Michel de Montaigne

Essays

Essais

In 1571, at thirty-eight, Michel de Montaigne retired from the law courts of Bordeaux to the tower library of his family's château, meaning to spend his remaining years in quiet among his books. Instead he started writing down whatever passed through his mind, and called the pieces essais: trials, attempts, tests of his own judgment. Two books appeared in 1580, a third in 1588, and he went on adding to all three, in the margins of his own copy, until his death in 1592.

The essays range over anything: friendship, cannibals, thumbs, coaches, sleep, cruelty, the education of children, the smell of things, the Roman Empire, kidney stones. They wander, contradict themselves and break off into anecdotes and quotations, and always come back to the one subject Montaigne claims to know: “I am myself the matter of my book.” Out of that self-scrutiny comes a steady doubt about human certainty, summed up in the motto he took, with the emblem of a pair of balanced scales, “What do I know?”, and a humane suspicion of anyone who calls other people’s customs barbarous.

This edition gives the text of 1595, published three years after Montaigne’s death by his “adopted daughter” Marie de Gournay from his final revisions, in its original spelling. The essays are numbered in the standard way, by book and chapter; the many quotations from Latin, Greek and Italian poets and historians are translated in the English column.

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French text: the posthumous edition of 1595 (Paris: Abel L’Angelier), edited by Marie de Gournay, in its original spelling, as reprinted from the Bibliothèque nationale copy in Essais de Montaigne (self-édition), ed. G.-E. Michaud, 4 vols. (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1907–1909), via the proofread transcription at Project Gutenberg (eBooks 48529, 49168 and 58801; public domain). Michaud’s modern-French version, summaries and notes are omitted. The 1595 text does not mark the layers of Montaigne’s revisions. The 1595 edition printed essay I.14 as I.40; it is restored here to its usual place and number. English: translated from the French with AI (Claude), then edited for accuracy and consistency. Not reviewed by a human specialist. Free to reuse under CC BY-SA 4.0. Margin numbers are book, essay and paragraph; Montaigne’s text runs on with few breaks, and the paragraphs follow the 1595 indentations and the section breaks marked in the 1907 reprint. Where the original uses a term now considered offensive, a neutral term is shown in brackets instead.

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To the ReaderAu lecteurAu lecteur · Montaigne tells the reader the book has only a private, domestic aim: it is a plain portrait of himself.
I.1 By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End1.1.1Par diuers moyens on arrive à pareille fin · Victors are sometimes softened by submission, sometimes by defiance; Montaigne finds man a marvelously vain, varied, and wavering subject.
I.2 Of Sadness1.2.1De la tristesse · Montaigne distrusts sadness, a passion he rarely feels, and shows how great grief strikes people dumb.
I.3 Our Feelings Reach Out Beyond Us1.3.1Nos affections s’emportent au delà de nous · We always live beyond ourselves in hopes and fears; Montaigne examines wishes about burial, reputation, and acting after death.
I.4 How the Soul Discharges Its Passions on False Objects When the True Are Wanting1.4.1Comme l’ame descharge ses passions sur des obiects faux, quand les vrais luy defaillent · When the soul lacks a real target for its passions, it invents one—even lashing out at objects or itself.
I.5 Whether the Governor of a Besieged Place Should Go Out to Parley1.5.1Si le chef d’vne place assiegee, doit sortir pour parlementer · Ancient Romans scorned trickery in war; modern soldiers prize surprise, so a besieged commander should not go out to negotiate.
I.6 The Hour of Parley Is Dangerous1.6.1L’heure des parlemens dangereuse · Towns taken by surprise during truce talks show that no agreement is safe until sealed, and victorious armies are hard to restrain.
I.7 That Intention Is Judge of Our Actions1.7.1Que l’intention iuge nos actions · Since only our will is in our power, duty rests on intention—so wrongs repaired only by deathbed wills earn little credit.
I.8 Of Idleness1.8.1De l’oysiueté · Retiring to rest his mind, Montaigne finds it bolting off into chimeras, so he writes them down to shame it.
I.9 Of Liars1.9.1Des menteurs · Montaigne laments his poor memory, then argues that lying is an accursed vice to be fought from childhood.
I.10 Of Prompt or Slow Speech1.10.1Du parler prompt ou tardif · Some speakers shine when improvising and others need preparation; Montaigne finds his own mind works best unpremeditated.
I.11 Of Prognostications1.11.1Des prognostications · Oracles and omens have lost credit; Montaigne mocks divination and the anxious curiosity that seeks to know the future.
I.12 Of Constancy1.12.1De la constance · Constancy means bearing misfortunes that cannot be avoided, not refusing to dodge dangers—even by flinching from a cannon shot.
I.13 The Ceremony of the Meeting of Kings1.13.1Ceremonie de l’entreueuë des rois · Starting from the etiquette of royal meetings, Montaigne describes his own impatience with ceremony and the servitude of manners.
I.14 That the Taste of Good and Evil Depends in Large Part on Our Opinion of Them1.14.1Que le goust des biens et des maux despend en bonne partie de l’opinion que nous en auons · If evils reach us only through our opinions, we can change their taste; Montaigne tests this on death, pain, and poverty.
I.15 One Is Punished for Holding a Place Obstinately Without Reason1.15.1On est puny pour s’opiniastrer en vne place sans raison · Commanders who stubbornly defend an indefensible place are rightly punished, though judging what is defensible is risky.
I.16 Of the Punishment of Cowardice1.16.1De la punition de la couardise · Faults of weakness differ from faults of malice, so cowardice is better punished with shame than with death.
I.17 A Trait of Certain Ambassadors1.17.1Vn traict de quelques ambassadeurs · Montaigne asks people about their own trades, and questions why ambassadors once held back unwelcome words from their king.
I.18 Of Fear1.18.1De la peur · Fear, the strangest of passions, breeds delusions, stampedes armies, and can even produce reckless courage; Montaigne fears fear most.
I.19 That We Should Not Judge of Our Happiness Until After Our Death1.19.1Qu’il ne faut iuger de nostre heur, qu’après la mort · Following Solon, no one should be called happy before death, for only the last act shows what a soul is truly worth.
I.20 That to Philosophize Is to Learn to Die1.20.1Que philosopher, c’est apprendre à mourir · Philosophy teaches us not to fear death; Montaigne urges keeping death always in mind so it loses its power to terrify.
I.21 Of the Power of the Imagination1.21.1De la force de l’imagination · Montaigne explores how imagination produces illness, cures, impotence, and supposed miracles, in himself and others.
I.22 One Man's Profit Is Another Man's Loss1.22.1Le profit de l’vn est dommage de l’autre · Every profit comes at someone's loss—and nature too lives by one thing's birth being another's corruption.
I.23 Of Custom, and Not Easily Changing an Accepted Law1.23.1De la coustume, et de ne changer aisément vne loy receüe · Custom rules us like a tyrant, shaping even conscience; yet Montaigne counsels against lightly changing established laws.
I.24 Different Outcomes of the Same Plan1.24.1Diuers euenemens de mesme Conseil · From the Duke of Guise's mercy to a would-be assassin, Montaigne weighs how the same counsel yields different results by fortune.
I.25 Of Pedantry1.25.1Du Pedantisme · Learned pedants stuff their memories but leave their judgment empty; true learning should make us wiser and better.
I.26 Of the Education of Children1.26.1De l’Institution des enfans, à Madame Diane de Foix, Contesse de Gurson · Writing to a noblewoman, Montaigne outlines an education that trains judgment and character rather than memory or rote learning.
I.27 It Is Folly to Measure the True and False by Our Own Capacity1.27.1C’est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux à nostre suffisance · It is presumptuous to dismiss as impossible whatever seems unlikely to us, since we do not know the limits of nature.
I.28 Of Friendship1.28.1De l’Amitié · Montaigne describes his perfect friendship with Étienne de La Boétie, a union of souls unlike any ordinary bond.
I.29 Twenty-Nine Sonnets of Étienne de La Boétie1.29.1Vingt et neuf sonnets d’Estienne de la Boetie, à Madame de Grammont Contesse de Guissen · Montaigne dedicates twenty-nine love sonnets by his late friend La Boétie to the Countess of Guiche.
I.30 Of Moderation1.30.1De la Moderation · Even virtue can be pursued to excess; Montaigne praises temperate natures and moderation even in pleasure and devotion.
I.31 Of Cannibals1.31.1Des Cannibales · Describing Brazilian peoples, Montaigne argues that Europeans, with their tortures and cruelties, are the true barbarians.
I.32 That We Must Be Sparing in Judging Divine Ordinances1.32.1Qu’il faut sobrement se mesler de iuger des ordonnances diuines · Those who read God's will into the outcome of events claim knowledge no one has, and weaken faith by doing so.
I.33 Of Fleeing from Pleasures at the Cost of Life1.33.1De fuir les voluptez au pris de la vie · Ancients advised death over a life of worldly ties; Montaigne finds a Christian version in Saint Hilary's prayer for his daughter.
I.34 Fortune Is Often Found in the Path of Reason1.34.1La fortune se rencontre souuent au train de la raison · Fortune sometimes acts with apparent justice and skill, punishing poisoners and curing the sick by chance.
I.35 Of a Lack in Our Administrations1.35.1D’vn defaut de nos polices · Montaigne's father proposed a public registry matching needs and offers; Montaigne also praises his household diary.
I.36 Of the Custom of Wearing Clothes1.36.1De l’vsage de se vestir · Were humans meant to go naked like other creatures? Montaigne argues that custom, not nature, makes cold unbearable to us.
I.37 Of Cato the Younger1.37.1Du ieune Caton · Montaigne refuses to measure others by himself and defends the greatness of heroic figures like Cato against detractors.
I.38 How We Weep and Laugh at the Same Thing1.38.1Comme nous pleurons et rions d’vne mesme chose · Conflicting feelings can be equally sincere; Montaigne shows how the soul shifts between grief and joy over the same thing.
I.39 Of Solitude1.39.1De la solitude · True solitude is inward: Montaigne urges freeing ourselves from attachments and keeping a back room of the mind for ourselves.
I.40 A Consideration upon Cicero1.40.1Consideration sur Ciceron · Cicero and Pliny's craving for literary fame is unworthy of statesmen; Montaigne also reflects on his own letters and style.
I.41 Of Not Sharing One’s Glory1.41.1De ne communiquer sa gloire · Glory is the hardest vanity to shed, yet some men have rare greatness enough to give their glory to others.
I.42 Of the Inequality That Is Between Us1.42.1De l’inegualité qui est entre nous · Men should be valued by their own qualities, not their trappings; Montaigne shows how kingship weighs on those who hold it.
I.43 Of Sumptuary Laws1.43.1Des lois somptuaires · Laws restricting luxury to princes only make it more desirable; kings could end extravagance by giving it up themselves.
I.44 Of Sleep1.44.1Du dormir · Great men like Alexander, Otho, and Cato slept soundly before battle or death, showing remarkable composure.
I.45 Of the Battle of Dreux1.45.1De la battaille de Dreux · Montaigne defends the Duke of Guise's waiting at Dreux: a soldier must aim at the whole victory, not partial rescues.
I.46 Of Names1.46.1Des noms · A hodgepodge on names—unlucky names, families renamed for their lands, and how glory attaches to mere words.
I.47 Of the Uncertainty of Our Judgment1.47.1De l’incertitude de nostre iugement · On questions of war, good arguments exist on both sides; Montaigne shows how uncertain our judgment of strategy is.
I.48 Of Warhorses1.48.1Des Destriers · Montaigne gathers lore on the warhorses and cavalry customs of the ancients and of various nations.
I.49 Of Ancient Customs1.49.1Des coustumes anciennes · Changing fashions blind us to their absurdity; Montaigne surveys Roman customs in dress, bathing, eating, and daily life.
I.50 Of Democritus and Heraclitus1.50.1De Democritus et Heraclitus · Montaigne tests his judgment on all subjects, and prefers Democritus's laughter at human folly to Heraclitus's tears.
I.51 Of the Vanity of Words1.51.1De la vanité des paroles · Rhetoric deceives judgment and flourishes in disordered states; Montaigne also mocks inflated words, from cooks to titles.
I.52 Of the Frugality of the Ancients1.52.1De la parsimonie des anciens · Romans like Regulus, Cato, and Scipio lived on little, even at the height of power and glory.
I.53 Of a Saying of Caesar1.53.1D’vn mot de Cæsar · Taking up a saying of Caesar, Montaigne finds we never rest content with present things and always crave the absent.
I.54 Of Vain Subtleties1.54.1Des vaines subtilitez · Admiring difficult trifles shows weak judgment; Montaigne notes how extremes meet, as in ignorance before and after knowledge.
I.55 Of Smells1.55.1Des Senteurs · The best bodily smell is none; Montaigne describes his own keen nose and the power of perfumes on the mind.
I.56 Of Prayers1.56.1Des prieres · Montaigne recommends the Lord's Prayer and warns against praying while unrepentant and against careless use of sacred texts.
I.57 Of Age1.57.1De l’Aage · Few people die of old age, so Montaigne thinks we should start careers early; the mind reaches its prime by about twenty.
II.1 Of the Inconstancy of Our Actions2.1.1De l’inconstance de nos actions · Human conduct contradicts itself so constantly that Montaigne doubts anyone can be judged by a single action—or understood as a single self.
II.2 Of Drunkenness2.2.1De l’yurongnerie · Montaigne denies that all vices are equal, finds drunkenness gross but less malicious than most, and weighs the case for drink.
II.3 A Custom of the Island of Cea2.3.1Coustume de l’Isle de Cea · Through a string of ancient examples, Montaigne weighs the arguments for and against suicide and asks what circumstances might excuse it.
II.4 Business Tomorrow2.4.1A demain les affaires · Praise for Amyot's French Plutarch leads to Montaigne's own heedlessness, and the question of whether urgent letters should ever wait.
II.5 Of Conscience2.5.1De la Conscience · A tense wartime encounter shows how a guilty conscience betrays itself, and why torture is a poor test of truth.
II.6 Of Practice2.6.1De l’exercitation · Montaigne recounts his near-fatal fall from a horse to show how gently dying may come, then defends writing about himself.
II.7 Of Rewards of Honor2.7.1Des récompenses d’honneur · Honors without monetary value reward virtue best, Montaigne argues, but only while rare—as France's Order of Saint Michael no longer is.
II.8 Of the Affection of Fathers for Their Children2.8.1De l’affection des pères aux enfants · Addressed to Madame d'Estissac, this essay argues that fathers should earn their children's love through reason, not hoard their wealth and authority.
II.9 Of the Arms of the Parthians2.9.1Des armes des Parthes · Montaigne faults the nobles of his day for arming only at the last moment and compares heavy French armor with ancient practice.
II.10 Of Books2.10.1Des Liures · Montaigne reviews the authors he reads for pleasure and use—poets, Plutarch, Seneca, historians—and judges Cicero and others with candid freedom.
II.11 Of Cruelty2.11.1De la cruauté · Distinguishing struggling virtue from easy natural goodness, Montaigne declares his horror of cruelty, even toward animals, as the extreme of all vices.
II.12 Apology for Raymond Sebond2.12.1Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde · Defending Sebond's natural theology, Montaigne dismantles human reason's pretensions, comparing us unfavorably with animals and ending in skeptical doubt and faith.
II.13 Of Judging Another's Death2.13.1De iuger de la mort d’autruy · A good death is hard to judge, since few believe their end has come; Montaigne weighs Cato's suicide and other deliberate deaths.
II.14 How Our Mind Hinders Itself2.14.1Comme nostre esprit s’empesche soy-mesmes · A brief puzzle about a mind poised between two equal desires, which Montaigne turns into a reflection on reason's limits.
II.15 That Our Desire Is Increased by Difficulty2.15.1Que nostre desir s’accroist par la malaisance · Montaigne shows how opposition and difficulty sharpen desire, in love and in everything else, and why he leaves his house unguarded.
II.16 Of Glory2.16.1De la gloire · Glory belongs to God alone, Montaigne argues; human fame is fickle and accidental, and virtue should be pursued for conscience, not reputation.
II.17 Of Presumption2.17.1De la presumption · Montaigne examines the opposite fault of underrating oneself, then sketches a candid, often unflattering self-portrait of his body, mind and talents.
II.18 Of Giving the Lie2.18.1Du desmentir · Montaigne justifies a book about an ordinary man, condemns lying as his age's vice, and asks why "you lie" provokes such outrage.
II.19 Of Freedom of Conscience2.19.1De la liberté de conscience · Julian the Apostate shows how zeal drives good men to injustice, and why religious liberty may weaken faction.
II.20 We Taste Nothing Pure2.20.1Nous ne goustons rien de pur · No pleasure or virtue reaches us unmixed, Montaigne argues; even our best goodness and sharpest wisdom carry some taint.
II.21 Against Idleness2.21.1Contre la faineantise · Rulers should labor until death, Montaigne argues, citing Vespasian and a Moorish king who directed a battle with his last breath.
II.22 Of Riding Post2.22.1Des Postes · From his own riding to Cyrus's relay stations and Caecina's swallows, Montaigne collects stories of how news was carried at speed.
II.23 Of Bad Means Used for a Good End2.23.1Des mauuais moyens employez à bonne fin · Montaigne compares states with diseased bodies and considers whether foreign wars and gladiator shows are justified ways to purge civic ills.
II.24 Of the Greatness of Rome2.24.1De la grandeur Romaine · A short essay using Cicero's letters and other anecdotes to show how far Rome's power exceeded the paltry grandeurs of Montaigne's time.
II.25 Of Not Pretending to Be Sick2.25.1De ne contrefaire le malade · Stories of people who faked gout or blindness and then truly got it lead Montaigne to warn against counterfeiting illness.
II.26 Of Thumbs2.26.1Des pouces · A brief gathering of ancient lore about thumbs: their names, their role in oaths and spectacles, and their deliberate mutilation.
II.27 Cowardice, the Mother of Cruelty2.27.1Coüardise mere de la cruauté · Montaigne traces cruelty to cowardice and fear, from tyrants who weep easily to duelists who rely on fencing skill instead of courage.
II.28 All Things Have Their Season2.28.1Toutes choses ont leur saison · Learning Greek in old age, as Cato the Censor did, strikes Montaigne as unseemly; he himself is now winding down his hopes.
II.29 Of Virtue2.29.1De la vertu · Heroic virtue comes in fits and starts, Montaigne finds, rarely becoming settled habit, and fanatics' readiness to die proves little.
II.30 Of a Monstrous Child2.30.1D’vn enfant monstrueux · A plain description of conjoined twins Montaigne saw, ending with the claim that nothing is contrary to nature, only to custom.
II.31 Of Anger2.31.1De la cholere · Starting with parents who beat children in anger, Montaigne studies anger's effects and the folly of punishing while angry.
II.32 A Defense of Seneca and Plutarch2.32.1Defence de Seneque et de Plutarque · Montaigne defends Seneca against a Protestant pamphlet likening him to a hated cardinal, and Plutarch against Jean Bodin's charges.
II.33 The Story of Spurina2.33.1L’histoire de Spurina · A handsome youth who disfigured his face to escape women's desire leads Montaigne to Caesar's ambition and the mastery of passions.
II.34 Observations on Julius Caesar's Methods of Making War2.34.1Obseruation sur les moyens de faire la guerre, de Iulius Cæsar · Montaigne gathers rare traits of Caesar's generalship from his Commentaries—his speed, daring, discipline and personal courage.
II.35 Of Three Good Women2.35.1De trois bonnes femmes · Montaigne praises three wives—a humble neighbor of Pliny's, Arria and Seneca's Paulina—who chose to die alongside their husbands.
II.36 Of the Most Excellent Men2.36.1Des plus excellens hommes · Montaigne ranks Homer, Alexander and above all Epaminondas as the most excellent men he knows, weighing each one's gifts and faults.
II.37 Of the Resemblance of Children to Their Fathers2.37.1De la ressemblance des enfans aux peres · Suffering from kidney stones like his father, Montaigne marvels at inherited traits and mounts a long, mocking attack on medicine and doctors.
III.1 Of the Useful and the Honorable3.1.1De l’vtile et de l’honeste · Montaigne asks whether private morality yields to public expediency and refuses treachery, keeping his own dealings open and honest.
III.2 Of Repentance3.2.1Du repentir · Montaigne portrays himself as ever-changing and argues that true repentance must reach the self, not just regret particular acts.
III.3 Of Three Kinds of Company3.3.1De trois commerces · Montaigne weighs the three kinds of company he enjoys—friends, women, and books—and describes the library in his tower.
III.4 Of Diversion3.4.1De la Diuersion · Montaigne shows that grief, fear, and passion are better eased by turning the mind aside than by facing them head-on.
III.5 On Some Verses of Virgil3.5.1Sur des vers de Virgile · Prompted by Virgil and Lucretius, an aging Montaigne writes frankly about sex, marriage, and the hypocrisy surrounding desire.
III.6 Of Coaches3.6.1Des Coches · From the pomp of royal coaches and spectacles, Montaigne turns to the Spanish conquest of the New World and condemns its cruelty.
III.7 Of the Disadvantage of Greatness3.7.1De l’incommodité de la grandeur · Montaigne argues that greatness is easy to forgo and that rank isolates princes from honest judgment and real competition.
III.8 Of the Art of Conversation3.8.1De l’art de conferer · Montaigne praises vigorous, frank debate as the best exercise for the mind and admits his own faults as a warning to others.
III.9 Of Vanity3.9.1De la vanité · Montaigne ranges over writing, travel, household cares, and public duty, defending his love of wandering and his Roman citizenship.
III.10 Of Husbanding Your Will3.10.1De mesnager sa volonté · Recalling his years as mayor of Bordeaux, Montaigne argues for lending yourself to public duties without giving yourself away.
III.11 Of the Lame3.11.1Des boyteux · Starting from the calendar reform, Montaigne mocks credulity about witches and miracles and urges suspended judgment.
III.12 Of Physiognomy3.12.1De la Physionomie · Montaigne praises Socrates' natural simplicity, recounts the civil wars and plague, and asks whether a good face shows a good soul.
III.13 Of Experience3.13.1De l’Experience · Montaigne finds laws and reason too weak to capture life's variety and turns to self-knowledge, health, and enjoying ordinary living.

About Michel de Montaigne

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) was a French nobleman, magistrate and mayor of Bordeaux who retired to his estate to write. His Essays founded the essay as a form and set a model for frank self-examination and skeptical inquiry.

Who’s who

Étienne de La Boétie: Montaigne's close friend, a magistrate and writer who died in 1563; the subject of the essay Of Friendship.
Pierre Eyquem de Montaigne: Montaigne's father, a soldier and mayor of Bordeaux who had his son taught Latin from infancy.
Marie de Gournay: Montaigne's “adopted daughter” and admirer, who edited the posthumous 1595 edition of the Essays.
Raymond Sebond: Fifteenth-century Spanish theologian whose Natural Theology Montaigne translated and defends in his longest essay.
Socrates: Athenian philosopher (died 399 BC), Montaigne's chief model of wisdom, plainness and calm in the face of death.
Plato: Greek philosopher, Socrates' pupil, whose dialogues Montaigne cites often, sometimes with irony.
Aristotle: Greek philosopher whose authority in the schools Montaigne often questions.
Pyrrho: Greek philosopher (about 360–270 BC), founder of the skeptical school whose suspension of judgment Montaigne explores.
Epicurus: Greek philosopher who taught that pleasure, rightly understood, is the goal of life.
Seneca: Roman Stoic philosopher and statesman, one of Montaigne's most quoted authors.
Plutarch: Greek biographer and moralist, Montaigne's favorite source of anecdotes and examples.
Cicero: Roman orator and philosopher, often quoted, though Montaigne mocks his vanity and long-windedness.
Julius Caesar: Roman general and dictator, whose deeds and Commentaries Montaigne discusses throughout.
Cato the Younger: Roman Stoic statesman who killed himself rather than submit to Caesar; an example of unbending virtue.
Alexander the Great: King of Macedon and conqueror, whom Montaigne cites for greatness and for excess.

Key terms

essays essais: Montaigne's word for his pieces: trials or tests, attempts in which he tries out his own judgment on any subject rather than finished treatises.
custom coustume: The habits and usages of a people, which shape what each person thinks natural, right or barbarous far more than reason does.
judgment iugement: The power to weigh and assess things for oneself; the faculty Montaigne exercises and tests in every essay.
the soul l'ame: The inner self of thought, feeling and will, which Montaigne treats as bound up with the body and its moods.
pleasure volupté: Enjoyment of body and mind, which Montaigne holds is the aim even of virtue, and which he defends against grim moralists.
glory la gloire: Fame and reputation in other people's eyes, which Montaigne treats as an empty and uncertain thing to live for.
virtue la vertu: Moral excellence, and also valor and strength of character; Montaigne prizes an easy, natural virtue over a harsh, strained one.
Fortune fortune: Chance, often personified, which governs much of human affairs and upsets the best-laid plans.
Pyrrhonists les Pyrrhoniens: Ancient skeptics, followers of Pyrrho, who suspend judgment on every question; Montaigne sets out their view at length in the Apology for Raymond Sebond.
human condition l'humaine condition: The shared nature and limits of human beings; Montaigne holds that every man bears its whole form.
What do I know? Que sçay-ie?: Montaigne's skeptical motto, taken with an emblem of balanced scales, expressing doubt about any claim to certain knowledge.
imagination imagination: The power of the mind to form images and beliefs, which Montaigne finds can make people ill, afraid or convinced.
opinion opinion: What people believe or suppose, as opposed to what they know; Montaigne argues that things affect us chiefly through our opinion of them.
temperament humeur: A person's natural disposition or mood, which Montaigne observes shifting constantly in himself.
barbarism barbarie: What each people calls customs unlike its own; Montaigne argues that Europeans are often more barbarous than those they condemn.
friendship amitié: The complete union of two minds, which Montaigne describes from his own friendship with Étienne de La Boétie.