Sharon Street

Sharon Street is a contemporary moral philosopher and Professor of Philosophy at New York University, known for her influential work on metaethics and evolutionary theory. Her research focuses on the implications of evolutionary biology for moral realism and ethical reasoning. Street's most significant contribution is her evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism, first presented in her 2006 paper "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." This argument examines how natural selection has shaped human evaluative attitudes and challenges the notion that moral truths exist independently of human minds. Street has developed the constructivist approach to metaethics, arguing that moral truths are constructed through practical reasoning rather than discovered as mind-independent facts. Her work extends beyond pure philosophy to engage with empirical sciences, particularly evolutionary biology and psychology. The impact of Street's work is evident in contemporary debates about moral epistemology, evolutionary ethics, and the foundations of normative reasoning. She continues to publish influential papers on these topics while teaching at NYU, where she has served as department chair.

Sharon Street's academic work generates discussion primarily among philosophy scholars and graduate students rather than general readers, as she publishes in academic journals rather than books for public audiences. Readers appreciate: - Clear writing style that makes complex philosophical arguments accessible - Integration of evolutionary science with moral philosophy - Strong logic in challenging traditional moral realism - Practical examples that illustrate abstract concepts Common critiques: - Arguments can become highly technical and dense - Some find the implications of evolutionary debunking too skeptical - Limited engagement with religious perspectives on morality Her papers are frequently cited in academic contexts but don't have traditional consumer reviews on sites like Goodreads or Amazon. The 2006 "Darwinian Dilemma" paper has been cited over 1,000 times according to Google Scholar. Philosophy forums and blogs show active discussion of her ideas, with graduate students often praising the clarity of her writing compared to other contemporary philosophers.

Constructivism about Reasons (2008) Examines how practical reasoning and normative facts are inherently connected to the evolutionary history of human evaluative judgments.

A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value (2006) Presents an argument that evolutionary forces pose a challenge to moral realism by shaping our evaluative attitudes in ways unrelated to moral truth.

Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason (2009) Develops a constructivist theory of practical reason that acknowledges the contingent nature of our values and normative judgments.

Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons (2009) Explores how evolutionary theory affects our understanding of epistemic norms and reasons for belief.

What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? (2010) Provides a systematic analysis of constructivist approaches in moral philosophy and their relationship to other metaethical theories.

How to Be a Relativist About Normativity (2016) Outlines a sophisticated form of relativism about normative reasons while addressing common objections to relativist positions.

Christine Korsgaard writes on moral philosophy and Kantian ethics while engaging with evolutionary theory and human nature. She examines questions about the sources of normativity and practical reasoning that parallel Street's work.

Thomas Nagel focuses on moral realism and questions about objectivity in ethics. His work directly engages with Street's evolutionary debunking arguments while defending moral realism.

David Copp develops naturalistic moral realism and examines the foundations of normativity. He tackles similar metaethical questions as Street about the relationship between evolution and moral truth.

Peter Singer writes on practical ethics and moral philosophy from a utilitarian perspective. His work connects evolutionary explanations with normative ethics in ways that intersect with Street's concerns.

Allan Gibbard theorizes about the nature of moral judgment and normative concepts through an expressivist lens. His work on moral psychology and the evolution of moral thinking shares common ground with Street's evolutionary critiques.