War and Decision

War and Decision is a firsthand account from Douglas Feith, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, documenting the critical decisions and internal discussions at the Pentagon from 2001 to 2004. The book provides direct access to the decision-making process during the inception of the War on Terrorism and the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The narrative incorporates extensive primary source material, including a 30-page appendix of government memos and official documents from the period. Feith presents the Pentagon's perspective on key strategic choices and policy developments during the Bush administration's response to 9/11 and subsequent military operations. The book examines both the strategic vision behind major military decisions and the practical challenges of implementation. It covers interagency debates, policy formation, and the complex relationship between civilian leadership and military operations in the post-9/11 security environment. The work serves as a significant historical document that explores the intersection of military strategy, bureaucratic process, and executive decision-making during a transformative period in U.S. foreign policy. Its detailed account of internal deliberations provides context for understanding how America's 21st century military engagements were conceived and initiated.

Readers view War and Decision as a detailed insider account of Bush administration decision-making, though opinions split along political lines. Positive reviews highlight: - Primary source documents and meeting notes that reveal internal debates - Step-by-step explanation of policy formation - Counterpoints to other Bush administration memoirs - Clear writing style for complex topics Common criticisms: - Defensive tone about controversial decisions - Too focused on bureaucratic conflicts rather than larger war implications - Perceived attempt to shift blame to other officials - Limited acknowledgment of policy failures Ratings: Goodreads: 3.9/5 (89 ratings) Amazon: 4.2/5 (92 reviews) Notable reader comments: "Valuable primary source material even if you disagree with the author's conclusions" - Goodreads reviewer "More interested in internal turf battles than honest analysis" - Amazon reviewer "Documents the interagency process better than any other Iraq War book" - Goodreads reviewer

Known and Unknown: A Memoir by Donald Rumsfeld Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's memoir provides direct insight into Pentagon decision-making during the same period as Feith's account.

In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir by Dick Cheney The Vice President's perspective complements Feith's narrative with additional context on executive branch deliberations during the War on Terror.

Decision Points by George W. Bush President Bush's account of key strategic choices offers the commander-in-chief's viewpoint on the same events Feith describes.

At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA by George Tenet CIA Director Tenet's memoir presents the intelligence community's role in the same national security decisions Feith examines.

Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War by Robert M. Gates Gates' account as Defense Secretary provides continuation and contrast to the Pentagon period Feith documents.

🔷 Douglas Feith was the youngest-ever Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, serving from 2001 to 2005, and previously worked in the Reagan administration as Middle East specialist. 🔷 The book reveals that initial military plans for Afghanistan were rejected by Secretary Rumsfeld for being too conventional and not innovative enough for this new type of warfare. 🔷 The 30 pages of declassified documents included in the book were personally selected by Feith from over 2,000 pages of materials he retained from his Pentagon service. 🔷 Before publication, the manuscript underwent extensive review by the Pentagon, CIA, and State Department, taking nearly two years to receive final clearance. 🔷 The book directly challenges several widely-held beliefs about the Iraq War planning, including the common assertion that there was no post-war planning - Feith presents evidence of extensive post-war preparations that were ultimately not implemented.