Τὸν κόσμον ἀεὶ λέγοντες καὶ πρόσθεν εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι σῶμα ἔχοντα εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνάγοιμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιμεν, σαφήνειαν δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἂν παρεχοίμεθα. ἐπεὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἡ μεταβολὴ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν περὶ γῆν ἡ φθορὰ τὸ εἶδος σώζουσα μήποτε οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀξιώσει γίγνεσθαι ὡς τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦτο δυναμένης ἀεὶ ὑπεκφεύγοντος καὶ ῥέοντος τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτιθέναι τὸ εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλῳ, ὡς μὴ σώζεσθαι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ εἰς τὸ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν τῷ εἴδει· ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν οὕτω κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μόνον τὸ ἀεὶ ἕξει, τὰ δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς κατὰ τόδε ἕξει τὸ ἀεί;
When we say that the cosmos, though it has a body, always existed before and will always exist, if we refer the cause to the will of the god, we might perhaps be saying something true, but we would not be offering any clarity. Again, since the change of the elements and the perishing of living things on earth preserve the form, perhaps one will think that the same holds for the All. The will would be capable of this: while the body is always slipping away and flowing, to put the same form now on one thing, now on another, so that what is preserved forever is not the numerically one but the one in form. But then why should some things have their “always” only in form, in this way, while the things in heaven, and heaven itself, have their “always” as individuals?
εἰ δὲ τῷ πάντα συνειληφέναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰς ὃ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσεται μηδέ τι ἔξωθεν ἂν προσπεσὸν φθεῖραι δύνασθαι τούτῳ δώσομεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς οὐ φθορᾶς, τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ δώσομεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὴ ἂν φθαρῆναι, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ἡ οὐσία τῷ μέρη καὶ μὴ ὅλον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πᾶν οὐχ ἕξει τὴν πίστιν παρὰ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι εἰς ἅπαντα μενεῖ τὸν χρόνον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ εἶδος τὴν μονὴν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πυρὶ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μόνον ἂν δόξειε παρεῖναι καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ.
But suppose we make the cause of its not perishing the fact that it has encompassed everything, so that there is nothing into which it could change, and nothing from outside that could fall on it and destroy it. Then from this argument we shall grant the whole, the All, that it cannot perish. But our sun and the being of the other stars, because each is a part and not a whole and an all, will not get from this argument any assurance that they will last for all time. Their permanence would seem to be only in form, as it would seem to be for fire and things like it—and for the whole cosmos itself as well.
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἔξωθεν μὴ φθειρόμενον [αὐτὸν] τῶν μερῶν ἄλληλα φθειρόντων οὕτω τὴν φθορὰν ἀεὶ ἔχοντα τῷ εἴδει μόνον περιμένειν, καὶ ῥεούσης ἀεὶ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὸ εἶδος ἄλλου διδόντος γίγνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός. οὐ τοίνυν ἔσται τὸ μὲν μένον αὐτοῦ ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ οὐρανός, τὰ δὲ περὶ γῆν φθειρόμενα, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως ἅπαντα, τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχοντα μόνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ· ἔσται γὰρ πολυχρονιώτερα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ.
For nothing prevents the cosmos, even though it is not destroyed by anything else from outside, from being constantly destroyed in this way, as its parts destroy one another, and so persisting only in form. And since the nature of the substrate is always flowing, and something else gives the form, the same thing would happen with the whole living being as with a human being, a horse and the rest: there is always a human being and a horse, but not the same one. So there will not be one part of it that remains forever, like the heaven, and another, the things on earth, that perishes. All things will be alike, differing only in time; the things in heaven will simply last longer.
εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω συγχωρησαίμεθα τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν εἶναι, ἧττον ἂν τὸ ἄπορον τῇ δόξῃ προσείη· μᾶλλον δὲ παντάπασιν ἔξω ἀπορίας ἂν γιγνοίμεθα, εἰ τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἱκανὸν εἶναι δεικνύοιτο κἂν οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον συνέχειν τὸ πᾶν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ τόδε τι αὐτοῦ ὁποσονοῦν λέγοιμεν ἔχειν τὸ ἀεί, ἥ τε βούλησις δεικτέα εἰ ἱκανὴ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, τό τε ἄπορον μένει διὰ τί τὰ μὲν οὕτω, τὰ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει μόνον, τά τε μέρη τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ πῶς καὶ αὐτά· ἐπειδὴ οὕτω καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πάντα εἴη ἄν.
If, then, we agreed that the “always” applies in this way to the All and its parts, our view would be less troubled by difficulty. Or rather, we would be entirely clear of difficulty, if the will of the god were shown to be sufficient to hold the All together even in this way and this manner. But if we say that some particular part of it, of whatever size, has the “always,” then we must show whether the will is sufficient to do this. And the difficulty remains: why some things are so and others not so, but only in form; and how the parts in heaven are so too—since on that view all things themselves would be so as well.
εἰ οὖν ταύτην παραδεχόμεθα τὴν δόξαν καί φαμεν τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ τόδε ἔχειν τὸ ἀεί, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῇ τῆς σελήνης σφαίρᾳ τὸ κατ’ εἶδος, δεικτέον πῶς σῶμα ἔχων ἕξει τὸ τόδε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυρίως, ὡς τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, τῆς φύσεως τοῦ σώματος ῥεούσης ἀεί. τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ φύσεως εἰρηκόσι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Πλάτωνι οὐ μόνον περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων αὐτῶν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, φησι, σώματα ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα ἀπαραλλάκτως ἕξει ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως; συγχωρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων δηλονότι τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ, ὃς ἔφη ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον γίνεσθαι. Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ τὰς ὑποθέσεις [τὰς περὶ] τοῦ πέμπτου παραδέξαιτο σώματος.
If, then, we accept this view, and say that the heaven and everything in it have their “always” as individuals, while the things below the sphere of the moon have it in form, we must show how the heaven, having a body, will be an individual in the strict sense, remaining the same, so that the individual is always as it was, when the nature of body is always flowing. For this is the view both of the others who have spoken about nature and of Plato himself, not only about the other bodies but about the heavenly ones too. “For how,” he says, “could things that have bodies and are seen remain always unchanged in the same state?” Here, evidently, he agrees with Heraclitus about these things too, who said that even the sun is always coming to be. For Aristotle there would be no problem, if one accepted his hypotheses [about] the fifth body.
τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτο τιθεμένοις, τοῦ σώματος δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὄντος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐξ ὧνπερ καὶ τὰ τῇδε ζῷα, πῶς τὸ τόδε [ἀεὶ] ἂν ἔχοι; ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον πῶς ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ μόρια ὄντα; συγκειμένου δὴ παντὸς ζῴου ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς σώματος φύσεως ἀνάγκη τὸν οὐρανόν, εἴπερ ἀεὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἔσται, ἢ δι’ ἄμφω ἔσεσθαι, ἢ διὰ θάτερον τῶν ἐνόντων, οἷον ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα.
But for those who do not posit this, and for whom the body of the heaven is made of the same things as the living beings here, how could it be an individual [always]? And still more, how could the sun and the things in heaven, which are parts? Since every living being is composed of soul and the nature of body, the heaven, if it is to be always numerically the same, must be so either through both, or through one of its constituents, soul or body.
ὁ μὲν δὴ τῷ σώματι διδοὺς τὸ ἄφθαρτον οὐδὲν ἂν εἰς τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς δέοιτο, ἢ τοῦ ὁμοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι πρὸς ζῴου σύστασιν· τῷ δὲ τὸ σῶμα παρ’ αὑτοῦ φθαρτὸν εἶναι λέγοντι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ διδόντι τὴν αἰτίαν πειρατέον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν μηδ’ αὐτὴν ἐναντιουμένην τῇ συστάσει καὶ τῇ διαμονῇ δεικνύναι, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀσύμφωνον ἐν τοῖς συνεστηκόσιν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πρόσφορον καὶ τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὑπάρχειν προσήκει.
Whoever grants incorruptibility to the body would need nothing from soul for this, except their always being together to make up a living being. But whoever says the body is corruptible of itself and gives the cause to the soul must try to show that the state of the body is not itself opposed to the composition and its persistence. In naturally composed things there is nothing discordant; the matter too must be suited to the intention of the finished work.
πῶς οὖν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς συνεργὸν ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἀθανασίαν ἀεὶ ῥέον; ἢ ὅτι, φαῖμεν ἄν, [ῥεῖ]· ῥεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἔξω. εἰ οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, μένον τὸ αὐτὸ οὔτ’ ἂν αὔξοιτο οὔτε φθίνοι· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ γηράσκει. ὁρᾶν δὲ δεῖ καὶ γῆν μένουσαν ἐν σχήματι τῷ αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀιδίου καὶ ὄγκῳ, καὶ ἀὴρ οὐ μήποτ’ ἐπιλείπῃ οὐδὲ ἡ ὕδατος φύσις· καὶ τοίνυν ὅσον μεταβάλλει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἠλλοίωσε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ζῴου φύσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόντων μορίων καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἀπιόντων μένει ἕκαστος εἰς πολύ· ᾧ δὲ ἔξω μηδέν, οὐκ ἀσύμφωνος ἂν τούτῳ ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ζῷον καὶ ἀεὶ μένον.
How, then, could the matter and body of the All cooperate in the immortality of the cosmos, when it is always flowing? Or rather, we would say, because [it flows]—it does not flow outside. If, then, it flows within itself and not away from itself, remaining the same, it would neither grow nor waste away; so it does not age either. We must see that earth too has remained in the same shape and bulk from all time, and air never fails, nor the nature of water. So as much of them as changes has not altered the nature of the whole living being. Even in our case, though our parts are always changing and passing outside, each of us remains for a long time. But for that which has nothing outside it, the nature of body would not be discordant with soul as regards being the same living being and always remaining.
πῦρ δὲ ὀξὺ μὲν καὶ ταχὺ τῷ μὴ ὧδε μένειν, ὥσπερ καὶ γῆ τῷ μὴ ἄνω· γενόμενον δὲ ἐκεῖ, οὗ στῆναι δεῖ, οὔτοι δεῖ νομίζειν οὕτως ἔχειν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἱδρυμένον, ὡς μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔκτασιν ἐπ’ ἄμφω ζητεῖν. ἀνωτέρω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν φέροιτο· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι· κάτω δ’ οὐ πέφυκε. λείπεται δὴ αὐτῷ εὐαγώγῳ τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν ὁλκὴν ἑλκομένῳ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν εὖ μάλα ἐν καλῷ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ γάρ, εἴ τῳ φόβος μὴ πέσῃ, θαρρεῖν δεῖ· φθάνει γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ πᾶσαν νεῦσιν, ὡς κρατοῦσαν ἀνέχειν. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸ κάτω ἔχει παρ’ αὑτοῦ, οὐκ ἀντιτεῖνον μένει.
Fire is sharp and swift because it does not stay here, just as earth is too because it does not stay above. But when fire has come to where it must stop, we should not suppose it is settled in its own place in such a way that it does not, like the others, seek extension in both directions. It could not be carried higher, for there is nothing further; and it is not of a nature to go downward. It remains, then, for it to be easily led, and, drawn by a natural attraction by soul toward life, to move very well in a beautiful place: in the soul. And if anyone is afraid it may fall, he should take heart: the soul’s revolution gets ahead of every inclination, so as to hold it up by mastering it. And if it does not even have from itself any tendency downward, it remains without resistance.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερα μέρη ἐν μορφῇ γενόμενα οὐ στέγοντα αὑτῶν τὴν σύστασιν ἀπαιτεῖ ἀπ’ ἄλλων μόρια, ἵνα μένῃ· εἰ δ’ ἐκεῖθεν μὴ ἀπορρέοι, οὐδὲν δεῖ τρέφεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἀπορρέοι ἀποσβεννύμενον ἐκεῖθεν, πῦρ δεῖ ἕτερον ἐξάπτεσθαι καί, εἰ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔχοι καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορρέοι, δεῖ καὶ ἀντ’ ἐκείνου ἄλλου. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μένοι ἂν τὸ πᾶν ζῷον τὸ αὐτό, εἰ καὶ οὕτως.
Our parts, then, having come to be in a shape, cannot hold their structure together by themselves, and they demand particles from other things in order to persist. But if nothing flows away from up there, there is no need of nourishment. If something did flow away from there and was extinguished, another fire would have to be kindled; and if it contained some other element as well and that flowed away from there, another would be needed in its place too. But then, if that were so, the whole living being would not, for this reason, remain the same.
ἀλλ’ αὐτό γ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον, σκεπτέον εἴτε τι ἀπορρεῖ ἐκεῖθεν, ὥστε δεῖσθαι κἀκεῖνα τῆς λεγομένης οὐ κυρίως τροφῆς, ἢ ἅπαξ τὰ ἐκεῖ ταχθέντα κατὰ φύσιν μένοντα οὐδεμίαν πάσχει ἀπορροήν· καὶ πότερον πῦρ μόνον ἢ πλέον τὸ πῦρ [ἢ] καὶ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰωρεῖσθαι καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος. εἰ γάρ τις προσθείη καὶ τὴν κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν, τὴν ψυχήν, μετὰ τῶν οὕτω σωμάτων καθαρῶν καὶ πάντως ἀμεινόνων — ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις αὐτῶν τὰ ἀμείνω ἐκλέγεται ἡ φύσις — πάγιον ἂν τὴν δόξαν περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τῆς ἀθανασίας λάβοι. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν φλόγα ζέσιν τινὰ καὶ πῦρ οἷον διὰ κόρον ὑβρίζον· τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ἠρεμαῖον καὶ τῇ τῶν ἄστρων πρόσφορον φύσει.
But we must examine the question in its own right, not as it bears on our inquiry: whether something flows away from up there, so that those things too need what is called—improperly—nourishment, or whether the things there, once set in order and remaining in their natural state, undergo no outflow; and whether there is fire only, or mostly fire, while the others too can be lifted and held aloft by what dominates. For if one added the most sovereign cause too, the soul, together with bodies that are pure in this way and in every respect better—since in other living beings too nature selects the better materials for their principal parts—one would arrive at a firm view about the immortality of the heaven. Aristotle was right to call flame a kind of boiling, fire running riot, as it were, from surfeit. But the fire up there is even and calm and suited to the nature of the stars.
τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς ἀρίστοις δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ κειμένην, πῶς ἐκφεύξεταί τι αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τῶν ἅπαξ ἐν αὐτῇ τεθέντων; μὴ παντὸς δὲ δεσμοῦ οἴεσθαι κρείττονα εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ ὡρμημένην, ἀνθρώπων ἀπείρων ἐστὶν αἰτίας τῆς συνεχούσης τὰ πάντα. ἄτοπον γὰρ τὴν καὶ ὁποσονοῦν χρόνον δυνηθεῖσαν συνέχειν μὴ καὶ ἀεὶ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ὥσπερ βίᾳ τοῦ συνέχειν γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλου ἢ τούτου ὄντος, ὃ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντός ἐστι φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς καλῶς τεθεῖσιν, ἢ ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ βιασομένου καὶ διαλύσοντος τὴν σύστασιν καὶ οἷον βασιλείας τινὸς καὶ ἀρχῆς καταλύσοντος τὴν ψυχῆς φύσιν. τό τε μήποτε ἄρξασθαι — ἄτοπον γὰρ καὶ ἤδη εἴρηται — πίστιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔχει. διὰ τί γὰρ ἔσται, ὅτε καὶ οὐκ ἤδη;
And the greatest point: the soul is placed next after the best things, with a wonderful power. How, then, could anything once placed within it escape it into non-being? Not to think that soul, which has set out from god, is stronger than any bond belongs to people with no experience of the cause that holds all things together. For it would be absurd that what has been able to hold things together for any length of time whatever should not do so forever—as if holding together came about by force, and what is natural were something other than this, which is in the nature of the All and in things well ordered; or as if there were something that would use force, dissolve the structure, and, as it were, depose the nature of soul from its kingship and rule. And its never having begun (a beginning would be absurd, as has already been said) gives assurance about the future too. For why should there be a time when it is not—and why not already?
οὐ γὰρ ἐκτέτριπται τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· μενόντων δ’ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ πᾶν μένει. καὶ εἰ μεταβάλλοι ἀεί, τὸ πᾶν μένει· μένει γὰρ καὶ ἡ τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτία. ἡ δὲ μετάνοια τῆς ψυχῆς ὅτι κενόν ἐστι δέδεικται, ὅτι ἄπονος καὶ ἀβλαβὴς ἡ διοίκησις· καὶ εἰ πᾶν οἷόν τε σῶμα ἀπολέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἀλλοιότερον αὐτῇ γίνοιτο.
For the elements are not worn out like pieces of wood and such things; and as they always remain, the All remains. And even if they are always changing, the All remains, since the cause of the change remains too. As for the soul’s changing its mind, it has been shown that this is an empty notion, since its governance involves no toil and no harm; and even if all body could perish, nothing would be any different for it.
πῶς οὖν τὰ ἐκεῖ μέρη μένει, τὰ δὲ ἐνταῦθα στοιχεῖά τε καὶ ζῷα οὐ μένει; ἢ [ὅτι], φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, τὰ μὲν παρὰ θεοῦ γεγένηται, τὰ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ζῷα παρὰ τῶν γενομένων παρ’ αὐτοῦ θεῶν· γενόμενα δὲ παρ’ ἐκείνου οὐ θεμιτὸν φθείρεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἐφεξῆς μὲν τῷ δημιουργῷ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν οὐρανίαν, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας δέ· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς οὐρανίας ἴνδαλμα αὐτῆς ἰὸν καὶ οἷον ἀπορρέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῷα ποιεῖν.
How, then, do the parts up there remain, while the elements and living beings here do not? Or rather [because], as Plato says, those were made by the god, while the living beings here were made by the gods who were made by him; and what was made by him may not lawfully perish. This amounts to saying that the heavenly soul comes next after the craftsman, and our souls do too; and that from the heavenly soul an image of it, going forth and, as it were, flowing off from the higher things, makes the living beings on earth.
ψυχῆς οὖν μιμουμένης τοιαύτης τὴν ἐκεῖ, ἀδυνατούσης δὲ τῷ καὶ χείροσι σώμασι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν καὶ ἐν τόπῳ χείρονι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὴν σύστασιν ληφθέντων οὐκ ἐθελόντων μένειν, τά τε ζῷα ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀεὶ δύναται μένειν, τά τε σώματα οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατοῖτο ἄν, ὡς ἂν ἄλλης ψυχῆς αὐτῶν προσεχῶς ἀρχούσης. τὸν δὲ ὅλον οὐρανὸν εἴπερ ἔδει μένειν, καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, τὰ ἄστρα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἔδει· ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔμεινε μὴ ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων μενόντων; τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐκέτι οὐρανοῦ μέρη· ἢ οὐ μέχρι σελήνης ὁ οὐρανός.
Since, then, a soul of this kind imitates the one up there, but falls short, because it uses worse bodies for its making, and in a worse place, and what it took up for the composition does not want to remain, the living beings here cannot remain forever; and the bodies would not be mastered in the same way as they would be if the other soul ruled them directly. But if the whole heaven was to remain, its parts too, the stars in it, had to remain; or how could it have remained if these did not remain likewise? For the things below the heaven are no longer parts of the heaven—or else the heaven does not reach down to the moon.
ἡμεῖς δὲ πλασθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς διδομένης παρὰ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν ψυχῆς καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατ’ ἐκείνην καὶ σύνεσμεν τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἄλλη ψυχή, καθ’ ἣν ἡμεῖς, τοῦ εὖ εἶναι, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι αἰτία. ἤδη γοῦν τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται γενομένου μικρὰ ἐκ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι συνεπιλαμβανομένη.
We, though, are molded by the soul given by the gods in heaven, and by the heaven itself, and it is in virtue of that soul that we are joined to our bodies. For the other soul, the one that is our self, is the cause of our being well, not of our being. At any rate, it comes when the body has already come into being, and contributes only a little to its being, from reasoning.
What the stars are made of
Plotinus reads the Timaeus: heavenly bodies are mostly fire, so they need no nourishment and do not flow away.
ἀλλὰ πότερον πῦρ μόνον καὶ εἰ ἀπορρεῖ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς νῦν σκεπτέον. τῷ μὲν οὖν Τιμαίῳ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα πεποιηκότι πρῶτον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρός, ἵνα ὁρατόν τε ᾖ διὰ τὸ πῦρ, στερεὸν δὲ διὰ τὴν γῆν, ἀκολουθεῖν ἔδοξε καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ποιεῖν οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἔχειν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἄστρα τὸ στερεὸν φαίνεται ἔχοντα. καὶ ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι συνεπικρίναντος καὶ Πλάτωνος τῷ εἰκότι τὴν γνώμην ταύτην. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατά τε τὴν ὄψιν κατά τε τὴν τῆς ἁφῆς ἀντίληψιν πυρὸς ἔχειν τὸ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ πᾶν φαίνεται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἐπισκοποῦσιν, εἰ τὸ στερεὸν ἄνευ γῆς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γῆς ἂν ἔχοι. ὕδατος δὲ καὶ ἀέρος τί ἂν δέοιτο;
But now we must consider whether there is fire only up there, and whether it flows away and needs nourishment. Timaeus made the body of the All first of earth and fire, so that it would be visible because of fire and solid because of earth; and it seemed to follow that he made the stars too not wholly but mostly of fire, since the stars evidently have solidity. And perhaps this is right, since Plato too endorses this view as likely. For to perception, by sight and by the grasp of touch, they appear to be mostly or wholly fire; but to those who examine it by reason, if solidity could not arise without earth, they would have earth too. But what would they need water and air for?
ἄτοπόν τε γὰρ δόξει ὕδατος εἶναι ἐν τοσούτῳ πυρί, ὅ τε ἀὴρ εἰ ἐνείη μεταβάλλοι ἂν εἰς πυρὸς φύσιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ δύο στερεὰ ἄκρων λόγον ἔχοντα δύο μέσων δεῖται, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, εἰ καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς οὕτως· ἐπεὶ καὶ γῆν ἄν τις ὕδατι μίξειεν οὐδενὸς δεηθεὶς μέσου. εἰ δὲ λέγοιμεν ‘ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη ἐν τῇ γῇ καὶ τῷ ὕδατι τὰ ἄλλα’, δόξομεν ἴσως τι λέγειν· εἴποι δ’ ἄν τις ‘ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὸ συνδῆσαι συνιόντα τὰ δύο’.
For it would seem absurd for there to be water in so much fire; and air, if it were in it, would change into the nature of fire. But if two solids standing as extremes in a proportion need two means, one might ask whether this holds among natural things too; for one could mix earth with water without needing any mean. And if we say, “But the others are already present in earth and water,” perhaps we shall seem to be saying something. Yet someone might say, “But not so as to bind the two together when they meet.”
ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐροῦμεν ἤδη συνδεῖσθαι τῷ ἔχειν ἑκάτερον πάντα. ἀλλ’ ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄνευ πυρὸς οὐχ ὁρατὸν γῆ, καὶ ἄνευ γῆς οὐ στερεὸν πῦρ· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, τάχα ἂν οὐδὲν ἔχοι ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αὑτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ πάντα μὲν μέμικται, λέγεται δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἕκαστον. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὴν γῆν ἄνευ ὑγροῦ φασι συστῆναι δύνασθαι· κόλλαν γὰρ εἶναι τῇ γῇ τὴν ὕδατος ὑγρότητα. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ δώσομεν οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστόν γε ἄτοπον λέγοντα εἶναί τι ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν μὴ διδόναι σύστασιν αὐτῷ, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοῦ, οὐδενὸς ἑκάστου ὄντος. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη γῆς φύσις καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι γῆ μηδενὸς ὄντος μορίου γῆς ὃ γῆ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὕδωρ ἐνείη εἰς κόλλησιν;
All the same, we shall say they are already bound together by each containing all. But we must examine whether earth is not visible without fire and fire not solid without earth. For if so, perhaps nothing would have its own being by itself; all would be mixed, and each named after what predominates in it. Indeed they say that not even earth can hold together without moisture, since the moisture of water is earth’s glue. But even if we grant this, it is surely absurd to say that each is something and yet not allow it any structure by itself, but only together with the others, none of them being anything on its own. For how could there be a nature of earth, and what it is to be earth, if there is no particle of earth that is earth unless water is present to glue it?
τί δ’ ἂν κολλήσειε μὴ ὄντος ὅλως μεγέθους, ὃ πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον συνεχὲς συνάψει; εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέγεθος γῆς αὐτῆς ἔσται, ἔσται γῆν φύσει καὶ ἄνευ ὕδατος εἶναι· ἤ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὃ κολλήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος. ἀέρος δὲ τί ἂν δέοιτο γῆς ὄγκος πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἔτι ἀέρος μένοντος πρὶν μεταβάλλειν; περὶ δὲ πυρὸς εἰς μὲν τὸ γῆ εἶναι οὐκ εἴρηται, εἰς δὲ τὸ ὁρατὴ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα· εὔλογον μὲν γὰρ συγχωρεῖν παρὰ φωτὸς τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ σκότος ὁρᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φατέον, ὥσπερ τὴν ἀψοφίαν μὴ ἀκούεσθαι.
And what would the water glue, if there were no magnitude at all for it to join, continuous, to another particle? If there is any magnitude whatever of earth itself, earth can exist by nature even without water; if not, there will be nothing for the water to glue. And why would a mass of earth need air in order to exist, when air remains air before it changes? As for fire, it has not been said to be needed for earth to be earth, but for it to be visible, both itself and the other things; for it is reasonable to grant that being seen comes from light. We must not say that darkness is seen, but that it is not seen, just as silence is not heard.
ἀλλὰ πῦρ γε ἐν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι· φῶς γὰρ ἀρκεῖ. χιὼν γοῦν καὶ τὰ ψυχρότατα πολλὰ λαμπρὰ πυρὸς ἄνευ. ἀλλ’ ἐνεγένετο, φήσει τις, καὶ ἔχρωσε πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ περὶ ὕδατος δὲ ἀπορητέον, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὕδωρ, εἰ μὴ γῆς λάβοι. ἀὴρ δὲ πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο μετέχειν γῆς εὔθρυπτος ὤν; περὶ δὲ πυρός, εἰ γῆς δεῖ αὐτῷ τὸ συνεχὲς παρ’ αὑτοῦ οὐκ ἔχοντι οὐδὲ τὸ διάστατον τριχῇ. ἡ δὲ στερεότης αὐτῷ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν τὴν τριχῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀντέρεισιν δηλονότι, διὰ τί οὐκ ἔσται ᾗ φυσικὸν σῶμα; σκληρότης δὲ γῇ μόνῃ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν τῷ χρυσῷ ὕδατι ὄντι προσγίνεται οὐ γῆς προσγενομένης, ἀλλὰ πυκνότητος ἢ πήξεως. καὶ πῦρ δὲ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ διὰ τί ψυχῆς παρούσης οὐ συστήσεται πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς;
But fire need not be present in earth; light is enough. Snow, at any rate, and many very cold things are bright without fire. But fire was present in them, someone will say, and colored them before it left. About water too we must ask whether there is no water unless it takes on some earth. And how could air be said to share in earth, when it breaks up so easily? As for fire, we must ask whether it needs earth, since of itself it has neither continuity nor three-dimensional extension. But its solidity—not in the sense of three-dimensional extension, but obviously in the sense of resistance—why should it not have it insofar as it is a natural body? Hardness belongs to earth alone. Indeed, density accrues even to gold, which is water, not through earth being added but through densification or solidifying. And why should fire by itself not hold together, when soul is present, according to soul’s power?
καὶ ζῷα δὲ πύρινά ἐστι δαιμόνων. ἀλλὰ κινήσομεν τὸ [τὸ] πᾶν ζῷον ἐκ πάντων τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν; ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τις ἐρεῖ, γῆν δὲ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν αἴρειν παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τεταγμένοις· συμπεριάγειν δὲ τὴν ταχίστην φορὰν γεηρὰ σώματα οὐ πιθανὸν εἶναι ἐμπόδιόν τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὸν καὶ λευκὸν τοῦ ἐκεῖ πυρός.
There are fiery living beings too: those of the spirits. But shall we unsettle the doctrine that the whole living being is composed of all the elements? Or rather, one will say this holds for those on earth; but to lift earth into the heaven is contrary to nature and against what nature has ordered; and it is not plausible that the swiftest motion should carry earthy bodies round with it, which would also obstruct the brilliance and whiteness of the fire up there.
ἴσως οὖν βέλτιον χρὴ ἀκούειν τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος ἐν μὲν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ δεῖν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον στερεόν, τὸ ἀντίτυπον ὄν, ἵνα τε ἡ γῆ ἐν μέσῳ ἱδρυμένη ἐπιβάθρα καὶ τοῖς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς βεβηκόσιν ἑδραία ᾖ, τά τε ζῷα τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ τοιοῦτο στερεὸν ἔχῃ [παρὰ γῆς], ἡ δὲ γῆ τὸ μὲν εἶναι συνεχὴς παρ’ αὑτῆς ἔχοι, ἐπιλάμποιτο δὲ ὑπὸ πυρός· μετέχειν δὲ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ μὴ αὐχμηρὸν καὶ μερῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ κωλύεσθαι συναγωγήν· ἀέρα δὲ κουφίζειν γῆς ὄγκους·
Perhaps, then, we should understand Plato better. He says that in the whole cosmos there must be this kind of solid, the resistant kind: so that earth, settled in the middle, may be a footing and a firm seat for what walks on it; so that the living beings on it may of necessity have this kind of solidity [from earth]; so that earth may have its continuity from itself but be lit up by fire; that it shares in water so as not to be parched, and so that the coming together of its parts is not hindered; that air lightens the masses of earth;
μεμῖχθαι δὲ τῷ ἄνω πυρὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ συστάσει τῶν ἄστρων τὴν γῆν, ἀλλ’ ἐν κόσμῳ γενομένου ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀπολαῦσαί τι τῆς γῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν γῆν τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον ἑκάστων, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἀπολαῦσαν γενέσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ οὗ μετέσχεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίαν, ὂν ὅ ἐστι, λαβεῖν οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ, οἷον οὐκ ἀέρα, ἀλλ’ ἀέρος τὴν ἁπαλότητα καὶ πυρὸς τὴν λαμπρότητα· τὴν δὲ μῖξιν πάντα διδόναι καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον τότε ποιεῖν, οὐ γῆν μόνον καὶ τὴν πυρὸς φύσιν, τὴν στερεότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν πυκνότητα.
and that earth is mixed with the fire above, not in the composition of the stars; rather, since each has come to be in the cosmos, the fire too enjoys something of earth, as earth does of fire, and each of each—not so that what enjoys comes to be made of both, itself and what it shares in, but in accordance with the community within the cosmos: remaining what it is, it takes not the other itself but something of it—not air, for instance, but air’s softness, and fire’s brightness. It is the mixing that gives everything and then produces the compound, not earth alone and the nature of fire—this solidity and density.
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τούτοις εἰπών ‘φῶς ἀνῆψεν ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἀπὸ γῆς περιφοράν’, τὸν ἥλιον λέγων, καὶ λαμπρότατόν που λέγει ἀλλαχοῦ τὸν ἥλιον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λευκότατον, ἀπάγων ἡμᾶς τοῦ ἄλλο τι νομίζειν ἢ πῦρ εἶναι, πῦρ δὲ οὐδετέρων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς, ὅ φησιν ἕτερον φλογὸς εἶναι, θερμὸν δὲ προσηνῶς μόνον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ φῶς σῶμα εἶναι, ἀποστίλβειν δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὁμώνυμον αὐτῷ φῶς, ὃ δή φαμεν καὶ ἀσώματον εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ φωτὸς παρέχεσθαι, ἐκλάμπον ἐξ ἐκείνου ὥσπερ ἄνθος ἐκείνου καὶ στιλπνότητα, ὃ δὴ καὶ εἶναι τὸ ὄντως λευκὸν σῶμα.
Plato himself bears witness to this when he says, “the god kindled a light in the second circuit from earth,” meaning the sun. And elsewhere, I think, he calls the sun the brightest and also the whitest, leading us away from thinking it is anything other than fire—but fire of neither of its other kinds: rather the light, which he says is different from flame and only gently warm. This light is a body; and from it shines out the light that shares its name, which we say is incorporeal. This is furnished by that light, shining out from it like its bloom and luster; and that is what the truly white body is.
ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ γεηρὸν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον λαμβάνοντες, τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν στερεότητα λαβόντος τὴν γῆν, ἕν τι δὴ γῆν ὀνομάζομεν ἡμεῖς διαφορὰς γῆς ἐκείνου τιθεμένου. τοῦ δὴ τοιούτου πυρὸς τοῦ φῶς παρέχοντος τὸ καθαρώτατον ἐν τῷ ἄνω τόπῳ κειμένου καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκεῖ ἱδρυμένου, ταύτην τὴν φλόγα οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὑποληπτέον, ἀλλὰ φθάνουσαν μέχρι τινὸς ἀποσβέννυσθαι ἐντυχοῦσαν πλείονι ἀέρι ἀνελθοῦσάν τε μετὰ γῆς ῥίπτεσθαι κάτω οὐ δυναμένην ὑπερβαίνειν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, κάτω δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἵστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ λεπτότερον ποιεῖν τὸν ἐκεῖ ἀέρα καὶ φλόγα, εἰ μένοι, μαραινομένην εἰς τὸ πρᾳότερον γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν μὴ ἔχειν ὅσον εἰς τὴν ζέσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅσον παρὰ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἄνω ἐναυγάζεσθαι·
We take “earthy” in the worse sense, whereas Plato took earth in terms of solidity; we call earth one single thing, whereas he posits different kinds of earth. Since this kind of fire, which gives the purest light, lies in the upper region and is settled there by nature, we must not suppose that the flame here mixes with the things there. Rather, it reaches up to a certain point and is extinguished when it meets more air; and having risen together with earth, it is thrown back down, unable to pass beyond to the upper region, and it stops below the moon, so that it makes the air there finer. And the flame, if it remains, dies down into something gentler, and has no brightness of the kind that goes with boiling, but only as much as it receives in light from the light above;
τὸ δὲ φῶς [τὸ] ἐκεῖ, τὸ μὲν ποικιλθὲν ἐν λόγοις τοῖς ἄστροις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς χρόαις τὴν διαφορὰν ἐργάσασθαι, τὸν δ’ ἄλλον οὐρανὸν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν τοιούτου φωτός, μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι δὲ λεπτότητι τοῦ σώματος καὶ διαφανείᾳ οὐκ ἀντιτύπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν καθαρὸν ἀέρα, προσέτι δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῷ πόρρω.
while the light up there, diversified in rational proportions in the stars, produces the difference among them in their colors as in their sizes. The rest of the heaven, too, is made of this kind of light, but it is not seen because of the fineness of its body and its unresisting transparency, just as pure air is not seen—and, besides, because of its distance.
τούτου δὴ μείναντος ἄνω τοῦ τοιούτου φωτὸς ἐν ᾧ τέτακται καθαροῦ ἐν καθαρωτάτῳ, τίς ἂν τρόπος ἀπορροῆς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἂν γένοιτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὸ κάτω πέφυκεν ἀπορρεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις, οὐδ’ αὖ τί ἐστιν ἐκεῖ τῶν βιαζομένων ὠθεῖν πρὸς τὸ κάτω. πᾶν δὲ σῶμα μετὰ ψυχῆς ἄλλο καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, οἷον μόνον ἦν· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ ἐκεῖ, οὐχ οἷον τὸ μόνον. τό τε γειτονοῦν εἴτε ἀὴρ εἴτε πῦρ εἴη, ἀὴρ μὲν τί ἂν ποιήσειε; πῦρ δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν ἐναρμόσειε πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐφάψαιτο εἰς τὸ δρᾶσαι· τῇ ῥύμῃ τε γὰρ παραλλάξειεν ἂν πρὶν παθεῖν ἐκεῖνο, ἔλαττόν τε, ἰσχύον τε οὐκ ἴσα τοῖς ἐνθάδε. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι θερμῆναί ἐστι· δεῖ δὲ τὸ θερμανθησόμενον μὴ θερμὸν παρ’ αὑτοῦ εἶναι.
Since, then, this light remains above, where it has been set, pure in the purest place, what manner of outflow from it could there be? Such a nature is not of a kind to flow downward, nor is there anything there that forces it to push downward. Every body together with soul is different, not the same as it would be alone; and the body up there is of this kind, not like a body alone. As for what is next to it, be it air or fire—what could air do? And fire would not be fitted to act on it, nor could it touch it so as to affect it. It would pass by in its rush before that could be affected; and it is lesser, and not as strong as the fire down here. Then, too, to act on something is to heat it; but what is to be heated must not be hot of itself.
εἰ δέ τι φθαρήσεται παρὰ πυρός, θερμανθῆναι δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ θερμαίνεσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὐδὲν δεῖ τοίνυν ἄλλου σώματος τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἵνα μένῃ, οὐδ’ αὖ, ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν [ᾖ] ἡ περιφορά· οὐ γάρ πω δέδεικται ἐπ’ εὐθείας οὖσα ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ φορά· ἢ γὰρ μένειν ἢ περιφέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι βιασθέντων.
And if anything is going to be destroyed by fire, it must first be heated, and in being heated come into a state contrary to its nature. The heaven, then, needs no other body in order to remain, nor in order for its revolution to be natural. For it has not yet been shown that its natural motion is in a straight line. For these things, the natural state is either to stay still or to move round; the other motions belong to things under force.
οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τροφῆς δεῖσθαι φατέον τὰ ἐκεῖ, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τῇδε περὶ ἐκείνων ἀποφαντέον οὔτε ψυχὴν τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν συνέχουσαν ἐχόντων οὔτε τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον οὔτε αἰτίας οὔσης ἐκεῖ, δι’ ἣν τὰ τῇδε τρέφεται συγκρίματα ἀεὶ ῥέοντα, τήν τε μεταβολὴν τῶν τῇδε σωμάτων ἀφ’ αὑτῶν μεταβάλλειν ἄλλης ἐπιστατούσης φύσεως αὐτοῖς, ἣ ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας οὐκ οἶδε κατέχειν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, μιμεῖται δὲ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ γεννᾶν τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς φύσιν. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὡσαύτως πάντη, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά, εἴρηται.
So we must not say that the things up there need nourishment either, nor make pronouncements about them on the basis of things here. They do not have the same soul holding them together, nor the same place, and the cause is not present there by which the composites here, always flowing, are nourished. As for change, the bodies here change away from themselves because another nature presides over them, which, through weakness, does not know how to hold them in being, but imitates the nature prior to it in coming to be or generating. That they are not in every way the same, as the intelligibles are, has already been said.