Ἆρ’ ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ θεῶν εἴ τί ἐστιν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ζητεῖν, ἢ ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδυναμίαις τε καὶ ἀμφισβητησίμοις δυνάμεσι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν πρέποι ζητεῖν, θεοῖς δὲ τὰ πάντα δύνασθαι ἐπιτρεπτέον, καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τί, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα εἶναι; ἢ τὴν δύναμιν δὴ πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὴ πάντα ἑνὶ ἐπιτρεπτέον, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δ’ ἐκείνως ἔχειν, καί τισιν ἑκατέρως; ἢ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ζητητέον, τολμητέον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῦ ἄνω ὑπὲρ πάντα ζητεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον, πῶς τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, κἂν πάντα συγχωρῶμεν δύνασθαι. καίτοι καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦτο σκεπτέον πῶς ποτε λέγεται, μήποτε οὕτως τὸ μὲν δύναμιν, τὸ δ’ ἐνέργειαν φήσομεν, καὶ ἐνέργειαν μέλλουσαν.
Can one ask, even in the case of gods, whether anything is up to them? Or is it fitting to ask such a thing only amid human incapacities and disputable powers, while to gods we must grant that they can do everything, and that not just something but everything is up to them? Or must we grant all power, and having everything up to it, to one alone, while for the others some things are one way, some the other, and for some both ways? Or must we ask about these things too, and also dare to ask such a thing about the first principles and about what is above, beyond all things: how is anything up to it, even if we agree that it can do everything? And yet this “can” must also be examined—how is it meant?—in case in this way we end up calling one thing power and another activity, and activity yet to come.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀναβλητέον, πρότερον δὲ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐφ’ ὧν καὶ ζητεῖν ἔθος, εἴ τι ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὂν τυγχάνει. πρῶτον [οὖν] ζητητέον τί ποτε δεῖ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναί τι λέγειν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τίς ἔννοια τοῦ τοιούτου· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πως γνωσθείη, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ θεὸν ἁρμόζει μεταφέρειν ἢ οὐ μετενεκτέον ἢ μετενεκτέον μέν, ζητητέον δέ, πῶς τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων. τί τοίνυν νοοῦντες τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν λέγομεν καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦντες;
But these questions must be postponed for the present. First we must ask about ourselves, where it is customary to ask, whether anything is in fact up to us. First [then] we must ask what we ought to mean by saying that something is up to us—that is, what the notion of such a thing is. For in this way we might somehow come to know whether it is fitting to transfer it to gods, and still more to god, or whether it should not be transferred; or whether it should be transferred, but we must ask how “up to them” applies both to the others and to the first principles. What, then, do we have in mind when we say “up to us,” and why are we asking?
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἐν ταῖς ἐναντίαις κινούμενοι τύχαις τε καὶ ἀνάγκαις καὶ παθῶν ἰσχυραῖς προσβολαῖς τὴν ψυχὴν κατεχούσαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα κύρια νομίσαντες εἶναι καὶ δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς καὶ φερόμενοι ᾗ ἐκεῖνα ἄγει, μή ποτε οὐδέν ἐσμεν οὐδέ τί ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἠπορήσαμεν, ὡς τούτου ἐσομένου ἂν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ὃ μὴ τύχαις δουλεύοντες μηδὲ ἀνάγκαις μηδὲ πάθεσιν ἰσχυροῖς πράξαιμεν ἂν βουληθέντες οὐδενὸς ἐναντιουμένου ταῖς βουλήσεσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, εἴη ἂν ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ὃ τῇ βουλήσει δουλεύει καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον ἂν γένοιτο ἢ μή, παρ’ ὅσον βουληθείημεν ἄν.
I think it is this. Tossed about among opposing fortunes and necessities and violent assaults of passions that grip the soul, regarding all these things as in control, enslaved to them and carried wherever they lead, we became puzzled whether we are nothing and nothing is up to us—on the assumption that what would be up to us is whatever we would do by willing it, not enslaved to fortunes or necessities or violent passions, with nothing opposing our wishes. If so, the notion of “up to us” would be: what is subservient to our will, and would happen or not happen to the extent that we willed it.
ἑκούσιον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ μὴ βίᾳ μετὰ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δέ, ὃ καὶ κύριοι πρᾶξαι· καὶ συνθέοι μὲν ἂν πολλαχοῦ ἄμφω καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν ἑτέρου ὄντος, ἔστι δ’ οὗ καὶ διαφωνήσειεν ἄν· οἷον εἰ κύριος ἦν τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἦν ἂν οὐχ ἑκούσιον αὐτῷ πεπραχότι, εἰ τὸν πατέρα ἠγνόει τοῦτον εἶναι· τάχα δ’ ἂν κἀκεῖνο διαφωνοῖ ἔχοντι τὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τὴν εἴδησιν ἐν τῷ ἑκουσίῳ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως. διὰ τί γάρ, εἰ μὲν ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτι φίλιος, ἀκούσιον, εἰ δὲ ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτι μὴ δεῖ, οὐκ ἀκούσιον; εἰ δ’ ὅτι ἔδει μανθάνειν, οὐχ ἑκούσιον τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἔδει μανθάνειν, ἢ τὸ ἀπάγον ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν.
For everything is voluntary that is done without force and with knowledge, and “up to us” is what we are also in control of doing. The two would coincide in many cases, though their definitions are different; but there are cases where they would diverge. For instance, if someone were in control of killing, it would not be voluntary for him when he did it, if he did not know that this man was his father; and perhaps that would also be at odds with his having it up to himself. So the knowledge in the voluntary must be not only of the particulars but also in general. For why is it involuntary if he does not know that the man is one of his own, but not involuntary if he does not know that he ought not to do it? And if it is because he ought to have learned, then not knowing that he ought to have learned is not voluntary either, nor is what draws him away from learning.
ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχον τίνι δεῖ διδόναι; ἢ γὰρ τῇ ὁρμῇ καὶ ᾑτινιοῦν ὀρέξει, οἷον ὃ θυμῷ πράττεται ἢ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ λογισμῷ τοῦ συμφέροντος μετ’ ὀρέξεως, ἢ μὴ πράττεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, καὶ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τι εἶναι δώσομεν καὶ μαινομένοις καὶ ἐξεστηκόσι καὶ φαρμάκοις ἁλοῦσι καὶ ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις, ὧν οὐ κύριοι· εἰ δὲ λογισμῷ μετ’ ὀρέξεως, ἆρα καὶ πεπλανημένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ; ἢ τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ ὀρέξει. καίτοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερα ὁ λογισμὸς τὴν ὄρεξιν ἐκίνησεν, ἢ τοῦτον ἡ ὄρεξις.
But we must ask this: this “up to us” that is referred to us—to what should we assign it? To impulse and to desire of any kind—for example, what is done, or not done, out of spirit or appetite, or out of calculation of advantage combined with desire? But if to spirit and appetite, we shall grant that something is up to them to children and wild animals, to the mad and the deranged, to those under the power of drugs and of the imaginations that come over them, which they do not control. And if to reasoning combined with desire, then even to reasoning that has gone astray? Or rather, to right reasoning and right desire. And yet here too one might ask whether reasoning moved desire, or desire reasoning.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ φύσιν αἱ ὀρέξεις, εἰ μὲν ὡς ζῴου καὶ τοῦ συνθέτου, ἠκολούθησεν ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ· εἰ δὲ ὡς ψυχῆς μόνης, πολλὰ τῶν νῦν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν λεγομένων ἔξω ἂν τούτου γένοιτο. εἶτα καί τις λογισμὸς ψιλὸς πρόεισι τῶν παθημάτων ἥ τε φαντασία ἀναγκάζουσα ἥ τε ὄρεξις ἐφ’ ὅ τι ἂν ἄγῃ ἕλκουσα πῶς ἐν τούτοις κυρίους ποιεῖ; πῶς δ’ ὅλως κύριοι, οὗ ἀγόμεθα; τὸ γὰρ ἐνδεὲς ἐξ ἀνάγκης πληρώσεως ὀρεγόμενον οὐκ ἔστι κύριον τοῦ ἐφ’ ὃ παντελῶς ἄγεται.
For if desires are natural, then if they belong to the living being, the compound, the soul has followed the necessity of nature; and if to soul alone, many of the things now said to be up to us would fall outside this. Then again, what bare reasoning goes ahead of the affections? And imagination compelling, and desire dragging us toward whatever it leads to—how do these make us in control in such matters? How are we in control at all, where we are led? For what is in need, and of necessity desires to be filled, is not in control of what it is wholly led toward.
πῶς δ’ ὅλως αὐτό τι παρ’ αὑτοῦ, ὃ παρ’ ἄλλου καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰς ἄλλο ἔχει κἀκεῖθεν γεγένηται οἷόν ἐστι; κατ’ ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ζῇ καὶ ὡς πέπλασται· ἢ οὕτω γε καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα ἕξει τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τι εἰληφέναι· ποιεῖ γὰρ ὡς γεγένηται καὶ τὸ πῦρ. εἰ δ’ ὅτι γινώσκει καὶ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὃ ποιεῖ, εἰ μὲν αἰσθήσει, τίς ἡ προσθήκη πρὸς τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις πεποίηκε τοῦ ἔργου κύριον ἰδοῦσα μόνον· εἰ δὲ γνώσει, εἰ μὲν γνώσει τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἶδε μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἄγει.
And how, in general, can something be its own, from itself, when it comes from another, has its origin in another, and has come to be from there such as it is? For it lives according to that, and as it has been shaped. Or rather, on these terms even soulless things will have received something that is up to them: for fire too acts as it came to be. But if it is because the living being and the soul know what they are doing: if they know it by perception, what does this add toward its being up to them? Perception does not make one master of the deed; it only sees. If by knowledge, and knowledge of what is being done, here too it only knows, and something else leads to the action.
εἰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ ἢ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ κρατεῖ, εἰς τί ἀναφέρει ζητητέον, καὶ ὅλως ποῦ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄλλην ὄρεξιν ποιεῖ, πῶς ληπτέον· εἰ δὲ τὴν ὄρεξιν παύσας ἔστη καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἐν πράξει τοῦτο ἔσται, ἀλλ’ ἐν νῷ στήσεται τοῦτο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν πράξει πᾶν, κἂν κρατῇ ὁ λόγος, μικτὸν καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν δύναται τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔχειν.
But if reason or knowledge acts even against desire, and prevails, we must ask what it refers this back to, and, in general, where this happens. If reason itself produces another desire, we must ask how to take this. But if it stops the desire and comes to rest, and this is where what is up to us lies, then this will not be in action. It will come to rest in intellect. For everything in action, even when reason prevails, is mixed, and cannot have what is up to us in a pure form.
Freedom and intellect
What is up to us lies in intellect and in virtue, not in outward action.
διὸ σκεπτέον περὶ τούτων· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐγγὺς γινοίμεθα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ θεῶν. ἀναγαγόντες τοίνυν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἰς βούλησιν, εἶτα ταύτην ἐν λόγῳ θέμενοι, εἶτα ἐν λόγῳ ὀρθῷ — ἴσως δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι τῷ ὀρθῷ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· οὐ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐδόξασεν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἔπραξεν, ἔχοι ἂν ἴσως ἀναμφισβήτητον τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, εἰ μὴ εἰδὼς διότι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἢ φαντασίᾳ τινὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον ἀχθείς· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι λέγοντες τοὺς κατ’ αὐτὴν δρῶντας πῶς ἂν εἰς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τάξαιμεν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν φαντασίαν, ἣν ἄν τις καὶ φαντασίαν κυρίως εἴποι, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῶν παθημάτων ἐγειρομένην — καὶ γὰρ κενώσεις σίτων καὶ ποτῶν φαντασίας οἷον ἀναπλάττουσι καὶ πληρώσεις.
That is why we must examine these questions; for now we may be coming close to the account of the gods. We have, then, traced what is up to us back to will, then placed will in reason, then in right reason. Perhaps we should add knowledge to “right.” For if someone has held a right opinion and acted on it, he would perhaps not have an undisputed claim to self-determination if he does not know why it is right, but was led to what he should do by chance or by some imagination. Since we say that imagination is not up to us, how could we class those who act by it as self-determining? But we, for our part—as for imagination, what one might call imagination in the strict sense, the kind aroused by the affections of the body: for being empty of food and drink molds images, as it were, and so does being full.
αὖ καὶ μεστός τις σπέρματος ἄλλα φαντάζεται καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστας ποιότητας ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν σώματι — τοὺς κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας ἐνεργοῦντας εἰς ἀρχὴν αὐτεξούσιον οὐ τάξομεν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις κατὰ ταύτας πράττουσι τὰ πολλὰ οὔτε τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς οὔτε τὸ ἑκούσιον δώσομεν, τῷ δὲ διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐλευθέρῳ τῶν παθημάτων τοῦ σώματος τὸ αὐτεξούσιον δώσομεν — εἰς ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καλλίστην ἀνάγοντες τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὰς ἐντεῦθεν προτάσεις ἐλευθέρας ὄντως δώσομεν καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐγειρομένας οὐκ ἀκουσίους εἶναι δώσομεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τοῦτον ζῶσι τὸν τρόπον, ὅσοι νῷ καὶ ὀρέξει τῇ κατὰ νοῦν ζῶσι, φήσομεν παρεῖναι.
Again, someone full of semen imagines other things, and so on according to the various qualities of the fluids in the body—those who act according to such images we shall not place under a self-determining principle. That is why we shall grant to bad people, who do most things by these, neither that their acts are up to them nor that they are voluntary. But to the one who, through intellect, is free in his activities from the affections of the body, we shall grant self-determination. Tracing what is up to us back to the finest principle, the activity of intellect, we shall grant that the premises that come from there are truly free; we shall grant that the desires aroused by thinking are not involuntary; and we shall say that it belongs to the gods who live in this way, those who live by intellect and by the desire that accords with intellect.
καίτοι ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, πῶς ποτε τὸ κατ’ ὄρεξιν γιγνόμενον αὐτεξούσιον ἔσται τῆς ὀρέξεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἔξω ἀγούσης καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐχούσης· ἄγεται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον, κἂν εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄγοιτο. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπορητέον, εἰ ὅπερ πέφυκε καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν ἐνεργῶν λέγοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἔχειν καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν· ἔπειτα, εἰ ὅλως κυρίως λέγοιτο ἐπ’ ἐκείνων τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, οἷς πρᾶξις οὐ πάρεστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς πρᾶξις, ἡ ἀνάγκη ἔξωθεν· οὐ γὰρ μάτην πράξουσιν. ἀλλ’ οὖν πῶς τὸ ἐλεύθερον δουλευόντων καὶ τούτων τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει; ἤ, εἰ μὴ ἑτέρῳ ἕπεσθαι ἠνάγκασται, πῶς ἂν τὸ δουλεύειν λέγοιτο;
Yet someone might ask how what comes about by desire can ever be self-determined, when desire leads outward and implies lack. For what desires is led, even if it is led toward the good. And about Intellect itself we must raise the difficulty whether, acting as is its nature and in the way that is its nature, it could be said to have freedom and to have something up to it, when it does not have it in its power not to act. Next, whether “up to them” can properly be said at all of those beings that have no action. Yet even for those that do have action, the necessity comes from outside: they will not act for nothing. But then how is there freedom, when these too are slaves to their own nature? Or rather, if a thing is not compelled to follow another, how could it be called a slave?
πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν τι φερόμενον ἠναγκασμένον ἂν εἴη ἑκουσίου τῆς ἐφέσεως οὔσης, εἰ εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐπ’ ἀγαθὸν ἴοι; τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἀπαγωγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἠναγκασμένον, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο φέροιτο, ὃ μὴ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ δουλεύει τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ κύριόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρου κρείττονος ἐφεστηκότος ἀπάγεται τῶν αὑτοῦ ἀγαθῶν δουλεῦον ἐκείνῳ. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ δουλεία ψέγεται οὐχ οὗ τις οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὗ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγόμενος πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἄλλου.
And how could something carried toward the good be under compulsion, when its striving is voluntary, if it goes to the good knowing that it is good? For the involuntary is being led away from the good and toward what is compelled, if a thing is carried toward what is not good for it. And that is a slave which is not in control of going to the good, but, with something else stronger set over it, is led away from its own goods, serving that other. This is why slavery is condemned: not where someone has no power to go to evil, but where, instead of going to his own good, he is led to the good of another.
τὸ δὲ καὶ δουλεύειν λέγειν τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει δύο ποιοῦντός ἐστι τό τε δουλεῦον καὶ τὸ ᾧ. φύσις δὲ ἁπλῆ καὶ ἐνέργεια μία καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ δυνάμει ἔχουσα ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, πῶς οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς πέφυκε λέγοιτο ἂν ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλης οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας, τῆς δὲ ἐνεργείας ἄλλης, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. εἰ οὖν οὔτε δι’ ἕτερον οὔτε ἐφ’ ἑτέρῳ, πῶς οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἁρμόσει, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ οὕτως ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ὅτι μὴ ἐφ’ ἑτέρῳ μηδ’ ἄλλο τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴπερ ἀρχή. καὶ εἰ ἄλλην δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔξω αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ.
To speak of being a slave to one’s own nature is to make two things: the one that serves, and the one it serves. But a nature that is simple, a single activity, not having one thing as potential and another as actual—how is it not free? Nor could it be said to act “as is its nature,” as though its being were one thing and its activity another, since There being and acting are the same. If, then, it acts neither because of another nor at another’s disposal, how is it not free? And if “up to itself” does not fit, here we have something greater than “up to itself.” It is up to itself in this sense: it is not at another’s disposal, nor is anything else master of its activity—nor of its being either, since it is a principle. And even if Intellect has another principle, that principle is not outside it, but in the Good.
καὶ εἰ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον [τὸ] ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τις ζητεῖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ χάριν. εἰ οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνεργεῖ, μᾶλλον ἂν τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ· ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμώμενον καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, εἴπερ πρὸς αὐτό, ὃ ἄμεινον ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ.
And if it is in accordance with that Good, it has what is up to it and freedom far more; for one seeks freedom and what is up to oneself for the sake of the good. If, then, it acts in accordance with the Good, it would have more of what is up to it: for it already has the movement toward the Good starting from itself and remaining in itself, since it is directed toward the Good—and that would be better for it.
ἆρ’ οὖν ἐν νῷ μόνῳ νοοῦντι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν νῷ τῷ καθαρῷ ἢ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργούσῃ καὶ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πραττούσῃ; τὸ μὲν οὖν πραττούσῃ εἴπερ δώσομεν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πρὸς τὴν τεῦξιν ἴσως χρὴ διδόναι· οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ τυχεῖν κύριοι. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ, τάχα μὲν ἂν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο· ἐκεῖνο δὲ πῶς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν; οἷον εἰ, διότι πόλεμος, ἀνδριζοίμεθα. λέγω δὲ τὴν τότε ἐνέργειαν πῶς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ὁπότε πολέμου μὴ καταλαβόντος οὐκ ἦν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην ποιήσασθαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων τῶν κατὰ ἀρετὴν ἁπασῶν πρὸς τὸ πῖπτον ἀεὶ ἀναγκαζομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς τοδὶ ἢ τοδὶ ἐργάζεσθαι.
Is self-determination, then, and what is up to oneself, found only in intellect when it thinks, in pure intellect? Or also in soul when it is active according to intellect and acts according to virtue? If we are to grant it to soul in action, first we should perhaps not grant it with respect to success: we are not masters of attaining. If it is with respect to acting finely and doing everything that depends on oneself, that might perhaps be rightly said. But how is that up to us? For instance, if we are brave because there is a war. I mean: how is the activity at that moment up to us, when, if war had not come upon us, it would not have been possible to perform that activity? And likewise with all the other actions done according to virtue, since virtue is always compelled to do this or that in response to whatever befalls.
καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις αἵρεσιν αὐτῇ δοίη τῇ ἀρετῇ, πότερα βούλεται, ἵν’ ἔχῃ ἐνεργεῖν, εἶναι πολέμους, ἵνα ἀνδρίζοιτο, καὶ εἶναι ἀδικίαν, ἵνα τὰ δίκαια ὁρίζῃ καὶ κατακοσμῇ, καὶ πενίαν, ἵνα τὸ ἐλευθέριον ἐνδεικνύοιτο, ἢ πάντων εὖ ἐχόντων ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, ἕλοιτο ἂν τὴν ἡσυχίαν τῶν πράξεων οὐδενὸς θεραπείας δεομένου τῆς παρ’ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἵ τις ἰατρός, οἷον Ἱπποκράτης, μηδένα δεῖσθαι τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῦ τέχνης.
For suppose someone offered virtue itself a choice: whether it wanted, in order to have something to do, that there be wars, so that it could be brave, and injustice, so that it could define and set in order what is just, and poverty, so that it could display generosity—or rather to be at rest, with everything going well. It would choose rest from actions, with no one needing its care—just as a doctor, Hippocrates for instance, would choose that no one needed his art.
εἰ οὖν ἐνεργοῦσα ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἠνάγκασται βοηθεῖν, πῶς ἂν καθαρῶς ἔχοι τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ; ἆρ’ οὖν τὰς πράξεις μὲν ἀναγκαίας, τὴν δὲ βούλησιν τὴν πρὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἠναγκασμένον φήσομεν; ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἐν ψιλῷ τιθέμενοι τῷ πρὸ τοῦ πραττομένου ἔξω τῆς πράξεως τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρετῇ θήσομεν. τί δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν; ἆρ’ οὐ κακῶς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης φήσομεν αὐτὴν εἰς κατακόσμησιν ἐλθεῖν συμμετρουμένην τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις; τίνα οὖν τρόπον λέγομεν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον τὴν ἀρετήν;
If, then, virtue, when it is active in actions, is compelled to give help, how could it have what is up to it in a pure form? Shall we say, then, that the actions are necessary, but the will that precedes the actions, and the reasoning, are not compelled? But if so, by placing it in the bare stage before what is done, we shall place self-determination, and what is up to virtue itself, outside action. And what about virtue as a state and a disposition? Shall we not say that it came to set the soul in order when the soul was in a bad condition, bringing its affections and desires into due measure? In what way, then, do we say that being good is up to us, and that “virtue has no master”?
ἢ τοῖς γε βουληθεῖσι καὶ ἑλομένοις· ἢ ὅτι ἐγγενομένη αὕτη κατασκευάζει τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ ἔτι δούλους εἶναι, ὧν πρότερον ἦμεν. εἰ οὖν οἷον νοῦς τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἕξις οἷον νοωθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ποιοῦσα, πάλιν αὖ ἥκει οὐκ ἐν πράξει τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν νῷ ἡσύχῳ τῶν πράξεων.
Or rather: it is up to those who have willed and chosen it. Or: because virtue, once it has come to be in us, establishes freedom and what is up to us, and no longer lets us be slaves to the things we were slaves to before. If, then, virtue is, as it were, a second intellect, a state that makes the soul, so to speak, become intellect, then again it turns out that what is up to us lies not in action, but in intellect at rest from actions.
πῶς οὖν εἰς βούλησιν πρότερον ἀνήγομεν τοῦτο λέγοντες ‘ὃ παρὰ τὸ βουληθῆναι γένοιτο ἄν’; ἢ κἀκεῖ ἐλέγετο ‘ἢ μὴ γένοιτο’. εἰ οὖν τά τε νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεται, ἐκεῖνά τε τούτοις συμφώνως ἕξει, φήσομεν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κύρια εἶναι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα χρῆναι ἀνάγειν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον· ἀδέσποτα δὲ ὄντα ταῦτα τὸν μὲν ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν βούλεσθαι μὲν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς εἶναι ἐφεστῶσαν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι ἀγαθήν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου αὐτήν τε ἐλευθέραν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλευθέραν παρασχέσθαι·
How, then, did we earlier trace this back to will, when we said “what would come about through our willing it”? Or rather, there too it was said “or would not come about.” If, then, what we are saying now is right, and what we said then agrees with it, we shall say that virtue and intellect are sovereign, and that what is up to us and freedom must be traced back to them. Since these have no master, intellect is its own; and virtue wants to be its own, presiding over the soul so that the soul may be good, and to this extent to be free itself and to make the soul free;
προσπιπτόντων δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων παθημάτων τε καὶ πράξεων ἐφεστῶσαν ταῦτα μὲν μὴ βεβουλεῦσθαι γενέσθαι, ὅμως γε μὴν καὶ ἐν τούτοις διασώσειν τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτῇ εἰς αὑτὴν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναφέρουσαν· οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφέψεσθαι, οἷον σώζουσαν τὸν κινδυνεύοντα, ἀλλ’ εἰ δοκοῖ αὐτῇ, καὶ προιεμένην τοῦτον καὶ τὸ ζῆν κελεύουσαν προίεσθαι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τέκνα καὶ αὐτὴν [τὴν] πατρίδα, σκοπὸν τὸ καλὸν αὑτῆς ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτήν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράττειν ἀνάγεσθαι οὐδ’ εἰς τὴν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν ἐντὸς ἐνέργειαν καὶ νόησιν καὶ θεωρίαν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς.
but when necessary affections and actions befall it, it presides over them without having willed that they happen, and yet even in these it will preserve what is up to it, by referring this, here too, back to itself. For it will not follow events—saving the man in danger, say—but, if it sees fit, it will even give him up, and command that one give up life, and money, and children, and one’s very country, keeping its own beauty as its aim, not the existence of what is below it. So self-determination in actions, and what is up to us, is traced back not to the doing, nor to the outer activity, but to the inner activity: the thinking and contemplation of virtue itself.
δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην νοῦν τινα λέγειν εἶναι οὐ συναριθμοῦντα τὰ πάθη τὰ δουλωθέντα ἢ μετρηθέντα τῷ λόγῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔοικέ, φησιν, ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ σώματος ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι κατορθωθέντα· ὥστε εἶναι σαφέστερον, ὡς τὸ ἄυλόν ἐστι τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἀναγωγὴ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ βούλησις ἡ κυρία καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς οὖσα, καὶ εἴ τι ἐπιτάξειε πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὅσα οὖν ἐκ ταύτης καὶ διὰ ταύτην, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἔξω τε καὶ ἐφ’ αὑτῆς, ὃ αὐτὴ βούλεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἀνεμποδίστως, τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.
We must say that this virtue is a kind of intellect, not counting in the affections that have been enslaved or measured by reason. For these, he says, seem to verge somewhat on the body, being set right by habits and exercises. So it becomes clearer that the immaterial is what is free; that what is up to us is to be traced back to this; and that this is the will that is sovereign and its own, even if it of necessity gives some command concerning external things. Whatever, then, comes from this will and happens because of it is up to us, both outside and in itself: what it itself wills and does without hindrance, that is primarily up to us.
ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς καὶ πρῶτος οὕτω τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτῷ, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ μηδαμῶς ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἐπέστραπται πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ κείμενος ἀνενδεὴς καὶ πλήρης ὑπάρχων καὶ οἷον κατὰ βούλησιν ζῶν· ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις, βούλησις δ’ ἐλέχθη, ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν· καὶ γὰρ [ἡ] λεγομένη βούλησις τὸ κατὰ νοῦν μιμεῖται. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις θέλει τὸ ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ νοεῖν ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ἔχει οὖν ἐκεῖνος, ὅπερ ἡ βούλησις θέλει καὶ οὗ τυχοῦσα ἂν ταύτῃ νόησις γίνεται. εἰ οὖν [ἐν] βουλήσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐτίθεμεν τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὸ ἤδη ἐν ᾧ θέλει ἡ βούλησις εἶναι ἱδρυμένον πῶς οὐ τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτῷ ἔχει;
But the contemplative, first Intellect has what is up to itself in this sense: its work is in no way at another’s disposal; it is wholly turned back toward itself, and its work is itself; it rests in the Good, without need and full, living, as it were, according to will. And the will is the thinking. It was called will because it accords with intellect; for what is called will imitates what accords with intellect. Will wants the good, and thinking truly is in the Good. So Intellect has what will wants, that by attaining which will becomes thinking. If, then, we placed what is up to us in the will for the good, how can what is already settled in that where will wants to be not have what is up to itself?
ἢ μεῖζον εἶναι θετέον, εἰ μή τις ἐθέλοι εἰς τοῦτο ἀναβαίνειν, τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτῷ.
Or rather, if one is unwilling to raise “up to itself” this high, we must posit that what it has is greater.
γίνεται οὖν ψυχὴ μὲν ἐλευθέρα διὰ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδουσα ἀνεμποδίστως, καὶ ὃ διὰ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἐφ’ αὑτῇ· νοῦς δὲ δι’ αὑτόν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ δι’ ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἔχει τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτοῖς, ὅταν τὸ μὲν τυγχάνειν ἀνεμποδίστως δύνηται, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν. πῶς δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ κύριον ἁπάντων τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸ τιμίων καὶ ἐν πρώτῃ ἕδρᾳ ὄν, πρὸς ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἀναβαίνειν θέλει καὶ ἐξήρτηται αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔχει παρ’ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε δύνασθαι τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἔχειν, πῶς ἄν τις εἰς τὸ ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐπὶ σοὶ ἄγοι;
Soul, then, becomes free when it presses on toward the Good through intellect without hindrance, and what it does because of this is up to it; Intellect is free through itself; and the nature of the Good is the very object of desire, that because of which the other things have what is up to them, when the one can attain it without hindrance and the other can possess it. How, then, could anyone bring that very thing—which is master of all the honored things after it, which sits in the first seat, toward which the others want to ascend, on which they depend and from which they have their powers, so that they can have what is up to them—how could anyone bring this down to “up to me” or “up to you”?
The bold argument
An objector says the First just happened to be as it is; Plotinus answers.
ὅπου καὶ νοῦς μόλις, ὅμως δὲ βίᾳ εἵλκετο· εἰ μή τις τολμηρὸς λόγος ἑτέρωθεν σταλεὶς λέγοι, ὡς τυχοῦσα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ οὐκ οὖσα κυρία τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν οὖσα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστιν οὐ παρ’ αὑτῆς οὔτε τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἂν ἔχοι, οὔτε τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ ποιοῦσα ἢ μὴ ποιοῦσα, ὃ ἠνάγκασται ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν· ὃς δὴ λόγος ἀντίτυπός τε καὶ ἄπορος καὶ παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἑκουσίου τε καὶ αὐτεξουσίου φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἴη ἂν ἀναιρῶν, ὡς μάτην εἶναι ταῦτα λεγόμενα καὶ φωνὰς πραγμάτων ἀνυποστάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον μηδὲν ἐπὶ μηδενὶ εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οὐδὲ συνιέναι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ λέγειν ταύτην τὴν φωνήν.
Even Intellect was drawn there only with difficulty, and by force. Unless some bold argument, launched from another quarter, should say this: since it happens to be the way it is, and is not master of what it is, being what it is not from itself, it would have neither freedom nor what is up to it, doing or not doing what it is compelled to do or not do. Such an argument would be obstinate and intractable, and would utterly abolish the nature of the voluntary and of self-determination, and the very notion of what is up to us, so that these would be empty words, sounds for things that do not exist. For its proponent would have to say not only that nothing is up to anyone, but that he does not even think or understand this word.
εἰ δὲ ὁμολογεῖ συνιέναι, ἤδη ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐλέγχοιτο τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐφαρμοζομένης οἷς ἐφαρμόττειν οὐκ ἔφη. ἡ γὰρ ἔννοια τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ οὐδὲ ἐκείνην προσπαραλαμβάνει — ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἑαυτό τι ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ὑπόστασίν ἄγειν — ἀλλὰ ἐθέλει θεωρεῖν ἡ ἐπίνοια, τί τῶν ὄντων δοῦλον ἑτέρων, καὶ τί ἔχει τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τί μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον, ὃ καθαρῶς τοῖς ἀιδίοις ὑπάρχει καθ’ ὅ εἰσιν ἀίδιοι καὶ τοῖς ἀκωλύτως τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκουσιν ἢ ἔχουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος οἷον ἄλλο παρ’ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν ἄτοπον.
But if he agrees that he understands it, he could easily be refuted, since the notion of what is up to us fits the very things he said it did not fit. For the notion does not concern itself with the being of the thing, nor take that into account—it is impossible for anything to make itself and bring itself into existence. What the concept wants to consider is which of the things that are is a slave to others, which has self-determination, which is not under another but is itself master of its activity. This belongs purely to eternal beings, insofar as they are eternal, and to those that pursue or possess the good without hindrance. Since the Good itself is above these, it is absurd to look for some other good, as it were, besides it.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τύχην λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕστερον καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἡ τύχη· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον οὔτε κατὰ τύχην ἂν λέγοιμεν, οὔτε οὐ κύριον τῆς αὐτοῦ γενέσεως, ὅτι μηδὲ γέγονε. τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὡς ἔχει ποιεῖ ἄτοπον, εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τότε εἶναι τὸ ἐλεύθερον, ὅταν παρὰ φύσιν ποιῇ ἢ ἐνεργῇ. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ τὸ μοναχὸν ἔχον ἀφῄρηται τῆς ἐξουσίας, εἰ τὸ μοναχὸν μὴ τῷ κωλύεσθαι παρ’ ἄλλου ἔχοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἀρέσκειν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ· ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ μάλιστα τυγχάνον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀφαιρήσεταί τις τὸ αὐτεξούσιον.
Nor is it right to say that it exists by chance: chance belongs among later things and among the many. We could not say that the First is by chance, nor that it is not master of its own coming-to-be, since it has not come to be at all. And the claim that it acts as it is, is absurd—if someone thinks freedom is present only when a thing acts or is active against its nature. Nor has what is only one way been stripped of power, if it is only one way not because it is hindered by another, but because it is just this, and, as it were, is pleasing to itself, and has nothing better than itself. Or rather, on this reasoning one will take self-determination away from what most attains the good.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἀτοπώτερον ἂν γίνοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀποστερεῖν τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ μένει οὐ δεόμενον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων κινουμένων πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ οὐδὲν δεόμενον οὐδενός. ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἡ οἷον ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ἡ οἷον ἐνέργεια ᾖ — οὐ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἕτερον, ἡ δ’ ἕτερόν ἐστιν, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦτο — οὔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἡ ἐνέργεια ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὸ εἶναι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ὡς πέφυκεν ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οἷον ζωὴ ἀνενεχθήσεται εἰς τὴν οἷον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ἡ οἷον οὐσία συνοῦσα καὶ οἷον συγγενομένη ἐξ ἀιδίου τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ποιεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐδενός.
If this is absurd, it would be more absurd still to deprive the Good itself of self-determination, because it is good and because it remains by itself, not needing to move toward something else, while the other things move toward it, and needing nothing at all. And when its existence, so to speak, is its activity, so to speak—for the one is not different from the other, since this is not so even with Intellect—then its activity is no more according to its being than its being according to its activity. So it does not have “acting as is its nature,” nor will its activity and its life, so to speak, be referred back to its being, so to speak. Rather, its being, as it were, being with its activity and, as it were, united with it from eternity, makes itself itself from both: its own, and no one else’s.
ἡμεῖς δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτεξουσίων ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὑτό· τὰ [δ’] ἐλάττω ἀπὸ τῶν ἐλαττόνων μεταφέροντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ τυχεῖν τῶν ἃ προσήκει λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴποιμεν. καίτοι οὐδὲν ἂν εὕροιμεν εἰπεῖν οὐχ ὅτι κατ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ κυρίως· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ ὕστερα. τούτων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀρχή· καίτοι ἄλλον τρόπον οὐκ ἀρχή. ἀποτιθεμένοις δὴ πάντα καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ὡς ὕστερον καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον· ἤδη γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο ἐνέργειαν λέγει, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεμποδίστως καὶ ὄντων ἄλλων τῶν εἰς ἃ ἀκωλύτως.
We, for our part, contemplate self-determination not as something incidental to it. Starting from the self-determinations found in other things, by taking away their opposites, we see it in itself, toward itself. Transferring lesser things from lesser beings, because we cannot attain what it would be fitting to say about it, these are the things we would say about it. And yet we could find nothing to say—not only nothing to say of it, but nothing to say even about it, properly speaking. For all things, even the beautiful and the venerable, come after it. It is their principle—and yet in another way it is not a principle. So we must set everything aside—including “up to itself,” as something later, and self-determination. For this already speaks of activity directed toward another: that it acts without hindrance, and that there are other things toward which it acts unimpeded.
δεῖ δὲ ὅλως πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν· ἔστι γὰρ ὅπερ ἔστι καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ἀφαιροῦμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα ὁπωσοῦν· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ὡς πέφυκεν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ λέγοιτο καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν λέγοιτο, ὥστε πρώτως ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔφυ· εἰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐν χρόνῳ ἡ φύσις, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ οὐ παρ’ αὐτῆς εἶναι λεκτέον· τό τε γὰρ εἶναι ἀφῃροῦμεν, τό τε οὐ παρ’ αὐτῆς λέγοιτο ἄν, ὅταν ὑπ’ ἄλλου. οὕτως οὖν συνέβη. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ συνέβη λεκτέον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλο· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς τὸ συνέβη, ὅταν τὰ μὲν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις συμβῇ. πῶς οὖν τὸ πρῶτον συνέβη;
We must say that it is in no relation to anything at all; for it is what it is even before them. We take away even “is,” and so also any relation whatever to the things that are. Nor, then, “as is its nature”: this too is later, and even if it is said of the things there, it would be said of those that come from another—so it would be said primarily of being, because being sprang by nature from that. And if “nature” belongs to things in time, it does not apply even to being. Nor, then, must we say “not being from itself”: we have taken away “being,” and “not from itself” would be said when something comes from another. So did it just happen this way? Or rather, we must not say “it happened” either: it did not happen to itself, nor in relation to another. “It happened” applies among many things, when some exist and something else happens in addition to them. How, then, could the First have “happened”?
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦλθεν, ἵνα ζητῇς ‘πῶς οὖν ἦλθε; τύχη τίς ἤγαγεν ἢ ὑπέστησεν αὐτό’; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τύχη πω ἦν οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτόματόν γε· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ παρ’ ἄλλου καὶ ἐν γινομένοις.
For it did not come, so that you could ask, “How did it come, then? What chance brought it, or gave it existence?” There was not yet any chance, nor spontaneity either: for spontaneity too comes from another, and is found among things that come to be.
ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἴ τις λαμβάνοι τὸ συνέβη, οὔτοι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὄνομα ἵστασθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅπως νοεῖ ὁ λέγων συνιέναι. τί οὖν νοεῖ; τοῦτο, ὅτι ταύτην ἔχον τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀρχή· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλην εἶχεν, ἦν ἂν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἦν, καὶ εἰ χεῖρον, ἐνήργησεν ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ οὐσίαν. πρὸς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λεκτέον, ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τε ἦν ἀρχὴν οὖσαν πάντων τὸ τυχὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι χεῖρον, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀγαθὸν μέν, ἀγαθὸν δ’ ἄλλως, οἷον ἐνδεέστερον. ἀλλὰ δεῖ κρείττονα εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν πάντων τῶν μετ’ αὐτήν· ὥστε ὡρισμένον τι.
But if someone takes “it happened” with reference to it, we must not stop at the word, but understand what the speaker means. What does he mean, then? This: that it is the principle having this nature and this power; and that if it had had a different one, it would be that which it was, and if a worse one, it would have acted according to its own being. To this sort of claim we must reply that what is the principle of all things could not be just anything—not worse, certainly, but not even good-but-good-in-another-way, less complete, say. The principle of all things must be better than everything after it; so it is something determinate.
λέγω δὲ ὡρισμένον, ὅτι μοναχῶς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀνάγκη· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἑπομένοις τῇ ἀρχῇ ἡ ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐδὲ αὕτη ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν βίαν· τὸ δὲ μοναχὸν τοῦτο παρ’ αὑτοῦ. τοῦτο οὖν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι· οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ’ ἔδει οὕτω· τὸ δ’ ἔδει τοῦτο ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει. τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἂν οὕτως εἴη, ὡς συνέβη· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅπερ ἐχρῆν.
By “determinate” I mean that it is uniquely so, and not by necessity: for there was no necessity. Necessity is found in what follows the principle, and even there it does not exert force; but this uniqueness is from itself. So it is this and nothing else, but what it had to be. It did not, then, just happen this way: it had to be this way, and this “had to” is the principle of all the things that had to be. This, then, would not be as it happened to be: for it is not what it chanced to be, but what it had to be—or rather, not even what it had to be.
ἀλλὰ ἀναμένειν δεῖ τὰ ἄλλα, τί ποτε αὐτοῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς φανείη, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἔστιν αὐτός, τοῦτο αὐτὸν θέσθαι οὐχ ὡς συνέβη φανέντα, ἀλλὰ ὄντως βασιλέα καὶ ὄντως ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὄντως, οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ἕπεσθαι ἄλλῳ· ἀλλ’ ὄντα ἕν, ὅπερ ἔστιν, ὥστε οὐ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο.
Rather, the other things must wait to see what the king will appear to them to be, and posit him as just what he is: not as having appeared as he happened to, but as truly king, truly principle, and truly the Good—not acting in accordance with the good, for then he would seem to follow another, but being one thing, what he is, so that he is not in accordance with that, but is that.
εἰ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ συνέβη — τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, εἴ τι συμβήσεται, συνέβη, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν συνέβη, οὐδὲ συνέκυρσε τὸ ὂν οὕτως εἶναι οὐδὲ παρ’ ἄλλου τὸ οὕτως εἶναι ὄν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ αὕτη ὄντος φύσις ὂν εἶναι — πῶς ἄν τις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τοῦτο ἐνθυμοῖτο τὸ οὕτω συνέβη, ᾧ ὑπάρχει γεγεννηκέναι τὸ ὄν, ὃ οὐχ οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, ὥς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία οὖσα ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς· ἐπεὶ οὕτως [ἄν] τις καὶ τὸν νοῦν εἴποι οὕτω συνέβη νοῦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι ἂν τὸν νοῦν ἐσόμενον ἢ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἐστὶ νοῦ. τὸ δὴ οὐ παρεκβεβηκὸς ἑαυτό, ἀλλ’ ἀκλινὲς ὂν ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτὸ ἄν τις κυριώτατα λέγοι εἶναι ὃ ἔστι.
If, then, “it happened” does not apply even to being—for if anything happens to being, it happened to being, but being itself did not happen, nor did being chance to be this way, nor does being have its being this way, as it is, from another; this is the nature of being, to be being—how could anyone think of “it happened this way” in the case of what is beyond being, to which it belongs to have generated being? Being did not happen this way: it is as being is, being what it is, and what Intellect is. For in this way someone might say of Intellect too that it happened to be Intellect, as if Intellect could be something other than this, which is the nature of Intellect. That which has not stepped out of itself, but is unswerving from itself, could most properly be said to be what it is.
τί ἂν οὖν τις λέγοι ἐκεῖ εἰς τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἀναβὰς καὶ εἰσιδών; ἆρά γε τὸ οὕτως, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα τὸ οὕτω, συνέβη; ἢ οὔτε τὸ οὕτω οὔτε τὸ ὁπωσοῦν συνέβη· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὅλως τὸ συνέβη, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὕτω μόνον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως, ἀλλ’ οὕτως. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ οὕτως· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁρίσας εἴης καὶ τόδε τι· ἀλλ’ ἔστι τῷ ἰδόντι οὐδὲ τὸ οὕτως εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ μὴ οὕτως· τὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴποις αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων, ἐφ’ ὧν τὸ οὕτως. ἄλλο τοίνυν παρ’ ἅπαντα τὸ οὕτως.
What, then, would someone say There, having gone up to what is above this and seen it? That it happened to be this way, since he saw it was this way? Or rather, neither “this way” nor “any way whatever” happened; there is no “it happened” at all, only “this way,” and “not otherwise, but this way.” But not even “this way”: for then you would be defining it and making it a “this.” For one who has seen, it is not possible to say even “this way,” nor again “not this way”: for you would be calling it one of the things that are, of which “this way” is said. It is, then, other than all that is “this way.”
ἀλλ’ ἀόριστον ἰδὼν πάντα μὲν ἕξεις εἰπεῖν τὰ μετ’ αὐτό, φήσεις δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκείνων εἶναι, ἀλλά, εἴπερ, δύναμιν πᾶσαν αὑτῆς ὄντως κυρίαν, τοῦτο οὖσαν ὃ θέλει, μᾶλλον δὲ ὃ θέλει ἀπορρίψασαν εἰς τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὴν δὲ μείζονα παντὸς τοῦ θέλειν οὖσαν τὸ θέλειν μετ’ αὐτὴν θεμένην. οὔτ’ οὖν αὐτὴ ἠθέλησε τὸ οὕτως, ἵνα ἂν εἵπετο, οὔτε ἄλλος πεποίηκεν οὕτως.
But if you see it as undefined, you will be able to name all the things after it, and you will say that it is none of them; but, if anything, that it is all power, truly master of itself, being what it wills—or rather, having cast what it wills down into the things that are, while it is itself greater than all willing and has placed willing after itself. So it did not itself will “this way,” in which case it would have been following, nor did another make it this way.
καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι χρὴ τὸν λέγοντα τὸ οὕτω συνέβη, πῶς ἂν ἀξιώσειε ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ συνέβη, εἴ τι εἴη. καὶ πῶς ἄν τις ἀφέλοι τὸ συνέβη; καὶ εἴ τις εἴη φύσις, τότε φήσει οὐκ ἐφαρμόζειν τὸ συνέβη· εἰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιροῦσαν τὸ οὕτω συνέβη ἀνατίθησι τύχῃ, ποῦ ποτε τὸ μὴ ἐκ τύχης εἶναι [ἂν] γένοιτο; ἀφαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ὡς ἔτυχεν αὕτη ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδος καὶ πέρας καὶ μορφὴν διδοῦσα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὕτω κατὰ λόγον γινομένοις τύχῃ ἀναθεῖναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ προηγουμένως καὶ μὴ ἀκολούθως, ἀλλὰ συμπτώμασιν, ἡ τύχη. τὴν δὴ ἀρχὴν παντὸς λόγου τε καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὅρου πῶς ἄν τις τὴν τούτου ὑπόστασιν ἀναθείη τύχῃ;
And then we must ask the one who says “it happened this way” how he would claim that “it happened” is false, if it ever is. And how could one remove “it happened”? If there were some nature, then he will say “it happened” does not apply. For if he ascribes to chance the very nature that removes “it happened this way” from the other things, where could not being from chance ever come about? But this principle of the other things does remove “as it chanced,” by giving them form and limit and shape; and in things that come about this way, according to reason, one cannot ascribe them to chance—the cause is this very thing. Chance is found in what comes about not by prior design, nor in due sequence, but by coincidence. How, then, could anyone ascribe to chance the existence of the principle of all reason, order and limit?
καὶ μὴν πολλῶν μὲν ἡ τύχη κυρία, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγου καὶ τάξεως εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ταῦτα οὐ κυρία, ὅπου τε καὶ ἐναντίον δοκεῖ λόγῳ εἶναι τύχη, πῶς ἂν γεννήτειρα αὐτοῦ γένοιτο; εἰ οὖν μὴ γεννᾷ νοῦν τύχη, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ οὐδὲ τὸ κρεῖττον νοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ εἶχεν ὅθεν γεννήσει, οὔτε ἦν τὸ παράπαν αὕτη οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ἀιδίοις.
Chance, certainly, is mistress of many things, but not of intellect, reason and order, so as to generate them. And when chance even seems to be the opposite of reason, how could it become its parent? If, then, chance does not generate intellect, neither does it generate what is before intellect and better than intellect. For it had nothing from which to generate it, nor did it exist at all, nor anywhere among eternal things.
εἰ οὖν μηδὲν πρὸ ἐκείνου, αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτος, στῆναι ἐνταῦθα δεῖ καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μετ’ αὐτὸ ζητεῖν πῶς ἐγένετο, αὐτὸ δὲ μηκέτι ὅπως, ὅτι ὄντως τοῦτο μὴ ἐγένετο. τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ ἐγένετο, ἔστι δὲ οἷός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας κύριος; καὶ εἰ μὴ οὐσίας δέ, ἀλλ’ ὢν ὃς ἔστιν, οὐχ ὑποστήσας ἑαυτόν, χρώμενος δὲ ἑαυτῷ οἷος ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως. ἢ οὐχ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως, οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ἄριστον οὕτως. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον ἐλθεῖν οὐ πᾶν αὐτεξούσιον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ χεῖρον ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲν ὑπ’ ἄλλου κεκώλυται.
If, then, there is nothing before it, and it is first, we must stop here and say nothing more about it, but inquire how the things after it came to be, and no longer how it did, because it truly did not come to be. What then? If it did not come to be, but is such as it is, not being master of its own being—and if, though not master of its being, it is what it is, not having brought itself into existence but making use of itself such as it is—then it would be what it is of necessity, and could not be otherwise. Or rather: it is not this way because it cannot be otherwise, but because what is best is this way. For not everything is self-determining with regard to going toward the better, but nothing is hindered by another from going toward the worse.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὴ ἦλθε, παρ’ αὑτοῦ οὐκ ἐλήλυθεν, οὐ τῷ κεκωλύσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ μὴ ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ἀδυναμίαν σημαίνει τοῦ μὴ ἥκοντος, ἀλλὰ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὑτὸν τὸ μὴ ἥκειν. καὶ τὸ μὴ ἥκειν πρὸς μηδὲν ἄλλο τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ κατειλημμένου, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων ὄντος καὶ νόμου. αὑτὴν οὖν ἡ ἀνάγκη ὑπέστησεν; ἢ οὐδὲ ὑπέστη τῶν ἄλλων ὑποστάντων τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸ δι’ αὐτό. τὸ οὖν πρὸ ὑποστάσεως πῶς ἂν ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἢ ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ ὑπέστη;
But as for its not having gone there: it is of itself that it has not gone, not because it was hindered, but because it is itself that which has not gone. Its inability to go toward the worse does not signify powerlessness in what does not go; it means that its not going is from itself and because of itself. And its going toward nothing else contains the superabundance of power within it—not because it is held fast by necessity, but because it is itself the necessity and law of the other things. Did necessity, then, bring itself into existence? Or rather, it did not even come into existence, while the other things, those after it, came into existence because of it. How, then, could what is before existence have been brought into existence, either by another or by itself?
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὑποστὰν τοῦτο τί; ἢ σιωπήσαντας δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ἀπόρῳ τῇ γνώμῃ θεμένους μηδὲν ἔτι ζητεῖν. τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ζητήσειεν εἰς οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔχων προελθεῖν πάσης ζητήσεως εἰς ἀρχὴν ἰούσης καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἱσταμένης; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζήτησιν ἅπασαν χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ τοῦ τί ἐστιν εἶναι ἢ τοῦ οἷον ἢ τοῦ διὰ τί ἢ τοῦ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὡς λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, ἐκ τῶν μετ’ αὐτό· τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ζητεῖ· ἀρχῆς δὲ τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή· τὸ δὲ οἷόν ἐστι ζητεῖν τί συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, ᾧ συμβέβηκε μηδέν· τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι δηλοῖ μᾶλλον τὸ μηδὲν δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν αὐτὸ μόνον, εἰ δυνατὸν αὑτοῖς, λαβόντας ἐν νῷ μηδὲν αὐτῷ θεμιτὸν εἶναι προσάπτειν μαθόντας.
But this which did not come into existence—what is it? Or rather, we must go away in silence, leave our judgment in perplexity, and inquire no further. For what could one even seek, having nowhere further to go, when every inquiry goes toward a principle and comes to a halt at something like this? Besides, we must bear in mind that every inquiry is about what something is, or what sort it is, or why it is, or whether it is. As for its being, in the sense in which we say it is, that comes from the things after it. The “why” seeks another principle, but there is no principle of the principle of all. To ask what sort it is would be to ask what is incidental to it, when nothing is incidental to it. And asking what it is shows rather that we must seek nothing about it, grasping it alone in intellect, if we can, having learned that it is not permitted to attach anything to it.
ὅλως δὲ ἐοίκαμεν ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνθυμηθῆναι περὶ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως, εἴπερ ἐνεθυμήθημεν, ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τίθεσθαι χώραν καὶ τόπον, ὥσπερ τι χάος, εἶτα χώρας ἤδη οὔσης ἐπαγαγεῖν ταύτην τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸν ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἡμῶν γεγονότα ἢ ὄντα τόπον, εἰσαγαγόντας δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν τοιοῦτον τόπον οὕτω τοι ζητεῖν, οἷον πόθεν καὶ πῶς ἐλήλυθεν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ὥσπερ ἔπηλυν ὄντα ἐζητηκέναι αὐτοῦ τὴν παρουσίαν καὶ οἷον τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος βάθους ἢ ἐξ ὕψους τινὸς ἐνθάδε ἐρρῖφθαι.
In general, we seem to have conceived this difficulty about this nature—if we did conceive it—from first positing space and place, like a kind of chaos, and then, once there is space, bringing this nature into the place that has come to be, or exists, in our imagination. Having brought it into such a place, we then inquire, as it were, where it has come from and how it got here; and as though it were a newcomer, we have inquired into its presence and, as it were, its being—as though it had been flung down here from some depth or some height.
διόπερ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἀπορίας ἀνελόντα ἔξω ποιήσασθαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντα τόπον καὶ μηδὲ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τίθεσθαι αὐτόν, μήτε ἀεὶ κείμενον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἱδρυμένον μήτε ἐληλυθότα, ἀλλ’ ὄντα μόνον, ὡς ἔστι, λεγόμενον ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης τῶν λόγων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὕστερον καὶ ὕστερον ἁπάντων. τὸ οὖν ἄτοπον τοῦτο νοοῦντες, ὡς νοοῦμεν, οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ἔτι τιθέντες οἷον κύκλῳ οὐδὲ περιλαβεῖν ἔχοντες ὅσος οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσον αὐτῷ συμβεβηκέναι φήσομεν· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ποιόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ μορφή τις περὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ νοητὴ ἂν εἴη· οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο· ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ γὰρ καὶ ὑφέστηκε, πρὶν ἄλλο. τί ἂν οὖν ἔτι εἴη τὸ οὕτω συνέβη;
So we must remove the cause of the difficulty and put all place outside our attention to it, and not posit it in anything at all—neither lying and settled in it forever, nor having come into it—but only being, as it is, said to be because our arguments force us to, while place, like everything else, is later, and later than all things. Thinking of it, then, as placeless, so far as we can think of it, and positing nothing around it, as in a circle, and unable to grasp how great it is, we shall not say that quantity belongs to it; nor quality either, for there would be no shape around it, not even an intelligible one; nor relation to another, for it exists by itself, before there is another. What, then, would “it happened this way” still mean?
ἢ πῶς φθεγξόμεθα τοῦτο, ὅτε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν ἀφαιρέσει πάντα τὰ περὶ τούτου λεγόμενα; ὥστε ἀληθὲς μᾶλλον οὐ τὸ οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐδὲ οὕτω συνέβη, ὅπου καὶ τὸ οὐδὲ συνέβη ὅλως.
Or how shall we even utter it, when everything else said of it is said by taking away? So what is truer is not “it happened this way” but “it did not even happen this way”—where in fact there is no “it happened” at all.
Master of itself
The One is what it wills; in a way it made itself and is cause of itself.
τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι; τοῦ δὲ εἶναι ὃ ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι ἆρά γε κύριος αὐτός; πάλιν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέν τι πεισθεῖσα τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἄπορός ἐστι. λεκτέον τοίνυν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε, ὡς ἕκαστος μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα πόρρω ἂν εἴη οὐσίας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὃ μάλιστα ἐσμὲν μετέχομεν οὐσίας καὶ ἐσμέν τις οὐσία. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οἷον σύνθετόν τι ἐκ διαφορᾶς καὶ οὐσίας οὔκουν κυρίως οὐσία οὐδ’ αὐτοουσία· διὸ οὐδὲ κύριοι τῆς αὑτῶν οὐσίας. ἄλλο γάρ πως ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο, καὶ κύριοι οὐχ ἡμεῖς τῆς αὑτῶν οὐσίας, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐσία αὐτὴ ἡμῶν, εἴπερ αὕτη καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν προστίθησιν.
What then? Is it not what it is? And is it master of being what it is, or of being beyond? For the soul, not at all persuaded by what has been said, is again perplexed. To this, then, we must reply as follows. Each of us, as regards the body, would be far from being; but as regards the soul, and what we most are, we share in being and are a kind of being. But this is, as it were, a compound of differentia and being; so it is not being in the strict sense, nor being itself. That is why we are not masters of our own being either. For being is, in a way, one thing and we another; and it is not we who are masters of our own being, but our being itself that is master of us, since it is also what adds the differentia.
ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ κύριον ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς πως ἐσμέν, οὕτω τοι οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα λεγοίμεθα ἂν αὑτῶν κύριοι· ὃ δέ γε παντελῶς ἐστιν ὃ ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν αὐτό, ἄλλο δὲ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα ὅπερ ἔστι τοῦτο ἐστὶ καὶ κύριον καὶ οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο ᾗ ἔστι καὶ ᾗ ἐστιν οὐσία. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἀφείθη κύριον εἶναι αὑτοῦ, ᾗ ὃ πρῶτον εἰς οὐσίαν. τὸ δὴ πεποιηκὸς ἐλεύθερον τὴν οὐσίαν, πεφυκὸς δηλονότι ποιεῖν ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἐλευθεροποιὸν ἂν λεχθέν, τίνι ἂν δοῦλον εἴη; εἴπερ ὅλως καὶ θεμιτὸν φθέγγεσθαι.
But since what is master of us is, in a way, what we are, in this sense we could nonetheless be called masters of ourselves even here. But in the case of that which is completely what it is, where it is not itself one thing and its being another—there, what it is, that it is also as master, and it is no longer referred to something else insofar as it is and insofar as it is being. For again, it has been left free to be master of itself, insofar as it is what comes first into being. And that which has made being free—evidently by nature a maker of freedom, and which could be called the freedom-maker—to whom could it be a slave? If it is permitted to utter such a thing at all.
τὸ δὲ τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὕτη παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐλευθέρα καὶ ὑστέρα καὶ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔχον οὐσίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸν θησόμεθα, οὐδ’ ἂν διὰ τοῦτο εἴη ἂν ἕτερον αὑτοῦ καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ κύριος, ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὅτι μὴ ἕτερον ἐνέργεια καὶ αὐτός. εἰ δ’ ὅλως ἐνέργειαν οὐ δώσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα περὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἴσχειν, ἔτι μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ κύριον οὔτε τὸ κυριευόμενον ἐκεῖ εἶναι δώσομεν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ αὑτοῦ κύριον, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτοῦ κύριον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ αὑτοῦ κύριον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπέδομεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τιμιωτέρῳ ἢ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐθέμεθα. τί οὖν τὸ ἐν τιμιωτέρῳ τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν αὑτοῦ κύριον;
A slave to its own being, then? But this too is free because of it, and later; and it itself has no being. If, then, there is some activity in it, and we place it in the activity, it would not on that account be different from itself, and not master of itself, it from which the activity comes, because activity and it are not different. But if we do not grant that there is any activity in it at all, but say that the other things, being active around it, have their existence, we shall grant all the more that there is neither master nor mastered There. Not even “master of itself”—not because something else is its master, but because we have assigned “master of itself” to being, and have placed it in something more honorable than this. What, then, is the more honorable thing than what is master of itself?
ἢ ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐκεῖ δύο πως ὄντα, ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐδίδου τοῦ κυρίου — τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταὐτόν — διὰ τοῦτο καὶ χωρὶς ἐγένετο τὸ κύριον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἐλέγετο κύριον. ὅπου δὲ οὐ δύο ὡς ἕν, ἀλλὰ ἕν — ἢ γὰρ ἐνέργεια μόνον ἢ οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐνέργεια — οὐδὲ τὸ κύριον αὑτοῦ ὀρθῶς.
Or rather: since There being and activity are, in a way, two, being gave the notion of mastery from its activity—and this was the same as its being—and that is why being master came to be separate, and it was said to be master of itself. But where there are not two as one, but one—for it is either activity alone or not activity at all—not even “master of itself” is correct.
ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα ἐπάγειν δεῖ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦ ζητουμένου, πάλιν αὖ λεγέσθω, ὡς τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ ποιητέον οὐδ’ ὡς εἰς ἐπίνοιαν δύο, τὰ δὲ νῦν τῆς πειθοῦς χάριν· καίτοι παρανοητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. εἰ γὰρ δοίημεν ἐνεργείας αὐτῷ, τὰς δὲ ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οἷον βουλήσει αὐτοῦ — οὐ γὰρ ἀβουλῶν ἐνεργεῖ — αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ἡ οἷον οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἡ βούλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ταὐτὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω καὶ ἔστιν. οὐ μᾶλλον ἄρα ὡς πέφυκε βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ἢ ὡς βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. κύριος ἄρα πάντη ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ ἔχων καὶ τὸ εἶναι.
But even if we must apply these words to what we are seeking, though not correctly, let it be said again that some things have been said correctly: that we must not make it two, not even for the sake of conception; whereas what we are saying now is for the sake of persuasion, and we must understand our words loosely. For if we grant it activities, and assign its activities to its will, as it were—for it is not active without willing—and its activities are its being, so to speak, then its will and its being will be the same. And if so, then as it willed, so it is. It does not, then, will and act as its nature is, any more than its being is as it wills and acts. It is, therefore, wholly master of itself, having even its being up to itself.
ἴδε δὴ καὶ τόδε· τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἐφιέμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βούλεται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἢ ὃ ἔστιν εἶναι, καὶ τότε μάλιστα οἴεται εἶναι, ὅταν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλάβῃ, καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ αἱρεῖται ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον τὸ εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴσχῃ, ὡς τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἑαυτῇ δηλονότι πολὺ πρότερον αἱρετῆς οὔσης, εἴπερ ὅση μοῖρα ἀγαθοῦ παρ’ ἄλλῳ αἱρετωτάτη, καὶ οὐσία ἑκούσιος καὶ παραγενομένη θελήσει καὶ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν οὖσα θελήσει καὶ διὰ θελήσεως ὑποστᾶσα. καὶ ἕως μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ εἶχεν ἕκαστον, ἠθέλησεν ἄλλο, ᾗ δὲ ἔσχεν, ἑαυτό τε θέλει ἤδη καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε κατὰ τύχην ἡ τοιαύτη παρουσία οὔτε ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, καὶ τούτῳ καὶ ὁρίζεται καὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐστι τούτῳ.
Look at this too. Each of the things that are, aspiring to the Good, wants to be that rather than what it is, and thinks it most is when it shares in the Good; and in such a state each chooses being for itself insofar as it has it from the Good. The nature of the Good, then, is evidently far more choiceworthy to itself, if whatever share of good is in another is most choiceworthy; and it is a voluntary being, present by willing, one and the same with willing, and brought into existence through willing. As long as each thing did not have the good, it wanted something else; but insofar as it has it, it now wants itself; and such presence is not by chance, nor is its being outside its will; and by this it is defined, and by this it belongs to itself.
εἰ οὖν τούτῳ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον ἑαυτὸ ποιεῖ, δῆλον δήπου γίνεται ἤδη, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη ἤδη ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον πρώτως, ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑαυτοῖς ἔστιν εἶναι, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἷον οὐσίᾳ ἡ θέλησις τοῦ οἷον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ὤν, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἕν, καὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ἧττον ἕν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός, ὅπερ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἄν. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠθέλησεν ἢ τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι;
If, then, it is by this that each thing makes itself itself, it now becomes clear, surely, that that would be primarily such for itself—that by which the other things too are able to be themselves. With its being, so to speak, goes the willing to be, so to speak, such as it is; and it is impossible to grasp it without its willing for itself what it is. It coincides with itself, willing to be itself and being this which it wills; its willing and it are one—and no less one for this, that it is not one thing as it happened to be and another as it would have willed. For what else would it have willed than this, which it is?
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὑποθοίμεθα ἑλέσθαι αὑτῷ ὅ τι θέλοι γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτ’ ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ’ ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὄντι, ὃ ἔστι, τοῦτο [δὲ] τῷ αὐτὸς εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ θέλει. ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὑτοῦ οὐ δεδεκασμένου οὐδὲ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἐπισπωμένου, ἀλλ’ ἑαυτὸν ἑλομένου, ὅτι μηδὲ ἦν ἄλλο, ἵνα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἑλχθῇ.
For even if we suppose that it could choose for itself what it wanted to become, and were allowed to change its nature into something else, it would not wish to become anything else, nor would it find fault with itself as being what it is by necessity—being this by being itself, which it has always willed and wills. For the nature of the Good is truly the willing of itself: not bribed, nor drawn along by its own nature, but having chosen itself, because there was nothing else for it to be drawn toward.
καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνο ἄν τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὑτῶν ἕκαστον τὰ ἄλλα οὐσίᾳ οὐ περιείληφε τὸν λόγον τὸν τοῦ ἀρέσκεσθαι αὑτῷ· καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ δυσχεραίνοι τι αὑτό· ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑποστάσει ἀνάγκη τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ θέλησιν ἐμπεριειλημμένην εἶναι ἢ σχολῇ γ’ ἂν ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχοι ἑαυτῷ ἀρεστῷ εἶναι, ἃ μετουσίᾳ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίᾳ ἀρέσκεται αὑτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, εἴ τις περὶ ἐκείνου λέγων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς χρῆται, ἃ ἀκριβείᾳ οὐκ ἐῶμεν λέγεσθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ οἷον ἐφ’ ἑκάστου.
And one might also say this: each of the other things does not include in its own being the ground for being pleased with itself—a thing might even be displeased with itself. But in the existence of the Good, choice and the willing of itself must be included; otherwise it would hardly belong to anything else to be pleasing to itself, since those things are pleased with themselves by participation in the Good or by an appearance of good. But we must make allowances for the words, if anyone speaking about that uses, of necessity, for the sake of pointing it out, words that, strictly, we do not allow to be said. And let him add “so to speak” to each.
εἰ οὖν ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συνυφίστησιν αὐτὸ ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ βούλησις — ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται — δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, συνακτέον εἰς ἓν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ θέλειν παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρ’ αὑτοῦ αὐτῷ εἶναι· ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὑτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὑτόν· ὥστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἠβουλήθη αὐτός.
If, then, the Good exists, and choice and will help to make it exist—for without these it will not be—but it must not be many, then will and being must be brought together into one; its willing must be from itself, and so its being must be from itself for it. So the argument has discovered that it has made itself. For if its will is from itself and, as it were, its own work, and this is the same as its existence, then it would, in this way, have brought itself into existence. So it is not what it happened to be, but what it itself willed.
ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ ταύτῃ· ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων εἶναι ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἶναι αὑτοῦ, ἢ ἕτερον· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ὅδε ἕτερος, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἄλλο· μετέχει γε μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. ψυχὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, εἰ ἁπλοῦν ψυχὴ καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν κατὰ τύχην γένοιτο, ὅτῳ ἕτερον τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κατὰ τύχην· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἄνθρωπος αὐτό.
Further, we must look at it this way too. Each of the things said to be either is the same as its being or different from it. For example, this man is one thing and being a man another—though the man does participate in what being a man is. But soul and being soul are the same, if soul is simple and not predicated of something else; and so are man himself and being man. The one for which being a man is different might come to be by chance, but being a man could not come to be by chance: and this is man himself, from itself.
εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην τοῦτο οὐδὲ συμβέβηκε, πῶς ἂν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄνθρωπος αὐτό, τὸ γεννητικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αὐτὸ καὶ οὗ τὰ ὄντα πάντα, κατὰ τύχην ἂν λέγοιτο, φύσις ἁπλουστέρα τοῦ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως τὸ ὂν εἶναι; εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἰόντι οὐκ ἔστι συναναφέρειν τὴν τύχην· ὥστε καὶ εἰς τὸ ἁπλούστατον ἀδύνατον ἀναβαίνειν τὴν τύχην.
If, then, being a man is from itself, and not by chance, nor incidental, how could what is above man himself—what generates man himself, to which all the things that are belong—be said to be by chance, a nature simpler than being man, and than being, in general, being? If one cannot bring chance along as one goes up toward the simple, then it is impossible for chance to ascend to the simplest of all.
ἔτι δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἀναμνησθῆναι προσήκει ἤδη που εἰρημένον, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὄντων καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως ἐλθόντων εἰς ὑπόστασιν, καὶ εἴ τι δὲ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τοιοῦτον, τῷ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων τοιοῦτον· λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τὸ σὺν αὐτῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἔχειν καὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὴν αἰτίαν, ὥστε τὸν ὕστερον θεατὴν ἑκάστου ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, διὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων, οἷον διὰ τί ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ διὰ τί πόδες τοῖσδε τοιοίδε, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν συναπογεννῶσαν ἕκαστον μέρος ἑκάστου εἶναι καὶ διάλληλα τὰ μέρη εἶναι. διὰ τί πόδες εἰς μῆκος;
Further, it is fitting to recall what was said somewhere before: that each of the things that truly are, and have come into existence from that nature—and if anything among perceptible things is like this, it is so by coming from them—is of a certain kind. By this I mean that it has, together with its being, the cause of its existence too, so that a later observer of each can say why each of the things in it is there—why an eye, for instance, and why these creatures have such feet—and the cause brings each part of each thing into being together with it, and the parts are there because of one another. Why are the feet long?
ὅτι καὶ τόδε τοιόνδε καὶ ὅτι πρόσωπον τοιόνδε, καὶ πόδες τοιοίδε· καὶ ὅλως ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων συμφωνία ἀλλήλοις αἰτία· καὶ τὸ διὰ τί τόδε, ὅτι τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ὥστε ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἴτιον. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς οὕτως ἦλθεν οὐ λελογισμένης, ἀλλὰ παρεχούσης ὅλον ἀθρόον τὸ διὰ τί καὶ τὸ εἶναι. πηγὴ οὖν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί εἶναι ὁμοῦ ἄμφω διδοῦσα· ἀλλὰ οἷα τὰ γινόμενα πολὺ ἀρχετυπώτερον καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ’ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ ταῦτα.
Because this other part is of such a kind, and because the face is of such a kind, the feet are of such a kind. In general, the harmony of all of them with one another is the cause for one another; and the reason why this is so is that this is what being a man is. So being and the cause are one and the same. These things came this way from a single source, which did not reason it out, but supplied the whole “why” and the “is” all at once. A source, then, of being and of the why of being, giving both together. But that from which these come is what the things that come to be are, far more archetypally and truly, and more so than they, in the direction of the better.
εἰ οὖν μηδὲν εἰκῆ μηδὲ κατὰ τύχην μηδὲ τὸ ‘συνέβη γὰρ οὕτως’ τῶν ὅσα τὰς αἰτίας ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἅπαντα, λόγου ὢν καὶ αἰτίας καὶ οὐσίας αἰτιώδους πατήρ, ἃ δὴ πάντα πόρρω ὑπάρχει τύχης, εἴη ἂν ἀρχὴ καὶ οἷον παράδειγμα τῶν ὅσα μὴ κεκοινώνηκε τύχῃ, τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀμιγὲς τύχαις καὶ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ συμβάσει, αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὑτὸν αὐτός· καὶ γὰρ πρώτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός.
If, then, nothing that has its causes in itself is random, or by chance, or a case of “for it just happened this way”—and all the things that come from it do have them—then, since it is the father of reason and of cause and of causal being, all of which are far removed from chance, it would be the principle and, as it were, the model of all the things that have no share in chance: what truly and first is, unmixed with chances and spontaneity and happening, cause of itself, from itself and because of itself, itself. For it is primarily itself, and itself beyond being.
καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὑτοῦ ἔρως, ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ συνὸν καὶ τὸ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν εἴη. εἰ δὲ τὸ συνὸν τῷ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἓν καὶ τὸ οἷον ἐφιέμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἕν, τὸ δὲ ἐφετὸν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οἷον ὑποκείμενον, πάλιν αὖ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ταὐτὸ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πάλιν αὖ αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τι ἕτερον ἠθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὡς θέλει αὐτός.
And it is at once lovable and love, and love of itself, since it is beautiful in no other way than from itself and in itself. For being with itself would not be possible either, unless what is with and what it is with were one and the same. And if what is with is one with what it is with, and what, as it were, desires is one with what is desired, and what is desired is on the side of existence and is, as it were, the substrate, then again desire and being have turned out to be the same. And if so, then again it is this one itself that makes itself and is master of itself, and did not come to be as something else willed, but as it itself wills.
καὶ μὴν καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸν οὔτε τι εἰς αὑτὸν δέχεσθαι οὔτε ἄλλο αὐτὸν καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν εἴημεν ἔξω ποιοῦντες τοῦ τύχῃ εἶναι τοιοῦτον, οὐ μόνον τῷ μονοῦν αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ καθαρὸν ποιεῖν ἁπάντων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐνίδοιμέν τινα φύσιν τοιαύτην οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συνήρτηται ἡμῖν, καθ’ ἃ πάσχειν ὅ τι περ ἂν συμβῇ καὶ κατὰ τύχην ὑπάρχει· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἡμῶν, δοῦλα καὶ ἐκκείμενα τύχαις καὶ οἷον κατὰ τύχην προσελθόντα, τούτῳ δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κύριον αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον φωτὸς ἀγαθοειδοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ μείζονος ἢ κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ νοεῖν ἐχούσῃ· εἰς ὃ δὴ ἀναβάντες καὶ γενόμενοι τοῦτο μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀφέντες, τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πλέον ἢ αὐτεξούσιοι;
Moreover, in saying that it neither receives anything into itself nor is anything else, we would in this way too be placing it outside being such by chance—not only by making it alone and pure of all things, but for this reason: if we ourselves should ever see within ourselves some such nature, having none of the other things attached to us, by which we are subject to whatever happens and exist by chance—for all the other things that are ours are slaves, exposed to chances, and have come to us, as it were, by chance—to this alone belong mastery of itself and self-determination, by an activity of light that is good-like and good, and greater than what accords with intellect, an activity that has what is beyond thinking not as something brought in from outside. Having ascended to this and become this alone, letting the rest go, what could we say it is, except that we are more than free, and more than self-determining?
τίς δ’ ἂν ἡμᾶς προσάψειε τότε τύχαις ἢ τῷ εἰκῆ ἢ τῷ συμβέβηκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ζῆν γενομένους ἢ ἐν τούτῳ γενομένους, ὃ μηδὲν ἔχει ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτὸ μόνον; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν αὑτοῖς αὐτάρκη εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι καὶ μονούμενον. ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν ἀψύχῳ οὐδ’ ἐν ζωῇ ἀλόγῳ· ἀσθενὴς γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ αὕτη σκέδασις οὖσα λόγου καὶ ἀοριστία· ἀλλ’ ὅσῳ πρόεισιν εἰς λόγον, ἀπολείπει τύχην· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον οὐ τύχῃ. ἀναβαίνουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὐ λόγος, κάλλιον δὲ ἢ λόγος· τοσοῦτο ἀπέχει τοῦ τύχῃ συμβῆναι.
Who could then fasten us to chances, or to the random, or to “it happened,” when we have become true life itself, or have come to be in that which has nothing else but is itself alone? The other things, when left alone, cannot be self-sufficient for being; but this is what it is even when alone. The first existence is not in what is soulless, nor in irrational life: for this too is weak for being, a scattering of reason and an indefiniteness. But the further it advances toward reason, the more it leaves chance behind: what is according to reason is not by chance. And as we ascend, that is not reason, but more beautiful than reason: so far is it from having happened by chance.
ῥίζα γὰρ λόγου παρ’ αὑτῆς καὶ εἰς τοῦτο λήγει τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ φυτοῦ μεγίστου κατὰ λόγον ζῶντος ἀρχὴ καὶ βάσις μένουσα αὐτὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς, διδοῦσα δὲ κατὰ λόγον τῷ φυτῷ, ὃν ἔλαβεν, εἶναι.
For it is the root of reason, from itself, and in it all things end—like the principle and base of a very great plant that lives according to reason, a base that remains itself by itself, while giving the plant its being according to the rational principle the plant received.
ἐπεὶ δέ φαμεν καὶ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ τε εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ αὖ εἶναι οὐδαμοῦ, τοῦτό τοι χρὴ ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ νοῆσαι, οἷον δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν σκοπουμένοις θέσθαι περὶ ὧν ζητοῦμεν. εἰ γὰρ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκε, καὶ εἰ πανταχοῦ, ὅσος ἐστὶν αὐτός, τοσοῦτος πανταχοῦ ὥστε τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ τὸ πάντη αὐτός, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὢν τῷ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο καὶ δοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ παρακεῖσθαι.
Since we say, and it seems so, that this is everywhere and again nowhere, we must reflect on this and think it through, to see what we should posit about the things we are inquiring into, looking at them from here too. For if it is nowhere, it has “happened” nowhere; and if everywhere, it is everywhere as great as it is. So it is itself the “everywhere” and the “in every way”—not being in that “everywhere,” but being it, and granting the other things to lie alongside in the everywhere.
ὁ δ’ ὑπερτάτην ἔχων τάξιν, μᾶλλον δ’ οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὢν ὑπέρτατος αὐτός, πάντα δοῦλα ἔχει, οὐ συμβὰς αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὰ βλέποντος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνων πρὸς αὐτόν· ὁ δ’ εἰς τὸ εἴσω οἷον φέρεται αὑτοῦ οἷον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας, αὐγὴν καθαράν, αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἠγάπησε· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας αὑτόν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον οἷον νοῦς. νοῦς δὲ ἐνέργημα· ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός. ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός· ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός.
And that which holds the highest rank—or rather does not hold it, but is itself the highest—has all things as its slaves. It has not happened to them; they have happened to it—or rather around it. It does not look toward them; they look toward it. It is carried, as it were, into its own inwardness, as it were loving itself, pure radiance, being itself what it loved. And this is to have brought itself into existence, if it is an activity that remains, and what is most lovable is like intellect. But Intellect is an act; so it is an act. But of nothing else; so it is the act of itself. It is not, then, as it happened to be, but as it itself acts.
ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰ ἔστι μάλιστα, ὅτι πρὸς αὑτὸν οἷον στηρίζει καὶ οἷον πρὸς αὑτὸν βλέπει καὶ τὸ οἷον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς αὑτὸν βλέπειν, οἷον ποιοῖ ἂν αὑτόν. οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐθέλει, καὶ οὐδ’ ἡ θέλησις εἰκῆ οὐδ’ οὕτω συνέβη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀρίστου ἡ θέλησις οὖσα οὐκ ἔστιν εἰκῆ. ὅτι δ’ ἡ τοιαύτη νεῦσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτὸν οἷον ἐνέργεια οὖσα αὐτοῦ καὶ μονὴ ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ εἶναι ὃ ἔστι ποιεῖ, μαρτυρεῖ ὑποτεθὲν τοὐναντίον· ὅτι, εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω νεύσειεν αὐτοῦ, ἀπολεῖ τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστι. τὸ ἄρα εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ πρὸς αὑτόν· τοῦτο δὲ ἓν καὶ αὐτός. αὐτὸς ἄρα ὑπέστησεν αὑτὸν συνεξενεχθείσης τῆς ἐνεργείας μετ’ αὐτοῦ.
Further, if it most is because it is, as it were, firmly fixed toward itself and, as it were, looks toward itself, and this looking toward itself is, as it were, its being, then it would, as it were, make itself. It is not, then, as it chanced, but as it itself wills; and its willing is not random either, nor did it happen this way: being the willing of the best, it is not random. That such an inclining of it toward itself—being, as it were, its activity and its remaining in itself—makes it be what it is, is witnessed by supposing the opposite: if it inclined toward what is outside itself, it would lose being what it is. Being what it is, then, is its activity toward itself; and this is one thing, and is itself. It brought itself into existence, then, with its activity brought forth together with it.
εἰ οὖν μὴ γέγονε, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἐγρήγορσις οὐκ ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος, ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὑπερνόησις ἀεὶ οὖσα, ἔστιν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγρηγόρησεν. ἡ δὲ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἔμφρονος· ταῦτα δὲ αὐτός ἐστιν. αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ζωήν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἄλλου. παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἄρα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὸ εἶναι. οὐκ ἄρα, ὡς συνέβη, οὕτως ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός ἐστιν.
If, then, its activity did not come to be, but always was—a waking, as it were, where what is awake is nothing other than the waking, a waking and a thinking beyond thinking that always is—then it is as it woke. And the waking is beyond being and Intellect and intelligent life; and this is what it itself is. It is, then, an activity above Intellect and understanding and life; and these come from it and not from another. Its being, then, is for it from itself and out of itself. It is not, then, as it happened, but as it willed, so it is.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε· ἕκαστά φαμεν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἔσχεν, εἰ ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος προαίρεσις ἠθέλησε, καὶ ὡς ἂν [εἰ] προθέμενος καὶ προιδὼν ἐν λογισμοῖς κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὕτως εἰργάσατο· ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ ἀεὶ οὕτως γιγνομένων, οὕτω τοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιοῦσι κεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους ἐν μείζονι εὐθημοσύνῃ ἑστῶτας· ὥστε ἐπέκεινα προνοίας τἀκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπέκεινα προαιρέσεως καὶ πάντα ἀεὶ νοερῶς ἑστηκότα εἶναι, ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὄντι. ὥστε τὴν οὕτω διάθεσιν εἴ τις ὀνομάζοι πρόνοιαν, οὕτω νοείτω, ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦδε νοῦς τοῦ παντὸς ἑστώς, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ καθ’ ὃν τὸ πᾶν τόδε.
Again, look at it this way. We say that each of the things in the All, and this All itself, is as it would have been if its maker’s choice had willed it, and as if he had made it so, having proposed and foreseen it in reasonings, by providence. But since these things always are so and always come to be so, the rational principles too always lie in the makers, standing in greater good order. So the things there are beyond providence and beyond choice, and all that is in being stands always in an intellectual way. So if anyone should call such a disposition providence, let him understand it this way: that before this All there stands Intellect, from which and according to which this All is.
εἰ μὲν οὖν νοῦς πρὸ πάντων καὶ ἀρχὴ ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὡς ἔτυχε, πολὺς μὲν ὤν, συνῳδὸς δὲ αὑτῷ καὶ οἷον εἰς ἓν συντεταγμένος. οὐδὲν γὰρ πολὺ καὶ πλῆθος συντεταγμένον καὶ λόγοι πάντες περιληφθέντες ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς ὡς ἔτυχε καὶ ὡς συνέβη, ἀλλὰ πόρρω φύσεως τῆς τοιαύτης καὶ ἐναντίον, ὅσον τύχη ἐν ἀλογίᾳ κειμένη λόγῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀρχή, δηλονότι προσεχὴς τούτῳ τῷ οὕτω λελογωμένῳ, καὶ τὸ οὕτω λελογωμένον τοῦτο κατ’ ἐκεῖνο καὶ μετέχον ἐκείνου καὶ οἷον θέλει ἐκεῖνο καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. ἀδιάστατος τοίνυν ἐκεῖνος, εἷς πάντα λόγος, εἷς ἀριθμὸς καὶ εἷς μείζων τοῦ γενομένου καὶ δυνατώτερος καὶ οὐδὲν μεῖζον αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ κρεῖττον. οὐδὲ ἄρα ἐξ ἄλλου ἔχει οὔτε τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ὁποῖός ἐστιν εἶναι.
If, then, Intellect is before all things, and such an Intellect is a principle, it would not be as it chanced—being many, yet in harmony with itself and, as it were, ordered together into one. For nothing that is many, a multitude ordered together, all its rational principles embraced by one throughout, is as it chanced and as it happened. It is far from such a nature, and its opposite—as far as chance, lying in irrationality, is from reason. And if what is before such a thing is a principle, it is clearly close to this which is so permeated with reason; and this thing so permeated with reason is in accordance with that, participates in it, is, as it were, what that wills, and is its power. That, then, is without extension: one rational principle that is all things, one number, and one, greater and more powerful than what came to be, and there is nothing greater or better than it. It does not, then, have from another either its being or its being such as it is.
αὐτὸς ἄρα αὑτῷ ὃ ἔστι πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐς αὑτόν, ἵνα μηδὲ ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν πᾶς.
It is, then, what it is, itself for itself, toward itself and into itself, so that not even in this way is it directed toward what is outside or toward another, but wholly toward itself.
Seek nothing outside him
The One is center and father of Intellect; take away everything else.
καὶ σὺ ζητῶν μηδὲν ἔξω ζήτει αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ εἴσω πάντα τὰ μετ’ αὐτόν· αὐτὸν δὲ ἔα. τὸ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτός ἐστι, περίληψις πάντων καὶ μέτρον. ἢ εἴσω ἐν βάθει. τὸ δ’ ἔξω αὐτοῦ, οἷον κύκλῳ ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξηρτημένον πᾶν, ὁ λόγος καὶ νοῦς· μᾶλλον δ’ ἂν εἴη νοῦς, καθ’ ὃ ἐφάπτεται καὶ ᾗ ἐφάπτεται αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾗ ἐξήρτηται, ἅτε παρ’ ἐκείνου ἔχων τὸ νοῦς εἶναι.
And you, when you seek, seek nothing outside him. Seek within him all the things that come after him, but let him himself be. For he himself is the outside, the encompassing and the measure of all things. Or rather, he is inside, in the depth. What is outside him, touching him in a circle, as it were, and wholly dependent on him, is rational principle and Intellect. Or rather, it would be Intellect insofar as it touches him and in the way it touches him and depends on him, since it has its being Intellect from him.
ὥσπερ ἂν οὖν κύκλος ἐφαπτόμενος κέντρου ὁμολογοῖτο ἂν τὴν δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ κέντρου ἔχειν, καὶ οἷον κεντροειδής, ᾗ γραμμαὶ ἐν κύκλῳ πρὸς κέντρον ἓν συνιοῦσαι τὸ πέρας αὑτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον ποιοῦσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἠνέχθησαν καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ οἷον ἐξέφυσαν, μείζονος ὄντος ἢ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν — καὶ ἔστι μὲν οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ καὶ οἷον ἴχνη ἐκείνου τοῦ ὅτι δύναται αὐτὰ καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς δυναμένου, αἳ πανταχοῦ ἔχουσιν αὐτό, καὶ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶν γραμμῶν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, οἷον ἐξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἐξεληλιγμένον — οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ ὂν χρὴ λαμβάνειν, γενόμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ οἷον ἐκχυθὲν καὶ ἐξελιχθὲν καὶ ἐξηρτημένον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοερᾶς φύσεως μαρτυρεῖν τὸν οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα· ἓν γάρ· ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐκεῖ γραμμὰς οὐδὲ κύκλον τὸ κέντρον, κύκλου δὲ καὶ γραμμῶν πατέρα, ἴχνη αὑτοῦ δόντα καὶ δυνάμει μενούσῃ γραμμὰς καὶ κύκλον οὐ πάντη ἀπηρτημένα αὐτοῦ ῥώμῃ τινὶ γεγεννηκότα.
A circle that touches a center would be agreed to have its power from the center, and to be, as it were, center-shaped. The lines in the circle that converge on the one center make their ends at the center like that toward which they were carried and from which they, as it were, grew out, though the center is greater than these lines and their ends can show. The ends are, as it were, like it, but faint, and, as it were, traces of what has the power to produce them and the lines. The lines have it everywhere, and through the lines it shows what it is like: unrolled, as it were, without having been unrolled. In the same way we must take Intellect and being. Having come to be from that, and been, as it were, poured out and unrolled, and hanging from it, it bears witness by its own intellectual nature to what is, as it were, Intellect in the One, which is not Intellect, for it is one. Just so, in the circle too, the center is not lines or circle but the father of circle and lines. It gave traces of itself, and by a power that remains it generated, with a certain strength, lines and circle that are not wholly cut off from it.
οὕτω τοι κἀκεῖνο τῆς νοερᾶς περιθεούσης δυνάμεως τὸ οἷον ἰνδάλματος αὐτοῦ ἀρχέτυπον ἐν ἑνὶ πολλοῖς καὶ εἰς πολλὰ οἷον κεκινημένου καὶ νοῦ διὰ ταῦτα γενομένου, ἐκείνου πρὸ νοῦ μείναντος, [ἐκ] τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ νοῦν γεννήσαντος, τίς ἂν συντυχία ἢ τί αὐτόματον ἢ τί ὡς συνέβη εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως τῆς νοοποιοῦ καὶ ὄντος ποιητικῆς πλησίον ἥκοι; οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν νῷ [εἰ καὶ] πολλαχῇ μεῖζον τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκείνῳ ὥσπερ φωτὸς ἐπὶ πολὺ σκεδασθέντος ἐξ ἑνός τινος ἐν αὑτῷ ὄντος διαφανοῦς, εἴδωλον μὲν τὸ σκεδασθέν, τὸ δ’ ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν ἀλλοειδὲς τὸ σκεδασθὲν εἴδωλον ὁ νοῦς, ὃς οὐ τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ αἰτία. αἴτιον δὲ ἐκεῖνο τοῦ αἰτίου.
So too with that One. The intellectual power runs around it, an image, as it were, of which that is the archetype: an image that is many in one and has, as it were, moved into many and become Intellect because of this, while that One remained before Intellect and generated Intellect from its power. What coincidence, then, what chance, what “it just happened so” could come anywhere near such a power, the power that makes Intellect and produces being? For what is in that One is like what is in Intellect, [even if] many times greater. It is as with light spread far out from some one thing that is transparent in itself: what is spread out is an image, and that from which it comes is the true light. Yet Intellect, the image spread out, is not different in form. It is not by chance; each part of it is rational principle and cause. And that One is the cause of the cause.
μειζόνως ἄρα οἷον αἰτιώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον αἰτία, ὁμοῦ πάσας ἔχον τὰς μελλούσας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἔσεσθαι νοερὰς αἰτίας καὶ γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός. ἡ δὲ θέλησις οὐκ ἄλογος ἦν οὐδὲ τοῦ εἰκῆ οὐδ’ ὡς ἐπῆλθεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔδει, ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἐκεῖ εἰκῆ. ὅθεν καὶ δέον καὶ καιρὸν ὁ Πλάτων ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν σημῆναι ἐφιέμενος, ὅτι πόρρω τοῦ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἔστι, τοῦτο δέον.
So it is, in a greater way, most causal, so to speak, and more truly cause. It holds together all the intellectual causes that were going to come from it, and it generates what is not as chance had it but as he himself willed. And his willing was not irrational, nor random, nor as the fancy took him, but as it had to be, since nothing There is random. That is why Plato too, aiming to signify this as far as was possible, spoke of “what ought to be” and “the right moment”: it is far from “as chance had it”; whatever it is, that is what ought to be.
εἰ δὲ τὸ δέον τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ καιρός, τὸ μάλιστα κυριώτατον ἐν τοῖς μετ’ αὐτὸ καὶ πρότερον αὑτῷ καὶ οὐχ οἷον ἔτυχε τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅπερ οἷον ἐβουλήθη αὐτός, εἴπερ τὰ δέοντα βούλεται καὶ ἓν τὸ δέον καὶ ἡ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνέργεια· καὶ ἔστι δέον οὐχ ὡς ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐνέργεια πρώτη τοῦτο ἑαυτὴν ἐκφήνασα, ὅπερ ἔδει. οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν λέγειν ἀδυνατοῦντα λέγειν ὥς τις ἐθέλει.
If this is what ought to be, it is not so irrationally. And if it is the right moment, it is the most sovereign of all in the things that come after it, and before that in itself. It is not what it happened to be; it is what he, as it were, wanted, since he wants what ought to be, and what ought to be and the activity of what ought to be are one. And it is what ought to be not as a substrate but as first activity, which has shown itself to be what it had to be. For this is how one must speak of him, unable as one is to speak as one would wish.
λαμβανέτω τις οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακινηθεὶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ καὶ θεάσεται καὶ αὐτὸς οὐχ ὅσον θέλει εἰπεῖν δυνάμενος. ἰδὼν δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐν αὑτῷ πάντα λόγον ἀφεὶς θήσεται παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἐκεῖνο τοῦτο ὄν, ὡς, εἴπερ εἶχεν οὐσίαν, δούλην ἂν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ οἷον παρ’ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· οὐδ’ ἂν τολμήσειέ τις ἰδὼν ἔτι τὸ ὡς συνέβη λέγειν, οὐδ’ ἂν ὅλως φθέγξασθαι δύναιτο. ἐκπλαγείη γὰρ ἂν τολμῶν, καὶ οὐδ’ ἂν ἔχοι ἀίξας [τὸ] ποῦ εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντη αὐτῷ ἐκείνου οἷον πρὸ ὀμμάτων τῆς ψυχῆς προφαινομένου καί, ὅπῃ ἂν ἀτενίσῃ, ἐκεῖνον βλέποντος, εἰ μή που ἄλλῃ ἀφεὶς τὸν θεὸν ἀτενίσῃ μηδὲν ἔτι περὶ αὐτοῦ διανοούμενος.
So let anyone who has been stirred toward that by what has been said lay hold of that itself, and he will see it, and he too will be unable to say as much as he wants. Seeing it within himself, letting every argument go, he will hold that it is what it is from itself: so that, if it had being, its being would be its slave and would, as it were, come from it. Nor would anyone who has seen dare any longer to say “as it happened”; he could not utter a word at all. For if he dared, he would be struck dumb. He could not even dart off anywhere so as to speak about it, since that would be appearing, as it were, everywhere before the eyes of his soul, and wherever he fixed his gaze he would see him, unless he let the god go and fixed his gaze elsewhere, no longer thinking anything about him.
χρὴ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λεγόμενον δι’ αἰνίξεως, οὐ μόνον ὅτι γεννᾷ οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐ δουλεύει οὔτε οὐσίᾳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ, οὐδέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν οὐχ αὑτῷ ἐποίησε τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσας ταύτην ἔξω εἴασεν ἑαυτοῦ, ἅτε οὐδὲν τοῦ εἶναι δεόμενος, ὃς ἐποίησεν αὐτό. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ καθ’ ὃ ἔστι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔστι.
And perhaps the “beyond being,” which the ancients spoke in a riddle, should also be understood this way: not only that he generates being, but that he is no slave either to being or to himself, and his being is not his principle. Rather, he is the principle of being, and he did not make being for himself; having made it, he left it outside himself, since he has no need at all of being, he who made it. So it is not even insofar as he is that he makes “is.”
τί οὖν; οὐ συμβαίνει, εἴποι τις ἄν, πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι γεγονέναι; εἰ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἑαυτόν, τῷ μὲν ἑαυτὸν οὔπω ἔστι, τῷ δ’ αὖ ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἤδη πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ ποιουμένου ὄντος αὐτοῦ. πρὸς ὃ δὴ λεκτέον, ὡς ὅλως οὐ τακτέον κατὰ τὸν ποιούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα, ἀπόλυτον τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ τιθεμένοις, καὶ οὐχ ἵνα ἄλλο ἀποτελεσθῇ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως, ἀλλ’ οὔσης ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀποτελεστικῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅλου τούτου ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ δύο, ἀλλ’ ἕν. οὐδὲ φοβητέον ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρώτην τίθεσθαι ἄνευ οὐσίας, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν οἷον ὑπόστασιν θετέον. εἰ δὲ ὑπόστασιν ἄνευ ἐνεργείας τις θεῖτο, ἐλλιπὴς ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀτελὴς ἡ τελειοτάτη πασῶν ἔσται. καὶ εἰ προσθείη ἐνέργειαν, οὐχ ἓν τηρεῖ.
What then? Someone might say: doesn’t it follow that he had come to be before he came to be? For if he makes himself, then as regards “himself” he does not yet exist, but as regards “making” he exists already, before himself, the one being made. To this we must reply that he is not to be placed at all on the side of the one made but on the side of the maker, if we take his making as absolute. Nor is it so that something else may be accomplished out of his making: his activity does not produce a result, but the whole of him is this, for there are not two but one. Nor should we be afraid to posit the first activity without being; we must posit just this as his hypostasis, so to speak. If someone posited a hypostasis without activity, the principle would be deficient, and the most perfect of all would be imperfect. And if he added activity, he does not keep it one.
εἰ οὖν τελειότερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας, τελειότατον δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, πρῶτον ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη. ἐνεργήσας οὖν ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς πρὶν γενέσθαι ἦν· ὅτε γάρ, οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἤδη πᾶς ἦν. ἐνέργεια δὴ οὐ δουλεύσασα οὐσίᾳ καθαρῶς ἐστιν ἐλευθέρα καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸς παρ’ αὑτοῦ αὐτός. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἐσώζετο εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπ’ ἄλλου, οὐ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ· εἰ δ’ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται συνέχειν, αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ παράγων ἑαυτόν, εἴπερ, ὅπερ συνέχει κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεποίηκεν εἶναι.
If, then, activity is more perfect than being, and the First is most perfect, the First would be activity. So in having acted he already is this, and it is not that he was before he came to be: when he was, he was not before he came to be but already entire. Activity that was never slave to being is purely free, and so he himself is himself from himself. For if he were kept in being by another, he would not be first from himself. But if he is rightly said to hold himself together, he is also the one who brings himself forth, since what he holds together by nature he has also made to be from the beginning.
εἰ μὲν οὖν χρόνος ἦν, ὅθεν ἤρξατο εἶναι, τὸ πεποιηκέναι κυριώτατον ἂν ἐλέχθη· νῦν δέ, εἰ καὶ πρὶν αἰῶνα εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστιν ἦν, τὸ πεποιηκέναι ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο νοείσθω τὸ σύνδρομον εἶναι τὸ πεποιηκέναι καὶ αὐτό· ἓν γὰρ τῇ ποιήσει καὶ οἷον γεννήσει ἀιδίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἄρχον ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ εἰ μὲν δύο, κυρίως, εἰ δὲ ἕν, τὸ ἄρχον μόνον· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἀρχόμενον. πῶς οὖν ἄρχον οὐκ ὄντος πρὸς ὅ; ἢ τὸ ἄρχον ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μηδὲν ἦν. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἦν, πρῶτον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τάξει, ἀλλὰ κυριότητι καὶ δυνάμει αὐτεξουσίῳ καθαρῶς. εἰ δὲ καθαρῶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ μὴ αὐτεξουσίως. ὅλον οὖν αὐτεξουσίως ἐν αὑτῷ. τί οὖν αὐτοῦ, ὃ μὴ αὐτός; τί οὖν, ὃ μὴ ἐνεργεῖ;
Now if there were a time from which he began to be, “having made” would be said in the strictest sense. As it is, if he was what he is even before eternity was, let “having made himself” be understood to mean that his having made and he himself run together. For his being is one with his making and, as it were, his eternal generation. Hence too “master of himself”: if there are two, in the strict sense; if one, there is only the master, for he has nothing that is mastered. How then is he master, when there is nothing for him to be master over? Or rather, “master” here is in relation to what is before him: that there was nothing. And if there was nothing, he is first; not first in order, but in sovereignty and in a power that is purely self-determining. And if purely, nothing can be found There that is not self-determined. So he is wholly self-determined within himself. What, then, is there of him that is not himself? What, then, is there that is not his activity?
καὶ τί, ὃ μὴ ἔργον αὐτοῦ; εἰ γάρ τι εἴη μὴ ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ καθαρῶς ἂν εἴη οὔτε αὐτεξούσιος οὔτε πάντα δυνάμενος· ἐκείνου τε γὰρ οὐ κύριος πάντα τε οὐ δυνάμενος. ἐκεῖνο γοῦν οὐ δύναται, οὗ μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν.
And what is there that is not his work? For if there were anything in him that was not his work, he would be neither purely self-determining nor all-powerful: he would not be master of that, and he would not have power over everything. At any rate, he has no power over what he is not master of making.
ἐδύνατο οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἢ ὃ ἐποίησεν; ἢ οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν ἀναιρήσομεν, ὅτι μὴ ἂν κακοποιοῖ. οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὸ δύνασθαι ἐκεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀστεμφεῖ καὶ ἀμετακινήτῳ δυνάμει, ἣ μάλιστα δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ ἐξίστηται τοῦ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀδυναμίας ἐστί τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου μένειν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν ποίησιν αὑτοῦ, ἣν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην ἅπαξ εἶναι· καλὴ γάρ· καὶ τίς ἂν παρατρέψειε βουλήσει γενομένην θεοῦ καὶ βούλησιν οὖσαν; βουλήσει οὖν μήπω ὄντος; τί δὲ βούλησιν ἐκείνου ἀβουλοῦντος τῇ ὑποστάσει; πόθεν οὖν αὐτῷ ἔσται ἡ βούλησις ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἀνενεργήτου; ἢ ἦν βούλησις ἔν γε τῇ οὐσίᾳ· οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας οὐδέν. ἢ τί ἦν, ὃ μὴ ἦν, οἷον ἡ βούλησις;
Could he, then, have made himself something other than what he made? Or, by that reasoning, we will also do away with his making the good, since he could not make evil. For “being able” There does not mean being able to do opposites; it means an unshakable, immovable power, which is power most of all when it does not depart from being one. Indeed, being able to do opposites belongs to an inability to remain with the best. And his making of himself, which we speak of, must also be once and for all, for it is fine. Who could divert what has come about by the will of god, and is will? By the will, then, of one who did not yet exist? But what will can he have, if he is without will in his hypostasis? Where, then, will his will come from, from a being without activity? Or rather, there was will in his being; so nothing is other than his being. Or else, what was there that he was not—will, for instance?
πᾶν ἄρα βούλησις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἔνι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον. οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα. πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτός. καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἑπόμενον, ὃ ἡ τοιαύτη βούλησις ἐγέννα· ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη ἦν. τὸ δὲ συνέχειν ἑαυτὸν οὕτω ληπτέον νοεῖν, εἴ τις ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ φθέγγοιτο, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶ παρὰ τούτου ἀνέχεται· μετουσίᾳ γάρ τινι αὐτοῦ ἔστι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἡ ἀναγωγὴ πάντων· αὐτὸς δὲ ἤδη παρ’ αὑτοῦ οὔτε συνοχῆς οὔτε μετουσίας δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἑαυτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν πάντων δεόμενος εἰς αὑτόν· ἀλλ’ ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπῃς ἢ ἐννοηθῇς, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἄφες.
So all of him was will, and there is nothing in him that does not will. Nor, then, is there anything before will. So he himself is first of all will. And so he is as he willed and such as he willed, and also what follows on his will, what such will generated; but it generated nothing further in him, for he was this already. As for “holding himself together,” if one were to put it correctly, it should be understood this way: all the other things that exist are upheld by him, for they exist by a certain participation in him, and all things are referred back to him. But he himself is already from himself, needing neither holding together nor participation; he is all things to himself—or rather, he needs nothing, not one of all things, for himself. When you speak of him or think of him, let all the other things go.
ἀφελὼν [οὖν] πάντα, καταλιπὼν δὲ μόνον αὐτόν, μὴ τί προσθῇς ζήτει, ἀλλὰ μή τί πω οὐκ ἀφῄρηκας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐν γνώμῃ τῇ σῇ. ἔστι γάρ τινος ἐφάψασθαι καὶ σέ, περὶ οὗ οὐκέτι ἄλλο ἐνδέχεται οὔτε λέγειν οὔτε λαβεῖν· ἀλλ’ ὑπεράνω κείμενον μόνον τοῦτο ἀληθείᾳ ἐλεύθερον, ὅτι μηδὲ δουλεῦόν ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ ὄντως αὐτό, εἴ γε τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ καὶ ἄλλο.
When you have taken everything away and left only him, do not look for what you might add; look for whether there is something you have not yet taken away from him in your mind. For it is possible even for you to touch something about which nothing more can be said or grasped. It lies high above, and it alone is in truth free, because it is not even slave to itself; it is only itself and really itself, whereas each of the other things is itself and something else.