CE n’est pas à l’aduenture sans raison, que nous attribuons à simplesse et ignorance, la facilité de croire et de se laisser persuader. Car il me semble auoir appris autrefois, que la creance estoit comme vne impression, qui se faisoit en nostre ame; et à mesure qu’elle se trouuoit plus molle et de moindre resistance, il estoit plus aysé à y empreindre quelque chose. Vt necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi: sic animum perspicuis cedere. D’autant que l’ame est plus vuide, et sans contrepoids, elle se baisse plus facilement souz la charge de la premiere persuasion. Voylà pourquoy les enfans, le vulgaire, les femmes et les malades sont plus suiets à estre menez par les oreilles.
It is perhaps not without reason that we attribute to simplicity and ignorance the readiness to believe and to be persuaded. For I seem to have learned once that belief was like an impression made on our soul, and that the softer and less resistant the soul was, the easier it was to imprint something on it. As the pan of a scale must sink under the weights placed in it, so the mind must yield to what is evident. The emptier the soul and the less counterweight it has, the more easily it sinks under the load of the first persuasion. That is why children, the common people, women and the sick are more apt to be led by the ears.
Mais aussi de l’autre part, c’est vne sotte presomption, d’aller desdeignant et condamnant pour faux, ce qui ne nous semble pas vray-semblable: qui est vn vice ordinaire de ceux qui pensent auoir quelque suffisance, outre la commune. I’en faisoy ainsin autrefois, et si i’oyois parler ou des esprits qui reuiennent, ou du prognostique des choses futures, des enchantemens, des sorcelleries, ou faire quelque autre conte, où ie ne peusse pas mordre, Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas, / Nocturnos lemures, portentáque Thessala: il me venoit compassion du pauure peuple abusé de ces folies.
But on the other hand, it is foolish presumption to go about disdaining and condemning as false whatever does not seem likely to us; which is a common vice of those who think they have some ability above the ordinary. I used to do so once. If I heard talk of returning spirits, or of the prediction of future things, of enchantments, of sorceries, or some other tale I could not swallow—Dreams, magic terrors, marvels, witches, / Ghosts of the night and Thessalian portents—I felt pity for the poor people deceived by these follies.
Et à present ie treuue, que i’estoy pour le moins autant à plaindre moy mesme. Non que l’experience m’aye depuis rien faict voir, au dessus de mes premieres creances; et si n’a pas tenu à ma curiosité: mais la raison m’a instruit, que de condamner ainsi resolument vne chose pour fausse, et impossible, c’est se donner l’aduantage d’auoir dans la teste, les bornes et limites de la volonté de Dieu, et de la puissance de nostre mere nature: et qu’il n’y a point de plus notable folie au monde, que de les ramener à la mesure de nostre capacité et suffisance. Si nous appelons monstres ou miracles, ce où nostre raison ne peut aller, combien s’en presente il continuellement à nostre veuë?
And now I find that I was at least as much to be pitied myself. Not that experience has since shown me anything beyond my first beliefs—and that is not for want of curiosity on my part. But reason has taught me that to condemn a thing so decisively as false and impossible is to claim the advantage of having in one’s head the bounds and limits of the will of God and of the power of our mother nature; and that there is no more notable folly in the world than to reduce them to the measure of our own capacity and ability. If we call monsters or miracles whatever our reason cannot reach, how many of them continually present themselves to our sight?
Considerons au trauers de quels nuages, et comment à tastons on nous meine à la cognoissance de la pluspart des choses qui nous sont entre mains: certes nous trouuerons que c’est plustost accoustumance, que science, qui nous en oste l’estrangeté: Iam nemo fessus saturúsque videndi, / Suspicere in cœli dignatur lucida templa: et que ces choses là, si elles nous estoyent presentees de nouueau, nous les trouuerions autant ou plus incroyables qu’aucunes autres.
Let us consider through what clouds, and how gropingly, we are led to the knowledge of most of the things we have in hand. We shall surely find that it is familiarity rather than knowledge that takes away their strangeness—Now no one, weary and sated with seeing, / Deigns to look up at the shining temples of the sky—and that if these things were presented to us anew, we would find them as unbelievable as any others, or more so.
Si nunc primùm morialibus adsint / Ex improuiso, ceu sint obiecta repente, / Nil magis his rebus poterat mirabile dici, / Aut minus antè quod auderent fore credere gentes. Celuy qui n’auoit iamais veu de riuiere, à la premiere qu’il rencontra, il pensa que ce fust l’Ocean: et les choses qui sont à nostre cognoissance les plus grandes, nous les iugeons estre les extremes que nature face en ce genre. *Scilicet et fluuius qui non est maximus, ei est / Qui non antè aliquem maiorem vidit, et ingens / Arbor homòque videtur, et omnia de genere omni / Maxima quæ vidit quisque, hæc ingentia fingit.
If now for the first time they appeared to mortals / Without warning, as if suddenly set before their eyes, / Nothing could be called more marvelous than these things, / Nor anything the nations would less have dared believe beforehand. The man who had never seen a river thought the first one he came upon was the Ocean; and the things that are greatest within our knowledge we judge to be the utmost that nature makes in that kind. *Indeed, a river that is not the largest seems so to one / Who has never seen a larger; and a tree, and a man, / Seem huge; and in every kind of thing, / Whatever is greatest that each has seen, he imagines to be huge.
Consuetudine oculorum assuescunt animi, neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper vident.* La nouuelleté des choses nous incite plus que leur grandeur, à en rechercher les causes. Il faut iuger auec plus de reuerence de cette infinie puissance de nature, et plus de recognoissance de nostre ignorance et foiblesse. Combien y a il de choses peu vray-semblables, tesmoignees par gens dignes de foy, desquelles si nous ne pouuons estre persuadez, au moins les faut-il laisser en suspens: car de les condamner impossibles, c’est se faire fort, par vne temeraire presumption, de sçauoir iusques où va la possibilité.
Minds grow accustomed through the habit of the eyes, and neither marvel at nor inquire into the causes of the things they always see.* The novelty of things incites us more than their greatness to seek their causes. We must judge this infinite power of nature with more reverence, and with more acknowledgment of our own ignorance and weakness. How many unlikely things there are, attested by people worthy of belief, which, if we cannot be persuaded of them, we must at least leave in suspense! For to condemn them as impossible is to claim, with rash presumption, to know how far possibility extends.
Si lon entendoit bien la difference qu’il y a entre l’impossible et l’inusité; et entre ce qui est contre l’ordre du cours de nature, et contre la commune opinion des hommes, en ne croyant pas temerairement, ny aussi ne descroyant pas facilement: on obserueroit la regle de Rien trop, commandee par Chilon.
If we properly understood the difference between the impossible and the unusual, and between what is contrary to the order of nature’s course and what is contrary to the common opinion of men—neither believing rashly nor disbelieving easily—we would observe the rule of “Nothing too much,” prescribed by Chilon.
Quand on trouue dans Froissard, que le Conte de Foix sçeut en Bearn la defaicte du Roy Iean de Castille à Iuberoth, le lendemain qu’elle fut aduenue, et les moyens qu’il en allegue, on s’en peut moquer: et de ce mesme que nos Annales disent, que le Pape Honorius le propre iour que le Roy Philippe Auguste mourut à Mante, fit faire ses funerailles publiques, et les manda faire par toute l’Italie. Car l’authorité de ces tesmoings n’a pas à l’aduenture assez de rang pour nous tenir en bride. Mais quoy?
When we find in Froissart that the Count of Foix, in Béarn, learned of the defeat of King John of Castile at Aljubarrota the day after it happened, and read the means he alleges for it, we may laugh at it; and likewise at what our annals say, that Pope Honorius, on the very day King Philip Augustus died at Mantes, had his public funeral held and ordered it held throughout Italy. For the authority of these witnesses perhaps does not rank high enough to keep us in check. But what then?
si Plutarque outre plusieurs exemples, qu’il allegue de l’antiquité, dit sçauoir de certaine science, que du temps de Domitian, la nouuelle de la bataille perdue par Antonius en Allemaigne à plusieurs iournees de là, fut publiee à Rome, et semee par tout le monde le mesme iour qu’elle auoit esté perduë: et si Cæsar tient, qu’il est souuent aduenu que la renommee a deuancé l’accident: dirons-nous pas que ces simples gens là, se sont laissez piper apres le vulgaire, pour n’estre pas clair-voyans comme nous? Est-il rien plus delicat, plus net, et plus vif, que le iugement de Pline, quand il luy plaist de le mettre en ieu? rien plus esloigné de vanité?
Suppose Plutarch, besides several examples he cites from antiquity, says he knows for certain that in Domitian’s time the news of the battle lost by Antonius in Germany, many days’ journey away, was published in Rome and spread through the whole world on the very day it was lost; and suppose Caesar holds that it has often happened that rumor has outrun the event: shall we say that these simple people let themselves be fooled along with the common people, for not being as clear-sighted as we are? Is there anything more delicate, more clear and more lively than Pliny’s judgment, when he cares to bring it into play? Anything further from vanity?
ie laisse à part l’excellence de son sçauoir, quand ie fay moins de conte: en quelle partie de ces deux là le surpassons nous? toutesfois il n’est si petit escolier, qui ne le conuainque de mensonge, et qui ne luy vueille faire leçon sur le progrez des ouurages de nature.
I leave aside the excellence of his learning, which I count for less: in which of these two qualities do we surpass him? And yet there is no schoolboy so petty that he does not convict him of lying and want to lecture him on the workings of nature.
Quand nous lisons dans Bouchet les miracles des reliques de Sainct Hilaire: passe: son credit n’est pas assez grand pour nous oster la licence d’y contredire: mais de condamner d’vn train toutes pareilles histoires, me semble singuliere impudence.
When we read in Bouchet of the miracles worked by the relics of Saint Hilary, let it pass: his credit is not great enough to deprive us of the license to contradict him. But to condemn all such stories wholesale seems to me a singular impudence.
Ce grand Sainct Augustin tesmoigne auoir veu sur les reliques Sainct Geruais et Protaise à Milan, vn enfant aueugle recouurer la veuë: vne femme à Carthage estre guerie d’vn cancer par le signe de la croix, qu’vne femme nouuellement baptisee luy fit: Hesperius, vn sien familier auoir chassé les esprits qui infestoient sa maison, auec vn peu de terre du Sepulchre de nostre Seigneur: et cette terre depuis transportee à l’Eglise, vn paralytique en auoir esté soudain guery: vne femme en vne procession ayant touché à la chasse S. Estienne, d’vn bouquet, et de ce bouquet s’estant frottée les yeux, auoir recouuré la veuë pieça perduë: et plusieurs autres miracles, où il dit luy mesmes auoir assisté. Dequoy accuserons nous et luy et deux S.
That great Saint Augustine testifies that he saw a blind child recover his sight at the relics of Saint Gervase and Saint Protasius in Milan; a woman in Carthage cured of a cancer by the sign of the cross that a newly baptized woman made over her; Hesperius, a friend of his, drive out the spirits that infested his house with a little earth from the Sepulcher of our Lord, and, when that earth was later carried to the church, a paralytic suddenly cured by it; a woman in a procession who touched Saint Stephen’s reliquary with a bouquet, rubbed her eyes with that bouquet, and recovered her sight, long since lost; and several other miracles at which he says he himself was present. Of what shall we accuse him, and the two holy
Euesques Aurelius et Maximinus, qu’il appelle pour ses recors? sera-ce d’ignorance, simplesse, facilité, ou de malice et imposture? Est-il homme en nostre siecle si impudent, qui pense leur estre comparable, suit en vertu et piété, soit en sçauoir, iugement et suffisance? Qui vt rationem nullam afferrent, ipsa autoritate me frangerent. C’est vne hardiesse dangereuse et de consequence, outre l’absurde temerité qu’elle traine quant et soy, de mespriser ce que nous ne conceuons pas. Car apres que selon vostre bel entendement, vous auez estably les limites de la verité et de la mensonge, et qu’il se treuue que vous auez necessairement à croire des choses où il y a encores plus d’estrangeté qu’en ce que vous niez, vous vous estes des-ia obligé de les abandonner.
bishops Aurelius and Maximinus whom he calls as his witnesses? Shall it be of ignorance, simplicity, credulity, or of malice and imposture? Is there any man in our century so impudent as to think himself comparable to them, whether in virtue and piety or in learning, judgment and ability? Though they gave no reason, they would overwhelm me by their authority alone. It is a dangerous and weighty boldness, besides the absurd rashness it drags along with it, to despise what we do not understand. For after you have established, by your fine understanding, the limits of truth and falsehood, and it turns out that you must necessarily believe things even stranger than what you deny, you have already obliged yourself to abandon those limits.
Or ce qui me semble apporter autant de desordre en nos consciences en ces troubles où nous sommes, de la Religion, c’est cette dispensation que les Catholiques font de leur creance. Il leur semble faire bien les moderez et les entenduz, quand ils quittent aux aduersaires aucuns articles de ceux qui sont en debat. Mais outre ce, qu’ils ne voyent pas quel aduantage c’est à celuy qui vous charge, de commancer à luy ceder, et vous tirer arriere, et combien cela l’anime à poursuiure sa pointe: ces articles là qu’ils choisissent pour les plus legers, sont aucunefois tres-importans. Ou il faut se submettre du tout à l’authorité de nostre police ecclesiastique, ou du tout s’en dispenser.
Now what seems to me to bring just as much disorder into our consciences, in these religious troubles we are in, is the way Catholics pick and choose within their belief. They think they are being very moderate and enlightened when they concede to their adversaries some of the articles in dispute. But besides not seeing what an advantage it is to the man who attacks you when you begin to yield to him and draw back, and how much it encourages him to press his point, they fail to see that the articles they choose as the least weighty are sometimes very important. Either we must submit entirely to the authority of our ecclesiastical government, or release ourselves from it entirely.
Ce n’est pas à nous à establir la part que nous luy deuons d’obeissance. Et d’auantage, ie le puis dire pour l’auoir essayé, ayant autrefois vsé de cette liberté de mon chois et triage particulier, mettant à nonchaloir certains points de l’obseruance de nostre Eglise, qui semblent auoir vn visage ou plus vain, ou plus estrange, venant à en communiquer aux hommes sçauans, i’ay trouué que ces choses là ont vn fondement massif et tressolide: et que ce n’est que bestise et ignorance, qui nous fait les receuoir auec moindre reuerence que le reste. Que ne nous souuient il combien nous sentons de contradiction en nostre iugement mesmes? combien de choses nous seruoyent hyer d’articles de foy, qui nous sont fables auiourd’huy?
It is not for us to determine what share of obedience we owe it. Moreover, I can say this from having tried it. I once made use of this freedom of personal choice and selection, disregarding certain points in the observance of our Church that seemed to have a more empty or a stranger look; then, coming to discuss them with learned men, I found that these things have a massive and very solid foundation, and that it is only stupidity and ignorance that make us receive them with less reverence than the rest. Why do we not remember how much contradiction we feel even within our own judgment? How many things served us yesterday as articles of faith that are fables to us today?
La gloire et la curiosité, sont les fleaux de nostre ame. Cette cy nous conduit à mettre le nez par tout, et celle là nous defend de rien laisser irresolu et indecis.
Glory and curiosity are the two scourges of our soul. The latter leads us to poke our nose into everything; the former forbids us to leave anything unresolved and undecided.