all (in an indirect way), with that tradition, alongside other massive reasons that follow from "democratic" feelings. So too is the *relatively* great immunity of formerly Puritan peoples to Caesarism. So too, in general, is the inwardly freer attitude of the English toward their great statesmen: more inclined, on the one hand, to "let the great have their due," but on the other hand rejecting all hysterical infatuation with them and the naive idea that one could be obliged to political obedience out of "gratitude." Compare much of what we have experienced of this in Germany since 1878, positively and negatively.—On the sinfulness of belief in authority, which is permissible only in *im*personal form, directed toward the content of Scripture, and likewise of excessive esteem even for the holiest and most eminent people, because it may endanger obedience to *God*, see Baxter, Christian Directory (2nd ed. 1678) I p. 56. —What the rejection of "idolatry of the creature" meant politically, and the principle that God alone should "rule"—first in the church, but ultimately in life as a whole—does not belong in our context.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. An allusion to the hero worship of Bismarck, whose conservative turn came in 1878.

ever, we return once more to the doctrine of predestination in

particular.

AM I ONE OF THE ELECT?

Believers needed certainty of election, and pastoral advice found it in self-assurance and restless work in a calling.

II.1.10 For the problem that is decisive for us is this: how was this

doctrine *endured*[46] in an age for which the next life was not only more important but in many respects also more certain than all

the interests of this one[47]? One question was bound to arise at once for every individual believer and push all other interests

into the background: Am *I* one of the elect? And how can *I* become certain of this election[48]?—For Calvin himself this was

47 WEBER'S NOTE. Just as, once again, this still forms the basic mood of Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress in so overwhelming a way.

no problem. He felt himself to be an "instrument" of God and was certain of his state of grace. Accordingly, to the question of

how the individual can become certain of his own election, he has at bottom only one answer: we should be content with

knowing God's decree and with the persevering trust in Christ that true faith brings about. On principle he rejects the assump-

tion that one can tell from other people's conduct whether they are elect or damned; that would be a presumptuous attempt to

penetrate God's mysteries. In this life the elect differ outwardly in no way from the damned[49]. All the subjective experiences of

the elect are possible for the damned too—as "ludibria spiritus sancti" [mockeries of the Holy Spirit]—with the sole exception of

that believing trust which perseveres "*finaliter*" [to the end]. The elect therefore are, and remain, God's *in*visible church. Quite

naturally, it was different with the epigones—already with Beza—and above all with the broad mass of ordinary people. For

them the "certitudo salutis" [certainty of salvation], in the sense that one's state of grace could be *recognized*, necessarily rose to

absolutely overriding importance[50]. And so, wherever the doctrine of predestination was retained, the question inevitably

arose whether there were sure signs by which one could recognize that one belonged to the "electi" [the elect]. This question

50 WEBER'S NOTE. Accordingly, the Westminster Confession (XVIII, 2) also holds out to the elect the prospect of an *infallible certainty* of grace, although with all our doing we remain "unprofitable servants" (XVI, 2) and the struggle against evil lasts a lifetime (XVIII, 3). Only, even one of the elect often has to struggle for a long time to attain the certitudo that comes to him from the consciousness of having done his duty, and of which the believer will never be entirely deprived.

was of lasting central importance in the development of Pietism, which first grew up on the soil of the Reformed Church; in a

certain sense it was at times actually constitutive of it. But that is not all. When we consider the politically and socially so far-

reaching significance of the Reformed doctrine and practice of the Lord's Supper, we shall also have to discuss the role that the

possibility of ascertaining the individual's state of grace played outside Pietism throughout the entire 17th century. It mattered,

for example, for the question of his admission to communion,

46 WEBER'S NOTE. Hundeshagen (Beitr. z. Kirchenverfassungsgesch. u. Kirchenpolitik 1864 I p. 37) takes the position, often repeated since, that the dogma of predestination was a doctrine of theologians, not a doctrine of the people. But that is correct only if one identifies the concept of "the people" with the *mass* of the uneducated lower strata. And even then it holds only to a very limited extent. In the 1840s Köhler (op. cit.) found precisely the "masses" (meaning the petty bourgeoisie in Holland) strictly predestinarian in outlook; to them, anyone who denied the double decree was a heretic and one of the damned. He himself was asked about the *moment* of his (predestinarian-conceived) rebirth. Da Costa and the de Kock secession were partly conditioned by this. Not only Cromwell—whom Zeller (Das theologische System Zwinglis p. 17) had already used as a paradigm to illustrate the effect of the dogma—but also his saints all knew very well what was at stake, and the canons of the Synods of Dordrecht and Westminster on the doctrine were a national affair on a grand scale. Cromwell's tryers and ejectors admitted only predestinarians, and Baxter (Life I p. 72), though otherwise their opponent, judges their effect on the quality of the clergy to have been considerable. It is quite out of the question that the Reformed Pietists, the members of the English and Dutch conventicles, were unclear about the doctrine. It was precisely *the doctrine* that drove them together to seek the certitudo salutis. What predestination meant, or did not mean, where it was a doctrine of *theologians*, can be seen from ecclesiastically correct Catholicism, to which, as an esoteric doctrine and in a fluctuating form, it was by no means foreign. (What was decisive here was that the view that the *individual* must *consider* himself elect and prove himself so was always rejected. Cf. the Catholic doctrine in, e.g., Ad. van Wyck, Tract. de praedestinatione, Cologne 1708. How far Pascal's belief in predestination was orthodox is not to be examined here.)—H., who dislikes the doctrine, evidently draws his impressions mainly from German conditions. His antipathy is grounded in the purely deductive opinion that it must lead to moral fatalism and antinomianism. Zeller op. cit. already refuted this opinion. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that such a turn was *possible*; Melanchthon and Wesley both speak of it. But it is characteristic that in both cases it involved a combination with an *emotional* religiosity of "faith." For such a religiosity, which lacked the rational idea of *proof*, this consequence did indeed lie in the nature of the case.—In *Islam* these fatalistic consequences did occur. But why? Because Islamic predetermination was *predeterministic*, not predestinarian: it related to fortunes in *this world*, not to salvation in the *next*. As a result, the ethically decisive element—"proof" of being predestined—played no role in Islam. So only fearlessness *in war* could follow from it (as with "Moira" [fate]), but not consequences for a *methodical* conduct of life, for which the religious "premium" was lacking. See the (Heidelberg) theological dissertation by F. Ullrich, Die Vorherbest. L. im Isl. und Chr., 1912).—The attenuations of the doctrine that practice brought—in Baxter, for example—did not touch its essence as long as the idea of God's decree of election concerning the *concrete individual*, and of its being *put to the test*, remained untouched.—Above all, finally, all the great figures of Puritanism (in the widest sense of the word) started out from this doctrine, whose somber seriousness influenced their development in youth: Milton just as much as Baxter—admittedly to a steadily diminishing degree—and even Franklin, who later became a very free thinker. Their later emancipation from its strict interpretation corresponds in detail entirely to the development that the religious movement as a whole also went through in the same direction. But *all* the great church revivals, at least in Holland, and most of those in England too, always went back precisely to this doctrine.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The "tryers" and "ejectors" were commissions set up under Cromwell in 1654 to approve and to remove parish clergy.

that is, to the central act of worship, which was decisive for the social standing of those who took part.

II.1.11 Orthodox doctrine never formally abandoned, at least in principle,[51] Calvin's reference to the self-testimony of the persevering faith that grace brings about in a person. But at least as soon as the question of one's *own* state of grace arose, it was impossible to stop there[52]. Above all, pastoral practice, which at every turn had to deal with the torments created by the doctrine, could not stop there. It came to terms with these difficulties in various ways[53]. Insofar as predestination was not reinterpreted, softened and at bottom abandoned in the process[54], two interconnected types of pastoral advice stand out as especially characteristic. On the one hand, it is made an absolute duty to *consider* oneself elect and to reject every doubt as a temptation of the devil[55], since lack of self-assurance was held to result from insufficient faith, and hence from an insufficient

51 WEBER'S NOTE. See, e.g., Olevian, De substantia foederis gratuiti inter Deum et electos (1585) 257.—Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae XXIV, 87 f., and other passages in *Heppe*, Dogmatik der ev. ref. Kirche (1861) p. 425.

52 WEBER'S NOTE. Genuine Calvinist doctrine pointed to *faith* and to the consciousness of communion with God in the sacraments, and mentioned the "other fruits of the Spirit" only in passing. See the passages in Heppe, Dogmatik d. ev. reform. Kirche p. 425. Calvin himself very emphatically rejected works as *marks* of standing before God, although for him, as for the Lutherans, they are fruits of faith (Instit. III, 2, 37, 38). The practical turn toward proving faith in works, which is precisely what characterizes *asceticism*, runs parallel with the gradual modification of Calvin's doctrine. According to that doctrine, (as with Luther) the true church is marked *first and foremost* by pure doctrine and the sacraments; it was gradually modified to place "disciplina" [discipline] on an equal footing with these two as a mark. This development can be traced, for instance, in the passages in Heppe op. cit. pp. 194/195, and also in the way congregational membership was acquired in the Netherlands as early as the end of the 16th century (explicit contractual submission to *discipline* as the central condition).

53 WEBER'S NOTE. See on this, among others, Schneckenburger's remarks op. cit. p. 48.

54 WEBER'S NOTE. Thus in Baxter, for example, the distinction between "mortal" and "venial sin" reappears—quite in the Catholic manner. The former is a sign that the state of grace is lacking or not currently present, and in that case only a "conversion" of the whole person can guarantee that one possesses it. The latter is not incompatible with the state of grace.

55 WEBER'S NOTE. So—with various shadings—Baxter, Bailey, Sedgwick, Hoornbeek. See also the examples in Schneckenburger op. cit. p. 262.

working of grace. The apostle's exhortation to "make sure" one's own calling is thus interpreted here as a duty to win, in daily struggle, the subjective certainty of one's own election and justification. In place of the humble sinners to whom Luther promises grace if they entrust themselves to God in penitent faith, there are thus bred those self-assured "saints"[56] whom we find again in the steel-hard Puritan merchants of that heroic age of capitalism, and in individual specimens down to the present. And on the other hand, *restless work in a calling* was urged as the most outstanding means of *attaining* that self-assurance[57]. It, and it alone, was said to dispel religious doubt and give certainty of one's state of grace.

II.1.12 That worldly work in a calling was considered capable of *this* achievement—that it could, so to speak, be treated as the appropriate means of discharging religious anxiety—is rooted, however, in deep-seated peculiarities of the religious sensibility cultivated in the Reformed Church. In their contrast with Lutheranism, these emerge most clearly in the doctrine of the nature of justifying faith. Schneckenburger's fine cycle of lec-

56 WEBER'S NOTE. The conception of the "state of grace" as a kind of quality of *rank*, like belonging to an estate (somewhat like the ascetic estate in the early church), is found often, among others still in Schortinghuis (Het innige Christendom 1740—*banned* by the States General!).

57 WEBER'S NOTE. So—as will be discussed later—in countless passages of Baxter's Christian Directory and in its concluding passage.—This recommendation of work in a calling as a distraction from anxiety about one's own moral inferiority is reminiscent of Pascal's psychological interpretation of the drive for money and of vocational asceticism as means invented to deceive oneself about one's own moral nothingness. In his case, the belief in predestination, together with the conviction that everything creaturely is worthless because of original sin, is placed entirely in the service of renouncing the world and recommending contemplation, as the only means of relief from the burden of sin and of attaining certainty of salvation. —On the orthodox Catholic and the Jansenist forms of the concept of the calling, Dr. Paul *Honigsheim* has made penetrating remarks in his dissertation already cited (part of a larger work that will, I hope, be continued). Among the Jansenists there is no trace of any link between certainty of salvation and *action* within the world. Their conception of the "calling," far more strongly even than the Lutheran and even the genuinely Catholic one, has entirely the sense of *resigning oneself* to one's given situation in life—a situation ordained not only, as in Catholicism, by the social order, but by the voice of one's own conscience (Honigsheim op. cit. p. 139 f.).

tures analyzes these differences so subtly and so purely objectively, with all value judgments set aside[58], that the brief remarks that follow can essentially just build on his account.

VESSEL OR INSTRUMENT

Reformed faith proves itself in action, so salvation depends on systematic self-control at every moment.

II.1.13 The highest religious experience toward which Lutheran piety strives, as it developed especially in the course of the 17th century, is the "unio mystica" [mystical union] with the God-

58 WEBER'S NOTE. Lobstein's very lucidly written sketch in the Festgabe for H. Holtzmann, which should also be compared for what follows, likewise builds on his points of view. It has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on the leitmotif of the "certitudo salutis." But here one must distinguish Calvin's theology from *Calvinism*, and the theological system from the needs of pastoral care. *All* religious movements that took hold of broader strata started from the question: "how can I become *certain* of my salvation?" As has been said, it plays a central role not only in this case but in the history of religion in general, for example in Indian religion as well. And how could it be otherwise?

head[59]. As the very term suggests—and in this form it is unknown to Reformed doctrine—this is a substantial feeling of God: the sensation of the divine really entering the believing soul. It is qualitatively of the same kind as the effects of the contemplation of the German mystics. It is marked by its *passive* character, directed toward fulfilling the longing for *rest* in God, and by its purely emotional inwardness. Now, as is known from the history of philosophy, a religiosity with a mystical turn is in itself not only very compatible with a pronounced, realistic sense of reality in the sphere of what is empirically given; owing to its rejection of dialectical doctrines, it is indeed often its dir-

59 WEBER'S NOTE. It can hardly be denied, admittedly, that the *full* development of this *concept* took place only in the *late* Lutheran period (Praetorius, Nicolai, Meisner). (It is *present* in Johann Gerhard as well, and entirely in the sense discussed here.) Ritschl, in the fourth book of his "Geschichte des Pietismus" (vol. II, p. 3 f.), therefore treats the introduction of this concept into Lutheran religiosity as a revival or adoption of Catholic piety. He does not dispute (p. 10) that the problem of individual certainty of salvation was the same for Luther and for the Catholic mystics, but he believes that the two sides arrived at exactly opposite solutions. I certainly cannot claim a judgment of my own on this. Everyone naturally feels that the air blowing through the "Freiheit eines Christenmenschen" [The Freedom of a Christian] is different from the sugary dallying with the "dear little Jesus" in the later literature, and also different from Tauler's religious mood. Likewise, the retention of the mystical-magical element in the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper certainly has religious motives other than that "Bernardine" piety—the "Song of Songs mood"—to which Ritschl returns again and again as the source that cultivated the "bridal" relationship with Christ. But might not that doctrine of the Supper, among other things, nonetheless have *helped to encourage* the reawakening of a mystical religiosity of feeling?—Further, to note this right away, it is by no means correct that (p. 11, op. cit.) the mystic's freedom consisted simply in *withdrawal* from the world. Tauler in particular, in remarks of great interest for the psychology of religion, singled out as the *practical* effect of those nightly contemplations, which he recommends among other things for sleeplessness, the *order* they also bring into the thoughts directed to worldly work in a calling: "Only by this (by mystical union with God at night before sleep) is *reason purified and the brain strengthened*, and a person is all the day the more peaceably and divinely composed through the inward exercise of having truly united himself with God: then all his works are *ordered*. And therefore, when a person has thus forewarned (= prepared) himself for his work and has thus founded himself on *virtue*—when he then comes to actuality, his works become *virtuous and divine*." (Predigten, fol. 318.) In any case one sees—and we shall return to this—that mystical contemplation and a rational conception of the calling *are* not in themselves *mutually exclusive*. The opposite occurs only where religiosity takes on a downright hysterical character, which was the case neither with all mystics nor, still less, with all Pietists.

ect support. Mysticism can also, just as well, benefit a rational conduct of life indirectly. Nevertheless, its relation to the world naturally lacks any positive valuation of outward activity. In Lutheranism, moreover, the "unio mystica" was combined with that deep feeling of unworthiness through original sin which the Lutheran believer's "poenitentia quotidiana" [daily repentance] was meant carefully to preserve, aimed as it was at maintaining the humility and simplicity indispensable for the forgiveness of sins. Specifically Reformed religiosity, by contrast, was from the beginning opposed both to Pascal's quietist flight from the world and to this purely inward-looking Lutheran piety of feeling. God's absolute transcendence over everything creaturely ruled out any real entry of the divine into the human soul: "finitum non est capax infiniti" [the finite cannot contain the infinite]. Rather, God's communion with those he had graced could take place and become conscious only in this way: God *worked* in them ("operatur") and they became aware of it. That is, their *action* sprang from the faith brought about by God's grace, and this faith in turn proved, by the quality of that action, that it had been brought about by God. This expresses profound differences in the decisive states of salvation[60], differences that hold for the classification of all practical religiosity whatsoever. The religious virtuoso can assure himself of his state of grace *either* by feeling himself a vessel of divine power *or* by feeling himself its instrument. In the first case his religious life tends toward a mystical cultivation of feeling, in the second toward ascetic *action*. Luther stood closer to the first type; Calvinism belonged to the second. The Reformed believer, too, wanted to be saved "sola fide" [by faith alone]. But since, already in Calvin's view, all mere feelings and moods, however sublime they may seem, are deceptive[61], faith must prove itself in its objective *effects* if it is to serve as a secure foundation for the certitudo salutis. It must be

60 WEBER'S NOTE. On this, see the following essays on the "Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen" [The Economic Ethics of the World Religions], Introduction.
61 WEBER'S NOTE. In this presupposition Calvinism touches official Catholicism. But for Catholics it led to the necessity of the sacrament of penance; for the Reformed, to the necessity of practical *proof* through activity within the world.

a "fides efficax" [effective faith][62], and the call to salvation an "effectual calling" (the expression of the Savoy Declaration). If one then asks further by *which* fruits the Reformed believer

62 WEBER'S NOTE. See, for example, already Beza (De praedestinat. doct. ex praelect. in Rom. 9. a Raph. Eglino exc. 1584), p. 133: ... "sicut ex operibus vere bonis ad sanctificationis donum, a sanctificatione ad fidem... ascendimus: ita ex certis illis effectis non quamvis vocationem, sed efficacem illam, et ex hac vocatione electionem et ex electione donum praedestinationis in Christo tam firmam quam immotus est Dei thronus certissima connexione effectorum et causarum colligimus..." [just as from truly good works we ascend to the gift of sanctification, and from sanctification to faith..., so from those sure effects we infer, by the most certain connection of effects and causes, not just any calling but that effectual one, and from this calling election, and from election the gift of predestination in Christ, as firm as God's throne is immovable]. Only with regard to the signs of *damnation*, he says, must one be cautious, since what matters is the *final* state. (It was Puritanism that first thought differently on this point.)—See further the detailed discussion in Schneckenburger, op. cit., who admittedly cites only a limited category of literature. This feature appears again and again throughout Puritan literature. "It will not be said: did you believe?—but: were you Doers, or Talkers only?" says Bunyan. According to Baxter (The saints' everlasting rest, ch. XII), who teaches the mildest form of predestination, faith is submission to Christ from the heart and *in deed*. "Do what you are able first, and then complain of God for denying you grace if *you have cause*," he replied to the objection that the will is unfree and that it is God alone who withholds the capacity for sanctification. (Works of the Puritan Divines IV, p. 155.) The examination of Fuller (the church historian) was confined to the single question of practical proof and of the evidence his conduct gave of his state of grace. Howe says the same in the passage already cited elsewhere. Any survey of the Works of the Puritan Divines turns up evidence at every step. Not infrequently it was actually *Catholic* ascetic writings that led to "conversion" to *Puritanism*—in Baxter's case a Jesuit tract.—These conceptions were not a complete innovation compared with Calvin's own doctrine (cf. Inst. Christ. c. I, original edition of 1536, pp. 97, 112). Only, for Calvin himself, certainty of grace could not be securely attained by this route either (ibid., p. 147). People customarily appealed to 1 John 3:5 and similar passages. The demand for fides efficax [effectual faith] is—to anticipate here—not confined to Calvinists in the strict sense. *Baptist* confessions of faith treat the fruits of faith in exactly the same way in the article on predestination ("and that its"—regeneration's—"proper evidence appears in the holy fruits of repentance and faith and *newness of life*": Art. 7 of the confession printed in The Baptist Church Manual by J. N. Brown, D.D., Philadelphia, Am. Bapt. Publ. Soc.). Likewise the *Mennonite*-influenced tract Olijf-Tacxken [Little Olive Branch], adopted by the Haarlem synod in 1649, opens on p. 1 with the question: by what does one *recognize* the children of God? And it answers (p. 10): Nu al is't dat dasdanigh *vruchtbare* ghelove alleene zii het seker fondamentale kennteeken.... om de conscientien der gelovigen in het nieuwe verbondt der genade Gods te *versekeren* [Now, although it is such *fruitful* faith alone that is the sure fundamental mark... to *assure* the consciences of believers in the new covenant of God's grace].

could unmistakably recognize true faith, the answer is: by a conduct of life that serves to increase *God's glory*. What serves this end is to be learned from God's will, revealed directly in the Bible or discernible indirectly from the purposeful orders of the world that he created (lex naturae [law of nature])[63]. In particular, one can check one's own state of grace by comparing one's own state of soul with that which, according to the Bible, belonged to the elect, for example to the patriarchs[64]. Only one of the elect really *has* the fides efficax[65]. Only he, by virtue of rebirth (regeneratio) and the sanctification (sanctificatio) of his whole life that follows from it, is able to increase God's glory through truly, not merely apparently, good works. His conduct—at least in its basic character and constant intention (propositum oboedientiae [the resolve to obey])—rests on a power living within him[66] for increasing God's glory; it is thus not only willed by God but above all *brought about* by God[67]. By being conscious of this, he attains that highest good for which this religiosity strove: certainty of grace[68]. That it could be attained was confirmed from 2 Cor. 13:5[69]. Good works, then, are absolutely unsuited to serve as a means of attaining salvation—for even the elect remains a creature, and everything he does falls infinitely

63 WEBER'S NOTE. On the significance of *these* for the material content of social ethics, some indications were already given above. Here we are concerned not with the *content* but with the *impulse* to moral action.

64 WEBER'S NOTE. It is obvious how this idea was bound to promote the penetration of the Old Testament and Jewish spirit into Puritanism.

65 WEBER'S NOTE. Thus the Savoy Declaration says of the members of the ecclesia pura [pure church] that they are "saints by *effectual* calling, *visibly manifested* by their profession *and walking*."

66 WEBER'S NOTE. "A principle of goodness": Charnock, in the Works of the Pur. Div., p. 175.

67 WEBER'S NOTE. Conversion is, as Sedgwick puts it at one point, a "word-for-word copy of the decree of predestination."—And: whoever is elect is also called to obedience *and made capable of it*, teaches Bailey.—Only those whom *God* calls to faith (a faith expressed in conduct) are real believers, not mere "temporary believers," teaches the (Baptist) Hanserd Knollys confession.

68 WEBER'S NOTE. Compare, for instance, the conclusion of Baxter's Christian Directory.

69 WEBER'S NOTE. So, for example, Charnock, Self-examination, p. 183, refuting the Catholic doctrine of "dubitatio" [doubt].

short of God's demands. But they are just as indispensable as *signs* of election[70]. They are the technical means not of buying salvation but of getting rid of the anxiety about salvation. In this sense they are occasionally described outright as "indispensable to salvation"[71], or the "possessio salutis" [possession of salvation] is tied to them[72]. In practice, however, this basically means that God helps those who help themselves[73]. As is also occasionally said, the Calvinist *himself "creates"* his salvation—or, to put it correctly, the *certainty* of it[74]. But this creating *cannot* consist, as in Catholicism, in gradually accumulating individual meritorious acts. It consists in a *systematic* self-*control* that at *every moment* faces the alternative: elect or damned? This brings us to a very important point in our discussion.

SALVATION BY WORKS AS A SYSTEM

Calvinism demanded not single good works but a whole life systematically devoted to proving one's election.

II.1.14 As is well known, the Lutherans again and again charged this line of thought, which took shape with increasing clarity[75]

---

70 WEBER'S NOTE. This argument recurs again and again, for example in Joh. *Hoornbeek*, Theologia practica, e.g. II pp. 70, 72, 182, I p. 160.

71 WEBER'S NOTE. For example, Conf. Helvet. 16 says "et improprie his (the works) *salus adtribuitur*" [and salvation is improperly attributed to these].

72 WEBER'S NOTE. On all the foregoing, see Schneckenburger, p. 80 f.

73 WEBER'S NOTE. "Si non es praedestinatus fac ut praedestineris" [If you are not predestined, see to it that you become predestined] is supposed to have been said as early as Augustine.

74 WEBER'S NOTE. One is reminded of Goethe's saying, which means essentially the same thing: "How can we come to know ourselves? Never by contemplation, but only by action. Try to do your duty, and you will know at once what is in you.—But what is your duty? The demand of the day."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. From Goethe's maxims, published with Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (1829).

75 WEBER'S NOTE. For in Calvin himself it is indeed established that "holiness" must also become *visible* (Instit. IV, 1, §§ 2, 7, 9), but the boundary between the holy and the unholy remains beyond the reach of human knowledge. We must believe that wherever God's word is purely proclaimed in a church organized and governed according to his law, there are also elect persons present—even if we cannot recognize them.

in the Reformed churches and sects, with "salvation by works"[76]. And, however justified those under attack were in objecting to the identification of their *dogmatic* position with Catholic doctrine, the charge was certainly justified if it meant the *practical* consequences for the everyday life of the average Reformed

Christian[77]. For there has perhaps never been a more intense form of religious valuation of moral *action* than the one Calvin-

ism produced in its followers. But what is decisive for the practical significance of this kind of "salvation by works" is, first of

77 WEBER'S NOTE. Baxter, The Saints' Everlasting rest I, 6, answers the question: Wether to make salvation our end be not mercenary or legal?—It is properly mercenary when we expect it as *wages* for work done... Otherwise it is only such a mercenarism as Christ commandeth... and if seeking Christ be mercenary, I desire to be so mercenary... Incidentally, some Calvinists regarded as orthodox do not escape a collapse into quite blatant salvation by works either. According to Bailey, Praxis pietatis, p. 262, alms are a means of averting *temporal* punishment. Other theologians recommended good works to the *damned* on the grounds that damnation might then perhaps be more bearable, and to the *elect* because God would then love them not merely without reason but ob causam [for a reason], which would surely find its reward somehow. The Apology, too, had after all made certain slight concessions to the significance of good works for the degree of salvation (Schneckenburger, op. cit., p. 101).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The Apology of the Augsburg Confession (1531), Melanchthon's defense of the Lutheran confession of faith.

all, an understanding of the *qualities* that characterized the corresponding conduct of life and distinguished it from the every-

day life of an average medieval Christian. One might try to formulate them roughly as follows. The ordinary medieval Catholic

layman[78] lived, ethically speaking, "from hand to mouth," so to speak. First of all, he conscientiously fulfilled the traditional

duties. But his "good works" beyond these normally remained a series of *individual* actions that were not necessarily connected

78 WEBER'S NOTE. Here too, in order first to bring out the characteristic differences, one *must* of necessity speak in an "ideal-typical" conceptual language, which in a certain sense does violence to historical reality—but without it, a clear formulation would be altogether impossible for sheer qualifications. How far the contrasts drawn here as sharply as possible are only relative would have to be discussed separately. It goes without saying that official Catholic *doctrine*, even in the Middle Ages, for its part also set up the ideal of the systematic sanctification of *the whole of life*. But it is equally beyond doubt (1) that the Church's everyday practice, precisely through its most effective instrument of discipline, confession, *made easier* the "unsystematic" conduct of life referred to in the text; and further (2) that the fundamental rigorist, cold emotional tone and the utterly self-reliant isolation of the Calvinists were bound to remain permanently absent from medieval lay Catholicism.

—or at least not necessarily rationalized into a *system* of life. He performed them as occasion arose: to make up for particular

sins, say, or under the influence of pastoral care, or toward the end of his life as a kind of insurance premium. Catholic ethics

was of course an ethic of "intention." But it was the concrete "intentio" [intention] of the *individual* action that decided its

value. And the *individual* action—good or bad—was credited to the one who performed it and affected his temporal and eternal

fate. Quite realistically, the Church reckoned with the fact that a human being is *not* a unit to be determined and assessed in

absolutely unambiguous terms, and that his moral life is (normally) a way of behaving swayed by conflicting motives and

often highly contradictory. It too, certainly, demanded of him, as an ideal, a transformation of life *in principle*. But it weakened

precisely this demand again (for the average person) through one of its most important means of power and education: the

sacrament of penance, whose function was deeply bound up

76 WEBER'S NOTE: Calvinist piety is one of the many examples in the history of religion of the relation between the *logically* and the *psychologically* derived consequences of certain religious *ideas* for practical religious *conduct*. *Logically*, of course, fatalism could be deduced as a consequence of predestination. But the *psychological effect*, because the idea of "proof" intervened, was exactly the reverse. (For a reason similar in principle, as is well known, Nietzsche's followers claim a positive ethical significance for the idea of eternal recurrence. Only here it is a matter of responsibility for a future life connected with the agent by no continuity of consciousness whatsoever—whereas for the Puritan the watchword was: Tua res agitur [It is your own affair that is at stake].) Hoornbeek already sets out the relation between predestination and action nicely, in the language of his time (Theol. pract. vol. I, p. 159): the electi [elect], precisely by virtue of their election, are immune to fatalism; it is precisely in their *rejection* of the fatalistic consequences that they *prove themselves*, "*quos ipsa electio* sollicitos reddit et diligentes officiorum" [whom election itself makes anxious and diligent in their duties]. The *practical* entanglement of interests cuts through the fatalistic consequences that could be *logically* inferred (and which, incidentally, despite everything, did *occasionally* occur in fact).—On the other hand, the *intellectual content* of a religion is—as Calvinism in particular shows—of *far* greater significance than, for example, William *James* (The varieties of religious experience, 1902, p. 444 f.) is inclined to concede. The significance of the rational element in religious metaphysics is shown in classic fashion precisely by the tremendous effects that the *intellectual* structure of the Calvinist conception of God in particular has had on life. If the God of the Puritans has had an effect on history as great as any other before or since, it was above all the attributes with which the power of *thought* had endowed him that enabled him to do so. (James's "pragmatic" valuation of the significance of religious ideas by the measure of their proof in life is, incidentally, itself a true child of the world of ideas of this eminent scholar's Puritan homeland.) Religious experience as such is of course irrational, like *every* experience. In its highest, mystical form it is indeed *the* experience κατ' ἐξοχήν [par excellence] and—as James has shown very finely—it is marked by its absolute incommunicability: it has a *specific* character and presents itself as *knowledge*, yet it cannot be adequately reproduced by the means of our linguistic and conceptual apparatus. And it is also true that *every* religious experience loses some of its content as soon as one attempts to formulate it *rationally*, and the more so the further the conceptual formulation advances. Therein lies the reason for the tragic conflicts of all rational theology, as the Baptist sects already knew in the 17th century. —But that irrationality—which, incidentally, belongs *by no means only* to *religious* "experience" but (in different *senses* and degrees) to *every* experience—does not prevent it from being of the very greatest importance, in practice above all, what *kind* of *intellectual* system it is that, so to speak, confiscates what has been immediately "experienced" religiously and steers it into its own channels. For it is *according to this* that, in times when the Church strongly influences life and dogmatic interests are strongly developed within it, most of those practically so important differences in ethical consequences arise that exist between the various religions of the world. Anyone who knows the historical sources knows how quite incredibly intense—measured by today's standards—the dogmatic interest even of the layman was in the age of the great religious struggles. The only parallel is the idea, at bottom also superstitious, that today's proletariat holds of what "science" can achieve and prove.

with the innermost character of Catholic religiosity.

NO MAGIC, NO CONFESSION

Without sacraments or confession to relieve him, the Calvinist had to turn his entire life into a method.

II.1.15 The "disenchantment" of the world—the elimination of *magic* as a means of salvation[79]—had not been carried through to its consequences in Catholic piety as it was in Puritan religiosity (and, before it, only in Jewish religiosity). The Catholic[80] had the *sacramental grace* of his Church at his disposal as a means of making up for his own inadequacy. The priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation and in whose hands the power of the keys had been placed. One could turn to him in contrition and penitence; he dispensed atonement, the hope of grace, the certainty of forgiveness, and thereby granted *release* from that tremendous *tension* in which it was the Calvinist's inescapable fate to live, a fate that nothing could soften. For him those friendly and human consolations did not exist, nor could he hope, as the Catholic and also the Lutheran could, to make up for hours of weakness and thoughtlessness by increased good will at other times. The God of Calvinism demanded of his own not individual "good works" but a salvation by

79 WEBER'S NOTE. The absolutely central significance of *this* factor will, as already mentioned once, emerge only gradually in the essays on the "Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen."

80 WEBER'S NOTE. And, to a certain extent, to the Lutheran *as well*. Luther did not *want* to root out this last remnant of sacramental magic.

works raised to a *system*[81]. There was no question of the Catholic, genuinely human up and down between sin, contrition, penance, release, and new sin, nor of a balance for one's whole life to be atoned for by temporal punishments and settled through the Church's means of grace. The ethical practice of the everyday person was thus stripped of its planlessness and lack of system and shaped into a consistent *method* for the whole conduct of life. It is no accident that the name "Methodists" stuck to those who carried the last great revival of Puritan ideas in the 18th century, just as the designation "Precisians," entirely equivalent in meaning, had been applied to their spiritual ancestors in the 17th century[82]. For only in a fundamental transformation of the meaning of the whole of life, in every hour and every

81 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., for example, Sedgwick, Buß- und Gnadenlehre [Doctrine of Repentance and Grace] (German translation by Röscher, 1689):

the penitent has "*a fixed rule*" to which he adheres strictly and by which he arranges and conducts his whole life (p. 591). He lives—prudently, watchfully and cautiously—according to the law (p. 596). *Only* a lasting change of the *whole* person can bring this about, since it is the consequence of election (p. 852). True repentance always shows itself in conduct (p. 361).—The difference between merely "moral" good works and the "opera spiritualia" [spiritual works] lies, as Hoornbeek, for example, explains (op. cit., l. IX c. 2), precisely in the fact that the latter are the consequence of a regenerate *life*, and that (op. cit., vol. I, p. 160) a steady progress can be perceived in them such as can be achieved only through the supernatural action of God's grace (op. cit., p. 150). Holiness is the transformation of the *whole* person by God's grace (ibid., p. 190 f.)—ideas that are common to all of Protestantism and that are of course also found in the highest ideals of Catholicism. *But* it was only in the Puritan movements geared to *worldly* asceticism that they could show their consequences for the world, and, above all, only there were they rewarded with a sufficiently strong psychological *premium*.

82 WEBER'S NOTE. In Holland, to be sure, the latter name derives specifically from the life of the "Fine Ones," led precisely according to the precepts of the *Bible* (so in Voët).—Incidentally, the name "Methodists" also occurs occasionally for the Puritans in the 17th century.

action[83], could the working of grace prove itself as a lifting of man out of the status naturae [state of nature] into the status gratiae [state of grace]. The life of the "saint" was directed exclusively toward a transcendent goal, salvation. But *for that very reason* its course in this world was thoroughly *rationalized* and governed by a single consideration: to increase God's glory on earth—and never has the principle "omnia in majorem dei gloriam" [all things for the greater glory of God] been taken with such bitter seriousness[84]. Only a life guided by constant reflection, however, could count as overcoming the status naturalis [natural state]: Descartes's "cogito ergo sum" [I think, therefore I am] was taken over by contemporary Puritans in this ethical reinterpretation[85]. It was this rationalization that gave Reformed piety its specifically *ascetic* character, and it grounded both its inner affinity[86] with Catholicism and its specific opposition to it. For something similar was, of course, by no means foreign to Catholicism.

---

83 WEBER'S NOTE. For—as the Puritan preachers emphasize (e.g. Bunyan in "The Pharisee and the Publican," W. of Pur. Div., p. 126)—*every* single sin destroys *everything* that might have been accumulated as "merit" through "good works" over the course of a whole life, if—inconceivably—man were capable at all, of his own accord, of achieving anything that God would have to *credit* to him as merit, or even of living perfectly all the time. There is not, as in Catholicism, a kind of current account with a balance to be settled—an image already familiar in antiquity—but for the *whole of life* the stark either-or holds: state of grace or damnation.—For echoes of the current-account conception, see note 1, p. 124.

84 WEBER'S NOTE. Therein lies the difference from mere "Legality" and "Civility," who in Bunyan live as companions of Mr. "Worldly-Wiseman" in the town called "Morality."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The figures come from Bunyan's allegory The Pilgrim's Progress (1678).

85 WEBER'S NOTE. Charnock, Self-examination (Works of the Pur. Div., p. 172): *Reflection* and knowledge of self is a prerogative of a *rational* nature. With the footnote: Cogito, ergo sum, is the first principle of the new philosophy.

86 WEBER'S NOTE. This is not yet the place to discuss the affinity between the theology of Duns Scotus—which never became dominant, was always merely tolerated, and at times was even branded heretical—and certain lines of thought in ascetic Protestantism. The later specific aversion of the Pietists to Aristotelian philosophy was shared by Calvin too, as by Luther in a somewhat different sense, in conscious opposition to Catholicism (cf. Inst. Chr. II c. 2, s. 4, IV c. 17, s. 24). The "primacy of the will," as Kahl called it, is common to all these tendencies.

THE RATIONAL ASCETICISM OF THE MONKS

Western monasticism had already developed a rational method of self-control, which Puritanism took over.

II.1.16 Christian asceticism undoubtedly contained within itself the most diverse things, both in outward appearance and in meaning. But in the West, in its highest forms, it already bore a thoroughly *rational* character in the Middle Ages, and in some manifestations even in antiquity. The world-historical significance of the monastic conduct of life in the West, as opposed to Eastern monasticism—not the whole of it, but its general type—rests on this. In principle it had already been freed from aimless flight from the world and virtuoso self-torment in the Rule of St. Benedict, still more among the Cluniacs, more again among the Cistercians, and most decisively of all among the Jesuits. It had become a systematically worked-out method of rational conduct of life. Its aim was to overcome the status naturae, to free man from the power of irrational drives and from dependence on the world and nature, to subject him to the supremacy of purposeful will[87], to place his actions under constant self-*control* and *consideration* of their ethical consequences, and so to train the monk—objectively—into a worker in the service of the kingdom of God, and thereby in turn—subjectively—to assure him of the salvation of his soul. This—*active*—self-mastery was the goal of the exercitia [Spiritual Exercises] of St. Ignatius and of the highest forms of rational monastic virtue in general[88], and it was

87 WEBER'S NOTE. The article "Ascese" in the Catholic "Kirchenlexikon," for example, defines its meaning in exactly this way, fully in keeping with its highest historical forms. So does Seeberg in the R. E. f. Prot. Th. u. K. It must be permissible, for the purposes of this study, to use the concept as it is used here. I am well aware that it can be—and usually is—understood differently, both more broadly and more narrowly.

88 WEBER'S NOTE. In Hudibras (1: canto 18. 19) the Puritans were compared to the barefoot friars. A report by the Genoese envoy Fieschi calls Cromwell's army an assembly of "monks."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Hudibras: Samuel Butler's mock-heroic satire on the Puritans (1663–78).

likewise the decisive practical ideal of life of Puritanism[89]. Already in the deep contempt with which the reports on the interrogations of its martyrs set the helpless blustering of the noble prelates and officials against the cool, reserved calm of its confessors[90], we see that esteem for reserved self-control which is still represented today in the best types of the English and Anglo-American "gentleman"[91]. To put it in the language familiar to us[92]: Puritan asceticism, like every "rational" asceticism, worked to enable a person to maintain and assert his "constant motives"—especially those it had itself "trained" into him—against the "affects"; that is, to educate him into a "personality" in *this* formal-psychological sense of the word. Contrary to some popular notions, the goal was to be able to lead an alert, conscious, clear-sighted life; the most urgent task was to destroy the spontaneity of instinctive enjoyment of life; and the most important *means* of asceticism was to bring *order* into the con-

89 WEBER'S NOTE. In view of this inner continuity between otherworldly monastic asceticism and worldly asceticism in a calling, which I have quite explicitly asserted, I am surprised to find Brentano (op. cit., p. 134 and elsewhere) citing the asceticism of labor among the *monks*, and its recommendation, *against* me! His whole "excursus" against me culminates in this. But that very continuity is, as anyone can see, a fundamental presupposition of my entire argument: the Reformation carried rational Christian asceticism and methodical living out of the monasteries and into worldly life in a calling. Cf. the following discussion, which has been left unchanged.

90 WEBER'S NOTE. So in the many reports on the interrogations of Puritan heretics reproduced in Neal's "History of the Puritans" and in Crosby's "English Baptists."

91 WEBER'S NOTE. Sanford, op. cit. (and many others before and after him), already derived the origin of the ideal of "reserve" from Puritanism. On that ideal, cf. also, for instance, the remarks of James Bryce on the American college in vol. II of his "American Commonwealth."—The ascetic principle of "self-mastery" also made Puritanism one of the fathers of modern *military discipline*. (On Maurice of Orange as the creator of modern military institutions, see Roloff in the Preuß. Jahrb. 1903, vol. III, p. 255.) Cromwell's "Ironsides," led against the enemy at a sharp trot with cocked pistols in hand, without firing, were superior to the "Cavaliers" not through dervish-like passion but, on the contrary, through their sober self-mastery, which always kept them in their commander's hand; the Cavaliers' chivalrous, headlong charge, by contrast, every time dissolved their own troops into atoms. There is much on this in Firth, Cromwell's Army.

92 WEBER'S NOTE. See especially on this: Windelband, Ueber Willensfreiheit [On Freedom of the Will], p. 77 f.

duct of life of its adherents. All these decisive points of view are found just as clearly[93] in the rules of Catholic monasticism as in the Calvinists' principles for the conduct of life[94]. On this methodical grip on the whole person rests, in both cases, their tremendous world-conquering power—and in the case of Calvinism in particular, as against Lutheranism, its ability as "ecclesia militans" [church militant] to secure the survival of Protestantism.

ASCETICISM LEAVES THE MONASTERY

Calvinism dropped the special counsels for monks and made every believer pursue ascetic ideals in worldly life.

II.1.17 On the other hand, it is obvious what the *contrast* between Calvinist and medieval asceticism consisted in: the dropping of the "consilia evangelica" [evangelical counsels] and, with it, the transformation of asceticism into a purely *worldly* one. Not that within Catholicism the "methodical" life had remained confined

93 WEBER'S NOTE. Only not in such unmixed form. Contemplation, sometimes combined with emotionalism, is intertwined with these rational elements in various ways. But then again, contemplation too is *methodically* regulated.

94 WEBER'S NOTE. According to Richard Baxter, *everything* is *sinful* that runs counter to the "reason" God created in us as our norm: not only passions sinful in their content, but all affects that are in any way senseless or immoderate *as such*, because they destroy one's "countenance" and, as purely creaturely processes, draw us away from relating all our action and feeling rationally to God, and so offend him. Cf., for example, what is said about the sinfulness of anger (Christian Directory, 2nd ed., 1678, I, p. 285; Tauler is cited on this on p. 287). On the sinfulness of *anxiety*, ibid., p. 287, col. 2. That it is deification of the creature (idolatry) when our *appetite* is the "rule or measure of eating" is set out very emphatically ibid. I, pp. 310, 316, col. 1, and often elsewhere. In such discussions, besides the Proverbs of Solomon, which everywhere come first, Plutarch's de tranquillitate animi [On Tranquillity of Mind] is cited, and not infrequently also the ascetic writings of the Middle Ages: St. Bernard, Bonaventure and others.—The contrast with "Who loves not wine, women and song..." could hardly be formulated more sharply than by extending the concept of idolatry to *all* sensual pleasures *insofar* as they cannot be justified on *hygienic* grounds; in that case they are permissible (as, within these limits, is sport, but also other "recreations") (more on this below). The reader should note that the sources cited here and elsewhere are neither dogmatic nor devotional works but grew out of the practice of pastoral care, and so give a good picture of the direction in which it worked.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The German saying, traditionally but doubtfully attributed to Luther, ends: "...remains a fool his whole life long."

to the monastic cell. That was by no means the case in theory, nor in practice either. Rather, it has already been emphasized that, despite Catholicism's greater moral undemandingness, an ethically unsystematic life does *not* measure up to the highest ideals it produced—including for life in the world[95]. The Third Order of St. Francis, for example, was a powerful attempt to permeate everyday life with asceticism, and, as is well known, by no means the only one.[96] Works like the "Imitation of Christ," to be sure, show precisely *through* the manner of their powerful influence that the way of life they preached was felt to be something *higher* than the everyday morality that sufficed as a minimum, and that the latter was *not* measured by standards like those Puritanism held ready. And the *practice* of certain church institutions—above all indulgences, which for this reason too were felt in the Reformation era not as a peripheral abuse but as the decisive, fundamental evil—was bound to cut across the beginnings of systematic worldly asceticism again and again. The decisive point, however, was this: the person who lived methodically in the religious sense par excellence was and remained, *after all, only the monk*. Thus the more intensely asceticism took hold of an individual, the *more* it drove him *out* of everyday life, because the specifically holy life lay precisely in *surpassing* worldly morality[97]. It was Luther who first did away with this—not as the executor of some "developmental tendency," but out of quite personal experiences, at first, incidentally, still wavering as to the practical consequences, and then pushed further by the *political* situation—and Calvinism simply

95 WEBER'S NOTE. I would regret it, by the way, if any *evaluation* of one or the other form of religiosity were read into this account. Nothing is further from my intention here. We are concerned only with the *effect* of certain features that are perhaps relatively peripheral for a purely religious evaluation but important for practical conduct.

96 The consilia evangelica ("evangelical counsels," or counsels of perfection): poverty, chastity and obedience, binding on monks and nuns but not on ordinary believers.

97 WEBER'S NOTE. See on this especially the article "Moralisten, englische" [English Moralists] by E. Tröltsch in the R. E. f. Prot. Th. u. K., 3rd ed.

took this over from him[98]. For Calvinism's kind of religiosity, it did indeed go to the heart of the matter when Sebastian Franck already saw the significance of the Reformation in the fact that now *every* Christian had to be a monk all his life. A dam had been built against the flooding of asceticism out of everyday life in the world, and those passionately earnest, inward natures that had hitherto supplied monasticism with its best representatives were now directed to pursue ascetic ideals *within* worldly life in a calling. In the course of its development, however, Calvinism added something positive: the idea that faith must necessarily be *proved* in worldly life in a calling[99]. It thereby gave the broader strata of religiously inclined natures a *positive incentive* to asceticism. And with its ethic anchored in the doctrine of predestination, the spiritual aristocracy of monks outside and above the world was replaced by the spiritual aristocracy of the saints *in* the world, predestined by God from eternity[100]. This was an aristocracy that, with its character indelebilis [indelible character], was separated from the rest of humanity, damned from eternity, by a gulf more unbridgeable in principle, and more sinister in its invisibility[101], than that which cut off the

98 WEBER'S NOTE. How much *quite concrete* contents of religious consciousness and situations that appear as "historical accident" have had an effect is shown with particular clarity by the fact that, in the circles of the Pietism that arose on a Reformed basis, the absence of monasteries, for example, was at times openly *regretted*, and that the "communist" experiments of Labadie and others were simply a substitute for monastic life.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Jean de Labadie (1610–1674), former Jesuit who founded a separatist, communally living congregation in the Netherlands.

99 WEBER'S NOTE. And indeed already in some confessions of the Reformation era itself. Even Ritschl (Pietismus I, p. 258 f.), although he regards the later development as a degeneration of the Reformers' ideas, does not deny that, for example, Conf. Gall. 25, 26, Conf. Belg. 29, Conf. Helv. post. 17 "define the Reformed particular church by entirely empirical marks, and that believers are *not counted as belonging to this true church without the mark of moral activity*." (See on this p. 104, note 3.)

100 WEBER'S NOTE. Bless God that we are not of the many (Th. Adams, W. of the Pur. Div., p. 138).

101 WEBER'S NOTE. The "birthright" idea, so important historically, received considerable support from this in England: "The first born which are written in heaven.... As the first born is not to be defeated in his inheritance and the enrolled names are never to be oblitterated, so certainly shall they inherit eternal life" (Th. Adams, W. of Pur. Div., p. XIV).

medieval monk, outwardly separated from the world—a gulf that cut with harsh sharpness into *all* social feelings. For what befitted this God-given grace of the elect, and therefore holy, in the face of a neighbor's sin was not indulgent helpfulness in the awareness of one's own weakness, but hatred and contempt for him as an enemy of God who bears the mark of eternal damnation[102]. This way of feeling was capable of such intensification that under certain circumstances it could end in the formation of *sects*. That was the case when—as in the "Independent" movements of the 17th century—the genuinely Calvinist belief that God's glory required the damned to be bent under the law through the Church was outweighed by the conviction that it brought shame on God if an unregenerate person was found in his flock and took part in the sacraments, or even—as an appoin-

102 WEBER'S NOTE. The Lutheran feeling of penitent *contrition* is inwardly foreign to ascetically developed Calvinism—not in theory, but certainly in practice. For it is ethically worthless to Calvinism and of no use to the damned. And for one who is certain of his election, any sin of his own that he may admit to himself is a symptom of arrested development and incomplete sanctification; instead of repenting of it, he *hates* it and strives to overcome it by action, to the glory of God. Cf. the discussion by Howe (Cromwell's chaplain, 1656–58) in "Of men's enmity against God and of reconciliation between God and Man," Works of the English Puritan Divines, p. 237: "The carnal mind is *enemity* against God. It is the mind, therefore, not as speculative merely, but as practical and active, that must be renewed." (ibid., p. 246): "Reconciliation... must begin in 1) a deep conviction... of your former *enemity*... I have been *alienated* from God... 2) (p. 251) a clear and lively apprehension... of the monstrous iniquity and wickedness thereof." Here only hatred of the sin, not of the sinner, is spoken of. But the famous letter of Duchess Renata of Este ("Leonora's" mother) to Calvin—in which she speaks, among other things, of the "*hatred*" she would feel for her father and husband *if* she were forced to be convinced that they belonged to the reprobate—already shows the transfer to the person. It is at the same time an example of what was said above (p. 97) about how the doctrine of predestination inwardly detached the individual from the bonds of the communities knit by "natural" feeling.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Renée of France (1510–1575), Duchess of Ferrara and protector of Protestants; her daughter Leonora d'Este is the heroine of Goethe's Torquato Tasso.

ted preacher—administered them[103]. When, in a word, the Donatist concept of the church emerged as a consequence of the idea of proof, as happened among the Calvinist Baptists.[104] And even where the full consequence of the demand for a "pure" church as the community of those proven regenerate—the formation of sects—was not drawn, various forms of church constitution arose from the attempt to separate regenerate Christians from unregenerate ones not yet ripe for the sacrament, to reserve church government for the former or otherwise give them a special position, and to admit only regenerate preachers[105].—

THE BIBLE, AND THE OLD TESTAMENT ABOVE ALL

Puritans took their fixed norm from the Bible, giving Old Testament moral law equal weight with the New.

II.1.18 This ascetic conduct of life naturally received its fixed norm —by which it could constantly orient itself, and which it evidently needed—from the Bible. And what matters for us in the often-described "bibliocracy" of Calvinism is this: the *Old* Testament, because it was just as inspired as the New, stood fully *equal* to the New in dignity as regards its moral precepts, insofar as these were not obviously meant only for the historical circumstances of the Jewish people or expressly abrogated by Christ. For *believers* in particular, the law was given as an ideal norm, never fully attainable yet still valid[106], whereas Luther, conversely—originally—had praised *freedom* from bondage to

103 WEBER'S NOTE. "None but those who give evidence of being *regenerated or holy* persons, ought to be received or counted fit members of visible churches. Where this is wanting, *the very essence of a church is lost*"—thus Owen, the Independent Calvinist Vice-Chancellor of Oxford under Cromwell, formulates the principle (Inv. into the origin of Ev. Ch.). See further the following essay.

104 Donatism: a 4th-century AD North African movement holding that only a church of the pure was the true church and that sacraments given by unworthy clergy were invalid.

105 WEBER'S NOTE. See the following essay.

106 WEBER'S NOTE. Cat. Genev. 149. Bailey, Praxis pietatis, p. 125: "In life we should act as if no one but Moses had authority over us."

the law as the divine privilege of believers[107]. The influence of Hebrew wisdom—deeply devout and yet entirely sober—set down in the books the Puritans read most, the Proverbs of Solomon and some of the Psalms, can be felt in their whole attitude to life. In particular, their *rational* character—the suppression of the mystical and, indeed, of the whole *emotional* side of religiosity—has already been rightly traced by Sanford[108] to the influence of the Old Testament. Nevertheless, this Old Testament rationalism as such was, in itself, essentially petty-bourgeois and traditionalist in character. Alongside it stood not only the mighty pathos of the prophets and many psalms, but also elements that had already provided points of departure for the development of a specifically emotional religiosity in the Middle Ages[109]. In the end, then, it was once again Calvinism's *own* basic character—its ascetic character, precisely—that selected the elements of Old Testament piety congenial to it and assimilated them.—

KEEPING ACCOUNTS WITH GOD

The Puritan monitored his state of grace continuously, even keeping a diary of sins and progress.

II.1.19 That systematization of the ethical conduct of life which the asceticism of Calvinist Protestantism shares with the rational forms of Catholic monastic life shows itself even in purely external ways: in how the "precise" Puritan Christian continu-

107 WEBER'S NOTE. "For the Reformed, the law hovers before them as an ideal norm; the Lutheran it crushes as an unattainable norm." In the Lutheran catechism it stands *first*, in order to awaken the necessary *humility*; in the Reformed catechisms it regularly comes *after* the Gospel. The Reformed reproached the Lutherans with having "a real dread of becoming holy" (Möhler); the Lutherans reproached the Reformed with "unfree bondage to the law" and with pride.

108 WEBER'S NOTE. Studies and reflections of the Great Rebellion, p. 79 f.

109 WEBER'S NOTE. Among these, one must not forget in particular the *Song of Songs*, which the Puritans for the most part simply ignored. Its Near Eastern eroticism helped shape, for example, the development of the type of piety found in St. Bernard.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), Cistercian abbot and mystic, whose sermons on the Song of Songs deeply shaped medieval devotion.

ally *monitored* his state of grace[110]. True, the religious diary, in which sins, temptations and the progress made in grace were entered continuously or even in tabular form, was common both to modern Catholic piety (especially in France), created primarily by the Jesuits, and to the piety of the most ecclesiastically zealous Reformed circles[111]. But in Catholicism it served to make confession complete, or it gave the "directeur de l'âme" [director of the soul] the basis for his authoritative guidance of the Christian man or (mostly) woman. The Reformed Christian, by contrast, used it to "take" his *own* "pulse." It is mentioned by all the important moral theologians, and Benjamin Franklin's tabular and statistical bookkeeping of his progress in the individual virtues still offers a classic example of it[112]. On the other hand, the old medieval (and even ancient) image of God's bookkeeping was pushed in Bunyan to the characteristically tasteless point of comparing the sinner's relation to God with that of a customer to the shopkeeper: whoever has once run into debt can, with the proceeds of all his own merits, at best pay off the accumulating interest, but never the principal[113]. The later Puritan, however, monitored God's conduct as well as his own, and saw His finger in every particular dispensation of life. And so, contrary to Calvin's genuine teaching, he knew why God had ordained this or that. The sanctification of life could thus take

110 WEBER'S NOTE. On the necessity of this self-monitoring see, e.g., Charnock's sermon on 2 Cor. 13:5, already cited, Works of the Pur. Div. p. 161 f.

111 WEBER'S NOTE. Most moral theologians recommend it. So Baxter, Christ. Directory II, p. 77 ff., who does not, however, conceal its "dangers."

112 WEBER'S NOTE. Moral bookkeeping was of course widespread elsewhere too. But what was missing was the *emphasis* placed on it here: that it was the sole means of *knowing* one's election or damnation, decreed from all eternity. And with that emphasis, the decisive psychological *premium* on care and attentiveness in this "calculation" was missing as well.

113 WEBER'S NOTE. *This* was the decisive difference from other, outwardly similar forms of behavior.

on almost the character of a business enterprise[114]. An all-pervading Christianization of the whole of existence was the consequence of this *method* in the ethical conduct of life, which Calvinism, unlike Lutheranism, enforced. To understand correctly the kind of effect Calvinism had, one must always keep in view that this *method* was what decisively shaped its influence on life. It follows, on the one hand, that only *this* particular form could exert that influence; on the other, that other confessions, too, were bound to work in the same direction if their ethical impulses were the same on this decisive point: the idea of proof.

WHY PREDESTINATION COMES FIRST

Predestination is the purest case of the idea of proof, and Lutheranism lacked any comparable impulse.

II.1.20 So far we have moved on the ground of Calvinist religiosity, and have accordingly presupposed the doctrine of predestination as the dogmatic background of Puritan morality, in the sense of a methodically rationalized ethical conduct of life. We did so because that dogma was in fact held as the cornerstone of Reformed doctrine far beyond the circles of the one religious party that kept strictly to Calvin's ground in every respect, the "Presbyterians." Not only the Independent Savoy Declaration of 1658 but equally the Baptist Hanserd Knollys confession of 1689 contained it. And within Methodism, too, John Wesley, the great

114 WEBER'S NOTE. Baxter too (Saints' everlasting rest c. XII) illustrates God's *invisibility* with the remark that, just as one can carry on profitable trade by correspondence with a stranger one has never seen, so one can also acquire "the one precious pearl" through a "blessed trade" with the invisible God.—These commercial parables, instead of the forensic ones customary among the older moralists and in Lutheranism, are quite characteristic of Puritanism, which in effect lets man "trade for" his own salvation.—Cf. further, for instance, the following passage from a sermon: We reckon the value of a thing by that which a wise man will give for it, who is not ignorant of it nor under necessity. Christ, the Wisdom of God, gave himself, his own precious blood, to redeem souls and he knew what they were and had no need of them (Matthew Henry, The worth of the soul, Works of the Pur. Div. p. 313).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Matthew Henry (1662–1714), English Nonconformist minister, best known for his Bible commentary.

organizing talent of his movement, was indeed an adherent of the universality of grace; but the great agitator of the first Methodist generation and its most consistent thinker, Whitefield, was an adherent of the "particularism of grace," as was the circle gathered around Lady Huntingdon, which was for a time really quite influential.[115] It was this doctrine, in its grandiose coherence, that in the most fateful epoch of the seventeenth century kept alive in the militant champions of the "holy life" the idea that they were God's instruments and the executors of His providential dispensations[116]. It prevented a premature collapse into a purely utilitarian salvation by works oriented only to this world, which would never have been capable of such unheard-of sacrifices for the sake of irrational and ideal goals. And the combination it achieved, in a form brilliant in its way, of belief in unconditionally valid norms with absolute determinism and the complete transcendence of the supersensible was at the same time—in principle—vastly more "*modern*" than the milder doctrine, more congenial to feeling, which subjected God too to the moral law. Above all, however, the idea of *proof*—fundamental to our discussion, as will become clear again and again—could be studied as the psychological starting point of methodical morality in such a "pure culture" precisely in the doctrine of predestination and its significance for everyday life. Since this idea recurs very uniformly, as the pattern linking faith and morality, in the denominations still to be examined, we had to start from that doctrine as its most consistent form. Within Protestantism, the consequences that *it* was bound to have for the ascetic shaping of conduct of life among its first adherents formed the *most fundamental* antithesis to the (relative) moral impotence of Lutheranism. The Lutheran "gratia amissibilis" [grace that can be lost], which could be regained at any time through penitent contrition, obviously contained *in itself* no

115 George Whitefield (1714–1770), English evangelist of the Great Awakening; Selina Hastings, Countess of Huntingdon (1707–1791), patron of Calvinistic Methodism.

116 WEBER'S NOTE. By contrast, Luther himself had already said: "Weeping comes before working, and suffering surpasses all doing."

impulse whatever toward what matters to us here as the product of ascetic Protestantism: a systematic, rational shaping of eth-

ical life as a whole[117]. Lutheran piety accordingly left the unself-conscious vitality of impulsive action and naive emotional life more unbroken. It lacked that impulse toward constant self-control, and thus toward any *planned* regulation of one's own life at all, which the uncanny doctrine of Calvinism contained. A religious genius like Luther lived unselfconsciously in this air of free openness to the world and—as long as the strength of his wings held out!—without danger of sinking back into the "status naturalis" [state of nature]. That simple, delicate and peculiarly evocative form of piety which has graced some of the highest types of Lutheranism rarely finds its parallel on the ground of genuine Puritanism, any more than its law-free morality does; it finds it far more readily in, for example, the mild Anglicanism of Hooker, Chillingworth and others. But for the ordinary Lutheran, even the capable one, nothing was more certain than that he was lifted out of the status naturalis only temporarily—as long as the influence of the individual confession or sermon lasted. Well known, of course, is the difference, so striking to contemporaries, between the ethical standard of the Reformed princely courts and that of the Lutheran ones, so often sunk in

drunkenness and coarseness[118]. So too is the helplessness of the Lutheran clergy, with their preaching of pure faith, in the face

of the ascetic Baptist movement.[119] People perceive in the Germans a "Gemütlichkeit" [easygoing warmth] and "naturalness"

118 WEBER'S NOTE. On these matters see, for instance, Tholuck's chatty book: Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus [Prehistory of Rationalism].

that contrast with the Anglo-American atmosphere of life, which still stands today—down to people's very physiognomy—under

119 Richard Hooker (1554–1600) and William Chillingworth (1602–1644), Anglican theologians of a moderate, rational temper.

the after-effects of that thorough destruction of the unselfconsciousness of the "status naturalis." Germans, for their part, reg-

ularly find the latter strange for its narrowness, unfreedom and inner constraint. These are contrasts in the conduct of life that

derive to a very substantial extent also from the *lesser* ascetic permeation of life by Lutheranism as compared with Calvinism.

What speaks in those feelings is the antipathy of the unselfconscious "child of the world" toward everything ascetic. Lutheran-

ism, precisely as a result of its doctrine of grace, lacked the psychological impulse toward system in the conduct of life that

compels its methodical rationalization. This impulse, which conditions the ascetic character of piety, *could* in itself

undoubtedly be generated by religious motives of various kinds, as we shall soon see; Calvinism's doctrine of predestination was

only *one* of several possibilities. But we did convince ourselves that in its way it was not only of quite unique consistency but

also of quite eminent psychological effectiveness[120]. Viewed purely from the standpoint of the religious motivation of their

and good works must follow it; otherwise—to put it in almost Puritan terms—it cannot be the true justifying faith. He also held a certain measure of relative perfection to be attainable on earth. Indeed, Melanchthon originally even taught that justification takes place in order to make man fit for good works, and that growing perfection brings at least that measure of blessedness in this world which faith can grant. Among the later Lutheran dogmatists, too, the idea that good works are the necessary *fruits* of faith, that faith brings about a new life, was developed in a way outwardly very similar to that of the Reformed. The question of what "good works" are was answered already by Melanchthon, and still more by the later Lutherans, increasingly by reference to the law. All that now remained as a reminder of Luther's original ideas was the lesser seriousness with which bibliocracy was treated, especially orientation to the individual norms of the Old Testament. Essentially it was the Decalogue that remained the norm for human action—as the codification of the most important principles of the *natural* moral law.—*But*: there was no secure bridge from its statutory validity to the exclusive significance of *faith* for justification, which was insisted on again and again—if only because this faith, as we saw above, had a quite different psychological character from the Calvinist one. The genuine Lutheran standpoint of the early period had been abandoned, and was bound to be abandoned by a church that regarded itself as an institution of salvation; but no other standpoint had been gained. In particular, if only for fear of losing the dogmatic foundation ("sola fide"! [by faith alone]), one could not arrive at the ascetic rationalization of life as a whole as the moral task of the individual. For there was simply no impulse to let the idea of *proof* grow to the significance that the doctrine of predestination gave it in Calvinism. The magical interpretation of the sacraments, too—consistent with the absence of this *doctrine*—and in particular the placing of regeneratio [regeneration], or at least its beginning, in *baptism*, was bound to work against the development of methodical morality once the *universalism* of grace was accepted. For it weakened, for feeling, the distance between the status naturalis and the state of grace, especially given the strong Lutheran emphasis on original sin. No less did the *exclusively forensic* interpretation of the act of justification, which presupposed that God's decisions could be changed through the influence of the converted sinner's *concrete* act of repentance. Yet it was precisely this that Melanchthon increasingly emphasized. That whole transformation of his doctrine, which shows itself in the growing weight given to *repentance*, was also inwardly connected with his profession of "free will." All this settled the *un*methodical character of the Lutheran conduct of life. In the mind of the average Lutheran—if only because confession continued to exist—the content of salvation was bound to consist of *concrete* acts of grace for concrete sins, not the development of an aristocracy of saints creating its own certainty of salvation. Thus there could be neither a law-*free* morality nor a rational *asceticism* oriented to the law. Instead, the law remained alongside "faith," unorganically, as statute and ideal demand; and moreover, since strict bibliocracy was shunned as salvation by works, it was quite uncertain and imprecise, and above all unsystematic, in its specific content.—Life, however, remained—as Tröltsch (op. cit.) said of ethical theory—a "sum of mere attempts that never quite succeed." These attempts, "held fast in the fragmentation of individual uncertain instructions," were not directed toward "working themselves out in a coherent whole of life." Rather, in keeping with the development Luther himself had already undergone (see above), they essentially amounted to an accommodation to the given situation of life, in small things as in large. —The much-lamented tendency of the Germans to "accommodate themselves" to foreign cultures, their rapid change of nationality, is—*alongside* certain political fortunes of the nation—*also* to be put down quite substantially to this development, whose after-effects are still felt today in all our relations of life. Subjective appropriation of culture remained weak *because* it took place essentially through passive acceptance of what was presented "authoritatively."

asceticism, the *non*-Calvinist ascetic movements accordingly

appear as *attenuations* of Calvinism's inner consistency.

II.1.21 In the reality of historical development, too, things were —not throughout, but mostly—such that the other ascetic movements either imitated the Reformed form of asceticism or drew on it, for comparison and supplementation, in developing their own principles where these diverged from it or went beyond it. Where the same ascetic consistency nonetheless appeared despite a different foundation of faith, this was regularly a consequence of church *constitution*, which will be discussed in another context[121].

REFORMED PIETISM

Pietism grew out of predestination, gathered the converted into conventicles and cultivated religious feeling.

II.1.22 *Historically*, at any rate, the idea of predestination was the starting point of the ascetic tendency usually called "*Pietism*." Insofar as this movement remained within the Reformed church, it is almost impossible to draw a definite line between

121 WEBER'S NOTE. See on this the following essay in this collection.

Pietist and non-Pietist Calvinists[122]. Almost all the pronounced representatives of Puritanism have at times been counted among the Pietists. It is an entirely legitimate view to regard all those connections between predestination and the idea of proof described above, together with the underlying interest in attaining a subjective "certitudo salutis" [certainty of salvation], as already a Pietist development of Calvin's genuine teaching. The emergence of ascetic revivals within the Reformed communities, especially in Holland, was quite regularly bound up with a fresh flaring-up of the doctrine of predestination, which had for a time been forgotten or weakened. For England, therefore, the

concept of "Pietism" is usually not used at all[123]. But continental Reformed Pietism (Dutch and Lower Rhenish), too, was at least

in its main thrust simply an intensification of Reformed asceticism at first, just like, say, the religiosity of Bailey. The decisive

123 WEBER'S NOTE. Mirbt's quite instructive article "Pietismus" in the 3rd ed. of the Realenz. f. Prot. Theol. u. K. leaves the Reformed antecedents entirely aside and treats the emergence of Pietism solely as a personal religious experience of Spener's, which is rather disconcerting.—Still worth reading as an introduction to Pietism is Gustav Freytag's account in the "Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit" [Pictures from the German Past]. For the beginnings of English Pietism in the contemporary literature, cf. for instance: W. Whitaker, Prima institutio disciplinaque pietatis [First Instruction and Discipline of Piety] (1570).

emphasis shifted so strongly onto the "praxis pietatis" [practice of piety] that dogmatic orthodoxy receded into the background

and at times seemed a matter of outright indifference. After all, the predestined could occasionally fall into dogmatic errors just

as into other sins. And experience taught that many Christians wholly uninformed about school theology bore the most evident

fruits of faith, while on the other hand it became clear that mere theological knowledge by no means guaranteed that faith would

prove itself in one's conduct[124]. Election, then, could not be proved by theological knowledge at all[125]. Hence Pietism, in

deep mistrust of the church of the theologians[126]—to which, and this is among its characteristics, it nonetheless officially contin-

ued to belong—began to gather the adherents of the "praxis pietatis" into "conventicles" set apart from the world[127]. It wanted

126 WEBER'S NOTE. The mistrust of Aristotle, and of classical philosophy in general, that is characteristic of Pietism is already prefigured in Calvin (cf. Instit. II c. 2 sect. 4; III c. 23 sect. 5; IV c. 17 sect. 24). In Luther, as is well known, it was no less pronounced in his early days, but it was later pushed back by humanist influence (above all Melanchthon's) and by the compelling needs of education and apologetics. That what is *necessary* for salvation is contained clearly enough in Scripture even for the unlearned was naturally also taught by the Westminster Confession (c. I, 7), in agreement with Protestant tradition.

to bring the invisible church of the saints visibly down to earth. Without drawing the consequence of forming a sect, it wanted,

sheltered in this community, to lead a life dead to the influences of the world and oriented in every detail to God's will—and

thereby to remain certain of its own rebirth even through the everyday outward marks of its conduct of life. The “ecclesiola”

[little church] of the truly converted thus wished—this too was common to all specific Pietism—to taste communion with God

in its blessedness through heightened asceticism already in this world. This latter aspiration had an inner kinship with the

Lutheran “unio mystica” [mystical union], and very often led to a stronger cultivation of the *emotional* side of religion than was

normally proper to average Reformed Christianity. *This*, then, would have to be regarded as the decisive mark of "Pietism" on

the ground of the Reformed church, as far as *our* points of view are concerned. For that element of feeling—originally foreign to

Calvinist piety as a whole, but inwardly akin to certain forms of medieval religiosity—steered practical religiosity toward the

enjoyment of blessedness in this world, instead of the ascetic struggle to secure it for the future in the beyond. Feeling *could*

be heightened to such a degree that religiosity took on an outright hysterical character. Then, through that neuropathically

grounded alternation—familiar from countless examples—between half-sensual states of religious ecstasy and periods of

nervous exhaustion experienced as "distance from God," what was achieved *in effect* was the direct opposite of the sober, strict

discipline in which the Puritan's systematized holy life held a person: a weakening of those "inhibitions" that shored up the

Calvinist's rational personality against the "affects"[128]. Likewise, the Calvinist idea of the depravity of all that is creaturely, when

grasped *emotionally*—for example in the form of the so-called "worm feeling"—*could* lead to a deadening of energy in the life of

128 WEBER'S NOTE. For good reasons, we have deliberately refrained here from going into the "psychological" relations—in the *technical*, scientific sense of the word—of these contents of religious consciousness, and have avoided as far as possible even using the corresponding terminology. The genuinely established stock of concepts in psychology, including *psychiatry*, is not yet sufficient to be made directly useful for historical research on our problems without clouding the impartiality of historical judgment. Using its terminology would merely create the temptation to drape facts that are immediately intelligible, and often downright trivial, in a veil of dilettantish learning in foreign words, and so to create the false appearance of heightened conceptual precision—as, unfortunately, was typical of Lamprecht, for example. —For more serious attempts to use psychopathological concepts in interpreting certain historical mass phenomena, see *W. Hellpach*, Grundlinien zu einer Psychologie der Hysterie [Outlines of a Psychology of Hysteria], chapter 12, as well as his "Nervosität und Kultur" [Nervousness and Culture]. I cannot attempt to argue here that, in my view, this very versatile writer too has been harmed by the influence of certain of Lamprecht's theories.—How completely worthless Lamprecht's schematic remarks on Pietism (in volume 7 of the Deutsche Geschichte) are, compared with the older literature, is surely known to anyone acquainted with even the standard literature.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915), German historian whose psychologizing cultural history provoked a long methodological controversy.

one's calling[129]. The idea of predestination, too, *could* turn into fatalism if—contrary to the genuine tendencies of Calvinist

rational religiosity—it became the object of an appropriation

129 WEBER'S NOTE. Thus, for instance, among the followers of Schortinghuis's "Innige Christendom" [Inward Christianity].—In the history of religion, this goes back to the Servant of the Lord pericope in Deutero-Isaiah and to Psalm 22.

through mood and *feeling*[130]. And finally, the saints' urge to withdraw from the world *could,* when strongly heightened *emotion-*

ally, lead to a kind of monastic communal organization of a semi-communist character, such as Pietism has produced again

130 WEBER'S NOTE. This occurred sporadically among Dutch Pietists, and then under *Spinozist* influences.

and again, in the Reformed church as well[131]. But as long as this extreme effect, conditioned precisely by that cultivation of *emo-*

tionality, was not produced—as long, that is, as Reformed Pietism sought to make sure of its blessedness within worldly life in

131 WEBER'S NOTE. Labadie, Tersteegen and others.

a *calling*—the practical effect of Pietist principles was simply an *even* stricter ascetic control of conduct of life in the calling. It

gave vocational morality a still firmer religious anchoring than the mere worldly "respectability" of ordinary Reformed Christi-

ans, which the "fine" Pietists regarded as second-rate Christianity, had been able to develop. The religious aristocracy of the

saints emerged all the more surely in the development of all Reformed asceticism the more seriously that asceticism was

taken. It was then organized on a voluntary basis within the church in the form of conventicles, as happened in Holland. In

English Puritanism, by contrast, it pressed partly toward a formal distinction between active and passive Christians in the

the ideal of the "nothingness of creaturely existence" was cultivated "in a manner contrary to the evangelical interest in salvation,"—III. "the assurance of grace in tender familiarity with the Lord Jesus" was sought in a manner alien to the Reformation. For this early period, the last mark applies to only *one* of the representatives he discusses. The idea of the "nothingness of the creature" was in itself a true child of the Calvinist spirit, and only where it led to practical flight from the *constitution* of the church, and party—as in the Netherlands, where Synod of Dordrecht had itself ordered conventicles to a certain extent (especially for catechetical purposes).—Of the marks of Pietist piety analyzed in Ritschl's preceding account, the following might be relevant: 1. "precisianism," in the sense of a more slavish subjection to the letter of the Bible in all the *externals* of life, which Gisbert Voët sometimes advocates;—2. the treatment of justification and reconciliation with God not as an end in itself but as a mere *means* to the ascetic holy life, as may perhaps be found in Lodensteyn but is also hinted at, e.g., in Melanchthon (p. 125 n. 2);—3. the high esteem for the "struggle of repentance" as a mark of true rebirth, as first taught by W. Teellinck;—4. abstention from the Lord's Supper when unregenerate persons take part in it (which will be discussed in another context), and the associated formation of conventicles not keeping within the limits of the canons of Dordrecht, with a revival of "prophecy," i.e., the interpretation of Scripture also by non-theologians, even women (Anna Maria Schürmann). All these are departures, some of them considerable, from the doctrine and practice of the Reformers. But compared with the tendencies Ritschl did not include in his account, especially those of the English Puritans, they represent—*except* for No. III—only an intensification of tendencies inherent in the whole development of this piety. The impartiality of Ritschl's account suffers from the great scholar's bringing in his church-political—or perhaps better, religious-political—value judgments. In his antipathy to all specifically *ascetic* religiosity, he reads relapses into "Catholicism" into every place where a turn toward it occurs. But like Catholicism, old Protestantism too in itself embraces "all sorts and conditions of men," *and yet* the Catholic *church* rejected the rigorism of worldly asceticism in the form of Jansenism, just as Pietism rejected the specifically Catholic quietism of the seventeenth century. —For our particular considerations, at any rate, Pietism turns into something whose effects differ not in degree but in kind only where the heightened fear of the "world" led to flight from private economic life in a calling—that is, to the formation of conventicles on a monastic-communist basis (Labadie)—or, as contemporaries alleged of certain extreme Pietists, to the deliberate *neglect* of worldly work in a calling in favor of contemplation. This consequence naturally occurred especially often where contemplation began to take on the trait Ritschl calls "Bernardinism," because it is first heard in St. Bernard's interpretation of the "Song of Songs": a mystical religiosity of mood that strives for a crypto-sexually colored "unio mystica." Even in purely religious-psychological terms, this undoubtedly represents an "aliud" [something other] compared with Reformed piety—but *also* compared with its *ascetic* form in men like Voët. Ritschl, however, tries everywhere to couple this quietism with Pietist *asceticism* and so to bring the latter under the same condemnation, and he puts his finger on every quotation from Catholic mysticism or ascetic writing that he finds in Pietist literature. Yet quite "unsuspect" English and Dutch moral theologians also quote Bernard, Bonaventure and Thomas a Kempis.—The relation to the Catholic past was a very complex one in all the Reformation churches. Depending on the point of view one puts in the foreground, now one and now another of them appears as the closer to Catholicism, or to particular aspects of it.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The Synod of Dordrecht, or Dort (1618–1619), of the Dutch Reformed Church upheld strict Calvinist predestination against the Arminians.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Anna Maria van Schurman (1607–1678), Dutch scholar and poet, later a follower of Labadie.

earlier—toward the formation of sects.

GERMAN PIETISM: SPENER AND FRANCKE

Lutheran Pietism borrowed methodical sanctification, but on a looser and more emotional foundation.

II.1.23 The development of *German* Pietism, rooted in Lutheranism and associated with the names of Spener, Francke and Zinzendorf, now leads us away from the ground of the doctrine of predestination. But it by no means necessarily leads us out of the sphere of those lines of thought of which that doctrine was the consistent culmination. Spener himself, in particular, attests that he was influenced by English and Dutch Pietism, and this showed itself, for example, in the reading of Bailey at his first conventicles[132]. For *our* particular points of view, at any rate, Pietism means simply the penetration of a methodically cultiv-

132 WEBER'S NOTE. This influence appears most clearly, perhaps, when he—just think: Spener!—disputes the authorities' competence to control the conventicles, except in cases of disorder and abuse, because what is at stake is a *fundamental right* of Christians guaranteed by the apostolic order (Theologische Bedenken [Theological Opinions] II p. 81 f.). This is—in principle—exactly the Puritan standpoint on the relation and scope of the rights of the individual that follow ex jure divino [from divine law] and are therefore inalienable. Accordingly, neither this (Pietismus II p. 157) nor the heresy mentioned later in the text (ibid. p. 115) has escaped Ritschl. However unhistorical, in particular, the positivist (not to say philistine) criticism is that he levels at the idea of "fundamental rights"—to which, after all, we owe not much less than *everything* that even the most "reactionary" person today envisages as the minimum sphere of his individual freedom—one must of course agree with him entirely that in both cases an organic integration into Spener's Lutheran standpoint is lacking.—

The conventicles themselves (collegia pietatis [gatherings for piety]), which Spener's famous "Pia desideria" [Pious Desires] justified in theory and which he brought into being in practice, corresponded in essence entirely to the English "prophesyings." These were first found in John a Lasco's London Bible classes (1547) and thereafter belonged to the standing repertoire of forms of Puritan piety persecuted as rebellion against church authority. Finally, his rejection of Genevan church discipline is, as is well known, justified on the ground that its appointed bearer, the "third estate" (status oeconomicus: the Christian laity), is *not* integrated into the church organization in the Lutheran church. On the other hand, it is feebly Lutheran of him—in his discussion of excommunication—to recognize the secular members of the consistory, deputed by the territorial ruler, as representatives of the "third estate."

ated and monitored, that is, *ascetic conduct of life*, into the domains of non-Calvinist religiosity as well[133]. Lutheranism, however, was bound to feel this rational asceticism as a foreign body, and the lack of consistency in German Pietist doctrine was a consequence of the difficulties that arose from this.[134] For the dogmatic foundation of a systematic religious conduct of life, Spener combines Lutheran lines of thought with the specifically Reformed mark of good works as such, undertaken with the "intention of the *glory* of God"[135], and with the belief—which also has a Reformed ring—that the regenerate can attain a relative measure of Christian perfection[136]. Only the theory lacked consistency. Spener, strongly influenced by the mystics[137], tried more to describe than to justify the systematic character of the Christian conduct of life, which is essential to his Pietism too, and did so in a rather vague but essentially Lutheran way. The certitudo salutis was not derived from sanctification; instead of the idea of proof, he chose the loose Lutheran connection with

133 WEBER'S NOTE. The very *name* "Pietism," which first arose in Lutheran territories, indicates that in the eyes of contemporaries its characteristic feature was that "pietas" [piety] was here turned into a methodical *enterprise*.

134 Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), August Hermann Francke (1663–1727) and Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700–1760), the leading figures of Lutheran Pietism and of the Moravian Brethren.

135 WEBER'S NOTE. It must be admitted, to be sure, that this motivation is characteristic mainly, but not *only*, of Calvinism. It is found especially often precisely in the *oldest* Lutheran church ordinances.

136 WEBER'S NOTE. In the sense of Heb. 5:13–14. Cf. Spener, Theol. Bedenken I 306.

137 WEBER'S NOTE. Besides Bailey and Baxter (see Consilia theologica III, 6, 1, dist. 1, 47; ibid. dist. 3, 6), Spener particularly valued Thomas a Kempis and above all Tauler (not all of whose work he understood: Consilia theologica III, 6, 1 dist. 1, 1). On the latter in detail, see especially Cons. theol. I, 1, 1 No. 7. For Spener, Luther grew out of Tauler.

faith mentioned earlier[138]. But again and again, wherever the rational-ascetic element in Pietism kept the upper hand over the emotional side, the ideas decisive for our points of view asserted their claims: namely, 1. that the methodical development of one's own holiness toward ever greater firmness and perfection, to be checked against the *law*, is a *sign* of the state of grace[139]; and 2. that it is God's providence that "*works*" in those thus perfected, in that He gives them His hints when they wait patiently

138 WEBER'S NOTE. See Ritschl, op. cit. II, p. 113. He rejected the "penitential struggle" of the later Pietists (and of Luther) as the *sole* decisive mark of true conversion (Theol. Bedenken III p. 476). On sanctification as the fruit of gratitude arising from faith in reconciliation (a specifically Lutheran formulation; see note 2, p. 70), see the passages cited in Ritschl, op. cit., p. 115, note 2. On the certitudo salutis [certainty of salvation], see on the one hand Theol. Bedenken I 324: true faith is not so much *felt* emotionally as *recognized* by its *fruits* (love of God and obedience to him). On the other hand, see Theol. Bedenken I p. 335 f.: "But as regards the concern about how you are to be assured of your state of salvation and grace, this is more reliably drawn"—than from the "English writers"—"from our"—the Lutheran—"books." On the nature of sanctification, however, he agreed with the English.

139 WEBER'S NOTE. Here too, the religious diaries that A. H. Francke recommended were the outward sign of this.—The methodical practice and *habit* of sanctification is supposed to bring about its growth and the *separation* of the good from the wicked. This, roughly, is the basic theme of Francke's book "Von des Christen Vollkommenheit" [On the Perfection of the Christian].

and *reflect methodically*[140]. For A. H. Francke, too, work in a calling was the ascetic means par excellence[141]. That it is God Himself who blesses His own through the success of their work was as certain to him as we shall see it was to the Puritans. As a surrogate for the "double decree," Pietism created for itself ideas which, in essentially the same way as that doctrine, only more feebly, established an aristocracy of the regenerate resting on God's special grace[142], with all the psychological consequences described above for Calvinism. Among these is, for example, so-called "terminism"[143], which the opponents of Pietism imputed to it generally (though wrongly, to be sure): the assumption that

140 WEBER'S NOTE. The divergence of this rational Pietist belief in providence from its orthodox interpretation came out characteristically in the famous dispute between the Halle Pietists and *Löscher*, the representative of Lutheran orthodoxy. In his "Timotheus Verinus," Löscher goes so far as to set everything achieved by *human* action in opposition to the dispensations of providence. *Francke's* position, by contrast, which he always maintained, was this: the sudden flash of clarity about what is to be done, which results from quietly *waiting* for the decision, is to be regarded as a "sign from God." This is quite analogous to the psychology of the Quakers, and in keeping with the general ascetic idea that rational *method* is the way to come closer to God.—Zinzendorf, to be sure, stands far removed from Francke's form of belief in providence: in one of his most decisive resolutions he left the fate of the community he was founding to the drawing of *lots*. —Spener, Theol. Bedenken I p. 314, had appealed to *Tauler* in characterizing Christian "composure" (Gelassenheit). In this state one was to give oneself over to God's workings and not thwart them by hasty, self-willed action, which was essentially Francke's position too. Everywhere the activity of Pietist devotion stands out clearly as considerably weakened compared with Puritanism, and as seeking (this-worldly) peace. By contrast, as late as 1904 a leading Baptist (G. White, in an address to be cited further below) summed up the ethical program of his denomination as "First righteousness, then peace" (Baptist Handbook 1904, p. 107).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Valentin Ernst Löscher (1673–1749), Dresden theologian and the leading opponent of Halle Pietism.

141 WEBER'S NOTE. Lect. paraenet. IV, p. 271.

142 WEBER'S NOTE. It is chiefly against this constantly recurring idea that Ritschl's criticism is directed.—See Francke's work cited three notes back, which contains the doctrine.

143 WEBER'S NOTE. It is also found among English Pietists who were *not* predestinarians, e.g., Goodwin. On him and others, cf. Heppe, Gesch. des Pietismus in der reformierten Kirche [History of Pietism in the Reformed Church], Leiden 1879. Even after Ritschl's standard work, this book has not yet become dispensable for England, and here and there for the Netherlands as well. Even in the nineteenth century, according to his book (to be cited in connection with the following essay), Köhler was often asked in the Netherlands about the *moment* of his rebirth.

grace is indeed offered universally, but to each person either only once, at one quite specific moment in life, or at any rate at some point for the last time[144]. Anyone who had missed this moment was no longer helped by the universality of grace; he was in the position of one passed over by God in Calvinist doctrine. Quite close to this theory in effect, too, came the assumption, abstracted, e.g., by Francke from personal experiences and very widespread in Pietism—one may well say predominant—that grace could "break through" only under specific phenomena occurring once and uniquely, namely after a prior "struggle of repentance"[145]. Since, in the Pietists' own view, not everyone was disposed to that experience, anyone who did not undergo it, despite the ascetic method that Pietist instruction prescribed for bringing it about, remained a kind of passive Christian in the eyes of the regenerate. On the other hand, the creation of a *method* for bringing about the "struggle of repentance" in effect made the attainment of divine grace, too, the object of *rational* human arrangement. The misgivings about private confession, too—held not by all Pietists, e.g. not by Francke, but by many, and especially, as the constantly recurring inquiries to Spener show, precisely by Pietist *pastors*—sprang from this aristocracy of grace, and they helped to cut away its roots in Lutheranism too. For the visible *effect* of the grace obtained through repentance, in a holy *walk of life*, had to decide whether absolution was permissible, and so it was impossible to be content with mere "contritio" [contrition] in granting it[146].—

144 WEBER'S NOTE. In this way people sought to combat the lax consequence of the Lutheran doctrine that grace could be regained (especially the customary "conversion" in extremis [at the point of death]).—

145 WEBER'S NOTE. Spener, Theol. Bed. II, 6, 1 p. 197, argues against the attendant necessity of knowing the day and hour of "conversion" as an *unconditional* mark of its genuineness. The "penitential struggle" was simply as unknown to him as Luther's terrores conscientiae [terrors of conscience] were to Melanchthon.

146 WEBER'S NOTE. Alongside this, of course, the anti-authoritarian interpretation of the "priesthood of all believers," peculiar to all asceticism, also played a part.—Occasionally the pastor was advised to postpone absolution until genuine contrition had been "proved." Ritschl rightly describes this as Calvinist in principle.

ZINZENDORF AND THE MORAVIAN BRETHREN

Zinzendorf's childlike, emotional piety worked against a rational vocational ethic, despite the Brethren's missionary activity.

II.1.24 *Zinzendorf's* religious assessment of *himself* kept returning to the idea of being an "instrument," though it wavered under the attacks of orthodoxy. Otherwise, however, the intellectual position of this remarkable "religious dilettante," as Ritschl calls him, can hardly be grasped unambiguously on the points that matter to us[147]. He himself repeatedly described himself as a representative of the "Pauline-Lutheran tropus" *as against* the "Pietist-Jacobean" one, which clings to the *law*. But consider the Brethren community itself and its practice, which he permitted and encouraged despite his constantly emphasized Lutheranism[148]. As early as its notarial record of August 12, 1729, the community took a position that in many respects fully matched that of the Calvinist aristocracy of saints[149]. The much-discussed transfer of the office of Elder to Christ on November 12, 1741,

147 WEBER'S NOTE. The points essential for us are most conveniently found in Plitt, Zinzendorfs Theologie [Zinzendorf's Theology] (3 vols., Gotha 1869 f.), vol. I pp. 325, 345, 381, 412, 429, 433 f., 444, 448; vol. II pp. 372, 381, 385, 409 f.; vol. III pp. 131, 167, 176.—Cf. also Bernh. Becker, Zinzendorf und sein Christentum [Zinzendorf and His Christianity] (Leipzig 1900), book 3, ch. III.—

148 WEBER'S NOTE. Admittedly, he considered the Augsburg Confession a suitable document of Lutheran-Christian religious life only if one had poured a "wound broth" over it, as he puts it in his repulsive terminology. Reading him is a penance: with its soft, formless dissolution of thought, his language has an even worse effect than that "Christoturpentine oil" which F. Th. Vischer found so dreadful (in his polemic with the Munich "Christoterpe").

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Zinzendorf's piety dwelt lavishly on the blood and wounds of Christ. The aesthetician Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807–1887) punned on the name of the devotional annual Christoterpe ("Christ's delight").

149 WEBER'S NOTE. "In no religion do we recognize any as brethren who have not been washed by the sprinkling of Christ's blood and, *wholly changed, continue* in the sanctification of the Spirit. We recognize no manifest (= visible) community of Christ except where the Word of God is taught purely and clearly and where they *also* lead *holy* lives *in accordance with it* as the children of God."—The last sentence is, admittedly, taken from Luther's Small Catechism. But, as Ritschl already points out, *there* it answers the question of how *God's* name is hallowed, whereas *here* it serves to *mark off* the church of the *saints*.

gave outward expression to something similar.[150] Moreover, of the three "tropi" of the Brethren community, the Calvinist and the Moravian were essentially oriented from the start toward the Reformed vocational ethic. Zinzendorf, too, in wholly Puritan fashion, told John Wesley that even if the justified person himself could not always *recognize* his justification from the way he lived, *others* could[151]. On the other hand, however, the element of feeling comes very strongly to the fore in the specifically Herrnhut piety. Zinzendorf in particular personally tried again and again to thwart outright the tendency toward ascetic sanctification in the Puritan sense within his community[152], and to bend salvation by works in a Lutheran direction[153]. Under the influence of the rejection of conventicles and the retention of the practice of confession, there also developed a dependence on the sacraments as the means of salvation, conceived in essentially Lutheran terms. Then there was the specifically Zinzendorfian principle that the *childlike* quality of religious feeling is the mark of its genuineness. This, like the use of the *lot* as a means of revealing God's will, for example, worked so strongly against the rationalism of the conduct of life that, on the whole,

150 "Tropus" was Zinzendorf's term for the distinct confessional "ways" (Lutheran, Reformed, Moravian) held together within the Brethren. "Jacobean" refers to the Epistle of James and its stress on works.

151 WEBER'S NOTE. See Plitt I p. 346.—Even more decisive is the answer, quoted in Plitt I p. 381, to the question "whether good works are necessary for salvation?": "Unnecessary and harmful for obtaining salvation, but once salvation has been obtained, so necessary that whoever does not do them is not saved either." So here too: works are not the real ground of salvation, but they are the ground for knowing it—the *only* one!

152 WEBER'S NOTE. For example, through those caricatures of "Christian freedom" that Ritschl castigates, op. cit. III p. 381.

153 WEBER'S NOTE. Above all, through a sharpened emphasis on the idea of penal satisfaction in the doctrine of salvation. After the American sects rejected his missionary overtures, he also made this idea the basis of the method of sanctification. From then on he placed the preservation of *childlikeness* and of the virtues of humble self-restraint in the foreground as the goal of Herrnhut asceticism. This stood in sharp contrast to the tendencies within the community that were entirely analogous to Puritan asceticism.

as far as the count's influence reached[154], the antirational, *emotional* elements in Herrnhut piety predominated far more than elsewhere in Pietism[155]. The link between morality and the forgiveness of sins in Spangenberg's "Idea fidei fratrum" [Outline of the Brethren's Faith] is as loose[156] as in Lutheranism generally. Zinzendorf's rejection of the Methodist striving for perfection corresponds, here as everywhere, to his basically eudaemonistic ideal. He wanted people to experience blessedness (he says "happiness") *emotionally*, already in the *present*[157], instead of guiding them to make sure of it for the *hereafter* through rational work on themselves[158]. On the other hand, the idea that the decisive value of the Brethren community, as opposed to other churches, lay in the activity of Christian life remained alive here

154 WEBER'S NOTE. Which, however, had its limits. For this reason alone it is mistaken to try to box Z.'s religiosity into a "*social*-psychological" stage of development, as Lamprecht does. Moreover, nothing influenced his entire religiosity more strongly than the fact that he was a *count* with basically feudal instincts. Furthermore, its *emotional side* in particular would fit "social-psychologically" into the age of the sentimental decadence of chivalry just as well as into the age of "Sensibility." In its opposition to Western European rationalism, it can best be made intelligible, if "social-psychologically" at all, by the patriarchal bonds of the German East.

155 WEBER'S NOTE. Zinzendorf's controversies with Dippel show this. After his death, too, the pronouncements of the synod of 1764 clearly express the character of the Herrnhut community as an *institution* for salvation. See Ritschl's criticism of this, op. cit. III p. 443 f.

156 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., e.g., §§ 151, 153, 160. That sanctification may fail to occur *despite* true repentance and the forgiveness of sins emerges especially from the remarks on p. 311. This is as consistent with the Lutheran doctrine of salvation as it is contrary to the Calvinist (and Methodist) one.

157 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. Zinzendorf's statements quoted in Plitt II p. 345. Likewise Spangenberg, Idea fidei p. 325.

158 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., e.g., Z.'s remark on Matt. 20:28, quoted in Plitt III p. 131: "When I see a person to whom God has given a fine gift, I rejoice and make use of the gift with pleasure. But when I notice that he is not content with what he has, but wants to make it finer still, I take that to be the beginning of that person's ruin."—Z., that is, denied any *progress* in sanctification, especially in his conversation with John Wesley in 1743. He identified sanctification with justification and found it *solely* in the relationship to Christ gained through *feeling*. Plitt I p. 413. In place of the feeling of being an "instrument" comes the "possession" of the divine: mysticism, not asceticism (in the sense to be discussed in the introduction to the later essays).—Of course (as is also discussed there), for the Puritan, too, what he *really* strives for is the present, *this-worldly* habitus. But for him this habitus, interpreted as certitudo salutis, is the active *feeling of being an instrument*.

too: in mission and, connected with it, in work in a calling[159]. Moreover, the practical rationalization of life from the standpoint of *utility* was an entirely essential component of Zinzendorf's view of life as well[160]. For him, as for other representatives of Pietism, it followed on the one hand from a decided aversion to philosophical speculation as dangerous to faith, and a corres-

159 WEBER'S NOTE. Which, however, precisely because of this derivation, was not given a consistent ethical foundation. Z. rejects Luther's idea of the "service of God" in the calling as the *decisive* consideration for faithfulness in one's calling. Such faithfulness is rather a *repayment* for the "Savior's faithfulness in his craft." (Plitt II p. 411).

160 WEBER'S NOTE. His dictum is well known: "A reasonable person should not be an unbeliever, and a believer should not be unreasonable." It appears in his "Sokrates, d.i. Aufrichtige Anzeige verschiedener nicht sowohl unbekannter als vielmehr in Abfall geratener Hauptwahrheiten" [Socrates, that is, a Candid Report on Various Chief Truths, Not So Much Unknown as Fallen into Neglect] (1725). So is his fondness for writers such as Bayle.

ponding preference for specific empirical knowledge[161]; on the other, from the worldly shrewdness of the professional missionary. As a center of missions, the Brethren community was at the same time a business enterprise. It thus guided its members onto the paths of worldly asceticism, which everywhere in life, too, asks first about "tasks" and shapes life soberly and systematically with a view to them. Yet here, once again, an obstacle stands in the way: the glorification, derived from the example of the apostles' missionary life, of the charisma of apostolic lack of

161 WEBER'S NOTE. The pronounced preference of Protestant asceticism for an empiricism rationalized by a mathematical foundation is well known and is not yet to be discussed in more detail here. On the turn of the sciences to mathematically rationalized "exact" research, on the philosophical motives for it, and on their contrast with Bacon's points of view, cf. Windelband, Gesch. d. Philos. [History of Philosophy], pp. 305–307. See especially the remarks at the bottom of p. 305, which aptly reject the idea that modern natural science is to be understood as the *product* of material and technological interests. Highly important connections do of course exist, but they are far more complicated. See further Windelband, Neuere Philos. I p. 40 f.—Consider the decisive *consideration* behind the stance of Protestant asceticism, which emerges perhaps most clearly in Spener's Theol. Bedenken I p. 232, III p. 260. It was, after all, this: just as one recognizes the Christian by the *fruits* of his faith, so knowledge of God and his purposes can be advanced only through knowledge of his *works*. Accordingly, the favored discipline of all Puritan, Baptist and Pietist Christianity was *physics*, and next to it the other mathematical and natural-scientific disciplines working with a similar method. People believed, that is, that from the empirical grasp of God's laws in nature they could ascend to knowledge of the "meaning" of the world. Given the fragmentary character of divine revelation (a Calvinist idea), this meaning could never be grasped by way of conceptual speculation. For asceticism, seventeenth-century empiricism was the means of seeking "God in nature." *It* seemed to lead *toward* God, philosophical speculation away from him. According to Spener, Aristotelian philosophy in particular had been the fundamental harm done to Christianity. *Any* other was better, especially the "*Platonic*": Cons. Theol. III, 6, 1, Dist. 2, no. 13. Cf. further the following characteristic passage: Unde pro Cartesio quid dicam non habeo (he had not read him), semper tamen optavi et opto, ut Deus viros excitet, qui veram philosophiam vel tandem oculis sisterent, *in qua nullius hominis attenderetur* auctoritas, sed sana tantum *magistri nescia ratio* [Hence I have nothing to say on behalf of Descartes, yet I have always wished, and still wish, that God would raise up men who would at last set true philosophy before our eyes, one in which no man's authority would be heeded, but only sound reason that knows no master], Spener, Cons. Theol. II, 5, no. 2.—The significance of these views of ascetic Protestantism for the development of *education*, especially of instruction in *practical and scientific subjects* (Realunterricht), is well known. Combined with its attitude toward "fides implicita" [implicit faith], they yielded its educational program.

property among the "disciples" chosen by God through "election"[162]. In effect, this did amount to a partial revival of the "consilia evangelica" [evangelical counsels]. This did, at any rate, hold back the creation of a rational vocational ethic of the Calvinist kind. It did not rule it out, however, as the example of the transformation of the Baptist movement shows. On the contrary, such an ethic was strongly prepared from within by the idea of working *solely* "for the sake of the calling."

PIETISM WEIGHED AGAINST CALVINISM

Pietism's focus on present feeling weakened its drive to rationalize life compared with Calvinism.

II.1.25 All in all, suppose we consider German Pietism from the points of view relevant *to us* here. We shall then have to note a wavering and uncertainty in the religious anchoring of its asceticism, which falls considerably short of the iron consistency of Calvinism. It is due partly to Lutheran influences, partly to the *emotional* character of its religiosity. For it is, to be sure, very one-sided to present this emotional element as what is specific to Pietism in contrast to *Luther*anism[163]. But compared with *Calvinism*, the intensity of the rationalization of life was necessarily bound to be lower. The inner impetus came from the thought of a state of grace that had to be proved ever anew and that guaranteed the eternal *future*. In Pietism this impetus was

162 WEBER'S NOTE. "They are a kind of people who place their happiness roughly in four things: 1. to be... lowly, despised, reviled...; 2. to neglect... all the senses they do not need for the service of their Lord...; 3. either to have nothing or to give away again whatever they receive...; 4. to work *like day laborers*, not for the sake of earnings, *but for the sake of the calling* and for the sake of the Lord's cause and of their neighbor..." (Rel. Reden II, p. 180; Plitt I p. 445.) *Not everyone* can or may become a "disciple," only those whom the Lord calls. Yet by Zinzendorf's own admission (Plitt I p. 449), difficulties still remain, since the Sermon on the Mount is formally addressed to *everyone*. The affinity of this "free acosmism of love" with the old Baptist ideals is obvious.

163 WEBER'S NOTE. For the emotional internalization of piety was by no means simply foreign to Lutheranism, even in the age of the epigones. Rather, the constitutive difference *here* was the *ascetic* element: the regimentation of life, which in Lutheran eyes smacked of "salvation by works."

diverted emotionally onto the *present*. The predestined person constantly sought to earn self-assurance anew through restless and successful work in a calling. In its place Pietism put that humility and brokenness[164] of character which resulted partly from emotional excitement directed purely at inner experiences. It resulted partly, too, from the Lutheran institution of confession, which Pietism often regarded with grave misgivings but mostly tolerated[165]. For in all this there manifests itself that specifically Lutheran way of seeking salvation, for which the decisive thing is the "forgiveness of sins," not practical "sanctification." Calvinism made a systematic, rational effort to attain and hold on to sure *knowledge* of future (otherworldly) salvation. In its place, here we find the need to *feel* reconciliation and communion with God now (in this world). In economic life, the inclination toward present enjoyment conflicts with the rational organization of the "economy," which is anchored precisely in provision for the future. In a certain sense, the same holds in the sphere of religious life. Quite obviously, then, directing religious need toward a present, inward *emotional* state gave *less* impetus toward the rationalization of worldly *action*. The need of the Reformed "saints" to prove themselves, directed solely toward the hereafter, gave more. Compared with the faith of the orthodox Lutheran, however, clinging in traditionalist fashion to Word and sacrament, Pietism was at least capable of developing a greater degree of *methodical* religious permeation of the conduct of life. On the whole, Pietism moved from Francke and Spener toward Zinzendorf with *increasing* emphasis on its emotional character. But this was not the expression of some "developmental tendency" immanent in it. Rather, these differences

164 WEBER'S NOTE. A "heartfelt anxiety" is a better sign of grace than "security," Spener holds, Theol. Bedenken I, 324. Among Puritan writers, too, we of course find emphatic warnings against "false security." But the doctrine of predestination, at least, always worked in the opposite direction insofar as its influence shaped pastoral care.

165 WEBER'S NOTE. For the *psychological* effect of the existence of confession was everywhere to *lighten* the individual's personal responsibility for his conduct. That, after all, is why it was sought. With that responsibility it also lightened the rigorist consistency of the ascetic demands.

resulted from contrasts in the religious (and also social) milieu from which its leading representatives came. This cannot be gone into here. Nor can we discuss how the distinctive character of German Pietism is expressed in its social and geographical *distribution*[166]. Here we must remind ourselves once more that this emotional Pietism of course shades off from the religious conduct of life of the Puritan saints through very gradual transitions. Suppose one practical consequence of the difference is to be characterized, at least provisionally. The virtues that Pietism cultivated can then be described as rather those that could be displayed, on the one hand, by the official, clerk, worker or domestic outworker who is "faithful to his calling"[167]. On the other hand, they were virtues displayed by predominantly patriarchal employers in a *condescension* pleasing to God (in Zinzendorf's manner). Calvinism, by comparison, appears to have a closer elective affinity with the hard, legal-minded and active disposition of bourgeois-capitalist entrepreneurs[168]. Finally, *pure* emotional Pietism is, as Ritschl[169] has already emphasized, a religious pastime for the "leisure classes." However far from exhaustive this characterization is, certain differences still correspond to it today, even in the economic character of the

166 WEBER'S NOTE. How strongly purely *political* factors played a part here, even for the *kind* of Pietist devotion, was already indicated by Ritschl in his account of Württemberg Pietism (vol. III of the frequently cited work).

167 WEBER'S NOTE. See Zinzendorf's dictum quoted on p. 142, note 1.

168 WEBER'S NOTE. Calvinism too, of course, at least genuine Calvinism, is "patriarchal." And the connection between the success of, for example, Baxter's ministry and the domestic-industry character of the trade in Kidderminster emerges clearly in his autobiography. See the passage quoted in the Works of the Pur. Divines, p. XXXVIII: "The town liveth upon the weaving of Kidderminster stuffs, and as they stand in their loom, they can set a book before them, or edify each other..." Nevertheless, patriarchalism on the basis of Reformed ethics, and still more of Baptist ethics, is of a different kind than on the basis of Pietism. This problem can only be discussed in another context.

169 WEBER'S NOTE. Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung [The Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation], 3rd ed., I p. 598.—Frederick William I described Pietism in general as a matter suited to *rentiers*. This, admittedly, is more characteristic of that king than of the Pietism of Spener and Francke. And the king, too, surely knew why he opened his territories to it through his edict of toleration.

peoples who have been under the influence of one or the other of these two ascetic tendencies.—

METHODISM

Methodism produced conversion methodically and then channeled the awakened feeling into a rational striving for perfection.

II.1.26 The Anglo-American counterpart of Continental Pietism, *Methodism*[170], is likewise characterized by a religiosity that is emotional yet still ascetic, combined with increasing indifference to, or rejection of, the dogmatic foundations of Calvinist asceticism. Its very name shows what struck contemporaries as the peculiarity of its adherents: the "methodical" systematization of the conduct of life for the purpose of attaining the certitudo salutis. For *this* is what was at stake here too from the beginning, and it remained the center of religious striving. Its affinity with certain tendencies of German Pietism[171], unmistakable despite all differences, shows itself above all in one fact: this method was also applied specifically to bringing about the *emotional* act of "conversion." The stress on feeling had been awakened in John Wesley by Herrnhut-Lutheran influences.

170 WEBER'S NOTE. As an introductory orientation to Methodism, the excellent article "Methodismus" by Loofs in the Real-Encykl. f. Prot. Theol. u. K., 3rd ed., is especially suitable. The works of Jacoby (especially the "Handbuch des Methodismus" [Handbook of Methodism]), Kolde, Jüngst and Southey are also useful. On Wesley: Tyerman, life and times of John W., London 1870 f. The book by Watson (Life of W., also available in translation) is popular.—One of the best libraries on the history of Methodism is at Northwestern University in Evanston, near Chicago. A kind of link between classical Puritanism and Methodism was formed by the religious poet Isaac Watts. He was a friend of Oliver Cromwell's chaplain (Howe), and later of Richard Cromwell, and Whitefield is said to have sought his advice (cf. Skeats p. 254 f.).

171 WEBER'S NOTE. Apart from the personal influences on the Wesleys, it is historically conditioned by the dying out of the dogma of predestination on the one hand and by the powerful reawakening of "sola fide" [by faith alone] among the founders of Methodism on the other. Above all, however, it is motivated by Methodism's specific *missionary* character. This brought about a (transformative) revival of certain medieval methods of "revivalist" preaching and combined them with Pietist forms. The phenomenon certainly does not belong in a *general* line of development toward "subjectivism." In this respect it lagged behind not only Pietism but also the Bernardine piety of the Middle Ages.

Here it took on a strongly *emotional* character, especially on American soil, since Methodism was geared from the start to missionary work among the masses. A penitential struggle, sometimes intensified to the most terrible ecstasies and in America preferably carried out on the "anxious bench," led to faith in God's unmerited grace. Together with that faith, it led directly to the consciousness of justification and reconciliation. Puritanism had stamped the ascetic ethic as *rational* once and for all. With this ethic, the emotional religiosity of Methodism entered into a peculiar union, not without considerable inner difficulties.[172] First, Calvinism held everything merely emotional to be suspect of delusion. In contrast, Methodism in principle took the sole indubitable foundation of the certitudo salutis to be an absolute certainty of being in grace that was purely *felt* and flowed from the immediacy of the witness of the Spirit. At least normally, the origin of this certainty was supposed to be fixed to the day and hour. Wesley's teaching represents a consistent intensification of the doctrine of sanctification, but a decided departure from its orthodox version. According to it, a person reborn in this way can, already in this life, by virtue of grace working in him, attain the consciousness of *perfection* in the sense of sinlessness. This happens through a second inner process, "sanctification," which as a rule occurs separately and is likewise often sudden. Hard as this goal is to reach, usually only toward the end of life, one must strive for it unconditionally. It definitively guarantees the certitudo salutis and puts joyful assurance in place of the "sullen" anxiety of the Calvinists[173]. And in any case, the truly converted person must prove himself as such, to himself and to others, by the fact that at the very least sin "no longer has power over him." Despite the decisive importance of the self-testimony of *feeling*, a holy life oriented to the *law* was therefore, naturally, still upheld. Where Wesley

172 The "anxious bench" was a front pew at American revival meetings where those in spiritual distress sat to be prayed over.

173 WEBER'S NOTE. This is how Wesley himself occasionally characterized the effect of Methodist faith. The affinity with Zinzendorf's "happiness" is plain.

fought against the justification by works of his time, he was merely reviving the old Puritan idea that works are not the real ground of the state of grace, only the ground for knowing it, and even this only when they are done solely for the glory of God. Correct conduct *alone* did not suffice, as he had learned from his own experience: the *feeling* of the state of grace had to be added to it. He himself occasionally described works as a "condition" of grace. In the declaration of August 9, 1771[174], he also stressed that whoever does no good works is not a true believer. And the Methodists have always stressed that they differ from the official church not in doctrine but in the kind of piety they practice. The significance of the "fruit" of faith was usually grounded in 1 John 3:9, and conduct was presented as a clear *sign* of rebirth. Despite all this, difficulties arose[175]. Some Methodists adhered to the doctrine of predestination. For them, the certitudo salutis was relocated: no longer in the consciousness of grace that follows from the ascetic conduct of life itself, in ever-renewed proof, but in the immediate *feeling* of grace and perfection[176]. Since the assurance of "perseverantia" [perseverance] was then attached to a *single* penitential struggle, this meant one of two things. Either, in weak natures, an antinomian interpretation of "Christian freedom," and thus the collapse of the methodical conduct of life. Or, where this consequence was rejected, a self-assurance of the saint that rose to dizzying heights[177]: an *emotional* intensification of the Puritan type. In the face of opponents' attacks, attempts were made to counter these consequences, on the one hand, by placing greater emphasis on the normative authority of the Bible and on the indispensability of

174 WEBER'S NOTE. See it, e.g., in Watson's Life of Wesley (German ed.), p. 331.
175 WEBER'S NOTE. J. Schneckenburger, Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleinen protestantischen Kirchenparteien [Lectures on the Doctrines of the Small Protestant Church Parties], ed. Hundeshagen, Frankfurt 1863, p. 147.
176 WEBER'S NOTE. Whitefield, the leader of the predestinarian group, essentially rejected Wesley's doctrine of "perfection." Being unorganized, his group fell apart after his death. Indeed, the doctrine of perfection is only a *substitute* for the Calvinists' idea of proof.
177 WEBER'S NOTE. Schneckenburger, op. cit., p. 145. Somewhat differently Loofs, op. cit. Both consequences are typical of all religiosity of a similar kind.

proving oneself[178]. On the other hand, however, these consequences in effect strengthened the anti-Calvinist tendency of Wesley within the movement, which taught that grace could be lost. Through the mediation of the Brethren community, Wesley had been exposed to strong Lutheran influences[179]. These reinforced this development and increased the *indeterminacy* of the religious orientation of Methodist morality[180]. In the end, essentially only two concepts were consistently retained. The first was "regeneration," an emotional certainty of salvation arising directly as the fruit of *faith*, as the indispensable foundation. The second was sanctification, with its consequence of (at least virtual) freedom from the power of sin, as the proof of the state of grace that follows from regeneration. The significance of the external means of grace, especially the sacraments, was correspondingly devalued. And in any case, the "general awakening" that followed in the wake of Methodism everywhere, including, for example, in New England, marks an intensification of the doctrine of grace and election[181].

II.1.27 For *our* purposes, then, Methodism appears as a formation whose ethics rest on a foundation as unstable as that of Pietism. But for Methodism, too, the striving for the "higher life," the "second blessing," served as a kind of substitute for the doctrine of predestination. And having grown up on English

178 WEBER'S NOTE. Thus the Conference of 1770. The first Conference, in 1744, had already acknowledged that the words of the Bible came "within a hair's breadth" of Calvinism on the one hand and antinomianism on the other. Given their obscurity, people should not separate from one another over doctrinal differences, so long as the authority of the Bible as a *practical* norm was upheld.

179 WEBER'S NOTE. What *separated* the Methodists from the Herrnhut Brethren was their doctrine of the possibility of sinless perfection, which Zinzendorf in particular also rejected. Wesley, on the other hand, perceived the *emotional* quality of Herrnhut religiosity as "mysticism" and called Luther's views on the "law" "blasphemous." Here we see the barrier that inevitably persisted between any kind of *rational* religious conduct of life and Lutheranism.

180 WEBER'S NOTE. John Wesley occasionally points out that everywhere else, among Quakers, Presbyterians and High Churchmen, one has to believe *dogmas*, but not among the Methodists.—On the foregoing, cf. also the account, admittedly summary, in Skeats, History of the free churches of England 1688–1851.

181 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., e.g., Dexter, Congregationalism, p. 455 f.

soil, it oriented the practice of its ethics wholly toward that of the Reformed Christianity found there, whose "revival" it indeed aimed to be. The emotional act of conversion was brought about *methodically*. Once it had been achieved, there followed no pious enjoyment of communion with God in the manner of Zinzendorf's emotional Pietism. Instead, the awakened feeling was promptly channeled into a rational striving for perfection. The emotional character of its religiosity therefore did not lead to an inward Christianity of feeling like that of German Pietism. Schneckenburger already showed that this was connected with the weaker development of the sense of *sin*, partly a result, precisely, of the emotional course that conversion took. This has remained a standing point in the criticism of Methodism. Here the fundamentally *Reformed* character of religious feeling remained decisive. Emotional excitement took on the character of an enthusiasm stirred up only occasionally, but then in "Corybantic" fashion. Otherwise, it in no way impaired the rational character of the conduct of life[182]. Methodist "regeneration" thus merely created a *supplement* to pure salvation by works: a religious anchoring of the ascetic conduct of life once predestination had been abandoned. The marks of conduct were indispensable as a check on true conversion, as its "condition," as Wesley occasionally says. In substance they were exactly the

182 WEBER'S NOTE. Though of course it *can* impair it, as it does today among African Americans.—For the rest, the often markedly pathological character of Methodist emotion, as opposed to the relatively mild emotionality of Pietism, has probably more than one cause. Besides purely historical reasons and the public nature of the process, it is *perhaps* also closely connected with a stronger *ascetic* permeation of life in the areas where Methodism spread. But deciding that would be a matter for neurologists alone.

same as in Calvinism.[183] Methodism was a latecomer[184], and it contributed nothing new to the development of the idea of the calling[185]. In what follows, when we discuss that idea, we can therefore essentially leave it aside.

THE BAPTIST SECTS

The Baptist movement and its descendants formed a believers' church, a sect of the personally reborn.

II.1.28 Continental European Pietism and the Methodism of the Anglo-Saxon peoples are secondary phenomena, considered both in their ideas and in their historical development[186]. By contrast, the second *independent* bearer of Protestant asceticism alongside Calvinism is the *Baptist movement*. Alongside it stand

183 The Corybantes were the priests of the goddess Cybele, known for their frenzied ecstatic dances.

184 WEBER'S NOTE. Loofs, op. cit., p. 750, emphatically points out that Methodism differs from other ascetic movements in coming *after* the English Enlightenment. He draws a parallel between it and the (admittedly much feebler) renaissance of Pietism in Germany in the first third of the nineteenth century.—Still, following Ritschl, Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, vol. I 568 f., it should surely remain permissible also to draw a parallel with the Zinzendorfian variety of Pietism. Unlike Spener and Francke, Zinzendorf's Pietism was *also* already a reaction against the Enlightenment. Only, as we have seen, this reaction takes a very different direction in Methodism than in the Herrnhut movement, at least insofar as the latter was influenced by Zinzendorf.

185 WEBER'S NOTE. Which, however, as the passage from John Wesley (below, p. 196) shows, it developed in just the same way and with exactly the same effect as the other ascetic denominations.

186 WEBER'S NOTE. And—as has become clear—*weakenings* of the consistent ascetic ethic of Puritanism. Yet if one wished, in the popular manner, to interpret these religious conceptions merely as "exponents" or "reflections" of capitalist development, it is precisely the *reverse* that ought to have happened.

the sects[187] that emerged from it in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, either directly or by adopting its religious forms of thought: the *Baptists, Mennonites* and, above all,

187 WEBER'S NOTE. Of the Baptists proper, only the so-called "General Baptists" go back to the old Anabaptist movement (the Täufer). The "Particular Baptists" were, as already said, Calvinists who in principle restricted church membership to the regenerate, or at least to *personal* confessors of the faith. They therefore remained voluntarists on principle and opponents of all state churches, though in practice, under Cromwell, not always consistently. They, and the General Baptists too, however historically important they are as bearers of the Baptist tradition, give us no occasion here for a special dogmatic analysis. That the Quakers, formally a new foundation by George Fox and his associates, were in their basic ideas simply continuers of the Baptist tradition is beyond question. The best introduction to their history, which at the same time illustrates their relation to Baptists and Mennonites, is Robert *Barclay*, The inner life of the religious societies of the Commonwealth, 1876. On the history of the Baptists cf., among others: *H. M. Dexter*, The true story of John Smyth, the Se-Baptist, as told by himself and his contemporaries, Boston 1881 (and on it J. C. Lang in Bapt. Quart. R. 1883, p. 1 f.). *J. Murch*, A hist. of the Presb. and Gen. Bapt. Ch. in the W. of Engl., London 1835. A. H. Newman, Hist. of the Bapt. Ch. in the U. S., New York 1894 (Am. Church Hist. Ser. Vol. 2); *Vedder*, A short hist. of the Baptists, London 1897; *E. B. Bax*, Rise and fall of the Anabaptists, New York 1902; *G. Lorimer*, Baptists in history, 1902; *J. A. Seiss*, Baptist system examined Luth. Publ. S. 1902; further material in the Baptist Handbook, London 1896 ff.; Baptist Manuals, Paris 1891/3; the Baptist Quart. Review; the Bibliotheca sacra (Oberlin 1900). The best *Baptist* library appears to be at Colgate College in the State of New York. For Quaker history, the collection at Devonshire House in London is considered the best (I have not used it). The modern official organ of orthodoxy is the "American Friend," edited by Prof. Jones; the best history of the Quakers is Rowntree's. Otherwise: Rufus *B. Jones*, George Fox, an autobiography, Phil. 1903; Alton *C. Thomas*, A Hist. of the S. of Friends in America, Phil. 1895; Eduard *Grubb*, Social Aspects of Quaker Faith, London 1899. In addition, there is the large and very good *biographical* literature.—

the *Quakers*[188]. With them we come to religious communities whose ethics rest on a foundation that is, in principle, heterogeneous to Reformed doctrine. The following sketch only highlights what is important for *us* here, and so cannot convey any idea of the diversity of this movement. Naturally, we again place the main emphasis on developments in the old-established capitalist countries. —The historically and fundamentally most important idea of all these communities is one we have already

encountered in rudimentary form: the “believers’ church”[189]. Its full import for cultural development can admittedly become

clear only in another context. It means that the religious community, the "visible church" in the language of the Reformation

189 WEBER'S NOTE. See above, note 1, p. 121.

churches[190], was no longer understood as a kind of endowed trust for supernatural ends. Nor was it understood as an *institu-*

tion necessarily embracing both the just and the unjust, whether to increase God's glory (the Calvinist view) or to dispense the

190 WEBER'S NOTE. On its origin and changes see A. Ritschl in his "Gesammelte Aufsätze" [Collected Essays], p. 69 f.

goods of salvation to human beings (the Catholic and Lutheran view). Instead, it was understood exclusively as a community of

personal believers and the reborn, and of these alone. In other words, it was understood not as a "church" but as a "sect"[191]. The

principle of baptizing only adults who had personally and inwardly acquired the faith and professed it was purely external

in itself. It was meant to symbolize this alone[192]. For the Baptists, "justification" *through* this faith was radically different from the

idea of a "forensic" *imputation* of Christ's merit that dominated the orthodox dogmatics of early Protestantism[193]. They persist-

192 WEBER'S NOTE. Cornelius, op. cit., has shown very clearly how important the symbol was historically for preserving the community of the churches, because it gave them an unambiguous and unmistakable distinguishing mark.

ently repeated this in all the religious disputations. Justification consisted rather in the *inward appropriation* of his work of

redemption. This, however, came about through individual *revelation*: through the working of the divine Spirit in the indi-

vidual, and *only* through that. It was offered to everyone, and it was enough to wait for the Spirit and not to resist its coming by

sinful attachment to the world. Consequently, faith in the sense of knowledge of church doctrine lost its significance entirely by

comparison, and so did faith in the sense of a penitent grasping of divine grace. There took place a renaissance, naturally a

strongly transformative one, of early Christian religious ideas of the Spirit. Take, for example, the sect for which Menno Simons,

in his Fondamentboek [Foundation Book] (1539), was the first to create a reasonably coherent doctrine. Like the other Baptist

sects, it sought to be *the* true, blameless church of Christ. Like the primitive community, it was to consist exclusively of people

personally awakened and called by God. The reborn, and they alone, are Christ's brethren, because, like him, they are begotten

directly by God in the spirit[194]. Strict *avoidance* of the "world"—that is,[195] of all intercourse with worldly people not absolutely

necessary—followed from this for the first Baptist communities. With it came the strictest bibliocracy, which took the life of the

194 WEBER'S NOTE. This idea perhaps underlies the religious interest in discussing how the incarnation of Christ and his relation to the Virgin Mary are to be conceived—discussions which, often as the *only* purely dogmatic element, look so strange even in the oldest Baptist documents (e.g., the "confessions" printed in Cornelius, op. cit., appendix to vol. II) (see on this, among others, K. Müller, K. G. II, 1, p. 330). The difference in Christology between the Reformed and the Lutherans (in the doctrine of the so-called communicatio idiomatum [communication of properties]) rested, after all, on similar religious interests.

first generation of Christians as its model. This principle of avoiding the world never entirely disappeared as long as the old

spirit remained alive[196]. From these motives that dominated their beginnings, the Baptist sects took one lasting possession.

We already came to know this principle in Calvinism, with a somewhat different grounding, and its fundamental importance

196 WEBER'S NOTE. It was expressed above all in the originally strict shunning of the excommunicated even in civil dealings—a point on which even the Calvinists made strong concessions, departing from the view that civil relations are in principle untouched by spiritual censures. See the following essay.

will emerge again and again: the unconditional *rejection of all "idolatry of the creature"* as a devaluation of the reverence owed

to God alone[197]. Among the first generation of Swiss and South German Baptists, the biblical conduct of life was conceived as

radically as it originally was by Saint Francis: as an abrupt break with all worldly joy and a life strictly on the model of the

197 WEBER'S NOTE. How this principle expressed itself among the Quakers in apparently unimportant externals (refusal to remove the hat, to kneel, to bow, and likewise to use the plural form of address) is well known. But the *basic* idea is in itself proper to *every* asceticism to some degree, which is why asceticism in its *genuine* form is always "hostile to authority." In Calvinism it expressed itself in the principle that in the *church* only *Christ* should rule. As for Pietism, one need only think of Spener's efforts to justify *titles* biblically.—*Catholic* asceticism broke this trait, as far as *ecclesiastical* authority is concerned, through the vow of *obedience*, by interpreting obedience itself ascetically. That "inversion" of this principle in Protestant asceticism is the historical basis for the distinctive character, even today, of the *democracy* of peoples influenced by Puritanism, and for its difference from democracy of the "Latin spirit." It is also what historically underlies that American "lack of respect" which, depending on the observer, strikes some as repellent and others as refreshing.

apostles. And indeed the lives of many of their first representatives recall that of Saint Aegidius. But this strictest observance of

the Bible[198] stood on none too firm a footing, given that their religiosity centered on the Spirit. What God had revealed to the

prophets and apostles was, after all, not everything he could and would reveal.[199] On the contrary: the Word lived on, not as a

198 WEBER'S NOTE. Admittedly, among the Baptists this applied from the beginning essentially only to the *New* Testament, not in the same way to the Old. The Sermon on the Mount in particular enjoyed special esteem among all denominations as a program of social ethics.

written document but as a power of the Holy Spirit at work in the daily life of believers, speaking directly to any individual

who is willing to hear it. According to the testimony of the primitive communities, this continuing life of the Word was the sole

mark of the true church, as Schwenckfeld had already taught against Luther, and later Fox against the Presbyterians. From

this idea of continuing revelation arose the well-known doctrine, later developed consistently by the Quakers, that the

inner testimony of the Spirit in reason and *conscience* is ultimately decisive.[200] This did away not with the authority of the

Bible, but with its sole dominion. At the same time it set in motion a development that radically swept away all remnants of

the churchly doctrine of salvation, and finally, among the Quakers, baptism and the Lord's Supper as well[201]. Alongside the

predestinarians, above all the strict Calvinists, the Baptist denominations carried out the most radical devaluation of all

sacraments as means of salvation. They thus carried the religious "disenchantment" of the world through to its ultimate con-

sequences. Only the "inner light" of continuing revelation made it possible at all truly to understand even God's revelations in

the Bible[202]. On the other hand, its effect could extend to people who had never come to know the biblical form of revelation, at

least according to the teaching of the Quakers, who here drew the full consequence. The maxim "extra ecclesiam nulla salus"

202 WEBER'S NOTE. In support of this the Baptist denominations, especially the Quakers (Barclay, Apology for the true Christian Divinity, 4th ed. London 1701—made available to me through the kindness of Ed. Bernstein), appealed to Calvin's statement in the Inst. Christ. Theol. III, 2, where there are indeed quite unmistakable approximations to Baptist doctrine. The older *distinction* between the dignity of the "Word of God," as what God revealed to the patriarchs, prophets and apostles, and that of "Holy Scripture," as what they *wrote down* of it, also touched inwardly on the Baptist view of the nature of revelation, though probably without any historical connection. The mechanical doctrine of inspiration, and with it the strict bibliocracy of the Calvinists, was just as much the product of a development in one direction in the course of the 16th century as the doctrine of the "inner light" in the Quaker teaching, which rested on Baptist foundations, was the result of a development running in exactly the opposite direction. The sharp separation here was probably also partly the result of constant controversy.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), German Social Democratic theorist, known for his revision of Marxism.

[outside the church there is no salvation] applied only to this *in*visible church of those illuminated by the Spirit. *Without* the

inner light, natural man, even when guided by natural reason[203], remained a purely creaturely being. The Baptists, the Quakers

included, felt his distance from God almost more sharply than Calvinism did. Rebirth, on the other hand, is brought about by

203 WEBER'S NOTE. This was sharply emphasized against certain tendencies of the Socinians. "Natural" reason knows *nothing at all* of God (Barclay op. cit. p. 102). This once again shifted the position that the "lex naturae" [law of nature] otherwise holds in Protestantism. In principle there could be no "general rules," no moral *code*, for the "calling" that each person has, and which is an *individual* one for each, was shown to him by God through *conscience*. It is *not* "the good"—in the generalizing concept of "natural" reason—but *God's will* that we are to do, as it is written in our hearts in the new covenant and expresses itself in conscience (Barclay p. 73 f., 76). This *irrationality* of the ethical, which follows from the heightened opposition between the divine and the creaturely, is expressed in the propositions fundamental to Quaker ethics: what a man does contrary to his faith, *though his faith may be wrong*, is no ways acceptable to God... though *the thing might have been lawful to another* (Barclay p. 487). In practice, of course, this could not be maintained. For Barclay, for example, the "moral and perpetual statutes acknowledged by all Christians" are even the limit of *toleration*. In practice, contemporaries regarded the Quaker ethic as similar in kind—with some peculiarities—to that of the Reformed Pietists. "Everything good in the church is suspected of being Quakerism," Spener repeatedly points out. Spener would therefore almost envy the Quakers this reputation. Cas. Theol. III, 6, 1, Dist. 2 (N. 64).—The refusal of the oath on the strength of a biblical text already shows how limited the real emancipation from the letter of Scripture was. The *social*-ethical significance of the maxim that some Quakers regarded as the epitome of the *whole* Christian ethic—"Do to others only what you would have them do to you"—need not concern us here.

the Spirit if we *wait for it* and inwardly surrender ourselves to it. Because it is wrought by God, it *can* lead to a state of such com-

plete victory over the power of sin[204] that relapses, let alone the loss of the state of grace, become practically impossible. As later

in Methodism, however, attaining that state was not regarded as the rule; rather, the individual's degree of perfection was con-

204 WEBER'S NOTE. Barclay justifies the necessity of assuming this *possibility* on the grounds that without it "there should never be a place known by the Saints wherein they might be free of doubting and despair, which... *is most absurd*." As one can see, the certitudo salutis [certainty of salvation] depends on it. So Barclay op. cit. p. 20.

sidered subject to development. *All* Baptist communities, however, wished to be "*pure*" congregations, in the sense of the

blameless conduct of their members. Inner separation from the world and its interests, and unconditional submission to the

rule of the God who speaks to us in conscience, was also the sole infallible mark of true rebirth. Conduct in keeping with it was

therefore a requirement for salvation. Salvation could not be earned but was a gift of God's grace; yet only someone who lived

according to his conscience could regard himself as reborn. "Good works" in this sense were a "causa sine qua non" [indis-

pensable condition]. As one can see, these latter lines of thought of Barclay's, whom we have been following, came, in practice, to

the same thing as Reformed doctrine after all. They were surely developed still under the influence of Calvinist asceticism,

which the Baptist sects found already present in England and the Netherlands. G. Fox spent the whole first period of his mis-

188 WEBER'S NOTE. It is one of the many merits of Karl Müller's church history that it gives the Baptist movement, magnificent in its way though outwardly inconspicuous, the place it deserves in its account. More than any other movement, it suffered pitiless persecution at the hands of *all* the churches—precisely because it *wanted* to be a sect in the specific sense of the word. Even five generations later it was still discredited throughout the world (in England, for example) by the catastrophe of the eschatological tendency that had sprung from it in Münster. And, crushed again and again and driven into corners, it arrived at a coherent formulation of its religious *ideas* above all only long after it had arisen. Hence it produced *even* less "theology" than would have been compatible with its principles, which were in themselves hostile to the professional pursuit of faith in God as a "science." This did not endear it to the older professional theology, even that of its own time, nor did it impress that theology very much. But even with some more recent writers things are no different. In Ritschl, Pietismus I p. 22 f., for example, the "Anabaptists" are treated with little impartiality, indeed with outright disdain: one is tempted to speak of a theological "bourgeois standpoint." And this although Cornelius's fine work (Geschichte des Münsterschen Aufruhrs [History of the Münster Uprising]) had been available for decades. Here too Ritschl everywhere constructs a relapse—from his point of view—into the "Catholic," and scents direct influences from the Spirituals and the Franciscan Observants. Even if such influences could be demonstrated in isolated cases, these threads would still be very thin. Above all, the historical facts are surely these: the official Catholic Church treated the *worldly* asceticism of the laity, wherever it went so far as to form conventicles, with the utmost suspicion. It sought to steer it into the path of founding orders—that is, *out* of the world—or at any rate deliberately attached it to the full orders as asceticism of the second degree and placed it under their control. Where this did not succeed, the church scented just as much the danger that the cultivation of a subjectivist ascetic morality would lead to the denial of authority and to heresy. The church of Elizabeth did the same, with equal justice, in its dealings with the "prophesyings," the semi-Pietist Bible conventicles, even where these were entirely correct with regard to "conformism"; and the Stuarts gave expression to it in their Book of sports (more on this later). The history of numerous heretical movements, but also, for example, of the Humiliati and the Beguines, and likewise the fate of St. Francis, bear this out. The preaching of the mendicant friars, especially the Franciscans, probably helped in several ways to prepare the ground for the ascetic lay morality of Reformed and Baptist Protestantism. But the many features of kinship between the asceticism of Western monasticism and the ascetic conduct of life within Protestantism—which, precisely in our context, will have to be stressed again and again as highly instructive—ultimately have their reason in this: that *any* asceticism grounded in biblical Christianity naturally and necessarily *must* have certain important features in common; and further, that *any* asceticism of whatever confession needs certain proven means for the "mortification" of the flesh.—Regarding the following sketch, it should also be noted that its brevity is due to the fact that the Baptist ethic is of only very limited significance for the problem to be discussed specifically in *this* essay: the development of the religious foundations of the "bourgeois" idea of the *calling*. It added nothing absolutely new to that idea. The far more important social side of the movement is set aside here for the time being. Given the way the problem is posed, only those elements of the historical content of the *older* Baptist movement can be presented here that later influenced the distinctive character of the sects in the foreground of our interest: Baptists, Quakers and (more incidentally) Mennonites.

sionary activity preaching that they should earnestly and

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. In 1534–35 radical Anabaptists seized Münster and set up a millenarian kingdom, which ended in siege and massacre.

inwardly appropriate it.[205]

WAITING FOR THE SPIRIT

Quaker silent waiting trained people in calm deliberation, and their rejection of public office drove them into business.

II.1.29 Psychologically, however—since predestination was rejected—the specifically *methodical* character of Baptist morality rested above all on the idea of "*waiting*" for the working of the Spirit. This idea still stamps its character on the Quaker "meeting" today, and Barclay has analyzed it finely. The purpose of this silent waiting is to overcome what is instinctive and irrational, the passions and subjectivities of the "natural" man: *he* is to be silent, so as to create that deep stillness in the soul in which alone God can speak. Admittedly, this "waiting" *could* issue in hysterical states, in prophecy and, as long as eschatological hopes persisted, under certain circumstances even in an outbreak of enthusiastic chiliasm. This is possible with every kind of piety grounded in a similar way, and it actually happened with the tendency that was destroyed in Münster. But once the Baptist movement flowed into ordinary worldly working life, the idea that God speaks only where the creature is silent evidently meant a training in calm *deliberation* before acting and in orienting action by careful individual examination of *conscience*[206]. The practical life of the later Baptist communities, and to a quite specific degree that of the Quakers, did indeed take on this calm, sober, eminently *conscientious* character. The radical disenchantment of the world left no other path open, inwardly, than worldly asceticism. For communities that wanted

205 Robert Barclay (1648–1690), the leading systematic theologian of the early Quakers; not the nineteenth-century historian of the same name cited in note [170].

206 WEBER'S NOTE. So a difference in key remains between the Calvinist and the Quaker rationalization of life. But when Baxter formulates it by saying that among the Quakers the "Spirit" is supposed to act on the soul as on a corpse, whereas the (characteristically formulated) Reformed principle is "reason and spirit are conjunct principles" (Christ. Dir. II p. 76), the contrast in *this* form no longer held in practice for his time.

nothing to do with the political powers and their doings, it also followed outwardly that these ascetic virtues flowed into work in a calling. The leaders of the earliest Baptist movement had been ruthlessly radical in turning away from the world; yet naturally, even in the first generation, a strictly apostolic conduct of life had *not* been held by *all* to be absolutely required as proof of regeneration. Well-to-do bourgeois elements already belonged to this generation. And even before Menno, who stood firmly on the ground of worldly vocational virtue and the order of private property, the earnest moral strictness of the Baptists had in practice turned into this channel dug by the Reformed ethic[207]—*because* the development toward the *otherworldly*, monastic form of asceticism had been ruled out since Luther, whom the Baptists followed in this, as unbiblical and as salvation by works. Nevertheless—apart from the semi-communist communities of the early period, which are not to be discussed here—not only has one Baptist sect, the so-called "Tunkers" (dompelaers, dunckards), held right up to the present to the rejection of education and of any possessions beyond what is indispensable for subsistence; but, for example,[208] even in Barclay faithfulness to one's calling is understood not in a Calvinist or even a Lutheran way, but rather in a Thomist one: as an unavoidable *consequence*, "naturali ratione" [by natural reason], of the

207 WEBER'S NOTE. See the very careful articles "Menno" and "Mennoniten" by Cramer in the R. E. f. Pr. Th. u. K., especially p. 604. Good as these articles are, the article "Baptisten" in the same work is superficial and in part downright inaccurate. Its author does not know, for example, the "Publications of the Hanserd Knollys Society," which are indispensable for the history of the Baptists.
208 The Tunkers or Dunkers (German Baptist Brethren) take their name from their practice of baptism by immersion.

believer's entanglement in the world[209]. If these views implied a weakening of the Calvinist conception of the calling similar to that in many utterances of Spener and the German Pietists, on the other hand the intensity of economic interest in the calling was substantially *heightened* among the Baptist sects by various factors. First, by the refusal to accept state offices, originally understood as a religious duty following from separation from the world. Even after it had been abandoned as a principle, this refusal persisted in practice, at least among Mennonites and Quakers, because of their strict refusal to bear arms and to swear oaths, since this disqualified them from public office. Hand in hand with it went the insuperable opposition of all Baptist denominations to any kind of aristocratic style of life—partly, as with the Calvinists, a consequence of the prohibition on glorifying the creature, partly likewise a consequence of those unpolitical or even antipolitical principles. The whole sober and conscientious method of the Baptist conduct of life was thereby pushed onto the path of *un*political working life in a calling. At the same time, the enormous importance that the Baptist doctrine of salvation attached to control by conscience, as God's individual revelation, stamped their conduct in their callings with a character whose great significance for the development of important aspects of the capitalist spirit we shall come to know more closely only later—and even then only so far as this is possible here without discussing the entire political and social ethic of Protestant asceticism. We shall then see—to

209 WEBER'S NOTE. Thus Barclay, op. cit. p. 404, argues that eating, drinking and *acquisition* are *natural*, not spiritual, acts, which may be performed even *without* God's special call.—This argument is the answer to the (characteristic) objection that if, as the Quakers teach, one may not pray without a special "motion of the spirit," then one would not be allowed to plow without such a special prompting from God either.—That modern resolutions of Quaker synods also contain the advice to withdraw from business once one has acquired sufficient wealth, so as to be able to live wholly for the Kingdom of God, at rest from the bustle of the world, is naturally also telling, although such ideas are certainly found occasionally in other denominations too, including the Calvinist. This, too, expresses the fact that the adoption of the bourgeois vocational ethic by its bearers was the worldly turn of an asceticism that had originally *fled* the world.

anticipate at least this much—that the specific form which worldly asceticism took among the Baptists, and especially the Quakers[210], showed itself, already in the judgment of the 17th century, in the practical proving of that important principle of capitalist "ethics" usually formulated as "honesty is the best policy"[211], which also found its classic document in Franklin's tract quoted earlier. By contrast, we shall expect the effects of Calvinism to lie more in the direction of unleashing the private economic energy of acquisition. For despite all the formal legality of the "saint," in the end Goethe's dictum often enough held for the Calvinist too: "The man of action is always without conscience; no one has a conscience but the observer"[212].

CHURCH DISCIPLINE AND THE SECTS

The voluntary discipline of sects strengthened asceticism more than the policing of state churches did.

II.1.30 A further important element that benefited the intensity of the worldly asceticism of the Baptist denominations can likewise be discussed in its full significance only in another context. Still, a few remarks on it may be offered in advance, which will also serve to justify the course of exposition chosen here. We

210 WEBER'S NOTE. Let me once again refer emphatically here to the excellent discussion by E. Bernstein, op. cit. Kautsky's extremely schematic account of the Anabaptist movement, and his theory of "heretical communism" in general (in the first volume of the same work), will have to be taken up on another occasion.

211 WEBER'S NOTE. Veblen (Chicago), in his stimulating book Theory of business enterprise, is of the opinion that this motto is merely "early capitalist." But economic "supermen" who, like today's "captains of industry," stand beyond good and evil have always existed; and in the broad stratum of capitalist conduct beneath them, that maxim still holds today.

212 WEBER'S NOTE. In civil actions it is good to be *as the many*, in religious, to be as the best, says Th. Adams, for example (Works of the Pur. Div. p. 138).—This admittedly sounds somewhat more far-reaching than it is meant to be. It means that Puritan honesty is *formalistic* legality—just as the "truthfulness" or "uprightness" that formerly Puritan peoples like to claim as a national virtue is something specifically *different* from German "Ehrlichkeit" [honesty], something remodeled formalistically and reflectively. There are good remarks on this by an educator in the Preuß. Jahrb. vol. 112 (1903) p. 226. The *formalism* of Puritan ethics is in turn the entirely fitting consequence of its commitment to the *law*.

have quite deliberately *not* started, for the time being, from the objective social institutions of the old Protestant churches and their ethical influences—in particular not from the very important *church discipline*—but from the effects that the *subjective* appropriation of ascetic religiosity by *individuals* was apt to produce on the conduct of life. This is not only because this side of the matter has so far received by far the less attention. It is also because the effect of church discipline by no means always pointed in the same direction. Rather, the ecclesiastical policing of the individual's life, carried almost to the verge of the Inquisition in the territories of the Calvinist state churches, *could* actually *counteract* that release of individual energies which was conditioned by the ascetic striving for a methodical appropriation of salvation, and under certain circumstances it actually did so. The mercantilist regulation of the state could breed industries, but not—at least not by itself—the capitalist "spirit," which on the contrary it often directly paralyzed wherever it took on a police-authoritarian character. In just the same way, the ecclesiastical regulation of asceticism could have the same effect when it developed too predominantly along police lines: it then enforced a certain outward behavior, but under certain circumstances paralyzed the subjective impulses toward a methodical conduct of life. Any discussion of this point[213] must take account of the great difference between the effect of the authoritarian moral policing of the state *churches* and that of the moral policing of the *sects*, which rested on voluntary submission. That the Baptist movement in all its denominations created, in principle, "sects" and not "churches" in any case benefited the intensity of its asceticism—just as, to varying degrees, was also the case with those Calvinist, Pietist and Methodist communities that were *in fact* pushed onto the path of forming voluntary communities[214].

213 WEBER'S NOTE. Some remarks on this in the essay immediately following.
214 WEBER'S NOTE. *Here* lies the reason for the pervasive economic effect of (ascetic) Protestant *minorities*, but not of Catholic ones.

ASCETICISM IN THE WORLD: A SUMMARY

Ascetic Protestantism rationalized conduct within the world, with a view to the hereafter, through its idea of the calling.

II.1.31 Now that the foregoing sketch has tried to set out the religious foundations of the Puritan idea of the calling, we must trace its effect on the life of *acquisition*. Despite all divergences in detail, and despite all differences in the emphasis that the various ascetic religious communities placed on the points decisive for us, these points were present and effective in all of them[215]. What was decisive for our inquiry, however—to recapitulate—was again and again the conception, recurring in all the denominations, of the religious "state of grace" precisely as a state (status) that separates man from the depravity of the creaturely, from the "world"[216]. Possession of this state—however it was attained according to the dogma of the denomination in question—could *not* be guaranteed by any magical-sacramental means, or by relief in confession, or by individual pious works, but only by *proof* in a specific kind of conduct unambiguously different from the style of life of the "natural" man. From this followed for the individual the *impulse* to *methodical supervision* of his state of grace in his conduct of life, and thus to its *ascetic* permeation. This ascetic style of life, however, meant, as we saw, precisely a *rational* shaping of one's whole existence, oriented to God's will. And this asceticism was *no* longer an opus supererogationis [a work beyond what is required], but a performance expected of everyone who wished to be certain of his salvation. That special life of the saints, required by religion and distinct from "natural" life, was—and this is the decisive point—

215 WEBER'S NOTE. That diversity of dogmatic foundations was compatible with the incorporation of the decisive interest in "proof" has its *ultimate* reason, not yet to be discussed here, in the distinctive character of Christianity as such within the history of religions.

216 WEBER'S NOTE. "Since God hath gathered us to be a people"... says Barclay too, for example, op. cit. p. 357; and I myself heard a Quaker sermon at Haverford College that laid all the emphasis on interpreting "saints" = separati [those set apart].

no longer lived outside the world in monastic communities, but *within* the world and its orders. This *rationalization* of the conduct of life within the world, with a view to the hereafter, was the effect of ascetic Protestantism's *conception of the calling*.—

II.1.32 Christian asceticism, which at first fled from the world into solitude, had already ruled the world ecclesiastically from within the monastery, by renouncing the world. But in doing so it had on the whole left everyday worldly life its natural, unself-conscious character. Now it strode into the marketplace of life, slammed the monastery door behind it, and set about permeating precisely worldly *everyday* life with its method, transforming it into a rational life *in* the world, and yet *not of* this world or *for* this world. With what result, our further discussion will try to show.

II.2 Asceticism and the Spirit of Capitalism

II. Die Berufsethik des asketischen Protestantismus—2. Askese und kapitalistischer Geist
Baxter on work, wealth and time, the ascetic formation of the modern economic order, and the "iron cage."

II.2.1 2. Asceticism and the Capitalist Spirit To see through the connections between the basic religious ideas of ascetic Protestantism and the maxims of everyday economic life, it is necessary above all to draw on theological writings that can be recognized as having grown out of pastoral practice. For in an age in which the hereafter was everything, in which the Christian's social position depended on admission to Communion, and in which the clergy, through pastoral care, church discipline and preaching, exerted an influence of which we modern people—as any glance at the collected "consilia" [counsels], "casus conscientiae" [cases of conscience], etc., shows—*simply can no longer form any idea*, the religious forces at work in *this practice* are the decisive shapers of "national character."—

II.2.2 For the discussion in *this* section, unlike later discussions, we can treat ascetic Protestantism as *a single* whole. But since English Puritanism, which grew out of Calvinism, offers the most consistent foundation for the idea of the calling, we shall, in keeping with our principle, place one of its representatives at the center. Richard *Baxter* stands out among the many literary representatives of the Puritan ethic for his eminently practical and irenic stance, and also for the universal recognition of his works, which were republished and translated again and again.

He was a Presbyterian and an apologist for the Westminster Synod, yet, like so many of the best minds of the time, gradually outgrew high Calvinism in matters of dogma. He was inwardly opposed to Cromwell's usurpation, since he was averse to every revolution, to sectarianism, and above all to the fanatical zeal of the "saints"; yet he was very broad-minded about external peculiarities and objective toward his opponents. He sought his field of work essentially in the practical promotion of church and moral life. One of the most successful pastors known to history, he put himself in the service of this work at the disposal of the parliamentary government, of Cromwell and of the Restoration alike[1], until under the last of these he withdrew from office—even before "St. Bartholomew's Day."[2] His "Christian Directory" is the most comprehensive compendium of Puritan moral theology, and it is everywhere oriented to the practical experience of his own pastoral work.—For comparison we shall draw on Spener's "Theologische Bedenken" [Theological Opinions] as representative of German Pietism, Barclay's "Apology" for

1 WEBER'S NOTE. See the fine characterization in Dowden, op. cit.—On Baxter's theology after he had gradually moved away from strict belief in the "double decree," the introduction (by Jenkyn) to his various works printed in the "Works of the Puritan Divines" gives a tolerable orientation.—His attempt to combine "universal redemption" and "personal election" satisfied no one. For us the only essential point is *that* he still held, even then, to *personal* election, that is, to the ethically decisive point of the doctrine of predestination. Important, on the other hand, is his weakening of the *forensic* conception of justification, as a certain approximation to the Baptists.

2 On St. Bartholomew's Day, 24 August 1662, some two thousand ministers who would not conform under the Act of Uniformity were ejected from their livings.

Quakerism, and other representatives of the ascetic ethic besides[3], to save space as far as possible in the notes[4].

BAXTER ON WEALTH AND WASTED TIME

Baxter warns against wealth only as a temptation to rest; wasting time is the gravest sin.

II.2.3 If we now take up Baxter's "Saints' Everlasting Rest" and his "Christian Directory," or related works by others[5], what strikes us at first glance in their judgments of wealth[6] and its acquisition is the emphasis on precisely the Ebionite elements of the

3 WEBER'S NOTE. Tracts and sermons by Th. Adams, John Howe, Matthew Henry, J. Janeway, St. Charnock, Baxter and Bunyan are collected, in an often somewhat arbitrary selection, in the 10 volumes of the "Works of the Puritan Divines" (London 1845–48). The editions of the works of Bailey, Sedgwick and Hoornbeck have already been given above, each at its first citation.

4 WEBER'S NOTE. Voët or other Continental representatives of worldly asceticism could just as well have been drawn on. Brentano's view that this development was "only Anglo-Saxon" is entirely mistaken. The selection rests on the wish to let the ascetic movement of the second half of the 17th century, immediately before its turn into utilitarianism, speak—not exclusively, but as far as possible. The appealing task of illustrating the style of life of ascetic Protestantism from the biographical literature as well—the Quaker literature in particular would be relevant here, being still relatively unknown in Germany—has unfortunately had to be forgone within the framework of this sketch.

5 WEBER'S NOTE. For one could just as well take up the writings of Gisbert Voët, or the proceedings of the Huguenot synods, or the Dutch Baptist literature. Sombart and Brentano, in a most unfortunate way, have picked out of Baxter precisely those "Ebionite" elements that I myself strongly emphasized, in order to confront me with the undoubted (capitalist) "backwardness" of his *doctrine*. But one must, 1. really *know* this whole literature thoroughly in order to use it correctly, and 2. not overlook the fact that what I am trying to show is precisely how, *despite* the "anti-Mammonist" *doctrine*, the spirit of this ascetic *religiosity* nevertheless gave birth to economic rationalism, just as in the monastic economies—because it put a premium on what was decisive: the rational *impulses* conditioned by asceticism. That alone is what matters, and that is precisely the point of what is argued here.

6 WEBER'S NOTE. Likewise in Calvin, who was by no means a lover of bourgeois wealth (see his violent attacks on Venice and Antwerp, Comm. in Jes. Opp. III 140 a, 308 a).

New Testament message[7]. Wealth as such is a grave danger; its temptations are unceasing; and striving[8] for it is not only senseless compared with the overriding importance of the Kingdom of God, but also morally questionable. Calvin saw in the wealth of the clergy no obstacle to their effectiveness but, on the contrary, a thoroughly desirable enhancement of their standing, and permitted them to invest their money profitably, provided only that they avoided giving offense. Here asceticism seems directed far more sharply than in Calvin *against* any striving to

7 WEBER'S NOTE. Saints' everlasting rest chap. X, XII.—Cf. Bailey, Praxis pietatis p. 182, or, for instance, Matthew Henry (The worth of the soul, Works of Pur. Div. p. 319: Those that are eager in pursuit of worldly wealth despise their soul, not only because the soul is neglected and the body preferred before it, but because it is employed in these pursuits: Psalm 127, 2. (On the *same* page, however, stands the remark, to be quoted later, on the sinfulness of wasting time of every kind, and especially through recreations.) The same is probably true of the whole religious literature of English and Dutch Puritanism. See, e.g., Hoornbeck's (op. cit. l. X c. 18 and 18) philippic against avaritia [avarice]. (In this writer, incidentally, sentimental Pietist influences are also at work: see his praise of the tranquillitas animi [tranquility of mind] that is pleasing to God, as opposed to the "sollicitudo" [anxious care] of this world.) "A rich man is not easily saved," says Bailey too (op. cit. p. 182), echoing a well-known biblical passage. The *Methodist* catechisms also warn against "laying up treasures on earth." With Pietism this goes entirely without saying. And with the Quakers it was no different. Cf. Barclay op. cit. p. 517: ... and therefore beware of such temptation as to use their callings and engine *to be richer*.

8 WEBER'S NOTE. For not only wealth but also the *instinctive pursuit of profit* (or what was taken for it) was condemned with similar severity. In the Netherlands, the South Holland Synod of 1574 declared in answer to an inquiry that "Lombards" [pawnbrokers], although the business was legally permitted, were not to be admitted to Communion; the Provincial Synod of Deventer of 1598 (Art. 24) extended this to the employees of "Lombards"; the Synod of Gorichem of 1606 laid down harsh and humiliating conditions under which the *wives* of "usurers" might be admitted; and as late as 1644 and 1657 it was debated whether Lombards might be admitted to Communion (this in particular against Brentano, who cites his Catholic ancestors—although for thousands of years there have been foreign-born traders and bankers throughout the European and Asian world); and Gisbert Voët (Disp. theol. IV Anst. 1667 de usuris p. 665) still wants to exclude the "trapezites" [money-changers] (Lombards, Piedmontese) from Communion. In the Huguenot synods things were no different. *These* kinds of capitalist strata were by *no* means the typical bearers of the mentality and conduct of life with which we are concerned here. Nor, compared with antiquity and the Middle Ages, were they anything *new*.

acquire temporal goods.[9] One can pile up examples at will from Puritan writings condemning the pursuit of money and goods, and contrast them with the late medieval ethical literature, which was far more relaxed on this point. And these misgivings are meant in all seriousness—only it takes a somewhat closer look to see their decisive ethical meaning and context. What is really morally reprehensible is *resting* on one's possessions[10], the *enjoyment* of wealth with its consequences of idleness and the lusts of the flesh, and above all of distraction from the pursuit of a "holy" life. And possessions are questionable *only because* they bring with them the danger of this resting. For the "saints' everlasting rest" lies in the hereafter; but on earth man too, if he is to become certain of his state of grace, must "work the works of him that sent him, while it is day." According to God's unambiguously revealed will, it is not leisure and enjoyment but *only activity* that serves to increase his glory[11]. *Wasting time* is thus the first and, in principle, the gravest of all sins. The span of life is infinitely short and precious for "making sure" one's own call-

9 The Ebionites were an early Jewish-Christian group who prized poverty.

10 WEBER'S NOTE. Developed in detail in chapter 10 of the Saints' "everlasting rest": whoever would rest permanently in the "inn" that God gives us in the form of possessions, God strikes even in this life. Complacent rest on wealth once acquired is almost always the harbinger of collapse.—If we had everything we *could* have in the world, would that already be everything we hoped to have? *Freedom from desire* cannot be attained on earth—precisely because, by God's will, it is not *meant* to be.

11 WEBER'S NOTE. Christ. Dir. I p. 375/6: It is for *action* that God maintaineth us and our activities: work is the moral as well as the natural *end of power*... It *is action* that God is most served and honoured by... *The public welfare or the good of many* is to be valued above our own. Here we see the point of departure for the shift from the will of God to the purely utilitarian viewpoints of later liberal theory. On the religious sources of utilitarianism see further below in the text, and already above, p. 141 n. 5.

ing. Loss of time through sociability, "idle talk"[12], luxury[13], even through more sleep than health requires[14]—six to at most eight hours—is absolutely reprehensible morally[15]. It does not yet say, as Franklin does, "Time is money," but the proposition holds, as it were, in a spiritual sense: time is infinitely valuable, because every hour lost is an hour withdrawn from labor in the service of God's glory[16]. Hence idle contemplation, too, is worthless and may even be directly reprehensible, at least when it comes at

12 WEBER'S NOTE. The commandment to be *silent*—taking its start from the biblical threat of punishment for "every idle word"—has been, especially since the Cluniacs, a proven ascetic means of training in self-control. Baxter too discourses at length on the sin of idle talk. Its significance for character was already appreciated by Sanford, op. cit. p. 90 f. The "melancholy" and "moroseness" of the Puritans, so deeply felt by their contemporaries, was precisely the result of breaking the *spontaneity* of the "status naturalis" [natural state], and the ban on thoughtless talk also served these ends.—When Washington Irving ("Bracebridge Hall" chap. XXX) looks for the reason partly in the "calculating spirit" of capitalism, partly in the effect of political freedom, which leads to self-responsibility, it must be said that the same effect did not appear among the Romance peoples, and that for England matters probably stood thus: 1. Puritanism enabled its adherents to create free institutions and still become a world power, and 2. it transformed that "calculativeness" (as Sombart calls that "spirit"), which is indeed constitutive of capitalism, from a means of economic activity into a *principle* of the entire *conduct of life*.

13 WEBER'S NOTE. Op. cit. I, p. 111.

14 WEBER'S NOTE. Op. cit. I, p. 383 f.

15 WEBER'S NOTE. Similarly on the preciousness of time, Barclay, op. cit., p. 14.

16 WEBER'S NOTE. Baxter, op. cit., p. 79: "Keep up a high esteem of time and be every day more careful that you lose none of your time, then you are that you lose none of your gold and silver. And if vain recreation, dressings, feastings, idle talk, unprofitable company, or sleep, be any of them temptations to rob you of any of your time, accordingly heighten your watchfulness."—"Those that are prodigal of their time despise their own souls," says Matthew Henry (Worth of the soul, W. of Pur. Div. p. 315). Here, too, Protestant asceticism moves along long-proven paths. We are used to regarding it as specific to the modern person with a calling that he "has no time," and, for example, we measure —as Goethe already did in the "Wanderjahre"—the degree of capitalist development by the fact that the *clocks* strike the quarter hours (so too Sombart in his "Kapitalismus").—But let us not forget that the first person who (in the Middle Ages) lived by *divided time* was the *monk*, and that church bells first had to serve *his* need to divide up time.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years, 1821, revised 1829), subtitled "Die Entsagenden" ("The Renunciants").

the expense of work in a calling[17]. For it is *less* pleasing to God than the active doing of his will in a calling[18]. Besides, Sunday is there for it; and according to Baxter it is always those who are idle in their callings who also have no time for God when the hour for him has come[19].

17 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. Baxter's discussions of the calling, op. cit. I, p. 108 f. They include the following passage: Question: But may I not cast off the world that I may only think of my salvation?—Answer: You may cast off all such excess of worldly cares or business as unnecessarily hinder you in spiritual things. But you may not cast off all bodily employment and mental labour in which *you may serve the common good.* Every one as a member of Church or Commonwealth must employ their parts to the utmost for the good of the Church and the Commonwealth. To neglect this and say: I will pray and meditate, is as if your servant should refuse your *greatest* work and tye himself to some lesser easier part. And *God hath commandeth* you some way or other to *labour for your daily bread and not to live as drones of the sweat of others only*. God's command to Adam, "In the sweat of your face...," and Paul's instruction, "Whoever does not work shall not eat," are cited in support. It was always known of the Quakers that even their wealthiest circles made their sons learn a vocation (for ethical reasons, not—as Alberti recommends—for utilitarian ones).

18 WEBER'S NOTE. Here lie points on which Pietism diverges because of its *emotional* character. For Spener (see Theol. Bedenken III p. 445), although he stresses, entirely in the Lutheran sense, that work in a calling is *service to God*, it is nevertheless settled—and this too is Lutheran—that the *restlessness* of business in one's calling draws one away from God: a highly characteristic antithesis to Puritanism.

19 WEBER'S NOTE. Op. cit. p. 242: It's they that are lazy in their callings that can find no time for holy duties. Hence the view that it is chiefly the *towns*—the seat of a bourgeoisie devoted to rational acquisition—that are the seats of the ascetic virtues. Thus Baxter says of his hand-loom weavers in Kidderminster, in his autobiography (excerpt in the W. of the Pur. Div. p. XXXVIII): And their constant *converse and traffic with London* doth much to promote civility and piety among tradesmen. That proximity to the capital should strengthen virtue will astonish present-day clergymen—German ones, at least. But Pietism, too, shows similar views. Thus Spener once writes to a young fellow minister: "At the very least it will become clear that among the great numbers in the towns—though most of them are wholly wicked—there are still always some good souls to be found here and there, with whom good can be accomplished; whereas in villages, I fear, scarcely anything truly good is sometimes to be found in a whole congregation." (Theol. Bed. I, 66 p. 303.)—The peasant, after all, is poorly suited to the ascetic rational conduct of life. His *ethical* glorification is very modern. We do not go into the significance of this and similar statements for the question of the *class* conditioning of asceticism here.

LABOR AS ASCETIC MEANS AND AS LIFE'S PURPOSE

Hard work guards against temptation, and God commands everyone, rich or poor, to labor in a calling.

II.2.4 Accordingly, Baxter's principal work is pervaded by constantly repeated, at times almost passionate preaching of hard, steady, physical or mental *labor*[20]. Two motives work together here[21]. Labor is, first of all, the time-tested *ascetic means*. In the church of the West—in sharp contrast not only to the East but to almost all monastic rules the world over[22]—it had always been valued as such[23]. It is above all the specific preventive against all those temptations that Puritanism sums up under the concept of "unclean life"—and their role is no small one. For in Puritanism, sexual asceticism differs from the monastic kind only in degree, not in its underlying principle; and because it takes in married life as well, it reaches further than the monastic kind. For sexual intercourse, even *within* marriage, is permissible *only* as the means willed by God for increasing his glory, in accordance

20 WEBER'S NOTE. Take, for instance, the following passages (op. cit. p. 336 f.): "Be wholly taken up in diligent business of your lawful callings when you are not exercised in the more immediate service of God."—"Labour hard in your callings"—"See that you have a calling which will find you employment for all the time which Gods immediate service spareth."

21 WEBER'S NOTE. That the specific ethical valuation of labor and its "dignity" was by no means an idea *originally* inherent in Christianity, let alone peculiar to it, was sharply emphasized once again only recently by Harnack (Mitt. des Ev.-Soz. Kongr. 14. Folge, 1905, Nr. 3/4, p. 48).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930): leading German Protestant church historian.

22 WEBER'S NOTE. What *this* important contrast rests on—it has clearly been present since the Benedictine Rule—can be shown only by a far more comprehensive study.

23 WEBER'S NOTE. So too in Pietism (Spener, op. cit. III p. 429, 430). The characteristically Pietist turn is that faithfulness in one's calling, imposed on us as a punishment because of the Fall, serves the *mortification* of one's own *will*. Work in a calling, as a service of love to one's neighbor, is a duty of gratitude for God's grace (a Lutheran idea!), and it is therefore not pleasing to God if it is done reluctantly and with resentment (op. cit. III p. 272). The Christian will therefore "show himself as diligent in his work as a worldly person" (III p. 278). This plainly falls short of the Puritan way of thinking.

with the commandment "Be fruitful and multiply"[24]. Against religious doubts and scrupulous self-torment, and likewise against all sexual temptations, the prescription—alongside a

24 WEBER'S NOTE. According to Baxter, its purpose is "*A sober* procreation of children." Similarly Spener, though with concessions to the crude Lutheran view that avoiding immorality—which otherwise cannot be suppressed—is a secondary purpose. Concupiscence, as an accompaniment of copulation, is sinful even in marriage; in the view of Spener, for example, it is only a *consequence* of the Fall, which thus turned a natural process willed by God into something inevitably bound up with sinful sensations, and so into a pudendum [something shameful]. In the view of several Pietist tendencies as well, the highest form of Christian marriage is one in which virginity is preserved; the next highest, one in which sexual intercourse serves exclusively for begetting children; and so on down to those marriages that are contracted for purely erotic or purely external reasons and are regarded, ethically, as concubinage. Among these lower stages, marriage contracted for purely external reasons (since it at least springs from *rational* deliberation) is preferred to marriage prompted by erotic feeling. The theory and practice of the Herrnhut Brethren (Moravians) may be left aside here. Rationalist philosophy (Chr. Wolff) took over the ascetic theory in this form: what is ordained as a *means* to an end—concupiscence and its satisfaction—must not be made an end *in itself*.—The shift to a purely hygienically oriented utilitarianism has already taken place in Franklin. He stands roughly on the ethical standpoint of modern physicians, understands by "chastity" the restriction of sexual intercourse to what is desirable for *health,* and, as is well known, also expressed himself theoretically on the question of how. Wherever these matters are made the object of purely *rational* considerations at all, this development has so far always occurred. The Puritan and the hygienic rationalist of sex go very different ways, but on this one point "they understand each other at once." In a lecture, a zealous advocate of "hygienic prostitution"—the issue was brothels and their regulation—justified the moral permissibility of "extramarital sexual intercourse" (regarded as *hygienically* useful) by referring to its poetic transfiguration in *Faust and Gretchen*. Treating Gretchen as a prostitute, and equating the mighty sway of human passions with sexual intercourse for the sake of health—both of these correspond *entirely* to the Puritan standpoint, as does, for example, the genuinely specialist view, occasionally advanced by very distinguished physicians, that a question reaching as deeply into the subtlest problems of personality and culture as the significance of sexual abstinence belongs "exclusively" before the forum of the physician (as the *specialist*). Among the Puritans the "specialist" is the moralistic theorist, here it is the hygienic one; but the principle of "competence" for settling the question—which strikes us as rather philistine—is the same, with the sign reversed, of course. Yet the mighty idealism of the Puritan view, with all its prudishness, could also show positive results, both from the standpoint of preserving the race and considered purely "hygienically"; whereas modern sexual hygiene, because of the appeal to "freedom from prejudice" that it simply cannot avoid, is in danger of knocking the bottom out of the very barrel it is drawing from. —How, among the peoples influenced by Puritanism, this rational interpretation of sexual relations nevertheless ultimately gave rise to that refinement and spiritual-ethical permeation of marital relations, and to those flowerings of marital chivalry—in contrast to the stuffy patriarchal atmosphere that in our country still lingers, often in very palpable remnants, even in the circles of the intellectual aristocracy—must of course remain outside the discussion here. (Baptist influences had a share in the "emancipation" of women; the protection of women's *freedom of conscience* and the extension to them of the idea of the "priesthood of all believers" were, here too, the first breaches in patriarchalism.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Faust and Gretchen: the lovers in Goethe's *Faust,* Part One (1808).

your calling"[25].

II.2.5 But beyond that, and above all, labor is the end *in itself* of life as such, prescribed by God[26]. The Pauline saying "Whoever does not work shall not eat" holds unconditionally and for everyone[27]. Unwillingness to work is a symptom that the state of grace is lacking[28].

II.2.6 The departure from the medieval attitude is plain here. Thomas Aquinas, too, had interpreted that saying. But according to him[29], labor is necessary only naturali ratione [by natural reason] for sustaining the life of the individual and of the community. Where this purpose falls away, the precept ceases to be valid. It applies only to the species, not to every individual. It does not concern anyone who can live from his property without working; and likewise contemplation, as a spiritual form of activity in the kingdom of God, naturally stands above the commandment in its literal interpretation. For popular theology, indeed, the highest form of monastic "productivity" lay in increasing the "thesaurus ecclesiae" [treasury of the church] through prayer and choir service. In Baxter, these exceptions to the ethical duty to work naturally fall away. But more than that, he insists with the greatest emphasis on the principle that wealth, too, does not release anyone from that unconditional

25 WEBER'S NOTE. Recurs again and again in Baxter. The biblical basis is regularly either the passage familiar to us from Franklin (Prov. 22:29) or the praise of labor in Prov. 31:16. Cf. op. cit. I, p. 382, p. 377, etc.

26 WEBER'S NOTE. Even Zinzendorf says on occasion: "One does not work only in order to live; one lives for the sake of work, and when one has nothing more to work at, one suffers or passes away" (Plitt I p. 428).

27 WEBER'S NOTE. A creed of the *Mormons*, too, closes (according to quotations) with the words: "But a sluggard or idler cannot be a Christian and be saved. He is destined to be stung to death and cast out of the hive." Here, however, it was chiefly the grandiose *discipline*, midway between monastery and manufactory, that confronted the individual with the choice of labor or elimination and—*combined*, to be sure, with religious enthusiasm and made possible *only by it*—produced the astonishing economic achievements of this sect.

28 WEBER'S NOTE. It is therefore carefully analyzed in its symptoms, op. cit. I, p. 380.—"Sloth" and "idleness" are such eminently grave sins *because* they are *continuous* in character. Baxter regards them outright as "destroyers of the state of grace" (op. cit. I, pp. 279/80). They are, precisely, the antithesis of the *methodical* life.

29 WEBER'S NOTE. See above, p. 70 n. 1.

precept[30]. The propertied man, too, shall not eat without working; for even if he does not need to work to meet his needs, God's commandment still stands, and he must obey it just as the poor man must[31]. For God's providence holds ready for everyone without distinction a calling, which he is to recognize and in which he is to work. And this calling is not, as in Lutheranism[32], a dispensation to which one must submit and with which one must be content, but a command from God to the individual to work for his glory. This seemingly slight nuance had far-reaching psychological consequences, and it was connected with a further development of that *providential* interpretation of the economic cosmos which had already been familiar to Scholasticism.

THE PROVIDENTIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Puritans valued callings by their usefulness and profitability, treating a chance of profit as a call from God.

II.2.7 Thomas Aquinas—to whom, once again, it is most convenient to refer—had, like others, already understood the division of labor and the occupational structure of society as a direct emanation of the divine plan for the world. But the placing of individuals within this cosmos occurs ex causis naturalibus [from natural causes] and is accidental ("contingent," in scholastic

30 WEBER'S NOTE. Baxter, op. cit. I p. 108 ff. The following passages are especially striking: Question: But will not wealth excuse us?—Answer: It may excuse you from some sordid sort of work, by making you more serviceable to another, but you are no more excused from service of work... then the poorest man... Further, op. cit. I p. 376: Though they (the rich) have no outward want to urge them, they have as great a necessity to obey God... God had strictly commandeth it (labor) to all. See n. 1 f. on pp. 105/6.

31 WEBER'S NOTE. Likewise Spener (op. cit. III, 338, 425). For this reason he especially combats the inclination to retire early as morally questionable; and, in rebutting an objection to the legitimacy of taking interest—that living on interest leads to laziness—he stresses that whoever can live on his interest is nonetheless *obliged* to work by God's command.

32 WEBER'S NOTE. Including Pietism. Where the question of *changing* one's calling is concerned, Spener always argues that *once* a particular calling has been taken up, remaining in it and accommodating oneself to it is a duty of obedience to God's providence.

usage). For Luther, as we saw, the placing of people in the given estates and callings, which follows from the objective historical order, became a direct emanation of the divine will; and so the individual's *remaining* in the position and within the limits that God had assigned him became a religious duty[33]. All the more so because the relations of Lutheran piety to the "world" in general were uncertain from the beginning and remained so. From Luther's circle of ideas, which never quite shed the Pauline indifference to the world, no ethical principles for shaping the world could be derived. One therefore had to take the world as it was, and could make only *this* into a religious duty.—In the Puritan view, the providential character of the interplay of private economic interests takes on yet another nuance. True to the Puritan scheme of pragmatic interpretation, one recognizes the providential purpose of the division into callings by its *fruits*. On these Baxter expounds in passages that in more than one respect directly recall Adam Smith's well-known apotheosis of the division of labor[34]. Because the specialization of callings makes possible the worker's practice ("skill"), it leads to a quantitative and qualitative increase in output, and so serves the general good ("common best"), which is identical with the good of as many as possible. Thus far the motivation is purely utilitarian and closely akin to many points of view already common in the sec-

33 WEBER'S NOTE. With what supreme pathos, dominating the whole conduct of life, the *Indian* doctrine of salvation links occupational traditionalism with the chances of rebirth is set out in the essays on the "Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen" [Economic Ethics of the World Religions]. Precisely here one can learn the difference between mere ethical *doctrinal* concepts and religion's creation of psychological *drives* of a particular kind. The devout Hindu could attain favorable chances of rebirth *only* by strictly *traditional* fulfillment of the duties of the caste into which he was born: the firmest religious anchoring of traditionalism conceivable. On this point Indian ethics is indeed the most consistent antithesis of Puritan ethics, just as in another respect (traditionalism of status) it is the most consistent antithesis of Judaism.

34 WEBER'S NOTE. *Baxter*, op. cit. I, p. 377.

ular literature of the time[35]. But the characteristically Puritan element emerges at once when Baxter places at the head of his discussion the motive: "Outside a fixed calling, a man's work is only unsteady casual labor, and he spends more time in idleness than in work"; and when he concludes it as follows: "and he (the worker in a calling) will carry out his work *in order*, while another is stuck in perpetual confusion and his business knows neither place nor time[36]... therefore a fixed calling ('certain calling'; elsewhere it says 'stated calling') is best for everyone." The unsteady work to which the ordinary day laborer is forced is an often unavoidable, but always undesirable, intermediate state. The life of the man "without a calling" lacks precisely the systematic, methodical character that, as we saw, worldly asceticism demands. According to Quaker ethics, too, a person's life in his calling is to be a consistent ascetic exercise in virtue, a proof of his state of grace through his *conscientiousness*, which shows itself in the care[37] and method with which he pursues his call-

35 WEBER'S NOTE. But not, for that reason, historically derivable from them. Rather, what works itself out here is the thoroughly genuine Calvinist notion that the cosmos of the "world" serves the glory of God, his self-glorification. The utilitarian turn—that the economic cosmos should serve the purpose of sustaining the life of all (good of the many, common good etc.)—was a consequence of the thought that any other interpretation would lead to (aristocratic) idolatry of the creature, or at any rate would serve not God's glory but creaturely "cultural purposes." But God's will, as it is expressed (see above, n. 3, p. 100) in the purposeful ordering of the economic cosmos, can only be—insofar as *this*-worldly ends come into consideration at all—the good of the "community": *im*personal "usefulness." Utilitarianism is thus, as was said earlier, a consequence of the *im*personal shaping of "love of neighbor" and of the rejection of all glorification of the world through the exclusivity of the Puritan "in majorem Dei gloriam" [to the greater glory of God]. How intensely this idea—that every glorification of the creature detracts from God's glory and is therefore absolutely reprehensible—dominated the whole of ascetic Protestantism is clearly shown by the scruples and the effort it cost even Spener, who was truly not "democratically" inclined, to uphold, in the face of numerous inquiries, the use of *titles* as an ἀδιάφορον [adiaphoron: a matter of indifference]. He finally reassured himself with the fact that even in the Bible the praetor Festus is addressed by the apostle as κράτιστος [kratistos: "most excellent"].—The *political* side of the matter does not belong in this context.

36 WEBER'S NOTE. The *inconstant* man is a stranger in his own house, says Th. Adams too (Works of the Pur. Div. p. 77).

37 WEBER'S NOTE. On this see especially George Fox's remarks in The Friends' Library (ed. W. & Th. Evans, Philadelphia 1837 ff.), Vol. I p. 130.

ing. What God demands is not labor as such, but rational labor in a calling. In the Puritan idea of the calling, the emphasis always lies on this methodical character of the asceticism of the calling, not, as with Luther, on contentment with the lot God has once allotted[38]. Hence the question whether someone may combine several callings is answered with an unqualified yes—provided this is beneficial to the general good or to one's own[39], harmful to no one else, and does not lead one to become unconscientious ("unfaithful") in one of the combined callings. But more than that: a *change* of calling, too, is regarded as by no means objectionable in itself, provided it is undertaken not frivolously but in order to take up a calling more pleasing to God[40]—which, in keeping with the general principle, means a more useful one. And above all: the usefulness of a calling, and its corresponding pleasingness to God, is judged first of all by moral standards and next by the importance for the "community" of the goods to be produced in it; but then there follows a third criterion, and naturally the most important in practice:

38 WEBER'S NOTE. Still less, of course, can this turn in religious ethics be regarded as a reflection of actual economic conditions. Occupational specialization in medieval Italy was naturally, if anything, further advanced than in England in that period.

39 WEBER'S NOTE. For God—as Puritan literature very often stresses—nowhere commanded that one should love one's neighbor *more* than oneself, but *as* oneself. One therefore also has the *duty* of self-love. Whoever knows, for example, that he himself uses his property more purposefully, and so more to God's glory, than his neighbor could, is not obliged by love of neighbor to give him a share of it.

40 WEBER'S NOTE. Spener, too, comes close to this standpoint. But even where the case is a move from the merchant's calling (morally especially dangerous) to theology, he remains extremely reserved and inclined rather to dissuade (III pp. 435, 443, I p. 524). The frequent recurrence of answers to precisely *this* question (on the permissibility of changing one's calling) in Spener's opinions—which have naturally been heavily selected—shows, incidentally, how eminently *practical* in everyday life the different ways of interpreting 1 Cor. 7 were.

private economic "*profitableness*"[41]. For if that God whom the Puritan sees at work in all the dispensations of life shows one of his own an opportunity for profit, he has his purposes in doing so. And consequently the believing Christian must follow this call by making use of it[42]. "If God shows you a way in which, without harm to your soul or to others, you can lawfully *gain more* than in another way, and you reject this and follow the less profitable way, then *you cross one of the ends of your calling*, *you refuse to be God's steward* ("stewart") and to accept his gifts so as to be able to use them for him when he should require it. Not, indeed, for the purposes of the lust of the flesh and sin, *but for God you may labor to be rich*"[43]. Wealth is objectionable only as a temptation to idle rest and sinful enjoyment of life, and striving

41 WEBER'S NOTE. Nothing of the kind is to be found, at least, in the writings of the leading Continental Pietists. Spener's position on "profit" wavers back and forth between Lutheranism (the standpoint of "livelihood") and mercantilist arguments about the usefulness of a "flourishing of commerce" and the like (op. cit. III pp. 330, 332; cf. I p. 418: *tobacco growing* brings money into the country and is *therefore* useful, *hence* not sinful!) (cf. III pp. 426, 427, 429, 434). But he does not fail to point out that, as the example of the Quakers and Mennonites shows, one can make a profit and still remain devout—indeed, that especially high profit can even be the direct *product* of devout honesty, a point we shall have to come back to later (op. cit. p. 435).

42 WEBER'S NOTE. These views of Baxter's are by *no* means a reflection of the economic milieu in which he lived. On the *contrary*, his autobiography stresses that a decisive factor in the success of his pastoral mission work was that the traders settled in Kidderminster were *not* rich but earned only "food and raiment," and that the master craftsmen had to live "from hand to mouth" no better than their workers. "*It is the poor* that receive the glad tidings of the Gospel."—Th. Adams remarks on the pursuit of gain: "He (the knowing man) knows... that money may make a man richer, not better, and thereupon chooseth rather to sleep with a good conscience than a full purse... therefore desires no more wealth *than an honest man may bear away*"—but *that much he does want* (Th. Adams, Works of Pur. Div. LI.), and that means: every formally *honest* gain is also *legitimate*.

43 WEBER'S NOTE. So Baxter, op. cit. I ch. X tit. 1 Dis. 9 (§ 24), Vol. I p. 378, col. 2. Prov. 23:4, "Do not labor to be rich," means only: riches for our fleshly ends must not ultimately be intended. What is odious is property in the feudal-seigneurial form of its *use* (cf. the remark op. cit. I p. 380 about the debauched part of the gentry), not property *as such*.—*Milton*, in the first defensio pro populo Anglicano [Defense of the English People], holds the well-known theory that only the "middle class" can be the bearer of *virtue*—"middle class" being meant as the "bourgeois class" in contrast to the "aristocracy," as his reasoning shows: that both "luxury" and "need" hinder the practice of virtue.

for it only when it is done in order to live carefree and merrily later on. But as the performance of one's duty in a calling, it is not only morally permitted but positively commanded[44]. The parable of the servant who was cast out because he had not put the pound entrusted to him to profitable use seemed to say this outright[45]. To *want* to be poor, as was often argued, would be the same as wanting to be ill[46]; it would be reprehensible as salvation by works and detrimental to God's glory. And begging by

44 WEBER'S NOTE. *This* is the decisive point.—Here, once more, the general remark: what matters for us here is, of course, not so much what theological ethical theory developed conceptually, but what morality was actually *in force* in the practical life of believers—that is, *how* the religious orientation of the vocational ethic *worked* in practice. At least occasionally one can read, in the casuistical literature of Catholicism, especially Jesuit casuistry, discussions—for example on the question of the permissibility of interest, which we do not go into here—that sound similar to those of many Protestant casuists, and even seem to go further in what counts as "permitted" or "probable" (the Puritans were later confronted often enough with the argument that Jesuit ethics was at bottom quite the same as their own). Just as the Calvinists are in the habit of citing Catholic moral theologians—not only Thomas Aquinas, Bernard of Clairvaux and Bonaventure, but contemporary ones as well—so the Catholic casuists regularly took note of heretical ethics, a matter we do not discuss further here. But quite apart from the decisive fact that the ascetic life of the *layman* received a religious *premium*, the enormous difference, even in theory, is this: in Catholicism these latitudinarian views were products of specifically *lax* ethical theories, not sanctioned by church authority, from which precisely the most serious and strictest adherents of the church kept their distance; whereas the Protestant idea of the calling, conversely, in its effect placed precisely the *most serious* adherents of the ascetic life in the service of capitalist acquisition. What could be *permitted* there under certain conditions appeared here as something positively, morally *good*. The fundamental differences between the two ethics, very important in practice, were also definitively fixed for the modern era by the Jansenist controversy and the bull "Unigenitus."

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. The papal bull *Unigenitus* (1713) condemned Jansenist propositions, siding with the Jesuits against their rigorist opponents.

45 WEBER'S NOTE. You may labour in that manner as tendeth most to your success and lawful gain. You are *bound* to improve all your talents... There follows the passage translated in the text above.—A direct parallel between striving for riches in the kingdom of God and striving for success in one's earthly calling is drawn, for example, by Janeway, Heaven upon earth (in the Works of the Pur. Div. p. 275, bottom).

46 WEBER'S NOTE. Already in the (Lutheran) confession of Duke Christoph of Württemberg, which was submitted to the Council of Trent, the argument against the *vow* of poverty is that whoever is poor by his station should bear it; but if he vows to *remain* so, this is the same as if he vowed to be permanently *ill* or to have a *bad reputation*.

someone able to work is not only sinful as sloth but also, according to the apostle's word, contrary to love of one's neighbor[47].

THE BUSINESSMAN AND THE OLD TESTAMENT

Puritan ethics glorified the self-made businessman and drew on Old Testament legalism, unlike Jewish pariah capitalism.

II.2.8 Just as insistence on the ascetic significance of the fixed calling gives ethical glory to the modern *specialist*, so the providential interpretation of opportunities for profit glorifies the *businessman*[48]. The aristocratic nonchalance of the seigneur and the parvenu ostentation of the braggart are equally hateful to asceticism. By contrast, a full beam of ethical approval falls on the

47 WEBER'S NOTE. So in Baxter and, for example, in Duke Christoph's confession. Cf. further passages like: "... the vagrant rogues whose lives are nothing but an exorbitant course: the main begging" etc. (Th. Adams, W. of Pur. Div. p. 259). Calvin had already strictly forbidden begging, and the Dutch synods inveigh against begging letters and certificates issued for purposes of begging. The era of the Stuarts, especially Laud's regime under Charles I, had systematically developed the principle of public poor relief and of allocating work to the unemployed. The Puritans' battle cry, by contrast, was "Giving alms is no charity" (the title of Defoe's later well-known pamphlet), and toward the end of the 17th century the deterrent system of "workhouses" for the unemployed began (cf. Leonard, Early History of English poor relief, Cambridge 1900, and H. Levy, Die Grundlagen des ökonomischen Liberalismus in der Gesch. d. engl. Volksw. [The Foundations of Economic Liberalism in the History of the English Economy], Jena 1912, p. 69 ff.).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Defoe's pamphlet *Giving Alms No Charity* appeared in 1704.

48 WEBER'S NOTE. The president of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, G. White, said emphatically in his inaugural address to the Assembly in London in 1903 (Baptist Handbook 1904, p. 104): "The best men on the roll of our Puritan churches were *men of affairs*, who believed, that religion should permeate the whole of life."

sober, middle-class self-made man[49]: "God blesseth his trade" is a stock phrase for those saints[50] who had successfully followed those divine dispensations. And the whole weight of the *God of the Old Testament*, who rewards his own for their piety in *this* very life[51], was bound to work in the same direction. For the Puritan, following Baxter's advice, checked his own state of grace by comparing it with the state of soul of the biblical her-

49 WEBER'S NOTE. Precisely *here* lies the characteristic contrast with every feudal view. According to the feudal view, only the *descendant* of the (political or social) parvenu can benefit from his success and from the consecration of blood. (Characteristically expressed in the Spanish hidalgo = hijo d'algo—filius de aliquo [son of something], where the "aliquid" [something] is precisely a *fortune* inherited from ancestors.) However much these differences are fading today with the rapid transformation and Europeanization of the American "national character," the *diametrically opposite*, specifically bourgeois view—which glorifies business *success* and *earning* as a symptom of intellectual *achievement* but shows no respect whatever for mere (inherited) *property*—is still occasionally represented there even today. In Europe, by contrast (as James Bryce once remarked), virtually any social honor can in effect be bought for money—*provided* only that the owner has not *himself* stood behind the counter and carries out the necessary metamorphoses of his property (the founding of an entailed estate, etc.).—*See against* the honor of *blood*, for example, Th. Adams, Works of the Pur. Div. p. 216.

50 WEBER'S NOTE. So, for example, already for the founder of the Familist sect, Hendrik Niklaes, who was a merchant. (Barclay, Inner life of the religious communities of the Commonwealth, p. 34.)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Hendrik Niclaes (c. 1502–c. 1580) founded the Family of Love, a mystical sect active in the Netherlands and England.

51 WEBER'S NOTE. For Hoornbeek, for example, this is quite certain, since Matt. 5:5 and 1 Tim. 4:8, too, make purely earthly promises to the saints (op. cit. Vol. I p. 193). Everything is a product of God's providence, but he cares especially for his own: op. cit. p. 192: Super alios autem summa cura et modis singularissimis versatur Dei providentia *circa fideles* [But above all others God's providence is occupied, with the greatest care and in the most singular ways, *with the faithful*]. There follows a discussion of how one can tell that a stroke of good fortune derives *not* from "communis providentia" [common providence] but from that special care. Bailey, too (op. cit. p. 191), refers to God's providence for the success of work in a calling. That prosperity is "often" the reward of a godly life is an entirely stock phrase in the writings of the *Quakers* (see, e.g., such a statement as late as 1848 in Selection from the Christian Advices issued by the general meeting of the S. of Fr. in London, VIth Ed., London 1851, p. 209). We shall return to the connection with Quaker ethics.

oes[52], and in doing so interpreted the sayings of the Bible "like the articles of a law code." —In themselves, to be sure, the sayings of the Old Testament were not entirely unambiguous. We saw that Luther first used the concept "Beruf" [calling] in the secular sense, linguistically, when translating a passage from Sirach. But in the whole mood that lives in it, the Book of Jesus Sirach, despite its Hellenistic influences, belongs among the traditionalist elements of the (extended) Old Testament. It is characteristic that among Lutheran German peasants this book still often seems to enjoy particular popularity to this day[53], just as the Lutheran-bound character of broad currents within German Pietism tended to express itself in a fondness for Jesus Sirach[54]. The Puritans rejected the Apocrypha as not inspired, in keeping with their stark either-or between the divine and the

52 WEBER'S NOTE. An example of this orientation toward the patriarchs—one that is at the same time characteristic of the Puritan view of life—is Thomas Adams's analysis of the quarrel between Jacob and Esau (Works of the Pur. Div. p. 235): "His (Esau's) folly may be argued from the base estimation of the birthright" (the passage is also important for the development of the birthright idea, of which more later), "that he would so lightely pass from it and on *so easy condition* as a pottage." But it was *perfidious* of him afterward to refuse to let the sale stand on the grounds that he had been cheated. He is, precisely, a "cunning hunter, a man of the fields": the uncultivated man who lives irrationally—whereas Jacob, "a plain man, dwelling in tents," represents the "man of grace." The feeling of an inner kinship with Judaism, still expressed in Roosevelt's well-known letter, was found by Köhler (op. cit.) to be widespread among the peasants in Holland as well.—On the other hand, Puritanism was well aware of its *opposition* to Jewish ethics in their practical dogmatics, as Prynne's pamphlet against the Jews (occasioned by Cromwell's plans for toleration) clearly shows. See below, p. 181 n. 2, at the end.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. William Prynne (1600–1669), Puritan pamphleteer, whose *Short Demurrer to the Jews* (1655–56) opposed their readmission to England.

53 WEBER'S NOTE. Zur bäuerlichen Glaubens- und Sittenlehre [On the Peasants' Doctrine of Faith and Morals]. By a Thuringian country pastor. 2nd ed., Gotha 1890, p. 16. The peasants described here are, characteristically, products of *Lutheran* churchmanship. Again and again I wrote "Lutheran" in the margin where the excellent author supposes a generally "peasant" religiosity.

54 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., e.g., the quotation in Ritschl, Pietismus II p. 158. Spener likewise bases his reservations about changing one's calling and about the pursuit of profit *in part* on sayings of Jesus Sirach. Theol. Bd. III p. 426.

creaturely[55]. All the more powerful, among the canonical books, was the influence of the Book of Job. It combined, on the one hand, a magnificent glorification of God's absolutely sovereign majesty, beyond all human standards—so highly congenial to Calvinist views—with, on the other, the certainty that breaks through again at the end: that God is wont to bless his own also, and precisely—in the Book of Job, only!—in this life, and in material respects as well[56]. For Calvin this certainty was incidental; for Puritanism it was important. The Eastern quietism that appears in some of the most evocative verses of the Psalms and the Proverbs of Solomon was explained away, just as Baxter did with the traditionalist coloring of the passage in First Corinthians that is constitutive for the concept of the calling. Instead, all the more emphasis was laid on those passages of the Old Testament that praise *formal rectitude* as the mark of conduct pleasing to God. The theory was that the Mosaic law had been stripped of its validity by the New Covenant only insofar as it contained ceremonial or historically conditioned precepts for the Jewish people; otherwise, as an expression of the "lex naturae" [law of nature], it had always been valid and had therefore remained so[57]. On the one hand, this theory made it possible to eliminate precepts that simply could not be fitted into modern life. On the other, through the many kindred features of Old Testament morality, it gave free rein to a powerful reinforcement of that spirit of self-righteous and sober legality which was

55 WEBER'S NOTE. Bailey, to be sure, nevertheless recommends reading them, and quotations from the Apocrypha do occur at least now and then, though naturally rarely. I do not recall (perhaps by chance) any from Jesus Sirach.

56 WEBER'S NOTE. Where outward success falls to those who are evidently damned, the Calvinist (for example Hoornbeeck), in accordance with the "theory of hardening," reassures himself with the certainty that God grants it to them in order to harden them and so destroy them all the more surely.

57 WEBER'S NOTE. We shall not go into this point in greater detail in this context. All that matters here is the formalistic character of "rectitude." On the significance of Old Testament ethics for the lex naturae [law of nature], there is much in Troeltsch's "Soziallehren."

peculiar to the worldly asceticism of this Protestantism[58]. So when recent writers, as contemporaries already did on several occasions, call the basic ethical mood of English Puritanism in particular "English Hebraism"[59], this is, rightly understood, entirely accurate. Only one must not think of the Palestinian Judaism of the period when the Old Testament scriptures came into being, but of Judaism as it gradually became under the influence of many centuries of formalistic-legal and Talmudic training—and even then one must be extremely cautious with parallels. The mood of ancient Judaism, turned on the whole toward an unselfconscious appreciation of life as such, was far removed from the specific character of Puritanism. Equally remote from Puritanism—and this too must not be overlooked—was the economic ethic of medieval and modern Judaism, in those traits that were decisive for the position of both within the development of the capitalist *ethos*. Judaism stood on the side of politically or speculatively oriented "adventurer" capitalism: its ethos was, in a word, that of *pariah* capitalism. Puritanism carried the ethos of the rational bourgeois *enterprise* and the rational organization of *labor*. It took from Jewish ethics only what fitted into this framework.[60]

II.2.9 Showing how permeating life with Old Testament norms shaped character would be an attractive task. It has not yet

58 WEBER'S NOTE. According to Baxter (Christian Directory III p. 173 f.), the ethical norms of Scripture are binding to the extent that 1. they are merely a "transcript" of the Law of nature, or 2. they bear the "express character of universality and perpetuity."

59 WEBER'S NOTE. E.g., Dowden (with reference to Bunyan), op. cit. p. 39.

60 "Pariah" is Weber's technical term in his sociology of religion for a ritually segregated "guest people" excluded from full membership in the surrounding society; it describes a social position, not a value judgment.

really been accomplished even for Judaism itself[61], and it would be impossible within the framework of this sketch. Besides the relationships already indicated, one thing above all must be considered for the Puritan's inner attitude as a whole: in him the belief in being God's chosen people experienced a grandiose

renaissance[62]. Even the mild Baxter thanks God for having let him be born in England and in the true church, and not else-

where. In the same way, this gratitude for one's own blamelessness, brought about by God's grace, permeated the attitude to

62 WEBER'S NOTE. For Baxter, the *truth* of Holy Scripture follows in the last instance from the "wonderful difference of the godly and ungodly": from the absolute difference between the "renewed man" and others, and from God's evident, quite special care for the salvation of his own (which of course *can* also express itself in "*trials*"). Christ. Dir. I p. 165, col. 2, marg.

61 WEBER'S NOTE. More on this in the essays on the "Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen" [Economic Ethics of the World Religions]. The enormous influence that the *second commandment* in particular ("You shall not make for yourself an image," etc.) has had on, for example, the development of Jewish character, on its rational character alien to any culture of the senses, cannot be analyzed here. Still, it may perhaps be mentioned as characteristic that one of the directors of the "Educational Alliance" in the United States named to me the "emancipation from the second commandment" as the first goal of becoming cultured, a goal pursued through all kinds of artistic and social instruction. The Educational Alliance is an organization that pursues the Americanization of Jewish immigrants with astonishing success and on a grand scale.—In Puritanism, the Israelite condemnation of any humanization of God (s. v. v.! [sit venia verbo: pardon the expression]) corresponds to the prohibition of the idolatry of the creature, which works somewhat differently but still in a related direction. —As far as Talmudic Judaism is concerned, it too certainly shares some fundamental traits with Puritan morality. The Talmud (in Wünsche, Babyl. Talmud II, p. 34), for example, enjoins that it is better, and more richly rewarded by God, to do something good out of *duty* than to perform a good deed to which one is *not* obliged by the law. In other words, loveless fulfillment of duty stands ethically higher than emotional philanthropy. Puritan ethics would accept this in essence, just as *Kant*, who was of Scottish descent and strongly influenced by Pietism in his upbringing, comes close to this proposition in its result. (Indeed, some of his formulations connect directly with ideas of ascetic Protestantism, a point that cannot be discussed here.) But, for one thing, Talmudic ethics is deeply steeped in Eastern traditionalism. "R. Tanchum" ben Chanilai said: "Never let a person change a custom" (Gemara on Mishnah VII, 1, fol. 86b, no. 93 in Wünsche; the matter concerns the food of day laborers). Only toward strangers does this obligation not apply.—For another, the Puritan conception of "lawfulness" as *proof*, compared with the Jewish conception of it as simply the fulfillment of commandments, evidently yielded far stronger motives for positive *action*. The idea that success reveals God's blessing is of course by no means alien to Judaism. But in Judaism, owing to the double (internal and external) ethic, it acquired a radically different religious and ethical significance, and this ruled out any similarity of effect precisely on this decisive point. What was *forbidden* toward the "brother" was *permitted* toward the "stranger." For that reason alone, success in this sphere of what was not "commanded" but "permitted" could not possibly be a mark of *religious* proof and a spur to a methodical shaping of life in the sense that it was for the Puritan. On this whole problem, which *Sombart* has in many respects treated incorrectly in his book "Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben" [The Jews and Economic Life], see the essays cited above. The details do not belong here. Jewish ethics, however strange this may sound at first, remained very strongly traditionalist. Nor can we go into the enormous shift that the inner attitude toward the world underwent through the Christian version of the ideas of "grace" and "redemption," which in a peculiar way always carried within it the seed of *new* possibilities of development. On Old Testament "lawfulness," cf. also, e.g., Ritschl, Rechtf. und Vers. II p. 265.

For the English Puritans, the Jews of their time were representatives of the kind of capitalism they themselves abhorred: a capitalism oriented toward war, state contracts, state monopolies, speculative company promotion, and princely building and financial projects. In fact, with the reservations that are always unavoidable, the contrast as a whole can probably be formulated thus: Jewish capitalism was speculative *pariah* capitalism; Puritan capitalism was the bourgeois organization of labor.

life[63] of the Puritan middle classes. It produced that formalistic-

ally correct, hard character that was peculiar to the representatives of that heroic epoch of capitalism.

AGAINST SPONTANEOUS ENJOYMENT

Puritans fought the Book of Sports and distrusted art, theater, festivals and adornment that served no rational purpose.

II.2.10 We now try to clarify specifically the points at which the Puritan conception of the calling and the demand for an ascetic conduct of life were bound to influence the development of the capitalist style of life *directly*. As we saw, asceticism turns with full force above all against one thing: the *spontaneous enjoyment* of existence and of the pleasures it has to offer. This trait is probably expressed most characteristically in the struggle over the "Book of sports"[64]. James I and Charles I made it law for the express purpose of combating Puritanism, and Charles ordered it to be read from every pulpit.[65] The Puritans fought furiously against the king's decree that certain popular amusements

63 WEBER'S NOTE. As a characteristic example, one need only read how tortuously even Bunyan comes to terms with the parable of the Pharisee and the tax collector (see the sermon The Pharisee and the Publican, op. cit. p. 100 f.)—Bunyan, in whom one does occasionally find something approaching the mood of Luther's "Freiheit eines Christenmenschen" [The Freedom of a Christian] (e.g., in Of the Law and a Christian, W. of Pur. Div. p. 254 bottom). Why is the Pharisee rejected?—In truth he does not keep God's commandments, for—he is evidently a *sectarian*, concerned only with outward trifles and ceremonies (p. 107). Above all, though, he ascribes the merit to himself and nevertheless, "as the Quakers do," thanks God for his virtue, misusing God's name. He sinfully builds on the value of this virtue (p. 126) and thereby implicitly disputes *God's predestination* (p. 139 f.). His prayer is thus idolatry of the creature, and that is what is sinful about it.—The tax collector, by contrast, is inwardly reborn, as the sincerity of his confession shows. For—as it says, in a characteristically Puritan weakening of the Lutheran sense of sin—to a right and sincere conviction of sin there must be a conviction of the *probability* of mercy (p. 209).

64 WEBER'S NOTE. Printed, e.g., in Gardiner's "Constitutional Documents." This struggle against (anti-authoritarian) asceticism might be compared with Louis XIV's persecution of Port-Royal and the Jansenists.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Port-Royal, a convent near Paris, was the center of Jansenism, a rigorist Catholic movement; Louis XIV had it razed in 1710–1711.

65 The Declaration of Sports (1618, reissued 1633) listed the recreations, such as dancing, archery and maypoles, that were lawful on Sundays after church.

should be legally permitted on Sundays outside the hours of church service. What enraged them was *not* only the disturbance of the Sabbath rest but the whole deliberate distraction from the ordered conduct of life of the saint. And when the king threatened any attack on the legality of those sports with severe punishment, his purpose was precisely to break that trait which was dangerous to the state because it was *anti-authoritarian and ascetic*. Monarchical and feudal society protected those "willing to take their pleasure" against the emerging bourgeois morality and the ascetic conventicle hostile to authority, just as capitalist society today tends to protect those "willing to work" against the class morality of the workers and the trade union hostile to authority. Against this, the Puritans upheld their most decisive characteristic: the principle of an ascetic conduct of life. For otherwise Puritanism's aversion to sport, even among the Quakers, was not a matter of principle pure and simple. Sport simply had to serve a rational purpose: the recreation necessary for physical efficiency. As a means for the purely spontaneous release of unbridled impulses, on the other hand, it was suspect to Puritanism. And insofar as it became a mere means of enjoyment, or even awakened competitive ambition, brutal instincts or the irrational passion for betting, it was of course utterly reprehensible. *Impulsive* enjoyment of life, which draws a person away both from work in a calling and from piety, was as such the enemy of rational asceticism, whether it took the form of

"seigneurial" sport or of the common man's visits to the dance hall and the tavern[66].

II.2.11 Accordingly, the attitude toward cultural goods that could not be valued directly in religious terms was also mistrustful and often hostile. Not that the Puritan ideal of life contained a gloomy philistinism contemptuous of culture. The exact opposite is true, at least of science and scholarship, with the exception of the detested scholasticism. Moreover, the greatest representatives of the Puritan movement were deeply steeped in the learning of the Renaissance. The sermons of the Presbyterian wing of the movement drip with classical allusions[67], and even those of the radicals did not disdain such learning in theological polemic, although it was precisely this that they found objectionable. Perhaps no country has ever been so overflowing with "graduates" as New England in the first generation of its existence. The satire of their opponents—for example, Butler's "Hudibras"—likewise takes aim precisely at the Puritans' bookish learning and trained dialectic. This is *partly* connected with the religious esteem for knowledge that followed from their attitude to the Catholic "fides implicita" [implicit faith].—Things are different, however, once one enters the domain of non-scholarly

66 WEBER'S NOTE. *Calvin's* position on this was still considerably milder, at least as far as the more refined aristocratic forms of enjoying life were concerned. The Bible alone sets the limit. Whoever holds to it and keeps a good conscience is not obliged to watch anxiously and suspiciously over every impulse to enjoy life. The relevant discussions in ch. X of the Inst. Christ. Rel. (e.g.: nec fugere ea quoque possumus quae videntur oblectationi magis quam necessitati inservire [nor can we shun even those things that seem to serve delight more than necessity]) could in themselves have opened the door wide to a very lax practice. Here, besides the growing anxiety about the certitudo salutis [certainty of salvation] among the epigones, another circumstance made itself felt, one we shall assess elsewhere: in the domain of the "ecclesia militans" [church militant] it was the *petty bourgeoisie* who became the bearers of Calvinism's ethical development.

67 WEBER'S NOTE. Th. Adams (Works of the Pur. Div. p. 3), for example, begins a sermon on "the three divine sisters" ("But the greatest of these is love") by pointing out—that Paris, too, gave the apple to Aphrodite!

literature[68], and further that of the arts of the senses. Here, to be sure, asceticism settled like a frost over the life of merry old England. And it was not only secular festivals that were affected. The Puritans' angry hatred of everything that smacked of "superstition," of every reminder of a magical or ritual dispensation of grace, pursued the Christian festival of Christmas just as it did the maypole[69] and the unselfconscious practice of art in the church. That in Holland room remained for the development of a great, often coarsely realistic art[70] proves only one thing: how little the authoritarian regulation of morals there was able to act exclusively in these directions. It could not prevail against the influence of the court and the class of regents (a *rentier* stratum), nor against the zest for life of petty bourgeois who had grown rich, once the brief rule of the Calvinist theocracy had

68 WEBER'S NOTE. Novels and the like are not to be read, being "wastetimes" (Baxter, Christ. Dir. I p. 51 col. 2).—The drying-up of lyric poetry and folk song, not only of drama, in England after the Elizabethan age is well known. In the visual arts, Puritanism perhaps did not find very much to suppress. What is striking, however, is the fall from an apparently quite good musical endowment (England's role in the history of music was not insignificant) to that absolute nothing which we observe in this respect among the Anglo-Saxon peoples later and still today. Except in the Black churches—and from those professional singers whom churches now engage as "attractions" (Trinity Church in Boston in 1904 for $8,000 a year)—in America, too, one mostly hears only a screeching unbearable to German ears by way of "congregational singing." (*Partly* analogous developments in Holland too.)

69 WEBER'S NOTE. Exactly the same in Holland, as the proceedings of the synods show. (See the resolutions on the maypole in Reitsma's collection VI, 78, 139, and elsewhere.)

70 WEBER'S NOTE. It seems plausible that the "renaissance of the Old Testament" must have helped make the *ugly* more possible as an artistic object, and so must the Pietist orientation toward certain Christian sentiments in art that were hostile to beauty and go back ultimately to Deutero-Isaiah and the 22nd Psalm. The Puritan rejection of the idolatry of the creature plausibly played a part as well. But all the details still seem uncertain. In the Roman church, quite different (demagogic) motives produced outwardly related phenomena—though, to be sure, with a quite different artistic result. Anyone who stands before Rembrandt's "Saul and David" (in the Mauritshuis) feels that he can directly sense the powerful effect of Puritan sentiment. Carl Neumann's brilliant analysis of Dutch cultural influences in his "Rembrandt" probably marks the limit of what one *can* know at present about how far ascetic Protestantism is to be credited with positive effects that fertilized art.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Carl Neumann (1860–1934), German art historian; his "Rembrandt" appeared in 1902.

dissolved into a sober state church and Calvinism had thereby noticeably lost its ascetic power of attraction[71]. The theater was

71 WEBER'S NOTE. Calvinist ethics penetrated practical life relatively less in Holland, and the ascetic spirit there weakened as early as the beginning of the 17th century (the English Congregationalists who fled to Holland in 1608 were offended by the inadequate Dutch observance of the Sabbath rest), and all the more under the Stadtholder Frederick Henry. Dutch Puritanism also had less expansive power generally. The most varied causes were decisive for all this, and they cannot possibly be listed here. They lay partly in the political constitution (a particularist league of cities and provinces) and in the far lesser military capacity. The war of independence was soon waged mainly with the *money* of Amsterdam and with mercenary armies; English preachers illustrated the Babylonian confusion of tongues by pointing to the Dutch army. As a result, the seriousness of the struggle for the faith was in good part shifted onto others, but with it participation in political *power* was also forfeited. Cromwell's army, by contrast, felt itself to be an army of *citizens*, although it had partly been pressed into service. (All the more characteristic, to be sure, that *this very* army included the abolition of *compulsory* military service in its program—because one may fight only for God's glory, for a cause recognized in conscience as good, but not for the whims of princes. The English military constitution, "immoral" by traditional German notions, *historically* had very "moral" motives at the outset. It was a demand of soldiers who had never been defeated, and only after the Restoration was it placed in the service of the Crown's interests.) The Dutch schutterijen [civic militias] were the bearers of Calvinism in the period of the great war. Yet only half a generation after the Synod of Dort, they can be seen in Hals's paintings behaving in a far from "ascetic" manner. Protests by the synods against their conduct of life recur again and again. The Dutch concept of "Deftigkeit" [Dutch deftigheid, dignified respectability] is a mixture of bourgeois-rational "respectability" and patrician class consciousness. The allocation of pews by rank in Dutch churches still shows the aristocratic character of this church system today. The survival of the urban economy hampered industry. Industry flourished almost only through refugees, and therefore always only temporarily. But in Holland too, the worldly asceticism of Calvinism and Pietism had been effective, in exactly the same direction as elsewhere (also in the sense, to be mentioned shortly, of an "ascetic compulsion to save," as Groen van Prinsterer attests in the passage cited in note 2, p. 193. The almost complete absence of belles-lettres in Calvinist Holland is of course no accident. On Holland see, e.g., Busken-Huët, Het land van Rembrandt, also published in German by von der Ropp). The significance of Dutch religiosity as an "ascetic compulsion to save" still emerges clearly in the 18th century, e.g., in the notes of Albertus Haller. For the characteristic peculiarities of Dutch artistic judgment and their motives, compare, e.g., the autobiographical notes of Const. *Huyghens* (written 1629–31) in Oud Holland 1891. (The previously cited work by Groen *van Prinsterer*, La Hollande et l'influence de Calvin [Holland and the Influence of Calvin] (1864), offers nothing decisive for *our* problems.)—Socially, the New Netherland colony in America was a semi-feudal rule by "patroons"—merchants who advanced the capital—and, in contrast to New England, it was hard to persuade "ordinary people" to settle there.

reprehensible to the Puritan[72], and the more radical view did not stop at strictly excluding the erotic and nudity from the range of the permissible, in literature as in art. The notions of "idle talk," of "superfluities"[73], of "vain ostentation" were quickly at hand to favor sober practicality decisively over any use of artistic motifs. All these designate behavior that is irrational and aimless, hence not ascetic, and that moreover serves the glory not of God but of man. This was all the more true where the direct adornment of the person was concerned, e.g., dress[74]. That powerful tendency toward a uniform style of life, which today is supported by the capitalist interest in the "standardization" of production[75], had its ideal foundation in the rejection of

72 WEBER'S NOTE. Let it be recalled that the Puritan town authorities closed the theater in Stratford-on-Avon while Shakespeare was still alive and living there in the last period of his life. (Shakespeare's hatred and contempt for the Puritans comes out at every opportunity.) As late as 1777 the city of Birmingham refused to license a theater on the grounds that it promoted "idleness" and was therefore harmful to trade (Ashley, in the work cited p. 196 n. 2, pp. 7, 8).

73 WEBER'S NOTE. Here too, what is decisive is that for the Puritan there was *only* the either-or: divine will or creaturely vanity. For him, therefore, no "adiaphora" [things indifferent, neither commanded nor forbidden] could exist. *Calvin*, as already said, took a different position in this respect. What one eats, what one wears and the like are indifferent, as long as the consequence is not the soul's enslavement to the power of desire. Freedom from the "world" is to express itself—as with the Jesuits—in indifference. For Calvin, however, this means the use, undiscriminating and free of desire, of the goods the earth offers (p. 409 ff. of the original edition of the Institutio Christianae Relig.)—a position evidently closer in effect to the Lutheran one than to the precisianism of the epigones.

74 WEBER'S NOTE. The behavior of the Quakers in this respect is well known. But as early as the beginning of the 17th century, the exile congregation in Amsterdam was shaken for a decade by the most violent storms over the fashionable hats and dresses of a pastor's wife. (Amusingly described in Dexter's Congregationalism of the last 300 years.)—Sanford, op. cit., already pointed out that the present-day male "haircut" is that of the much-mocked "Roundheads," and that the likewise mocked male *dress* of the Puritans is essentially the same as today's, at any rate in its underlying *principle*.

75 WEBER'S NOTE. On this see again Veblen's already cited book: The theory of business enterprise.

the "idolatry of the creature"[76]. Certainly one must not forget that Puritanism contained a world of contradictions. The instinctive sense for what is timelessly great in art was surely more highly developed among its leaders than in the atmosphere of the "Cavaliers"[77]. And a unique genius like Rembrandt, little as his "conduct" would always have found grace in the eyes of the Puritan God, was nevertheless quite essentially shaped in the direction of his work by his sectarian milieu[78]. But this does not alter the overall picture. For the powerful inward deepening of personality that the further development of the Puritan atmosphere could bring with it, and actually helped to bring about, benefited predominantly literature, and even there only later generations.

76 WEBER'S NOTE. We keep coming back to this point of view. It explains statements such as this: Every penny, which is paid upon yourselves and children and friends must be done as by Gods own appointment and to serve and please him. Watch narrowly, or else that thievish carnal self will leave God nothing. (Baxter op. cit. I p. 108 bottom right.) This is what is decisive: whatever one devotes to *personal* ends is *withdrawn* from service to God's glory.

77 WEBER'S NOTE. It is rightly recalled, for example (thus Dowden, op. cit.), that Cromwell saved Raphael's cartoons and Mantegna's Triumph of Caesar from destruction, while Charles II tried to sell them. Restoration society, as is well known, was likewise quite cool or downright hostile toward English national literature. At the courts the influence of Versailles was simply all-powerful everywhere.—Puritanism turned people away from the unreflective pleasures of everyday life. To analyze in detail how this influenced the spirit of its highest types, and of the people who went through its school, is a task that could not in any case be accomplished within the framework of this sketch. Washington Irving (Bracebridge Hall, op. cit.) formulates the effect, in the usual English terminology, as follows: "it (political freedom, he means—Puritanism, we say) evinces less play of the *fancy*, but more power of *imagination*." One need only think of the position of the *Scots* in science, literature, technical inventions and also in the business life of England to sense that this somewhat too narrowly formulated remark comes close to the truth.—We shall not discuss here its significance for the development of technology and the empirical sciences. The relationship itself is evident everywhere in everyday life too. For the Quaker, for example, permitted "recreations" are (according to Barclay): visiting friends, reading historical works, *mathematical and physical experiments*, gardening, discussing business and other events in the world, and the like. —The reason is the one discussed earlier.

78 WEBER'S NOTE. Superbly analyzed in Carl Neumann's "Rembrandt," which should in general be compared with the above remarks.

THE STEWARD OF POSSESSIONS

A person is only the steward of God's goods and must increase them without spending on enjoyment.

II.2.12 We cannot go into Puritanism's influences in all these directions in more detail here. Let us just bear in mind that the permissibility of taking pleasure in cultural goods that serve purely aesthetic or sporting enjoyment always meets *one* characteristic limit: they *must cost nothing*. Man, after all, is only the steward of the goods that have come to him through God's grace. Like the servant in the Bible, he must give an account of every penny entrusted to him[79], and it is at the very least questionable to spend any of it for a purpose that serves not God's glory but one's own enjoyment[80]. Who, with open eyes, has not met representatives of this view right up to the present?[81] The idea of man's *obligation* toward the possessions entrusted to him, to which he subordinates himself as a serving steward or even as a "machine for acquisition," weighs on life with a chilling heaviness. The greater the possessions become, the heavier becomes

79 WEBER'S NOTE. Thus Baxter in the passage cited above, I p. 108 bottom.

80 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf., e.g., the well-known description of Colonel Hutchinson (often quoted, e.g., in Sanford op. cit. p. 57) in the biography written by his widow. After setting out all his chivalrous virtues and his nature, inclined to a cheerful joy in life, it says: "He was wonderfully neat, cleanly and genteel in his habit, and had a very good fancy in it; but *he left off* very early the wearing of *anything that was costly*."...—In very similar terms, Baxter's funeral sermon for Mary Hammer (Works of the Pur. Div. p. 533) draws the ideal of the Puritan woman who is open to the world and highly cultivated, yet sparing with two things: 1. time and 2. expenditure on "pomp" and amusement.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. John Hutchinson (1615–1664), Parliamentarian colonel; his widow Lucy Hutchinson wrote his memoirs.

81 WEBER'S NOTE. I remember—among *many* other examples—in particular a manufacturer who was unusually successful in business and very wealthy in his old age. When his doctor advised him to eat a few oysters daily for a persistent digestive weakness, he could be persuaded to do so only with the greatest difficulty. On the other hand, very considerable endowments for charitable purposes, which he made during his lifetime, and an "open hand" showed that this was *merely* a residue of that "ascetic" feeling which regards one's own *enjoyment* of possessions as morally questionable, and not anything akin to "avarice."

—*if* the ascetic attitude to life stands the test—the feeling of responsibility for preserving them undiminished for God's glory and increasing them by restless work. Like so many components of the modern capitalist spirit, this style of life too has some of its roots in the Middle Ages[82]. But only in the ethic of ascetic Protestantism did it find its consistent ethical foundation. Its significance for the development of capitalism is obvious[83].

82 WEBER'S NOTE. The *separation* of workshop, office and "business" in general from the private residence, of firm from name, of business capital from private fortune, and the tendency to make the "business" (at first at least the partnership's assets) into a "corpus mysticum" [mystical body]—all of this lay in this direction. On this see my "Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter" [Trading Companies in the Middle Ages].

83 WEBER'S NOTE. Sombart, in his "Kapitalismus" [Capitalism] (1st ed.), had already rightly pointed on occasion to this characteristic phenomenon. One need only note that the accumulation of wealth springs from two very different psychological sources. The effects of one reach far back into remotest antiquity. It finds expression in endowments, family estates, entails, etc., just as it does—or rather much more purely and clearly than it does—in the similar striving to die one day weighed down with great material possessions of one's own and, above all, to secure the continuance of the "business," even at the cost of violating the personal interests of most of the children who share in the inheritance. In *these* cases, besides the wish to lead an ideal life beyond death in one's own creation, the concern is to preserve the "splendor familiae" [splendor of the family]. It is thus a vanity directed, so to speak, toward the extended personality of the founder—in any case, aims that are fundamentally egocentric. Not so with the "bourgeois" motive that *we* are dealing with here. There the maxim of asceticism, "You must renounce, you must renounce," turned in a positive capitalist direction—"You must acquire, you must acquire"—stands before us in its irrationality, plainly and simply, as a kind of categorical imperative. For the Puritans the motive here is only God's glory and one's own duty, not human vanity; and *today: only* duty toward the "calling." Anyone who enjoys illustrating an idea by its extreme consequences might recall the theory of certain American billionaires that one should *not* leave the billions one has acquired to one's children, so as not to deprive them of the moral benefit of having to work and earn for themselves. *Today*, to be sure, this is probably no more than a "theoretical" soap bubble.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Weber adapts Faust's complaint in Goethe's Faust I: "Entbehren sollst du! sollst entbehren!" ("You must do without! do without!").

SAVING AND ACQUISITION

Asceticism restricted consumption but freed acquisition, and together these produced capital through the compulsion to save.

II.2.13 Worldly Protestant asceticism—so we may perhaps summarize what has been said so far—thus worked with full force against the spontaneous *enjoyment* of possessions; it constricted *consumption*, especially the consumption of luxuries. On the other hand, in its psychological effect it *freed* the *acquisition of goods* from the inhibitions of traditionalist ethics. It burst the fetters of the pursuit of profit by not only legalizing it but (in the sense described) regarding it as directly willed by God. The struggle against the lusts of the flesh and attachment to external goods was *not* a struggle against rational *acquisition*, but against the irrational use of possessions. This is expressly attested not only by the Puritans but also by the great apologist of Quakerism, Barclay. This irrational use lay above all in esteem for *ostentatious* forms of luxury, which came so naturally to feudal sensibility and were condemned as idolatry of the creature[84]. What God willed instead was rational and utilitarian use for the vital purposes of the individual and the community. Asceticism wanted to impose on the propertied person *not mortification*[85] but the use of his possessions for necessary and *practically useful* things. The concept of "*comfort*" characteristically encompasses the range of ethically permissible uses. And it is of course no accident that the style of life attached to that concept was observed to develop earliest and most clearly precisely among the most consistent representatives of this whole outlook on life: the Quakers. Against the glitter and pretense of chivalric pomp, which rests on an unsound economic basis and prefers shabby

84 WEBER'S NOTE. *This*—as must be stressed again and again—is the ultimate decisive religious motive (besides the purely ascetic considerations of mortifying the flesh), and it emerges especially clearly among the Quakers.

85 WEBER'S NOTE. Baxter (Saints' everl. rest 12) rejects it entirely, on the grounds usual among the Jesuits: the body should be granted what it needs, otherwise one becomes its slave.

elegance to sober simplicity, they set up as their ideal the clean and solid comfort of the bourgeois "home"[86].

II.2.14 *On the side of the production* of private wealth, asceticism fought against dishonesty as well as against purely *impulsive* greed. For it was this that it condemned as "covetousness," as "Mammonism," etc.: the striving for wealth with the ultimate aim of *being* rich. For possessions as such were a temptation. But here asceticism was the force "that ever wills the good and ever works evil"—evil in its own sense: possessions and their temptations. For it was not merely that, with the Old Testament and in full analogy to its ethical valuation of "good works," it saw the height of reprehensibility in striving for wealth as an *end*, while seeing God's blessing in the attainment of wealth as the *fruit* of work in a calling.[87] What was even more important was this: the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling as simply the highest ascetic means, and at the same time as the surest and most visible proof of the regenerate person and the genuineness of his faith, was bound to be the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that outlook on life which we have here called the "spirit" of capital-

86 WEBER'S NOTE. This ideal is already clearly present in Quakerism in particular in the first period of its development, as Weingarten already showed on important points in his "Englische Revolutionskirchen" [English Revolutionary Churches]. Barclay's detailed discussions, op. cit. p. 519 ff., 533, also illustrate this very clearly. To be avoided are: 1. creaturely vanity, hence all ostentation, frippery and the use of things that have no *practical* purpose or are valued only for their rarity (that is, out of vanity); 2. unconscientious use of possessions, such as spending on less necessary wants in a way that is *disproportionate* to necessary vital needs and to provision for the future. The Quaker was thus, so to speak, a walking "law of marginal utility." "Moderate use of the creature" is entirely permissible; *in particular*, one was allowed to attach importance to the quality and durability of materials, etc., as long as this did not lead to "vanity." On all this cf. Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser 1846 no. 216 ff. (In particular, on comfort and durability of materials among the Quakers, cf. Schneckenburger, Vorlesungen p. 96 f.)

87 Weber inverts Mephistopheles' self-description in Goethe's Faust I: "part of that power which ever wills evil and ever works good."

ism[88]. And if we now put that constriction of consumption *together* with this unleashing of the striving for acquisition, the outward result is obvious: *capital formation* through the *ascetic compulsion to save*[89]. The inhibitions that stood in the way of consuming what had been acquired necessarily benefited its productive use as *investment* capital. How strong this effect was naturally eludes any exact numerical determination. In New England the connection emerges so tangibly that it did not escape

88 WEBER'S NOTE. It has already been said that we do not go into the question of the class conditioning of religious movements *here* (on this see the essays on the "Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen"). But Baxter, for example, on whom we chiefly rely here, did not look through the spectacles of the "bourgeoisie" of his time. To see this, it suffices to bear in mind that for him too, in the ranking of callings by how pleasing they are to God, the husbandman comes first after the learned professions, and only *then* mariners, clothiers, booksellers, tailors, etc., in a motley throng. The "mariners" mentioned here (characteristically enough) are perhaps meant at least as much as fishermen as sailors.—Some sayings of the Talmud take a different view in this respect. Cf., e.g., in Wünsche, Babyl. Talmud II[1] p. 20, 21, the sayings of Rabbi Eleazar—admittedly not uncontested—all to the effect that trade is better than tilling the soil. (More conciliatory, II 2 p. 68, on advisable investment of capital: ⅓ in land, ⅓ in goods, ⅓ in cash.)

For those whose causal conscience is not at peace without an economic ("materialist," as one unfortunately still says) interpretation, let it be remarked here that I consider the influence of economic development on the fate of religious ideas to be very significant. I shall later try to show how, in our case, the processes of mutual adaptation and the relations between the two took shape. It is simply that those religious contents absolutely *cannot* be *deduced* "economically." They are—nothing can be done about it—*for their part* the most powerful formative elements of "national characters," and they carry their own autonomous laws and compelling power purely within themselves as well. Moreover, the *most important* differences—those between Lutheranism and Calvinism—are predominantly *politically* conditioned, insofar as non-religious factors come into play.

89 WEBER'S NOTE. This is what Ed. Bernstein has in mind when he says in his previously cited essay (p. 681 and p. 625): "Asceticism is a bourgeois virtue." His arguments, op. cit., *are the first* to have hinted at these important connections at all. Only, the connection is far more comprehensive than he supposes. For what was decisive was not mere capital accumulation but the ascetic rationalization of the whole of vocational life.—For the American colonies, Doyle already clearly emphasizes the contrast between the Puritan North, where the "ascetic compulsion to save" meant there was always capital in need of investment, and the conditions of the South.

the eye of so excellent a historian as Doyle[90]. But even in Holland, which was really ruled by strict Calvinism for only seven years, the greater simplicity of life that prevailed in the more religiously earnest circles, combined with enormous wealth, led to an excessive passion for accumulating capital[91]. It is obvious, moreover, that Puritanism's antipathy to feudal forms of life was bound to inhibit noticeably the tendency toward the "ennoblement" of bourgeois fortunes, a tendency present at all times and everywhere, and very much at work among us today. English mercantilist writers of the 17th[92] century attributed the superiority of Dutch capital over England to the fact that in Holland, unlike in England, newly acquired fortunes did not regularly seek ennoblement. In England they did so by investing in land and—for this, not the mere purchase of land, is what matters—by adopting feudal habits of life, and were thereby withdrawn

90 WEBER'S NOTE. Doyle, The English in America Vol. II ch. 1. In New England, in the first generation after the colony was founded, there were ironworks companies (1643) and cloth weaving for the market (1659), and incidentally also a high flowering of the crafts. Considered in purely economic terms, these are anachronisms. They stand in the most striking contrast both to conditions in the South and to Rhode Island, which was not Calvinist but enjoyed full freedom of conscience. There, despite the excellent harbor, the report of Governor and Council still said in 1686: "The great obstruction concerning trade is the want of merchants and men of considerable Estates amongst us" (Arnold, Hist. of the State of R. I. p. 490). That a part was played here by the compulsion to reinvest saved capital again and again, which the Puritan restriction of consumption exerted, can indeed hardly be doubted. Added to this was the role of church discipline, which is not yet to be discussed here.

91 WEBER'S NOTE. That these circles, to be sure, rapidly dwindled in the Netherlands is shown by Busken-Huët's account (op. cit. vol. II, chs. III and IV). Nonetheless, *Groen van Prinsterer* (Handb. d. Gesch. v. h. V. 3rd ed., § 303 note, p. 254) says, even of the period *after* the Peace of Westphalia: "De Nederlanders verkoopen veel en verbruiken weinig" [The Dutch sell much and consume little].

92 John Andrew Doyle (1844–1907), English historian of the American colonies.

from capitalist use[93]. The Puritans too esteemed *agriculture* as a particularly important branch of earning a living, and one especially conducive to piety. But this esteem applied (e.g., in Baxter) not to the landlord but to the yeoman and farmer, and in the 18th century not to the Junker but to the "rational" *agriculturist*[94]. Through English society since the 17th century there runs the cleavage between the "squirearchy," the bearer of "merry old England," and the Puritan circles, whose social power fluctuated greatly[95]. Both traits—an unbroken, naive joy in life on the one hand, and on the other a strictly regulated and reserved self-control and conventional ethical constraint—still stand side by side today in the image of the English "national character"[96]. Likewise, through the earliest history of North American colonization runs the sharp contrast between the "adventurers," who wanted to set up plantations with the labor of indented servants

93 WEBER'S NOTE. For England, a petition by a noble Royalist after Charles II's entry into London, cited, e.g., by Ranke, Englische Geschichte IV, p. 197, advocated a legal ban on the purchase of landed estates by bourgeois capital, which was thereby to be forced to turn exclusively to trade.—The class of Dutch "regents" set itself apart as an "estate" from the bourgeois patriciate of the cities *by* buying up the old knightly estates. (See on this the complaint of 1652, cited in Fruin, Tien jaren uit den tachtigjarigen oorlog [Ten Years of the Eighty Years' War], that the regents were now rentiers and no longer merchants.) These circles, to be sure, were never seriously Calvinist at heart. And the notorious craving for nobility and titles in broad circles of the Dutch middle class in the second half of the 17th century alone shows that, at any rate for *this* period, the contrast between English and Dutch conditions must be accepted only with caution. Here the overwhelming power of inherited money broke the ascetic spirit.

94 WEBER'S NOTE. The large-scale buying up of English landed estates by bourgeois capital was followed by the great epoch of English agriculture.

95 WEBER'S NOTE. Anglican landlords not infrequently refused to take Nonconformists as tenants, even into this century. (At present the two church parties are roughly equal in numbers; formerly the Nonconformists were always the minority.)

96 WEBER'S NOTE. H. Levy (in the essay just published in the Archiv f. Sozialwiss. 46, p. 605 f.) rightly points out that, judging by the "character disposition" of the English people, which can be inferred from numerous traits, they were probably *less* disposed than other peoples to take up an ascetic ethos and bourgeois virtues: a hearty and coarse zest for life was (and is) a fundamental trait of their nature. The power of Puritan asceticism in the period of its dominance shows itself precisely in the astonishing degree to which this trait of character was *tempered* among its adherents.

and live like lords, and the specifically bourgeois mentality of the Puritans[97].

WEALTH UNDERMINES ASCETICISM

As wealth grew, religious zeal waned; Wesley himself saw that religion produces the riches that destroy it.

II.2.15 Wherever the power of the Puritan outlook on life reached, it worked in all circumstances in favor of the tendency toward a bourgeois, economically *rational* conduct of life, and this is of course far more important than its mere encouragement of capital formation. It was the most essential vehicle of that tendency and, above all, its only consistent one. It stood at the cradle of modern "economic man." To be sure, these Puritan ideals of life gave way when put to too severe a test by the "temptations" of wealth, which the Puritans themselves knew very well. Very regularly we find the most genuine adherents of the Puritan spirit in the ranks of the strata that were only just *on the rise*[98]—

97 WEBER'S NOTE. This point recurs again and again in Doyle's account as well. In the Puritans' stance, the religious motive always played a decisive part (not always, of course, the *only* decisive part). The colony (under Winthrop's leadership) was inclined to allow gentlemen to settle in Massachusetts, and even to accept an upper house with a hereditary nobility, *provided only* that the gentlemen joined the *church*. For the sake of *church* discipline, it insisted on *compact* settlement. (New Hampshire and Maine were colonized by great Anglican merchants, who laid out large cattle plantations. There was very little social cohesion there.) Complaints about the New Englanders' strong "greed for profit" were made as early as 1632 (see e.g. Weeden's Economic and social history of New England I p. 125).

98 WEBER'S NOTE. Petty already stresses this, op. cit., and all contemporary sources without exception speak of the Puritan *sectarians* in particular—Baptists, Quakers, Mennonites—as a stratum partly without means and partly of *small* capitalists, and contrast them both with the aristocracy of the great merchants and with the financial adventurers. Yet it was precisely from this *small*-capitalist stratum, and *not*, say, from the hands of the great financiers—monopolists, government contractors, lenders to the state, colonial entrepreneurs, promoters, etc.—that there emerged what was *characteristic* of Western capitalism: the bourgeois, private-enterprise organization of industrial labor. (See e.g. *Unwin*, Industrial Organization in the 16th and 17th centuries, London 1914, p. 196 ff.) That this contrast was already well known to contemporaries themselves is shown by *Parker's* Discourse concerning Puritans of 1641, where the contrast with projectors and courtiers is likewise stressed.

the lower middle class and the farmers—and we find the "beati possidentes" [blessed are those who possess], even among the Quakers, quite often ready to disown the old ideals[99]. This was, after all, the same fate to which the forerunner of worldly asceticism, the monastic asceticism of the Middle Ages, succumbed again and again. Whenever rational economic management had fully unfolded its effect there, in the place of strictly regulated life and restrained consumption, the wealth thus gained either passed directly to the nobility, as in the period before the split in the faith, or else monastic discipline threatened to break down and one of the numerous "reformations" had to step in. Indeed, the whole history of the monastic rules is in a certain sense a constantly renewed struggle with the problem of the secularizing effect of property. The same holds, on a grand scale, for the worldly asceticism of Puritanism. The powerful "revival" of Methodism, which preceded the flourishing of English industry toward the end of the 18th century, can quite well be compared with such a monastic reformation. Let me quote here a passage[100] from John Wesley himself which might well stand as a motto over everything said so far. For it shows that the leaders of the ascetic movements were themselves perfectly clear about

99 WEBER'S NOTE. On the way this showed itself in the politics of Pennsylvania in the 18th century, especially during the War of Independence, see Sharpless, A Quaker experiment in Government, Philadelphia 1902.

100 WEBER'S NOTE. See it in Southey's Life of Wesley, ch. 29. I was referred to it (I did not know it) in a letter from Prof. Ashley (1913). E. Troeltsch, to whom I passed it on for this purpose, has already quoted it on occasion.

the seemingly so paradoxical connections set out here, and indeed entirely in the sense developed here[101]. He writes:

II.2.16 "I fear that wherever wealth has increased, the substance of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how, in the nature of things, any revival of true religion can last long. For religion *must necessarily* produce both diligence (industry) and thrift (frugality), and these cannot but produce wealth. But as wealth increases, so do pride, passion and love of the world in all its forms. How then is it possible that Methodism, that is, a religion of the heart, though it now flourishes like a green tree, should continue in this state? Methodists everywhere become industrious and thrifty; consequently their possessions increase. Hence they grow correspondingly in pride, in passion, in the desires of the flesh and of the world, and in the pride of life. So the form of religion remains, but the spirit gradually vanishes. Is there no way to prevent this continual decay of pure religion? We must not prevent people from being industrious and thrifty. *We must exhort all Christians to gain all they can and to save all they can, that is, in effect, to grow rich.*" (There follows the exhortation that those who "gain all they can and save all they can" should also "give all they can," so that they may grow in grace and lay up a treasure in heaven.)—As one can

101 WEBER'S NOTE. I recommend this passage to all those who today want to be better informed and cleverer about these things than the leaders and contemporaries of those movements *themselves*, who, as one can see, knew very well what they were doing and what they were putting at risk. Some of my critics have, unfortunately, disputed these facts all too lightly. It really will not do. The facts are quite indisputable, no one had ever disputed them before, and all I did was examine their inner driving forces somewhat more closely. No one in the 17th century ever doubted these connections (cf. also Manley, Usurry of 6% examined 1669, p. 137). Besides the modern authors already cited, poets such as H. Heine and Keats, just as much as scholars such as Macaulay, Cunningham and Rogers, or writers such as Mathew Arnold, have treated them as self-evident. From the most recent literature see *Ashley*, Birmingham Industry and Commerce (1913), who at the time also expressed his complete agreement to me by letter. On the whole problem, cf. now the essay by *H. Levy* cited in note 4, p. 194.

see, this is, down to every detail, the very connection that we have been illuminating here[102].

THE UTILITARIAN HEIR

Once the religious root died, a good conscience in money-making and a disciplined workforce remained.

II.2.17 The significance of these powerful religious movements for economic development lay above all in their ascetic *educational* effects. As a rule, just as Wesley says here, they unfolded their full *economic* effect only after the peak of *purely* religious enthusiasm had already passed. By then the convulsive search for the kingdom of God had gradually begun to dissolve into sober vocational virtue, and the religious root was slowly withering and giving way to utilitarian this-worldliness. To put it in Dowden's words, in the popular imagination "Robinson Crusoe," the *isolated economic man* who does some missionary work on the side[103], had taken the place of Bunyan's "Pilgrim," hurrying through "Vanity Fair" in his inwardly solitary striving for the kingdom of heaven. When, further, the principle "to make the best of *both* worlds" came to prevail, then in the end, as Dowden has also remarked, a good conscience simply had to take its place among the means to a comfortable bourgeois life. The German proverb about the "soft pillow" expresses this rather nicely. What that religiously vital epoch of the 17th century bequeathed to its utilitarian heir was, however, above all an enormously good conscience about making money—let us say it plainly: a *pharisaically* good one—provided only that the money was made in legal ways. Every trace of the "Deo placere vix potest" [(the

102 WEBER'S NOTE. That precisely the same connections were already taken for granted by the Puritans of the classical period is perhaps shown by nothing more clearly than the fact that in Bunyan "Mr. Money-Love" argues outright that "one may become religious *in order to become rich*, e.g. to increase one's custom," since *why* one has become religious does not matter (p. 114 of the Tauchnitz ed.).
103 WEBER'S NOTE. Defoe was a zealous Nonconformist.

merchant) can scarcely please God] had vanished[104]. A specifically *bourgeois vocational ethos* had come into being.[105] Conscious of standing in God's full grace and of being visibly blessed by him, the bourgeois entrepreneur could pursue his acquisitive interests, and indeed *was supposed* to do so, as long as he kept within the bounds of formal correctness, his moral conduct was blameless and the use he made of his wealth gave no offense. The power of religious asceticism, moreover, placed at his disposal sober, conscientious, exceptionally industrious workers who clung to work as the purpose of life willed by God[106]. It also gave him the reassuring certainty that the unequal distribution of this world's goods was the quite special work of God's providence, which pursued its secret ends, unknown to us, through these differences, just as it did through a grace granted only to

104 WEBER'S NOTE. Spener, too (Theol. Bedenken, op. cit., pp. 426 f., 429, 432 ff.), considers the merchant's calling full of temptations and snares, but in reply to an inquiry he nevertheless declares: "I am glad to see that my dear friend has no scruples as far as trade itself is concerned, but recognizes it for what it is, a way of life by which much good is done to the human race and thus, according to God's will, *love* is practiced." In various other places he supports this in more detail with mercantilist arguments. At times Spener, quite in the Lutheran manner, describes the desire to become rich as the chief snare, one to be renounced absolutely, citing 1 Tim. 6:8 and 9 and appealing to Jesus Sirach (see above!), and he takes the "subsistence standpoint" (Theol. Bd. III p. 435, top). When he does so, he weakens this again by pointing to the sectarians, who prosper and yet live godly lives (p. 175 n. 4). For him too, wealth as the *effect* of diligent work in a calling is unobjectionable. Because of the Lutheran admixture, his standpoint is less consistent than Baxter's.

105 The proverb runs "Ein gutes Gewissen ist ein sanftes Ruhekissen" ("a good conscience is a soft pillow").

106 WEBER'S NOTE. Baxter, op. cit., II p. 16, warns against hiring "heavy, flegmatik, sluggish, fleshly, slothful persons" as "servants" and recommends giving preference to "godly" servants. This is not only because "ungodly" servants would be mere "eye-servants" but above all because "a. truly godly servant will do all your service in obedience *to God, as if God himself had bid him do it*." Others, by contrast, are inclined "to make no great *matter of conscience* of it." And conversely, the mark of holiness in a worker is not the outward profession of religion but the "conscience to do their duty." As one can see, God's interest and the employer's here merge suspiciously into one another. Spener too (Theol. Bed. III p. 272), who otherwise urgently exhorts people to leave themselves *time* to think of God, takes it for granted that workers must content themselves with the barest minimum of free time (even on Sundays).—English writers rightly called the Protestant immigrants the "pioneers of skilled labor." See also the evidence in *H. Levy*, Die Grundl. des ökonom. Liberalismus, p. 53.

some[107]. Calvin had already made the often-quoted remark that the "people," that is, the mass of workers and artisans, remain obedient to God only if they are kept poor[108]. The Dutch (Pieter de la Court and others) had "secularized" this into the view that the mass of people *work* only when need drives them to it. This formulation of a leitmotif of the capitalist economy then flowed on into the current of the theory of the "productivity" of low wages. Here too, as the idea's religious root died away, the utilitarian turn slipped in beneath it unnoticed, exactly in line with the pattern of development we have observed again and again. Medieval ethics had not only tolerated begging but had positively glorified it in the mendicant orders. Even secular beggars, since after all they gave the propertied the opportunity for good works through almsgiving, were at times actually described and valued as an "estate." The Anglican social ethics of the Stuarts still stood inwardly very close to this attitude. It was left to Puritan asceticism to help shape the harsh English poor law legislation that brought about a fundamental change here. And it could do so because the Protestant sects and the strictly Puritan communities in general actually *knew no* begging in their own midst[109].

WORK AS A CALLING FOR THE WORKER

Treating labor as a calling became typical of the modern worker, as acquisition did of the entrepreneur.

II.2.18 For, on the other hand, seen from the other side, that of the workers, the Zinzendorf variety of Pietism, for example, glori-

107 WEBER'S NOTE. The analogy (which, after all, suggested itself so readily) between the predestination of only some, "unjust" by human standards, and the distribution of goods, equally unjust but equally willed by God, is drawn e.g. in Hoornbeek, op. cit., vol. I p. 153. Moreover, as Baxter says (op. cit. I p. 380), poverty is very often a symptom of sinful idleness.

108 WEBER'S NOTE. Th. Adams, too (Works of the Pur. Div. p. 158), thinks that God presumably lets so many remain poor above all because he knows they would not be equal to the temptations that wealth brings with it. For wealth all too often drives religion out of a person.

fied the worker who is faithful to his calling and does not strive for gain, as living after the example of the apostles and thus endowed with the charisma of discipleship[110]. Similar views had at first been widespread in still more radical form among the Baptists. Now of course the whole ascetic literature of almost *all* confessions is steeped in the view that faithful work, even at low wages, on the part of someone to whom life has otherwise allotted no opportunities, is something highly pleasing to God. *In this* respect Protestant asceticism in itself brought nothing new. But it not only deepened this view in the most powerful way; it also created for this norm the one thing that, in the end, *alone mattered* for its effect: the psychological *impulse* that came from regarding this work as a *calling*, as the pre-eminent, and ultimately often the *only*, means of becoming certain of one's state of grace[111]. And on the other side, it legalized the exploitation of this specific willingness to work by interpreting the entrepren-

109 WEBER'S NOTE. See above, n. 3, p. 177, and the work by H. Levy cited there. Exactly the same point is stressed in all accounts (thus by Manley for the Huguenots).

110 WEBER'S NOTE. Similar things were not lacking in England either. To this belongs, for example, the Pietism that, taking its lead from Law's "Serious call" (1728), preached *poverty*, chastity and, originally, also isolation from the world.

111 WEBER'S NOTE. When Baxter arrived in the parish of Kidderminster, it was utterly run-down, and the success of his work there is almost unparalleled in the history of pastoral care. It is at the same time a typical example of *how* asceticism trained the masses for work, or, in Marxist terms, for the production of "surplus value," and thus *made it possible in the first place* to use them in the capitalist labor relationship (domestic industry, weaving). That is how the causal relationship stands quite generally.—Seen from Baxter's side, he placed the integration of his charges into the machinery of capitalism in the service of his religious and ethical interests. Seen from the side of capitalism's development, those interests came to serve the development of the capitalist "spirit."

eur's money-making, too, as a "calling"[112]. It is obvious how powerfully the *exclusive* striving for the kingdom of God through fulfilling the duty to work as a calling, together with the strict asceticism that church discipline naturally imposed on the propertyless classes in particular, was bound to promote the "productivity" of labor in the capitalist sense of the word. Treating work as a "calling" became as characteristic of the modern worker as the corresponding view of acquisition became of the entrepreneur. It was a reflection of this state of affairs, new at the time, when so sharp an Anglican observer as Sir William Petty traced the economic power of Holland in the 17th century to the fact that the "Dissenters" (Calvinists and Baptists), especially numerous there, were people who regarded "*labor and industry as their duty to God*." The "organic" social order took a fiscal and monopolistic turn in Anglicanism under the Stuarts, especially in Laud's conceptions: an alliance of state and church with the "monopolists" on a Christian-social foundation. Against it Puritanism set the individualist *impulses* toward rational, legal acquisition by virtue of one's own ability and initiative. Its representatives were, without exception, among the passionate opponents of *this* kind of state-privileged merchant, putting-out and colonial capitalism. And while the state-privileged monopoly industries in England soon all disappeared again, these impulses played a decisive part in building up the industries that arose without the authorities, and in part in spite of and

112 WEBER'S NOTE. And one more thing. One may well doubt how much weight the medieval craftsman's "joy" in "what he had created," which is so often invoked, carried as a psychological factor. Still, there was undoubtedly something to it. In any case, asceticism now *stripped* work of this this-worldly, secular charm, which capitalism has today destroyed for ever, and directed it toward the beyond. Work in a calling *as such* is willed by God. The impersonality of present-day work, its joyless meaninglessness as seen from the standpoint of the individual, is here still transfigured by religion. Capitalism in the period of its emergence needed workers who were available for economic exploitation for *conscience's* sake. Today it sits in the saddle and can compel their willingness to work without otherworldly rewards.

against them[113]. The Puritans (Prynne, Parker) rejected all association with the big-capitalist "courtiers and projectors" as an ethically suspect class. They took pride in their own superior bourgeois business morality, which, they held, was the real reason for the persecution they suffered from those circles. Defoe was still proposing that the struggle against Dissent be won by boycotting bank bills and withdrawing deposits. The contrast between the two kinds of capitalist conduct went very largely hand in hand with the religious contrasts. Even in the 18th century the opponents of the Nonconformists repeatedly mocked them as the bearers of the "spirit of shopkeepers" and attacked them as the ruin of the old English ideals. *Here*, too, was anchored the contrast between the Puritan and the Jewish economic ethos, and contemporaries (Prynne) already knew that it was the former, not the latter, that was the *bourgeois* economic ethos[114].

THE CASING AS HARD AS STEEL

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we must, inside an economic order that now needs no religion.

II.2.19 One of the constituent elements of the modern capitalist spirit, and not only of that spirit but of modern culture, namely the rational conduct of life on the basis of the *idea of the calling*, was born from the spirit of *Christian asceticism*. That is what these discussions were meant to show. Read once more the

113 WEBER'S NOTE. On these contrasts and developments see H. Levy in the book cited earlier. The very powerful anti-monopoly attitude of public opinion characteristic of England arose historically in the 17th century from a combination of three things: the *political* power struggle against the Crown (the Long Parliament excluded the monopolists from Parliament), the ethical motives of Puritanism, and the economic interests of bourgeois small and middle capitalism against the financial magnates. The Declaration of the Army of 2 Aug. 1652, and likewise the Levellers' petition of 28 Jan. 1653, demand, besides the abolition of excises, tariffs and indirect taxes and the introduction of a single tax on estates, above all "free trade," i.e. the removal of all monopolistic barriers to acquisition (trade), at home and abroad, as violations of human rights. The "Grand Remonstrance" had already done much the same.

114 WEBER'S NOTE. Cf. on this *H. Levy*, Oekon. Liberal. p. 51 f.

treatise by Franklin quoted at the beginning of this essay, and you will see that the essential elements of the attitude called there the "spirit of capitalism" are precisely those that we identified above as the content of Puritan vocational asceticism[115], only without the religious foundation, which in Franklin had already died away.—The idea that modern work in a calling bears an *ascetic* stamp is, after all, not new either. That confinement to specialized work, with the renunciation of the Faustian many-sidedness of humanity that it entails, is in today's world the precondition of any worthwhile action at all, and that "deed" and "renunciation" therefore inevitably condition each other today—this basic ascetic motif of the bourgeois style of life (if it means to be a style, that is, and not the absence of style) is what *Goethe*, too, at the height of his wisdom about life, wanted to teach us in the "Wanderjahre" and in the ending he gave his Faust[116]. For him this insight meant a renunciatory farewell to an age of full and beautiful humanity, which will no more recur in the course of our cultural development than the heyday of Athens in antiquity. The Puritan *wanted* to work in a calling; we *have* to. For when asceticism was carried out of the monastic

115 WEBER'S NOTE. The elements not yet traced back to their religious roots here, especially the maxim honesty is the best policy (Franklin's discussions of *credit*), are also of Puritan origin. That, however, belongs in a somewhat different context (see the following essay on this). Here let me reproduce only the following remark by *J. A. Rowntree* (Quakerism, past and present pp. 95/6), to which Ed. Bernstein drew my attention: "Is it merely a *coincidence*, or is it a *consequence*, that the lofty profession of spirituality made by the Friends has gone hand in hand with shrewdness and tact in the transaction of mundane affairs? Real piety favours the success of a trader by insuring his integrity, and fostering habits of prudence and forethought:—important items in obtaining that standing and credit in the commercial world, which are requisite for the steady accumulation of wealth." (See the following essay.) "Honest as a Huguenot" was as proverbial in the 17th century as the integrity of the Dutch, which Sir W. Temple admired, and, a century later, that of the English, compared with Continentals who had not been through this ethical school.

116 WEBER'S NOTE. Well analyzed in Bielschowsky's Goethe, vol. II, ch. 18.—For the development of the *scientific* "cosmos," Windelband, for example, has also expressed a related idea at the end of his "Blütezeit der deutschen Philosophie" [The Golden Age of German Philosophy] (vol. II of the "Gesch. d. neueren Philosophie" [History of Modern Philosophy]).

cells into working life and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the mighty cosmos of the modern economic order, bound to the technical and economic conditions of mechanical, machine-based production. Today this cosmos determines, with overwhelming force, the style of life of all the individuals born into this mechanism, and *not* only of those directly engaged in economic acquisition. Perhaps it will go on determining it until the last hundredweight of fossil fuel has burned away. In Baxter's view, care for external goods should lie on the shoulders of his saints only like "a thin cloak that can be thrown off at any moment"[117]. But fate decreed that the cloak should become a casing as hard as steel.[118] As asceticism undertook to remake the world and to work itself out in the world, the external goods of this world gained an increasing and finally inescapable power over human beings, as never before in history. Today the spirit of asceticism has escaped from this casing —whether for good, who knows? Victorious capitalism, at any rate, no longer needs this support, since it rests on mechanical foundations. Even the rosy mood of asceticism's laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems to be fading for good, and the idea of "duty in a calling" prowls about in our lives like the ghost of once-religious beliefs. Where the "fulfillment of one's calling" cannot be directly related to the highest spiritual values of culture, or where, conversely, it need not also be felt subjectively as simple economic compulsion, the individual today generally gives up trying to interpret it at all. In the field of its greatest unleashing, the United States, the striving for acquisition, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, now tends to become associated with purely competitive passions, which not

117 WEBER'S NOTE. Saints' everlasting rest, ch. XII.

118 Talcott Parsons's 1930 translation rendered "stahlhartes Gehäuse" as "iron cage," and made the phrase famous.

infrequently give it the character of an outright sport[119]. No one yet knows who will live in that casing in the future. No one knows whether at the end of this tremendous development there will stand entirely new prophets, or a powerful rebirth of old ideas and ideals, *or else*, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a kind of convulsive self-importance. Then, indeed, for the "last men" of this cultural development the saying might come true: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart: this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of humanity never before achieved."—[120]

THE LIMITS OF THIS STUDY

Weber outlines further tasks and rejects replacing materialist history with an equally one-sided spiritualist one.

II.2.20 But with this we stray into the realm of judgments of value and of faith, with which this purely historical account is not to be burdened. The task would rather be to show the significance of ascetic rationalism, only touched on in the foregoing sketch, for the content of *social and political* ethics as well, that is, for the kind of organization and the functions of social communities, from the conventicle to the state. Its relation to humanist rationalism[121], with its ideals of life and its cultural influences, would then have to be analyzed, and further its relation to the develop-

119 WEBER'S NOTE. "Couldn't the old man retire on his $75,000 a year?—No! The store front now has to be widened to 400 feet. Why?—That beats everything, he says.—In the evening, when his wife and daughters read together, he longs for bed; on Sundays he looks at the clock every 5 minutes to see when the day will be over: —what a wasted existence!"—This is how the son-in-law (an immigrant from Germany) of the leading dry-good-man of a city on the Ohio summed up his judgment of the latter. The "old man," for his part, would no doubt have found this judgment wholly incomprehensible and taken it as a symptom of German lack of energy.
120 The "last men" allude to Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Prologue, 5), where the "last man" is the contented, petty endpoint of humanity.
121 WEBER'S NOTE. This remark alone (left unchanged here) could have shown Brentano (op. cit.) that I have never doubted the *independent* significance of humanist rationalism. That humanism, too, was not *pure* "rationalism" has recently been strongly emphasized once again by Borinski in the Abhandl. der Münchener Ak. der Wiss. 1919.

ment of philosophical and scientific empiricism, to technical development and to the goods of intellectual culture. Then, finally, its historical emergence from the medieval beginnings of a worldly asceticism, and its dissolution into pure utilitarianism, would have to be traced *historically* and through each of the regions into which ascetic religiosity spread. Only from this could the *degree* of the cultural significance of ascetic Protestantism be determined, in relation to the other formative elements of modern culture. Here, after all, we have only attempted to trace the fact and the *manner* of its influence back to their motives on one point, albeit an important one. Beyond that, however, the way in which Protestant asceticism was in turn influenced, in its development and its distinctive character, by the totality of social and cultural conditions, especially *economic* ones, would then also have to be brought to light[122]. For modern man in general, even with the best will in the world, is usually unable to imagine the significance that religious ideas have had for the conduct of life, for culture and for national character to have been *as* great as it actually was. Even so, it cannot, of course, be our intention to replace a one-sidedly "materialist" causal interpretation of culture and history with an equally one-

122 WEBER'S NOTE. It is not this problem but that of the Reformation in general, and of Luther in particular, that is treated in the academic address by *von Below*, Die Ursachen der Reformation [The Causes of the Reformation] (Freiburg 1916). For the subject treated here, and especially for the controversies that followed this study, I refer finally to *Hermelink*'s work Reformation und Gegenreformation, which, however, is devoted primarily to other problems.

sided spiritualist one. *Both* are *equally possible*[123], but if either claims to be not the preparation for an inquiry but its conclusion, it serves historical truth equally little[124].

123 WEBER'S NOTE. For the foregoing sketch has deliberately taken up only those relations in which an influence of religious ideas on "material" cultural life is really beyond doubt. It would have been easy to go further, to a formal "construction" that logically *deduced everything* "characteristic" of modern culture from Protestant rationalism. But that sort of thing is better left to the type of dilettante who believes in the "unity" of the "social psyche" and its reducibility to *one* formula.—Let me only add that the period of capitalist development *preceding* the development we have considered was of course *everywhere* partly conditioned by Christian influences, inhibiting ones *as well as promoting* ones. What kind of influences these were belongs in a later chapter. Whether, incidentally, one or another of the further problems outlined above can still be discussed within the framework of *this* journal is uncertain, given its range of tasks. But I am not very fond of writing thick books that would have to lean as heavily as would be the case here on the work of others (theological and historical). (I leave these sentences here unchanged.)—On the *tension* between the ideal of life and reality in the "early capitalist" period *before* the Reformation, see now *Strieder*, Studien zur Geschichte der kapitalist. Organisationsformen (1914), Book II (which also argues against the work by *Keller*, cited earlier, that Sombart used).

124 WEBER'S NOTE. I think that this sentence and the remarks and notes immediately preceding it should have been enough to rule out any misunderstanding of what this study *set out* to do, and I see *no reason to add anything*. At the time, I had originally intended a direct continuation along the lines of the program set out above. Instead I decided first to write down the results of comparative studies of the *universal*-historical connections between religion and society. I did so partly for incidental reasons, in particular the appearance of E. Troeltsch's "Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen" [The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches], which dealt with much that I would have had to discuss, and did so in a way that I, as a non-theologian, could not have managed. But I did so partly also in order to strip these discussions of their isolation and place them within the whole of cultural development. These studies follow here. They are preceded only by a short occasional essay that clarifies the concept of "sect" used above and at the same time sets out the significance of the Puritan conception of the *church* for the capitalist spirit of modern times.