Περὶ ἔρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἢ δαίμων ἢ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ ὁ μὲν θεός τις ἢ δαίμων, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πάθος, καὶ ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον, ἐπισκέψασθαι ἄξιον τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἐπινοίας ἐπιόντας, καὶ ὅσαι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἐγένοντο περὶ τούτων, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα ὑπολαμβάνει ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων, ὃς δὴ καὶ πολλὰ πολλαχῇ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ ἔρωτος ἔγραψεν· ὃς δὴ οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγινόμενόν τι πάθος εἴρηκεν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δαίμονά φησιν αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ γενέσεως αὐτοῦ διεξῆλθεν, ὅπως καὶ ὅθεν ἐστὶ γεγενημένος.
About love—whether it is a god or a spirit or a passion of the soul, or whether one kind is a god or spirit and another is also a passion, and what each is like—it is worth inquiring, going over what other people have thought, and the views on these matters that have arisen in philosophy, and above all what the divine Plato holds; for he wrote a great deal about love in many places in his works. He says not only that it is a passion that arises in souls, but also calls it a spirit, and he related its birth: how it was born and from whom.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πάθους οὗ τὸν ἔρωτα αἰτιώμεθα, ὅτι ἐγγίνεται ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐφιεμέναις καλῷ τινι συμπλακῆναι, καὶ ὡς ἡ ἔφεσις αὕτη ἡ μέν ἐστι παρὰ σωφρόνων αὐτῷ τῷ κάλλει οἰκειωθέντων, ἡ δὲ καὶ τελευτᾶν ἐθέλει εἰς αἰσχροῦ τινος πρᾶξιν, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δήπου· ὅθεν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἑκάτερος τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπισκοπεῖν διὰ φιλοσοφίας προσήκει. ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴ τις θεῖτο τὴν αὐτοῦ [τοῦ] κάλλους πρότερον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν καὶ συγγένειαν καὶ οἰκειότητος ἄλογον σύνεσιν, τυγχάνοι ἄν, οἶμαι, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τῆς αἰτίας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐναντίον καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ θεῷ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπουσα ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμένον βλέπει, ὃ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ συστοιχίᾳ· τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον αἰσχρὸν καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας συστοιχίας.
As for the passion for which we hold love responsible—that it arises in souls longing to be united with something beautiful, and that in some this longing belongs to the moderate, who have become intimate with beauty itself, while in others it wants to end in some shameful act—no one, surely, is unaware of this. But where each has its origin is what philosophy should examine from here on. If someone took as the origin the longing for beauty itself that was there in souls beforehand, and their recognition of it, their kinship with it and their unreasoning awareness of their affinity, he would, I think, hit on the truth about the cause. For the ugly is opposed both to nature and to god. Nature makes by looking toward the beautiful, and it looks toward the defined, which is in the column of the good; the undefined is ugly and belongs to the other column.
τῇ δὲ φύσει γένεσις ἐκεῖθεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ. ὅτῳ δέ τις ἄγαται καὶ ἔστι συγγενής, τούτου ᾠκείωται καὶ πρὸς τὰς εἰκόνας. εἰ δέ τις ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνέλοι, ὅπῃ τὸ πάθος γίνεται καὶ δι’ ἃς αἰτίας οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν οὐδ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν διὰ μῖξιν ἐρώτων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τίκτειν βούλονται ἐν τῷ καλῷ· ἐπείπερ ἄτοπον βουλομένην τὴν φύσιν καλὰ ποιεῖν ἐν αἰσχρῷ γεννᾶν βούλεσθαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τῇδε γεννᾶν κινουμένοις ἀρκεῖ τὸ τῇδε καλὸν ἔχειν, ὅπερ πάρεστιν ἐν εἰκόσι καὶ σώμασιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον αὐτοῖς τοῦ καὶ τοῦδε ἐρᾶν.
Nature comes from there, from the good, and so clearly from the beautiful too. And whatever someone delights in and is akin to, he feels at home with, even with its images. If someone did away with this cause, he would be unable to say how the passion comes about and for what reasons, not even in the case of loves aimed at intercourse. For these people too want to give birth in beauty, since it would be absurd for nature, which wants to make beautiful things, to want to beget in the ugly. But for those who are moved to beget here below, it is enough to have the beauty here, which is present in images and bodies, since the archetype is not present to them—the archetype that is the cause of their loving even this beauty.
καὶ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν μὲν ἐκείνου ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐλθοῦσιν ἀγαπᾶται τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών, μὴ ἀναμνησθεῖσι δὲ ὑπ’ ἀγνοίας τοῦ πάθους ἀληθὲς τοῦτο φαντάζεται· καὶ σώφροσι μὲν οὖσιν ἀναμάρτητος ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῇδε καλὸν οἰκείωσις, ἡ δὲ πρὸς μῖξιν ἔκπτωσις ἁμαρτία. καὶ ὅτῳ μὲν καθαρὸς ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔρως ἀγαπητὸν τὸ κάλλος μόνον εἴτε ἀναμνησθέντι εἴτε καὶ μή, ὅτῳ δὲ μέμικται καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀθάνατον εἶναι ὡς ἐν θνητῷ ἐπιθυμία, οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀειγενεῖ καὶ ἀιδίῳ τὸ καλὸν ζητεῖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν ἰὼν σπείρει καὶ γεννᾷ ἐν καλῷ, σπείρων μὲν εἰς τὸ ἀεί, ἐν καλῷ δὲ διὰ συγγένειαν τοῦ καλοῦ.
For those who come from this beauty to the recollection of that one, this one is loved as an image; those who have not recollected do not know what is happening to them, and take it for the true one. For those who are moderate, intimacy with the beauty here is no fault; but to lapse into intercourse is a fault. And one whose love of the beautiful is pure loves beauty alone, whether he has recollected or not; but one in whom another desire is mixed in, the desire to be immortal so far as a mortal can, seeks the beautiful in what is always being born and everlasting, and, going according to nature, sows and begets in beauty—sowing for perpetuity, and in beauty because of the kinship of the beautiful.
καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον συγγενὲς τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἡ ἀίδιος φύσις τὸ πρώτως τοιοῦτον καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τοιαῦτα πάντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν ἐθέλον μᾶλλον αὐταρκέστερον τῷ καλῷ, τὸ δὲ ἐφιέμενον ποιῆσαι καλόν τε ἐθέλει ποιεῖν ὑπ’ ἐνδείας καὶ οὐκ αὔταρκες καί, εἴπερ ποιήσει τοιοῦτον, οἴεται, εἰ ἐν καλῷ γεννήσεται. οἳ δ’ ἂν ἐν παρανόμῳ καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐθέλωσι γεννᾶν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν πορείας ποιησάμενοι τὰς ἀρχὰς γενόμενοι παράφοροι ἐκ ταύτης οἷον ὁδοῦ ὀλισθήσαντες κεῖνται πεσόντες οὔτε ἔρωτα γνόντες ἐφ’ ὃ ἦγεν αὐτοὺς οὔτε ἔφεσιν γεννήσεως οὔτε χρῆσιν κάλλους εἰκόνος οὔτε ὅ τι ἐστὶ κάλλος αὐτό.
For the everlasting too is akin to the beautiful, and the everlasting nature is what is primarily of this kind, and everything that comes from it is of this kind too. So what does not want to beget is more self-sufficient as regards beauty, while what longs to produce wants to produce something beautiful out of lack, and is not self-sufficient; and it thinks it will produce something like that if it begets in beauty. Those who want to beget unlawfully and against nature started out on the natural path, but strayed from it; they have slipped, as off a road, and lie fallen, knowing neither the love that was leading them, nor the longing to beget, nor the use of an image of beauty, nor what beauty itself is.
ἀλλ’ οὖν οἵ τε σωμάτων καλῶν οὐ διὰ μῖξιν ἐρῶντες, ὅτι καλά ἐστιν ἐρῶσιν, οἵ τε τὸν λεγόμενον μικτὸν ἔρωτα, γυναικῶν μέν, ἵνα καὶ τὸ ἀεί. μὴ τοιούτων δὲ σφαλλόμενοι σωφρονοῦσι μὲν ἄμφω· οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τὸ τῇδε κάλλος σέβουσιν ἀρκούμενοι, οἱ δὲ κἀκεῖνο, ὅσοι ἀνεμνήσθησαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀτιμάζουσιν οὐδὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἂν καὶ ἀποτέλεσμά τι ὂν ἐκείνου καὶ παίγνιον. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸ καλὸν αἰσχροῦ ἄνευ, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ καλὸν εἰς αἰσχρὸν πεσόντες· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀγαθοῦ ἔφεσις ἔχει εἰς κακὸν τὴν ἔκπτωσιν πολλάκις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ παθήματα.
Now those who love beautiful bodies not for the sake of intercourse love them because they are beautiful; and those who have the so-called mixed love—of women, so as to have perpetuity too, but not of others, in which they would go astray—are both moderate; but the first are better. Some revere the beauty here and are content with it; others, those who have recollected, revere that beauty too, and do not dishonor this one either, since it is an offshoot and plaything of that. These, then, are concerned with the beautiful without anything shameful; others fall into the shameful because of the beautiful; for the longing for good, too, often lapses into what is bad. These, then, are the passions of the soul.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὃν θεὸν τίθενται οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεολόγοι καὶ Πλάτων πολλαχοῦ Ἀφροδίτης Ἔρωτα λέγων καὶ ἔργον αὐτῷ εἶναι καλῶν τε ἔφορον παίδων [εἶναι] καὶ κινητικὸν τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ κάλλος, ἢ καὶ ἐπαύξειν τὴν ἤδη γενομένην πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ ὁρμήν, περὶ τούτου μάλιστα φιλοσοφητέον· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅσα ἐν Συμποσίῳ εἴρηται παραληπτέον, ἐν οἷς οὐκ [Ἀφροδίτης φησὶν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν] Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις ἐκ τῆς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ Πόρου. ἔοικε δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀπαιτήσειν τι εἰπεῖν, εἴτ’ οὖν ἐξ ἐκείνης εἴτε μετ’ ἐκείνης γεγονέναι λέγεται ὁ Ἔρως. πρῶτον οὖν τίς ἡ Ἀφροδίτη; εἶτα πῶς ἢ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἢ σὺν αὐτῇ ἢ τίνα τρόπον ἔχει τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς τε ἅμα καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ.
But about the one whom not only other people but theologians too, and Plato in many places, regard as a god—Love, son of Aphrodite, as he calls him, whose task is to watch over beautiful boys and to move souls toward the beauty there, or to strengthen the impulse toward it that has already arisen—about him above all we must philosophize. And we must take up what is said in the Symposium, where he is born not [of Aphrodite, Plato says, but] at Aphrodite’s birthday feast, of Poverty and Resource. The argument seems to require us to say something about Aphrodite too, whether Love is said to have been born from her or with her. First, then, who is Aphrodite? Then, how is he either from her or with her, or in what way is he both from her and with her at once?
λέγομεν δὴ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι διττήν, τὴν μὲν οὐρανίαν Οὐρανοῦ λέγοντες εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, τὴν τῶν τῇδε ἐφαπτομένην γάμων· ἀμήτορα δὲ ἐκείνην καὶ ἐπέκεινα γάμων, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ γάμοι. τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου μείνασαν ἄνω, ὡς μηδὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν μήτε ἐθελήσασαν μήτε δυναμένην, μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φῦσαν βαίνειν χωριστὴν οὖσάν τινα ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν — ὅθεν αὐτὴν τούτῳ ᾐνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι — ἣν δὴ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὖσαν καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς μένουσαν.
We say, then, that Aphrodite is twofold. One is the Heavenly, said to be daughter of Ouranos; the other, born of Zeus and Dione, is the one who has to do with marriages here. The first is motherless and beyond marriage, since there are no marriages in heaven either. The one called Heavenly, born of Kronos—who is Intellect—must be the most divine soul, coming straight from him, pure from the pure, remaining above, so that she neither wished nor was able to come into the things here. For she is not of a nature to step down among the things below, since she is a separate hypostasis and a being without share in matter—which is why they hinted at it by calling her motherless. One might justly call her a goddess, not a spirit, since she is unmixed and remains pure by herself.
τὸ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐκ νοῦ πεφυκὸς καθαρὸν καὶ αὐτό, ἅτε ἰσχύον καθ’ ἑαυτὸ τῷ ἐγγύθεν, ἅτε καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὔσης αὐτῇ καὶ τῆς ἱδρύσεως πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν ἱκανὸν ὂν κατέχειν ἄνω. ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐκπέσοι ψυχὴ νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον.
For what has sprung straight from Intellect is pure itself as well, strong in itself by its nearness, since its desire and its settled place are directed toward what generated it, which is able to hold it above. So a soul attached to Intellect could fall away even less than the sun could hold off from itself the light that shines around it, the light that comes from it and is joined to it.
ἐφεπομένη δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ ἤ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου [τῷ] Οὐρανῷ ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾠκειώθη καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα Ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ ἄμφω ἐκεῖ βλέπουσι, καὶ ἡ γειναμένη καὶ ὁ καλὸς Ἔρως ὁ γεγεννημένος ὑπόστασις πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸν ἀεὶ τεταγμένη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχουσα [τῷ] μεταξὺ ὥσπερ ποθοῦντος καὶ ποθουμένου, ὀφθαλμὸς ὁ τοῦ ποθοῦντος παρέχων μὲν τῷ ἐρῶντι δι’ αὑτοῦ τὸ ὁρᾶν τὸ ποθούμενον, προτρέχων δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνῳ παρασχεῖν τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δι’ ὀργάνου δύναμιν αὐτὸς πιμπλάμενος τοῦ θεάματος, πρότερος μέν, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως ὁρῶν τῷ ἐνστηρίζειν μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὅραμα, αὐτὸν δὲ καρποῦσθαι τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτὸν παραθέουσαν.
Following Kronos—or, if you like, Kronos’ father, Ouranos—she was active toward him and became intimate with him, and, loving him, she gave birth to Love, and together with Love she looks toward him. Her activity produced a hypostasis and a being, and both look there: the mother and the beautiful Love she bore, a hypostasis always directed toward another beautiful thing and having its being in this—between, as it were, the one who longs and the one longed for. He is the eye of the one who longs, providing the lover through himself with the sight of what he longs for, but running ahead himself and, before giving the lover the power of seeing through the organ, being filled himself with the sight. He sees first, but not in the same way, since he fixes the vision in the lover, while he himself enjoys the vision of the beautiful as it streams past him.
ὑπόστασιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσίας ἐλάττω μὲν τῆς ποιησαμένης, οὖσαν δὲ ὅμως, ἀπιστεῖν οὐ προσήκει. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη οὐσία ἦν γενομένη ἐξ ἐνεργείας τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ ζῶσα καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ὁρώσης, ὃ πρώτη ἦν οὐσία, καὶ σφόδρα ὁρώσης. καὶ πρῶτον ἦν ὅραμα αὐτῇ τοῦτο καὶ ἑώρα ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν αὑτῆς καὶ ἔχαιρεν ὁρῶσα, καὶ τὸ ὅραμα τοιοῦτον ἦν, ὡς μὴ πάρεργον τὴν θέαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ ὁρῶν, ὡς τῇ οἷον ἡδονῇ καὶ τάσει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ σφοδρότητι τῆς θέας γεννῆσαί τι παρ’ αὑτῆς ἄξιον αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὁράματος.
That there is a hypostasis and a being from a being, lesser than the one that produced it but still a being, we should not doubt. For that soul too was a being, come from the activity before it, and alive, belonging to the being of the things that are, and looking toward that which was the first being, and looking intensely. This was its first vision, and it looked at it as at its own good, and rejoiced in looking. And the vision was such that the seer did not treat the seeing as a side matter, so that by its pleasure, as it were, its straining toward it and the intensity of its vision, it begot from itself something worthy of itself and of the vision.
ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος συντόνως περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οἷον ἀπορρέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὄμμα πληρωθέν, οἷον μετ’ εἰδώλου ὅρασις, Ἔρως ἐγένετο τάχα που καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον αὐτῷ γεγενημένης, ὅτι ἐξ ὁράσεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει· ἐπεὶ τό γε πάθος ἀπὸ τούτου ἔχοι ἂν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, εἴπερ πρότερον οὐσία μὴ οὐσίας καὶ τό γε πάθος ἐρᾶν λέγεται, καὶ εἴπερ ἔρως αὐτὸν ἔχει τοῦδε· ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο ἔρως.
So from what was intently active about the object seen, and from what flows, as it were, from the object seen, an eye filled with sight—a seeing with an image, so to speak—Love came to be. And perhaps his name came from this too, because he has his existence from seeing (horasis). For the passion would take its name from him, since a being comes before what is not a being; and we do speak of the passion as “being in love,” and say that love for this or that has someone in its grip—but it would not be called love without qualification.
ὁ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἄνω ψυχῆς Ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ὁρῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνω, ἅτε ὀπαδὸς ὢν ἐκείνης καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνης γεγενημένος καὶ θεῶν ἀρκούμενος θέᾳ. χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τὸν Οὐρανὸν χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα οὐρανίαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἴπομεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν λέγοντες τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄριστον εἶναι χωριστὸν ὅμως τιθέμεθα αὐτὸ εἶναι· μόνον ἐκεῖ ἔστω, οὗ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀκήρατος. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν εἶναι ἔδει, ὑπέστη μετὰ ταύτης ἤδη καὶ ὁ ἄλλος Ἔρως ὄμμα καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀρέξεως καὶ αὐτὸς γεγενημένος. τοῦ δὲ κόσμου οὖσα ἡ.
Such, then, would be the Love of the soul above, himself looking upward, since he is her attendant, born from her and of her, and content with the vision of gods. And since we call that soul separate—the soul that first illuminates Heaven—we shall set down this Love as separate too, even though we have called the soul heavenly in the highest degree; just as, in our own case, when we say that the best in us is in us, we nevertheless posit it as separate. Let him be only there, where the pure soul is. But since there also had to be a soul of this All, the other Love came into existence along with it at once, himself also an eye, born from the longing of this soul too. And this
Ἀφροδίτη αὕτη καὶ οὐ μόνον ψυχὴ οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς ψυχὴ καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ Ἔρωτα ἐγεννήσατο ἐφαπτόμενον ἤδη καὶ αὐτὸν γάμων καί, καθ’ ὅσον ἐφάπτεται καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ὀρέξεως τῆς ἄνω, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινοῦντα καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ᾗ συντέτακται ἀναστρέφοντα, καθ’ ὅσον καὶ αὐτὴ εἰς μνήμην ἐκείνων πέφυκεν ἰέναι. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἡ μεμιγμένη καὶ ἥ τινος γενομένη· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης.
Aphrodite, being the soul of the cosmos, and not only soul nor soul without qualification, gave birth to the Love in this cosmos, who himself already has to do with marriages. And insofar as he too touches the longing above, to that extent he moves the souls of the young as well, and turns back the soul with which he is ranked, to the degree that it too is by nature able to come to remember those things. For every soul longs for the good, even the mixed soul and the one that has come to belong to someone; since this one too comes next after that one, and from it.
ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἑκάστη ψυχὴ ἔχει ἔρωτα τοιοῦτον ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει; ἢ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν ὅλη ἕξει καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ὑποστάντα τὸν ἔρωτα, ἡ δὲ ἑκάστου ἡμῶν οὔ· πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἅπασι; καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἔρως οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων, ὅν φασιν ἑκάστῳ συνέπεσθαι, ὁ αὑτοῦ ἑκάστου ἔρως. οὗτος γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ ἐμποιῶν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς ὀριγνωμένης ἀνάλογον ἑκάστης πρὸς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα γεννώσης εἴς τε ἀξίαν καὶ πρὸς οὐσίαν. ἐχέτω δὴ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ὅλον, αἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει τὸν αὑτῆς ἑκάστη.
Does every soul, then, have a love of this kind as its being and as a hypostasis? Or why should the whole Soul, the Soul of the All, have a love that exists as a hypostasis, but not the soul of each of us—and, besides, the soul in all the other living beings? And so this love is the spirit which they say accompanies each person, the love belonging to each. For he would be the one who produces the desires according to the nature of each soul, as each reaches out in proportion to its own nature and generates love fitted to its worth and its being. Let the whole Soul, then, have a whole Love, and the partial souls each its own.
καθ’ ὅσον δὲ ἑκάστη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἔχει οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη, ἐμπεριεχομένη δέ, ὡς εἶναι πάσας μίαν, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν πάντα ἂν ἔχοι· συνεῖναι δ’ αὖ καὶ τὸν ἐν μέρει τῇ ἐν μέρει καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ τὸν μέγαν ἐκεῖνον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τῷ παντὶ πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πολλοὺς αὖ τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι φαινόμενον πανταχοῦ τοῦ παντὸς οὗ ἂν θέλῃ σχηματιζόμενον μέρεσιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ φανταζόμενον, εἰ θέλοι. οἴεσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πολλάς, δαίμονας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας μετ’ ἔρωτος, ῥυείσας ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης τινὸς ὅλης, ἐν μέρει πολλὰς ἐκείνης ἐξηρτημένας μετὰ ἰδίων ἐρώτων, εἴπερ ψυχὴ μήτηρ ἔρωτος, Ἀφροδίτη δὲ ψυχή, ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης.
And insofar as each soul stands in relation to the whole, not cut off from it but contained in it, so that all are one, each love too would stand in relation to the whole Love. Again, the partial love would be with the partial soul, that great Love with the whole Soul, and the Love in the All everywhere in the All; and this one Love becomes and is many, appearing everywhere in the All where he wishes, taking shape in his parts and showing himself, if he wishes. We must also think that there are many Aphrodites in the whole, spirits that have come to be in it together with love, flowing from one whole Aphrodite, many partial ones depending on her, each with its own loves—since soul is the mother of love, Aphrodite is soul, and love is the activity of a soul reaching out for the good.
ἄγων τοίνυν ἑκάστην οὗτος ὁ ἔρως πρὸς τὴν ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὁ μὲν τῆς ἄνω θεὸς ἂν εἴη, ὃς ἀεὶ ψυχὴν ἐκείνῳ συνάπτει, δαίμων δ’ ὁ τῆς μεμιγμένης.
This love, then, leading each soul to the nature of the good, would be a god in the case of the higher soul, since he always joins soul to that; in the case of the mixed soul he would be a spirit.
What a spirit is
Plotinus asks how spirits differ from gods and why Love, a spirit, shares in matter.
ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ δαίμονος καὶ ὅλως ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις, περὶ ἧς καὶ ἐν Συμποσίῳ λέγεται, ἥ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, ὃς ἐκ Πενίας καὶ Πόρου [τοῦ] Μήτιδός ἐστι γεγεννημένος ἐν τοῖς Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις; τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸν κόσμον ὑπονοεῖν λέγεσθαι τόνδε τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ κόσμου τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκφύντα Ἔρωτα, πολλὰ τὰ ἐναντιούμενα τῇ δόξῃ ἔχει, τοῦ μὲν κόσμου λεγομένου εὐδαίμονος θεοῦ καὶ αὐτάρκους εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ Ἔρωτος τούτου ὁμολογουμένου τῷ ἀνδρὶ οὔτε θεοῦ οὔτε αὐτάρκους, ἀεὶ δὲ ἐνδεοῦς εἶναι.
But what is the nature of a spirit, and of spirits in general, which the Symposium also discusses—both the nature of the others and that of Love himself, who was born of Poverty and Resource, [the son] of Metis, at Aphrodite’s birthday feast? To suppose that Plato means this cosmos by Love, and not the Love that has sprung up within the cosmos, runs up against a great deal: the cosmos is said to be a blessed god and self-sufficient, whereas this Love is agreed by him to be neither a god nor self-sufficient, but always in need.
εἶτα ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, μέρος τὸ κύριον τοῦ Ἔρωτος τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι· ἤ, εἰ κόσμος ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή, τὸν Ἔρωτα τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι. εἶτα διὰ τί οὗτος μὲν δαίμων ὢν ὁ κόσμος ἔσται, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι δαίμονες — δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας εἰσίν — οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονται; καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔσται σύστασις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ δαιμόνων. ὁ δὲ ἔφορος καλῶν παίδων λεχθεὶς εἶναι πῶς ἂν ὁ κόσμος εἴη; τὸ δὲ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄοικον πῶς ἂν ἐφαρμόσειε μὴ οὐ γλίσχρως καὶ ἀπᾳδόντως;
Next, if the cosmos is made of soul and body, and the soul of the cosmos is, for him, Aphrodite, then Aphrodite must be the ruling part of Love; or, if the cosmos is its soul, as a human being is the human soul, then Love must be Aphrodite. Next, why should this one, who is a spirit, be the cosmos, while the other spirits—clearly they are of the same being—are not? And then the cosmos will be nothing but a compound of spirits. And how could the one said to watch over beautiful boys be the cosmos? And how could “no bedding, no shoes, no home” fit it, except in a strained and jarring way?
ἀλλὰ τί δὴ χρὴ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ Ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς λεγομένης γενέσεως αὐτοῦ; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δεῖ λαβεῖν τίς ἡ Πενία καὶ τίς ὁ Πόρος, καὶ πῶς ἁρμόσουσιν οὗτοι γονεῖς εἶναι αὐτῷ. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δαίμοσι τούτους ἁρμόσαι, εἴπερ δεῖ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν μίαν καθὸ δαίμονες δαιμόνων, εἰ μὴ κοινὸν ὄνομα ἕξουσι μόνον. λάβωμεν τοίνυν πῇ ποτε διορίζομεν θεοὺς δαιμόνων, καὶ εἰ πολλάκις καὶ δαίμονας θεοὺς λέγομεν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον λέγωμεν αὐτῶν εἶναι γένος. τὸ μὲν δὴ θεῶν ἀπαθὲς λέγομεν καὶ νομίζομεν γένος, δαίμοσι δὲ προστίθεμεν πάθη, ἀιδίους λέγοντες ἐφεξῆς τοῖς θεοῖς, ἤδη [δὲ] πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μεταξὺ θεῶν τε καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους.
But what, then, should we say about Love and his so-called birth? Clearly we must grasp who Poverty is and who Resource is, and how they will fit as his parents. And clearly we must fit them to the other spirits too, if spirits, as spirits, are to have one nature and being, and not just share a common name. Let us consider, then, how we distinguish gods from spirits—even if we often call spirits gods too—at least when we say that they are one kind and another. We say and believe that the race of gods is free of passion, but we attribute passions to spirits, calling them everlasting, next after the gods, already on our side of them, between the gods and our race.
πῇ δὴ οὖν οὐκ ἔμειναν ἀπαθεῖς οὗτοι, πῇ δὲ κατέβησαν τῇ φύσει πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον; καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερα δαίμων ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐδὲ εἷς καὶ αὖ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ δαίμονες μόνον, θεὸς δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀφορίζεται, ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεοὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὥσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος καὶ οἱ μέχρι σελήνης ἕκαστος θεός. βέλτιον δὲ μηδένα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ δαίμονα λέγειν, ἀλλά, καὶ εἰ αὐτοδαίμων, θεὸν καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τοὺς μέχρι σελήνης θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς δευτέρους μετ’ ἐκείνους καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς νοητούς, ἐξηρτημένους ἐκείνων, ὥσπερ αἴγλην περὶ ἕκαστον ἄστρον.
How was it, then, that these did not remain free of passion, and how did they come down in nature toward the worse? And this too must be examined: whether there is not a single spirit in the intelligible world, while in this cosmos there are only spirits and god is confined to the intelligible; or whether there are gods here too, and the cosmos is a god—the third, as we usually say—and each of the beings down to the moon is a god. It is better to say that there is no spirit in the intelligible world, but that even if there is a Spirit-itself, this too is a god; and again, that in the perceptible world the visible gods down to the moon are second gods, after those intelligible gods and modeled on them, depending on them like the radiance around each star.
τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας τί; ἆρά γε ψυχῆς ἐν κόσμῳ γενομένης τὸ ἐφ’ ἑκάστης ἴχνος; διὰ τί δὲ τῆς ἐν κόσμῳ; ὅτι καθαρὰ θεὸν γεννᾷ, καὶ θεὸν ἔφαμεν τὸν ταύτης ἔρωτα. πρῶτον δὴ διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ δαίμονες ἔρωτες; εἶτα πῶς οὐ καθαροὶ καὶ οὗτοι ὕλης; ἢ ἔρωτες μέν, οἳ γεννῶνται ψυχῆς ἐφιεμένης τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ, καὶ γεννῶσι πᾶσαι τοῦτον τὸν δαίμονα αἱ ἐν τῷδε, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἀπὸ ψυχῆς μὲν καὶ οὗτοι τῆς τοῦ παντός, δυνάμεσι δὲ ἑτέραις γεννώμενοι κατὰ χρείαν τοῦ ὅλου συμπληροῦσι καὶ συνδιοικοῦσι τῷ παντὶ ἕκαστα. ἔδει γὰρ ἀρκεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντὸς τῷ παντὶ γεννήσασαν δυνάμεις δαιμόνων καὶ προσφόρους τῷ ἑαυτῆς ὅλῳ. ἀλλὰ πῶς καὶ τίνος ὕλης μετέχουσιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς σωματικῆς, ἢ ζῷα αἰσθητὰ ἔσται.
And the spirits—what are they? Is a spirit the trace that each soul leaves when it has come into the cosmos? But why of soul in the cosmos? Because pure soul begets a god, and we said that the love of this soul is a god. First, then, why are not all spirits loves? And then, how is it that these too are not pure of matter? Or rather: loves are those that are born of soul longing for the good and the beautiful, and all souls here beget this spirit; the other spirits also come from soul, the Soul of the All, but they are born from other powers, according to the needs of the whole, and they help to complete it and help to govern each thing for the All. For the Soul of the All had to be sufficient for the All, generating powers of spirits suited to its own whole. But how, and in what matter, do they share? Not in bodily matter, surely, or they will be perceptible living beings.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ σώματα προσλαμβάνουσιν ἀέρινα ἢ πύρινα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ γε πρότερον διάφορον αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ μετάσχωσι σώματος· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς τὸ καθαρὸν πάντη σώματι μίγνυται, καίτοι πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ δαίμονος καθ’ ὅσον δαίμων μετά τινος σώματος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ πυρὸς εἶναι. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν σώματι μίγνυται, ἡ δὲ οὔ, εἰ μή τις εἴη τῇ μιγνυμένῃ αἰτία; τίς οὖν ἡ αἰτία; ὕλην δεῖ νοητὴν ὑποθέσθαι, ἵνα τὸ κοινωνῆσαν ἐκείνης ἥκῃ καὶ εἰς ταύτην τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δι’ αὐτῆς.
For even if they take on bodies of air or of fire, their nature must first be different, so that they can share in body at all; for what is altogether pure does not mix with body directly—although many people think that the being of a spirit, as a spirit, goes with some body, of air or of fire. But why does one kind of being mix with body and another not, unless there is some cause in the one that mixes? What, then, is the cause? We must posit an intelligible matter, so that what shares in it may come through it into this matter of bodies too.
διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ Ἔρωτος ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ τὸν Πόρον τὴν μέθην ἔχειν τοῦ νέκταρος οἴνου οὔπω ὄντος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος γενομένου καὶ τῆς Πενίας μετεχούσης φύσεως νοητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰδώλου νοητοῦ ἐκεῖθεν ἐμφαντασθέντος, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ γενομένης καὶ συμμιχθείσης ὡς ἐξ εἴδους καὶ ἀοριστίας, ἣν ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν τυχεῖν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μαντευομένη δέ τι εἶναι κατὰ ἀόριστον καὶ ἄπειρον φάντασμα, τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Ἔρωτος τεκούσης. λόγος οὖν γενόμενος ἐν οὐ λόγῳ, ἀορίστῳ δὲ ἐφέσει καὶ ὑποστάσει ἀμυδρᾷ, ἐποίησε τὸ γενόμενον οὐ τέλειον οὐδὲ ἱκανόν, ἐλλιπὲς δέ, ἅτε ἐξ ἐφέσεως ἀορίστου καὶ λόγου ἱκανοῦ γεγενημένον.
That is why, in the birth of Love, Plato says that Resource was drunk on nectar, since wine did not yet exist—because Love came into being before the perceptible world, and Poverty shares in an intelligible nature. She is not an intelligible image reflected from there; she came to be there and was mingled, as from form and indefiniteness—the indefiniteness the soul has before it attains the good, when it divines that there is something, through an indefinite and unlimited appearance—and she gave birth to Love as a hypostasis. So a rational principle, coming to be in what is not rational principle but an indefinite longing and a dim existence, made what came to be not perfect or sufficient but deficient, since it was born of an indefinite longing and a sufficient rational principle.
καὶ ἔστι λόγος οὗτος οὐ καθαρός, ἅτε ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ἔφεσιν ἀόριστον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἄπειρον· οὐ γὰρ μήποτε πληρώσεται, ἕως ἂν ἔχῃ ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσιν. ἐξήρτηται δὲ ψυχῆς ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνης μὲν γενόμενος ὡς ἀρχῆς, μῖγμα δὲ ὢν ἐκ λόγου οὐ μείναντος ἐν αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ μιχθέντος ἀοριστίᾳ, οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀνακραθέντος ἐκείνῃ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνῃ. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἔρως οἷον οἶστρος ἄπορος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει· διὸ καὶ τυγχάνων ἄπορος πάλιν.
And this rational principle is not pure, since it has within itself an indefinite, irrational, unlimited longing; it will never be filled as long as it has within itself the nature of the indefinite. It depends on soul, having come from it as from its source, but it is a mixture, made of a rational principle that did not remain in itself but was mixed with indefiniteness—not the principle itself blended with it, but what comes from it. And love is like a gadfly, resourceless by its own nature; and so even when it attains what it wants, it is resourceless again.
οὐ γὰρ ἔχει πληροῦσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ μῖγμα· μόνον γὰρ πληροῦται ἀληθῶς, ὅτιπερ καὶ πεπλήρωται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν συνοῦσαν ἔνδειαν ἐφίεται, κἂν παραχρῆμα πληρωθῇ, οὐ στέγει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀμήχανον αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, τὸ δὲ ποριστικὸν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου φύσιν δεῖ δὲ καὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον τοιοῦτον νομίζειν καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων· καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐφ’ ᾧ τέτακται ποριστικὸν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου καὶ συγγενὲς καὶ ταύτῃ τῷ Ἔρωτι καὶ οὐ πλῆρες οὐδ’ αὐτό, ἐφιέμενον δέ τινος τῶν ἐν μέρει ὡς ἀγαθῶν.
For it cannot be filled, since its mixed nature does not allow it. Only that is truly filled which has also been filled by its own nature; but this, because of the lack that is in it, longs, and even if it is filled for the moment, it does not hold it. Its helplessness comes from its lack, its resourcefulness from the nature of the rational principle. And we must think that everything of the nature of spirits is like this and comes from such sources. For each spirit is resourceful in what it is assigned to, longs for it and is akin to it, and in this way is akin to Love too; and it too is not full, but longs for something among partial things, as for goods.
ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοὺς ὃν ἔχουσιν ἔρωτα τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ἔχειν οὐκ ἔρωτά τινα ἔχοντας, τοὺς δὲ κατ’ ἄλλους δαίμονας τεταγμένους. κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ ἄλλον δαίμονα τετάχθαι· ὃν ἁπλῶς εἶχον ἀργὸν ἀφέντας, ἐνεργοῦντας δὲ κατ’ ἄλλον δαίμονα, ὃν εἵλοντο κατὰ τὸ σύμφωνον μέρους τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχῆς. οἱ δὲ κακῶν ἐφιέμενοι ταῖς κακαῖς ἐγγενομέναις ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπέδησαν πάντας τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔρωτας, ὥσπερ καὶ λόγον τὸν ὀρθόν, ὅστις σύμφυτος, κακαῖς ταῖς ἐπιγενομέναις δόξαις.
That is why the good people here, too, have the love they have for what is simply good and what really is. It is not some particular love. Those who are ranked under other spirits are each ranked under a different spirit: they have let the one they had simply lie idle, and they act under another spirit, which they chose in accord with the part of soul that is active in them. Those who desire bad things have fettered all the loves in them with the bad desires that have arisen in them, just as they have fettered right reason, which is innate in them, with the bad opinions that came on top of it.
οἱ μὲν οὖν φύσει ἔρωτες καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καλοί· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐλάττονος ψυχῆς ἐλάττους εἰς ἀξίαν καὶ δύναμιν, οἱ δὲ [κρείττονος] κρείττους, πάντες [δὲ] ἐν οὐσίᾳ· οἱ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν σφαλέντων πάθη ταῦτα καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐσίαι οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις οὐ παρὰ ψυχῆς ἔτι γεννώμενα, ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα κακίᾳ ψυχῆς ὅμοια γεννώσης ἐν διαθέσεσι καὶ ἕξεσιν ἤδη. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως κινδυνεύει τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀληθῆ κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης ἐν ὡρισμένοις οὐσία εἶναι, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲν.
So the loves that are by nature, and in accord with nature, are fine. Those of a lesser soul are lesser in worth and power, those [of a better] better, and all of them belong to being. But those contrary to nature are affections of souls that have gone astray. They are in no way beings, nor hypostases that have real being. They are no longer generated by soul; they arise along with the vice of a soul that now generates things like itself in its dispositions and states. And in general it may well be that true goods, when soul acts according to nature within what is defined, are being, while the rest, since then it is not acting from itself, are nothing
δ’ ἄλλο ἢ πάθη εἶναι· ὥσπερ ψευδῆ νοήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτὰ οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὰ ἀληθῆ ὄντως καὶ ἀίδια καὶ ὡρισμένα ὁμοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ περὶ τὸ νοητὸν ὄντως καὶ νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἴδει. [δεῖ δὲ] καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τίθεσθαι καθαρῶς νόησιν καὶ νοητόν, καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ ὄντων ἡμῶν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ἡμῖν ὁ ἔρως· καὶ γὰρ αἱ νοήσεις· καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν ἐν μέρει, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ εἴ [τις] τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ορθὰς θεωρεῖ καθ’ ὅσον ἁπλῶς τρίγωνον.
but affections. They are like false thoughts, which have no realities underlying them, as true thoughts do. Those that really are true, eternal and defined have thinking, the intelligible and being all together, not only in what is simply so, but also in each case, with regard to what is really intelligible and the intellect in each Form. [We must] also posit in each of us pure thinking and the intelligible, even though we are not this all together and simply. That is why our love, too, is for what is simple; for so are our thoughts. And if it is for something particular, it is incidentally, as when [someone] contemplates that this triangle has angles equal to two right angles insofar as it is simply a triangle.
Zeus, his garden and Poros
The myth is decoded: Zeus is Intellect, Aphrodite is Soul, Poros the rational principles flowing into her.
ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ Ζεύς, οὗ τὸν κῆπον λέγει, εἰς ὃν εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Πόρος, καὶ τίς ὁ κῆπος οὗτος; ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ἀφροδίτη ψυχὴ ἦν ἡμῖν, λόγος δὲ ἐλέγετο τῶν πάντων ὁ Πόρος. ταῦτα δὲ τί δεῖ τίθεσθαι, τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κῆπον αὐτοῦ; οὐδὲ γὰρ ψυχὴν δεῖ τίθεσθαι τὸν Δία τὴν Ἀφροδίτην τοῦτο θέντας. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δία ἐκ μὲν Φαίδρου ἡγεμόνα μέγαν λέγοντος αὐτοῦ τοῦτον τὸν θεόν, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ τρίτον, οἶμαι, τοῦτον· σαφέστερον δὲ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ, ἡνίκ’ ἂν φῇ ἐν τῷ Διὶ εἶναι βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν.
But who is Zeus, whose garden he speaks of, the one Poros entered? And what is this garden? Aphrodite, we said, was soul, and Poros was said to be the rational principle of all things. What should we take these to be, Zeus and his garden? We cannot take Zeus to be soul, since we have already taken Aphrodite to be that. Here too, then, we must get Zeus from Plato. In the Phaedrus he calls this god a great leader; elsewhere, I think, he calls him the third; and more clearly in the Philebus, when he says that in Zeus there is a kingly soul and a kingly intellect.
εἰ οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς νοῦς ἐστι μέγας καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις τάττεται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον δεῖ τάττειν διά τε τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι αἴτιον καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὁ μὲν ἔσται κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, ἡ δὲ Ἀφροδίτη αὐτοῦ οὖσα καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τετάξεται κατὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγλαὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄκακον καὶ ἁβρὸν Ἀφροδίτη λεχθεῖσα.
If, then, Zeus is a great Intellect and Soul, and is ranked among the causes, and we must rank him by what is better in him—for other reasons, and because the cause, the kingly and the leading, lies there—then he will correspond to Intellect. And Aphrodite, who is his and from him and with him, will be ranked with soul. She is called Aphrodite for soul’s beauty and splendor, its innocence and its delicacy.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸν νοῦν τοὺς ἄρρενας τάττομεν τῶν θεῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τὰς θηλείας λέγομεν, ὡς νῷ ἑκάστῳ ψυχῆς συνούσης, εἴη ἂν καὶ ταύτῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Διὸς ἡ Ἀφροδίτη πάλιν μαρτυρούντων τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἱερέων τε καὶ θεολόγων, οἳ εἰς ταὐτὸν Ἥραν καὶ Ἀφροδίτην ἄγουσι καὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀστέρα ἐν οὐρανῷ Ἥρας λέγουσιν.
For if we rank the male gods with intellect and call the female ones their souls, since a soul goes with each intellect, then on this ground too Aphrodite would be Zeus’s soul. And again the priests and theologians bear witness to this account: they identify Hera with Aphrodite and call Aphrodite’s star in heaven Hera’s.
ὁ οὖν Πόρος λόγος ὢν τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ νῷ καὶ μᾶλλον κεχυμένος καὶ οἷον ἁπλωθεὶς περὶ ψυχὴν ἂν γένοιτο καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ. τὸ γὰρ ἐν νῷ συνεσπειραμένον οὐ παρὰ ἄλλου εἰς αὐτόν, τούτῳ δὲ μεθύοντι ἐπακτὸν τὸ τῆς πληρώσεως. τὸ δ’ ἐκεῖ πληρούμενον τοῦ νέκταρος τί ἂν εἴη ἢ λόγος ἀπὸ κρείττονος ἀρχῆς πεσὼν εἰς ἐλάττονα; ἐν οὖν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὅτε ἡ Ἀφροδίτη λέγεται γεγονέναι, εἰσρυεὶς εἰς τὸν κῆπον αὐτοῦ. κῆπος δὲ πᾶς ἀγλάισμα καὶ πλούτου ἐγκαλλώπισμα. ἀγλαίζεται δὲ τῷ τοῦ Διὸς λόγῳ καὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα αὐτοῦ, τὰ παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθόντα ἀγλαίσματα. ἢ τί ἂν εἴη ὁ κῆπος τοῦ Διὸς ἢ τὰ ἀγάλματα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀγλαίσματα;
So Poros, since he is the rational principle of the things in the intelligible and in Intellect, but more diffused and, as it were, unfolded, would come to be around soul and in soul. For what is gathered together in Intellect does not come into it from anything else, whereas for Poros, who is drunk, the filling is something brought in from outside. And what is it that is filled with nectar there, if not a rational principle that has fallen from a higher principle to a lower one? So this rational principle is in soul, coming from Intellect, at the time when Aphrodite is said to have been born; it has flowed into his garden. Every garden is a splendor, an adornment of wealth. Zeus’s garden is made splendid by his rational principle, and its adornments are the splendors that have come from his intellect into soul. Or what could Zeus’s garden be but his statues and his splendors?
τί δ’ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγλαίσματα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ κοσμήματα ἢ οἱ λόγοι οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ῥυέντες; ὁμοῦ δὴ οἱ λόγοι, ὁ Πόρος, ἡ εὐπορία καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τῶν καλῶν, ἐν ἐκφάνσει ἤδη καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν τῷ νέκταρι. τί γὰρ θεοῖς νέκταρ ἢ ὃ τὸ θεῖον κομίζεται; κομίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑποβεβηκὸς νοῦ λόγον· νοῦς δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ἐν κόρῳ καὶ οὐ μεθύει ἔχων. οὐ γὰρ ἐπακτόν τι ἔχει. ὁ δὲ λόγος νοῦ γέννημα καὶ ὑπόστασις μετὰ νοῦν καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτοῦ ὤν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐν τῷ νοῦ Διὸς κήπῳ λέγεται κεῖσθαι τότε κείμενος, ὅτε ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑποστῆναι λέγεται.
And what could his splendors and adornments be but the rational principles that have flowed from him? The rational principles taken together, then, are Poros, the plenty and wealth of beautiful things, now made manifest; and this is being drunk on nectar. For what is nectar for gods but what the divine receives? What is below Intellect receives a rational principle; but Intellect has itself in satiety and is not drunk in having it, since it has nothing brought in from outside. The rational principle, the offspring of Intellect, a hypostasis after Intellect, no longer belonging to it but in another, is said to lie in the garden of Zeus, who is Intellect. It lies there from the time when Aphrodite is said to come into existence among the things that are.
δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ μερίζειν χρόνοις ἃ λέγουσι, καὶ διαιρεῖν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντα, τάξει δὲ ἢ δυνάμεσι διεστῶτα, ὅπου καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ἀγεννήτων ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ αὐτοὶ διαιροῦσι, καὶ διδάξαντες ὡς δύνανται τῷ νοήσαντι ἤδη συγχωροῦσι συναιρεῖν.
Myths, if they are to be myths at all, must divide what they tell into times, and separate from one another many things that exist together but are distinct in rank or in powers. Even arguments, after all, create generations of things that are ungenerated, and they too divide things that exist together; and having taught as best they can, they let the one who has understood put them back together.
ἡ δὲ συναίρεσις ψυχὴ νῷ συνοῦσα καὶ παρὰ νοῦ ὑποστᾶσα καὶ αὖ λόγων πληρωθεῖσα καὶ καλὴ καλοῖς κοσμηθεῖσα καὶ εὐπορίας πληρωθεῖσα, ὡς εἶναι ἐν αὐτῇ ὁρᾶν πολλὰ ἀγλαίσματα καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων εἰκόνας, Ἀφροδίτη μέν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, οἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοι πάντες εὐπορία καὶ Πόρος, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ῥυέντος τοῦ ἐκεῖ νέκταρος· τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἀγλαίσματα ὡς ἂν ἐν ζωῇ κείμενα κῆπος Διὸς λέγεται, καὶ εὕδειν ἐκεῖ ὁ Πόρος οἷς ἐπληρώθη βεβαρημένος. ζωῆς δὲ φανείσης καὶ οὔσης ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἑστιᾶσθαι οἱ θεοὶ λέγονται ὡς ἂν ἐν τοιαύτῃ μακαριότητι ὄντες. ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως ὑπέστη ὅδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφέσεως πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἦν ἀεὶ ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ ψυχὴ [ὁ] ἔρως.
Here is the putting together. Soul is with Intellect and has come into existence from Intellect; she is filled with rational principles in turn, beautiful, adorned with beautiful things and filled with plenty, so that one can see in her many splendors and images of all beautiful things. This whole is Aphrodite. All the rational principles in her are plenty and Poros, the nectar there having flowed from above. The splendors in her, lying as they do in life, are called the garden of Zeus, and Poros is said to sleep there, weighed down by what he was filled with. And since life has appeared and is always among the things that are, the gods are said to feast, since they are in such blessedness. And this one has always come into existence in this way, of necessity, from soul’s aspiration toward the better and the good; and [the] Love has always existed, for as long as soul has.
ἔστι δὲ οὗτος μικτόν τι χρῆμα μετέχον μὲν ἐνδείας, ᾗ πληροῦσθαι θέλει, οὐκ ἄμοιρον δὲ εὐπορίας, ᾗ οὗ ἔχει τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ζητεῖ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάμπαν ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄν ποτε ζητήσειεν. ἐκ Πόρου οὖν καὶ Πενίας λέγεται εἶναι, ᾗ ἡ ἔλλειψις καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ τῶν λόγων ἡ μνήμη ὁμοῦ συνελθόντα ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγέννησε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρός τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔρωτα τοῦτον ὄντα. ἡ δὲ μήτηρ αὐτῷ Πενία, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡ ἔφεσις ἐνδεοῦς· ὕλη δὲ ἡ Πενία, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐνδεὴς τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμίας· οὐ γὰρ μορφή τις οὐδὲ λόγος ἐν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ τούτου· ὑλικώτερον τὸ ἐφιέμενον καθ’ ὅσον ἐφίεται ποιεῖ.
He is something mixed. He shares in need, by which he wants to be filled; but he is not without a share of plenty, by which he seeks what he lacks. For what had no share of the good at all would never seek the good. So he is said to be born of Poros and Penia, in the sense that the lack, the aspiration and the memory of the rational principles, coming together in soul, gave birth to the activity directed toward the good, and this is love. His mother is Penia because aspiration always belongs to what is in need. And Penia is matter, because matter too is in need of everything, and because the desire for the good is indefinite: there is no shape or rational principle in what desires it. Desiring makes what desires more material, to the extent that it desires.
τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶδός ἐστι μόνον ἐν αὑτῷ μένον· καὶ δέξασθαι δὲ ἐφιέμενον ὕλην τῷ ἐπιόντι τὸ δεξόμενον παρασκευάζει. οὕτω τοι ὁ Ἔρως ὑλικός τίς ἐστι καὶ δαίμων οὗτός ἐστιν ἐκ ψυχῆς, καθ’ ὅσον ἐλλείπει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἐφίεται δέ, γεγενημένος.
What it is directed toward is form, remaining alone in itself. And when something desires to receive, it makes what is to receive into matter for what comes to it. So Love is something material; and he is a spirit, born of soul insofar as soul falls short of the good and yet aspires to it.