Michael Bratman

Michael Bratman is a professor of philosophy at Stanford University and a leading scholar in action theory, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of mind. His work has significantly influenced contemporary understanding of human agency, practical reasoning, and shared cooperative activity. Bratman's most notable contribution is his planning theory of intention and agency, introduced in his 1987 book "Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason." This theory explains how future-directed intentions and plans serve as essential building blocks of human rationality and action, helping to coordinate both individual behavior and social interactions. His research on shared agency and collective intentionality has shaped discussions about how people engage in cooperative activities and form shared intentions. The 2014 book "Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together" represents a major development in understanding how individuals coordinate their actions to achieve common goals. Bratman has received numerous academic honors, including fellowship in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Philosopher's Annual Prize. His influence extends beyond philosophy into fields such as artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and social theory.

Readers value Bratman's systematic analysis of human planning and intention, citing his clear explanations of complex philosophical concepts. Philosophy students and academics praise his detailed arguments about practical reasoning, particularly in "Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason." Reader reviews highlight: - Clear framework for understanding how people form and execute plans - Thorough examination of shared agency concepts - Useful insights for AI researchers and cognitive scientists Common criticisms: - Dense academic writing style - Repetitive arguments - Limited accessibility for non-philosophers On Goodreads, "Shared Agency" maintains a 4.0/5 rating from 20 reviews. Academic reviewers note its importance for understanding collective action, though some find the writing "unnecessarily technical" (Philosophy Review, 2015). "Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason" averages 4.2/5 from 25 reviews, with readers appreciating its foundational ideas but noting it requires significant philosophical background. Several academic forums highlight Bratman's influence on AI planning systems and robotics research.

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987) A philosophical examination of how human beings plan and act intentionally, introducing the influential planning theory of intention.

Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (1999) A collection of essays exploring the relationship between intention, rationality, and agency in human action.

Structures of Agency: Essays (2007) Essays investigating how human agency is structured by planning, intention, and self-governance.

Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (2014) An analysis of how individuals engage in shared activities and collective intentions through planning.

Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality (2018) A series of connected essays examining how planning, temporality, and self-governance are fundamental to human practical rationality.

A Planning Theory of Self-Governance: Agency in Time (2022) An exploration of how human beings govern themselves over time through planning and commitment.

Amartya Sen applies philosophical analysis to topics of rationality, identity and choice in ways that complement Bratman's planning theory. His work on practical reasoning and collective decision-making connects with similar themes about human agency and intentionality.

Christine Korsgaard explores the foundations of moral philosophy and agency through examining practical identity and self-constitution. Her analysis of practical reason and normativity aligns with Bratman's interest in planning agency and shared intention.

David Velleman investigates the nature of human agency, practical reasoning, and self-knowledge. His work on how agents constitute themselves through their actions parallels Bratman's planning theory of intention.

Margaret Gilbert develops accounts of collective intentionality, shared agency, and social groups. Her theories about joint commitment and plural subjects connect directly to Bratman's work on shared cooperative activity.

John Searle analyzes the nature of mind, intentionality, and social reality through examining collective intentionality and institutional facts. His investigations of collective behavior and social ontology complement Bratman's planning theory and shared agency work.