Ἅπαντα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἤτοι κατ’ αἰτίας γίνεται καὶ ἔστι, ἢ ἄνευ αἰτίας ἄμφω· ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ αἰτίας, τὰ δὲ μετ’ αἰτίας ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἢ τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα μετ’ αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ ὄντα τὰ μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν μετ’ αἰτίας, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ αἰτίας, ἢ οὐδὲν μετ’ αἰτίας· ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν ὄντα μετ’ αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μετ’ αἰτίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀιδίων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἰς ἄλλα αἴτια ἀνάγειν οὐχ οἷόν τε πρῶτα ὄντα· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἤρτηται, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι ἐχέτω. τάς τε ἐνεργείας ἑκάστων ἀποδιδούς τις ἐπὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναγέτω· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν, τὸ τοιάνδε ἐνέργειαν ἀποδιδόναι.
Everything that comes to be and everything that is either comes to be and is according to causes, or both are without cause. Or, in both cases, some are without cause and some with a cause. Or all the things that come to be are with a cause, while of the things that are, some are with a cause and some without, or none with a cause. Or, conversely, all the things that are are with a cause, while of the things that come to be some are one way and some the other, or none of them with a cause. Now among eternal things, the first cannot be traced back to other causes, since they are first; but let whatever depends on the first have its being from them. And when one accounts for the activities of each, let one trace them back to their substances; for their being consists in this, in giving off an activity of such and such a kind.
περὶ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ ὄντων μὲν ἀεί, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ποιουμένων ἀεὶ κατ’ αἰτίας ἅπαντα λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀναίτιον οὐ παραδεκτέον, οὔτε παρεγκλίσεσι κεναῖς χώραν διδόντα οὔτε κινήσει σωμάτων τῇ ἐξαίφνης, ἣ οὐδενὸς προηγησαμένου ὑπέστη, οὔτε ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ ἐμπλήκτῳ μηδενὸς κινήσαντος αὐτὴν εἰς τό τι πρᾶξαι ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐποίει.
As for things that come to be, or that always are but do not always exercise the same activity, we must say that all of them come to be according to causes. We must not admit the uncaused, giving no room either to empty swerves, or to a sudden movement of bodies that arises with nothing preceding it, or to a capricious impulse of the soul when nothing has moved it to do something it was not doing before.
ἢ αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ μείζων ἄν τις ἔχοι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη τῷ μὴ αὑτῆς εἶναι, φέρεσθαι δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας φορὰς ἀβουλήτους τε καὶ ἀναιτίους οὔσας. ἢ γὰρ τὸ βουλητόν — τοῦτο δὲ ἢ ἔξω ἢ εἴσω — ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητὸν ἐκίνησεν· ἤ, εἰ μηδὲν ὀρεκτὸν ἐκίνησεν, οὐδ’ ἂν ὅλως ἐκινήθη. γιγνομένων δὲ πάντων κατ’ αἰτίας τὰς μὲν προσεχεῖς ἑκάστῳ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν καὶ εἰς ταύτας ἀνάγειν· οἷον τοῦ βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγορὰν τὸ οἰηθῆναι δεῖν τινα ἰδεῖν ἢ χρέος ἀπολαβεῖν καὶ ὅλως τὸ τάδε ἢ τάδε ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁρμῆσαι, ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ φανῆναι ἑκάστῳ ταδὶ ποιεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας ἀνάγειν [ἔστιν, οἷον] τοῦ ὑγιάσαι [αἰτία] ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρός.
Or rather, by this very fact a greater necessity would hold it: not to belong to itself, but to be carried along by such motions, unwilled and uncaused as they are. For either what it wanted moved it—and this is either outside or inside—or what it desired; or, if nothing desirable moved it, it would not have moved at all. Since all things come to be according to causes, it is easy to grasp the immediate causes of each and trace things back to them. The cause of walking to the marketplace, for example, is thinking one ought to see someone or collect a debt, and in general choosing this or that and setting out for it, and then its seeming right to each person to do this particular thing. And some things can be traced back to the arts[: for instance,] medicine and the doctor [are the cause] of being healed.
καὶ τοῦ πλουτῆσαι θησαυρὸς εὑρεθεὶς ἢ δόσις παρά του ἢ ἐκ πόνων ἢ τέχνης χρηματίσασθαι, καὶ τοῦ τέκνου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ εἴ τι συνεργὸν ἔξωθεν εἰς παιδοποιίαν ἄλλο παρ’ ἄλλου ἧκον. οἷον σιτία τοιάδε ἢ καὶ ὀλίγῳ προσώτερα εὔροια εἰς παιδοποιίαν ἢ γυνὴ ἐπιτήδειος εἰς τόκους. καὶ ὅλως εἰς φύσιν.
And of getting rich, a treasure found, or a gift from someone, or making money by labor or a trade. And of a child, the father, and whatever else contributes from outside to producing children, coming from one source or another: a particular diet, for example, or, a little further back, a good flow for begetting children, or a woman well suited to childbearing. And, in general, to nature.
μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐλθόντα ἀναπαύσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω μὴ ἐθελῆσαι χωρεῖν ῥᾳθύμου ἴσως καὶ οὐ κατακούοντος τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αἴτια ἀνιόντων. διὰ τί γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν γενομένων, οἷον τῆς σελήνης φανείσης, ὁ μὲν ἥρπασεν, ὁ δὲ οὔ; καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡκόντων ὁ μὲν ἐνόσησεν, ὁ δὲ οὔ; καὶ [ὁ μὲν] πλούσιος, ὁ δὲ πένης ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων.
To come this far and stop, unwilling to go higher, is perhaps the mark of someone lazy, who doesn’t listen to those who ascend to the first causes and to the causes beyond. For why is it that when the same things happen—when the moon appears, say—one man steals and another does not? And when similar influences come from the environment, one falls sick and another does not? And [one] becomes rich and another poor from the same work?
καὶ τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη διάφορα καὶ τύχαι ἐπὶ τὰ πόρρω ἀξιοῦσιν ἰέναι· καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ οὐχ ἱστάμενοι οἱ μὲν ἀρχὰς σωματικὰς θέμενοι, οἷον ἀτόμους, τῇ τούτων φορᾷ καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ συμπλοκαῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕκαστα ποιοῦντες καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ γίνεσθαι, ᾗ ἐκεῖνα συνέστη ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάσχει, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις ταύτῃ ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖναι ποιῶσιν, ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ τὴν παρὰ τούτων εἰς τὰ ὄντα εἰσάγουσι. κἂν ἄλλα δέ τις σώματα ἀρχὰς διδῷ καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, τῇ παρὰ τούτων ἀνάγκῃ δουλεύειν ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα.
Differences of manners, characters and fortunes do indeed call for going further back. And so, never coming to a stop, some posit bodily principles, atoms for instance. By the atoms’ motion, collisions and entanglements with one another they make each thing be and come to be as it does, according to how the atoms combine, act and are acted upon; and they make our impulses and dispositions be as the atoms make them. So they bring this necessity, the one that comes from atoms, into the things that are. And if someone assigns other bodies as principles and has everything come from them, he makes the things that are slaves to the necessity that comes from those bodies.
οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες ἀπ’ αὐτῆς κατάγουσι πάντα, διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασαν αἰτίαν καὶ ταύτην οὐ μόνον κινοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιοῦσαν ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἱμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν θέμενοι αὐτὴν οὖσαν, καὶ πάντα οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας διανοήσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνης ἰέναι κινημάτων, οἷον ζῴου μορίων κινουμένων ἑκάστων οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονοῦντος ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων. ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν περιέχουσαν καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσαν τῇ κινήσει καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄστρων πλανωμένων τε καὶ ἀπλανῶν σχέσεσι καὶ σχηματισμοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ τούτων προρρήσεως πιστούμενοι, ἕκαστα ἐντεῦθεν γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῦσι.
Others go to the principle of the All and derive everything from it. They say that it is a cause that pervades all things, and that it not only moves but also makes each of them; they posit that it is itself fate and the most sovereign cause, and that not only everything else that happens but even our thoughts come from its movements—as each of an animal’s parts moves not of itself but from the ruling part in each animal. Others hold that the revolution of the All, which embraces everything and produces everything by its motion, and the positions and configurations of the planets and fixed stars relative to one another, are the source of each thing; their confidence comes from the predictions they make from these.
καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτίων ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν εἱρμὸν καὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις ἀεὶ τὰ ὕστερα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα ἀνιέναι δι’ αὐτῶν γενόμενα καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γενόμενα δουλεύειν τε τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ ὕστερα, ταῦτα εἴ τις λέγοι, εἱμαρμένην ἕτερον τρόπον εἰσάγων φανεῖται. διττοὺς δὲ ἄν τις θέμενος καὶ τούτους οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ’ ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. λεχθήσεται δὲ περὶ τούτων. νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πρώτους ἰτέον τῷ λόγῳ· εἶτ’ ἐφεξῆς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκεπτέον.
Moreover, if someone speaks of the interweaving of causes with one another and the chain from above, of later things always following earlier ones and leading back to them, since they came to be through them and would not have come to be without them, and of later things being slaves to those before them—he will plainly be introducing fate in another way. And one would not miss the truth if one divided these too into two groups: some hang everything from some one thing, others do not. We shall speak of these. For now the argument must go to the first group; then we must examine the views of the others in turn.
σώμασι μὲν οὖν ἐπιτρέψαι τὰ πάντα εἴτε ἀτόμοις εἴτε τοῖς στοιχείοις καλουμένοις καὶ τῇ ἐκ τούτων ἀτάκτῳ φορᾷ τάξιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡγουμένην γεννᾶν ἀμφοτέρως μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδυνατώτερον δέ, εἰ οἷόν τε λέγειν, τὸ ἐξ ἀτόμων. καὶ περὶ τούτων πολλοὶ εἴρηνται λόγοι ἀληθεῖς. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θεῖτό τις τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον οὔτε τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνάγκην οὔτε τὴν ἄλλως εἱμαρμένην ἕπεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ πρῶτον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι. αὗται τοίνυν κινήσονται τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ κάτω — ἔστω γάρ τι κάτω — τὴν δ’ ἐκ πλαγίων, ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλαι κατὰ ἄλλα. οὐδὲν δὴ τακτῶς, τάξεώς γε οὐκ οὔσης, τὸ δὲ γενόμενον τοῦτο, ὅτε γέγονε, πάντως.
To hand everything over to bodies, whether atoms or the so-called elements, and to have order, reason and the soul that governs generated from their disorderly motion, is absurd and impossible either way—but more impossible, if one can say so, from atoms. Many true arguments have been made about these. But even if one were to posit such principles, it would not follow, even so, that either necessity over all things or fate in some other sense must result. Suppose first that atoms exist. They will move, then, some downward—let there be a “down”—and some sideways, wherever they happen to go, different ones in different directions. Nothing, then, would happen in an orderly way, since there is no order; what comes about is simply whatever came about, when it did.
ὥστε οὔτε πρόρρησις οὔτε μαντικὴ τὸ παράπαν ἂν εἴη, οὔτε εἴ τις ἐκ τέχνης — πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτάκτοις τέχνη; — οὔτε εἴ τις ἐξ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἐπιπνοίας· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὡρισμένον τὸ μέλλον εἶναι. καὶ σώμασι μὲν ἔσται παρὰ τῶν ἀτόμων πάσχειν πληττομένοις, ἅπερ ἂν ἐκεῖναι φέρωσιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὰ δὲ δὴ ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη τίσι κινήσεσι τῶν ἀτόμων ἀναθήσει τις; ποία γὰρ πληγὴ ἢ κάτω φερομένης ἢ ὁπουοῦν προσκρουούσης ἐν λογισμοῖς τοιοῖσδε ἢ ὁρμαῖς τοιαῖσδε, ἢ ὅλως ἐν λογισμοῖς ἢ ὁρμαῖς ἢ νοήσεσι, ποιήσει ἀναγκαίαις εἶναι ἢ ὅλως εἶναι; ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἐναντιῶται ψυχὴ τοῖς τοῦ σώματος παθήμασι; κατὰ ποίας δὲ φορὰς ἀτόμων ὁ μὲν γεωμετρικὸς ἀναγκασθήσεται εἶναι, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ἐπισκέψεται, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἔσται;
So there would be no prediction or divination at all: neither by art—how could there be an art of what is disorderly?—nor by possession and inspiration, for here too the future must be determinate. Bodies, struck by the atoms, will necessarily suffer whatever the atoms bring them; but to what movements of atoms will one attribute the works and affections of the soul? What blow from an atom, moving downward or colliding anywhere, will make reasonings or impulses be of this or that kind—or make reasonings, impulses or thoughts be necessary, or exist at all? And what about when the soul opposes the affections of the body? By what motions of atoms will one man be compelled to be a geometer, another to study arithmetic and astronomy, another to be wise?
ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον καὶ τὸ ζῴοις εἶναι ἀπολεῖται φερομένων ᾗ τὰ σώματα ἄγει ὠθοῦντα ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ ἄψυχα σώματα. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα σώματα αἴτια τῶν πάντων τιθεμένους καὶ ὅτι θερμαίνειν μὲν καὶ ψύχειν ἡμᾶς καὶ φθείρειν δὲ τὰ ἀσθενέστερα δύναται ταῦτα, ἔργον δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα ψυχὴ ἐργάζεται παρὰ τούτων ἂν γίνοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ἑτέρας δεῖ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς ἰέναι.
For our own activity, and our being living creatures at all, will be utterly lost, if we are carried wherever the bodies lead, as they push us about like soulless bodies. The same applies against those who posit other bodies as the causes of everything: these can heat and chill us and destroy weaker things, but none of the works that soul produces could come from them; these must come from another principle.
ἀλλ’ ἆρα μία τις ψυχὴ διὰ παντὸς διήκουσα περαίνει τὰ πάντα ἑκάστου ταύτῃ κινουμένου ὡς μέρους, ᾗ τὸ ὅλον ἄγει, φερομένων δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν αἰτίων ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη τὴν τούτων ἐφεξῆς συνέχειαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν εἱμαρμένην; οἷον εἰ φυτοῦ ἐκ ῥίζης τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ πάντα διήκουσαν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλοκὴν ποίησίν τε καὶ πεῖσιν διοίκησιν μίαν καὶ οἷον εἱμαρμένην τοῦ φυτοῦ τις εἶναι λέγοι. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εἱμαρμένης αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τὸν εἱρμὸν καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ἀναιρεῖ.
But is it, then, that one soul, pervading the All, accomplishes everything, each thing being moved by it as a part, in the way the whole leads; and that, as the causes are carried along from there, their continuous succession and interweaving must follow—and this is fate? It would be as if someone said that, in a plant whose principle lies in the root, the interweaving that extends from there to all its parts and binds them to one another, their acting and being acted upon, is one administration and, as it were, the fate of the plant. But first, this very excess of necessity, of a fate of this kind, does away with fate itself, and with the chain and interweaving of causes.
ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις μέρεσι κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν κινουμένοις ἄλογον τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην λέγειν κινεῖσθαι — οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐνδεδωκὸς τὴν κίνησιν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ παραδεξάμενον καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁρμῇ κεχρημένον, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι πρῶτον τὸ κινῆσαν τὸ σκέλος — τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἓν ἔσται τὸ πᾶν ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παρ’ ἄλλου κατ’ αἰτίας τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἀεὶ ἐφ’ ἕτερον ἐχούσας, οὐ δὴ ἀληθὲς κατ’ αἰτίας τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἓν ἔσται τὰ πάντα. ὥστε οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς οὔτε τι ἡμέτερον ἔργον· οὐδὲ λογιζόμεθα αὐτοί, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρου λογισμὸς τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλεύματα· οὐδὲ πράττομεν ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἱ πόδες λακτίζουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς διὰ μερῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν.
Our limbs are moved according to the ruling part, and it is unreasonable to say that they are moved by fate; for it is not that one thing imparts the motion and another receives it and makes use of the impulse that comes from it, but it is the ruling part that is first in moving the leg. In the same way, if in the All too there is to be one thing acting and being acted upon, and not one thing from another, by causes that always lead back to something else, then it is not true that everything comes to be by causes; rather, all things will be one. So we are not ourselves, and no act is ours. Nor do we ourselves reason: our decisions are someone else’s reasoning. Nor do we act, any more than our feet kick; we do, through parts of ourselves.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς ἑκάστου καλάς τε καὶ αἰσχρὰς πράξεις παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ παντὶ τὴν γοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ποίησιν ἀνατιθέναι.
But each must be itself; our actions and thoughts must be our own; and each person’s fine and shameful actions must come from himself, and we must not, at any rate, attribute the doing of the shameful ones to the All.
Against the astrologers’ causes
The stars may signify what will happen, but they do not make our characters or actions.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως μὲν οὐχ οὕτως ἕκαστα περαίνεται, ἡ δὲ φορὰ διοικοῦσα πάντα καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄστρων κίνησις οὕτως ἕκαστα τίθησιν, ὡς ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσεως ἔχῃ μεσουρανήσεσι καὶ ἀνατολαῖς, δύσεσί τε καὶ παραβολαῖς. ἀπὸ τούτων γοῦν μαντευόμενοι προλέγουσι περί τε τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐσομένων περί τε ἑκάστου, ὅπως τε τύχης καὶ διανοίας οὐχ ἥκιστα ἕξει.
But perhaps things are not accomplished in that way. Perhaps the revolution that governs everything and the movement of the stars arrange each thing according to how the stars stand toward one another, in culminations and risings, settings and conjunctions. At any rate, divining from these, they predict both what will happen in the All and what will happen to each person—how he will fare in fortune and, not least, in mind.
ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων συμπαθείας αὐξόμενά τε καὶ μειούμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα παρ’ αὐτῶν πάσχοντα, τούς τε τόπους τοὺς ἐπὶ γῆς διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων εἶναι κατά τε τὴν πρὸς τὸ πᾶν σχέσιν καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον μάλιστα· ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ τοῖς τόποις οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ χρόας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἐπιτηδεύματά τε καὶ ἤθη. κυρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πάντων φορά. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον, ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ἕτερον τρόπον ἐκείνοις ἀνατίθησι τὰ ἡμέτερα, βουλὰς καὶ πάθη, κακίας τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐδὲν διδοὺς λίθοις φερομένοις καταλείπει εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι παρ’ αὑτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν φύσεως ἔργον.
One can see, they say, that the other animals and the plants grow and diminish through their sympathy with the stars, and are affected by them in other ways too. The regions of the earth differ from one another according to their relation to the All, and above all to the sun. And it is not only the other plants and animals that follow their regions, but human beings too: their looks, sizes and colors, their tempers and desires, their ways of life and characters. So the revolution of the All is sovereign over everything. Against this, the first thing to say is that this man too, in a different way, attributes to those beings what is ours—choices and passions, vices and impulses—and, granting us nothing, leaves us to be stones that are carried along, not human beings with an activity of their own, coming from themselves and their own nature.
ἀλλὰ χρὴ διδόναι μὲν τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡμῖν, ἥκειν δὲ εἰς τὰ ἡμέτερα ἤδη ὄντα καὶ οἰκεῖα ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἄττα, καὶ διαιρούμενον, τίνα μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐργαζόμεθα, τίνα δὲ πάσχομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ πάντα ἐκείνοις ἀνατιθέναι· καὶ ἰέναι μὲν παρὰ τῶν τόπων καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ περιέχοντος εἰς ἡμᾶς οἷον θερμότητας ἢ ψύξεις ἐν τῇ κράσει, ἰέναι δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν γονέων· τοῖς γοῦν γονεῦσιν ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καί τινα τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοίων ὄντων τοῖς εἴδεσι παρὰ τοὺς τόπους ἔν γε τοῖς ἤθεσι πλείστη παραλλαγὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἐνορᾶται, ὡς ἂν ἀπ’ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς τῶν τοιούτων ἰόντων. αἵ τε πρὸς τὰς κράσεις τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐναντιώσεις καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρεπόντως λέγοιντο ἄν.
Rather, we must grant to ourselves what is ours, while allowing that some things come from the All into what is already ours and our own. Distinguishing what we do from what we undergo of necessity, we must not attribute everything to the stars. We must allow that from the regions and the differences of the surrounding air there come into us things like heat or cold in our temperament; and things come from our parents too: we resemble our parents, at any rate, mostly in appearance and in some of the irrational affections of the soul. Nevertheless, even among people who look alike because of their regions, a very great variety is seen in character and in thought, as though such things came from another principle. And the resistance we put up against bodily temperaments and desires could fittingly be mentioned here too.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν ἰδόντες περὶ ἑκάστων λέγουσι τὰ γιγνόμενα, παρ’ ἐκείνων ποιεῖσθαι τεκμαίρονται, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ οἱ ὄρνεις ποιητικοὶ ὧν σημαίνουσιν εἶεν καὶ πάντα, εἰς ἃ βλέποντες οἱ μάντεις προλέγουσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε ἀκριβέστερον ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο περὶ τούτων. ἅ τις ἂν ἰδὼν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν, ἣν εἶχον ὅτε ἕκαστος ἐγίνετο, προείπῃ, ταῦτά φασι καὶ γίνεσθαι παρ’ αὐτῶν οὐ σημαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιούντων. ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ εὐγενείας λέγωσιν ὡς ἐξ ἐνδόξων τῶν πατέρων καὶ μητέρων, πῶς ἔνι ποιεῖσθαι λέγειν ταῦτα, ἃ προυπάρχει περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς πρὶν σχέσιν γενέσθαι ταύτην τῶν ἄστρων, ἀφ’ ἧς προλέγουσι;
If, because they predict what happens to each person by looking at the positions of the stars, they infer that it is produced by the stars, then birds too would produce what they signify, and so would everything diviners look to in making predictions. One might examine these matters more precisely from the following as well. Whatever someone predicts by looking at the position the stars had when each person was born, they say this comes about through the stars, which not only signify it but also produce it. Well then, when they speak of noble birth, as coming from distinguished fathers and mothers, how can one say that this is produced, when it already belonged to the parents before the stars took up the position from which they make the prediction?
καὶ μὴν καὶ γονέων τύχας ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων τῆς γενέσεως καὶ παίδων διαθέσεις οἷαι ἔσονται καὶ ὁποίαις συνέσονται τύχαις ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων περὶ τῶν οὔπω γεγονότων λέγουσι καὶ ἐξ ἀδελφῶν ἀδελφῶν θανάτους καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀνάπαλίν τε ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνα. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἡ ἐπὶ ἑκάστου σχέσις τῶν ἄστρων ποιοῖ, ἃ ἤδη ἐκ πατέρων οὕτως ἕξειν λέγεται; ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερα ἔσται τὰ ποιοῦντα, ἤ, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνα ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης [ἡ] ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι πρὸς τοὺς γονέας οἴκοθέν φασι καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος ἰέναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ φορᾶς ἄστρων.
Again, they tell parents’ fortunes from their children’s births; and from the fathers they tell what the children’s dispositions will be and what fortunes they will meet with, about children not yet born; and from brothers they tell brothers’ deaths, and from wives what concerns their husbands, and the reverse. How then could the position of the stars at each person’s birth produce what is already said to be going to turn out so, from the fathers? Either those earlier positions will be what produces it, or, if those do not produce it, these do not either. And then there is the resemblance to parents in appearance: beauty and ugliness, they say, come from the family, not from the motion of the stars.
εὔλογόν τε κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ ἄλλα ἅμα ζῷά τε παντοδαπὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἅμα γίνεσθαι· οἷς ἅπασιν ἐχρῆν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οἷς ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις. πῶς οὖν ἅμα μὲν ἀνθρώπους, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ τῶν [αὐτῶν] σχημάτων;
And it is reasonable that, at the same moments, all sorts of other animals are born together with human beings. All of these, to whom the same position applies, ought to have the same fortunes. How then can the [same] configurations produce human beings at once, and the other creatures at once?
ἀλλὰ γὰρ γίγνεται μὲν ἕκαστα κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν φύσεις, ἵππος μέν, ὅτι ἐξ ἵππου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοιόσδε, ὅτι ἐκ τοιοῦδε· ἔστω δὲ συνεργὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ συγχωροῦσα τὸ πολὺ τοῖς γινομένοις· ἔστωσαν δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ σωματικῶς διδόντες, θερμότητας καὶ ψύξεις καὶ σωμάτων κράσεις ἐπακολουθούσας. πῶς οὖν τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα οὐ δοκεῖ κράσει σωμάτων δουλεύειν, οἷον γραμματικός τις καὶ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κυβευτικὸς καὶ τῶνδέ τις εὑρετής; πονηρία δὲ ἤθους παρ’ [ἀστέρων] θεῶν ὄντων πῶς ἂν δοθείη;
No: each thing comes to be according to its own nature—a horse because it comes from a horse, a human being because from a human being, and of this sort because from one of this sort. Let the revolution of the All be a contributing cause, leaving the greater part to the things that come to be. Let the stars give much to the body, in a bodily way: heat and cold, and the bodily temperaments that follow. How then do they give characters and ways of life, and especially those that do not seem to be slaves to bodily temperament—someone being a grammarian, say, or a geometer, or a dice-player, or an inventor of these things? And how could wickedness of character be given by [stars that are] gods?
καὶ ὅλως ὅσα λέγονται διδόναι κακὰ κακούμενοι, ὅτι δύνουσι καὶ ὅτι ὑπὸ γῆν φέρονται, ὥσπερ διάφορόν τι πασχόντων, εἰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δύνοιεν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ σφαίρας οὐρανίας φερομένων καὶ πρὸς τὴν γῆν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχόντων σχέσιν. οὐδὲ λεκτέον, ὡς ἄλλος ἄλλον ἰδὼν τῶν θεῶν κατ’ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην στάσιν χείρων ἢ κρείττων γίνεται· ὥστε εὐπαθοῦντας μὲν ἡμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν, κακοῦν δέ, εἰ τἀναντία· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χρείαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαινόμενον· ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὁ ὄρνις, σημαίνειν ὑψηλάς τινας πράξεις.
And in general, how could they give all the evils they are said to give when they are harmed—because they set and because they pass beneath the earth? As if they suffered something different when they set relative to us, and were not forever moving on the heavenly sphere, keeping the same relation to the earth! Nor should one say that one god becomes worse or better by seeing another god in this or that position, so that they do us good when they are in a good state and harm us in the opposite case. Rather, they move for the preservation of the whole, and they also provide another service: those who know this kind of grammar can look at them as at letters and read the future from their configurations, working out what is signified by analogy—as if someone were to say that because the bird flies high it signifies some lofty deeds.
λοιπὸν δὲ ἰδεῖν τὴν ἐπιπλέκουσαν καὶ οἷον συνείρουσαν ἀλλήλοις πάντα καὶ τό πως ἐφ’ ἑκάστου ἐπιφέρουσαν ἀρχὴν τιθεμένην μίαν, ἀφ’ ἧς πάντα κατὰ λόγους σπερματικοὺς περαίνεται. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐγγὺς ἐκείνης τῆς πᾶσαν καὶ σχέσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἡμετέραν τε καὶ πᾶσαν [πάντων] ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἥκειν λεγούσης, εἰ καὶ βούλεταί τι ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκάστοις χαρίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ παρ’ ἡμῶν ποιεῖν τι. ἔχει μέντοι τὴν πάντως πάντων ἀνάγκην, καὶ πάντων εἰλημμένων τῶν αἰτίων οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον μὴ οὐ γίγνεσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ κωλῦσον ἢ ἄλλως γενέσθαι ποιῆσον, εἰ πάντα εἴληπται ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὄντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ὡρμημένα ἡμῖν οὐδὲν καταλείψει, ἢ φέρεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὠθῇ.
It remains to consider the view that posits a single principle which interweaves all things, and, as it were, strings them together and brings about the “how” of each—a principle from which everything is accomplished according to seminal rational principles. This opinion too is close to the one that says that all our states and movements, and every one [of all things], come from the World Soul, even if it wants to grant us and each thing something toward acting on our own. It holds, however, the absolute necessity of all things: once all the causes are included, it is impossible for anything not to happen; for nothing is left to prevent it or make it happen otherwise, if everything has been included in fate. Things being so, and set in motion as from a single principle, they will leave us nothing but to be carried wherever they push us.
αἵ τε γὰρ φαντασίαι τοῖς προηγησαμένοις αἵ τε ὁρμαὶ κατὰ ταύτας ἔσονται, ὄνομά τε μόνον τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ὁρμῶμεν ἡμεῖς, ταύτῃ τι πλέον ἔσται τῆς ὁρμῆς κατ’ ἐκεῖνα γενομένης· τοιοῦτόν τε τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔσται, οἷον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ τὸ τῶν νηπίων καθ’ ὁρμὰς τυφλὰς ἰόντων καὶ τὸ τῶν μαινομένων· ὁρμῶσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι· καὶ νὴ Δία αἱ πυρὸς ὁρμαὶ καὶ πάντων ὅσα δουλεύοντα τῇ αὑτῶν κατασκευῇ φέρεται κατὰ ταύτην. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πάντες ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρμῆς ταύτης ἄλλας αἰτίας ζητοῦντες οὐχ ἵστανται ὡς ἐπ’ ἀρχῆς ταύτης.
For the images of our imagination will follow from what preceded, and our impulses from them, and “what is up to us” will be a mere name. The fact that it is we who have the impulse will add nothing, since the impulse arises in accordance with those causes. What is ours will be like what belongs to the other animals, and to infants, who go by blind impulses, and to madmen—for they too have impulses; and, by Zeus, like the impulses of fire, and of everything that, a slave to its own constitution, moves in accordance with it. Everyone sees this and does not dispute it; but they look for other causes of this impulse and do not stop at it as a principle.
Soul as a principle
Each soul is a primary cause, free outside body and partly bound within it.
τίς οὖν ἄλλη αἰτία παρὰ ταύτας ἐπελθοῦσα ἀναίτιόν τε οὐδὲν καταλείψει ἀκολουθίαν τε τηρήσει καὶ τάξιν ἡμᾶς τέ τι εἶναι συγχωρήσει προρρήσεις τε καὶ μαντείας οὐκ ἀναιρήσει; ψυχὴν δὴ δεῖ ἀρχὴν οὖσαν ἄλλην ἐπεισφέροντας εἰς τὰ ὄντα, οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑκάστου μετὰ ταύτης, ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐ σμικρᾶς οὔσης, πλέκειν τὰ πάντα, οὐ γιγνομένης καὶ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ σπερμάτων, ἀλλὰ πρωτουργοῦ αἰτίας οὔσης. ἄνευ μὲν οὖν σώματος οὖσα κυριωτάτη τε αὑτῆς καὶ ἐλευθέρα καὶ κοσμικῆς αἰτίας ἔξω· ἐνεχθεῖσα δὲ εἰς σῶμα οὐκέτι πάντα κυρία, ὡς ἂν μεθ’ ἑτέρων ταχθεῖσα. τύχαι δὲ τὰ κύκλῳ πάντα, οἷς συνέπεσεν ἐλθοῦσα εἰς μέσον, τὰ πολλὰ ἤγαγον, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν διὰ ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ κρατοῦσαν αὐτὴν ταῦτα ὅπῃ ἐθέλει ἄγειν.
What other cause, then, coming in besides these, will leave nothing uncaused, keep sequence and order, allow us to be something, and not do away with predictions and divinations? We must bring soul into the things that are as another principle—not only the Soul of the All but, together with it, the soul of each individual, as a principle of no small importance—to weave everything together. This soul does not itself come to be from seeds, as other things do, but is a primary, originating cause. Without a body, then, it is wholly its own master and free, and outside cosmic causation; but once brought into a body, it is no longer master of everything, since it has been ranked with other things. Chance circumstances—all the things around it, among which it fell when it came into their midst—have led it in many things, so that some things it does because of them, while in others it masters them and leads them wherever it wants.
πλείω δὲ κρατεῖ ἡ ἀμείνων, ἐλάττω δὲ ἡ χείρων. ἡ γὰρ κράσει σώματός τι ἐνδιδοῦσα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ὀργίζεσθαι ἠνάγκασται ἢ πενίαις ταπεινὴ ἢ πλούτοις χαῦνος ἢ δυνάμεσι τύραννος. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀντέσχεν, ἡ ἀγαθὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἠλλοίωσεν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἠλλοιώθη, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἑτεροιῶσαι, τοῖς δὲ συγχωρῆσαι μὴ μετὰ κάκης.
The better soul masters more, the worse less. For the soul that gives in to the body’s temperament is compelled to feel desire or anger, or is abased by poverty, or puffed up by wealth, or made a tyrant by power. But the other, the soul good by nature, has held out even in these same circumstances, and has changed them more than it has been changed, so that it has altered some and gone along with others without vice.
ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ὅσα προαιρέσει καὶ τύχαις κραθέντα γίνεται· τί γὰρ ἂν ἔτι καὶ ἄλλο εἴη; πάντων δὲ ληφθέντων τῶν αἰτίων πάντα πάντως γίνεται· ἐν τοῖς ἔξωθεν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ τῆς φορᾶς συντελεῖται. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀλλοιωθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν ἔξω ψυχὴ πράττῃ τι καὶ ὁρμᾷ οἷον τυφλῇ τῇ φορᾷ χρωμένη, οὐχὶ ἑκούσιον τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐδὲ τὴν διάθεσιν λεκτέον· καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ παρ’ αὑτῆς χείρων οὖσα οὐκ ὀρθαῖς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ ἡγεμονούσαις ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ᾖ χρωμένη.
Necessary, then, are all the things that come about from choice and chance blended together; for what else could there be? Once all the causes are taken, everything happens absolutely; and among the external causes is included whatever contribution comes from the revolution of the heavens. Now when the soul has been altered by external things and acts and has an impulse, using, as it were, a blind momentum, we must not call the action or the disposition voluntary. Nor when the soul, being worse by its own doing, uses impulses that are not right in every case, nor in command.
λόγον δὲ ὅταν ἡγεμόνα καθαρὸν καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἔχουσα ὁρμᾷ, ταύτην μόνην τὴν ὁρμὴν φατέον εἶναι ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιον, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον, ὃ μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἦλθεν, ἀλλ’ ἔνδοθεν ἀπὸ καθαρᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πρώτης ἡγουμένης καὶ κυρίας, ἀλλ’ οὐ πλάνην ἐξ ἀγνοίας παθούσης ἢ ἧτταν ἐκ βίας ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἳ προσελθοῦσαι ἄγουσι καὶ ἕλκουσι καὶ οὐκέτι ἔργα ἐῶσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παθήματα παρ’ ἡμῶν.
But when it has an impulse with its own reason as its guide, pure and unaffected, this alone is the impulse we must call up to us and voluntary; and this is our own act. It has not come from elsewhere but from within, from the pure soul, from a first principle that guides and is sovereign—not from a soul that has been led astray through ignorance, or defeated by the violence of desires, which come upon it and lead and drag it, and no longer allow there to be acts on our part, only things we undergo.
τέλος δή φησιν ὁ λόγος πάντα μὲν σημαίνεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι κατ’ αἰτίας μέν, διττὰς δὲ ταύτας· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς κύκλῳ. πραττούσας δὲ ψυχὰς ὅσα πράττουσι κατὰ μὲν λόγον ποιούσας ὀρθὸν παρ’ αὑτῶν πράττειν ὅσα πράττουσι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐμποδιζομένας τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν, πάσχειν τε μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν μὴ φρονεῖν ἄλλα αἴτια εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα ἴσως ὀρθὸν καθ’ εἱμαρμένην λέγειν πράττειν, οἷς γε καὶ δοκεῖ ἔξωθεν τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἴτιον εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἄριστα παρ’ ἡμῶν.
In the end, then, the argument says that all things are signified and come to be according to causes, but that these are of two kinds: some things come about through soul, others through other causes, the ones around it. And when souls do what they do according to right reason, they do it of themselves; otherwise they are hindered from doing what is their own, and are acted upon rather than act. So the causes of lacking understanding are other things; and it is perhaps correct to say that such actions are done by fate—at least for those who hold that fate is an external cause. But the best things come from us.
ταύτης γὰρ καὶ [ἡμεῖς] τῆς φύσεως ἐσμέν, ὅταν μόνοι ὦμεν· καὶ τούς γε σπουδαίους καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, καθ’ ὅσον ἄν ἀναπνεύσωσι συγχωρηθέντες τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν λαβόντας τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅταν φρονῶσι, μόνον δὲ οὐ κωλυθέντας.
For this is the nature [we] belong to, when we are alone. The good do fine things, and doing them is up to them; the others do fine things to the extent that they are allowed a breathing space—not getting their understanding from elsewhere, when they have it, but simply not being hindered.