Memorabilia

XENOPHON

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Ἀπομνημονεύματα

Translated from the Greek with AI (Claude) and edited



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INTRODUCTION

Xenophon of Athens—soldier, horseman, historian—was a young follower of Socrates before he left in 401 BC to fight for the Persian prince Cyrus. Two years later Socrates was tried and executed for impiety and for corrupting the young. Years afterward, in exile, Xenophon wrote down what he remembered of the man: the *Memorabilia*, or "Recollections."

It opens as a defense. Socrates honored the gods, Xenophon insists, and made his companions better, not worse. Then come dozens of conversations, short and practical: Socrates talking to a son angry with his mother, to brothers who have fallen out, to a poor man with a houseful of relatives, to would-be generals and politicians, to a painter, an armorer, and the courtesan Theodote. Here too is the famous fable of Heracles choosing between Virtue and Vice.

Xenophon's Socrates is less the ironic questioner of Plato's dialogues than a shrewd, devout, generous adviser—a teacher of self-control, friendship and useful knowledge. Read beside Plato, he is our other main witness to who Socrates was.

Book I

The charges answered
Socrates honored the gods and did not corrupt the young; how he lived and taught self-control.

CHAPTER 1

Socrates honored the gods: his divine sign was a kind of divination, and he shunned speculation about nature.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.1.1	Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τίσι ποτέ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτη ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. ἡ μέν γάρ γραφή κατ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδε τις ἦν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὕς μέν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δέ καινά δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δέ καί τούς νέους διαφθείρων.	I have often wondered what arguments Socrates' accusers could possibly have used to persuade the Athenians that he deserved death at the city's hands. The indictment against him ran something like this: Socrates does wrong by not recognizing the gods the city recognizes, and by bringing in other, new divinities; he also does wrong by corrupting the young.[1]
1.1.2	Πρῶτον μέν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὕς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γάρ φανερός ἦν πολλάκις μέν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δέ ἐπί τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καί μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανής ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γάρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τό δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δή καί μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτόν αἰτιάσασθαι καινά δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.	First, then, the claim that he didn't recognize the gods the city recognizes: what evidence could they possibly have used for that? He was plainly seen offering sacrifice, often at home and often at the city's public altars, and he made no secret of using divination. It was common talk that Socrates said the divine sign gave him signals, and this, I think, is the main reason they accused him of bringing in new divinities.[2]
1.1.3	ὁ δ' οὐδέν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικήν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καί φήμαις καί συμβόλοις καί θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γάρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τούς ὄρνιθας οὐδέ τούς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τά συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλά τούς θεούς διά τούτων αὐτά σημαίνειν, κἀκεῖνος δέ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν.	Yet he was bringing in nothing newer than anyone else who believes in divination and relies on birds, chance utterances, omens and sacrifices. These people don't suppose that the birds, or the people they happen to meet, know what is good for those consulting them. They think the gods signal it through these means, and that is what he believed too.
1.1.4	ἀλλ' οἱ μέν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καί τῶν ἀπαντώντων ἀποτρέπεσθαί τε καί προτρέπεσθαι· Σωκράτης δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τό δαιμόνιον γάρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καί πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τά μέν ποιεῖν, τά δέ μή ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καί τοῖς μέν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δέ μή πειθομένοις μετέμελε.	But most people say that the birds and the people they meet turn them away from something or urge them on to it. Socrates put it just as he understood it: it was the divine sign, he said, that gave the signal. And he told many of his companions in advance to do some things and not to do others, because the divine sign was forewarning him. Those

1 Socrates was tried and executed at Athens in 399 BC.
2 Socrates spoke of a private divine sign, an inner voice that warned him about what to do or avoid.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		who listened to him did well by it, and those who didn't came to regret it.
1.1.5	καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἄν ὁμολογήσειεν αὐτόν βούλεσθαι μήτ' ἠλίθιον μήτ' ἀλαζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνοῦσιν; ἐδόκει δ' ἄν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπό θεοῦ φαινόμενα [καὶ] ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἄν προέλεγεν, εἰ μή ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν· ταῦτα δέ τίς ἄν ἄλλῳ πιστεύσειεν ἤ θεῷ; πιστεύων δέ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεούς ἐνόμιζεν; ἀλλά μήν ἐποίει καί τάδε πρός τούς ἐπιτηδείους.	And yet who wouldn't agree that he wanted to look neither a fool nor a braggart to his companions? He would have looked like both if he had foretold things as revealed by a god and [also] been shown to be lying. Clearly, then, he wouldn't have made predictions unless he trusted that he would turn out to be right. And in such matters, whom would anyone trust but a god? And if he trusted the gods, how could he think there were no gods? What's more, he also did the following with his friends.[3]
1.1.6	τά μέν γάρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καί πράττειν, ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἄν πραχθῆναι· περί δέ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα.	Where matters were bound to turn out a certain way, he advised them to act in the way he thought would work best. But where it was unclear how things would turn out, he sent them to consult an oracle about whether to act at all.
1.1.7	καί τούς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καί πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικόν μέν γάρ ἤ χαλκευτικόν ἤ γεωργικόν [ἤ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικόν] ἤ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικόν ἤ λογιστικόν ἤ οἰκονομικόν ἤ στρατηγικόν γενέσθαι, πάντα τά τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καί ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετά ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι·	He also said that anyone who means to run a household or a city well needs divination as well. To become a skilled builder, smith or farmer [or ruler of men], or an expert examiner of work like this, or a skilled calculator, household manager or general: all learning of this kind, he thought, could be acquired by human judgment;
1.1.8	τά δέ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τούς θεούς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδέν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὔτε γάρ τῷ καλῶς ἀγρόν φυτευσαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτε τῷ καλῶς οἰκίαν οἰκοδομησαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις ἐνοικήσει, οὔτε τῷ στρατηγικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν, οὔτε τῷ πολιτικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν, οὔτε τῷ καλήν γήμαντι, ἵν' εὐφραίνηται, δῆλον εἰ διά ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, οὔτε τῷ δυνατούς ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστάς λαβόντι δῆλον εἰ διά τούτους στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως.	but the most important things in these matters, he said, the gods reserve for themselves, and none of them is clear to human beings. A man who has planted a field well can't know who will harvest it. A man who has built a house well can't know who will live in it. A skilled general can't know whether it will benefit him to command, and a skilled statesman can't know whether it will benefit him to lead the city. A man who marries a beautiful wife to enjoy her can't know whether she'll bring him grief, and a man who gains powerful in-laws in the city can't know whether they'll get him banished from it.
1.1.9	τούς δέ μηδέν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλά πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἔφη· δαιμονᾶν δέ καί τούς μαντευομένους ἅ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῴη πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπί ζεῦγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ἤ μή ἐπιστάμενον, ἤ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπί τήν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν ἤ μή ἐπιστάμενον, ἤ ἅ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἤ μετρήσαντας ἤ στήσαντας εἰδέναι, τούς	People who think none of these things belongs to the divine, and that everything depends on human judgment, are possessed, he said. But those who ask oracles about things the gods have let human beings decide for themselves by learning are possessed as well. Suppose someone asks whether it's better to take on, for his chariot team, a man

3 Words in square brackets are ones the editor, Gilbert, judged to be later additions to the text.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τά τοιαῦτα παρά τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιτα ποιεῖν ἡγεῖτο. ἔφη δέ δεῖν, ἅ μέν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἃ δέ μή δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διά μαντικῆς παρά τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τούς θεούς γάρ οἷς ἄν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ σημαίνειν.	who knows how to drive or one who doesn't. Or he asks whether it's better to take on, for his ship, a man who knows how to steer or one who doesn't. Or he asks about things one can find out by counting, measuring or weighing. Socrates believed that people who put such questions to the gods were doing something forbidden. He said that where the gods have given us the ability to act once we have learned how, we should learn. But where things are not clear to human beings, we should try to find them out from the gods through divination, for the gods give signs to those they are gracious to.
1.1.10	Ἀλλά μήν ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεί μέν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ· πρῴ τε γάρ εἰς τούς περιπάτους καί τά γυμνάσια ᾔει καί πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καί τό λοιπόν ἀεί τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι· καί ἔλεγε μέν ὡς τό πολύ, τοῖς δέ βουλομένοις ἐξῆν ἀκούειν.	Moreover, he was always out in public. Early in the morning he went to the covered walks and the gymnasiums. When the marketplace was full he could be seen there, and for the rest of the day he was always wherever he would meet the most people. He talked most of the time, and anyone who wished could listen.
1.1.11	οὐδείς δέ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδέν ἀσεβές οὐδέ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. οὐδέ γάρ περί τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ᾗπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπό τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει καί τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλά καί τούς φροντίζοντας τά τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.	Yet no one ever saw Socrates do, or heard him say, anything impious or unholy. Unlike most of the others, he didn't even discuss the nature of the universe. He didn't investigate how what the sophists call the "cosmos" is arranged, or by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomena comes about. On the contrary, he showed that people who worried about such things were fools.
1.1.12	καί πρῶτον μέν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπί τό περί τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τά μέν ἀνθρώπινα παρέντες, τά δαιμόνια δέ σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τά προσήκοντα πράττειν.	First he would ask about them whether they took up thinking about such matters because they believed they already knew enough about human affairs. Or did they think they were doing what they ought by leaving human things aside and investigating divine ones?
1.1.13	ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μή φανερόν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν· ἐπεί καί τούς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπί τῷ περί τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταὐτά δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλά τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρός ἀλλήλους.	He was amazed that they couldn't see that these things are impossible for human beings to discover. Even those who pride themselves most on speaking about them don't hold the same opinions as one another, and behave toward each other like madmen.
1.1.14	τῶν τε γάρ μαινομένων τούς μέν οὐδέ τά δεινά δεδιέναι, τούς δέ καί τά μή φοβερά φοβεῖσθαι, καί τοῖς μέν οὐδ' ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρόν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν, τοῖς δέ οὐδ' ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καί τούς μέν οὔθ' ἱερόν οὔτε βωμόν οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδέν τιμᾶν, τούς δέ καί λίθους καί ξύλα τά τυχόντα καί θηρία	Among madmen, some aren't afraid even of what is dangerous, while others fear even what isn't frightening. Some think there's nothing shameful in saying or doing anything at all, even in a crowd, while others think they shouldn't even go out among people. Some respect neither temple nor

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	σέβεσθαι· τῶν τε περί τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μέν δοκεῖν ἕν μόνον τό ὄν εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἄπειρα τό πλῆθος, καί τοῖς μέν ἀεί πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δ' οὐδέν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι, καί τοῖς μέν πάντα γίγνεσθαί τε καί ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δέ οὔτ' ἄν γενέσθαι ποτέ οὐδέν οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι.	altar nor anything else divine, while others worship stones, any old bits of wood, and wild animals. It is the same with those who worry about the nature of the universe. Some think that what exists is only one thing, others that it is infinite in number. Some think everything is always in motion, others that nothing could ever be moved. Some think everything comes into being and perishes, others that nothing could ever come into being or perish.
1.1.15	ἐσκόπει δέ περί αὐτῶν καί τάδε, ἆρ' ὥσπερ οἱ τἀνθρώπεια μανθάνοντες ἡγοῦνται τοῦθ' ὅ τι ἄν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καί τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῳ ἄν βούλωνται ποιήσειν, οὕτω καί οἱ τά θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδάν γνῶσιν αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσειν, ὅταν βούλωνται, καί ἀνέμους καί ὕδατα καί ὥρας καί ὅτου ἄν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἤ τοιοῦτον μέν οὐδέν οὐδ' ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς γνῶναι μόνον ᾗ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεται.	He also asked this about them. People who learn the human arts expect to put what they have learned into practice for themselves and for anyone else they like. Do those who inquire into divine things likewise think that, once they know by what necessities each thing happens, they will produce winds and rain and seasons, and whatever else of that sort they need, whenever they like? Or do they have no such hope at all, and are they content merely to know how each of these things comes about?
1.1.16	περί μέν οὖν τῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν· αὐτός δέ περί τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεί διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχή ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικός ἀνθρώπων. καί περί τῶν ἄλλων, ἅ τούς μέν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλούς κἀγαθούς εἶναι, τούς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἄν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι.	That is what he said about people who busied themselves with these matters. He himself always talked about human things. He examined what is pious and what is impious, what is fine and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what sound-mindedness is and what madness is, what courage is and what cowardice is, what a city is and what a statesman is, what rule over people is and what makes someone fit to rule people. He also talked about the other things that, in his view, make those who know them true gentlemen, while those who don't know them could rightly be called slavish.[4]
1.1.17	Ὅσα μέν οὖν μή φανερός ἦν ὅπως ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὐδέν θαυμαστόν ὑπέρ τούτων περί αὐτοῦ παραγνῶναι τούς δικαστάς· ὅσα δέ πάντες ᾔδεσαν, οὐ θαυμαστόν εἰ μή τούτων ἐνεθυμήθησαν;	Where his views weren't publicly known, it's no wonder the jurors misjudged him. But where everyone knew them, isn't it a wonder that the jurors didn't take them into account?
1.1.18	βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε καί τόν βουλευτικόν ὅρκον ὀμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατά τούς νόμους βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρά τούς νόμους [ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς] μιᾷ ψήφῳ τούς ἀμφί Θράσυλλον καί Ἐρασινίδην ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, ὀργιζομένου μέν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου,	Once he was serving on the Council and had sworn the councilor's oath, which included a pledge to act in accordance with the laws. He became presiding officer in the Assembly just when the people wanted, against the laws, to put to death [nine generals], Thrasyllus, Erasinides and

4 "True gentleman" renders *kalos kagathos,* literally "beautiful and good," the standard Greek phrase for a man of fine character and good standing.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	πολλῶν δέ καί δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων· ἀλλά περί πλείονος ἐποιήσατο εὐορκεῖν ἤ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρά τό δίκαιον καί φυλάξασθαι τούς ἀπειλοῦντας.	their colleagues, all by a single vote. He refused to put the motion to the vote, though the people were furious with him and many powerful men threatened him. He thought it more important to keep his oath than to gratify the people against what was just and to protect himself from those who threatened him.[5]
1.1.19	καί γάρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεούς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ὅν τρόπον οἱ πολλοί νομίζουσιν· οὗτοι μέν γάρ οἴονται τούς θεούς τά μέν εἰδέναι, τά δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι· Σωκράτης δέ πάντα μέν ἡγεῖτο θεούς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καί πραττόμενα καί τά σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δέ παρεῖναι καί σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περί τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.	He believed that the gods care for human beings, though not in the way most people think. Most people believe the gods know some things and not others. Socrates held that the gods know everything: what is said, what is done, and what is silently planned. He also held that they are present everywhere and give signs to human beings about all human affairs.
1.1.20	Θαυμάζω οὖν ὅπως ποτέ ἐπείσθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτη περί θεούς μή σωφρονεῖν, τόν ἀσεβές μέν οὐδέν ποτε [περί τούς θεοὺς] οὔτ' εἰπόντα οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δέ καί λέγοντα καί πράττοντα [περί θεῶν] οἷά τις ἄν καί λέγων καί πράττων εἴη τε καί νομίζοιτο εὐσεβέστατος.	So I wonder how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates was not sound-minded about the gods. He never said or did anything impious [regarding the gods]. On the contrary, he said and did [about the gods] exactly the sort of things that would make anyone who said and did them both be, and be thought, the most pious of men.

CHAPTER 2

Xenophon answers the charge of corrupting the young, explaining Critias, Alcibiades and the accuser's other claims.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.2.1	Θαυμαστόν δέ φαίνεταί μοι καί τό πεισθῆναί τινας ὡς Σωκράτης τούς νέους διέφθειρεν, ὅς πρός τοῖς εἰρημένοις πρῶτον μέν ἀφροδισίων καί γαστρός πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν, εἶτα πρός χειμῶνα καί θέρος καί πάντας πόνους καρτερικώτατος, ἔτι δέ πρός τό μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως ὥστε πάνυ μικρά κεκτημένος πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα.	It also seems astonishing to me that some people were persuaded that Socrates corrupted the young. Besides what I've already described, he was, first of all, the most self-controlled of all men where sex and food were concerned. He was also better able than anyone to endure winter and summer and every kind of hardship. And he had trained himself to need so little that he owned very little, yet very easily had enough.
1.2.2	πῶς οὖν αὐτός ὢν τοιοῦτος ἄλλους ἄν ἤ ἀσεβεῖς ἤ παρανόμους ἤ λίχνους ἤ ἀφροδισίων ἀκρατεῖς ἤ πρός τό πονεῖν μαλακούς ἐποίησεν; ἀλλ' ἔπαυσε μέν τούτων πολλούς, ἀρετῆς ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καί ἐλπίδας παρασχών, ἄν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶνται, καλούς κἀγαθούς ἔσεσθαι·	How, then, could a man like that have made others impious or lawless or gluttonous, or uncontrolled in sex, or soft in the face of hard work? On the contrary, he weaned many people off these things. He made them desire excellence and gave them hope that, if they took care of themselves, they would become true gentlemen;
1.2.3	καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλά τῷ φανερός εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τούς	and yet he never once promised to teach this. Rather, simply by being plainly such a man him-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούτους γενήσεσθαι.	self, he made those who spent time with him hope that by imitating him they would become like him.
1.2.4	ἀλλά μήν καί τοῦ σώματος αὐτός τε οὐκ ἠμέλει τούς τ' ἀμελοῦντας οὐκ ἐπῄνει· τό μέν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τό δέ, ὅσα ἡδέως ἡ ψυχή δέχεται, ταῦτα ἱκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε· ταύτην γάρ τήν ἕξιν ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καί τήν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη.	Then again, he didn't neglect his own body, and he didn't praise those who neglected theirs. He disapproved of overeating and then overexerting. But he approved of working off, in sufficient measure, as much food as the soul gladly accepts. This regimen, he said, was healthy enough and didn't interfere with caring for the soul.
1.2.5	ἀλλ' οὐ μήν θρυπτικός γε οὐδέ ἀλαζονικός ἦν οὔτ' ἀμπεχόνῃ οὔθ' ὑποδέσει οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ διαίτῃ. οὐ μήν οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τούς συνόντας ἐποίει. τῶν μέν γάρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπαυε, τούς δέ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο χρήματα.	But he certainly wasn't fussy or showy in his clothes, his shoes, or the rest of his way of life. Nor did he make his companions greedy for money. He weaned them off their other desires, and he charged no money to those who desired his company.
1.2.6	τούτου δ' ἀπεχόμενος ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τούς δέ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὁμιλίας μισθόν ἀνδραποδιστάς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει διά τό ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ' ὧν [ἄν] λάβοιεν τόν μισθόν.	By refraining from this he believed he was looking after his freedom. He called those who took fees for their company their own slave-dealers, because they had to converse with anyone from whom they [might] get their fee.
1.2.7	ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις ἀρετήν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πράττοιτο καί μή νομίζοι τό μέγιστον κέρδος ἕξειν φίλον ἀγαθόν κτησάμενος, ἀλλά φοβοῖτο μή ὁ γενόμενος καλός κἀγαθός τῷ τά μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μή τήν μεγίστην χάριν ἔξοι.	He was amazed that anyone who professed to teach excellence would charge money. Such a person did not think that gaining a good friend was the greatest profit. Instead he feared that the man who had become a true gentleman would not feel the greatest gratitude toward the one who had done him the greatest good.
1.2.8	Σωκράτης δέ ἐπηγγείλατο μέν οὐδενί πώποτε τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. ἐπίστευε δέ τῶν συνόντων ἑαυτῷ τούς ἀποδεξαμένους ἅπερ αὐτός ἐδοκίμαζεν εἰς τόν πάντα βίον ἑαυτῷ τε καί ἀλλήλοις φίλους ἀγαθούς ἔσεσθαι. πῶς ἄν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ διαφθείροι τούς νέους; εἰ μή ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν.	Socrates never promised anyone anything of the kind. But he trusted that those of his companions who took up what he himself approved would be good friends to him and to one another all their lives. How, then, could such a man corrupt the young? Unless, of course, caring for excellence is corruption.
1.2.9	Ἀλλά νή Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τούς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μῶρον εἴη τούς μέν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπό κυάμου καθιστάναι, κυβερνήτῃ δέ μηδένα ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι κυαμευτῷ μηδέ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἃ πολλῷ ἐλάττονας βλάβας ἁμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περί τήν πόλιν ἁμαρτανομένων· τούς δέ τοιούτους λόγους	"But by Zeus," said the accuser, "he made his companions look down on the established laws. He said it was foolish to appoint the city's officials by lot with beans, when no one would be willing to use a ship's pilot chosen by beans, or a builder, or a pipe player, or anyone else for jobs like these. Mistakes in such jobs do far less harm than mistakes in running the city." Talk like this, he said,

5 In 406 BC, after the naval victory at Arginusae, the Assembly tried the commanding generals together, against the law, for failing to rescue the shipwrecked. Socrates happened to be presiding that day.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τούς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας καί ποιεῖν βιαίους.	encouraged the young to despise the established constitution and made them violent.[6]
1.2.10	ἐγώ δ' οἶμαι τούς φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντας καί νομίζοντας ἱκανούς ἔσεσθαι τά συμφέροντα διδάσκειν τούς πολίτας ἥκιστα γίγνεσθαι βιαίους, εἰδότας ὅτι τῇ μέν βίᾳ πρόσεισιν ἔχθραι καί κίνδυνοι, διά δέ τοῦ πείθειν ἀκινδύνως τε καί μετά φιλίας ταὐτά γίγνεται. οἱ μέν γάρ βιασθέντες ὡς ἀφαιρεθέντες μισοῦσιν, οἱ δέ πεισθέντες ὡς κεχαρισμένοι φιλοῦσιν. οὔκουν τῶν φρόνησιν ἀσκούντων τό βιάζεσθαι, ἀλλά τῶν ἰσχύν ἄνευ γνώμης ἐχόντων [τά τοιαῦτα πράττειν] ἐστίν.	But I think that people who cultivate understanding, and believe they will be able to teach their fellow citizens what is beneficial, are the least likely to become violent. They know that violence brings enmity and danger, while persuasion achieves the same results safely and with goodwill. People who are forced hate you, as though they had been robbed. People who are persuaded love you, as though they had been done a favor. So violence is not the way of those who cultivate understanding. It belongs to those who have strength without judgment [to do such things].
1.2.11	ἀλλά μήν καί συμμάχων ὁ μέν βιάζεσθαι τολμῶν δέοιτ' ἄν οὐκ ὀλίγων, ὁ δέ πείθειν δυνάμενος οὐδενός· καί γάρ μόνος ἡγοῖτ' ἄν δύνασθαι πείθειν. καί φονεύειν δέ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἥκιστα συμβαίνει· τίς γάρ ἀποκτεῖναί τινα βούλοιτ' ἄν μᾶλλον ἤ ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρῆσθαι;	What's more, a man who dares to use force would need quite a few allies, while a man who can persuade needs none, since he would believe he could persuade all on his own. And such people are least likely to end up killing anyone. Who would rather kill someone than keep him alive as a willing follower to make use of?
1.2.12	ἀλλ', ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητά γενομένω Κριτίας τε καί Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεῖστα κακά τήν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Κριτίας μέν γάρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων πλεονεκτίστατός τε καί βιαιότατος [καί φονικώτατος] ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δέ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατός τε καί ὑβριστότατος [καί βιαιότατος].	"But," said the accuser, "Critias and Alcibiades were associates of Socrates, and the two of them did the city a great deal of harm. Critias was the greediest and most violent [and most murderous] of all the members of the oligarchy. Alcibiades, for his part, was the most uncontrolled and insolent [and violent] of all the men under the democracy."[7]
1.2.13	ἐγώ δ', εἰ μέν τι κακόν ἐκείνω τήν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην, οὐκ ἀπολογήσομαι· τήν δέ πρός Σωκράτη συνουσίαν αὐτοῖν ὡς ἐγένετο διηγήσομαι.	For my part, if those two did the city any harm, I won't defend them. But I will describe how their association with Socrates came about.
1.2.14	ἐγενέσθην μέν γάρ δή τώ ἄνδρε τούτω φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων, βουλομένω τε πάντα δι' ἑαυτῶν πράττεσθαι καί πάντων ὀνομαστοτάτω γενέσθαι. ἤδεσαν δέ Σωκράτη ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μέν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα, τῶν ἡδονῶν δέ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατον ὄντα, τοῖς δέ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιτο.	These two men were by nature the most ambitious of all the Athenians. They wanted everything to be done through themselves, and they wanted to become the most famous men of all. They knew that Socrates lived with complete self-sufficiency on the slenderest means. They knew he was the most self-controlled of men with regard to every pleasure. And they knew that in argument he could handle everyone who talked with him just as he liked.

6 Most Athenian officials were chosen by lot, with beans used in the drawing. Xenophon's "accuser" may be the pamphleteer Polycrates rather than one of the prosecutors at the trial.
7 Critias led the Thirty, the oligarchy that ruled Athens by terror in 404–403 BC. Alcibiades, a brilliant and reckless democratic leader, defected to Sparta during the Peloponnesian War.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.2.15	ταῦτα δέ ὁρῶντε καί ὄντε οἵω προείρησθον, πότερόν τις αὐτώ φῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντε καί τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἣν ἐκεῖνος εἶχεν, ὀρέξασθαι τῆς ὁμιλίας αὐτοῦ, ἢ νομίσαντε, εἰ ὁμιλησαίτην ἐκείνῳ, γενέσθαι ἄν ἱκανωτάτω λέγειν τε καί πράττειν;	Seeing this, and being the sort of men I've just described, why did they seek his company? Would anyone say it was because they desired Socrates' way of life and the moderation he had? Or was it because they thought that if they associated with him, they would become supremely capable in speech and action?
1.2.16	ἐγώ μέν γάρ ἡγοῦμαι, θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτοῖν ἤ ζῆν ὅλον τόν βίον ὥσπερ ζῶντα Σωκράτη ἑώρων ἤ τεθνάναι, ἑλέσθαι ἄν μᾶλλον αὐτώ τεθνάναι. δήλω δ' ἐγενέσθην ἐξ ὧν ἐπραξάτην· ὡς γάρ τάχιστα κρείττονε τῶν συγγιγνομένων ἡγησάσθην εἶναι, εὐθύς ἀποπηδήσαντε Σωκράτους ἐπραττέτην τά πολιτικά, ὥνπερ ἕνεκα Σωκράτους ὠρεχθήτην.	I myself believe that if a god had offered them the choice between dying and living their whole lives as they saw Socrates living, they would have chosen to die. They made this plain by what they did. As soon as they thought themselves superior to their companions, they leapt away from Socrates and went into politics, the very thing for which they had sought him out.
1.2.17	Ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἄν πρός ταῦτα ὅτι ἐχρῆν τόν Σωκράτη μή πρότερον τά πολιτικά διδάσκειν τούς συνόντας ἤ σωφρονεῖν. ἐγώ δέ πρός τοῦτο μέν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω· πάντας δέ τούς διδάσκοντας ὁρῶ αὐτούς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μανθάνουσιν ᾗπερ αὐτοί ποιοῦσιν ἅ διδάσκουσι καί τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας. οἶδα δέ καί Σωκράτη δεικνύντα τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἑαυτόν καλόν κἀγαθόν ὄντα καί διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περί ἀρετῆς καί τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρωπίνων.	Perhaps someone might reply to this that Socrates should not have taught his companions politics before he taught them moderation. I don't dispute that. But I see that all teachers show their pupils how they themselves do what they teach, and also win them over by argument. And I know that Socrates, too, showed his companions that he himself was a true gentleman, and that he discussed excellence and other human matters beautifully.
1.2.18	οἶδα δέ κἀκείνω σωφρονοῦντε, ἕστε Σωκράτει συνήστην, οὐ φοβουμένω μή ζημιοῖντο ἤ παίοιντο ὑπό Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' οἰομένω τότε κράτιστον εἶναι τοῦτο πράττειν.	I also know that those two behaved sensibly as long as they kept company with Socrates. They did not do so out of fear that Socrates would fine them or beat them. They did so because at the time they thought this was the best way to behave.
1.2.19	Ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἄν πολλοί τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδέ ὁ σώφρων ὑβριστής, οὐδέ ἄλλο οὐδέν ὧν μάθησίς ἐστιν ὁ μαθών ἀνεπιστήμων ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. ἐγώ δέ περί τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω· ὁρῶ γάρ ὥσπερ τά τοῦ σώματος ἔργα τούς μή τά σώματα ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους ποιεῖν, οὕτω καί τά τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τούς μή τήν ψυχήν ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους· οὔτε γάρ ἅ δεῖ πράττειν οὔτε ὧν δεῖ ἀπέχεσθαι δύνανται.	Perhaps many of those who claim to pursue philosophy might say that a just man could never become unjust, or a sensible man insolent. In the same way, they might say, no one who has learned anything that can be learned could ever lose that knowledge. That isn't my view of these matters. I see that people who don't train their bodies can't do the work of the body, and in the same way people who don't train their souls can't do the work of the soul. They can neither do what they should nor refrain from what they shouldn't.
1.2.20	διό καί τούς υἱεῖς οἱ πατέρες, κἄν ὦσι σώφρονες, ὅμως ἀπό τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴργουσιν, ὡς τήν μέν τῶν χρηστῶν ὁμιλίαν ἄσκησιν οὖσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς, τήν δέ τῶν πονηρῶν κατάλυσιν. μαρτυρεῖ δέ καί τῶν ποιητῶν ὅ τε λέγων· Ἐσθλῶν μέν γάρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά διδάξεαι· ἢν δέ κακοῖσι / συμμίσγῃς. ἀπολεῖς καί τόν ἐόντα νόον, καὶ ὁ	That's why fathers keep their sons away from bad people, even when the sons are sensible. Good company, they think, is training in excellence, while bad company undoes it. One of the poets bears witness to this when he says: "From the good you will learn good things; but if with the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	λέγων· Αὐτάρ ἀνήρ ἀγαθός τοτέ μέν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός.	bad / you mingle, you will lose even the sense you have." Another bears witness when he says: "But a good man is sometimes bad, and at other times good."[8]
1.2.21	κἀγώ δέ μαρτυρῶ τούτοις ὁρῶ γάρ ὥσπερ τῶν ἐν μέτρῳ πεποιημένων ἐπῶν τούς μή μελετῶντας ἐπιλανθανομένους, οὕτω καί τῶν διδασκαλικῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀμελοῦσι λήθην ἐγγιγνομένην. ὅταν δέ τῶν νουθετικῶν λόγων ἐπιλάθηταί τις, ἐπιλέλησται καί ὧν ἡ ψυχή πάσχουσα τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπεθύμει· τούτων δ' ἐπιλαθόμενον οὐδέν θαυμαστόν καί τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπιλαθέσθαι.	I bear witness to them too. I see that people who don't practice forget verses composed in meter, and in the same way those who neglect what their teachers have told them come to forget it. And when someone forgets words of advice, he has also forgotten the experiences that made his soul desire moderation. Once he has forgotten these, it's no wonder that he forgets moderation too.
1.2.22	ὁρῶ δέ καί τούς εἰς φιλοποσίαν προαχθέντας καί τούς εἰς ἔρωτας ἐγκυλισθέντας ἧττον δυναμένους τῶν τε δεόντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καί τῶν μή δεόντων ἀπέχεσθαι. πολλοί γάρ καί χρημάτων δυνάμενοι φείδεσθαι, πρίν ἐρᾶν, ἐρασθέντες οὐκέτι δύνανται καί τά χρήματα καταναλώσαντες, ὧν πρόσθεν ἀπείχοντο κερδῶν, αἰσχρά νομίζοντες εἶναι, τούτων οὐκ ἀπέχονται.	I also see that people who have been drawn into heavy drinking, or have tumbled headlong into love affairs, are less able to attend to what they should and refrain from what they shouldn't. Many who were able to be careful with money before they fell in love can no longer manage it once they are in love. And when they have spent all their money, they no longer refrain from the kinds of gain they used to avoid because they thought them shameful.
1.2.23	πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται σωφρονήσαντα πρόσθεν αὖθις μή σωφρονεῖν καί δίκαια δυνηθέντα πράττειν αὖθις ἀδυνατεῖν; πάντα μέν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τά καλά καί τἀγαθά ἀσκητά εἶναι, οὐχ ἥκιστα δέ σωφροσύνη. ἐν τῷ γάρ αὐτῷ σώματι συμπεφυτευμέναι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἡδοναί πείθουσιν αὐτήν μή σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλά τήν ταχίστην ἑαυταῖς τε καί τῷ σώματι χαρίζεσθαι.	So how can it not be possible for someone who was sensible before to stop being sensible later? And for someone who was able to act justly to become unable later? To me, at any rate, everything fine and good seems to depend on training, and moderation not least. Pleasures are planted together with the soul in the same body, and they persuade the soul to abandon moderation and gratify them and the body as quickly as possible.
1.2.24	Καί Κριτίας δή καί Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μέν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μή καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε, Κριτίας μέν φυγών εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἤ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις, Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διά μέν κάλλος ὑπό πολλῶν καί σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, διά δύναμιν δέ τήν ἐν τῇ πόλει καί τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπό πολλῶν καί δυνατῶν [κολακεύειν] ἀνθρώπων διαθρυπτόμενος, ὑπό δέ τοῦ δήμου τιμώμενος καί ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύων, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν γυμνικῶν ἀγώνων ἀθληταί ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύοντες ἀμελοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως, οὕτω κἀκεῖνος ἠμέλησεν αὐτοῦ.	So it was with Critias and Alcibiades. As long as they kept company with Socrates, they were able, with him as their ally, to master their ignoble desires. But once they had parted from him, Critias went into exile in Thessaly and kept company there with people who practiced lawlessness rather than justice. Alcibiades, for his part, was hunted by many grand women for his beauty. Because of his power in the city and among the allies, he was pampered by many powerful men [flattering him]. He was honored by the people and easily came first. Athletes in the gymnastic contests who easily come first neglect their training, and in the same way he too neglected himself.

8 The first quotation is from Theognis (lines 35–36); the source of the second is unknown.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.2.25	τοιούτων δέ συμβάντων αὐτοῖν, καί ὠγκωμένω μέν ἐπί γένει, ἐπηρμένω δ' ἐπί πλούτῳ, πεφυσημένω δ' ἐπί δυνάμει, διατεθρυμμένω δέ ὑπό πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπί δέ πᾶσι τούτοις [διεφθαρμένω] καί πολύν χρόνον ἀπό Σωκράτους γεγονότε, τί θαυμαστόν εἰ ὑπερηφάνω ἐγενέσθην;	With all this happening to them, they were puffed up over their birth, elated by their wealth, inflated by their power, and spoiled by many people. On top of all this they were [corrupted] and had long been separated from Socrates. What wonder is it, then, that they became arrogant?
1.2.26	εἶτα, εἰ μέν τι ἐπλημμελησάτην, τούτου Σωκράτη ὁ κατήγορος αἰτιᾶται; ὅτι δέ νέω ὄντε αὐτώ, ἡνίκα καί ἀγνωμονεστάτω καί ἀκρατεστάτω εἰκός εἶναι, Σωκράτης παρέσχε σώφρονε, οὐδενός ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ τῷ κατηγόρῳ ἄξιος εἶναι; οὐ μήν τά γε ἄλλα οὕτω κρίνεται.	And then, if they went wrong in some way, does the accuser blame Socrates for it? Socrates made them sensible while they were young, at the age when they would be expected to be at their most thoughtless and uncontrolled. Does the accuser think he deserves no praise at all for that? That's certainly not how other matters are judged.
1.2.27	τίς μέν γάρ αὐλητής, τίς δέ κιθαριστής, τίς δέ ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἱκανούς ποιήσας τούς μαθητάς, ἐάν πρός ἄλλους ἐλθόντες χείρους φανῶσιν, αἰτίαν ἔχει τούτου; τίς δέ πατήρ, ἐάν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ συνδιατρίβων τῳ σωφρονῇ, ὕστερον δέ ἄλλῳ τῳ συγγενόμενος πονηρός γένηται, τόν πρόσθεν αἰτιᾶται, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὅσῳ ἄν παρά τῷ ὑστέρῳ χείρων φαίνηται, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖ τόν πρότερον; ἀλλ' οἵ γε πατέρες αὐτοί συνόντες τοῖς υἱέσι, τῶν παίδων πλημμελούντων, οὐκ αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, ἐάν αὐτοί σωφρονῶσιν.	Take a pipe player, a lyre player, or any other teacher who has made his pupils competent. If they go to other teachers and turn out worse, is he blamed for it? Take a father whose son is sensible while spending time with one person, and later turns bad after associating with someone else. Does the father blame the first person? Doesn't he rather praise the first one all the more, the worse his son looks under the second? Why, even fathers who live with their sons are not blamed when their children go wrong, as long as they themselves are sensible.
1.2.28	οὕτω δέ καί Σωκράτη δίκαιον ἦν κρίνειν· εἰ μέν αὐτός ἐποίει τι φαῦλον, εἰκότως ἄν ἐδόκει πονηρός εἶναι· εἰ δ' αὐτός σωφρονῶν διετέλει, πῶς ἄν δικαίως τῆς οὐκ ἐνούσης αὐτῷ κακίας αἰτίαν ἔχοι;	That is how it would have been just to judge Socrates too. If he himself had done anything base, he would reasonably have been thought a bad man. But if he himself stayed sensible throughout, how could he justly be blamed for a badness that wasn't in him?
1.2.29	ἀλλ' εἰ καί μηδέν αὐτός πονηρόν ποιῶν ἐκείνους φαῦλα πράττοντας ὁρῶν ἐπῄνει, δικαίως ἄν ἐπιτιμῷτο. Κριτίαν μέν τοίνυν αἰσθανόμενος ἐρῶντα Εὐθυδήμου καί πειρῶντα χρῆσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ πρός τἀφροδίσια τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολαύοντες, ἀπέτρεπε φάσκων ἀνελεύθερόν τε εἶναι καί οὐ πρέπον ἀνδρί καλῷ κἀγαθῷ τόν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ βούλεται πολλοῦ ἄξιος φαίνεσθαι, προσαιτεῖν ὥσπερ τούς πτωχούς ἱκετεύοντα καί δεόμενον προσδοῦναι, καί ταῦτα μηδενός ἀγαθοῦ.	Still, if he did nothing bad himself but praised them when he saw them behaving badly, he would rightly be censured. Well, then: when he noticed that Critias was in love with Euthydemus and was trying to make use of him, the way people do who enjoy bodies for sex, he tried to turn him away from it. He told Critias that it was unworthy of a free man, and unbecoming to a true gentleman, to go begging to his beloved, in whose eyes he wanted to appear worth a great deal. Critias was pleading and entreating like a beggar for a handout, and a handout of nothing good at that.
1.2.30	τοῦ δέ Κριτίου τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐχ ὑπακούοντος οὐδέ ἀποτρεπομένου, λέγεται τόν Σωκράτη ἄλλων τε πολλῶν παρόντων καί τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὑικόν αὐτῷ	Critias paid no attention to such words and would not be turned from his course. Socrates is then said to have remarked, in front of Euthydemus

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	δοκοίη πάσχειν ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπιθυμῶν Εὐθυδήμῳ προσκνῆσθαι ὥσπερ τά ὕδια τοῖς λίθοις.	and many others, that Critias seemed to him to have the urge of a pig: he wanted to rub himself against Euthydemus the way piglets rub against stones.
1.2.31	ἐξ ὧν δή καί ἐμίσει τόν Σωκράτη ὁ Κριτίας, ὥστε καί ὅτε τῶν τριάκοντα ὢν νομοθέτης μετά Χαρικλέους ἐγένετο, ἀπεμνημόνευσεν αὐτῷ καί ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε λόγων τέχνην μή διδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ καί οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ ἐπιλάβοιτο, ἀλλά τό κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπό τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ καί διαβάλλων πρός τούς πολλούς· οὐδέ γάρ ἔγωγε οὔτ' αὐτός τοῦτο πώποτε Σωκράτους ἤκουσα οὔτ' ἄλλου του φάσκοντος ἀκηκοέναι ἠσθόμην.	These were the reasons Critias came to hate Socrates. When he was one of the Thirty and became lawgiver together with Charicles, he remembered it against him and wrote into the laws a ban on teaching the art of speech. He meant it as an insult to Socrates. Having no other way to get a hold on him, he pinned on him the charge the multitude commonly brings against philosophers, and so slandered him before the people. I myself never heard Socrates do this, nor did I ever hear of anyone else who claimed to have heard him do it.[9]
1.2.32	ἐδήλωσε δέ· ἐπεί γάρ οἱ τριάκοντα πολλούς μέν τῶν πολιτῶν καί οὐ τούς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον, πολλούς δέ προετρέποντο ἀδικεῖν, εἶπέ που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεύς καί τάς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καί χείρους ποιῶν μή ὁμολογοίη κακός βουκόλος εἶναι, ἔτι δέ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως καί ποιῶν τούς πολίτας ἐλάττους τε καί χείρους μή αἰσχύνεται μηδ' οἴεται κακός εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως.	The grudge came out into the open. The Thirty were putting many citizens to death, and not the worst of them, and were pushing many others into wrongdoing. Socrates remarked somewhere that it seemed amazing to him if a man put in charge of a herd of cattle, who was making the cattle fewer and worse, would not admit he was a bad cowherd. It was more amazing still if a man who had become leader of a city, and was making the citizens fewer and worse, felt no shame and did not think himself a bad leader of the city.
1.2.33	ἀπαγγελθέντος δέ αὐτοῖς τούτου, καλέσαντε ὅ τε Κριτίας καί ὁ Χαρικλῆς τόν Σωκράτη τόν τε νόμον ἐδεικνύτην αὐτῷ καί τοῖς νέοις ἀπειπέτην μή διαλέγεσθαι. ὁ δέ Σωκράτης ἐπήρετο αὐτώ, εἰ ἐξείη πυνθάνεσθαι, εἴ τι ἀγνοοῖτο τῶν προαγορευομένων.	When this was reported to them, Critias and Charicles summoned Socrates, showed him the law, and forbade him to converse with the young. Socrates asked them whether he might put a question, in case there was anything in their orders he didn't understand.
1.2.34	τώ δ' ἐφάτην. Ἐγώ τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρεσκεύασμαι μέν πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις· ὅπως δέ μή δι' ἄγνοιαν λάθω τι παρανομήσας, τοῦτο βούλομαι σαφῶς μαθεῖν παρ' ὑμῶν, πότερον τήν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σύν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες ἤ σύν τοῖς μή ὀρθῶς ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς. εἰ μέν γάρ σύν τοῖς ὀρθῶς, δῆλον ὅτι ἀφεκτέον ἄν εἴη τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν· εἰ δέ σύν τοῖς μή ὀρθῶς, δῆλον ὅτι πειρατέον ὀρθῶς λέγειν.	They said he might. "Well then," he said, "I'm prepared to obey the laws. But I don't want to break one through ignorance without realizing it. So I'd like to learn this clearly from you. When you order me to keep away from the art of speech, is that because you think it goes with speaking correctly, or with speaking incorrectly? If it goes with speaking correctly, then clearly one would have to keep away from speaking correctly. If it goes with speaking incorrectly, then clearly one should try to speak correctly."
1.2.35	καί ὁ Χαρικλῆς ὀργισθείς αὐτῷ· Ἐπειδή, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγνοεῖς, τάδε σοι εὐμαθέστερα ὄντα προαγορεύομεν, τοῖς	Charicles lost his temper with him. "Since you don't understand, Socrates," he said, "we'll give

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	νέοις ὅλως μή διαλέγεσθαι. καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Ἵνα τοίνυν, ἔφη, μή ἀμφίβολον ᾖ [ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῶ ἤ τά προηγορευμένα], ὁρίσατέ μοι μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν δεῖ νομίζειν νέους εἶναι τούς ἀνθρώπους. καί ὁ Χαρικλῆς· Ὅσουπερ, εἶπε, χρόνου βουλεύειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὡς οὔπω φρονίμοις οὖσι· μηδέ σύ διαλέγου νεωτέροις τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.	you an order that's easier to understand: don't converse with the young at all." And Socrates said, "Then so there's no doubt [about whether I'm doing anything other than what I've been ordered], define for me up to what age I should consider people young." And Charicles said, "For as long as they aren't allowed to sit on the Council, since they don't yet have understanding. So don't converse with anyone under thirty, either."
1.2.36	Μηδ' ἐάν τι ὠνῶμαι, ἔφη, ἤν πωλῇ νεώτερος τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, ἔρωμαι ὁπόσου πωλεῖ; Ναί τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς· ἀλλά τοι σύγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴωθας εἰδώς πῶς ἔχει τά πλεῖστα ἐρωτᾶν· ταῦτα οὖν μή ἐρώτα. Μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν, ἔφη, ἄν τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, ἐάν εἰδῶ, οἷον ποῦ οἰκεῖ Χαρικλῆς ἤ ποῦ ἐστι Κριτίας; Ναί τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς.	"Not even if I'm buying something," he said, "and the seller is under thirty? May I not ask him how much he wants for it?" "Oh, things like that, yes," said Charicles. "But you, Socrates, are in the habit of asking questions when you know perfectly well how most things stand. So don't ask those." "Then am I not to answer either," he said, "if a young man asks me something I know, like where Charicles lives or where Critias is?" "Things like that, yes," said Charicles.
1.2.37	ὁ δέ Κριτίας· ἀλλά τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καί τῶν τεκτόνων καί τῶν χαλκέων· καί γάρ οἶμαι αὐτούς ἤδη κατατετρῖφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπό σοῦ. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καί τῶν ἑπομένων τούτοις, τοῦ τε δικαίου καί τοῦ ὁσίου καί τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων; Ναί μά Δί', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς· καί τῶν βουκόλων γε· εἰ δέ μή, φυλάττου ὅπως μή καί σύ ἐλάττους τάς βοῦς ποιήσῃς.	And Critias said, "But you'll have to keep away from these, Socrates: your shoemakers and carpenters and smiths. In fact I think they're worn out by now, with you talking them to death." "Then also from what goes along with them," said Socrates, "the just, the pious, and all the rest of that kind?" "Yes, by Zeus," said Charicles, "and from cowherds too. Otherwise watch out that you don't make the cattle fewer yourself."
1.2.38	ἔνθα καί δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι ἀπαγγελθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ περί τῶν βοῶν λόγου ὠργίζοντο τῷ Σωκράτει. Οἷα μέν οὖν ἡ συνουσία ἐγεγόνει Κριτίᾳ πρός Σωκράτη καί ὡς εἶχον πρός ἀλλήλους, εἴρηται.	That made it plain that they were angry with Socrates because his remark about the cattle had been reported to them. I have now told what sort of association Critias had had with Socrates, and how the two stood toward each other.
1.2.39	φαίην δ' ἄν ἔγωγε μηδενί μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρά τοῦ μή ἀρέσκοντος. Κριτίας δέ καί Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὡμιλησάτην ὅν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι γάρ Σωκράτει συνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισί μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἤ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι τά πολιτικά.	I would maintain that nobody gets any education from someone he doesn't like. Critias and Alcibiades did not like Socrates during the time they kept company with him. From the very beginning they were bent on leading the city. Even while they were still with Socrates, there was no one they were keener to talk with than those most active in politics.
1.2.40	λέγεται γάρ Ἀλκιβιάδην, πρίν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι, Περικλεῖ ἐπιτρόπῳ μέν ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ, προστάτῃ δέ τῆς πόλεως, τοιάδε διαλεχθῆναι περί νόμων·	It is said, for instance, that Alcibiades, before he was twenty, had a conversation like this about

9 The Thirty were the oligarchic regime installed in Athens after its defeat by Sparta in 404 BC; Critias and Charicles were among its leaders.

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		laws with Pericles, who was his guardian and also the leader of the city:
1.2.41	Εἰπέ μοι, φάναι, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἔχοις ἄν με διδάξαι τί ἐστι νόμος; Πάντως δήπου, φάναι τόν Περικλέα. Δίδαξον δή πρός τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τόν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ὡς ἐγώ ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι νόμιμοι ἄνδρες εἰσίν, οἶμαι μή ἄν δικαίως τούτου τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαίνου τόν μή εἰδότα τί ἐστι νόμος.	"Tell me, Pericles," he said, "could you teach me what a law is?" "Certainly," said Pericles. "Then teach me, for the gods' sake," said Alcibiades. "When I hear certain people praised as law-abiding men, I think that nobody who doesn't know what a law is could rightly earn that praise."
1.2.42	ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμεῖς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φάναι τόν Περικλέα, βουλόμενος γνῶναι τί ἐστι νόμος· πάντες γάρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὕς τό πλῆθος συνελθόν καί δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον, ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καί ἅ μή. Πότερον δέ τἀγαθά νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν ἤ τά κακά; Τἀγαθά νή Δία, φάναι, ὦ μειράκιον, τά δέ κακά οὔ.	"Well, Alcibiades," said Pericles, "there's nothing very difficult about what you want, if you want to know what a law is. Laws are all the things the people has met together, approved, and written down, declaring what must be done and what must not." "And does it think one must do good things, or bad ones?" "Good things, by Zeus, my boy," he said, "not bad."
1.2.43	Ἐάν δέ μή τό πλῆθος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ὅπου ὀλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὀλίγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν ὅ τι χρή ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστι; Πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἄν τό κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον, ἅ χρή ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. Κἄν τύραννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις, ἅ χρή ποιεῖν, καί ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί; Καί ὅσα τύραννος ἄρχων, φάναι, γράφει, καί ταῦτα νόμος καλεῖται.	"And if it isn't the people, but a few who meet and write down what must be done, as where there's an oligarchy, what are these?" "Everything that the controlling power in the city writes down," he said, "after deliberating about what must be done, is called law." "So if a tyrant controlling the city writes down for the citizens what they must do, is that law too?" "Whatever a tyrant writes down as ruler," he said, "is also called law."
1.2.44	Βία δέ, φάναι, καί ἀνομία τί ἐστιν, ὦ Περίκλεις; ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τόν ἧττω μή πείσας, ἀλλά βιασάμενος, ἀναγκάσῃ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἄν αὐτῷ δοκῇ; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, φάναι τόν Περικλέα. Καί ὅσα ἄρα τύραννος μή πείσας τούς πολίτας ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν γράφων, ἀνομία ἐστί; δοκεῖ μοι, φάναι τόν Περικλέα· ἀνατίθεμαι γάρ τό, ὅσα τύραννος μή πείσας γράφει, νόμον εἶναι.	"And what are force and lawlessness, Pericles?" he said. "Aren't they when the stronger compels the weaker to do whatever he likes, not by persuading him but by forcing him?" "I think so," said Pericles. "Then whatever a tyrant writes down and compels the citizens to do without persuading them is lawlessness?" "I think so," said Pericles. "I take back what I said, that whatever a tyrant writes down without persuading people is law."
1.2.45	Ὅσα δέ οἱ ὀλίγοι τούς πολλούς μή πείσαντες, ἀλλά κρατοῦντες γράφουσι, πότερον βίαν φῶμεν ἤ μή φῶμεν εἶναι; Πάντα μοι δοκεῖ, φάναι τόν Περικλέα, ὅσα τις μή πείσας ἀναγκάζει τινά ποιεῖν, εἴτε γράφων εἴτε μή, βία μᾶλλον ἤ νόμος εἶναι. Καί ὅσα ἄρα τό πᾶν πλῆθος κρατοῦν τῶν τά χρήματα ἐχόντων γράφει μή πεῖσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἤ νόμος ἄν εἴη;	"And what the few write down, not by persuading the many but by overpowering them, shall we call that force, or not?" "Everything that anyone compels another to do without persuading him," said Pericles, "whether he writes it down or not, seems to me force rather than law." "Then whatever the whole people writes down while overpowering the propertied, without persuading them, would be force rather than law?"
1.2.46	Μάλα τοι, φάναι τόν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καί ἡμεῖς τηλικοῦτοι ὄντες δεινοί τά τοιαῦτα ἦμεν· τοιαῦτα γάρ καί ἐμελετῶμεν καί ἐσοφιζόμεθα οἷάπερ καί σύ νῦν ἐμοί	"You know, Alcibiades," said Pericles, "when we were your age, we were very clever at this sort of thing too. We used to practice and spin clever ar-

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	δοκεῖς μελετᾶν. τόν δέ Ἀλκιβιάδην φάναι· Εἴθε σοι, ὦ Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγενόμην ὅτε δεινότατος ἑαυτοῦ [ταῦτα] ἦσθα.	guments about exactly the kind of things I think you're practicing now." And Alcibiades said, "I wish I'd been with you, Pericles, back when you were at your cleverest [at these things]."
1.2.47	Ἐπεί τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μέν οὐκέτι προσῇσαν· οὔτε γάρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν, εἴ τε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπέρ ὧν ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τά δέ τῆς πόλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καί Σωκράτει προσῆλθον.	So as soon as they supposed they were superior to those active in politics, they stopped going to Socrates. They didn't like him anyway, and if they did come, they resented being refuted for their mistakes. Instead they went in for the city's affairs, which was the very reason they had come to Socrates in the first place.
1.2.48	ἀλλά Κρίτων τε Σωκράτους ἦν ὁμιλητής καί Χαιρεφῶν καί Χαιρεκράτης καί Ἑρμογένης καί Σιμμίας καί Κέβης καί Φαιδώνδας καί ἄλλοι, οἵ ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν, οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοί ἤ δικανικοί γένοιντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοί τε κἀγαθοί γενόμενοι καί οἴκῳ καί οἰκέταις καί οἰκείοις καί φίλοις καί πόλει καί πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι. καί τούτων οὐδείς οὔτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ὢν οὔτ' ἐποίησε κακόν οὐδέν οὔτ' αἰτίαν ἔσχεν.	But Crito kept company with Socrates, and so did Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others who spent time with him. They did so not to become public speakers or courtroom pleaders, but to become true gentlemen and be able to deal well with household and household slaves, relatives and friends, city and citizens. And none of these men, younger or older, ever did anything bad or was ever accused of it.
1.2.49	Ἀλλά Σωκράτης γ', ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τούς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε, πείθων μέν τούς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων. φάσκων δέ κατά νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἑλόντι καί τόν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ὡς τόν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπό τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἴη δεδέσθαι.	"But Socrates," said the accuser, "taught people to treat their fathers with contempt. He persuaded those who kept company with him that he was making them wiser than their fathers. He claimed that the law allows a man to have even his father put in chains once he has convicted him of insanity. He used this as evidence that it was lawful for the more ignorant to be kept in chains by the wiser."
1.2.50	Σωκράτης δέ τόν μέν ἀμαθίας ἕνεκα δεσμεύοντα δικαίως ἄν καί αὐτόν ᾤετο δεδέσθαι ὑπό τῶν ἐπισταμένων ἅ μή αὐτός ἐπίσταται· καί τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα πολλάκις ἐσκόπει, τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθία· καί τούς μέν μαινομένους ᾤετο συμφερόντως ἄν δεδέσθαι καί ἑαυτοῖς καί τοῖς φίλοις, τούς δέ μή ἐπισταμένους τά δέοντα δικαίως ἄν μανθάνειν παρά τῶν ἐπισταμένων.	But Socrates thought that anyone who put another man in chains for ignorance would himself deserve to be put in chains by those who know what he doesn't. With cases like this in mind, he often examined how ignorance differs from madness. He thought it was to their own advantage, and their friends', that madmen should be kept in chains. But those who didn't know what they should, he thought, would rightly learn it from those who did.
1.2.51	ἀλλά Σωκράτης γε, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τούς πατέρας ἀλλά καί τούς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρά τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὔτε τούς κάμνοντας οὔτε τούς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελοῦσιν, ἀλλά τούς μέν οἱ ἰατροί, τούς δέ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι	"But Socrates," said the accuser, "made those who kept company with him hold not only their fathers but their other relatives too in low esteem. He told them that relatives are no help either to the sick or to people involved in lawsuits. The sick are helped

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		by doctors, and litigants by those who know how to plead a case."
1.2.52	ἔφη δέ καί περί τῶν φίλων αὐτόν λέγειν ὡς οὐδέν ὄφελος εὔνους εἶναι, εἰ μή καί ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται μόνους δέ φάσκειν αὐτόν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τούς εἰδότας τά δέοντα καί ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους· ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τούς νέους αὐτόν ὡς αὐτός εἴη σοφώτατός τε καί ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τούς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τούς ἄλλους εἶναι πρός ἑαυτόν.	He also said that Socrates spoke of friends in the same way. He said it was no use their being well-disposed unless they could also be of help, and that only those who knew what was needed and could explain it deserved honor. So, the accuser said, by convincing the young that he himself was the wisest of men and the most capable of making others wise, he put those who kept company with him in such a frame of mind that, in their eyes, everyone else counted for nothing compared to him.
1.2.53	ἐγώ δ' αὐτόν οἶδα μέν καί περί πατέρων τε καί τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν [τε] καί περί φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καί πρός τούτοις γε δή ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις, τό σῶμα τοῦ οἰκειοτάτου ἀνθρώπου τήν ταχίστην ἐξενεγκόντες ἀφανίζουσιν.	Now I know that he did say these things about fathers and other relatives and about friends. He also said that once the soul has left, the soul in which alone understanding arises, people carry out the body of even their nearest and dearest as fast as they can and put it out of sight.
1.2.54	ἔλεγε δ', ὅτι καί ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ, ὅν πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὅ τι ἄν ἀχρεῖον ᾖ καί ἀνωφελές, αὐτός τε ἀφαιρεῖ καί ἄλλῳ παρέχει. αὐτοί τέ γε αὐτῶν ὄνυχάς τε καί τρίχας καί τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι καί τοῖς ἰατροῖς παρέχουσι μετά πόνων τε καί ἀλγηδόνων καί ἀποτέμνειν καί ἀποκάειν καί τούτου χάριν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς καί μισθόν τίνειν· καί τό σίαλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν ὡς δύνανται πορρωτάτω, διότι ὠφελεῖ μέν οὐδέν αὐτούς ἐνόν, βλάπτει δέ πολύ μᾶλλον.	He used to say, too, that even while he is alive, each person removes, or lets someone else remove, any part of his own body that is useless and unprofitable, though he loves his body above everything. People remove their own nails and hair and calluses. They let doctors cut and cauterize them, with toil and pain, and even think they ought to pay them a fee for it. And they spit the saliva out of their mouths as far as they can, because it does them no good staying inside and does them much more harm.
1.2.55	ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν οὐ τόν μέν πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων, ἑαυτόν δέ κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων, ὅτι τό ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι, παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καί ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπό πατρός ἐάν τε ὑπό ἀδελφοῦ ἐάν τε ὑπ' ἄλλου τινός βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μή τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλά πειρᾶται, ὑφ' ὧν ἄν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.	He said these things not to teach people to bury their fathers alive or cut themselves to pieces. He was showing that what lacks understanding is held in no honor. He urged people to take care to have as much understanding and be as useful as possible. That way, if a man wants to be honored by his father, his brother, or anyone else, he won't rely on being family and neglect himself, but will try to be useful to those he wants to be honored by.
1.2.56	Ἔφη δ' αὐτόν ὁ κατήγορος καί τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τά πονηρότατα καί τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τούς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καί τυραννικούς, Ἡσιόδου μέν τό Ἔργον δ' οὐδέν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος· τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ὁ	The accuser also said that Socrates picked out the most wicked passages from the most famous poets and used them as evidence to teach his companions to be criminals and tyrants. One was Hesiod's line "Work is no disgrace; idleness is a disgrace." The accuser said Socrates explained this to mean

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ποιητὴς κελεύει μηδενὸς ἔργου μήτ' ἀδίκου μήτ' αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει.	that the poet tells us to shrink from no work, whether unjust or shameful, but to do even that for gain.
1.2.57	Σωκράτης δ' ἐπεί διομολογήσαιτο τό μέν ἐργάτην εἶναι ὠφέλιμόν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καί ἀγαθόν εἶναι, τό δέ ἀργόν βλαβερόν τε καί κακόν, καί τό μέν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγαθόν, τό δ' ἀργεῖν κακόν, τούς μέν ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἐργάζεσθαί τε ἔφη καί ἐργάτας [ἀγαθοὺς] εἶναι, τούς δέ κυβεύοντας ἤ τι ἄλλο πονηρόν καί ἐπιζήμιον ποιοῦντας ἀργούς ἀπεκάλει. ἐκ δέ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἄν ἔχοι τό Ἔργον δ' οὐδέν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος. τό	But Socrates would first get agreement that being a worker is beneficial and good for a person, and being idle harmful and bad, so that working is good and idling bad. Then he would say that those who do something good are working and are [good] workers, while those who gamble or do anything else wicked and ruinous he called idle. On that basis the line "Work is no disgrace; idleness is a disgrace" would be right.
1.2.58	δέ Ὁμήρου ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτόν λέγειν, ὅτι Ὀδυσσεύς Ὄντινα μέν βασιλῆα καί ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη, τόν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς· δαιμόνι', οὔ σε ἔοικε κακόν ὥς δειδίσσεσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτός τε κάθησο καί ἄλλους ἵδρυε λαούς. ὅν δ' αὖ δήμου τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι, τόν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ· δαιμόνι', ἀτρέμας ἧσο, καί ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε, οἵ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι· σύ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καί ἄναλκις, οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνί βουλῇ. ταῦτα δή αὐτόν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὡς ὁ ποιητής ἐπαινοίη παίεσθαι τούς δημότας καί πένητας.	The accuser also said that Socrates often quoted the passage of Homer about Odysseus: Whenever he came upon a king or a man of note, he would stand beside him and restrain him with gentle words: "Good sir, it isn't right to try to frighten you like a coward; sit down yourself, and make the rest of the people sit." But whenever he saw a man of the people and found him shouting, he would strike him with his staff and rebuke him with words: "Good sir, sit still and listen to what others say, who are better than you; you're unwarlike and weak, never counted for anything in war or in council." The accuser said Socrates explained this to mean that the poet approves of beating common people and the poor.[10]
1.2.59	Σωκράτης δ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἔλεγε· καί γάρ ἑαυτόν οὕτω γ' ἄν ᾤετο δεῖν παίεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἔφη δεῖν τούς μήτε λόγῳ μήτ' ἔργῳ ὠφελίμους, ὄντας μήτε στρατεύματι μήτε πόλει μήτε αὐτῷ τῷ δήμῳ, εἴ τι δέοι, βοηθεῖν ἱκανούς, ἄλλως τ' ἐάν πρός τούτῳ καί θρασεῖς ὦσι, πάντα τρόπον κωλύεσθαι, κἄν πάνυ πλούσιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες.	But Socrates didn't say that. If he had, he would have thought he himself deserved a beating. What he said was that some people are useful neither in word nor in deed, and can't help an army or a city or the people itself when there is need. Such people should be held in check by every means, especially if they are insolent as well, even if they happen to be very rich.
1.2.60	ἀλλά Σωκράτης γε τἀναντία τούτων φανερός ἦν καί δημοτικός καί φιλάνθρωπος ὤν. ἐκεῖνος γάρ πολλούς ἐπιθυμητάς καί ἀστούς καί ξένους λαβών οὐδένα πώποτε μισθόν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλά πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ· ὧν τινες μικρά μέρη παρ' ἐκείνου	Socrates was plainly the opposite of all this: a friend of the people and a friend of humanity. He had many eager followers, citizens and foreigners alike, but he never charged any of them a fee for his company. He shared what was his with all of

10 The lines come from *Iliad* 2.188–191 and 198–202, where Odysseus stops the Greek troops from rushing to their ships to sail home.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	προῖκα λαβόντες πολλοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καί οὐκ ἦσαν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος δημοτικοί· τοῖς γάρ μή ἔχουσι χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι.	them ungrudgingly. Some of them took small portions from him for nothing and sold them to others at a high price. They weren't friends of the people as he was, since they refused to converse with anyone who had no money to give.
1.2.61	ἀλλά Σωκράτης γε καί πρός τούς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κόσμον τῇ πόλει παρεῖχε, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἤ Λίχας τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅς ὀνομαστός ἐπί τούτῳ γέγονε. Λίχας μέν γάρ ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις τούς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξένους ἐδείπνιζε, Σωκράτης δέ διά παντός τοῦ βίου τά ἑαυτοῦ δαπανῶν τά μέγιστα πάντας τούς βουλομένους ὠφέλει· βελτίους γάρ ποιῶν τούς συγγιγνομένους ἀπέπεμπεν.	Socrates also brought the city credit in the eyes of the rest of the world, much more than Lichas did for Sparta, though Lichas became famous for it. Lichas used to give dinners for the foreigners visiting Sparta at the Gymnopaedia. Socrates spent what was his throughout his whole life and conferred the greatest benefits on everyone who wanted them, because he sent away the people who spent time with him better than they had been.[11]
1.2.62	Ἐμοί μέν δή Σωκράτης τοιοῦτος ὤν ἐδόκει τιμῆς ἄξιος εἶναι τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἤ θανάτου. καί κατά τούς νόμους δέ σκοπῶν ἄν τις τοῦθ' εὕροι. κατά γάρ τούς νόμους, ἐάν τις φανερός γένηται κλέπτων ἤ λωποδυτῶν ἤ βαλλαντιοτομῶν ἤ τοιχωρυχῶν ἤ ἀνδραποδιζόμενος ἤ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία· ὧν ἐκεῖνος πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστον ἀπεῖχεν.	To me, then, Socrates, being the man he was, seemed to deserve honor from the city rather than death. Anyone who considered the matter in terms of the laws would reach the same conclusion. Under the laws, the penalty is death for anyone caught stealing, stripping people of their clothes, cutting purses, breaking into houses, kidnapping people to sell as slaves, or robbing temples. Of all people, he kept furthest from these crimes.
1.2.63	ἀλλά μήν τῇ πόλει γε οὔτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος οὔτε στάσεως οὔτε προδοσίας οὔτε ἄλλου κακοῦ οὐδενός πώποτε αἴτιος ἐγένετο· οὐδέ μήν ἰδίᾳ γε οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησεν οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰτίαν τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδενός πώποτ' ἔσχε.	What's more, he was never responsible for any harm to the city, whether a war that went badly, civil strife, treason, or anything else. In private life he never deprived anyone of good things or plunged anyone into bad ones. He was never even accused of any of the things I've mentioned.
1.2.64	πῶς οὖν ἄν ἔνοχος εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; ὅς ἀντί μέν τοῦ μή νομίζειν θεούς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐγέγραπτο, φανερός ἦν θεραπεύων τούς θεούς μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἀντί δέ τοῦ διαφθείρειν τούς νέους, ὅ δή ὁ γραψάμενος αὐτόν ᾐτιᾶτο, φανερός ἦν τῶν συνόντων τούς πονηράς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας τούτων μέν παύων, τῆς δέ καλλίστης καί μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ᾗ πόλεις τε καί οἶκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν· ταῦτα δέ πράττων πῶς οὐ μεγάλης ἄξιος ἦν τιμῆς τῇ πόλει;	So how could he be guilty under the indictment? The indictment said he did not recognize the gods, yet he was plainly more devoted to serving the gods than anyone. His accuser charged him with corrupting the young, yet he was plainly stopping those of his companions who had wicked desires from pursuing them. He urged them instead to desire the finest and most magnificent excellence, the kind by which cities and households are well run. Since he did all this, how did he not deserve great honor from the city?

11 Lichas was a wealthy Spartan famous for his hospitality; the Gymnopaedia was a Spartan festival with dances and displays by naked youths.

CHAPTER 3

Socrates prays simply, sacrifices modestly, and keeps strict control over food, drink and sex.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.3.1	Ὡς δέ δή καί ὠφελεῖν ἐδόκει μοι τούς συνόντας τά μέν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτόν οἷος ἦν, τά δέ καί διαλεγόμενος, τούτων δή γράψω ὁπόσα ἄν διαμνημονεύσω. τά μέν τοίνυν πρός τούς θεούς φανερός ἦν καί ποιῶν καί λέγων ᾗπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἤ περί θυσίας ἤ περί προγόνων θεραπείας ἤ περί ἄλλου τινός τῶν τοιούτων· ἥ τε γάρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἄν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτω καί αὐτός ἐποίει καί τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῄνει, τούς δέ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καί ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.	In my view he also benefited those who spent time with him, partly by showing in action what kind of man he was, and partly through conversation. I'll now write down as much of this as I can recall. In matters concerning the gods, he plainly acted and spoke just as the Pythia answers those who ask how they should act about sacrifice, the care of their ancestors, or anything else of the kind. The Pythia's answer is that people who act according to the law of their city will be acting piously. Socrates both acted that way himself and urged others to do so, and he thought that those who acted otherwise were overly fussy and foolish.[12]
1.3.2	καί ηὔχετο δέ πρός τούς θεούς ἁπλῶς τἀγαθά διδόναι, ὡς τούς θεούς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὁποῖα ἀγαθά ἐστι· τούς δ' εὐχομένους χρυσίον ἤ ἀργύριον ἤ τυραννίδα ἤ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὔχεσθαι ἤ εἰ κυβείαν ἤ μάχην ἤ ἄλλο τι εὔχοιντο τῶν φανερῶς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο.	He prayed to the gods simply to give him good things, believing the gods know best what sorts of things are good. People who prayed for gold or silver or tyranny or anything like that were, he thought, praying for nothing different than if they prayed for a throw of the dice or a battle or anything else whose outcome was plainly uncertain.
1.3.3	θυσίας δέ θύων μικράς ἀπό μικρῶν οὐδέν ἡγεῖτο μειοῦσθαι τῶν ἀπό πολλῶν καί μεγάλων πολλά καί μεγάλα θυόντων. οὔτε γάρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔφη καλῶς ἔχειν, εἰ ταῖς μεγάλαις θυσίαις μᾶλλον ἤ ταῖς μικραῖς ἔχαιρον· πολλάκις γάρ ἄν αὐτοῖς τά παρά τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἤ τά παρά τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι κεχαρισμένα· οὔτ' ἄν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, εἰ τά παρά τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἦν κεχαρισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς ἤ τά παρά τῶν χρηστῶν· ἀλλ' ἐνόμιζε τούς θεούς ταῖς παρά τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν. ἐπαινέτης δ' ἦν καί τοῦ ἔπους τούτου· Καδδύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, καί πρός φίλους δέ καί ξένους καί πρός τήν ἄλλην δίαιταν καλήν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι τήν Καδδύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν.	When he offered small sacrifices from his small means, he thought he came off no worse than those who offered many large sacrifices from many large means. It wouldn't be right for the gods, he said, if they delighted more in large sacrifices than in small ones, since then offerings from the wicked would often please them more than offerings from the good. Nor would life be worth living for human beings if offerings from the wicked were more pleasing to the gods than offerings from the good. No, he believed that the gods delight most in honors from the most pious. He also admired this line: "Offer sacrifice to the immortal gods according to your means." And he said that "according to your means" was fine advice for dealing with friends and guests and for the rest of one's way of life as well.
1.3.4	εἰ δέ τι δόξειεν αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρά τῶν θεῶν, ἧττον ἄν ἐπείσθη παρά τά σημαινόμενα ποιῆσαι ἤ εἴ τις αὐτόν ἔπειθεν ὁδοῦ λαβεῖν ἡγεμόνα τυφλόν καί μή εἰδότα τήν ὁδόν ἀντί βλέποντος καί εἰδότος· καί τῶν ἄλλων δέ μωρίαν κατηγόρει, οἵτινες παρά τά ὑπό τῶν θεῶν	If he thought he had been given a sign by the gods, you could sooner have persuaded him to take a blind guide who didn't know the way instead of one who could see and knew it, than to act against

12 The Pythia was the priestess through whom Apollo gave his oracles at Delphi.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	σημαινόμενα ποιοῦσί τι, φυλαττόμενοι τήν παρά τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδοξίαν· αὐτός δέ πάντα τἀνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρός τήν παρά τῶν θεῶν συμβουλίαν.	the sign. He denounced the folly of others who act against signs from the gods to avoid people's disapproval. He himself thought nothing of every human consideration compared with counsel from the gods.
1.3.5	Διαίτῃ δέ τήν τε ψυχήν ἐπαίδευσε καί τό σῶμα ᾗ χρώμενος ἄν τις, εἰ μή τι δαιμόνιον εἴη, θαρραλέως καί ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι καί οὐκ ἄν ἀπορήσειε τοσαύτης δαπάνης. οὕτω γάρ εὐτελής ἦν, ὥστ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις οὕτως ἄν ὀλίγα ἐργάζοιτο ὥστε μή λαμβάνειν τά Σωκράτει ἀρκοῦντα. σίτῳ μέν γάρ τοσούτῳ ἐχρῆτο, ὅσον ἡδέως ἤσθιε, καί ἐπί τοῦτο οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ἦει ὥστε τήν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι· ποτόν δέ πᾶν ἡδύ ἦν αὐτῷ διά τό μή πίνειν, εἰ μή διψῴη.	He trained both his soul and his body with a way of life that would let anyone who followed it live confidently and safely, barring some act of the gods, and never be short of so modest an outlay. He was so frugal that I doubt anyone could work so little that he didn't earn enough to satisfy Socrates. He ate only as much food as he enjoyed eating, and he came to his meals so ready for them that his appetite for food served him as relish. Any drink was pleasant to him, because he didn't drink unless he was thirsty.
1.3.6	εἰ δέ ποτε κληθείς ἐθελήσειεν ἐπί δεῖπνον ἐλθεῖν, ὅ τοῖς πλείστοις ἐργωδέστατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε φυλάξασθαι τό ὑπέρ τόν κόρον ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τοῦτο ῥᾳδίως πάνυ ἐφυλάττετο. τοῖς δέ μή δυναμένοις τοῦτο ποιεῖν συνεβούλευε φυλάττεσθαι τά πείθοντα μή πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν μηδέ διψῶντας πίνειν· καί γάρ τά λυμαινόμενα γαστέρας καί κεφαλάς καί ψυχάς ταῦτ' ἔφη εἶναι.	If he was ever invited to dinner and chose to go, he found it very easy to avoid what most people find hardest, which is stuffing themselves past the point of fullness. Those who couldn't manage this he advised to beware of the things that tempt people to eat when they aren't hungry and drink when they aren't thirsty. These, he said, are what ruin stomachs and heads and souls.
1.3.7	οἴεσθαι δ' ἔφη ἐπισκώπτων καί τήν Κίρκην ὗς ποιεῖν τοιούτοις πολλοῖς δειπνίζουσαν· τόν δέ Ὀδυσσέα Ἑρμοῦ τε ὑποθημοσύνῃ καί αὐτόν ἐγκρατῆ ὄντα καί ἀποσχόμενον τοῦ ὑπέρ τόν κόρον τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, διά ταῦτα οὐ γενέσθαι ὗν.	He said jokingly that he thought Circe, too, turned people into pigs by feasting them on plenty of such things. Odysseus, thanks to Hermes' advice and his own self-control, refrained from touching such things past the point of fullness, and that, he said, was why he didn't become a pig.
1.3.8	τοιαῦτα μέν περί τούτων ἔπαιζεν ἅμα σπουδάζων. Ἀφροδισίων δέ παρῄνει τῶν καλῶν ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέχεσθαι· οὐ γάρ ἔφη ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἁπτόμενον σωφρονεῖν. ἀλλά καί Κριτόβουλόν ποτε τόν Κρίτωνος πυθόμενος, ὅτι ἐφίλησε τόν Ἀλκιβιάδου υἱόν καλόν ὄντα, παρόντος τοῦ Κριτοβούλου ἤρετο Ξενοφῶντα·	This was the sort of thing he joked about, while being serious at the same time. When it came to sex, he urged people to keep well away from the beautiful, since he said it wasn't easy for anyone who touched them to stay sensible. Once, for instance, he learned that Critobulus, Crito's son, had kissed Alcibiades' son, a beautiful boy. With Critobulus present, he asked Xenophon:[13]
1.3.9	Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, οὐ σύ Κριτόβουλον ἐνόμιζες εἶναι τῶν σωφρονικῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἤ τῶν θρασέων καί τῶν προνοητικῶν μᾶλλον ἤ τῶν ἀνοήτων τε καί ῥιψοκινδύνων; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν. Νῦν τοίνυν νόμιζε αὐτόν θερμουργότατον εἶναι καί λεωργότατον· οὗτος κἄν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστήσειε κἄν εἰς πῦρ ἅλοιτο.	"Tell me, Xenophon," he said, "didn't you think Critobulus was one of the sensible sort rather than the reckless, one of those who think ahead rather than the thoughtless and foolhardy?" "Certainly," said Xenophon. "Well, now you can think of him as the most hotheaded and reckless man alive.

13 Xenophon here refers to himself in the third person.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		He'd turn somersaults onto knives, he'd leap into fire."
1.3.10	Καί τί δή, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἰδών ποιοῦντα τοιαῦτα κατέγνωκας αὐτοῦ; Οὐ γάρ οὗτος, ἔφη, ἐτόλμησε τόν Ἀλκιβιάδου υἱόν φιλῆσαι, ὄντα εὐπροσωπότατον καί ὡραιότατον; ἀλλ' εἰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τό ῥιψοκίνδυνον ἔργον, κἄν ἐγώ δοκῶ μοι τόν κίνδυνον τοῦτον ὑπομεῖναι.	"And what did you see him do," said Xenophon, "that made you judge him like this?" "Didn't this fellow dare to kiss Alcibiades' son," he said, "a boy with a very handsome face and in the full bloom of youth?" "Well, if that's what a foolhardy act is," said Xenophon, "I think I'd face that danger myself."
1.3.11	Ὦ, τλῆμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καί τί ἄν οἴει παθεῖν καλόν φιλήσας; ἆρ' οὐκ ἄν αὐτίκα μάλα δοῦλος μέν εἶναι ἀντ' ἐλευθέρου, πολλά δέ δαπανᾶν εἰς βλαβεράς ἡδονάς, πολλήν δέ ἀσχολίαν ἔχειν τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναί τινος καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ, σπουδάζειν δ' ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐφ' οἷς οὐδ' ἄν μαινόμενος σπουδάσειεν;	"You poor wretch," said Socrates, "what do you think would happen to you if you kissed someone beautiful? Wouldn't you at once become a slave instead of a free man? Wouldn't you spend a great deal on harmful pleasures, have no time to attend to anything fine and good, and be forced to take seriously things not even a madman would take seriously?"
1.3.12	Ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ὡς δεινήν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι. Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, θαυμάζεις; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τά φαλάγγια οὐδ' ἡμιωβελιαῖα τό μέγεθος ὄντα προσαψάμενα μόνον τῷ στόματι ταῖς τε ὀδύναις ἐπιτρίβει τούς ἀνθρώπους καί τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐξίστησι; Ναί μά Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν· ἐνίησι γάρ τι τά φαλάγγια κατά τό δῆγμα.	"Heracles!" said Xenophon. "What a terrible power you say a kiss has!" "Does that surprise you?" said Socrates. "Don't you know that venomous spiders, not even the size of a half-obol coin, just by touching people with their mouths, wear them down with pain and drive them out of their minds?" "Yes, by Zeus," said Xenophon, "because spiders inject something when they bite."
1.3.13	Ὦ, μῶρε, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τούς δέ καλούς οὐκ οἴει φιλοῦντας ἐνιέναι τι, ὅτι σύ οὐχ ὁρᾷς; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοῦτο τό θηρίον, ὅ καλοῦσι καλόν καί ὡραῖον, τοσούτῳ δεινότερόν ἐστι τῶν φαλαγγίων, ὅσῳ ἐκεῖνα μέν ἁψάμενα, τοῦτο δέ οὐδ' ἁπτόμενον, ἐάν τις αὐτό θεᾶται, ἐνίησί τι καί πάνυ πρόσωθεν τοιοῦτον ὥστε μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν; ἴσως δέ καί οἱ ἔρωτες τοξόται διά τοῦτο καλοῦνται, ὅτι καί πρόσωθεν οἱ καλοί τιτρώσκουσιν. ἀλλά συμβουλεύω σοι, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, ὁπόταν ἴδῃς τινά καλόν, φεύγειν προτροπάδην. σοί δ', ὦ Κριτόβουλε, συμβουλεύω ἀπενιαυτίσαι· μόλις γάρ ἄν ἴσως ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ [τό δῆγμα] ὑγιής γένοιο.	"You fool," said Socrates, "and don't you think beautiful people inject something when they kiss, just because you can't see it? Don't you know that this creature they call 'beautiful and in bloom' is more dangerous than spiders by just this much: spiders inject something by touching, but this creature doesn't even need to touch. If someone just looks at it, it injects something, even from very far away, that drives him mad. Perhaps that's why the Loves are called archers too, because the beautiful wound us even from far away. My advice to you, Xenophon, is that whenever you see someone beautiful, you run for your life. And you, Critobulus, I advise to go away for a year. Even in that much time you might only barely recover [from the bite]."
1.3.14	οὕτω δή καί ἀφροδισιάζειν τούς μή ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρός ἀφροδίσια ᾤετο χρῆναι πρός τοιαῦτα, οἷα μή πάνυ μέν δεομένου τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἄν προσδέξαιτο ἡ ψυχή, δεομένου δέ οὐκ ἄν πράγματα παρέχοι. αὐτός δέ πρός ταῦτα φανερός ἦν οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ὥστε ῥᾳον	Accordingly, he thought that those who weren't steady where sex was concerned should engage in it only with partners the soul would not welcome unless the body were in real need, and who would cause no trouble when it was. He himself was

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν καλλίστων καί ὡραιοτάτων ἤ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν αἰσχίστων καί ἀωροτάτων.	plainly so well prepared in this regard that he found it easier to keep away from the most beautiful and youthful than others do from the ugliest and least in their prime.
1.3.15	περί μέν δή βρώσεως καί πόσεως καί ἀφροδισίων οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ἦν καί ᾤετο οὐδέν ἄν ἧττον ἀρκούντως ἥδεσθαι τῶν πολλά ἐπί τούτοις πραγματευομένων, λυπεῖσθαι δέ πολύ ἔλαττον.	In matters of food, drink, and sex, then, this was how he was prepared. He believed he took no less pleasure in them, and enjoyed them quite as fully, as those who go to great trouble over them, and that he suffered far less pain.

CHAPTER 4

Socrates shows Aristodemus, who scorns religion, how the design of living things proves the gods' care.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.4.1	Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτη νομίζουσιν, οἷς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καί λέγουσι περί αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μέν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετήν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ' ἐπ' αὐτήν οὐχ ἱκανόν, σκεψάμενοι μή μόνον ἅ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τούς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλά καί ἅ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων εἰ ἱκανός ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τούς συνόντας.	Some people, judging by what certain writers and speakers say about him, believe that Socrates was superb at urging people toward excellence but not capable of leading them on to it. They should consider not only how he questioned and refuted those who thought they knew everything, as a way of chastising them, but also the things he said as he spent his days with his companions. Then let them judge whether he was able to make those who spent time with him better.
1.4.2	λέξω δέ πρῶτον ἅ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περί τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρός Ἀριστόδημον τόν μικρόν ἐπικαλούμενον. καταμαθών γάρ αὐτόν οὔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς οὔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλά καί τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, ἔστιν οὕστινας ἀνθρώπους τεθαύμακας ἐπί σοφίᾳ; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.	First I'll tell what I once heard him say about the divine in a conversation with Aristodemus, nicknamed "the Small." He had found out that Aristodemus neither sacrificed to the gods nor used divination, and even laughed at those who did. "Tell me, Aristodemus," he said, "are there people you've admired for their wisdom?" "There are," he said.
1.4.3	καί ὅς· λέξον ἡμῖν, ἔφη. τά ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. Ἐπί μέν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει Ὅμηρον ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπί δέ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην, ἐπί δέ τραγῳδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπί δέ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ἐπί δέ ζωγραφίᾳ Ζεῦξιν.	And Socrates said, "Tell us their names." "Well, in epic poetry I've admired Homer most, in dithyramb Melanippides, in tragedy Sophocles, in sculpture Polyclitus, and in painting Zeuxis."[14]
1.4.4	Πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἴδωλα ἄφρονά τε καί ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἤ οἱ ζῷα ἔμφρονά τε καί ἐνεργά; Πολύ νή Δία οἱ ζῷα, εἴπερ γε μή τύχῃ τινί, ἀλλ' ὑπό γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. Τῶν δέ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων ὅτου ἕνεκα ἔστι καί τῶν φανερῶς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης καί πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; Πρέπει μέν τά ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης εἶναι ἔργα.	"Do you think those who make images without sense or motion are more admirable, or those who make living creatures with sense and activity?" "The ones who make living creatures, by far, by Zeus—provided, that is, that the creatures come about by design and not by some chance." "And of things that give no clue to what they exist for, and

14 Melanippides was a leading fifth-century BC composer of dithyrambs, choral songs for Dionysus. Polyclitus and Zeuxis were the most celebrated sculptor and painter of the age.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		things that plainly exist for some benefit, which do you judge to be the works of chance and which of design?" "It stands to reason that things that come about for a benefit are the works of design."
1.4.5	Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμούς μέν ὥσθ' ὁρᾶν τά ὁρατά, ὦτα δέ ὥστ' ἀκούειν τά ἀκουστά; ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μή ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἄν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; τίς δ' ἄν αἴσθησις ἦν γλυκέων καί δριμέων καί πάντων τῶν διά στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μή γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων ἐνειργάσθη;	"Then don't you think that the one who made human beings in the beginning gave them, for their benefit, the means by which they perceive each thing? He gave them eyes to see what can be seen and ears to hear what can be heard. And smells—if noses hadn't been added, what use would they be to us? What perception would there be of sweet and sharp things, and of all the pleasures that come through the mouth, if a tongue hadn't been built in to judge them?
1.4.6	πρός δέ τούτοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καί τάδε προνοίας ἔργοις ἐοικέναι, τό, ἐπεί ἀσθενής μέν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, βλεφάροις αὐτήν θυρῶσαι, ἅ, ὅταν μέν αὐτῇ χρῆσθαί τι δέῃ, ἀναπετάννυται, ἐν δέ τῷ ὕπνῳ συγκλείεται, ὡς δ' ἄν μηδέ ἄνεμοι βλάπτωσιν, ἡθμόν βλεφαρίδας ἐμφῦσαι, ὀφρύσι τε ἀπογεισῶσαι τά ὑπέρ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὡς μηδ' ὁ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἱδρώς κακουργῇ· τό δέ τήν ἀκοήν δέχεσθαι μέν πάσας φωνάς, ἐμπίμπλασθαι δέ μήποτε· καί τούς μέν πρόσθεν ὀδόντας πᾶσι ζῴοις οἵους τέμνειν εἶναι, τούς δέ γομφίους οἵους παρά τούτων δεξαμένους λεαίνειν· καί στόμα μέν, δι' οὗ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ τά ζῷα εἰσπέμπεται, πλησίον ὀφθαλμῶν καί ῥινῶν καταθεῖναι, ἐπεί δέ τά ἀποχωροῦντα δυσχερῆ, ἀποστρέψαι τούς τούτων ὀχετούς [καί ἀπενεγκεῖν] ᾗ δυνατόν προσωτάτω ἀπό τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα ἀπορεῖς πότερα τύχης ἤ γνώμης ἔργα ἐστίν;	"Besides these, don't you think the following also look like the works of forethought? Since sight is delicate, it has been fitted with eyelids for doors, which open when it needs to be used and close in sleep. So that even winds can't harm it, lashes have been planted as a sieve. The area above the eyes has been given eaves in the eyebrows, so that not even sweat from the head can do damage. The hearing takes in every sound yet never fills up. All animals have front teeth fit for cutting, and molars fit for taking the food from them and grinding it. The mouth, through which animals send in what they want, has been placed near the eyes and nose; and since what passes out of the body is unpleasant, its channels have been turned away [and carried off] as far as possible from the senses. When these things have been done with such forethought, are you really at a loss whether they are the works of chance or of design?"
1.4.7	Οὐ μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καί φιλοζῴου τεχνήμασι. Τό δέ ἐμφῦσαι μέν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῦσαι δέ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δέ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μέν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δέ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; Ἀμέλει καί ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῷα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου.	"No, by Zeus," he said. "Looked at this way, they do seem very much like the handiwork of some wise craftsman who loves living things." "And what about planting in them the desire to have children, planting in mothers the desire to rear them, and giving the young who are reared the strongest longing to live and the strongest fear of death?" "Certainly these too look like the contrivances of someone who planned for living creatures to exist."
1.4.8	Σύ δ' ἐν σαυτῷ φρόνιμον τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν; Ἐρώτα γοῦν καί ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δέ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδέν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καί ταῦτ' εἰδώς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρόν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καί ὑγροῦ βραχύ πολλοῦ	"And do you think you have something intelligent in yourself?" "Ask me, anyway, and I'll answer." "And you think there's nothing intelligent anywhere else? You know that you have in your body

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	ὄντος καί τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρόν μέρος λαβόντι τό σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δέ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καί τάδε τά ὑπερμεγέθη καί πλῆθος ἄπειρα δι' ἀφροσύνην τινά οὕτως οἴει εὐτάκτως ἔχειν;	a small part of the earth, which is vast, and a little of the moisture, which is abundant. You know too that your body was put together from a small portion of each of the other elements, great as they surely are. Do you think, then, that mind alone exists nowhere, and that you somehow had the luck to snatch it up? And do you think that these things, so enormous and so countless, are kept in such good order by some kind of mindlessness?"
1.4.9	Μά Δί' οὐ γάρ ὁρῶ τούς κυρίους, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τούς δημιουργούς. Οὐδέ γάρ τήν σαυτοῦ σύγε ψυχήν ὁρᾷς, ἥ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδέν γνώμῃ, ἀλλά τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις.	"No, by Zeus, for I don't see the ones in charge, the way I see the makers of the things that are made here." "But you don't see your own soul either, and it's in charge of your body. By that reasoning you could say that you do nothing by design and everything by chance."
1.4.10	καί ὁ Ἀριστόδημος· Οὗτοι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερορῶ τό δαιμόνιον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι ἤ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ὄν ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό	And Aristodemus said, "Look, Socrates, I don't despise the divine. I just think it's too grand to need my service as well." "Then the grander it is," he said, "in seeing fit to look after you, the more it should be honored."
1.4.11	Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεούς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἄν ἀμελοίην αὐτῶν. Ἔπειτ' οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; οἵ πρῶτον μέν μόνον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθόν ἀνέστησαν· ἡ δέ ὀρθότης καί προορᾶν πλέον ποιεῖ δύνασθαι καί τά ὕπερθεν μᾶλλον θεᾶσθαι καί ἧττον κακοπαθεῖν· [καί ὄψιν καί ἀκοήν καί στόμα ἐνεποίησαν·] ἔπειτα τοῖς μέν ἄλλοις ἑρπετοῖς πόδας ἔδωκαν, οἵ τό πορεύεσθαι μόνον παρέχουσιν, ἀνθρώπῳ δέ καί χεῖρας προσέθεσαν, αἵ τά πλεῖστα οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμέν ἐξεργάζονται.	"Rest assured," he said, "if I believed the gods gave any thought to human beings, I wouldn't neglect them." "So you don't think they give any thought to us? First, they made the human being the only creature to stand upright, and being upright lets us see farther ahead, view what's above better, and suffer less harm. [And they put sight and hearing and a mouth in us.] Then, to the other creatures that move on the ground they gave feet, which provide only the ability to get about, but to human beings they added hands as well, which accomplish most of the things that make us happier than they are.
1.4.12	καί μήν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζῴων ἐχόντων, μόνην τήν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἵαν ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψαύουσαν τοῦ στόματος ἀρθροῦν τε τήν φωνήν καί σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἅ βουλόμεθα. τό δέ καί τάς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονάς τοῖς μέν ἄλλοις ζῴοις δοῦναι περιγράψαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δέ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν;	"Again, though all animals have a tongue, they made the human tongue alone able to touch the mouth now here, now there, and so to articulate the voice and signal to one another everything we want. And what about giving the pleasures of sex to the other animals only for a fixed season of the year, but granting them to us continuously until old age?
1.4.13	οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καί τήν ψυχήν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε. τίνος γάρ ἄλλου ζῴου ψυχή πρῶτα μέν θεῶν τῶν τά μέγιστα καί κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ἤσθηται ὅτι εἰσί; τί δέ φῦλον ἄλλο ἤ	"Nor was the god content to take care of the body alone. What matters most, he also implanted in the human being the most powerful soul. For what other creature's soul has perceived, first of all, that there are gods, who arranged the greatest and

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	ἄνθρωποι θεούς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δέ ψυχή τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμόν ἢ δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρός μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἄν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστί διαμεμνῆσθαι;	most beautiful things? What race besides human beings worships gods? What soul is more capable than the human soul of guarding against hunger or thirst or cold or heat, or of treating diseases, or of training its strength, or of working hard at learning? What soul is better able to remember whatever it hears or sees or learns?
1.4.14	οὐ γάρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρά τἆλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοί ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καί τῷ σώματι καί τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γάρ βοός ἄν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δέ γνώμην ἐδύνατ' ἄν πράττειν ἅ ἐβούλετο, οὔθ' ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δ' ἐστί, πλέον οὐδέν ἔχει. σύ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκώς οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεούς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτούς σοῦ φροντίζειν;	"Isn't it perfectly clear to you that, compared with the other animals, human beings live like gods, superior by nature in body and soul alike? A creature with the body of an ox but a human mind couldn't do what it wanted, and creatures that have hands but no sense are no better off. And you, who have received both of these most precious things, don't think the gods care about you? What will they have to do before you believe they give you any thought?"
1.4.15	Ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σοί σύ φῄς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρή ποιεῖν καί μή ποιεῖν. Ὅταν δέ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διά μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καί σοί δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδ' ὅταν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τέρατα πέμποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδ' ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλά μόνον σέ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται;	"When they send me advisers on what to do and what not to do, the way you say they send them to you." "And when the Athenians inquire about something through divination and the gods tell them," he said, "don't you think they're telling you too? Or when they send portents to give the Greeks warning, or all humankind? Do they single you out alone and set you aside in neglect?
1.4.16	οἴει δ' ἄν τούς θεούς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καί κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μή δυνατοί ἦσαν, καί ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τόν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτ' ἄν αἰσθέσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τά πολυχρονιώτατα καί σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καί ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι, καί αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται;	"Do you think the gods would have implanted in human beings the belief that they can do us good and harm if they weren't able to? And that human beings, deceived for all time, would never have noticed? Don't you see that the oldest and wisest of human institutions, cities and nations, are the most god-fearing, and that the most sensible time of life is the most attentive to the gods?
1.4.17	ὠγαθέ, ἔφη. κατάμαθε ὅτι καί ὁ σός νοῦς ἐνών τό σόν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἴεσθαι οὖν χρή καί τήν ἐν τῷ παντί φρόνησιν τά πάντα, ὅπως ἄν αὐτῇ ἡδύ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καί μή τό σόν μέν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπί πολλά στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τόν δέ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμόν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, μηδέ τήν σήν μέν ψυχήν καί περί τῶν ἐνθάδε καί περί τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καί ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τήν δέ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μή ἱκανήν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.	"My good friend," he said, "understand that your own mind, which is in you, handles your body as it wishes. So you should believe that the understanding in the universe also disposes all things as it pleases. You shouldn't think that your eye can reach across many stades while the god's eye can't see everything at once, or that your soul can think about things here and things in Egypt and Sicily while the god's understanding isn't capable of attending to everything at once.
1.4.18	ἦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γιγνώσκεις τούς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καί χαριζόμενος τούς ἀντιχαριζομένους καί συμβουλευόμενος καταμανθάνεις	"With people, you find out who is willing to serve you in return by serving them, who will return a favor by doing them favors, and who has good

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούς φρονίμους, οὕτω καί τῶν θεῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνῃς θεραπεύων, εἴ τί σοι θελήσουσι περί τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώσει τό θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καί τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καί πάντα ἀκούειν καί πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καί ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.	sense by consulting them. If, in the same way, you put the gods to the test by serving them, to see whether they'll be willing to advise you about things hidden from human beings, you will learn that the divine is so great and of such a kind that it sees all things at once, hears all things, is present everywhere, and attends to all things at once." To me, at any rate, it seemed that by saying these things he made his companions refrain from unholy, unjust, and shameful acts not only when other people could see them but also when they were alone, since they believed that nothing they did would ever escape the notice of the gods.
1.4.19	ἐμοί μέν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τούς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν, ὁπότε ὑπό τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῷντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καί ἀδίκων καί αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλά καί ὁπότε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν, ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδέν ἄν ποτε ὧν πράττοιεν θεούς διαλαθεῖν.	

CHAPTER 5

Socrates argues that self-control is the foundation of excellence, and lack of it a kind of slavery.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.5.1	Εἰ δέ δή καί ἐγκράτεια καλόν τε κἀγαθόν ἀνδρί κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι προυβίβαζε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιάδε· Ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου βουλοίμεθα ἑλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ὑφ' οὗ μάλιστ' ἄν αὐτοί μέν σῳζοίμεθα, τούς δέ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἆρ' ὅντινα αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρός ἤ οἴνου ἤ ἀφροδισίων [ἤ πόνου] ἤ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἄν αἱροίμεθα; καί πῶς ἄν οἰηθείημεν τόν τοιοῦτον ἤ ἡμᾶς σῶσαι ἤ τούς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι;	Now if self-control too is a fine and good thing for a man to possess, let's consider whether he helped people advance toward it by saying things like this. Gentlemen, if war broke out and we wanted to choose the man who would do most to keep us safe and defeat the enemy, would we choose someone we saw was mastered by his stomach, or wine, or sex, [or toil,] or sleep? How could we think such a man would either save us or overcome the enemy?
1.5.2	SOCRATES εἰ δ' ἐπί τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι βουλοίμεθά τῳ ἐπιτρέψαι ἤ παῖδας ἄρρενας παιδεῦσαι ἤ θυγατέρας παρθένους διαφυλάξαι ἤ χρήματα διασῶσαι, ἆρ' ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦθ' ἡγησαίμεθ' ἄν τόν ἀκρατῆ; δούλῳ δ' ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαιμεν ἄν ἤ βοσκήματα ἤ ταμιεῖα ἤ ἔργων ἐπιστασίαν; διάκονον δέ καί ἀγοραστήν τοιοῦτον ἐθελήσαιμεν ἄν προῖκα λαβεῖν;	SOCRATES And if, at the end of our lives, we wanted to entrust someone with educating our sons, or guarding our unmarried daughters, or preserving our property, would we consider the uncontrolled man trustworthy for the job? Would we entrust our livestock or our storerooms or the supervision of work to an uncontrolled slave? Would we be willing to take such a man as a servant or shopper even for free?
1.5.3	ἀλλά μήν εἴ γε μηδέ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; καί γάρ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτούς δοκοῦσι πλουτίζειν, οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατής τοῖς μέν ἄλλοις βλαβερός, ἑαυτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλά κακοῦργος μέν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δέ πολύ κακουργότερος, εἴ γε κακουργότατόν ἐστι μή μόνον τόν οἶκον τόν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν, ἀλλά καί τό σῶμα καί τήν ψυχήν.	Surely, if we wouldn't even accept an uncontrolled slave, it must be worth taking care not to become that sort of person oneself. Grasping people take money from others and are thought to enrich themselves, but it's not like that with the uncontrolled man: he isn't harmful to others and beneficial to himself. He does harm to others, but far more harm to himself—if indeed the greatest harm is to ruin not only one's household but one's body and soul as well.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.5.4	ἐν συνουσίᾳ δέ τίς ἄν ἡσθείη τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅν εἰδείη τῷ ὄψῳ τε καί τῷ οἴνῳ χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἤ τοῖς φίλοις καί τάς πόρνας ἀγαπῶντα μᾶλλον ἤ τούς ἑταίρους; ἆρά γε οὐ χρή πάντα ἄνδρα, ἡγησάμενον τήν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι;	And in company, who could enjoy such a person, someone he knew cared more for fine food and wine than for his friends, and was fonder of prostitutes than of his companions? Shouldn't every man, recognizing that self-control is the foundation of excellence, establish it in his soul first of all?
1.5.5	τίς γάρ ἄν ἄνευ ταύτης ἤ μάθοι τι ἀγαθόν ἤ μελετήσειεν ἀξιολόγως; ἤ τίς οὐκ ἄν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχρῶς διατεθείη καί τό σῶμα καί τήν ψυχήν; ἐμοί μέν δοκεῖ νή τήν Ἥραν [ἐλευθέρῳ μέν ἀνδρί εὐκτόν εἶναι μή τυχεῖν δούλου τοιούτου,] δουλεύοντα [δὲ] ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τούς θεούς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν· οὕτω γάρ ἄν μόνως ὁ τοιοῦτος σωθείη.	For without it, who could learn anything good or practice it to any worthwhile degree? Or who, enslaved to pleasures, wouldn't end up in a shameful state in both body and soul? It seems to me, by Hera, [that a free man should pray not to end up with a slave like that, and] that someone enslaved to such pleasures should beg the gods to give him good masters. That's the only way such a man could be saved.
1.5.6	τοιαῦτα δέ λέγων ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἤ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτόν ἐπεδείκνυεν· οὐ γάρ μόνον τῶν διά τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν ἐκράτει, ἀλλά καί τῆς διά τῶν χρημάτων, νομίζων τόν παρά τοῦ τυχόντος χρήματα λαμβάνοντα δεσπότην ἑαυτοῦ καθιστάναι καί δουλεύειν δουλείαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον αἰσχράν.	Saying such things, he showed himself even more self-controlled in his actions than in his words. He mastered not only the pleasures of the body but also the pleasure that money brings, believing that a man who takes money from just anyone sets up a master over himself and is a slave in a slavery as shameful as any.

CHAPTER 6

Antiphon the sophist mocks Socrates' poverty and free teaching, and Socrates defends his way of life.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.6.1	ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ καί ἅ πρός Ἀντιφῶντα τόν σοφιστήν διελέχθη μή παραλιπεῖν. ὁ γάρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόμενος τούς συνουσιαστάς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι προσελθών τῷ Σωκράτει παρόντων αὐτῶν ἔλεξε τάδε·	It's also worth not passing over the conversations he had with Antiphon the sophist. Once Antiphon, wanting to draw Socrates' companions away from him, came up to him while they were present and said this:[15]
1.6.2	**ANTIPHON** Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ μέν ᾤμην τούς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι· σύ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τἀναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέναι. ζῇς γοῦν οὕτως ὡς οὐδ' ἄν εἷς δοῦλος ὑπό δεσπότῃ διαιτώμενος μείνειε· σιτία τε σιτεῖ καί ποτά πίνεις τά φαυλότατα, καί ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλά τό αὐτό θέρους τε καί χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητός τε καί ἀχίτων διατελεῖς.	**ANTIPHON** Socrates, I thought that people who pursue philosophy were supposed to become happier. But you seem to me to have gotten the opposite out of philosophy. Just look at how you live: not even a slave would put up with living like that under a master. You eat the poorest food and drink the poorest drink. The cloak you wear is not only shabby but the same one summer and winter, and you always go without shoes or tunic.
1.6.3	καί μήν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἅ καί κτωμένους εὐφραίνει καί κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν τε καί ἥδιον	And you don't take money, which cheers people when they get it and, once they have it, lets them live more freely and pleasantly. Teachers of other

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ποιεῖ ζῆν. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ καί τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τούς μαθητάς μιμητάς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδεικνύουσιν, οὕτω καί σύ τούς συνόντας διαθήσεις, νόμιζε κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι.	skills make their pupils imitate them. If you're going to shape your companions that way too, you should consider yourself a teacher of misery.
1.6.4	καί ὁ Σωκράτης πρός ταῦτα εἶπε· Δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὑπειληφέναι με οὕτως ἀνιαρῶς ζῆν, ὥστε πέπεισμαι σέ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν ἄν ἐλέσθαι ἤ ζῆν ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ἴθι οὖν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπόν ᾔσθησαι τοὐμοῦ βίου.	Socrates replied to this: Antiphon, you seem to have assumed that I live so miserably that, I'm convinced, you'd rather die than live as I do. Come, then, let's consider what you've noticed that's so hard about my life.
1.6.5	**SOCRATES** πότερον ὅτι τοῖς μέν λαμβάνουσιν ἀργύριον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ ἄν μισθόν λάβωσιν, ἐμοί δέ μή λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἄν μή βούλωμαι; ἤ τήν δίαιτάν μου φαυλίζεις ὡς ἧττον μέν ὑγιεινά ἐσθίοντος ἐμοῦ ἤ σοῦ, ἧττον δέ ἰσχύν παρέχοντα; ἤ ὡς χαλεπώτερα πορίσασθαι τά ἐμά διαιτήματα τῶν σῶν διά τό σπανιώτερά τε καί πολυτελέστερα εἶναι; ἤ ὡς ἡδίω σοι ἅ σύ παρασκευάζει ὄντα ἤ ἐμοί ἅ ἐγώ; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ὁ μέν ἥδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται, ὁ δέ ἥδιστα πίνων ἥκιστα τοῦ μή παρόντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ποτοῦ;	**SOCRATES** Is it that people who take money have to produce the work they're paid for, while I, since I don't take it, don't have to converse with anyone I don't want to? Or do you look down on my way of life because the food I eat is less healthy than yours and gives less strength? Or because my provisions are harder to get than yours, being rarer and more expensive? Or because what you get ready for yourself is more pleasant to you than what I get ready is to me? Don't you know that the person who most enjoys his food has the least need of fancy dishes, and the person who most enjoys his drink has the least craving for a drink he doesn't have?
1.6.6	τά γε μήν ἱμάτια οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ μεταβαλλόμενοι ψύχους καί θάλπους ἕνεκα μεταβάλλονται, καί ὑποδήματα ὑποδοῦνται, ὅπως μή διά τά λυποῦντα τούς πόδας κωλύωνται πορεύεσθαι· ἤδη οὖν ποτε ᾔσθου ἐμέ ἤ διά ψῦχος μᾶλλόν του ἔνδον μένοντα, ἤ διά θάλπος μαχόμενόν τῳ περί σκιᾶς, ἤ διά τό ἀλγεῖν τούς πόδας οὐ βαδίζοντα ὅποι ἄν βούλωμαι;	As for cloaks, you know that people change them because of cold and heat, and they put on shoes so as not to be kept from walking by things that hurt their feet. So have you ever noticed me staying indoors because of the cold more than anyone else, or fighting with anyone over shade because of the heat, or not walking wherever I like because my feet hurt?
1.6.7	οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ φύσει ἀσθενέστατοι τῷ σώματι μελετήσαντες τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων ἀμελησάντων κρείττους τε γίγνονται πρός ἅ ἄν μελετῶσι καί ῥᾷον αὐτά φέρουσιν; ἐμοί δέ ἄρα οὐκ οἴει, τῷ σώματι ἀεί τά συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντι καρτερεῖν, πάντα ῥᾷον φέρειν σοῦ μή μελετῶντος;	Don't you know that people who are naturally weakest in body, if they train, become stronger than the strongest who neglect training, in whatever they train for, and bear it more easily? And yet you don't think that I, who am always training my body to endure whatever comes along, bear everything more easily than you, who don't train?
1.6.8	τοῦ δέ μή δουλεύειν γαστρί μηδ' ὕπνῳ καί λαγνείᾳ οἴει τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι ἤ τό ἕτερα ἔχειν τούτων ἡδίω, ἅ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει, ἀλλά καί ἐλπίδας παρέχοντα ὠφελήσειν ἀεί; καί μήν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μέν οἰόμενοι μηδέν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δέ	And as for not being a slave to the stomach or to sleep and lust, do you think anything is more responsible for that than having other things more pleasant than these—things that not only delight us while we use them but also give us hope that

15 Antiphon the sophist was a fifth-century BC thinker known from fragments of works such as *On Truth*. Whether he is the same man as the orator Antiphon is disputed.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἡγούμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ ναυκληρίαν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἄν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ὡς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται·	they'll benefit us always? You certainly know this much: people who think nothing is going well for them aren't cheerful, while those who believe they're getting on well—in farming, or shipping, or whatever they happen to work at—are cheerful because they think they're doing well.
1.6.9	οἴει οὖν ἀπό πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονήν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπό τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καί φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; ἐγώ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων. ἐάν δέ δή φίλους ἢ πόλιν ὠφελεῖν δέῃ, ποτέρῳ ἡ πλείων σχολή τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ ὡς ἐγώ νῦν ἢ τῷ ὡς σύ μακαρίζεις διαιτωμένῳ; στρατεύοιτο δέ πότερος ἄν ῥᾷον, ὁ μή δυνάμενος ἄνευ πολυτελοῦς διαίτης ζῆν ἢ ᾧ τό παρόν ἀρκοίη; ἐκπολιορκηθείη δέ πότερος ἄν θᾶττον, ὁ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων εὑρεῖν δεόμενος, ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥᾴστοις ἐντυγχάνειν ἀρκούντως χρώμενος;	So do you think all these things give as much pleasure as believing that you yourself are becoming better and gaining better friends? Well, that's what I believe, and I always have. And if friends or the city need help, which man has more time to look after them—the one who lives as I do now, or the one who lives the way you call blessed? Which would go on campaign more easily—the man who can't live without an expensive diet, or the one who is satisfied with whatever is at hand? Which would be starved out by a siege sooner—the one who needs things that are hardest to find, or the one who is content with whatever is easiest to come by?
1.6.10	ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τήν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφήν καί πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγώ δέ νομίζω τό μέν μηδενός δέεσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τό δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καί τό μέν θεῖον κράτιστον, τό δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.	You seem to think, Antiphon, that happiness is luxury and extravagance. But I believe that to need nothing is divine, and to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine; and the divine is best, so what is nearest to the divine is nearest to the best.
1.6.11	Πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει· Ὦ, Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοί σε δίκαιον μέν νομίζω, σοφόν δέ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καί αὐτός τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττει. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τήν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὧν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι οὐδενί ἄν μή ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών.	Another time Antiphon, in conversation with Socrates, said, "Socrates, I do think you're just, but not wise in any way whatever. And you seem to me to recognize this yourself: you don't charge anyone money for your company, at any rate. Yet your cloak or your house or anything else you own, if you thought it worth money, you wouldn't give to anyone for free, or even for less than it's worth.
1.6.12	δῆλον δή ὅτι εἰ καί τήν συνουσίαν ᾧου τινός ἀξίαν εἶναι, καί ταύτης ἄν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μέν οὖν ἄν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπί πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφός δέ οὐκ ἄν, μηδενός γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος.	"So clearly, if you thought your company was worth anything too, you would charge no less money for it than it was worth. You may well be just, then, since you don't deceive people for gain; but you can't be wise, since what you know isn't worth anything."
1.6.13	ὁ δέ Σωκράτης πρός ταῦτα εἶπεν· Ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τήν ὥραν καί τήν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μέν καλόν, ὁμοίως δέ αἰσχρόν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τήν τε γάρ ὥραν ἐάν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτόν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐάν δέ τις, ὅν ἄν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθόν	Socrates replied: Antiphon, among us it is held that youthful beauty and wisdom can alike be disposed of honorably or shamefully. If someone sells his beauty for money to anyone who wants it, people call him a prostitute; but if he makes a

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐραστήν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καί τήν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τούς μέν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστάς [ὥσπερ πόρνους] ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δέ, ὅν ἄν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα, διδάσκων, ὅ τι ἄν ἔχῃ ἀγαθόν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἅ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.	friend of a lover whom he knows to be a true gentleman, we consider him sensible. Wisdom is the same. People who sell it for money to anyone who wants it are called sophists [as if they were prostitutes]. But when someone takes a person he knows to be naturally gifted and makes him a friend by teaching him whatever good he has, we consider him to be doing what befits a citizen who is a true gentleman.
1.6.14	**SOCRATES** ἐγώ δ' οὖν καί αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἥ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἥ κυνί ἥ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καί ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καί ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καί ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ' ὧν ἄν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτούς εἰς ἀρετήν· καί τούς θησαυρούς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὕς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σύν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, κἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγόμεθα· καί μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐάν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι γιγνώμεθα. ἐμοί μέν δή ταῦτα ἀκούοντι ἐδόκει αὐτός τε μακάριος εἶναι καί τούς ἀκούοντας ἐπί καλοκἀγαθίαν ἄγειν.	**SOCRATES** So I myself, Antiphon, take as much pleasure in good friends as other people take in a good horse or dog or bird—even more. If I have anything good, I teach it, and I introduce them to others from whom I think they'll gain something toward excellence. The treasures that the wise men of old left behind written in books I unroll and go through together with my friends, and if we see something good, we pick it out. And we count it a great gain if we become friends to one another. For my part, when I heard this, it seemed to me that he was blessed himself and that he led those who listened to him toward gentlemanly excellence.
1.6.15	Καί πάλιν ποτέ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου αὐτόν, πῶς ἄλλους μέν ἡγοῖτο πολιτικούς ποιεῖν, αὐτός δ' οὐ πράττοι τά πολιτικά, εἴπερ ἐπίσταιτο· Ποτέρως δ' ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τά πολιτικά πράττοιμι, εἰ μόνος αὐτά πράττοιμι ἥ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανούς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;	And once again Antiphon asked him how he could think he was making others skilled in politics when he himself didn't take part in politics—if he really understood it. "Antiphon," he said, "in which way would I take more part in politics: by doing it alone, or by making it my concern that as many people as possible are capable of doing it?"

CHAPTER 7

Socrates warns that pretending to skills you lack brings ridicule and harm.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
1.7.1	Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δέ εἰ καί ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τούς συνόντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν· ἀεί γάρ ἔλεγεν, ὡς οὐκ εἴη καλλίων ὁδός ἐπ' εὐδοξίαν, ἥ δι' ἧς ἄν τις ἀγαθός τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὅ καί δοκεῖν βούλοιτο. ὅτι δ' ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν, ὧδ' ἐδίδασκεν·	Let's also consider whether, by turning his companions away from pretense, he urged them to care for excellence. He always said that there was no finer road to a good reputation than the one by which a person becomes good at the very thing he wants to be thought good at. And he showed that this was true in the following way.
1.7.2	Ἐνθυμώμεθα γάρ, ἔφη, εἴ τις μή ὢν ἀγαθός αὐλητής δοκεῖν βούλοιτο, τί ἄν αὐτῷ ποιητέον εἴη. ἆρ' οὐ τά ἔξω τῆς τέχνης μιμητέον τούς ἀγαθούς αὐλητάς; καί πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι σκευήν τε καλήν κέκτηνται καί ἀκολούθους πολλούς περιάγονται, καί τούτῳ ταῦτα	"Let's think," he said, "about what a man would have to do if he wanted to be thought a good pipe-player without being one. Wouldn't he have to imitate good pipe-players in everything outside the craft itself? First, since they own fine equipment

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ποιητέον· ἔπειτα, ὅτι ἐκείνους πολλοί ἐπαινοῦσι, καί τούτῳ πολλούς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. ἀλλά μήν ἔργον γε οὐδαμοῦ ληπτέον, ἥ εὐθύς ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὤν καί οὐ μόνον αὐλητής κακός, ἀλλά καί ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών. καίτοι πολλά μέν δαπανῶν, μηδέν δ' ὠφελούμενος, πρός δέ τούτοις κακοδοξῶν πῶς οὐκ ἐπιπόνως τε καί ἀλυσιτελῶς καί καταγελάστως βιώσεται;	and take many attendants around with them, he would have to do the same. Then, since many people praise them, he would have to get himself plenty of people to praise him. But he must never take on an actual performance, or he'll immediately be shown up as ridiculous—not only a bad pipe-player but a fraud as well. And spending a great deal, gaining nothing, and getting a bad name on top of it, how can his life be anything but laborious, unprofitable, and laughable?
1.7.3	ὥς δ' αὖτως εἴ τις βούλοιτο στρατηγός ἀγαθός μή ὤν φαίνεσθαι ἥ κυβερνήτης, ἐννοῶμεν, τί ἄν αὐτῷ συμβαίνοι. ἆρ' οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μέν ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἱκανός εἶναι ταῦτα πράττειν μή δύναιτο πείθειν, τοῦτ' εἴη λυπηρόν, εἰ δέ πείσειεν, ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον; δῆλον γάρ ὅτι κυβερνᾶν κατασταθείς ὁ μή ἐπιστάμενος ἥ στρατηγεῖν ἀπολέσειεν ἄν οὕς ἥκιστα βούλοιτο καί αὐτός αἰσχρῶς ἄν καί κακῶς ἀπαλλάξειεν.	"Likewise, if someone wanted to appear to be a good general or helmsman without being one, let's think what would happen to him. If he wanted to be thought capable of these things and couldn't convince people, wouldn't that be painful? And if he did convince them, wouldn't it be still more miserable? For clearly a man who is appointed to steer a ship or command an army without knowing how would destroy the very people he least wanted to, and would come off shamefully and badly himself."
1.7.4	ὡσαύτως δέ καί τό πλούσιον καί τό ἀνδρεῖον καί τό ἰσχυρόν μή ὄντα δοκεῖν ἀλυσιτελές ἀπέφαινε· προστάττεσθαι γάρ αὐτοῖς ἔφη μείζω ἥ κατά δύναμιν, καί μή δυναμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν, δοκοῦντας ἱκανούς εἶναι, συγγνώμης οὐκ ἄν τυγχάνειν.	In the same way he showed that seeming to be rich or brave or strong without being so does a person no good. Such people, he said, are given tasks beyond their power, and when they can't carry them out, since they're thought capable, they get no forgiveness.
1.7.5	ἀπατεῶνα δ' ἐκάλει οὐ μικρόν μέν οὐδ' εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἥ σκεῦος παρά του πειθοῖ λαβών ἀποστεροίη, πολύ δέ μέγιστον ὅστις μηδενός ἄξιος ὤν ἐξηπατήκοι πείθων ὡς ἱκανός εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι. ἐμοί μέν οὖν ἐδόκει καί τοῦ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τούς συνόντας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος.	He called a man no small cheat if he got money or some article from someone by persuasion and then robbed him of it; but by far the greatest cheat, he said, was the man who, though worth nothing, had deceived people into believing he was fit to lead the city. So it seemed to me that by conversing in this way he also turned his companions away from putting on pretenses.

Book II

Friends and family
Prodicus' Choice of Heracles, a son and his mother, two quarreling brothers, and the worth of friends.

CHAPTER 1

Socrates questions Aristippus about training rulers and retells Prodicus' fable of Heracles choosing between Vice and Virtue.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.1.1	Ἐδόκει δέ μοι καί τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τούς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρός ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καί ποτοῦ καί λαγνείας καί ὕπνου καί ῥίγους καί θάλπους καί πόνου. γνούς δέ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα [πρός τά τοιαῦτα]· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τόν μέν, ὅπως ἱκανός ἔσται ἄρχειν, τόν δ', ὅπως μηδ' ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἄν ἑκάτερον παιδεύοις; βούλει σκοπῶμεν, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπό τῆς τροφῆς ὥσπερ ἀπό τῶν στοιχείων; καί ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφή ἀρχή εἶναι· οὐδέ γάρ ζῴη γ' ἄν τις, εἰ μή τρέφοιτο.	It seemed to me that by saying things like the following he also urged his companions to practice self-control with regard to the desire for food and drink, sex and sleep, and with regard to cold, heat and toil. Learning that one of his companions was rather undisciplined [in such matters], he said, "Tell me, Aristippus: if you had to take on two young men and educate them, one so that he'd be capable of ruling and the other so that he wouldn't even lay claim to rule, how would you educate each of them? Shall we look into it starting from their food, as if from the alphabet?" And Aristippus said, "Food does seem to me a starting point, at any rate. Nobody could even stay alive without being fed."[1]
2.1.2	Οὐκοῦν τό μέν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἅπτεσθαι, ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκός παραγίγνεσθαι; Εἰκός γάρ, ἔφη. Τό οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τό κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν ἤ τῇ γαστρί χαρίζεσθαι πότερον ἄν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; Τόν εἰς τό ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νή Δία παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μή τά τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρά τήν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καί ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τό δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετέον; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη.	"Then it's likely that both of them would want to eat when the time comes?" "Likely enough," he said. "So which of them would we train to choose to do what's urgent rather than gratify his belly?" "The one being educated to rule, by Zeus," he said, "so that the city's business doesn't go undone during his time in office." "And when they want to drink," he said, "mustn't the ability to hold out while thirsty be given to the same one?" "Certainly," he said.
2.1.3	Τό δέ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι καί ὀψέ κοιμηθῆναι καί πρῴ ἀναστῆναι καί ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἄν προσθείημεν; Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. Τί δέ, ἔφη, τό ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε μή διά ταῦτα κωλύεσθαι πράττειν, εἴ τι δέοι; Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. Τί δέ; τό μή φεύγειν τούς πόνους, ἀλλ' ἐθελοντήν ὑπομένειν ποτέρῳ ἄν προσθείημεν; Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ. Τί δέ; τό μαθεῖν, εἴ τι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστι μάθημα πρός τό κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιπάλων, ποτέρῳ ἄν	"And being in control of sleep, so as to be able to go to bed late, get up early and stay awake if need be—which of the two should we give that to?" "That too to the same one," he said. "And what about being in control of sex," he said, "so as not to be kept by it from doing what needs doing?" "That too to the same one," he said. "What about not running away from hard work but enduring it willingly—which should we give that to?" "That too to

1 Aristippus of Cyrene was a follower of Socrates, later associated with a philosophy of pleasure.

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	προσθεῖναι μᾶλλον πρέποι; Πολύ νή Δί', ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ καί γάρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ὄφελος ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων.	the one being educated to rule," he said. "And what about learning any subject that helps one get the better of opponents—which would it be more fitting to give that to?" "Far more, by Zeus, to the one being educated to rule," he said, "since without that kind of learning none of the rest is any use."
2.1.4	Οὐκοῦν ὁ οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ἧττον ἄν δοκεῖ σοι ὑπό τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἤ τά λοιπά ζῷα ἁλίσκεσθαι; τούτων γάρ δήπου τά μέν γαστρί δελεαζόμενα, καί μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, ὅμως τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἀγόμενα πρός τό δέλεαρ ἁλίσκεται, τά δέ ποτῷ ἐνεδρεύεται. Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί ἄλλα ὑπό λαγνείας, οἷον οἵ τε ὄρτυγες καί οἱ πέρδικες, πρός τήν τῆς θηλείας φωνήν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καί τῇ ἐλπίδι τῶν ἀφροδισίων φερόμενοι καί ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ τά δεινά ἀναλογίζεσθαι, τοῖς θηράτροις ἐμπίπτουσι; συνέφη καί ταῦτα.	"So don't you think someone educated like this would be less likely to be caught by his opponents than the other animals are? Some of them, I suppose, are lured by their bellies: even some that are very wary are still drawn to the bait by their desire to eat, and get caught; others are ambushed at the water." "Certainly," he said. "And aren't others caught through lust—quails and partridges, for instance, which are carried toward the female's call by desire and the hope of sex, lose all thought of danger, and fall into the snares?" He agreed to this too.
2.1.5	Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχρόν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ ταὐτά πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν θηρίων; ὥσπερ οἱ μοιχοί εἰσέρχονται εἰς τάς εἰρκτάς, εἰδότες ὅτι κίνδυνος τῷ μοιχεύοντι ἅ τε ὁ νόμος ἀπειλεῖ παθεῖν καί ἐνεδρευθῆναι καί ληφθέντα ὑβρισθῆναι· καί τηλικούτων μέν ἐπικειμένων τῷ μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τε καί αἰσχρῶν, ὄντων δέ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείᾳ, ὅμως εἰς τά ἐπικίνδυνα φέρεσθαι ἆρ' οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν;	"So don't you think it's shameful for a human being to suffer the same fate as the most senseless of beasts? Take adulterers: they walk into enclosed quarters knowing that the adulterer risks the penalties the law threatens, and being ambushed, and, if caught, being outraged. With such bad and shameful things hanging over the adulterer, and with so many ways of relieving sexual desire without any fear, still to rush into danger—isn't that the mark of a man thoroughly cursed?"
2.1.6	Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τό δέ εἶναι μέν τάς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, οἷον τάς τε πολεμικάς καί τάς γεωργικάς καί τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τάς ἐλαχίστας, τούς δέ πολλούς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καί θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλή ἀμέλεια εἶναι; συνέφη καί τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι τόν μέλλοντα ἄρχειν ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καί ταῦτα εὐπετῶς φέρειν;	"I think so," he said. "And given that most of the activities people most need to carry on take place in the open air—in war and farming, for instance, and not the least of the others—don't you think it's great negligence that most people are untrained to bear cold and heat?" He agreed to this too. "So don't you think the man who's going to rule should train himself to bear these things easily as well?"
2.1.7	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τούς † ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων εἰς τούς ἀρχικούς τάττομεν, τούς ἀδυνάτους ταῦτα ποιεῖν εἰς τούς μηδ' ἀντιποιησομένους τοῦ ἄρχειν τάξομεν; συνέφη καί τοῦτο. Τί οὖν; ἐπειδή καί τούτων ἑκατέρου τοῦ φύλου τήν τάξιν οἶσθα, ἤδη ποτ' ἐπεσκέψω, εἰς ποτέραν τῶν τάξεων τούτων σαυτόν δικαίως ἄν τάττοις;	"Certainly," he said. "So if we place those who are in control of all these things among those fit to rule, won't we place those unable to do them among the ones who won't even lay claim to ruling?" He agreed to this too. "Well then: since you know which rank each of these two kinds belongs in, have you ever considered which of these ranks you would rightly place yourself in?"
2.1.8	Ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος· καί οὐδαμῶς γε τάττω ἐμαυτόν εἰς τήν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν. καί γάρ πάνυ μοι	"I have," said Aristippus, "and I certainly don't place myself in the rank of those who want to rule.

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	δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τά δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μή ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλά προσαναθέσθαι τό καί τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν· καί ἑαυτῷ μέν πολλά ὧν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δέ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐάν μή πάντα ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττῃ, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλή ἀφροσύνη ἐστί;	In fact it seems to me the act of a very foolish man that, when providing for one's own needs is a big enough job, he isn't content with that but takes on the further task of supplying the other citizens with what they need. And to go short of much that he wants for himself, while, as the city's leader, he has to pay the penalty if he doesn't accomplish everything the city wants—how is that not great folly?
2.1.9	καί γάρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὥσπερ ἐγώ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι. ἐγώ τε γάρ ἀξιῶ τούς θεράποντας ἐμοί μέν ἄφθονα τά ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτούς δέ μηδενός τούτων ἅπτεσθαι, αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τούς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μέν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθά πορίζειν, αὐτούς δέ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἐγώ οὖν τούς μέν βουλομένους πολλά πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καί ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἄν παιδεύσας εἰς τούς ἀρχικούς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τούς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καί ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.	"For cities expect to treat their rulers the way I treat my household slaves. I expect my servants to provide me with necessities in abundance but not to touch any of them themselves; and cities think their rulers should supply them with as many good things as possible but keep their own hands off all of them. So those who want plenty of trouble for themselves and want to make trouble for others—I'd educate them that way and put them among those fit to rule. Myself, though, I place among those who want to live as easily and pleasantly as possible."
2.1.10	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Βούλει οὖν καί τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότεροι ἥδιον ζῶσιν, οἱ ἄρχοντες ἤ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Πρῶτον μέν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἐν μέν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μέν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δέ Σύροι καί Φρύγες καί Λυδοί· ἐν δέ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Σκύθαι μέν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δέ ἄρχονται· ἐν δέ τῇ Λιβύῃ Καρχηδόνιοι μέν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δέ ἄρχονται. τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζῆν; ἤ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καί αὐτός εἶ, πότεροί σοι δοκοῦσιν ἥδιον, οἱ κρατοῦντες ἤ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν;	And Socrates said, "Then shall we look at this too: who live more pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled?" "Certainly," he said. "Well, first, among the peoples we know of: in Asia the Persians rule, while the Syrians, Phrygians and Lydians are ruled; in Europe the Scythians rule and the Maeotians are ruled; in Libya the Carthaginians rule and the Libyans are ruled. Which of these do you think live more pleasantly? Or among the Greeks, to whom you yourself belong—which do you think live more pleasantly, those who hold power or those under it?"[2]
2.1.11	ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδέ εἰς τήν δουλείαν ἐμαυτόν τάττω, ἀλλ' εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διά δουλείας, ἀλλά δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρός εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει.	"But I, you see," said Aristippus, "don't place myself in slavery either. There seems to me to be a middle road between these, which I try to walk—not through rule, not through slavery, but through freedom, which is the road that leads most surely to happiness."
2.1.12	ἀλλ' εἰ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διά δουλείας ἡ ὁδός αὕτη φέρει, οὕτω μηδέ δι' ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὤν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μηδέ τούς ἄρχοντας ἑκών θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν, ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ	"Well," said Socrates, "if this road, just as it doesn't run through rule or through slavery, didn't run through people either, you might have a point. But if, living among people, you won't see fit either to rule or to be ruled, and won't willingly serve those who rule, I think you can see how the stronger

2 "Libya" is the Greek name for Africa. The Maeotians lived around Lake Maeotis, the modern Sea of Azov.

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	κρείττονες τούς ἥττονας καί κοινῇ καί ἰδίᾳ κλάοντας καθιστάντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι.	know how to reduce the weaker to tears, both publicly and privately, and treat them as slaves.
2.1.13	ἤ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καί φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καί δενδροκοποῦντες καί πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τούς ἥττονας καί μή θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἄν πείσωσιν ἐλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντί τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καί ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι καί δυνατοί τούς ἀνάνδρους καί ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται; ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μή πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτόν κατακλείω, ἀλλά ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι.	"Or haven't you noticed people who, after others have sown and planted, cut down their grain and chop down their trees and besiege in every way the weaker who refuse to serve them, until they persuade them to choose slavery over war with the stronger? And in private life too, don't you know that the brave and powerful enslave the cowardly and powerless and reap the profit from them?" "But I, you see," he said, "so as not to suffer this, don't shut myself up inside any citizenship either: I'm a stranger everywhere."
2.1.14	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη λέγεις δεινόν πάλαισμα. τούς γάρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὅ τε Σίνις καί ὁ Σκείρων καί ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδείς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ; ἀλλά νῦν οἱ μέν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι καί νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μή ἀδικῶνται, καί φίλους πρός τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καί ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καί ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμύνονται τούς ἀδικοῦντας, καί πρός τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται, καί οἱ μέν ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται,	And Socrates said: Now that's a formidable wrestling hold you're describing! Ever since Sinis and Sciron and Procrustes died, nobody wrongs strangers anymore—is that it? Yet as things are, those who take part in public life in their own countries make laws so as not to be wronged, and acquire friends to help them besides their so-called next of kin, and put walls around their cities, and acquire weapons to fend off wrongdoers, and on top of that they secure allies from outside; and those who have all these things are still wronged,[3]
2.1.15	**SOCRATES** σύ δέ οὐδέν μέν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δέ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολύν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δ' ἄν πόλιν ἀφίκῃ, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὤν καί τοιοῦτος, οἵοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διά τό ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἄν οἴει ἀδικηθῆναι; ἤ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καί προσιόντι καί ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἤ διότι καί δοῦλος ἄν οἴει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενί δεσπότῃ λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γάρ ἄν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μέν μηδέν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δέ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα;	**SOCRATES** while you, who have none of these things, who spend a great deal of time on the roads, where most people are wronged, and who, whatever city you arrive in, are weaker than all its citizens and just the sort that would-be wrongdoers most like to attack—do you still think you won't be wronged, just because you're a stranger? Or are you confident because the cities proclaim safe conduct for you, coming and going? Or because you think you'd make the kind of slave no master would profit from? For who would want to keep a man in his house who's unwilling to do any work but enjoys the most expensive way of living?
2.1.16	σκεψώμεθα δέ καί τοῦτο, πῶς οἱ δεσπόται τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκέταις χρῶνται. ἆρα οὐ τήν μέν λαγνείαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σωφρονίζουσι; κλέπτειν δέ κωλύουσιν ἀποκλείοντες ὅθεν ἄν τι λαβεῖν ᾖ; τοῦ δέ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; τήν ἀργίαν δέ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσιν; ἤ σύ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινα τοιοῦτον ὄντα καταμανθάνῃς;	Let's look at this too: how masters treat servants of that kind. Don't they discipline their lust by starving them? Stop them stealing by locking up anything there is to take? Keep them from running away with chains? Drive the laziness out of them with beatings? Or what do you do yourself, when you find that one of your servants is like that?

3 Sinis, Sciron and Procrustes were legendary brigands who preyed on travelers on the road to Athens until Theseus killed them.

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2.1.17	Κολάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἄν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω. ἀλλά γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τήν βασιλικήν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἥν δοκεῖς μοι σύ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καί διψήσουσι καί ῥιγώσουσι καί ἀγρυπνήσουσι καί τἆλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες; ἐγώ μέν γάρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι διαφέρει τό αὐτό δέρμα ἑκόντα ἤ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι ἤ ὅλως τό αὐτό σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντα ἤ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι ἄλλο γε ἤ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ θέλοντι τά λυπηρά ὑπομένειν.	"I punish him with every kind of misery," he said, "until I force him to serve. But look here, Socrates: those being trained in the art of kingship, which you seem to me to consider happiness—how are they any different from people who suffer hardship by necessity, if they're going to go hungry and thirsty and cold and sleepless and toil at everything else of that kind willingly? For my part, I don't see what difference it makes whether the same hide is flogged willingly or unwillingly, or in general whether the same body is besieged by all such things willingly or unwillingly—except that folly is added to the one who chooses to endure what's painful."
2.1.18	Τί δέ, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε; ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τά ἑκούσια τῶν ἀκουσίων, ᾗ ὁ μέν ἑκών πεινῶν φάγοι ἄν ὁπότε βούλοιτο καί ὁ ἑκών διψῶν πίοι καί τἆλλα ὡσαύτως, τῷ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῦτα πάσχοντι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ὁπόταν βούληται παύεσθαι; ἔπειτα ὁ μέν ἑκουσίως ταλαιπωρῶν ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται, οἷον οἱ τά θηρία θηρῶντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεσθαι ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι·	And Socrates said: What's this, Aristippus? Don't you think that in matters like these the voluntary differs from the involuntary, in that the man who goes hungry willingly can eat whenever he likes, and the man who goes thirsty willingly can drink, and so on, while the one who suffers these things by necessity isn't free to stop whenever he wants? Then again, the man who undergoes hardship voluntarily takes delight in his toil, buoyed by good hope, the way hunters toil gladly in the hope of a catch.
2.1.19	SOCRATES καί τά μέν τοιαῦτα ἆθλα τῶν πόνων μικροῦ τινος ἄξιά ἐστι, τούς δέ πονοῦντας, ἵνα φίλους ἀγαθούς κτήσωνται, ἤ ὅπως ἐχθρούς χειρώσωνται, ἤ ἵνα δυνατοί γενόμενοι καί τοῖς σώμασι καί ταῖς ψυχαῖς καί τόν ἑαυτῶν οἶκον καλῶς οἰκῶσι καί τούς φίλους εὖ ποιῶσι καί τήν πατρίδα εὐεργετῶσι, πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρή τούτους καί πονεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τά τοιαῦτα καί ζῆν εὐφραινομένους, ἀγαμένους μέν ἑαυτούς, ἐπαινουμένους δέ καί ζηλουμένους ὑπό τῶν ἄλλων;	SOCRATES And prizes like those are worth little for the effort; but those who toil to win good friends, or to subdue enemies, or so that, having grown capable in body and soul, they may manage their own households well, do good to their friends and serve their country—how can we not think that they toil gladly for such ends and live in delight, admiring themselves and praised and envied by everyone else?
2.1.20	ἔτι δέ αἱ μέν ῥᾳδιουργίαι καί ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναί οὔτε σώματι εὐεξίαν ἱκαναί εἰσιν ἐνεργάζεσθαι, ὥς φασιν οἱ γυμνασταί, οὔτε ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον οὐδεμίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν, αἱ δέ διά καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαι τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἐξικνεῖσθαι ποιοῦσιν, ὥς φασιν οἱ ἀγαθοί ἄνδρες. λέγει δέ που καί Ἡσίοδος· Τήν μέν γάρ κακότητα καί ἰλαδόν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι ῥηιδίως· λείη μέν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει. τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοί προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν ἀθάνατοι· μακρός δέ καί ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν καί τρηχύς τό πρῶτον· ἐπήν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, ῥηιδίη δή ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ	Besides, easy living and immediate pleasures can't produce physical fitness, as the trainers say, nor do they instill any knowledge in the soul worth speaking of; whereas efforts sustained through endurance bring people to accomplish fine and good deeds, as good men say. And Hesiod says somewhere: "Badness you can take by the heap, and easily: smooth is the road, and she lives very near. But before excellence the gods have set sweat, the immortals; long and steep is the path to her, and rough at first; but once you reach the summit, then she is easy, hard though she is." Epicharmus

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	καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τῷδε· τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τἀγάθ' οἱ θεοί.	bears witness too, in this line: "The gods sell us all good things for toil."[4]
	καί ἐν ἄλλῳ δέ [τόπῳ φησίν]· Ὦ πονηρέ, μή τά μαλακά μῶσο, μή τά σκλήρ· ἔχῃς.	And elsewhere [he says]: "You rascal, don't hanker after soft things, or you may get the hard ones."
2.1.21	καί Πρόδικος δέ ὁ σοφός ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περί Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δή καί πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περί τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὧδέ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγώ μέμνημαι. φησί γάρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεί ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὡρμᾶτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τήν δι' ἀρετῆς ὁδόν τρέψονται ἐπί τόν βίον εἴτε τήν διά κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται·	Prodicus the wise, too, in his essay on Heracles, the one he performs for the largest audiences, expresses the same view about excellence. He puts it something like this, as far as I remember. He says that when Heracles was passing from boyhood into youth, the age when the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they'll take the road of virtue through life or the road of vice, he went off to a quiet place and sat down, unsure which of the two roads to take;[5]
2.1.22	καί φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προσιέναι μεγάλας, τήν μέν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν καί ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τό μέν χρῶμα καθαρότητι, τά δέ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τό δέ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ, ἐσθῆτι δέ λευκῇ, τήν δ' ἑτέραν τεθραμμένην μέν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καί ἁπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δέ τό μέν χρῶμα ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καί ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τό δέ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τά δέ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δέ ἐξ ἧς ἄν μάλιστα ἡ ὥρα διαλάμποι· κατασκοπεῖσθαι δέ θαμά ἑαυτήν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δέ καί εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτήν θεᾶται, πολλάκις δέ καί εἰς τήν ἑαυτῆς σκιάν ἀποβλέπειν.	and two tall women appeared, coming toward him. One was lovely to look at, with the bearing of the freeborn: her skin was adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty, her posture with moderation, and she was dressed in white. The other had been fed up to plumpness and softness. She had painted her complexion to look whiter and rosier than it really was, and held herself to look straighter and taller than nature had made her. Her eyes were wide open, and she wore clothes through which her charms would best shine. She kept looking herself over, watching whether anyone else was looking at her, and often glancing back even at her own shadow.
2.1.23	ὡς δ' ἐγένοντο πλησιαίτερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τήν μέν πρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσαν ἰέναι τόν αὐτόν τρόπον, τήν δ' ἑτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ καί εἰπεῖν· Ὁρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν ὁδόν ἐπί τόν βίον τράπῃ. ἐάν οὖν ἐμέ φίλην ποιησάμενος, [ἐπὶ] τήν ἡδίστην τε καί ῥᾳστην ὁδόν ἄξω σε, καί τῶν μέν τερπνῶν οὐδενός ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δέ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος διαβιώσει.	As they came nearer to Heracles, the first one I mentioned kept on at the same pace, but the other, eager to get there first, ran up to Heracles and said: I see you, Heracles, unsure which road to take through life. Make me your friend, and I'll lead you [on] the pleasantest and easiest road. There's no delight you won't taste, and you'll live out your days without ever knowing hardship.
2.1.24	**VICE** πρῶτον μέν γάρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδέ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλά σκοπούμενος † διέσει τί ἄν κεχαρισμένον ἤ σιτίον ἤ ποτόν εὕροις, ἤ τί ἄν ἰδών ἤ ἀκούσας τερφθείης, ἤ τίνων ἄν ὀσφραινόμενος ἤ ἁπτόμενος ἡσθείης, τίσι δέ παιδικοῖς ὁμιλῶν μάλιστ' ἄν εὐφρανθείης, καί πῶς ἄν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καί πῶς ἄν ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις.	**VICE** First of all, you won't worry about wars or affairs of any kind. You'll pass your time considering what delicious food or drink you might find, what you might see or hear to delight you, what you might smell or touch to give you pleasure, which beloved's company would please you most,

4 The verses are from Hesiod's *Works and Days*; Epicharmus was a Sicilian comic poet of the early fifth century BC.
5 Prodicus of Ceos was a famous sophist. In his fable, which runs to 2.1.34, the personified Aretē and Kakia appear as "Virtue" and "Vice"; elsewhere aretē is rendered "excellence."

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		how you might sleep most softly, and how you might come by all of this with the least effort.
2.1.25	ἐάν δέ ποτε γένηταί τις ὑποψία σπάνεως ἀφ' ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος μή σε ἀγάγω ἐπί τό πονοῦντα καί ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καί τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἷς ἄν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σύ χρήσει. οὐδενός ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἄν δυνατόν ᾖ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γάρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοί συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγώ παρέχω.	And if there's ever any suspicion of a shortage of the means to these things, there's no fear that I'll lead you to provide them by toiling and suffering in body and soul. No, you'll make use of what others work for, holding back from nothing that might bring you some gain. For I give those who keep company with me license to profit from every source.
2.1.26	**SOCRATES** καί ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα· Ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστιν; ἡ δέ· Οἱ μέν ἐμοί φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δέ μισοῦντές με [ὑποκοριζόμενοι] ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν.	**SOCRATES** When Heracles heard this, he said, "Lady, what is your name?" And she said, "My friends call me Happiness, but those who hate me [give me a nickname and] call me Vice."
2.1.27	**VIRTUE** καί ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνή προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· Καί ἐγώ ἥκω πρός σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τούς γεννήσαντάς σε καί τήν φύσιν τήν σήν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα, ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τήν πρός ἐμέ ὁδόν τράποιο, σφόδρ· ἄν σε τῶν καλῶν καί σεμνῶν ἀγαθόν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καί ἐμέ ἔτι πολύ ἐντιμοτέραν καί ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ᾗπερ οἱ θεοί διέθεσαν τά ὄντα διηγήσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας.	**VIRTUE** Meanwhile the other woman came up and said: I too have come to you, Heracles, because I know your parents and have observed your nature in the course of your upbringing. That makes me hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will become a very good worker of fine and noble deeds, and that I will appear still more honored and more distinguished for the good I bring. But I won't deceive you with preludes of pleasure; I will truthfully describe things as the gods have arranged them.
2.1.28	τῶν γάρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καί καλῶν οὐδέν ἄνευ πόνου καί ἐπιμελείας οἵ θεοί διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' εἴτε τούς θεούς ἵλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τούς θεούς, εἴτε ὑπό φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τούς φίλους εὐεργετητέον, εἴτε ὑπό τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τήν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπό τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τήν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρπούς ἀφθόνους φέρειν, τήν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἴτε ἀπό βοσκημάτων οἴει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἴτε διά πολέμου ὁρμᾷς αὔξεσθαι καί βούλει δύνασθαι τούς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καί τούς ἐχθρούς χειροῦσθαι, τάς πολεμικάς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρά τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καί ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δέ καί τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατός εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τό σῶμα καί γυμναστέον σύν πόνοις καί ἱδρῶτι.	Of the things that are truly good and fine, the gods give none to human beings without toil and care. If you want the gods to be gracious to you, you must serve the gods; if you wish to be loved by friends, you must do good to your friends; if you desire to be honored by some city, you must benefit that city; if you think you deserve to be admired by all Greece for excellence, you must try to do good to Greece; if you want the earth to bear you abundant crops, you must tend the earth; if you think you should grow rich from livestock, you must take care of livestock; if you're eager to grow great through war and want to be able to free your friends and subdue your enemies, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and practice how they should be used; and if you want to be strong in body too, you must accustom your body to serve your mind and train it with toil and sweat.
2.1.29	**VICE** καί ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος· Ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς χαλεπήν καί μακράν ὁδόν ἐπί	**VICE** And Vice broke in, as Prodicus tells it, and said, "Do you see, Heracles, what a hard, long road

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	τάς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνή σοι αὕτη διηγεῖται; ἐγώ δέ ῥᾳδίαν καί βραχεῖαν ὁδόν ἐπί τήν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε.	to enjoyment this woman is describing to you? I will lead you to happiness by a short and easy road."
2.1.30	**VIRTUE** καί ἡ Ἀρετή εἶπεν· Ὦ τλῆμον, τί δέ σύ ἀγαθόν ἔχεις; ἤ τί ἡδύ οἶσθα μηδέν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἥτις οὐδέ τήν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλά πρίν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐμπίμπλασαι, πρίν μέν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρίν δέ διψῆν πίνουσα, ἵνα μέν ἡδέως φάγῃς, ὀψοποιίας μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δέ ἡδέως πίῃς, οἴνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζει καί τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς, ἵνα δέ καθυπνώσῃς ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τάς στρωμνάς μαλακάς, ἀλλά καί [τάς κλίνας καὶ] τά ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις παρασκευάζει· οὐ γάρ διά τό πονεῖν, ἀλλά διά τό μηδέν ἔχειν ὅ τι ποιῇς ὕπνου ἐπιθυμεῖς· τά δ' ἀφροδίσια πρό τοῦ δέεσθαι ἀναγκάζεις, πάντα μηχανωμένη καί γυναιξί τοῖς ἀνδράσι χρωμένη· οὕτω γάρ παιδεύεις τούς ἑαυτῆς φίλους, τῆς μέν νυκτός ὑβρίζουσα, τῆς δ' ἡμέρας τό χρησιμώτατον κατακοιμίζουσα.	**VIRTUE** And Virtue said: You wretch, what good do you have? Or what pleasure do you know, when you're unwilling to do anything for its sake? You don't even wait for the desire for pleasant things: you stuff yourself with everything before you desire it, eating before you're hungry and drinking before you're thirsty. To eat with pleasure you contrive fancy cooking; to drink with pleasure you lay in expensive wines and run around in summer hunting for snow; to sleep with pleasure you provide not only soft bedding but [beds and] stands for the beds as well—for you desire sleep not because you've worked but because you have nothing to do. You force sex before there's any need, contriving every means and using men as women. That's how you train your friends: running riot by night, and sleeping through the most useful hours of the day.
2.1.31	ἀθάνατος δέ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μέν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπό δέ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζει· τοῦ δέ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καί τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδέν γάρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλόν τεθέασαι. τίς δ' ἄν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πιστεύσειε; τίς δ' ἄν δεομένῃ τινός ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἤ τίς ἄν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἵ νέοι μέν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δέ γενόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μέν λιπαροί διά νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δέ αὐχμηροί διά γήρως περῶντες, τοῖς μέν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυνόμενοι, τοῖς δέ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τά μέν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τά δέ χαλεπά εἰς τό γῆρας ἀποθέμενοι.	Immortal though you are, you have been cast out by the gods and are dishonored by good men. The sweetest thing of all to hear—praise of yourself—you have never heard, and the sweetest sight of all you have never seen, for you have never yet beheld a single fine deed of your own. Who would believe anything you say? Who would help you when you're in need? Or who in his right mind would dare to join your band of revelers? Your followers are feeble in body while they are young, and senseless in soul when they grow old. They are kept sleek and idle through their youth, then trudge, withered and toiling, through old age, ashamed of what they have done and weighed down by what they still must do. They raced through the pleasures in their youth and laid up the hardships for old age.
2.1.32	ἐγώ δέ σύνειμι μέν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δέ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δέ καλόν οὔτε θεῖον οὔτ' ἀνθρώπειον χωρίς ἐμοῦ γίγνεται. τιμῶμαι δέ μάλιστα πάντων καί παρά θεοῖς καί παρά ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκει, ἀγαπητή μέν συνεργός τεχνίταις, πιστή δέ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπόταις, εὐμενής δέ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθή δέ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δέ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δέ φιλίας κοινωνός.	But I keep company with gods, and I keep company with good human beings, and no fine deed, divine or human, happens without me. I am honored most of all, both among gods and among the men to whom I properly belong: a welcome fellow worker for craftsmen, a trusty guardian of households for masters, a kindly helper for servants, a good partner in the labors of peace, a steadfast ally in the deeds of war, the best companion in friendship.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.1.33	ἔστι δέ τοῖς μέν ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μέν καί ἀπράγμων σίτων καί ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις· ἀνέχονται γάρ ἕως ἄν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν. ὕπνος δ' αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων ἤ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καί οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτόν ἄχθονται οὔτε διά τοῦτον μεθιᾶσι τά δέοντα πράττειν. καί οἱ μέν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν, οἱ δέ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλλονται· καί ἡδέως μέν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δέ τάς παρούσας ἥδονται πράττοντες, δι' ἐμέ φίλοι μέν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοί δέ φίλοις, τίμιοι δέ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δ' ἔλθῃ τό πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετά λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλά μετά μνήμης τόν ἀεί χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τήν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι.	My friends enjoy food and drink with pleasure and without fuss, because they wait until they desire them. Sleep comes to them sweeter than to those who never toil, and they neither resent leaving it nor neglect their duties on its account. The young delight in the praise of their elders, and the older rejoice in the honors paid them by the young. They remember their past deeds with pleasure and take pleasure in doing their present ones well, being, thanks to me, dear to the gods, loved by their friends and honored by their countries. And when the destined end comes, they don't lie forgotten and dishonored, but live on in memory, flourishing and celebrated in song for all time. Such, Heracles, son of good parents, is the most blessed happiness that can be yours, if you labor to win it.
2.1.34	**SOCRATES** οὕτω πως † διώκει Πρόδικος τήν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παίδευσιν· ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τάς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν ἤ ἐγώ νῦν. σοί δ' οὖν ἄξιον, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, τούτων ἐνθυμουμένῳ πειρᾶσθαί τι καί τῶν εἰς τόν μέλλοντα χρόνον τοῦ βίου φροντίζειν.	**SOCRATES** That is roughly how Prodicus tells of Heracles' education by Virtue—though he dressed up the thoughts in even grander language than I have just now. So it would be worth your while, Aristippus, to take all this to heart and try to give some thought to the part of your life that lies ahead.

CHAPTER 2

Socrates shows his son Lamprocles, angry with his mother, how much he owes her.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.2.1	Αἰσθόμενος δέ ποτε Λαμπροκλέα τόν πρεσβύτατον υἱόν αὐτοῦ πρός τήν μητέρα χαλεπαίνοντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, οἶσθά τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλουμένους; Καί μάλα, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. Καταμεμάθηκας οὖν τούς τί ποιοῦντας τό ὄνομα τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη· τούς γάρ εὖ παθόντας, ὅταν δυνάμενοι χάριν ἀποδοῦναι μή ἀποδῶσιν, ἀχαρίστους καλοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν δοκοῦσί σοι ἐν τοῖς ἀδίκοις καταλογίζεσθαι τούς ἀχαρίστους;	Once, when he noticed that Lamprocles, his eldest son, was angry with his mother, he said, "Tell me, my boy, do you know that some people are called ungrateful?" "Certainly," said the young man. "And have you worked out what people do to get called by that name?" "I have," he said. "People who have been well treated and don't return the favor when they could are called ungrateful." "So don't you think the ungrateful are counted among the unjust?"[6]
2.2.2	Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. Ἤδη δέ ποτ' ἐσκέψω εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τό ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι τούς μέν φίλους ἄδικον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τούς δέ πολεμίους δίκαιον, οὕτω καί τό ἀχαριστεῖν πρός μέν τούς φίλους ἀδικόν ἐστι, πρός δέ τούς πολεμίους δίκαιον; Καί μάλα, ἔφη· καί δοκεῖ μοι, ὑφ' οὗ ἄν τις εὖ	"I do," he said. "And have you ever considered whether, just as enslaving friends is thought unjust but enslaving enemies just, so too being ungrateful is unjust toward friends but just toward enemies?" "Certainly I have," he said. "And I think that anyone who has been well treated by

6 Lamprocles was the eldest of the three sons of Socrates and his wife Xanthippe.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	παθών εἴτε φίλου εἴτε πολεμίου μή πειρᾶται χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ἄδικος εἶναι.	someone, friend or enemy, and doesn't try to return the favor is unjust."
2.2.3	Οὐκοῦν, εἴ γ' οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο, εἰλικρινής τις ἂν εἴη ἀδικία ἡ ἀχαριστία; συνωμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ ἄν τις μείζω ἀγαθά παθών μή ἀποδιδῷ χάριν, τοσούτῳ ἀδικώτερος ἂν εἴη; συνέφη καί τοῦτο. Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, ὑπό τίνων εὕροιμεν ἄν μείζω εὐεργετημένους ἢ παῖδας ὑπό γονέων; οὓς οἱ γονεῖς ἐκ μέν οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησαν εἶναι, τοσαῦτα δέ καλά ἰδεῖν καί τοσούτων ἀγαθῶν μετασχεῖν, ὅσα οἱ θεοί παρέχουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἅ δή καί οὕτως ἡμῖν δοκεῖ παντός ἄξια εἶναι, ὥστε πάντες τό καταλιπεῖν αὐτά πάντων μάλιστα φεύγομεν καί αἱ πόλεις ἐπί τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποιήκασιν ὡς οὐκ ἄν μείζονος κακοῦ φόβῳ τήν ἀδικίαν παύσαντες.	"Well then, if that's how it is, wouldn't ingratitude be injustice pure and simple?" He agreed. "And so the greater the benefits someone has received without returning the favor, the more unjust he would be?" He agreed to this too. "Then whom," he said, "could we find who have been benefited more by anyone than children by their parents? Their parents brought them from not being into being, and gave them the chance to see so many beautiful things and to share in so many good things, all that the gods provide to human beings. And these seem to us so precious that we all shun leaving them behind more than anything else, and cities have made death the penalty for the greatest crimes, on the view that there is no greater evil whose fear could stop wrongdoing.
2.2.4	καί μήν οὐ τῶν γε ἀφροδισίων ἕνεκα παιδοποιεῖσθαι τούς ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἐπεί τούτου γε τῶν ἀπολυσόντων μεσταί μέν αἱ ὁδοί, μεστά δέ τά οἰκήματα. φανεροί δ' ἐσμέν καί σκοπούμενοι, ἐξ ὁποίων ἄν γυναικῶν βέλτιστα ἡμῖν τέκνα γένοιτο· αἷς συνελθόντες τεκνοποιούμεθα.	"And surely you don't suppose that people have children for the sake of sex, since the streets are full of those who can relieve us of that need, and so are the brothels. No, it's plain that we even look into what kind of women would give us the best children; and those are the women we come together with to have them.
2.2.5	καί ὁ μέν γε ἀνήρ τήν τε συντεκνοποιήσουσαν ἑαυτῷ τρέφει καί τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι παισί προπαρασκευάζει πάντα, ὅσα ἄν οἴηται συνοίσειν αὐτοῖς πρός τόν βίον, καί ταῦτα ὡς ἄν δύνηται πλεῖστα ἡ δέ γυνή ὑποδεξαμένη τε φέρει τό φορτίον τοῦτο, βαρυνομένη τε καί κινδυνεύουσα περί τοῦ βίου καί μεταδιδοῦσα τῆς τροφῆς ᾗ καί αὐτή τρέφεται, καί σύν πολλῷ πόνῳ διενεγκοῦσα καί τεκοῦσα τρέφει τε καί ἐπιμελεῖται, οὔτε προπεπονθυῖα οὐδέν ἀγαθόν οὔτε γιγνῶσκον τό βρέφος, ὑφ' ὅτου εὖ πάσχει, οὐδέ σημαίνειν δυνάμενον ὅτου δεῖται, ἀλλ' αὐτή στοχαζομένη τά τε συμφέροντα καί τά κεχαρισμένα πειρᾶται ἐκπληροῦν καί τρέφει πολύν χρόνον καί ἡμέρας καί νυκτός ὑπομένουσα πονεῖν, οὐκ εἰδυῖα τινα τούτων χάριν ἀπολήψεται.	"And the husband supports the woman who is to have his children with him, and prepares in advance for the children to come everything he thinks will help them in life, and as much of it as he can. The woman conceives and carries this burden, weighed down by it and risking her life, and sharing the food that nourishes her own body. After carrying it to term with great labor and giving birth, she nurses it and cares for it, though she has received nothing good from it beforehand, and though the infant neither knows who is treating it well nor can signal what it needs. She has to guess for herself what is good for it and what will please it, and tries to supply these; and she nurses it for a long time, enduring toil day and night, without knowing what gratitude she will get for any of it.
2.2.6	καί οὐκ ἀρκεῖ θρέψαι μόνον, ἀλλά καί, ἐπειδάν δόξωσιν ἱκανοί εἶναι οἱ παῖδες μανθάνειν τι, ἅ μέν ἄν αὐτοί ἔχωσιν οἱ γονεῖς ἀγαθά πρός τόν βίον, διδάσκουσιν, ἅ δ' ἄν οἴωνται ἄλλον ἱκανώτερον εἶναι διδάξαι, πέμπουσι πρός τοῦτον δαπανῶντες, καί ἐπιμελοῦνται πάντα	"And just bringing them up isn't enough. Once the children seem old enough to learn something, the parents teach them whatever good things for life they themselves have to offer, and for whatever they think someone else is better able to teach, they send them to that person at their own ex-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ποιοῦντες ὅπως οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς γένωνται ὡς δυνατόν βέλτιστοι.	pense; and they take every care, doing everything they can, to make their children turn out as good as possible."
2.2.7	πρός ταῦτα ὁ νεανίσκος εἶπεν· ἀλλά τοι εἰ καί πάντα ταῦτα πεποίηκε καί ἄλλα τούτων πολλαπλάσια, οὐδείς ἄν δύναιτο αὐτῆς ἀνασχέσθαι τήν χαλεπότητα. καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Πότερα δέ, ἔφη, οἴει θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἤ μητρός; Ἐγώ μέν οἶμαι, ἔφη, μητρός τῆς γε τοιαύτης. Ἤδη πώποτε οὖν ἤ δακοῦσα κακόν τί σοι ἔδωκεν ἤ λακτίσασα, οἷα ὑπό θηρίων ἤδη πολλοί ἔπαθον;	To this the young man said, "But really, even if she has done all this and many times more besides, nobody could put up with her bad temper." And Socrates said, "Which do you think is harder to bear—the savagery of a wild beast or of a mother?" "I think a mother's," he said, "at least a mother like this one." "So has she ever done you any harm by biting or kicking you, the way many people have suffered from wild animals?"
2.2.8	ἀλλά νή Δία, ἔφη, λέγει ἅ οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπί τῷ βίῳ παντί βούλοιτο ἀκοῦσαι. Σύ δέ πόσα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἴει ταύτῃ [δυσάνεκτα] καί τῇ φωνῇ καί τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκ παιδίου δυσκολαίνων καί ἡμέρας καί νυκτός πράγματα παρασχεῖν, πόσα δέ λυπῆσαι κάμνων; ἀλλ' οὐδεπώποτε αὐτήν, ἔφη, οὔτ' εἶπα οὔτ' ἐποίησα οὐδέν ἐφ' ᾧ ᾐσχύνθη.	"No, but by Zeus," he said, "she says things no one would want to hear for anything in the world." "And how many [unbearable] troubles," said Socrates, "do you think you've given her, being difficult in word and deed, day and night, ever since you were a little child—and how much grief when you were sick?" "But I've never said or done anything to her," he said, "that made her ashamed."
2.2.9	Τί δ'; οἴει, ἔφη, χαλεπώτερον εἶναί σοι ἀκούειν ὧν αὕτη λέγει ἤ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς, ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἀλλήλους τά ἔσχατα λέγωσιν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, ἐπειδή οὐκ οἴονται τῶν λεγόντων οὔτε τόν ἐλέγχοντα ἐλέγχειν ἵνα ζημιώσῃ οὔτε τόν ἀπειλοῦντα ἀπειλεῖν ἵνα κακόν τι ποιήσῃ, ῥᾳδίως φέρουσι. Σύ δ' εὖ εἰδώς, ὅτι ἅ λέγει σοι ἡ μήτηρ οὐ μόνον οὐδέν κακόν νοοῦσα λέγει, ἀλλά καί βουλομένη σοι ἀγαθά εἶναι ὅσα οὐδενί ἄλλῳ, χαλεπαίνεις; ἤ νομίζεις κακόνουν τήν μητέρα σοι εἶναι;	"Well then," he said, "do you think it's harder for you to listen to what she says than it is for actors when they say the most terrible things to each other in tragedies? And yet, I suppose, because they don't think that the speaker who reproaches is reproaching in order to punish, or that the one who threatens is threatening in order to do some harm, they take it easily. But you know perfectly well that whatever your mother says to you, she says it not only without meaning you any harm, but wishing you more good than she wishes anyone else—and you get angry? Or do you think your mother means you ill?"
2.2.10	Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· τοῦτό γε οὐκ οἶμαι. καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, σύ ταύτην, εὖνουν τέ σοι οὖσαν καί ἐπιμελομένην ὡς μάλιστα δύναται κάμνοντος ὅπως ὑγιάνῃς τε καί ὅπως τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μηδενός ἐνδεής ἔσει, καί πρός τούτοις πολλά τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομένην [ἀγαθά] ὑπέρ σοῦ καί εὐχάς ἀποδιδοῦσαν, χαλεπήν εἶναι φής; ἐγώ μέν οἶμαι, εἰ τοιαύτην μή δύνασαι φέρειν μητέρα, τἀγαθά σε οὐ δύνασθαι φέρειν.	"Certainly not," he said. "That I don't think." And Socrates said, "So this woman—who wishes you well, and takes as much care as she possibly can when you're sick to see that you get well and lack nothing you need, and who besides prays to the gods for many [good things] for you and pays her vows—you say she's difficult? For my part, I think that if you can't bear a mother like that, you can't bear what's good for you."
2.2.11	εἰπέ δέ μοι, ἔφη, πότερον ἄλλον τινά οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; ἤ παρεσκεύασαι μηδενί ἀνθρώπων πειρᾶσθαι ἀρέσκειν μηδέ πείθεσθαι μήτε στρατηγῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ ἄρχοντι;	"Tell me," he said, "do you think there is anyone else you should show regard for? Or are you prepared to make no effort to please anyone at all,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		and to obey neither a general nor any other official?"
2.2.12	Ναί μά Δί' ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καί τῷ γείτονι βούλει σύ ἀρέσκειν, ἵνα σοι καί πῦρ ἐναύῃ, ὅταν τούτου δέῃ, καί ἀγαθοῦ τέ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ κἄν τι σφαλλόμενος τύχῃς, εὐνοϊκῶς ἐγγύθεν βοηθῇ σοι; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Τί δέ; συνοδοιπόρον ἤ σύμπλουν, ἤ εἴ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἐντυγχάνοις, οὐδέν ἄν σοι διαφέροι φίλον ἤ ἐχθρόν γενέσθαι, ἤ καί τῆς παρά τούτων εὐνοίας οἴει δεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι;	"Yes, by Zeus, I do think so," he said. "So," said Socrates, "you want to please your neighbor too, so that he'll give you a light for your fire when you need it, and be a partner to you in good things, and if you happen to slip up, be close at hand to help you kindly?" "I do," he said. "And what about this? A fellow traveler on the road or at sea, or anyone else you might meet—would it make no difference to you whether he became your friend or your enemy, or do you think you should care about having their goodwill too?"
2.2.13	Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Εἶτα τούτων μέν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι παρεσκεύασαι, τήν δέ μητέρα τήν πάντων μάλιστά σε φιλοῦσαν οὐκ οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καί ἡ πόλις ἄλλης μέν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται οὐδέ δικάζει, ἀλλά περιορᾷ τούς εὖ πεπονθότας χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντας, ἐάν δέ τις γονέας μή θεραπεύῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησι καί ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἄρχειν τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε ἄν τά ἱερά εὐσεβῶς θυόμενα ὑπέρ τῆς πόλεως τούτου θύοντος οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καί δικαίως οὐδέν ἄν τούτου πράξαντος; καί νή Δία ἐάν τις τῶν γονέων τελευτησάντων τούς τάφους μή κοσμῇ, καί τοῦτο ἐξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δοκιμασίαις.	"I do," he said. "So you're prepared to take care with these people, but you don't think you should show regard for your mother, who loves you more than anyone? Don't you know that the city, too, pays no attention to any other kind of ingratitude and gives no judgment on it, but overlooks people who have been well treated and don't return the favor—yet if anyone fails to look after his parents, it imposes a penalty on him, and rejects him at his scrutiny and doesn't allow him to hold office, on the ground that the sacrifices offered on the city's behalf would not be offered piously if he offered them, and nothing else would be done well and justly if he did it? And, by Zeus, if someone doesn't tend his parents' graves after they die, the city looks into that too, in the scrutinies of officials.[7]
2.2.14	σύ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἐάν σωφρονῇς, τούς μέν θεούς παραιτήσει συγγνώμονάς σοι εἶναι, εἴ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός, μή σε καί οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἶναι οὐκ ἐθελήσωσιν εὖ ποιεῖν, τούς δέ ἀνθρώπους φυλάξει μή σε αἰσθόμενοι τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσιν, εἶτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῇς. εἰ γάρ σε ὑπολάβοιεν πρός τούς γονεῖς ἀχάριστον εἶναι, οὐδείς ἄν νομίσειεν εὖ σε ποιήσας χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι.	"So, my boy, if you're sensible, you'll beg the gods to forgive you if you have neglected your mother in any way, so that they don't regard you as ungrateful too and refuse to do you good; and you'll be careful with people, so that they don't all notice you neglecting your parents and hold you in contempt, and you end up exposed without a friend in the world. For if they took you to be ungrateful toward your parents, nobody would think that he'd get any gratitude for treating you well."

CHAPTER 3

Socrates teaches Chaerecrates how to win back his brother Chaerephon by being the first to show kindness.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.3.1		

7 At Athens, every man chosen for office underwent a scrutiny (*dokimasia*) of his eligibility and conduct, which included questions about how he treated his parents.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Χαιρεφῶντα δέ ποτε καί Χαιρεκράτη, ἀδελφώ μέν ὄντε ἀλλήλοιν, ἑαυτῷ δέ γνωρίμω, αἰσθόμενος διαφερομένω, ἰδών τόν Χαιρεκράτη· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐ δήπου καί σύ εἶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, οἵ χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἤ ἀδελφούς; καί ταῦτα τῶν μέν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δέ φρονίμου, καί τῶν μέν βοηθείας δεομένων, τοῦ δέ βοηθεῖν δυναμένου, καί πρός τούτοις τῶν μέν πλειόνων ὑπαρχόντων, τοῦ δέ ἑνός.	Once he noticed that Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, who were brothers and both acquaintances of his, were quarreling. When he saw Chaerecrates, he said: Tell me, Chaerecrates, you're surely not one of those people who think money more useful than brothers? And this when money has no sense and a brother has sense, when money needs help and a brother can give it, and besides, when money is plentiful and a brother is just one.[8]
2.3.2	**SOCRATES** θαυμαστόν δέ καί τοῦτο, εἴ τις τούς μέν ἀδελφούς ζημίαν ἡγεῖται, ὅτι οὐ καί τά τῶν ἀδελφῶν κέκτηται, τούς δέ πολίτας οὐχ ἡγεῖται ζημίαν, ὅτι οὐ καί τά τῶν πολιτῶν ἔχει· ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μέν δύνανται λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι κρεῖττον σύν πολλοῖς οἰκοῦντα ἀσφαλῶς τἀρκοῦντα ἔχειν ἤ μόνον διαιτώμενον τά τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπικινδύνως πάντα κεκτῆσθαι, ἐπί δέ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τό αὐτό τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦσι·	**SOCRATES** It's strange, too, if someone regards his brothers as a loss because he doesn't also own what his brothers own, but doesn't regard his fellow citizens as a loss because he doesn't also have what the citizens have. In that case people are able to reason that it's better to live among many and have enough in safety than to live alone and possess all the citizens' property at great risk; yet when it comes to brothers, they fail to see this very same thing;
2.3.3	καί οἰκέτας μέν οἱ δυνάμενοι ὠνοῦνται, ἵνα συνεργούς ἔχωσι, καί φίλους κτῶνται, ὡς βοηθῶν δεόμενοι, τῶν δ' ἀδελφῶν ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν μέν γιγνομένους φίλους, ἐξ ἀδελφῶν δέ οὐ γιγνομένους.	and those who can afford it buy slaves to have helpers in their work, and acquire friends because they need allies, yet they neglect their brothers—as though friends could come from among fellow citizens but not from among brothers.
2.3.4	καί μήν πρός φιλίαν μέγα μέν ὑπάρχει τό ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν φῦναι, μέγα δέ τό ὁμοῦ τραφῆναι, ἐπεί καί τοῖς θηρίοις πόθος τις ἐγγίγνεται τῶν συντρόφων· πρός δέ τούτοις καί οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τιμῶσί τε μᾶλλον τούς συναδέλφους ὄντας τῶν ἀναδέλφων καί ἧττον τούτοις ἐπιτίθενται.	And surely, when it comes to friendship, being born of the same parents counts for a great deal, and so does being brought up together; even wild animals come to feel a kind of longing for those raised with them. Besides, other people also respect those who have brothers more than those who have none, and are less inclined to attack them.
2.3.5	καί ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἀλλ' εἰ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή μέγα εἴη τό διάφορον, ἴσως ἄν δέοι φέρειν τόν ἀδελφόν καί μή μικρῶν ἕνεκα φεύγειν· ἀγαθόν γάρ, ὥσπερ καί σύ λέγεις, ἀδελφός ὢν οἷον δεῖ· ὁπότε μέντοι παντός ἐνδέοι καί πᾶν τό ἐναντιώτατον εἴη, τί ἄν τις ἐπιχειροίη τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις;	And Chaerecrates said, "Well, Socrates, if the disagreement weren't a serious one, perhaps one ought to put up with one's brother and not avoid him over little things. A brother is a good thing, as you say yourself, when he is what he should be. But when he falls short in every way and is the complete opposite, why should anyone attempt the impossible?"
2.3.6	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Πότερα δέ, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐδενί ἀρέσαι δύναται Χαιρεφῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ σοί, ἤ ἔστιν οἷς καί πάνυ ἀρέσκει; Διά τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐμοί μισεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι ἄλλοις μέν ἀρέσκειν δύναται,	And Socrates said, "Tell me, Chaerecrates, is Chaerephon unable to please anyone, just as he can't please you, or are there people he pleases very much?" "That's exactly why, Socrates," he

8 Chaerephon was Socrates' devoted friend, famous for asking the Delphic oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐμοί δέ ὅπου ἄν παρῇ πανταχοῦ καί λόγῳ καί ἔργῳ ζημία μᾶλλον ἤ ὠφέλειά ἐστιν.	said, "I have every right to hate him: he can please others, but to me, wherever he is, he's always more of a loss than a benefit, in word and deed alike."
2.3.7	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ ἵππος τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μέν, ἐγχειροῦντι δέ χρῆσθαι ζημία ἐστίν, οὕτω καί ἀδελφός, ὅταν τις αὐτῷ μή ἐπιστάμενος ἐγχειρῇ χρῆσθαι, ζημία ἐστί;	"Then is it the case," said Socrates, "that just as a horse is a liability to someone who doesn't know how to handle it but tries to use it anyway, so too a brother is a liability when someone tries to deal with him without knowing how?"
2.3.8	Πῶς δ' ἄν ἐγώ, ἔφη ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, ἀνεπιστήμων εἴην ἀδελφῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπιστάμενός γε καί εὖ λέγειν τόν εὖ λέγοντα καί εὖ ποιεῖν τόν εὖ ποιοῦντα; τόν μέντοι καί λόγῳ καί ἔργῳ πειρώμενον ἐμέ ἀνιᾶν οὐκ ἄν δυναίμην οὔτ' εὖ λέγειν οὔτ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδέ πειράσομαι.	"But how could I not know how to deal with a brother," said Chaerecrates, "when I know how to speak kindly to someone who speaks kindly to me, and to treat well someone who treats me well? But a man who tries to annoy me in word and deed—I couldn't speak kindly to him or treat him well, and I won't even try."
2.3.9	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Θαυμαστά γε λέγεις, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, εἰ κύνα μέν, εἴ σοι ἦν ἐπί προβάτοις ἐπιτήδειος ὢν καί τούς μέν ποιμένας ἠσπάζετο, σοί δέ προσιόντι ἐχαλέπαινεν, ἀμελήσας ἄν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπειρῶ εὖ ποιήσας πραΰνειν αὐτόν, τόν δέ ἀδελφόν φῄς μέν μέγα ἀγαθόν εἶναι ὄντα πρός σέ οἷον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι δέ ὁμολογῶν καί εὖ ποιεῖν καί εὖ λέγειν οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως σοι ὡς βέλτιστος ᾖ.	And Socrates said, "That's an astonishing thing to say, Chaerecrates. If you had a dog that was good with sheep, and it was friendly to the shepherds but snarled at you when you came near, you'd forget about being angry and try to calm it by treating it well. Yet with your brother, who you say is a great good when he's what he should be toward you, and though you admit you know how to treat people well and speak kindly to them, you don't try to find a way to make him as good to you as he can be."
2.3.10	καί ὁ Χαιρεκράτης· δέδοικα, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή οὐκ ἔχω ἐγώ τοσαύτην σοφίαν ὥστε Χαιρεφῶντα ποιῆσαι πρός ἐμέ οἷον δεῖ. Καί μήν οὐδέν γε ποικίλον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδέ καινόν δεῖ ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἐμοί δοκεῖ, μηχανᾶσθαι, οἷς δέ καί σύ ἐπίστασαι αὐτός οἶομαι ἄν αὐτόν ἁλόντα περί πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαί σε.	And Chaerecrates said, "I'm afraid, Socrates, that I don't have wisdom enough to make Chaerephon treat me as he should." "And yet," said Socrates, "to my mind you don't need to devise anything elaborate or new to use on him. I think that with means you already know yourself, you could catch him and make him think highly of you."
2.3.11	Οὐκ ἄν φθάνοις, ἔφη, λέγων, εἴ τι ᾔσθησαί με φίλτρον ἐπιστάμενον ὅ ἐγώ εἰδώς λέληθα ἐμαυτόν. λέγε δή μοι, ἔφη, εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι, ὁπότε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπί δεῖπνον, τί ἄν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι κατάρχοιμ' ἄν τοῦ αὐτός, ὅτε θύοιμι, καλεῖν ἐκεῖνον.	"Then tell me right away," he said, "if you've noticed that I know some love charm I've been unaware of knowing." "All right, tell me," he said. "If you wanted to get one of your acquaintances to invite you to dinner whenever he offered a sacrifice, what would you do?" "Obviously I'd start by inviting him myself whenever I offered one."
2.3.12	Εἰ δέ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινά προτρέψασθαι, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σῶν, τί ἄν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι πρότερος ἄν ἐγχειροίην ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐκείνου, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίη.	"And if you wanted to persuade one of your friends to look after your affairs whenever you were away, what would you do?" "Obviously I'd be the first to try looking after his when he was away."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.3.13	Εἰ δέ βούλοιο ξένον ποιῆσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν, ὁπότε ἔλθοις εἰς τήν ἐκείνου, τί ἄν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι καί τοῦτον πρότερος ὑποδεχοίμην ἄν, ὁπότε ἔλθοι Ἀθήναζε· καί εἴ γε βουλοίμην αὐτόν προθυμεῖσθαι διαπράττειν μοι ἐφ' ἅ ἥκοιμι, δῆλον ὅτι καί τοῦτο δέοι ἄν πρότερον αὐτόν ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν.	"And if you wanted to get a guest-friend to put you up whenever you came to his city, what would you do?" "Obviously I'd be the first to put him up whenever he came to Athens. And if I wanted him to be eager to help me accomplish whatever I'd come for, obviously I'd have to do that for him first, too."[9]
2.3.14	Πάντ' ἄρα σύγε τά ἐν ἀνθρώποις φίλτρα ἐπιστάμενος πάλαι ἀπεκρύπτου· ἤ ὀκνεῖς, ἔφη, ἄρξαι, μή αἰσχρός φανῇς, ἐάν πρότερος τόν ἀδελφόν εὖ ποιῇς; καί μήν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνήρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὅς ἄν φθάνῃ τούς μέν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τούς δέ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. εἰ μέν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικώτερος εἶναι σοῦ πρός τήν φιλίαν ταύτην, ἐκεῖνον ἄν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τῷ σέ φίλον ποιεῖσθαι· νῦν δέ μοι σύ δοκεῖς ἡγούμενος μᾶλλον ἄν ἐξεργάσασθαι τοῦτο.	"So you've known all the love charms there are among human beings all along, and kept them hidden! Or are you hesitant," he said, "to make the first move, for fear of looking contemptible if you're the first to do your brother good? Yet surely the man who seems to deserve the most praise is the one who is quickest to harm his enemies and do good to his friends. Now if I thought Chaerephon better suited than you to lead the way to this friendship, I'd be trying to persuade him to make the first attempt at winning you as a friend. As it is, I think you're the one more likely to bring it off by taking the lead."
2.3.15	καί ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἄτοπα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί οὐδαμῶς πρός σοῦ, ὅς γε κελεύεις ἐμέ νεώτερον ὄντα καθηγεῖσθαι· καίτοι τούτου γε παρά πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τἀναντία νομίζεται, τόν πρεσβύτερον ἡγεῖσθαι παντός καί λόγου καί ἔργου.	And Chaerecrates said, "That's a strange thing to say, Socrates, and not like you at all—telling me, the younger brother, to take the lead. Yet everywhere in the world the custom is the opposite: the elder takes the lead in everything, in word and deed alike."
2.3.16	Πῶς; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γάρ καί ὁδοῦ παραχωρῆσαι τόν νεώτερον πρεσβυτέρῳ συντυγχάνοντι πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καί καθήμενον ὑπαναστῆναι καί κοίτῃ μαλακῇ τιμῆσαι καί λόγων ὑπεῖξαι; ὠγαθέ, μή ὄκνει, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τόν ἄνδρα καταπραΰνειν, καί πάνυ ταχύ σοι ὑπακούσεται· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς φιλότιμός ἐστι καί ἐλευθέριος; τά μέν γάρ πονηρά ἀνθρώπια οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἔλοις ἤ εἰ δοίης τι, τούς δέ καλούς κἀγαθούς ἀνθρώπους προσφιλῶς χρώμενος μάλιστ' ἄν κατεργάσαιο.	"How so?" said Socrates. "Isn't it the custom everywhere for a younger man to step aside in the road when he meets an older one, to get up from his seat, to honor him with the soft bed, and to give way to him in speaking? My good friend, don't hesitate," he said, "but set about calming the man down, and he'll respond to you very quickly. Don't you see how keen he is on honor, and how generous in spirit? Worthless little people you couldn't win over better than by giving them something; but true gentlemen you'd best win over by treating them in a friendly way."
2.3.17	καί ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· Ἐάν οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ποιοῦντος ἐκεῖνος μηδέν βελτίων γίγνηται; Τί γάρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἤ κινδυνεύσεις ἐπιδεῖξαι σύ μέν χρηστός τε καί φιλάδελφος εἶναι, ἐκεῖνος δέ φαῦλός τε καί οὐκ ἄξιος εὐεργεσίας; ἀλλ' οὐδέν οἶμαι τούτων ἔσεσθαι· νομίζω γάρ αὐτόν, ἐπειδάν αἴσθηταί σε προκαλούμενον ἑαυτόν εἰς	And Chaerecrates said, "And what if I do all this and he gets no better?" Socrates said: What else, except that you'll risk showing that you are good and love your brother, and that he is worthless and doesn't deserve kindness? But I don't think anything of the sort will happen. I believe that

9 A guest-friend (*xenos*) was a man in another city bound to one by a lasting, often hereditary, tie of mutual hospitality.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τόν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, πάνυ φιλονικήσειν ὅπως περιγένηταί σου καί λόγῳ καί ἔργῳ εὖ ποιῶν.	once he sees you challenging him to this contest, he'll be very competitive about outdoing you in treating you well, in word and deed.
2.3.18	**SOCRATES** νῦν μέν γάρ οὕτως, ἔφη, διάκεισθον, ὥσπερ εἰ τώ χεῖρε, ἅς ὁ θεός ἐπί τῷ συλλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλοιν ἐποίησεν, ἀφεμένω τούτου τράποιντο πρός τό διακωλύειν ἀλλήλω, ἤ εἰ τώ πόδε θείᾳ μοίρᾳ πεποιημένω πρός τό συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοιν, ἀμελήσαντε τούτου ἐμποδίζοιεν ἀλλήλω·	**SOCRATES** As things stand, he said, the two of you are in the same state as if a pair of hands, which the god made to help each other, were to give that up and turn to obstructing each other, or as if a pair of feet, made by divine dispensation to work together, were to neglect that and trip each other up;
2.3.19	οὐκ ἄν πολλή ἀμαθία εἴη καί κακοδαιμονία τοῖς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ πεποιημένοις ἐπί βλάβῃ χρῆσθαι; καί μήν ἀδελφώ γε, ὡς ἐμοί δοκεῖ, ὁ θεός ἐποίησεν ἐπί μείζονι ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν ἤ χεῖρέ τε καί πόδε καί ὀφθαλμώ καί τἆλλα ὅσα ἀδελφά ἔφυσεν ἀνθρώποις. χεῖρες μέν γάρ, εἰ δέοι αὐτάς τά πλέον ὀργυιᾶς διέχοντα ἅμα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἄν δύναιντο· πόδες δέ οὐδ' ἄν ἐπί τά ὀργυιάν διέχοντα ἔλθοιεν ἅμα, ὀφθαλμοί δέ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐπί πλεῖστον ἐξικνεῖσθαι οὐδ' ἄν τῶν ἔτι ἐγγυτέρω ὄντων τά ἔμπροσθεν ἅμα καί τά ὄπισθεν ἰδεῖν δύναιντο· ἀδελφώ δέ φίλω ὄντε καί πολύ διεστῶτε πράττετον ἅμα ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν.	wouldn't it be great stupidity and misery to use for harm what was made for benefit? And surely, it seems to me, the god made a pair of brothers for greater benefit to each other than hands, feet, eyes, and all the other things he made in pairs for human beings, as "brothers" of a kind. Hands, if they had to do things more than a fathom apart at the same time, couldn't do it; feet couldn't even reach things a fathom apart at the same time; and eyes, which seem to reach farthest, couldn't see what is in front and what is behind at the same time, even of things still closer. But two brothers who are friends, even when far apart, act together for each other's benefit.[10]

CHAPTER 4

Socrates complains that people care for their possessions more than for friends, the most valuable possession.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.4.1	Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καί περί φίλων διαλεγομένου ἐξ ὧν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὠφελεῖσθαι πρός φίλων κτῆσίν τε καί χρείαν. τοῦτο μέν γάρ δή πολλῶν ἔφη ἀκούειν, ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον [ἄν] εἴη φίλος σαφής καί ἀγαθός· ἐπιμελομένους δέ παντός μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν ἔφη τούς πολλούς ἤ φίλων κτήσεως.	I once heard him discussing friends, too, in a way that I think would help anyone a great deal in acquiring friends and making use of them. He said he had heard many people say that of all possessions the best [would] be a sure and good friend; but he said he saw most people caring about anything rather than acquiring friends.
2.4.2	καί γάρ οἰκίας καί ἀγρούς καί ἀνδράποδα καί βοσκήματα καί σκεύη κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὁρᾶν ἔφη καί τά ὄντα σῴζειν πειρωμένους, φίλον δέ, ὅ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν εἶναί φασιν, ὁρᾶν ἔφη τούς πολλούς οὔτε ὅπως κτήσωνται φροντίζοντας οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες αὐτοῖς σῴζωνται.	For he said he saw them carefully acquiring houses and farms and slaves and livestock and furnishings, and trying to preserve what they had; but a friend, which they say is the greatest good, he saw most people giving no thought to how they might acquire one, or how they might keep the friends they had.
2.4.3	ἀλλά καί καμνόντων φίλων τε καί οἰκετῶν ὁρᾶν τινας ἔφη τοῖς μέν οἰκέταις καί ἰατρούς εἰσάγοντας καί τἆλλα	What's more, he said, when friends and slaves fell sick, he saw some people bringing in doctors for

10 A fathom was the span of a man's outstretched arms, about six feet.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τά πρός ὑγίειαν ἐπιμελῶς παρασκευάζοντας, τῶν δέ φίλων ὀλιγωροῦντας, ἀποθανόντων τε ἀμφοτέρων ἐπί μέν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀχθομένους τε καί ζημίαν ἡγουμένους, ἐπί δέ τοῖς φίλοις οὐδέν οἰομένους ἐλαττοῦσθαι, καί τῶν μέν ἄλλων κτημάτων οὐδέν ἐῶντας ἀθεράπευτον οὐδ' ἀνεπίσκεπτον, τῶν δέ φίλων ἐπιμελείας δεομένων ἀμελοῦντας.	their slaves and carefully providing everything else needed for their health, while making light of their friends; and when both died, they were upset about their slaves and counted it a loss, but thought they had lost nothing over their friends. They left none of their other possessions untended or unchecked, yet neglected their friends when they needed care.
2.4.4	ἔτι δέ πρός τούτοις ὁρᾶν ἔφη τούς πολλούς τῶν μέν ἄλλων κτημάτων καί πάνυ πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων τό πλῆθος εἰδότας, τῶν δέ φίλων ὀλίγων ὄντων οὐ μόνον τό πλῆθος ἀγνοοῦντας, ἀλλά καί τοῖς πυνθανομένοις τοῦτο καταλέγειν ἐγχειρήσαντας, οὕς ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἔθεσαν, πάλιν τούτους ἀνατίθεσθαι· τοσοῦτον αὐτούς τῶν φίλων φροντίζειν.	Besides this, he said, he saw that most people knew the number of their other possessions, even when they had a great many, but with their friends, few as they were, not only did they not know the number, but when they tried to list them for someone who asked, they would take back some of those they had just put among their friends—that's how much thought they gave to their friends.
2.4.5	καίτοι πρός ποῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενος φίλος ἀγαθός οὐκ ἄν πολλῷ κρείττων φανείη; ποῖος γάρ ἵππος ἤ ποῖον ζεῦγος οὕτω χρήσιμον ὥσπερ ὁ χρηστός φίλος; ποῖον δέ ἀνδράποδον οὕτως εὔνουν καί παραμόνιμον; ἤ ποῖον ἄλλο κτῆμα οὕτω πάγχρηστον;	And yet, compared with which other possession would a good friend not prove far better? What horse or what yoke of oxen is as useful as a good friend? What slave is as loyal and steadfast? Or what other possession is so useful in every way?
2.4.6	ὁ γάρ ἀγαθός φίλος ἑαυτόν τάττει πρός πᾶν τό ἐλλεῖπον τῷ φίλῳ καί τῆς τῶν ἰδίων κατασκευῆς καί τῶν κοινῶν πράξεων, κἄν τέ τινα εὖ ποιῆσαι δέῃ, συνεπισχύει, ἐάν τέ τις φόβος ταράττῃ, συμβοηθεῖ, τά μέν συναναλίσκων, τά δέ συμπράττων, καί τά μέν συμπείθων, τά δέ βιαζόμενος, καί εὖ μέν πράττοντας πλεῖστα εὐφραίνων, σφαλλομένους δέ πλεῖστα ἐπανορθῶν.	For a good friend puts himself at his friend's disposal wherever he falls short, whether in managing his private affairs or in public business. If he needs to do someone a good turn, he lends his strength; if some fear troubles him, he comes to his aid—now sharing the expense, now sharing the work, now helping to persuade, now using force—giving the greatest joy to his friends when they are doing well, and doing the most to set them right when they stumble.
2.4.7	ἅ δέ αἵ τε χεῖρες ἑκάστῳ ὑπηρετοῦσι καί οἱ ὀφθαλμοί προορῶσι καί τά ὦτα προακούουσι καί οἱ πόδες διανύτουσι, τούτων φίλος εὐεργετῶν οὐδενός λείπεται· πολλάκις δέ ἅ πρό αὐτοῦ τις ἤ οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο ἤ οὐκ εἶδεν ἤ οὐκ ἤκουσεν ἤ οὐ διήνυσε, ταῦθ' ὁ φίλος πρό τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔνιοι δένδρα μέν πειρῶνται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκεν, τοῦ δέ παμφορωτάτου κτήματος, ὅ καλεῖται φίλος, ἀργῶς καί ἀνειμένως οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπιμέλονται.	Whatever each man's hands serve him in, his eyes foresee, his ears hear in advance, and his feet accomplish—in none of these does a friend fall short in doing him good. And often what a man has failed to accomplish for himself, or to see, or to hear, or to get done, his friend has managed for him. And yet some people try to look after trees for the sake of their fruit, while most are idle and slack in caring for the most productive possession of all, the one called a friend.

CHAPTER 5

Socrates asks Antisthenes whether friends, like slaves, differ in value, and urges each to be worth much.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.5.1	Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καί ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅς ἐδόκει μοι προτρέπειν τόν ἀκούοντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτόν ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. ἰδών γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενίᾳ πιεζομένου, ἤρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ καί ἄλλων πολλῶν·	I once heard another discussion of his, too, which seemed to me to urge the listener to examine himself and ask how much he was worth to his friends. Seeing one of his companions neglecting a friend who was hard pressed by poverty, he questioned Antisthenes in front of the neglectful man himself and many others:[11]
2.5.2	ἆρ', ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσί τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥσπερ οἰκετῶν; τῶν γάρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μέν που δυοῖν μναῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν, ὁ δέ [οὐδ'] ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δέ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δέ καί δέκα· Νικίας δέ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς τἀργύρεια πρίασθαι ταλάντου· σκοποῦμαι δή τοῦτο, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καί τῶν φίλων εἰσίν ἀξίαι.	"Antisthenes," he said, "do friends have different values, the way slaves do? One slave, I suppose, is worth two minas, another [not even] half a mina, another five minas, another as much as ten; and Nicias son of Niceratus is said to have paid a talent for a manager for his silver mines. So this is what I'm asking," he said, "whether friends too have different values, just as slaves do."[12]
2.5.3	Ναί μά Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· ἐγώ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἄν τόν μέν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἤ δύο μνᾶς, τόν δ' οὐδ' ἄν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τόν δέ καί πρό δέκα μνῶν ἑλοίμην ἄν, τόν δέ [πρὸ] πάντων χρημάτων καί πόνων πριαίμην ἄν φίλον μοι εἶναι.	"Yes, by Zeus," said Antisthenes. "At any rate, I'd rather have one man as my friend than two minas; another I wouldn't value even above half a mina; another I'd choose over ten minas; and another I'd pay [beyond] all the money and effort in the world to have as my friend."
2.5.4	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα τοιαῦτά ἐστι, καλῶς ἄν ἔχοι ἐξετάζειν τινά ἑαυτόν, πόσου ἄρα τυγχάνει τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος ὤν, καί πειρᾶσθαι ὡς πλείστου ἄξιος εἶναι, ἵνα ἧττον αὐτόν οἱ φίλοι προδιδῶσιν. ἐγώ γάρ τοι, ἔφη, πολλάκις ἀκούων τοῦ μέν ὅτι προύδωκεν αὐτόν φίλος ἀνήρ, τοῦ δ' ὅτι μνᾶν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀνήρ,	"Well then," said Socrates, "if that's how things are, it would be a good idea for each of us to examine himself and ask how much he actually happens to be worth to his friends, and to try to be worth as much as possible, so that his friends are less likely to betray him. For when I keep hearing," he said, "one man say that a friend betrayed him, and another that he was given up for a mina by a man
2.5.5	ὅν ᾤετο φίλον εἶναι, καί τά τοιαῦτα πάντα, σκοπῶ, μή, ὥσπερ † ὅταν τις οἰκέτην πονηρόν πωλῇ καί ἀποδῶται τοῦ εὐρόντος, οὕτω καί τόν πονηρόν φίλον, ὅταν ἐξῇ τό πλέον τῆς ἀξίας λαβεῖν, ἐπαγωγόν ᾖ ἀποδίδοσθαι· τούς δέ χρηστούς οὔτε οἰκέτας πάνυ τι πωλουμένους ὁρῶ οὔτε φίλους προδιδομένους.	he thought was his friend, and all that sort of thing, I wonder whether, just as when someone sells a bad slave he lets him go for whatever he'll fetch, so too with a bad friend, when it's possible to get more than he's worth, it's tempting to sell him off. Good slaves, I notice, are hardly ever put up for sale, and good friends are never betrayed."

11 Antisthenes was one of Socrates' closest followers, later regarded as a forerunner of the Cynics.
12 Nicias was a wealthy Athenian general who hired out large numbers of slaves to the silver mines; a talent was sixty minas.

CHAPTER 6

Socrates and Critobulus discuss how to test, choose and win good friends.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.6.1	Ἐδόκει δέ μοι καί εἰς τό δοκιμάζειν φίλους ὁποίους ἄξιον κτᾶσθαι φρενοῦν τοιάδε λέγων· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, εἰ δεοίμεθα φίλου ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἄν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν; ἆρα πρῶτον μέν ζητητέον, ὅστις ἄρχει γαστρός τε καί φιλοποσίας καί λαγνείας καί ὕπνου καί ἀργίας; ὁ γάρ ὑπό τούτων κρατούμενος οὔτ' αὐτός ἑαυτῷ δύναιτ' ἄν οὔτε φίλῳ τά δέοντα πράττειν. Μά Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ μέν ὑπό τούτων ἀρχομένου ἀφεκτέον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;	He also seemed to me to teach people how to judge which friends are worth acquiring, by saying things like this. "Tell me, Critobulus," he said, "if we needed a good friend, how would we set about looking for one? Shouldn't we first look for someone who rules his belly, his love of drink, his lust, his sleep and his idleness? A man overpowered by these couldn't do what's needed either for himself or for a friend." "No, by Zeus, certainly not," he said. "So you think we should keep away from someone ruled by them?"[13]
2.6.2	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ὅστις δαπανηρός ὢν μή αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀεί τῶν πλησίον δεῖται, καί λαμβάνων μέν μή δύναται ἀποδιδόναι, μή λαμβάνων δέ τόν μή διδόντα μισεῖ, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καί οὗτος χαλεπός φίλος εἶναι; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἀφεκτέον καί τούτου; Ἀφεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.	"Absolutely," he said. "Well then," he said, "take a man who's extravagant and can't support himself. He's always in need of his neighbors. When he receives, he can't pay it back, and when he doesn't receive, he hates the one who won't give. Don't you think he too makes a difficult friend?" "Certainly," he said. "So we should keep away from him too?" "We certainly should," he said.
2.6.3	Τί γάρ; ὅστις χρηματίζεσθαι μέν δύναται, πολλῶν δέ χρημάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ, καί διά τοῦτο δυσσύμβολός ἐστι, καί λαμβάνων μέν ἥδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δέ μή βούλεται; Ἐμοί μέν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, οὗτος ἔτι πονηρότερος ἐκείνου εἶναι.	"And what about someone who's able to make money but craves a great deal of it, and is therefore hard to do business with—who enjoys receiving but doesn't want to pay back?" "To me," he said, "he seems even worse than the other one."
2.6.4	Τί δ'; ὅστις διά τόν ἔρωτα τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι μηδέ πρός ἕν ἄλλο σχολήν ποιεῖται ἤ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ; ἀφεκτέον καί τούτου, ὡς ἐμοί δοκεῖ· ἀνωφελής γάρ ἄν εἴη τῷ χρωμένῳ. Τί δέ; ὅστις στασιώδης τέ ἐστι καί θέλων πολλούς τοῖς φίλοις ἐχθρούς παρέχειν; Φευκτέον νή Δία καί τοῦτον. Εἰ δέ τις τούτων μέν τῶν κακῶν μηδέν ἔχοι, εὖ δέ πάσχων ἀνέχεται, μηδέν φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν; Ἀνωφελής ἄν εἴη καί οὗτος. ἀλλά ποῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρήσομεν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι;	"And what about someone whose passion for making money leaves him no time for anything except what will bring him some profit?" "We should keep away from him too, I think: he'd be no use to anyone who had dealings with him." "And what about someone who's quarrelsome and ready to make lots of enemies for his friends?" "By Zeus, we should run from him too." "And suppose someone had none of these faults, but was content to receive kindness without a thought of returning it?" "He'd be useless too. But what sort of man, Socrates, should we try to make our friend?"
2.6.5	Οἶμαι μέν, ὅς ἄν τἀναντία τούτων ἐγκρατής μέν ἥ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὔοικος δέ καί εὐσύμβολος ὢν τυγχάνῃ καί φιλόνικος πρός τό μή ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τούς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις.	"The opposite of these, I think: someone who's self-controlled about the pleasures of the body. He also happens to be a good manager of his household and fair in his dealings, and he's competitive about never falling behind in doing good to those

13 Critobulus was the son of Socrates' old friend Crito, a wealthy young Athenian known for his good looks.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		who do him good. That makes him worth having for those who deal with him."
2.6.6	Πῶς οὖν ἄν ταῦτα δοκιμάσαιμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρό τοῦ χρῆσθαι; Τούς μέν ἀνδριαντοποιούς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅν ἄν ὁρῶμεν τούς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καί τούς λοιπούς εὖ ποιήσειν.	"So how could we test for these qualities, Socrates, before we have dealings with him?" "With sculptors," he said, "we don't judge by going on what they say. When we see that someone has made his earlier statues well, we trust that he'll make the rest well too."
2.6.7	Καί ἄνδρα δή λέγεις, ἔφη, ὅς ἄν τούς φίλους τούς πρόσθεν εὖ ποιῶν φαίνηται, δῆλον εἶναι καί τούς ὕστερον εὐεργετήσοντα; Καί γάρ ἵπποις, ἔφη, ὅν ἄν ὁρῶ τοῖς πρόσθεν καλῶς χρώμενον, τοῦτον κἄν ἄλλοις οἶμαι καλῶς χρῆσθαι.	"So you mean," he said, "that a man who has evidently treated his earlier friends well is clearly going to do good to his later ones too?" "Yes, and it's the same with horses," he said. "When I see someone who has handled his earlier ones well, I think he'll handle others well too."
2.6.8	Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὅς δ' ἄν ἡμῖν ἄξιος φιλίας δοκῇ εἶναι, πῶς χρή φίλον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι; Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, τά παρά τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ συμβουλεύουσιν αὐτόν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, ὅν ἄν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ καί οἱ θεοί μή ἐναντιῶνται, ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὗτος θηρατέος;	"Very well," he said. "And when someone seems to us worthy of friendship, how should we make him our friend?" "First," he said, "we should consult the signs from the gods, to see whether they advise making him a friend." "Well then," he said, "when someone seems right to us and the gods don't oppose it, can you tell me how he's to be hunted?"
2.6.9	Μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐ κατά πόδας ὥσπερ ὁ λαγῶς οὐδ' ἀπάτῃ ὥσπερ αἱ ὄρνιθες οὐδέ βίᾳ ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι. ἄκοντα γάρ φίλον ἐλεῖν ἐργῶδες· χαλεπόν δέ καί δήσαντα κατέχειν ὥσπερ δοῦλον. ἐχθροί γάρ μᾶλλον ἤ φίλοι γίγνονται οἱ ταῦτα πάσχοντες. Φίλοι δέ πῶς; ἔφη.	"Not by running him down on foot like a hare, by Zeus," he said, "or by trickery like birds, or by force like wild boars. It's hard work to catch a friend against his will, and hard to keep him tied up like a slave. People treated that way become enemies rather than friends." "Then how do they become friends?" he said.
2.6.10	Εἶναι μέν τινάς φασιν ἐπῳδάς, ἅς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπᾴδοντες οἷς ἄν βούλωνται φίλους αὐτούς ποιοῦνται· εἶναι δέ καί φίλτρα, οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πρός οὕς ἄν βούλωνται χρώμενοι φιλοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν.	"They say there are certain incantations. Those who know them chant them over whomever they like and so make them their friends. And they say there are love potions too, which those who know them use on whomever they like, and so are loved by them."
2.6.11	Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα μάθοιμεν ἄν; ἅ μέν αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ, ἤκουσας Ὁμήρου, ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχή τοιάδε τις· Δεῦρ' ἄγε δή, πολύαιν' Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν. Ταύτην οὖν, ἔφη, τήν ἐπῳδήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπᾴδουσαι κατεῖχον, ὥστε μή ἀπιέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν τούς ἑπᾳσθέντας;	"So where could we learn these?" he said. "You've heard from Homer what the Sirens chanted to Odysseus. It begins something like this: 'Come here, come, much-praised Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans.'" "So was this the incantation, Socrates," he said, "that the Sirens chanted to other people as well, holding them fast so that those they enchanted never left them?"
2.6.12	Οὐκ ἀλλά τοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις οὕτως ἐπῇδον. Σχεδόν τι λέγεις τοιαῦτα χρῆναι ἑκάστῳ ἐπᾴδειν, οἷα μή	"No. That was how they enchanted people who were ambitious for excellence." "You're pretty

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	νομιεῖ ἀκούων τόν ἐπαινοῦντα καταγελῶντα λέγειν; Οὕτω μέν γάρ ἐχθίων τ' ἄν εἴη καί ἀπελαύνοι τούς ἀνθρώπους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ τόν εἰδότα ὅτι μικρός τε καί αἰσχρός καί ἀσθενής ἐστιν ἐπαινοίη λέγων ὅτι καλός τε καί μέγας καί ἰσχυρός ἐστιν. ἄλλας δέ τινας οἶσθα ἐπῳδάς;	much saying that you have to chant to each person the sort of thing he won't take, when he hears it, as mockery from the person praising him?" "Yes, because otherwise you'd make yourself hated and drive people away. Imagine praising a man who knows he's short and ugly and weak by telling him he's handsome and tall and strong." "Do you know any other incantations?"
2.6.13	Οὐκ ἀλλ' ἤκουσα μέν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλάς ἐπίσταιτο, ἅς ἐπᾴδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτήν φιλεῖν αὐτόν. Θεμιστοκλῆς δέ πῶς ἐποίησε τήν πόλιν φιλεῖν αὐτόν; Μά Δί' οὐκ ἐπᾴδων, ἀλλά περιάψας τι ἀγαθόν αὐτῇ.	"No. But I've heard that Pericles knew many, and by chanting them over the city he made it love him." "And how did Themistocles make the city love him?" "Not by chanting, by Zeus, but by hanging something good around its neck, like an amulet."[14]
2.6.14	δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς, εἰ μέλλομεν ἀγαθόν τινα κτήσεσθαι φίλον, αὐτούς ἡμᾶς ἀγαθούς δεῖ γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καί πράττειν. Σύ δ' ᾧου, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷόν τ' εἶναι καί πονηρόν ὄντα χρηστούς φίλους κτήσασθαι;	"You seem to me to be saying, Socrates, that if we're going to acquire a good friend, we have to become good ourselves, in both speech and action." "And did you think," said Socrates, "that even a bad man could acquire good friends?"
2.6.15	ἑώρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ῥήτορᾶς τε φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας, καί στρατηγεῖν οὐχ ἱκανούς πάνυ στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑταίρους.	"Well," said Critobulus, "I've seen poor speakers who were friends of good public orators, and men unfit to be generals who were companions of highly capable commanders."
2.6.16	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη. καί, περί οὗ διαλεγόμεθα, οἶσθά τινας οἵ ἀνωφελεῖς ὄντες ὠφελίμους δύνανται φίλους ποιεῖσθαι; Μά Δί' οὐ δῆτ', ἔφη· ἀλλ' εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι πονηρόν ὄντα καλούς κἀγαθούς φίλους κτήσασθαι, ἐκεῖνο ἤδη μέλει μοι, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτόν καλόν κἀγαθόν γενόμενον ἐξ ἑτοίμου τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς φίλον εἶναι.	"Well then," he said, "on the point we're discussing, do you know any people who are useless themselves but can make useful friends?" "No, by Zeus, certainly not," he said. "But if a bad man can't acquire true gentlemen as friends, then what concerns me now is this: whether someone who has become a true gentleman himself can then readily be a friend to true gentlemen."
2.6.17	Ὅ ταράττει σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις ἄνδρας καί τά καλά πράττοντας καί τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπεχομένους ὁρᾷς ἀντί τοῦ φίλους εἶναι στασιάζοντας ἀλλήλοις καί χαλεπώτερον χρωμένους τῶν μηδενός ἀξίων ἀνθρώπων.	"What's troubling you, Critobulus, is that you often see men who do fine things and keep away from shameful ones, yet instead of being friends they quarrel with each other and treat one another worse than worthless people do."
2.6.18	Καί οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οἱ ἰδιῶται τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλά καί πόλεις αἱ τῶν τε καλῶν μάλιστα ἐπιμελόμεναι καί τά αἰσχρά ἥκιστα προσιέμεναι πολλάκις πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι πρός ἀλλήλας.	"And it isn't only private individuals who do this," said Critobulus. "Cities too, even those that care most for what is fine and have least to do with what is shameful, are often hostile toward one another.
2.6.19	ἅ λογιζόμενος πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχω πρός τήν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν· οὔτε γάρ τούς πονηρούς ὁρῶ φίλους ἀλλήλοις	"When I think about this, I feel quite discouraged about acquiring friends. For I don't see bad men

14 Themistocles led Athens against the Persians at Salamis in 480 BC and built up its navy and walls.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δυναμένους εἶναι· πῶς γάρ ἄν ἤ ἀχάριστοι ἤ ἀμελεῖς ἤ πλεονέκται ἤ ἄπιστοι ἤ ἀκρατεῖς ἄνθρωποι δύναιντο φίλοι γενέσθαι; οἱ μέν οὖν πονηροί πάντως ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροί μᾶλλον ἤ φίλοι πεφυκέναι.	being able to be friends with one another. How could people who are ungrateful or careless or grasping or untrustworthy or uncontrolled become friends? So bad men, in my view, are altogether made by nature to be enemies of one another rather than friends.
2.6.20	ἀλλά μήν, ὥσπερ σύ λέγεις, οὐδ' ἄν τοῖς χρηστοῖς οἱ πονηροί ποτε συναρμόσειαν εἰς φιλίαν· πῶς γάρ οἱ τά πονηρά ποιοῦντες τοῖς τά τοιαῦτα μισοῦσι φίλοι γένοιντ' ἄν; εἰ δέ δή καί οἱ ἀρετήν ἀσκοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε περί τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καί φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται καί ἐν τίσιν ἀνθρώποις εὔνοια καί πίστις ἔσται;	"And yet, as you say, bad men could never be joined in friendship with good men either. How could people who do bad things become friends with those who hate such things? And if even those who practice excellence quarrel over first place in their cities, and envy and hate one another, who will still be friends? Among what people will there be goodwill and trust?"
2.6.21	ἀλλ' ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε. φύσει γάρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τά μέν φιλικά· δέονταί τε γάρ ἀλλήλων καί ἐλεοῦσι καί συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καί τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τά δέ πολεμικά· τά τε γάρ αὐτά καλά καί ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπέρ τούτων μάχονται καί διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικόν δέ καί ἔρις καί ὀργή· καί δυσμενές μέν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητόν δέ ὁ φθόνος.	"Well, Critobulus," said Socrates, "these matters are rather complicated. By nature people have some tendencies toward friendship. They need one another, they feel pity, they help each other by working together, and since they understand this they feel gratitude toward one another. But they also have tendencies toward war. Since they consider the same things fine and pleasant, they fight over them, and when they disagree they set themselves against each other. Strife and anger are warlike too. The passion for getting more than one's share breeds ill will, and envy breeds hatred.
2.6.22	ἀλλ' ὅμως διά τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τούς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. διά γάρ τήν ἀρετήν αἱροῦνται μέν ἄνευ πόνου τά μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἤ διά πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν, καί δύνανται πεινῶντες καί διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καί ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν καί τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόμενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε μή λυπεῖν οὕς μή προσήκει·	"Yet in spite of all this, friendship slips through and joins true gentlemen together. Because of their excellence they choose to possess a moderate amount without toil rather than to master everything through war. When they're hungry and thirsty, they can share food and drink without resentment. And though they take pleasure in love affairs with those in their youthful bloom, they can restrain themselves so as not to hurt those they shouldn't.
2.6.23	δύνανται δέ καί χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενοι νομίμως κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλά καί ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις· δύνανται δέ καί τήν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλά καί συμφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι καί τήν ὀργήν κωλύειν εἰς τό μεταμελησόμενον προϊέναι· τόν δέ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τά μέν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθά τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τά δέ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες.	"They can share money lawfully, refraining from taking more than their share, and they can also help each other out. They can settle their disputes not only without hurt but to their mutual advantage, and they can keep anger from going so far that they'll regret it. Envy they remove altogether, by offering their own good things to their friends as if they belonged to them, and by regarding their friends' good things as their own.
2.6.24		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκός τούς καλούς κἀγαθούς καί τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν μή μόνον ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀλλά καί ὠφελίμους ἀλλήλοις κοινωνούς εἶναι; οἱ μέν γάρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαί τε καί ἄρχειν, ἵνα ἐξουσίαν ἔχωσι χρήματά τε κλέπτειν καί ἀνθρώπους βιάζεσθαι καί ἡδυπαθεῖν, ἄδικοί τε καί πονηροί ἄν εἶεν καί ἀδύνατοι ἄλλῳ συναρμόσαι.	"So isn't it likely that true gentlemen will also share political honors, and do so not only without harming one another but to one another's benefit? Those who want to be honored and hold office in their cities so that they'll have the power to steal money, use violence on people and live in luxury would be unjust and bad, and incapable of getting along with anyone else.
2.6.25	εἰ δέ τις ἐν πόλει τιμᾶσθαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως αὐτός τε μή ἀδικῆται καί τοῖς φίλοις τά δίκαια βοηθεῖν δύνηται, καί ἄρξας ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν τήν πατρίδα πειρᾶται, διά τί ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἄν δύναιτο συναρμόσαι; πότερον τούς φίλους ὠφελεῖν μετά τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἧττον δυνήσεται; ἤ τήν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν ἀδυνατώτερος ἔσται καλούς κἀγαθούς ἔχων συνεργούς;	"But suppose someone wants to be honored in his city so that he won't be wronged himself and can help his friends to justice, and once in office tries to do some good for his country. Why couldn't such a man get along with another like him? Will he be less able to benefit his friends with true gentlemen beside him? Or will he be less able to do good to the city if he has true gentlemen as fellow workers?
2.6.26	ἀλλά καί ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι, εἰ ἐξῆν τοῖς κρατίστοις συνθεμένους ἐπί τούς χείρους ἰέναι, πάντας ἄν τούς ἀγῶνας οὗτοι ἐνίκων καί πάντα τά ἆθλα οὗτοι ἐλάμβανον. ἐπεί οὖν ἐκεῖ μέν οὐκ ἐῶσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐν δέ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἐν οἷς οἱ καλοί κἀγαθοί κρατιστεύουσιν, οὐδείς κωλύει μεθ' οὗ ἄν τις βούληται τήν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν, πῶς οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τούς βελτίστους φίλους κτησάμενον πολιτεύεσθαι, τούτοις κοινωνοῖς καί συνεργοῖς τῶν πράξεων μᾶλλον ἤ ἀνταγωνισταῖς χρώμενον;	"Even in athletic contests it's clear that if the strongest were allowed to band together against the weaker, they'd win every contest and carry off every prize. That isn't allowed there. But in politics, where true gentlemen excel, no one stops you from benefiting the city together with whomever you like. So how can it not pay to acquire the best men as friends before taking part in public life, and to treat them as partners and fellow workers in what you do rather than as rivals?
2.6.27	ἀλλά μήν κἀκεῖνο δῆλον, ὅτι κἄν πολεμῇ τίς τινι, συμμάχων δεήσεται, καί τούτων πλειόνων, ἐάν καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἀντιτάττηται· καί μήν οἱ συμμαχεῖν ἐθέλοντες εὖ ποιητέοι, ἵν' ἐθέλωσι· προθυμεῖσθαι· πολύ δέ κρεῖττον τούς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὖ ποιεῖν ἤ τούς χείρονας πλείονας ὄντας· οἱ γάρ πονηροί πολύ πλειόνων εὐεργεσιῶν ἤ οἱ χρηστοί δέονται.	"And this too is clear: if someone goes to war against someone else, he'll need allies, and more of them if he's up against true gentlemen. Those willing to be allies must be treated well, so that they'll be willing to exert themselves. And it's far better to do good to the best, who are fewer, than to the worse, who are more numerous, for bad men need many more benefits than good ones do.
2.6.28	ἀλλά θαρρῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, πειρῶ ἀγαθός γίγνεσθαι, καί τοιοῦτος γενόμενος θηρᾶν ἐπιχείρει τούς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. ἴσως δ' ἄν τί σοι κἀγώ συλλαβεῖν εἰς τήν τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν θήραν ἔχοιμι διά τό ἐρωτικός εἶναι· δεινῶς γάρ, ὧν ἄν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀνθρώπων, ὅλος ὥρμημαι ἐπί τό φιλῶν τε αὐτούς ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν καί ποθῶν ἀντιποθεῖσθαι καί ἐπιθυμῶν συνεῖναι [καὶ] ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς συνουσίας·	"So take heart, Critobulus," he said. "Try to become good, and once you've become so, set about hunting true gentlemen. Perhaps I too could lend you a hand in the hunt for true gentlemen, because I'm so given to love. Whenever I desire people, I throw myself wholly and fiercely into loving them and being loved by them in return, longing for them and being longed for in return, desiring their company [and] having my company desired in return.
2.6.29		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ὁρῶ δέ καί σοί τούτων δεῆσον, ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσῃς φιλίαν πρός τινας ποιεῖσθαι· μή οὖν ἀποκρύπτου με οἷς ἄν βούλοιο φίλος γενέσθαι· διά γάρ τό ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀρέσαι τῷ ἀρέσκοντί μοι οὐκ ἀπείρως οἶμαι ἔχειν πρός θήραν ἀνθρώπων.	"And I can see that you'll need this too, whenever you want to form a friendship with anyone. So don't hide from me the people you'd like to befriend. Because I take pains to please those who please me, I don't think I'm inexperienced at hunting people."
2.6.30	καί ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· Καί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἐγώ τῶν μαθημάτων πάλαι ἐπιθυμῶ ἄλλως τε καί εἰ ἐξαρκέσει μοι ἡ αὐτή ἐπιστήμη ἐπί τούς ἀγαθούς τάς ψυχάς καί ἐπί τούς καλούς τά σώματα.	And Critobulus said, "Well, Socrates, I've wanted to learn these lessons for a long time, especially if the same knowledge will serve me both for those who are good in soul and for those who are beautiful in body."
2.6.31	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ἀλλ', ὦ Κριτόβουλε, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τό τάς χεῖρας προσφέροντα ποιεῖν ὑπομένειν τούς καλούς. πέπεισμαι δέ καί ἀπό τῆς Σκύλλης διά τοῦτο φεύγειν τούς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι τάς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς προσέφερε· τάς δέ γε Σειρῆνας, ὅτι τάς χεῖρας οὐδενί προσέφερον, ἀλλά πᾶσι πόρρωθεν ἐπῇδον, πάντας φασίν ὑπομένειν καί ἀκούοντας αὐτῶν κηλεῖσθαι.	And Socrates said, "But Critobulus, my knowledge doesn't extend to making the beautiful hold still when you lay hands on them. I'm convinced that people run from Scylla for exactly this reason, that she laid hands on them. The Sirens, though, laid hands on no one but sang to everyone from a distance, and so, they say, everyone stayed and was enchanted listening to them."
2.6.32	καί ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· Ὡς οὐ προσοίσοντος τάς χεῖρας, εἴ τι ἔχεις ἀγαθόν εἰς φίλων κτῆσιν, δίδασκε. Οὐδέ τό στόμα οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πρός τό στόμα προσοίσεις; Θάρρει, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος· οὐδέ γάρ τό στόμα πρός τό στόμα προσοίσω οὐδενί, ἐάν μή καλός ᾖ. Εὐθύς, ἔφη, σύγε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, τοὐναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἴρηκας. οἱ μέν γάρ καλοί τά τοιαῦτα οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· οἱ δέ αἰσχροί καί ἡδέως προσίενται, νομίζοντες διά τήν ψυχήν καλοί καλεῖσθαι.	And Critobulus said, "On the understanding that I won't lay hands on anyone, teach me whatever good method you have for acquiring friends." "Then you won't put your mouth to anyone's mouth either?" said Socrates. "Don't worry," said Critobulus, "I won't put my mouth to anyone's mouth—unless he's beautiful." "There, Critobulus," he said, "you've immediately said the opposite of what's good for you. The beautiful don't put up with that sort of thing, but the ugly even welcome it gladly, thinking they're being called beautiful for the sake of their souls."
2.6.33	καί ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· Ὡς τούς μέν καλούς φιλήσοντός μου, τούς δ' ἀγαθούς καταφιλήσοντος, θαρρῶν δίδασκε τῶν φίλων τά θηρατικά. καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη Ὅταν οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, φίλος τινί βούλῃ γενέσθαι, ἐάσεις με κατειπεῖν σου πρός αὐτόν ὅτι ἄγασαί τε αὐτοῦ καί ἐπιθυμεῖς φίλος αὐτοῦ εἶναι; Κατηγόρει, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος· οὐδένα γάρ οἶδα μισοῦντα τούς ἐπαινοῦντας.	And Critobulus said, "On the understanding that I'll kiss the beautiful and smother the good with kisses, go ahead and teach me the arts of hunting friends." And Socrates said, "Well then, Critobulus, when you want to become someone's friend, will you let me inform on you to him, and tell him that you admire him and want to be his friend?" "Accuse away," said Critobulus. "I don't know anyone who hates people who praise him."
2.6.34	Ἐάν δέ σου προσκατηγορήσω, ἔφη, ὅτι διά τό ἄγασθαι αὐτοῦ καί εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις πρός αὐτόν, ἆρα μή διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; ἀλλά καί αὐτῷ μοι, ἔφη, ἐγγίγνεται εὔνοια πρός οὕς ἄν ὑπολάβω εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν πρός ἐμέ.	"And if I add to the charges," he said, "that because you admire him you also feel goodwill toward him, won't you think I'm slandering you?" "No. I feel goodwill myself," he said, "toward people I take to feel goodwill toward me."
2.6.35		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Ταῦτα μέν δή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν περί σοῦ πρός οὕς ἄν βούλῃ φίλους ποιήσασθαι· ἐάν δέ μοι ἔτι ἐξουσίαν δῷς λέγειν περί σοῦ ὅτι ἐπιμελής τε τῶν φίλων εἶ καί οὐδενί οὕτω χαίρεις ὡς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καί ἐπί τε τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις τῶν φίλων ἀγάλλει οὐχ ἧττον ἤ ἐπί τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καί ἐπί τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν φίλων χαίρεις οὐδέν ἧττον ἤ ἐπί τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπως τε ταῦτα γίγνηται τοῖς φίλοις οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος, καί ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρός ἀρετήν εἶναι νικᾶν τούς μέν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τούς δ' ἐχθρούς κακῶς, πάνυ ἄν οἶμαί σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναί με σύνθηρον τῶν ἀγαθῶν φίλων.	"Then I'll be able to say this about you," said Socrates, "to anyone you want to make your friend. Now suppose you also give me leave to say other things about you. You're attentive to your friends, and nothing gives you as much joy as good friends. You take pride in your friends' fine deeds no less than in your own, and you rejoice in your friends' good fortune no less than in your own. You never tire of finding ways for these things to come to your friends. And you've recognized that a man's excellence lies in outdoing his friends in doing them good and his enemies in doing them harm. If I can say all that, I think I'd make a very handy partner for you in the hunt for good friends."
2.6.36	Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ἐμοί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπί σοί ὄν ὅ τι ἄν βούλῃ περί ἐμοῦ λέγειν; Μά Δί' οὐχ, ὥς ποτε ἐγώ Ἀσπασίας ἤκουσα· ἔφη γάρ τάς ἀγαθάς προμνηστρίδας μετά μέν ἀληθείας τἀγαθά διαγγελλούσας δεινάς εἶναι συνάγειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς κηδείαν, ψευδομένας δ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἐπαινεῖν· τούς γάρ ἐξαπατηθέντας ἅμα μισεῖν ἀλλήλους τε καί τήν προμνησαμένην. ἅ δή καί ἐγώ πεισθείς ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἐξεῖναί μοι περί σοῦ λέγειν ἐπαινοῦντι οὐδέν ὅ τι ἄν μή ἀληθεύω.	"Why are you telling me this," said Critobulus, "as if it weren't up to you to say whatever you like about me?" "No, by Zeus, it isn't, as I once heard from Aspasia. She said that good matchmakers, when they report people's good qualities truthfully, are very skillful at bringing people together in marriage, but they won't give false praise, because those who've been deceived end up hating both each other and the woman who made the match. I'm convinced she's right about this, so I don't think I may say anything in your praise that isn't true."[15]
2.6.37	Σύ μέν ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, τοιοῦτός μοι φίλος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷος, ἄν μέν τι αὐτός ἔχω ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τό φίλους κτήσασθαι, συλλαμβάνειν μοι· εἰ δέ μή, οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλοις πλάσας τι εἰπεῖν ἐπί τῇ ἐμῇ ὠφελείᾳ. Πότερα δ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, δοκῶ σοι μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖν σε τά ψευδῆ ἐπαινῶν ἤ πείθων πειρᾶσθαί σε ἀγαθόν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι;	"So you're the kind of friend to me, Socrates," said Critobulus, "who'll help me if I already have something that fits me for acquiring friends. But if I don't, you wouldn't be willing to make something up and say it to help me." "Which do you think, Critobulus," said Socrates, "would help you more: my praising you falsely, or my persuading you to try to become a good man?
2.6.38	εἰ δέ μή φανερόν οὕτω σοι, ἐκ τῶνδε σκέψαι· εἰ γάρ σε βουλόμενος φίλον ποιῆσαι ναυκλήρῳ ψευδόμενος ἐπαινοίην, φάσκων ἀγαθόν εἶναι κυβερνήτην, ὁ δέ μοι πεισθείς ἐπιτρέψειέ σοι τήν ναῦν μή ἐπισταμένῳ κυβερνᾶν, ἔχεις τινά ἐλπίδα μή ἄν σαυτόν τε καί τήν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι; ἤ εἴ σοι πείσαιμι κοινῇ τήν πόλιν ψευδόμενος ὡς ἄν στρατηγικῷ τε καί δικαστικῷ καί πολιτικῷ ἑαυτήν ἐπιτρέψαι, τί ἄν οἴει σεαυτόν καί τήν πόλιν ὑπό σοῦ παθεῖν; ἤ εἴ τινας ἰδίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν πείσαιμι ψευδόμενος ὡς ὄντι οἰκονομικῷ τε καί ἐπιμελεῖ	"If that isn't clear to you yet, look at it this way. Suppose I wanted to make you friends with a shipowner, and I praised you falsely, claiming you were a good helmsman. If he believed me and entrusted his ship to you though you didn't know how to steer, would you have any hope of not destroying both yourself and the ship? Or suppose I falsely persuaded the city as a whole to entrust itself to you as a capable general, judge and statesman. What do you think you and the city would suffer at your hands? Or suppose I falsely per-

15 Aspasia of Miletus, Pericles' partner, was famous for her intelligence.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τά ἑαυτῶν ἐπιτρέψαι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἄν πεῖραν διδούς ἅμα τε βλαβερός εἴης καί καταγέλαστος φαίνοιο;	suaded some citizens privately to entrust their affairs to you as a careful household manager. When you were put to the test, wouldn't you do them harm and look ridiculous as well?
2.6.39	ἀλλά συντομωτάτη τε καί ἀσφαλεστάτη καί καλλίστη ὁδός, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅ τι ἄν βούλῃ δοκεῖν ἀγαθός εἶναι, τοῦτο καί γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν πειρᾶσθαι· ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταί λέγονται, σκοπούμενος εὑρήσεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καί μελέτῃ αὐξανομένας. ἐγώ μέν οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, οἶμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς τάς ἀρετάς μελετᾶν· εἰ δέ σύ πως ἄλλως γιγνώσκεις, δίδασκε. καί ὁ Κριτόβουλος· ἀλλ' αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀντιλέγων τούτοις· οὔτε γάρ καλά οὔτε ἀληθῆ λέγοιμ' ἄν.	"No, Critobulus. The shortest, safest and finest road is this: whatever you want to be thought good at, try actually to become good at it. And if you look into it, you'll find that all the qualities people call excellences grow through learning and practice. So I think, Critobulus, that we ought to practice the excellences. But if you see it some other way, tell me." And Critobulus said, "I'd be ashamed, Socrates, to argue against this. Nothing I said would be either fine or true."

CHAPTER 7

Aristarchus, with fourteen destitute kinswomen in his house, is persuaded to set them to paid work.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.7.1	Καί μήν τάς ἀπορίας γε τῶν φίλων τάς μέν δι' ἄγνοιαν ἐπειρᾶτο γνώμῃ ἀκεῖσθαι, τάς δέ δι' ἔνδειαν διδάσκων κατά δύναμιν ἀλλήλοις ἐπαρκεῖν. ἐρῶ δέ καί ἐν τούτοις ἅ σύνοιδα αὐτῷ. Ἀρίσταρχον γάρ ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· Ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι. χρή δέ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γάρ ἄν τί σε καί ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.	And then there were his friends' difficulties. Those that came from ignorance he tried to cure with good advice, and those that came from want, by teaching them to help one another as far as they could. Here too I'll tell what I know of him. Once, seeing Aristarchus looking gloomy, he said, "Aristarchus, you look as if something's weighing on you. You should share the load with your friends. Maybe we could lighten it for you a little."
2.7.2	καί ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος· ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν πολλῇ γέ εἰμι ἀπορίᾳ. ἐπεί γάρ ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις, πολλῶν φυγόντων εἰς τόν Πειραιᾶ, συνεληλύθασιν ὡς ἐμέ καταλελειμμέναι ἀδελφαί τε καί ἀδελφιδαῖ καί ἀνεψιαί τοσαῦται ὥστ' εἶναι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τέτταρας καί δέκα τούς ἐλευθέρους. λαμβάνομεν δέ οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδέν· οἱ γάρ ἐναντίοι κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς· οὔτ' ἀπό τῶν οἰκιῶν· ὀλιγανθρωπία γάρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει γέγονε. τά ἔπιπλα δέ οὐδείς ὠνεῖται· οὐδέ δανείσασθαι οὐδαμόθεν ἔστιν ἀργύριον, ἀλλά πρότερον ἄν τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ζητῶν εὑρεῖν ἤ δανειζόμενος λαβεῖν. χαλεπόν μέν οὖν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀπολλυμένους, ἀδύνατον δέ τοσούτους τρέφειν ἐν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν.	And Aristarchus said, "Well, Socrates, I really am in a great deal of trouble. Ever since the city fell into civil war and many people fled to the Piraeus, the sisters, nieces and female cousins who were left behind have gathered at my house. There are so many of them that there are fourteen free people in the household. We get nothing from our land, because the enemy holds it, and nothing from our houses, because the city has emptied of people. Nobody buys furniture, and there's nowhere to borrow money either. I think you'd sooner find money by looking for it in the street than get it by borrowing. So, Socrates, it's hard to stand by and watch my family perish, but it's impossible to feed so many in times like these."[16]
2.7.3	ἀκούσας οὖν ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης· Τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι Κεράμων μέν πολλούς τρέφων οὐ μόνον ἑαυτῷ τε καί	When Socrates heard this, he said, "How is it, then, that Ceramon feeds a lot of people and not

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούτοις τά ἐπιτήδεια δύναται παρέχειν, ἀλλά καί περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα ὥστε καί πλουτεῖν, σύ δέ πολλούς τρέφων δέδοικας μή δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἅπαντες ἀπόλησθε; Ὅτι νή Δί', ἔφη, ὁ μέν δούλους τρέφει, ἐγώ δ' ἐλευθέρους.	only manages to provide the necessities for himself and them, but even puts aside so much that he's getting rich, while you feed a lot of people and are afraid you'll all die for lack of necessities?" "Because, by Zeus," he said, "he feeds slaves and I feed free people."
2.7.4	Καί πότερον, ἔφη, τούς παρά σοί ἐλευθέρους οἴει βελτίους εἶναι ἤ τούς παρά Κεράμωνι δούλους; Ἐγώ μέν οἶμαι, ἔφη, τούς παρ' ἐμοί ἐλευθέρους. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, αἰσχρόν τόν μέν ἀπό τῶν πονηροτέρων εὐπορεῖν, σέ δέ πολλῷ βελτίους ἔχοντα ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἶναι; Νή Δί', ἔφη, ὁ μέν γάρ τεχνίτας τρέφει, ἐγώ δ' ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους.	"And which do you think are better," he said, "the free people in your house or the slaves at Ceramon's?" "I think the free people in mine," he said. "Then isn't it a disgrace," he said, "that he does well out of worse people, while you, with much better ones, are in difficulty?" "Of course, by Zeus," he said. "He feeds craftsmen, and my people were brought up as free people should be."
2.7.5	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, τεχνῖταί εἰσιν οἱ χρήσιμόν τι ποιεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι; Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν χρήσιμά γ' ἄλφιτα; Σφόδρα γε. Τί δ' ἄρτοι; Οὐδέν ἧττον. Τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἱμάτιά τε ἀνδρεῖα καί γυναικεῖα καί χιτωνίσκοι καί χλαμύδες καί ἐξωμίδες; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη, καί πάντα ταῦτα χρήσιμα. Ἔπειτα, ἔφη, οἱ παρά σοί τούτων οὐδέν ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν; Πάντα μέν οὖν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.	"Well," he said, "are craftsmen people who know how to make something useful?" "Certainly," he said. "And barley meal is useful, isn't it?" "Very." "What about bread?" "Just as much." "And what about men's and women's cloaks," he said, "and tunics, and capes, and work smocks?" "Yes," he said, "all of these are very useful too." "And do you mean the people in your house don't know how to make any of these?" "Oh no, they know how to make all of them, I think."
2.7.6	Εἶτ' οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἀφ' ἑνός μέν τούτων, ἀλφιτοποιίας, Ναυσικύδης οὐ μόνον ἑαυτόν τε καί τούς οἰκέτας τρέφει, ἀλλά πρός τούτοις καί ὗς πολλάς καί βοῦς, καί περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα ὥστε καί τῇ πόλει πολλάκις λειτουργεῖν, ἀπό δέ ἀρτοποιίας Κύρηβος τήν τε οἰκίαν πᾶσαν διατρέφει καί ζῇ δαψιλῶς, Δημέας δ' ὁ Κολλυτεύς ἀπό χλαμυδουργίας, Μένων δ' ἀπό χλανιδοποιίας, Μεγαρέων δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀπό ἐξωμιδοποιίας διατρέφονται; Νή Δί', ἔφη, οὗτοι μέν γάρ ὠνούμενοι βαρβάρους ἀνθρώπους ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' ἀναγκάζειν ἐργάζεσθαι ἅ καλῶς ἔχει, ἐγώ δ' ἐλευθέρους τε καί συγγενεῖς.	"Then don't you know that from just one of these, making barley meal, Nausicydes feeds not only himself and his servants but many pigs and cattle besides? He puts aside so much that he often performs public services for the city. Cyrebus keeps his whole household and lives in plenty by baking bread. Demeas of Collytus makes his living from making capes, Menon from making fine woolen cloaks, and most of the Megarians from making work smocks." "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "because these men buy foreigners and own them, so they can force them to do whatever work is fitting. My people are free, and my relatives."[17]
2.7.7	Ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ὅτι ἐλεύθεροί τ' εἰσί καί συγγενεῖς σοι, οἴει χρῆναι αὐτούς μηδέν ἄλλο ποιεῖν ἤ ἐσθίειν καί καθεύδειν; πότερον καί τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθέρων τούς οὕτω ζῶντας ἄμεινον διάγοντας ὁρᾷς καί μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονίζεις ἤ τούς, ἅ ἐπίστανται χρήσιμα πρός τόν βίον, τούτων ἐπιμελομένους; ἤ τήν μέν ἀργίαν καί τήν ἀμέλειαν αἰσθάνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρός τε τό μαθεῖν, ἅ προσήκει	"So," he said, "because they're free and related to you, you think they should do nothing but eat and sleep? Among other free people, too, do you see those who live like that getting on better? Do you count them happier than those who devote themselves to the useful things they know? Or do you

16 The civil war of 404–403 BC, when democratic exiles seized the Piraeus, Athens' port, against the oligarchy of the Thirty in the city.

17 Public services (liturgies) were costly duties, such as funding a chorus or equipping a warship, laid on wealthy Athenians.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπίστασθαι, καί πρός τό μνημονεύειν, ἅ ἄν μάθωσι, καί πρός τό ὑγιαίνειν τε καί ἰσχύειν τοῖς σώμασι καί πρός τό κτήσασθαί τε καί σῴζειν τά χρήσιμα πρός τόν βίον ὠφέλιμα ὄντα, τήν δ' ἐργασίαν καί τήν ἐπιμέλειαν οὐδέν χρήσιμα;	find that idleness and carelessness help people learn what they ought to know and remember what they've learned? That they keep their bodies healthy and strong and help them acquire and keep what's useful for life? And that work and diligence are no use at all?
2.7.8	ἔμαθον δέ, ἅ φής αὐτάς ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ὡς οὔτε χρήσιμα ὄντα πρός τόν βίον οὔτε ποιήσουσαι αὐτῶν οὐδέν, ἤ τοὐναντίον ὡς καί ἐπιμελησόμεναι τούτων καί ὠφελησόμεναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν; ποτέρως γάρ ἄν μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι σωφρονοῖεν, ἀργοῦντες ἤ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιμελόμενοι; ποτέρως δ' ἄν δικαιότεροι εἶεν, εἰ ἐργάζοιντο ἤ εἰ ἀργοῦντες βουλεύοιντο περί τῶν ἐπιτηδείων;	"And when they learned the things you say they know, did they think these were of no use for life and that they'd never do any of them? Or, on the contrary, did they mean to devote themselves to them and benefit from them? Which way would people be more sensible, idling or busy with useful things? And which way would they be more just, if they worked or if they sat idle and deliberated about how to get their necessities?
2.7.9	ἀλλά καί νῦν μέν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὔτε σύ ἐκείνας φιλεῖς οὔτ' ἐκεῖναι σέ, σύ μέν ἡγούμενος αὐτάς ἐπιζημίους εἶναι σεαυτῷ, ἐκεῖναι δέ σέ ὁρῶσαι ἀχθόμενον ἐφ' ἑαυταῖς· ἐκ δέ τούτων κίνδυνος μείζω τε ἀπέχθειαν γίγνεσθαι καί τήν προγεγονυῖαν χάριν μειοῦσθαι. ἐάν δέ προστατήσῃς ὅπως ἐνεργοί ὦσι, σύ μέν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις, ὁρῶν ὠφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὔσας, ἐκεῖναι δέ σέ ἀγαπήσουσιν, αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντά αὐταῖς, τῶν δέ προγεγονυιῶν εὐεργεσιῶν ἥδιον μεμνημένοι τήν ἀπ' ἐκείνων χάριν αὐξήσετε, καί ἐκ τούτων φιλικώτερόν τε καί οἰκειότερον ἀλλήλοις ἕξετε.	"Besides, as things are now, I imagine you don't love them and they don't love you. You think they're a drain on you, and they see that you resent them. The danger is that the dislike will grow and the gratitude built up before will shrink. But if you see to it that they're kept busy, you'll love them, seeing that they're useful to you, and they'll be fond of you, sensing that you're pleased with them. You'll remember past kindnesses with more pleasure and so increase the gratitude for them, and as a result you'll be on friendlier and closer terms with each other.
2.7.10	εἰ μέν τοίνυν αἰσχρόν τι ἔμελλον ἐργάσεσθαι, θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν· νῦν δέ ἅ μέν δοκεῖ κάλλιστα καί πρεπωδέστατα γυναικί εἶναι ἐπίστανται, ὡς ἔοικε· πάντες δέ ἅ ἐπίστανται ῥᾷστά τε καί τάχιστα καί κάλλιστα καί ἥδιστα ἐργάζονται. μή οὖν ὄκνει, ἔφη, ταῦτα εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐταῖς ἅ σοί τε λυσιτελήσει κἀκείναις·	"Now if they were going to do something shameful, they ought to choose death instead. But as it is, apparently they know the kinds of work that are thought finest and most fitting for a woman. And everyone does the work they know most easily, most quickly, best, and with the most pleasure. So don't hesitate," he said, "to propose to them the work that will pay off both for you and for them;
2.7.11	καί, ὡς εἰκός, ἡδέως ὑπακούσονται. Ἀλλά νή τούς θεούς, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, οὕτω μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥστε πρόσθεν μέν οὐ προσιέμην δανείσασθαι, εἰδώς ὅτι ἀναλώσας ὅ ἄν λάβω οὐχ ἕξω ἀποδοῦναι, νῦν δέ μοι δοκῶ εἰς ἔργων ἀφορμήν ὑπομενεῖν αὐτό ποιῆσαι.	and, as you'd expect, they'll gladly go along with it." "Well, by the gods, Socrates," said Aristarchus, "I think you're so right that I've changed my mind. Before, I wouldn't consider borrowing, because I knew that once I'd spent what I got I'd have nothing to pay it back with. Now I think I'll bring myself to do it, to get the capital for the work."
2.7.12	Ἐκ τούτων δέ ἐπορίσθη μέν ἀφορμή, ἐωνήθη δέ ἔρια· καί ἐργαζόμεναι μέν ἠρίστων, ἐργασάμεναι δέ ἐδείπνουν, ἱλαραί δέ ἀντί σκυθρωπῶν ἦσαν· καί ἀντί ὑφορωμένων ἑαυτούς ἡδέως ἀλλήλους ἑώρων. καί αἱ μέν ὡς κηδεμόνα	After this the capital was found and wool was bought. The women had their lunch while they worked and their dinner when they'd finished. They were cheerful instead of gloomy, and instead

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐφίλουν, ὁ δέ ὡς ὠφελίμους ἠγάπα. τέλος δέ ἐλθών πρός τόν Σωκράτη χαίρων διηγεῖτο ταῦτά τε καί ὅτι αἰτιῶνται αὐτόν μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀργόν ἐσθίειν.	of eyeing each other with suspicion they looked at each other with pleasure. They loved him as their protector, and he was fond of them because they were useful. In the end he came to Socrates and happily told him all this. He also said that they complained he was the only one in the house who ate without working.
2.7.13	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Εἶτα οὐ λέγεις αὐταῖς τόν τοῦ κυνός λόγον; φασί γάρ, ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τά ζῷα, τήν οἶν πρός τόν δεσπότην εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστόν ποιεῖς, ὅς ἡμῖν μέν ταῖς καί ἔριά σοι καί ἄρνας καί τυρόν παρεχούσαις οὐδέν δίδως ὅ τι ἄν μή ἐκ τῆς γῆς λάβωμεν, τῷ δέ κυνί, ὅς οὐδέν τοιοῦτόν σοι παρέχει, μεταδίδως οὗπερ αὐτός ἔχεις σίτου.	And Socrates said, "Then why don't you tell them the story of the dog? They say that when animals could talk, the sheep said to her master, 'What you do is strange. We give you wool and lambs and cheese, and you give us nothing except what we get from the ground ourselves. But the dog, who gives you nothing of the kind, gets a share of the very food you eat yourself.'
2.7.14	τόν κύνα οὖν ἀκούσαντα εἰπεῖν· Ναί μά Δί' ἐγώ γάρ εἰμι ὁ καί ὑμᾶς αὐτάς σῴζων ὥστε μήτε ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι μήτε ὑπό λύκων ἁρπάζεσθαι· ἐπεί ὑμεῖς γε, εἰ μή ἐγώ προφυλάττοιμι ὑμᾶς, οὐδ' ἄν νέμεσθαι δύναισθε, φοβούμεναι μή ἀπόλησθε. οὕτω δή λέγεται καί τά πρόβατα συγχωρῆσαι τόν κύνα προτιμᾶσθαι. καί σύ οὖν ἐκείναις λέγε ὅτι ἀντί κυνός εἶ φύλαξ καί ἐπιμελητής, καί διά σέ οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνός ἀδικούμεναι ἀσφαλῶς τε καί ἡδέως ἐργαζόμεναι ζῶσιν.	"And when the dog heard this, they say, he said, 'Yes, by Zeus, and for good reason. I'm the one who keeps you yourselves safe, so that you aren't stolen by men or carried off by wolves. Why, if I didn't stand guard over you, you couldn't even graze, for fear of being killed.' And so, the story goes, the sheep too agreed that the dog should be given preference. So you tell them, too, that you're their guardian and protector in place of the dog, and that thanks to you no one wrongs them and they work and live in safety and comfort."

CHAPTER 8

Socrates advises Eutherus, an aging laborer, to find work as a steward before his strength fails.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.8.1	ἄλλον δέ ποτε ἀρχαῖον ἑταῖρον διά χρόνου ἰδών· Πόθεν, ἔφη, Εὔθηρε, φαίνει; Ὑπό μέν τήν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῆς ἀποδημίας, νυνί μέντοι αὐτόθεν. ἐπειδή γάρ ἀφῃρέθημεν τά ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ κτήματα, ἐν δέ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὁ πατήρ μοι οὐδέν κατέλιπεν, ἀναγκάζομαι νῦν ἐπιδημήσας τῷ σώματι ἐργαζόμενος τά ἐπιτήδεια πορίζεσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι τοῦτο κρεῖττον εἶναι ἤ δέεσθαί τινος ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλως τε καί μηδέν ἔχοντα ἐφ' ὅτῳ ἄν δανειζοίμην.	Another time, seeing an old companion after a long while, he said, "Where have you turned up from, Eutherus?" "When the war ended, Socrates," he said, "I came home from abroad. But just now I've come from right here. We were stripped of our property across the border, and my father left me nothing in Attica, so now that I'm living at home I'm forced to earn my living by working with my body. And I think that's better than begging from anyone, especially since I have nothing to borrow against."[18]
2.8.2	Καί πόσον ἄν χρόνον οἴει σοι, ἔφη. τό σῶμα ἱκανόν εἶναι μισθοῦ τά ἐπιτήδεια ἐργάζεσθαι; Μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, οὐ πολύν χρόνον. Καί μήν, ἔφη, ὅταν γε πρεσβύτερος γένῃ,	"And how long do you think your body will be strong enough to earn your living for wages?" he said. "Not long, by Zeus," he said. "And yet when

18 The Peloponnesian War ended with Athens' defeat in 404 BC, and Athenians lost the properties they had held abroad.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	δῆλον ὅτι δαπάνης μέν δεήσει, μισθόν δέ οὐδείς σοι θελήσει τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων διδόναι.	you get older," he said, "clearly you'll need money to spend, but no one will be willing to pay you for physical labor."
2.8.3	ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, κρεῖττόν ἐστιν αὐτόθεν τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἔργων ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἅ καί πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ ἐπαρκέσει, καί προσελθόντα τῳ τῶν πλείονα χρήματα κεκτημένων, [τῷ] δεομένῳ τοῦ συνεπιμελησομένου, ἔργων τε ἐπιστατοῦντα καί συγκομίζοντα καρπούς καί συμφυλάττοντα τήν οὐσίαν, ὠφελοῦντα ἀντωφελεῖσθαι.	"That's true," he said. "So," he said, "isn't it better to take up right now the sort of work that will still support you when you're older? You could go to someone who has more property, [someone] who needs a person to help him look after it. By supervising the work, helping bring in the harvest and helping to watch over the estate, you'd benefit him and be benefited in return."
2.8.4	Χαλεπῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δουλείαν ὑπομείναιμι. Καί μήν οἵ γε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστατεύοντες καί τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐ δουλοπρεπέστεροι ἕνεκα τούτου, ἀλλ' ἐλευθεριώτεροι νομίζονται.	"I'd find it hard to put up with being a slave, Socrates," he said. "And yet those who lead their cities and take care of public affairs aren't thought any more like slaves for it. They're thought more like free men."
2.8.5	Ὅλως, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό ὑπαίτιον εἶναί τινι οὐ πάνυ προσίεμαι. Καί μήν, ἔφη, Εὔθηρε, οὐ πάνυ γε ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ οὐκ ἄν τις αἰτίαν ἔχοι. χαλεπόν γάρ οὕτω τι ποιῆσαι ὥστε μηδέν ἁμαρτεῖν, χαλεπόν δέ καί ἀναμαρτήτως τι ποιήσαντα μή ἀγνώμονι κριτῇ περιτυχεῖν· ἐπεί καί οἷς νῦν ἐργάζεσθαι φῄς θαυμάζω εἰ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνέγκλητον διαγίγνεσθαι.	"In general, Socrates," he said, "I don't at all like being answerable to anyone." "And yet, Eutherus," he said, "it isn't at all easy to find work you can't be blamed for. It's hard to do anything without making any mistakes. And even if you do it without mistakes, it's hard not to run into an unreasonable judge. Why, even with the people you say you work for now, I wonder whether it's easy to get through without reproach.
2.8.6	χρή οὖν πειρᾶσθαι τούς φιλαιτίους φεύγειν καί τούς εὐγνώμονας διώκειν, καί τῶν πραγμάτων ὅσα μέν δύνασαι ποιεῖν ὑπομένειν, ὅσα δέ μή δύνασαι φυλάττεσθαι, ὅ τι δ' ἄν πράττῃς, τούτου ὡς κάλλιστα καί προθυμότατα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. οὕτω γάρ ἥκιστ' ἄν μέν σε οἶμαι ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶναι, μάλιστα δέ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ βοήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ῥᾷστα δέ καί ἀκινδυνότατα ζῆν καί εἰς τό γῆρας διαρκέστατα.	"So you should try to avoid people who like to find fault and seek out those who are fair-minded. Take on the tasks you can do and steer clear of the ones you can't. And whatever you do undertake, see to it as well and as eagerly as you can. That way, I think, you'd be least likely to be blamed and most likely to find relief from your want. You'd live most easily and safely, with the most to last you into old age."

CHAPTER 9

Crito, harassed by blackmailers, takes on Archedemus as a protector, to the benefit of both.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.9.1	Οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτόν καί Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα, ὡς χαλεπόν ὁ βίος Ἀθήνησιν εἴη ἀνδρί βουλομένῳ τά ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. Νῦν γάρ, ἔφη. ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομίζουσιν ἥδιον ἄν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι ἤ πράγματα ἔχειν.	I know that he once heard Crito say how hard life in Athens was for a man who wanted to mind his own business. "Right now, for instance," he said, "some people are taking me to court. It isn't because I've wronged them. It's because they think I'd rather pay up than have trouble."
2.9.2		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, κύνας δέ τρέφεις, ἵνα σοι τούς λύκους ἀπό τῶν προβάτων ἀπερύκωσι; Καί μάλα, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γάρ μοι λυσιτελεῖ τρέφειν ἤ μή. Οὐκ ἄν οὖν θρέψαις καί ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐθέλοι τε καί δύναιτο σοῦ ἀπερύκειν τούς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε;	And Socrates said, "Tell me, Crito, do you keep dogs to fend the wolves off your sheep?" "Certainly," he said. "It pays me better to keep them than not." "Then wouldn't you keep a man too, one who'd be willing and able to fend off the people who try to wrong you?"
2.9.3	Ἡδέως γ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μή φοβοίμην ὅπως μή ἐπ' αὐτόν με τράποιτο. Τί δ'; ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι πολλῷ ἥδιόν ἐστι χαριζόμενον οἵῳ σοί ἀνδρί ἤ ἀπεχθόμενον ὠφελεῖσθαι; εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι εἰσίν ἐνθάδε τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν, οἵ πάνυ ἄν φιλοτιμηθεῖεν φίλῳ σοι χρῆσθαι.	"Gladly," he said, "if I weren't afraid he'd turn on me himself." "What?" he said. "Don't you see that it's much pleasanter to profit by doing favors for a man like you than by making an enemy of you? You can be sure there are men of that sort here who'd be very proud to have you as a friend."
2.9.4	Καί ἐκ τούτων ἀνευρίσκουσιν Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ μέν ἱκανόν εἰπεῖν τε καί πρᾶξαι, πένητα δέ· οὐ γάρ ἦν οἷος ἀπό παντός κερδαίνειν, ἀλλά φιλόχρηστός τε καί ἔφη ῥᾷστον εἶναι ἀπό τῶν συκοφαντῶν λαμβάνειν. τούτῳ οὖν ὁ Κρίτων, ὁπότε συγκομίζοι ἤ σῖτον ἤ ἔλαιον ἤ οἶνον ἤ ἔρια ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀγρῷ γιγνομένων χρησίμων πρός τόν βίον, ἀφελών ἄν ἔδωκε· καί ὁπότε θύοι, ἐκάλει, καί τά τοιαῦτα πάντα ἐπεμελεῖτο.	After this they found Archedemus, a very capable speaker and man of action, but poor. He wasn't the kind to make a profit any way he could. He was honest, and he said it was very easy to get money out of informers. So whenever Crito was bringing in grain or oil or wine or wool or any other farm produce useful for life, he would set some aside and give it to him. Whenever he made a sacrifice, he invited him, and he looked after him in all such ways.[19]
2.9.5	νομίσας δέ ὁ Ἀρχέδημος ἀποστροφήν οἱ τόν Κρίτωνος οἶκον μάλα περιεῖπεν αὐτόν. καί εὐθύς του τῶν συκοφαντούντων τόν Κρίτωνα ἀνευρίσκει πολλά μέν ἀδικήματα, πολλούς δ' ἐχθρούς· καί προσεκαλέσατο εἰς δίκην δημοσίαν, ἐν ᾗ αὐτόν ἔδει κριθῆναι ὅ τι δεῖ παθεῖν ἤ ἀποτῖσαι.	Archedemus regarded Crito's household as a refuge for himself and paid him every attention. Before long he found that one of the informers harassing Crito had many crimes to his name and many enemies. He summoned him to a public trial, in which it would be decided what penalty he should suffer or pay.
2.9.6	ὁ δέ συνειδώς αὐτῷ πολλά καί πονηρά πάντ' ἐποίει ὥστε ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ Ἀρχεδήμου. ὁ δέ Ἀρχέδημος οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο, ἕως τόν τε Κρίτωνα ἀφῆκε καί αὐτῷ χρήματα ἔδωκεν.	The man knew he had many wicked things on his conscience, and he did everything he could to get rid of Archedemus. But Archedemus wouldn't let go until he had dropped his case against Crito and given Archedemus money as well.
2.9.7	ἐπεί δέ τοῦτό τε καί ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ὁ Ἀρχέδημος διεπράξατο, ἤδη τότε, ὥσπερ, ὅταν νομεύς ἀγαθόν κύνα ἔχῃ, καί οἱ ἄλλοι νομεῖς βούλονται πλησίον αὐτοῦ τάς ἀγέλας ἱστάναι, ἵνα τοῦ κυνός ἀπολαύωσιν, οὕτω δή καί Κρίτωνος πολλοί τῶν φίλων ἐδέοντο καί σφίσι παρέχειν φύλακα τόν Ἀρχέδημον.	After Archedemus had pulled this off, and other things like it, many of Crito's friends asked him to lend them Archedemus as a guardian too. It was just as when a shepherd has a good dog and the other shepherds want to pasture their flocks near him to get the benefit of the dog.
2.9.8	ὁ δέ Ἀρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο, καί οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλά καί οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τούτων οἷς ἀπήχθετο ὀνειδίζοι ὡς ὑπό Κρίτωνος ὠφελούμενος κολακεύοι αὐτόν· Πότερον οὖν,	Archedemus was glad to oblige Crito, and not only was Crito left in peace, but his friends were too. And if any of the people Archedemus had made enemies of reproached him for flattering Crito be-

19 Informers (sycophants) were people who brought or threatened lawsuits in Athens for profit, often to extort a settlement.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἔφη ὁ Ἀρχέδημος, αἰσχρόν ἐστιν εὐεργετούμενον ὑπό χρηστῶν ἀνθρώπων καί ἀντευεργετοῦντα τούς μέν τοιούτους φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δέ πονηροῖς διαφέρεσθαι, ἤ τούς μέν καλούς κἀγαθούς ἀδικεῖν πειρώμενον ἐχθρούς ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δέ πονηροῖς συνεργοῦντα πειρᾶσθαι φίλους ποιεῖσθαι καί χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀντ' ἐκείνων; ἐκ δέ τούτου εἷς τε τῶν Κρίτωνος φίλων Ἀρχέδημος ἦν καί ὑπό τῶν ἄλλων Κρίτωνος φίλων ἐτιμᾶτο.	cause Crito did him good, Archedemus said, "Which, then, is shameful? To receive kindness from good people, return it, and so make such people your friends while being at odds with the wicked? Or to try to wrong true gentlemen and make them your enemies, while working with the wicked to try to make them your friends, and associating with them instead?" As a result Archedemus became one of Crito's friends and was honored by Crito's other friends.

CHAPTER 10

Socrates urges Diodorus to help his poor friend Hermogenes, who will repay him well.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.10.1	Οἶδα δέ καί Διοδώρῳ αὐτόν ἑταίρῳ ὄντι τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Διόδωρε, ἄν τίς σοι τῶν οἰκετῶν ἀποδρᾷ, ἐπιμελεῖ ὅπως ἀνασώσει;	I know too that he had a conversation like this with Diodorus, a companion of his. "Tell me, Diodorus," he said, "if one of your slaves runs away, do you take steps to get him back?"
2.10.2	Καί ἄλλους γε νή Δί', ἔφη, παρακαλῶ, σῶστρα τούτου ἀνακηρύττων. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τίς σοι κάμνῃ τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτου ἐπιμελεῖ καί παρακαλεῖς ἰατρούς, ὅπως μή ἀποθάνῃ; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Εἰ δέ τίς σοι τῶν γνωρίμων, ἔφη, πολύ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρησιμώτερος ὤν κινδυνεύει δι' ἔνδειαν ἀπολέσθαι, οὐκ οἴει σοι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως διασωθῇ;	"Yes, by Zeus," he said, "and I call on others to help too, by announcing a reward for his return." "And what if one of your slaves is sick?" he said. "Do you look after him and call in doctors so he won't die?" "Certainly," he said. "And if one of your acquaintances, who is much more useful than your slaves, is in danger of perishing from want," he said, "don't you think it's worth your while to see that he's saved?
2.10.3	καί μήν οἶσθά γε ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνώμων ἐστίν Ἑρμογένης, αἰσχύνοιτο δ' ἄν, εἰ ὠφελούμενος ὑπό σοῦ μή ἀντωφελοίη σε καίτοι τό ὑπηρέτην ἑκόντα τε καί εὔνουν καί παραμόνιμον [καί τό κελευόμενον ἱκανόν ποιεῖν] ἔχειν καί μή μόνον τό κελευόμενον ἱκανόν ὄντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλά δυνάμενον καί ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ χρήσιμον εἶναι καί προνοεῖν καί προβουλεύεσθαι πολλῶν οἰκετῶν οἶμαι ἀντάξιον εἶναι.	"And you know that Hermogenes isn't ungrateful. He'd be ashamed if he were helped by you and didn't help you in return. And yet to have an assistant who is willing, well-disposed and dependable [and capable of doing what he's told], who is not only capable of doing what he's told but able to be useful on his own initiative, to look ahead and plan ahead—that, I think, is worth many slaves.
2.10.4	οἱ μέντοι ἀγαθοί οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τό πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ ἐξῇ πρίασθαι, τότε φασί δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι· νῦν δέ διά τά πράγματα εὐωνοτάτους ἔστι φίλους ἀγαθούς κτήσασθαι.	"Good household managers, mind you, say that the time to buy is when you can get something of great value for little. And right now, the way things are, you can acquire good friends very cheaply."
2.10.5	καί ὁ Διόδωρος· ἀλλά καλῶς γε, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί κέλευσον ἐλθεῖν ὡς ἐμέ τόν Ἑρμογένη. Μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε· νομίζω γάρ οὔτε σοί κάλλιον εἶναι τό καλέσαι ἐκεῖνον τοῦ αὐτόν ἐλθεῖν πρός ἐκεῖνον οὔτ' ἐκείνῳ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν τό πραχθῆναι ταῦτα ἤ σοί.	And Diodorus said, "Well, you're right, Socrates. Tell Hermogenes to come to me." "No, by Zeus," he said, "I won't. I don't think it's any finer for you to summon him than to go to him yourself, or that this will do him any more good than it does you."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
2.10.6	οὕτω δή ὁ Διόδωρος ᾤχετο πρός τόν Ἑρμογένη· καί οὐ πολύ τελέσας ἐκτήσατο φίλον, ὅς ἔργον εἶχε σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἄν ἤ λέγων ἤ πράττων ὠφελοίη τε καί εὐφραίνοι Διόδωρον.	So Diodorus went off to Hermogenes. Without spending much, he gained a friend who made it his business to look for ways, by word or by deed, to help Diodorus and give him pleasure.

Book III

Ambition and skill
Advice to would-be generals and politicians, artists and craftsmen, and to the courtesan Theodote.

CHAPTER 1

A young man returns from a teacher of generalship knowing only tactics, and Socrates shows what he lacks.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.1.1	Ὅτι δέ τούς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν ἐπιμελεῖς ὧν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν ὠφέλει, νῦν τοῦτο διηγήσομαι. ἀκούσας γάρ ποτε Διονυσόδωρον εἰς τήν πόλιν ἥκειν ἐπαγγελλόμενον στρατηγεῖν διδάξειν, ἔλεξε πρός τινα τῶν συνόντων, ὅν ᾐσθάνετο βουλόμενον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης ἐν τῇ πόλει τυχεῖν·	I'll now describe how he helped those who aspired to fine things by making them work at what they aspired to. Once he heard that Dionysodorus had come to the city, offering to teach generalship. He then spoke to one of his companions, who he saw wanted to win that office in the city:[1]
3.1.2	Αἰσχρόν μέντοι, ὦ νεανία, τόν βουλόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει στρατηγεῖν, ἐξόν τοῦτο μαθεῖν, ἀμελῆσαι αὐτοῦ· καί δικαίως ἄν οὗτος ὑπό τῆς πόλεως ζημιοῖτο πολύ μᾶλλον ἤ εἴ τις ἀνδριάντας ἐργολαβοίη μή μεμαθηκώς ἀνδριαντοποιεῖν.	"It's a disgrace, young man, for someone who wants to be a general in the city to neglect learning how when he has the chance. A man like that would deserve to be penalized by the city far more than someone who took a contract for statues without having learned to sculpt them.
3.1.3	ὅλης γάρ τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις ἐπιτρεπομένης τῷ στρατηγῷ, μεγάλα τά τε ἀγαθά κατορθοῦντος αὐτοῦ καί τά κακά διαμαρτάνοντος εἰκός γίγνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄν δικαίως ὁ τοῦ μέν μανθάνειν τοῦτο ἀμελῶν, τοῦ δέ αἱρεθῆναι ἐπιμελόμενος ζημιοῖτο; τοιαῦτα μέν δή λέγων ἔπεισεν αὐτόν ἐλθόντα μανθάνειν.	"In the dangers of war the whole city is entrusted to the general, so great good is likely to come of his success and great harm of his failure. How, then, could a man not deserve to be penalized if he neglects to learn this but takes pains to get elected?" By saying things like this, he persuaded him to go and learn.
3.1.4	ἐπεί δέ μεμαθηκώς ἦκε, προσέπαιζεν αὐτῷ λέγων· Οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος τόν Ἀγαμέμνονα γεραρόν ἔφη εἶναι, οὕτω καί ὅδε στρατηγεῖν μαθών γεραρώτερος φαίνεσθαι; καί γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαρίζειν μαθών, καί ἐάν μή κιθαρίζῃ, κιθαριστής ἐστι, καί ὁ μαθών ἰᾶσθαι, κἄν μή ἰατρεύῃ, ὅμως ἰατρός ἐστιν, οὕτω καί ὅδε ἀπό τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου διατελεῖ στρατηγός ὤν, κἄν μηδείς αὐτόν ἕληται. ὁ δέ μή ἐπιστάμενος οὔτε στρατηγός οὔτε ἰατρός ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐάν ὑπό πάντων ἀνθρώπων αἱρεθῇ.	When he came back having learned, Socrates teased him: "Don't you think, gentlemen, that just as Homer called Agamemnon 'stately,' this man too looks statelier now that he's learned generalship? Someone who has learned to play the lyre is a lyre-player even when he isn't playing, and someone who has learned to heal is still a doctor even if he doesn't practice. In the same way, this man will go on being a general from now on, even if nobody elects him. But the man without the knowledge is neither a general nor a doctor, not even if the whole human race elects him.[2]
3.1.5	ἀτάρ, ἔφη, ἵνα καί, ἐάν ἡμῶν τις ἤ ταξιαρχῇ ἤ λοχαγῇ σοι, ἐπιστημονέστεροι τῶν πολεμικῶν ὦμεν, λέξον ἡμῖν	"But tell us," he said, "so that if any of us commands a regiment or a company under you, we'll

1 Dionysodorus was a traveling teacher who appears, with his brother Euthydemus, in Plato's *Euthydemus*.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	πόθεν ἤρξατό σε διδάσκειν τήν στρατηγίαν. καί ὅς· Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἔφη, εἰς ὅπερ καί ἐτελεύτα· τά γάρ τακτικά ἐμέ γε καί ἄλλ᾽ οὐδέν ἐδίδαξεν.	know more about warfare: where did he start when he taught you generalship?" And the young man said, "At the same point where he finished. Tactics was what he taught me, and nothing else."
3.1.6	ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦτό γε πολλοστόν μέρος ἐστί στρατηγίας. καί γάρ παρασκευαστικόν τῶν εἰς τόν πόλεμον τόν στρατηγόν εἶναι χρή καί ποριστικόν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατιώταις καί μηχανικόν καί ἐργαστικόν καί ἐπιμελῆ καί καρτερικόν καί ἀγχίνουν καί φιλόφρονά τε καί ὠμόν καί ἁπλοῦν τε καί ἐπίβουλον καί φυλακτικόν τε καί κλέπτην καί προετικόν καί ἅρπαγα καί φιλόδωρον καί πλεονέκτην καί ἀσφαλῆ καί ἐπιθετικόν, καί ἄλλα πολλά καί φύσει καί ἐπιστήμῃ δεῖ τόν εὖ στρατηγήσοντα ἔχειν.	"But that," said Socrates, "is only a tiny part of generalship. A general must be able to get ready what's needed for war and to provide the soldiers with supplies. He must be inventive, hardworking, careful, enduring, and quick-witted; kindly and harsh, straightforward and crafty, watchful and thieving, lavish and grasping, generous and greedy, cautious and aggressive. And there are many other qualities, some from nature and some from knowledge, that a man must have if he is going to be a good general.
3.1.7	καλόν δέ καί τό τακτικόν εἶναι· πολύ γὰρ διαφέρει στράτευμα τεταγμένον ἀτάκτου, ὥσπερ λίθοι τε καί πλίνθοι καί ξύλα καί κέραμος ἀτάκτως μέν ἐρριμμένα οὐδέν χρήσιμά ἐστιν, ἐπειδάν δέ ταχθῇ κάτω μέν καί ἐπιπολῆς τά μήτε σηπόμενα μήτε τηκόμενα, οἵ τε λίθοι καί ὁ κέραμος, ἐν μέσῳ δέ αἵ τε πλίνθοι καί τά ξύλα, ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ συντίθεται, τότε γίγνεται πολλοῦ ἄξιον κτῆμα, οἰκία.	"It's a fine thing to be good at tactics too, since an army in order is far superior to one in disorder. Stones, bricks, timber, and tiles thrown down in a heap are no use at all. But when the materials that neither rot nor crumble, the stones and the tiles, are placed at the bottom and on top, and the bricks and timber in the middle, the way they're put together in building, then they become a valuable possession: a house."
3.1.8	ἀλλά πάνυ, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος, ὅμοιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας. καί γάρ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούς τε πρώτους ἀρίστους δεῖ τάττειν καί τούς τελευταίους, ἐν μέσῳ δέ τούς χειρίστους, ἵνα ὑπό μέν τῶν ἄγωνται, ὑπό δέ τῶν ὠθῶνται.	"That's a very apt comparison, Socrates," said the young man. "In war, too, you have to put the best men in front and at the rear and the worst in the middle, so that they're led by the one group and pushed along by the other."
3.1.9	Εἰ μέν τοίνυν, ἔφη, καί διαγιγνώσκειν σε τούς ἀγαθούς καί τούς κακούς ἐδίδαξεν. εἰ δέ μή, τί σοι ὄφελος ὧν ἔμαθες; οὐδέ γάρ εἴ σε ἀργύριον ἐκέλευσε πρῶτον μέν καί τελευταῖον τό κάλλιστον τάττειν, ἐν μέσῳ δέ τό χείριστον, μή διδάξας διαγιγνώσκειν τό τε καλόν καί τό κίβδηλον, οὐδέν ἄν σοι ὄφελος ἦν. ἀλλά μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν· ὥστε αὐτούς ἄν ἡμᾶς δέοι τούς τε ἀγαθούς καί τούς κακούς κρίνειν.	"Fine," he said, "if he also taught you to tell the good men from the bad. If not, what good is what you learned? Suppose he had told you to put the finest silver first and last and the worst in the middle without teaching you to tell genuine coin from counterfeit. That would have been no good to you at all." "No, by Zeus," he said, "he didn't teach me that. So we'd have to judge the good and the bad ourselves."
3.1.10	Τί οὖν οὐ σκοποῦμεν, ἔφη, πῶς ἄν αὐτῶν μή διαμαρτάνοιμεν; Βούλομαι, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, εἰ μέν ἀργύριον δέοι ἁρπάζειν, τούς φιλαργυρωτάτους πρώτους καθιστάντες ὀρθῶς ἄν τάττοιμεν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Τί δέ τούς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας; ἆρα τούς φιλοτιμοτάτους προτακτέον; Οὗτοι γοῦν εἰσιν, ἔφη, οἱ ἕνεκα ἐπαίνου κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες.	"Then why don't we consider how we might avoid mistakes about them?" he said. "I'd like that," said the young man. "So if we needed to seize money, wouldn't we be arranging things correctly if we put the greediest for money in front?" "I think so." "And what about men who are going to face

2 In the *Iliad* (3.170) Priam, watching from the walls of Troy, calls Agamemnon "stately."

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οὐ τοίνυν οὗτοί γε ἄδηλοι, ἀλλ' ἐπιφανεῖς πανταχοῦ ὄντες εὐεύρετοι ἄν εἶεν.	danger? Shouldn't the most ambitious be put in front?" "Those are certainly the ones," he said, "who are willing to face danger for the sake of praise. And they aren't hard to spot. They stand out everywhere, so they'd be easy to find."
3.1.11	Ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερά σε τάττειν μόνον ἐδίδαξεν, ἢ καί ὅπῃ καί ὅπως χρηστέον ἑκάστῃ τῶν τάξεων; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. Καί μήν πολλά γ' ἐστί πρός ἃ οὔτε τάττειν οὔτε ἄγειν ὡσαύτως προσήκει. Ἀλλά μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐ διεσαφήνιζε ταῦτα. Νή Δί', ἔφη, πάλιν τοίνυν ἐλθών ἐπανερώτα· ἤν γάρ ἐπίστηται καί μή ἀναιδής ᾖ, αἰσχυνεῖται ἀργύριον εἰληφώς ἐνδεᾶ σε ἀποπέμψασθαι.	"But did he teach you only how to draw up troops," he said, "or also where and how to use each formation?" "Not at all," he said. "And yet there are many situations where it isn't right to draw up or lead troops in the same way." "No, by Zeus," he said, "he didn't explain any of that." "Then by Zeus," he said, "go back and ask him again. If he knows and has any shame, he'll be ashamed to take your money and send you away short."

CHAPTER 2

Socrates argues that a good leader's whole task is to make his people happy.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.2.1	Ἐντυχών δέ ποτε στρατηγεῖν ᾑρημένῳ τῳ· Τοῦ ἕνεκεν, ἔφη, Ὅμηρον οἴει τόν Ἀγαμέμνονα προσαγορεῦσαι ποιμένα λαῶν; ἆρά γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ τόν ποιμένα δεῖ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ οἷες καί τά ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσι καί, οὗ ἕνεκα τρέφονται, τοῦτο ἔσται, οὕτω καί τόν στρατηγόν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σῶοί τε οἱ στρατιῶται ἔσονται καί τά ἐπιτήδεια ἕξουσι καί, οὗ ἕνεκα στρατεύονται, τοῦτο ἔσται; στρατεύονται δέ, ἵνα κρατοῦντες τῶν πολεμίων εὐδαιμονέστεροι ὦσιν.	Once he met a man who had been elected general. "Why do you think Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people'?" he said. "Isn't it because a shepherd must see to it that his sheep are safe, have what they need, and serve the purpose they're kept for? In the same way a general must see to it that his soldiers are safe, have what they need, and achieve the purpose they go on campaign for. And they go on campaign so that by defeating the enemy they may be happier.
3.2.2	ἤ τί δήποτε οὕτως ἐπῄνεσε τόν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἰπών· Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθός κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής; ἆρά γε ὅτι αἰχμητής τε κρατερός ἄν εἴη, οὐκ εἰ μόνος αὐτός εὖ ἀγωνίζοιτο πρός τούς πολεμίους, ἀλλ' εἰ καί παντί τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τούτου αἴτιος εἴη, καί βασιλεύς ἀγαθός, οὐκ εἰ μόνον τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου καλῶς προεστήκοι, ἀλλ' εἰ καί, ὧν βασιλεύοι, τούτοις εὐδαιμονίας αἴτιος εἴη;	"Or why else did Homer praise Agamemnon like this: 'Both a good king and a mighty spearman'? Isn't it because he would be a mighty spearman not if he alone fought well against the enemy, but if he made the whole army do the same, and a good king not if he managed only his own life well, but if he made the people he ruled happy too?[3]
3.2.3	καί γάρ βασιλεύς αἱρεῖται οὐχ ἵνα ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς ἐπιμελῆται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καί οἱ ἑλόμενοι δι' αὐτόν εὖ πράττωσι· καί στρατεύονται δέ πάντες, ἵνα ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ὡς βέλτιστος ᾖ, καί στρατηγούς αἱροῦνται τούτου ἕνεκα, ἵνα πρός τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἡγεμόνες ὦσι.	"A king, after all, is chosen not to take good care of himself, but so that those who chose him may prosper through him. Everyone goes on campaign so that their life may be as good as possible, and they elect generals for this reason: to lead them toward that goal.
3.2.4	δεῖ οὖν τόν στρατηγοῦντα τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν τοῖς ἑλομένοις αὐτόν στρατηγόν· καί γάρ οὔτε κάλλιον τούτου	"So the man in command must provide this for those who elected him general. It isn't easy to find

3 The line is *Iliad* 3.179.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἄλλο ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν οὔτε αἴσχιον τοῦ ἐναντίου. καί οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετή τά μέν ἄλλα περιῄρει, κατέλιπε δέ τό εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὧν ἄν ἡγῆται.	anything finer than that, or anything more shameful than its opposite." In this way he examined what the excellence of a good leader is. He stripped away everything else and left just this: making happy those he leads.

CHAPTER 3

Socrates questions a newly elected cavalry commander about horses, riders, training and persuasion.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.3.1	Καί ἱππαρχεῖν δέ τινι ᾑρημένῳ οἶδά ποτε αὐτόν τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Ἔχοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ νεανία, εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅτου ἕνεκα ἐπεθύμησας ἱππαρχεῖν; οὐ γάρ δή τοῦ πρῶτος τῶν ἱππέων ἐλαύνειν· καί γάρ οἱ ἱπποτοξόται τούτου γε ἀξιοῦνται· προελαύνουσι γοῦν καί τῶν ἱππάρχων. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. ἀλλά μήν οὐδέ τοῦ γνωσθῆναί γε· ἐπεί καί οἱ μαινόμενοί γε ὑπό πάντων γιγνώσκονται.	I know that he once had a conversation like this with a man who had been elected cavalry commander. "Could you tell us, young man," he said, "why you wanted to be cavalry commander? Surely it wasn't to ride at the head of the cavalry. The mounted archers get that honor. At any rate, they ride out ahead even of the cavalry commanders." "That's true," he said. "Nor, surely, was it to be well known. Even madmen are known to everybody."[4]
3.3.2	ἀληθές, ἔφη, καί τοῦτο λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ὅτι τό ἱππικόν οἴει τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἄν ποιήσας παραδοῦναι καί, εἴ τις χρεία γίγνοιτο ἱππέων, τούτων ἡγούμενος ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτιος γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Καί ἔστι γε νή Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καλόν, ἐάν δύνῃ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι. ἡ δέ ἀρχή που ἐφ' ἧς ᾑρησαι ἵππων τε καί ἀμβατῶν ἐστιν. Ἔστι γάρ οὖν, ἔφη.	"That's true too," he said. "Then is it because you think you could improve the cavalry and hand it back to the city in better shape, and, if cavalry were ever needed, lead them and do the city some good?" "Very much so," he said. "And by Zeus," said Socrates, "that is a fine thing, if you can do it. And the office you've been elected to has charge, I take it, of horses and riders." "Yes, it does," he said.
3.3.3	Ἴθι δή λέξον ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρῶτον, ὅπως διανοεῖ τούς ἵππους βελτίους ποιῆσαι. καί ὅς· ἀλλά τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη. οὐκ ἐμόν οἶμαι τό ἔργον εἶναι, ἀλλά ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον δεῖν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἵππου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.	"Come, then, tell us this first: how do you plan to make the horses better?" And he said, "Well, I don't think that's my job. Each man has to look after his own horse privately."
3.3.4	Ἐάν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, παρέχωνταί σοι τούς ἵππους οἱ μέν οὕτω κακόποδας ἤ κακοσκελεῖς ἤ ἀσθενεῖς, οἱ δέ οὕτως ἀτρόφους, ὥστε μή δύνασθαι ἀκολουθεῖν, οἱ δέ οὕτως ἀναγώγους ὥστε μή μένειν ὅπου ἄν σύ τάξῃς, οἱ δέ οὕτω λακτιστάς ὥστε μηδέ τάξαι δυνατόν εἶναι, τί σοι τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ὄφελος ἔσται; ἤ πῶς δυνήσει τοιούτων ἡγούμενος ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι τήν πόλιν; καί ὅς· Ἀλλά καλῶς τε λέγεις, ἔφη, καί πειράσομαι τῶν ἵππων εἰς τό δυνατόν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.	"Then," said Socrates, "suppose some of them present their horses to you with such bad hooves or legs, or so weak, and others so underfed that they can't keep up, others so unruly that they won't stay where you post them, and others such kickers that you can't post them at all. What use will the cavalry be to you then? Or how will you be able to do the city any good leading horses like that?" And he said, "You're right, and I'll try to look after the horses as best I can."
3.3.5	Τί δέ; τούς ἱππέας οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἔφη, βελτίονας ποιῆσαι; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μέν ἀναβατικωτέρους ἐπί τούς ἵππους ποιήσεις [αὐτούς]; Δεῖ	"Well, then, won't you try to make the riders better too?" he said. "I will," he said. "So first, won't you make [them] quicker at mounting their horses?" "I

4 Athens kept a small corps of mounted archers alongside its citizen cavalry.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	γοῦν, ἔφη· καί γάρ εἴ τις αὐτῶν καταπέσοι, μᾶλλον ἄν οὕτω σῴζοιτο.	have to, at any rate," he said. "If any of them fell off, he'd have a better chance of getting away safely that way."
3.3.6	Τί γάρ; ἐάν που κινδυνεύειν δέῃ, πότερον ἐπάγειν τούς πολεμίους ἐπί τήν ἄμμον κελεύσεις, ἔνθαπερ εἰώθατε ἱππεύειν, ἤ πειράσει τάς μελέτας ἐν τοιούτοις ποιεῖσθαι χωρίοις ἐν οἵοισπερ οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται;	"And another thing: if you ever have to face danger, will you tell them to lure the enemy onto the sand where you usually ride? Or will you try to hold your exercises on the kind of ground where wars are actually fought?"
3.3.7	Βέλτιον γοῦν, ἔφη. Τί γάρ; τοῦ βάλλειν ὡς πλείστους ἀπό τῶν ἵππων ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιήσει; Βέλτιον γοῦν, ἔφη, καί τοῦτο. Θήγειν δέ τάς ψυχάς τῶν ἱππέων καί ἐξοργίζειν πρός τούς πολεμίους, ἅπερ ἀλκιμωτέρους ποιεῖ, διανενόησαι; Εἰ δέ μή, ἀλλά νῦν γε πειράσομαι, ἔφη.	"That would be better, anyway," he said. "And another thing: will you take some care to have as many as possible throwing javelins from horseback?" "That would be better too," he said. "And have you thought about sharpening the riders' spirits and rousing their anger against the enemy, which makes them braver?" "If I haven't, I'll certainly try to now," he said.
3.3.8	Ὅπως δέ σοι πείθωνται οἱ ἱππεῖς πεφρόντικάς τι; ἄνευ γάρ δή τούτου οὔτε ἵππων οὔτε ἱππέων ἀγαθῶν καί ἀλκίμων οὐδέν ὄφελος. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη· ἀλλά πῶς ἄν τις μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπί τοῦτο αὐτούς προτρέψαιτο;	"And have you given any thought to how you'll get the riders to obey you? Without that, neither horses nor riders are of any use, however good and brave they are." "You're right," he said. "But how could anyone best encourage them to do that, Socrates?"
3.3.9	Ἐκεῖνο μέν δήπου οἶσθα, ὅτι ἐν παντί πράγματι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτοις μάλιστα ἐθέλουσι πείθεσθαι οὕς ἄν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι. καί γάρ ἐν νόσῳ, ὅν ἄν ἡγῶνται ἰατρικώτατον εἶναι, τούτῳ μάλιστα πείθονται, καί ἐν πλοίῳ [οἱ πλέοντες], ὅν ἄν κυβερνητικώτατον, καί ἐν γεωργίᾳ, ὅν ἄν γεωργικώτατον. Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἰκός, ἔφη, καί ἐν ἱππικῇ, ὅς ἄν μάλιστα εἰδώς φαίνηται ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, τούτῳ μάλιστα ἐθέλειν τούς ἄλλους πείθεσθαι.	"You surely know this much: in any matter, people are most willing to obey those they consider best. In sickness they most readily obey the man they think the best doctor. On a ship [the passengers] obey the man they think the best pilot, and in farming the man they think the best farmer." "Certainly," he said. "Then it's likely," he said, "that in horsemanship too, the others will be most willing to obey whoever is seen to know best what has to be done."
3.3.10	Ἐάν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, βέλτιστος ὢν αὐτῶν δῆλος ὦ, ἀρκέσει μοι τοῦτο εἰς τό πείθεσθαι αὐτούς ἐμοί; Ἐάν γε πρός τούτῳ, ἔφη, διδάξῃς αὐτούς ὡς τό πείθεσθαί σοι κάλλιόν τε καί σωτηριώτερον αὐτοῖς ἔσται. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτο διδάξω; Πολύ νή Δί', ἔφη, ῥᾷον ἤ εἴ σοι δέοι διδάσκειν ὡς τά κακά τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνω καί λυσιτελέστερά ἐστι.	"So if I'm clearly the best of them, Socrates," he said, "will that be enough to make them obey me?" "Yes," he said, "if on top of that you teach them that obeying you will be finer and safer for them." "And how shall I teach them that?" he said. "Much more easily, by Zeus," he said, "than if you had to teach them that bad things are better and more profitable than good ones."
3.3.11	λέγεις, ἔφη, σύ τόν ἵππαρχον πρός τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν καί τοῦ λέγειν δύνασθαι; Σύ δ' ᾧου, ἔφη, χρῆναι σιωπῇ ἱππαρχεῖν; ἤ οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι, ὅτι, ὅσα τε νόμῳ μεμαθήκαμεν κάλλιστα ὄντα, δι' ὧν γε ζῆν ἐπιστάμεθα, ταῦτα πάντα διά λόγου ἐμάθομεν, καί εἴ τι ἄλλο καλόν μανθάνει τις μάθημα, διά λόγου μανθάνει,	"Are you saying," he said, "that a cavalry commander, besides everything else, has to make a point of being able to speak?" "Did you think," he said, "that you were supposed to command cavalry in silence? Haven't you realized this? All the finest things we've learned under our laws, the

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καί οἱ ἄριστα διδάσκοντες μάλιστα λόγῳ χρῶνται καί οἱ τά σπουδαιότατα [μάλιστα] ἐπιστάμενοι κάλλιστα διαλέγονται;	things by which we know how to live, we learned through speech. If anyone learns any other fine subject, he learns it through speech. The best teachers make the most use of speech, and those who know the most important things [best] are the finest at discussion.
3.3.12	ἦ τόδε οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι, ὡς, ὅταν γε χορός εἷς ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως γίγνηται, ὥσπερ ὁ εἰς Δῆλον πεμπόμενος, οὐδείς ἄλλοθεν οὐδαμόθεν τούτῳ ἐφάμιλλος γίγνεται οὐδέ εὐανδρία ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ὁμοία τῇ ἐνθάδε συνάγεται;	"Or haven't you realized this: whenever a single chorus is formed from this city, like the one sent to Delos, no chorus from anywhere else rivals it, and no other city brings together such a fine body of men as this one?[5]
3.3.13	ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. ἀλλά μήν οὔτε εὐφωνίᾳ τοσοῦτον διαφέρουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε σωμάτων μεγέθει καί ῥώμῃ, ὅσον φιλοτιμίᾳ, ἥπερ μάλιστα παροξύνει πρός τά καλά καί ἔντιμα. ἀληθές, ἔφη, καί τοῦτο.	"That's true," he said. "And yet the Athenians don't surpass others so much in good voices, or in size and strength of body, as in love of honor, which more than anything spurs men on to what is fine and honored." "That's true too," he said.
3.3.14	Οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, καί τοῦ ἱππικοῦ τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἴ τις ἐπιμεληθείη, [ὡς] πολύ ἄν καί τοῦτο διενεγκεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ὅπλων τε καί ἵππων παρασκευῇ καί εὐταξίᾳ καί τῷ ἑτοίμως κινδυνεύειν πρός τούς πολεμίους, εἰ νομίσειαν ταῦτα ποιοῦντες ἐπαίνου καί τιμῆς τεύξεσθαι;	"So don't you think," he said, "[that] if someone took care of the cavalry here too, it would also far surpass the others in its equipment of arms and horses, in its discipline, and in its readiness to face danger against the enemy, if the riders thought that by doing this they would win praise and honor?"
3.3.15	Εἰκός γε, ἔφη. Μή τοίνυν ὄκνει, ἔφη, ἀλλά πειρῶ τούς ἄνδρας ἐπί ταῦτα προτρέπειν, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτός τε ὠφελήσει καί οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται διά σέ. ἀλλά νή Δία πειράσομαι, ἔφη.	"Likely enough," he said. "Then don't hesitate," he said, "but try to urge the men on to this. You'll benefit from it yourself, and so will your fellow citizens, thanks to you." "By Zeus, I'll try," he said.

CHAPTER 4

Nicomachides scorns a businessman elected general, and Socrates argues that good managers make good generals.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.4.1	Ἰδών δέ ποτε Νικομαχίδην ἐξ ἀρχαιρεσιῶν ἀπιόντα ἤρετο· Τίνες, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, στρατηγοί ᾑρηνται; καί ὅς· Οὐ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστε ἐμέ μέν οὐχ εἵλοντο, ὅς ἐκ καταλόγου στρατευόμενος κατατέτριμμαι καί λοχαγῶν καί ταξιαρχῶν καί τραύματα ὑπό τῶν πολεμίων τοσαῦτα ἔχω — ἅμα δέ καί τάς οὐλάς τῶν τραυμάτων ἀπογυμνούμενος ἐπεδείκνυεν — Ἀντισθένη δέ, ἔφη, εἵλοντο τόν οὔτε ὁπλίτην πω στρατευσάμενον ἔν τε τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν οὐδέν περίβλεπτον ποιήσαντα ἐπιστάμενόν τε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἤ χρήματα συλλέγειν;	Once he saw Nicomachides coming away from the elections and asked him, "Who's been elected general, Nicomachides?" And he said, "Isn't it just like the Athenians, Socrates? They didn't elect me—me, who've worn myself out serving whenever my name was on the call-up list, as company commander and as regimental commander, and who have so many wounds from the enemy"—and as he spoke he bared himself and showed the scars of his wounds—"but they elected Antisthenes," he said, "who has never even served as a hoplite, has done nothing remarkable in the cavalry, and knows nothing except how to make money!"[6]

5 Athens regularly sent a sacred delegation with a chorus to the festival of Apollo on the island of Delos.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.4.2	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦτο μέν ἀγαθόν, εἴ γε τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱκανός ἔσται τά ἐπιτήδεια πορίζειν; Καί γάρ οἱ ἔμποροι, ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, χρήματα συλλέγειν ἱκανοί εἰσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕνεκα τούτου καί στρατηγεῖν δύναιντ᾽ ἄν.	"Well," said Socrates, "isn't that a good thing, if he'll be able to supply the soldiers with provisions?" "Merchants are able to make money too," said Nicomachides, "but that doesn't mean they could be generals."
3.4.3	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ἀλλά καί φιλόνικος Ἀντισθένης ἐστίν, ὅ στρατηγῷ προσεῖναι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστιν· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι καί ὁσάκις κεχορήγηκε πᾶσι τοῖς χοροῖς νενίκηκε; Μά Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέν ὅμοιόν ἐστι χοροῦ τε καί στρατεύματος προεστάναι.	And Socrates said, "But Antisthenes is also eager to win, and that's a good quality for a general to have. Don't you see that every time he's been a chorus sponsor, he has won with all his choruses?" "No, by Zeus," said Nicomachides, "but leading a chorus is nothing like leading an army."[7]
3.4.4	Καί μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδέ ᾠδῆς γε ὁ Ἀντισθένης οὐδέ χορῶν διδασκαλίας ἔμπειρος ὤν ὅμως ἐγένετο ἱκανός εὑρεῖν τούς κρατίστους ταῦτα. Καί ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, ἄλλους μέν εὑρήσει τούς τάξοντας ἀνθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, ἄλλους δέ τούς μαχουμένους.	"And yet," said Socrates, "though Antisthenes had no experience of singing or of training choruses, he still proved able to find the best people for those jobs." "Then in the army too," said Nicomachides, "he'll find others to draw up the troops for him, and others to do the fighting."
3.4.5	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν γε καί ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τούς κρατίστους, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς χορικοῖς, ἐξευρίσκῃ τε καί προαιρῆται, εἰκότως ἄν καί τούτου νικηφόρος εἴη· καί δαπανᾶν δ᾽ αὐτόν εἰκός μᾶλλον ἄν ἐθέλειν εἰς τήν σύν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν πολεμικῶν νίκην ἤ εἰς τήν σύν τῇ φυλῇ τῶν χορικῶν.	"Well," said Socrates, "if in war, as with choruses, he finds and picks out the best people, he would likely win the prize here too. And he would likely be more willing to spend money on a victory in war shared with the whole city than on a choral victory shared with his tribe."
3.4.6	λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστι χορηγεῖν τε καλῶς καί στρατηγεῖν; λέγω ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη, ὡς, ὅτου ἄν τις προστατεύῃ, ἐάν γιγνώσκῃ τε ὧν δεῖ καί ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνηται, ἀγαθός ἄν εἴη προστάτης, εἴτε χοροῦ εἴτε οἴκου εἴτε πόλεως εἴτε στρατεύματος προστατεύοι.	"Are you saying, Socrates," he said, "that it's the same man's job to be a good chorus sponsor and a good general?" "What I'm saying," he said, "is that whatever a man is in charge of, if he knows what's needed and can provide it, he would be a good leader, whether he's in charge of a chorus, a household, a city, or an army."
3.4.7	καί ὁ Νικομαχίδης· Μά Δί᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ᾤμην ἐγώ σοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοί οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοί στρατηγοί ἄν εἶεν. Ἴθι δή, ἔφη, ἐξετάσωμεν τά ἔργα ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν πότερον τά αὐτά ἐστιν ἤ διαφέρει τι. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.	And Nicomachides said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I never thought I'd hear you say that good household managers would make good generals." "Come, then," he said, "let's examine the tasks of each, so that we can see whether they're the same or differ in some way." "By all means," he said.
3.4.8	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τό μέν τούς ἀρχομένους κατηκόους τε καί εὐπειθεῖς ἑαυτοῖς παρασκευάζειν ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν ἔργον; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τό προστάττειν ἕκαστα τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πράττειν; Καί τοῦτ᾽, ἔφη. Καί μήν τό τούς κακούς κολάζειν καί τούς ἀγαθούς τιμᾶν ἀμφοτέροις οἶμαι προσήκειν.	"So," he said, "isn't it the task of both to make those under them obedient and willing to follow orders?" "Very much so," he said. "And what about assigning each job to the people suited to it?" "That too," he said. "And punishing the bad and honoring the good is a job for both, I think."

6 This Antisthenes is a wealthy Athenian, not the philosopher of that name. Athens elected ten generals each year.
7 A chorus sponsor (*chorēgos*) was a wealthy citizen who paid to train and costume a chorus that competed for his tribe at a festival.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.4.9	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Τό δέ τούς ὑπηκόους εὐμενεῖς ποιεῖσθαι πῶς οὐ καλόν ἀμφοτέροις; Καί τοῦτ', ἔφη. Συμμάχους δέ καί βοηθούς προσάγεσθαι δοκεῖ σοι συμφέρειν ἀμφοτέροις ἤ οὔ; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. ἀλλά φυλακτικούς τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί ἐπιμελεῖς καί φιλοπόνους ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει περί τά αὑτῶν ἔργα;	"Absolutely," he said. "And how could it not be good for both to win the goodwill of those under them?" "That too," he said. "And do you think it's in the interest of both to gain allies and helpers, or not?" "It certainly is," he said. "And shouldn't both be good at protecting what they have?" "Very much so," he said. "So shouldn't both also be careful and hardworking in their own tasks?"
3.4.10	Ταῦτα μέν, ἔφη, πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν· ἀλλά τό μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι ἀμφοτέρων. ἀλλ' ἐχθροί γέ τοι ἀμφοτέροις γίγνονται; Καί μάλα, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Οὐκοῦν τό περιγενέσθαι τούτων ἀμφοτέροις συμφέρει;	"All these things," he said, "belong to both alike. But fighting doesn't belong to both." "But surely both have enemies?" "Yes, they certainly do," he said. "So isn't it in the interest of both to get the better of them?"
3.4.11	Πάνυ γ', ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο παριεῖς, ἄν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, τί ὠφελήσει ἡ οἰκονομική; Ἐνταῦθα δήπου καί πλεῖστον, ἔφη· ὁ γάρ ἀγαθός οἰκονόμος, εἰδώς ὅτι οὐδέν οὕτω λυσιτελές τε καί κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τό μαχόμενον τούς πολεμίους νικᾶν, οὐδέ οὕτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καί ζημιῶδες, ὡς τό ἡττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μέν τά πρός τό νικᾶν συμφέροντα ζητήσει καί παρασκευάσεται, ἐπιμελῶς δέ τά πρός τό ἡττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέψεται καί φυλάξεται, ἐνεργῶς δ', ἄν τήν παρασκευήν ὁρᾷ νικητικήν οὖσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δέ τούτων, ἐάν ἀπαράσκευος ᾖ, φυλάξεται συνάπτειν μάχην.	"Certainly," he said. "But you're passing over this: if there has to be fighting, what use will household management be?" "Surely that's where it will be of most use," he said. "The good household manager knows that nothing is so profitable and gainful as beating the enemy in battle, and nothing so unprofitable and costly as being defeated. So he will eagerly seek out and prepare whatever helps toward victory, and carefully look out for and guard against whatever leads to defeat. If he sees that his preparations are fit to win, he'll fight with energy; and, not least, if he's unprepared, he'll take care not to join battle."
3.4.12	μή καταφρόνει, ἔφη, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἡ γάρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τά δέ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει τό δέ μέγιστον, ὅτι οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται οὔτε δι' ἄλλων μέν ἀνθρώπων τά ἴδια πράττεται, δι' ἄλλων δέ τά κοινά. οὐ γάρ ἄλλοις τισίν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρῶνται ἤ οἷσπερ οἱ τά ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες· οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι χρῆσθαι καί τά ἴδια καί τά κοινά καλῶς πράττουσιν, οἱ δέ μή ἐπιστάμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθι πλημμελοῦσι.	"Don't look down on men who are good at managing households, Nicomachides," he said. "Looking after private affairs differs from looking after public ones only in scale; in other respects they're much alike. And the most important point is this: neither gets done without people, and private affairs aren't carried on through one set of people and public affairs through another. Those who take care of public affairs deal with no other people than the ones private householders deal with. Those who know how to deal with people handle both private and public affairs well, and those who don't go wrong in both."

CHAPTER 5

Socrates and the younger Pericles discuss how Athens might recover its ancient excellence.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.5.1	Περικλεῖ δέ ποτε τῷ τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους υἱῷ διαλεγόμενος· Ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἐλπίδα ἔχω σοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἀμείνω τε καί ἐνδοξοτέραν τήν πόλιν εἰς	Once, when he was talking with Pericles, the son of the great Pericles, he said, "You know, Pericles, I have hopes that with you as general the city will

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τά πολεμικά ἔσεσθαι καί τῶν πολεμίων κρατήσειν. καί ὁ Περικλῆς· Βουλοίμην ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἅ λέγεις· ὅπως δέ ταῦτα γένοιτ' ἄν, οὐ δύναμαι γνῶναι. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, διαλογιζόμενοι περί αὐτῶν ἐπισκοπῶμεν ὅπου ἤδη τό δυνατόν ἐστι;	become better and more glorious in war, and will defeat its enemies." And Pericles said, "I'd like what you describe, Socrates, but how it could come about I can't see." "Then would you like us," said Socrates, "to talk it through and look at how far it's already possible?"[8]
3.5.2	Βούλομαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει μέν οὐδέν μείους εἰσίν Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν; Οἶδα γάρ, ἔφη. Σώματα δέ ἀγαθά καί καλά πότερον ἐκ Βοιωτῶν οἴει πλείω ἄν ἐκλεχθῆναι ἤ ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν; Οὐδέ ταύτῃ μοι δοκοῦσι λείπεσθαι. Εὐμενεστέρους δέ ποτέρους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι νομίζεις; Ἀθηναίους ἔγωγε· Βοιωτῶν μέν γάρ πολλοί πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπό Θηβαίων δυσμενῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν, Ἀθήνησι δέ οὐδέν ὁρῶ τοιοῦτον.	"I would," he said. "Well then, you know," he said, "that in numbers the Athenians are no fewer than the Boeotians?" "Yes, I know." "And do you think more good, fine bodies could be picked out from the Boeotians or from Athens?" "In that respect too I don't think we fall short." "And which of the two do you think are better disposed toward one another?" "The Athenians, I'd say. Many of the Boeotians are taken advantage of by the Thebans and are hostile to them, but at Athens I see nothing of the kind."
3.5.3	ἀλλά μήν φιλοτιμότατοί γε καί μεγαλοφρονέστατοι πάντων εἰσίν· ἅπερ οὐχ ἥκιστα παροξύνει κινδυνεύειν ὑπέρ εὐδοξίας τε καί πατρίδος. Οὐδέ ἐν τούτοις Ἀθηναῖοι μεμπτοί. Καί μήν προγόνων γε καλά ἔργα οὐκ ἔστιν οἷς μείζω καί πλείω ὑπάρχει ἤ Ἀθηναίοις· ᾧ πολλοί ἐπαιρόμενοι προτρέπονταί τε ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καί ἄλκιμοι γίγνεσθαι.	"And then they are the most ambitious and most high-minded of all people—qualities that, more than anything, spur men to face danger for glory and for their country." "In these things too the Athenians can't be faulted." "And again, no people can claim greater or more numerous fine deeds of their ancestors than the Athenians. Many are lifted up by this and urged on to care for excellence and to become brave."
3.5.4	Ταῦτα μέν ἀληθῆ λέγεις πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὅτι, ἀφ' οὗ ἥ τε σύν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ συμφορά ἐγένετο καί ἡ μεθ' Ἱπποκράτους ἐπί Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τούτων τεταπείνωται μέν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δόξα πρός τούς Βοιωτούς, ἐπῆρται δέ τό τῶν Θηβαίων φρόνημα πρός τούς Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε Βοιωτοί μέν, οἱ πρόσθεν οὐδ' ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν τολμῶντες Ἀθηναίοις ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων τε καί τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων ἀντιτάττεσθαι, νῦν ἀπειλοῦσιν αὐτοί καθ' αὑτούς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τήν Ἀττικήν, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ, οἱ πρότερον [ὅτε Βοιωτοί μόνοι ἐγένοντο] πορθοῦντες τήν Βοιωτίαν, φοβοῦνται, μή Βοιωτοί δῃώσωσι τήν Ἀττικήν.	"All that you say is true, Socrates. But you can see that ever since the disaster of the thousand with Tolmides at Lebadea, and the one with Hippocrates at Delium, the reputation of the Athenians has been humbled in relation to the Boeotians, and the pride of the Thebans has risen against the Athenians. So the Boeotians, who before didn't dare to face the Athenians even on their own soil without the Spartans and the other Peloponnesians, now threaten to invade Attica on their own; and the Athenians, who used to ravage Boeotia [when the Boeotians were on their own], are afraid the Boeotians will lay Attica waste."[9]
3.5.5	καί ὁ Σωκράτης· ἀλλ' αἰσθάνομαι μέν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα· δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἀνδρί ἀγαθῷ ἄρχοντι νῦν εὐαρεστοτέρως διακεῖσθαι ἡ πόλις. τό μέν γάρ θάρρος ἀμέλειάν τε καί ῥᾳθυμίαν καί ἀπείθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὁ δέ	And Socrates said, "Yes, I'm aware that's how things stand. But it seems to me the city is now in a better frame of mind for a good man to lead it. Confidence breeds carelessness, laziness and dis-

8 The younger Pericles, son of Pericles and Aspasia, was one of the generals executed after the naval battle of Arginusae in 406 BC.
9 Tolmides' force was destroyed by the Boeotians near Lebadea (at Coronea) in 447 BC, and Hippocrates' army at Delium in 424 BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	φόβος προσεκτικωτέρους τε καί εὐπειθεστέρους καί εὐτακτοτέρους ποιεῖ.	obedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient and more disciplined.
3.5.6	τεκμήραιο δ' ἄν τοῦτο καί ἀπό τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν· ὅταν μέν γάρ δήπου μηδέν φοβῶνται, μεστοί εἰσιν ἀταξίας· ἔστ' ἄν δέ ἤ χειμῶνα ἤ πολεμίους δείσωσιν, οὐ μόνον τά κελευόμενα πάντα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλά καί σιγῶσι καραδοκοῦντες τά προσταχθησόμενα, ὥσπερ χορευταί.	"You can see this from people on ships too. When they have nothing to fear, I suppose, they're full of disorder; but as soon as they're afraid of a storm or of the enemy, they not only do everything they're told, but even fall silent, waiting for the next order, like a chorus."
3.5.7	Ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη ὁ Περικλῆς, εἴ γε νῦν μάλιστα πείθοιντο, ὥρα ἄν εἴη λέγειν, πῶς ἄν αὐτούς προτρεψαίμεθα πάλιν ἀνερασθῆναι τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀρετῆς τε καί εὐκλείας καί εὐδαιμονίας.	"Well," said Pericles, "if they're really most ready to obey now, this would be the time to say how we might urge them to fall in love again with their ancient excellence, glory and happiness."
3.5.8	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ μέν ἐβουλόμεθα χρημάτων αὐτούς ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι εἶχον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, ἀποδεικνύντες αὐτοῖς ταῦτα πατρῷά τε ὄντα καί προσήκοντα μάλιστ' ἄν οὕτως αὐτούς ἐξωρμῶμεν ἀντέχεσθαι τούτων· ἐπεί δέ τοῦ μετ' ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν αὐτούς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι βουλόμεθα, τοῦτ' αὖ δεικτέον ἐκ παλαιοῦ μάλιστα προσῆκον αὐτοῖς, καί ὡς τούτου ἐπιμελόμενοι πάντων ἄν εἶεν κράτιστοι.	"Well then," said Socrates, "if we wanted them to lay claim to money that others held, the best way to spur them to go after it would be to show them that it had belonged to their fathers and was rightfully theirs. But since we want them to make it their concern to be first through excellence, we must show in turn that this has belonged to them above all from long ago, and that if they cared for it they would be the strongest of all."
3.5.9	Πῶς οὖν ἄν τοῦτο διδάσκοιμεν; Οἶμαι μέν, εἰ τούς γε παλαιτάτους ὧν ἀκούομεν προγόνους αὐτῶν ἀναμιμνῄσκοιμεν αὐτούς ἀκηκοότας ἀρίστους γεγονέναι.	"So how might we teach this?" "I think by reminding them—they've heard it already—that the most ancient of their ancestors we know of were the best of men."
3.5.10	ἆρα λέγεις τήν τῶν θεῶν κρίσιν, ἥν οἱ περί Κέκροπα δι' ἀρετήν ἔκριναν; λέγω γάρ, καί τήν Ἐρεχθέως γε τροφήν καί γένεσιν, καί τόν πόλεμον τόν ἐπ' ἐκείνου γενόμενον πρός τούς ἐκ τῆς ἐχομένης ἠπείρου πάσης, καί τόν ἐφ' Ἡρακλειδῶν πρός τούς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καί πάντας τούς ἐπί Θησέως πολεμηθέντας, ἐν οἷς πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνοι δῆλοι γεγόνασι τῶν καθ' ἑαυτούς ἀνθρώπων ἀριστεύσαντες·	"Do you mean the judgment between the gods, which Cecrops and his people were given to decide because of their excellence?" "Yes, I do—and the rearing and birth of Erechtheus too, and the war in his time against the peoples of the whole adjoining mainland, and the one in the time of the Heraclidae against those in the Peloponnese, and all the wars fought in the time of Theseus. In all of them our ancestors plainly proved the best of the people of their day;[10]
3.5.11	εἰ δέ βούλει, ἅ ὕστερον οἱ ἐκείνων μέν ἀπόγονοι, οὐ πολύ δέ πρό ἡμῶν γεγονότες ἔπραξαν, τά μέν αὐτοί καθ' αὐτούς ἀγωνιζόμενοι πρός τούς κυριεύοντας τῆς τε Ἀσίας πάσης καί τῆς Εὐρώπης μέχρι Μακεδονίας καί πλείστην τῶν προγεγονότων δύναμιν καί ἀφορμήν κεκτημένους καί μέγιστα ἔργα κατειργασμένους, τά δέ καί μετά Πελοποννησίων ἀριστεύοντες καί κατά γῆν καί κατά	and, if you like, there's what their descendants did later, the men who lived not long before us: sometimes fighting on their own against the masters of all Asia and of Europe as far as Macedonia, who had acquired greater power and resources than anyone before them and had accomplished the greatest deeds; and sometimes excelling on land and sea together with the Peloponnesians. These

10 In Athenian legend Cecrops, an early king, judged the contest between Athena and Poseidon for Attica, and Erechtheus was born from the earth and reared by Athena. Athens later sheltered the Heraclidae, Heracles' children, against Eurystheus.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	θάλατταν· οἵ δή καί λέγονται πολύ διενεγκεῖν τῶν καθ' αὐτούς ἀνθρώπων.	too, of course, are said to have far surpassed the people of their day."[11]
3.5.12	λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη. Τοιγαροῦν πολλῶν μέν μεταναστάσεων ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γεγονυιῶν διέμειναν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν, πολλοί δέ ὑπέρ δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντες ἐπέτρεπον ἐκείνοις, πολλοί δέ ὑπό κρειττόνων ὑβριζόμενοι κατέφευγον πρός ἐκείνους.	"So they are," he said. "And that's why, when there were many migrations in Greece, they stayed in their own land; many who were in dispute over their rights entrusted the decision to them, and many who were being abused by stronger powers took refuge with them."
3.5.13	καί ὁ Περικλῆς· Καί θαυμάζω γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ πόλις ὅπως ποτ' ἐπί τό χεῖρον ἔκλινεν. Ἐγώ μέν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ καί ἀθληταί τινες διά τό πολύ ὑπερενεγκεῖν καί κρατιστεῦσαι καταρρᾳθυμήσαντες ὑστερίζουσι τῶν ἀντιπάλων, οὕτω καί Ἀθηναίους πολύ διενεγκόντας ἀμελῆσαι ἑαυτῶν καί διά τοῦτο χείρους γεγονέναι.	And Pericles said, "And it amazes me, Socrates, how the city ever slid into decline." "I think," said Socrates, "that just as some athletes, because they far outclass everyone and come out on top, grow lazy and fall behind their rivals, so the Athenians too, having far surpassed others, neglected themselves and so became worse."
3.5.14	Νῦν οὖν, ἔφη, τί ἄν ποιοῦντες ἀναλάβοιεν τήν ἀρχαίαν ἀρετήν; καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Οὐδέν ἀπόκρυφον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἰ μέν ἐξευρόντες τά τῶν προγόνων ἐπιτηδεύματα μηδέν χεῖρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν, οὐδέν ἄν χείρους ἐκείνων γενέσθαι· εἰ δέ μή, τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι καί τούτοις τά αὐτά ἐπιτηδεύοντες, ὁμοίως μέν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώμενοι οὐδέν ἄν χείρους ἐκείνων εἶεν, εἰ δ' ἐπιμελέστερον, καί βελτίους.	"So now," he said, "what could they do to recover their ancient excellence?" And Socrates said, "I don't think it's any secret. If they found out what their ancestors' practices were and followed them no worse than they did, they would become no worse than they were. If not, then by imitating those who are first now and following the same practices, they would be no worse than them if they followed them in the same way, and better if they did so more diligently."
3.5.15	λέγεις, ἔφη, πόρρω που εἶναι τῇ πόλει τήν καλοκαγαθίαν. πότε γάρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἤ πρεσβυτέρους αἰδέσονται, οἵ ἀπό τῶν πατέρων ἄρχονται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων, ἤ σωμασκήσουσιν οὕτως, οἵ οὐ μόνον αὐτοί εὐεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἀλλά καί τῶν ἐπιμελομένων καταγελῶσι;	"You're saying," he said, "that gentlemanly excellence is a long way off for our city. After all, when will Athenians respect their elders as the Spartans do, when they start with their own fathers in showing contempt for older men? Or when will they train their bodies the way the Spartans do, when they not only neglect their own fitness but even laugh at those who take care of theirs?
3.5.16	πότε δέ οὕτω πείσονται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οἵ καί ἀγάλλονται ἐπί τῷ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἤ πότε οὕτως ὁμονοήσουσιν, οἵ γε ἀντί μέν τοῦ συνεργεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τά συμφέροντα ἐπηρεάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις καί φθονοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς μᾶλλον ἤ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δέ πάντων ἔν τε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνόδοις καί ταῖς κοιναῖς διαφέρονται καί πλείστας δίκας ἀλλήλοις δικάζονται καί προαιροῦνται μᾶλλον οὕτω κερδαίνειν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἤ συνωφελοῦντες αὐτούς, τοῖς δέ κοινοῖς ὥσπερ ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμενοι περί τούτων αὖ μάχονται καί ταῖς εἰς τά τοιαῦτα δυνάμεσι μάλιστα χαίρουσιν;	"And when will they obey their officials the way the Spartans do, when they actually take pride in despising them? Or when will they be of one mind like that? Instead of working together for their common advantage they abuse one another and envy one another more than they envy the rest of mankind; above all they quarrel in private gatherings and public ones alike, bring more lawsuits against one another than anyone, and would rather profit from one another that way than help one another. They treat public affairs as if they be-

11 The Persians, in the wars of 490–479 BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		longed to someone else, fight over them in turn, and take the greatest delight in having the power to do such things.
3.5.17	ἐξ ὧν πολλή μέν ἀτηρία καί κακία τῇ πόλει ἐμφύεται, πολλή δέ ἔχθρα καί μῖσος ἀλλήλων τοῖς πολίταις ἐγγίγνεται, δι' ἅ ἔγωγε μάλα φοβοῦμαι ἀεί, μή τι μεῖζον ἤ ὥστε φέρειν δύνασθαι κακόν τῇ πόλει συμβῇ.	"From all this, much mischief and badness are growing up in the city, and much hostility and mutual hatred among the citizens; and because of it I'm always very much afraid that some evil too great to bear may befall the city."
3.5.18	Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὕτως ἡγοῦ ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους. οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς εὔτακτοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων δέ καταδεέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις;	"Pericles," said Socrates, "don't by any means think that the Athenians are sick with so incurable a wickedness. Don't you see how well disciplined they are in the navy, how orderly they are in obeying the officials at athletic contests, and how in choruses they serve their trainers as readily as anyone?"
3.5.19	Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καί θαυμαστόν ἐστι, τό τούς μέν τοιούτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τούς δέ ὁπλίτας καί τούς ἱππεῖς, οἵ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων.	"Yes, and that's exactly what's so amazing," he said, "that people like that obey those in charge of them, while the heavy infantry and the cavalry, who are thought to be the pick of the citizens for gentlemanly excellence, are the most disobedient of all."
3.5.20	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Ἡ δέ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δεδοκιμασμένων καθίσταται; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Οἶσθα οὖν τινας, ἔφη, κάλλιον ἤ νομιμώτερον ἤ σεμνότερον ἤ δικαιότερον τάς τε δίκας δικάζοντας καί τἆλλα πάντα πράττοντας; Οὐ μέμφομαι, ἔφη, τούτοις. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὡς οὐκ εὐτάκτων ὄντων Ἀθηναίων.	And Socrates said, "And the Council of the Areopagus, Pericles—isn't it made up of men who have passed the scrutiny?" "Certainly," he said. "Then do you know of any people who try cases and do everything else more finely, more lawfully, more solemnly or more justly?" "I've no complaint against them," he said. "Then you shouldn't lose heart," he said, "as though the Athenians were undisciplined."[12]
3.5.21	Καί μήν ἔν γε τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς, ἔφη, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ σωφρονεῖν τε καί εὐτακτεῖν καί πειθαρχεῖν, οὐδενί τούτων προσέχουσιν. Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν τούτοις οἱ ἥκιστα ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν. οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι κιθαριστῶν μέν καί χορευτῶν καί ὀρχηστῶν οὐδέ εἷς ἐπιχειρεῖ ἄρχειν μή ἐπιστάμενος, οὐδέ παλαιστῶν οὐδέ παγκρατιαστῶν; ἀλλά πάντες οἱ τούτων ἄρχοντες ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ὁπόθεν ἔμαθον ταῦτα ἐφ' οἷς ἐφεστᾶσι· τῶν δέ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν.	"And yet in military matters," he said, "where moderation, discipline and obedience are needed most, they pay no attention to any of them." "Perhaps," said Socrates, "that's because in these matters the people commanding them are the ones who know least. Don't you see that no one tries to direct lyre players, chorus singers or dancers without knowing how, or wrestlers or pankration fighters either? Everyone who directs them can show where they learned the things they're in charge of. But most generals improvise.
3.5.22	οὐ μέντοι σέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐγώ νομίζω εἶναι, ἀλλ' οἶμαί σε οὐδέν ἧττον ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὁπότε στρατηγεῖν ἤ ὁπότε	"Not that I think you're that sort. I think you could say just as readily when you began to learn gener-

12 The Council of the Areopagus was made up of former archons, all of whom had passed the official scrutiny of their fitness for office.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	παλαίειν ἤρξω μανθάνειν. καί πολλά μέν οἶμαί σε τῶν πατρῴων στρατηγημάτων παρειληφότα διασῴζειν, πολλά δέ πανταχόθεν συνηχέναι, ὁπόθεν οἷόν τε ἦν μαθεῖν τι ὠφέλιμον εἰς στρατηγίαν.	alship as when you began to learn wrestling. And I think you've inherited many of your father's stratagems and keep them safe, and have gathered many more from every quarter where something useful for generalship could be learned.
3.5.23	οἶμαι δέ σε πολλά μεριμνᾶν, ὅπως μή λάθῃς σεαυτόν ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν εἰς στρατηγίαν ὠφελίμων, καί ἐάν τι τοιοῦτον αἴσθῃ σεαυτόν μή εἰδότα, ζητεῖν τούς ἐπισταμένους ταῦτα, οὔτε δώρων οὔτε χαρίτων φειδόμενον, ὅπως μάθῃς παρ' αὐτῶν ἅ μή ἐπίστασαι καί συνεργούς ἀγαθούς ἔχῃς.	"I also think you take great pains not to be ignorant, without realizing it, of anything useful for generalship; and if you notice that you don't know something of the sort, you look for those who do, sparing neither gifts nor favors, so as to learn from them what you don't know and to have good helpers."
3.5.24	καί ὁ Περικλῆς· Οὐ λανθάνεις με, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐδ' οἰόμενός με τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ταῦτα λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγχειρῶν με διδάσκειν, ὅτι τόν μέλλοντα στρατηγεῖν τούτων ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ.	And Pericles said, "I can see, Socrates, that you're not saying this because you think I already attend to these things, but because you're trying to teach me that a man who is going to be a general must attend to all of them.
3.5.25	ὁμολογῶ μέντοι κἀγώ σοι ταῦτα. Τοῦτο δ', ἔφη, ὦ Περίκλεις, κατανενόηκας, ὅτι πρόκειται τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν ὄρη μεγάλα, καθήκοντα ἐπί τήν Βοιωτίαν, δι' ὧν εἰς τήν χώραν εἴσοδοι στεναί τε καί προσάντεις εἰσί, καί ὅτι μέση διέζωται ὄρεσιν ἐρυμνοῖς; Καί μάλα, ἔφη.	"I do agree with you about that, though." "Have you noticed this, Pericles," he said, "that great mountains stand in front of our country, stretching toward Boeotia, and the passes through them into our land are narrow and steep, and that the middle of the country is girdled by rugged mountains?" "Certainly," he said.
3.5.26	Τί δέ; ἐκεῖνο ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Μυσοί καί Πισίδαι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ κατέχοντες ἐρυμνά πάνυ χωρία καί κούφως ὡπλισμένοι δύνανται πολλά μέν τήν βασιλέως χώραν καταθέοντες κακοποιεῖν, αὐτοί δέ ζῆν ἐλεύθεροι; Καί τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἀκούω.	"Well, and have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, who hold very strong positions within the King's territory and are lightly armed, are able to raid the King's territory and do a great deal of damage, while living free themselves?" "Yes, I've heard that too," he said.[13]
3.5.27	Ἀθηναίους δ' οὐκ ἄν οἴει, ἔφη, μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας ὡπλισμένους κουφοτέροις ὅπλοις καί τά προκείμενα τῆς χώρας ὄρη κατέχοντας βλαβερούς μέν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι, μεγάλην δέ προβολήν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι; καί ὁ Περικλῆς· Πάντ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί ταῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.	"And don't you think," he said, "that if Athenians, up to the age when they're still nimble, were armed with lighter weapons and held the mountains in front of our country, they would be a menace to our enemies and would have built a great bulwark for the country's citizens?" And Pericles said, "I think all this is useful too, Socrates."
3.5.28	Εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα, ἐπιχείρει αὐτοῖς, ὦ ἄριστε· ὅ τι μέν γάρ ἄν τούτων καταπράξῃς, καί σοί καλόν ἔσται καί τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν· ἐάν δέ τι αὐτῶν ἀδυνατῇς, οὔτε τήν πόλιν βλάψεις οὔτε σαυτόν καταισχυνεῖς.	"Well then," said Socrates, "if you like these ideas, set your hand to them, my good friend. Whatever of them you accomplish will bring honor to you and good to the city; and if you can't manage some of them, you'll neither harm the city nor disgrace yourself."

13 "The King" is the king of Persia; the Mysians and Pisidians were hill peoples of Asia Minor who never fully submitted to him.

CHAPTER 6

Socrates shows young Glaucon, eager to lead the city, that he knows nothing of its affairs.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.6.1	Γλαύκωνα δέ τόν Ἀρίστωνος, ὅτ' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως οὐδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων τε καί φίλων οὐδείς ἐδύνατο παῦσαι ἑλκόμενόν τε ἀπό τοῦ βήματος καί καταγέλαστον ὄντα· Σωκράτης δέ, εὔνους ὢν αὐτῷ διά τε Χαρμίδην τόν Γλαύκωνος καί διά Πλάτωνα, μόνος ἔπαυσεν.	Glaucon, the son of Ariston, was trying to address the people, eager to become a leader of the city though he was not yet twenty years old. None of his other relatives or friends could stop him, though he kept getting dragged off the speakers' platform and making himself a laughingstock. Socrates, who was well disposed toward him for the sake of Charmides son of Glaucon and of Plato, was the only one who stopped him.[14]
3.6.2	ἐντυχών γάρ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μέν εἰς τό ἐθελῆσαι ἀκούειν τοιάδε λέξας κατέσχεν· Ὦ Γλαύκων, ἔφη, προστατεύειν ἡμῖν διανενόησαι τῆς πόλεως; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Νή Δί', ἔφη, καλόν γάρ, εἴπερ τι καί ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις. δῆλον γάρ ὅτι, ἐάν τοῦτο διαπράξῃ, δυνατός μέν ἔσει αὐτός τυγχάνειν ὅτου ἄν ἐπιθυμῇς, ἱκανός δέ τούς φίλους ὠφελεῖν, ἐπαρεῖς δέ τόν πατρῷον οἶκον, αὐξήσεις δέ τήν πατρίδα, ὀνομαστός δ' ἔσει πρῶτον μέν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἴσως δ', ὥσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς, καί ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις·	Meeting him, he first got him to stop and listen by saying something like this: "Glaucon," he said, "so you've made up your mind to lead our city?" "I have, Socrates," he said. "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "and it's a fine thing, if anything in human life is. Clearly, if you achieve it, you'll be able to get whatever you want for yourself, and to help your friends; you'll raise up your father's house and make your country greater; you'll be famous first in the city, then in Greece, and perhaps, like Themistocles, among the barbarians as well;[15]
3.6.3	ὅπου δ' ἄν ᾖς, πανταχοῦ περίβλεπτος ἔσει. ταῦτ' οὖν ἀκούων ὁ Γλαύκων ἐμεγαλύνετο καί ἡδέως παρέμενε. μετά δέ ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης· Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δῆλον, ὅτι, εἴπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ὠφελητέα σοι ἡ πόλις ἐστί; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Πρός θεῶν, ἔφη, μή τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃ. ἀλλ' εἶπον ἡμῖν ἐκ τίνος ἄρξει τήν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν.	wherever you are, all eyes will be on you." Hearing this, Glaucon swelled with pride and was glad to stay. After that Socrates said, "So this much is clear, isn't it, Glaucon: if you want to be honored, you have to benefit the city?" "Certainly," he said. "Then for the gods' sake," he said, "don't keep it from us, but tell us where you'll start doing good to the city."
3.6.4	ἐπεί δέ ὁ Γλαύκων διεσιώπησεν, ὡς ἄν τότε σκοπῶν ὁπόθεν ἄρχοιτο· ἆρ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ φίλου οἶκον εἰ αὐξῆσαι βούλοιο, πλουσιώτερον αὐτόν ἐπιχειροίης ἄν ποιεῖν, οὕτω καί τήν πόλιν πειράσει πλουσιωτέραν ποιῆσαι;	When Glaucon fell silent, as though he were only now considering where to begin, Socrates said, "If you wanted to build up a friend's household, you'd try to make it richer; in the same way, will you try to make the city richer too?"
3.6.5	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πλουσιωτέρα γ' ἄν εἴη προσόδων αὐτῇ πλειόνων γενομένων; Εἰκός γοῦν, ἔφη. λέξον δή, ἔφη, ἐκ τίνων νῦν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῇ πόλει καί πόσαι τινές εἰσι; δῆλον γάρ ὅτι ἔσκεψαι, ἵνα, εἰ μέν τινες αὐτῶν ἐνδεῶς ἔχουσιν, ἐκπληρώσῃς, εἰ δέ παραλείπονται, προσπορίσῃς. Ἀλλά μά Δί', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἐπέσκεμμαι.	"Certainly," he said. "And it would be richer if it had more revenues?" "That seems likely, anyway," he said. "Then tell us," he said, "where do the city's revenues come from now, and how large are they? Clearly you've looked into it, so that if some of them are falling short you can make them up, and if some are being overlooked you can add them."

14 This Glaucon was Plato's brother; Charmides, son of an elder Glaucon, was their uncle.
15 Themistocles, the victor of Salamis in 480 BC, ended his life honored at the Persian court.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		"No, by Zeus," said Glaucon, "I haven't looked into that."
3.6.6	ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἔφη, παρέλιπες, τάς γε δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν εἰπέ· δῆλον γάρ ὅτι καί τούτων τάς περιττάς ἀφαιρεῖν διανοεῖ. Ἀλλά μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, οὐδέ πρός ταῦτά πω ἐσχόλασα. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τό μέν πλουσιωτέραν τήν πόλιν ποιεῖν ἀναβαλούμεθα· πῶς γάρ οἷόν τε μή εἰδότα γε τά ἀναλώματα καί τάς προσόδους ἐπιμεληθῆναι τούτων;	"Well, if you've left that out," he said, "tell us the city's expenses. Clearly you intend to cut out the unnecessary ones among those too." "No, by Zeus," he said, "I haven't found time for that yet either." "Then we'll put off making the city richer," he said, "since how can someone take care of expenditure and revenue without knowing what they are?"
3.6.7	ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, δυνατόν ἐστι καί ἀπό πολεμίων τήν πόλιν πλουτίζειν. Νή Δία σφόδρα γ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν τις αὐτῶν κρείττων ᾖ· ἥττων δέ ὤν καί τά ὄντα προσαποβάλοι ἄν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.	"But, Socrates," said Glaucon, "it's also possible to make the city rich at the enemy's expense." "Yes, by Zeus, very much so," said Socrates, "if you're stronger than they are; but if you're weaker, you might lose what you have as well." "That's true," he said.
3.6.8	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τόν γε βουλευσόμενον, πρός οὕστινας δεῖ πολεμεῖν, τήν τε τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καί τήν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδέναι δεῖ, ἵνα, ἐάν μέν ἡ τῆς πόλεως κρείττων ᾖ, συμβουλεύῃ ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐάν δέ ἥττων τῶν ἐναντίων, εὐλαβεῖσθαι πείθῃ.	"Then the man who is going to give advice on whom to make war against," he said, "needs to know both the city's strength and the opponents', so that if the city's is greater he can advise taking on the war, and if it's weaker than the opponents', he can persuade people to be cautious."
3.6.9	Ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἔφη. Πρῶτον μέν τοίνυν, ἔφη, λέξον ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως τήν τε πεζικήν καί τήν ναυτικήν δύναμιν, εἶτα τήν τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἀλλά μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἄν ἔχοιμί σοι οὕτω γε ἀπό στόματος εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' εἰ γέγραπταί σοι, ἔνεγκε, ἔφη πάνυ γάρ ἡδέως ἄν τοῦτο ἀκούσαιμι. ἀλλά μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, οὐδέ γέγραπταί μοί πω.	"You're right," he said. "First, then," he said, "tell us the city's land and naval forces, and then the opponents'." "No, by Zeus," he said, "I couldn't tell you offhand, just like that." "Well, if you've got it written down, bring it," he said. "I'd very much like to hear it." "No, by Zeus," he said, "I haven't written it down yet either."
3.6.10	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καί περί πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τήν γε πρώτην ἐπισχήσομεν· ἴσως γάρ καί διά τό μέγεθος αὐτῶν ἄρτι ἀρχόμενος τῆς προστατείας οὔπω ἐξήτακας. ἀλλά τοι περί γε φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας οἶδ' ὅτι ἤδη σοι μεμέληκε καί οἶσθα ὁπόσαι τε φυλακαί ἐπίκαιροί εἰσι καί ὁπόσαι μή, καί ὁπόσοι τε φρουροί ἱκανοί εἰσι καί ὁπόσοι μή εἰσι καί τάς μέν ἐπικαίρους φυλακάς συμβουλεύσεις μείζονας ποιεῖν, τάς δέ περιττάς ἀφαιρεῖν.	"Then we'll hold off on advising about war, at least to begin with," he said. "Perhaps it's because these matters are so large that you haven't examined them yet, just starting out in leadership as you are. But the defense of the country—I'm sure you've already given that some thought, and you know how many guard posts are well placed and how many aren't, and how many guards are enough and how many aren't; and you'll advise strengthening the well-placed posts and doing away with the superfluous ones."
3.6.11	Νή Δί', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ἁπάσας μέν οὖν ἔγωγε, ἕνεκά γε τοῦ οὕτως αὐτάς φυλάττεσθαι ὥστε κλέπτεσθαι τά ἐκ τῆς χώρας. Ἐάν δέ τις ἀφέλῃ γ', ἔφη, τάς φυλακάς, οὐκ οἴει καί ἁρπάζειν ἐξουσίαν ἔσεσθαι τῷ βουλομένῳ; ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερον ἐλθών αὐτός ἐξήτακας τοῦτο, ἤ πῶς οἶσθα ὅτι κακῶς φυλάττονται; Εἰκάζω, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καί περί	"Yes, by Zeus," said Glaucon, "I'd do away with all of them, given the way they're guarded—so that things get stolen from the countryside." "But if someone does away with the guard posts," he said, "don't you think anyone who wants to will be free to plunder openly too? But tell me," he said, "did you go and examine this yourself, or how do you

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούτων, ὅταν μηκέτι εἰκάζωμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη εἰδῶμεν, τότε συμβουλεύσομεν;	know they're badly guarded?" "I'm guessing," he said. "Then on this too we'll give advice when we're no longer guessing but actually know?"
3.6.12	Ἴσως, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, βέλτιον. Εἴς γε μήν, ἔφη, τἀργύρεια οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἀφῖξαι, ὥστ᾽ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν διότι νῦν ἐλάττω ἢ πρόσθεν προσέρχεται αὐτόθεν. Οὐ γάρ οὖν ἐλήλυθα, ἔφη. Καί γάρ νή Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, λέγεται βαρύ τό χωρίον εἶναι, ὥστε, ὅταν περί τούτου δέῃ συμβουλεύειν, αὕτη σοι ἡ πρόφασις ἀρκέσει. Σκώπτομαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.	"Perhaps that would be better," said Glaucon. "As for the silver mines," he said, "I'm sure you haven't been there, so you can't say why less revenue comes in from them now than before." "No, I haven't been," he said. "Just as well, by Zeus," said Socrates. "The place is said to be unhealthy, so when you have to give advice about it, that excuse will serve you." "You're making fun of me," said Glaucon.[16]
3.6.13	ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνου γέ τοι, ἔφη. οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἠμέληκας, ἀλλ᾽ ἔσκεψαι, πόσον χρόνον ἱκανός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σῖτος διατρέφειν τήν πόλιν, καί πόσου εἰς τόν ἐνιαυτόν προσδέεται, ἵνα μή τοῦτό γε λάθῃ σέ ποτε ἡ πόλις ἐνδεής γενομένη, ἀλλ᾽ εἰδώς ἔχῃς ὑπέρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καί σῴζειν αὐτήν. λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, παμμέγεθες πρᾶγμα, εἴ γε καί τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεήσει.	"But this, at least, I'm sure you haven't neglected," he said. "You've looked into how long the grain grown in our country can feed the city, and how much more it needs each year, so that the city never runs short without your noticing, and you can give advice about necessities from knowledge, and come to the city's help and save it." "That's an enormous task you're describing," said Glaucon, "if one is going to have to attend to things like that as well."
3.6.14	ἀλλά μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδ᾽ ἄν τόν ἑαυτοῦ ποτε οἶκον καλῶς τις οἰκήσειεν, εἰ μή πάντα μέν εἴσεται ὧν προσδέεται, πάντων δέ ἐπιμελόμενος ἐκπληρώσει. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεί ἡ μέν πόλις ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ μυρίων οἰκιῶν συνέστηκε, χαλεπόν δ᾽ ἐστίν ἅμα τοσούτων οἴκων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ἕνα τόν τοῦ θείου πρῶτον ἐπειράθης αὐξῆσαι; δέεται δέ. κἄν μέν τοῦτον δύνῃ, καί πλείοσιν ἐπιχειρήσεις· ἕνα δέ μή δυνάμενος ὠφελῆσαι πῶς ἄν πολλούς γε δυνηθείης; ὥσπερ, εἴ τις ἕν τάλαντον μή δύναιτο φέρειν, πῶς οὐ φανερόν ὅτι πλείω γε φέρειν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιχειρητέον αὐτῷ;	"And yet," said Socrates, "no one could run even his own household well unless he knows everything it needs and attends to supplying all of it. But since the city is made up of more than ten thousand households, and it's hard to look after so many at once, why haven't you tried first to build up one, your uncle's? It needs it. If you can manage that one, you can take on more; but if you can't help one, how could you possibly help many? It's like someone who couldn't carry one talent: isn't it obvious he shouldn't even try to carry more?"[17]
3.6.15	ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ὠφελοίην ἄν τόν τοῦ θείου οἶκον, εἴ μοι ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι. Εἶτα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τόν θεῖον οὐ δυνάμενος πείθειν, Ἀθηναίους πάντας μετά τοῦ θείου νομίζεις δυνήσεσθαι ποιῆσαι πείθεσθαί σοι;	"But I would help my uncle's household," said Glaucon, "if he were willing to listen to me." "And then," said Socrates, "when you can't persuade your uncle, you think you'll be able to make all the Athenians, your uncle included, listen to you?"
3.6.16	φυλάττου, ἔφη, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅπως μή τοῦ εὐδοξεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἔλθῃς. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς σφαλερόν ἐστι τό, ἅ μή οἶδέ τις, ταῦτα ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν; ἐνθυμοῦ δέ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσους οἶσθα τοιούτους, οἵοι φαίνονται καί λέγοντες ἅ μή ἴσασι καί πράττοντες, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν	"Be careful, Glaucon," he said, "that in your desire for good repute you don't end up with the opposite. Or don't you see how risky it is to say or do things you don't know about? Think of the others you know who are like that, who are evidently saying and doing things they don't know about: do

16 The state-owned silver mines at Laurium in southern Attica were a major source of Athenian revenue.
17 A talent was a weight of about 26 kilograms (57 pounds), also used as a large unit of money.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐπί τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπαίνου μᾶλλον ἢ ψόγου τυγχάνειν καί πότερον θαυμάζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ καταφρονεῖσθαι·	you think they get more praise or more blame for it, more admiration or more contempt?
3.6.17	ἐνθυμοῦ δέ καί τῶν εἰδότων ὅ τι τε λέγουσι καί ὅ τι ποιοῦσι· καί, ὡς ἐγώ νομίζω, εὑρήσεις ἐν πᾶσιν ἔργοις τούς μέν εὐδοκιμοῦντάς τε καί θαυμαζομένους ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπισταμένων ὄντας, τούς δέ κακοδοξοῦντάς τε καί καταφρονουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἀμαθεστάτων.	"Think too of those who know what they're saying and what they're doing. You'll find, I believe, that in every field of activity those who are well thought of and admired come from among the most knowledgeable, and those with a bad name and held in contempt come from among the most ignorant.
3.6.18	εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς εὐδοκιμεῖν τε καί θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, πειρῶ κατεργάσασθαι ὡς μάλιστα τό εἰδέναι, ἅ βούλει πράττειν· ἐάν γάρ τούτῳ διενεγκών τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιχειρῇς τά τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, οὐκ ἄν θαυμάσαιμι εἰ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως τύχοις ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖς.	"So if you want to be well thought of and admired in the city, try as hard as you can to achieve real knowledge of what you want to do. If you surpass the others in this when you set about handling the city's affairs, I wouldn't be surprised if you got what you desire quite easily."

CHAPTER 7

Socrates urges the able but shy Charmides not to fear speaking before the Assembly.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.7.1	Χαρμίδην δέ τόν Γλαύκωνος ὁρῶν ἀξιόλογον μέν ἄνδρα ὄντα καί πολλῷ δυνατώτερον τῶν τά πολιτικά τότε πραττόντων, ὀκνοῦντα δέ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ καί τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἴ τις, ἱκανός ὤν τούς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας νικᾶν καί διά τοῦτο αὐτός τε τιμᾶσθαι καί τήν πατρίδα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι εὐδοκιμωτέραν ποιεῖν, μή θέλοι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ποῖόν τινα τοῦτον νομίζοις ἄν τόν ἄνδρα εἶναι; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, μαλακόν τε καί δειλόν.	Seeing that Charmides, the son of Glaucon, was a man of note and far more capable than those who were then active in politics, but shrank from coming before the people and taking part in the city's affairs, he said, "Tell me, Charmides, if someone were able to win at the crown games, and so be honored himself and make his country more famous in Greece, but wouldn't compete, what sort of man would you think he was?" "Clearly," he said, "a soft one and a coward."[18]
3.7.2	Εἰ δέ τις, ἔφη, δυνατός ὤν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τήν τε πόλιν αὔξειν καί αὐτός διά τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὀκνοίη δή τοῦτο πράττειν, οὐκ ἄν εἰκότως δειλός νομίζοιτο; Ἴσως, ἔφη· ἀτάρ πρός τί με ταῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς; Ὅτι, ἔφη, οἶμαί σε δυνατόν ὄντα ὀκνεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καί ταῦτα ὢν ἀνάγκη σοι μετέχειν πολίτῃ γε ὄντι.	"And if someone," he said, "were capable of making the city greater by attending to its affairs, and of being honored for it himself, but shrank from doing it, wouldn't he rightly be thought a coward?" "Perhaps," he said, "but why are you asking me this?" "Because," he said, "I think you're capable but shrink from attending to things—and to things you're bound to take part in, as a citizen at any rate."
3.7.3	Τήν δέ ἐμήν δύναμιν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἐν ποίῳ ἔργῳ καταμαθών ταῦτά μου καταγιγνώσκεις; Ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἔφη. ἅς σύνει τοῖς τά τῆς πόλεως πράττουσι· καί γάρ ὅταν τι ἀνακοινῶνταί σοι, ὁρῶ σε καλῶς συμβουλεύοντα, καί ὅταν τι ἁμαρτάνωσιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντα.	"And in what activity," said Charmides, "did you observe this capability of mine, that you pass such a judgment on me?" "In your meetings," he said, "with the men who handle the city's affairs. Whenever they consult you about something, I see

18 The crown games were the great festivals, such as the Olympic and Pythian, where the prize was a wreath.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		you giving good advice, and whenever they make a mistake, criticizing them rightly."
3.7.4	Οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἰδίᾳ τε διαλέγεσθαι καί ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Καί μήν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ἀριθμεῖν δυνάμενος οὐδέν ἧττον ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἢ μόνος ἀριθμεῖ, καί οἱ κατά μόνας ἄριστα κιθαρίζοντες οὗτοι καί ἐν τῷ πλήθει κρατιστεύουσιν.	"It's not the same thing, Socrates," he said, "to talk in private and to contend in front of the crowd." "And yet," he said, "a man who can count counts no worse in a crowd than alone, and those who play the lyre best on their own are the best in front of a crowd too."
3.7.5	Αἰδῶ δέ καί φόβον, ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἔμφυτά τε ἀνθρώποις ὄντα καί πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὁμιλίαις παριστάμενα; Καί σέ γε διδάξων, ἔφη, ὥρμημαι, ὅτι οὔτε τούς φρονιμωτάτους αἰδούμενος οὔτε τούς ἰσχυροτάτους φοβούμενος ἐν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τε καί ἀσθενεστάτοις αἰσχύνει λέγειν.	"But don't you see," he said, "that shame and fear are inborn in people, and come over them much more in crowds than in private company?" And he said: That is just what I've set out to show you. You aren't ashamed before the wisest or afraid of the strongest, and yet you're ashamed to speak in front of the most foolish and the weakest.
3.7.6	**SOCRATES** πότερον γάρ τούς γναφεῖς αὐτῶν ἤ τούς σκυτεῖς ἤ τούς τέκτονας ἤ τούς χαλκεῖς ἤ τούς γεωργούς ἤ τούς ἐμπόρους ἤ τούς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μεταβαλλομένους καί φροντίζοντας ὅ τι ἐλάττονος πριάμενοι πλείονος ἀποδῶνται αἰσχύνει; ἐκ γάρ τούτων ἁπάντων ἡ ἐκκλησία συνίσταται.	**SOCRATES** Which of them are you ashamed of—the fullers, the cobblers, the carpenters, the smiths, the farmers, the merchants, or the people in the marketplace who trade and think about how to buy cheap and sell dear? These are all the people the Assembly is made of.
3.7.7	τί δέ οἴει διαφέρειν ὅ σύ ποιεῖς ἤ τῶν ἀσκητῶν ὄντα κρείττω τούς ἰδιώτας φοβεῖσθαι; σύ γάρ τοῖς πρωτεύουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὧν ἔνιοι καταφρονοῦσί σου, ῥᾳδίως διαλεγόμενος καί τῶν ἐπιμελομένων τοῦ τῇ πόλει διαλέγεσθαι πολύ περιών ἐν τοῖς μηδεπώποτε φροντίσασι τῶν πολιτικῶν μηδέ σοῦ καταπεφρονηκόσιν ὀκνεῖς λέγειν, δεδιώς μή καταγελασθῇς.	How do you think what you're doing differs from a man who is better than the trained athletes being afraid of amateurs? You talk easily with the leading men in the city, some of whom look down on you, and you're far ahead of those who make a business of addressing the city; yet among people who have never given a thought to politics, and have never looked down on you, you shrink from speaking for fear of being laughed at.
3.7.8	Τί δ'; ἔφη, οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλάκις οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν ὀρθῶς λεγόντων καταγελᾶν; Καί γάρ οἱ ἕτεροι, ἔφη διό καί θαυμάζω σου, εἰ, ἐκείνους, ὅταν τοῦτο ποιῶσι, ῥᾳδίως χειρούμενος, τούτοις μηδένα τρόπον οἴει δυνήσεσθαι προσενεχθῆναι.	"What?" he said. "Don't you think the people in the Assembly often laugh at those who speak rightly?" And he said: So do the others. That's why I'm surprised at you: you handle those men easily when they do it, yet you think you won't be able to deal with these people in any way at all.
3.7.9	**SOCRATES** ὠγαθέ, μή ἀγνόει σεαυτόν, μηδέ ἁμάρτανε ἅ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνουσιν· οἱ γάρ πολλοί ὡρμηκότες ἐπί τό σκοπεῖν τά τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα οὐ τρέπονται ἐπί τό ἑαυτούς ἐξετάζειν. μή οὖν ἀπορρᾳθύμει τούτου, ἀλλά διατείνου μᾶλλον πρός τό σαυτῷ προσέχειν. καί μή ἀμέλει τῶν τῆς πόλεως, εἴ τι δυνατόν ἐστι διά σέ βέλτιον ἔχειν· τούτων γάρ καλῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται, ἀλλά καί οἱ σοί φίλοι καί αὐτός σύ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα ὠφελήσει.	**SOCRATES** My good man, don't be ignorant of yourself, and don't make the mistake most people make. Most people are eager to look into other people's affairs and never turn to examining themselves. So don't shirk this; strain all the harder to pay attention to yourself. And don't neglect the city's affairs, if there's anything that can be made better through you. If they go well, not only the other citizens but your friends and you yourself will benefit, and not a little.

CHAPTER 8

Socrates answers Aristippus' trick questions about the good and the beautiful, and describes a well-built house.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.8.1	Ἀριστίππου δέ ἐπιχειροῦντος ἐλέγχειν τόν Σωκράτη, ὥσπερ αὐτός ὑπ' ἐκείνου τό πρότερον ἠλέγχετο, βουλόμενος τούς συνόντας ὠφελεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀπεκρίνατο οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ φυλαττόμενοι μή πῃ ὁ λόγος ἐπαλλαχθῇ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄν πεπεισμένος μάλιστα πράττειν τά δέοντα.	When Aristippus tried to refute Socrates, just as he himself had earlier been refuted by him, Socrates wanted to benefit those who were with him. So he answered not like people who are on their guard in case their argument gets twisted somewhere, but like a man fully convinced that he was doing what he should.
3.8.2	ὁ μέν γάρ αὐτόν ἤρετο, εἴ τι εἰδείη ἀγαθόν, ἵνα, εἴ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἤ σιτίον ἤ ποτόν ἤ χρήματα ἤ ὑγίειαν ἤ ῥώμην ἤ τόλμαν, δεικνύοι δή τοῦτο κακόν ἐνίοτε ὄν. ὁ δέ εἰδώς, ὅτι, ἐάν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τοῦ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο ᾗπερ καί ποιεῖν κράτιστον·	Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything good. His plan was that if Socrates named any such thing, like food or drink or money or health or strength or daring, he would show that it was sometimes bad. But Socrates knew that when something troubles us, we need whatever will put a stop to it, and he answered in the way that it is actually best to act:
3.8.3	ἆρά γε, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμίας; Οὐδέ τοῦτο. ἀλλά λιμοῦ; Οὐδέ λιμοῦ. Ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γ' ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι ἀγαθόν οἶδα ὅ μηδενός ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὔτ' οἶδα, ἔφη, οὔτε δέομαι.	"Are you asking me," he said, "whether I know of anything good for a fever?" "No, I'm not," he said. "For sore eyes, then?" "Not that either." "For hunger?" "Not for hunger either." "Well then," he said, "if you're asking me whether I know of anything good that isn't good for anything, I don't know of one," he said, "and I don't need one."
3.8.4	Πάλιν δέ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἐρωτῶντος αὐτόν, εἴ τι εἰδείη καλόν· Καί πολλά, ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, πάντα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις; Ὡς οἷόν τε μέν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τό τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον καλόν ἄν εἴη; Ὅτι νή Δί', ἔφη, ἔστι μέν τῷ καλῷ πρός δρόμον ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος καλός πρός πάλην, ἔστι δέ ἀσπίς καλή πρός τό προβάλλεσθαι ὡς ἔνι ἀνομοιοτάτη τῷ ἀκοντίῳ, καλῷ πρός τό σφόδρα τε καί ταχύ φέρεσθαι.	Another time Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful. "Yes, many things," he said. "Then are they all like one another?" he asked. "Far from it. Some are as unlike as they can possibly be." "Then how," he said, "could something unlike the beautiful be beautiful?" "Why, by Zeus," he said, "because there's a man who is beautiful for running, and another, unlike him, who is beautiful for wrestling. And there's a shield, beautiful for protecting you, which is as unlike as can be to the javelin, beautiful for flying hard and fast."
3.8.5	Οὐδέν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνει μοι ἤ ὅτε σε ἠρώτησα εἴ τι ἀγαθόν εἰδείης. Σύ δ' οἴει, ἔφη, ἄλλο μέν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δέ καλόν εἶναι; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι πρός ταὐτά πάντα καλά τε κἀγαθά ἐστι; πρῶτον μέν γάρ ἡ ἀρετή οὐ πρός ἄλλα μέν ἀγαθόν, πρός ἄλλα δέ καλόν ἐστιν, ἔπειτα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τό αὐτό τε καί πρός τά αὐτά καλοί τε κἀγαθοί λέγονται, πρός τά αὐτά δέ καί τά σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλά τε κἀγαθά φαίνεται, πρός ταὐτά δέ καί τἆλλα πάντα	"That's no different," he said, "from the answer you gave me when I asked whether you knew of anything good." "Do you think," he said, "that the good is one thing and the beautiful another? Don't you know that everything is beautiful and good with respect to the same things? First, excellence isn't good with respect to some things and beautiful with respect to others. Then, people are called 'beautiful and good' in the same sense and with re-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	οἷς ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται καλά τε κἀγαθά νομίζεται, πρός ἅπερ ἄν εὔχρηστα ᾖ.	spect to the same things. People's bodies, too, look beautiful and good with respect to the same things. And everything else people use is considered beautiful and good with respect to the same things: whatever it is well suited for."
3.8.6	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καί κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλόν ἐστι; Νή Δί', ἔφη, καί χρυσῆ γε ἀσπίς αἰσχρόν, ἐάν πρός τά ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ὁ μέν καλῶς πεποιημένος ᾖ, ἡ δέ κακῶς. λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καλά τε καί αἰσχρά τά αὐτά εἶναι;	"So is a dung basket beautiful too?" he asked. "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "and a golden shield is ugly, if for their own jobs the one is well made and the other badly." "Are you saying," he said, "that the same things are both beautiful and ugly?"
3.8.7	Καί νή Δί' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀγαθά τε καί κακά· πολλάκις γάρ τό τε λιμοῦ ἀγαθόν πυρετοῦ κακόν ἐστι καί τό πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν λιμοῦ κακόν ἐστι πολλάκις δέ τό μέν πρός δρόμον καλόν πρός πάλην αἰσχρόν, τό δέ πρός πάλην καλόν πρός δρόμον αἰσχρόν· πάντα γάρ ἀγαθά μέν καί καλά ἐστι πρός ἅ ἄν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακά δέ καί αἰσχρά πρός ἅ ἄν κακῶς.	"Yes, by Zeus, I am," he said, "and good and bad too. Often what is good for hunger is bad for a fever, and what is good for a fever is bad for hunger. Often what is beautiful for running is ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wrestling is ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful with respect to what they are well suited for, and bad and ugly with respect to what they are badly suited for."
3.8.8	Καί οἰκίας δέ λέγων τάς αὐτάς καλάς τε εἶναι καί χρησίμους παιδεύειν ἔμοιγ' ἐδόκει, οἵας χρή, οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. ἐπεσκόπει δέ ὧδε· ἆρά γε τόν μέλλοντα οἰκίαν, οἵαν χρή, ἔχειν τοῦτο δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἡδίστη τε ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι καί χρησιμωτάτη ἔσται;	And when he said that the same houses are both beautiful and useful, he seemed to me to be teaching how houses ought to be built. He went about examining it like this: "Shouldn't someone who means to have the house he ought to have contrive to make it as pleasant to live in and as useful as possible?"
3.8.9	τούτου δέ ὁμολογουμένου· Οὐκοῦν ἡδύ μέν θέρους ψυχεινήν ἔχειν, ἡδύ δέ χειμῶνος ἀλεεινήν; ἐπειδή δέ καί τοῦτο συμφαῖεν· Οὐκοῦν ἐν ταῖς πρός μεσημβρίαν βλεπούσαις οἰκίαις τοῦ μέν χειμῶνος ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τάς παστάδας ὑπολάμπει, τοῦ δέ θέρους ὑπέρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καί τῶν στεγῶν πορευόμενος σκιάν παρέχει. οὐκοῦν, εἴ γε καλῶς ἔχει ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεσθαι, οἰκοδομεῖν δεῖ ὑψηλότερα μέν τά πρός μεσημβρίαν, ἵνα ὁ χειμερινός ἥλιος μή ἀποκλείηται, χθαμαλώτερα δέ τά πρός ἄρκτον, ἵνα οἱ ψυχροί μή ἐμπίπτωσιν ἄνεμοι.	When this was agreed: "So it's pleasant to have it cool in summer and warm in winter?" And when they agreed to this too: "Now in houses that face south, the winter sun shines in under the porches, while in summer it passes right over our heads and over the roofs and gives shade. So if it's good for things to happen this way, you should build the south side higher, so that the winter sun isn't shut out, and the north side lower, so that the cold winds don't blow in."
3.8.10	ὡς δέ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅποι πάσας ὥρας αὐτός τε ἄν ἥδιστα καταφεύγοι καί τά ὄντα ἀσφαλέστατα τιθοῖτο, αὕτη ἄν εἰκότως ἡδίστη τε καί καλλίστη οἴκησις εἴη. γραφαί δέ καί ποικιλίαι πλείονας εὐφροσύνας ἀποστεροῦσιν ἤ παρέχουσι. ναοῖς γε μήν καί βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη· ἡδύ μέν γάρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἡδύ δέ ἁγνῶς ἔχοντας προσιέναι.	To sum it up, the place where the owner could most pleasantly take refuge in every season, and where he could store his possessions most safely, would reasonably be the most pleasant and the most beautiful dwelling. Paintings and ornate decoration take away more enjoyment than they provide. For temples and altars, he said, the most fitting site was the one that was most conspicuous and least trodden. It's pleasant to pray as you

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		catch sight of them, and pleasant to approach them in a state of purity.

CHAPTER 9

Socrates gives his views on courage, wisdom, madness, envy, leisure, true rulers and doing well.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.9.1	Πάλιν δέ ἐρωτώμενος ἡ ἀνδρεία πότερον εἴη διδακτόν ἤ φυσικόν· Οἶμαι μέν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον πρός τούς πόνους φύεται, οὕτω καί ψυχήν ψυχῆς ἐρρωμενεστέραν πρός τά δεινά φύσει γίγνεσθαι· ὁρῶ γάρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις τε καί ἔθεσι τρεφομένους πολύ διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τόλμῃ.	Another time he was asked whether courage could be taught or came by nature. "I think," he said, "that just as one body is born stronger than another for hard work, so one soul is by nature sturdier than another in the face of danger. For I see people brought up under the same laws and customs differing greatly from one another in daring.
3.9.2	νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καί μελέτῃ πρός ἀνδρείαν αὔξεσθαι· δῆλον μέν γάρ ὅτι Σκύθαι καί Θρᾷκες οὐκ ἄν τολμήσειαν ἀσπίδας καί δόρατα λαβόντες Λακεδαιμονίοις διαμάχεσθαι· φανερόν δ' ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτ' ἄν Θρᾳξί πέλταις καί ἀκοντίοις οὔτε Σκύθαις τόξοις ἐθέλοιεν ἄν διαγωνίζεσθαι.	"Still, I believe that every nature grows in courage through learning and practice. It's clear that Scythians and Thracians wouldn't dare to take up shields and spears and fight it out with Spartans. And it's obvious that Spartans wouldn't be willing to compete with Thracians using light shields and javelins, or with Scythians using bows.
3.9.3	ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καί ἐπί τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως καί φύσει διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τούς ἀνθρώπους καί ἐπιμελείᾳ πολύ ἐπιδιδόντας. ἐκ δέ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πάντας χρή καί τούς εὐφυεστέρους καί τούς ἀμβλυτέρους τήν φύσιν, ἐν οἷς ἄν ἀξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καί μανθάνειν καί μελετᾶν.	"And I see the same in everything else too: people differ from one another by nature, and they improve a great deal through application. From this it is clear that everyone, the more gifted and the duller by nature alike, should learn and practice whatever they want to become notable at."
3.9.4	Σοφίαν δέ καί σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλά τῷ τά μέν καλά τε κἀγαθά γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καί τῷ τά αἰσχρά εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καί σώφρονα ἔκρινε. προσερωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τούς ἐπισταμένους μέν ἅ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δέ τἀναντία σοφούς τε καί ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι· Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἤ ἀσόφους τε καί ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γάρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἅ οἴονται συμφορώτατα αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν· νομίζω οὖν τούς μή ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφούς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι.	He did not distinguish wisdom from moderation. Someone who recognized what is fine and good and made use of it, and who knew what is shameful and guarded against it, he judged to be both wise and sensible. When he was further asked whether he thought that people who know what they ought to do but do the opposite are wise and uncontrolled, "No more," he said, "than I think them unwise and uncontrolled. For I believe that everyone chooses, out of the courses open to them, what they think is most advantageous to themselves, and does that. So I hold that those who don't act rightly are neither wise nor sensible."
3.9.5	ἔφη δέ καί τήν δικαιοσύνην καί τήν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετήν σοφίαν εἶναι. τά τε γάρ δίκαια καί πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλά τε κἀγαθά εἶναι· καί οὔτ' ἄν τούς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντί τούτων οὐδέν προελέσθαι οὔτε τούς μή ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλά καί ἐάν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν· οὕτω [καὶ] τά καλά τε κἀγαθά	He said that justice, too, and all the rest of excellence is wisdom. Just actions, and everything done through excellence, are fine and good. Those who know these things would never choose anything else instead of them, and those who don't understand them can't do them, and even if they try,

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τούς μέν σοφούς πράττειν, τούς δέ μή σοφούς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλά καί ἐάν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐπεί οὖν τά τε δίκαια καί τἆλλα καλά τε κἀγαθά πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καί δικαιοσύνη καί ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετή σοφία ἐστί.	they go wrong. So [too] the wise do what is fine and good, while those who aren't wise can't, and even if they try, they go wrong. Since, then, just actions and all other fine and good actions are done through excellence, it is clear that justice and all the rest of excellence is wisdom.
3.9.6	μανίαν γε μήν ἐναντίον μέν ἔφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γε τήν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε· τό δέ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν καί, ἅ μή οἶδε, δοξάζειν τε καί οἴεσθαι γιγνώσκειν ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι. τούς μέντοι πολλούς ἔφη, ἅ μέν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀγνοοῦσι, τούς διημαρτηκότας τούτων οὐ φάσκειν μαίνεσθαι, τούς δέ διημαρτηκότας ὧν οἱ πολλοί γιγνώσκουσι μαινομένους καλεῖν·	Madness, he said, was the opposite of wisdom. Yet he did not consider ignorance madness. But not knowing oneself, and supposing and believing that one knows what one doesn't, he reckoned to be very close to madness. Most people, he said, don't call someone mad who is mistaken about things that most people don't know. It is someone mistaken about things most people do know that they call mad:
3.9.7	ἐάν τε γάρ τις μέγας οὕτως οἴηται εἶναι ὥστε κύπτειν τάς πύλας τοῦ τείχους διεξιών, ἐάν τε οὕτως ἰσχυρός ὥστ' ἐπιχειρεῖν οἰκίας αἴρεσθαι ἤ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἐπιθέσθαι τῶν πᾶσι δήλων ὅτι ἀδύνατά ἐστι, τοῦτον μαίνεσθαι φάσκειν τούς δέ μικρόν διαμαρτάνοντας οὐ δοκεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς μαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ τήν ἰσχυράν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔρωτα καλοῦσιν, οὕτω καί τήν μεγάλην παράνοιαν μανίαν αὐτούς καλεῖν.	for if someone thinks he's so tall that he stoops when he passes through the gates in the city wall, or so strong that he tries to lift houses or attempts anything else that everyone can see is impossible, they say he is mad. Those who are only slightly wrong don't seem mad to most people. Rather, just as they call a strong desire "love," so they call a great derangement "madness."
3.9.8	Φθόνον δέ σκοπῶν, ὅ τι εἴη, λύπην μέν τινα ἐξηύρισκεν αὐτόν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι τήν ἐπί φίλων ἀτυχίαις οὔτε τήν ἐπ' ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην, ἀλλά μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τούς ἐπί ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. θαυμαζόντων δέ τινων εἴ τις φιλῶν τινα ἐπί τῇ εὐπραξίᾳ αὐτοῦ λυποῖτο, ὑπεμίμνῃσκεν, ὅτι πολλοί οὕτω πρός τινας ἔχουσιν, ὥστε κακῶς μέν πράττοντας μή δύνασθαι περιορᾶν, ἀλλά βοηθεῖν ἀτυχοῦσιν, εὐτυχούντων δέ λυπεῖσθαι. τοῦτο μέντοι φρονίμῳ μέν ἀνδρί οὐκ ἄν συμβῆναι, τούς ἠλιθίους δέ ἀεί πάσχειν αὐτό.	When he examined what envy was, he found it to be a kind of pain. It was not, however, the pain we feel at our friends' misfortunes or at our enemies' good fortune. The only envious people, he said, are those who are distressed at their friends' successes. When some people were surprised that anyone who cared for someone could be pained at his success, he reminded them that many people are so disposed toward certain others that they can't stand by when they are doing badly, but help them in their misfortunes, and yet are pained when they prosper. This, though, would not happen to a man of understanding. It is fools who always suffer from it.
3.9.9	Σχολήν δέ σκοπῶν, τί εἴη, ποιοῦντας μέν τι τούς πλείστους εὑρίσκειν ἔφη· καί γάρ τούς πεττεύοντας καί τούς γελωτοποιοῦντας ποιεῖν τι πάντας δέ τούτους ἔφη σχολάζειν· ἐξεῖναι γάρ αὐτοῖς ἰέναι πράξοντας τά βελτίω τούτων. ἀπό μέντοι τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπί τά χείρω ἰέναι οὐδένα σχολάζειν· εἰ δέ τις ἴοι, τοῦτον ἀσχολίας αὐτῷ οὔσης κακῶς ἔφη τοῦτο πράττειν.	When he examined what leisure was, he said he found that most people are doing something. Even people playing board games and people clowning around are doing something. And yet all of these, he said, are at leisure, since they are free to go and do something better than this. No one, though, has leisure to go from better things to worse. And if anyone did, he said, he was doing wrong, since he had no time to spare for it.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.9.10	Βασιλεῖς δέ καί ἄρχοντας οὐ τούς τά σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι οὐδέ τούς ὑπό τῶν τυχόντων αἱρεθέντας οὐδέ τούς κλήρῳ λαχόντας οὐδέ τούς βιασαμένους οὐδέ τούς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλά τούς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν.	Kings and rulers, he said, are not the people who hold scepters, or the people chosen by whoever happens along, or the people appointed by lot, or the people who have used force or deceit. They are the people who know how to rule.
3.9.11	ὁπότε γάρ τις ὁμολογήσειε τοῦ μέν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τό προστάττειν ὅ τι χρή ποιεῖν, τοῦ δέ ἀρχομένου τό πείθεσθαι, ἐπεδείκνυεν ἔν τε νηί τόν μέν ἐπιστάμενον ἄρχοντα, τόν δέ ναύκληρον καί τούς ἄλλους τούς ἐν τῇ νηί πάντας πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ, καί ἐν γεωργίᾳ τούς κεκτημένους ἀγρούς, καί ἐν νόσῳ τούς νοσοῦντας, καί ἐν σωμασκίᾳ τούς σωμασκοῦντας, καί τούς ἄλλους πάντας οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον, ἄν μέν αὐτοί ἡγῶνται ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εἰ δέ μή, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις οὐ μόνον παροῦσι πειθομένους, ἀλλά καί ἀπόντας μεταπεμπομένους, ὅπως ἐκείνοις πειθόμενοι τά δέοντα πράττωσιν· ἐν δέ ταλασίᾳ καί τάς γυναῖκας ἐπεδείκνυεν ἀρχούσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν διά τό τάς μέν εἰδέναι ὅπως χρή ταλασιουργεῖν, τούς δέ μή εἰδέναι.	For whenever someone agreed that it is the ruler's part to order what should be done and the subject's part to obey, he would point out that on a ship the one who knows how rules, while the shipowner and everyone else on board obey the one who knows. The same goes for landowners in farming, for the sick in illness, for people in training, in physical exercise, and for everyone else who has something that needs care. If they think they know how to take care of it themselves, they do so. If not, they obey those who know, not only when these are present, but they even send for them when they are away, so that by obeying them they may do what is needed. And in wool-spinning, he pointed out, women actually rule men, because they know how to work wool and the men don't.
3.9.12	εἰ δέ τις πρός ταῦτα λέγοι, ὅτι τῷ τυράννῳ ἔξεστι μή πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγουσι· Καί πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξείη μή πείθεσθαι, ἐπικειμένης γε ζημίας, ἐάν τις τῷ εὖ λέγοντι μή πείθηται; ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἄν τις πράγματι μή πείθηται τῷ εὖ λέγοντι, ἁμαρτήσεται δήπου, ἁμαρτάνων δέ ζημιωθήσεται.	If someone objected that a tyrant is free not to obey those who give him good advice, "And how," he said, "could he be free not to obey, when a penalty lies in store if anyone fails to obey the person who speaks well? In whatever matter someone fails to obey good advice, he will surely go wrong, and when he goes wrong, he will pay the penalty."
3.9.13	εἰ δέ φαίη τις τῷ τυράννῳ ἐξεῖναι καί ἀποκτεῖναι τόν εὖ φρονοῦντα· Τόν δέ ἀποκτείναντα, ἔφη, τούς κρατίστους τῶν συμμάχων οἴει ἀζήμιον γίγνεσθαι ἤ ὡς ἔτυχε ζημιοῦσθαι; πότερα γάρ ἄν μᾶλλον οἴει σῴζεσθαι τόν τοῦτο ποιοῦντα ἤ οὕτω καί τάχιστ' ἄν ἀπολέσθαι;	And if someone said that a tyrant is free even to put a man of good sense to death, "Do you think," he said, "that someone who puts to death the best of his allies goes unpunished, or gets off with some trivial penalty? Do you think a man who does this is more likely to survive, or to come to ruin, and very quickly at that?"
3.9.14	Ἐρομένου δέ τινος αὐτόν, τί δοκοίη αὐτῷ κράτιστον ἀνδρί ἐπιτήδευμα εἶναι, ἀπεκρίνατο εὐπραξίαν. ἐρομένου δέ πάλιν, εἰ καί τήν εὐτυχίαν ἐπιτήδευμα νομίζοι εἶναι· Πᾶν μέν οὖν τοὐναντίον ἔγωγ', ἔφη, τύχην καί πρᾶξιν ἡγοῦμαι· τό μέν γάρ μή ζητοῦντα ἐπιτυχεῖν τινι τῶν δεόντων εὐτυχίαν οἶμαι εἶναι, τό δέ μαθόντα τε καί μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν εὐπραξίαν νομίζω, καί οἱ τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεύοντες δοκοῦσί μοι εὖ πράττειν.	When someone asked him what he thought was the best pursuit for a man, he answered, "Doing well." Asked again whether he thought good luck was a pursuit too, "I think luck and doing are complete opposites," he said. "Hitting on something you need without looking for it is what I think good luck is. But doing something well after learning and practicing it is what I call doing well, and the people who pursue this seem to me to do well."
3.9.15		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καί ἀρίστους δέ καί θεοφιλεστάτους ἔφη εἶναι ἐν μέν γεωργίᾳ τούς τά γεωργικά εὖ πράττοντας, ἐν δ' ἰατρείᾳ τούς τά ἰατρικά, ἐν δέ πολιτείᾳ τούς τά πολιτικά· τόν δέ μηδέν εὖ πράττοντα οὔτε χρήσιμον οὐδέν ἔφη εἶναι οὔτε θεοφιλῆ.	And he said that the best people and the dearest to the gods are, in farming, those who do the work of farming well; in medicine, those who do medical work well; in politics, those who do political work well. But someone who does nothing well, he said, is neither useful for anything nor dear to the gods.

CHAPTER 10

Socrates talks with a painter, a sculptor and an armorer about portraying character and making things fit.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.10.1	ἀλλά μήν καί εἴ ποτε τῶν τάς τέχνας ἐχόντων καί ἐργασίας ἕνεκα χρωμένων αὐταῖς διαλέγοιτό τινι, καί τούτοις ὠφέλιμος ἦν. εἰσελθών μέν γάρ ποτε πρός Παρράσιον τόν ζωγράφον καί διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ· ἆρα, ἔφη, ὦ Παρράσιε, ἡ γραφική ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων; τά γοῦν κοῖλα καί τά ὑψηλά καί τά σκοτεινά καί τά φωτεινά καί τά σκληρά καί τά μαλακά καί τά τραχέα καί τά λεῖα καί τά νέα καί τά παλαιά σώματα διά τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε.	Moreover, whenever he conversed with any of those who had crafts and practiced them for a living, he was useful to them too. Once, for instance, he visited Parrhasius the painter, and in conversation with him he said, "Parrhasius, isn't painting a representation of the things we see? At any rate, you painters use your colors to reproduce bodies hollow and raised, dark and bright, hard and soft, rough and smooth, young and old, and you imitate them."[19]
3.10.2	ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Καί μήν τά γε καλά εἴδη ἀφομοιοῦντες, ἐπειδή οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἑνί ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἄμεμπτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες τά ἐξ ἑκάστου κάλλιστα οὕτως ὅλα τά σώματα καλά ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι.	"That's true," he said. "And when you portray beautiful figures, since it isn't easy to come across a single person who is flawless in every respect, you bring together from many people the most beautiful features of each, and that's how you make whole bodies look beautiful."
3.10.3	Ποιοῦμεν γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, τό πιθανώτατον καί ἥδιστον καί φιλικώτατον καί ποθεινότατον καί ἐρασμιώτατον ἀπομιμεῖσθε τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος; ἢ οὐδέ μιμητόν ἐστι τοῦτο; Πῶς γάρ ἄν, ἔφη, μιμητόν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ μήτε συμμετρίαν μήτε χρῶμα μήτε ὧν σύ εἶπας ἄρτι μηδέν ἔχει μηδέ ὅλως ὁρατόν ἐστιν;	"Yes, that's what we do," he said. "Well then," he said, "do you also reproduce the character of the soul, at its most winning, most pleasant, most friendly, most longed for, and most lovable? Or can't that even be imitated?" "How could it be imitated, Socrates," he said, "when it has no proportion and no color, none of the things you just mentioned, and isn't visible at all?"
3.10.4	ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, γίγνεται ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τό τε φιλοφρόνως καί τό ἐχθρῶς βλέπειν πρός τινας; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε μιμητόν ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Ἐπί δέ τοῖς τῶν φίλων ἀγαθοῖς καί τοῖς κακοῖς ὁμοίως σοι δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν τά πρόσωπα οἵ τε φροντίζοντες καί οἱ μή; Μά Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἐπί μέν γάρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φαιδροί, ἐπί δέ τοῖς κακοῖς σκυθρωποί γίγνονται. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καί ταῦτα δυνατόν ἀπεικάζειν	"Well, doesn't a person look at some people kindly and at others with hostility?" "I think so," he said. "Then can't that at least be imitated in the eyes?" "Certainly," he said. "And when their friends fare well or badly, do you think people who care and people who don't have the same expression on their faces?" "No, by Zeus, not at all," he said. "When things go well they look radiant, and when things go badly they look gloomy." "So these can be represented too?" he said.

19 Parrhasius of Ephesus was among the most celebrated painters of the late fifth century BC.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.10.5	Καί μάλα, ἔφη. ἀλλά μήν καί τό μεγαλοπρεπές τε καί ἐλευθέριον καί τό ταπεινόν τε καί ἀνελεύθερον καί τό σωφρονικόν τε καί φρόνιμον καί τό ὑβριστικόν τε καί ἀπειρόκαλον καί διά τοῦ προσώπου καί διά τῶν σχημάτων καί ἑστώτων καί κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί ταῦτα μιμητά; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις ἥδιον ὁρᾶν τούς ἀνθρώπους δι' ὧν τά καλά τε κἀγαθά καί ἀγαπητά ἤθη φαίνεται ἤ δι' ὧν τά αἰσχρά τε καί πονηρά καί μισητά; Πολύ νή Δί', ἔφη, διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες.	"Certainly," he said. "And then nobility and generosity, meanness and servility, moderation and understanding, insolence and vulgarity all show through in people's faces and in their postures, whether they're standing still or moving." "That's true," he said. "So these can be imitated too?" "Certainly," he said. "Then which do you think it is more pleasant to look at: people through whom fine, good, and lovable characters show, or people through whom shameful, wicked, and hateful ones do?" "By Zeus, Socrates," he said, "there's a big difference."
3.10.6	Πρός δέ Κλείτωνα τόν ἀνδριαντοποιόν εἰσελθών ποτε καί διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ· Ὅτι μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Κλείτων, καλοί, οὕς ποιεῖς δρομεῖς τε καί παλαιστάς καί πύκτας καί παγκρατιαστάς, ὁρῶ τε καί οἶδα· ὅ δέ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διά τῆς ὄψεως τούς ἀνθρώπους, τό ζωτικόν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζει τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσιν;	Once he visited Clito the sculptor, and in conversation with him he said, "Clito, I can see, and I know, that the runners and wrestlers and boxers and pankration fighters you make are beautiful. But the thing that most captivates people through their eyes, the look of being alive—how do you work that into your statues?"
3.10.7	ἐπεί δέ ἀπορῶν ὁ Κλείτων οὐ ταχύ ἀπεκρίνατο· ἆρ', ἔφη, τοῖς τῶν ζώντων εἴδεσιν ἀπεικάζων τό ἔργον ζωτικωτέρους ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι τούς ἀνδριάντας; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τά τε ὑπό τῶν σχημάτων κατασπώμενα καί τἀνασπώμενα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι καί τά συμπιεζόμενα καί τά διελκόμενα καί τά ἐντεινόμενα καί τά ἀνιέμενα ἀπεικάζων ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καί πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι;	When Clito was at a loss and didn't answer quickly, he said, "Is it by modeling your work on the figures of living people that you make your statues look more alive?" "Certainly," he said. "So by reproducing the parts of the body that the postures pull down and pull up, squeeze together and draw apart, stretch tight and let go slack, you make them look more like the real thing and more convincing?"
3.10.8	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Τό δέ καί τά πάθη τῶν ποιούντων τι σωμάτων ἀπομιμεῖσθαι οὐ ποιεῖ τινα τέρψιν τοῖς θεωμένοις; Εἰκός γοῦν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί τῶν μέν μαχομένων ἀπειλητικά τά ὄμματα ἀπεικαστέον, τῶν δέ νενικηκότων εὐφραινομένων ἡ ὄψις μιμητέα; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. δεῖ ἄρα, ἔφη, τόν ἀνδριαντοποιόν τά ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ εἴδει προσεικάζειν.	"Very much so," he said. "And doesn't reproducing the feelings of bodies in action give the viewers a certain delight?" "It's likely, at any rate," he said. "Then the eyes of fighters should be made menacing, and the look of victors in their joy should be imitated?" "Absolutely," he said. "So," he said, "the sculptor must represent the workings of the soul in the figure."
3.10.9	Πρός δέ Πιστίαν τόν θωρακοποιόν εἰσελθών, ἐπιδείξαντος αὐτοῦ τῷ Σωκράτει θώρακας εὖ εἰργασμένους Νή τήν Ἥραν, ἔφη, καλόν γε, ὦ Πιστία, τό εὕρημα τό τά μέν δεόμενα σκέπης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σκεπάζειν τόν θώρακα, ταῖς δέ χερσί μή κωλύειν χρῆσθαι.	When he visited Pistias the breastplate maker, and Pistias showed Socrates some well-made breastplates, he said, "By Hera, Pistias, the breastplate is a fine invention: it covers the parts of a person that need protection without keeping him from using his hands.
3.10.10	ἀτάρ, ἔφη, λέξον μοι, ὦ Πιστία, διά τί οὔτ' ἰσχυροτέρους οὔτε πολυτελεστέρους τῶν ἄλλων ποιῶν τούς θώρακας πλείονος πωλεῖς Ὅτι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὐρυθμοτέρους ποιῶ. Τόν δέ ῥυθμόν, ἔφη, πότερα μέτρῳ ἤ σταθμῷ	"But tell me, Pistias," he said, "why do you sell your breastplates for more, when you make them neither stronger nor more costly than others do?" "Because, Socrates," he said, "I make them better

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	ἀποδεικνύων πλείονος τιμᾷ; οὐ γάρ δή ἴσους γε πάντας οὐδέ ὁμοίους οἶμαί σε ποιεῖν, εἴ γε ἁρμόττοντας ποιεῖς. Ἀλλά νή Δί', ἔφη, ποιῶ· οὐδέν γάρ ὄφελός ἐστι θώρακος ἄνευ τούτου.	proportioned." "And this proportion," he said, "do you show it by measure or by weight when you price them higher? For I don't suppose you make them all equal or all alike, not if you make them to fit." "Oh, by Zeus, I do make them to fit," he said. "A breastplate is no use without that."
3.10.11	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, σώματά γε ἀνθρώπων τά μέν εὔρυθμά ἐστι, τά δέ ἄρρυθμα; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τῷ ἀρρύθμῳ σώματι ἁρμόττοντα τόν θώρακα εὔρυθμον ποιεῖς; Ὥσπερ καί ἁρμόττοντα, ἔφη·	"And aren't people's bodies, some of them, well proportioned, and others ill proportioned?" "Certainly," he said. "Then how do you make a breastplate that fits an ill-proportioned body well proportioned?" "The same way I make it fit," he said;
3.10.12	ὁ ἁρμόττων γάρ ἐστιν εὔρυθμος. δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τό εὔρυθμον οὐ καθ' ἑαυτό λέγειν, ἀλλά πρός τόν χρώμενον, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ φαίης ἀσπίδα, ᾧ ἄν ἁρμόττῃ, τούτῳ εὔρυθμον εἶναι, καί χλαμύδα, καί τἆλλα ὡσαύτως ἔοικεν ἔχειν τῷ σῷ λόγῳ.	"for one that fits is well proportioned." "You seem to me," said Socrates, "to mean 'well proportioned' not in itself but in relation to the wearer. It's as if you were to say that a shield is well proportioned for whoever it fits, and the same with a cloak; and on your account everything else seems to work the same way.
3.10.13	ἴσως δέ καί ἄλλο τι οὐ μικρόν ἀγαθόν τῷ ἁρμόττειν πρόσεστι. Δίδαξον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τι ἔχεις. Ἧττον, ἔφη, τῷ βάρει πιέζουσιν οἱ ἁρμόττοντες τῶν ἀναρμόστων τόν αὐτόν σταθμόν ἔχοντες. οἱ μέν γάρ ἀνάρμοστοι ἤ ὅλοι ἐκ τῶν ὤμων κρεμάμενοι ἤ καί ἄλλο τι τοῦ σώματος σφόδρα πιέζοντες δύσφοροι καί χαλεποί γίγνονται· οἱ δέ ἁρμόττοντες, διειλημμένοι τό βάρος τό μέν ὑπό τῶν κλειδῶν καί ἐπωμίδων, τό δ' ὑπό τῶν ὤμων, τό δέ ὑπό τοῦ στήθους, τό δέ ὑπό τοῦ νώτου, τό δέ ὑπό τῆς γαστρός, ὀλίγου δεῖν οὐ φορήματι, ἀλλά προσθήματι ἐοίκασιν.	"And perhaps there's another advantage, and no small one, that comes with fitting." "Teach me, Socrates," he said, "if you have something." "Breastplates that fit," he said, "press down less with their weight than ill-fitting ones of the same weight. Ill-fitting ones either hang entirely from the shoulders or press hard on some other part of the body, and they become hard and uncomfortable to wear. But those that fit have their weight shared out, some on the collarbones and shoulder pieces, some on the shoulders, some on the chest, some on the back, some on the belly, and they seem almost not a load to carry but something attached to you."
3.10.14	Εἴρηκας, ἔφη, αὐτό δι' ὅπερ ἔγωγε τά ἐμά ἔργα πλείστου ἄξια νομίζω εἶναι· ἔνιοι μέντοι τούς ποικίλους καί τούς ἐπιχρύσους θώρακας μᾶλλον ὠνοῦνται. ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γε διά ταῦτα μή ἁρμόττοντας ὠνοῦνται, κακόν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι ποικίλον τε καί ἐπίχρυσον ὠνεῖσθαι.	"You've named the very reason," he said, "why I think my work is worth so much. Still, some people prefer to buy decorated and gilded breastplates." "Well," he said, "if that's why they buy ones that don't fit, it seems to me they're buying a nuisance, decorated and gilded.
3.10.15	ἀτάρ, ἔφη, τοῦ σώματος μή μένοντος, ἀλλά τοτέ μέν κυρτουμένου, τοτέ δέ ὀρθουμένου, πῶς ἄν ἀκριβεῖς θώρακες ἁρμόττοιεν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Λέγεις, ἔφη, ἁρμόττειν οὐ τούς ἀκριβεῖς, ἀλλά τούς μή λυποῦντας ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ. Αὐτός, ἔφη, τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί πάνυ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέχει.	"But," he said, "since the body doesn't stay still, but is sometimes bent and sometimes straight, how could breastplates made to an exact fit fit?" "They couldn't at all," he said. "So you mean," he said, "that the ones that fit aren't the exact ones, but the ones that don't hurt in use." "You're saying that yourself, Socrates," he said, "and you've understood it quite correctly."

CHAPTER 11

Socrates visits the courtesan Theodote and teases her about how to hunt and keep friends.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.11.1	Γυναικός δέ ποτε οὔσης ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῆς, ᾗ ὄνομα ἦν Θεοδότη, καί οἵας συνεῖναι τῷ πείθοντι, μνησθέντος αὐτῆς τῶν παρόντων τινός καί εἰπόντος, ὅτι κρεῖττον εἴη λόγου τό κάλλος τῆς γυναικός, καί ζωγράφους φήσαντος εἰσιέναι πρός αὐτήν ἀπεικασομένους, οἷς ἐκείνην ἐπιδεικνύειν ἑαυτῆς ὅσα καλῶς ἔχοι· Ἰτέον ἄν εἴη θεασομένους, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γάρ δή ἀκούσασί γε τό λόγου κρεῖττον ἔστι καταμαθεῖν. καί ὁ διηγησάμενος· Οὐκ ἄν φθάνοιτ', ἔφη, ἀκολουθοῦντες.	There was once a beautiful woman in the city named Theodote, the kind who would keep company with any man who could win her over. One of those present mentioned her and said that the woman's beauty was beyond words. He said that painters went to her house to make her portrait, and that she showed them as much of herself as was beautiful. "Then we'd better go and look," said Socrates, "since what's beyond words certainly can't be grasped by hearing about it." And the man who had told them said, "Follow me, then, and quickly."[20]
3.11.2	οὕτω μέν δή πορευθέντες πρός τήν Θεοδότην καί καταλαβόντες ζωγράφῳ τινί παρεστηκυῖαν ἐθεάσαντο. παυσαμένου δέ τοῦ ζωγράφου· Ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πότερον ἡμᾶς δεῖ μᾶλλον Θεοδότῃ χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν τό κάλλος ἑαυτῆς ἐπέδειξεν, ἤ ταύτην ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐθεασάμεθα; ἆρ' εἰ μέν ταύτῃ ὠφελιμωτέρα ἐστίν ἡ ἐπίδειξις, ταύτην ἡμῖν χάριν ἐκτέον, εἰ δέ ἡμῖν ἡ θέα, ἡμᾶς ταύτῃ;	So they went off to Theodote's, found her posing for a painter, and looked at her. When the painter had finished, Socrates said, "Gentlemen, should we be more grateful to Theodote for showing us her beauty, or she to us for looking at it? If the showing does her more good, isn't she the one who owes us gratitude? And if the sight does us more good, aren't we the ones who owe it to her?"
3.11.3	εἰπόντος δέ τινος ὅτι δίκαια λέγοι· Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη μέν ἤδη τε τόν παρ' ἡμῶν ἔπαινον κερδαίνει καί, ἐπειδάν εἰς πλείους διαγγείλωμεν, πλείω ὠφελήσεται· ἡμεῖς δέ ἤδη τε ὧν ἐθεασάμεθα ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἅψασθαι καί ἅπιμεν ὑποκνιζόμενοι καί ἀπελθόντες ποθήσομεν. ἐκ δέ τούτων εἰκός ἡμᾶς μέν θεραπεύειν, ταύτην δέ θεραπεύεσθαι. καί ἡ Θεοδότη· Νή Δί', ἔφη, εἰ τοίνυν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἐμέ ἄν δέοι ὑμῖν τῆς θέας χάριν ἔχειν.	When someone said that this was fair, he went on, "Well then, she's already earning our praise, and once we spread the word to more people she'll benefit even more. But we already long to touch what we've seen, and we'll go away with an itch and miss her once we've gone. It follows that we should be the ones paying court and she the one being courted." And Theodote said, "Well, by Zeus, if that's how things are, I should be the one grateful to you for looking."
3.11.4	ἐκ δέ τούτου ὁ Σωκράτης ὁρῶν αὐτήν τε πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένην, καί μητέρα παροῦσαν αὐτῇ ἐν ἐσθῆτί τε καί θεραπείᾳ οὐ τῇ τυχούσῃ, καί θεραπαίνας πολλάς καί εὐειδεῖς καί οὐδέ ταύτας ἠμελημένως ἐχούσας, καί τοῖς ἄλλοις τήν οἰκίαν ἀφθόνως κατεσκευασμένην· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Θεοδότη, ἔστι σοι ἀγρός; Οὐκ ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. ἀλλ' ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; Οὐδέ οἰκία, ἔφη. Ἀλλά μή χειροτέχναι τινές; Οὐδέ χειροτέχναι, ἔφη. Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, τά ἐπιτήδεια ἔχεις; Ἐάν τις, ἔφη, φίλος μοι γενόμενος εὖ ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃ, οὗτός μοι βίος ἐστί.	After this Socrates noticed several things. She herself was expensively dressed. Her mother was there with her, in clothes and with attendants of no ordinary kind. She had many good-looking maids, and they weren't neglected either. And the house was lavishly furnished in every other way. "Tell me, Theodote," he said, "do you own a farm?" "Not I," she said. "Then perhaps a house that brings in rent?" "Not a house either," she said. "Some craftsmen, then?" "No craftsmen either," she said. "So where do you get your living?" he

20 Theodote was a well-known Athenian courtesan (*hetaira*), a woman who lived on the gifts of the men who kept company with her.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		asked. "If someone becomes my friend and wants to be good to me," she said, "that's my living."
3.11.5	Νή τήν Ἥραν, ἔφη, ὦ Θεοδότη, καλόν γε τό κτῆμα καί πολλῷ κρεῖττον οἰῶν τε καί αἰγῶν καί βοῶν, φίλων ἀγέλην κεκτῆσθαι. ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερον τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπεις, ἐάν τίς σοι φίλος ὥσπερ μυῖα πρόσπτηται, ἤ καί αὐτή τι μηχανᾷ,	"By Hera, Theodote," he said, "that's a fine property to own, and far better than flocks of sheep and goats and herds of cattle: a herd of friends. But tell me," he said, "do you leave it to chance whether a friend comes flying to you like a fly, or do you also contrive something yourself?"
3.11.6	Πῶς δ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἐγώ τούτου μηχανήν εὕροιμι; Πολύ νή Δί', ἔφη, προσηκόντως μᾶλλον ἤ αἱ φάλαγγες· οἶσθα γάρ ὡς ἐκεῖναι θηρῶσι τά πρός τόν βίον· ἀράχνια γάρ δήπου λεπτά ὑφηνάμεναι, ὅ τι ἄν ἐνταῦθα ἐμπέσῃ, τούτῳ τροφῇ χρῶνται.	"And how could I find a contrivance for that?" she said. "Much more fittingly than spiders do, by Zeus," he said. "You know how they hunt for their living. They weave fine webs, of course, and whatever falls into them they use for food."
3.11.7	Καί ἐμοί οὖν, ἔφη, συμβουλεύεις ὑφήνασθαί τι θήρατρον; Οὐ γάρ δή οὕτω γε ἀτέχνως οἴεσθαι χρή τό πλείστου ἄξιον ἄγρευμα, φίλους, θηράσειν. οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι καί τό μικροῦ ἄξιον, τούς λαγῶς, θηρῶντες πολλά τεχνάζουσιν;	"So you advise me to weave myself a trap as well?" she said. "Well, you certainly shouldn't think you'll catch the most valuable prey there is, friends, with no skill at all. Don't you see that even people hunting something of little value, like hares, use plenty of tricks?
3.11.8	ὅτι μέν γάρ τῆς νυκτός νέμονται, κύνας νυκτερευτικάς πορισάμενοι, ταύταις αὐτούς θηρῶσιν· ὅτι δέ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀποδιδράσκουσιν, ἄλλας κτῶνται κύνας, αἵτινες, ᾗ ἄν ἐκ τῆς νομῆς εἰς τήν εὐνήν ἀπέλθωσι, τῇ ὀσμῇ αἰσθανόμεναι εὑρίσκουσιν αὐτούς· ὅτι δέ ποδώκεις εἰσίν ὥστε καί ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τρέχοντες ἀποφεύγειν, ἄλλας αὖ κύνας ταχείας παρασκευάζονται, ἵνα κατά πόδας ἁλίσκωνται· ὅτι δέ καί ταύτας αὐτῶν τινες ἀποφεύγουσι, δίκτυα ἱστᾶσιν εἰς τάς ἀτραπούς, ᾗ φεύγουσιν, ἵν' εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπίπτοντες συμποδίζωνται.	"Hares feed at night, so the hunters get dogs trained for night work and hunt them with those. Hares run off by day, so they acquire other dogs that pick up the scent along the way from the feeding grounds to their beds and find them. Hares are so fast that they escape even when running in the open, so the hunters get still other dogs, fast ones, to catch them in the chase. And since some hares escape even these, they set nets across the paths they flee along, so that they run into them and get tangled up."
3.11.9	Τίνι οὖν, ἔφη, τοιούτῳ φίλους ἄν ἐγώ θηρῴην; Ἐάν νή Δί', ἔφη, ἀντί κυνός κτήσῃ, ὅστις σοι ἰχνεύων μέν τούς φιλοκάλους καί πλουσίους εὑρήσει, εὑρών δέ μηχανήσεται ὅπως ἐμβάλῃ αὐτούς εἰς τά σά δίκτυα.	"Then with what sort of thing could I hunt friends?" she said. "By Zeus," he said, "if instead of a dog you get someone who'll track down rich men with an eye for beauty, and once he's found them, will contrive a way to drive them into your nets."
3.11.10	Καί ποῖα, ἔφη, ἐγώ δίκτυα ἔχω; Ἕν μέν δήπου, ἔφη, καί μάλα εὖ περιπλεκόμενον, τό σῶμα· ἐν δέ τούτῳ ψυχήν, ᾗ καταμανθάνεις, καί ὡς ἄν ἐμβλέπουσα χαρίζοιο καί ὅ τι ἄν λέγουσα εὐφραίνοις, καί ὅτι δεῖ τόν μέν ἐπιμελόμενον ἀσμένως ὑποδέχεσθαι, τόν δέ τρυφῶντα ἀποκλείειν, καί ἀρρωστήσαντός γε φίλου φροντιστικῶς ἐπισκέψασθαι καί καλόν τι πράξαντος σφόδρα συνησθῆναι καί τῷ σφόδρα σοῦ φροντίζοντι ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ κεχαρίσθαι· φιλεῖν γε μήν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐπίστασαι οὐ μόνον μαλακῶς, ἀλλά καί εὐνοϊκῶς· καί ὅτι ἀρεστοί σοί εἰσιν οἱ φίλοι, οἶδ' ὅτι οὐ	"And what nets do I have?" she said. "One, of course," he said, "and one that wraps itself around a man very well: your body. And in it a soul. With your soul you learn how to please with a look and to delight with what you say. You learn that you should welcome gladly the man who takes care of you and shut out the one who is only self-indulgent; that when a friend falls ill you should visit him with real concern; that when he does something fine you should share his delight with all your heart; and that you should give yourself, with

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ ἀναπείθεις. Μά τόν Δί’, ἔφη ἡ Θεοδότη, ἐγώ τούτων οὐδέν μηχανῶμαι.	your whole soul, to the man who cares deeply for you. As for loving, I’m sure you know how to do it not only tenderly but kindly. And I’m sure you convince your friends that you’re fond of them not by word but by deed.” “No, by Zeus,” said Theodote, “I don’t contrive any of this.”
3.11.11	Καί μήν, ἔφη, πολύ διαφέρει τό κατά φύσιν τε καί ὀρθῶς ἀνθρώπῳ προσφέρεσθαι. καί γάρ δή βίᾳ μέν οὔτ’ ἄν ἔλοις οὔτε κατάσχοις φίλον, εὐεργεσίᾳ δέ καί ἡδονῇ τό θηρίον τοῦτο ἁλώσιμόν τε καί παραμόνιμόν ἐστιν.	“And yet,” he said, “it makes a great difference to deal with a person naturally and in the right way. You can neither catch nor keep a friend by force. This creature is caught and made to stay by kindness and pleasure.”
3.11.12	ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Δεῖ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πρῶτον μέν τούς φροντίζοντάς σου τοιαῦτα ἀξιοῦν, οἷα ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς μικρότατα μελήσει, ἔπειτα δέ αὐτήν ἀμείβεσθαι χαριζομένην τόν αὐτόν τρόπον· οὕτω γάρ ἄν μάλιστα φίλοι γίγνοιντο καί πλεῖστον χρόνον φιλοῖεν καί μέγιστα εὐεργετοῖεν.	“That’s true,” she said. “Then first,” he said, “you should ask those who care for you only for the kinds of things that will cost them the least trouble to do. Then you should repay them by pleasing them in the same way. That’s how they’d be most likely to become your friends, to love you for the longest time, and to do you the greatest kindnesses.
3.11.13	χαρίζοιο δ’ ἄν μάλιστα, εἰ δεομένοις δωροῖο τά παρά σεαυτῆς· ὁρᾷς γάρ ὅτι καί τῶν βρωμάτων τά ἥδιστα, ἐάν μέν τις προσφέρῃ πρίν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀηδῆ φαίνεται, κεκορεσμένοις δέ καί βδελυγμίαν παρέχει, ἐάν δέ τις προσφέρῃ λιμόν ἐμποιήσας, κἄν φαυλότερα ᾖ, πάνυ ἡδέα φαίνεται.	“And you’d please them most if you gave what you have when they want it. You see that even the most delicious foods seem unappetizing if they’re served before a man has an appetite, and if he’s already full they’re even nauseating. But if they’re served after hunger has been worked up, they seem very delicious, even if they’re fairly plain.”
3.11.14	Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, ἐγώ λιμόν ἐμποιεῖν τῶν παρ’ ἐμοί δυναίμην; Εἰ νή Δί’, ἔφη, πρῶτον μέν τοῖς κεκορεσμένοις μήτε προσφέροις μήτε ὑπομιμνῄσκοις, ἕως ἄν τῆς πλησμονῆς παυσάμενοι πάλιν δέωνται, ἔπειτα τούς δεομένους ὑπομιμνῄσκοις ὡς κοσμιωτάτῃ τε ὁμιλίᾳ καί τῷ μή φαίνεσθαι βουλομένη χαρίζεσθαι καί διαφεύγουσα, ἕως ἄν ὡς μάλιστα δεηθῶσι· τηνικαῦτα γάρ πολύ διαφέρει τά αὐτά δῶρα ἤ πρίν ἐπιθυμῆσαι διδόναι.	“So how could I work up hunger in those who come to me?” she said. “By Zeus,” he said, “first, if you neither offer anything to those who are full nor remind them, until they’ve gotten over their surfeit and want again. Then, when they do want, remind them, with the most modest manner, and by not seeming eager to give yourself, and by holding back, until they want it as badly as possible. At that point the same gifts are worth far more than if you give them before they desire them.”
3.11.15	καί ἡ Θεοδότη· Τί οὖν οὐ σύ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγένου συνθηρατής τῶν φίλων; Ἐάν γε νή Δί’, ἔφη, πείθῃς με σύ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, πείσαιμί σε; Ζητήσεις, ἔφη, τοῦτο αὐτή καί μηχανήσει, ἐάν τί μου δέῃ.	And Theodote said, “Then why don’t you become my partner in hunting friends, Socrates?” “I will, by Zeus,” he said, “if you persuade me.” “And how could I persuade you?” she said. “You’ll look for a way yourself and contrive it,” he said, “if you need anything from me.”
3.11.16	Εἴσιθι τοίνυν, ἔφη, θαμινά. καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων τήν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην· ἀλλ’, ὦ Θεοδότη, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι σχολάσαι· καί γάρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλά	“Then come and visit often,” she said. And Socrates, making fun of his own lack of any occupation, said, “But Theodote, it isn’t at all easy for me

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	καί δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν· εἰσί δέ καί φίλαι μοι, αἵ οὔτε ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτός ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἐάσουσί με ἀπιέναι, φίλτρα τε μανθάνουσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ καί ἐπῳδάς.	to find the time. I have lots of private and public business that keeps me busy. And I have lady friends too, who won't let me leave them day or night, because they're learning love potions and spells from me."
3.11.17	Ἐπίστασαι γάρ, ἔφη, καί ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἀλλά διά τί οἴει, ἔφη, Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καί Ἀντισθένη οὐδέποτέ μου ἀπολείπεσθαι; διά τί δέ καί Κέβητα καί Σιμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καί ἐπῳδῶν καί ἰύγγων ἐστί.	"Do you know about these things too, Socrates?" she said. "Why else do you think Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave my side?" he said. "And why do Cebes and Simmias come to me all the way from Thebes? You can be sure this doesn't happen without plenty of love potions and spells and love wheels."[21]
3.11.18	Χρῆσον τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, τήν ἴυγγα, ἵνα ἐπί σοί πρῶτον ἕλκω αὐτήν. ἀλλά μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ αὐτός ἕλκεσθαι πρός σέ βούλομαι, ἀλλά σέ πρός ἐμέ πορεύεσθαι. ἀλλά πορεύσομαι, ἔφη· μόνον ὑποδέχου. ἀλλ' ὑποδέξομαί σε, ἔφη, ἐάν μή τις φιλωτέρα σου ἔνδον ᾖ.	"Then lend me your love wheel," she said, "so I can work it on you first." "No, by Zeus," he said, "I don't want to be drawn to you. I want you to come to me." "All right, I'll come," she said. "Just let me in." "I'll let you in," he said, "unless there's someone dearer to me than you inside."[22]

CHAPTER 12

Socrates tells Epigenes, young and out of shape, why everyone should keep his body fit.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.12.1	Ἐπιγένη δέ τῶν συνόντων τινά νέον τε ὄντα καί τό σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα ἰδών· ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς, ἔφη, τό σῶμα ἔχεις, ὦ Ἐπίγενες. καί ὅς· Ἰδιώτης γάρ, ἔφη, εἰμί, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τῶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ μελλόντων ἀγωνίζεσθαι· ἤ δοκεῖ σοι μικρός εἶναι ὁ περί τῆς ψυχῆς πρός τούς πολεμίους ἀγών, ὅν Ἀθηναῖοι θήσουσιν, ὅταν τύχωσι;	Seeing Epigenes, one of his companions, who was young and in poor physical shape, he said, "What an amateur's body you have, Epigenes!" And he said, "Well, I am an amateur, Socrates." "No more than those who are about to compete at Olympia," he said. "Or do you think it's a small contest, the fight for your life against the enemy, which the Athenians will hold whenever the occasion arises?
3.12.2	καί μήν οὐκ ὀλίγοι μέν διά τήν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν ἀποθνῄσκουσί τε ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις καί αἰσχρῶς σῴζονται· πολλοί δέ δι' αὐτό τοῦτο ζῶντές τε ἁλίσκονται καί ἁλόντες ἤτοι δουλεύουσι τόν λοιπόν βίον, ἐάν οὕτω τύχωσι, τήν χαλεπωτάτην δουλείαν ἤ εἰς τάς ἀνάγκας τάς ἀλγεινοτάτας ἐμπεσόντες καί ἐκτίσαντες ἐνίοτε πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς τόν λοιπόν βίον ἐνδεεῖς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄντες καί κακοπαθοῦντες διαζῶσι· πολλοί δέ δόξαν αἰσχράν κτῶνται διά τήν τοῦ σώματος ἀδυναμίαν δοκοῦντες ἀποδειλιᾶν.	"And yet quite a few men die in the dangers of war because their bodies are in poor condition, or save themselves shamefully. Many are taken alive for this very reason. Once captured, they either spend the rest of their lives as slaves, if it turns out that way, in the harshest slavery, or they fall into the most painful straits. Sometimes they pay a ransom greater than everything they own, and then live out the rest of their lives short of necessities and suffering hardship. And many gain a shameful reputation because their bodily weakness makes them look like cowards.

21 Apollodorus and Antisthenes were devoted followers of Socrates. Cebes and Simmias were Thebans who appear in Plato's *Phaedo*.

22 The *iynx* was a love charm: a wryneck bird bound to a wheel, or a small spinning wheel, believed to draw a desired person to the one who spun it.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.12.3	ἢ καταφρονεῖς τῶν ἐπιτιμίων τῆς καχεξίας τούτων, καί ῥᾳδίως ἄν οἴει φέρειν τά τοιαῦτα; καί μήν οἶμαί γε πολλῷ ῥᾴω καί ἡδίω τούτων εἶναι, ἅ δεῖ ὑπομένειν τόν ἐπιμελόμενον τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐεξίας. ἢ ὑγιεινότερόν τε καί εἰς τἆλλα χρησιμώτερον νομίζεις εἶναι τήν καχεξίαν τῆς εὐεξίας, ἢ τῶν διά τήν εὐεξίαν γιγνομένων καταφρονεῖς;	"Or do you look down on these penalties for poor condition, and think you'd bear such things easily? And yet I think that what a man who looks after his bodily fitness has to endure is far easier and more pleasant than these. Or do you think that poor condition is healthier and more useful for everything else than good condition? Or do you look down on what good condition brings?
3.12.4	καί μήν πάντα γε τἀναντία συμβαίνει τοῖς εὖ τά σώματα ἔχουσιν ἢ τοῖς κακῶς. καί γάρ ὑγιαίνουσιν οἱ τά σώματα εὖ ἔχοντες καί ἰσχύουσι· καί πολλοί μέν διά τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων σῴζονταί τε εὐσχημόνως καί τά δεινά πάντα διαφεύγουσι, πολλοί δέ φίλοις τε βοηθοῦσι καί τήν πατρίδα εὐεργετοῦσι καί διά ταῦτα χάριτός τε ἀξιοῦνται καί δόξαν μεγάλην κτῶνται καί τιμῶν καλλίστων τυγχάνουσι καί [διά ταῦτα] τόν τε λοιπόν βίον ἥδιον καί κάλλιον διαζῶσι καί τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισί καλλίους ἀφορμάς εἰς τόν βίον καταλείπουσιν.	"And yet everything that happens to those in good bodily condition is the opposite of what happens to those in bad. Those in good condition are healthy and strong. Because of this, many of them come through the struggles of war safely and with honor, and escape every danger. Many help their friends and do their country good. For this they are thought to deserve gratitude, win a great reputation and gain the finest honors, and [for this reason] they live out the rest of their lives more pleasantly and more finely, and leave their children better means to start out in life.
3.12.5	οὔτοι χρή, ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ ἡ πόλις τά πρός τόν πόλεμον, διά τοῦτο καί ἰδίᾳ ἀμελεῖν, ἀλλά μηδέν ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. εὖ γάρ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐδέ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδενί ἀγῶνι οὐδέ ἐν πράξει οὐδεμιᾷ μεῖον ἕξεις διά τό βέλτιον τό σῶμα παρεσκευάσθαι· πρός πάντα γάρ ὅσα πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι χρήσιμον τό σῶμά ἐστιν· ἐν πάσαις δέ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος χρείαις πολύ διαφέρει ὡς βέλτιστα τό σῶμα ἔχειν·	"Just because the city doesn't train for war at public expense, you mustn't neglect it privately as well; you should take care of it all the same. You can be sure that in no other contest and in no undertaking will you be worse off for having your body better prepared. The body is useful for everything people do, and in every use of the body it makes a big difference to have it in the best possible condition;
3.12.6	ἐπεί καί ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ ἐλαχίστη σώματος χρεία εἶναι, ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι καί ἐν τούτῳ πολλοί μεγάλα σφάλλονται διά τό μή ὑγιαίνειν τό σῶμα; καί λήθη δέ καί ἀθυμία καί δυσκολία καί μανία πολλάκις πολλοῖς διά τήν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν εἰς τήν διάνοιαν ἐμπίπτουσιν οὕτως ὥστε καί τάς ἐπιστήμας ἐκβάλλειν.	for even where the body seems least needed, in thinking, who doesn't know that here too many people go badly wrong because their bodies aren't healthy? Forgetfulness, despondency, irritability and madness often assail many people's minds because their bodies are in poor condition, so badly that they even drive out the knowledge they had.
3.12.7	τοῖς δέ τά σώματα εὖ ἔχουσι πολλή ἀσφάλεια καί οὐδείς κίνδυνος διά γε τήν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν τοιοῦτόν τι παθεῖν, εἰκός δέ μᾶλλον πρός τἀναντία τῶν διά τήν καχεξίαν γιγνομένων [καὶ] τήν εὐεξίαν χρήσιμον εἶναι· καίτοι τῶν γε τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐναντίων ἕνεκα τί οὐκ ἄν τις νοῦν ἔχων ὑπομείνειεν;	"But those whose bodies are in good condition are quite safe, and in no danger of suffering anything like this, at least not because of poor bodily condition. More likely, good condition is [also] useful for producing the opposite of what poor condition brings. And for the sake of the opposites of the things just mentioned, what wouldn't a sensible person endure?
3.12.8	αἰσχρόν δέ καί τό διά τήν ἀμέλειαν γηρᾶναι, πρίν ἰδεῖν ἑαυτόν ποῖος ἄν κάλλιστος καί κράτιστος τῷ σώματι	"It's shameful, too, to grow old through neglect before you've seen yourself become the finest and

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	γένοιτο· ταῦτα δέ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἀμελοῦντα· οὐ γάρ ἐθέλει αὐτόματα γίγνεσθαι.	strongest you could be in body. And you can't see that if you neglect it, because it won't happen on its own."

CHAPTER 13

Socrates gives short, sharp replies to everyday complaints about rudeness, food, servants and travel.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.13.1	ὀργιζομένου δέ ποτέ τινος, ὅτι προσειπών τινα χαίρειν οὐκ ἀντιπροσερρήθη· Γελοῖον, ἔφη, τό, εἰ μέν τό σῶμα κάκιον ἔχοντι ἀπήντησάς τῳ, μή ἄν ὀργίζεσθαι, ὅτι δέ τήν ψυχήν ἀγροικοτέρως διακειμένῳ περιέτυχες, τοῦτό σε λυπεῖ.	Once someone was angry because he had greeted a man and gotten no greeting in return. "It's funny," Socrates said. "If you'd met someone in worse bodily shape, you wouldn't be angry. But because you've run into someone whose soul is rather boorish, that upsets you."
3.13.2	ἄλλου δέ λέγοντος, ὅτι ἀηδῶς ἐσθίοι· Ἀκουμενός, ἔφη, τούτου φάρμακον ἀγαθόν διδάσκει. ἐρομένου δέ· Ποῖον; Παύσασθαι ἐσθίοντα, ἔφη· καί ἥδιόν τε καί εὐτελέστερον καί ὑγιεινότερον διάξειν παυσάμενον.	When another man said he got no pleasure from eating, he said, "Acumenus teaches a good remedy for that." The man asked, "What is it?" "Stop eating," he said. "He says that once you stop, you'll live more pleasantly, more cheaply and more healthily."[23]
3.13.3	ἄλλου δ' αὖ λέγοντος, ὅτι θερμόν εἴη παρ' ἑαυτῷ τό ὕδωρ ὅ πίνοι· Ὅταν ἄρ', ἔφη, βούλῃ θερμῷ λούσασθαι, ἕτοιμον ἔσται σοι. Ἀλλά ψυχρόν, ἔφη, ἐστίν ὥστε λούσασθαι. ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καί οἱ οἰκέται σου ἄχθονται πίνοντές τε αὐτό καί λούμενοι αὐτῷ; Μά τόν Δί', ἔφη· ἀλλά καί πολλάκις τεθαύμακα ὡς ἡδέως αὐτῷ πρός ἀμφότερα ταῦτα χρῶνται. Πότερον δέ, ἔφη, τό παρά σοί ὕδωρ θερμότερον πιεῖν ἐστιν ἤ τό ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ; Τό ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ, ἔφη. Πότερον δέ λούσασθαι ψυχρότερον τό παρά σοί ἤ τό ἐν Ἀμφιαράου; Τό ἐν Ἀμφιαράου, ἔφη. Ἐνθυμοῦ οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι κινδυνεύεις δυσαρεστότερος εἶναι τῶν τε οἰκετῶν καί τῶν ἀρρωστούντων.	Another man, again, said that the water he drank at home was warm. "So when you want a warm bath," he said, "it'll be ready for you." "But it's too cold to bathe in," the man said. "Then do your servants mind drinking it and bathing in it?" he asked. "No, by Zeus," he said. "In fact I've often been amazed at how happily they use it for both." "And which is warmer to drink," he asked, "the water at your house or the water at the shrine of Asclepius?" "The water at the shrine of Asclepius," he said. "And which is colder to bathe in, yours or the water at the shrine of Amphiaraus?" "The water at Amphiaraus'," he said. "Then bear in mind," he said, "that you may well be harder to please than your servants and the sick."[24]
3.13.4	Κολάσαντος δέ τινος ἰσχυρῶς ἀκόλουθον, ἤρετο τί χαλεπαίνοι τῷ θεράποντι. Ὅτι, ἔφη, ὀψοφαγίστατός τε ὤν βλακότατός ἐστι καί φιλαργυρώτατος ὤν ἀργότατος. Ἤδη ποτέ οὖν ἐπεσκέψω, πότερος πλειόνων πληγῶν δεῖται, σύ ἤ ὁ θεράπων;	When someone was punishing his attendant harshly, Socrates asked why he was angry with the servant. "Because," he said, "he's an utter glutton and an utter dolt, as greedy for money as he is lazy." "Have you ever stopped to consider which of you needs more beatings, you or the servant?"
3.13.5	Φοβουμένου δέ τινος τήν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ὁδόν· Τί, ἔφη, φοβεῖ τήν πορείαν; οὐ καί οἴκοι σχεδόν ὅλην τήν ἡμέραν	When someone was afraid of the journey to Olympia, he said, "Why are you afraid of the trip?

23 Acumenus was a well-known Athenian physician.
24 Both were healing sanctuaries visited by the sick: the shrine of Asclepius in Athens and that of the hero Amphiaraus at Oropus, each with its own spring.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	περιπατεῖς καί ἐκεῖσε πορευόμενος περιπατήσας ἀριστήσεις, περιπατήσας δειπνήσεις καί ἀναπαύσει; οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι, εἰ ἐκτείναις τούς περιπάτους, οὕς ἐν πέντε ἤ ἕξ ἡμέραις περιπατεῖς, ῥᾳδίως ἄν Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἀφίκοιο; χαριέστερον δέ καί προεξορμᾶν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ μᾶλλον ἤ ὑστερίζειν. τό μέν γάρ ἀναγκάζεσθαι περαιτέρω τοῦ μετρίου μηκύνειν τάς ὁδούς χαλεπόν, τό δέ μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ πλείονας πορευθῆναι πολλήν ῥᾳστώνην παρέχει. κρεῖττον οὖν ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ σπεύδειν ἤ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ.	Don't you walk around nearly all day at home? On the way there you'll take a walk and then have lunch, take a walk and then have dinner and rest. Don't you know that if you laid end to end the walks you take in five or six days, you could easily get from Athens to Olympia? It's also more pleasant to set out a day early than a day late. Being forced to stretch your daily stages beyond a reasonable length is hard, while spending one day more on the road makes things much easier. So it's better to hurry when setting out than on the road."
3.13.6	ἄλλου δέ λέγοντος, ὡς παρετάθη μακράν ὁδόν πορευθείς, ἤρετο αὐτόν, εἰ καί φορτίον ἔφερε. Μά Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀλλά τό ἱμάτιον. Μόνος δ' ἐπορεύου, ἔφη. ἤ καί ἀκόλουθός σοι ἠκολούθει; Ἠκολούθει, ἔφη. Πότερον κενός, ἔφη, ἤ φέρων τι; Φέρων νή Δί', ἔφη, τά τε στρώματα καί τἆλλα σκεύη. Καί πῶς [τι], ἔφη, ἀπήλλαχεν ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ; Ἐμοί μέν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, βέλτιον ἐμοῦ. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, εἰ τό ἐκείνου φορτίον ἔδει σε φέρειν, πῶς ἄν οἴει διατεθῆναι; Κακῶς νή Δί', ἔφη· μᾶλλον δέ οὐδ' ἄν ἐδυνήθην κομίσαι. Τό οὖν τοσούτῳ ἧττον τοῦ παιδός δύνασθαι πονεῖν πῶς ἠσκημένου δοκεῖ σοι ἀνδρός εἶναι;	Another man said he was worn out after walking a long way, and Socrates asked him whether he had been carrying a load as well. "No, by Zeus, not I," he said, "only my cloak." "Were you traveling alone," he said, "or did an attendant come along with you?" "He came along," he said. "Empty-handed, or carrying something?" "Carrying, by Zeus," he said, "the bedding and the rest of the baggage." "And how did he [at all] come through the journey?" "Better than I did, it seems to me," he said. "Well then," he said, "if you'd had to carry his load, how do you think you'd have fared?" "Badly, by Zeus," he said, "or rather, I couldn't have carried it at all." "So being able to bear so much less hard work than your slave—does that seem to you the mark of a man in training?"

CHAPTER 14

Socrates teaches manners at shared dinners and mocks those who eat only the fancy dishes.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
3.14.1	Ὁπότε δέ τῶν συνιόντων ἐπί δεῖπνον οἱ μέν μικρόν ὄψον, οἱ δέ πολύ φέροιεν, ἐκέλευεν ὁ Σωκράτης τόν παῖδα τό μικρόν ἤ εἰς τό κοινόν τιθέναι ἤ διανέμειν ἑκάστῳ τό μέρος. οἱ οὖν τό πολύ φέροντες ᾐσχύνοντο τό τε μή κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰς τό κοινόν τιθεμένου καί τό μή ἀντιτιθέναι τό ἑαυτῶν· ἐτίθεσαν οὖν καί τό ἑαυτῶν εἰς τό κοινόν. καί ἐπεί οὐδέν πλέον εἶχον τῶν μικρόν φερομένων, ἐπαύοντο πολλοῦ ὀψωνοῦντες.	Whenever some of those meeting for dinner brought a little relish and others a lot, Socrates would tell the slave either to put the small portion into the common share or to divide it out among everyone. Those who had brought a lot were then ashamed both to take no part in what was put in common and not to put in their own in return; so they put theirs into the common share too. And since they got no more than those who brought little, they stopped spending a lot on relish.[25]
3.14.2	Καταμαθών δέ ποτε τῶν συνδειπνούντων τινά τοῦ μέν σίτου πεπαυμένον, τό δέ ὄψον αὐτό καθ' αὑτό ἐσθίοντα, λόγου ὄντος περί ὀνομάτων, ἐφ' οἵῳ ἔργῳ ἕκαστον εἴη· Ἔχοιμεν ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰπεῖν, ἐπί ποίῳ ποτέ ἔργῳ	Once he noticed that one of his fellow diners had stopped eating bread and was eating the relish by itself. The conversation was about names, and what sort of action each name was given for. "Gen-

25 "Relish" (*opson*) was anything eaten with the staple bread or barley cake—above all fish, but also meat or vegetables.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἄνθρωπος ὀψοφάγος καλεῖται; ἐσθίουσι μέν γάρ δή πάντες ἐπί τῷ σίτῳ ὄψον, ὅταν παρῇ· ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ οἶμαί πω ἐπί τούτῳ γε ὀψοφάγοι καλοῦνται. Οὐ γάρ οὖν, ἔφη τις τῶν παρόντων.	tlemen," he said, "could we say for what sort of action a man is called a relish-eater? Everyone eats relish with their bread when there is some, but I don't suppose that's what gets people called relish-eaters." "Certainly not," said one of those present.[26]
3.14.3	Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ σίτου τό ὄψον αὐτό ἐσθίῃ, μή ἀσκήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, πότερον ὀψοφάγος εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ οὔ; Σχολῇ γ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, ἄλλος τις ὀψοφάγος εἴη. καί τις ἄλλος τῶν παρόντων· Ὁ δέ μικρῷ σίτῳ, ἔφη, πολύ ὄψον ἐπεσθίων; Ἐμοί μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καί οὗτος δοκεῖ δικαίως ἄν ὀψοφάγος καλεῖσθαι· καί ὅταν γε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχωνται πολυκαρπίαν, εἰκότως ἄν οὗτος πολυοψίαν εὔχοιτο.	"Well then," he said, "if someone eats the relish by itself without bread, not for training but for pleasure, does he seem to be a relish-eater or not?" "If he isn't," the man said, "it's hard to see who else would be." And another of those present said, "What about someone who eats a lot of relish with a little bread?" "To me," said Socrates, "he too seems to deserve the name of relish-eater. And when other people pray to the gods for plenty of crops, he'd naturally pray for plenty of relish."
3.14.4	ταῦτα δέ τοῦ Σωκράτους εἰπόντος, νομίσας ὁ νεανίσκος εἰς αὐτόν εἰρῆσθαι τά λεχθέντα τό μέν ὄψον οὐκ ἐπαύσατο ἐσθίων, ἄρτον δέ προσέλαβε. καί ὁ Σωκράτης καταμαθών· Παρατηρεῖτ᾽, ἔφη, τοῦτον οἱ πλησίον, ὁπότερα τῷ σίτῳ ὄψῳ ἢ τῷ ὄψῳ σίτῳ χρήσεται.	When Socrates said this, the young man, thinking the remarks had been aimed at him, didn't stop eating his relish, but took some bread as well. And Socrates, noticing this, said, "You people next to him, keep an eye on him and see whether he'll treat the bread as relish or the relish as bread."
3.14.5	ἄλλον δέ ποτε τῶν συνδείπνων ἰδών ἐπί τῷ ἑνί ψωμῷ πλειόνων ὄψων γευόμενον· ἆρα γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, πολυτελεστέρα ὀψοποιία ἢ μᾶλλον τά ὄψα λυμαινομένη, ἢ ἥν ὀψοποιεῖται ὁ [ἅμα πολλά ἐσθίων καὶ] ἅμα παντοδαπά ἡδύσματα εἰς τό στόμα λαμβάνων; πλείω μέν γε τῶν ὀψοποιῶν συμμιγνύων πολυτελέστερα ποιεῖ· ἃ δέ ἐκεῖνοι μή συμμιγνύουσιν, ὡς οὐχ ἁρμόττοντα, ὁ συμμιγνύων, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνοι ὀρθῶς ποιοῦσιν, ἁμαρτάνει τε καί καταλύει τήν τέχνην αὐτῶν·	Another time, seeing one of his fellow diners tasting several relishes with a single mouthful of bread, he said, "Could there be any cookery more extravagant, or more ruinous to the dishes, than what's cooked up by the man who [eats many things at once and] takes all kinds of flavors into his mouth at once? By mixing more things than the cooks do, he makes it more expensive. And by mixing what they don't mix because it doesn't go together, he goes wrong, if they do it right, and undoes their art;
3.14.6	καίτοι πῶς οὐ γελοῖόν ἐστι παρασκευάζεσθαι μέν ὀψοποιούς τούς ἄριστα ἐπισταμένους, αὐτόν δέ μηδ᾽ ἀντιποιούμενον τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τά ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ποιούμενα μετατιθέναι; καί ἄλλο δέ τι προσγίγνεται τῷ ἅμα πολλά ἐπεσθίειν ἐθισθέντι· μή παρόντων γάρ πολλῶν μειονεκτεῖν ἄν τι δοκοίη ποθῶν τό σύνηθες· ὁ δέ συνεθισθείς τόν ἕνα ψωμόν ἑνί ὄψῳ προπέμπειν, ὅτε μή παρείη πολλά, δύναιτ᾽ ἄν ἀλύπως τῷ ἑνί χρῆσθαι.	and isn't it absurd to provide yourself with cooks who know their business best, and then, without even laying claim to that art yourself, rearrange what they've made? There's another consequence for the man who has gotten used to eating many things at once. When many aren't available, he'll feel he's missing something, because he longs for what he's used to. But the man used to sending his one mouthful of bread down with one relish could make do with just one, without distress, when many weren't available."
3.14.7		

26 A "relish-eater" (*opsophagos*) was the Greek word for a glutton for fancy food.

GREEK	ENGLISH
Ἔλεγε δέ καί, ὡς τό εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ ἐσθίειν καλοῖτο· τό δέ εὖ προσκεῖσθαι ἔφη ἐπί τῷ ταῦτα ἐσθίειν, ἅ μήτε τήν ψυχήν μήτε τό σῶμα λυποίη μηδέ δυσεύρετα εἴη· ὥστε καί τό εὐωχεῖσθαι τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις ἀνετίθει.	He also said that in Athenian speech *euōcheisthai*, "to feast," was used for "eating," and that the *eu*, "well," was added for eating things that would harm neither soul nor body and weren't hard to come by. And so he credited feasting, too, to those who lived orderly lives.[27]

27 *Euōcheisthai* begins with *eu*, "well," and Socrates hears it as "eating well."

Book IV

Education and death
The young Euthydemus humbled, piety, justice with Hippias, dialectic, and how Socrates died.

CHAPTER 1

Socrates adapted his teaching to different natures, from the gifted to the proud and the rich.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.1.1	Οὕτω δέ Σωκράτης ἦν ἐν παντί πράγματι καί πάντα τρόπον ὠφέλιμος, ὥστε σκοπουμένῳ τῷ καί μετρίως αἰσθανομένῳ φανερόν εἶναι ὅτι οὐδέν ὠφελιμώτερον ἦν τοῦ Σωκράτει συνεῖναι καί μετ' ἐκείνου διατρίβειν ὁπουοῦν καί ἐν ὁτῳοῦν πράγματι· ἐπεί καί τό ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι μή παρόντος οὐ μικρά ὠφέλει τούς εἰωθότας τε αὐτῷ συνεῖναι καί ἀποδεχομένους ἐκεῖνον. καί γάρ παίζων οὐδέν ἧττον ἤ σπουδάζων ἐλυσιτέλει τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι.	Socrates was so beneficial in every matter and in every way that anyone who looked into it, even someone of modest perception, could see that nothing was more beneficial than being with Socrates and spending time in his company, anywhere and in any matter whatever. Even remembering him when he wasn't there did no small good to those who were used to being with him and who valued him. Whether he was joking or in earnest, he was just as profitable to those who spent time with him.
4.1.2	πολλάκις γάρ ἔφη μέν ἄν τινος ἐρᾶν, φανερός δ' ἦν οὐ τῶν τά σώματα πρός ὥραν, ἀλλά τῶν τάς ψυχάς πρός ἀρετήν εὖ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος. ἐτεκμαίρετο δέ τάς ἀγαθάς φύσεις ἐκ τοῦ ταχύ τε μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν καί μνημονεύειν ἅ μάθοιεν καί ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων δι ὧν ἔστιν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καί πόλιν καί τό ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καί τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι· τούς γάρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἄν μόνον αὐτούς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καί τούς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλά καί ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καί πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν.	He would often say, for instance, that he was in love with someone. But it was clear that what drew him was not bodies naturally endowed with youthful beauty but souls naturally well suited to excellence. He judged good natures by how quickly they learned whatever they turned their minds to, how well they remembered what they had learned, and whether they desired all the kinds of learning by which one can manage a household and a city well and, in short, deal well with human beings and human affairs. He thought that people like this, once educated, would not only be happy themselves and manage their own households well, but would also be able to make other people and whole cities happy.
4.1.3	οὐ τόν αὐτόν δέ τρόπον ἐπί πάντας ᾔει, ἀλλά τούς μέν οἰομένους φύσει ἀγαθούς εἶναι, μαθήσεως δέ καταφρονοῦντας ἐδίδασκεν ὅτι αἱ ἄρισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις μάλιστα παιδείας δέονται, ἐπιδεικνύων τῶν τε ἵππων τούς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καί σφοδρούς ὄντας, εἰ μέν ἐκ νέων δαμασθεῖεν, εὐχρηστοτάτους καί ἀρίστους γιγνομένους, εἰ δέ ἀδάμαστοι γένοιντο, δυσκαθεκτοτάτους καί φαυλοτάτους· καί τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καί ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τάς μέν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι πρός	He did not approach everyone in the same way. Those who thought they were good by nature and looked down on learning he taught that the natures that seem best are the ones most in need of education. He pointed out that the most gifted horses, spirited and vigorous as they are, become the most serviceable and the best if they are broken in young, but if they are left unbroken they become the hardest to control and the worst. And the most gifted dogs, hard-working and keen to go

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τάς θήρας καί χρησιμωτάτας, ἀναγώγους δέ γιγνομένας ματαίους τε καί μανιώδεις καί δυσπειθεστάτας.	after game, become the best and most useful for hunting if they are well trained, but if they go untrained they turn out useless, crazed and utterly disobedient.
4.1.4	ὁμοίως δέ καί τῶν ἀνθρώπων τούς εὐφυεστάτους, ἐρρωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας καί ἐξεργαστικωτάτους ὧν ἄν ἐγχειρῶσι, παιδευθέντας μέν καί μαθόντας, ἅ δεῖ πράττειν, ἀρίστους τε καί ὠφελιμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· πλεῖστα γάρ καί μέγιστα ἀγαθά ἐργάζεσθαι· ἀπαιδεύτους δέ καί ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καί βλαβερωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· κρίνειν γάρ οὐκ ἐπισταμένους, ἅ δεῖ πράττειν, πολλάκις πονηροῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι, μεγαλείους δέ καί σφοδρούς ὄντας δυσκαθέκτους τε καί δυσαποτρέπτους εἶναι, διό πλεῖστα καί μέγιστα κακά ἐργάζεσθαι.	In the same way, he said, the most gifted human beings, with the strongest souls and the greatest capacity for carrying through whatever they take in hand, become the best and most beneficial if they are educated and learn what they ought to do, since they accomplish the most and the greatest goods. But if they stay uneducated and ignorant, they become the worst and most harmful. Not knowing how to judge what they ought to do, they often set their hands to wicked undertakings, and because they are grand and forceful they are hard to restrain and hard to turn aside. That is why they accomplish the most and the greatest evils.
4.1.5	τούς δ' ἐπί πλούτῳ μέγα φρονοῦντας καί νομίζοντας οὐδέν προσδεῖσθαι παιδείας, ἐξαρκέσειν δέ σφίσι τόν πλοῦτον οἰομένους πρός τό διαπράττεσθαί τε ὅ τι ἄν βούλωνται καί τιμᾶσθαι ὑπό τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐφρένου λέγων, ὅτι μῶρος μέν εἴη, εἴ τις οἴεται μή μαθών τά τε ὠφέλιμα καί τά βλαβερά τῶν πραγμάτων διαγνώσεσθαι, μῶρος δ', εἴ τις μή διαγιγνώσκων μέν ταῦτα, διά δέ τόν πλοῦτον ὅ τι ἄν βούληται ποριζόμενος οἴεται δυνήσεσθαι τά συμφέροντα πράττειν, ἠλίθιος δ', εἴ τις μή δυνάμενος τά συμφέροντα πράττειν εὖ τε πράττειν οἴεται καί τά πρός τόν βίον αὐτῷ [ἤ καλῶς ἤ] ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, ἠλίθιος δέ καί, εἴ τις οἴεται διά τόν πλοῦτον, μηδέν ἐπιστάμενος, δόξειν τι ἀγαθός εἶναι ἤ, μηδέν ἀγαθός εἶναι δοκῶν, εὐδοκιμήσειν.	Then there were those who prided themselves on their wealth, thought they needed no education besides, and supposed their wealth would be enough for them to accomplish whatever they wanted and to be honored by people. He brought them to their senses by saying this. A man is a fool if he thinks he will tell beneficial things from harmful ones without having learned how. He is a fool, too, if he can't tell them apart but thinks that, because his wealth gets him whatever he wants, he will be able to do what is to his advantage. He is an idiot if, unable to do what is to his advantage, he thinks he is doing well and that he has provided himself [either finely or] adequately with what he needs for life. And he is an idiot also if he thinks his wealth will get him a reputation for being good at something when he knows nothing, or a good name when he is thought good for nothing.

CHAPTER 2

Socrates humbles the young Euthydemus, proud of his books, until he admits he knows nothing.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.2.1	Τοῖς δέ νομίζουσι παιδείας τε τῆς ἀρίστης τετυχηκέναι καί μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπί σοφίᾳ ὡς προσεφέρετο, νῦν διηγήσομαι. καταμαθών γάρ Εὐθύδημον τόν καλόν γράμματα πολλά συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καί σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων καί ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τε νομίζοντα διαφέρειν τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἐν σοφίᾳ καί μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα πάντων διοίσειν τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καί πράττειν, πρῶτον μέν, αἰσθανόμενος αὐτόν	I will now relate how he dealt with those who thought they had received the best education and prided themselves on their wisdom. He had learned that Euthydemus the handsome had collected many writings of the most celebrated poets and sophists. On the strength of these, Euthydemus already believed he surpassed those of his own age in wisdom, and he had high hopes of sur-

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	διά νεότητα οὔπω εἰς τήν ἀγοράν εἰσιόντα, εἰ δέ τι βούλοιτο διαπράξασθαι, καθίζοντα εἰς ἡνιοποιεῖόν τι τῶν ἐγγύς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτο καί αὐτός ᾔει τῶν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τινας ἔχων.	passing everyone in the ability to speak and act. Socrates noticed that, being so young, he didn't yet go into the marketplace, but when he wanted to get some business done he would sit in a harness-maker's shop near the marketplace. So, to begin with, Socrates went there too, taking some of his companions with him.
4.2.2	καί πρῶτον μέν πυνθανομένου τινός, πότερον Θεμιστοκλῆς διά συνουσίαν τινός τῶν σοφῶν ἤ φύσει τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥστε πρός ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλέπειν τήν πόλιν, ὁπότε σπουδαίου ἀνδρός δεηθείη, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος κινεῖν τόν Εὐθύδημον εὖηθες ἔφη εἶναι τό οἴεσθαι τάς μέν ὀλίγου ἀξίας τέχνας μή γίγνεσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνευ διδασκάλων ἱκανῶν, τό δέ προεστάναι πόλεως, πάντων ἔργων μέγιστον ὄν, ἀπό ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.	First, someone asked whether it was through associating with one of the wise men or by nature that Themistocles so far surpassed his fellow citizens that the city looked to him whenever it needed a capable man. Socrates, wanting to stir Euthydemus up, said it was naive to think that in crafts of little worth people don't become accomplished without competent teachers, but that presiding over a city, the greatest work of all, comes to people of its own accord.[1]
4.2.3	πάλιν δέ ποτε παρόντος τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, ὁρῶν αὐτόν ἀποχωροῦντα τῆς συνεδρίας καί φυλαττόμενον μή δόξῃ τόν Σωκράτη θαυμάζειν ἐπί σοφίᾳ· Ὅτι μέν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Εὐθύδημος οὑτοσί ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος, τῆς πόλεως λόγον περί τινος προτιθείσης, οὐκ ἀφέξεται τοῦ συμβουλεύειν, εὔδηλον ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἐπιτηδεύει· δοκεῖ δέ μοι καλόν προοίμιον τῶν δημηγοριῶν παρασκευάσασθαι φυλαττόμενος μή δόξῃ μανθάνειν τι παρά του. δῆλον γάρ ὅτι λέγειν ἀρχόμενος ὧδε προοιμιάσεται	Another time, when Euthydemus was there, Socrates saw him withdrawing from the group and taking care not to seem to admire Socrates for his wisdom. "Gentlemen," he said, "it's quite clear from what our Euthydemus here is up to that when he comes of age and the city puts some matter up for debate, he won't hold back from giving advice. And it seems to me he has prepared a fine introduction for his public speeches, taking care not to seem to learn anything from anyone. Obviously, when he begins to speak, he will open like this:
4.2.4	Παρ' οὐδενός μέν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδέν ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ἀκούων τινάς εἶναι λέγειν τε καί πράττειν ἱκανούς ἐζήτησα τούτοις ἐντυχεῖν, οὐδ' ἐπεμελήθην τοῦ διδάσκαλόν τινά μοι γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ἀλλά καί τἀναντία· διατετέλεκα γάρ φεύγων οὐ μόνον τό μανθάνειν τι παρά τινος, ἀλλά καί τό δόξαι. ὅμως δέ ὅ τι ἄν ἀπό ταὐτομάτου ἐπίῃ μοι συμβουλεύσω ὑμῖν	"'Men of Athens, I have never learned anything from anyone. When I heard that certain people were capable speakers and men of action, I never sought to meet them, nor did I take any trouble to have one of the experts as my teacher. Quite the opposite: I have spent my whole life avoiding not only learning anything from anyone, but even seeming to. Nevertheless, I will advise you of whatever comes into my head of its own accord.'
4.2.5	ἁρμόσειε δ' ἄν οὕτω προοιμιάζεσθαι καί τοῖς βουλομένοις παρά τῆς πόλεως ἰατρικόν ἔργον λαβεῖν· ἐπιτήδειόν γ' ἄν αὐτοῖς εἴη τοῦ λόγου ἄρχεσθαι ἐντεῦθεν· Παρ' οὐδενός μέν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τήν ἰατρικήν τέχνην ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ἐζήτησα διδάσκαλον ἐμαυτῷ γενέσθαι τῶν ἰατρῶν οὐδένα· διατετέλεκα γάρ φυλαττόμενος οὐ μόνον τό μαθεῖν τι παρά τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἀλλά καί τό δόξαι	"This would be a suitable way to open for people who want the city to give them a post as a doctor, too. It would be fitting for them to begin their speech like this: 'Men of Athens, I have never learned the art of medicine from anyone, nor have I sought to have any doctor as my teacher. I have spent my whole life taking care not only to avoid

1 Themistocles was the Athenian statesman and general who led the Greek fleet to victory over the Persians at Salamis in 480 BC.

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	μεμαθηκέναι τήν τέχνην ταύτην. ὅμως δέ μοι τό ἰατρικόν ἔργον δότε· πειράσομαι γάρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων μανθάνειν πάντες οὖν οἱ παρόντες ἐγέλασαν ἐπί τῷ προοιμίῳ.	learning anything from doctors, but even to avoid seeming to have learned this art. Nevertheless, give me the post as doctor. I'll try to learn by taking my chances on you.'" Everyone present laughed at the introduction.[2]
4.2.6	ἐπεί δέ φανερός ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἤδη μέν οἷς ὁ Σωκράτης λέγοι προσέχων, ἔτι δέ φυλαττόμενος αὐτός τι φθέγγεσθαι καί νομίζων τῇ σιωπῇ σωφροσύνης δόξαν περιβάλλεσθαι, τότε ὁ Σωκράτης, βουλόμενος αὐτόν παῦσαι τούτου· Θαυμαστόν γάρ, ἔφη, τί ποτε οἱ βουλόμενοι κιθαρίζειν ἤ αὐλεῖν ἤ ἱππεύειν ἤ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἱκανοί γενέσθαι πειρῶνται ὡς συνεχέστατα ποιεῖν, ὅ τι ἄν βούλωνται δυνατοί γενέσθαι, καί οὐ καθ' ἑαυτούς, ἀλλά παρά τοῖς ἀρίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάντα ποιοῦντες καί ὑπομένοντες ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδέν ἄνευ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως ἀξιόλογοι γενόμενοι· τῶν δέ βουλομένων δυνατῶν γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καί πράττειν τά πολιτικά νομίζουσί τινες ἄνευ παρασκευῆς καί ἐπιμελείας αὐτόματοι ἐξαίφνης δυνατοί ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔσεσθαι.	By now it was clear that Euthydemus was paying attention to what Socrates said, but he was still careful not to utter a word himself, thinking that by keeping silent he was clothing himself in a reputation for moderation. Socrates, wanting to put a stop to this, said, "It's astonishing. People who want to become capable at playing the lyre or the pipes or at riding, or at anything else of the kind, try to practice whatever they want to be able to do as constantly as possible—and not on their own, but under those reputed to be the best. They do and endure everything so as to do nothing without their teachers' judgment, believing they could never amount to anything otherwise. Yet among those who want to become able to speak and act in public affairs, some think that without preparation or effort they will suddenly, all by themselves, be able to do it.
4.2.7	καίτοι γε τοσούτῳ ταῦτα ἐκείνων δυσκατεργαστότερα φαίνεται, ὅσῳπερ πλειόνων περί ταῦτα πραγματευομένων ἐλάττους οἱ κατεργαζόμενοι γίγνονται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καί ἐπιμελείας δέονται πλείονος καί ἰσχυροτέρας οἱ τούτων ἐφιέμενοι ἤ οἱ ἐκείνων.	"And yet these things are evidently harder to accomplish than those, to the degree that more people busy themselves with them and fewer succeed. So it's clear that those who aim at these need more effort, and more intense effort, than those who aim at the others."
4.2.8	κατ' ἀρχάς μέν οὖν ἀκούοντος Εὐθυδήμου τοιούτους λόγους ἔλεγε Σωκράτης· ὡς δ' ᾔσθετο αὐτόν ἑτοιμότερον ὑπομένοντα, ὅτε διαλέγοιτο, καί προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα, μόνος ἦλθεν εἰς τό ἡνιοποιεῖον, παρακαθεζομένου δ' αὐτῷ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἐγώ ἀκούω, πολλά γράμματα συνῆχας τῶν λεγομένων σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γεγονέναι; καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος· Νή τόν Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· καί ἔτι γε συνάγω, ἕως ἄν κτήσωμαι ὡς ἄν δύνωμαι πλεῖστα.	At first, then, Socrates said things like this while Euthydemus listened. But when he noticed that Euthydemus was more willing to stay while he conversed and listened more eagerly, he went to the harness-maker's shop alone. When Euthydemus sat down beside him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true, as I hear, that you've collected many writings by men who are said to have been wise?" And Euthydemus said, "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and I'm still collecting them, until I have as many as I possibly can."
4.2.9	Νή τήν Ἥραν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἄγαμαί γέ σου, διότι οὐκ ἀργυρίου καί χρυσίου προείλου θησαυρούς κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἤ σοφίας· δῆλον γάρ ὅτι νομίζεις ἀργύριον καί χρυσίον οὐδέν βελτίους ποιεῖν τούς ἀνθρώπους, τάς δέ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἀρετῇ πλουτίζειν τούς	"By Hera," said Socrates, "I do admire you for choosing to possess treasures of wisdom rather than of silver and gold. Clearly you think silver and gold make people no better, while the thoughts of wise men make those who possess

2 Greek cities appointed and paid public doctors, who were chosen by the Assembly.

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	κεκτημένους. καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔχαιρεν ἀκούων ταῦτα, νομίζων δοκεῖν τῷ Σωκράτει ὀρθῶς μετιέναι τήν σοφίαν. ὁ δέ καταμαθών αὐτόν ἡσθέντα τῷ ἐπαίνῳ τούτῳ·	them rich in excellence." Euthydemus was delighted to hear this, thinking Socrates believed he was going about the pursuit of wisdom the right way. Socrates noticed that he was pleased by this praise, and said:
4.2.10	Τί δέ δή βουλόμενος ἀγαθός γενέσθαι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, συλλέγεις τά γράμματα; ἐπεί δέ διεσιώπησεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος σκοπῶν ὅ τι ἀποκρίναιτο, πάλιν ὁ Σωκράτης· ἆρα μή ἰατρός; ἔφη· πολλά γάρ καί ἰατρῶν ἐστι συγγράμματα. καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος· Μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἀλλά μή ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι; γνωμονικοῦ γάρ ἀνδρός καί τοῦτο δεῖ. Οὔκουν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἀλλά μή γεωμέτρης ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἔφη, γενέσθαι ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος; Οὐδέ γεωμέτρης. ἔφη. ἀλλά μή ἀστρολόγος, ἔφη, βούλει γενέσθαι; ὡς δέ καί τοῦτο ἠρνεῖτο· ἀλλά μή ῥαψῳδός; ἔφη· καί γάρ τά Ὁμήρου σέ φασιν ἔπη πάντα κεκτῆσθαι. Μά Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη· τούς γάρ τοι ῥαψῳδούς οἶδα τά μέν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας, αὐτούς δέ πάνυ ἠλιθίους ὄντας.	"And what is it you want to become good at, Euthydemus, that you collect these writings?" Euthydemus fell silent, considering what to answer, so Socrates went on: "A doctor, perhaps? There are plenty of medical writings too." And Euthydemus said, "No, by Zeus, not I." "Then do you want to become an architect? That too takes a man of judgment." "No, not I," he said. "Then do you long to become a good geometer, like Theodorus?" "Not a geometer either," he said. "Then do you want to become an astronomer?" When he denied this too, Socrates said, "A rhapsode, then? They tell me you own the complete epics of Homer." "No, by Zeus, not I," he said. "I know rhapsodes are very precise about the verses, but they themselves are complete idiots."[3]
4.2.11	καί ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Οὐ δήπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, δι' ἥν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοί γίγνονται καί οἰκονομικοί καί ἄρχειν ἱκανοί καί ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καί ἑαυτοῖς; καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς δέομαι. Νή Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τῆς καλλίστης ἀρετῆς καί μεγίστης ἐφίεσαι τέχνης ἔστι γάρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη καί καλεῖται βασιλική. ἀτάρ, ἔφη, κατανενόηκας, εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μή ὄντα δίκαιον ἀγαθόν ταῦτα γενέσθαι; Καί μάλα, ἔφη· καί οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθόν πολίτην γενέσθαι.	And Socrates said, "Surely, Euthydemus, you're not aiming at the excellence that makes people good at politics and at managing households, capable of ruling, and beneficial both to others and to themselves?" And Euthydemus said, "I want that excellence very much, Socrates." "By Zeus," said Socrates, "you're aiming at the finest excellence and the greatest art. It belongs to kings and is called the kingly art. But," he said, "have you considered whether it's possible to be good at these things without being just?" "Yes, I certainly have," he said, "and it isn't possible to become a good citizen without justice."
4.2.12	Τί οὖν; ἔφη, σύ δή τοῦτο κατείργασαι; Οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδενός ἄν ἧττον φανῆναι δίκαιος. ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, τῶν δικαίων ἐστίν ἔργα ὥσπερ τῶν τεκτόνων; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ οἱ τέκτονες ἔχουσι τά ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ἐπιδεῖξαι, οὕτως οἱ δίκαιοι τά αὐτῶν ἔχοιεν ἄν ἐξηγήσασθαι; Μή οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ δύναμαι ἐγώ τά τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; καί νή Δί' ἔγωγε τά τῆς ἀδικίας· ἐπεί οὐκ ὀλίγα ἔστι καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τοιαῦτα ὁρᾶν τε καί ἀκούειν.	"Well then," he said, "have you achieved that?" "I think, Socrates, I'd turn out to be no less just than anyone." "Do the just have works, the way carpenters do?" "Of course they do." "So just as carpenters can display their works, could the just set out theirs?" "What," said Euthydemus, "do you think I can't set out the works of justice? Yes, by Zeus, and those of injustice too, since you can see and hear quite a few of those every single day."
4.2.13	Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, γράψωμεν ἐνταυθοῖ μέν δέλτα, ἐνταυθοῖ δέ ἄλφα, εἶτα ὅ τι μέν ἄν δοκῇ ἡμῖν τῆς	"Then would you like us to write a delta here and an alpha here," said Socrates, "and then put

3 Theodorus of Cyrene was a celebrated mathematician. Rhapsodes were professional performers who recited Homer.

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	δικαιοσύνης ἔργον εἶναι, πρός τό δέλτα τιθῶμεν, ὅ τι δ' ἄν τῆς ἀδικίας, πρός τό ἄλφα; Εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, προσδεῖν τούτων, ποίει ταῦτα. καί ὁ Σωκράτης γράψας ὥσπερ εἶπεν· Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ψεύδεσθαι;	whatever seems to us a work of justice under the delta, and whatever seems a work of injustice under the alpha?" "If you think we need that, go ahead." Socrates wrote the letters as he had said and asked, "Well, there is such a thing as lying among people, isn't there?"[4]
4.2.14	Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. Ποτέρωσε οὖν, ἔφη, θῶμεν τοῦτο; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, πρός τήν ἀδικίαν. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καί ἐξαπατᾶν ἔστι; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. Τοῦτο οὖν ποτέρωσε θῶμεν; Καί τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, πρός τήν ἀδικίαν. Τί δέ τό κλέπτειν; Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη. Τό δέ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι; Καί τοῦτο. Πρός δέ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ οὐδέν ἡμῖν τούτων κείσεται, ὦ Εὐθύδημε;	"There certainly is," he said. "Which side shall we put it on, then?" "Clearly," he said, "on the side of injustice." "And there is deceiving too, isn't there?" "Very much so," he said. "Which side shall we put this on?" "This too clearly goes on the side of injustice," he said. "What about stealing?" "That too," he said. "And enslaving people?" "That too." "And none of these will be placed on the side of justice, Euthydemus?"
4.2.15	δεινόν γάρ ἄν εἴη, ἔφη. Τί δ'; ἐάν τις στρατηγός αἱρεθείς ἄδικόν τε καί ἐχθράν πόλιν ἐξανδραποδίσηται, φήσομεν τοῦτον ἀδικεῖν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Δίκαια δέ ποιεῖν οὐ φήσομεν; Καί μάλα. Τί δ'; ἐάν ἐξαπατᾷ πολεμῶν αὐτοῖς; Δίκαιον, ἔφη, καί τοῦτο. Ἐάν δέ κλέπτῃ τε καί ἁρπάζῃ τά τούτων, οὐ δίκαια ποιήσει; Καί μάλα, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἐγώ σε τό πρῶτον ὑπελάμβανον πρός τούς φίλους μόνον ταῦτα ἐρωτᾶν. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσα πρός τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν, ταῦτα καί πρός τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θετέον ἄν εἴη;	"That would be outrageous," he said. "What about this: if someone is elected general and enslaves an unjust, hostile city, shall we say he does wrong?" "Certainly not," he said. "Won't we say he acts justly?" "Of course." "And what if he deceives them while at war with them?" "That's just too," he said. "And if he steals and plunders their property, won't he be acting justly?" "Of course," he said, "but at first I took you to be asking these questions about friends only." "So everything we placed on the side of injustice would have to be placed on the side of justice too?"
4.2.16	Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω θέντες διορισώμεθα πάλιν πρός μέν τούς πολεμίους δίκαιον εἶναι τά τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν, πρός δέ τούς φίλους ἄδικον, ἀλλά δεῖν πρός γε τούτους ὡς ἁπλούστατον εἶναι;	"It seems so," he said. "Then, now that we've placed them so, would you like us to draw a new distinction: that it is just to do things like this to enemies but unjust to friends, and that toward friends, at any rate, one must be as straightforward as possible?"
4.2.17	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. Τί οὖν; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν τις στρατηγός ὁρῶν ἀθύμως ἔχον τό στράτευμα ψευσάμενος φήσῃ συμμάχους προσιέναι καί τῷ ψεύδει τούτῳ παύσῃ τῆς ἀθυμίας τούς στρατιώτας, ποτέρωθι τήν ἀπάτην ταύτην θήσομεν; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, πρός τήν δικαιοσύνην. Ἐάν δέ τις υἱόν ἑαυτοῦ δεόμενον φαρμακείας καί μή προσιέμενον φάρμακον ἐξαπατήσας ὡς σιτίον τό φάρμακον δῷ καί τῷ ψεύδει χρησάμενος οὕτως ὑγιᾶ ποιήσῃ, ταύτην αὖ τήν ἀπάτην ποῖ θετέον; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. καί ταύτην εἰς τό αὐτό. Τί δ'; ἐάν τις, ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ὄντος φίλου, δείσας, μή διαχρήσηται ἑαυτόν, κλέψῃ ἤ ἁρπάσῃ ἤ ξίφος ἤ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, τοῦτο αὖ	"By all means," said Euthydemus. "Well then," said Socrates, "suppose a general sees that his army is despondent, lies to them that allies are approaching, and with this lie stops the soldiers' despondency—which side shall we put this deception on?" "On the side of justice, I think," he said. "And suppose someone has a son who needs medicine and won't take it, and he tricks him by giving him the medicine as if it were food, and by using this lie makes him healthy—where should this deception go?" "I think that one goes in the same place," he said. "What about this: suppose a friend is des-

4 Delta and alpha are the first letters of the Greek words for justice (*dikaiosynē*) and injustice (*adikia*).

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	ποτέρωσε θετέον; Καί τοῦτο νή Δί', ἔφη, πρός τήν δικαιοσύνην.	pondent, and someone, afraid he may kill himself, steals or snatches away his sword or something of the kind—which side should this go on?" "That too, by Zeus," he said, "goes on the side of justice."
4.2.18	λέγεις, ἔφη, σύ οὐδέ πρός τούς φίλους ἅπαντα δεῖν ἁπλοίζεσθαι; Μά Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη ἀλλά μετατίθεμαι τά εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ἔξεστι. Δεῖ γέ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξεῖναι πολύ μᾶλλον ἤ μή ὀρθῶς τιθέναι.	"You're saying," he said, "that one shouldn't be straightforward in everything even with friends?" "No, by Zeus, one certainly shouldn't," he said, "and I take back what I said earlier, if I'm allowed." "You certainly ought to be allowed," said Socrates, "far rather than placing things incorrectly."
4.2.19	τῶν δέ δή τούς φίλους ἐξαπατώντων ἐπί βλάβῃ, ἵνα μηδέ τοῦτο παραλίπωμεν ἄσκεπτον, πότερος ἀδικώτερός ἐστιν, ὁ ἑκών ἤ ὁ ἄκων; ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μέν ἔγωγε πιστεύω οἷς ἀποκρίνομαι· καί γάρ τά πρόσθεν πάντα νῦν ἄλλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ μοι, ἤ ὡς ἐγώ τότε ᾤμην· ὅμως δέ εἰρήσθω μοι ἀδικώτερον εἶναι τόν ἑκόντα ψευδόμενον τοῦ ἄκοντος.	"Now, so that we don't leave this unexamined either: of those who deceive their friends to do them harm, which is more unjust, the one who does it deliberately or the one who does it involuntarily?" "Well, Socrates, I no longer trust my own answers. Everything we said before now seems to me to be different from what I thought then. Still, let me say that the one who lies deliberately is more unjust than the one who lies involuntarily."
4.2.20	δοκεῖ δέ σοι μάθησις καί ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι ὥσπερ τῶν γραμμάτων; Ἔμοιγε. Πότερον δέ γραμματικώτερον κρίνεις, ὅς ἄν ἑκών μή ὀρθῶς γράφῃ καί ἀναγιγνώσκῃ ἤ ὅς ἄν ἄκων; Ὅς ἄν ἑκών, ἔγωγε· δύναιτο γάρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιτο, καί ὀρθῶς αὐτά ποιεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μέν ἑκών μή ὀρθῶς γράφων γραμματικός ἄν εἴη, ὁ δέ ἄκων ἀγράμματος; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; Τά δίκαια δέ πότερον ὁ ἑκών ψευδόμενος καί ἐξαπατῶν οἶδεν ἤ ὁ ἄκων; Δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἑκών. Οὐκοῦν γραμματικώτερον μέν τόν ἐπιστάμενον γράμματα τοῦ μή ἐπισταμένου φῄς εἶναι; Ναί. δικαιότερον δέ τόν ἐπιστάμενον τά δίκαια τοῦ μή ἐπισταμένου; Φαίνομαι· δοκῶ δέ μοι καί ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως λέγειν.	"Do you think there is learning and knowledge of what is just, as there is of letters?" "I do." "Which do you judge more literate: the one who writes and reads incorrectly deliberately, or the one who does it involuntarily?" "The one who does it deliberately, I'd say, since he could also do it correctly whenever he wanted." "So the one who writes incorrectly on purpose would be literate, and the one who does it involuntarily illiterate?" "Of course." "And which one knows what is just: the one who lies and deceives deliberately, or the one who does it involuntarily?" "Clearly the one who does it deliberately." "So you say the one who knows his letters is more literate than the one who doesn't?" "Yes." "And the one who knows what is just is more just than the one who doesn't?" "Apparently I do. But I seem to be saying this too without knowing how."
4.2.21	Τί δέ δή; ὅς ἄν βουλόμενος τἀληθῆ λέγειν μηδέποτε ταὐτά περί τῶν αὐτῶν λέγῃ, ἀλλ' ὁδόν τε φράζων τήν αὐτήν τοτέ μέν πρός ἕω, τοτέ δέ πρός ἑσπέραν φράζῃ, καί λογισμόν ἀποφαινόμενος τόν αὐτόν τοτέ μέν πλείω, τοτέ δ' ἐλάττω ἀποφαίνηται, τί σοι δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος; Δῆλος νή Δί' εἶναι ὅτι ἃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ οἶδεν.	"And what about this: someone who wants to tell the truth but never says the same things about the same matters—giving directions for the same road, he says one time that it goes east and another time west, and presenting the same calculation, he gives a larger total one time and a smaller one another—what do you think of a person like that?" "By Zeus, it's clear that he doesn't know what he thought he knew."

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4.2.22	Οἶσθα δέ τινας ἀνδραποδώδεις καλουμένους; ἔγωγε. Πότερον διά σοφίαν ἤ δι' ἀμαθίαν; δῆλον ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν. ἆρ' οὖν διά τήν τοῦ χαλκεύειν ἀμαθίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου τυγχάνουσιν; Οὐ δῆτα. ἀλλ' ἄρα διά τήν τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι; Οὐδέ διά ταύτην. Ἀλλά διά τήν τοῦ σκυτεύειν; Οὐδέ δι' ἕν τούτων, ἔφη, ἀλλά καί τοὐναντίον· οἱ γάρ πλεῖστοι τῶν γε τά τοιαῦτα ἐπισταμένων ἀνδραποδώδεις εἰσίν. ἆρ' οὖν τῶν τά καλά καί ἀγαθά καί δίκαια μή εἰδότων τό ὄνομα τοῦτ' ἐστίν;	"Do you know of some people who are called slavish?" "I do." "Is that because of wisdom or because of ignorance?" "Clearly because of ignorance." "Do they get this name because they're ignorant of metalworking?" "Certainly not." "Of carpentry, then?" "Not for that either." "Of shoemaking?" "Not for any of these," he said, "quite the opposite: most of those who do know such things are slavish." "Then does this name belong to those who don't know what is fine and good and just?"
4.2.23	Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ παντί τρόπῳ διατειναμένους φεύγειν ὅπως μή ἀνδράποδα ὦμεν. Ἀλλά νή τούς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ ᾤμην φιλοσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν δι' ἧς ἄν μάλιστα ἐνόμιζον παιδευθῆναι τά προσήκοντα ἀνδρί καλοκαγαθίας ὀρεγομένῳ· νῦν δέ πῶς οἴει με ἀθύμως ἔχειν, ὁρῶντα ἐμαυτόν διά μέν τά προπεπονημένα οὐδέ τό ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι δυνάμενον ὑπέρ ὧν μάλιστα χρή εἰδέναι, ἄλλην δέ ὁδόν οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα ἥν ἄν πορευόμενος βελτίων γενοίμην;	"I think so," he said. "So we must strain every nerve, in every way, to avoid being slaves." "But by the gods, Socrates," he said, "I really did think I was pursuing the kind of philosophy through which I believed I would best be educated in what befits a man who aspires to gentlemanly excellence. Now how despondent do you think I am, seeing that for all my previous labors I can't even answer a question about the things one most needs to know, and that I have no other road to travel by which I might become better?"
4.2.24	καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· εἰς Δελφούς δέ ἦδη πώποτε ἀφίκου; Καί δίς γε νή Δί', ἔφη. Κατέμαθες οὖν πρός τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τό Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν ἤ προσέσχες τε καί ἐπεχείρησας σαυτόν ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅστις εἶης; Μά Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· καί γάρ δή πάνυ τοῦτό γε ᾤμην εἰδέναι· σχολῇ γάρ ἄν ἄλλο τι ἤδη, εἴ γε μηδ' ἐμαυτόν ἐγίγνωσκον.	And Socrates said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?" "Twice, by Zeus," he said. "Then did you notice the inscription somewhere on the temple, 'Know yourself'?" "I did." "Did you pay no attention to the inscription, or did you take note of it and try to examine yourself, what sort of person you are?" "No, by Zeus, I certainly didn't," he said, "because I was quite sure I knew that already. I'd hardly know anything else if I didn't even know myself."
4.2.25	Πότερα δέ σοι δοκεῖ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, ὅστις τοὔνομα τό ἑαυτοῦ μόνον οἶδεν, ἤ ὅστις, ὥσπερ οἱ τούς ἵππους ὠνούμενοι οὐ πρότερον οἴονται γιγνώσκειν ὅν ἄν βούλωνται γνῶναι, πρίν ἄν ἐπισκέψωνται, πότερον εὐπειθής ἐστιν ἤ δυσπειθής, καί πότερον ἰσχυρός ἤ ἀσθενής, καί πότερον ταχύς ἤ βραδύς, καί τἆλλα τά πρός τήν τοῦ ἵππου χρείαν ἐπιτήδειά τε καί ἀνεπιτήδεια ὅπως ἔχει, οὕτως ἑαυτόν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρός τήν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν, ἔγνωκε τήν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν; Οὕτως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ μή εἰδώς τήν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν.	"Which do you think knows himself: the one who knows only his own name, or the one who does what people buying horses do? They don't think they know the horse they want to know until they've examined whether it's obedient or unruly, strong or weak, fast or slow, and how it stands in all the other respects that make a horse suitable or unsuitable for use. Isn't it the one who has examined himself in the same way, what he is like for human use, who knows his own capacity?" "It seems to me," he said, "that the one who doesn't know his own capacity doesn't know himself."
4.2.26	Ἐκεῖνο δέ οὐ φανερόν, ἔφη, ὅτι διά μέν τό εἰδέναι ἑαυτούς πλεῖστα ἀγαθά πάσχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, διά δέ τό ἐψεῦσθαι ἑαυτῶν πλεῖστα κακά; οἱ μέν γάρ εἰδότες	"And isn't this clear," he said, "that through knowing themselves people meet with the most good things, and through being mistaken about them-

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	ἑαυτούς τά τε ἐπιτήδεια ἑαυτοῖς ἴσασι καί διαγιγνώσκουσιν ἅ τε δύνανται καί ἃ μή· καί ἃ μέν ἐπίστανται πράττοντες πορίζονταί τε ὧν δέονται καί εὖ πράττουσιν, ὧν δέ μή ἐπίστανται ἀπεχόμενοι ἀναμάρτητοι γίγνονται καί διαφεύγουσι τό κακῶς πράττειν· διά τοῦτο δέ καί τούς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους δυνάμενοι δοκιμάζειν καί διά τῆς τῶν ἄλλων χρείας τά τε ἀγαθά πορίζονται καί τά κακά φυλάττονται.	selves the most bad ones? Those who know themselves know what is suitable for them and can tell what they are able to do and what they aren't. By doing what they understand, they get what they need and do well; by keeping away from what they don't understand, they make no mistakes and escape doing badly. Because of this they are also able to assess other people, and through their dealings with others they gain good things and guard against bad ones.
4.2.27	οἱ δέ μή εἰδότες, ἀλλά διεψευσμένοι τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως πρός τε τούς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καί τἆλλα ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα ὁμοίως διάκεινται, καί οὔτε ὧν δέονται ἴσασιν οὔτε ὅ τι πράττουσιν οὔτε οἷς χρῶνται, ἀλλά πάντων τούτων διαμαρτάνοντες τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀποτυγχάνουσι καί τοῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι.	"But those who don't know themselves, and are mistaken about their own capacity, are in the same state with regard to other people and other human affairs. They know neither what they need nor what they're doing nor whom they're dealing with, and by going wrong in all these things they miss out on the good things and run into the bad ones.
4.2.28	καί οἱ μέν εἰδότες ὅ τι ποιοῦσιν, ἐπιτυγχάνοντες ὧν πράττουσιν, εὔδοξοί τε καί τίμιοι γίγνονται· καί οἵ τε ὅμοιοι τούτοις ἡδέως χρῶνται, οἵ τε ἀποτυγχάνοντες τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσι τούτους ὑπέρ αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι, καί προΐστασθαί γε αὐτῶν τούτους, καί τάς ἐλπίδας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔχουσι, καί διά [πάντα] ταῦτα πάντων μάλιστα τούτους ἀγαπῶσιν.	"Those who know what they are doing succeed in what they undertake and become well regarded and honored. People like them enjoy dealing with them, and those who fail in their affairs want these men to deliberate on their behalf and to take the lead for them. They place their hopes of good things in them, and for [all] these reasons they love them above everyone else.
4.2.29	οἱ δέ μή εἰδότες ὅ τι ποιοῦσι, κακῶς τε αἱρούμενοι καί οἷς ἄν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν ἀποτυγχάνοντες, οὐ μόνον ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ζημιοῦνταί τε καί κολάζονται, ἀλλά καί ἀδοξοῦσι διά ταῦτα καί καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται καί καταφρονούμενοι καί ἀτιμαζόμενοι ζῶσιν. ὁρᾷς δέ καί τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ὅσαι ἄν ἀγνοήσασαι τήν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν κρείττοσι πολεμήσωσιν, αἱ μέν ἀνάστατοι γίγνονται, αἱ δ' ἐξ ἐλευθέρων δοῦλαι.	"But those who don't know what they are doing choose badly and fail in whatever they attempt. Not only are they penalized and punished in these very matters, but because of them they also lose their reputations, become laughingstocks, and live despised and dishonored. And you see that among cities too, those that go to war with stronger powers in ignorance of their own capacity are either laid waste or reduced from freedom to slavery."
4.2.30	καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος· Ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί πολλοῦ ποιητέον εἶναι τό ἑαυτόν γιγνώσκειν, οὕτως ἴσθι· ὁπόθεν δέ χρή ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτόν, τοῦτο πρός σέ ἀποβλέπω εἴ μοι ἐθελήσαις ἄν ἐξηγήσασθαι.	And Euthydemus said, "Rest assured, Socrates, that I think knowing oneself is something to be taken very seriously. But where one should start examining oneself—for that I'm looking to you, in case you'd be willing to explain it to me."
4.2.31	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τά μέν ἀγαθά καί τά κακά ὁποῖά ἐστι πάντως που γιγνώσκεις; Νή Δί', ἔφη, εἰ γάρ μηδέ ταῦτα οἶδα, καί τῶν ἀνδραπόδων φαυλότερος ἄν εἴην. Ἴθι δή, ἔφη, καί ἐμοί ἐξήγησαι αὐτά. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· πρῶτον μέν γάρ αὐτό τό ὑγιαίνειν ἀγαθόν	"Well," said Socrates, "you surely know, I suppose, what sort of things are good and what sort are bad?" "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "for if I don't even know that, I'd be worse off than the slaves." "Come on, then," he said, "explain them to me too." "It

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	εἶναι νομίζω, τό δέ νοσεῖν κακόν· ἔπειτα καί τά αἴτια ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν καί ποτά καί βρωτά καί ἐπιτηδεύματα τά μέν πρός τό ὑγιαίνειν φέροντα ἀγαθά, τά δέ πρός τό νοσεῖν κακά.	isn't hard," he said. "First, I think being healthy is in itself a good, and being sick a bad. Then the causes of each of these—drinks and foods and habits—are good when they lead to health, and bad when they lead to sickness."
4.2.32	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καί τό ὑγιαίνειν καί τό νοσεῖν, ὅταν μέν ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτια γίγνηται, ἀγαθά ἄν εἴη, ὅταν δέ κακοῦ, κακά. Πότε δ' ἄν, ἔφη, τό μέν ὑγιαίνειν κακοῦ αἴτιον γένοιτο, τό δέ νοσεῖν ἀγαθοῦ; Ὅταν νή Δί', ἔφη, στρατείας τε αἰσχρᾶς καί ναυτιλίας βλαβερᾶς καί ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων οἱ μέν διά ῥώμην μετασχόντες ἀπόλωνται, οἱ δέ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολειφθέντες σωθῶσιν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, ὅτι καί τῶν ὠφελίμων οἱ μέν διά ῥώμην μετέχουσιν, οἱ δέ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολείπονται. Ταῦτα οὖν, ἔφη, ποτέ μέν ὠφελοῦντα, ποτέ δέ βλάπτοντα, τί μᾶλλον ἀγαθά ἤ κακά ἐστιν; Οὐδέν μά Δία φαίνεται κατά γε τοῦτον τόν λόγον.	"So then," he said, "health and sickness themselves would be goods whenever they turn out to cause something good, and bad whenever they cause something bad." "But when," he said, "could health cause something bad, and sickness something good?" "Why, by Zeus," he said, "whenever there's a disgraceful campaign, or a disastrous voyage, or many other things of that sort, and some take part because they're strong and are killed, while others are left behind because they're weak and survive." "That's true. But you see," he said, "that in beneficial things too, some take part because they're strong while others are left out because they're weak." "So these things," he said, "which sometimes benefit and sometimes harm—how are they any more good than bad?" "No, by Zeus, they don't seem to be, at least on this argument."
4.2.33	ἀλλ' ἥ γέ τοι σοφία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθόν ἐστι· ποῖον γάρ ἄν τις πρᾶγμα οὐ βέλτιον πράττοι σοφός ὤν ἤ ἀμαθής; Τί δέ; τόν Δαίδαλον, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι ληφθείς ὑπό Μίνω διά τήν σοφίαν ἠναγκάζετο ἐκείνῳ δουλεύειν καί τῆς τε πατρίδος ἅμα καί τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερήθη καί ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδιδράσκειν μετά τοῦ υἱοῦ τόν τε παῖδα ἀπώλεσε καί αὐτός οὐκ ἐδυνήθη σωθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀπενεχθείς εἰς τούς βαρβάρους πάλιν ἐκεῖ ἐδούλευε; λέγεται νή Δί', ἔφη, ταῦτα. Τά δέ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; τοῦτον γάρ δή πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς διά σοφίαν φθονηθείς ὑπό τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἀπόλλυται. λέγεται καί ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἄλλους δέ πόσους οἴει διά σοφίαν ἀνασπάστους πρός βασιλέα γεγονέναι καί ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν;	"But wisdom, Socrates, surely is a good beyond dispute. What task wouldn't a person do better if he were wise than if he were ignorant?" "Really? Haven't you heard," he said, "about Daedalus? Minos seized him because of his wisdom and forced him to be his slave. He was robbed of his homeland and his freedom alike. When he tried to escape with his son, he lost the boy and couldn't save himself either, but was carried off among the barbarians and was a slave there all over again." "That's the story, by Zeus," he said. "And haven't you heard what happened to Palamedes? Everyone sings of how Odysseus envied him for his wisdom and he was destroyed." "That's the story too," he said. "And how many others do you suppose have been hauled off to the King because of their wisdom, and are slaves there?"[5]
4.2.34	Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφιλογώτατον ἀγαθόν εἶναι τό εὐδαιμονεῖν. Εἴ γε μή τις αὐτό, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων ἀγαθῶν συντιθείη. Τί δ' ἄν, ἔφη, τῶν εὐδαιμονικῶν ἀμφίλογον εἴη; Οὐδέν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μή προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ κάλλος ἤ ἰσχύν ἤ πλοῦτον ἤ δόξαν ἤ	"It looks, Socrates," he said, "as though being happy is the least disputable good." "Unless, Euthydemus," he said, "someone builds it out of disputable goods." "And what part of happiness could be disputable?" he said. "Nothing," he said, "unless we add to it beauty or strength or wealth or repu-

5 Palamedes, a Greek hero at Troy famed for his inventions, was framed for treason by Odysseus. "The King" is the king of Persia.

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	καί τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλά νή Δία προσθήσομεν, ἔφη· πῶς γάρ ἄν τις ἄνευ τούτων εὐδαιμονοίη;	tation or something else of that kind." "But of course we'll add them, by Zeus," he said. "How could anyone be happy without these?"
4.2.35	Νή Δί', ἔφη, προσθήσομεν ἄρα, ἐξ ὧν πολλά καί χαλεπά συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· πολλοί μέν γάρ διά τό κάλλος ὑπό τῶν ἐπί τοῖς ὡραίοις παρακεκινηκότων διαφθείρονται, πολλοί δέ διά τήν ἰσχύν μείζοσιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντες οὐ μικροῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι, πολλοί δέ διά τόν πλοῦτον διαθρυπτόμενοί τε καί ἐπιβουλευόμενοι ἀπόλλυνται, πολλοί δέ διά δόξαν καί πολιτικήν δύναμιν μεγάλα κακά πεπόνθασιν.	"Then by Zeus," he said, "we'll be adding things that bring people a great deal of trouble. Many are ruined because of their beauty, by men who have gone wild over youthful looks. Many, because of their strength, take on tasks too big for them and land in no small troubles. Many, because of their wealth, are spoiled and plotted against and destroyed. And many, because of their reputation and political power, have suffered great evils."
4.2.36	ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μηδέ τό εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὀρθῶς λέγω, ὁμολογῶ μηδ' ὅ τι πρός τούς θεούς εὔχεσθαι χρή εἰδέναι. ἀλλά ταῦτα μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως διά τό σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι· ἐπεί δέ πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης παρασκευάζει προεστάναι, δῆλον ὅτι δημοκρατίαν γε οἶσθα τί ἐστι.	"Well," he said, "if I'm not even right to praise being happy, I admit I don't know what one ought to pray to the gods for either." "But maybe," said Socrates, "you've never even examined these things, because you're so sure you know them. Still, since you're preparing to be a leader in a democratically governed city, you obviously know what democracy is, at least."
4.2.37	Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι δυνατόν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν εἰδέναι μή εἰδότα δῆμον; Μά Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Καί δῆμον ἄρ' οἶσθα τί ἐστιν; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Καί τί νομίζεις δῆμον εἶναι; Τούς πένητας τῶν πολιτῶν ἔγωγε. Καί τούς πένητας ἄρα οἶσθα; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; ἆρ' οὖν καί τούς πλουσίους οἶσθα; Οὐδέν γε ἧττον ἤ καί τούς πένητας. Ποίους δέ πένητας καί ποίους πλουσίους καλεῖς; Τούς μέν, οἶμαι, μή ἱκανά ἔχοντας εἰς ἅ δεῖ τελεῖν πένητας, τούς δέ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν πλουσίους.	"Absolutely, I should think," he said. "Then do you think it's possible to know democracy without knowing the *dēmos,* the people?" "No, by Zeus, I don't." "So you know what the people is?" "I think so." "And what do you take the people to be?" "The poor among the citizens." "So you know the poor too?" "Of course." "Then do you also know the rich?" "No less than the poor." "And what sort do you call poor, and what sort rich?" "Those who don't have enough to pay for what they need, I suppose, are poor; those who have more than enough are rich."
4.2.38	Καταμεμάθηκας οὖν ὅτι ἐνίοις μέν πάνυ ὀλίγα ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα, ἀλλά καί περιποιοῦνται ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δέ πάνυ πολλά οὐχ ἱκανά ἐστι; Καί νή Δί', ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὀρθῶς γάρ με ἀναμιμνῄσκεις, οἶδα καί τυράννους τινάς, οἵ δι' ἔνδειαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι ἀναγκάζονται ἀδικεῖν.	"Have you noticed, then, that some people who have very little not only find it enough but even save something out of it, while for others a great deal isn't enough?" "Yes, by Zeus," said Euthydemus—"you're right to remind me—I even know some tyrants who are driven by want to do wrong, just like the most destitute."
4.2.39	Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τούς μέν τυράννους εἰς τόν δῆμον θήσομεν, τούς δέ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἐάν οἰκονομικοί ὦσιν, εἰς τούς πλουσίους. καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔφη· Ἀναγκάζει με καί ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἐμή φαυλότης· καί φροντίζω μή κράτιστον ᾖ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γάρ ἁπλῶς οὐδέν εἰδέναι. καί πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε καί καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ καί νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι.	"Then if that's so," said Socrates, "we'll put the tyrants among the people, and those who own little, if they manage their households well, among the rich." And Euthydemus said, "My own poor wits are obviously forcing me to agree to this too. And I'm wondering whether it would be best for me to keep quiet, since it looks as if I simply know noth-

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		ing." And he went away thoroughly dejected, despising himself and thinking he really was no better than a slave.
4.2.40	πολλοί μέν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπό Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῇσαν, οὕς καί βλακοτέρους ἐνόμιζεν· ὁ δέ Εὐθύδημος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως ἀνήρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μή ὅ τι μάλιστα Σωκράτει συνείη· καί οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη· ἔνια δέ καί ἐμιμεῖτο ὧν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήδευεν. ὁ δ', ὡς ἔγνω αὐτόν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μέν διετάραττεν, ἁπλούστατα δέ καί σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἅ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν καί ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.	Now many of those whom Socrates had put into this state never came near him again, and he regarded them as rather dull. But Euthydemus concluded that he could never become a man worth anything unless he spent as much time with Socrates as he possibly could. From then on he never left his side unless he had to, and he even imitated some of his habits. And Socrates, once he saw how he felt, unsettled him as little as possible, and explained as simply and clearly as he could what he thought one needed to know and what practices were best.

CHAPTER 3

Socrates shows Euthydemus how the gods provide for human beings and how to honor them.

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4.3.1	Τό μέν οὖν λεκτικούς καί πρακτικούς [καί μηχανικούς] γίγνεσθαι τούς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλά πρότερον τούτων ᾤετο χρῆναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι. τούς γάρ ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους ἀδικωτέρους τε καί δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.	So he was in no hurry for his companions to become good speakers and capable men of action [and inventive]; he thought that before these things they needed to acquire moderation. For he considered that those who had these abilities without being sensible were both more unjust and more capable of doing harm.
4.3.2	πρῶτον μέν δή περί θεούς ἐπειρᾶτο σώφρονας ποιεῖν τούς συνόντας. ἄλλοι μέν οὖν αὐτῷ πρός ἄλλους οὕτως ὁμιλοῦντι παραγενόμενοι διηγοῦντο· ἐγώ δέ, ὅτε πρός Εὐθύδημον τοιάδε διελέγετο, παρεγενόμην,	First of all, then, he tried to make his companions sensible about the gods. Others who were present when he spoke this way with other people have described it; but I myself was there when he had a conversation of this kind with Euthydemus:
4.3.3	Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἤδη ποτέ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, ὡς ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοί ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται κατεσκευάκασι; καί ὅς· Μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλ' οἶσθά γ', ἔφη, ὅτι πρῶτον μέν φωτός δεόμεθα, ὅ ἡμῖν οἱ θεοί παρέχουσι; Νή Δί', ἔφη, ὅ γ' εἰ μή εἴχομεν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς τυφλοῖς ἄν ἦμεν ἕνεκά γε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν. ἀλλά μήν καί ἀναπαύσεώς γε δεομένοις ἡμῖν νύκτα παρέχουσι κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον.	"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "has it ever occurred to you to think about how carefully the gods have provided what human beings need?" And he said, "No, by Zeus, it hasn't." "But you do know," he said, "that first of all we need light, and the gods supply it to us?" "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "and if we didn't have it, we'd be like the blind, for all the good our eyes would do us." "And then, since we need rest, they give us night, the loveliest time for resting."
4.3.4	Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, καί τοῦτο χάριτος ἄξιον. Οὐκοῦν καί ἐπειδή ὁ μέν ἥλιος φωτεινός ὤν τάς τε ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμῖν καί τἆλλα πάντα σαφηνίζει, ἡ δέ νύξ διά τό σκοτεινή εἶναι ἀσαφεστέρα ἐστίν, ἄστρα ἐν τῇ νυκτί ἀνέφηναν, ἅ ἡμῖν τῆς νυκτός τάς ὥρας ἐμφανίζει, καί διά τοῦτο πολλά ὧν	"Very much so," he said, "and that deserves gratitude too." "And since the sun, being bright, makes the hours of the day and everything else clear to us, while night is less clear because it's dark, haven't they made stars shine out in the night,

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	δεόμεθα πράττομεν; Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἀλλά μήν ἥ γε σελήνη οὐ μόνον τῆς νυκτός, ἀλλά καί τοῦ μηνός τά μέρη φανερά ἡμῖν ποιεῖ.	which show us the hours of the night, so that we can do many of the things we need to?" "That's so," he said. "And the moon, moreover, makes plain to us the divisions not only of the night but of the month."
4.3.5	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Τό δ', ἐπεί τροφῆς δεόμεθα, ταύτην ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδόναι καί ὥρας ἁρμοττούσας πρός τοῦτο παρέχειν, αἵ ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον ὧν δεόμεθα πολλά καί παντοῖα παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλά καί οἷς εὐφραινόμεθα;	"Certainly," he said. "And what about this: since we need food, they make the earth yield it to us, and provide seasons suited to the purpose, which furnish us not only with a great variety of the things we need but also with things we enjoy?"
4.3.6	Πάνυ, ἔφη, καί ταῦτα φιλάνθρωπα. Τό δέ καί ὕδωρ ἡμῖν παρέχειν οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξιον, ὥστε συμφύειν τε καί συναύξειν τῇ γῇ καί ταῖς ὥραις πάντα τά χρήσιμα ἡμῖν, συντρέφειν δέ καί αὐτούς ἡμᾶς καί μιγνύμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς εὐκατεργαστότερά τε καί ὠφελιμώτερα καί ἡδίω ποιεῖν αὐτά, καί ἐπειδή πλείστου δεόμεθα τούτου, ἀφθονέστατον αὐτό παρέχειν ἡμῖν; Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη, προνοητικόν.	"Yes," he said, "that too shows love for humanity." "And what about their giving us water, something so valuable? It helps the earth and the seasons bring forth and increase everything useful to us. It helps nourish us ourselves, and mixed with all our foods it makes them easier to digest, more beneficial, and more pleasant. And since we need it most of all, they supply it most abundantly." "That too," he said, "shows forethought."
4.3.7	Τό δέ καί τό πῦρ πορίσαι ἡμῖν, ἐπίκουρον μέν ψύχους, ἐπίκουρον δέ σκότους, συνεργόν δέ πρός πᾶσαν τέχνην καί πάντα ὅσα ὠφελείας ἕνεκα ἄνθρωποι κατασκευάζονται; ὡς γάρ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν οὐδέν ἀξιόλογον ἄνευ πυρός ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρός τόν βίον χρησίμων κατασκευάζονται. Ὑπερβάλλει, ἔφη, καί τοῦτο φιλανθρωπίᾳ.	"And what about their providing us with fire, a defense against cold and a defense against darkness, a helper in every craft and in everything people make for their benefit? To put it briefly, people make nothing worth mentioning among the things useful for life without fire." "That too," he said, "is a surpassing kindness to humanity."
4.3.8	Τό δέ τόν ἥλιον, ἐπειδάν ἐν χειμῶνι τράπηται, προσιέναι τά μέν ἀδρύνοντα, τά δέ ξηραίνοντα, ὧν καιρός διελήλυθε, καί ταῦτα διαπραξάμενον μηκέτι ἐγγυτέρω προσιέναι, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι φυλαττόμενον μή τι ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων βλάψῃ, καί ὅταν αὖ πάλιν ἀπιών γένηται, ἔνθα καί ἡμῖν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι, εἰ προσωτέρω ἄπεισιν, ἀποπαγησόμεθα ὑπό τοῦ ψύχους, πάλιν αὖ τρέπεσθαι καί προσχωρεῖν, καί ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἔνθα ὧν μάλιστ' ἄν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοίη; Νή τόν Δί', ἔφη, καί ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἔοικεν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γιγνομένοις.	"And what about the sun? After it turns in winter, it draws near, ripening some things and drying up others whose season is past. Having done this, it comes no closer, but turns back, careful not to harm us by heating us more than it should. And when, going away again, it reaches the point where even we can see that if it goes any farther we'll freeze solid from the cold, it turns once more and approaches, and reverses its course in just that part of the sky where it would benefit us most." "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "this too looks entirely as if it happens for the sake of human beings."
4.3.9	Τό δ', ἐπειδή καί τοῦτο φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ὑπενέγκοιμεν οὔτε τό καῦμα οὔτε τό ψῦχος, εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο, οὕτω μέν κατά μικρόν προσιέναι τόν ἥλιον, οὕτω δέ κατά μικρόν ἀπιέναι, ὥστε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἰς ἑκάτερα τά ἰσχυρότατα καθισταμένους; Ἐγώ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἤδη τοῦτο σκοπῶ, εἰ ἄρα τί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἤ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν· ἐκεῖνο δέ μόνον ἐμποδίζει με, ὅτι καί τἆλλα ζῷα τούτων μετέχει.	"And since this too is obvious, that we couldn't bear either the heat or the cold if it came on suddenly, the sun approaches so gradually and departs so gradually that we pass into the extremes of each without noticing?" "For my part," said Euthydemus, "I'm already wondering whether the gods have any other work at all than caring for hu-

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		man beings. Only one thing holds me back: the other animals share in these things too."
4.3.10	Οὐ γάρ καί τοῦτ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, φανερόν ὅτι καί ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γίγνεταί τε καί ἀνατρέφεται; τί γάρ ἄλλο ζῷον αἰγῶν τε καί οἰῶν καί βοῶν καί ἵππων καί ὄνων καί τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τοσαῦτα ἀγαθά ἀπολαύει ὅσα ἄνθρωποι; ἐμοί μέν γάρ δοκεῖ, πλείω ἤ τῶν φυτῶν· τρέφονται γοῦν καί χρηματίζονται οὐδέν ἧττον ἀπό τούτων ἤ ἀπ' ἐκείνων· πολύ δέ γένος ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μέν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένοις εἰς τροφήν οὐ χρῆται, ἀπό δέ βοσκημάτων γάλακτι καί τυρῷ καί κρέασι τρεφόμενοι ζῶσι· πάντες δέ τιθασεύοντες καί δαμάζοντες τά χρήσιμα τῶν ζώων εἴς τε πόλεμον καί εἰς ἄλλα πολλά συνεργοῖς χρῶνται.	"Well, isn't this obvious too," said Socrates, "that these animals are also born and raised for the sake of human beings? What other creature gets as much good out of goats and sheep and cattle and horses and donkeys and the other animals as human beings do? More, it seems to me, than from plants. At any rate, people feed themselves and make money from animals no less than from plants. A large part of mankind doesn't use what grows from the earth for food at all, but lives on the milk and cheese and meat of their herds. And everyone tames and breaks the useful animals and uses them as helpers in war and in many other things."
	Ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι καί τοῦτ', ἔφη ὁρῶ γάρ αὐτῶν καί τά πολύ ἰσχυρότερα ἡμῶν οὕτως ὑποχείρια γιγνόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ὅ τι ἄν βούλωνται.	"I agree with you on this too," he said, "for I see that even those of them that are far stronger than we are become so subject to human beings that people use them however they like."
4.3.11	Τό δ', ἐπειδή πολλά μέν καλά καί ὠφέλιμα, διαφέροντα δέ ἀλλήλων ἐστί, προσθεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰσθήσεις ἁρμοττούσας πρός ἕκαστα, δι' ὧν ἀπολαύομεν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τό δέ καί λογισμόν ἡμῖν ἐμφῦσαι, ᾧ περί ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα λογιζόμενοί τε καί μνημονεύοντες καταμανθάνομεν, ὅπῃ ἕκαστα συμφέρει, καί πολλά μηχανώμεθα, δι' ὧν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύομεν καί τά κακά ἀλεξόμεθα·	"And what about this: since there are many fine and beneficial things, but they differ from one another, they've given human beings senses suited to each, through which we enjoy all good things. And they've implanted reason in us, by which we reason and remember about what we perceive, and so learn how each thing is advantageous, and devise many means of enjoying good things and warding off bad ones;
4.3.12	τό δέ καί ἑρμηνείαν δοῦναι, δι ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καί κοινωνοῦμεν καί νόμους τιθέμεθα καί πολιτευόμεθα; Παντάπασιν ἐοίκασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοί πολλήν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. Τό δέ καί, ᾗ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τά συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπέρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτῃ αὐτούς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διά μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τά ἀποβησόμενα καί διδάσκοντας ᾗ ἄν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο; Σοί δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἤ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἴ γε μηδέ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπό σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρή ποιεῖν καί ἅ μή.	and they've given us language too, through which we share all good things with one another by teaching, and live in communities, and make laws, and govern ourselves as citizens?" "It looks altogether, Socrates, as though the gods take great care of human beings." "And what about this: where we're unable to foresee what will be advantageous in the future, there they themselves come to our aid, telling those who inquire through divination what will come about, and teaching them how things would turn out best?" "With you, Socrates," he said, "they seem to deal even more like friends than with other people, if they signal to you beforehand what you should do and what not, without your even asking them."
4.3.13	Ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καί σύ γνώσει, ἄν μή ἀναμένῃς ἕως ἄν τάς μορφάς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τά ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καί τιμᾶν τούς θεούς. ἐννόει	"And that I'm telling the truth you too will recognize, if you don't wait until you see the shapes of the gods, but are content to see their works and so

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	δέ ὅτι καί αὐτοί οἱ θεοί οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν· οἵ τε γάρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν τἀγαθά διδόντες οὐδέν τούτων εἰς τοὐμφανές ἰόντες διδόασι, καί ὁ τόν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καί συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλά καί ἀγαθά ἐστι, καί ἀεί μέν χρωμένοις ἀτριβῆ τε καί ὑγιᾶ καί ἀγήρατα παρέχων, θᾶττον δέ νοήματος ὑπηρετοῦντα ἀναμαρτήτως, οὗτος τά μέγιστα μέν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δέ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν.	revere and honor them. Reflect that the gods themselves point the way to this. The others, when they give us good things, never come into plain view to give any of them. And the one who orders and holds together the whole universe, in which all things are fine and good, who keeps it always unworn and healthy and ageless for those who use it, serving him without error and faster than thought—he is seen accomplishing the greatest works, but as he manages them he is invisible to us.
4.3.14	ἐννόει δ' ὅτι καί ὁ πᾶσι φανερός δοκῶν εἶναι Ἥλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτόν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ', ἐάν τις αὐτόν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεάσασθαι, τήν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται. καί τούς ὑπηρέτας δέ τῶν θεῶν εὑρήσεις ἀφανεῖς ὄντας· κεραυνός τε γάρ ὅτι μέν ἄνωθεν ἀφίεται, δῆλον, καί ὅτι οἷς ἄν ἐντύχῃ πάντων κρατεῖ, ὁρᾶται δ' οὔτ' ἐπιών οὔτ' ἐγκατασκήψας οὔτε ἀπιών· καί ἄνεμοι αὐτοί μέν οὐχ ὁρῶνται, ἅ δέ ποιοῦσι φανερά ἡμῖν ἐστι, καί προσιόντων αὐτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα. ἀλλά μήν καί ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἴπερ τι καί ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μέν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δέ οὐδ' αὐτή. ἅ χρή κατανοοῦντα μή καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τήν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τό δαιμόνιον.	"Reflect too that the sun, who seems to be plain for all to see, doesn't allow people to look at him closely; if anyone shamelessly tries to stare at him, he takes away his sight. And you'll find that the servants of the gods are invisible too. That the thunderbolt is hurled from above is clear, and that it overpowers whatever it strikes; yet it isn't seen as it comes, or as it strikes, or as it goes. The winds, too, aren't seen themselves, but what they do is plain to us, and we feel them as they approach. And then there is the human soul, which, if anything human does, shares in the divine: that it rules within us is plain, but it too is not seen. Anyone who takes these things to heart should not despise what is invisible, but learn its power from what happens, and honor the divine."
4.3.15	Ἐγώ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὅτι μέν οὐδέ μικρόν ἀμελήσω τοῦ δαιμονίου, σαφῶς οἶδα· ἐκεῖνο δέ ἀθυμῶ, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τάς τῶν θεῶν εὐεργεσίας οὐδ' ἄν εἷς ποτε ἀνθρώπων ἀξίαις χάρισιν ἀμείβεσθαι.	"For my part, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I know clearly that I won't neglect the divine in the slightest. But what disheartens me is that I don't think any human being could ever repay the gods' benefits with the gratitude they deserve."
4.3.16	Ἀλλά μή τοῦτο ἀθύμει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ὁρᾷς γάρ ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεός, ὅταν τις αὐτόν ἐπερωτᾷ πῶς ἄν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο, ἀποκρίνεται· Νόμῳ πόλεως· νόμος δέ δήπου πανταχοῦ ἐστι κατά δύναμιν ἱεροῖς θεούς ἀρέσκεσθαι. πῶς οὖν ἄν τις κάλλιον καί εὐσεβέστερον τιμῴη θεούς ἤ, ὡς αὐτοί κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν;	"Don't be disheartened about that, Euthydemus," he said. "You see that the god at Delphi, when someone asks him how he can win the favor of the gods, answers: 'By the law of your city.' And the law everywhere, surely, is to please the gods with sacrifices as far as one is able. So how could anyone honor the gods more finely or more piously than by doing as they themselves command?
4.3.17	ἀλλά χρή τῆς μέν δυνάμεως μηδέν ὑφίεσθαι· ὅταν γάρ τις τοῦτο ποιῇ, φανερός δήπου ἐστί τότε οὐ τιμῶν θεούς. χρή οὖν μηδέν ἐλλείποντα κατά δύναμιν τιμᾶν τούς θεούς θαρρεῖν τε καί ἐλπίζειν τά μέγιστα. ἀγαθά. οὐ γάρ παρ' ἄλλων γ' ἄν τις μείζω ἐλπίζων σωφρονοίη ἤ παρά τῶν τά μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδ' ἄν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἤ εἰ	"But one must not fall short of one's means in the least; for when someone does that, he is plainly not honoring the gods at that moment. So whoever falls short in nothing, but honors the gods as far as he is able, should take heart and hope for the greatest goods. For no one would be sensible in hoping for greater things from anyone other than

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	τούτοις ἀρέσκοι· ἀρέσκοι δέ πῶς ἄν μᾶλλον ἤ εἰ ὡς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς·	those who are able to benefit us most, or in hoping for them in any other way than by pleasing them; and how could he please them more than by obeying them as fully as he can?"
4.3.18	τοιαῦτα μέν δή λέγων τε καί αὐτός ποιῶν εὐσεβεστέρους τε καί σωφρονεστέρους τούς συνόντας παρεσκεύαζεν.	By saying such things, then, and acting this way himself, he made his companions more pious and more sensible.

CHAPTER 4

Socrates obeyed the laws all his life, and he argues with Hippias that the lawful is the just.

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4.4.1	ἀλλά μήν καί περί τοῦ δικαίου γε οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο ἥν εἶχε γνώμην, ἀλλά καί ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο, ἰδίᾳ τε πᾶσι νομίμως τε καί ὠφελίμως χρώμενος καί κοινῇ ἄρχουσί τε ἅ οἱ νόμοι προστάττοιεν πειθόμενος καί κατά πόλιν καί ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρά τούς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν,	As for justice, he didn't hide the view he held, but demonstrated it in action too. In private, he dealt with everyone lawfully and helpfully; in public, he obeyed the authorities in whatever the laws commanded, both in the city and on campaign, so that his good discipline made him stand out from everyone else;
4.4.2	καί ὅτε ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρά τούς νόμους ψηφίσασθαι, ἀλλά σύν τοῖς νόμοις ἠναντιώθη τοιαύτῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ δήμου ἥν οὐκ ἄν οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα ἄνθρωπον ὑπομεῖναι·	and when he was presiding over the Assembly, he would not allow the people to vote against the laws, but with the laws on his side stood up to a surge of popular feeling that I don't think any other man would have withstood;[6]
4.4.3	καί ὅτε οἱ τριάκοντα προσέταττον αὐτῷ παρά τούς νόμους τι, οὐκ ἐπείθετο· τοῖς τε γάρ νέοις ἀπαγορευόντων αὐτῶν μή διαλέγεσθαι καί προσταξάντων ἐκείνῳ τε καί ἄλλοις τισί τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαγεῖν τινα ἐπί θανάτῳ, μόνος οὐκ ἐπείσθη, διά τό παρά τούς νόμους αὐτῷ προστάττεσθαι·	and when the Thirty ordered him to do something against the laws, he would not obey. When they forbade him to converse with the young, and when they ordered him and some other citizens to arrest a man to be put to death, he alone refused, because the order he had been given was against the laws;
4.4.4	καί ὅτε τήν ὑπό Μελήτου γραφήν ἔφευγε, τῶν ἄλλων εἰωθότων ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις πρός χάριν τε τοῖς δικασταῖς διαλέγεσθαι καί κολακεύειν καί δεῖσθαι παρά τούς νόμους, καί διά τά τοιαῦτα πολλῶν πολλάκις ὑπό τῶν δικαστῶν ἀφιεμένων, ἐκεῖνος οὐδέν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρά τούς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἀλλά ῥᾳδίως ἄν ἀφεθείς ὑπό τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καί μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν ἤ παρανομῶν ζῆν.	and when he was defending himself against the indictment brought by Meletus, though others were accustomed in the courts to speak so as to win the jurors' favor, and to flatter them and plead with them in violation of the laws, and many were often acquitted by the jurors for that sort of thing, he refused to do any of the things customary in court that were against the laws. He could easily have been acquitted by the jurors if he had done even a little of this, but he chose to die abiding by the laws rather than to live by breaking them.
4.4.5	καί ἔλεγε δέ οὕτως καί πρός ἄλλους μέν πολλάκις. οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτόν καί πρός Ἱππίαν τόν Ἠλεῖον περί τοῦ	And he spoke this way too, often to others; but I know that once he also had a conversation of this kind about justice with Hippias of Elis. Hippias

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	δικαίου τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα. διά χρόνου γάρ ἀφικόμενος ὁ Ἱππίας Ἀθήναζε παρεγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει λέγοντι πρός τινας, ὡς θαυμαστόν εἴη τό, εἰ μέν τις βούλοιτο σκυτέα διδάξασθαί τινα ἢ τέκτονα ἢ χαλκέα ἢ ἱππέα, μή ἀπορεῖν ὅποι ἄν πέμψας τούτου τύχοι· φασί δέ τινες καί ἵππον καί βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστά εἶναι τῶν διδαξόντων· ἐάν δέ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτός μαθεῖν τό δίκαιον ἢ υἱόν ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μή εἰδέναι ὅποι ἄν ἐλθών τύχοι τούτου.	had come to Athens after a long absence, and he came upon Socrates telling some people how remarkable it was that if someone wants to have a person taught to be a cobbler or a carpenter or a smith or a horseman, he has no trouble knowing where to send him to get this—some say that if you want to make a horse or an ox just, the place is full of people who will teach it—but if someone wants either to learn what is just himself, or to have his son or household slave taught it, he doesn't know where he could go to get it.[7]
4.4.6	καί ὁ μέν Ἱππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν· Ἔτι γάρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνα τά αὐτά λέγεις ἃ ἐγώ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα; καί ὁ Σωκράτης· Ὅ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεί τά αὐτά λέγω, ἀλλά καί περί τῶν αὐτῶν· σύ δ' ἴσως διά τό πολυμαθής εἶναι περί τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τά αὐτά λέγεις.	And Hippias, hearing this, said, as if mocking him: "What, Socrates, are you still saying the very same things I heard from you long ago?" And Socrates said, "Yes, Hippias, and what's even more dreadful, I'm not only always saying the same things, but saying them about the same things. You, perhaps, since you know so much, never say the same things about the same things."
4.4.7	Ἀμέλει, ἔφη, πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν ἀεί. Πότερον, ἔφη, καί περί ὧν ἐπίστασαι; οἷον περί γραμμάτων ἐάν τις ἔρηταί σε, πόσα καί ποῖα Σωκράτους ἐστίν, ἄλλα μέν πρότερον, ἄλλα δέ νῦν πειρᾷ λέγειν; ἤ περί ἀριθμῶν τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν, εἰ τά δίς πέντε δέκα ἐστίν, οὐ τά αὐτά νῦν ἅ καί πρότερον ἀποκρίνει; Περί μέν τούτων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σύ, καί ἐγώ ἀεί τά αὐτά λέγω· περί μέντοι τοῦ δικαίου πάνυ οἶμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρός ἅ οὔτε σύ οὔτ' ἄν ἄλλος οὐδείς δύναιτ' ἀντειπεῖν.	"Certainly," he said, "I always try to say something new." "Even about things you know?" he said. "For instance, if someone asks you about letters—how many there are in 'Socrates,' and which ones—do you try to say one thing before and another now? Or about numbers, when people ask whether twice five is ten, don't you give the same answer now as before?" "About these things, Socrates," he said, "I always say the same, just as you do. But about justice I'm quite sure I now have something to say that neither you nor anyone else could contradict."
4.4.8	Νή τήν Ἥραν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθόν ηὑρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μέν οἱ δικασταί δίχα ψηφιζόμενοι, παύσονται δ' οἱ πολῖται περί τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καί ἀντιδικοῦντες καί στασιάζοντες, παύσονται δ' αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περί τῶν δικαίων καί πολεμοῦσαι. καί ἐγώ μέν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἄν ἀπολειφθείην σου πρό τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τηλικοῦτον ἀγαθόν ηὑρηκότος.	"By Hera," he said, "you're claiming to have found a great good, if jurors are going to stop splitting their votes, and citizens are going to stop disputing and suing and fighting factional battles over what's just, and cities are going to stop quarreling and going to war over what's just. As for me, I don't see how I could leave you before I've heard what such a great good you've found."
4.4.9	Ἀλλά μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκούσει, πρίν γ' ἄν αὐτός ἀποφήνῃ, ὅ τι νομίζεις τό δίκαιον εἶναι. ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς ἐρωτῶν μέν καί ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτός δ'	"But no, by Zeus," he said, "you won't hear it until you've declared yourself what you think justice is. It's enough that you laugh at everyone else, questioning and refuting them all, while you yourself

6 The presiding officer (*epistatēs*) chaired the Assembly for a single day, chosen by lot; this was the trial of the generals in 406 BC (see 1.1.18).
7 Hippias of Elis was a famous sophist who claimed knowledge of almost every subject. A horse or ox was called "just" when it was well trained and obedient.

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	οὐδενί ἐθέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδέ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περί οὐδενός.	are never willing to give an account to anyone or declare your opinion about anything."
4.4.10	Τί δέ, ὦ Ἱππία; ἔφη, οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, ὅτι ἐγώ ἃ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι οὐδέν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύμενος; Καί ποῖος δή σοι, ἔφη, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν; Εἰ δέ μή λόγῳ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυμαι· ἤ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τό ἔργον εἶναι; Πολύ γε νή Δί', ἔφη· δίκαια μέν γάρ λέγοντες πολλοί ἄδικα ποιοῦσι, δίκαια δέ πράττων οὐδ' ἄν εἷς ἄδικος εἴη.	"What's that, Hippias?" he said. "Haven't you noticed that I never stop declaring what I think is just?" "And just what is this account of yours?" he said. "If not in words," he said, "then I declare it in deeds. Or don't you think deeds are more reliable evidence than words?" "Far more, by Zeus," he said. "Many people who say what's just do what's unjust, but no one who does what's just could be unjust."
4.4.11	Ἤισθησαι οὖν πώποτέ μου ἤ ψευδομαρτυροῦντος ἤ συκοφαντοῦντος ἤ φίλους ἤ πόλιν εἰς στάσιν ἐμβάλλοντος ἤ ἄλλο τι ἄδικον πράττοντος; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τό δέ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι οὐ δίκαιον ἡγεῖ; δῆλος εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί νῦν διαφεύγειν ἐγχειρῶν τό ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην, ὅ τι νομίζεις τό δίκαιον· οὐ γάρ ἃ πράττουσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, ἀλλ' ἃ μή πράττουσι, ταῦτα λέγεις.	"Then have you ever noticed me giving false testimony, or bringing malicious prosecutions, or throwing friends or the city into faction, or doing anything else unjust?" "No, I haven't," he said. "And don't you consider keeping away from unjust acts to be just?" "It's clear, Socrates," he said, "that even now you're trying to escape declaring your view of what justice is. You're telling us not what just people do, but what they don't do."
4.4.12	ἀλλ' ὤμην ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τό μή θέλειν ἀδικεῖν ἱκανόν δικαιοσύνης ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι. εἰ δέ σοι μή δοκεῖ, σκέψαι, ἐάν τόδε σοι μᾶλλον ἀρέσκῃ φημί γάρ ἐγώ τό νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι. ἆρα τό αὐτό λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καί δίκαιον εἶναι;	"Well, I thought," said Socrates, "that being unwilling to do wrong was proof enough of justice. But if you don't think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just." "Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing?"
4.4.13	Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐ γάρ αἰσθάνομαί σου μᾶλλον ὁποῖον νόμιμον ἤ ποῖον δίκαιον λέγεις. Νόμους δέ πόλεως, ἔφη, γιγνώσκεις; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Καί τίνας τούτους νομίζεις; ἃ οἱ πολῖται, ἔφη, συνθέμενοι ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καί ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, νόμιμος μέν ἄν εἴη ὁ κατά ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δέ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί δίκαια μέν ἄν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος, ἄδικα δ' ὁ τούτοις ἀπειθῶν; Πάνυ μέν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μέν τά δίκαια πράττων δίκαιος, ὁ δέ τά ἄδικα ἄδικος; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; Ὁ μέν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὁ δέ ἄνομος ἄδικος.	"I do," he said. "I ask because I can't make out what sort of thing you call lawful, or what sort just." "Do you know the laws of a city?" he said. "I do," he said. "And what do you take them to be?" "What the citizens," he said, "have agreed on and written down, about what they must do and what they must keep away from." "So," he said, "one who lives as a citizen in accordance with these would be lawful, and one who transgresses them lawless?" "Certainly," he said. "And wouldn't the one who obeys them do just things, and the one who disobeys them unjust things?" "Certainly." "And isn't the one who does just things just, and the one who does unjust things unjust?" "Of course." "So the lawful man is just, and the lawless man unjust."
4.4.14	καί ὁ Ἱππίας· Νόμους δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἤ τό πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὕς γε πολλάκις αὐτοί οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται; Καί γάρ πόλεμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλάκις ἀράμεναι αἱ πόλεις πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται.	And Hippias said, "But Socrates, how could anyone think laws are a serious matter, or obeying them either, when the very people who made them often reject them and change them?" "Yes, and cities often take up war," said Socrates, "and

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	Καί μάλα, ἔφη. διάφορον οὖν τι οἴει ποιεῖν, ἔφη, τούς τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους φαυλίζων, ὅτι καταλυθεῖεν ἄν οἱ νόμοι, ἤ εἰ τούς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγοις, ὅτι γένοιτ' ἄν εἰρήνη; ἤ καί τούς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ταῖς πατρίσι προθύμως βοηθοῦντας μέμφει; Μά Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.	then make peace again." "They certainly do," he said. "So do you think you're doing anything different," he said, "when you belittle those who obey the laws because the laws might be repealed, from what you'd be doing if you criticized those who keep good discipline in war because peace might come? Or do you also find fault with those who eagerly come to the defense of their native lands in war?" "No, by Zeus, I don't," he said.
4.4.15	Λυκοῦργον δέ τόν Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καταμεμάθηκας ὅτι οὐδέν ἄν διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τήν Σπάρτην ἐποίησεν, εἰ μή τό πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μάλιστα ἐνειργάσατο αὐτῇ; τῶν δέ ἀρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι, οἵτινες ἄν τοῖς πολίταις αἰτιώτατοι ὦσι τοῦ τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, οὗτοι ἄριστοί εἰσι, καί πόλις, ἐν ᾗ μάλιστα οἱ πολῖται τοῖς νόμοις πείθονται, ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε ἄριστα διάγει καί ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν;	"And Lycurgus the Spartan," said Socrates, "have you grasped that he wouldn't have made Sparta any different from other cities if he hadn't, above all, instilled obedience to the laws in it? And among those who hold office in cities, don't you know that the ones who do most to make the citizens obey the laws are the best? And that a city where the citizens obey the laws most fares best in peace and is irresistible in war?"[8]
4.4.16	ἀλλά μήν καί ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε ἀγαθόν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι καί πλειστάκις ἐν αὐταῖς αἵ τε γερουσίαι καί οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καί πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τούς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καί πανταχοῦ ὀμνύουσι τόν ὅρκον τοῦτον· οἶμαι δ' ἐγώ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι οὐχ ὅπως τούς αὐτούς χορούς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδ' ὅπως τούς αὐτούς αὐλητάς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδ' ὅπως τούς αὐτούς ποιητάς αἱρῶνται, οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδωνται, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. τούτοις γάρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταταί τε καί εὐδαιμονέσταται γίγνονται· ἄνευ δέ ὁμονοίας οὔτ' ἄν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθείη οὔτ' οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθείη.	"And then there's concord. It's thought to be the greatest good for cities, and very often in them the councils of elders and the best men urge the citizens to be of one mind. Everywhere in Greece there's a law that citizens swear to be of one mind, and everywhere they swear this oath. I don't think this happens so that the citizens will judge the same choruses best, or praise the same pipe-players, or choose the same poets, or enjoy the same things. It happens so that they'll obey the laws. When the citizens abide by these, cities become very strong and very prosperous. Without concord, no city could be governed well and no household run well.
4.4.17	ἰδίᾳ δέ πῶς μέν ἄν τις ἧττον ὑπό πόλεως ζημιοῖτο, πῶς δ' ἄν μᾶλλον τιμῷτο, ἤ εἰ τοῖς νόμοις πείθοιτο; πῶς δ' ἄν ἧττον ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡττῷτο ἤ πῶς ἄν μᾶλλον νικῴη; τίνι δ' ἄν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε παρακαταθέσθαι ἤ χρήματα ἤ υἱούς ἤ θυγατέρας; τίνα δ' ἄν ἡ πόλις ὅλη ἀξιοπιστότερον ἡγήσαιτο τοῦ νομίμου; παρά τίνος δ' ἄν μᾶλλον τῶν δικαίων τύχοιεν ἤ γονεῖς ἤ οἰκεῖοι ἤ οἰκέται ἤ φίλοι ἤ πολῖται ἤ ξένοι; τίνι δ' ἄν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι πιστεύσειαν ἤ ἀνοχάς ἤ σπονδάς ἤ συνθήκας περί εἰρήνης; τίνι δ' ἄν μᾶλλον ἤ τῷ νομίμῳ σύμμαχοι ἐθέλοιεν γίγνεσθαι; τῷ δ' ἄν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἤ ἡγεμονίαν ἤ φρουραρχίαν ἤ πόλεις; τίνα δ' ἄν τις εὐεργετήσας ὑπολάβοι χάριν κομιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἤ τόν νόμιμον;	"And in private life, how could anyone be less likely to be penalized by the city, or more likely to be honored, than by obeying the laws? How could he be less likely to lose in the courts, or more likely to win? Whom would anyone more readily trust with a deposit, whether money or sons or daughters? Whom would the whole city consider more trustworthy than the law-abiding man? From whom would parents or relatives or household slaves or friends or fellow citizens or foreigners more likely get just treatment? Whom would enemies more readily trust with an armistice, a truce, or a peace treaty? Whose allies would people rather become than the law-abiding man's?

8 Lycurgus was the legendary lawgiver credited with founding Sparta's laws and way of life.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		And to whom would allies more readily entrust command, or a garrison, or cities? Whom would anyone who'd done a kindness more confidently expect to receive gratitude from than the law-abiding man?
	ἢ τίνα μᾶλλον ἄν τις εὐεργετήσειεν ἢ παρ' οὗ χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι νομίζει; τῷ δ' ἄν τις βούλοιτο μᾶλλον φίλος εἶναι ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἢ τῷ ἧττον ἐχθρός; τῷ δ' ἄν τις ἧττον πολεμήσειεν ἢ ᾧ μάλιστα μέν φίλος εἶναι βούλοιτο, ἥκιστα δ' ἐχθρός, καί ᾧ πλεῖστοι μέν φίλοι καί σύμμαχοι βούλοιντο εἶναι, ἐλάχιστοι δ' ἐχθροί καί πολέμιοι;	"Or whom would anyone rather do a kindness for than the one he expects to get gratitude back from? Whose friend would anyone rather be than such a man's, or whose enemy less? Whom would anyone be less inclined to make war on than the man whose friend he'd most want to be and whose enemy he'd least want to be, the man the greatest number would want to be friends and allies with, and the fewest would want to be enemies and opponents of?
4.4.18	ἐγώ μέν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τό αὐτό ἀποδείκνυμαι νόμιμόν τε καί δίκαιον εἶναι· σύ δ' εἰ τἀναντία γιγνώσκεις, δίδασκε. καί ὁ Ἱππίας· ἀλλά μά τόν Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ μοι δοκῶ τἀναντία γιγνώσκειν οἷς εἴρηκας περί τοῦ δικαίου.	"So I, Hippias, declare that the lawful and the just are the same thing. If you think the opposite, teach me." And Hippias said, "No, by Zeus, Socrates, I don't think I hold the opposite of what you've said about the just."
4.4.19	Ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, νόμους; Τούς γ' ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρᾳ κατά ταὐτά νομιζομένους. Ἔχοις ἄν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτούς ἔθεντο; Καί πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἵ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἄν δυνηθεῖεν οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι· Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τούς νόμους τούτους; Ἐγώ μέν, ἔφη, θεούς οἶμαι τούς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι· καί γάρ παρά πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται θεούς σέβειν.	"And do you know of certain unwritten laws, Hippias?" he said. "Yes, the ones observed in the same way in every land," he said. "Could you say, then, that human beings laid them down?" "How could they," he said, "when they couldn't all meet in one place and don't even speak the same language?" "Then who do you think laid down these laws?" he said. "I think," he said, "that the gods laid down these laws for human beings. After all, the first thing observed among all people is to revere the gods."
4.4.20	Οὐκοῦν καί γονέας τιμᾶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται; Καί τοῦτο, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί μήτε γονέας παισί μίγνυσθαι μήτε παῖδας γονεῦσιν; Οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος θεοῦ νόμος εἶναι. Τί δή; ἔφη. Ὅτι, ἔφη, αἰσθάνομαί τινας παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν.	"And isn't honoring parents also observed everywhere?" "That too," he said. "And also that parents shouldn't have intercourse with their children, or children with their parents?" "That one, Socrates," he said, "no longer looks to me like a law from a god." "Why not?" he said. "Because," he said, "I notice some people breaking it."
4.4.21	Καί γάρ ἄλλα πολλά, ἔφη, παρανομοῦσιν. ἀλλά δίκην γέ τοι διδόασιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τούς ὑπό τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἥν οὐδενί τρόπῳ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ διαφυγεῖν, ὥσπερ τούς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τό δίκην διδόναι, οἱ μέν λανθάνοντες, οἱ δέ βιαζόμενοι.	"Yes, and they break plenty of other laws too," he said. "But those who transgress the laws laid down by the gods pay a penalty that no human being can escape by any means. It's not like the laws laid down by human beings, which some people break and still escape paying the penalty, some by not getting caught, others by force."
4.4.22		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Καί ποίαν, ἔφη, δίκην, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δύνανται διαφεύγειν γονεῖς τε παισί καί παῖδες γονεῦσι μιγνύμενοι; Τήν μεγίστην νή Δί', ἔφη· τί γάρ ἄν μεῖζον πάθοιεν ἄνθρωποι τεκνοποιούμενοι τοῦ κακῶς τεκνοποιεῖσθαι;	"And what penalty, Socrates," he said, "is it that parents and children who have intercourse with each other can't escape?" "The greatest, by Zeus," he said. "What worse could happen to people producing children than producing them badly?"
4.4.23	Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κακῶς οὗτοι τεκνοποιοῦνται, οὕς γε οὐδέν κωλύει ἀγαθούς αὐτούς ὄντας ἐξ ἀγαθῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι; Ὅτι νή Δί', ἔφη, οὐ μόνον ἀγαθούς δεῖ τούς ἐξ ἀλλήλων παιδοποιουμένους εἶναι, ἀλλά καί ἀκμάζοντας τοῖς σώμασιν· ἤ δοκεῖ σοι ὅμοια τά σπέρματα εἶναι τά τῶν ἀκμαζόντων τοῖς τῶν μήπω ἀκμαζόντων ἤ τῶν παρηκμακότων; Ἀλλά μά Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εἰκός ὅμοια εἶναι. Πότερα οὖν, ἔφη, βελτίω; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, τά τῶν ἀκμαζόντων. Τά τῶν μή ἀκμαζόντων ἄρα οὐ σπουδαῖα; Οὐκ εἰκός μά Δί', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω γε οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιεῖσθαι; Οὐ γάρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε οὕτω παιδοποιούμενοι ὡς οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιοῦνται; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τίνες οὖν ἄλλοι, ἔφη, κακῶς ἄν παιδοποιοῖντο, εἴ γε μή οὗτοι; Ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἔφη, καί τοῦτο.	"But how do these people produce children badly," he said, "when nothing stops them, if they're good themselves, from having children by good partners?" "Because, by Zeus," he said, "people who have children by each other mustn't only be good, they must also be in their bodily prime. Or do you think the seed of those in their prime is like the seed of those not yet in their prime, or of those past it?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "it's not likely to be alike." "Which is better, then?" he said. "Obviously that of those in their prime," he said. "So that of those not in their prime isn't sound?" "Not likely, by Zeus," he said. "So that isn't the way to have children?" "Certainly not," he said. "So those who have children that way have them as they shouldn't?" "I think so," he said. "Then who else would be having children badly," he said, "if not these?" "I agree with you on this too," he said.
4.4.24	Τί δέ; τούς εὖ ποιοῦντας ἀντευεργετεῖν οὐ πανταχοῦ νόμιμόν ἐστι; Νόμιμον, ἔφη· παραβαίνεται δέ καί τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν καί οἱ τοῦτο παραβαίνοντες δίκην διδόασι, φίλων μέν ἀγαθῶν ἔρημοι γιγνόμενοι, τούς δέ μισοῦντας ἑαυτούς ἀναγκαζόμενοι διώκειν; ἤ οὐχ οἱ μέν εὖ ποιοῦντες τούς χρωμένους ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθοί φίλοι εἰσίν, οἱ δέ μή ἀντευεργετοῦντες τούς τοιούτους διά μέν τήν ἀχαριστίαν μισοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν, διά δέ τό μάλιστα λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι τούτους μάλιστα διώκουσι; Νή τόν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θείοις ταῦτα πάντα ἔοικε· τό γάρ τούς νόμους αὐτούς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τάς τιμωρίας ἔχειν βελτίονος ἤ κατ' ἄνθρωπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι.	"What about this? Isn't it lawful everywhere to repay kindness to those who treat you well?" "It is lawful," he said, "but this one gets broken too." "And don't those who break it pay a penalty, by losing good friends and being forced to chase after people who hate them? Isn't it true that those who treat well the people who deal with them are good friends, while those who don't repay such people are hated by them for their ingratitude, and yet, because it pays best to have dealings with such people, they chase after them most of all?" "By Zeus, Socrates," he said, "all this does look like the work of gods. For the laws to carry within them the punishment for those who break them seems to me the mark of a lawgiver better than any human."
4.4.25	Πότερον οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τούς θεούς ἡγεῖ τά δίκαια νομοθετεῖν ἤ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων; Οὐκ ἄλλα μά Δί', ἔφη· σχολῇ γάρ ἄν ἄλλος γέ τις τά δίκαια νομοθετήσειεν, εἰ μή θεός. Καί τοῖς θεοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τό αὐτό δίκαιόν τε καί νόμιμον εἶναι ἀρέσκει. [Τοιαῦτα λέγων τε καί πράττων δικαιοτέρους ἐποίει τούς πλησιάζοντας.]	"Then do you think, Hippias, that the gods legislate what is just, or something other than what is just?" "Nothing other, by Zeus," he said. "Hardly anyone else could legislate what is just, if not a god." "So the gods too, Hippias, are pleased to have the just and the lawful be the same." [By saying and doing such things he made those who spent time with him more just.]

CHAPTER 5

Socrates argues with Euthydemus that self-control brings freedom, true pleasure and skill in discussion.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.5.1	Ὡς δέ καί πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίει τούς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο λέξω. νομίζων γάρ ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθόν εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι καλόν τι πράξειν. πρῶτον μέν αὐτός φανερός ἦν τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἠσκηκώς αὐτόν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα διαλεγόμενος προετρέπετο πάντων μάλιστα τούς συνόντας πρός ἐγκράτειαν.	Now I'll describe how he also made his companions more capable of action. He believed that self-control is a good thing for anyone who means to accomplish anything fine. So, first, he himself was plainly, to those around him, the most rigorously trained of all people in it. Then, in conversation, he urged his companions toward self-control above all else.
4.5.2	ἀεί μέν οὖν περί τῶν πρός ἀρετήν χρησίμων αὐτός τε διετέλει μεμνημένος καί τούς συνόντας πάντας ὑπομιμνήσκων· οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτόν καί [πρός Εὐθύδημον] περί ἐγκρατείας τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἆρα καλόν καί μεγαλεῖον νομίζεις εἶναι καί ἀνδρί καί πόλει κτῆμα ἐλευθερίαν; Ὡς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα, ἔφη.	He was constantly mindful himself of what is useful for excellence, and he kept reminding all his companions of it. I know that he once had a conversation [with Euthydemus] about self-control that went like this: "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "do you think freedom is a fine and magnificent possession, both for a man and for a city?" "As fine as anything can be," he said.
4.5.3	Ὅστις οὖν ἄρχεται ὑπό τῶν διά τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καί διά ταύτας μή δύναται πράττειν τά βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι; Ἥκιστα, ἔφη. Ἴσως γάρ ἐλευθέριον φαίνεταί σοι τό πράττειν τά βέλτιστα, εἶτα τό ἔχειν τούς κωλύσοντας τά τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀνελεύθερον νομίζεις;	"Then someone who is ruled by the pleasures of the body and can't do what is best because of them —do you think he's free?" "Not in the least," he said. "Perhaps because doing what is best looks to you like what a free man does, and so having people who'll stop you from doing such things seems to you unworthy of a free man?"
4.5.4	Παντάπασί γ', ἔφη. Παντάπασιν ἄρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι εἶναι; Νή τόν Δί' εἰκότως. Πότερα δέ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς κωλύεσθαι μόνον τά κάλλιστα πράττειν ἤ καί ἀναγκάζεσθαι τά αἴσχιστα ποιεῖν Οὐδέν ἧττον ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, δοκοῦσι ταῦτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἤ ἐκεῖνα κωλύεσθαι.	"Exactly," he said. "So the uncontrolled seem to you to be utterly unfree?" "Yes, by Zeus, and naturally so." "And do the uncontrolled seem to you only to be prevented from doing the finest things, or also forced to do the most shameful?" "They seem to me," he said, "to be forced into the one no less than they're prevented from the other."
4.5.5	Ποίους δέ τινας δεσπότας ἡγεῖ τούς τά μέν ἄριστα κωλύοντας, τά δέ κάκιστα ἀναγκάζοντας; Ὡς δυνατόν νή Δί', ἔφη, κακίστους. δουλείαν δέ ποίαν κακίστην νομίζεις εἶναι; Ἐγώ μέν, ἔφη, τήν παρά τοῖς κακίστοις δεσπόταις. Τήν κακίστην ἄρα δουλείαν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύουσιν;	"And what sort of masters do you consider those who prevent the best things and compel the worst?" "The worst possible, by Zeus," he said. "And what kind of slavery do you think is worst?" "I'd say," he said, "slavery under the worst masters." "So the uncontrolled are slaves in the worst slavery?"
4.5.6	Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Σοφίαν δέ τό μέγιστον ἀγαθόν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπείργουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἀκρασία εἰς τοὐναντίον αὐτούς ἐμβάλλειν; ἤ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι προσέχειν τε τοῖς ὠφελοῦσι καί καταμανθάνειν αὐτά κωλύειν, ἀφέλκουσα ἐπί τά ἡδέα, καί πολλάκις αἰσθανομένους	"I think so," he said. "And doesn't it seem to you that lack of self-control shuts people off from wisdom, the greatest good, and drives them into its opposite? Don't you think it keeps them from paying attention to what benefits them and learning

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καί τῶν κακῶν ἐκπλήξασα ποιεῖν τό χεῖρον ἀντί τοῦ βελτίονος αἱρεῖσθαι; Γίγνεται τοῦτ', ἔφη.	it, by dragging them off toward what's pleasant—and often, when they can tell good from bad, it stuns them and makes them choose the worse instead of the better?" "That does happen," he said.
4.5.7	Σωφροσύνης δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίνι ἄν φαίημεν ἧττον ἢ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ προσήκειν; αὐτά γάρ δήπου τά ἐναντία σωφροσύνης καί ἀκρασίας ἔργα ἐστίν. Ὁμολογῶ καί τοῦτο, ἔφη. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὧν προσήκει οἴει τι κωλυτικώτερον εἶναι ἀκρασίας; Οὔκουν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τοῦ δέ ἀντί τῶν ὠφελούντων τά βλάπτοντα προαιρεῖσθαι ποιοῦντος καί τούτων μέν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐκείνων δέ ἀμελεῖν πείθοντος καί τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι τά ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζοντος οἴει τι ἀνθρώπῳ κάκιον εἶναι;	"And moderation, Euthydemus—who would we say has less to do with it than the uncontrolled person? After all, the works of moderation and of lack of self-control are exact opposites." "I agree to that too," he said. "And do you think anything gets more in the way of taking care of what one should than lack of self-control?" "No, I don't," he said. "And do you think there's anything worse for a human being than what makes him prefer the harmful to the beneficial, persuades him to take care of the one and neglect the other, and forces him to do the opposite of what sensible people do?"
4.5.8	Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τήν ἐγκράτειαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἤ τήν ἀκρασίαν εἰκός τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίαν εἶναι; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καί τῶν ἐναντίων τό αἴτιον εἰκός ἄριστον εἶναι; Εἰκός γάρ, ἔφη. Ἔοικεν ἄρ', ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐγκράτεια εἶναι;	"Nothing," he said. "So isn't it likely that self-control produces in people the opposite effects from lack of self-control?" "Certainly," he said. "And isn't what produces the opposites likely to be the best thing?" "Yes, it's likely," he said. "So it seems, Euthydemus," he said, "that self-control is the best thing for a human being?"
4.5.9	Εἰκότως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἐκεῖνο δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἤδη πώποτε ἐνεθυμήθης; Ποῖον; ἔφη. Ὅτι καί ἐπί τά ἡδέα, ἐφ' ἅπερ μόνα δοκεῖ ἡ ἀκρασία τούς ἀνθρώπους ἄγειν, αὐτή μέν οὐ δύναται ἄγειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια πάντων μάλιστα ἥδεσθαι ποιεῖ. Πῶς; ἔφη. Ἡ μέν ἀκρασία οὐκ ἐῶσα καρτερεῖν οὔτε λιμόν οὔτε δίψος οὔτε ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν οὔτε ἀγρυπνίαν, δι' ὧν μόνων ἔστιν ἡδέως μέν φαγεῖν τε καί πιεῖν καί ἀφροδισιάσαι, ἡδέως δ' ἀναπαύσασθαί τε καί κοιμηθῆναι, περιμείναντας καί ἀνασχομένους, ἕως ἄν ταῦτα ὡς ἔνι ἥδιστα γένηται, κωλύει τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις τε καί συνεχεστάτοις ἀξιολόγως ἥδεσθαι· ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια μόνη ποιοῦσα καρτερεῖν τά εἰρημένα μόνη καί ἥδεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπί τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	"Naturally, Socrates," he said. "But have you ever thought about this, Euthydemus?" "What?" he said. "That even to pleasure—the one place lack of self-control seems to lead people—it can't lead them, whereas self-control makes people enjoy things more than anything does." "How so?" he said. "Lack of self-control won't let people endure hunger or thirst or sexual desire or lack of sleep. Yet these are the only ways to eat and drink and make love with pleasure, and to rest and sleep with pleasure, by waiting and holding out until these things are as pleasant as they can be. So it prevents people from taking any pleasure worth mentioning in the most necessary and constant things. Self-control alone makes them endure the things I've mentioned, and so it alone makes them take a pleasure worth remembering in those same things." "Absolutely," he said. "What you say is true."
4.5.10	ἀλλά μήν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι καλόν καί ἀγαθόν καί τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν τοιούτων τινός, δι' ὧν ἄν τις καί τό ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καί τόν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε καί φίλοις καί πόλει ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καί ἐχθρούς κρατήσειεν, ἀφ' ὧν οὐ μόνον	"And then there's learning something fine and good, and devoting yourself to some such pursuit—the kind of thing that lets a person look after his own body well, manage his own household well, be useful to his friends and his city, and get the

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	ὠφέλειαι, ἀλλά καί ἡδοναί μέγισται γίγνονται, οἱ μέν ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπολαύουσι πράττοντες αὐτά, οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐδενός μετέχουσι. τῷ γάρ ἄν ἧττον φήσαιμεν τῶν τοιούτων προσήκειν, ἢ ᾧ ἥκιστα ἔξεστι ταῦτα πράττειν, κατεχομένῳ ἐπί τῷ σπουδάζειν περί τάς ἐγγυτάτω ἡδονάς;	better of his enemies, all of which bring not only benefits but also the greatest pleasures. The self-controlled enjoy these things as they practice them, while the uncontrolled have no share in any of them. For who would we say has less to do with such things than the person least able to practice them, held fast as he is by his eagerness for the pleasures closest at hand?"
4.5.11	καί ὁ Εὐθύδημος· δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν ὡς ἀνδρί ἥττονι τῶν διά τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν πάμπαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρετῆς προσήκει. Τί γάρ διαφέρει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄνθρωπος ἀκρατής θηρίου τοῦ ἀμαθεστάτου; ὅστις γάρ τά μέν κράτιστα μή σκοπεῖ, τά ἥδιστα δ' ἐκ παντός τρόπου ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τί ἄν διαφέροι τῶν ἀφρονεστάτων βοσκημάτων; ἀλλά τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τά κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καί λόγῳ καί ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατά γένη τά μέν ἀγαθά προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δέ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.	And Euthydemus said, "Socrates, you seem to me to be saying that a man who is overcome by the pleasures of the body has nothing whatever to do with any excellence." "Well, Euthydemus," he said, "how does an uncontrolled human being differ from the stupidest beast? Someone who doesn't consider what is best, but seeks by every means to do what is most pleasant—how would he differ from the most senseless grazing animals? Only the self-controlled can consider what is best in things, and, sorting them by kinds in word and in deed, choose the good and keep away from the bad."
4.5.12	καί οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καί εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι καί διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους· ἔφη δέ καί τό διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατά γένη τά πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρός τοῦτο ἑαυτόν ἕτοιμον παρασκευάζειν καί τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γάρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καί ἡγεμονικωτάτους καί διαλεκτικωτάτους.	And this, he said, is how men become best and happiest and most capable in discussion. He said that the very word "discuss" got its name from people meeting together and deliberating in common, sorting things out by kinds. So one should try to make oneself as ready for this as possible and care about it above all, since this is what makes men best, most fit to lead, and most skilled in discussion.[9]

CHAPTER 6

Socrates and Euthydemus define piety, justice, wisdom, the good, the beautiful and courage.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.6.1	Ὡς δέ καί διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τούς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καί τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκράτης γάρ τούς μέν εἰδότας, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καί τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τούς δέ μή εἰδότας οὐδέν ἔφη θαυμαστόν εἶναι αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καί ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σύν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ' ἔληγε. πάντα μέν οὖν ᾗ διωρίζετο πολύ ἔργον ἄν εἴη διεξελθεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δέ τόν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.	I'll also try to describe how he made his companions more skilled in discussion. Socrates believed that those who know what each thing is could also explain it to others, while as for those who don't know, he said it was no wonder that they go wrong themselves and lead others wrong. That's why he never stopped examining, together with his companions, what each thing is. To go through all the ways he defined things would be a long task; I'll mention as many as I think will show his method of inquiry.

9 Socrates plays on the Greek *dialegesthai*, "to converse, discuss," and *dialegein*, "to sort out, separate," which look like the same word.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.6.2	πρῶτον δέ περί εὐσεβείας ὧδέ πως ἐσκόπει· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ποῖόν τι νομίζεις εὐσέβειαν εἶναι; καί ὅς· Κάλλιστον νή Δί', ἔφη. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ὁποῖός τις ὁ εὐσεβής ἐστιν; Ἐμοί μέν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ τούς θεούς τιμῶν. Ἔξεστι δέ ὅν ἄν τις βούληται τρόπον τούς θεούς τιμᾶν; Οὐκ ἀλλά νόμοι εἰσί καθ' οὕς δεῖ τούς θεούς τιμᾶν.	First, on piety, his inquiry went something like this: "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "what sort of thing do you think piety is?" And he said, "A very fine thing, by Zeus." "Can you say, then, what sort of person the pious man is?" "I'd say," he said, "the one who honors the gods." "And can you honor the gods in any way you like?" "No, there are laws according to which one must honor the gods."
4.6.3	Οὐκοῦν ὁ τούς νόμους τούτους εἰδώς εἰδείη ἄν ὡς δεῖ τούς θεούς τιμᾶν; Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν ὁ εἰδώς ὡς δεῖ τούς θεούς τιμᾶν οὐκ ἄλλως οἴεται δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἤ ὡς οἶδεν; Οὐ γάρ οὖν, ἔφη. ἄλλως δέ τις θεούς τιμᾷ ἤ ὡς οἴεται δεῖν;	"So the one who knows these laws would know how one must honor the gods?" "I think so," he said. "And does the one who knows how one must honor the gods think he must do it in any way other than the way he knows?" "Certainly not," he said. "And does anyone honor the gods in a way other than the way he thinks he must?"
4.6.4	Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. Ὁ ἄρα τά περί τούς θεούς νόμιμα εἰδώς νομίμως ἄν τούς θεούς τιμῴη; Πάνυ μέν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε νομίμως τιμῶν ὡς δεῖ τιμᾷ; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; Ὁ δέ γε ὡς δεῖ τιμῶν εὐσεβής ἐστι; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Ὁ ἄρα τά περί τούς θεούς νόμιμα εἰδώς ὀρθῶς ἄν ἡμῖν εὐσεβής ὡρισμένος εἴη; Ἐμοί γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.	"I don't think so," he said. "So the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would honor the gods lawfully?" "Certainly." "And the one who honors lawfully honors as one should?" "Of course." "And the one who honors as one should is pious?" "Certainly," he said. "So the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would be correctly defined by us as pious?" "I think so, at any rate," he said.
4.6.5	ἀνθρώποις δέ ἆρα ἔξεστιν ὅν ἄν τις τρόπον βούληται χρῆσθαι; Οὐκ ἀλλά καί περί τούτους [ὁ εἰδώς ἅ] ἐστι νόμιμα, καθ' ἅ δεῖ [πρός ἀλλήλους χρῆσθαι, νόμιμος ἄν εἴη]. Οὐκοῦν οἱ κατά ταῦτα χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ὡς δεῖ χρῶνται; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε ὡς δεῖ χρώμενοι καλῶς χρῶνται; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καλῶς χρώμενοι καλῶς πράττουσι τἀνθρώπεια πράγματα; Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενοι δίκαια οὗτοι ποιοῦσι;	"And can you deal with human beings in any way you like?" "No: concerning them too there are lawful practices [—and the one who knows them], according to which one must [deal with one another, would be law-abiding]." "So those who deal with one another according to these deal as they should?" "Of course." "And those who deal as they should deal well?" "Certainly," he said. "And those who deal well with human beings handle human affairs well?" "That's likely," he said. "And those who obey the laws do what is just?"
4.6.6	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Δίκαια δέ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὁποῖα καλεῖται; ἅ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν, ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα ποιοῦντες ἅ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι δίκαιά τε ποιοῦσι καί ἅ δεῖ; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε τά δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσιν; Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οἴει οὖν τινας πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μή εἰδότας ἅ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Εἰδότας δέ ἅ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἴει τινάς οἴεσθαι δεῖν μή ταῦτα ποιεῖν; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. Οἶσθα δέ τινας ἄλλα ποιοῦντας ἤ ἅ οἴονται δεῖν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα τά περί ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα εἰδότες οὗτοι τά δίκαια ποιοῦσι; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε τά δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσι; Τίνες γάρ	"Certainly," he said. "And do you know what sort of things are called just?" "What the laws command," he said. "So those who do what the laws command do what is just and what they should?" "Of course." "And those who do what is just are just?" "I think so," he said. "Do you think, then, that anyone obeys the laws without knowing what the laws command?" "No, I don't," he said. "And do you think anyone who knows what he must do thinks he mustn't do it?" "I don't think so," he said. "And do you know anyone who does something

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἄλλοι; ἔφη. Ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε ἄρα ὁριζοίμεθα ὁριζόμενοι δικαίους εἶναι τούς εἰδότας τά περί ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα;	other than what he thinks he must?" "No, I don't," he said. "So those who know what is lawful concerning human beings do what is just?" "Certainly," he said. "And those who do what is just are just?" "Who else could be?" he said. "Then we'd be defining correctly if we defined the just as those who know what is lawful concerning human beings?"
	Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.	"I think so," he said.
4.6.7	Σοφίαν δέ τί ἄν φήσαιμεν εἶναι; εἰπέ μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἅ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοί εἶναι, ἤ εἰσί τινες ἅ μή ἐπίστανται σοφοί; ἅ ἐπίστανται δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη· πῶς γάρ ἄν τις, ἅ γε μή ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφός εἴη; ἆρ' οὖν οἱ σοφοί ἐπιστήμῃ σοφοί εἰσι; Τίνι γάρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μή ἐπιστήμῃ; ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἴει εἶναι ἤ ᾧ σοφοί εἰσιν; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν εἶναι τά ὄντα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; Οὐδέ μά Δί' ἔμοιγε πολλοστόν μέρος αὐτῶν. Πάντα μέν ἄρα σοφόν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἶναι; Μά Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Ὅ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καί σοφός ἐστιν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.	"And what would we say wisdom is? Tell me, do the wise seem to you to be wise in what they know, or are some people wise in what they don't know?" "In what they know, obviously," he said. "How could anyone be wise in what he didn't know?" "So the wise are wise by knowledge?" "By what else," he said, "could anyone be wise, if not by knowledge?" "And do you think wisdom is anything other than that by which people are wise?" "No, I don't." "So knowledge is wisdom?" "I think so." "And do you think it's possible for a human being to know everything there is?" "No, by Zeus, not even the tiniest fraction of it." "So it isn't possible for a human being to be wise in everything?" "No, by Zeus, certainly not," he said. "So whatever each person knows, in that he is also wise?" "I think so."
4.6.8	ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, καί τἀγαθόν οὕτω ζητητέον ἐστί; Πῶς; ἔφη. δοκεῖ σοι τό αὐτό πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δέ; τό ἄλλῳ ὠφέλιμον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐνίοτε ἄλλῳ βλαβερόν εἶναι; Καί μάλα, ἔφη. ἄλλο δ' ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθόν εἶναι ἤ τό ὠφέλιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τό ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἄν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.	"Now, Euthydemus, should the good be looked into in the same way?" "How?" he said. "Do you think the same thing is beneficial to everyone?" "No, I don't." "Well then, don't you think that what's beneficial to one person is sometimes harmful to another?" "Very much so," he said. "And would you say the good is anything other than the beneficial?" "No, I wouldn't," he said. "So the beneficial is good for whomever it's beneficial to?" "I think so," he said.
4.6.9	Τό δέ καλόν ἔχοιμεν ἄν πως ἄλλως εἰπεῖν; ἤ ἔστιν, ὅ ὀνομάζεις καλόν ἤ σῶμα ἤ σκεῦος ἤ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὅ οἶσθα πρός πάντα καλόν ὄν; Μά Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν, πρός ὅ ἄν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρός τοῦτο ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Καλόν δέ πρός ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἕκαστον, ἤ πρός ὅ ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; Οὐδέ πρός ἕν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Τό χρήσιμον ἄρα καλόν ἐστι πρός ὅ ἄν ᾖ χρήσιμον; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.	"And the beautiful—could we put it some other way? Or is there something you call beautiful, whether a body or a vessel or anything else, that you know to be beautiful for every purpose?" "No, by Zeus, there isn't," he said. "So whatever each thing is useful for, isn't it fine to use each thing for that?" "Certainly," he said. "And is each thing beautiful for anything other than what it's fine to use it for?" "Not for a single other thing," he said. "So the useful is beautiful for whatever it's useful for?" "I think so," he said.
4.6.10		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Ἀνδρείαν δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἆρα τῶν καλῶν νομίζεις εἶναι; Κάλλιστον μέν οὖν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Χρήσιμον ἄρα οὐ πρός τά ἐλάχιστα νομίζεις τήν ἀνδρείαν; Νή Δί', ἔφη, πρός τά μέγιστα μέν οὖν. ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι πρός τά δεινά τε καί ἐπικίνδυνα χρήσιμον εἶναι τό ἀγνοεῖν αὐτά; Ἥκιστά γ'. ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα μή φοβούμενοι τά τοιαῦτα διά τό μή εἰδέναι τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι; Νή Δί', ἔφη, πολλοί γάρ ἄν οὕτω γε τῶν τε μαινομένων καί τῶν δειλῶν ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν. Τί δέ οἱ καί τά μή δεινά δεδοικότες; Ἔτι γε νή Δί' ἧττον, ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν τούς μέν ἀγαθούς πρός τά δεινά καί ἐπικίνδυνα ὄντας ἀνδρείους ἡγεῖ εἶναι, τούς δέ κακούς δειλούς;	"And courage, Euthydemus—do you count it among the fine things?" "Among the very finest," he said. "So you don't think courage is useful for the smallest matters?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "for the greatest." "Then do you think that, when it comes to things that are terrible and dangerous, it's useful to be ignorant of them?" "Not in the least," he said. "So those who don't fear such things because they don't know what they are aren't courageous?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "otherwise plenty of madmen and cowards would be courageous." "And what about those who are afraid even of things that aren't terrible?" "Still less, by Zeus," he said. "Then do you consider those who are good when facing terrible and dangerous things courageous, and those who are bad cowardly?"
4.6.11	Πάνυ μέν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀγαθούς δέ πρός τά τοιαῦτα νομίζεις ἄλλους τινάς ἤ τούς δυναμένους αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρῆσθαι; Οὐκ ἀλλά τούτους, ἔφη. Κακούς δέ ἄρα τούς οἵους τούτοις κακῶς χρῆσθαι; Τίνας γάρ ἄλλους; ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν ἕκαστοι χρῶνται ὡς οἴονται δεῖν; Πῶς γάρ ἄλλως; ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν οἱ μή δυνάμενοι καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἴσασιν ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι; Οὐ δήπου γε, ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες, ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οὗτοι καί δύνανται; Μόνοι γ', ἔφη. Τί δέ; οἱ μή διημαρτηκότες ἆρα κακῶς χρῶνται τοῖς τοιούτοις; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα κακῶς χρώμενοι διημαρτήκασιν; Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Οἱ μέν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καί ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δέ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί; Ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη.	"Certainly," he said. "And do you think the good in such matters are any others than those able to handle them well?" "No, these," he said. "And the bad are those of a sort to handle them badly?" "Who else?" he said. "And does each of them handle things the way they think they must?" "How else?" he said. "And do those who aren't able to handle them well know how one must handle them?" "Surely not," he said. "So those who know how one must handle them are also the ones able to?" "They alone," he said. "Well then, do those who haven't gone wrong handle such things badly?" "I don't think so," he said. "So those who handle them badly have gone wrong?" "That's likely," he said. "So those who know how to handle terrible and dangerous things well are courageous, and those who fail at this are cowardly?" "So they seem to me," he said.
4.6.12	Βασιλείαν δέ καί τυραννίδα ἀρχάς μέν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δέ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε. τήν μέν γάρ ἑκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καί κατά νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχήν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο, τήν δέ ἀκόντων τε καί μή κατά νόμους, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἄρχων βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα. καί ὅπου μέν ἐκ τῶν τά νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων αἱ ἀρχαί καθίστανται, ταύτην μέν τήν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.	Kingship and tyranny he considered both to be forms of rule, but he thought they differed from each other. Rule over willing people and in accordance with the laws of cities he considered kingship; rule over unwilling people, not in accordance with laws but however the ruler wished, he considered tyranny. And where offices are filled from among those who carry out what is lawful, he thought the constitution was an aristocracy; where they are filled on the basis of property assessments, a plutocracy; and where from everyone, a democracy.
4.6.13		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	Εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περί του ἀντιλέγοι μηδέν ἔχων σαφές λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι, ὅν αὐτός λέγοι, ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἤ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπί τήν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἄν πάντα τόν λόγον ὧδέ πως·	If anyone contradicted him on some point without having anything clear to say, but claimed without proof that the person he himself was talking about was wiser, or more of a statesman, or braver, or something of that kind, Socrates would lead the whole discussion back to its basic assumption in something like this way:
4.6.14	Φῄς σύ ἀμείνω πολίτην εἶναι ὅν σύ ἐπαινεῖς ἤ ὅν ἐγώ; Φημί γάρ οὖν. Τί οὖν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστιν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου; Ποιῶμεν τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μέν χρημάτων διοικήσει κρατοίη ἄν ὁ χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τήν πόλιν ποιῶν; Πάνυ μέν οὖν. Ἐν δέ γε πολέμῳ ὁ καθυπερτέραν τῶν ἀντιπάλων; Πῶς γάρ οὔ; Ἐν δέ πρεσβείᾳ ἆρ᾽ ὅς ἄν φίλους ἀντί πολεμίων παρασκευάζῃ; Εἰκός γε. Οὐκοῦν καί ἐν δημηγορίᾳ ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καί ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὕτω δέ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων καί τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερόν ἐγίγνετο τἀληθές.	"You say the man you praise is a better citizen than the one I praise?" "Yes, I do." "Then why don't we first look at this: what is the job of a good citizen?" "Let's do that." "In managing finances, then, wouldn't the one who makes the city richer in funds come out ahead?" "Certainly." "And in war, the one who makes it stronger than its opponents?" "Of course." "And on an embassy, the one who wins friends in place of enemies?" "Likely so." "And in speaking before the people, the one who ends factional strife and creates concord?" "I think so." When the arguments were led back in this way, the truth became plain even to those who were contradicting him.
4.6.15	ὁπότε δέ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διά τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τήν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου. τοιγαροῦν πολύ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγώ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τούς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε. ἔφη δέ καί Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τό ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὡς ἱκανόν αὐτόν ὄντα διά τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τούς λόγους.	Whenever he himself went through some subject in argument, he proceeded by way of what was most widely agreed, believing that this was what made an argument safe. As a result, of all the people I know, he was by far the best at getting his listeners to agree with him when he spoke. He said that Homer, too, credited Odysseus with being a "safe speaker," because he was able to lead his arguments through what people already accepted.

CHAPTER 7

Socrates teaches how far to study geometry, astronomy and arithmetic, and urges care for health.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.7.1	Ὅτι μέν οὖν ἁπλῶς τήν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρός τούς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι· ὅτι δέ καί αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεσιν αὐτούς εἶναι ἐπεμελεῖτο, νῦν τοῦτο λέξω. πάντων μέν γάρ ὧν ἐγώ οἶδα μάλιστα ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῶν συνόντων αὐτῷ· ὧν δέ προσήκει ἀνδρί καλῷ κἀγαθῷ εἰδέναι, ὅ τι μέν αὐτός εἰδείη, πάντων προθυμότατα ἐδίδασκεν· ὅτου δέ αὐτός ἀπειρότερος εἴη, πρός τούς ἐπισταμένους ἦγεν αὐτούς.	That Socrates declared his own views plainly to those who spent time with him seems to me clear from what I have said. Now I will show how he also made sure that they were self-sufficient in the activities proper to them. Of everyone I know, he cared most about finding out what each of his companions had real knowledge of. Among the things a true gentleman ought to know, whatever he knew himself he taught more eagerly than anyone. Whatever he had less experience of, he took them to people who knew it.
4.7.2		

	GREEK	ENGLISH
	ἐδίδασκε δέ καί μέχρι ὅτου δέοι ἔμπειρον εἶναι ἑκάστου πράγματος τόν ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένον. αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μέν τούτου ἔφη δεῖν μανθάνειν, ἕως ἱκανός τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσειε, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι· οὕτω δέ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν ὥστε τόν προσέχοντα τόν νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει ἅμα τήν τε γῆν ὁπόση ἐστίν εἰδέναι καί ὡς μετρεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ἀπιέναι.	He also taught how far a properly educated man should become familiar with each subject. Geometry, for example, he said one should learn up to the point where one could, if ever the need arose, measure out land correctly when taking it over, handing it over or dividing it up, or work out the labor done on it. This, he said, was so easy to learn that anyone who paid attention to the measuring would go away knowing both how big the land was and how it is measured.
4.7.3	τό δέ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν. ὅ τι μέν γάρ ὠφελοίη ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν· ἔφη δέ ταῦτα ἱκανά εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν καί ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καί ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποκωλύειν.	But he disapproved of studying geometry as far as the diagrams that are hard to understand. He said he couldn't see what use they were, though he was certainly not unfamiliar with them himself. They were enough, he said, to use up a person's whole life and keep him from many other useful studies.
4.7.4	ἐκέλευε δέ καί ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καί ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καί μηνός καί ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γιγνώσκειν ἕνεκα πορείας τε καί πλοῦ καί φυλακῆς, καί ὅσα ἄλλα ἤ νυκτός ἤ μηνός ἤ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρός ταῦτ' ἔχειν τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι, τάς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας· καί ταῦτα δέ ῥᾴδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρά τε νυκτοθηρῶν καί κυβερνητῶν καί ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷς ἐπιμελές ταῦτα εἰδέναι.	He also urged them to become familiar with astronomy, but here too only far enough to be able to tell the time of night, of the month and of the year, for journeys, voyages and keeping watch. For anything else that is done at night, or by the month, or by the year, they should have signs to go by, telling apart the divisions of those periods. These things too, he said, were easy to learn from night hunters, ship's pilots and many others whose business it is to know them.
4.7.5	τό δέ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καί τά μή ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα, καί τούς πλάνητάς τε καί ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας, γνῶναι καί τάς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπό τῆς γῆς καί τάς περιόδους καί τάς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦντας κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν. ὠφέλειαν μέν γάρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐδέ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν· ἔφη δέ καί ταῦτα ἱκανά εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καί πολλῶν καί ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν.	But he strongly discouraged studying astronomy so far as to learn even about the bodies that do not move in the same revolution, the planets and the stars that wander unpredictably, and wearing oneself out investigating their distances from the earth, their periods and their causes. Here too he said he could see no benefit at all, though he had certainly heard about these matters as well. These too, he said, were enough to use up a person's life and keep him from many useful things.
4.7.6	ὅλως δέ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεός μηχανᾶται, φροντιστήν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γάρ εὑρετά ἀνθρώποις αὐτά ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἄν ἡγεῖτο τόν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἄν ἔφη καί παραφρονῆσαι τόν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδέν ἧττον ἤ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπί τῷ τάς τῶν θεῶν μηχανάς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.	

	GREEK	ENGLISH
		In general he discouraged anyone from brooding over the heavens and how the god contrives each thing there. He didn't think these things could be discovered by human beings, and he didn't believe that someone who inquired into what the gods had not wished to make clear would please them. He said that a person who fretted over such things risked losing his mind, just as Anaxagoras lost his. Anaxagoras was the man who thought most highly of his own mind for explaining the gods' contrivances.[10]
4.7.7	ἐκεῖνος γάρ λέγων μέν τό αὐτό εἶναι πῦρ τε καί ἥλιον ἠγνόει, ὅτι τό μέν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥᾳδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δέ τόν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καί ὑπό μέν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τά χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπό δέ τοῦ πυρός οὔ· ἠγνόει δέ καί, ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ μέν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδέν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπό δέ τοῦ πυρός θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δέ τόν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι καί τοῦτο ἠγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μέν ἐν πυρί ὤν οὔτε λάμπει οὔτε πολύν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δέ ἥλιος τόν πάντα χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὤν διαμένει.	When he said that fire and the sun were the same thing, he failed to see that people can look at fire easily but cannot look straight at the sun. He also missed that people's skin turns darker when the sun shines on them, while fire has no such effect. He failed to see, too, that nothing growing from the earth can thrive without the sun's light, whereas everything heated by fire perishes. And when he declared that the sun was a red-hot stone, he failed to see this as well: a stone in a fire neither shines nor lasts long, while the sun goes on for all time as the brightest of all things.
4.7.8	ἐκέλευε δέ καί λογισμούς μανθάνειν. καί τούτων δέ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τήν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δέ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καί αὐτός συνεσκόπει καί συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι.	He also urged them to learn arithmetic. But here too, as with the other subjects, he told them to steer clear of pointless labor. As far as it was useful, he examined everything himself together with his companions and worked it through with them.
4.7.9	προέτρεπε δέ σφόδρα καί ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τούς συνόντας παρά τε τῶν εἰδότων μανθάνοντας, ὅσα ἐνδέχοιτο, καί ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον προσέχοντα διά παντός τοῦ βίου, τί βρῶμα ἤ τί πῶμα ἤ ποῖος πόνος συμφέροι αὐτῷ, καί πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγιεινότατ' ἄν διάγοι· τοῦ γάρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ ἔργον ἔφη εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἰατρόν τά πρός ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνώσκοντα [αὐτοῦ].	He also strongly urged his companions to look after their health. They should learn what they could from those who knew, and each should pay attention to himself all his life: what food or drink or what kind of exercise suited him, and how he should use them to live most healthily. Someone who paid attention to himself in this way, he said, would be hard put to find a doctor who could tell better [than he himself] what was good for his health.
4.7.10	Εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον ἤ κατά τήν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ὠφελεῖσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τόν γάρ εἰδότα δι' ὧν οἱ θεοί τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περί τῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνουσιν οὐδέποτ' ἔρημον ἔφη γίγνεσθαι συμβουλῆς θεῶν.	And if anyone wanted more help than human wisdom can give, he advised him to take up divination. Someone who knew the means by which the gods give human beings signs about their affairs, he said, would never be left without the gods' counsel.

10 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a fifth-century BC philosopher who lived in Athens, was prosecuted for impiety for claiming, among other things, that the sun was a fiery stone.

CHAPTER 8

Socrates faces trial and death calmly, explaining why he prepared no defense; Xenophon gives his verdict.

	GREEK	ENGLISH
4.8.1	Εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τό δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν, ἅ τε δέοι καί ἃ μή δέοι ποιεῖν, ὑπό τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἴεται αὐτόν ἐλέγχεσθαι περί τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστ', εἰ καί μή τότε, οὐκ ἄν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τόν βίον· εἶτα ὅτι τό μέν ἀχθεινότατόν τοῦ βίου καί ἐν ᾧ πάντες τήν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται ἀπέλιπεν, ἀντί δέ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς τήν ῥώμην ἐπιδειξάμενος εὔκλειαν προσεκτήσατο, τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καί ἐλευθεριώτατα καί δικαιότατα εἰπών καί τήν κατάγνωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πραότατα καί ἀνδρωδέστατα ἐνεγκών.	Socrates claimed that the divine sign told him in advance what he should and should not do, and yet he was condemned to death by the jurors. If anyone thinks this proves he was lying about the divine sign, let him consider two things. First, he was already so far on in years that, if not then, he would have ended his life not much later. Second, he left behind the most burdensome part of life, when everyone's mind declines. In its place he showed the strength of his soul and won a fine reputation besides. He spoke in his own defense more truthfully, more freely and more justly than anyone, and he bore his death sentence more gently and more bravely than anyone.
4.8.2	ὁμολογεῖται γάρ οὐδένα πω τῶν μνημονευομένων ἀνθρώπων κάλλιον θάνατον ἐνεγκεῖν. ἀνάγκη μέν γάρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μετά τήν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιῶναι διά τό Δήλια μέν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνός εἶναι, τόν δέ νόμον μηδένα ἐᾶν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἕως ἄν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ, καί τόν χρόνον τοῦτον ἅπασι τοῖς συνήθεσι φανερός ἐγένετο οὐδέν ἀλλοιότερον διαβιούς ἤ τόν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον· καίτοι τόν ἔμπροσθέν γε πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπί τῷ εὐθύμως τε καί εὐκόλως ζῆν.	Everyone agrees that no human being on record ever faced death more nobly. He had to live for thirty days after the trial, because the Delian festival fell in that month, and the law allows no one to be publicly executed until the sacred delegation returns from Delos. Throughout that time all his friends could see that he lived no differently from before. And before, he had been admired more than anyone for living cheerfully and contentedly.[11]
4.8.3	καί πῶς ἄν τις κάλλιον ἤ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἤ ποῖος ἄν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἤ ὅν κάλλιστά τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δ' ἄν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἤ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;	How could anyone die more finely than that? What death could be finer than the one in which a person dies most finely? What death could be happier than the finest one? Or dearer to the gods than the happiest?
4.8.4	λέξω δέ καί ἅ Ἑρμογένους τοῦ Ἱππονίκου ἤκουσα περί αὐτοῦ. ἔφη γάρ, ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτόν τήν γραφήν, αὐτός ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ περί τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου λέγειν αὐτῷ, ὡς χρή σκοπεῖν, ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται. τόν δέ τό μέν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· Οὐ γάρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεί δέ αὐτόν ἤρετο, ὅπως, εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐδέν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγένηται ἤ διασκοπῶν μέν τά τε δίκαια καί τά ἄδικα, πράττων δέ τά δίκαια καί τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἥνπερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι.	I will also tell what I heard about him from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus. He said that after Meletus had already brought the indictment against Socrates, he heard Socrates discussing everything except the trial. So he told him that he ought to be thinking about what he would say in his defense. At first Socrates said, "Don't you think I've spent my whole life practicing for that?" When Hermogenes asked him how, Socrates said that he had spent his life doing nothing but examining what is just and what is unjust, doing what is just

11 Each year Athens sent a sacred delegation to Apollo's festival on the island of Delos, and the city had to stay ritually pure, with no executions, until it returned.

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		and keeping away from what is unjust. That, he believed, was the finest practice for a defense.
4.8.5	αὐτός δέ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταί πολλούς μέν ἤδη μηδέν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλούς δέ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλά νή τόν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρός τούς δικαστάς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τό δαιμόνιον.	Hermogenes said he then spoke up again: "Don't you see, Socrates, that Athenian juries have often been carried away by a speech and put to death men who had done no wrong, and have often acquitted men who had?" "Yes, by Zeus, Hermogenes," Socrates said, "and when I did start to think about my defense before the jurors, the divine sign opposed me."
4.8.6	καί αὐτός εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστά λέγεις. τόν δέ· Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμέ τελευτᾶν τόν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι μέχρι μέν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγώ οὐδενί ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἄν οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθ' ἥδιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μέν γάρ οἶμαι ζῆν τούς μάλιστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δέ τούς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται.	Hermogenes said, "That's an astonishing thing to say." And Socrates replied: Are you astonished that the god thinks it better for me to end my life now? Don't you know that up to now I wouldn't have granted to anyone that he had lived a better or a more pleasant life than I have? I think the people who live best are those who take the greatest care to become as good as possible. And the people who live most pleasantly are those who most clearly perceive that they are getting better.
4.8.7	SOCRATES ἅ ἐγώ μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἠσθανόμην ἐμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα, καί τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων καί πρός τούς ἄλλους παραθεωρῶν ἐμαυτόν οὕτω διατετέλεκα περί ἐμαυτοῦ γιγνώσκων· καί οὐ μόνον ἐγώ, ἀλλά καί οἱ ἐμοί φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περί ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὐ διά τό φιλεῖν ἐμέ, καί γάρ οἱ τούς ἄλλους φιλοῦντες οὕτως ἄν εἶχον πρός τούς ἑαυτῶν φίλους, ἀλλά διόπερ καί αὐτοί ἄν οἴονται ἐμοί συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίγνεσθαι.	SOCRATES That is what I have perceived happening to me up to now. Whenever I met other people and compared myself with them, I went on judging myself this way. And not only I: my friends, too, go on feeling this way about me. It isn't because they love me, since people who love others would feel the same about their own friends. It's because they believe that they themselves become their best by spending time with me.
4.8.8	εἰ δέ βιώσομαι πλείω χρόνον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τά τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καί ὁρᾶν τε καί ἀκούειν ἧττον καί διανοεῖσθαι χεῖρον καί δυσμαθέστερον ἀποβαίνειν καί ἐπιλησμονέστερον, καί ὧν πρότερον βελτίων ἦν, τούτων χείρω γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλά μήν ταῦτά γε μή αἰσθανομένῳ μέν ἀβίωτος ἄν εἴη ὁ βίος, αἰσθανόμενον δέ πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη χεῖρόν τε καί ἀηδέστερον ζῆν;	If I live longer, I may well have to pay the dues of old age. I'll see and hear less and think less well. I'll become slower to learn and more forgetful, and I'll get worse at the things I used to be better at. If I didn't notice this happening, life wouldn't be worth living. And if I did notice it, how could I help living a worse and less pleasant life?
4.8.9	ἀλλά μήν εἴ γε ἀδίκως ἀποθανοῦμαι, τοῖς μέν ἀδίκως ἐμέ ἀποκτείνασιν αἰσχρόν ἄν εἴη τοῦτο· εἰ γάρ τό ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρόν ἐστι, πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρόν καί τό ἀδίκως ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν; ἐμοί δέ τί αἰσχρόν τό ἑτέρους μή δύνασθαι περί ἐμοῦ τά δίκαια μήτε γνῶναι μήτε ποιῆσαι;	And if I die unjustly, surely that will be shameful for those who unjustly kill me. If doing wrong is shameful, how can doing anything at all unjustly not be shameful too? But why should it be shameful for me that others can neither recognize nor do what is just where I'm concerned?
4.8.10	ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καί τήν δόξαν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις οὐχ ὁμοίαν καταλειπομένην τῶν τε ἀδικησάντων καί τῶν	I see that the people of the past leave behind a different reputation among those who come after them, depending on whether they did wrong or

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ἀδικηθέντων. οἶδα δ’ ὅτι καί ἐγώ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων, καί ἐάν νῦν ἀποθάνω, οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐμέ ἀποκτείνασιν· οἶδα γάρ ἀεί μαρτυρήσεσθαί μοι, ὅτι ἐγώ ἠδίκησα μέν οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδέ χείρω ἐποίησα, βελτίους δέ ποιεῖν ἐπειρώμην ἀεί τούς ἐμοί συνόντας. τοιαῦτα μέν πρός Ἑρμογένη τε διελέχθη καί πρός τούς ἄλλους.	were wronged. I know that I too will be remembered, even if I die now, and not in the same way as those who killed me. I know it will always be said in my favor that I never wronged any human being or made anyone worse, and that I always tried to make those who spent time with me better. That was the substance of his conversations with Hermogenes and with the others.
4.8.11 τῶν δέ Σωκράτη γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καί νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρός ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοί μέν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγώ διήγημαι, εὐσεβής μέν οὕτως ὥστε μηδέν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δέ ὥστε βλάπτειν μέν μηδέ μικρόν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δέ τά μέγιστα τούς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατής δέ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τό ἥδιον ἀντί τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δέ ὥστε μή διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τά βελτίω καί τά χείρω μηδέ ἄλλου προσδέεσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρός τήν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἱκανός δέ καί λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καί διορίσασθαι τά τοιαῦτα, ἱκανός δέ καί ἄλλους δοκιμάσαι τε καί ἁμαρτάνοντας ἐλέγξαι καί προτρέψασθαι ἐπ’ ἀρετήν καί καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἄν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνήρ καί εὐδαιμονέστατος.	Of those who knew what sort of man Socrates was, all who strive for excellence still miss him more than anyone, even now, because he did more than anyone to help them pursue excellence. He was the man I have described. He was so pious that he did nothing without the gods’ approval. He was so just that he never did anyone even the slightest harm, but brought the greatest benefits to those who associated with him. He was so self-controlled that he never chose the more pleasant over the better. He was so understanding that he never went wrong in judging between better and worse, and he needed no one else, but was self-sufficient in knowing such things. He was able to state such matters in words and to define them. And he was able to test others, to refute them when they went wrong, and to turn them toward excellence and toward being true gentlemen. To me, at any rate, he seemed to be the kind of man who would be both the best and the happiest of men.
εἰ δέ τῳ μή ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τό ἄλλων ἦθος πρός ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω.	If anyone is not satisfied with this, let him compare other men’s characters with his and judge accordingly.