Τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἕτερον λέγοντες ἑκάτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν περὶ τὴν ἀίδιον εἶναι φύσιν, τὸν δὲ χρόνον περὶ τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, αὐτόθεν μὲν καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἐναργές τι παρ’ αὑτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἔχειν πάθος νομίζομεν λέγοντές τε ἀεὶ καὶ παρ’ ἅπαντα ὀνομάζοντες. πειρώμενοι μὴν εἰς ἐπίστασιν αὐτῶν ἰέναι καὶ οἷον ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν πάλιν αὖ ταῖς γνώμαις ἀποροῦντες τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀποφάσεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ἄλλας, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς αὐτὰς λαβόντες ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναπαυσάμενοι καὶ αὔταρκες νομίσαντες, εἰ ἔχοιμεν ἐρωτηθέντες τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις λέγειν, ἀγαπήσαντες ἀπαλλαττόμεθα τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν.
When we say that eternity and time are different, each from the other, and that eternity has to do with everlasting nature and time with what comes to be and with this All, we think, straightaway and as if by the more concentrated apprehensions of our notion, that we have a clear experience of them in our souls, since we are always talking about them and naming them on every occasion. Yet when we try to examine them closely and, so to speak, come right up to them, we are once again at a loss in our thinking. We take up the pronouncements of the ancients about them—different ones in different ways, or perhaps the same ones differently—and rest on these; we think it enough if, when asked, we can say what they thought, and, content with that, we let ourselves off from inquiring any further about them.
εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινας τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δὲ οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα, καὶ πῶς ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει. καὶ πρότερον περὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ζητεῖν, τί ποτε νομίζουσιν εἶναι αὐτὸν οἱ ἕτερον τοῦ χρόνου τιθέντες εἶναι· γνωσθέντος γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ἑστῶτος καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, ὃν δὴ χρόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι, τάχα ἂν σαφὲς γένοιτο. εἰ δέ τις πρὸ τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα θεάσασθαι τὸν χρόνον ὅς ἐστι φαντασθείη, γένοιτ’ ἂν καὶ τούτῳ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖ κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν ἐλθόντι ᾧ ἄρα ὡμοίωτο ὁ χρόνος θεάσασθαι, εἴπερ ὁμοιότητα οὗτος πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχει.
Now we must believe that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers found the truth; but which of them hit on it most fully, and how we too might come to understand these things, is what we ought to examine. And we should first inquire about eternity: what in the world do those who make it different from time think it is? For once we know what stands still as the model, its image too—which they say is time—might perhaps become clear. But if someone, before contemplating eternity, should form a picture of what time is, he too could go from here to there by recollection and contemplate what time was made like, if indeed time has a likeness to it.
τίνα οὖν ποτε χρὴ φάναι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι; ἆρά γε τὴν νοητὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸν χρόνον τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔσχον τινές, φασι, περὶ τοῦ χρόνου. ἐπεὶ γὰρ σεμνότατόν τι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι φανταζόμεθα καὶ νοοῦμεν, σεμνότατον δὲ τὸ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι σεμνότερον ὁποτερονοῦν· τοῦ δὲ ἐπέκεινα οὐδὲ τοῦτο κατηγορητέον· εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄν τις οὕτω συνάγοι. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ὅ τε κόσμος ὁ νοητὸς ὅ τε αἰὼν περιεκτικὰ ἄμφω καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.
What, then, are we to say eternity is? Is it intelligible being itself—just as if someone were to say that time is the whole heaven and cosmos? For some, they say, did hold this opinion about time too. Since we imagine and think eternity to be something most august, and what belongs to the intelligible nature is most august, and one cannot say that either of them is more august—while of what is beyond, not even this may be predicated—one might in this way bring them together into the same thing. And again, both the intelligible world and eternity are encompassing, and encompass the same things.
ἀλλ’ ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον ἐν θατέρῳ λέγωμεν κεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅταν τὸ αἰώνιον κατηγορῶμεν αὐτῶν· ἡ μὲν γάρ, φησι, τοῦ παραδείγματος φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος· ἄλλο τὸν αἰῶνα πάλιν αὖ λέγομεν, εἶναι μέντοι περὶ ἐκείνην ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἢ παρεῖναι ἐκείνῃ φαμέν. τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν ἑκάτερον εἶναι ταυτότητα οὐ δηλοῖ· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ σεμνὸν γίνοιτο. ἥ τε περιοχὴ τῷ μὲν ὡς μερῶν ἔσται, τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι ὁμοῦ τὸ ὅλον οὐχ ὡς μέρος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα αἰώνια κατ’ αὐτόν.
But when we say that the one lies in the other, and when we predicate “eternal” of them—for “the nature of the model,” he says, “was eternal”—we are once again calling eternity something else, though we say it is around that nature, or in it, or present to it. And that each is august does not show identity; perhaps one of them gets its augustness from the other. And the encompassing will be, for the one, as of parts; for eternity the whole is all together, not as a part, but because all such things as are eternal are so in accordance with it.
ἀλλ’ ἆρα κατὰ τὴν στάσιν φατέον ἐκεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὴν κίνησίν φασιν; ἀλλ’ εἰκότως ἄν τις τὸν αἰῶνα ζητήσειε πότερον ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει λέγοντες ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τῇ στάσει τῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῇ στάσει ταὐτόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἐροῦμεν αἰώνιον τὴν στάσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα αἰώνιον· τὸ γὰρ αἰώνιον τὸ μετέχον αἰῶνος. ἔπειτα ἡ κίνησις πῶς αἰώνιον; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ στάσιμον εἴη. εἶτα πῶς ἔχει ἡ τῆς στάσεως ἔννοια ἐν αὑτῇ τὸ ἀεί; λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ οἷον νοοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ ἀίδιον λέγωμεν. εἰ δὲ τῇ τῆς οὐσίας στάσει, ἔξω πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἄλλα γένη τοῦ αἰῶνος ποιήσομεν.
But should we say that eternity there corresponds to rest, as they say time here corresponds to motion? One might reasonably ask whether we are saying eternity is the same as rest without qualification, or as the rest that belongs to being. If it is the same as rest, then first, we will not call rest eternal, just as we do not call eternity eternal either—for what is eternal is what participates in eternity. Then, how is motion eternal? For then it would also be at rest. Then, how does the notion of rest contain in itself the “always”? I mean not the “always” in time, but the one we think of when we speak of the everlasting. And if it is the same as the rest of being, we will once again be placing the other kinds of being outside eternity.
εἶτα τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ μόνον ἐν στάσει δεῖ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑνί· εἶτα καὶ ἀδιάστατον, ἵνα μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ χρόνῳ· ἡ δὲ στάσις οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἓν οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἀδιαστάτου ἔχει ἔννοιαν ἐν αὑτῇ, ᾗ στάσις. εἶτα τοῦ μὲν αἰῶνος κατηγοροῦμεν τὸ μένειν ἐν ἑνί· μετέχοι ἂν οὖν στάσεως, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοστάσις εἴη.
Then too, eternity must be thought of not only as at rest but as in one; and also as without extension, so that it is not the same as time. But rest, insofar as it is rest, does not contain in itself the notion of one or that of the unextended. Then again, we predicate of eternity “remaining in one”; so it would participate in rest, but would not be rest itself.
τί ἂν οὖν εἴη τοῦτο, καθ’ ὃ τὸν κόσμον πάντα τὸν ἐκεῖ αἰώνιον λέγομεν καὶ ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τί ἡ ἀιδιότης, εἴτε ταὐτὸν καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ αἰῶνι, εἴτε κατ’ αὐτὴν ὁ αἰών; ἀλλὰ γὰρ καθ’ ἕν τι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλῶν συνηθροισμένην τινὰ νόησιν ἢ καὶ φύσιν εἴτ’ ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἐκεῖ εἴτε συνοῦσαν εἴτ’ ἐνορωμένην πάντα δὴ ταῦτα ἐκείνην μίαν μὲν εἶναι, πολλὰ δὲ δυναμένην καὶ πολλὰ οὖσαν. καὶ ὅ γε τὴν πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰσαθρήσας κατὰ μὲν τοδὶ τὸ οἷον ὑποκείμενον λέγει οὐσίαν, εἶτα κίνησιν τοῦτο, καθ’ ὃ ζωὴν ὁρᾷ, εἶτα στάσιν τὸ πάντη ὡσαύτως, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ταὐτόν, ᾗ ταῦτα ὁμοῦ ἕν.
What, then, would this be, by which we say that the whole world there is eternal and everlasting? And what is everlastingness—is it the same as eternity, and identical with it, or is eternity in accordance with it? It must, at any rate, be in accordance with some one thing—yet a thinking, or a nature, gathered together from many, whether it accompanies the things there, or is with them, or is seen in them; and all these are that one nature, which is one but has many powers and is many. And whoever has looked into its manifold power calls this, as the substrate so to speak, being; then motion, according as he sees life; then rest, its being in every way the same; and otherness and sameness, insofar as these are all together one.
οὕτω δὴ καὶ συνθεὶς πάλιν αὖ εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ εἶναι ζωὴν μόνην ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἑτερότητα συστείλας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἄπαυστον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὐδέποτε ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο νόησιν ἢ ζωήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀεὶ ἀδιαστάτως, ταῦτα πάντα ἰδὼν αἰῶνα εἶδεν ἰδὼν ζωὴν μένουσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ παρὸν τὸ πᾶν ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ νῦν μὲν τόδε, αὖθις δ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλ’ ἅμα τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐ νῦν μὲν ἕτερα, αὖθις δ’ ἕτερα, ἀλλὰ τέλος ἀμερές, οἷον ἐν σημείῳ ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ οὔποτε εἰς ῥύσιν προιόντων, ἀλλὰ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ οὐ μὴ μεταβάλλοντος, ὄντος δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀεί, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν οὐδ’ αὖ γενήσεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἔστι, τοῦτο καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος· ὥστε εἶναι τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οἷον ἐκλάμπον κατὰ τὴν ἣν ἐπαγγέλλεται περὶ τοῦ μὴ μέλλοντος, ἀλλὰ ἤδη ὄντος, ταυτότητα, ὡς ἄρα οὕτω καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως.
And so, putting them together again so that they are all together one, life alone, contracting the otherness in them; and seeing the unceasing quality of the activity, its sameness, its never being other, and a thinking or life that does not go from one thing to another but is always the same and without extension—seeing all this, he saw eternity. He saw a life that remains in the same, always having the whole present to it: not this now and then something else, but all things at once; not now some things and later others, but a partless completion, as if all things were together at a point and never going forth into flux, while it remains in the same, in itself, and does not change at all, and is always in the present, because nothing of it has passed away, nor again will come to be, but what it is, that it always is. So eternity is not the substrate, but what, as it were, shines out from the substrate itself, in accordance with the sameness it proclaims about what is not going to be but already is: that it is thus and not otherwise.
τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὕστερον αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ὃ μὴ νῦν ἔχει; μηδ’ αὖ ὕστερον ἐσομένου, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἤδη. οὔτε γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀφ’ οὗ εἰς τὸ νῦν ἥξει· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἦν οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο· οὔτε μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, ὃ μὴ νῦν ἔχει, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε τὸ ἦν ἕξει περὶ αὑτόν· τί γὰρ ἔστιν, ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ παρελήλυθεν; οὔτε τὸ ἔσται· τί γὰρ ἔσται αὐτῷ; λείπεται δὴ ἐν τῷ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν εἶναι. ὃ οὖν μήτε ἦν, μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ’ ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο ἑστὼς ἔχον τὸ εἶναι τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μηδ’ αὖ μεταβεβληκέναι ἐστὶν ὁ αἰών. γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ περὶ τὸ ὂν ἐν τῷ εἶναι ζωὴ ὁμοῦ πᾶσα καὶ πλήρης ἀδιάστατος πανταχῇ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν, αἰών.
For what could come to it later that it does not have now? Nor will it later be anything that it is not already. For there is nothing from which it will arrive at the now—that would be nothing other than this; nor, of what is going to be, is there anything it does not have now. So of necessity it will not have the “was” about it—for what is there that was for it and has passed away? Nor the “will be”—for what will be for it? What remains, then, is that in its being it is just what it is. That, then, which neither was nor will be, but only is, having its being at a standstill by not changing into the “will be” nor having changed—this is eternity. So the life that belongs to what is, in its being, all together and full, without extension in any way: this is what we are looking for—eternity.
οὐκ ἔξωθεν δὲ δεῖ συμβεβηκέναι νομίζειν τοῦτον ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ σὺν ἐκείνῃ. ἐνορᾶται γὰρ ἐν οὐσίᾳ παρ’ αὐτῇ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν ἐκεῖ εἶναι ἐνυπάρχοντα ὁρῶντες λέγομεν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἅπαντα καὶ σὺν τῇ οὐσίᾳ. τὰ γὰρ πρώτως ὄντα συνόντα δεῖ τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν μέρει τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος, τὰ δὲ ἐν παντί, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πᾶν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἠθροισμένον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη γεννῆσαν αὐτό, ἵνα καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς ἀληθῶς πᾶν ᾖ. καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια δὲ οὐ συμφωνία πρὸς ἄλλο ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου οὗπερ ἀλήθεια.
We must not think that eternity has come to that nature as an accident from outside; it is from it and with it. For it is seen in being, alongside it, since all the other things too that we say are there, seeing that they are present in it, we say are all from being and with being. For the things that primarily are must be with the first things and in the first things; for the beautiful too is in them and from them, and truth is in them. And some are as it were in a part of the whole of what is, others in the whole, just as this truly whole is not assembled from its parts, but has generated the parts itself, so that in this way too it may be truly whole. And truth there is not agreement with something else, but belongs to each thing whose truth it is.
δεῖ δὴ τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ἀληθινόν, εἴπερ ἔσται πᾶν ὄντως, μὴ μόνον εἶναι πᾶν ᾗ ἐστι τὰ πάντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔχειν οὕτως, ὥστε μηδενὶ ἐλλείπειν. εἰ [δὲ] τοῦτο, οὐδ’ ἔσται τι αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται, ἐλλεῖπον ἦν τούτῳ· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν πᾶν. παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τί ἂν αὐτῷ γένοιτο; πάσχει γὰρ οὐδέν.
This true All, then, if it is to be really all, must not only be all in the sense of being all things, but must have the all in such a way as to lack nothing. [And] if this is so, nothing will be still to come for it; for if something will be, it was lacking that; so it was not all. And what could happen to it contrary to nature? It is affected by nothing.
εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αὐτῷ γένοιτο, οὐδὲ μέλλει οὐδὲ ἔσται οὐδὲ ἐγένετο. τοῖς μὲν οὖν γεννητοῖς, εἰ ἀφέλοις τὸ ἔσται, ἅτε ἐπικτωμένοις ἀεὶ εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει [τὸ] μὴ εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοιούτοις, εἰ προσθείης τὸ ἔσται, ὑπάρχει τὸ ἔρρειν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἶναι ἕδρας· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἦν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι οὐ σύμφυτον, εἰ γίγνοιτο ἐν τῷ μέλλειν καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι εἰς ὕστερον. κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοῖς μὲν γεννητοῖς ἡ οὐσία εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τῆς γενέσεως, μέχρι περ ἂν εἰς ἔσχατον ἥκῃ τοῦ χρόνου, ἐν ᾧ μηκέτι ἔστι, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἔσται εἶναι, καί, εἴ τις τοῦτο παρέλοιτο, ἠλαττῶσθαι ὁ βίος· ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶναι. καὶ τῷ παντὶ δὲ εἰς ὅπερ οὕτως ἔσται.
If, then, nothing could come to it, it neither is about to be, nor will be, nor came to be. For things that come into being, if you take away the “will be,” since they are always acquiring, [the] not-being belongs to them at once; while for things that are not of this kind, if you add the “will be,” falling from the seat of being belongs to them. For clearly being was not native to them, if it lay in being about to be, in coming to be, and in being hereafter. It looks, in fact, as though for things that come into being, their being consists in existing from the beginning of their coming to be until they reach the last point of time, in which they no longer are, and that this is the “will be”; and if one took this away, their life would be diminished, and so their being too. And for the All, too, its being is toward what it will be, in this same way.
διὸ καὶ σπεύδει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ στῆναι οὐ θέλει ἕλκον τὸ εἶναι αὑτῷ ἐν τῷ τι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ποιεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι κύκλῳ ἐφέσει τινὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε εἶναι ἡμῖν εὑρημένον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως τῆς οὕτω σπευδούσης ἐπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι. τοῖς δὲ πρώτοις καὶ μακαρίοις οὐδὲ ἔφεσίς ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος· ἤδη γάρ εἰσι τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς οἷον ὀφείλεται ζῆν ἔχουσι πᾶν· ὥστε οὐδὲν ζητοῦσι, διότι τὸ μέλλον αὐτοῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἄρα ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέλλον.
That is why it hurries toward what is going to be and does not want to stand still, drawing being to itself by doing one thing after another and moving in a circle, by a kind of aspiration for being; so we have also found the cause of the motion that hurries in this way toward always being by means of the future. But the first and blessed things do not even aspire to the future; for they already are the whole, and they possess all the life that is, as it were, owed to them. So they seek nothing, because the future is nothing to them, nor, then, is that in which the future lies.
ἡ οὖν τοῦ ὄντος παντελὴς οὐσία καὶ ὅλη, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ μηδὲν ἂν ἔτι ἐλλείψειν καὶ τῷ μηδὲν ἂν μὴ ὂν αὐτῇ προσγενέσθαι — οὐ γὰρ μόνα τὰ ὄντα πάντα δεῖ παρεῖναι τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδὲν τοῦ ποτε μὴ ὄντος· αὕτη ἡ διάθεσις αὐτοῦ καὶ φύσις εἴη ἂν αἰών· αἰὼν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος.
So the complete and whole being of what is—not only the being in the parts, but also the being that consists in its never going to lack anything and in nothing that is not being able to be added to it (for not only must all the things that are be present to the whole and all, but also nothing of what at some time is not)—this disposition and nature of it would be eternity: for aiōn comes from aei on, “always being.”
τοῦτο δέ, ὅταν τινὶ προσβαλὼν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον μηδὲν περὶ αὐτὸ ὅλως γεγονέναι· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀεὶ ὄν, ἢ οὐκ ἀεί τι ὅλον ὄν. ἆρα οὖν ἤδη ἀίδιον; [ἢ οὔ,] εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχοι αὐτῷ τοιαύτη φύσις, ὡς πίστιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὕτω καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἔτι· ὡς, εἰ πάλιν προσβάλλοις, εὑρεῖν τοιοῦτον. τί οὖν, εἰ μηδὲ ἀφίσταιτό τις αὐτοῦ τῆς θέας, ἀλλὰ [ἀεὶ] συνὼν εἴη τῆς φύσεως ἀγασθεὶς καὶ δυνατὸς τοῦτο πράττειν ἀτρύτῳ φύσει ἢ δραμὼν καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς αἰῶνα σταίη οὐκ ἀποκλίνων οὐδαμῇ, ἵν’ ᾖ ὅμοιος καὶ αἰώνιος, τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ αἰωνίῳ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον θεώμενος;
And this is so when, applying my soul to something, I can say of it—or rather, see it to be—such that nothing at all has ever happened to it; for if something had, it would not be always being, or not always something whole. Is it then already everlasting? [Or not,] unless there is also present in it a nature such that one can be confident about it that it is this way and not otherwise any more; so that, if you applied yourself to it again, you would find it such. What, then, if one never stood away from the vision of it, but were [always] with it, wondering at its nature and able to do this with a tireless nature—or rather, running to eternity, were himself to stand there, not inclining away at all, so as to be like it and eternal, contemplating eternity and the eternal by the eternal in himself?
εἰ οὖν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον αἰώνιον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν, τὸ μὴ ἀποκλῖνον εἰς ἑτέραν φύσιν κατὰ μηδέν, ζωὴν ἔχον, ἣν ἔχει πᾶσαν ἤδη, οὐ προσλαβὸν οὐδὲ προσλαμβάνον ἢ προσληψόμενον, εἴη ἂν ἀίδιον μὲν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον, ἀιδιότης δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὖσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, αἰὼν δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐμφαινομένης. ὅθεν σεμνὸν ὁ αἰών, καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἔννοια λέγει. καὶ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν θεὸς ἐμφαίνων καὶ προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν οἷός ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι ὡς ἀτρεμὲς καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸ βεβαίως ἐν ζωῇ.
If, then, what is in this state is eternal and always being—what does not incline in any respect toward another nature, having a life that it already has entire, having added nothing, adding nothing, and never going to add anything—then what is in this state would be everlasting, everlastingness would be this sort of condition of the substrate, coming from it and in it, and eternity would be the substrate together with this sort of condition showing in it. Hence eternity is something august, and our notion declares it the same as the god. And eternity could rightly be called a god that shows itself forth and displays itself as it is: being unshaken and the same, and so too firmly established in life.
εἰ δ’ ἐκ πολλῶν λέγομεν αὐτόν, οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ δύναμιν ἄπειρον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τῷ μὴ ἂν ἐπιλείπειν, καὶ τοῦτο κυρίως, ὅτι μηδὲν αὑτοῦ ἀναλίσκει. καὶ εἴ τις οὕτω τὸν αἰῶνα λέγοι ζωὴν ἄπειρον ἤδη τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν αὑτῆς τῷ μὴ παρεληλυθέναι μηδ’ αὖ μέλλειν· ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶσα· ἐγγὺς ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ἑξῆς τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν ἐξήγησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄπειρον ἤδη εἶναι.
And if we say it is made up of many things, there is no need to wonder; for each of the things there is many through unlimited power—since “unlimited” too means never failing, and this in the strict sense, because it uses up nothing of itself. And if someone were in this way to call eternity life that is already unlimited, by being whole and using up nothing of itself, because it has no past and no future—for then it would no longer be whole—he would be close to defining it. For what follows, “by being whole and using up nothing,” would be an explanation of “being already unlimited.”
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις οὕτω παγκάλη καὶ ἀίδιος περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲν ἐκβαίνουσα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, μένουσα δὲ ἀεὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ ζῶσα κατ’ ἐκεῖνο, εἴρηταί τε, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, τοῦτο τῷ Πλάτωνι καλῶς καὶ βαθείᾳ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί· ἵνα μὴ μόνον ᾖ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἄγων, ἀλλ’ ᾖ περὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ζωὴ ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δὴ ὃ ζητοῦμεν, καὶ τὸ οὕτω μένον αἰών ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτω μένον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μένον ὅ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ζωῆς μενούσης παρ’ αὑτῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὔτε τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ζῆν ψευδομένη ἔχοι ἂν τὸ αἰὼν εἶναι.
Such a nature, so wholly beautiful and everlasting, is around the One, and from it and toward it, never stepping away from it but always remaining around it and in it and living according to it. And so Plato, as I think, put it well, with profound understanding and not idly, in that phrase “eternity remaining in one”: so that it is not only that eternity brings itself into one, toward itself, but that the life of what is, around the One, is in the same way. This, then, is what we are seeking, and what remains in this way is eternity. For that which is this and remains thus, and is itself the remaining—the activity of a life that remains of itself, directed toward that and in that, and is false neither in its being nor in its living—would be what eternity is.
τὸ γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἶναί ἐστι τὸ οὐδέποτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδ’ ἄλλως εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ὡσαύτως εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδιαφόρως εἶναι. οὐκ ἔχει οὖν ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οὐδ’ ἄρα διαστήσεις, οὐδ’ ἐξελίξεις, οὐδὲ προάξεις, οὐδὲ παρατενεῖς, οὐδ’ ἄρα οὔτε πρότερον αὐτοῦ οὔτε τι ὕστερον λαβεῖν ἔχεις. εἰ οὖν μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ἀληθέστατον τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὕτως δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὡς οὐσία ἢ τὸ ζῆν, πάλιν αὖ ἥκει ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ λέγομεν, ὁ αἰών.
For truly being is never not being and never being otherwise; and this is being in the same way; and this is being without difference. So it does not have any “this and then that”: you cannot spread it apart, or unroll it, or draw it forward, or stretch it out; nor, then, can you take anything of it as earlier or later. If, then, there is neither earlier nor later about it, and the “is” is the truest thing about it, and is itself—and is so in the sense that it is, as being or as living—then once again what we are speaking of comes to us: eternity.
ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ λέγωμεν καὶ τὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν ὄν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἡμῖν ἕνεκα τῆς σαφηνείας δεῖ νομίζειν λέγεσθαι· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀεὶ τάχ’ ἂν οὐ κυρίως λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ ληφθὲν εἰς δήλωσιν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου πλανῷ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔκβασιν τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἔτι ὡς μὴ ἐπιλείψοντός ποτε. τὸ δὲ ἴσως βέλτιον ἦν μόνον τὸ ὂν λέγειν.
When we say “always” and “not at one time being and at another not being,” we must think that this is said for our sake, for clarity. For “always” is perhaps not used in the strict sense, but, taken to indicate the incorruptible, it might lead the soul astray into an expansion toward more and more, and further into the idea of something that will never run out. Perhaps it would have been better just to say “being.”
ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν ἀρκοῦν ὄνομα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίαν ἐνόμιζον, ἐδεήθησαν πρὸς τὸ μαθεῖν καὶ προσθήκης τοῦ ἀεί. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μέν ἐστιν ὄν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἄλλο μὲν φιλόσοφος, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ ἀληθινός· ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ὑποδυόμενον ἦν φιλοσοφίαν, ἡ προσθήκη τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐγένετο. οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν τῷ ἀεί, ὥστε λέγεσθαι ἀεὶ ὄν· διὸ ληπτέον τὸ ἀεὶ οἷον ἀληθῶς ὂν λέγεσθαι καὶ συναιρετέον τὸ ἀεὶ εἰς ἀδιάστατον δύναμιν τὴν οὐδὲν δεομένην οὐδενὸς μεθ’ ὃ ἤδη ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ τὸ πᾶν. πᾶν οὖν ὂν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν οὐκ ἐνδεὲς καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ μὲν πλῆρες, ἄλλῃ δὲ ἐλλεῖπον ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις.
But just as “being” is a sufficient name for real being, yet because they thought becoming too was being, they needed, in order to understand, the addition of “always.” For being is not one thing and always-being another, just as a philosopher is not one thing and the true philosopher another; but because there was something that put on the guise of philosophy, the addition “true” came about. So too “always” was added to “being,” and “being” to “always,” so that we say “always being.” Hence “always” must be taken as meaning something like “truly being,” and “always” must be contracted into an unextended power that needs nothing beyond what it already has; and it has everything. Such a nature, then, is all being, lacking in no respect, not full in one way and deficient in another.
τὸ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ, κἂν τέλειον ᾖ, ὡς δοκεῖν, οἷον σῶμά τι ἱκανὸν ψυχῇ τέλειον, δεόμενον καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, ἐλλεῖπον τῷ χρόνῳ, οὗ δεῖται· ὥστε σὺν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ παρείη αὐτῷ καὶ συνθέοι, ὂν ἀτελὲς ταύτῃ ὂν ὁμωνύμως ἂν τέλειον λέγοιτο. ὅτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει μηδὲ τοῦ ἔπειτα δεῖσθαι μήτε εἰς χρόνον ἄλλον μεμετρημένον μήτε τὸν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀπείρως ἐσόμενον, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἔχειν, τοῦτό ἐστιν οὗ ἡ ἔννοια ἐπορέγεται, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τοσοῦδε, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ τοσοῦδε. ἔπρεπε γὰρ αὐτῷ μηδὲ τοσῷδε ὄντι πάντη μηδενὸς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοσοῦδε, ἵνα μὴ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ μερισθεῖσα τὸ καθαρῶς ἀμερὲς αὐτοῦ ἀνέλῃ, ἀλλ’ ᾖ καὶ τῇ ζωῇ ἀμερὲς καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ.
For what is in time, even if it is complete, as it seems—like a body adequate to a soul, complete—still needs the “afterward,” lacking the time it needs. So it is together with that time—if it were present to it and ran along with it—that it would be; and, being incomplete in this respect, it could be called complete only in name. But that to which it belongs not even to need the “afterward,” neither for some further measured time nor for the unlimited time that will unlimitedly be, but to have what it ought to be—this is what our notion reaches for: that whose being does not derive from a quantity but is before quantity. For it was fitting that, not being a quantity at all, it should not touch any quantity, so that its life should not be divided and destroy its pure partlessness, but that it should be partless both in its life and in its being.
τὸ δ’ ‘ἀγαθὸς ἦν’ ἀναφέρει εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ παντὸς σημαῖνον τῷ ἐπέκεινα παντὸς τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ χρόνου τινός· ὥστε μηδὲ τὸν κόσμον ἀρχήν τινα χρονικὴν εἰληφέναι τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ τὸ πρότερον παρεχούσης. ἀλλ’ ὅμως δηλώσεως χάριν τοῦτο εἰπὼν μέμφεται ὕστερον καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὡς οὐδ’ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς πάντη λεγομένου ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν λεγόμενον καὶ νοούμενον αἰῶνα εἰληχότων.
And “he was good” refers us to the notion of the All, signifying, by his being beyond the All, that it is not from any time; so that the cosmos too did not receive any temporal beginning, since it is the cause of its being that supplies the “before.” Yet having said this for the sake of clarity, he later finds fault even with this word, as not quite correctly used either of the things that have been allotted what is called and thought of as eternity.
From eternity down to time
Plotinus reviews and rejects the views that time is motion, the moving sphere, or a measure of motion.
ταῦτα οὖν λέγοντες ἆρά γε μαρτυροῦντες ἑτέροις καὶ ὡς περὶ ἀλλοτρίων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμεθα; καὶ πῶς; τίς γὰρ ἂν σύνεσις γένοιτο μὴ ἐφαπτομένοις; πῶς δ’ ἂν ἐφαψαίμεθα τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις; δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἡμῖν μετεῖναι τοῦ αἰῶνος. ἀλλ’ ἐν χρόνῳ οὖσι πῶς; ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ πῶς ἐν αἰῶνι ἔστιν εἶναι, γνωσθείη ἂν εὑρεθέντος πρότερον τοῦ χρόνου. καὶ τοίνυν καταβατέον ἡμῖν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸν χρόνον· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡ πορεία πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν ἤδη οὐ πάνυ καταβάντες, ἀλλ’ οὕτως, ὥσπερ κατέβη χρόνος.
In saying all this, then, are we bearing witness to others, and speaking as if about things foreign to us? How could that be? For what understanding could there be for those not in contact with it? And how could we be in contact with what is foreign to us? So we too must have a share in eternity. But how, when we are in time? Well, how it is possible to be in time and how in eternity might become known once we have first found out what time is. So we must go down from eternity to the inquiry into time, and to time; for there the journey was upward, but now let us speak, not having gone down altogether, but in the way that time came down.
εἰ μὲν [οὖν] περὶ χρόνου εἰρημένον μηδὲν ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ μακαρίοις ἀνδράσιν, ἐχρῆν τῷ αἰῶνι ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνείραντας τὸ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ πειρωμένους τῇ ἐννοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἣν κεκτήμεθα ἐφαρμόζειν τὴν λεγομένην ὑφ’ ἡμῶν δόξαν· νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον λαβεῖν τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου εἰρημένα σκοποῦντας, εἴ τινι αὐτῶν συμφώνως ὁ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἕξει λόγος. τριχῇ δ’ ἴσως διαιρετέον τοὺς λεγομένους περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγους τὴν πρώτην. ἢ γὰρ κίνησις ἡ λεγομένη, ἢ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιεν ἄν, ἢ κινήσεώς τι τὸν χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ στάσιν ἢ τὸ ἑστηκὸς ἢ στάσεώς τι λέγειν παντάπασι πόρρω τῆς ἐννοίας ἂν εἴη τοῦ χρόνου οὐδαμῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος.
Now [then] if nothing had been said about time by the ancient and blessed men, we would have had to begin by linking it to eternity and say next what we think about it, trying to fit the opinion we state to the notion of it that we possess. As it is, we must first take the views most worth discussing and consider whether our own account will agree with any of them. And perhaps we should first divide the accounts given of it into three. They would say that time is either motion, or what is moved, or something of motion; for to say it is rest, or what is at rest, or something of rest, would be altogether remote from the notion of time, since time is never the same.
τῶν δὲ κίνησιν λεγόντων οἱ μὲν κίνησιν ἂν πᾶσαν λέγοιεν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντός· οἱ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοντες τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἂν σφαῖραν λέγοιεν· οἱ δὲ κινήσεώς τι ἢ διάστημα κινήσεως, οἱ δὲ [ἀριθμὸν ἢ] μέτρον, οἱ δ’ ὅλως παρακολουθοῦν αὐτῇ· καὶ ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τεταγμένης.
Of those who say motion, some would say all motion, others the motion of the All; those who say what is moved would say the sphere of the All; and those who say something of motion would say, some, the extension of motion, others [number or] measure, others in general something that accompanies it—and this either of all motion or of ordered motion.
κίνησιν μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε οὔτε τὰς συμπάσας λαμβάνοντι κινήσεις καὶ οἷον μίαν ἐκ πασῶν ποιοῦντι, οὔτε τὴν τεταγμένην· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἑκατέρα ἡ λεγομένη. εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀπείη τοῦ χρόνος εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, ἄλλου τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῆς οὔσης. καὶ ἄλλων λεγομένων καὶ λεχθέντων [ἓν] ἂν ἀρκοῖ τοῦτο, ὅτι κίνησις μὲν ἂν καὶ παύσαιτο καὶ διαλείποι, χρόνος δὲ οὔ.
It cannot be motion, then, whether one takes all motions together and, as it were, makes one out of all, or ordered motion; for each of the motions mentioned is in time. And if someone says motion is not in time, it would be much further still from being time, since that in which motion is is one thing and motion itself another. And among the other things that are and have been said, this [one] would be enough: that motion could stop and pause, but time does not.
εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κίνησιν μὴ διαλείπειν τις λέγοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὕτη, εἴπερ τὴν περιφορὰν λέγοι, ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ περιφέροιτ’ ἂν εἰς τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἥμισυ ἤνυσται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν εἴη ἥμισυς, ὁ δὲ διπλάσιος, κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς οὔσης ἑκατέρας, τῆς τε εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἥμισυ ἡκούσης. καὶ τὸ ὀξυτάτην δὲ καὶ ταχίστην λέγειν τὴν τῆς ἐξωτάτης σφαίρας κίνησιν μαρτυρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε ἕτερον ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ χρόνος. ταχίστη γὰρ πασῶν δηλονότι τῷ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ μέγιστον διάστημα ἀνύειν· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα βραδύτερα τῷ ἐν πλείονι ἀνύειν καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ.
If someone were to say that the motion of the All does not pause—well, this too, if he means the circuit, would go round to the same point in a certain time, not the time in which half of it is accomplished; and the one time would be half and the other double, though both are motions of the All, the one from the same point to the same point and the one reaching halfway. And saying that the motion of the outermost sphere is the sharpest and swiftest bears witness to the argument: its motion and time are different. For it is clearly the swiftest of all by accomplishing the greater, indeed the greatest, distance in less time; the others are slower by accomplishing even a part of it in more.
εἰ τοίνυν μηδ’ ἡ κίνησις τῆς σφαίρας ὁ χρόνος, σχολῇ γ’ ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτή, ἣ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὑπενοήθη χρόνος εἶναι.
If, then, not even the motion of the sphere is time, the sphere itself would hardly be—the sphere which was supposed to be time because it moves.
ἆρ’ οὖν κινήσεώς τι; εἰ μὲν διάστημα, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσης κινήσεως τὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς· θᾶττον γὰρ καὶ βραδύτερον ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐν τόπῳ. καὶ εἶεν ἂν ἄμφω μετρούμεναι αἱ διαστάσεις ἑνὶ ἑτέρῳ, ὃ δὴ ὀρθότερον ἄν τις εἴποι χρόνον. ποτέρας δὲ αὐτῶν τὸ διάστημα χρόνος, μᾶλλον δὲ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν; εἰ δὲ τῆς τεταγμένης, οὐ πάσης μὲν οὐδὲ τῆς τοιαύτης· πολλαὶ γὰρ αὗται· ὥστε καὶ πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα ἔσονται. εἰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διάστημα, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κινήσει διάστημα, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἂν εἴη;
Is time, then, something of motion? If it is extension, then first, the extension is not the same for all motion, not even for motion of the same kind; for motion, even motion in place, can be faster and slower. And both extensions could be measured by one other thing, which one would more correctly call time. But of which of the two is the extension time—or rather, of which of them all, since they are unlimited in number? And if it is of ordered motion, it is not of all, nor of all such motion; for these are many, so there will also be many times at once. And if it is the extension of the motion of the All—if it is the extension in the motion itself, what else would it be but the motion?
τοσήδε μέντοι· τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε τοῦτο ἤτοι τῷ τόπῳ, ὅτι τοσόσδε ὃν διεξῆλθε, μετρηθήσεται, καὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἔσται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τόπος ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τῇ συνεχείᾳ αὑτῆς καὶ τῷ μὴ εὐθὺς πεπαῦσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιλαμβάνειν ἀεί, τὸ διάστημα ἕξει. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ πολὺ τῆς κινήσεως ἂν εἴη· καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς αὐτήν τις βλέπων ἀποφανεῖται πολλήν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις πολὺ τὸ θερμὸν λέγοι, οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα χρόνος φανεῖται οὐδὲ προσπίπτει, ἀλλὰ κίνησις πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, ὡσπερεὶ ὕδωρ ῥέον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ διάστημα θεωρούμενον. καὶ τὸ μὲν πάλιν καὶ πάλιν ἔσται ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ δυὰς ἢ τριάς, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦ ὄγκου.
A motion of a certain size, to be sure. But this size will either be measured by place, because it is so great that it has traversed it, and this will be the extension—but this is not time but place; or the motion itself will have the extension by its continuity, by not stopping at once but always taking on more. But this would be the muchness of the motion; and if someone, looking at the motion itself, declares it much, as if someone were to say that heat is much, not even here will time appear or present itself, but motion again and again, like water flowing again and again, and the extension observed in it. And the “again and again” will be number, like a two or a three, and the extension will be that of the bulk.
οὕτως οὖν καὶ πλῆθος κινήσεως ὡς δεκάς, ἢ ὡς τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον τῷ οἷον ὄγκῳ τῆς κινήσεως διάστημα, ὃ οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν χρόνου, ἀλλὰ ἔσται τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦτο γενόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ ὁ χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ κινήσει, συμβαίνει τε πάλιν αὖ κίνησιν τὸν χρόνον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτῆς τὸ διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κίνησις οὐκ ἀθρόα.
So too a multitude of motion will be like a ten, or like the extension that shows on what is, as it were, the bulk of the motion, which does not contain the notion of time; rather, this quantity will be something that has come about in time—or else time will not be everywhere, but in motion as in a substrate; and again it turns out that we are calling time motion. For the extension is not outside it; it is motion that is not all at once.
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀθρόον, εἰ τὸ ἀθρόον ἐν χρόνῳ, τίνι διοίσει τοῦ ἀθρόου, ἢ τῷ [ἄλλως] ἐν χρόνῳ; ὥστε ἡ διεστῶσα κίνησις καὶ τὸ διάστημα αὐτῆς οὐκ αὐτὸ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ ἐν χρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸ διάστημα τῆς κινήσεως λέγοι τις χρόνον, οὐ τὸ αὐτῆς τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ὃ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τὴν παράτασιν ἔχει οἷον συμπαραθέουσα ἐκείνῳ· τί δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐκ εἴρηται. δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ γέγονεν ἡ κίνησις. τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζήτει ὁ λόγος, τί ὤν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ἐπεὶ ὅμοιόν τε γίνεται καὶ ταὐτὸ οἷον εἴ τις ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι χρόνος, λέγοι κινήσεως διάστημα ἐν χρόνῳ.
And what is not all at once—if what is all at once is in time—how will it differ from what is all at once, except by being [otherwise] in time? So extended motion and its extension are not themselves time, but in time. And if someone were to say that time is the extension of motion—not the extension of the motion itself, but that alongside which the motion itself has its stretch, as if running along with it—what this is has not been said. For clearly this is time: that in which the motion has taken place. But this was what the argument was looking for from the start: what time is. So it comes out like, indeed the same as, someone who, asked what time is, says: the extension of motion in time.
τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα, ὃ δὴ χρόνον καλεῖ ὁ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ οἰκείου διαστήματος ἔξω τιθέμενος; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ τιθέμενος τῇ κινήσει τὸ διάστημα τὴν τῆς ἠρεμίας διάστασιν ποῖ θήσεται, ἄπορος ἔσται. ὅσον γὰρ κινεῖταί τι, τοσοῦτον ἂν σταίη καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ εἴποις ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἑκατέρου τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλον δηλονότι ἀμφοῖν ὄντα. τί οὖν ἐστι καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα; ἐπείπερ τοπικὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἔξωθέν ἐστιν.
What, then, is this extension that the person who places time outside motion’s own extension calls time? For again, the one who places the extension in motion itself will be at a loss where to put the extension of rest. For something can be at rest for as long as something else is moving, and you would say that the time of each is the same, plainly as being something other than both. What, then, is this extension, and what nature does it have? It cannot be spatial, since that too is outside.
ἀριθμὸς δὲ κινήσεως ἢ μέτρον — βέλτιον γὰρ οὕτω συνεχοῦς οὔσης — πῶς, σκεπτέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πάσης ὁμοίως ἀπορητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαστήματος τῆς κινήσεως, εἴ τις τῆς πάσης εἶναι λέγοι. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἀριθμήσειε τὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἀνώμαλον ἢ τίς ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ κατὰ τί τὸ μέτρον; εἰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑκατέραν καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν, ταχεῖαν, βραδεῖαν, ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ μέτρον τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ δεκὰς εἴη μετροῦσα καὶ ἵππους καὶ βοῦς, ἢ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέτρον καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν εἴη. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτον μέτρον, τίνων μέν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος εἴρηται, ὅτι κινήσεων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὃ ἔστιν οὔπω εἴρηται.
Time is the number or the measure of motion—measure is the better word, since motion is continuous. How could this be? We must look into it. First, then, here too we must raise the same difficulty about its being the measure of all motion alike as we did about the extension of motion, if someone says it belongs to all motion. For how could anyone number motion that is disorderly and irregular? What number or measure would that be, and by what standard would it measure? And if one and the same thing measures each kind, and in general all motion, fast and slow, then the number and the measure will be like a ten that measures both horses and cattle, or like the same measure serving for liquids and for dry goods. If time is a measure of that sort, we have been told what it is the measure of, namely motions, but we have not yet been told what time itself is.
εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ δεκάδος ληφθείσης καὶ ἄνευ ἵππων ἔστι νοεῖν τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸ μέτρον μέτρον ἐστὶ φύσιν ἔχον τινά, κἂν μήπω μετρῇ, οὕτω δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὸν χρόνον μέτρον ὄντα — εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οἷον ἀριθμός, τί ἂν τοῦδε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δεκάδα ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν διαφέροι μοναδικοῦ; εἰ δὲ συνεχὲς μέτρον ἐστί, ποσόν τι ὂν μέτρον ἔσται, οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖον. μέγεθος τοίνυν ἔσται, οἷον γραμμὴ συνθέουσα δηλονότι κινήσει. ἀλλ’ αὕτη συνθέουσα πῶς μετρήσει τὸ ᾧ συνθεῖ; τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁποτερονοῦν θάτερον; καὶ βέλτιον τίθεσθαι καὶ πιθανώτερον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάσης, ἀλλ’ ᾗ συνθεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ συνεχὲς δεῖ εἶναι, ᾗ ἐφέξει ἡ συνθέουσα. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ χωρίς, ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦ κίνησιν μεμετρημένην.
But you can take the number ten and think of it even without horses, and a measure is a measure with a nature of its own even when it is not yet measuring anything. Suppose time, being a measure, must be like this too. Then if it is something like a number in itself, how would it differ from this number ten, or from any other number made up of units? If instead it is a continuous measure, it will be a measure by being a certain quantity, like a cubit-rule. So it will be a magnitude: a line, evidently, running along with the motion. But how will this line, running along with it, measure what it runs along with? Why should either one measure the other rather than be measured by it? It is better, and more plausible, to posit it not over all motion but over the motion it runs along with. That motion must be continuous, if the line running alongside is to keep pace with it. But we should not take the measuring thing as external or separate; we must take measured motion all together.
καὶ τί τὸ μετροῦν ἔσται; ἢ μεμετρημένη μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἔσται, μεμετρηκὸς δὲ ἔσται μέγεθος. καὶ ποῖον αὐτῶν ὁ χρόνος ἔσται; ἡ κίνησις ἡ μεμετρημένη, ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρῆσαν;
And what will do the measuring? Well: the motion will be what is measured, and a magnitude will be what has measured it. And which of them will time be? The measured motion, or the magnitude that did the measuring?
ἢ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἔσται ἡ μεμετρημένη ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους ὁ χρόνος, ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρῆσαν, ἢ τὸ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον, ὥσπερ τῷ πήχει πρὸς τὸ μετρῆσαι ὅση ἡ κίνησις. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν πάντων τούτων ὑποθέσθαι, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, πιθανώτερόν ἐστι τὴν ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν· ἄνευ γὰρ ὁμαλότητος καὶ προσέτι μιᾶς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ἀπορώτερον τὸ τοῦ λόγου τῷ θεμένῳ ὁπωσοῦν μέτρον γίνεται.
For time will be either the motion measured by the magnitude, or the magnitude that did the measuring, or whatever used the magnitude, the way one uses a cubit-rule, to measure how much motion there is. In all these cases, as we said, it is more plausible to assume uniform motion. Without uniformity—and, besides that, without its being a single motion, the motion of the whole—the argument gets even more difficult for anyone who makes time a measure in any way at all.
εἰ δὲ δὴ μεμετρημένη κίνησις ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ μεμετρημένη, ὥσπερ τὴν κίνησιν, εἰ ἔδει μεμετρῆσθαι, οὐχ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἔδει μεμετρῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρῳ, οὕτως ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ μέτρον ἕξει ἄλλο ἡ κίνησις παρ’ αὑτήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐδεήθημεν τοῦ συνεχοῦς μέτρου εἰς μέτρησιν αὐτῆς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δεῖ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῷ μέτρου, ἵν’ ἡ κίνησις τοσοῦδε γεγενημένου τοῦ καθ’ ὃ μετρεῖται ὅση μετρηθῇ. καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ μεγέθους ἔσται [τοῦ] τῇ κινήσει παρομαρτοῦντος ἐκεῖνος ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ συνθέον τῇ κινήσει. οὗτος δὲ τίς ἂν εἴη ἢ ὁ μοναδικός; ὃς ὅπως μετρήσει ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη. ἐπεί, κἄν τις ἐξεύρῃ ὅπως, οὐ χρόνον εὑρήσει μετροῦντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν τοσόνδε χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν χρόνῳ.
Now suppose time is measured motion, and measured by a quantity. Motion, if it had to be measured, had to be measured not by itself but by something else. In the same way, then, if motion is to have a measure other than itself—and that is why we needed the continuous measure to measure it—the magnitude itself must need a measure too, so that the motion can be measured for how much it is once the thing it is measured by has been fixed at so much. And then time will be that number of the magnitude which accompanies the motion, not the magnitude running along with the motion. But what could this number be, if not one made up of units? And how that will measure, we can’t help being puzzled. For even if someone works out how, he won’t have found time doing the measuring but a certain amount of time; and that is not the same as time.
ἕτερον γὰρ εἰπεῖν χρόνον, ἕτερον δὲ τοσόνδε χρόνον· πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ τοσόνδε δεῖ ὅ τι πότ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο εἰπεῖν, ὃ τοσόνδε ἐστίν. ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μετρήσας τὴν κίνησιν ἔξωθεν τῆς κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος, οἷον ἡ δεκὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων οὐ μετὰ τῶν ἵππων λαμβανομένη. τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ εἴρηται, ὃς πρὸ τοῦ μετρεῖν ἔστιν ὅπερ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ ἡ δεκάς. ἢ οὗτος, ὃς κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τῆς κινήσεως παραθέων ἐμέτρησεν.
To say “time” is one thing, to say “so much time” another; before the “so much” we have to say what that is which is so much. But perhaps time is the number that has measured the motion from outside it, the way ten applies to the horses without being taken along with the horses. Then we have not been told what this number is which, before it measures, is what it is, as ten is. Or perhaps it is the number that measured by running alongside the motion according to its before and after.
ἀλλ’ οὗτος ὁ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὔπω δῆλος ὅστις ἔστιν. ἀλλ’ οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μετρῶν εἴτε σημείῳ εἴθ’ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ πάντως κατὰ χρόνον μετρήσει. ἔσται οὖν οὗτος ὁ μετρῶν τὴν κίνησιν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ἐχόμενος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος, ἵνα μετρῇ. ἢ γὰρ τὸ τοπικὸν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οἷον ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ σταδίου, λαμβάνεται, ἢ ἀνάγκη τὸ χρονικὸν λαμβάνειν. ἔστι γὰρ ὅλως τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὸ μὲν χρόνος ὁ εἰς τὸ νῦν λήγων, τὸ δὲ ὃς ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἄρχεται. ἄλλο τοίνυν ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μετροῦντος τὴν κίνησιν οὐ μόνον ἡντιναοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τεταγμένην, ὁ χρόνος.
But what this number “according to before and after” is, is not yet clear. In any case, whatever measures according to before and after, whether by a point or by anything else, will certainly be measuring according to time. So this number that measures motion by before and after will be holding on to time and touching it, in order to measure. For either it is the spatial before and after that is taken, like the starting line of the racecourse, or it has to be the temporal. And in general, of before and after, the one is time ending at the now, the other time beginning from the now. Time, then, is something other than the number that measures motion by before and after—not only any motion whatever, but ordered motion too.
ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν προσγεγενημένου εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μετροῦντα καὶ μεμετρημένον εἶναι· ἀλλ’ οὖν διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν γενομένου χρόνος ἔσται, κινήσεως δὲ οὔσης καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πάντως ὑπάρχοντος περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι ὅσον ἔστιν, εἰ μή τις τὸ ὅσον ἔστι τοῦτο λάβοι. ἀπείρου δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ὄντος καὶ λεγομένου πῶς ἂν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸς εἴη; εἰ μή τις ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι αὐτοῦ μετροῖ, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνει εἶναι καὶ πρὶν μετρηθῆναι. διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἔσται πρὶν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μετροῦσαν εἶναι; εἰ μή τις τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ ψυχῆς λέγοι γίνεσθαι.
Next: why should there be time once number has been added, whether on the side of what is measured or of what measures (for the same number could be both measuring and measured)? Why, I say, should there be time once number has come about, but no time when there is motion, with a before and after certainly belonging to it? That is like saying a magnitude is not as big as it is unless someone grasps how big it is. And since time is unlimited, and is called so, how could there be a number of it? Unless someone cuts off some part of it and measures that—a part in which time in fact existed even before it was measured. And why should time not exist before there is a soul to measure it? Unless one says that it owes its coming into being to soul.
ἐπεὶ διά γε τὸ μετρεῖν οὐδαμῶς· ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ὅσον ἔστι, κἂν μή τις μετρῇ. τὸ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον πρὸς τὸ μετρῆσαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἄν τις λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἔννοιαν χρόνου;
Certainly not because of the measuring; that much is necessary. For a thing is as much as it is, even if nobody measures it. As for what used the magnitude in order to measure, one might say that is the soul; but what would this contribute to the notion of time?
τὸ δὲ παρακολούθημα λέγειν τῆς κινήσεως, τί ποτε τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστι διδάσκοντος οὐδὲ [ἔχοντος] εἰρηκέναι, πρὶν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ παρακολουθοῦν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν ἴσως εἴη ὁ χρόνος. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τὸ παρακολούθημα τοῦτο εἴτε ὕστερον εἴτε ἅμα εἴτε πρότερον, εἴπερ τι ἔστι τοιοῦτον παρακολούθημα· ὅπως γὰρ ἂν λέγηται, ἐν χρόνῳ λέγεται. εἰ [δὲ] τοῦτο, ἔσται ὁ χρόνος παρακολούθημα κινήσεως ἐν χρόνῳ.
To call time a concomitant of motion, whatever that is, is not to teach anything, nor to have said anything, before saying what it is that accompanies; for that would perhaps be time. And we must examine whether this concomitant comes after, at the same time, or before—if there is any such concomitant at all. For however it is described, it is described in time. If so, time will be a concomitant of motion in time.
ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ οὐ τί μή ἐστι ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τί ἐστιν, εἴρηταί τε πολλὰ πολλοῖς τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν καθ’ ἑκάστην θέσιν, ἃ εἴ τις διεξίοι, ἱστορίαν μᾶλλον ἂν ποιοῖτο, ὅσον τε ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς εἴρηταί τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μέτρον κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς ἐκ τῶν ἤδη εἰρημένων ἀντιλέγειν τά τε ἄλλα ὅσα [τε] νῦν περὶ μέτρου κινήσεως εἴρηται — χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας πάντα τὰ ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἁρμόσει — εἴη ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν χρόνον εἶναι.
But we are looking not for what time is not but for what it is. Many of our predecessors have said many things about each position, and anyone who went through them all would be writing history instead. We have said something about them in passing. And against anyone who says time is the measure of the motion of the All, one can argue from what has already been said, and from everything else just said about the measure of motion—for apart from the point about irregularity, all the rest will apply to them as well. So it would be fitting now to say what we ought to take time to be.
How time came to be
A restless power of soul, wanting more than the present, made time as an image of eternity.
δεῖ δὴ ἀναγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν διάθεσιν, ἣν ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, τὴν ἀτρεμῆ ἐκείνην καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἤδη ζωὴν καὶ ἀκλινῆ πάντη καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἑστῶσαν· χρόνος δὲ οὔπω ἦν, ἢ ἐκείνοις γε οὐκ ἦν, γενησόμενον δὲ λόγῳ καὶ φύσει τοῦ ὑστέρου. τούτων δὴ οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον ἐξέπεσε χρόνος, τὰς μὲν Μούσας οὔπω τότε οὔσας οὐκ ἄν τις ἴσως καλοῖ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο· ἀλλ’ ἴσως [οὐδ’] εἴπερ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ Μοῦσαι τότε· αὐτὸν δ’ ἄν τις τάχα τὸν γενόμενον χρόνον, ὅπως ἐστὶν ἐκφανεὶς καὶ γενόμενος.
We must take ourselves back again to that state which we said belonged to eternity: that unwavering life, all together at once, already unlimited, wholly unswerving, standing in one and directed toward one. Time did not yet exist—or at any rate it did not exist for those beings; it was to come into being, in thought and in nature, with the “later.” So while these were at rest in themselves, how did time first fall out? One could hardly call on the Muses to tell this, since they did not yet exist then—though perhaps one could, if the Muses too existed even then. But one might perhaps ask time itself, now that it has come into being, how it appeared and came to be.
λέγοι δ’ ἂν περὶ αὑτοῦ ὧδέ πως· ὡς πρότερον πρὶν τὸ πρότερον δὴ τοῦτο γεννῆσαι καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου δεηθῆναι σὺν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἀνεπαύετο χρόνος οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡσυχίαν ἦγε. φύσεως δὲ πολυπράγμονος καὶ ἄρχειν αὑτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὑτῆς καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ παρόντος ζητεῖν ἑλομένης ἐκινήθη μὲν αὐτή, ἐκινήθη δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, εἶθ’ ἕτερον, κινούμενοι μῆκός τι τῆς πορείας ποιησάμενοι αἰῶνος εἰκόνα τὸν χρόνον εἰργάσμεθα.
It might speak about itself something like this. Formerly, before it had generated this “before” and come to need the “after,” it rested with eternity in what is; it was not yet time, but it too kept still within that. But there was a nature that was restless, that wanted to rule itself and belong to itself, and chose to seek more than what it had. So it moved, and time moved too. And moving on always toward the “next” and the “later,” toward what is not the same but different, and then different again, we covered a certain length of our journey and produced time as an image of eternity.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς ἦν τις δύναμις οὐχ ἥσυχος, τὸ δ’ ἐκεῖ ὁρώμενον ἀεὶ μεταφέρειν εἰς ἄλλο βουλομένη, τὸ μὲν ἀθρόον αὐτῇ πᾶν παρεῖναι οὐκ ἤθελεν· ὥσπερ δ’ ἐκ σπέρματος ἡσύχου ἐξελίττων αὑτὸν ὁ λόγος διέξοδον εἰς πολύ, ὡς οἴεται, ποιεῖ ἀφανίζων τὸ πολὺ τῷ μερισμῷ καὶ ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς ἐν αὑτῷ οὐκ ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ ἓν δαπανῶν εἰς μῆκος ἀσθενέστερον πρόεισιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὴ κόσμον ποιοῦσα αἰσθητὸν μιμήσει ἐκείνου κινούμενον κίνησιν οὐ τὴν ἐκεῖ, ὁμοίαν δὲ τῇ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐθέλουσαν εἰκόνα ἐκείνης εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωσεν ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ἔδωκε δουλεύειν χρόνῳ ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὸν πάντα ποιήσασα εἶναι τὰς τούτου διεξόδους ἁπάσας ἐν αὐτῷ περιλαβοῦσα· ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ κινούμενος· οὐ γάρ τις αὐτῷ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τόπος ἢ ψυχή· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνης αὖ ἐκινεῖτο χρόνῳ.
For there was a power of soul that was not at rest; it always wanted to transfer what it saw there into something else, and did not want the whole to be present to it all at once. A rational principle unfolds itself out of a seed at rest and works its way out to a great extent, as it thinks; but it annuls that greatness by dividing it, and instead of keeping its unity within itself, it spends its unity outside itself and goes forward into a weaker extension. In the same way soul, making the perceptible cosmos in imitation of that one—a cosmos moving with a motion not the motion there, but like the one there and wanting to be its image—first made itself temporal, producing time in place of eternity. Then it handed over what had come into being to be a slave to time, making the whole of it exist in time and enclosing all its unfoldings within time. For the cosmos moves in soul—there is no other place for this All than soul—and so it also moved in soul’s time.
τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν αὑτῆς παρεχομένη ἄλλην μετ’ ἄλλην, εἶθ’ ἑτέραν πάλιν ἐφεξῆς, ἐγέννα τε μετὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ συμπροῄει μετὰ διανοίας ἑτέρας μετ’ ἐκείνην τὸ μὴ πρότερον ὄν, ὅτι οὔθ’ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργηθεῖσα ἦν οὔθ’ ἡ νῦν ζωὴ ὁμοία τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς. ἅμα οὖν ζωὴ ἄλλη καὶ τῷ ἄλλη χρόνον εἶχεν ἄλλον. διάστασις οὖν ζωῆς χρόνον εἶχε καὶ τὸ πρόσω ἀεὶ τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον ἔχει ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ παρελθοῦσα ζωὴ χρόνον ἔχει παρεληλυθότα.
For soul, putting forth its activity one act after another, and then yet another in sequence, generated succession along with its activity; and together with one discursive thought after another there came forth what had not existed before, since that thought had not been actualized, nor was the present life like the one before it. At once, then, there was a different life, and by being different it had a different time. The extension of life, then, involved time; life’s constant going forward always involves time; and life that has passed involves past time.
εἰ οὖν χρόνον τις λέγοι ψυχῆς ἐν κινήσει μεταβατικῇ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον βίον ζωὴν εἶναι, ἆρ’ ἂν δοκοῖ τι λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ αἰών ἐστι ζωὴ ἐν στάσει καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἄπειρος ἤδη, εἰκόνα δὲ δεῖ τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἀντὶ μὲν ζωῆς τῆς ἐκεῖ ἄλλην δεῖ ζωὴν τὴν τῆσδε τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ὁμώνυμον λέγειν εἶναι καὶ ἀντὶ κινήσεως νοερᾶς ψυχῆς τινος μέρους κίνησιν, ἀντὶ δὲ ταυτότητος καὶ τοῦ ὡσαύτως καὶ μένοντος τὸ μὴ μένον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργοῦν, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀδιαστάτου καὶ ἑνὸς εἴδωλον τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ ἐν συνεχείᾳ ἕν, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀπείρου ἤδη καὶ ὅλου τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀεί, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀθρόου ὅλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐσόμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενον ὅλον.
So if someone said that time is the life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another, would he seem to be saying something? For eternity is life at rest, in the same and in the same way, already unlimited; and time must be an image of eternity, as this All is of that one. So instead of the life there, we must say there is another life, that of this power of soul, which shares the name, so to speak; instead of intellectual motion, the motion of a part of soul; instead of sameness, the “in the same way” and the remaining, what does not remain in the same but is active now in one thing, now in another; instead of what is without extension and one, an image of the one, the one in continuity; instead of what is already unlimited and whole, what goes on to the unlimited, always toward what comes next; instead of the whole all together, what will be whole part by part, and always will be whole.
οὕτω γὰρ μιμήσεται τὸ ἤδη ὅλον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ ἄπειρον ἤδη, εἰ ἐθελήσει ἀεὶ προσκτώμενον εἶναι ἐν τῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι οὕτω τὸ ἐκείνου μιμήσεται. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος, οὐδ’ αὖ παρακολούθημα οὐδ’ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐνορώμενον καὶ ἐνόντα καὶ συνόντα, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ ὁ αἰών.
For in this way it will imitate what is already whole, all together, and already unlimited, if it means to be always acquiring more in its being; for its being too will in this way imitate the being of that. We must not take time as outside soul, any more than eternity there is outside being; nor again as a concomitant, or something that comes after, any more than it is there; but as something seen in soul, present in it and with it, just as eternity is there.
νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἡ φύσις αὕτη, τὸ τοιούτου μῆκος βίου ἐν μεταβολαῖς προιὸν ὁμαλαῖς τε καὶ ὁμοίαις ἀψοφητὶ προιούσαις, συνεχὲς τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔχει. εἰ δὴ πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἀναστρέψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην καὶ παύσαιμεν τοῦδε τοῦ βίου, ὃν νῦν ἔχει ἄπαυστον ὄντα καὶ οὔποτε λήξοντα, ὅτι ψυχῆς τινος ἀεὶ οὔσης ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, οὐ πρὸς αὑτὴν οὐδ’ ἐν αὑτῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ γενέσει — εἰ οὖν ὑποθοίμεθα μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ παυσαμένην ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐπιστραφὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μένον, τί ἂν ἔτι μετὰ αἰῶνα εἴη; τί δ’ ἂν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πάντων ἐν ἑνὶ μεινάντων; τί δ’ ἂν ἔτι πρότερον; τί δ’ ἂν ὕστερον ἢ μᾶλλον;
We may also understand from this that this nature—this length of such a life, advancing in changes that are uniform and alike and proceed without a sound—has continuity in its activity. Now suppose that in our thought we made this power turn back again and stopped it from this life it now has: a life without pause, never to end, because it is the activity of a soul that always exists—an activity not directed toward itself or within itself, but in making and generating. Suppose, then, that it were no longer active, that this activity had stopped, and that this part of soul too had turned back toward what is there and toward eternity, and remained in quiet. What would there still be after eternity? What “one thing and then another,” when all things had remained in one? What would there still be that was “before”? What “after,” or “more”?
ποῦ δ’ ἂν ἔτι ψυχὴ ἐπιβάλλοι εἰς ἄλλο ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι; μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τούτῳ· ἀφεστήκοι γὰρ ἂν πρότερον, ἵνα ἐπιβάλλῃ. ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτὴ εἴη, ἣ οὐ πρότερον ὑπάρχει ἢ χρόνος· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη καὶ ἔστι καὶ κινεῖται, κἂν στῇ ἐκείνης ἐνεργούσης, ὅση ἡ στάσις αὐτῆς μετρήσομεν, ἕως ἐκείνη ἐστὶν ἔξω.
Where would soul still direct itself, toward anything other than that in which it is? Or rather, not even toward that; it would first have to stand apart from it in order to direct itself toward it. And then not even the sphere itself would exist, since it does not exist before time; it too both exists and moves in time. And even if it stood still while soul was active, we will measure how long its rest lasts, so long as soul is outside.
εἰ οὖν ἀποστάσης ἐκείνης καὶ ἑνωθείσης ἀνῄρηται χρόνος, δηλονότι ἡ ταύτης ἀρχὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κινήσεως καὶ οὗτος ὁ βίος τὸν χρόνον γεννᾷ. διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἅμα τῷδε τῷ παντὶ γεγονέναι, ὅτι ψυχὴ αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἐγέννησεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τόδε γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν· καὶ ἡ μὲν χρόνος, τὸ δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι χρόνους λέγεσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς, ἀναμνησθήτω, ὅτι ταῦτά φησι γεγονέναι πρὸς δήλωσιν καὶ διορισμὸν χρόνου καὶ τὸ ἵνα ᾖ μέτρον ἐναργές.
If, then, time is abolished when soul withdraws and is united, it is clearly the beginning of soul’s motion toward these things here, and this life, that generates time. That is why it is said to have come into being together with this All: soul generated it along with this All. For it is in an activity of this kind that this All too has come into being; and the activity is time, while the All is in time. And if someone objects that Plato also calls the courses of the stars “times,” let him remember that he says these came into being to make time plain and to mark it off, and “so that there might be a clear measure.”
ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἦν τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁρίσαι οὐδὲ μετρεῖν παρ’ αὑτοῖς ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀοράτου ὄντος καὶ οὐ ληπτοῦ καὶ μάλιστα ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδόσιν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ποιεῖ, δι’ ὧν ἦν δύο τῇ ἑτερότητι λαβεῖν, ἀφ’ οὗ ἔννοιά, φησιν, ἀριθμοῦ. εἶθ’ ὅσον τὸ ἀπ’ ἀνατολῆς εἰς τὸ πάλιν λαμβάνουσιν ἦν ὅσον χρόνου διάστημα ὁμαλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ τῆς κινήσεως εἴδους, ὅτῳ ἐπερειδόμεθα, ἔχειν καὶ οἷον μέτρῳ χρώμεθα τῷ τοιούτῳ· μέτρῳ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οὐ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς μέτρον. πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ μετροῖ καὶ τί ἂν λέγοι μετρῶν τοσοῦτον εἶναι, ὅσον ἐγὼ τοσόνδε; τίς οὖν ὁ ἐγώ;
For it was not possible for the soul to define time itself, nor for people to measure each part of it among themselves, since it is invisible and cannot be grasped—especially as they did not know how to count. So he makes day and night, by whose difference it was possible to get two, and from this, he says, came the notion of number. Then, taking the stretch from one sunrise to the next, it was possible to have so much of an interval of time, since the form of the motion we rely on is uniform; and we use this as a measure, so to speak—a measure of time, that is, for time itself is not a measure. How would it measure, and what would it say in measuring—that this is as long as I am, so long? Who, then, is this “I”?
ἢ καθ’ ὃν ἡ μέτρησις. οὐκοῦν ὤν, ἵνα μετρῇ, καὶ μὴ μέτρον. ἡ οὖν κίνησις ἡ τοῦ παντὸς μετρουμένη κατὰ χρόνον ἔσται, καὶ ὁ χρόνος οὐ μέτρον ἔσται κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὢν ἄλλο τι πρότερον παρέξει δήλωσιν τοῦ ὁπόση ἡ κίνησις. καὶ ἡ κίνησις δὲ ληφθεῖσα ἡ μία ἐν τοσῷδε χρόνῳ πολλάκις ἀριθμουμένη εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀνάξει τοῦ ὁπόσος παρελήλυθεν· ὥστε τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν περιφορὰν εἴ τις λέγοι τρόπον τινὰ μετρεῖν τὸν χρόνον ὅσον οἷόν τε ὡς δηλοῦσαν ἐν τῷ αὑτῆς τοσῷδε τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦ χρόνου, οὐκ ὂν λαβεῖν οὐδὲ συνεῖναι ἄλλως, οὐκ ἄτοπος τῆς δηλώσεως.
Presumably that according to which the measuring takes place. Then it exists so that it may measure, and is not itself a measure. The motion of the All, then, will be measured according to time, and time will not be the measure of motion in what it is; rather, being something else first, it will incidentally make plain how much motion there is. And the single motion, taken in a given amount of time and counted over and over, will lead us to the notion of how much time has passed. So if someone said that the motion, the revolution, in a way measures time, as far as that is possible—since by its own amount it shows the amount of time, which cannot be grasped or understood otherwise—his account of the indicating would not be absurd.
τὸ οὖν μετρούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς — τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ δηλούμενον — ὁ χρόνος ἔσται, οὐ γεννηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ δηλωθείς· καὶ οὕτω τὸ μέτρον τῆς κινήσεως τὸ μετρηθὲν ὑπὸ κινήσεως ὡρισμένης καὶ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ ταύτης ἄλλο ὂν αὐτῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ᾗ μετροῦν ἄλλο ἦν καὶ ᾗ μετρούμενον ἕτερον, μετρούμενον δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἐλέγετο, ὡς εἰ τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ πήχεως λέγοι τις τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι ὅ τι πότ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο μὴ λέγων, μέγεθος ὁριζόμενος, καὶ οἷον εἴ τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτὴν οὐ δυνάμενος τῷ ἀόριστον εἶναι δηλῶσαι λέγοι τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ τόπου· λαβὼν γὰρ τόπον τις, ὃν ἐπεξῆλθεν ἡ κίνησις, τοσαύτην ἂν εἶπεν εἶναι, ὅσος ὁ τόπος.
What is measured by the revolution—that is, what is indicated—will be time: not generated by the revolution but indicated by it. In this way the measure of motion is what is measured by a definite motion and is measured by it while being other than it; for as measuring, the motion was one thing, and as measured, time was another—and measured incidentally. That would be like someone saying that magnitude is what is measured by the cubit, without saying what magnitude itself is, as a definition of magnitude; or like someone unable to make motion itself plain, because it is indefinite, saying it is what is measured by place. For one would take the place the motion has traversed and say the motion is as great as the place.
χρόνον οὖν ἡ περιφορὰ δηλοῖ, ἐν ᾧ αὐτή. δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον μηκέτι τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον αὐτὸν εἶναι ὅς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖται καὶ ἕστηκεν ὁμαλῶς καὶ τεταγμένως, καὶ παρὰ μέν τινος τεταγμένου ἐμφαίνεσθαι καὶ προφαίνεσθαι εἰς ἔννοιαν, οὐ μέντοι γίνεσθαι, εἴτε ἑστῶτος εἴτε κινουμένου, μᾶλλον μέντοι κινουμένου· μᾶλλον γὰρ κινεῖ εἰς γνώρισιν καὶ μετάβασιν ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἡ κίνησις ἤπερ ἡ στάσις καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὸ ὁπόσον κεκίνηταί τι ἢ ὅσον ἕστηκε. διὸ καὶ κινήσεως ἠνέχθησαν εἰς τὸ εἰπεῖν μέτρον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν κινήσει μετρούμενον, εἶτα προσθεῖναι τί ὢν κινήσει μετρεῖται καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινόμενόν τι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐνηλλαγμένως.
So the revolution indicates time, in which it is. But time itself must no longer have an “in which”; it must first be what it is, that in which the other things move and stand still, uniformly and in order. It shows itself, and comes forward into our understanding, through something ordered, but it does not come into being through it, whether that thing is at rest or in motion—though more through what is in motion. For motion moves us more than rest does to recognize time and pass over to it, and how far a thing has moved is easier to recognize than how long it has stood still. That is why people were led into calling it a measure of motion, instead of saying it is measured by motion and then adding what it is that motion measures—rather than stating something incidental about it, and that the wrong way round.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἐνηλλαγμένως, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ συνίεμεν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς λεγόντων μέτρον κατὰ τὸ μετρούμενον οὐκ ἐτυγχάνομεν τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ συνιέναι ἡμᾶς, ὅτι τί ὢν εἴτε μετροῦν εἴτε μετρούμενον οὐκ ἐκδηλοῦσι διὰ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὡς εἰδόσι καὶ ἠκροαμένοις αὐτῶν γράφοντες. ὁ μέντοι Πλάτων οὔτε μετροῦν εἴρηκεν οὔτε μετρούμενον ὑπό τινος τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ εἰς δήλωσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν περιφορὰν ἐλάχιστόν τι εἰληφέναι πρὸς ἐλάχιστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν γινώσκειν δύνασθαι, οἷον καὶ ὅσον ὁ χρόνος.
But perhaps they did not put it the wrong way round; perhaps it is we who don’t understand, and although they plainly meant “measure” in the sense of “what is measured,” we missed their meaning. The reason we don’t understand is that in their writings they do not make plain what time is, whether as measuring or as measured, because they were writing for people who knew and had attended their lectures. Plato, however, did not say that its being consists in measuring or in being measured by something. Rather, to make it plain, he says that the revolution has taken a very small unit to correspond to a very small part of it, so that from this one could know what time is like and how much of it there is.
τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι θέλων ἅμα οὐρανῷ φησι γεγονέναι κατὰ παράδειγμα αἰῶνος καὶ εἰκόνα κινητήν, ὅτι μὴ μένει μηδ’ ὁ χρόνος τῆς ζωῆς οὐ μενούσης, ᾗ συνθεῖ καὶ συντρέχει· ἅμα οὐρανῷ δέ, ὅτι ζωὴ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ καὶ μία ζωὴ οὐρανὸν καὶ χρόνον ἐργάζεται. ἐπιστραφείσης οὖν ζωῆς ταύτης εἰς ἕν, εἰ δύναιτο, ὁμοῦ καὶ χρόνος πέπαυται ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ὢν ταύτῃ καὶ οὐρανὸς τὴν ζωὴν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχων.
But when he wants to make plain its being, he says it came into being together with the heaven, after the model of eternity, as a moving image—because time does not remain either, since the life it runs along and keeps pace with does not remain. Together with the heaven, because a life of this kind makes the heaven too, and one life produces both the heaven and time. So if this life turned back to unity, if it could, then time, which is in this life, would at once have stopped, and so would the heaven, no longer having this life.
εἰ δέ τις τῆσδε μὲν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λαμβάνων χρόνον λέγοι· εἶναι γάρ τι τοῦτο· τῆς δ’ ἀληθεστέρας κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἐχούσης μὴ λέγοι τι εἶναι, ἀτοπώτατος ἂν εἴη, κινήσει μὲν ἀψύχῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον καὶ χρόνον παρ’ αὑτήν, κινήσει δέ, καθ’ ἣν καὶ αὕτη ὑφέστηκε κατὰ μίμησιν, μὴ διδοὺς τοῦτο, παρ’ ἧς καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον πρώτως ὑπέστη αὐτουργοῦ οὔσης κινήσεως καὶ ὥσπερ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὑτῆς ἑκάστας γεννώσης, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ ἅμα τῇ γεννήσει καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν αὐτῶν.
Suppose someone takes the before and after of this life and motion here and calls it time, on the grounds that this is something, but says that the before and after of the truer motion is nothing. He would be utterly absurd. He grants to soulless motion that it has a before and after, and time alongside it; but he does not grant this to the motion in imitation of which this one too exists—the motion from which before and after first came into existence, since it is a self-acting motion, and, just as it generates each of its activities, so it generates their succession too, and along with generating them, the passage from one to the next.
διὰ τί οὖν ταύτην μὲν τὴν κίνησιν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀνάγομεν εἰς περιοχὴν ἐκείνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ φαμέν, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν διεξόδῳ οὖσαν ἀιδίῳ; ἢ ὅτι τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἐστιν αἰὼν οὐ συμπαραθέων οὐδὲ συμπαρατείνων αὐτῇ. πρώτη οὖν αὕτη εἰς χρόνον καὶ χρόνον ἐγέννησε καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὑτῆς ἔχει.
Why, then, do we bring this motion of the All within the embrace of that motion and say it is in time, but not the motion of soul too, which within itself is an everlasting progression? Because what is before it is eternity, which does not run along with it or stretch out alongside it. This motion, then, was the first to go into time; it generated time, and has it along with its activity.
πῶς οὖν πανταχοῦ; ὅτι κἀκείνη οὐδενὸς ἀφέστηκε τοῦ κόσμου μέρους, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐδενὸς ἡμῶν μέρους. εἰ δέ τις ἐν οὐχ ὑποστάσει ἢ ἐν οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸν χρόνον λέγοι, δηλονότι ψεύσεται καὶ τὸν θεὸν αὐτόν, ὅταν λέγῃ ἦν καὶ ἔσται· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἦν, ὡς τὸ ἐν ᾧ λέγει αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἄλλος τρόπος λόγων. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἅπασι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὡς, ὅταν τις τὸν κινούμενον ἄνθρωπον λαμβάνῃ ὅσον προελήλυθε, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν λαμβάνει ὅση, καὶ ὅταν τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον τὴν διὰ σκελῶν, ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς κινήσεως ταύτης ἐν αὐτῷ κίνημα ὅτι τοσοῦτον ἦν, εἴ γε ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον συνεῖχε τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σώματος.
How, then, is time everywhere? Because that soul too is absent from no part of the cosmos, just as the soul in us is absent from no part of us. And if someone says that time has no real existence or reality, he will clearly be accusing the god himself of lying when he says “was” and “will be”; for these will be, and were, only in the way that the thing in which he says it will be exists. But people like that need a different kind of argument. What we must bear in mind, in addition to everything said so far, is this. When someone takes a man in motion and sees how far he has gone, he also takes how much motion there was; and when he sees the motion—the motion of the legs, say—he sees too that the movement within the man prior to this motion was of the same amount, if it kept the body’s motion going for that long.
τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα τὸ κινούμενον τὸν τοσόνδε χρόνον ἀνάξει ἐπὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν τοσήνδε· αὕτη γὰρ αἰτία· καὶ τὸν χρόνον ταύτης, ταύτην δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν, ἥτις τὰ ἴσα διειστήκει. τὴν οὖν κίνησιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τί; εἰς ὃ γὰρ ἐθελήσει, ἀδιάστατον ἤδη. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα· αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐν ᾧ· οὐ γὰρ ἕξει. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς ὡσαύτως. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν [ὁ] χρόνος; ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πάσῃ καὶ ὁμοειδῶς ἐν πᾶσι καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι μία. διὸ οὐ διασπασθήσεται ὁ χρόνος· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ὁ αἰὼν ὁ κατ’ ἄλλο ἐν τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι πᾶσιν.
The body, then, moving for so much time, will lead you back to the motion of this amount—for that is the cause—and to its time; and this motion will lead you back to the motion of the soul, which spread itself out over equal stretches. And the motion of the soul, to what will you lead it back? To whatever you choose: that will already be without extension. This, then, is what is primary, that in which the other things are; but it itself is no longer in something, for it will have nothing to be in. And it is the same with the Soul of the All. Is time in us too, then? It is in every soul of this kind, in the same form in all, and all souls are one. That is why time will not be torn apart; just as eternity is not either, which in another way is in all the beings of the same form.