Forage Anselm of Canterbury · Proslogion
Anselm of Canterbury

Proslogion

Proslogion

Anselm (c. 1033–1109), an Italian monk at the abbey of Bec in Normandy and later Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote the Proslogion around 1077–78. He wanted, he says, a single argument that needed nothing but itself to show that God exists. Its first title was Faith Seeking Understanding, and it is written as a prayer.

Its second chapter contains what is now called the ontological argument. God is “something than which nothing greater can be thought.” Even the fool of the Psalms, who says in his heart “there is no God,” understands those words, so such a being exists at least in his understanding. But what exists in reality as well is greater than what exists only in the mind; so that than which nothing greater can be thought must exist in reality too. Philosophers have argued about it ever since.

A monk named Gaunilo, of Marmoutier, answered at once “on behalf of the fool”: by the same reasoning, he said, one could prove that a perfect lost island exists. Anselm replied, and asked that both answers be copied with his book. All three are given here.

Latin text: Proslogion after F. S. Schmitt’s edition, via The Latin Library; Gaunilo’s reply and Anselm’s answer from Migne, Patrologia Latina 158 (1853), via Latin Wikisource (public domain; transcription CC BY-SA 4.0), with Migne’s spelling brought in line with Schmitt’s and his editorial summaries omitted. English: translated from the Latin with AI (Claude), then edited for accuracy and consistency. Not reviewed by a human specialist. Free to reuse under CC BY-SA 4.0. Margin numbers are chapter and paragraph; G marks Gaunilo’s reply and R Anselm’s answer.
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    About Anselm of Canterbury

    Anselm (c. 1033–1109) was an Italian-born monk and abbot of Bec in Normandy who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093. He is often called the father of scholasticism, and his Proslogion argument for God’s existence is still debated.

    Who’s who

    The fool
    The person in Psalms 14 and 53 who says in his heart there is no God; Anselm argues against him.
    Gaunilo
    A monk of Marmoutier, near Tours, who wrote On Behalf of the Fool, objecting to Anselm’s argument.
    Hugh of Die
    Archbishop of Lyon and papal legate, who ordered Anselm to put his name to the book.
    Adam
    The first man, whose fall Anselm laments as the cause of human exile from God.
    Augustine
    Bishop of Hippo (AD 354–430), whose example of a craftsman’s chest Gaunilo cites against Anselm’s painter.

    Key terms

    that than which nothing greater can be thought id quo maius cogitari nequit
    Anselm’s description of God. Anyone who understands the phrase has it in the understanding, and Anselm argues it must also exist in reality.
    the fool insipiens
    The person in Psalms 14 and 53 who “has said in his heart: There is no God.” Anselm argues against him; Gaunilo writes on his behalf.
    in the understanding in intellectu
    Existing as an object of the mind: whatever someone understands when they hear it is in their understanding, whether or not it is real.
    in reality in re
    Existing as an actual thing, not only in the mind. Anselm holds that existing in reality as well is greater than existing in the understanding alone.
    understand intelligere
    To grasp what is said or what a thing is. Gaunilo uses it strictly, for grasping something true, which leads to a dispute with Anselm.
    think cogitare
    To have something before the mind, whether true or false. Anselm’s formula and his claim that God cannot be thought not to exist turn on this word.
    cannot be thought not to exist non possit cogitari non esse
    Anselm’s claim in chapter 3: God exists so truly that his nonexistence cannot even be thought, which is greater than being able not to exist.
    faith seeking understanding fides quaerens intellectum
    The Proslogion’s first title. Anselm starts from what he believes and seeks to understand it by reason.
    greater than all maius omnibus
    Gaunilo’s way of restating Anselm’s formula. Anselm replies that it is not the same and does not prove existence in the same way.
    the lost island insula perdita
    Gaunilo’s imagined island richer than all lands, used to show that Anselm’s reasoning would prove the existence of anything described as best.
    impassible impassibilis
    Not subject to being acted upon or to suffering. Anselm asks how God can be impassible and yet merciful.
    supreme good summum bonum
    God as the highest good, needing nothing, through which every other good exists and which all things need in order to exist and be well.
    unbounded incircumscriptus
    Not confined by place or time. Only God is wholly everywhere at once; created spirits are unbounded only compared with bodies.
    LatinEnglish

    Proslogion

    Faith seeking understanding · Anselm’s prayer-argument that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.

    Preface

    Postquam opusculum quoddam velut exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei cogentibus me precibus quorundam fratrum, in persona alicuius tacite secum ratiocinando quae nesciat investigantis edidi: considerans illud esse multorum concatenatione contextum argumentorum, coepi mecum quaerere, si forte posset inveniri unum argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret, et solum ad astruendum quia Deus vere est, et quia est summum bonum nullo alio indigens, et quo omnia indigent ut sint et ut bene sint, et quaecumque de divina credimus substantia, sufficeret.

    At the urgent request of certain brothers, I published a short work as an example of meditating on the rational basis of faith, written in the person of someone who investigates, by silently reasoning with himself, things he does not know. Considering that it was woven together from a chain of many arguments, I began to ask myself whether perhaps a single argument could be found that needed nothing but itself to prove itself, and that would suffice on its own to establish that God truly exists; that he is the supreme good, needing nothing else, whom all things need in order to exist and to be well; and whatever else we believe about the divine substance.

    Ad quod cum saepe studioseque cogitationem converterem, atque aliquando mihi videretur iam posse capi quod quaerebam, aliquando mentis aciem omnino fugeret: tandem desperans volui cessare velut ab inquisitione rei, quam inveniri esset impossibile. Sed cum illam cogitationem, ne mentem meam frustra occupando ab aliis, in quibus proficere possem, impediret, penitus a me vellem excludere: tunc magis ac magis nolenti et defendenti se coepit cum importunitate quadam ingerere. Cum igitur quadam die vehementer eius importunitati resistendo fatigarer, in ipso cogitationum conflictu sic se obtulit quod desperaveram, ut studiose cogitationem amplecterer, quam sollicitus repellebam.

    I often turned my thought to this, and eagerly. At times it seemed to me that what I was looking for could already be grasped; at times it escaped my mind’s eye altogether. At last, in despair, I decided to give it up, as the search for something that could not be found. But when I wanted to shut the thought out of myself completely, so that it would not occupy my mind in vain and keep it from other things in which I could make progress, then, the more I refused it and fended it off, the more it began to press itself on me with a kind of insistence. So one day, when I was worn out from resisting its insistence so fiercely, in the very clash of my thoughts what I had despaired of offered itself, so that I eagerly embraced the thought I had been anxiously driving away.

    Aestimans igitur quod me gaudebam invenisse, si scriptum esset, alicui legenti placiturum, de hoc ipso et de quibusdam aliis sub persona conantis erigere mentem suam ad contemplandum Deum et quaerentis intelligere quod credit, subditum scripsi opusculum. Et quoniam nec istud nec illud, cuius supra memini, dignum libri nomine aut cui auctoris praeponeretur nomen iudicabam, nec tamen eadem sine aliquo titulo, quo aliquem, in cuius manus veniret, quodam modo ad se legendum invitarent, dimittenda putabam: unicuique suum dedi titulum, ut prius Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei, et sequens Fides quaerens intellectum diceretur.

    Judging, then, that what I rejoiced to have found would please some reader if it were written down, I wrote the short work that follows, on this and on certain other matters, in the person of one who is trying to raise his mind to contemplate God and who seeks to understand what he believes. I judged that neither this work nor the one I mentioned above deserved to be called a book, or to have its author’s name set at its head; and yet I thought they should not be sent out without some title by which they might, in a way, invite whoever came upon them to read them. So I gave each its own title: the first was to be called An Example of Meditation on the Rational Basis of Faith, and the second Faith Seeking Understanding.

    Sed cum iam a pluribus cum his titulis utrumque transcriptum esset, coegerunt me plures, et maxime reverendus archiepiscopus Lugdunensis, Hugo nomine, fungens in Gallia legatione Apostolica qui mihi hoc ex Apostolica praecepit auctoritate, ut nomen meum illis praescriberem. Quod ut aptius fieret, illud quidem Monologion, id est soliloquium, istud vero Proslogion, id est alloquium, nominavi.

    But when many people had already copied both works under these titles, many urged me—above all the reverend archbishop of Lyon, Hugh by name, then serving as apostolic legate in Gaul, who commanded it by apostolic authority—to put my name to them. To make this more fitting, I named the first Monologion, that is, a soliloquy, and this one Proslogion, that is, an address.

    Hugh of Die, archbishop of Lyon (1082–1106) and papal legate in France. The titles are Greek coinages: “speaking alone” and “speaking to.”

    Rousing the mind to contemplate God

    Anselm urges himself to withdraw into prayer, laments the fall, and asks God to show himself.

    Eia, nunc homuncio, fuge paululum occupationes tuas, absconde te modicum a tumultuosis cogitationibus tuis. Abice nunc onerosas curas, et postpone laboriosas distentiones tuas. Vaca aliquantulum Deo, et requiesce aliquantulum in eo. “Intra in cubiculum” mentis tuae, exclude omnia praeter Deum et quae te iuvent ad quaerendum eum, et “clauso ostio” quaere eum. Dic nunc, totum “cor meum”, dic nunc Deo: “Quaero vultum tuum, vultum tuum, Domine, requiro”.

    Come now, little man, flee your occupations for a little while; hide yourself for a moment from your turbulent thoughts. Cast off your heavy cares now, and put aside your wearying distractions. Make a little room for God, and rest a little in him. “Enter the inner room” of your mind; shut out everything except God and whatever helps you seek him, and “with the door closed” seek him. Speak now, my whole “heart”; speak now to God: “I seek your face; your face, Lord, I long for.”

    Quotation marks throughout mark Anselm’s borrowings from Scripture; here Matthew 6:6 and Psalm 27:8.

    Eia nunc ergo tu, Domine Deus meus, doce cor meum ubi et quomodo quaerat ubi et quomodo te inveniat. Domine, si hic non es, ubi te quaeram absentem? Si autem ubique es, Cur non video praesentem? Sed certe habitas “lucem inaccessibilem”. Et ubi est lux inaccessibilis? Aut quomodo accedam ad lucem inaccessibilem? Aut quis ducet et inducet in illam, ut videam te in illa? Deinde quibus signis, qua facie te quaeram? Numquam te vidi, Domine Deus meus, non novi faciem tuam. Quid faciet, altissime Domine, quid faciet iste tuus longinquus exsul? Quid faciet servus tuus, anxius amore tui et longe “proiectus a facie tua”? Anhelat videre te et nimis abest illi facies tua. Accedere ad te desiderat et inaccessibilis est habitatio tua.

    Come then now, Lord my God, teach my heart where and how to seek you, where and how to find you. Lord, if you are not here, where shall I seek you, absent? But if you are everywhere, why do I not see you present? Surely you dwell in “light inaccessible.” And where is light inaccessible? Or how shall I approach light inaccessible? Or who will lead me and bring me into it, so that I may see you in it? And then, by what signs, under what appearance, shall I seek you? I have never seen you, Lord my God; I do not know your face. What shall he do, most high Lord, what shall this far-off exile of yours do? What shall your servant do, anxious with love for you and “cast far from your face”? He pants to see you, and your face is too far from him. He longs to approach you, and your dwelling is inaccessible.

    1 Timothy 6:16.

    Invenire te cupit et nescit locum tuum. Quaerere te affectat et ignorat vultum tuum. Domine, Deus meus es et Dominus meus es et numquam te vidi. Tu me fecisti et refecisti et omnia bona tu mihi contulisti et nondum novi te. Denique ad te videndum factus sum et nondum feci, propter quod factus sum.

    He desires to find you, and does not know where you are. He strives to seek you, and does not know your face. Lord, you are my God and you are my Lord, and I have never seen you. You made me and remade me, and you have given me all my good things, and still I do not know you. In short, I was made to see you, and I have not yet done what I was made for.

    O misera sors hominis, cum hoc perdidit, ad quod factus est! O durus et dirus casus ille! Heu, quid perdidit et quid invenit, quid abscessit et quid remansit! Perdidit beatitudinem, ad quam factus est, et invenit miseriam, propter quod factus non est. Abscessit, sine quo nihil felix est, et remansit, quod per se non nisi miserum est. “Manducabat tunc homo panem angelorum”, quem nunc esurit; manducat nunc “panem dolorum”, quem tunc nesciebat. Heu publicus luctus hominum, universalis planctus filiorum Adae! Ille ructabat saturitate nos suspiramus esurie. Ille abundabat nos mendicamus. Ille feliciter tenebat et misere deseruit nos infeliciter egemus et miserabiliter desideramus. et heu, vacui remanemus! Cur non nobis custodivit, cum facile posset, quo tam graviter careremus?

    O wretched lot of man, now that he has lost what he was made for! O that hard and dreadful fall! Alas, what he lost and what he found; what departed and what remained! He lost the blessedness for which he was made, and found the misery for which he was not made. That departed without which nothing is happy, and that remained which in itself is nothing but wretched. “Man ate then the bread of angels,” for which he now hungers; now he eats “the bread of sorrows,” which then he did not know. Alas, the common mourning of mankind, the universal lament of the children of Adam! He belched with fullness; we sigh with hunger. He had plenty; we beg. He held it happily and deserted it wretchedly; we lack it unhappily and long for it miserably—and alas, we remain empty! Why did he not keep for us, when he easily could, what we so grievously lack?

    Psalms 78:25 and 127:2. “He” is Adam.

    Quare sic nobis obseravit lucem et obduxit nos tenebris? Ut quid nobis abstulit vitam et inflixit mortem? Aerumnosi, unde sumus expulsi, quo sumus impulsi! Unde praecipitati, quo obruti! A patria in exsilium, a visione Dei in caecitatem nostram. A iucunditate immortalitatis in amaritudinem et horrorem mortis. Misera mutatio! De quanto bono in quantum malum! Grave damnum, gravis dolor, grave totum!

    Why did he shut out the light from us like this, and cover us with darkness? Why did he take life from us and inflict death on us? Wretched as we are, from where have we been driven out, and where driven to! From where cast down, where buried! From our homeland into exile, from the vision of God into our blindness. From the delight of immortality into the bitterness and horror of death. Miserable change! From how great a good into how great an evil! Heavy loss, heavy grief, heavy all of it!

    Sed heu me miserum, unum de aliis miseris filiis Evae elongatis a Deo! quid incepi, quid effeci? Quo tendebam, quo deveni? Ad quid aspirabam, in quibus suspiro? “Quaesivi bona et ecce turbatio”! Tendebam in Deum et offendi in me ipsum. Requiem quaerebam in secreto meo et “tribulationem et dolorem inveni” in intimis meis. Volebam ridere a gaudio mentis meae et cogor “rugire a gemitu cordis mei”. Sperabatur laetitia et ecce, unde densentur suspiria!

    But alas, wretch that I am, one of the other wretched children of Eve, far removed from God! What did I set out to do, what have I achieved? Where was I heading, where have I come to? What was I reaching for, and what am I sighing among? “I sought good things, and behold, turmoil!” I was heading toward God, and I stumbled over myself. I sought rest in my inner privacy, and “I found trouble and sorrow” in my depths. I wanted to laugh for joy of mind, and I am forced “to roar with the groaning of my heart.” Gladness was hoped for, and behold, what makes my sighs come thicker!

    Et o “tu, Domine, usquequo? Usquequo, Domine, oblivisceris nos, usquequo avertis faciem tuam a nobis”? Quando “respicies et exaudies” nos? Quando “illuminabis oculos” nostros et “ostendes” nobis “faciem tuam”? Quando restitues te nobis? Respice, Domine, exaudi, illumina nos, ostende nobis teipsum. Restitue te nobis, ut bene sit nobis, sine quo tam male est nobis. Miserare labores et conatus nostros ad te, qui nihil valemus sine te. Invita nos, “adiuva” nos. Obsecro, Domine, ne desperem suspirando, sed respirem sperando. Obsecro, Domine, amaricatum est cor meum sua desolatione, indulca illud tua consolatione. Obsecro, Domine, esuriens incepi quaerere te, ne desinam ieiunus de te. Famelicus accessi, ne recedam impastus. Pauper veni ad divitem, miser ad misericordem, ne redeam vacuus et contemptus.

    And you, “O Lord, how long? How long, Lord, will you forget us? How long will you turn your face away from us?” When will you “look upon us and hear” us? When will you “enlighten” our “eyes” and “show” us “your face”? When will you give yourself back to us? Look upon us, Lord, hear us, enlighten us, show yourself to us. Give yourself back to us, so that it may be well with us—for without you it is so ill with us. Have pity on our toils and strivings toward you, for we can do nothing without you. Invite us, “help” us. I beg you, Lord, let me not sigh myself into despair, but breathe again in hope. I beg you, Lord, my heart is made bitter by its desolation; sweeten it with your consolation. I beg you, Lord, I began to seek you hungry; let me not leave off still fasting from you. Famished I came to you; let me not go away unfed. Poor I came to the rich, wretched to the merciful; let me not return empty and scorned.

    Psalm 13:1–3.

    Et si “antequam comedam, suspiro”, da vel post suspiria quod comedam. Domine, incurvatus non possum nisi deorsum aspicere; erige me, ut possim sursum intendere. “Iniquitates meae supergressae caput meum” obvolvunt me, “et sicut onus grave” gravant me. Evolve me, exonera me, ne “urgeat puteus” earum “os suum super me”. Liceat mihi suspicere lucem tuam, vel de longe, vel de profundo. Doce me quaerere te et ostende te quaerenti; quia nec quaerere te possum, nisi tu doceas, nec invenire, nisi te ostendas. Quaeram te desiderando, desiderem quaerendo. Inveniam amando, amem inveniendo.

    And if “I sigh before I eat,” give me at least after my sighs something to eat. Lord, bent over as I am, I can only look downward; raise me up, so that I can look upward. “My iniquities have gone over my head”; they wrap me round, “and like a heavy burden” they weigh me down. Unwrap me, unburden me, lest their “pit close its mouth over me.” Let me look up at your light, even from afar, even from the depths. Teach me to seek you, and show yourself to me as I seek; for I cannot seek you unless you teach me, nor find you unless you show yourself. Let me seek you in desiring you, and desire you in seeking you. Let me find you in loving you, and love you in finding you.

    Famous passage I believe in order to understandAnselm prays to understand what he believes: “I do not seek to understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand.”

    Fateor, Domine, et gratias ago, quia creasti in me hanc “imaginem tuam”, ut tui memor te cogitem, te amem. Sed sic est abolita attritione vitiorum, sic offuscata fumo peccatorum, ut non possit facere, ad quod facta est, nisi tu renoves et reformes eam. Non tento, Domine, penetrare altitudinem tuam, quia nullatenus comparo illi intellectum meum; sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo: quia “nisi credidero, non intelligam”.

    I acknowledge, Lord, and I give thanks, that you have created in me this “image of yours,” so that, remembering you, I may think of you and love you. But it is so worn away by the abrasion of vices, so darkened by the smoke of sins, that it cannot do what it was made to do unless you renew and reform it. I do not try, Lord, to penetrate your height, for I in no way compare my understanding with it; but I long to understand to some degree your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand. For this too I believe: that “unless I believe, I shall not understand.”

    Isaiah 7:9 in the Old Latin version, a text often cited by Augustine.

    That God truly exists

    Even the fool understands “that than which nothing greater can be thought,” so it must exist in reality too.

    Famous passage The ontological argumentGod is “something than which nothing greater can be thought,” which must exist in reality as well as in the understanding.

    Ergo Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut, quantum scis expedire, intelligam, quia es sicut credimus, et hoc es quod credimus. Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia “dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus”? Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico: 'aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest', intelligit quod audit; et quod intelligit, in intellectu eius est, etiam si non intelligat illud esse. Aliud enim est rem esse in intellectu, aliud intelligere rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae facturus est, habet quidem in intellectu, sed nondum intelligit esse quod nondum fecit. Cum vero iam pinxit, et habet in intellectu et intelligit esse quod iam fecit.

    So, Lord, you who give understanding to faith, grant me to understand, as far as you know it to be good for me, that you exist as we believe, and that you are what we believe. And indeed we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or is there, then, no such nature, since “the fool has said in his heart: There is no God”? But surely this same fool, when he hears the very thing I am saying—“something than which nothing greater can be thought”—understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the thing exists. When a painter thinks out beforehand what he is going to make, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand that what he has not yet made exists. But once he has painted it, he both has it in his understanding and understands that what he has now made exists.

    Psalms 14:1 and 53:1.

    Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, quia hoc, cum audit, intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est.

    So even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists at least in the understanding, since when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding.

    Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.

    And surely that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For if it exists even in the understanding alone, it can be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater. If, then, that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the understanding alone, the very thing than which nothing greater can be thought is something than which something greater can be thought. But surely this cannot be. Therefore there exists beyond doubt something than which nothing greater can be thought, both in the understanding and in reality.

    That God cannot be thought not to exist

    What cannot be thought not to exist is greater, so God cannot even be thought not to exist.

    Famous passage Cannot be thought not to existAnselm argues that God exists so truly that he cannot even be thought not to exist.

    Quod utique sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod maius est quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: id ipsum quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitari nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.

    And it exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to exist, and this is greater than what can be thought not to exist. So if that than which nothing greater can be thought can be thought not to exist, then that very thing than which nothing greater can be thought is not that than which nothing greater can be thought—which cannot hold together. So something than which nothing greater can be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist.

    Et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster. Sic ergo vere es, Domine, Deus meus, ut nec cogitari possis non esse. Et merito. Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super creatorem et iudicaret de creatore; quod valde est absurdum. Et quidem quidquid est aliud praeter te solum, potest cogitari non esse. Solus igitur verissime omnium et ideo maxime omnium habes esse, quia quidquid aliud est, non sic vere, et idcirco minus habet esse. Cur itaque “dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus”, cum tam in promptu sit rationali menti te maxime omnium esse? Cur, nisi quia stultus et insipiens?

    And this is you, Lord our God. So truly, then, do you exist, Lord my God, that you cannot even be thought not to exist. And rightly so. For if some mind could think of something better than you, the creature would rise above the Creator and sit in judgment on the Creator, which is utterly absurd. Indeed, whatever else there is, apart from you alone, can be thought not to exist. You alone, then, of all things, have existence most truly, and therefore most fully of all; for whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and so has less existence. Why then “has the fool said in his heart: There is no God,” when it is so obvious to a rational mind that you exist most fully of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool?

    How the fool said in his heart what cannot be thought

    One can think the words “God does not exist,” but not while understanding what God is.

    Verum quomodo dixit in corde quod cogitare non potuit; aut quomodo cogitare non potuit quod dixit in corde, cum idem sit dicere in corde et cogitare? Quod si vere, immo quia vere et cogitavit, quia dixit in corde, et non dixit in corde, quia cogitare non potuit: non uno tantum modo dicitur aliquid in corde et cogitatur. Aliter enim cogitatur res, cum vox eam significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur. Illo itaque modo potest cogitari Deus non esse, isto vero minime. Nullus quippe intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est, licet haec verba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea significatione. Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest.

    But how has he said in his heart what he could not think? Or how could he not think what he said in his heart, since saying in the heart and thinking are the same? If he truly—or rather, since he truly—both thought it, because he said it in his heart, and did not say it in his heart, because he could not think it, then there is more than one way in which something is said in the heart or thought. For a thing is thought in one way when the word signifying it is thought, and in another when what the thing itself is is understood. In the first way God can be thought not to exist, but in the second not at all. No one who understands what God is can think that God does not exist, even though he may say these words in his heart, either with no meaning at all or with some foreign meaning. For God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.

    Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare.

    Whoever understands this well certainly understands that it exists in such a way that it cannot, even in thought, not exist. So whoever understands that God exists in this way cannot think that he does not exist.

    Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut, si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere.

    Thanks to you, good Lord, thanks to you, because what I first believed by your gift I now so understand by your illumination that, even if I did not want to believe that you exist, I could not fail to understand it.

    That God is whatever it is better to be than not to be

    God, existing through himself and making all things from nothing, is just, truthful and blessed.

    Quid igitur es, Domine Deus, quo nil maius valet cogitari? Sed quid es, nisi id quod summum omnium solum existens per seipsum, omnia alia fecit de nihilo? Quidquid enim hoc non est, minus est quam cogitari possit. Sed hoc de te cogitari non potest. Quod ergo bonum deest summo bono, per quod est omne bonum? Tu es itaque iustus, verax, beatus, et quidquid melius est esse quam non esse. Melius namque est esse iustum quam non iustum, beatum quam non beatum.

    What, then, are you, Lord God, you than whom nothing greater can be thought? What are you but that which, highest of all, alone existing through itself, made all other things from nothing? For whatever is not this is less than what can be thought; but this cannot be thought of you. What good, then, is lacking to the supreme good, through which every good exists? You are therefore just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just, blessed than not blessed.

    How God perceives though he is not a body

    God perceives in the sense that he supremely knows all things, not through bodily senses.

    Verum cum melius sit esse sensibilem, omnipotentem, misericordem, impassibilem quam non esse: quomodo es sensibilis, si non es corpus; aut omnipotens, si omnia non potes; aut misericors simul et impassibilis? Nam si sola corporea sunt sensibilia, quoniam sensus circa corpus et in corpore sunt: quomodo es sensibilis, cum non sis corpus, sed summus spiritus, qui corpore melior est?

    But since it is better to be able to perceive, omnipotent, merciful and impassible than not to be so, how are you able to perceive if you are not a body; or omnipotent if you cannot do all things; or at once merciful and impassible? For if only bodily things can perceive, since the senses are around a body and in a body, how are you able to perceive, since you are not a body but the supreme spirit, which is better than body?

    Impassible: not subject to being acted upon or to suffering.

    Sed si sentire non nisi cognoscere aut non nisi ad cognoscendum est qui enim sentit cognoscit secundum sensuum proprietatem, ut per visum colores, per gustum sapores: non inconvenienter dicitur aliquo modo, sentire quidquid aliquo modo cognoscit. Ergo, Domine, quamvis non sis corpus, vere tamen eo modo summe sensibilis es, quo summe omnia cognoscis, non quo animal corporeo sensu cognoscit.

    But if perceiving is nothing but knowing, or exists only for the sake of knowing—for whoever perceives knows according to the particular nature of each sense, as colors through sight and flavors through taste—then it is not inappropriate to say that whatever knows in some way perceives in some way. So, Lord, though you are not a body, you truly are supremely able to perceive in the sense that you supremely know all things, not in the way an animal knows through bodily sense.

    How God is omnipotent though there are many things he cannot do

    Being able to lie or be corrupted is powerlessness, not power, so God lacks nothing.

    Sed et omnipotens quomodo es, si omnia non potes? Aut si non potes corrumpi nec mentiri nec facere verum esse falsum, ut quod factum est non esse factum, et plura similiter: quomodo potes omnia?

    But how are you omnipotent, too, if you cannot do all things? Or if you cannot be corrupted, or lie, or make the true false—such as making what has been done not to have been done—and many other things like these, how can you do all things?

    An haec posse non est potentia, sed impotentia? Nam qui haec potest quod sibi non expedit et quod non debet potest. Quae quanto magis potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in illum et ipse minus contra illas. Qui ergo sic potest, non potentia potest, sed impotentia. Non enim ideo dicitur posse, quia ipse possit, sed quia sua impotentia facit aliud in se posse; sive aliquo alio genere loquendi, sicut multa improprie dicuntur. Ut cum ponimus 'esse' pro 'non esse', et 'facere' pro eo quod est 'non facere', aut pro 'nihil facere'. Nam saepe dicimus ei, qui rem aliquam esse negat: sic est, quemadmodum dicis esse; cum magis proprie videatur dici: sic non est quemadmodum dicis non esse.

    Or is being able to do these things not power but powerlessness? For whoever can do these things can do what is not good for him and what he ought not to do. And the more he can do them, the more power adversity and wickedness have over him, and the less he has against them. So whoever can do things in this way can do them not by power but by powerlessness. For he is said to be able not because he himself is able, but because his powerlessness makes something else able to act on him; or else it is by some other manner of speaking, as many things are said improperly. For instance, we put “to be” for “not to be,” and “to do” for what is “not to do,” or for “to do nothing.” For we often say to someone who denies that something is so: “It is as you say it is”; though it would seem more proper to say: “It is not, as you say it is not.”

    Item dicimus: iste sedet, sicut ille facit, aut: iste quiescit, sicut ille facit; cum 'sedere' sit quiddam non facere et 'quiescere' sit nihil facere. Sic itaque, cum dicitur habere potentiam faciendi aut patiendi quod sibi non expedit aut quod non debet, impotentia intelligitur per potentiam; quia quo plus habet hanc potentiam, eo adversitas et perversitas in illum sunt potentiores, et ille contra eas impotentior. Ergo, Domine Deus, inde verius et omnipotens, quia nihil potes per impotentiam, et nihil potest contra te.

    Likewise we say: “This man is sitting, just as that man is doing,” or “This man is resting, just as that man is doing,” although “sitting” is a kind of not doing, and “resting” is doing nothing. So, when someone is said to have the power of doing or suffering what is not good for him or what he ought not, powerlessness is meant by “power”; for the more he has this power, the more powerful adversity and wickedness are against him, and the more powerless he is against them. Therefore, Lord God, you are all the more truly omnipotent because you can do nothing through powerlessness, and nothing has power against you.

    How God is both merciful and impassible

    We feel the effect of God’s mercy, though God feels no emotion of compassion.

    Sed et misericors simul et impassibilis quomodo es? Nam si es impassibilis, non compateris; si non compateris, non est tibi miserum cor ex compassione miseri, quod est esse misericordem. At si non es misericors, unde miseris est tanta consolatio?

    But how are you at once merciful and impassible? For if you are impassible, you do not feel compassion; if you do not feel compassion, your heart is not made wretched by compassion for the wretched—which is what it is to be merciful. But if you are not merciful, where do the wretched find such consolation?

    Anselm plays on misericors, “merciful,” as having a heart (cor) made wretched (miserum) for the wretched.

    Quomodo ergo es et non es misericors, Domine, nisi quia es misericors secundum nos, et non es secundum te? Es quippe secundum nostrum sensum, et non es secundum tuum. Etenim cum tu respicis nos miseros, nos sentimus misericordis effectum, tu non sentis affectum. Et misericors es igitur, quia misericors salvas et peccatoribus tuis parcis; et misericors non es, quia nulla miseriae compassione afficeris.

    How, then, are you both merciful and not merciful, Lord, unless it is that you are merciful with respect to us and not with respect to yourself? You are so according to our experience, and not according to yours. For when you look upon us in our wretchedness, we feel the effect of mercy, but you do not feel the emotion. So you are merciful because in your mercy you save us and spare those who sin against you; and you are not merciful because you are touched by no compassion for wretchedness.

    How the wholly just God spares the wicked

    God’s mercy springs from his supreme goodness, which is itself not separate from his justice.

    Verum malis quomodo parcis, si es totus iustus et summe iustus? Quomodo enim totus et summe iustus facit aliquid non iustum? Aut quae iustitia est merenti mortem aeternam dare vitam sempiternam? Unde ergo, bone Deus, bone bonis et malis, unde tibi salvare malos, si hoc non est iustum, et tu facis aliquid non iustum?

    But how do you spare the wicked if you are wholly just and supremely just? For how does one who is wholly and supremely just do something that is not just? Or what justice is it to give everlasting life to one who deserves eternal death? How, then, good God, good to the good and to the wicked, how is it that you save the wicked, if this is not just—and do you do anything that is not just?

    An quia bonitas tua est incomprehensibilis, latet hoc in “luce inaccessibili quam habitas”? Vere in altissimo et secretissimo bonitatis tuae latet fons, unde manat fluvius misericordiae tuae. Nam cum totus et summe iustus sis, tamen idcirco etiam malis benignus es, quia totus summe bonus es. Minus namque bonus esses, si nulli malo esses benignus. Melior est enim qui et bonis et malis bonus est, quam qui bonis tantum est bonus. Et melior est, qui malis et puniendo et parcendo est bonus, quam qui puniendo tantum. Ideo ergo misericors es, quia totus et summe bonus es. Et cum forsitan videatur, cur bonis bona et malis mala retribuas, illud certe penitus est mirandum, cur tu totus iustus et nullo egens malis et reis tuis bona tribuas.

    Or is it because your goodness is incomprehensible that this lies hidden in the “inaccessible light in which you dwell”? Truly, in the highest and most secret depth of your goodness lies hidden the spring from which the river of your mercy flows. For though you are wholly and supremely just, you are nonetheless kind even to the wicked, precisely because you are wholly and supremely good. For you would be less good if you were kind to no wicked person. One who is good to both the good and the wicked is better than one who is good only to the good. And one who is good to the wicked both in punishing and in sparing is better than one who is good only in punishing. That is why you are merciful: because you are wholly and supremely good. And while it may perhaps be seen why you repay good to the good and evil to the wicked, it is certainly altogether to be wondered at why you, wholly just and needing nothing, grant good things to the wicked and to those guilty before you.

    O altitudo bonitatis tuae, Deus! et videtur, unde sis misericors, et non pervidetur. Cernitur, unde flumen manat, et non perspicitur fons, unde nascatur. Nam et de plenitudine bonitatis est, quia peccatoribus tuis pius es; et in altitudine bonitatis latet, qua ratione hoc es. Etenim licet bonis bona et malis mala ex bonitate retribuas, ratio tamen iustitiae hoc postulare videtur. Cum vero malis bona tribuis: et scitur, quia summe bonus hoc facere voluit, et mirum est, cur summe iustus hoc velle potuit.

    O height of your goodness, God! We see where your mercy comes from, and do not see through to it. We discern where the river flows from, and do not see the spring from which it rises. For it comes from the fullness of your goodness that you are gracious to those who sin against you; and it lies hidden in the height of your goodness for what reason you are so. For though you repay good to the good and evil to the wicked out of goodness, the principle of justice seems to demand this. But when you grant good things to the wicked, we know that the supremely good willed to do this, and we wonder how the supremely just could will it.

    Nam etsi difficile sit intelligere, quomodo misericordia tua non absit a tua iustitia, necessarium tamen est credere, quia nequaquam adversatur quod exundat ex bonitate, quae nulla est sine iustitia, immo vere concordat iustitiae. Nempe si misericors es, quia es summe bonus, et summe bonus non es, nisi quia es summe iustus: vere idcirco es misericors, quia summe iustus es.

    For although it is hard to understand how your mercy is not separated from your justice, we must nonetheless believe that what overflows from goodness is in no way opposed to justice—for goodness is nothing without justice—but truly agrees with justice. Indeed, if you are merciful because you are supremely good, and you are not supremely good except because you are supremely just, then truly you are merciful precisely because you are supremely just.

    Adiuva me, iuste et misericors Deus, cuius lucem quaero, adiuva me, ut intelligam quod dico. Vere ergo ideo misericors es, quia iustus.

    Help me, just and merciful God, whose light I seek; help me to understand what I am saying. Truly, then, you are merciful for this reason: because you are just.

    Ergone misericordia tua nascitur ex iustitia tua? Ergone parcis malis ex iustitia? Si sic est, Domine, si sic est, doce me quomodo est. An quia iustum est te sic esse bonum, ut nequeas intelligi melior, et sic potenter operari, ut non possis cogitari potentius? Quid enim hoc iustius? Hoc utique non fieret, si esses bonus tantum retribuendo et non parcendo, et si faceres de non bonis tantum bonos et non etiam de malis. Hoc itaque modo iustum est ut parcas malis, et ut facias bonos de malis. Denique quod non iuste fit, non debet fieri; et quod non debet fieri, iniuste fit. Si ergo non iuste malis misereris, non debes misereri; et si non debes misereri, iniuste misereris.

    Is your mercy, then, born of your justice? Do you, then, spare the wicked out of justice? If so, Lord, if so, teach me how it is. Is it because it is just that you should be so good that you cannot be understood to be better, and should work so powerfully that you cannot be thought more powerful? For what is more just than this? And this would certainly not be the case if you were good only in repaying and not in sparing, and if you made good people only out of those who are not good, and not also out of the wicked. In this way, then, it is just that you spare the wicked and make good people out of the wicked. Finally, what is not done justly ought not to be done; and what ought not to be done is done unjustly. If, then, you have mercy on the wicked unjustly, you ought not to have mercy; and if you ought not to have mercy, you have mercy unjustly.

    Quod si nefas est dicere, fas est credere te iuste misereri malis.

    And if it is wrong to say this, it is right to believe that you have mercy on the wicked justly.

    How God justly punishes and justly spares

    Punishment fits the deserts of the wicked; sparing them befits God’s goodness.

    Sed iustum est, ut malos punias. Quid namque iustius, quam ut boni bona et mali mala recipiant? Quomodo ergo et iustum est ut malos punias, et iustum est ut malis parcas?

    But it is just that you punish the wicked. For what is more just than that the good receive good and the wicked evil? How, then, is it both just that you punish the wicked and just that you spare the wicked?

    An alio modo iuste punis malos, et alio modo iuste parcis malis? Cum enim punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, non quia illorum meritis, sed quia bonitati tuae condecens est. Nam parcendo malis ita iustus es secundum te et non secundum nos, sicut misericors es secundum nos et non secundum te. Quoniam salvando nos, quos iuste perderes, sicut misericors es, non quia tu sentias affectum, sed quia nos sentimus effectum: ita iustus es, non quia nobis reddas debitum, sed quia facis quod decet te summe bonum. Sic itaque sine repugnantia iuste punis et iuste parcis.

    Or do you justly punish the wicked in one way and justly spare the wicked in another? When you punish the wicked, it is just, because it fits their deserts; but when you spare the wicked, it is just, not because it fits their deserts but because it befits your goodness. For in sparing the wicked you are just with respect to yourself and not with respect to us, just as you are merciful with respect to us and not with respect to yourself. For in saving us, whom you might justly destroy, just as you are merciful not because you feel emotion but because we feel the effect, so you are just not because you give us what we are owed but because you do what befits you, the supremely good. In this way, then, without contradiction, you justly punish and justly spare.

    All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth

    Whatever God wills is just, though why he spares some and not others cannot be grasped.

    Sed numquid etiam non est iustum secundum te, Domine, ut malos punias? Iustum quippe est te sic esse iustum, ut iustior nequeas cogitari. Quod nequaquam esses, si tantum bonis bona et non malis mala redderes. Iustior enim est qui et bonis et malis, quam qui bonis tantum merita retribuit. Iustum igitur est secundum te, iuste et benigne Deus, et cum punis et cum parcis. Vere igitur “universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas” et tamen “iustus Dominus in omnibus viis suis”. Et utique sine repugnantia; quia quos vis punire, non est iustum salvari, et quibus vis parcere, non est iustum damnari. Nam id solum iustum est quod vis et non iustum quod non vis.

    But is it not also just with respect to yourself, Lord, that you punish the wicked? It is indeed just that you should be so just that you cannot be thought more just. And this you would by no means be if you repaid good to the good but not evil to the wicked. For one who repays both the good and the wicked their deserts is more just than one who repays only the good. It is just, therefore, with respect to you, just and kind God, both when you punish and when you spare. Truly, then, “all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth,” and yet “the Lord is just in all his ways.” And certainly without contradiction: for those whom you will to punish, it is not just that they be saved; and those whom you will to spare, it is not just that they be condemned. For that alone is just which you will, and that is not just which you do not will.

    Psalms 25:10 and 145:17.

    Sic ergo nascitur de iustitia tua misericordia tua, quia iustum est te sic esse bonum, ut et parcendo sis bonus. Et hoc est forsitan, cur summe iustus potest velle bona malis. Sed si utcumque capi potest, cur malos potes velle salvare: illud certe nulla ratione comprehendi potest, cur de similibus malis hos magis salves quam illos per summam bonitatem, et illos magis damnes quam istos per summam iustitiam.

    So, then, your mercy is born of your justice, since it is just that you be so good that you are good even in sparing. And this, perhaps, is why the supremely just can will good things for the wicked. But if it can somehow be grasped why you can will to save the wicked, it certainly cannot be comprehended by any reasoning why, among those equally wicked, you save these rather than those through your supreme goodness, and condemn those rather than these through your supreme justice.

    Sic ergo vere es sensibilis, omnipotens, misericors et impassibilis, quemadmodum vivens, sapiens, bonus, beatus, aeternus, et quidquid melius est esse quam non esse.

    So, then, you are truly able to perceive, omnipotent, merciful and impassible, just as you are living, wise, good, blessed, eternal, and indeed whatever it is better to be than not to be.

    That God is the very life by which he lives

    Whatever God is, he is through himself: life, wisdom and goodness itself.

    Sed certe quidquid es, non per aliud es quam per teipsum. Tu es igitur ipsa vita qua vivis, et sapientia qua sapis, et bonitas ipsa qua bonis et malis bonus es; et ita de similibus.

    But certainly, whatever you are, you are through nothing other than yourself. You are, then, the very life by which you live, and the wisdom by which you are wise, and the very goodness by which you are good to the good and the wicked; and likewise with the rest.

    How God alone is unbounded and eternal

    God alone is wholly everywhere and always; created spirits are unbounded only compared with bodies.

    Sed omne quod clauditur aliquatenus loco et tempore, minus est quam nulla lex loci aut temporis coercet. Quoniam ergo maius te nihil est, nullus locus aut tempus te cohibet, sed ubique et semper es. Quod quia de te solo dici potest, tu solus incircumscriptus es et aeternus. Quomodo igitur dicuntur et alii spiritus incircumscripti et aeterni?

    But everything that is enclosed in any way by place or time is less than what no law of place or time constrains. Since, then, nothing is greater than you, no place or time contains you; you are everywhere and always. And since this can be said of you alone, you alone are unbounded and eternal. How, then, are other spirits also said to be unbounded and eternal?

    Et quidem solus es aeternus, quia solus omnium, sicut non desinis, sic non incipis esse. Sed solus quomodo es incircumscriptus? An creatus spiritus ad te collatus est circumscriptus, ad corpus vero incircumscriptus? Nempe omnino circumscriptum est, quod cum alicubi totum est, non potest simul esse alibi; quod de solis corporeis cernitur. Incircumscriptum vero, quod simul est ubique totum; quod de te solo intelligitur. Circumscriptum autem simul et incircumscriptum est, quod, cum alicubi sit totum, potest simul esse totum alibi, non tamen ubique; quod de creatis spiritibus cognoscitur. Si enim non esset anima tota in singulis membris sui corporis, non sentiret tota in singulis. Tu ergo, domine, singulariter es incircumscriptus et aeternus, et tamen et alii spiritus sunt incircumscripti et aeterni.

    And indeed you alone are eternal, because you alone of all things, just as you do not cease to be, so you do not begin to be. But how are you alone unbounded? Is it that a created spirit, compared with you, is bounded, but compared with a body is unbounded? For that is wholly bounded which, when it is wholly in one place, cannot at the same time be elsewhere; and this is seen only in bodily things. That is unbounded which is at the same time wholly everywhere; and this is understood of you alone. And that is at once bounded and unbounded which, when it is wholly in one place, can at the same time be wholly in another, but not everywhere; and this is known of created spirits. For if the soul were not whole in each of the limbs of its body, it would not perceive as a whole in each of them. So you, Lord, are uniquely unbounded and eternal, and yet other spirits too are unbounded and eternal.

    How God is seen and not seen by those who seek him

    The soul has found God yet cannot see him, darkened by its weakness and dazzled by his light.

    An invenisti, anima mea, quod quaerebas? Quaerebas Deum et invenisti eum esse quiddam summum omnium, quo nihil melius cogitari potest; et hoc esse ipsam vitam, lucem, sapientiam, bonitatem, aeternam beatitudinem et beatam aeternitatem; et hoc esse ubique et semper. Nam si non invenisti Deum tuum: quomodo est ille hoc quod invenisti, et quod illum tam certa veritate et vera certitudine intellexisti? Si vero invenisti: quid est, quod non sentis quod invenisti? Cur non te sentit, Domine Deus, anima mea, si invenit te?

    Have you found, my soul, what you were looking for? You were seeking God, and you found him to be something highest of all, than which nothing better can be thought; and you found that this is life itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed eternity; and that this is everywhere and always. For if you have not found your God, how is he this which you have found, and which you have understood with such certain truth and true certainty? But if you have found him, why is it that you do not feel what you have found? Why does my soul not feel you, Lord God, if it has found you?

    An non invenit, quem invenit esse lucem et veritatem? Quomodo namque intellexit hoc, nisi videndo lucem et veritatem? Aut potuit omnino aliquid intelligere de te, nisi per “lucem tuam et veritatem tuam”? Si ergo vidit lucem et veritatem, vidit te. Si non vidit te, non vidit lucem nec veritatem. An et veritas et lux est quod vidit, et tamen nondum te vidit, quia vidit te aliquatenus, sed non vidit te “sicuti es”?

    Or has it not found the one it found to be light and truth? For how did it understand this except by seeing light and truth? Or could it understand anything at all about you except through “your light and your truth”? If, then, it saw light and truth, it saw you. If it did not see you, it saw neither light nor truth. Or is what it saw both truth and light, and yet it has not yet seen you, because it saw you to some extent but did not see you “as you are”?

    Domine Deus meus, formator et reformator meus, dic desideranti animae meae, quid aliud es, quam quod vidit, ut pure videat quod desiderat. Intendit se ut plus videat, et nihil videt ultra hoc quod vidit, nisi tenebras; immo non videt “tenebras, quae nullae sunt in te”, sed videt se non plus posse videre propter tenebras suas. Cur hoc, Domine cur hoc? Tenebratur oculus eius infirmitate sua, aut reverberatur fulgore tuo? Sed certe et tenebratur in se, et reverberatur a te. Utique et obscuratur sua brevitate, et obruitur tua immensitate. Vere et contrahitur angustia sua, et vincitur amplitudine tua. Quanta namque est lux illa, de qua micat omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet!

    Lord my God, you who formed me and re-formed me, tell my longing soul what else you are than what it has seen, so that it may see clearly what it longs for. It strains to see more, and sees nothing beyond what it has seen but darkness—or rather, it does not see “darkness, of which there is none in you,” but it sees that it cannot see more because of its own darkness. Why is this, Lord, why is this? Is its eye darkened by its own weakness, or dazzled by your brilliance? Surely it is both darkened in itself and dazzled by you. Truly it is both dimmed by its own smallness and overwhelmed by your immensity. Truly it is both cramped by its own narrowness and overcome by your vastness. For how great is that light from which shines every truth that gives light to the rational mind!

    1 John 1:5.

    Quam ampla est illa veritas, in qua est omne quod verum est et extra quam non nisi nihil et falsum est! Quam immensa est, quae uno intuitu videt, quaecumque facta sunt, et a quo et per quem et quomodo de nihilo facta sunt! Quid puritatis, quid simplicitatis, quid certitudinis et splendoris ibi est! Certe plus quam a creatura valeat intelligi.

    How vast is that truth in which is everything that is true, and outside which there is only nothingness and falsehood! How immense it is, which in one glance sees all things that have been made, and by whom, and through whom, and how they were made from nothing! What purity, what simplicity, what certainty and splendor are there! Surely more than a creature can understand.

    That God is greater than can be thought

    God is not only that than which nothing greater can be thought but greater than can be thought.

    Famous passage Greater than can be thoughtGod is not only that than which nothing greater can be thought but something greater than can be thought.

    Ergo, Domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit. Quoniam namque valet cogitari esse aliquid huiusmodi: si tu non es hoc ipsum, potest cogitari aliquid maius te; quod fieri nequit.

    So, Lord, you are not only that than which nothing greater can be thought; you are something greater than can be thought. For since it is possible to think that something of this kind exists, if you are not this very thing, something greater than you can be thought—which cannot happen.

    That this is the inaccessible light in which God dwells

    Everything is seen by God’s light, yet the light itself is too bright to look at.

    Vere, Domine, haec est “lux inaccessibilis, in qua habitas”. Vere enim non est aliud quod hanc penetret, ut ibi te pervideat. Vere ideo hanc non video, quia nimia mihi est; et tamen quidquid video, per illam video, sicut infirmus oculus quod videt, per lucem solis videt, quam in ipso sole nequit aspicere. Non potest intellectus meus ad illam. Nimis fulget, non capit illam, nec suffert oculus animae meae diu intendere in illam. Reverberatur fulgore, vincitur amplitudine, obruitur immensitate, confunditur capacitate. O summa et inaccessibilis lux, o tota et beata veritas, quam longe es a me, qui tam prope tibi sum! Quam remota es a conspectu meo, qui sic praesens sum conspectui tuo! Ubique es tota praesens et non te video.

    Truly, Lord, this is the “inaccessible light in which you dwell.” For truly there is nothing else that can pierce it so as to see you there fully. Truly, I do not see it because it is too much for me; and yet whatever I see, I see through it, as a weak eye sees what it sees by the light of the sun, which it cannot look at in the sun itself. My understanding cannot reach it. It shines too brightly; my understanding does not take it in, nor can the eye of my soul bear to gaze on it for long. It is dazzled by its brilliance, overcome by its vastness, overwhelmed by its immensity, bewildered by its fullness. O supreme and inaccessible light, O whole and blessed truth, how far you are from me, who am so near to you! How remote you are from my sight, while I am so present to yours! You are everywhere wholly present, and I do not see you.

    “In te moveor et in te sum” et ad te non possum accedere. Intra me et circa me es et non te sentio.

    “In you I move and in you I am,” and I cannot approach you. You are within me and around me, and I do not feel you.

    Acts 17:28.

    That harmony, fragrance and beauty are in God

    God has beauty, harmony, fragrance, savor and softness in his own way, but sin dulls the soul’s senses.

    Adhuc lates, Domine, animam meam in luce et beatitudine tua, et idcirco versatur illa adhuc in tenebris et miseria sua. Circumspicit enim et non videt pulchritudinem tuam. Auscultat et non audit harmoniam tuam. Olfacit et non percipit odorem tuum. Gustat et non cognoscit saporem tuum. Palpat et non sentit lenitatem tuam. Habes enim haec, Domine Deus, in te tuo ineffabili modo, qui ea dedisti rebus a te creatis suo sensibili modo; sed obriguerunt, sed obstupuerunt, sed obstructi sunt sensus animae meae vetusto languore peccati

    You are still hidden, Lord, from my soul in your light and blessedness, and so it still turns about in its own darkness and misery. It looks around and does not see your beauty. It listens and does not hear your harmony. It smells and does not perceive your fragrance. It tastes and does not recognize your savor. It touches and does not feel your softness. For you have these things, Lord God, in yourself, in your own ineffable way, you who have given them to the things you created in their own perceptible way; but the senses of my soul have grown stiff, have grown numb, have been blocked up by the ancient sickness of sin.

    That there are no parts in God or in his eternity

    Anselm laments his fallen state again, then argues that God is simple unity with no parts.

    Et iterum “ecce turbatio” ecce iterum obviat maeror et luctus quaerenti “gaudium et laetitiam”! Sperabat iam anima mea satietatem et ecce iterum obruitur egestate! Affectabam iam comedere et ecce magis esurire! Conabar assurgere ad lucem Dei et recidi in tenebras meas. Immo non modo cecidi in eas, sed sentio me involutum in eis. Ante cecidi, quam “conciperet me mater mea”. Certe in illis “conceptus sum”, et cum earum obvolutione natus sum. Olim certe in illo omnes cecidimus, “in quo omnes peccavimus”. In illo omnes perdidimus, qui facile tenebat et male sibi et nobis perdidit, quod cum volumus, quaerere nescimus; cum quaerimus, non invenimus; cum invenimus, non est quod quaerimus. Adiuva me tu “propter bonitatem tuam, Domine”.

    And again, “behold, turmoil”! Behold, again grief and mourning confront one who seeks “joy and gladness”! My soul was already hoping for fullness, and behold, again it is overwhelmed by want! I was already reaching out to eat, and behold, I hunger more! I was trying to rise to the light of God, and I have fallen back into my own darkness. Indeed, not only have I fallen into it, but I feel myself wrapped up in it. I fell before “my mother conceived me.” Surely in it “I was conceived,” and wrapped in it I was born. Long ago, surely, we all fell in him “in whom we all sinned.” In him we all lost what he held easily and lost, to his harm and ours—what, when we want it, we do not know how to seek; when we seek it, we do not find; when we find it, it is not what we seek. Help me, “for your goodness’ sake, Lord.”

    Psalm 51:5; Romans 5:12.

    “Quaesivi vultum tuum, vultum tuum, Domine, requiram; ne avertas faciem tuam a me”. Releva me de me ad te. Munda, sana, acue, “illumina” oculum mentis meae, “ut intueatur te”. Recolligat vires suas anima mea, et toto intellectu iterum intendat in te, Domine.

    “I have sought your face; your face, Lord, I will seek; do not turn your face away from me.” Lift me up from myself to you. Cleanse, heal, sharpen, “enlighten” the eye of my mind, “that it may gaze on you.” Let my soul gather its strength again, and with all its understanding strain once more toward you, Lord.

    Quid es, Domine, quid es, quid te intelliget cor meum? Certe vita es, sapientia es, veritas es, bonitas es, beatitudo es, aeternitas es, et omne verum bonum es. Multa sunt haec, non potest angustus intellectus meus tot uno simul intuitu videre, ut omnibus simul delectetur. Quomodo ergo, Domine, es omnia haec? An sunt partes tui, aut potius unumquodque horum est totum quod es? Nam quidquid partibus est iunctum, non est omnino unum, sed quodam modo plura et diversum a seipso, et vel actu vel intellectu dissolvi potest; quae aliena sunt a te, quo nihil melius cogitari potest.

    What are you, Lord, what are you, what shall my heart understand you to be? Surely you are life, you are wisdom, you are truth, you are goodness, you are blessedness, you are eternity, and you are every true good. These are many things; my narrow understanding cannot see so many at once in a single glance, so as to delight in all of them at once. How, then, Lord, are you all these things? Are they parts of you, or rather is each of them the whole of what you are? For whatever is composed of parts is not altogether one, but in some way many and different from itself, and it can be broken up either in fact or in the understanding; and these things are foreign to you, than whom nothing better can be thought.

    Nullae igitur partes sunt in te, Domine, nec es plura, sed sic es unum quiddam et idem tibi ipsi, ut in nullo tibi ipsi sis dissimilis; immo tu es ipsa unitas, nullo intellectu divisibilis. Ergo vita et sapientia et reliqua non sunt partes tui, sed omnia sunt unum, et unumquodque horum est totum quod es, et quod sunt reliqua omnia. Quoniam ergo nec tu habes partes nec tua aeternitas, quae tu es: nusquam et numquam est pars tua aut aeternitatis tuae, sed ubique totus es, et aeternitas tua tota est semper.

    So there are no parts in you, Lord, nor are you many; you are so much one thing, and the same as yourself, that in nothing are you unlike yourself. Indeed, you are unity itself, divisible by no understanding. So life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of you, but all are one, and each of them is the whole of what you are and what all the rest are. Since, then, neither you nor your eternity, which is you, has parts, nowhere and never is there a part of you or of your eternity; rather you are whole everywhere, and your eternity is whole always.

    That God is not in place or time, but all things are in him

    God did not exist yesterday and will not tomorrow; he simply is, outside all time.

    Sed si per aeternitatem tuam fuisti et es et eris, et fuisse non est futurum esse et esse non est fuisse vel futurum esse: quomodo aeternitas tua tota est semper? An de aeternitate tua nihil praeterit, ut iam non sit, nec aliquid futurum est, quasi nondum sit? Non ergo fuisti heri aut eris cras, sed heri et hodie et cras es. Immo nec heri nec hodie nec cras es, sed simpliciter es extra omne tempus. Nam nihil aliud est heri et hodie et cras quam in tempore; tu autem, licet nihil sit sine te, non es tamen in loco aut tempore, sed omnia sunt in te. Nihil enim te continet, sed tu contines omnia.

    But if through your eternity you were and are and will be, and to have been is not to be going to be, and to be is not to have been or to be going to be, how is your eternity whole always? Or is it that nothing of your eternity passes away so as no longer to be, nor is anything of it future, as if it were not yet? So you did not exist yesterday, nor will you exist tomorrow; rather, yesterday and today and tomorrow you are. Or rather, you are neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow, but you simply are, outside all time. For yesterday and today and tomorrow are nothing but in time; you, however, though nothing exists without you, are not in place or time, but all things are in you. For nothing contains you, but you contain all things.

    That God is before and beyond all things, even eternal ones

    God surpasses even eternal things, since their whole eternity is present to him at once.

    Tu ergo imples et complecteris omnia; tu es ante et ultra omnia. Et quidem ante omnia es, quia “antequam fierent, tu es”. Ultra omnia vero quomodo es? Qualiter enim es ultra ea quae finem non habebunt?

    You, then, fill and embrace all things; you are before and beyond all things. And you are before all things because “before they came to be, you are.” But how are you beyond all things? In what way are you beyond those things that will have no end?

    Psalm 90:2.

    An quia illa sine te nullatenus esse possunt, tu autem nullo modo minus es, etiam si illa redeunt in nihilum? Sic enim quodam modo es ultra illa. An etiam, quia illa cogitari possunt habere finem, tu vero nequaquam? Nam sic illa quidem finem quodam modo, tu vero nullo modo. Et certe quod nullo modo habet finem, ultra est quod aliquo modo finitur. An hoc quoque modo transis omnia etiam aeterna, quia tua et illorum aeternitas tota tibi praesens est, cum illa nondum habeant de sua aeternitate quod venturum est, sicut iam non habent quod praeteritum est? Sic quippe semper es ultra illa, cum semper tibi sis praesens, seu cum illud semper tibi praesens, ad quod illa nondum pervenerunt.

    Is it because they can in no way exist without you, whereas you are in no way less even if they return to nothing? For in this way you are, in a sense, beyond them. Or is it also because they can be thought to have an end, but you cannot at all? For in this way they do have an end in a sense, but you in no sense. And surely what has no end in any sense is beyond what is ended in some sense. Or do you also surpass all things, even eternal ones, in this way: that your eternity and theirs is wholly present to you, while they do not yet have the part of their eternity that is to come, just as they no longer have the part that is past? For in this way you are always beyond them, since you are always present to yourself, or since that which they have not yet reached is always present to you.

    Whether this is the age of the age

    God’s eternity contains all the ages of time, yet has no extent or parts.

    An ergo hoc est saeculum saeculi sive saecula saeculorum? Sicut enim saeculum temporum continet omnia temporalia, sic tua aeternitas continet etiam ipsa saecula temporum. Quae saeculum quidem est propter indivisibilem unitatem, saecula vero propter interminabilem immensitatem. Et quamvis ita sis magnus, Domine, ut omnia sint te plena et sint in te: sic tamen es sine omni spatio, ut nec medium nec dimidium nec ulla pars sit in te.

    Is this, then, “the age of the age,” or “the ages of ages”? For just as an age of time contains all temporal things, so your eternity contains even the ages of time themselves. It is an age because of its indivisible unity, and ages because of its endless immensity. And although you are so great, Lord, that all things are full of you and are in you, yet you are so without any spatial extent that there is neither middle nor half nor any part in you.

    Saeculum saeculi and saecula saeculorum are liturgical phrases usually rendered “for ever and ever.”

    That God alone is what he is and who he is

    Only God exists properly and absolutely, with no past or future, only present being.

    Tu solus ergo, Domine, es quod es, et tu es qui es. Nam quod aliud est in toto et aliud in partibus, et in quo aliquid est mutabile, non omnino est quod est. Et quod incepit a non esse et potest cogitari non esse et, nisi per aliud subsistat, redit in non esse; et quod habet fuisse quod iam non est, et futurum esse quod nondum est: id non est proprie et absolute. Tu vero es quod es; quia quidquid aliquando aut aliquo modo es, hoc totus et semper es.

    You alone, then, Lord, are what you are, and you are who you are. For what is one thing as a whole and another in its parts, and has something changeable in it, is not altogether what it is. And what began from not being, and can be thought not to exist, and returns to not being unless it subsists through something else; and what has a past that it no longer is, and a future that it not yet is: that does not exist in the proper and absolute sense. But you are what you are, because whatever you are at any time or in any way, that you are wholly and always.

    Exodus 3:14: “I am who I am.”

    Et tu es qui proprie et simpliciter es; quia nec habes fuisse aut futurum esse, sed tantum praesens esse, nec potes cogitari aliquando non esse. Et vita es et lux et sapientia et beatitudo et aeternitas et multa huiusmodi bona, et tamen non es nisi unum et summum bonum; tu, tibi omnino sufficiens, nullo indigens, quo omnia indigent ut sint, et ut bene sint.

    And you are the one who exists properly and simply, for you have neither past nor future but only present being, and you cannot be thought ever not to exist. And you are life and light and wisdom and blessedness and eternity and many goods of this kind, and yet you are nothing but the one supreme good: you, wholly sufficient to yourself, needing nothing, whom all things need in order to exist and to be well.

    That this good is Father, Son and Holy Spirit

    The supreme good is the Trinity, the one necessary thing, which is every good.

    Hoc bonum es tu, Deus Pater; hoc est Verbum tuum, id est Filius tuus. Etenim non potest aliud quam quod es, aut aliquid maius vel minus te esse in Verbo, quo te ipsum dicis; quoniam Verbum tuum sic est verum, quomodo tu verax, et idcirco est ipsa Veritas sicut tu, non alia quam tu; et sic es tu simplex, ut de te non possit nasci aliud quam quod tu es. Hoc ipsum est Amor unus et communis tibi et Filio tuo, id est Sanctus Spiritus ab utroque procedens.

    This good is you, God the Father; this is your Word, that is, your Son. For there can be nothing other than what you are, nothing greater or less than you, in the Word by which you speak yourself; for your Word is true as you are truthful, and therefore it is Truth itself, just as you are, not other than you; and you are so simple that nothing can be born of you other than what you are. This same good is the Love that is one and common to you and your Son, that is, the Holy Spirit proceeding from both.

    Nam idem Amor non est impar tibi aut Filio tuo; quia tantum amas te et illum, et ille te et seipsum, quantus es tu et ille; nec est aliud a te et ab illo, quod dispar non est tibi illi; nec de summa simplicitate potest procedere aliud, quam quod est de quo procedit. Quod autem est singulus quisque, hoc est tota Trinitas simul, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; quoniam singulus quisque non est aliud quam summe simplex unitas et summe una simplicitas, quae nec multiplicari nec aliud et aliud esse potest. “Porro unum est necessarium”. Porro hoc est illud unum necessarium, in quo est omne bonum, immo quod est omne et unum et totum et solum bonum.

    For this same Love is not unequal to you or to your Son, since you love yourself and him, and he loves you and himself, as much as you and he are; nor is it anything other than you and him, since it is not unequal to you and him; nor can anything proceed from supreme simplicity other than what that is from which it proceeds. And what each one is individually, that the whole Trinity is together, Father and Son and Holy Spirit; since each individually is nothing other than supremely simple unity and supremely unified simplicity, which can neither be multiplied nor be one thing and another. “But one thing is necessary.” And this is that one necessary thing in which is every good—or rather, which is the whole good, the one good, the complete good and the only good.

    Luke 10:42.

    A guess at what kind of good this is, and how great

    If created goods delight us, the good that made them must delight far more.

    Excita nunc, anima mea, et erige totum intellectum tuum, et cogita, quantum potes, quale et quantum sit illud bonum. Si enim singula bona delectabilia sunt, cogita intente quam delectabile sit illud bonum, quod continet iucunditatem omnium bonorum; et non qualem in rebus creatis sumus experti, sed tanto differentem, quanto differt creator a creatura. Si enim bona est vita creata: quam bona est vita creatrix? Si iucunda est salus facta: quam iucunda est salus, quae facit omnem salutem? Si amabilis est sapientia in cognitione rerum conditarum: quam amabilis est sapientia, quae omnia condidit ex nihilo? Denique si multae et magnae delectationes sunt in rebus delectabilibus: qualis et quanta delectatio est in illo, qui fecit ipsa delectabilia?

    Wake up now, my soul, and raise up your whole understanding, and think as hard as you can what kind of good this is, and how great. For if particular goods are delightful, think intently how delightful that good is which contains the delight of all goods—and not such delight as we have experienced in created things, but as different from it as the Creator differs from the creature. For if created life is good, how good is the life that creates? If health that has been made is pleasant, how pleasant is the health that makes all health? If wisdom is lovable in the knowledge of things that have been created, how lovable is the wisdom that created all things from nothing? Finally, if there are many and great delights in delightful things, what kind of delight, and how great, is there in him who made those very delights?

    Salus means both health and salvation.

    What goods await those who enjoy God, and how great

    Anselm lists the goods of heaven, from beauty and health to friendship, concord and security.

    O, qui hoc bono fruetur: quid illi erit et quid illi non erit! Certe quidquid volet, erit, et quod nolet non erit. Ibi quippe erunt bona corporis et animae, qualia “nec oculus vidit nec auris audivit nec cor hominis” cogitavit. Cur ergo per multa vagaris, homuncio, quaerendo bona animae tuae et corporis tui? Ama unum bonum, in quo sunt omnia bona et sufficit. Desidera simplex bonum, quod est omne bonum et satis est. Quid enim amas, caro mea, quid desideras, anima mea? Ibi est, ibi est quidquid amatis, quidquid desideratis.

    O, whoever enjoys this good—what will he have, and what will he not have! Surely whatever he wants will be, and what he does not want will not be. For there will be goods of body and soul such as “eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man” conceived. Why, then, little man, do you wander through many things, seeking goods for your soul and your body? Love the one good in which all goods are, and it is enough. Desire the simple good that is every good, and it is sufficient. For what do you love, my flesh, what do you desire, my soul? It is there, it is there, whatever you love, whatever you desire.

    1 Corinthians 2:9.

    Si delectat pulchritudo: “fulgebunt iusti sicut sol”. Si velocitas aut fortitudo aut libertas corporis, cui nihil obsistere possit: “erunt similes angelis dei”; quia “seminatur corpus animale, et surget corpus spirituale”, potestate utique, non natura. Si longa et salubris vita: ibi est sana aeternitas et aeterna sanitas; quia “iusti in perpetuum vivent et salus iustorum a Domino”. Si satietas: satiabuntur, “cum apparuerit gloria Dei”. Si ebrietas: “inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus Dei”. Si melodia: ibi angelorum chori concinunt sine fine Deo. Si quaelibet non immunda, sed munda voluptas: “torrente voluptatis suae potabit eos” Deus.

    If beauty delights you: “the just will shine like the sun.” If speed, or strength, or a freedom of body that nothing can resist: “they will be like the angels of God,” for “it is sown a natural body, and it will rise a spiritual body”—in power, that is, not in nature. If a long and healthy life: there is healthy eternity and eternal health, for “the just will live for ever, and the salvation of the just is from the Lord.” If fullness: they will be filled “when the glory of God appears.” If drunkenness: “they will be drunk with the abundance of the house of God.” If melody: there the choirs of angels sing together to God without end. If any pleasure, not impure but pure: God “will give them drink from the torrent of his pleasure.”

    Si sapientia: ipsa Dei sapientia ostendet eis seipsam. Si amicitia: diligent Deum plus quam seipsos, et invicem tamquam seipsos, et Deus illos plus quam illi seipsos; quia illi illum et se et invicem per illum, et ille se et illos per seipsum. Si concordia: omnibus illis erit una voluntas, quia nulla illis erit nisi sola Dei voluntas. Si potestas: omnipotentes erunt suae voluntatis, ut Deus suae. Nam sicut poterit Deus quod volet, per seipsum, ita poterunt illi quod volent, per illum; quia sicut illi non aliud volent quam quod ille, ita ille volet quidquid illi volent; et quod ille volet, non poterit non esse.

    If wisdom: the very wisdom of God will show itself to them. If friendship: they will love God more than themselves, and one another as themselves, and God will love them more than they love themselves; for they will love him, and themselves, and one another through him, and he will love himself and them through himself. If concord: they will all have one will, for they will have no will but the will of God alone. If power: they will be all-powerful in their own will, as God is in his. For just as God will be able to do what he wills through himself, so they will be able to do what they will through him; for just as they will want nothing but what he wants, so he will want whatever they want; and what he wants cannot fail to be.

    Si honor et divitiae: Deus suos “servos bonos et fideles supra multa constituet”; immo “filii Dei” et dii “vocabuntur” et erunt; et ubi erit Filius eius, ibi erunt et illi, “haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi”. Si vera securitas: certe ita certi erunt numquam et nullatenus ista vel potius bonum sibi defuturum, sicut certi erunt se non sua sponte illud amissuros, nec dilectorem Deum illud dilectoribus suis invitis ablaturum, nec aliquid Deo potentius invitos Deum et illos separaturum.

    If honor and riches: God “will set” his “good and faithful servants over many things”; indeed, they “will be called” “children of God” and gods, and so they will be; and where his Son is, there they too will be, “heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ.” If true security: surely they will be as certain that never and in no way will these things—or rather this good—fail them, as they will be certain that they will not lose it of their own accord, that God who loves them will not take it from those who love him against their will, and that nothing more powerful than God will separate them from God against their will.

    Gaudium vero quale aut quantum est, ubi tale ac tantum bonum est? Cor humanum, cor indigens, cor expertum aerumnas, immo obrutum aerumnis: quantum gauderes, si his omnibus abundares? Interroga intima tua, si capere possint gaudium suum de tanta beatitudine sua. Sed certe, si quis alius, quem omnino sicut teipsum diligeres, eandem beatitudinem haberet, duplicaretur gaudium tuum, quia non minus gauderes pro eo quam pro teipso. Si vero duo vel tres vel multo plures idipsum haberent, tantundem pro singulis quantum pro teipso gauderes, si singulos sicut teipsum amares. Ergo in illa perfecta caritate innumerabilium beatorum angelorum et hominum, ubi nullus minus diliget alium quam seipsum, non aliter gaudebit quisque pro singulis aliis quam pro seipso.

    But what kind of joy is there, and how great, where there is a good of such a kind and so great? Human heart, needy heart, heart that has known hardships—no, heart overwhelmed by hardships: how much would you rejoice if you abounded in all these things? Ask your innermost self whether it could contain its joy at so great a happiness of its own. But surely, if someone else whom you loved exactly as yourself had that same happiness, your joy would be doubled, for you would rejoice no less for him than for yourself. And if two or three or many more had it, you would rejoice as much for each of them as for yourself, if you loved each one as yourself. So in that perfect love of countless blessed angels and human beings, where no one will love another less than himself, each will rejoice for every other just as for himself.

    Si ergo cor hominis de tanto suo bono vix capiet gaudium suum: quomodo capax erit tot et tantorum gaudiorum? Et utique, quoniam quantum quidque diligit aliquem, tantum de bono eius gaudet: sicut in illa perfecta felicitate unusquisque plus amabit sine comparatione Deum quam se et omnes alios secum, ita plus gaudebit absque existimatione de felicitate Dei quam de sua et omnium aliorum secum. Sed si Deum sic diligent “toto corde, tota mente, tota anima”, ut tamen totum cor, tota mens, tota anima non sufficiat dignitate dilectionis: profecto sic gaudebunt “toto corde, tota mente, tota anima”, ut totum cor, tota mens, tota anima non sufficiat plenitudini gaudii.

    If, then, the human heart will scarcely contain its joy over so great a good of its own, how will it have room for so many joys, and such great ones? And indeed, since each rejoices in another’s good just as much as he loves that other, then just as in that perfect happiness each one will love God incomparably more than himself and all the others with him, so he will rejoice beyond all reckoning more in God’s happiness than in his own and in that of all the others with him. But if they love God “with all their heart, all their mind, all their soul” in such a way that the whole heart, the whole mind, the whole soul is still not equal to the worthiness of that love, then surely they will rejoice “with all their heart, all their mind, all their soul” in such a way that the whole heart, the whole mind, the whole soul will not be equal to the fullness of that joy.

    Whether this is the full joy the Lord promises

    The joy of the blessed exceeds all measure; Anselm prays to know and love God more.

    Deus meus et Dominus meus, spes mea et gaudium cordis mei, dic animae meae, si hoc est gaudium, de quo nobis dicis per Filium tuum: “Petite et accipietis, ut gaudium vestrum sit plenum”. Inveni namque gaudium quoddam plenum, et plus quam plenum. Pleno quippe corde, plena mente, plena anima, pleno toto homine gaudio illo: adhuc supra modum superit gaudium. Non ergo totum illud gaudium intrabit in gaudentes, sed toti gaudentes intrabunt in gaudium. Dic, Domine, dic servo tuo intus in corde suo, si hoc est gaudium in quod intrabunt servi tui, qui intrabunt “in gaudium Domini sui”. Sed gaudium illud certe, quo gaudebunt electi tui, “nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit”.

    My God and my Lord, my hope and the joy of my heart, tell my soul whether this is the joy of which you speak to us through your Son: “Ask and you will receive, that your joy may be full.” For I have found a joy that is full, and more than full. When the heart is full, the mind full, the soul full, the whole person full of that joy, joy will still overflow beyond measure. So that joy will not enter wholly into those who rejoice; rather, those who rejoice will enter wholly into joy. Tell me, Lord, tell your servant inwardly, in his heart, whether this is the joy into which your servants will enter, those who will enter “into the joy of their Lord.” But surely that joy with which your chosen ones will rejoice is something “eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the human heart.”

    John 16:24 and Matthew 25:21.

    Nondum ergo dixi et cogitavi, Domine, quantum gaudebunt illi beati tui. Utique tantum gaudebunt, quantum amabunt; tantum amabunt, quantum cognoscent. Quantum te cognoscent, Domine, tunc, et quantum amabunt? Certe “nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit” in hac vita, quantum te cognoscent et amabunt in illa vita.

    So I have not yet said or thought, Lord, how greatly those blessed ones of yours will rejoice. Surely they will rejoice as much as they love, and they will love as much as they know. How much will they know you then, Lord, and how much will they love you? Surely “eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the human heart” in this life how much they will know and love you in that life.

    Oro, Deus, cognoscam te, amem te, ut gaudeam de te. Et si non possum in hac vita ad plenum, vel proficiam in dies, usque dum veniat illud ad plenum. Proficiat hic in me notitia tui et ibi fiat plena; crescat amor tuus et ibi sit plenus, ut hic gaudium meum sit in spe magnum, et ibi sit in re plenum. Domine, per Filium tuum iubes, immo consulis petere et promittis accipere, “ut gaudium nostrum plenum sit”. Peto, Domine, quod consulis “per admirabilem consiliarium” nostrum; accipiam, quod promittis per veritatem tuam, “ut gaudium meum plenum sit”. Deus verax, peto accipiam, “ut gaudium meum plenum sit”. Meditetur interim inde mens mea, loquatur inde lingua mea. Amet illud cor meum, sermonicetur os meum.

    I pray, God, that I may know you and love you, so that I may rejoice in you. And if I cannot do so fully in this life, may I at least advance day by day until that fullness comes. Let knowledge of you grow in me here, and there be made full; let love of you increase here, and there be full; so that here my joy may be great in hope, and there full in reality. Lord, through your Son you command us—no, you counsel us—to ask, and you promise that we will receive, “that our joy may be full.” I ask, Lord, for what you counsel through our “wonderful counselor”; may I receive what you promise through your truth, “that my joy may be full.” God of truth, I ask: may I receive, “that my joy may be full.” Meanwhile let my mind meditate on it, let my tongue speak of it. Let my heart love it, let my mouth talk of it.

    “Wonderful counselor” is a title of the Messiah in Isaiah 9:6, here applied to Christ.

    Esuriat illud omnia mea, sitiat caro mea, desideret tota substantia mea, donec “intrem in gaudium Domini mei”, qui est trinus et unus Deus “benedictus in saecula. Amen”.

    Let all that I am hunger for it, let my flesh thirst for it, let my whole being long for it, until I “enter into the joy of my Lord,” who is God, three and one, “blessed for ever. Amen.”

    On Behalf of the Fool

    Liber pro insipiente · Gaunilo of Marmoutier objects, with the famous lost island.

    Gaunilo restates the argument

    Gaunilo summarizes Anselm’s proof as he, speaking for the fool, understands it.

    Dubitanti utrum sit, vel neganti quod sit aliqua talis natura, qua nihil maius cogitari possit; tamen esse illam, hinc dicitur primo probari: quod ipse negans vel ambigens de illa, iam habeat eam in intellectu; cum audiens illam dici, id quod dicitur intelligit; deinde, quia quod intelligit, necesse est ut non in solo intellectu, sed etiam in re sit. Et hoc ita probatur, quia maius est esse in intellectu et in re, quam in solo intellectu. Et si illud in solo est intellectu, maius illo erit quidquid etiam fuerit in re: ac sic maius omnibus, minus erit aliquo; et non erit maius omnibus, quod utique repugnat.

    To one who doubts whether there is, or denies that there is, some nature of this kind, than which nothing greater can be thought, it is said that its existence is proved, first, from this: that the very person who denies or doubts it already has it in his understanding, since when he hears it spoken of he understands what is said; and next, that what he understands must exist not in the understanding alone but also in reality. And this is proved as follows: it is greater to exist in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone. And if that thing is in the understanding alone, then whatever also existed in reality would be greater than it; and so what is greater than all things would be less than something, and would not be greater than all—which is plainly a contradiction.

    Et ideo necesse est ut maius omnibus, quod iam probatum est esse in intellectu, non in solo intellectu, sed et in re sit; quoniam aliter maius omnibus esse non poterit.

    Therefore what is greater than all, which has already been proved to be in the understanding, must exist not in the understanding alone but also in reality, since otherwise it could not be greater than all.

    Anything can be in the understanding

    Gaunilo objects that false and doubtful things are also in the understanding when heard.

    Respondere forsitan potest, quod hoc iam esse dicitur in intellectu meo, non ob aliud, nisi quia id quod dicitur intelligo. Nonne et quaecunque falsa, ac nullo prorsus modo in seipsis existentia, in intellectu habere similiter dici possem cum ea, dicente aliquo, quaecumque ille diceret, ego intelligerem? nisi forte tale illud constat esse, ut non eo modo quo etiam falsa quaeque vel dubia, haberi possit in cogitatione: et ideo non dicor illud auditum cogitare, vel in cogitatione habere; sed intelligere, et in intellectu habere; quia scilicet, non possum hoc aliter cogitare, nisi intelligendo, id est scientia comprehendendo, reipsa illud existere.

    The reply might be made that this is said to be in my understanding already only because I understand what is said. But could I not equally be said to have in my understanding all sorts of false things, things that in no way at all exist in themselves, since, if someone spoke of them, I would understand whatever he said? Unless perhaps it is established that this thing is such that it cannot be held in thought in the way that any false or doubtful things can; and that is why I am not said to think of it when I hear it, or to have it in thought, but to understand it and have it in the understanding—namely, because I cannot think of it except by understanding, that is, by grasping with knowledge, that it actually exists.

    Sed si hoc est: primo quidem non hic erit aliud, idemque tempore praecedens, habere rem in intellectu; et aliud, idemque tempore sequens, intelligere rem esse, ut fit de pictura, quae prius est in animo pictoris, deinde in opere. Deinde, vix unquam poterit esse credibile, cum dictum et auditum fuerit istud non eo modo posse cogitari non esse, quo etiam potest cogitari non esse Deus. Nam si non potest, cur contra negantem aut dubitantem quod sit aliqua talis natura, tota ista disputatio assumpta est?

    But if that is so, then, first, there will be no difference here between having a thing in the understanding, which comes first in time, and understanding that the thing exists, which comes later—as happens with a picture, which is first in the painter’s mind and afterwards in the finished work. Second, it could hardly ever be believable that, once this has been spoken and heard, it cannot be thought not to exist in the way that even God can be thought not to exist. For if God cannot, why was this whole argument undertaken against someone who denies or doubts that there is any such nature?

    Postremo, quod tale sit illud, ut non possit, nisi mox cogitatum, indubitabilis existentiae suae certo percipi intellectu; indubio aliquo probandum mihi est argumento: non autem isto; quod iam sit hoc in intellectu meo, cum auditum intelligo: in quo similiter esse posse quaecunque alia incerta, vel etiam falsa ab aliquo, cuius verba intelligerem dicta adhuc puto; et insuper magis, si illa deceptus, ut saepe fit, crederem qui istud nondum credo.

    Finally, that this thing is such that, as soon as it is thought, it cannot but be perceived by the understanding with certainty as indubitably existing—this must be proved to me by some unquestionable argument, but not by this one: that it is already in my understanding when I understand what I hear. For in my understanding, I still think, there could equally be any other uncertain or even false things spoken by someone whose words I understood; and all the more so if, deceived, as often happens, I believed them—I who do not yet believe this.

    The painter’s example does not fit

    A picture in the painter’s mind is part of his own understanding; God is not.

    Unde nec illud exemplum de pictore, picturam, quam facturus est, iam in intellectu habente, satis potest huic argumento congruere. Illa enim pictura, antequam fiat, in ipsa pictoris arte habetur; et tale quidpiam in arte artificis alicuius nihil est aliud quam pars quaedam intelligentiae ipsius; quia et (sicut sanctus Augustinus ait) cum faber arcam facturus in opere, prius habet illam in arte: arca, quae fit in opere, non est vita; arca, quae est in arte, vita est; quia vivit anima artificis, in qua sunt ista omnia, antequam proferantur. Ut quid enim in vivente artificis anima vita sunt ista, nisi quia nihil sunt aliud quam scientia, vel intelligentia animae ipsius?

    Hence the example of the painter who already has in his understanding the picture he is going to make cannot fit this argument well enough. For that picture, before it is made, is held in the painter’s very art; and any such thing in an artist’s art is nothing other than a part of his own understanding. As St Augustine says, when a craftsman is going to make a chest in actual work, he first has it in his art. The chest that is made in the work is not life; the chest that is in the art is life, because the craftsman’s soul, in which all these things exist before they are brought forth, is alive. For why are these things life in the living soul of the craftsman, except that they are nothing other than the knowledge or understanding of that soul itself?

    Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 1.17.

    At vero quidquid extra illa, quae ad ipsam mentis noscuntur pertinere naturam, aut auditum aut excogitatum intellectu percipitur verum; aliud sine dubio est verum illud, aliud intellectus ipse quo capitur: quocirca etiamsi verum sit esse aliquid, quo maius quidquam nequeat cogitari; non tamen hoc auditum et intellectum, tale est, qualis nondum facta pictura in intellectu pictoris.

    But whatever true thing, beyond those known to belong to the very nature of the mind, is perceived by the understanding, whether heard or thought up, that true thing is without doubt one thing, and the understanding by which it is grasped is another. So even if it is true that there is something than which nothing greater can be thought, this thing, when heard and understood, is still not like the not-yet-made picture in the painter’s understanding.

    We cannot think of God as a known thing

    Gaunilo can think of God only through the word, since he knows nothing like God.

    Huc accedit illud, quod praetaxatum est superius; quia scilicet illud omnibus, quae cogitari possint, maius, quod nihil aliud posse esse dicitur quam ipse Deus; tam ego secundum rem, vel ex specie mihi vel ex genere notam, cogitare auditum vel in intellectu habere non possum, quam nec ipsum Deum, quem utique ob hoc ipsum etiam non esse cogitare possum. Neque enim aut rem ipsam quae Deus est, novi; aut ipsam possum coniicere ex alia simili, quandoquidem et tu talem asseris illam, ut esse non possit simile quidquam.

    Add to this the point made above: that this thing greater than all that can be thought, which is said to be nothing other than God himself, I can no more think of or have in my understanding when I hear of it, on the basis of a real thing known to me by species or genus, than I can God himself—whom for this very reason I can also think not to exist. For I neither know the reality that God is, nor can I infer it from some other similar thing, since you yourself maintain that it is such that nothing can be like it.

    Nam si de homine aliquo, mihi prorsus ignoto, quem etiam esse nescirem, dici tamen aliquid audirem, per illam specialem generalemve notitiam, qua quid sit homo vel homines novi, de illo quoque secundum rem ipsam, quae est homo, cogitare possem: et tamen fieri posset, ut, mentiente illo qui diceret, ipse, quem cogitarem, homo non esset; cum tamen ego de illo, secundum veram nihilominus rem, non quae esset ille homo, sed quae est homo quilibet, cogitarem. Nec sic igitur, ut haberem falsum istud in cogitatione vel in intellectu, habere possum illud, cum audio dici, Deus, aut, aliquid omnibus maius. Cum quando illud secundum rem veram mihique notam cogitare possum, istud omnino nequeam, nisi tantum secundum vocem, secundum quam solam aut vix aut nunquam potest ullum cogitari verum.

    For if I heard something said about some man wholly unknown to me, whom I did not even know to exist, I could still think of him on the basis of the real thing that a man is, through that specific or general knowledge by which I know what a man, or men, are. And yet it could happen that, if the speaker were lying, the man I was thinking of did not exist; though I would still be thinking of him on the basis of a real thing—not the thing that this man was, but the thing that any man is. So I cannot have this thing in thought or in understanding, when I hear someone say “God” or “something greater than all,” in the way I would have that false man. For while I can think of the man on the basis of a real thing known to me, I cannot do so at all with this, except only on the basis of the word; and on the basis of a word alone one can scarcely, if ever, think anything true.

    Siquidem cum ita cogitatur; non tam ipsa vox, quae res est utique vera, hoc est, litterarum sonus vel syllabarum, quam vocis auditae significatio cogitetur; sed non ita ut ab illo, qui novit quid ea soleat voce significari: a quo, scilicet, cogitatur secundum rem vel in sola cogitatione vera: verum ut ab eo, qui illud non novit; et solummodo cogitat secundum animi motum illius auditu vocis effectum, significationemque perceptae vocis conantem effingere sibi: quod mirum est si unquam rei veritate potuerit. Ita ergo, ne prorsus aliter adhuc et in intellectu meo constat illud haberi, cum audio intelligoque dicentem esse aliquid maius omnibus quae valeant cogitari: haec de eo, quod summa illa natura iam esse dicitur in intellectu meo.

    For when it is thought in that way, what is thought is not so much the word itself—which is indeed a real thing, namely the sound of letters or syllables—as the meaning of the word heard. But it is not thought as by someone who knows what is usually meant by that word, who thinks of it on the basis of the thing, or of something true at least in thought alone. It is thought rather as by someone who does not know it, and who thinks only by way of the movement of the mind produced by hearing the word, a mind trying to picture to itself the meaning of the word it has taken in—and it would be remarkable if it could ever do so truly. So it is in this way, and so far in no other, that this thing is established as being in my understanding when I hear and understand someone saying that there is something greater than all that can be thought. So much for the claim that this supreme nature is already in my understanding.

    Existence in reality has not been proved

    Gaunilo denies that the greater-than-all must exist in reality until it is first shown to exist.

    Quod autem non solum in intellectu, sed et in re necessario esse, inde mihi probatur; quia nisi fuerit, quidquid est in re, maius illa erit: ac per hoc, non erit illud maius omnibus, quod utique iam esse in intellectu probatum est. Adhuc respondeo: Si esse dicendum est in intellectu, quod secundum veritatem cuiusquam rei nequit saltem cogitari; et hoc in meo sic esse non denego. Sed quia per hoc esse quoque in re non potest ullatenus obtinere, illud esse ei adhuc penitus non concedo, quousque mihi argumento probetur indubio; quod qui esse dicit hoc, quod maius omnibus aliter non erit omnibus maius, non satis attendit cui loquatur.

    Next, it is proved to me that it necessarily exists not only in the understanding but also in reality, on the grounds that, unless it did, whatever exists in reality would be greater than it; and so it would not be greater than all, which it has already been proved to be in the understanding. To this I reply: if we must say that something is in the understanding which cannot even be thought on the basis of the reality of any thing, I do not deny that it is in mine in that sense. But since existence in reality can in no way follow from this, I do not yet grant it that existence at all, until it is proved to me by an unquestionable argument. For whoever says that this thing exists because otherwise what is greater than all will not be greater than all does not pay enough attention to whom he is speaking.

    Ego enim nondum dico, imo etiam nego, vel dubito, ulla re vera esse maius illud: nec aliud ei esse concedo, quam illud, si dicendum est esse, cum secundum vocem tantum auditam rem prorsus ignotam sibi conatur animus effingere. Quomodo igitur inde mihi probatur maius illud rei veritate subsistere, quia constet illud maius omnibus esse: cum id ego eousque negem adhuc, dubitemve constare; ut ne in intellectu quidem vel cogitatione mea, eo saltem modo maius ipsum esse dicam, quo dubia etiam multa sunt et incerta. Prius enim certum nihil necesse est fiat, revera esse alicubi maius ipsum, et tum demum ex eo, quod maius est omnibus, in seipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum.

    For I do not yet say—indeed I deny, or doubt—that that greater thing exists as any real thing; nor do I grant it any other existence than this (if it must be called existence): that the mind, on the basis of a word merely heard, tries to picture to itself a thing wholly unknown to it. How then is it proved to me that that greater thing subsists in reality because it is established that it is greater than all, when I still deny, or doubt, that this is established—so much so that I do not say that this greater thing is even in my understanding or thought in the way that many doubtful and uncertain things are? For it must first be made certain that this greater thing really exists somewhere; and only then, from the fact that it is greater than all, will it be beyond question that it also subsists in itself.

    The lost island

    The same reasoning would prove that a perfect lost island in the Ocean really exists.

    Famous passage Gaunilo’s lost islandGaunilo argues that the same reasoning would prove that a perfect lost island really exists.

    Exempli gratia: Aiunt quidam alicubi Oceani esse insulam, quam ex difficultate vel potius impossibilitate inveniendi quod non est, cognominant aliqui perditam: quamque fabulantur multo amplius, quam de fortunatis insulis fertur, divitiarum, deliciarumque omnium inaestimabili ubertate pollere, nulloque possessore aut habitatore, universis aliis, quas incolunt homines, terris, possidendorum redundantia usquequaque praestare. Hoc ita esse dicat mihi quispiam; et ego facile dictum, in quo nihil est difficultatis, intelligam.

    For example: some say that somewhere in the Ocean there is an island which, because of the difficulty—or rather the impossibility—of finding what does not exist, some call “the lost island.” They tell stories that it abounds in a priceless wealth of riches and delights of every kind, far more than is said of the Fortunate Isles; and that, though it has no owner or inhabitant, it surpasses in every way all the other lands that people inhabit in the abundance of its possessions. Suppose someone tells me that this is so; I will easily understand what is said, since there is nothing difficult in it.

    The Fortunate Isles, or Isles of the Blessed, were a legendary paradise in the western Ocean in Greek and Roman tradition.

    At si tunc velut consequenter adiungat ac dicat: Non potes ultra dubitare insulam illam omnibus terris praestantiorem vere esse alicubi in re, quam et in intellectu tuo non ambigis esse: et quia praestantius est non in intellectu solo, sed etiam esse in re; ideo sic eum necesse est esse; quia nisi fuerit, quaecunque alia in re est terra praestantior illa erit; ac sic ipsa iam a te praestantior intellecta, praestantior non erit.

    But suppose he then goes on, as if drawing a consequence, and says: “You can no longer doubt that this island, more excellent than all lands, truly exists somewhere in reality, since you do not doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent to exist not in the understanding alone but also in reality, it must exist in this way. For unless it did, any other land that exists in reality would be more excellent than it; and so the island you have already understood to be more excellent would not be more excellent.”

    Si, inquam, per haec ille mihi velit astruere de insula illa, quod vere sit, et ambigendum ultra non esse: aut iocari ipsum credam, aut nescio quem stultiorem debeam reputare; utrum me, si ei concedam; an illum, si se putet aliqua certitudine insulae illius essentiam astruxisse, nisi prius ipsam praestantiam eius solummodo sicut rem vere atque indubie existentem, nec ullatenus sicut falsum aut incertum aliquid in intellectu meo esse docuerit.

    If, I say, he wanted by these means to establish for me that this island truly exists and that it can no longer be doubted, I would either think he was joking, or I do not know which of us I ought to consider the greater fool: myself, if I granted it, or him, if he thought he had established the existence of that island with any certainty—unless he had first shown me that its very excellence is in my understanding only as a thing truly and indubitably existing, and in no way as something false or uncertain.

    Cannot be thought not to exist

    Gaunilo suggests God’s non-existence cannot be understood, and doubts whether he can think himself nonexistent.

    Haec interim ad obiecta insipiens ille responderit cui cum deinceps asseritur tale esse maius illud, ut nec sola cogitatione valeat non esse: et hoc rursus non aliunde probatur, quam eo ipso, quod aliter non erit omnibus maius, idem ipsum possit referre responsum, et dicere. Quandonam ego rei veritate esse tale aliquid, hoc est, maius omnibus, dixi: ut ex hoc mihi debeat probari intantum etiam reipsa id esse, ut nec possit cogitari non esse? Quapropter certissimo primitus aliquo probandum est argumento aliquam superiorem, hoc est, maiorem ac meliorem omnium, quae sunt, esse naturam, ut ex hoc, alia iam possimus omnia probare quibus necesse est illud quod maius ac melius est omnibus, non carere.

    These are the replies the fool might make, for the time being, to the objections. When it is next asserted to him that this greater thing is such that it cannot fail to exist even in thought alone—and this again is proved from nothing other than the fact that otherwise it would not be greater than all—he could give this same reply and say: “When did I say that such a thing, that is, something greater than all, exists in reality, so that from this it should be proved to me that it exists in reality so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist?” Therefore it must first be proved by some utterly certain argument that there is some superior nature, that is, one greater and better than all that exist, so that from this we can then prove all the other attributes that what is greater and better than all must not lack.

    Cum autem dicitur quod summa res ista non esse nequeat cogitari, melius fortasse diceretur quod non esse, aut etiam posse non esse, non possit intelligi: nam secundum proprietatem verbi istius, falsa nequeunt intelligi; quae possunt utique eo modo cogitari, quo Deum non esse, insipiens cogitavit: et me quoque esse certissime scio, sed et posse non esse nihilominus scio; summum vero illud quod est Deus, et esse, et non esse non posse, indubitanter intelligo. Cogitare autem me non esse, quandiu esse certissime scio, nescio utrum possim; sed si possum, cur non et quidquid aliud eadem certitudine scio? Si autem non possum, non erit iam istud proprium Deo.

    When it is said, though, that this supreme thing cannot be thought not to exist, it would perhaps be better to say that its not existing, or even its being able not to exist, cannot be understood. For in the strict sense of that word, false things cannot be understood—though they can certainly be thought, in the way that the fool thought that God does not exist. I too know with complete certainty that I exist, but I know no less that I am able not to exist; whereas I understand without any doubt that that supreme being which is God both exists and cannot fail to exist. Whether I can think that I do not exist, as long as I know with complete certainty that I exist, I do not know. But if I can, why not also anything else I know with the same certainty? And if I cannot, this will no longer be peculiar to God.

    Praise for the rest of the book

    Gaunilo praises the rest of the Proslogion and asks for a stronger opening argument.

    Caetera libelli illius tam veraciter et tam praeclare sunt magnificeque disserta, tanta denique referta utilitate, et pii ac sancti affectus intimo quodam odore fragrantia, ut nullo modo propter illa, quae in initiis recte quidem sensa, sed minus firmiter argumentata sunt, ista sint contemnenda, sed illa potius argumentanda robustius, ac omnia cum ingenti veneratione et laude suscipienda.

    The rest of that little book is argued so truly, so brilliantly and splendidly, is so full of benefit, and so fragrant with a certain inward perfume of devout and holy feeling, that it should in no way be despised because of those points at the beginning which, though rightly felt, are less firmly argued. Rather, those points should be argued more robustly, and the whole received with great reverence and praise.

    Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo

    Quid ad haec respondeat editor ipsius libelli · Anselm answers point by point and restates his argument.

    Anselm answers the Catholic, not the fool

    Since his critic is a believer, Anselm will reply to him as a Catholic.

    Quoniam non me reprehendit in his dictis ille insipiens, contra quem sum locutus in meo opusculo; sed quidam non insipiens, et catholicus, pro insipiente, sufficere mihi potest respondere catholico.

    Since the one who criticizes me in these remarks is not that fool against whom I spoke in my little work, but someone who is no fool, and a Catholic, speaking on the fool’s behalf, it may be enough for me to reply to the Catholic.

    If it can be thought, it must exist

    Anselm argues that what cannot be thought to begin must exist if it can be thought at all.

    Dicis quidem (quicunque es qui dicis haec posse dicere insipientem) quia non est in intellectu aliquid, quo maius cogitari non possit, aliter quam quod secundum veritatem cuiusque rei nequit saltem cogitari: et quia non magis consequitur hoc, quod dico, quo maius cogitari non possit, ex eo quia est in intellectu, esse et in re, quam perditam insulam certissime existere ex eo quia cum describitur verbis, audiens eam non ambigit in intellectu suo esse. Ego vero dico: Si, quo maius cogitari non potest, non intelligitur, vel cogitatur, nec est in intellectu vel cogitatione; profecto Deus aut non est quo maius cogitari non possit, aut non intelligitur vel cogitatur, et non est in intellectu vel cogitatione.

    You say—whoever you are who say that the fool can say these things—that something than which nothing greater can be thought is in the understanding only in the way that something is which cannot even be thought on the basis of the reality of any thing. And you say that what I claim—that that than which nothing greater can be thought exists also in reality because it is in the understanding—follows no more than that the lost island most certainly exists because someone who hears it described in words does not doubt that it is in his understanding. But I say: if that than which nothing greater can be thought is not understood or thought, and is not in the understanding or in thought, then surely either God is not that than which nothing greater can be thought, or he is not understood or thought, and is not in the understanding or in thought.

    Quod quam falsum sit, fide et conscientia tua pro firmissimo utor argumento. Ergo quo maius cogitari non potest, vere intelligitur et cogitatur, et est in intellectu et cogitatione. Quare, aut vera non sunt quibus contra conaris probare, aut ex eis non consequitur quod te consequenter opinaris concludere. Quod autem putas ex eo, quia intelligitur aliquid quo maius cogitari nequit, non consequi illud esse in intellectu; nec si est in intellectu, ideo esse in re: certe ego dico: si vel cogitari potest esse, necesse est illud esse. Nam quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest cogitari esse, nisi sine initio. Quidquid autem potest cogitari esse, et non est: per initium potest cogitari esse. Non ergo quo maius cogitari nequit, cogitari potest esse, et non est.

    To show how false this is, I appeal to your faith and conscience as the firmest argument. Therefore that than which nothing greater can be thought is truly understood and thought, and is in the understanding and in thought. So either the premises by which you try to prove the contrary are not true, or what you think you conclude does not follow from them. You also think that it does not follow, from the fact that something than which nothing greater can be thought is understood, that it is in the understanding; nor, if it is in the understanding, that it therefore exists in reality. To this I say with certainty: if it can so much as be thought to exist, it must exist. For that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought to exist except as without beginning. But whatever can be thought to exist, and does not exist, can be thought to exist through a beginning. So that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be something that can be thought to exist and yet does not exist.

    Si ergo potest cogitari esse, ex necessitate est. Amplius. Si utique vel cogitari potest, necesse est illud esse. Nullus enim negans aut dubitans esse aliquid, quo maius cogitari non possit, negat vel dubitat quia si esset, nec actu nec intellectu posset non esse. Aliter namque non esset quo maius cogitari non posset; sed quidquid cogitari potest, et non est; si esset, posset, vel actu vel intellectu non esse. Quare si vel cogitari potest, non potest non esse quo maius cogitari nequit. Sed ponamus non esse, si vel cogitari valet: at quidquid cogitari potest, et non est; si esset, non esset quo maius cogitari non possit. Si ergo esset quo maius cogitari non possit, non esset quo maius cogitari non possit: quod nimis est absurdum.

    If, then, it can be thought to exist, it exists of necessity. Further: if it can so much as be thought, it must exist. For no one who denies or doubts that there is something than which nothing greater can be thought denies or doubts that, if it existed, it could not fail to exist either in actuality or in the understanding. Otherwise it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought. But whatever can be thought, and does not exist, could, if it existed, fail to exist either in actuality or in the understanding. So if it can so much as be thought, that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot fail to exist. But let us suppose that it does not exist, if it can so much as be thought. Yet whatever can be thought, and does not exist, would not, if it existed, be that than which nothing greater can be thought. So if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought—which is utterly absurd.

    Falsum est igitur non esse aliquid, quo maius cogitari non possit si vel cogitari potest: multo itaque magis, si intelligi aut in intellectu esse potest. Plus aliquid dicam: procul dubio quidquid alicubi aut aliquando non est, etiamsi est alicubi aut aliquando; potest tamen cogitari nunquam et nusquam esse, sicut non est alicubi aut aliquando. Nam quod heri non fuit, et hodie est: sicut heri non fuisse intelligitur; ita nunquam esse subintelligi potest: et quod hic non est, et alibi est, sicut non est hic, ita potest cogitari nusquam esse. Similiter cuius partes singulae non sunt ubi aut quando sunt aliae partes eius; omnes partes, et ideo ipsum totum, possunt cogitari nunquam aut nusquam esse.

    It is false, then, that something than which nothing greater can be thought does not exist, if it can so much as be thought; and much more so if it can be understood or be in the understanding. I will say something more. Without doubt, whatever does not exist somewhere or at some time, even if it does exist somewhere or at some time, can still be thought to exist never and nowhere, just as it does not exist somewhere or at some time. For what did not exist yesterday and exists today can, just as it is understood not to have existed yesterday, be taken never to exist; and what is not here but is elsewhere can, just as it is not here, be thought to exist nowhere. Likewise, a thing whose individual parts are not where or when its other parts are: all its parts, and therefore the whole itself, can be thought to exist never or nowhere.

    Nam etsi dicatur tempus semper esse, et mundus ubique; non tamen illud totum semper, aut iste totus est ubique: et sicut singulae partes temporis non sunt, quando aliae sunt; ita possunt nunquam esse cogitari; et singulae mundi partes, sicut non sunt ubi aliae sunt; ita subintelligi possunt nusquam esse: sed et quod partibus coniunctum est, cogitatione dissolvi, et non esse potest. Quare quidquid alicubi aut aliquando totum non est, etiamsi est, potest cogitari non esse: at quo maius cogitari nequit, si est, non potest cogitari non esse, alioquin si est, non est quo maius cogitari non potest: quod non convenit. Nullatenus ergo alicubi, aut aliquando totum non est; sed semper et ubique totum est.

    For even if time is said to exist always, and the world everywhere, still time as a whole does not exist always, nor the world as a whole everywhere. And just as the individual parts of time do not exist when the others do, so they can be thought never to exist; and the individual parts of the world, just as they are not where the others are, can be taken to exist nowhere. Moreover, what is joined together from parts can be taken apart in thought, and so not exist. Therefore whatever does not exist as a whole somewhere or at some time, even if it does exist, can be thought not to exist. But that than which nothing greater can be thought, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist; otherwise, if it exists, it is not that than which nothing greater can be thought, which is incoherent. So in no way does it fail to exist as a whole somewhere or at some time; it exists always and everywhere as a whole.

    Putasne aliquatenus posse cogitari vel intelligi, aut esse in cogitatione vel intellectu, de quo haec intelliguntur? Si enim non potest, non possunt haec intelligi de eo. Quod si dicis non intelligi et non esse in intellectu, quod non penitus intelligitur; dic quia qui non potest intueri purissimam lucem solis, non videt lucem diei, quae non est nisi lux solis. Certe vel hactenus intelligitur, et est in intellectu, quo maius cogitari nequit; ut haec de eo intelligantur.

    Do you think that the thing of which these things are understood can in some measure be thought or understood, or be in thought or in the understanding? For if it cannot, these things cannot be understood of it. And if you say that what is not fully understood is not understood and is not in the understanding, then say that someone who cannot gaze at the purest light of the sun does not see the daylight, which is nothing but the light of the sun. Surely that than which nothing greater can be thought is understood, and is in the understanding, at least to the extent that these things are understood of it.

    Understood, therefore in the understanding

    Anselm defends each step: what is understood is in the understanding, and cannot be there alone.

    Dixi itaque in argumentatione, quam reprehendis, quia cum insipiens audit proferri, quo maius cogitari non potest, intelligit quod audit. Utique qui non intelligit, si nota lingua dicitur, aut nullum, aut nimis obtusum habet intellectum. Deinde dixi quia si intelligitur, est in intellectu. An est in nullo intellectu, quod necessario in rei veritate esse monstratum est? Sed dices quia etsi est in intellectu, non tamen consequenter quia intelligitur. Vide quia consequitur esse in intellectu, ex eo quia intelligitur. Sicut enim quod cogitatur, cogitatione cogitatur; et quod cogitatione cogitatur, sicut cogitatur, sic est in cogitatione; ita quod intelligitur, intellectu intelligitur: et quod intellectu intelligitur, sicut intelligitur, sic est in intellectu. Quid hoc planius?

    So I said in the argument you criticize that when the fool hears “that than which nothing greater can be thought” spoken, he understands what he hears. Surely anyone who does not understand it, if it is said in a language he knows, has either no understanding at all or an extremely dull one. Next I said that if it is understood, it is in the understanding. Or is what has been shown to exist necessarily in reality in no understanding at all? But you will say that even if it is in the understanding, this does not follow from its being understood. See how it does follow, from its being understood, that it is in the understanding. For just as what is thought is thought by thought, and what is thought by thought is in thought just as it is thought; so what is understood is understood by the understanding, and what is understood by the understanding is in the understanding just as it is understood. What could be plainer?

    Postea dixi quia, si est vel in solo intellectu, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod maius est. Si ergo in intellectu solo est, idipsum scilicet quo maius non potest cogitari, est quo maius cogitari potest: rogo quid consequentius? An enim si est vel in solo intellectu, non potest cogitari esse et in re? Aut si potest, nonne qui hoc cogitat, aliquid cogitat maius eo; si est in solo intellectu? Quid ergo consequentius, quam si quo maius cogitari nequit, est in solo intellectu; idem esse quo maius cogitari possit? Sed utique, quo maius cogitari potest, in nullo intellectu est quo maius cogitari non possit. An ergo non consequitur, quo maius cogitari nequit, si est in ullo intellectu, non esse in solo intellectu?

    Next I said that if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be thought to exist also in reality, which is greater. So if it is in the understanding alone, then that very thing than which nothing greater can be thought is something than which something greater can be thought. What, I ask, follows more logically? For if it is even in the understanding alone, can it not be thought to exist also in reality? Or if it can, does not whoever thinks this think something greater than it, if it is in the understanding alone? What then follows more logically than that, if that than which nothing greater can be thought is in the understanding alone, it is the same as that than which something greater can be thought? But surely in no understanding is that than which something greater can be thought that than which nothing greater can be thought. Does it not follow, then, that that than which nothing greater can be thought, if it is in any understanding at all, is not in the understanding alone?

    Si enim est in solo intellectu, est quo maius cogitari potest: quod non convenit.

    For if it is in the understanding alone, it is that than which something greater can be thought—which is incoherent.

    The lost island answered

    The argument applies only to that than which nothing greater can be thought, so the island fails.

    Famous passage Anselm’s reply on the islandAnselm promises to find the lost island and give it to anyone who can apply his argument to anything but God.

    Sed tale est, inquis, ac si aliquis insulam Oceani, omnes terras sua fertilitate vincentem, quae difficultate, imo impossibilitate inveniendi quod non est, perdita nominatur, dicat idcirco non posse dubitari vere esse in re, quia verbis descriptam facile quis intelligit. Fidens loquor; quia si quis invenerit mihi aliquid aut reipsa, aut sola cogitatione existens, praeter quo maius cogitari non possit, cui aptare valeat connexionem huius meae argumentationis, inveniam, et dabo illi perditam insulam amplius non perdendam. Palam autem iam videtur quo non valet cogitari maius, non posse cogitari non esse, quod tam certa ratione veritatis existit; aliter enim nullatenus existeret. Denique si quis dicit se cogitare illud non esse: dico quod tum cum hoc cogitat aut cogitat aliquid, quo maius cogitari non possit, aut non cogitat.

    But this, you say, is just as if someone were to say of an island in the Ocean, surpassing all lands in its fertility, which is called “lost” because of the difficulty—or rather the impossibility—of finding what does not exist, that it cannot be doubted that it truly exists in reality, because anyone easily understands it when it is described in words. I speak with confidence: if anyone finds for me something, existing either in reality or in thought alone, other than that than which nothing greater can be thought, to which he can apply the logic of this argument of mine, I will find that lost island and give it to him, never to be lost again. But it now seems plainly evident that that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought not to exist, since it exists by so certain a reason of truth; for otherwise it would not exist at all. Finally, if anyone says that he thinks it does not exist, I say that when he thinks this, he either thinks something than which nothing greater can be thought, or he does not.

    Si non cogitat, non cogitat non esse quod non cogitat. Si vero cogitat, utique cogitat aliquid, quod nec cogitari possit non esse. Si enim posset cogitari non esse, cogitari posset habere principium et finem; sed hoc non potest. Qui ergo illud cogitat, aliquid cogitat quod nec cogitari possit non esse; hoc vero qui cogitat, non cogitat idipsum non esse; alioquin cogitat quod cogitari non potest. Non igitur potest cogitari non esse quo maius nequit cogitari.

    If he does not, then he does not think that what he is not thinking of does not exist. But if he does, then surely he thinks something that cannot even be thought not to exist. For if it could be thought not to exist, it could be thought to have a beginning and an end; but this is impossible. So whoever thinks of it thinks of something that cannot even be thought not to exist; and whoever thinks this does not think that this very thing does not exist—otherwise he would be thinking what cannot be thought. Therefore that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought not to exist.

    Why “cannot be thought” is the right phrase

    Anything but God can be thought not to exist, even while known to exist.

    Quod autem dicis: quia cum dicitur quod summa res ista non esse nequeat cogitari, melius fortasse diceretur quod non esse, aut etiam posse non esse, non possit intelligi; potius dicendum fuit, non possit cogitari. Si enim dixissem rem ipsam non posse intelligi non esse, fortasse tu ipse, qui dicis quia secundum proprietatem verbi istius falsa nequeunt intelligi, obiiceres nihil, quod est, posse intelligi non esse, falsum est enim non esse quod est: quare non esset proprium Deo, non posse intelligi non esse. Quod si aliquid eorum, quae certissime sunt, potest intelligi non esse similiter et alia certa posse intelligi non esse. Sed hoc utique non potest obiici de cogitatione, si bene consideretur.

    You say that when it is said that this supreme thing cannot be thought not to exist, it would perhaps be better to say that its not existing, or even its being able not to exist, cannot be understood. But “cannot be thought” is rather what needed to be said. For if I had said that the thing itself cannot be understood not to exist, perhaps you yourself, who say that in the strict sense of that word false things cannot be understood, would object that nothing that exists can be understood not to exist, since it is false that what exists does not exist; and so it would not be peculiar to God that he cannot be understood not to exist. And if one of the things that most certainly exist can be understood not to exist, then other certain things can likewise be understood not to exist. But this objection certainly cannot be made about thinking, if the matter is considered carefully.

    Nam etsi nulla quae sunt, possunt intelligi non esse; omnia tamen possunt cogitari non esse, praeter id quod summe est. Illa quippe omnia et sola possunt cogitari non esse, quae initium, aut finem, aut partium habent coniunctionem, et, sicut iam dixi, quidquid alicubi aut aliquando totum non est; illud vero solum non potest cogitari non esse, in quo nec initium, nec finem, nec partium coniunctionem, et quod nonnisi semper et ubique totum ulla invenit cogitatio. Scito igitur quia potes cogitare te non esse, quandiu esse certissime scis: quod te miror dixisse nescire. Multa namque cogitamus non esse, quae scimus esse; et multa esse, quae non esse scimus: non existimando, sed fingendo ita esse ut cogitamus.

    For even though none of the things that exist can be understood not to exist, they can all nevertheless be thought not to exist, except that which exists supremely. Indeed all those things, and only those, can be thought not to exist which have a beginning, or an end, or a joining of parts, and, as I have already said, whatever does not exist as a whole somewhere or at some time. But that alone cannot be thought not to exist in which no thought finds a beginning, or an end, or a joining of parts, and which any thought finds only as existing always and everywhere as a whole. Know, then, that you can think that you do not exist, even while you know with complete certainty that you exist—and I am surprised that you said you did not know this. For we think many things not to exist which we know do exist, and many things to exist which we know do not—not judging them to be so, but imagining them to be as we think them.

    Et quidem possumus cogitare aliquid non esse, quandiu scimus esse, quia simul et illud possumus, et istud scimus; et non possumus cogitare non esse quandiu scimus esse; quia non possumus cogitare esse simul, et non esse. Si quis igitur sic distinguat huius prolationis has duas sententias: intelliget nihil, quandiu esse scitur, posse cogitari non esse; et quidquid est, praeter id quo maius cogitari nequit, etiam cum scitur esse, posse cogitari non esse. Sic igitur et proprium est Deo, non posse cogitari non esse; et, tamen multa non possunt cogitari, quandiu sunt, non esse. Quomodo autem dicatur cogitari Deus non esse, in ipso libello puto sufficienter esse dictum.

    And indeed we can think that something does not exist while we know that it does, because we can do the one at the same time as we know the other. And we cannot think that something does not exist while we know that it does, because we cannot think that it exists and does not exist at the same time. If, then, someone distinguishes the two senses of this statement in this way, he will understand that nothing, while it is known to exist, can be thought not to exist; and that whatever exists, except that than which nothing greater can be thought, can be thought not to exist even when it is known to exist. So it is both peculiar to God that he cannot be thought not to exist, and yet many things cannot, while they exist, be thought not to exist. As for the way in which God is said to be thought not to exist, I think that has been sufficiently explained in the little book itself.

    “Greater than all” is not my formula

    Anselm says Gaunilo misstated his argument, which rests on “nothing greater can be thought.”

    Qualia vero sint et alia quae mihi obiicis pro insipiente facile est deprehendere vel parum sapienti; et ideo id ostendere supersedendum existimaveram. Sed quoniam audio quibusdam ea legentibus aliquid contra me valere videri, paucis de illis commemorabo. Primum, quod saepe repetis me dicere quia quod est maius omnibus, est in intellectu; et si est in intellectu, est et in re: aliter enim omnibus maius non esset omnibus maius. Nusquam in omnibus dictis meis invenitur talis probatio. Non enim idem valet, quod dicitur; maius omnibus, et, quo maius cogitari nequit, ad probandum quia est in re quod dicitur. Si quis enim dicat quo maius cogitari non possit, non esse aliquid in re, aut posse non esse, aut vel non esse posse cogitari, facile refelli potest.

    What the other objections are that you raise against me on behalf of the fool is easy to see even for someone of little wisdom, and so I had thought I should refrain from showing it. But since I hear that some who read them think they carry weight against me, I will say a few words about them. First, you often repeat that I say that what is greater than all is in the understanding, and that if it is in the understanding, it is also in reality, since otherwise what is greater than all would not be greater than all. Nowhere in anything I have said is such a proof to be found. For saying “greater than all” and saying “that than which nothing greater can be thought” do not have the same force for proving that what is spoken of exists in reality. For if someone says that that than which nothing greater can be thought is not something in reality, or can fail to exist, or can even be thought not to exist, he can easily be refuted.

    Nam quod non est, potest non esse; et quod non esse potest, cogitari potest non esse. Quidquid autem cogitari potest non esse; si est, non est quo maius cogitari non possit: quod si non est, utique si esset, non esset quo maius non possit cogitari. Sed dici non potest; quia quo maius non possit cogitari, si est, non est quo maius cogitari non possit; aut si esset, non esset quo non possit cogitari maius. Patet ergo quia nec non est, nec potest non esse, aut cogitari non esse. Aliter enim, si est, non est quod dicitur; et si esset, non esset. Hoc autem non tam facile probari posse videtur de eo quod maius omnibus dicitur.

    For what does not exist can fail to exist; and what can fail to exist can be thought not to exist. But whatever can be thought not to exist, if it exists, is not that than which nothing greater can be thought; and if it does not exist, then surely, if it did exist, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought. But it cannot be said that that than which nothing greater can be thought, if it exists, is not that than which nothing greater can be thought; or that, if it existed, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought. It is clear, then, that it neither does not exist, nor can fail to exist, nor can be thought not to exist. For otherwise, if it exists, it is not what it is said to be; and if it existed, it would not be. But this does not seem so easy to prove of what is said to be greater than all.

    Non enim ita patet quia quod non esse cogitari potest, non est maius omnibus quae sunt; sicut quia non est quo maius cogitari non possit: nec sic est indubitabile quia, si est aliquid maius omnibus, non est aliud quam quo maius non possit cogitari; aut si esset, non esset similiter aliud: quomodo certum est de eo quod dicitur, quo maius cogitari nequit. Quid enim: si quis dicat esse aliquid maius omnibus quae sunt, et idipsum tamen posse cogitari non esse; et aliquid maius eo, etiamsi non sit posse tamen cogitari: an hic sic aperte inferri potest, non est ergo maius omnibus quae sunt, sicut ibi apertissime diceretur; ergo non est quo maius cogitari nequit? Illud namque alio indiget argumento, quam hoc quod dicitur, omnibus maius.

    For it is not as clear that what can be thought not to exist is not greater than all things that exist as it is that it is not that than which nothing greater can be thought. Nor is it as indubitable that, if there is something greater than all, it is nothing other than that than which nothing greater can be thought, or that, if there were, it would likewise be nothing other, as it is certain of what is called that than which nothing greater can be thought. For suppose someone says that there is something greater than all things that exist, and yet that this very thing can be thought not to exist, and that something greater than it can be thought, even if it does not exist: can one here infer as plainly, “So it is not greater than all things that exist,” as one would most plainly say in the other case, “So it is not that than which nothing greater can be thought”? For the former needs some argument other than this phrase, “greater than all.”

    In isto vero non est opus alio, quam hoc ipso quod sonat, quo maius cogitari non possit. Ergo si non similiter potest probari de eo quod maius omnibus dicitur, quod de se per seipsum probat quo maius nequit cogitari, iniuste me reprehendisti dixisse quod non dixi, cum tantum differat ab eo quod dixi. Si vero vel aliud argumentum potest: nec sic me debuisti reprehendere dixisse quod probari potest. Utrum autem possit, facile perpendit, qui hoc posse, quo maius cogitari nequit, cognoscit: nullatenus enim potest intelligi quo maius cogitari non possit; nisi id quod solum omnibus est maius.

    But in the latter case there is no need for anything other than the very words “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” So if what that than which nothing greater can be thought proves of itself, through itself, cannot be proved in the same way of what is said to be greater than all, you have unjustly criticized me for saying what I did not say, since it differs so much from what I did say. And if it can be proved by some other argument, you still should not have criticized me for saying what can be proved. Whether it can, anyone easily judges who recognizes that that than which nothing greater can be thought can do this. For that than which nothing greater can be thought can in no way be understood except as that which alone is greater than all.

    Sicut ergo quo maius cogitari nequit intelligitur, et est in intellectu; et ideo esse in rei veritate asseritur: sic quod maius dicitur omnibus intelligi, et esse in intellectu; et idcirco reipsa esse ex necessitate concluditur. Vides ergo quam recte me comparasti stulto illi, qui hoc solo quod descripta intelligeretur, perditam insulam esse vellet asserere.

    So just as that than which nothing greater can be thought is understood and is in the understanding, and is therefore asserted to exist in reality, so what is said to be greater than all is concluded to be understood and to be in the understanding, and therefore to exist in reality of necessity. You see, then, how rightly you compared me to that fool who wanted to assert that the lost island exists merely because it is understood when described.

    False things in the understanding

    Showing the thing is in the understanding was only the first step of the proof.

    Quod autem obiicis, quaelibet falsa vel dubia similiter posse intelligi, et esse in intellectu: quemadmodum illud, quod dicebam. Miror quid hic sensisti contra me, dubium probare volentem; cui primum hoc satis erat, ut quolibet modo illud intelligi et esse in intellectu ostenderem: quatenus consequenter consideraretur utrum esset in solo intellectu, velut falsa; an et in re, ut vera. Nam si falsa et dubia hoc modo intelliguntur, et sunt in intellectu; quia, cum dicuntur, audiens intelligit quid dicens significet: nihil prohibet quod dixi intelligi, et esse in intellectu.

    You object that any false or doubtful things can equally be understood and be in the understanding, just like what I was speaking of. I wonder what you thought you were objecting against me here. I wanted to prove something that was in doubt, and for that it was enough, at first, to show that it is understood and is in the understanding in some way or other, so that it could then be considered whether it is in the understanding alone, like false things, or in reality as well, like true ones. For if false and doubtful things are understood and are in the understanding in this way—because, when they are spoken, the hearer understands what the speaker means—nothing prevents what I spoke of from being understood and being in the understanding.

    Quomodo autem sibi conveniant quod dicis quia falsa dicente aliquo, quaecunque ille diceret, intelligeres: et quia illud quod est non eo modo quo etiam falsa habentur in cogitatione, non diceris auditum cogitare, aut in cogitatione habere; quia scilicet, non possis hoc aliter cogitare, nisi intelligendo, id est, scientia comprehendendo reipsa illud existere? Quomodo, inquam, conveniant, et falsa intelligi; et intelligere esse scientia comprehendere existere aliquid: nihil ad me, tu videris. Quod si et falsa aliquo modo intelliguntur; et non omnis, sed cuiusdam intellectus est haec definitio: Non debui reprehendi, quia dixi quo maius cogitari non possit intelligi, et in intellectu esse; etiam antequam certum esset reipsa illud existere.

    But how do these two claims of yours fit together: that if someone spoke false things, you would understand whatever he said; and that, since this thing exists, you are not said to think of it when you hear it, or to have it in thought, in the way that even false things are held in thought, because you cannot think of it except by understanding—that is, by grasping with knowledge—that it actually exists? How, I say, do they fit together: that false things are understood, and that to understand is to grasp with knowledge that something exists? That is no concern of mine; you see to it. And if false things too are understood in some way, and this definition applies not to every kind of understanding but to one particular kind, then I should not have been criticized for saying that that than which nothing greater can be thought is understood and is in the understanding, even before it was certain that it actually exists.

    Something understood in part

    It is easier to prove what is understood in some way than what is not understood at all.

    Deinde quod dicis vix unquam posse esse credibile, cum dictum et auditum fuerit, istud non eo modo posse cogitari non esse, quo etiam potest cogitari non esse Deus. Respondeant pro me, qui vel parvam scientiam disputandi argumentandique attigerunt. An enim rationabile est, ut idcirco neget aliquis quod intelligit; quia esse dicitur id quod ideo negat, quia non intelligit? Aut si aliquando negatur, quod aliquatenus intelligitur, et idem est illi, quod nullatenus intelligitur; nonne facilius probatur quod dubium est, de illo quod in aliquo, quam de eo quod in nullo est intellectu? Quare nec credibile potest esse, idcirco quemlibet negare quo maius cogitari nequit, quod auditum aliquatenus intelligit; quia negat Deum, cuius sensum nullo modo cogitat.

    Next, you say that it could hardly ever be believable that, once this has been spoken and heard, it cannot be thought not to exist in the way that even God can be thought not to exist. Let those who have acquired even a little skill in disputation and argument answer for me. Is it reasonable for someone to deny what he understands because it is said to be the same as something he denies because he does not understand it? Or if what is in some measure understood is sometimes denied, and it is the same as what is not understood at all, is not what is in doubt more easily proved from what is in some understanding than from what is in none? So it cannot be believable that anyone denies that than which nothing greater can be thought, which he understands in some measure when he hears it, on the grounds that he denies God, whose meaning he does not think of in any way.

    Aut si et aliud, quia non omnino intelligitur, negatur, nonne tamen facilius id quod aliquo modo, quam id quod nullo modo intelligitur, probatur? Non ergo irrationabiliter contra insipientem, ad probandum Deum esse, attulit, quo maius cogitari non possit; cum illud nullo modo, istud aliquo modo intelligeret.

    Or if the one is also denied because it is not fully understood, is not what is understood in some way still more easily proved than what is not understood in any way? So it was not unreasonable, in arguing against the fool to prove that God exists, to bring forward that than which nothing greater can be thought, since he would understand God in no way, but this in some way.

    We can form an idea of the greatest

    By rising from lesser goods to greater ones, one can form an idea of the greatest.

    Quod vero tam studiose probas, quo maius cogitari nequit, non tale esse; qualis nondum facta pictura in intellectu pictoris, sine causa fit. Non enim ad hoc protuli picturam praecogitatam, ut tale illud, de quo agebatur, vellem asserere; sed tantum, ut aliquid esse in intellectu, quod non esse intelligeretur, possem ostendere. Item, quod dicis: quo maius cogitari nequit, secundum rem vel ex genere tibi vel ex specie notam, te cogitare auditum, vel in intellectu habere non posse; quoniam nec ipsam rem nosti, nec eam ex alia simili potes cognoscere; palam est rem aliter sese habere.

    As for your careful proof that that than which nothing greater can be thought is not like a picture not yet made in the painter’s understanding, it serves no purpose. For I did not bring in the picture planned in advance because I wanted to claim that the thing under discussion was like it, but only so that I could show that something is in the understanding which is not understood to exist. Again, you say that when you hear of that than which nothing greater can be thought, you cannot think of it or have it in your understanding on the basis of a real thing known to you by genus or species, since you neither know the thing itself nor can you come to know it from some other similar thing. But it is plain that the matter stands otherwise.

    Quoniam namque omne minus bonum in tantum est simile maiori bono, in quantum est bonum; patet cuilibet rationali menti quia de minoribus bonis ad maiora conscendendo, ex his, quibus aliquid cogitari potest maius, multum possumus coniicere illud, quo nihil potest maius cogitari.

    For since every lesser good is like a greater good insofar as it is good, it is clear to any rational mind that, by climbing from lesser goods to greater ones, we can infer a great deal about that than which nothing greater can be thought from those things than which something greater can be thought.

    Quis enim, verbi gratia, vel hoc cogitare non potest, etiam si non credat in re esse quod cogitat, scilicet, si bonum est aliquid, quod initium et finem habet; multo melius esse bonum, quod, licet incipiat, non tamen desinit: et sicut istud illo melius est, ita isto esse melius illud, quod nec finem habet nec initium, etiamsi semper de praeterito per praesens transeat ad futurum: et sive sit in re aliquid huiusmodi, sive non sit; valde tamen eo melius esse id, quod nullo modo indiget vel cogitur mutari, vel moveri: an hoc cogitari non potest; aut aliquid hoc maius cogitari potest, aut non est hoc ex iis, quibus maius cogitari valet, coniicere id quo maius cogitari nequit? Est igitur unde possit coniici, quo maius cogitari nequeat.

    Who, for example, cannot at least think this, even if he does not believe that what he thinks exists in reality: that if something that has a beginning and an end is good, then a good that begins but does not end is much better; and that just as the latter is better than the former, so what has neither end nor beginning is better than the latter, even if it always passes from the past through the present into the future; and that, whether or not there is anything of this kind in reality, what in no way needs, or is forced, to change or move is far better still? Can this not be thought? Or can something greater than this be thought? Or is this not to infer that than which nothing greater can be thought from things than which something greater can be thought? There is, then, a way by which that than which nothing greater can be thought can be inferred.

    Sic itaque facile refelli potest insipiens, qui sacram auctoritatem non recipit; si negat, quo maius cogitari non valet, ex aliis rebus coniici posse. At si quis Catholicus hoc neget, meminerit quia invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas.

    So the fool, who does not accept sacred authority, can easily be refuted if he denies that that than which nothing greater can be thought can be inferred from other things. But if any Catholic denies it, let him remember that the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity.

    Romans 1:20.

    Even the fool understands the phrase

    Whoever denies the phrase must understand it, and so thinks of what cannot fail to exist.

    Sed etsi verum esset non posse cogitari vel intelligi illud, quo maius nequit cogitari; non tamen falsum esset quo maius cogitari nequit, cogitari posse et intelligi. Sicut enim nihil prohibet dici, ineffabile; licet illud dici non possit, quod ineffabile dicitur; et quemadmodum cogitari potest non cogitabile, quamvis illud cogitari non possit, cui convenit non cogitabile dici: ita cum dicitur, quo nihil maius valet cogitari; procul dubio quod auditur, cogitari et intelligi potest, etiamsi res illa cogitari non valeat aut intelligi, qua maius cogitari nequit.

    But even if it were true that that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought or understood, it would still not be false that “that than which nothing greater can be thought” can be thought and understood. For just as nothing prevents us from saying “ineffable,” though what is called ineffable cannot be said; and just as “unthinkable” can be thought, though what is fittingly called unthinkable cannot be thought: so when “that than which nothing greater can be thought” is said, what is heard can without doubt be thought and understood, even if the thing itself than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought or understood.

    Nam etsi quisquam est tam insipiens, ut dicat non esse aliquid quo maius non possit cogitari, non tamen ita erit impudens, ut dicat se non posse intelligere aut cogitare quid dicat: aut si quis talis invenitur, non modo sermo eius est respuendus, sed et ipse conspuendus. Quisquis igitur negat aliquid esse, quo maius nequeat cogitari; utique intelligit et cogitat negationem, quam facit: quam negationem intelligere aut cogitare non potest sine partibus eius: pars autem eius est, quo maius cogitari non potest. Quicunque igitur hoc negat; intelligit et cogitat, quo maius cogitari nequit. Palam autem est quia similiter potest cogitari et intelligi, quod non potest non esse; maius vero cogitat qui hoc cogitat, quam qui cogitat quod possit non esse.

    For even if someone is such a fool as to say that there is not something than which nothing greater can be thought, he will not be so shameless as to say that he cannot understand or think what he is saying; or if such a person is found, not only should his words be spat out, but he himself should be spat upon. Whoever, then, denies that there is something than which nothing greater can be thought surely understands and thinks the denial he makes; and he cannot understand or think that denial without its parts. But one part of it is “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” So whoever denies this understands and thinks that than which nothing greater can be thought. Now it is plain that, in the same way, what cannot fail to exist can be thought and understood; and whoever thinks this thinks something greater than one who thinks what can fail to exist.

    Cum ergo cogitatur, quo maius non possit cogitari, si cogitatur quod possit non esse, non cogitatur quo non possit cogitari maius; sed nequit idem simul cogitari, et non cogitari. Quare qui cogitat quo maius non possit cogitari, non cogitat quod possit, sed quod non possit non esse. Quapropter necesse est esse quod cogitat; quia quidquid non esse potest, non est quod cogitat.

    So when that than which nothing greater can be thought is being thought, if what is thought is something that can fail to exist, then that than which nothing greater can be thought is not being thought. But the same thing cannot be thought and not thought at the same time. Therefore whoever thinks that than which nothing greater can be thought thinks not of something that can fail to exist, but of something that cannot. Hence what he thinks must exist, since whatever can fail to exist is not what he is thinking of.

    Conclusion and thanks

    Anselm restates that his proof is necessary and thanks his critic for his praise and criticism.

    Puto quia monstravi me non infirma, sed satis necessaria argumentatione probasse in praefato libello, reipsa existere aliquid, quo maius cogitari non possit; nec eam alicuius obiectionis infirmari firmitate. Tantam enim vim huius probationis in se continet significatio; ut hoc ipsum quod dicitur, ex necessitate, eo ipso quod intelligitur vel cogitatur, et revera probetur existere, et idipsum esse quidquid de divina substantia oportet credere. Credimus namque de divina substantia, quidquid absolute cogitari potest melius esse quam non esse. Verbi gratia: melius est esse aeternum, quam non aeternum; bonum, quam non bonum; imo bonitatem ipsam, quam non bonitatem ipsam. Nihil autem huiusmodi non esse potest, quo maius aliquid cogitari non potest. Necesse igitur est, quo maius cogitari non potest, esse quidquid de divina essentia credi oportet.

    I think I have shown that in the little book mentioned above I proved, by an argument not weak but quite necessary, that something than which nothing greater can be thought actually exists, and that this argument is not weakened by the strength of any objection. For the meaning of this phrase contains such force of proof in itself that what is said is, of necessity, by the very fact that it is understood or thought, both proved to exist in reality and proved to be whatever we ought to believe about the divine substance. For we believe of the divine substance whatever can be thought, without qualification, to be better to be than not to be. For example, it is better to be eternal than not eternal; good than not good; indeed goodness itself than not goodness itself. But that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot fail to be anything of this kind. Therefore that than which nothing greater can be thought must be whatever we ought to believe about the divine essence.

    Gratias ago benignitati tuae et in reprehensione, et in laude opusculi mei. Cum enim ea, quae tibi digna susceptione videntur, tanta laude extulisti, satis apparet, quia quae tibi infirma visa sunt, benevolentia, non malevolentia, reprehendisti.

    I thank you for your kindness, both in your criticism and in your praise of my little work. For since you have extolled with such praise what seems to you worthy of acceptance, it is quite clear that what seemed weak to you, you criticized out of goodwill, not ill will.