Forage Michel de Montaigne · Essays · II.12 Apology for Raymond Sebond
Michel de Montaigne · Essays

II.12 Apology for Raymond Sebond

Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde · Defending Sebond's natural theology, Montaigne dismantles human reason's pretensions, comparing us unfavorably with animals and ending in skeptical doubt and faith.

ListenRead by George · AI voice · 7 hr 4 min (this part) · 44 hr 18 min in all
Chapters

    MP3 of this part (204 MB)

    FrenchEnglish

    C’EST à la verité vne tres-vtile et grande partie que la science: ceux qui la mesprisent tesmoignent assez leur bestise: mais ie n’estime pas pourtant sa valeur iusques à cette mesure extreme qu’aucuns luy attribuent. Comme Herillus le philosophe, qui logeoit en elle le souuerain bien, et tenoit qu’il fust en elle de nous rendre sages et contens: ce que ie ne croy pas: ny ce que d’autres ont dict, que la science est mere de toute vertu, et que tout vice est produit par l’ignorance. Si cela est vray, il est subiect à vne longue interpretation.

    In truth, knowledge is a very useful and important accomplishment; those who despise it show their stupidity plainly enough. But I do not, for all that, value it to the extreme degree that some attribute to it—like Herillus the philosopher, who placed the sovereign good in it and held that it was in its power to make us wise and content, which I do not believe; nor do I believe what others have said, that knowledge is the mother of all virtue, and that all vice is produced by ignorance. If that is true, it needs a long interpretation.

    Herillus of Carthage (3rd century BC) was a pupil of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism.

    Translating Sebond

    His father’s learned guests gave him Sebond’s Natural Theology, which Montaigne translated at his request.

    Ma maison a esté dés long temps ouuerte aux gens de sçauoir, et en est fort cogneuë; car mon pere qui l’a commandée cinquante ans, et plus, eschauffé de cette ardeur nouuelle, dequoy le Roy François premier embrassa les lettres et les mit en credit, rechercha auec grand soin et despence l’accointance des hommes doctes, les receuant chez luy, comme personnes sainctes, et ayans quelque particuliere inspiration de sagesse diuine, recueillant leurs sentences, et leurs discours comme des oracles, et auec d’autant plus de reuerence, et de religion, qu’il auoit moins de loy d’en iuger: car il n’auoit aucune cognoissance des lettres, non plus que ses predecesseurs. Moy ie les ayme bien, mais ie ne les adore pas.

    My house has long been open to learned men, and is well known for it. For my father, who ruled it for fifty years and more, was fired with that new ardor with which King Francis I embraced letters and brought them into favor. He sought the acquaintance of learned men with great care and expense, receiving them in his home like holy persons who had some special inspiration of divine wisdom, collecting their sayings and discourses like oracles—and with all the more reverence and religious awe as he was less qualified to judge them, for he had no knowledge of letters, any more than his forebears. As for me, I like them well enough, but I do not worship them.

    Entre autres, Pierre Bunel, homme de grande reputation de sçauoir en son temps, ayant arresté quelques iours à Montaigne en la compagnie de mon pere, auec d’autres hommes de sa sorte, luy fit present au desloger d’vn liure qui s’intitule Theologia naturalis; siue Liber creaturarum, magistri Raimondi de Sebonde.

    Among others, Pierre Bunel, a man of great reputation for learning in his day, having stayed some days at Montaigne in my father’s company, with other men of his kind, made him a present on leaving of a book entitled Natural Theology, or Book of Creatures, by Master Raymond Sebond.

    Pierre Bunel (1499–1546) was a humanist from Toulouse. Raymond Sebond (d. 1436), a Catalan, taught theology at Toulouse.

    Et par ce que la langue Italienne et Espagnolle estoient familieres à mon pere, et que ce liure est basty d’vn Espagnol barragouiné en terminaisons Latines, il esperoit qu’auec bien peu d’ayde, il en pourroit faire son profit, et le luy recommanda, comme liure tres-vtile et propre à la saison, en laquelle il le luy donna: ce fut lors que les nouuelletez de Luther commençoient d’entrer en credit, et esbranler en beaucoup de lieux nostre ancienne creance. En quoy il auoit vn tresbon aduis; preuoyant bien par discours de raison, que ce commencement de maladie declineroit aisément en vn execrable atheisme.

    And because the Italian and Spanish languages were familiar to my father, and this book is built of a Spanish jargon with Latin endings, he hoped that with very little help he could profit from it, and recommended it to him as a very useful book, suited to the time when he gave it to him. This was when Luther’s novelties were beginning to gain credit and to shake our ancient belief in many places. In this he showed very good judgment, clearly foreseeing by rational reasoning that this incipient disease would easily degenerate into execrable atheism.

    Car le vulgaire n’ayant pas la faculté de iuger des choses par elles mesmes, se laissant emporter à la Fortune et aux apparences, apres qu’on luy a mis en main la hardiesse de mespriser et contreroller les opinions qu’il auoit euës en extreme reuerence, comme sont celles où il va de son salut, et qu’on a mis aucuns articles de sa religion en doubte et à la balance, il iette tantost apres aisément en pareille incertitude toutes les autres pieces de sa creance, qui n’auoient pas chez luy plus d’authorité ny de fondement, que celles qu’on luy a esbranlées: et secoue comme vn ioug tyrannique toutes les impressions, qu’il auoit receues par l’authorité des loix, ou reuerence de l’ancien vsage, Nam cupidè conculcatur nimis antè metutum; entreprenant deslors en auant, de ne receuoir rien, à quoy il n’ait interposé son decret, et presté particulier consentement.

    For the common people do not have the ability to judge things in themselves, and let themselves be carried away by chance and appearances. Once they have been given the boldness to despise and criticize the opinions they had held in extreme reverence, such as those on which their salvation depends, and once some articles of their religion have been put in doubt and in the balance, they soon easily throw all the other parts of their belief into similar uncertainty, for these had no more authority or foundation for them than the ones that have been shaken. And they shake off like a tyrannical yoke all the impressions they had received from the authority of the laws or from reverence for ancient custom, For what was too much feared before is eagerly trampled underfoot; resolving from then on to accept nothing to which they have not applied their own decree and given their particular consent.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things.

    Or quelques iours auant sa mort, mon pere ayant de fortune rencontré ce liure soubs vn tas d’autres papiers abandonnez, me commanda de le luy mettre en François. Il faict bon traduire les autheurs, comme celuy-là, où il n’y a guere que la matiere à representer: mais ceux qui ont donné beaucoup à la grace, et à l’elegance du langage, ils sont dangereux à entreprendre, nommément pour les rapporter à vn idiome plus foible.

    Now, a few days before his death, my father, having by chance come across this book under a heap of other discarded papers, ordered me to put it into French for him. It is good to translate authors like that one, where there is little but the matter to render; but those who have given much to grace and elegance of language are dangerous to undertake, especially when bringing them into a weaker idiom.

    Montaigne’s father died in June 1568; the translation of Sebond appeared in Paris in 1569.

    C’estoit vne occupation bien estrange et nouuelle pour moy: mais estant de fortune pour lors de loisir, et ne pouuant rien refuser au commandement du meilleur pere qui fut onques, i’en vins à bout, comme ie peuz: à quoy il print vn singulier plaisir, et donna charge qu’on le fist imprimer: ce qui fut executé apres sa mort.

    It was a very strange and new occupation for me; but happening to have leisure at the time, and being unable to refuse anything to the command of the best father there ever was, I got through it as best I could. He took singular pleasure in it, and gave orders for it to be printed—which was done after his death.

    Ie trouuay belles les imaginations de cet autheur, la contexture de son ouurage bien suyuie; et son dessein plein de pieté. Par ce que beaucoup de gens s’amusent à le lire, et notamment les dames, à qui nous deuons plus de seruice, ie me suis trouué souuent à mesme de les secourir, pour descharger leur liure de deux principales obiections qu’on luy faict. Sa fin est hardie et courageuse, car il entreprend par raisons humaines et naturelles, establir et verifier contre les atheistes tous les articles de la religion Chrestienne.

    I found this author’s ideas fine, the structure of his work well sustained, and his purpose full of piety. Many people enjoy reading it, especially the ladies, to whom we owe more service, so I have often found myself in a position to help them by clearing their book of the two main objections made against it. His aim is bold and courageous, for he undertakes to establish and prove all the articles of the Christian religion against the atheists by human and natural reasons.

    En quoy, à dire la verité, ie le trouue si ferme et si heureux, que ie ne pense point qu’il soit possible de mieux faire en cet argument là; et croy que nul ne l’a esgalé. Cet ouurage me semblant trop riche et trop beau, pour vn autheur, duquel le nom soit si peu cogneu, et duquel tout ce que nous sçauons, c’est qu’il estoit Espagnol, faisant profession de medecine à Thoulouse, il y a enuiron deux cens ans; ie m’enquis autrefois à Adrianus Turnebus, qui sçauoit toutes choses, que ce pouuoit estre de ce liure: il me respondit, qu’il pensoit que ce fust quelque quinte essence tirée de S.

    In this, to tell the truth, I find him so firm and so successful that I do not think it possible to do better on that subject, and I believe no one has equaled him. This work seemed to me too rich and too fine for an author whose name is so little known. All we know of him is that he was a Spaniard who practiced medicine at Toulouse some two hundred years ago. So I once asked Adrianus Turnebus, who knew everything, what this book might be. He answered that he thought it was some quintessence drawn from Saint

    Thomas d’Aquin: car de vray cet esprit là, plein d’vne erudition infinie et d’vne subtilité admirable, estoit seul capable de telles imaginations. Tant y a que quiconque en soit l’autheur et inuenteur, et ce n’est pas raison d’oster sans plus grande occasion à Sebonde ce tiltre, c’estoit vn tres-suffisant homme, et ayant plusieurs belles parties.

    Thomas Aquinas. In truth that mind, full of boundless learning and admirable subtlety, was the only one capable of such ideas. Be that as it may, whoever its author and inventor may be, he was a very able man with many fine qualities. And it is not right to take that title away from Sebond without stronger reason.

    The first objection: faith and reason

    Faith alone grasps divine truth, but reason may still serve it, as Christians fail to show by their lives.

    La premiere reprehension qu’on fait de son ouurage; c’est que les Chrestiens se font tort de vouloir appuyer leur creance, par des raisons humaines, qui ne se conçoit que par foy, et par vne inspiration particuliere de la grace diuine. En cette obiection, il semble qu’il y ait quelque zele de pieté: et à cette cause nous faut-il auec autant plus de douceur et de respect essayer de satisfaire à ceux qui la mettent en auant. Ce seroit mieux la charge d’vn homme versé en la theologie, que de moy, qui n’y sçay rien.

    The first criticism made of his work is that Christians do themselves wrong in trying to support their belief with human reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a particular inspiration of divine grace. There seems to be some pious zeal in this objection, and for that reason we must try all the more gently and respectfully to satisfy those who put it forward. This task would suit a man versed in theology better than me, for I know nothing of it.

    Toutefois ie iuge ainsi, qu’à vne chose si diuine et si haultaine, et surpassant de si loing l’humaine intelligence, comme est cette verité, de laquelle il a pleu à la bonté de Dieu nous esclairer, il est bien besoin qu’il nous preste encore son secours, d’vne faueur extraordinaire et priuilegiée, pour la pouuoir conceuoir et loger en nous: et ne croy pas que les moyens purement humains en soyent aucunement capables. Et s’ils l’estoient, tant d’ames rares et excellentes, et si abondamment garnies de forces naturelles és siecles anciens, n’eussent pas failly par leur discours, d’arriuer à cette cognoissance.

    Nevertheless, this is my judgment. This truth, with which God in his goodness has been pleased to enlighten us, is so divine and so lofty, and surpasses human understanding by so far, that he must surely lend us his help as well, by an extraordinary and privileged favor, if we are to conceive it and lodge it within us. I do not believe that purely human means are in any way capable of it. If they were, so many rare and excellent souls in ancient times, so richly furnished with natural powers, would not have failed to reach this knowledge by their reasoning.

    C’est la foy seule qui embrasse viuement et certainement les hauts mysteres de nostre religion. Mais ce n’est pas à dire, que ce soit vne tresbelle et treslouable entreprinse, d’accommoder encore au seruice de nostre foy, les vtils naturels et humains, que Dieu nous a donnez. Il ne faust pas doubter que ce ne soit l’vsage le plus honorable, que nous leur sçaurions donner: et qu’il n’est occupation ny dessein plus digne d’vn homme Chrestien, que de viser par tous ses estudes et pensemens à embellir, estendre et amplifier la verité de sa creance.

    It is faith alone that embraces the high mysteries of our religion vividly and surely. But that is not to say that it is not a very fine and very praiseworthy undertaking to adapt the natural and human tools God has given us to the service of our faith as well. There is no doubt that this is the most honorable use we could put them to. No occupation or design is more worthy of a Christian than to aim, through all his studies and thoughts, at embellishing, extending and amplifying the truth of his belief.

    Nous ne nous contentons point de seruir Dieu d’esprit et d’ame: nous luy deuons encore, et rendons vne reuerence corporelle: nous appliquons noz membres mesmes, et noz mouuements et les choses externes à l’honorer. Il en faut faire de mesme, et accompaigner nostre foy de toute la raison qui est en nous: mais tousiours auec cette reseruation, de n’estimer pas que ce soit de nous qu’elle despende, ny que nos efforts et arguments puissent atteindre à vne si supernaturelle et diuine science.

    We are not content to serve God with mind and soul. We owe him bodily reverence as well, and we render it: we apply even our limbs, our movements and external things to honoring him. We must do the same here and accompany our faith with all the reason that is in us. But we must always keep this reservation: we must not think that faith depends on us, or that our efforts and arguments can attain to so supernatural and divine a knowledge.

    Si elle n’entre chez nous par vne infusion extraordinaire: si elle y entre non seulement par discours, mais encore par moyens humains, elle n’y est pas en sa dignité ny en sa splendeur. Et certes ie crain pourtant que nous ne la iouyssions que par cette voye.

    If it does not enter into us by an extraordinary infusion, if it enters not only by reasoning but also by human means, then it is not there in its dignity or its splendor. And yet I certainly fear that this is the only way we enjoy it.

    Si nous tenions à Dieu par l’entremise d’vne foy viue: si nous tenions à Dieu par luy, non par nous: si nous auions vn pied et vn fondement diuin, les occasions humaines n’auroient pas le pouuoir de nous esbranler, comme elles ont: nostre fort ne seroit pas pour se rendre à vne si foible batterie: l’amour de la nouuelleté, la contraincte des Princes, la bonne fortune d’vn party, le changement temeraire et fortuite de nos opinions, n’auroient pas la force de secouër et alterer nostre croyance: nous ne la lairrions pas troubler à la mercy d’un nouuel argument, et à la persuasion, non pas de toute la rhetorique qui fut onques: nous soustiendrions ces flots d’vne fermeté inflexible et immobile: Illisos fluctus rupes vt vasta refundit, / Et varias circùm latrantes dissipat vndas / Mole sua.

    If we held to God through a living faith, if we held to God through him and not through ourselves, if we had a divine footing and foundation, human occurrences would not have the power to shake us as they do. Our fortress would not be likely to surrender to so weak a battery. Love of novelty, the compulsion of princes, the good fortune of one party, the rash and accidental changes in our opinions would not have the strength to shake and alter our belief. We would not let it be troubled at the mercy of a new argument, or by persuasion, no, not even by all the rhetoric there ever was. We would withstand these waves with an unbending and immovable firmness: As a vast rock throws back the waves that dash against it, / And scatters the various billows barking all around it / By its sheer mass.

    Verses of uncertain authorship, echoing Virgil’s image of a rock standing firm against the sea (Aeneid VII).

    Si ce rayon de la diuinité nous touchoit aucunement, il y paroistroit par tout: non seulement nos parolles, mais encore nos operations en porteroient la lueur et le lustre. Tout ce qui partiroit de nous, on le verroit illuminé de cette noble clarté. Nous deurions auoir honte, qu’és sectes humaines il ne fut iamais partisan, quelque difficulté et estrangeté que maintinst sa doctrine, qui n’y conformast aucunement ses deportemens et sa vie: et vne si diuine et celeste institution ne marque les Chrestiens que par la langue. Voulez vous voir cela? comparez nos mœurs à vn Mahometan, à vn Payen, vous demeurez tousiours au dessoubs.

    If this ray of divinity touched us at all, it would show everywhere. Our words and our deeds alike would bear its gleam and luster, and everything that came from us would be seen lit by this noble brightness. We ought to be ashamed of this. Among human sects there has never been a follower who did not to some extent conform his conduct and his life to his doctrine, however difficult and strange it was. Yet so divine and heavenly a teaching marks Christians out only by their tongues. Do you want to see this? Compare our morals with a Muslim’s or a pagan’s: you always come off worse.

    Là où au regard de l’auantage de nostre religion, nous deurions luire en excellence, d’vne extreme et incomparable distance: et deuroit on dire, sont ils si iustes, si charitables, si bons? ils sont donq Chrestiens. Toutes autres apparences sont communes à toutes religions: esperance, confiance, euenemens, ceremonies, penitence, martyres. La merque peculiere de nostre verité deuroit estre nostre vertu, comme elle est aussi la plus celeste merque, et la plus difficile: et que c’est la plus digne production de la verité. Pourtant eut raison nostre bon S.

    Given the superiority of our religion, we ought instead to shine in excellence by an extreme and incomparable distance. People ought to say: “Are they so just, so charitable, so good? Then they are Christians.” All other outward signs are common to all religions: hope, trust, events, ceremonies, penance, martyrdoms. The distinctive mark of our truth ought to be our virtue, for it is also the most heavenly mark and the most difficult, and the worthiest product of truth. So our good Saint

    Loys, quand ce Roy Tartare, qui s’estoit faict Chrestien, desseignoit de venir à Lyon, baiser les pieds au Pape, et y recognoistre la sanctimonie qu’il esperoit trouuer en nos mœurs, de l’en destourner instamment, de peur qu’au contraire, nostre desbordée façon de viure ne le dégoustast d’vne si saincte creance. Combien que depuis il aduint tout diuersement, à cet autre, lequel estant allé à Rome pour mesme effect, y voyant la dissolution des prelats, et peuple de ce temps là, s’establit d’autant plus fort en nostre religion, considerant combien elle deuoit auoir de force et de diuinité, à maintenir sa dignité et sa splendeur, parmy tant de corruption, et en mains si vicieuses.

    Louis was right to act as he did. That Tartar king who had become a Christian was planning to come to Lyons to kiss the Pope’s feet and to see there the holiness he hoped to find in our ways. Louis earnestly urged him not to come, for fear that our dissolute way of life would instead put him off so holy a belief. Yet things later turned out quite otherwise for another man, who went to Rome for the same purpose. Seeing the dissoluteness of the prelates and people of that time, he became all the more firmly settled in our religion. He reasoned that it must have great strength and divinity to keep its dignity and splendor amid so much corruption and in such vicious hands.

    Louis IX of France (reigned 1226–1270). The visitor to Rome recalls the Jew Abraham in Boccaccio’s Decameron (I.2).

    Si nous auions vne seule goutte de foy, nous remuerions les montaignes de leur place, dict la saincte parole: nos actions qui seroient guidées et accompaignées de la diuinité, ne seroient pas simplement humaines, elles auroient quelque chose de miraculeux, comme nostre croyance. Breuis est institutio vitæ honestæ beatæque, si credas. Les vns font accroire au monde, qu’ils croyent ce qu’ils ne croyent pas. Les autres en plus grand nombre, se le font accroire à eux mesmes, ne sçachants pas penetrer que c’est que croire.

    If we had a single drop of faith, Holy Writ says, we would move mountains from their place. Our actions, guided and accompanied by divinity, would not be merely human; they would have something miraculous about them, like our belief. The training for an honorable and happy life is short, if you believe. Some make the world believe that they believe what they do not believe. Others, a greater number, make themselves believe it, for they cannot fathom what it is to believe.

    Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory XII.

    Nous trouuons estrange si aux guerres, qui pressent à cette heure nostre Estat, nous voyons flotter les euenements et diuersifier d’vne maniere commune et ordinaire: c’est que nous n’y apportons rien que le nostre. La iustice, qui est en l’vn des partis, elle n’y est que pour ornement et couuerture: elle y est bien alleguée, mais elle n’y est ny receuë, ny logée, ny espousée: elle y est comme en la bouche de l’aduocat, non comme dans le cœur et affection de la partie. Dieu doit son secours extraordinaire à la foy et à la religion, non pas à nos passions. Les hommes y sont conducteurs, et s’y seruent de la religion: ce deuroit estre tout le contraire.

    In the wars now pressing on our state, we find it strange to see events fluctuate and vary in a common and ordinary way. That is because we bring nothing to them but what is our own. Justice, which is on one of the sides, is there only as ornament and cover. It is indeed invoked, but it is not received, or lodged, or wedded there. It is there as it is in the lawyer’s mouth, not as it is in the heart and affection of his client. God owes his extraordinary help to faith and religion, not to our passions. Here men are the leaders, and they make use of religion. It ought to be quite the opposite.

    Sentez, si ce n’est par noz mains que nous la menons: à tirer comme de cire tant de figures contraires, d’vne regle si droitte et si ferme. Quand s’est il veu mieux qu’en France en noz iours? Ceux qui l’ont prinse à gauche, ceux qui l’ont prinse à droitte, ceux qui en disent le noir, ceux qui en disent le blanc, l’employent si pareillement à leurs violentes et ambitieuses entreprinses, s’y conduisent d’vn progrez si conforme en desbordement et iniustice, qu’ils rendent doubteuse et malaisée à croire la diuersité qu’ils pretendent de leurs opinions en chose de laquelle depend la conduitte et loy de nostre vie. Peut on veoir partir de mesme eschole et discipline des mœurs plus vnies, plus vnes?

    Feel whether it is not our own hands that steer religion, as we draw so many contrary shapes from so straight and firm a rule, as if from wax. When has this been seen more clearly than in France in our day? Some have taken it to the left and some to the right, some call it black and some call it white. Yet they all use it so alike for their violent and ambitious enterprises, and follow so similar a course of excess and injustice, that the difference of opinion they claim seems doubtful and hard to believe, on a matter on which the conduct and law of our life depends. Could you see morals more alike, more one and the same, coming from the same school and discipline?

    Voyez l’horrible impudence dequoy nous pelotons les raisons diuines: et combien irreligieusement nous les auons et reiettées et reprinses selon que la Fortune nous a changé de place en ces orages publiques. Cette proposition si solenne: S’il est permis au subiect de se rebeller et armer contre son Prince pour la defense de la religion: souuienne vous en quelles bouches cette année passée l’affirmatiue d’icelle estoit l’arc-boutant d’vn parti: la negatiue, de quel autre parti c’estoit l’arc-boutant. Et oyez à present de quel quartier vient la voix et instruction de l’vne et de l’autre: et si les armes bruyent moins pour cette cause que pour celle là.

    See the horrible impudence with which we bat divine reasons back and forth like a ball. See how irreligiously we have both rejected them and taken them up again, as Fortune has shifted our place in these public storms. Take that solemn proposition: whether it is lawful for a subject to rebel and take up arms against his prince in defense of religion. Remember in whose mouths, last year, the affirmative was the buttress of one party, and which other party had the negative for its buttress. And hear now which quarter the voice and teaching of each comes from, and whether arms make less noise for this cause than for that.

    After the Protestant Henry of Navarre became heir to the throne in 1584, the Catholic League adopted the right of resistance the Huguenots had earlier defended, and the Huguenots abandoned it.

    Et nous bruslons les gents, qui disent, qu’il faut faire souffrir à la verité le ioug de nostre besoing: et de combien faict la France pis que de le dire? Confessons la verité, qui trieroit de l’armée mesme legitime, ceux qui y marchent par le seul zele d’vne affection religieuse, et encore ceux qui regardent seulement la protection des loix de leur pays, ou seruice du Prince, il n’en sçauroit bastir vne compagnie de gens-darmes complete. D’où vient cela, qu’il s’en trouue si peu, qui ayent maintenu mesme volonté et mesme progrez en nos mouuemens publiques, et que nous les voyons tantost n’aller que le pas, tantost y courir à bride aualée?

    And we burn people who say that truth must be made to bear the yoke of our needs. How much worse does France do than say it? Let us confess the truth. Suppose someone sifted out from the army, even the lawful one, those who march in it solely out of religious zeal, and also those who look only to the protection of their country’s laws or the service of their prince. He could not make up one complete company of men-at-arms from them. How is it that so few have kept the same will and the same pace in our public upheavals? Why do we see them now merely walking, now riding at full gallop?

    et mesmes hommes, tantost gaster nos affaires par leur violence et aspreté, tantost par leur froideur, mollesse et pesanteur; si ce n’est qu’ils y sont poussez par des considerations particulieres et casuelles, selon la diuersité desquelles ils se remuent?

    and the same men now spoiling our affairs by their violence and harshness, now by their coldness, softness and sluggishness? It can only be that they are driven by private and chance considerations, and they move according to how these vary.

    Ie voy cela euidemment, que nous ne prestons volontiers à la deuotion que les offices, qui flattent noz passions. Il n’est point d’hostilité excellente comme la Chrestienne. Nostre zele fait merueilles, quand il va secondant nostre pente vers la haine, la cruauté, l’ambition, l’auarice, la detraction, la rebellion. A contre-poil, vers la bonté, la benignité, la temperance, si, comme par miracle, quelque rare complexion ne l’y porte, il ne va ny de pied, ny d’aile. Nostre religion est faicte pour extirper les vices: elle les couure, les nourrit, les incite. Il ne faut point faire barbe de foarre à Dieu, comme on dict.

    I see this plainly: we willingly lend devotion only those services that flatter our passions. There is no hostility so excellent as Christian hostility. Our zeal works wonders when it seconds our leaning toward hatred, cruelty, ambition, avarice, slander, rebellion. Against the grain, toward goodness, kindness and temperance, it will neither walk nor fly, unless by some miracle a rare temperament carries it there. Our religion is made to root out vices; instead it covers them, nourishes them, incites them. We must not try to fob God off with a straw beard, as the saying goes.

    A proverbial expression: to mock someone, or to try to fool him with a sham.

    Si nous le croyions, ie ne dy pas par foy, mais d’vne simple croyance: voire, et ie le dis à nostre grande confusion, si nous le croyions et cognoissions comme vne autre histoire, comme l’vn de nos compaignons, nous l’aimerions au dessus de toutes autres choses, pour l’infinie bonté et beauté qui reluit en luy: au moins marcheroit il en mesme reng de nostre affection, que les richesses, les plaisirs, la gloire et nos amis. Le meilleur de nous ne craind point de l’outrager, comme il craind d’outrager son voisin, son parent, son maistre.

    Suppose we believed in him, I do not say by faith, but with a simple belief. Indeed, and I say it to our great shame, suppose we believed in him and knew him as we do any other history, or one of our companions. Then we would love him above all other things, for the infinite goodness and beauty that shine in him. At the very least he would hold the same rank in our affection as riches, pleasures, glory and our friends. The best of us is not afraid of outraging him as he is afraid of outraging his neighbor, his kinsman or his master.

    Est-il si simple entendement, lequel ayant d’vn costé l’obiect d’vn de nos vicieux plaisirs, et de l’autre en pareille cognoissance et persuasion, l’estat d’vne gloire immortelle, entrast, en bigue de l’vn pour l’autre? Et si nous y renonçons souuent de pur mespris: car quelle enuie nous attire au blasphemer, sinon à l’aduenture l’enuie mesme de l’offense? Le philosophe Antisthenes, comme on l’initioit aux mysteres d’Orpheus, le prestre luy disant, que ceux qui se voüoyent à cette religion, auoyent à receuoir apres leur mort des biens eternels et parfaicts: Pourquoy si tu le crois ne meurs tu donc toy mesmes? luy fit-il.

    Is any mind so simple that it would trade one for the other, with the object of one of our vicious pleasures on one side, and on the other the state of immortal glory, known and believed with equal conviction? And yet we often renounce that glory out of pure contempt. For what desire draws us to blaspheme, unless perhaps the very desire to offend? The philosopher Antisthenes was being initiated into the mysteries of Orpheus. The priest told him that those who devoted themselves to this religion were to receive eternal and perfect goods after their death. “If you believe that,” Antisthenes said to him, “why don’t you die yourself?”

    Diogenes plus brusquement selon sa mode, et plus loing de nostre propos, au prestre qui le preschoit de mesme, de se faire de son ordre, pour paruenir aux biens de l’autre monde: Veux tu pas que ie croye qu’Agesilaüs et Epaminondas, si grands hommes, seront miserables, et que toy qui n’es qu’vn veau, et qui ne fais rien qui vaille; seras bien heureux, par ce que tu és prestre?

    Diogenes, more bluntly as was his way, and further from our point, spoke to a priest who was likewise urging him to join his order so as to attain the goods of the other world: “Do you want me to believe that Agesilaus and Epaminondas, such great men, will be wretched, while you, who are nothing but a calf and do nothing worthwhile, will be blessed because you are a priest?”

    Ces grandes promesses de la beatitude eternelle si nous les receuions de pareille authorité qu’vn discours philosophique, nous n’aurions pas la mort en telle horreur que nous auons: Non iam se moriens dissolui conquereretur, / Sed magis ire foras, vestémque relinquere, vt anguis, / Gauderet, prælonga senex aut cornua ceruus. Ie veux estre dissoult, dirions nous, et estre aueques Iesus-Christ. La force du discours de Platon de l’immortalité de l’ame, poussa bien aucuns de ses disciples à la mort, pour iouïr plus promptement des esperances qu’il leur donnoit.

    If we accepted these great promises of eternal bliss on the same authority as a philosophical argument, we would not hold death in such horror as we do: The dying man would no longer complain of being dissolved, / But would rather rejoice to go out and leave his garment behind, as a snake does, / Or an old stag its overlong antlers. “I desire to be dissolved,” we would say, “and to be with Jesus Christ.” The force of Plato’s reasoning on the immortality of the soul did indeed drive some of his disciples to their death, so that they might enjoy sooner the hopes he gave them.

    Saint Paul, Philippians 1:23. Ancient writers tell of Cleombrotus, who killed himself after reading Plato’s Phaedo.

    A religion received like any other

    We hold our religion by custom and country, as others hold theirs.

    Tout cela c’est vn signe tres-euident que nous ne receuons nostre religion qu’à nostre façon et par nos mains, et non autrement que comme les autres religions se reçoiuent. Nous nous sommes rencontrez au pays, où elle estoit en vsage, ou nous regardons son ancienneté, ou l’authorité des hommes qui l’ont maintenuë, ou craignons les menaces qu’elle attache aux mescreans, ou suyuons ses promesses. Ces considerations là doiuent estre employées à nostre creance, mais comme subsidiaires: ce sont liaisons humaines. Vne autre region, d’autres tesmoings, pareilles promesses et menasses, nous pourroyent imprimer par mesme voye vne creance contraire. Nous sommes Chrestiens à mesme tiltre que nous sommes ou Perigordins ou Alemans.

    All this is a very clear sign that we receive our religion only in our own way and by our own hands, no differently from the way other religions are received. Either we happened to be in the country where it was practiced, or we respect its antiquity or the authority of the men who have upheld it. Or we fear the threats it holds over unbelievers, or we follow its promises. Those considerations should be applied to our belief, but only as auxiliaries; they are human ties. Another region, other witnesses, similar promises and threats could imprint a contrary belief on us in the same way. We are Christians by the same title as we are Perigordians or Germans.

    Et ce que dit Plato, qu’il est peu d’hommes si fermes en l’atheïsme, qu’vn danger pressant ne ramene à la recognoissance de la diuine puissance: ce rolle ne touche point vn vray Chrestien. C’est à faire aux religions mortelles et humaines, d’estre receuës par vne humaine conduite. Quelle foy doit ce estre, que la lascheté et la foiblesse de cœur plantent en nous et establissent? Plaisante foy, qui ne croid ce qu’elle croid, que pour n’auoir le courage de le descroire. Vne vitieuse passion, comme celle de l’inconstance et de l’estonnement, peut elle faire en nostre ame aucune production reglée?

    Plato says that few men are so firm in atheism that a pressing danger will not bring them back to acknowledging divine power. That role does not concern a true Christian. It is for mortal and human religions to be received by human means. What sort of faith must it be that cowardice and faintness of heart plant and establish in us? A fine faith, which believes what it believes only because it lacks the courage to disbelieve it! Can a vicious passion, such as inconstancy or terror, produce anything well ordered in our soul?

    Ils establissent, dit-il, par la raison de leur iugement, que ce qui se recite des enfers, et des peines futures est feint, mais l’occasion de l’experimenter s’offrant lors que la vieillesse ou les maladies les approchent de leur mort: la terreur d’icelle les remplit d’vne nouuelle creance, par l’horreur de leur condition à venir. Et par ce que telles impressions rendent les courages craintifs, il defend en ses Loix toute instruction de telles menaces, et la persuasion que des Dieux il puisse venir à l’homme aucun mal, sinon pour son plus grand bien quand il y eschoit, et pour vn medecinal effect.

    Such men, he says, establish by the reasoning of their judgment that what is told of hell and future punishments is invented. But the chance to test it comes when old age or illness brings them near death. Then the terror of death fills them with a new belief, through horror of their condition to come. Because such impressions make hearts fearful, he forbids in his Laws all teaching of such threats. He also forbids the belief that any harm can come to man from the gods, except for his greater good when it befalls him, and as a kind of medicine.

    Ils recitent de Bion, qu’infect des atheïsmes de Theodorus, il auoit esté long temps se moquant des hommes religieux: mais la mort le surprenant, qu’il se rendit aux plus extremes superstitions: comme si les Dieux s’ostoyent et se remettoyent selon l’affaire de Bion. Platon, et ces exemples, veulent conclurre, que nous sommes ramenez à la creance de Dieu, ou par raison, ou par force.

    They tell of Bion that he was infected with the atheisms of Theodorus and had long mocked religious men. But when death overtook him, he surrendered to the most extreme superstitions, as if the gods withdrew and returned according to Bion’s business. Plato and these examples mean to conclude that we are brought back to belief in God either by reason or by force.

    L’atheïsme estant vne proposition, comme desnaturée et monstrueuse, difficile aussi, et malaisée d’establir en l’esprit humain, pour insolent et desreglé qu’il puisse estre: il s’en est veu assez, par vanité et par fierté de conceuoir des opinions non vulgaires, et reformatrices du monde, en affecter la profession par contenance: qui, s’ils sont assez fols, ne sont pas assez forts, pour l’auoir plantée en leur conscience. Pourtant ils ne lairront de ioindre leurs mains vers le ciel, si vous leur attachez vn bon coup d’espée en la poitrine: et quand la crainte ou la maladie aura abatu et appesanti cette licentieuse ferueur d’humeur volage, ils ne lairront pas de se reuenir, et se laisser tout discretement manier aux creances et exemples publiques.

    Atheism is a proposition that is, as it were, unnatural and monstrous, and also difficult and hard to establish in the human mind, however insolent and unruly that mind may be. Yet plenty of men have been seen to profess it for show. They do it out of vanity, and from pride in conceiving opinions that are not common and would reform the world. Foolish enough they may be, but they are not strong enough to have planted it in their conscience. So they will not fail to clasp their hands toward heaven if you deal them a good sword-thrust in the chest. And once fear or sickness has crushed and weighed down the licentious fervor of their fickle temperament, they will not fail to come back. They will very discreetly let themselves be guided by public beliefs and examples.

    Autre chose est, vn dogme serieusement digeré, autre chose ces impressions superficielles: lesquelles nées de la desbauche d’vn esprit desmanché, vont nageant temerairement et incertainement en la fantasie. Hommes bien miserables et esceruellez, qui taschent d’estre pires qu’ils ne peuuent!

    A seriously digested doctrine is one thing; these superficial impressions are another. They are born of the debauchery of an unhinged mind and go floating rashly and uncertainly in the imagination. Truly wretched and brainless men, who try to be worse than they can!

    L’erreur du paganisme, et l’ignorance de nostre saincte verité, laissa tomber cette grande ame: mais grande d’humaine grandeur seulement, encores en cet autre voisin abus, que les enfans et les vieillars se trouuent plus susceptibles de religion, comme si elle naissoit et tiroit son credit de nostre imbecillité. Le neud qui deuroit attacher nostre iugement et nostre volonté, qui deuroit estreindre nostre ame et ioindre à nostre Createur, ce deuroit estre vn neud prenant ses repliz et ses forces, non pas de noz considerations, de noz raisons et passions, mais d’vne estreinte diuine et supernaturelle, n’ayant qu’vne forme, vn visage, et vn lustre, qui est l’authorité de Dieu et sa grace.

    The error of paganism and ignorance of our holy truth let that great soul fall into this other, neighboring error as well. He was great, but with human greatness only. The error is that children and old men are more susceptible to religion, as if religion were born of our weakness and drew its credit from it. The knot that should bind our judgment and our will, that should clasp our soul and join it to our Creator, ought to take its folds and its strength not from our considerations, our reasons and passions. It ought to take them from a divine and supernatural grip, which has only one form, one face and one luster: the authority of God and his grace.

    Or nostre cœur et nostre ame estant regie et commandée par la foy, c’est raison qu’elle tire au seruice de son dessein toutes nos autres pieces selon leur portée. Aussi n’est-il pas croyable, que toute cette machine n’ait quelques merques empreintes de la main de ce grand architecte, et qu’il n’y ait quelque image és choses du monde raportant aucunement à l’ouurier, qui les a basties et formées. Il a laissé en ces hauts ouurages le charactere de sa diuinité, et ne tient qu’à nostre imbecillité, que nous ne le puissions descouurir. C’est ce qu’il nous dit luy-mesme, que ses operations inuisibles, il nous les manifeste par les visibles.

    Now since our heart and our soul are ruled and commanded by faith, it is right that faith should draw all our other parts into the service of its purpose, according to their capacity. Nor is it credible that this whole machine should not bear some marks imprinted by the hand of that great architect. There must be some image in the things of the world that corresponds in some way to the workman who built and formed them. He has left the stamp of his divinity in these lofty works, and only our weakness keeps us from discovering it. He tells us so himself: he makes his invisible operations manifest to us through the visible ones.

    Sebonde s’est trauaillé à ce digne estude, et nous montre comment il n’est piece du monde, qui desmente son facteur. Ce seroit faire tort à la bonté diuine, si l’vniuers ne consentoit à nostre creance. Le ciel, la terre, les elemens, nostre corps et nostre ame, toutes choses y conspirent: il n’est que de trouuer le moyen de s’en seruir: elles nous instruisent, si nous sommes capables d’entendre. Car ce monde est vn temple tressainct, dedans lequel l’homme est introduict, pour y contempler des statues, non ouurées de mortelle main, mais celles que la diuine pensée a faict sensibles, le soleil, les estoilles, les eaux et la terre, pour nous representer les intelligibles.

    Sebond labored at this worthy study and shows us that no part of the world belies its maker. It would wrong divine goodness if the universe did not agree with our belief. The sky, the earth, the elements, our body and our soul all conspire to it; we have only to find the way to use them. They teach us, if we are capable of understanding. For this world is a most holy temple into which man is brought to contemplate statues. These are not wrought by mortal hand. They are the ones that divine thought has made perceptible to the senses, the sun, the stars, the waters and the earth, to represent the intelligible ones to us.

    Les choses inuisibles de Dieu, dit Sainct Paul, apparoissent par la creation du monde, considerant sa sapience eternelle, et sa diuinité par ses œuures. Atque adeo faciem cœli non inuidet orbi / Ipse Deus, vultúsque suos corpúsque recludit / Semper voluendo; séque ipsum inculcat et offert, / Vt bene cognosci possit, doceátque videndo / Qualis eat, doceátque suas attendere leges.

    The invisible things of God, says Saint Paul, are made plain by the creation of the world, for his eternal wisdom and his divinity are seen in his works. And so God himself does not begrudge the world the sight of heaven’s face; / He reveals his features and his body / By ever turning it; he impresses and offers himself, / So that he may be well known, and teach by being seen / How he moves, and teach us to heed his laws.

    Romans 1:20. The verses are from Manilius, Astronomica IV.

    Or nos raisons et nos discours humains c’est comme la matiere lourde et sterile: la grace de Dieu en est la forme: c’est elle qui y donne la façon et le prix. Tout ainsi que les actions vertueuses de Socrates et de Caton demeurent vaines et inutiles pour n’auoir eu leur fin, et n’auoir regardé l’amour et obeyssance du vray createur de toutes choses, et pour auoir ignoré Dieu: ainsin est-il de nos imaginations et discours: ils ont quelque corps, mais vne masse informe, sans façon et sans iour, si la foy et grace de Dieu n’y sont ioinctes.

    Now our reasons and our human reasonings are like heavy, barren matter. The grace of God is their form; it is grace that gives them shape and value. The virtuous actions of Socrates and Cato remain vain and useless because they did not have their proper end. They did not look to the love and obedience of the true creator of all things, and they did not know God. It is just the same with our ideas and reasonings. They have a sort of body, but it is a shapeless mass, without form and without light, unless the faith and grace of God are joined to them.

    La foy venant à teindre et illustrer les argumens de Sebonde, elle les rend fermes et solides: ils sont capables de seruir d’acheminement, et de premiere guyde à vn apprentif, pour le mettre à la voye de cette cognoissance: ils le façonnent aucunement et rendent capable de la grace de Dieu, par le moyen de laquelle se parfournit et se parfaict apres nostre creance. Ie sçay vn homme d’authorité nourry aux lettres, qui m’a confessé auoir esté ramené des erreurs de la mescreance par l’entremise des argumens de Sebonde.

    When faith comes to tinge and illuminate Sebond’s arguments, it makes them firm and solid. They can then serve an apprentice as a first step and a first guide, setting him on the road to this knowledge. They shape him somewhat and make him receptive to the grace of God, through which our belief is afterward completed and perfected. I know a man of authority, brought up in letters, who confessed to me that Sebond’s arguments had brought him back from the errors of unbelief.

    Et quand on les despouïllera de cet ornement, et du secours et approbation de la foy, et qu’on les prendra pour fantasies pures humaines, pour en combatre ceux qui sont precipitez aux espouuantables et horribles tenebres de l’irreligion, ils se trouueront encores lors, aussi solides et autant fermes, que nuls autres de mesme condition qu’on leur puisse opposer. De façon que nous serons sur les termes de dire à nos parties, Si melius quid habes, accerse; vel imperium fer. Qu’ils souffrent la force de nos preuues, ou qu’ils nous en facent voir ailleurs, et sur quelque autre subiect, de mieux tissuës, et mieux estoffées.

    Now suppose they are stripped of this ornament and of the help and approval of faith, and taken as purely human notions, to fight those who have plunged into the frightful and horrible darkness of irreligion. Even then they will be found as solid and as firm as any others of the same kind that can be set against them. So we shall be in a position to say to our opponents: If you have anything better, bring it out; or else submit. Let them either accept the force of our proofs, or show us others that are better woven and of better stuff, elsewhere and on some other subject.

    Horace, Epistles I.5.

    The second objection: weak arguments

    Against those who call Sebond’s reasons weak, Montaigne sets out to humble human reason itself.

    Ie me suis sans y penser à demy desia engagé dans la seconde obiection, à laquelle i’auois proposé de respondre pour Sebonde.

    Without meaning to, I have already half engaged in the second objection, which I had set out to answer on Sebond’s behalf.

    Aucuns disent que ses argumens sont foibles et ineptes à verifier ce qu’il veut, et entreprennent de les choquer aysément. Il faut secouër ceux cy vn peu plus rudement: car ils sont plus dangereux et plus malitieux que les premiers. On couche volontiers les dicts d’autruy à la faueur des opinions qu’on a preiugées en soy. A vn atheïste tous escrits tirent à l’atheïsme. Il infecte de son propre venin la matiere innocente. Ceux cy ont quelque preoccupation de iugement qui leur rend le goust fade aux raisons de Sebonde.

    Some say that his arguments are weak and unfit to prove what he intends, and they set out to knock them down easily. These people must be shaken a little more roughly, for they are more dangerous and more malicious than the first. People readily bend what others say to fit the opinions they have already formed. To an atheist, all writings lean toward atheism; he infects innocent matter with his own venom. These people have some prejudice in their judgment that dulls their palate for Sebond’s reasons.

    Au demeurant il leur semble qu’on leur donne beau ieu, de les mettre en liberté de combattre nostre religion par les armes pures humaines, laquelle ils n’oseroyent attaquer en sa majesté pleine d’authorité et de commandement. Le moyen que ie prens pour rabatre cette frenesie, et qui me semble le plus propre, c’est de froisser et fouler aux pieds l’orgueil, et l’humaine fierté: leur faire sentir l’inanité, la vanité, et deneantise de l’homme: leur arracher des poingts, les chetiues armes de leur raison: leur faire baisser la teste et mordre la terre, soubs l’authorité et reuerence de la majesté diuine.

    Moreover, they think they are being dealt a winning hand when they are left free to fight our religion with purely human weapons. They would not dare attack it in its majesty, full of authority and command. The means I take to beat down this frenzy, and the one that seems to me most fitting, is to crush human pride and arrogance and trample it underfoot. I will make them feel the inanity, the vanity and the nothingness of man. I will wrench the puny weapons of their reason from their fists, and make them bow their heads and bite the dust under the authority and reverence of the divine majesty.

    C’est à elle seule qu’appartient la science et la sapience: elle seule qui peut estimer de soy quelque chose, et à qui nous desrobons ce que nous nous contons, et ce que nous nous prisons. Ου γαρ εα φρονεεν ὁ Θεος μεγα αλλον η ἑαυτον. Abbattons ce cuider, premier fondement de la tyrannie du maling esprit. Deus superbis resistit: humilibus autem dat gratiam. L’intelligence est en touts les Dieux, dit Platon, et point ou peu aux hommes.

    To that majesty alone belong knowledge and wisdom. It alone can value itself as something, and from it we steal whatever we reckon ourselves to be and whatever we prize in ourselves. For God allows no one but himself to think proud thoughts. Let us beat down this conceit, the first foundation of the tyranny of the evil spirit. God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble. Intelligence is in all the gods, says Plato, and in men little or none.

    The Greek is from Herodotus VII.10; the Latin from 1 Peter 5:5.

    Or c’est cependant beaucoup de consolation à l’homme Chrestien, de voir nos vtils mortels et caduques, si proprement assortis à nostre foy saincte et diuine: que lors qu’on les employe aux suiects de leur nature mortels et caduques, ils n’y soient pas appropriez plus vniement, ny auec plus de force.

    Yet it is a great consolation for a Christian to see our mortal and perishable tools so fittingly matched to our holy and divine faith. When they are applied to subjects that are mortal and perishable by nature, they are no more uniformly or more forcefully suited to them.

    Voyons donq si l’homme a en sa puissance d’autres raisons plus fortes que celles de Sebonde: voire s’il est en luy d’arriuer à aucune certitude par argument et par discours. Car sainct Augustin plaidant contre ces gents icy, a occasion de reprocher leur iniustice, en ce qu’ils tiennent les parties de nostre creance fauces, que nostre raison faut à establir. Et pour montrer qu’assez de choses peuuent estre et auoir esté, desquelles nostre discours ne sçauroit fonder la nature et les causes: il leur met en auant certaines experiences cognuës et indubitables, ausquelles l’homme confesse rien ne veoir. Et cela faict il, comme toutes autres choses, d’vne curieuse et ingenieuse recherche.

    Let us see, then, whether man has in his power other reasons stronger than Sebond’s, and indeed whether it is in him to reach any certainty by argument and reasoning. Saint Augustine, pleading against these people, has occasion to reproach them for their injustice. They hold to be false those parts of our belief that our reason fails to establish. To show that many things can exist and have existed whose nature and causes our reasoning could not establish, he puts before them certain known and indubitable experiences in which man confesses he sees nothing. He does this, like everything else, with careful and ingenious research.

    Saint Augustine, The City of God XXI.

    Il faut plus faire, et leur apprendre, que pour conuaincre la foiblesse de leur raison, il n’est besoing d’aller triant des rares exemples: et qu’elle est si manque et si aueugle, qu’il n’y a nulle si claire facilité, qui luy soit assez claire: que l’aizé et le malaisé luy sont vn: que tous subiects egalement, et la nature en general desaduouë sa iurisdiction et entremise.

    We must do more. We must teach them that there is no need to go picking out rare examples to convict their reason of weakness. Reason is so defective and so blind that nothing is so clear and easy as to be clear enough for it. The easy and the difficult are all one to it. All subjects equally, and nature in general, disown its jurisdiction and its meddling.

    Que nous presche la verité, quand elle nous presche de fuir la mondaine philosophie: quand elle nous inculque si souuent, que nostre sagesse n’est que folie deuant Dieu: que de toutes les vanitez la plus vaine c’est l’homme: que l’homme qui presume de son sçauoir, ne sçait pas encore que c’est que sçauoir: et que l’homme, qui n’est rien, s’il pense estre quelque chose, se seduit soy-mesmes, et se trompe? Ces sentences du sainct Esprit expriment si clairement et si viuement ce que ie veux maintenir, qu’il ne me faudroit aucune autre preuue contre des gens qui se rendroient auec toute submission et obeyssance à son authorité.

    What does truth preach to us when it preaches that we should flee worldly philosophy, when it so often drives home to us that our wisdom is but folly before God, that of all vanities the vainest is man, that the man who presumes on his knowledge does not yet know what knowing is, and that man, who is nothing, deceives and misleads himself if he thinks he is something? These sentences of the Holy Spirit express so clearly and vividly what I want to maintain that I would need no other proof against people who would surrender to his authority with all submission and obedience.

    Colossians 2:8; 1 Corinthians 3:19 and 8:2; Galatians 6:3.

    Mais ceux cy veulent estre fouëtez à leurs propres despens, et ne veulent souffrir qu’on combatte leur raison que par elle mesme.

    But these people want to be whipped at their own expense, and will not allow their reason to be fought except by reason itself.

    Man without grace

    Stripped of divine help, man claims mastery of a universe he cannot even understand.

    Considerons donq pour cette heure, l’homme seul, sans secours estranger, armé seulement de ses armes, et despourueu de la grace et cognoissance diuine, qui est tout son honneur, sa force, et le fondement de son estre. Voyons combien il a de tenuë en ce bel equipage. Qu’il me face entendre par l’effort de son discours, sur quels fondemens il a basty ces grands auantages, qu’il pense auoir sur les autres creatures. Qui luy a persuadé que ce branle admirable de la voute celeste, la lumiere eternelle de ces flambeaux roulans si fierement sur sa teste, les mouuemens espouuentables de cette mer infinie, soyent establis et se continuent tant de siecles, pour sa commodité et pour son seruice?

    Let us consider, then, for the present, man alone, without outside help, armed only with his own weapons. Let us take him stripped of divine grace and knowledge, which are his whole honor, his strength and the foundation of his being. Let us see how well he holds his ground in this fine array. Let him make me understand, by the effort of his reasoning, on what foundations he has built those great advantages he thinks he has over the other creatures. Who has persuaded him that the admirable motion of the heavenly vault was established for his convenience and service? Or the eternal light of those torches rolling so proudly over his head, or the terrifying movements of that infinite sea? Who told him that they continue through so many centuries for his sake?

    Est-il possible de rien imaginer si ridicule, que cette miserable et chetiue creature, qui n’est pas seulement maistresse de soy, exposée aux offences de toutes choses, se die maistresse et emperiere de l’vniuers? duquel il n’est pas en sa puissance de cognoistre la moindre partie, tant s’en faut de la commander. Et ce priuilege qu’il s’attribuë d’estre seul en ce grand bastiment, qui ayt la suffisance d’en recognoistre la beauté et les pieces, seul qui en puisse rendre graces à l’architecte, et tenir conte de la recepte et mise du monde: qui luy a seelé ce priuilege? qu’il nous montre lettres de cette belle et grande charge. Ont elles esté ottroyées en faueur des sages seulement? Elles ne touchent guere de gents.

    Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous? This miserable and puny creature is not even master of himself and is exposed to injury from all things. Yet he calls himself master and emperor of the universe, when it is not in his power to know the smallest part of it, much less to command it. Then there is the privilege he claims, of being the only one in this great edifice able to recognize its beauty and its parts. He alone can give thanks to the architect and keep the accounts of the world’s receipts and expenses. Who sealed this privilege for him? Let him show us his letters patent for this fine and great office. Were they granted to the wise alone? That covers very few people.

    Les fols et les meschants sont-ils dignes de faueur si extraordinaire? et estants la pire piece du monde, d’estre preferez à tout le reste? en croirons nous cestuy-là; Quorum igitur causa quis dixerit effectum esse mundum? Eorum scilicet animantium, quæ ratione vtuntur; hi sunt dij et homines, quibus profectò nihil est melius. Nous n’aurons iamais assez bafoüé l’impudence de cet accouplage. Mais pauuret qu’a il en soy digne d’vn tel auantage?

    Are fools and the wicked worthy of so extraordinary a favor? Being the worst part of the world, do they deserve to be preferred to all the rest? Shall we believe the man who says: For whose sake, then, shall we say the world was made? For the sake of those living beings that use reason. These are gods and men, and surely nothing is better than they. We shall never mock enough the impudence of this pairing. But the poor wretch, what has he in himself worthy of such an advantage?

    Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II, where the speaker is the Stoic Balbus.

    A considerer cette vie incorruptible des corps celestes, leur beauté, leur grandeur, leur agitation continuée d’vne si iuste regle: Cùm suscipimus magni cœlestia mundi / Templa super, stellisque micantibus Æthæra fixum, / Et venit in mentem Lunæ Solisque viarum: à considerer la domination et puissance que ces corps là ont, non seulement sur nos vies et conditions de nostre fortune, Facta etenim et vitas hominum suspendit ab astris: mais sur nos inclinations mesmes, nos discours, nos volontez: qu’ils regissent, poussent et agitent à la mercy de leurs influances, selon que nostre raison nous l’apprend et le trouue: Speculatáque longè / Deprendit tacitis dominantia legibus astra, / Et totum alterna mundum ratione moueri, / Fatorúmque vices certis discernere signis: à voir que non vn homme seul, non vn Roy, mais les monarchies, les empires, et tout ce bas monde se meut au branle des moindres mouuements celestes:

    Consider the incorruptible life of the heavenly bodies, their beauty, their size, their motion kept up by so exact a rule: When we look up at the heavenly temples of the great universe / Above us, and the ether set with glittering stars, / And the courses of the moon and sun come to mind. Consider the dominion and power those bodies have, not only over our lives and the conditions of our fortune, For he makes the deeds and lives of men hang on the stars, but over our very inclinations, our reasonings, our wills. They govern, drive and stir these at the mercy of their influences, as our reason teaches and finds: Observing from afar, it perceives / That the stars rule by silent laws, / That the whole world moves in alternating cycles, / And that the turns of the fates are discerned by sure signs. See how not one man alone, not one king, but monarchies, empires and all this world below move to the swing of the slightest heavenly motions:

    Quantàque quàm parui faciant discrimina motus: / Tantum est hoc regnum, quod regibus imperat ipsis! si nostre vertu, nos vices, nostre suffisance et science, et ce mesme discours que nous faisons de la force des astres, et cette comparaison d’eux à nous, elle vient, comme iuge nostre raison, par leur moyen et de leur faueur: Furit alter amore, / Et pontum tranare potest et vertere Troiam, / Alterius sors est scribendis legibus apta; / Ecce patrem nati perimunt, natósque parentes, / Mutuáque armati coeunt in vulnera fratres; / Non nostrum hoc bellum est, coguntur tanta mouere, / Inque suas ferri pœnas, lacerandáque membra, / Hoc quoque fatale est sic ipsum expendere fatum. nous tenons de la distribution du ciel cette part de raison que nous auons, comment nous pourra elle esgaler à luy?

    And how great are the changes so small a movement makes: / So great is this kingdom that rules over kings themselves! Our virtue, our vices, our ability and knowledge, even this very reasoning we make about the power of the stars and this comparison between them and us, all come, as our reason judges, through their means and by their favor: One man is mad with love, / And can swim across the sea and overthrow Troy; / Another’s lot is fitted for the writing of laws; / See, sons kill fathers, and fathers kill sons, / And brothers take up arms and clash to wound each other. / This war is not ours; they are forced to stir up such turmoil, / And to be carried to their own punishment and the tearing of their limbs; / This too is fated: thus to weigh fate itself. If we hold this share of reason that we have by heaven’s distribution, how can it make us equal to heaven?

    comment soubs-mettre à nostre science son essence et ses conditions?

    How can it subject heaven’s essence and conditions to our knowledge?

    Tout ce que nous voyons en ces corps là, nous estonne; quæ molitio, quæ ferramenta, qui vectes, quæ machinæ, qui ministri tanti operis fuerunt? pourquoy les priuons nous et d’ame, et de vie, et de discours? y auons nous reconnu quelque stupidité immobile et insensible, nous qui n’auons aucun commerce auec eux que d’obeïssance? Dirons nous, que nous n’auons veu en nulle autre creature, qu’en l’homme, l’vsage d’vne ame raisonnable? Et quoy? Auons nous veu quelque chose semblable au soleil? Laisse-il d’estre, par ce que nous n’auons rien veu de semblable? et ses mouuements d’estre, par ce qu’il n’en est point de pareils? Si ce que nous n’auons pas veu, n’est pas, nostre science est merueilleusement raccourcie.

    Everything we see in those bodies astounds us. What labor, what iron tools, what levers, what machines, what workmen were there for so great a work? Why do we deprive them of soul, of life and of reasoning? Have we found some immobile and insensible stupidity in them, we who have no dealings with them except to obey? Shall we say that we have seen the use of a rational soul in no creature but man? So what? Have we seen anything like the sun? Does it cease to exist because we have seen nothing like it? Do its movements cease to exist because there are no others like them? If what we have not seen does not exist, our knowledge is wonderfully shrunk.

    Quæ sunt tantæ animi angustiæ? Sont ce pas des songes de l’humaine vanité, de faire de la lune vne terre celeste? y deuiner des montaignes, des vallées, comme Anaxagoras? y planter des habitations et demeures humaines, et y dresser des colonies pour nostre commodité, comme faict Platon et Plutarque? et de nostre terre en faire vn astre esclairant et lumineux? Inter cætera mortalitatis incommoda, et hoc est, caligo mentium: nec tantùm necessitas errandi, sed errorum amor. Corruptibile corpus aggrauat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem.

    What great narrowness of mind is this? Are they not dreams of human vanity, to make the moon a heavenly earth? To imagine mountains and valleys there, like Anaxagoras? To set up human habitations and dwellings there and found colonies for our convenience, as Plato and Plutarch do? Or to make our earth a bright and shining star? Among the other drawbacks of our mortal state is this darkness of minds: not only the necessity of erring, but the love of errors. The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling presses down the mind that ponders many things.

    The first sentence is from Seneca, On Anger II; the second from the Book of Wisdom (9:15), as quoted by Saint Augustine.

    Presumption, our natural malady

    Man sets himself above the animals without knowing their minds.

    La presomption est nostre maladie naturelle et originelle. La plus calamiteuse et fragile de toutes les creatures c’est l’homme, et quant et quant, la plus orgueilleuse. Elle se sent et se void logée icy parmy la bourbe et le fient du monde, attachée et cloüée à la pire, plus morte et croupie partie de l’vniuers, au dernier estage du logis, et le plus esloigné de la voute celeste, auec les animaux de la pire condition des trois: et se va plantant par imagination au dessus du cercle de la lune, et ramenant le ciel soubs ses pieds.

    Presumption is our natural and original malady. The most calamitous and frail of all creatures is man, and at the same time the proudest. He feels and sees himself lodged here amid the mud and dung of the world. He is fastened and nailed to the worst, deadest and most stagnant part of the universe, on the lowest story of the house and the farthest from the vault of heaven, with the animals of the worst of the three conditions. And yet in imagination he sets himself up above the circle of the moon and brings the sky under his feet.

    The three kinds of animals are those of the air, the water and the land.
    Famous passage When I play with my cat“Who knows whether she is not passing her time with me more than I am with her?”

    C’est par la vanité de cette mesme imagination qu’il s’egale à Dieu, qu’il s’attribue les conditions diuines, qu’il se trie soy-mesme et separe de la presse des autres creatures, taille les parts aux animaux ses confreres et compagnons, et leur distribue telle portion de facultez et de forces, que bon luy semble. Comment cognoist il par l’effort de son intelligence, les branles internes et secrets des animaux? par quelle comparaison d’eux à nous conclud il la bestise qu’il leur attribue? Quand ie me iouë à ma chatte, qui sçait, si elle passe son temps de moy plus que ie ne fay d’elle? Nous nous entretenons de singerie reciproques. Si i’ay mon heure de commencer ou de refuser, aussi à elle la sienne.

    It is by the vanity of this same imagination that he makes himself God’s equal and attributes divine qualities to himself. He picks himself out and separates himself from the crowd of other creatures. He carves out the shares of the animals, his brothers and companions, and hands them whatever portion of faculties and powers he sees fit. How does he know, by the effort of his intelligence, the inner and secret stirrings of animals? By what comparison between them and us does he conclude that they are as stupid as he says? When I play with my cat, who knows whether she is not passing her time with me more than I am with her? We entertain each other with reciprocal monkey tricks. If I have my moment to begin or to refuse, so has she.

    Platon en sa peinture de l’aage doré sous Saturne, compte entre les principaux aduantages de l’homme de lors, la communication qu’il auoit auec les bestes, desquelles s’enquerant et s’instruisant, il sçauoit les vrayes qualitez, et differences de chacune d’icelles: par où il acqueroit vne tres parfaicte intelligence et prudence; et en conduisoit de bien loing plus heureusement sa vie, que nous ne sçaurions faire. Nous faut il meilleure preuue à iuger l’impudence humaine sur le faict des bestes? Ce grand autheur a opiné qu’en la plus part de la forme corporelle, que Nature leur a donné, elle a regardé seulement l’vsage des prognostications, qu’on en tiroit en son temps.

    In his picture of the golden age under Saturn, Plato counts among the chief advantages of the men of that time their communication with the beasts. By inquiring of them and learning from them, a man knew the true qualities and differences of each kind. In this way he acquired a very perfect understanding and prudence, and conducted his life far more happily than we could. Do we need better proof of human impudence where beasts are concerned? That great author held that in most of the bodily form Nature gave them, she considered only the prognostications people drew from them in his time.

    Plato, Statesman, the myth of the age of Cronos (the Roman Saturn). The prognostications are omens drawn from animals.

    How animals communicate

    Beasts understand one another and us; our hands and gestures are a speech as rich as words.

    Ce defaut qui empesche la communication d’entre elles et nous, pourquoy n’est il aussi bien à nous qu’à elles? C’est à deuiner à qui est la faute de ne nous entendre point: car nous ne les entendons non plus qu’elles nous. Par cette mesme raison elles nous peuuent estimer bestes, comme nous les estimons. Ce n’est pas grand merueille, si nous ne les entendons pas, aussi ne faisons nous les Basques et les Troglodytes. Toutesfois aucuns se sont vantez de les entendre, comme Appollonius Thyaneus, Melampus, Tiresias, Thales et autres. Et puis qu’il est ainsi, comme disent les cosmographes, qu’il y a des nations qui reçoyuent vn chien pour leur Roy, il faut bien qu’ils donnent certaine interpretation à sa voix et mouuements.

    This defect that hinders communication between them and us, why is it not as much ours as theirs? It is anyone’s guess whose fault it is that we do not understand each other, for we understand them no more than they understand us. By the same reasoning they may consider us beasts, as we consider them. It is no great wonder if we do not understand them; we do not understand the Basques and the Troglodytes either. Yet some have boasted of understanding them, like Apollonius of Tyana, Melampus, Tiresias, Thales and others. And the cosmographers say there are nations that accept a dog as their king. If so, they must surely give some interpretation to its voice and movements.

    The Troglodytes were a cave-dwelling people of Africa described by ancient geographers. Apollonius of Tyana was a sage of the 1st century AD; Melampus and Tiresias were legendary seers.

    Il nous faut remerquer la parité qui est entre nous. Nous auons quelque moyenne intelligence de leurs sens, aussi ont les bestes des nostres, enuiron à mesme mesure. Elles nous flattent, nous menassent, et nous requierent: et nous elles. Au demeurant nous decouurons bien euidemment, qu’entre elles il y a vne pleine et entiere communication, et qu’elles s’entr’entendent, non seulement celles de mesme espece, mais aussi d’especes diuerses: Et mutæ pecudes, et denique secla ferarum / Dissimiles suerunt voces variásque ciuere / Cùm metus aut dolor est, aut cùm iam gaudia gliscunt. En certain abboyer du chien le cheual cognoist qu’il y a de la colere: de certaine autre sienne voix, il ne s’effraye point.

    We must notice the parity between us. We have a middling understanding of what they mean, and the beasts have about the same understanding of what we mean. They fawn on us, threaten us and beg of us, and we do the same to them. Besides, we can see quite plainly that among themselves they have full and complete communication. They understand each other, not only those of the same species but also those of different species: And mute cattle, and even the races of wild beasts / Utter different and varied cries / When they feel fear or pain, or when joy swells in them. From a certain kind of barking, the horse knows the dog is angry; at a certain other sound from it, the horse is not frightened.

    Aux bestes mesmes qui n’ont pas de voix, par la societé d’offices, que nous voyons entre elles, nous argumentons aisément quelque autre moyen de communication: leurs mouuemens discourent et traictent. Non alia longè ratione atque ipsa videtur / Protrahere ad gestum pueros infantia linguæ. Pourquoy non, tout aussi bien que nos muets disputent, argumentent, et content des histoires par signes? I’en ay veu de si souples et formez à cela, qu’à la verité, il ne leur manquoit rien à la perfection de se sçauoir faire entendre. Les amoureux se courroussent, se reconcilient, se prient, se remercient, s’assignent, et disent en fin toutes choses des yeux. E’l silentio ancor suole / Hauer prieghi e parole.

    Even with beasts that have no voice, the services we see them render each other let us easily infer some other means of communication. Their movements reason and negotiate. In much the same way, it seems, the very inability to speak / Drives children to gesture. Why not? Those among us who cannot speak argue, debate and tell stories by signs. I have seen some so supple and practiced at it that in truth they lacked nothing of perfection in making themselves understood. Lovers grow angry, make up, plead, thank, make appointments, and in short say everything with their eyes. And silence too can / Hold prayers and words.

    Tasso, Aminta II.

    Quoy des mains? nous requerons, nous promettons, appellons, congedions, menaçons, prions, supplions, nions, refusons, interrogeons, admirons, nombrons, confessons, repentons, craignons, vergoignons, doubtons, instruisons, commandons, incitons, encourageons, iurons, tesmoignons, accusons, condamnons, absoluons, iniurions, mesprisons, deffions, despittons, flattons, applaudissons, benissons, humilions, moquons, reconcilions, recommandons, exaltons, festoyons, resiouïssons, complaignons, attristons, desconfortons, desesperons, estonnons, escrions, taisons: et quoy non? d’vne variation et multiplication à l’enuy de la langue. De la teste nous conuions, renuoyons, aduoüons, desaduoüons, desmentons, bienueignons, honorons, venerons, dedaignons, demandons, esconduisons, egayons, lamentons, caressons, tansons, soubsmettons, brauons, enhortons, menaçons, asseurons, enquerons. Quoy des sourcils? Quoy des espaules? Il n’est mouuement, qui ne parle, et vn langage intelligible sans discipline, et vn langage publique.

    And what of the hands? We request, promise, call, dismiss, threaten, pray, entreat, deny, refuse, question, admire, count, confess, repent, fear, show shame, doubt, instruct, command, incite, encourage, swear, testify, accuse, condemn, absolve, insult, scorn, defy, vex, flatter, applaud, bless, humble, mock, reconcile, recommend, exalt, celebrate, rejoice, complain, sadden, discourage, despair, astonish, exclaim, fall silent. And what not? All with a variety and multiplicity that rival the tongue’s. With the head we invite, send away, approve, disapprove, contradict, welcome, honor, venerate, disdain, ask, turn down, cheer, lament, caress, scold, submit, defy, exhort, threaten, reassure, inquire. And what of the eyebrows? What of the shoulders? There is no movement that does not speak, in a language intelligible without instruction, and a public language.

    Qui fait, voyant la varieté et vsage distingué des autres, que cestuy-cy doibt plustost est iugé le propre de l’humaine nature. Ie laisse à part ce que particulierement la necessité en apprend soudain à ceux qui en ont besoing: et les alphabets des doigts, et grammaires en gestes: et les sciences qui ne s’exercent et ne s’expriment que par iceux: et les nations que Pline dit n’auoir point d’autre langue. Vn ambassadeur de la ville d’Abdere, apres auoir longuement parlé au Roy Agis de Sparte, luy demanda: Et bien, Sire, quelle responce veux-tu que ie rapporte à nos citoyens?

    Given the variety and the distinct usage of the other languages, this one should rather be judged the language proper to human nature. I leave aside what necessity quickly teaches in particular to those who need it, the finger alphabets and grammars of gesture, and the sciences that are practiced and expressed only through gestures. I leave aside, too, the nations that Pliny says have no other language. An ambassador from the city of Abdera, after speaking at length to King Agis of Sparta, asked him: “Well, Sire, what answer do you want me to take back to our citizens?”

    que ie t’ay laissé dire tout ce que tu as voulu, et tant que tu as voulu, sans iamais dire mot: voila pas vn taire parlier et bien intelligible?

    “That I let you say all you wanted, and for as long as you wanted, without ever saying a word.” Is that not a silence that speaks, and very intelligibly?

    The skills of animals

    Bees, swallows and spiders work with an art that implies judgment, not mere instinct.

    Au reste, quelle sorte de nostre suffisance ne recognoissons nous aux operations des animaux? est-il police reglée auec plus d’ordre, diuersifiée à plus de charges et d’offices, et plus constamment entretenuë, que celle des mouches à miel? Cette disposition d’actions et de vacations si ordonnée, la pouuons nous imaginer se conduire sans discours et sans prudence? His quidam signis atque hæc exempla sequuti, / Esse apibus partem diuinæ mentis, et haustus / Æthereos dixere. Les arondelles que nous voyons au retour du printemps fureter tous les coins de nos maisons, cherchent elles sans iugement, et choisissent elles sans discretion de mille places, celle qui leur est la plus commode à se loger?

    For the rest, which of our abilities do we not recognize in the workings of animals? Is there any government regulated with more order, divided into more charges and offices, and more steadily maintained, than that of the honeybees? Can we imagine so orderly an arrangement of actions and occupations being conducted without reasoning and prudence? From these signs and following these examples, some / Have said that bees have a share of the divine mind / And draughts of the ether. On the return of spring we see the swallows ferreting through every corner of our houses. Do they search without judgment? Do they choose without discernment, out of a thousand places, the one most convenient to lodge in?

    Virgil, Georgics IV.

    Et en cette belle et admirable contexture de leurs bastimens, les oiseaux peuuent ils se seruir plustost d’vne figure quarrée, que de la ronde, d’vn angle obtus, que d’vn angle droit, sans en sçauoir les conditions et les effects? Prennent-ils tantost de l’eau, tantost de l’argile, sans iuger que la dureté s’amollit en l’humectant? Planchent-ils de mousse leur palais, ou de duuet, sans preuoir que les membres tendres de leurs petits y seront plus mollement et plus à l’aise? Se couurent-ils du vent pluuieux, et plantent leur loge à l’orient, sans cognoistre les conditions differentes de ces vents, et considerer que l’vn leur est plus salutaire que l’autre? Pourquoy espessit l’araignée sa toile en vn endroit, et relasche en vn autre?

    And in the fine and admirable structure of their buildings, can birds use a square shape rather than a round one, an obtuse angle rather than a right angle, without knowing their properties and effects? Do they take now water, now clay, without judging that moistening softens what is hard? Do they floor their palace with moss or down without foreseeing that their young’s tender limbs will lie there more softly and comfortably? Do they shelter from the rainy wind and set their dwelling toward the east without knowing the different qualities of these winds, and without considering that one is healthier for them than the other? Why does the spider thicken its web in one place and slacken it in another?

    se sert à cette heure de cette sorte de neud, tantost de celle-là, si elle n’a et deliberation, et pensement, et conclusion?

    Why does it use now this kind of knot, now that one, unless it has deliberation, thought and conclusion?

    Nous recognoissons assez en la pluspart de leurs ouurages, combien les animaux ont d’excellence au dessus de nous, et combien nostre art est foible à les imiter. Nous voyons toutesfois aux nostres plus grossiers, les facultez que nous y employons, et que nostre ame s’y sert de toutes ses forces: pourquoy n’en estimons nous autant d’eux? Pourquoy attribuons nous à ie ne sçay quelle inclination naturelle et seruile, les ouurages qui surpassent tout ce que nous pouuons par nature et par art?

    We recognize well enough, in most of their works, how far animals excel us and how feeble our skill is at imitating them. Yet in our own cruder works we see the faculties we bring to them, and that our soul uses all its powers on them. Why do we not think the same of them? Why do we attribute to some kind of natural, servile inclination works that surpass anything we can do by nature or by skill?

    En quoy sans y penser nous leur donnons vn tres-grand auantage sur nous, de faire que Nature par vne douceur maternelle les accompaigne et guide, comme par la main à toutes les actions et commoditez de leur vie, et qu’à nous elle nous abandonne au hazard et à la fortune, et à quester par art, les choses necessaires à nostre conseruation; et nous refuse quant et quant les moyens de pouuoir arriuer par aucune institution et contention d’esprit, à la suffisance naturelle des bestes: de maniere que leur stupidité brutale surpasse en toutes commoditez, tout ce que peult nostre diuine intelligence. Vrayement à ce compte nous aurions bien raison de l’appeller vne tres-iniuste marastre.

    In doing so, without realizing it, we give them a very great advantage over us. We make Nature, with a mother’s tenderness, accompany and guide them as if by the hand in all the actions and conveniences of their life, while she abandons us to chance and to fortune, to seek out by skill the things we need to survive. At the same time she denies us the means of reaching, by any amount of education and mental effort, the natural competence of beasts, so that their brutish stupidity surpasses, in every convenience, all that our divine intelligence can do. Truly, on that reckoning we would have good reason to call her a most unjust stepmother.

    Mais il n’en est rien, nostre police n’est pas si difforme et desreglée.

    But nothing of the sort is true: the order that governs us is not so misshapen and unruly.

    Nature a embrassé vniuersellement toutes ses creatures: et n’en est aucune, qu’elle n’ait bien plainement fourny de tous moyens necessaires à la conseruation de son estre. Car ces plaintes vulgaires que i’oy faire aux hommes (comme la licence de leurs opinions les esleue tantost au dessus des nuës, et puis les rauale aux Antipodes) que nous sommes le seul animal abandonné, nud sur la terre nuë, lié, garrotté, n’ayant dequoy s’armer et couurir que de la despouïlle d’autruy:

    Nature has embraced all her creatures universally, and there is none she has not very fully supplied with every means necessary to preserve its being. For there are these common complaints I hear men make (as the license of their opinions now lifts them above the clouds and then drags them down to the Antipodes): that we are the only animal abandoned, naked on the naked earth, bound and tied up, with nothing to arm and cover ourselves with but the spoils of others;

    là où toutes les autres creatures, Nature les a reuestuës de coquilles, de gousses, d’escorse, de poil, de laine, de pointes, de cuir, de bourre, de plume, d’escaille, de toison, et de soye selon le besoin de leur estre: les a armées de griffes, de dents, de cornes, pour assaillir et pour defendre, et les a elle mesmes instruites à ce qui leur est propre, à nager, à courir, à voler, à chanter: là où l’homme ne sçait ny cheminer, ny parler, ny manger, ny rien que pleurer sans apprentissage.

    whereas Nature has clothed all the other creatures in shells, husks, bark, hair, wool, spines, hide, down, feathers, scales, fleece and silk, according to the needs of their being. She has armed them with claws, teeth and horns, to attack and to defend, and has herself taught them what is proper to them: to swim, to run, to fly, to sing. Man, meanwhile, cannot walk, or speak, or eat, or do anything but cry, without being taught.

    Tum porro puer, vt sæuis proiectus ab vndis / Nauita, nudus humi iacet infans, indigus omni / Vitali auxilio, cùm primùm in luminis oras / Nexibus ex aluo matris natura profudit, / Vagitúque locum lugubri complet, vt æquum est / Cui tantùm in vita restet transire malorum. / At variæ crescunt pecudes, armenta, feræque, / Nec crepitacula eis opus est, nec cuiquam adhibenda est / Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela; / Nec varias quærunt vestes pro tempore cœli; / Denique non armis opus est, non mœnibus altis / Queis sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia largè / Tellus ipsa parit, naturáque dædala rerum.

    Then again the child, like a sailor cast up by the cruel waves, / lies naked on the ground, speechless, lacking every / help for life, as soon as into the shores of light / nature has poured him forth with labor from his mother’s womb, / and he fills the place with mournful wailing, as is only fitting / for one who has so many evils still to pass through in life. / But the various flocks, herds and wild beasts grow up; / they have no need of rattles, nor must any of them be given / the coaxing, broken prattle of a fond nurse; / they seek no change of clothes to suit the season; / and lastly they need no weapons, no high walls / to guard their own, since for all of them all things / are lavishly brought forth by the earth herself and by nature, the cunning craftsman of things.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Book V.

    Ces plaintes là sont fauces: il y a en la police du monde, vne egalité plus grande, et vne relation plus vniforme. Nostre peau est pourueue aussi suffisamment que la leur, de fermeté contre les iniures du temps, tesmoing plusieurs nations, qui n’ont encores essayé nul vsage de vestemens. Nos anciens Gaulois n’estoient gueres vestus, ne sont pas les Irlandois noz voisins, soubs vn ciel si froid. Mais nous le iugeons mieux par nous mesmes: car tous les endroits de la personne, qu’il nous plaist descouurir au vent et à l’air, se trouuent propres à le souffrir.

    These complaints are false. There is, in the order of the world, a greater equality and a more uniform relationship. Our skin is provided as adequately as theirs with toughness against the harshness of the weather: witness several nations that have not yet tried any use of clothing. Our ancient Gauls wore hardly any clothes, nor do our neighbors the Irish, under so cold a sky. But we can judge it better from ourselves, for every part of the body that we choose to expose to the wind and the air turns out to be fit to bear it.

    S’il y a partie en nous foible, et qui semble deuoir craindre la froidure, ce deuroit estre l’estomach, où se fait la digestion: noz peres le portoyent descouuert, et noz Dames, ainsi molles et delicates qu’elles sont, elles s’en vont tantost entr’ouuertes iusques au nombril. Les liaisons et emmaillottemens des enfants ne sont non plus necessaires: et les meres Lacedemoniennes esleuoient les leurs en toute liberté de mouuements de membres, sans les attacher ne plier. Nostre pleurer est commun à la plus part des autres animaux, et n’en est guere qu’on ne voye se plaindre et gemir long temps apres leur naissance: d’autant que c’est vne contenance bien sortable à la foiblesse, en quoy ils se sentent.

    If there is any part of us that is weak and seems likely to fear the cold, it ought to be the stomach, where digestion takes place. Our fathers wore it uncovered, and our ladies, soft and delicate as they are, sometimes go about with their bodices open down to the navel. Binding and swaddling children is not necessary either: the Spartan mothers raised theirs in complete freedom to move their limbs, without tying them up or folding them in. Our crying is shared by most other animals, and there are hardly any that are not seen to whimper and moan long after their birth, since that is a bearing well suited to the weakness they feel themselves in.

    Quant à l’vsage du manger, il est en nous, comme en eux, naturel et sans instruction. Sentit enim vim quisque suam quam possit abuti. Qui fait doute qu’vn enfant arriué à la force de se nourrir, ne sçeut quester sa nourriture? et la terre en produit, et luy en offre assez pour sa necessité, sans autre culture et artifice. Et sinon en tout temps, aussi ne fait elle pas aux bestes, tesmoing les prouisions, que nous voyons faire aux fourmis et autres, pour les saisons steriles de l’année.

    As for eating, it is in us, as in them, natural and untaught. For every creature senses what its powers are and how far it can use them. Who doubts that a child, once he had the strength to feed himself, would know how to seek out his food? And the earth produces enough of it and offers him enough for his needs, without any further cultivation or artifice. And if it does not do so at all times, neither does it for the beasts: witness the provisions we see ants and others laying up for the barren seasons of the year.

    Ces nations, que nous venons de descouurir, si abondamment fournies de viande et de breuuage naturel, sans soing et sans façon, nous viennent d’apprendre que le pain n’est pas nostre seule nourriture: et que sans labourage, nostre mere Nature nous auoit munis à planté de tout ce qu’il nous falloit: voire, comme il est vray-semblable, plus plainement et plus richement qu’elle ne fait à present, que nous y auons meslé nostre artifice: Et tellus nitidas fruges, vinetáque læta / Sponte sua primùm mortalibus ipsa creauit; / Ipsa dedit dulces fœtus, et pabula læta; / Quæ nunc vix nostro grandescunt aucta labore, / Conterimúsque boues et vires agricolarum; le débordement et desreglement de nostre appetit deuançant toutes les inuentions, que nous cherchons de l’assouuir.

    These nations we have just discovered, so abundantly supplied with natural food and drink, without effort or preparation, have just taught us that bread is not our only nourishment, and that without plowing, our mother Nature had furnished us in plenty with all we needed—indeed, as is likely, more fully and more richly than she does now that we have mixed our artifice into it: And the earth herself, of her own accord, first created for mortals / shining crops and joyful vineyards; / she herself gave sweet fruits and joyful pastures, / which now scarcely grow, though increased by our toil; / and we wear out our oxen and the strength of the farmers; the excess and unruliness of our appetite outrunning every invention by which we try to satisfy it.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Book II.

    Quant aux armes, nous en auons plus de naturelles que la plus part des autres animaux, plus de diuers mouuemens de membres, et en tirons plus de seruice naturellement et sans leçon: ceux qui sont duicts à combatre nuds, on les void se ietter aux hazards pareils aux nostres. Si quelques bestes nous surpassent en cet auantage, nous en surpassons plusieurs autres. Et l’industrie de fortifier le corps et le couurir par moyens acquis, nous l’auons par vn instinct et precepte naturel. Qu’il soit ainsi, l’elephant aiguise et esmoult ses dents, desquelles il se sert à la guerre (car il en a de particulieres pour cet vsage, lesquelles il espargne, et ne les employe aucunement à ses autres seruices).

    As for weapons, we have more natural ones than most other animals, more varied movements of the limbs, and we get more service from them naturally and without lessons. Those trained to fight naked are seen throwing themselves into the same dangers as we do. If some beasts surpass us in this advantage, we surpass many others. And the skill of strengthening the body and covering it by acquired means we have by a natural instinct and precept. To prove it: the elephant sharpens and grinds the tusks it uses in war (for it has special ones for this purpose, which it spares and never uses for its other tasks).

    Quand les taureaux vont au combat, ils respandent et iettent la poussiere à l’entour d’eux: les sangliers affinent leurs deffences: et l’ichneumon, quand il doit venir aux prises auec le crocodile, munit son corps, l’enduit et le crouste tout à l’entour, de limon bien serré et bien paistry, comme d’vne cuirasse. Pourquoy ne dirons nous qu’il est aussi naturel de nous armer de bois et de fer?

    When bulls go into battle, they scatter and toss the dust around them; boars hone their tusks; and the ichneumon, when it is about to come to grips with the crocodile, fortifies its body, coating and crusting it all over with tightly packed, well-kneaded mud, as with a breastplate. Why shall we not say that it is just as natural for us to arm ourselves with wood and iron?

    The ichneumon is the Egyptian mongoose.

    Quant au parler, il est certain, que s’il n’est pas naturel, il n’est pas necessaire. Toutesfois ie croy qu’vn enfant, qu’on auroit nourry en pleine solitude, esloigné de tout commerce (qui seroit vn essay malaisé à faire) auroit quelque espece de parolle pour exprimer ses conceptions: et n’est pas croyable, que Nature nous ait refusé ce moyen qu’elle a donné à plusieurs autres animaux. Car qu’est-ce autre chose que parler, cette faculté, que nous leur voyons de se plaindre, de se resiouyr, de s’entr’appeller au secours, se conuier à l’amour, comme ils font par l’vsage de leur voix? Comment ne parleroient elles entr’elles? elles parlent bien à nous, et nous à elles. En combien de sortes parlons nous à nos chiens, et ils nous respondent?

    As for speech, it is certain that if it is not natural, it is not necessary. Nevertheless I believe that a child raised in complete solitude, far from all company (which would be a hard experiment to make), would have some kind of speech to express his ideas; and it is not credible that Nature has refused us this means, which she has given to many other animals. For what else is speaking but this faculty we see in them of complaining, rejoicing, calling one another for help, inviting one another to love, as they do by using their voices? How could they not speak among themselves? They certainly speak to us, and we to them. In how many ways do we speak to our dogs, and they answer us?

    D’autre langage, d’autres appellations, deuisons nous auec eux, qu’auec les oyseaux, auec les pourceaux, les beufs, les cheuaux: et changeons d’idiome selon l’espece. Cosi per entro loro schiera bruna / S’ammusa l’vna con l’altra formica, / Forse à spiar lor via, et lor fortuna. Il me semble que Lactance attribuë aux bestes, non le parler seulement, mais le rire encore. Et la difference de langage, qui se voit entre nous, selon la difference des contrées, elle se treuue aussi aux animaux de mesme espece.

    We converse with them in a different language, with different names, from those we use with birds, with pigs, oxen and horses; and we change idiom according to the species. So, within their dark troop, / one ant touches snouts with another, / perhaps to spy out their way and their fortune. It seems to me that Lactantius attributes to beasts not only speech but laughter as well. And the difference of language we see among ourselves, according to the difference of regions, is also found in animals of the same species.

    Dante, Purgatorio XXVI. Lactantius was a Christian writer of the late 3rd and early 4th centuries AD.

    Aristote allegue à ce propos le chant diuers des perdrix, selon la situation des lieux: Variæque volucres / Longè alias alio iaciunt in tempore voces, / Et partim mutant cum tempestatibus vna / Raucisonos cantus. Mais cela est à sçauoir, quel langage parleroit cet enfant: et ce qui s’en dit par diuination, n’a pas beaucoup d’apparence. Si on m’allegue contre cette opinion, que les sourds naturels ne parlent point: ie respons que ce n’est pas seulement pour n’auoir peu receuoir l’instruction de la parolle par les oreilles, mais plustost pource que le sens de l’ouye, duquel ils sont priuez, se rapporte à celuy du parler, et se tiennent ensemble d’vne cousture naturelle.

    Aristotle cites on this point the song of partridges, which varies with the location: And the various birds / utter very different cries at different times, / and some change, along with the weather, / their raucous songs. But the question is what language that child would speak; and what is said about it by guesswork is not very plausible. If someone objects to this opinion that people deaf from birth do not speak, I answer that this is not only because they could not receive instruction in speech through their ears, but rather because the sense of hearing, which they lack, is bound up with that of speech, and the two are held together by a natural seam.

    En façon, que ce que nous parlons, il faut que nous le parlions premierement à nous, et que nous le facions sonner au dedans à nos oreilles, auant que de l’enuoyer aux estrangeres.

    So whatever we speak, we must first speak it to ourselves and make it sound within, in our own ears, before sending it out to other people’s.

    I’ay dict tout cecy, pour maintenir cette ressemblance, qu’il y a aux choses humaines: et pour nous ramener et ioindre à la presse. Nous ne sommes ny au dessus, ny au dessous du reste: tout ce qui est sous le ciel, dit le sage, court vne loy et fortune pareille. Indupedita suis fatalibus omnia vinclis. Il y a quelque difference, il y a des ordres et des degrez: mais c’est soubs le visage d’vne mesme nature: Res quæque suo ritu procedit, et omnes / Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina seruant.

    I have said all this to maintain the likeness that exists with human things, and to bring us back and join us to the crowd. We are neither above nor below the rest. All that is under heaven, says the wise man, runs under one law and one fortune. All things are bound by their own fated chains. There is some difference; there are orders and degrees; but it is under the face of one and the same nature: Each thing proceeds in its own way, and all / keep their distinctions by a fixed covenant of nature.

    The “wise man” is the author of Ecclesiastes; both Latin quotations are from Lucretius, Book V.

    Il faut contraindre l’homme, et le renger dans les barrieres de cette police. Le miserable n’a garde d’eniamber par effect au delà: il est entraué et engagé, il est assubiecty de pareille obligation que les autres creatures de son ordre, et d’vne condition fort moyenne, sans aucune prerogatiue, præexcellence vraye et essentielle. Celle qu’il se donne par opinion, et par fantasie, n’a ny corps ny goust.

    We must constrain man and line him up within the barriers of this order. The poor wretch has no way of actually stepping over them: he is shackled and bound, subjected to the same obligation as the other creatures of his rank, and of a very middling condition, without any prerogative or true and essential preeminence. The preeminence he grants himself by opinion and fancy has neither body nor flavor.

    Et s’il est ainsi, que luy seul de tous les animaux, ayt cette liberté de l’imagination, et ce desreglement de pensées, luy representant ce qui est, ce qui n’est pas; et ce qu’il veut; le faulx et le veritable c’est vn aduantage qui luy est bien cher vendu, et duquel il a bien peu à se glorifier: car de là naist la source principale des maux qui le pressent, peché, maladie, irresolution, trouble, desespoir.

    And if it is true that he alone of all animals has this freedom of imagination and this unruliness of thought, which represent to him what is, what is not, and what he wants, the false and the true, it is an advantage sold to him very dear, and one he has very little reason to boast of. For from it springs the main source of the evils that press upon him: sin, sickness, irresolution, confusion, despair.

    Beasts reason too

    The fox on the ice and the dog at the crossroads reason as we would.

    Ie dy donc, pour reuenir à mon propos, qu’il n’y a point d’apparence d’estimer, que les bestes facent par inclination naturelle et forcée, les mesmes choses que nous faisons par nostre choix et industrie. Nous deuons conclurre de pareils effects, pareilles facultez, et de plus riches effects des facultez plus riches: et confesser par consequent, que ce mesme discours, cette mesme voye, que nous tenons à œuurer, aussi la tiennent les animaux, ou quelque autre meilleure.

    I say, then, to return to my subject, that there is no likelihood in thinking that beasts do by natural and compelled inclination the same things we do by our choice and ingenuity. From like effects we must conclude like faculties, and from richer effects richer faculties; and consequently we must admit that the same reasoning, the same method we follow in working, the animals follow too—or some other, better one.

    Pourquoy imaginons nous en eux cette contrainte naturelle, nous qui n’en esprouuons aucun pareil effect? Ioint qu’il est plus honorable d’estre acheminé et obligé à reglément agir par naturelle et ineuitable condition, et plus approchant de la diuinité, que d’agir reglément par liberté temeraire et fortuite; et plus seur de laisser à Nature, qu’à nous les resnes de nostre conduitte.

    Why do we imagine this natural compulsion in them, we who experience nothing of the kind? Besides, it is more honorable, and closer to divinity, to be led and obliged to act in an orderly way by a natural and inevitable condition than to act in an orderly way by a rash and accidental freedom; and it is safer to leave the reins of our conduct to Nature than to ourselves.

    La vanité de nostre presomption faict, que nous aymons mieux deuoir à noz forces, qu’à sa liberalité, nostre suffisance: et enrichissons les autres animaux des biens naturels, et les leur renonçons, pour nous honorer et annoblir des biens acquis: par vne humeur bien simple, ce me semble: car ie priseroy bien autant des graces toutes miennes et naïfues, que celles que i’aurois esté mendier et quester de l’apprentissage. Il n’est pas en nostre puissance d’acquerir vne plus belle recommendation que d’estre fauorisé de Dieu et de Nature.

    The vanity of our presumption makes us prefer to owe our abilities to our own powers rather than to her bounty. So we credit the other animals with the natural goods and hand those over to them, in order to honor and ennoble ourselves with acquired goods—a very simple-minded attitude, it seems to me, for I would prize graces that were wholly mine and natural just as highly as those I had gone begging and seeking from learning. It is not in our power to acquire a finer recommendation than to be favored by God and by Nature.

    Par ainsi le renard, dequoy se seruent les habitans de la Thrace, quand ils veulent entreprendre de passer par dessus la glace de quelque riuiere gelée, et le laschent deuant eux pour cet effect, quand nous le verrions au bord de l’eau approcher son oreille bien pres de la glace, pour sentir s’il orra d’vne longue ou d’vne voisine distance, bruire l’eau courant au dessoubs, et selon qu’il trouue par là, qu’il y a plus ou moins d’espesseur en la glace, se reculer, ou s’auancer, n’aurions nous pas raison de iuger qu’il luy passe par la teste ce mesme discours, qu’il feroit en la nostre: que c’est vne ratiocination et consequence tirée du sens naturel: Ce qui fait bruit, se remue; ce qui se remue, n’est pas gelé; ce qui n’est pas gelé est liquide, et ce qui est liquide plie soubs le faix?

    Take the fox, then, which the inhabitants of Thrace use when they want to venture across the ice of some frozen river, letting it loose ahead of them for this purpose. If we saw it at the water’s edge putting its ear close to the ice, to sense whether it could hear the water running beneath from far off or near by, and then, according as it found by this that the ice was thicker or thinner, drawing back or going forward—would we not be right to judge that the same reasoning passes through its head as would pass through ours, and that it is a ratiocination and inference drawn from natural sense: What makes a noise moves; what moves is not frozen; what is not frozen is liquid; and what is liquid gives way under a weight?

    Car d’attribuer cela seulement à vne viuacité du sens de l’ouye, sans discours et sans consequence, c’est vne chimere, et ne peut entrer en nostre imagination. De mesme faut-il estimer de tant de sortes de ruses et d’inuentions, dequoy les bestes se couurent des entreprises que nous faisons sur elles.

    For to attribute this solely to a keen sense of hearing, without reasoning and without inference, is a fantasy that cannot enter our imagination. We must think the same of the many kinds of tricks and contrivances by which beasts protect themselves from the designs we have on them.

    Et si nous voulons prendre quelque aduantage de cela mesme, qu’il est en nous de les saisir, de nous en seruir, et d’en vser à nostre volonté, ce n’est que ce mesme aduantage, que nous auons les vns sur les autres. Nous auons à cette condition noz esclaues, et les Climacides estoient ce pas des femmes en Syrie qui seruoyent couchées à quatre pattes, de marchepied et d’eschelle aux dames à monter en coche? Et la plus part des personnes libres, abandonnent pour bien legeres commoditez, leur vie, et leur estre à la puissance d’autruy. Les femmes et concubines des Thraces plaident à qui sera choisie pour estre tuée au tumbeau de son mary.

    And if we want to claim some advantage from the very fact that it is in our power to seize them, make use of them and treat them as we please, that is only the same advantage we have over one another. On these terms we have our slaves. And were not the Climacides women in Syria who crouched on all fours and served as footstools and ladders for ladies getting into their carriages? And most free people surrender their life and their being into the power of others for very slight advantages. The wives and concubines of the Thracians argue over which of them will be chosen to be killed at her husband’s tomb.

    Climacides comes from the Greek klimax, “ladder”; the custom is reported by Plutarch.

    Les tyrans ont-ils iamais failly de trouuer assez d’hommes vouez à leur deuotion: aucuns d’eux adioustans d’auantage cette necessité de les accompagner à la mort, comme en la vie? Des armées entieres se sont ainsin obligées à leurs Capitaines. La formule du serment en cette rude escole des escrimeurs à outrance, portoit ces promesses: Nous iurons de nous laisser enchainer, brusler, battre, et tuer de glaiue, et souffrir tout ce que les gladiateurs legitimes souffrent de leur maistre; engageant tresreligieusement et le corps et l’ame à son seruice: Vre meum, si vis, flamma caput, et pete ferro / Corpus, et intorto verbere terga seca. C’estoit vne obligation veritable, et si il s’en trouuoit dix mille telle année, qui y entroyent et s’y perdoyent.

    Have tyrants ever failed to find enough men devoted to them, some of them even adding the obligation to accompany them in death as in life? Whole armies have bound themselves in this way to their captains. The form of the oath in that harsh school of fighters to the death contained these promises: We swear to let ourselves be chained, burned, beaten and killed by the sword, and to suffer all that regular gladiators suffer from their master—pledging both body and soul most religiously to his service: Burn my head with fire, if you will, and strike my body / with the sword, and cut my back with the twisted lash. It was a real obligation, and yet in a given year there were ten thousand who entered into it and perished by it.

    Tibullus, Elegies I.9.

    Quand les Scythes enterroyent leur Roy, ils estrangloyent sur son corps, la plus fauorie de ses concubines, son eschanson, escuyer d’escuirie, chambellan, huissier de chambre et cuisinier. Et en son anniuersaire ils tuoyent cinquante cheuaux montez de cinquante pages, qu’ils auoyent empalé par l’espine du dos iusques au gozier, et les laissoyent ainsi plantez en parade autour de la tombe. Les hommes qui nous seruent, le font à meilleur marché, et pour vn traictement moins curieux et moins fauorable, que celuy que nous faisons aux oyseaux, aux cheuaux, et aux chiens. A quel soucy ne nous demettons nous pour leur commodité?

    When the Scythians buried their king, they strangled over his body the favorite among his concubines, his cupbearer, his master of the horse, his chamberlain, his usher and his cook. And on the anniversary of his death they killed fifty horses ridden by fifty pages, whom they had impaled along the spine up to the throat, and left them planted there on display around the tomb. The men who serve us do it more cheaply, and for less careful and less kindly treatment than we give our birds, horses and dogs. What trouble do we not stoop to for their comfort?

    Il ne me semble point, que les plus abiects seruiteurs facent volontiers pour leurs maistres, ce que les Princes s’honorent de faire pour ces bestes. Diogenes voyant ses parents en peine de le rachetter de seruitude: Ils sont fols, disoit-il, c’est celuy qui me traitte et nourrit, qui me sert; et ceux qui entretiennent les bestes, se doiuent dire plustost les seruir, qu’en estre seruis. Et si elles ont cela de plus genereux, que iamais lyon ne s’asseruit à vn autre lyon, ny vn cheual à vn autre cheual par faute de cœur.

    It does not seem to me that the most abject servants would willingly do for their masters what princes take pride in doing for these beasts. Diogenes, seeing his relatives troubled about ransoming him from slavery, said: “They are fools; it is the man who looks after me and feeds me who serves me.” And those who keep animals should be said to serve them rather than to be served by them. Besides, the animals have this more noble trait: never did a lion enslave itself to another lion, nor a horse to another horse, for lack of courage.

    Diogenes was said to have been captured by pirates and sold as a slave.

    Comme nous allons à la chasse des bestes, ainsi vont les tigres et les lyons à la chasse des hommes: et ont vn pareil exercice les vnes sur les autres: les chiens sur les lieures, les brochets sur les tanches, les arondeles sur les cigales, les esperuiers sur les merles et sur les allouettes: Serpente ciconia pullos / Nutrit, et inuenta per deuia rura lacerta, / Et leporem aut capream famulæ Iouis et generosæ / In saltu venantur aues. Nous partons le fruict de nostre chasse auec noz chiens et oyseaux, comme la peine et l’industrie.

    Just as we go hunting beasts, so tigers and lions go hunting men; and the animals practice the same exercise on one another: dogs on hares, pike on tench, swallows on cicadas, sparrowhawks on blackbirds and larks: The stork feeds her young / on snakes and on lizards found in remote fields; / and the noble birds, Jupiter’s servants, / hunt the hare or the roe deer in the woodland pastures. We share the fruit of our hunting with our dogs and birds, as we share the toil and the skill.

    Juvenal, Satires XIV.

    Et au dessus d’Amphipolis en Thrace, les chasseurs et les faucons sauuages, partent iustement le butin par moitié: comme le long des palus Mæotides, si le pescheur ne laisse aux loups de bonne foy, vne part esgale de sa prise, ils vont incontinent deschirer ses rets. Et comme nous auons vne chasse, qui se conduit plus par subtilité, que par force, comme celle des colliers de noz lignes et de l’hameçon, il s’en void aussi de pareilles entre les bestes.

    And above Amphipolis in Thrace, the hunters and the wild falcons share the booty exactly half and half; just as along the Maeotian marshes, if the fisherman does not in good faith leave the wolves an equal share of his catch, they promptly go and tear his nets. And just as we have a kind of hunting conducted more by cunning than by force, such as with snares, with our lines and with the hook, similar kinds are seen among the beasts too.

    The Maeotian marshes are the Sea of Azov.

    Aristote dit, que la Seche iette de son col vn boyau long comme vne ligne, qu’elle estand au loing en le laschant, et le retire à soy quand elle veut: à mesure qu’elle apperçoit quelque petit poisson s’approcher, elle luy laisse mordre le bout de ce boyau, estant cachée dans le sable, ou dans la vase, et petit à petit le retire iusques à ce que ce petit poisson soit si prés d’elle, que d’vn sault elle puisse l’attraper.

    Aristotle says that the cuttlefish throws out from its neck a gut as long as a fishing line, which it lets out to stretch far away and draws back to itself when it wishes. As soon as it sees some little fish approaching, it lets the fish bite the end of this gut, while it lies hidden in the sand or the mud, and little by little reels it in until the little fish is so close that it can catch it in one leap.

    Quant à la force, il n’est animal au monde en butte de tant d’offences, que l’homme: il ne nous faut point vne balaine, vn elephant, et vn crocodile, ny tels autres animaux, desquels vn seul est capable de deffaire vn grand nombre d’hommes: les poulx sont suffisans pour faire vacquer la dictature de Sylla: c’est le desieuner d’vn petit ver, que le cœur et la vie d’vn grand et triomphant Empereur.

    As for strength, there is no animal in the world exposed to so many injuries as man. We do not need a whale, an elephant or a crocodile, or other such animals, any one of which can destroy a great number of men: lice are enough to vacate Sulla’s dictatorship. The heart and life of a great and triumphant emperor are breakfast for a little worm.

    The Roman dictator Sulla was said to have died in 78 BC of a disease that bred lice in his flesh.

    Pourquoy disons nous, que c’est à l’homme science et cognoissance bastie par art et par discours, de discerner les choses vtiles à son viure, et au secours de ses maladies, de celles qui ne le sont pas, de cognoistre la force de la rubarbe et du polypode;

    Why do we say that, in man, it is science and knowledge built up by skill and reasoning to tell the things useful for his living and for the relief of his illnesses from those that are not, and to know the power of rhubarb and polypody;

    Polypody is a fern once used as a purgative.

    et quand nous voyons les cheures de Candie, si elles ont receu vn coup de traict, aller entre vn million d’herbes choisir le dictame pour leur guerison, et la tortue quand elle a mangé de la vipere, chercher incontinent de l’origanum pour se purger, le dragon fourbir et esclairer ses yeux auecques du fenoil, les cigongnes se donner elles mesmes des clysteres à tout de l’eau de marine, les elephans arracher non seulement de leur corps et de leurs compagnons, mais des corps aussi de leurs maistres, tesmoin celuy du Roy Porus qu’Alexandre deffit, les iauelots et les dardz qu’on leur a iettez au combat, et les arracher si dextrement, que nous ne le sçaurions faire auec si peu de douleur: pourquoy ne disons nous de mesmes, que c’est science et prudence?

    and yet when we see the goats of Crete, if they have been struck by an arrow, go and choose dittany out of a million herbs to cure themselves; the tortoise, when it has eaten a viper, immediately look for oregano to purge itself; the serpent polish and brighten its eyes with fennel; storks give themselves enemas of seawater; elephants pull out the javelins and darts thrown at them in battle—not only from their own bodies and their companions’, but from their masters’ bodies too, witness the elephant of King Porus, whom Alexander defeated—and pull them out so deftly that we could not do it with so little pain: why do we not likewise say that this is knowledge and wisdom?

    Porus, an Indian king, was defeated by Alexander the Great at the Hydaspes in 326 BC.

    Car d’alleguer, pour les deprimer, que c’est par la seule instruction et maistrise de Nature, qu’elles le sçauent, ce n’est pas leur oster le tiltre de science et de prudence: c’est la leur attribuer à plus forte raison qu’à nous, pour l’honneur d’vne si certaine maistresse d’escole.

    For to allege, in order to belittle them, that they know these things solely by the instruction and mastery of Nature is not to take away from them the title of knowledge and wisdom; it is to grant it to them with more reason than to us, in honor of so reliable a schoolmistress.

    Chrysippus, bien qu’en toutes autres choses autant desdaigneux iuge de la condition des animaux, que nul autre Philosophe, considerant les mouuements du chien, qui se rencontrant en vn carrefour à trois chemins, ou à la queste de son maistre qu’il a esgaré, ou à la poursuitte de quelque proye qui fuit deuant luy, va essayant vn chemin apres l’autre, et apres s’estre asseuré des deux, et n’y auoir trouué la trace de ce qu’il cherche, s’eslance dans le troisiesme sans marchander:

    Chrysippus, though in all other matters as disdainful a judge of the condition of animals as any philosopher, considered the movements of a dog that comes to a crossroads where three roads meet, either in search of its master whom it has lost or in pursuit of some prey fleeing before it. The dog tries one road after another, and after making sure of two of them and finding no trace there of what it seeks, it dashes down the third without hesitation.

    il est contraint de confesser, qu’en ce chien là, vn tel discours se passe: I’ay suiuy iusques à ce carre-four mon maistre à la trace, il faut necessairement qu’il passe par l’vn de ces trois chemins: ce n’est ny par cettuy-cy, ny par celuy-là, il faut donc infailliblement qu’il passe par cet autre: et que s’asseurant par cette conclusion et discours, il ne se sert plus de son sentiment au troisiesme chemin, ny ne le sonde plus, ains s’y laisse emporter par la force de la raison.

    Chrysippus is forced to admit that a reasoning such as this goes on in that dog: I have followed my master’s trail to this crossroads; he must necessarily have gone by one of these three roads; it is neither this one nor that one; therefore he must infallibly have gone by this other. And, made sure by this conclusion and reasoning, the dog no longer relies on its senses on the third road, nor tests it any further, but lets itself be carried along by the force of reason.

    Ce traict purement dialecticien, et cet vsage de propositions diuisées et conioinctes, et de la suffisante enumeration des parties, vaut-il pas autant que le chien le sçache de soy que de Trapezonce?

    This purely dialectical move, this use of disjunctive and conjunctive propositions and of sufficient enumeration of the parts—is it not worth just as much whether the dog knows it by itself or learned it from Trebizond?

    George of Trebizond (1395–1486), author of a widely used textbook of logic.

    Si ne sont pas les bestes incapables d’estre encore instruites à nostre mode. Les merles, les corbeaux, les pies, les perroquets, nous leur apprenons à parler: et cette facilité, que nous recognoissons à nous fournir leur voix et haleine si souple et si maniable, pour la former et l’astreindre à certain nombre de lettres et de syllabes, tesmoigne qu’ils ont vn discours au dedans, qui les rend ainsi disciplinables et volontaires à apprendre.

    And yet beasts are not incapable of being taught in our manner too. Blackbirds, ravens, magpies, parrots—we teach them to speak; and the readiness we see in them to lend us their voice and breath, so supple and pliable, so that we can shape it and bind it to a certain number of letters and syllables, shows that they have a reasoning within that makes them so teachable and willing to learn.

    Chacun est saoul, ce croy-ie, de voir tant de sortes de cingeries que les batteleurs apprennent à leurs chiens: les dances, où ils ne faillent vne seule cadence du son qu’ils oyent; plusieurs diuers mouuemens et saults qu’ils leur font faire par le commandement de leur parolle: mais ie remerque auec plus d’admiration cet effect, qui est toutes-fois assez vulgaire, des chiens dequoy se seruent les aueugles, et aux champs et aux villes: ie me suis pris garde comme ils s’arrestent à certaines portes, d’où ils ont accoustumé de tirer l’aumosne, comme ils euitent le choc des coches et des charrettes, lors mesme que pour leur regard, ils ont assez de place pour leur passage: i’en ay veu le long d’vn fossé de ville, laisser vn sentier plain et vni, et en prendre vn pire, pour esloigner son maistre du fossé.

    Everyone, I believe, has had his fill of seeing the many kinds of monkey tricks that showmen teach their dogs: the dances in which they do not miss a single beat of the music they hear, and the many different movements and leaps they are made to perform at a word of command. But I note with more wonder something that is nevertheless common enough: the dogs that blind men use, both in the country and in towns. I have noticed how they stop at certain doors where they are used to receiving alms, and how they avoid being struck by coaches and carts, even when they have room enough to pass for their own part. I have seen one, along a town moat, leave a smooth, level path and take a worse one, to keep its master away from the moat.

    Comment pouuoit-on auoir faict conceuoir à ce chien, que c’estoit sa charge de regarder seulement à la seureté de son maistre, et mespriser ses propres commoditez pour le seruir? et comment auoit-il la cognoissance que tel chemin luy estoit bien assez large, qui ne le seroit pas pour vn aueugle? Tout cela se peut-il comprendre sans ratiocination?

    How could anyone have made this dog understand that its duty was to look only to its master’s safety and to disregard its own convenience in order to serve him? And how did it know that a path quite wide enough for itself would not be so for a blind man? Can all this be understood without ratiocination?

    Il ne faut pas oublier ce que Plutarque dit auoir veu à Rome d’vn chien, auec l’Empereur Vespasian le pere au Theatre de Marcellus. Ce chien seruoit à vn batteleur qui ioüoit vne fiction à plusieurs mines et à plusieurs personnages, et y auoit son rolle.

    We must not forget what Plutarch says he saw of a dog in Rome, in the presence of the Emperor Vespasian, the father, at the Theater of Marcellus. This dog belonged to a showman who was performing a play with many scenes and many characters, and it had its own part in it.

    Il falloit entre autres choses qu’il contrefist pour vn temps le mort, pour auoir mangé de certaine drogue: apres auoir auallé le pain qu’on feignoit estre cette drogue, il commença tantost à trembler et branler, comme s’il eust esté estourdy: finalement s’estendant et se roidissant, comme mort, il se laissa tirer et trainer d’vn lieu à autre, ainsi que portoit le subject du ieu, et puis quand il cogneut qu’il estoit temps, il commença premierement à se remuer tout bellement, ainsi que s’il se fust reuenu d’vn profond sommeil, et leuant la teste regarda çà et là d’vne façon qui estonnoit tous les assistans.

    Among other things, it had to pretend for a while to be dead, from having eaten a certain drug. After swallowing the bread that was supposed to be this drug, it soon began to tremble and stagger as if it were dazed. Finally, stretching out and stiffening as though dead, it let itself be pulled and dragged from place to place, as the plot of the play required. Then, when it knew the time had come, it began first to stir very gently, as if it were waking from a deep sleep, and raising its head, it looked this way and that in a manner that astonished all the spectators.

    Les bœufs qui seruoyent aux iardins Royaux de Suse, pour les arrouser et tourner certaines grandes rouës à puiser de l’eau, ausquelles il y a des baquets attachez, comme il s’en voit plusieurs en Languedoc, on leur auoit ordonné d’en tirer par iour iusques à cent tours chacun, ils estoient si accoustumez à ce nombre, qu’il estoit impossible par aucune force de leur en faire tirer vn tour dauantage, et ayans faict leur tasche ils s’arrestoient tout court. Nous sommes en l’adolescence auant que nous sçachions compter iusques à cent, et venons de descouurir des nations qui n’ont aucune cognoissance des nombres.

    The oxen used in the royal gardens of Susa to water them, turning certain great wheels for drawing water with buckets attached to them, like many to be seen in Languedoc, had been ordered to make up to a hundred turns each a day. They were so accustomed to this number that it was impossible by any force to make them do a single turn more, and having done their task they stopped dead. We are in adolescence before we know how to count to a hundred, and we have just discovered nations that have no knowledge of numbers.

    Susa was a capital of the ancient Persian kings.

    Il y a encore plus de discours à instruire autruy qu’à estre instruit. Or laissant à part ce que Democritus iugeoit et prouuoit, que la plus part des arts, les bestes nous les ont apprises: comme l’araignée à tistre et à coudre, l’arondelle à bastir, le cigne et le rossignol la musique, et plusieurs animaux par leur imitation à faire la medecine: Aristote tient que les rossignols instruisent leurs petits à chanter, et y employent du temps et du soing: d’où il aduient que ceux que nous nourrissons en cage, qui n’ont point eu loisir d’aller à l’escole soubs leurs parens, perdent beaucoup de la grace de leur chant. Nous pouuons iuger par là, qu’il reçoit de l’amendement par discipline et par estude.

    There is even more reasoning in teaching others than in being taught. Now, leaving aside what Democritus judged and proved—that beasts taught us most of the arts, as the spider taught us to weave and sew, the swallow to build, the swan and the nightingale music, and many animals, through our imitation of them, the practice of medicine—Aristotle holds that nightingales teach their young to sing and spend time and care on it. Hence those we raise in cages, which have not had the chance to go to school under their parents, lose much of the grace of their song. We can judge from this that their song improves through discipline and study.

    Et entre les libres mesme, il n’est pas vng et pareil; chacun en a pris selon sa capacité. Et sur la ialousie de leur apprentissage, ils se debattent à l’enuy, d’vne contention si courageuse, que par fois le vaincu y demeure mort, l’aleine luy faillant plustost que la voix. Les plus ieunes ruminent pensifs, et prennent à imiter certains couplets de chanson: le disciple escoute la leçon de son precepteur, et en rend compte auec grand soing: ils se taisent l’vn tantost, tantost l’autre: on oyt corriger les fautes, et sent-on aucunes reprehensions du precepteur.

    And even among the free ones it is not one and the same: each has taken from it according to its capacity. Jealous over their learning, they compete with one another in a contest so spirited that sometimes the loser dies of it, his breath failing him before his voice does. The youngest ponder thoughtfully and set themselves to imitating certain snatches of song; the pupil listens to his teacher’s lesson and repeats it back with great care; they fall silent, now one, now the other; one can hear faults being corrected and detect certain reproofs from the teacher.

    I’ay veu, dit Arrius, autresfois vn elephant ayant à chacune cuisse vn cymbale pendu, et vn autre attaché à sa trompe, au son desquels tous les autres dançoyent en rond, s’esleuans et s’inclinans à certaines cadences, selon que l’instrument les guidoit, et y auoit plaisir à ouyr cette harmonie. Aux spectacles de Rome, il se voyoit ordinairement des elephans dressez à se mouuoir et dancer au son de la voix, des dances à plusieurs entrelasseures, coupeures et diuerses cadances tres-difficiles à apprendre. Il s’en est veu, qui en leur priué rememoroient leur leçon, et s’exerçoyent par soing et par estude pour n’estre tancez et battuz de leurs maistres.

    I once saw, says Arrian, an elephant with a cymbal hanging from each thigh and another tied to its trunk, at the sound of which all the others danced in a circle, rising and bowing at certain beats as the instrument guided them; and it was a pleasure to hear this harmony. At the shows in Rome, elephants were regularly seen trained to move and dance to the sound of the voice—dances with many interweavings, breaks and varied rhythms, very hard to learn. Some have been seen rehearsing their lesson in private, practicing with care and study so as not to be scolded and beaten by their masters.

    Arrian, Greek historian of the 2nd century AD, in his Indica.

    Mais cett’autre histoire de la pie, de laquelle nous auons Plutarque mesme pour respondant, est estrange. Elle estoit en la boutique d’vn barbier à Rome, et faisoit merueilles de contrefaire auec la voix tout ce qu’elle oyoit. Vn iour il aduint que certaines trompettes s’arresterent à sonner long temps deuant cette boutique: depuis cela et tout le lendemain, voyla cette pie pensiue, muette et melancholique; dequoy tout le monde estoit esmerueillé, et pensoit-on que le son des trompettes l’eust ainsin estourdie et estonnée; et qu’auec l’ouye, la voix se fust quant et quant esteinte.

    But that other story, about the magpie, for which we have Plutarch himself as guarantor, is a strange one. It lived in a barber’s shop in Rome and did wonders at mimicking with its voice everything it heard. One day some trumpeters happened to stop and play for a long time in front of the shop. After that, and all the next day, there was the magpie, pensive, mute and melancholy. Everyone marveled at this, and people thought the sound of the trumpets had so dazed and stunned it that its voice had been extinguished along with its hearing.

    Mais on trouua en fin, que c’estoit vne estude profonde, et vne retraicte en soy-mesmes, son esprit s’exercitant et preparant sa voix, à representer le son de ces trompettes: de maniere que sa premiere voix ce fut celle là, d’exprimer parfaictement leurs reprises, leurs poses, et leurs nuances; ayant quicté par ce nouuel apprentissage, et pris à desdain tout ce qu’elle sçauoit dire auparauant.

    But it was found in the end that this was deep study and a withdrawal into itself, its mind exercising and preparing its voice to reproduce the sound of those trumpets. So its first utterance was that one: a perfect rendering of their repeats, their pauses and their changes of tone; for the sake of this new learning, it had given up and come to scorn everything it could say before.

    Ie ne veux pas obmettre d’alleguer aussi cet autre exemple d’vn chien, que ce mesme Plutarque dit auoir veu (car quant à l’ordre, ie sens bien que ie le trouble, mais ie n’en obserue non plus à renger ces exemples, qu’au reste de toute ma besongne) luy estant dans vn nauire, ce chien estant en peine d’auoir l’huyle qui estoit dans le fond d’vne cruche, où il ne pouuoit arriuer de la langue, pour l’estroite emboucheure du vaisseau, alla querir des cailloux, et en mit dans cette cruche iusques à ce qu’il eust faict hausser l’huyle plus pres du bord, où il la peust atteindre. Cela qu’est-ce, si ce n’est l’effect d’vn esprit bien subtil?

    I do not want to leave out this other example either, of a dog that the same Plutarch says he saw (for as to order, I am well aware that I am mixing it up, but I observe it no more in arranging these examples than in all the rest of my work). He was on a ship, and this dog, struggling to get at the oil at the bottom of a jar, which it could not reach with its tongue because of the vessel’s narrow mouth, went and fetched pebbles and put them into the jar until it had raised the oil close enough to the rim to reach it. What is that, if not the work of a very subtle mind?

    On dit que les corbeaux de Barbarie en font de mesme, quand l’eau qu’ils veulent boire est trop basse.

    They say that the ravens of Barbary do the same when the water they want to drink is too low.

    Barbary is the coast of North Africa.
    Famous passage This man and thatMontaigne maintains there is more difference between one man and another than between an animal and a man.

    Cette action est aucunement voisine de ce que recitoit des elephans, vn Roy de leur nation, Iuba; que quand par la finesse de ceux qui les chassent, l’vn d’entre eux se trouue pris dans certaines fosses profondes qu’on leur prepare, et les recouure lon de menues brossailles pour les tromper, ses compagnons y apportent en diligence force pierres, et pieces de bois, afin que cela l’ayde à s’en mettre hors. Mais cet animal rapporte en tant d’autres effects à l’humaine suffisance, que si ie vouloy suiure par le menu ce que l’experience en a appris, ie gaignerois aisément ce que ie maintiens ordinairement, qu’il se trouue plus de difference de tel homme à tel homme, que de tel animal à tel homme.

    This action is somewhat akin to what Juba, a king of their own country, related of elephants: that when, through the cunning of their hunters, one of them is caught in one of the deep pits prepared for them and covered over with small brushwood to deceive them, its companions hurry to bring plenty of stones and pieces of wood to help it get out. But this animal resembles human ability in so many other actions that if I wanted to follow in detail what experience has taught about it, I would easily win the point I usually maintain: that there is more difference between this man and that one than between this animal and that man.

    Juba II, king of Mauretania (died AD 23), a learned writer on Africa.

    Le gouuerneur d’vn elephant en vne maison priuée de Syrie, desroboit à tous les repas, la moitié de la pension qu’on luy auoit ordonnée: vn iour le maistre voulut luy-mesme le penser, versa dans sa mangeoire la iuste mesure d’orge, qu’il luy auoit prescrite, pour sa nourriture: l’elephant regardant de mauuais œil ce gouuerneur, separa auec la trompe, et en mit à part la moitié, declarant par là le tort qu’on luy faisoit. Et vn autre, ayant vn gouuerneur qui mesloit dans sa mangeaille des pierres pour en croistre la mesure, s’approcha du pot où il faisoit cuyre sa chair pour son disner, et le luy remplit de cendre.

    The keeper of an elephant in a private house in Syria stole half its ration at every meal. One day the master decided to feed it himself and poured into its manger the exact measure of barley he had prescribed for its food. The elephant, glaring at the keeper, separated half of it with its trunk and set it aside, thereby declaring the wrong being done to it. And another, whose keeper mixed stones into its fodder to increase the measure, went up to the pot in which he was cooking his meat for dinner and filled it with ashes for him.

    Cela ce sont des effects particuliers: mais ce que tout le monde a veu, et que tout le monde sçait, qu’en toutes les armées qui se conduisoyent du pays de Leuant, l’vne des plus grandes forces consistoit aux elephans, desquels on tiroit des effects sans comparaison plus grands que nous ne faisons à present de nostre artillerie, qui tient à peu pres leur place en vne battaille ordonnée (cela est aisé à iuger à ceux qui cognoissent les histoires anciennes) Si quidem Tyrio seruire solebant / Annibali, et nostris ducibus, regique Molosso, / Horum maiores, et dorso ferre cohortes, / Partem aliquam belli, et euntem in prælia turrim. Il falloit bien qu’on se respondist à bon escient de la creance de ces bestes et de leur discours, leur abandonnant la teste d’vne battaille;

    These are individual incidents. But what everyone has seen and everyone knows is that in all the armies brought from the lands of the Levant, one of the greatest strengths lay in the elephants, which achieved results incomparably greater than we now get from our artillery, which roughly takes their place in a pitched battle (this is easy to judge for those who know ancient history): Since indeed they used to serve the Tyrian / Hannibal, and our generals, and the Molossian king, / these beasts’ ancestors, and to carry cohorts on their backs, / a share of the war, and a tower going into battle. People must surely have had complete and serious confidence in the reliability of these beasts and their reasoning, to entrust them with the front of a battle;

    Juvenal, Satires XII; the Molossian king is Pyrrhus of Epirus.

    là où le moindre arrest qu’elles eussent sçeu faire, pour la grandeur et pesanteur de leur corps, le moindre effroy qui leur eust faict tourner la teste sur leurs gens, estoit suffisant pour tout perdre.

    for the slightest halt they might have made, given the size and weight of their bodies, the slightest fright that turned their heads back toward their own side, was enough to lose everything.

    Et s’est veu peu d’exemples, où cela soit aduenu, qu’ils se reiectassent sur leurs trouppes, au lieu que nous mesmes nous reiectons les vns sur les autres, et nous rompons. On leur donnoit charge non d’vn mouuement simple, mais de plusieurs diuerses parties au combat: comme faisoient aux chiens les Espagnols à la nouuelle conqueste des Indes; ausquels ils payoient solde, et faisoient partage au butin. Et montroient ces animaux, autant d’addresse et de iugement à poursuiure et arrester leur victoire, à charger ou à reculer, selon les occasions, à distinguer les amis des ennemis, comme ils faisoient d’ardeur et d’aspreté. Nous admirons et poisons mieux les choses estrangeres que les ordinaires: et sans cela ie ne me fusse pas amusé à ce long registre.

    And few cases have been seen where they turned back on their own troops, whereas we ourselves fall back on one another and break ranks. They were given not a single movement to perform but several different parts in the fighting—as the Spaniards did with their dogs in the recent conquest of the Indies, paying them wages and giving them a share of the booty. And these animals showed as much skill and judgment in pursuing and halting their victory, in charging or retreating as occasion required, in telling friends from enemies, as they did ardor and fierceness. We admire and weigh foreign things more than ordinary ones; otherwise I would not have amused myself with this long register.

    Car selon mon opinion, qui contrerollera de pres ce que nous voyons ordinairement es animaux, qui viuent parmy nous, il y a dequoy y trouuer des effects autant admirables, que ceux qu’on va recueillant és pays et siecles estrangers. C’est vne mesme nature qui roule son cours. Qui en auroit suffisamment iugé le present estat, en pourroit seurement conclurre et tout l’aduenir et tout le passé.

    For in my opinion, whoever looks closely at what we commonly see in the animals that live among us will find in them actions as wonderful as those that people go collecting in foreign lands and ages. It is one and the same nature that rolls on its course. Whoever had sufficiently judged its present state could safely infer from it both the whole future and the whole past.

    Judging what we do not understand

    As we scorn foreigners we do not understand, so we misjudge the beasts.

    I’ay veu autresfois parmy nous, des hommes amenez par mer de loingtain pays, desquels par ce que nous n’entendions aucunement le langage, et que leur façon au demeurant et leur contenance, et leurs vestemens, estoient du tout esloignez des nostres, qui de nous ne les estimoit et [non civilisés] et brutes? qui n’attribuoit à stupidité et à bestise, de les voir muets, ignorans la langue Françoise, ignorans nos baise-mains, et nos inclinations serpentées; nostre port et nostre maintien, sur lequel sans faillir, doit prendre son patron la nature humaine? Tout ce qui nous semble estrange, nous le condamnons, et ce que nous n’entendons pas. Il nous aduient ainsin au iugement que nous faisons des bestes.

    I once saw among us men brought by sea from a distant country. Because we did not understand their language at all, and because their manners, their bearing and their clothes were entirely unlike ours, which of us did not consider them uncivilized and brutish? Who did not put it down to stupidity and dullness to see them mute, ignorant of the French language, ignorant of our hand-kissings and our serpentine bows, of our carriage and our bearing—on which, of course, human nature must without fail take its model? Everything that seems strange to us, we condemn, and everything we do not understand. That is how it goes with us in the judgment we make of beasts.

    Elles ont plusieurs conditions, qui se rapportent aux nostres: de celles-là par comparaison nous pouuons tirer quelque coniecture: mais de ce qu’elles ont particulier, que sçauons nous que c’est? Les cheuaux, les chiens, les bœufs, les brebis, les oyseaux, et la pluspart des animaux, qui viuent auec nous, recognoissent nostre voix, et se laissent conduire par elle: si faisoit bien encore la murene de Crassus, et venoit à luy quand il l’appelloit: et le font aussi les anguilles, qui se trouuent en la fontaine d’Arethuse: et i’ay veu des gardoirs assez, où les poissons accourent, pour manger, à certain cry de ceux qui les traictent. Nomen habent, et ad magistri / Vocem quisque sui venit citatus. Nous pouuons iuger de cela.

    They have many characteristics that correspond to ours: from those, by comparison, we can draw some conjecture. But as for what is peculiar to them, what do we know of what it is? Horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, birds and most of the animals that live with us recognize our voice and let themselves be led by it. So too did Crassus’s moray eel, which came to him when he called it; and so do the eels in the fountain of Arethusa; and I have seen plenty of fishponds where the fish come running to feed at a certain call from those who tend them. They have names, and each comes when summoned / at its master’s voice. That much we can judge.

    Martial, Epigrams IV.30. The fountain of Arethusa is a spring at Syracuse in Sicily.

    Nous pouuons aussi dire, que les elephans ont quelque participation de religion, d’autant qu’apres plusieurs ablutions et purifications, on les voit haussans leur trompe, comme des bras; et tenans les yeux fichez vers le soleil leuant, se planter long temps en meditation et contemplation, à certaines heures du iour; de leur propre inclination, sans instruction et sans precepte. Mais pour ne voir aucune telle apparence és autres animaux, nous ne pouuons pourtant establir qu’ils soient sans religion, et ne pouuons prendre en aucune part ce qui nous est caché.

    We can also say that elephants have some share in religion, since after several ablutions and purifications they are seen raising their trunks like arms and, with their eyes fixed on the rising sun, standing still for a long time in meditation and contemplation at certain hours of the day, of their own inclination, without instruction or precept. But because we see no such sign in other animals, we cannot for all that establish that they are without religion; we cannot grasp in any respect what is hidden from us.

    Comme nous voyons quelque chose en cette action que le philosophe Cleanthes remerqua, par ce qu’elle retire aux nostres: Il vid, dit-il, des fourmis partir de leur fourmiliere, portans le corps d’vn fourmis mort, vers vne autre fourmiliere, de laquelle plusieurs autres fourmis leur vindrent au deuant, comme pour parler à eux, et apres auoir esté ensemble quelque piece, ceux-cy s’en retournerent, pour consulter, pensez, auec leurs concitoyens, et firent ainsi deux ou trois voyages pour la difficulté de la capitulation. En fin ces derniers venus, apporterent aux premiers vn ver de leur taniere comme pour la rançon du mort, lequel ver les premiers chargerent sur leur dos, et emporterent chez eux, laissans aux autres le corps du trespassé.

    So too we see something in this action that the philosopher Cleanthes noticed, because it resembles ours. He saw, he says, some ants leaving their anthill carrying the body of a dead ant toward another anthill, from which several other ants came out to meet them as if to talk with them. After being together for some time, these went back to consult—just imagine—with their fellow citizens, and made two or three trips in this way because the terms were hard to settle. At last the latter brought the former a worm from their den, as if as ransom for the dead one; the first group loaded this worm on their backs and carried it home, leaving the others the body of the deceased.

    Voila l’interpretation que Cleanthes y donna: tesmoignant par là que celles qui n’ont point de voix, ne laissent pas d’auoir pratique et communication mutuelle; de laquelle c’est nostre deffaut que nous ne soyons participans; et nous meslons à cette cause sottement d’en opiner.

    That is the interpretation Cleanthes gave of it, showing thereby that creatures without voices still have dealings and communication with one another; it is our own defect that we have no share in it, and so we are foolish to meddle in giving opinions on the matter.

    Or elles produisent encores d’autres effects, qui surpassent de bien loing nostre capacité, ausquels il s’en faut tant que nous puissions arriuer par imitation, que par imagination mesme nous ne les pouuons conceuoir. Plusieurs tiennent qu’en cette grande et derniere battaille nauale qu’Antonius perdit contre Auguste, sa galere capitainesse fut arrestée au milieu de sa course, par ce petit poisson, que les Latins nomment remora, à cause de cette sienne proprieté d’arrester toute sorte de vaisseaux, ausquels il s’attache.

    Now they produce still other effects that far surpass our capacity—so far beyond imitation that we cannot even conceive them in imagination. Many hold that in the great final naval battle that Antony lost to Augustus, his flagship was stopped in mid-course by the little fish the Latins call remora, because of its peculiar property of stopping every kind of vessel it attaches itself to.

    The battle of Actium, 31 BC; Latin remora means “delay”.

    Et l’Empereur Caligula vogant auec vne grande flotte en la coste de la Romanie, sa seule galere fut arrestée tout court, par ce mesme poisson; lequel il fit prendre attaché comme il estoit au bas de son vaisseau, tout despit dequoy vn si petit animal pouuoit forcer et la mer et les vents, et la violence de tous ses auirons, pour estre seulement attaché par le bec à sa galere, car c’est vn poisson à coquille, et s’estonna encore non sans grande raison, de ce que luy estant apporté dans le batteau, il n’auoit plus cette force, qu’il auoit au dehors. Vn citoyen de Cyzique acquit iadis reputation de bon mathematicien, pour auoir appris la condition de l’herisson.

    And when the Emperor Caligula was sailing with a great fleet along the coast of Romania, his galley alone was stopped dead by this same fish. He had it taken, attached as it was to the bottom of his vessel, quite vexed that so small an animal could overpower the sea and the winds and the force of all his oars merely by being attached by its beak to his galley—for it is a shellfish. And he was astonished besides, not without good reason, that once it was brought into the boat it no longer had the strength it had outside. A citizen of Cyzicus once gained a reputation as a good mathematician for having learned the ways of the hedgehog.

    Cyzicus was a Greek city on the Sea of Marmara.

    Il a sa taniere ouuerte à diuers endroits et à diuers vents; et preuoyant le vent aduenir, il va boucher le trou du costé de ce vent-là; ce que remerquant ce citoyen, apportoit en sa ville certaines predictions du vent, qui auoit à tirer. Le cameleon prend la couleur du lieu, où il est assis: mais le poulpe se donne luy-mesme la couleur qu’il luy plaist, selon les occasions, pour se cacher de ce qu’il craint, et attrapper ce qu’il cherche. Au cameleon c’est changement de passion, mais au poulpe c’est changement d’action.

    Its den has openings in various places, facing various winds; and foreseeing the coming wind, it goes and stops up the hole on that wind’s side. Noticing this, the citizen would bring his city predictions of which wind was going to blow. The chameleon takes the color of the place where it sits; but the octopus gives itself whatever color it pleases, as occasion requires, to hide from what it fears and catch what it seeks. In the chameleon it is a change it undergoes; in the octopus it is a change it makes.

    Nous auons quelques mutations de couleur, à la frayeur, la cholere, la honte, et autres passions, qui alterent le teint de nostre visage: mais c’est par l’effect de la souffrance, comme au cameleon. Il est bien en la iaunisse de nous faire iaunir, mais il n’est pas en la disposition de nostre volonté. Or ces effects que nous recognoissons aux autres animaux, plus grands que les nostres, tesmoignent en eux quelque faculté plus excellente, qui nous est occulte; comme il est vraysemblable que sont plusieurs autres de leurs conditions et puissances, desquelles nulles apparances ne viennent iusques à nous.

    We have some changes of color in fright, anger, shame and other passions that alter the complexion of our face; but that is the effect of something we undergo, as with the chameleon. Jaundice can certainly make us turn yellow, but that is not at the disposal of our will. Now these effects we recognize in other animals, greater than ours, testify to some more excellent faculty in them that is hidden from us; as are, very likely, many other characteristics and powers of theirs, no sign of which ever reaches us.

    De toutes les predictions du temps passé, les plus anciennes et plus certaines estoyent celles qui se tiroient du vol des oyseaux. Nous n’auons rien de pareil ny de si admirable. Cette regle, cet ordre du bransler de leur aisle, par lequel on tire des consequences des choses à venir, il faut bien qu’il soit conduit par quelque excellent moyen à vne si noble operation; car c’est prester à la lettre, d’aller attribuant ce grand effect, à quelque ordonnance naturelle, sans l’intelligence, consentement, et discours, de qui le produit: et est vne opinion euidemment faulse.

    Of all the predictions of times past, the oldest and most certain were those drawn from the flight of birds. We have nothing like it, nothing so wonderful. That rule, that order in the beating of their wings, from which people draw inferences about things to come, must surely be guided to so noble an operation by some excellent means. For it is merely playing with words to go attributing this great effect to some natural ordering, without intelligence, consent and reasoning in whatever produces it; and it is a plainly false opinion.

    Qu’il soit ainsi: la torpille a cette condition, non seulement d’endormir les membres qui la touchent, mais au trauers des filets, et de la scene, elle transmet vne pesanteur endormie aux mains de ceux qui la remuent et manient: voire dit-on d’auantage, que si on verse de l’eau dessus, on sent cette passion qui gaigne contremont iusques à la main, et endort l’attouchement au trauers de l’eau. Cette force est merueilleuse: mais elle n’est pas inutile à la torpille: elle la sent et s’en sert; de maniere que pour attraper la proye qu’elle queste, on la void se tapir soubs le limon, afin que les autres poissons se coulans par dessus, frappez et endormis de cette sienne froideur, tombent en sa puissance.

    That this is so: the torpedo fish has this property, that it not only numbs the limbs that touch it, but also, through nets and seines, transmits a numbing heaviness to the hands of those who stir and handle it. Indeed they say further that if you pour water on it, you feel this sensation creeping upward to your hand, numbing your touch through the water. This power is marvelous; but it is not useless to the torpedo. It feels it and makes use of it, so that to catch the prey it is after, it can be seen lurking under the mud, so that the other fish gliding over it, struck and numbed by this cold of its own, fall into its power.

    The torpedo is the electric ray.

    Les gruës, les arondeles, et autres oyseaux passagers, changeans de demeure selon les saisons de l’an, montrent assez la cognoissance qu’elles ont de leur faculté diuinatrice, et la mettent en vsage.

    Cranes, swallows and other birds of passage, changing their abode with the seasons of the year, show plainly enough that they know they have this power of divination, and they put it to use.

    Les chasseurs nous asseurent, que pour choisir d’vn nombre de petits chiens, celuy qu’on doit conseruer pour le meilleur, il ne faut que mettre la mere au propre de le choisir elle mesme; comme si on les emporte hors de leur giste, le premier qu’elle y rapportera, sera tousiours le meilleur: ou bien si on fait semblant d’entourner de feu le giste, de toutes parts, celuy des petits, au secours duquel elle courra premierement. Par où il appert qu’elles ont vn vsage de prognostique que nous n’auons pas: ou qu’elles ont quelque vertu à iuger de leurs petits, autre et plus viue que la nostre.

    Hunters assure us that to choose, out of a litter of puppies, the one that should be kept as the best, you need only let the mother choose it herself. Thus if you carry them out of their bed, the first one she brings back will always be the best; or else, if you pretend to surround the bed with fire on all sides, it will be the one she runs to rescue first. From which it appears that they have a use of prognostication that we lack, or else some power of judging their young that is different from ours and keener.

    La maniere de naistre, d’engendrer, nourrir, agir, mouuoir, viure et mourir des bestes, estant si voisine de la nostre, tout ce que nous retranchons de leurs causes motrices, et que nous adioustons à nostre condition au dessus de la leur, cela ne peut aucunement partir du discours de nostre raison.

    Since the way beasts are born, breed, feed, act, move, live and die is so close to our own, whatever we strip away from their motive causes and add to our own condition above theirs cannot possibly arise from any reasoning of our reason.

    Pour reglement de nostre santé, les medecins nous proposent l’exemple du viure des bestes, et leur façon: car ce mot est de tout temps en la bouche du peuple: Tenez chaults les pieds et la teste, / Au demeurant viuez en beste. La generation est la principale des actions naturelles: nous auons quelque disposition de membres, qui nous est plus propre à cela: toutesfois ils nous ordonnent de nous ranger à l’assiette et disposition brutale, comme plus effectuelle: More ferarum, / Quadrupedúmque magis ritu, plerumque putantur / Concipere vxores: quia sic loca sumere possunt, / Pectoribus positis, sublatis semina lumbis. Et reiettent comme nuisibles ces mouuements indiscrets, et insolents, que les femmes y ont meslé de leur creu; les ramenant à l’exemple et vsage des bestes de leur sexe, plus modeste et rassis.

    For the regulation of our health, doctors put before us the example of the way beasts live and their manner; for this saying has always been on the lips of the people: Keep your feet and your head warm, / For the rest, live like a beast. Generation is the chief of the natural actions. We have a certain arrangement of limbs that is better suited to us for it; yet they order us to adopt the posture and position of the brutes, as more effective: In the manner of wild beasts, / And rather in the fashion of four-footed creatures, wives are generally thought / To conceive: because so the seeds can reach their place, / With breasts lowered and loins raised. And they reject as harmful those indiscreet and immodest movements that women have added of their own invention, bringing them back to the example and practice of the beasts of their sex, which are more modest and sedate.

    Nam mulier prohibet se concipere atque repugnat, / Clunibus ipse viri Venerem si læta retractet, / Atque exossato ciet omni pectore fluctus. / Eijcit enim sulci recta regione viáque / Vomerem, atque locis auertit seminis ictum.

    For a woman prevents herself from conceiving and fights against it / If in her delight she thrusts back against the man with her buttocks / And stirs up waves with her whole body gone limp. / For she throws the plowshare out of the straight line and path / Of the furrow, and turns the stroke of the seed away from its place.

    The virtues of animals

    Animals show justice, friendship, gratitude, fidelity and even religion.

    Si c’est iustice de rendre à chacun ce qui luy est deu, les bestes qui seruent, ayment et deffendent leurs bien-faicteurs, et qui poursuyuent et outragent les estrangers et ceux qui les offencent, elles representent en cela quelque air de nostre iustice: comme aussi en conseruant vne equalité tres-equitable en la dispensation de leurs biens à leurs petits. Quant à l’amitié, elles l’ont sans comparaison plus viue et plus constante, que n’ont pas les hommes. Hyrcanus le chien du Roy Lysimachus, son maistre mort, demeura obstiné sus son lict, sans vouloir boire ne manger: et le iour qu’on en brusla le corps, il print sa course, et se ietta dans le feu, où il fut bruslé.

    If justice is giving each his due, then the beasts that serve, love and defend their benefactors, and that chase and attack strangers and those who harm them, show in this something of the look of our justice; as they also do in keeping a most fair equality in sharing out their goods among their young. As for friendship, theirs is incomparably keener and more constant than that of men. Hyrcanus, the dog of King Lysimachus, when his master died, stayed stubbornly on his bed, refusing to eat or drink; and on the day the body was burned, he took a run and threw himself into the fire, where he was burned.

    Comme fit aussi le chien d’vn nommé Pyrrhus; car il ne bougea de dessus le lict de son maistre, depuis qu’il fut mort: et quand on l’emporta, il se laissa enleuer quant et luy, et finalement se lança dans le buscher où on brusloit le corps de son maistre.

    So too did the dog of a certain Pyrrhus. It did not stir from its master’s bed from the time he died, and when he was carried out it let itself be lifted along with him, and finally leaped onto the pyre on which its master’s body was being burned.

    Il y a certaines inclinations d’affection, qui naissent quelquefois en nous, sans le conseil de la raison, qui viennent d’vne temerité, fortuite, que d’autres nomment sympathie: les bestes en sont capables comme nous. Nous voyons les cheuaux prendre certaine accointance des vns aux autres, iusques à nous mettre en peine pour les faire viure ou voyager separément. On les void appliquer leur affection à certain poil de leurs compagnons, comme à certain visage: et où ils le rencontrent, s’y ioindre incontinent auec feste et demonstration de bienueillance; et prendre quelque autre forme à contre-cœur et en haine. Les animaux ont choix comme nous, en leurs amours, et font quelque triage de leur femelles.

    There are certain inclinations of affection that sometimes arise in us without the counsel of reason, coming from a chance rashness that others call sympathy: beasts are capable of them just as we are. We see horses form a kind of attachment to one another, to the point that we have trouble making them live or travel apart. We see them fix their affection on a certain coat in their companions, as on a certain face; and wherever they meet it, they join it at once with rejoicing and signs of goodwill, while taking some other form in dislike and hatred. Animals make choices as we do in their loves, and do some sorting among their females.

    Ils ne sont pas exempts de nos ialousies et d’enuies extremes et irreconciliables.

    They are not free of our jealousies, or of extreme and irreconcilable envy.

    Les cupiditez sont ou naturelles et necessaires, comme le boire et le manger; ou naturelles et non necessaires, comme l’accointance des femelles; ou elles ne sont ny naturelles ny necessaires: de cette derniere sorte sont quasi toutes celles des hommes: elles sont toutes superfluës et artificielles. Car c’est merueille combien peu il faut à Nature pour se contenter, combien peu elle nous a laissé à desirer. Les apprests à nos cuisines ne touchent pas son ordonnance. Les Stoiciens disent qu’vn homme auroit dequoy se substanter d’vne oliue par iour. La delicatesse de nos vins, n’est pas de sa leçon, ny la recharge que nous adioustons aux appetits amoureux: Neque illa / Magno prognatum deposcit consule cunnum.

    Desires are either natural and necessary, like drinking and eating; or natural and not necessary, like intercourse with females; or neither natural nor necessary. Of this last kind are nearly all the desires of men: they are all superfluous and artificial. For it is a wonder how little Nature needs to be content, how little she has left us to desire. The preparations of our kitchens are no part of her ordinance. The Stoics say that a man could sustain himself on one olive a day. The delicacy of our wines is not of her teaching, nor the extra spice we add to our amorous appetites: Nor does she / Demand private parts descended from a great consul.

    Ces cupiditez estrangeres, que l’ignorance du bien, et vne fauce opinion ont coulées en nous, sont en si grand nombre, qu’elles chassent presque toutes les naturelles. Ny plus ny moins que si en vne cité, il y auoit si grand nombre d’estrangers, qu’ils en missent hors les naturels habitans, ou esteignissent leur authorité et puissance ancienne, l’vsurpant entierement, et s’en saisissant.

    These foreign desires, which ignorance of the good and false opinion have slipped into us, are so numerous that they drive out almost all the natural ones. It is just as if in a city there were so many foreigners that they put out the native inhabitants, or extinguished their ancient authority and power, usurping it entirely and seizing it for themselves.

    Les animaux sont beaucoup plus reglez que nous ne sommes, et se contiennent auec plus de moderation soubs les limites que Nature nous a prescripts. Mais non pas si exactement, qu’ils n’ayent encore quelque conuenance à nostre desbauche. Et tout ainsi comme il s’est trouué des desirs furieux, qui ont poussé les hommes à l’amour des bestes, elles se trouuent aussi par fois esprises de nostre amour, et reçoiuent des affections monstrueuses d’vne espece à autre.

    Animals are much better regulated than we are, and keep with more moderation within the limits that Nature has prescribed for us. But not so strictly that they do not still have something in common with our debauchery. And just as there have been furious desires that drove men to love beasts, so beasts too are sometimes smitten with love for us, and conceive monstrous affections from one species to another.

    Tesmoin l’elephant corriual d’Aristophanes le grammairien, en l’amour d’vne ieune bouquetiere en la ville d’Alexandrie, qui ne luy cedoit en rien aux offices d’vn poursuyuant bien passionné: car se promenant par le marché, où lon vendoit des fruicts, il en prenoit auec sa trompe, et les luy portoit: il ne la perdoit de veuë, que le moins qu’il luy estoit possible; et luy mettoit quelquefois la trompe dans le sein par dessoubs son collet, et luy tastoit les tettins. Ils recitent aussi d’vn dragon amoureux d’vne fille; et d’vne oye esprise de l’amour d’vn enfant, en la ville d’Asope; et d’vn belier seruiteur de la menestriere Glaucia: et il se void tous les iours des magots furieusement espris de l’amour des femmes.

    Witness the elephant that was the rival of Aristophanes the grammarian for the love of a young flower girl in the city of Alexandria, and yielded to him in nothing in the attentions of an ardent suitor. Walking through the market where fruit was sold, he would take some with his trunk and bring it to her; he let her out of his sight as little as he possibly could; and sometimes he would put his trunk into her bosom under her collar and feel her breasts. They also tell of a serpent in love with a girl; of a goose enamored of a boy in the town of Asopus; and of a ram that courted the minstrel Glaucia; and every day we see apes furiously in love with women.

    Aristophanes of Byzantium, Alexandrian scholar of the 3rd–2nd century BC; the story comes from Plutarch.

    On void aussi certains animaux s’addonner à l’amour des masles de leur sexe. Oppianus et autres recitent quelques exemples, pour montrer la reuerence que les bestes en leurs mariages portent à la parenté; mais l’experience nous fait bien souuent voir le contraire; Nec habetur turpe iuuencæ / Ferre patrem tergo; fit equo sua filia coniux; / Quásque creauit, init pecudes caper; ipsáque cuius / Semine concepta est, ex illo concipit ales.

    We also see certain animals giving themselves to the love of males of their own sex. Oppian and others report some examples to show the respect that beasts pay to kinship in their matings; but experience very often shows us the contrary: It is not held shameful for a heifer / To bear her father on her back; the horse takes his own daughter as mate; / The goat mounts the flock he has fathered; and the bird / Conceives by the very one from whose seed she was conceived.

    Oppian, Greek poet of the 2nd century AD, author of poems on hunting and fishing.

    De subtilité malitieuse, en est-il vne plus expresse que celle du mulet du philosophe Thales? lequel passant au trauers d’vne riuiere chargé de sel, et de fortune y estant bronché, si que les sacs qu’il portoit en furent tous mouillez, s’estant apperçeu que le sel fondu par ce moyen, luy auoit rendu sa charge plus legere, ne failloit iamais aussi tost qu’il rencontroit quelque ruisseau, de se plonger dedans auec sa charge, iusques à ce que son maistre descouurant sa malice, ordonna qu’on le chargeast de laine, à quoy se trouuant mesconté, il cessa de plus vser de cette finesse.

    Of malicious cunning, is there a clearer example than that of the mule of the philosopher Thales? Crossing a river loaded with salt, it happened to stumble, so that the sacks it carried were all soaked. Noticing that the salt, melted in this way, had made its load lighter, it never failed, as soon as it came to a stream, to plunge in with its load, until its master, discovering its trick, ordered it to be loaded with wool. Finding its reckoning wrong, it gave up the trick.

    Il y en a plusieurs qui representent naïfuement le visage de nostre auarice; car on leur void vn soin extreme de surprendre tout ce qu’elles peuuent, et de le curieusement cacher, quoy qu’elles n’en tirent point vsage. Quant à la mesnagerie, elles nous surpassent non seulement en cette preuoyance d’amasser et espargner pour le temps à venir, mais elles ont encore beaucoup de parties de la science, qui y est necessaire. Les fourmis estandent au dehors de l’aire leurs grains et semences pour les esuenter, refreschir et secher, quand ils voyent qu’ils commencent à se moisir et à sentir le rance, de peur qu’ils ne se corrompent et pourrissent.

    There are many of them that show to the life the face of our avarice; for we see in them an extreme care to snatch up everything they can and hide it carefully, though they make no use of it. As for husbandry, they surpass us not only in this foresight of gathering and saving for the time to come, but they also have many parts of the knowledge it requires. Ants spread their grain and seeds outside their storehouse to air, cool and dry them, when they see them beginning to mold and smell rancid, for fear they spoil and rot.

    Mais la caution et preuention dont ils vsent à ronger le grain de froment, surpasse toute imagination de prudence humaine. Par ce que le froment ne demeure pas tousiours sec ny sain, ains s’amolit, se resoult et destrempe comme en laict, s’acheminant à germer et produire: de peur qu’il ne deuienne semence, et perde sa nature et proprieté de magasin pour leur nourriture, ils rongent le bout, par où le germe a coustume de sortir.

    But the caution and foresight they show in gnawing the grain of wheat surpasses anything human prudence can imagine. Wheat does not always stay dry and sound, but softens, dissolves and turns as if to milk, on its way to sprouting and growing; so, for fear it may become seed and lose its nature and quality as a store for their food, they gnaw off the end from which the germ usually comes out.

    Human war, animal war

    War, the proudest human action, rises from trivial causes and can be routed by bees.

    Quant à la guerre, qui est la plus grande et pompeuse des actions humaines, ie sçaurois volontiers, si nous nous en voulons seruir pour argument de quelque prerogatiue, ou au rebours pour tesmoignage de nostre imbecillité et imperfection: comme de vray, la science de nous entre-deffaire et entretuer, de ruiner et perdre nostre propre espece, il semble qu’elle n’a pas beaucoup dequoy se faire desirer aux bestes qui ne l’ont pas. *Quando leoni / Fortior eripuit vitam leo?

    As for war, which is the greatest and most pompous of human actions, I should like to know whether we mean to use it as an argument for some prerogative of ours, or, on the contrary, as evidence of our feebleness and imperfection. For indeed the science of destroying and killing one another, of ruining and wrecking our own species, does not seem to have much to make it desirable to the beasts that lack it. *When has a stronger lion / ever taken a lion’s life?

    Juvenal, Satires XV.

    quo nemore vnquam / Expirauit aper maioris dentibus apri? Mais elles n’en sont pas vniuersellement exemptes pourtant: tesmoin les furieuses rencontres des mouches à miel, et les entreprinses des Princes des deux armées contraires: Sæpe duobus / Regibus incessit magno discordia motu; / Continuóque animos vulgi et trepidantia bello / Corda licet longé præsciscere.* Ie ne voy iamais cette diuine description, qu’il ne m’y semble lire peinte l’ineptie et vanité humaine.

    In what forest / did a boar ever breathe his last under the tusks of a bigger boar? But they are not universally exempt from it, all the same: witness the furious clashes of honeybees, and the enterprises of the princes of the two opposing armies: Often between two / kings discord arises with great upheaval; / and at once you may foresee from afar the passions of the crowd / and their hearts throbbing for war.* I never see this divine description without seeming to read in it a painting of human folly and vanity.

    Car ces mouuemens guerriers, qui nous rauissent de leur horreur et espouuantement, cette tempeste de sons et de cris: Fulgur ibi ad cælum se tollit, totáque circum / Ære renidescit tellus, subtèrque virûm vi / Excitur pedibus sonitus, clamoréque montes / Icti reiectant voces ad sidera mundi. cette effroyable ordonnance de tant de milliers d’hommes armez, tant de fureur, d’ardeur, et de courage, il est plaisant à considerer par combien vaines occasions elle est agitée, et par combien legeres occasions esteinte. Paridis propter narratur amorem / Græcia Barbariæ diro collisa duello. Toute l’Asie se perdit et se consomma en guerres pour le macquerellage de Paris.

    For these warlike movements that carry us away with their horror and dread, this storm of sounds and cries: There the flash rises to the sky, and all the earth around / gleams with bronze, and beneath, by the might of men, / a sound is raised by their feet, and the mountains, struck by the clamor, / hurl the voices back to the stars of heaven. this fearful array of so many thousands of armed men, so much fury, ardor and courage—it is amusing to consider by what vain occasions it is stirred up, and by what slight occasions it is put out. For the love of Paris, so the story goes, / Greece clashed with the barbarians in dire war. All Asia was lost and consumed in wars for Paris’s pandering.

    L’enuie d’vn seul homme, vn despit, vn plaisir, vne ialousie domestique, causes qui ne deuroient pas esmouuoir deux harangeres à s’esgratigner, c’est l’ame et le mouuement de tout ce grand trouble. Voulons nous en croire ceux mesmes qui en sont les principaux autheurs et motifs? Oyons le plus grand, le plus victorieux Empereur, et le plus puissant qui fust onques, se iouant et mettant en risée tres-plaisamment et tres-ingenieusement, plusieurs batailles hazardées et par mer et par terre, le sang et la vie de cinq cens mille hommes qui suiuirent sa fortune, et les forces et richesses des deux parties du monde espuisées pour le seruice de ses entreprinses: *Quòd futuit Glaphyran Antonius, hanc mihi pœnam / Fuluia constituit, se quoque vti futuam.

    The envy of a single man, a grudge, a pleasure, a domestic jealousy—causes that should not move two fishwives to scratch each other—these are the soul and the motive force of all this great turmoil. Shall we believe the very men who are its principal authors and movers? Let us hear the greatest, the most victorious and the most powerful emperor who ever lived, joking and making very amusing and very witty fun of many battles risked by sea and by land, of the blood and lives of five hundred thousand men who followed his fortune, and of the forces and riches of two parts of the world exhausted in the service of his enterprises: *Because Antony is screwing Glaphyra, Fulvia has set me this penalty: / that I must screw her too.

    An epigram by the emperor Augustus, preserved by Martial (XI.20); Glaphyra was Antony’s mistress and Fulvia his wife.

    / Fuluiam ego vt futuam! quid si me Manius oret / Pædicem, faciam? non puto, si sapiam. / Aut futue, aut pugnemus, ait: quid si mihi vita / Charior est ipsa mentula? signa canant. I’vse en liberté de conscience de mon Latin, auecq le congé, que vous m’en auez donné. Or ce grand corps à tant de visages et de mouuemens, qui semblent menasser le ciel et la terre: Quàm multi Lybico voluuntur marmore fluctus, / Sæuus vbi Orion hybernis conditur vndis, / Vel cùm sole nouo densæ torrentur aristæ, / Aut Hermi campo, aut Lyciæ flauentibus aruis, / Scuta sonant, pulsùque pedum tremit excita tellus:* ce furieux monstre, à tant de bras et à tant de testes, c’est tousiours l’homme foyble, calamiteux, et miserable.

    / I, screw Fulvia! What if Manius begged me / to sodomize him—would I do it? Not, I think, if I had any sense. / “Either screw me or let us fight,” she says. What if dearer to me than life / is my prick itself? Let the trumpets sound! I use my Latin with freedom of conscience, by the leave you have given me. Now this great body with so many faces and movements, which seem to threaten heaven and earth: As many as the waves that roll on the Libyan sea / when fierce Orion sets in the winter waves, / or as the thick ears of corn scorched by the new sun / on the plain of Hermus or in the yellow fields of Lycia, / so the shields clang, and the earth trembles, roused by the tramp of feet:* this furious monster with so many arms and so many heads is still, always, man—feeble, calamitous and wretched.

    Montaigne is addressing the princess, probably Margaret of Valois, for whom this essay is said to have been written; the second quotation is Virgil, Aeneid VII.

    Ce n’est qu’vne formilliere esmeuë et eschaufée, It nigrum campis agmen: vn souffle de vent contraire, le croassement d’vn vol de corbeaux, le faux pas d’vn cheual, le passage fortuite d’vn aigle, vn songe, vne voix, vn signe, vne brouée matiniere, suffisent à le renuerser et porter par terre.

    It is only an anthill stirred up and heated: The black column moves across the plains: a gust of contrary wind, the croaking of a flight of crows, a horse’s stumble, the chance passing of an eagle, a dream, a voice, a sign, a morning mist are enough to overturn it and bring it to the ground.

    Virgil, Aeneid IV, describing ants.

    Donnez luy seulement d’vn rayon de soleil par le visage, le voyla fondu et esuanouy: qu’on luy esuente seulement vn peu de poussiere aux yeux, comme aux mouches à miel de nostre Poëte, voyla toutes nos enseignes, nos legions, et le grand Pompeius mesmes à leur teste, rompu et fracassé: car ce fut luy, ce me semble, que Sertorius battit en Espaigne à tout ces belles armes, qui ont aussi seruy à Eumenes contre Antigonus, à Surena contre Crassus: Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta / Pulueris exigui iactu compressa quiescent. Qu’on descouple mesmes de noz mouches apres, elles auront et la force et le courage de le dissiper.

    Just strike it in the face with a ray of sunlight, and there it is, melted away and vanished. Just blow a little dust in its eyes, as with the honeybees of our Poet, and there are all our standards, our legions, and even the great Pompey at their head, broken and shattered. For it was he, I think, whom Sertorius beat in Spain with those fine weapons, which also served Eumenes against Antigonus and Surena against Crassus: These passions of the soul and these great contests / will be checked and stilled by the throwing of a little dust. Even let some of our bees loose on it afterwards: they will have the strength and the courage to scatter it.

    Sertorius, Roman rebel general in Spain; Eumenes and Antigonus, successors of Alexander; Surena, the Parthian general who defeated Crassus in 53 BC. The quotation is from Virgil, Georgics IV.

    De fresche memoire, les Portugais assiegeans la ville de Tamly, au territoire de Xiatine, les habitans d’icelle porterent sur la muraille quantité de ruches, dequoy ils sont riches. Et auec du feu chasserent les abeilles si viuement sur leurs ennemis, qu’ils abandonnerent leur entreprinse, ne pouuans soustenir leurs assauts et piqueures. Ainsi demeura la victoire et liberté de leur ville, à ce nouueau secours: auec telle fortune, qu’au retour du combat, il ne s’en trouua vne seule à dire. Les ames des Empereurs et des sauatiers sont iettées à mesme moule. Considerant l’importance des actions des Princes et leur poix, nous nous persuadons qu’elles soyent produictes par quelques causes aussi poisantes et importantes.

    Within recent memory, when the Portuguese were besieging the town of Tamly, in the territory of Xiatine, its inhabitants brought a quantity of beehives onto the wall, for they have plenty of them. And with fire they drove the bees so fiercely onto their enemies that the Portuguese gave up their enterprise, unable to withstand their attacks and stings. Thus the victory and the freedom of their town were owed to this new kind of help—with such good fortune that on their return from the fight not a single bee was missing. The souls of emperors and of cobblers are cast in the same mold. Considering the importance and weight of the actions of princes, we persuade ourselves that they must be produced by causes equally weighty and important.

    Montaigne took this episode from Simon Goulart’s French version of a history of the Portuguese conquests in the East.

    Nous nous trompons: ils sont menez et ramenez en leurs mouuemens, par les mesmes ressors, que nous sommes aux nostres. La mesme raison qui nous fait tanser auec vn voisin, dresse entre les Princes vne guerre: la mesme raison qui nous fait fouëtter vn laquais, tombant en vn Roy, luy fait ruiner vne prouince. Ils veulent aussi legerement que nous, mais ils peuuent plus. Pareils appetits agitent vn ciron et vn elephant.

    We are mistaken. They are pushed this way and that in their movements by the same springs as we are in ours. The same reason that makes us quarrel with a neighbor sets off a war between princes; the same reason that makes us whip a lackey, when it falls on a king, makes him ruin a province. Their will is as light as ours, but their power is greater. The same appetites stir a mite and an elephant.

    Quant à la fidelité, il n’est animal au monde traistre au prix de l’homme. Nos histoires racontent la vifue poursuitte que certains chiens ont faict de la mort de leurs maistres. Le Roy Pyrrhus ayant rencontré vn chien qui gardoit vn homme mort, et ayant entendu qu’il y auoit trois iours qu’il faisoit cet office, commanda qu’on enterrast ce corps, et mena ce chien quant et luy. Vn iour qu’il assistoit aux montres generales de son armee, ce chien apperceuant les meurtriers de son maistre, leur courut sus, auec grans aboys et aspreté de courroux, et par ce premier indice achemina la vengeance de ce meurtre, qui en fut faicte bien tost apres par la voye de la iustice.

    As for fidelity, there is no animal in the world as treacherous as man. Our histories tell of the eager pursuit that certain dogs have made to avenge their masters’ deaths. King Pyrrhus, having come upon a dog guarding a dead man, and hearing that it had been doing this duty for three days, ordered the body to be buried and took the dog along with him. One day, when he was attending the general review of his army, the dog spotted its master’s murderers and ran at them with loud barking and fierce anger; and by this first clue it set in motion the vengeance for the murder, which was carried out soon afterwards by way of justice.

    Autant en fit le chien du sage Hesiode, ayant conuaincu les enfans de Ganistor Naupactien, du meurtre commis en la personne de son maistre. Vn autre chien estant à la garde d’vn temple à Athenes, ayant aperçeu vn larron sacrilege qui emportoit les plus beaux ioyaux, se mit à abbayer contre luy tant qu’il peut: mais les marguilliers ne s’estans point esueillez pour cela, il se mit à suyure, et le iour estant venu, se tint vn peu plus esloigné de luy, sans le perdre iamais de veuë: s’il luy offroit à manger, il n’en vouloit pas, et aux autres passans qu’il rencontroit en son chemin, il leur faisoit feste de la queuë, et prenoit de leurs mains ce qu’ils luy donnoient à manger: si son larron s’arrestoit pour dormir, il s’arrestoit quant et quant au lieu mesmes.

    So too did the dog of the wise Hesiod, which convicted the sons of Ganyctor of Naupactus of the murder of its master. Another dog, guarding a temple in Athens, saw a sacrilegious thief carrying off the finest jewels and began to bark at him as loud as it could. But since the wardens did not wake up for all that, it began to follow him; and when day came, it kept a little farther off, without ever losing sight of him. If he offered it food, it would not take it; but to the other passers-by it met on the way it wagged its tail and took from their hands whatever they gave it to eat. If its thief stopped to sleep, it stopped at the same spot as well.

    La nouuelle de ce chien estant venuë aux marguilliers de cette eglise, ils se mirent à le suiure à la trace, s’enquerans des nouuelles du poil de ce chien, et en fin le rencontrerent en la ville de Cromyon, et le larron aussi, qu’ils ramenerent en la ville d’Athenes, où il fut puny. Et les iuges en recognoissance de ce bon office, ordonnerent du public certaine mesure de bled pour nourrir le chien, et aux prestres d’en auoir soin. Plutarque tesmoigne cette histoire, comme chose tres-aueree et aduenue en son siecle.

    When news of this dog reached the wardens of that church, they set out to follow its track, asking for news of a dog of that color, and at last found it in the town of Cromyon, and the thief too, whom they brought back to the city of Athens, where he was punished. And the judges, in acknowledgment of this good service, ordered that a certain measure of grain be provided from public funds to feed the dog, and that the priests take care of it. Plutarch vouches for this story as a well-attested thing that happened in his own time.

    Androdus and the lion

    A lion spares the slave who once pulled a splinter from its paw.

    Quant à la gratitude, car il me semble que nous auons besoin de mettre ce mot en credit, ce seul exemple y suffira, qu’Appion recite comme en ayant esté luy mesme spectateur. Vn iour, dit-il, qu’on donnoit à Rome au peuple le plaisir du combat de plusieurs bestes estranges, et principalement de lyons de grandeur inusitee, il y en auoit vn entre autres, qui par son port furieux, par la force et grosseur de ses membres, et vn rugissement hautain et espouuantable, attiroit à soy la veuë de toute l’assistance. Entre les autres esclaues, qui furent presentez au peuple en ce combat des bestes, fut vn Androdus de Dace, qui estoit à vn Seigneur Romain, de qualité consulaire.

    As for gratitude—for it seems to me we need to bring this word back into credit—this single example will suffice, which Apion reports as having witnessed himself. One day, he says, when the people in Rome were being given the pleasure of a fight among many strange beasts, chiefly lions of unusual size, there was one among them which, by its furious bearing, by the strength and size of its limbs, and by a proud and terrifying roar, drew the eyes of the whole audience. Among the other slaves brought before the people in this fight with the beasts was one Androdus, from Dacia, who belonged to a Roman lord of consular rank.

    Apion, Greek grammarian of the 1st century AD; the story, told by Aulus Gellius, is that of the slave usually called Androclus or Androcles.

    Ce lyon l’ayant apperceu de loing, s’arresta premierement tout court, comme estant entré en admiration, et puis s’approcha tout doucement d’vne façon molle et paisible, comme pour entrer en recognoissance auec luy. Cela faict, et s’estant asseuré de ce qu’il cherchoit, il commença à battre de la queuë à la mode des chiens qui flattent leur maistre, et à baiser, et lescher les mains et les cuisses de ce pauure miserable, tout transi d’effroy et hors de soy. Androdus ayant repris ses esprits par la benignité de ce lyon, et r’asseuré sa veuë pour le considerer et recognoistre: c’estoit vn singulier plaisir de voir les caresses, et les festes qu’ils s’entrefaisoient l’vn à l’autre.

    This lion, seeing him from afar, first stopped short as if struck with wonder, and then came up very gently, in a soft and peaceful way, as if to recognize him. That done, and having made sure of what it was looking for, it began to wag its tail like dogs fawning on their master, and to kiss and lick the hands and thighs of this poor wretch, who was frozen with fright and beside himself. Androdus recovered his wits thanks to the lion’s gentleness, and steadied his gaze enough to look at it and recognize it; and it was a singular pleasure to see the caresses and the welcome they gave each other.

    Dequoy le peuple avant esleué des cris de ioye, l’Empereur fit appeller cet esclaue, pour entendre de luy le moyen d’vn si estrange euenement. Il luy recita vne histoire nouuelle et admirable. Mon maistre, dict-il, estant proconsul en Aphrique, ie fus contrainct par la cruauté et rigueur qu’il me tenoit, me faisant iournellement battre, me desrober de luy, et m’en fuir. Et pour me cacher seurement d’vn personnage ayant si grande authorité en la prouince, ie trouuay mon plus court, de gaigner les solitudes et les contrees sablonneuses et inhabitables de ce pays là, resolu, si le moyen de me nourrir venoit à me faillir, de trouuer quelque façon de me tuer moy-mesme.

    When the people raised cries of joy at this, the Emperor had the slave called, to learn from him how so strange an event had come about. He told him a new and wonderful story. When my master was proconsul in Africa, he said, I was forced by the cruelty and harshness with which he treated me, having me beaten every day, to steal away from him and flee. And to hide myself safely from a personage of such great authority in the province, I found it quickest to make for the solitudes and the sandy, uninhabitable regions of that country, resolved, if the means of feeding myself should fail me, to find some way of killing myself.

    Le soleil estant extremement aspre sur le midy, et les chaleurs insupportables, ie m’embatis sur vne cauerne cachee et inaccessible, et me iettay dedans. Bien tost apres y suruint ce lyon, ayant vne patte sanglante et blessee, tout plaintif et gemissant des douleurs qu’il y souffroit: à son arriuee i’eu beaucoup de frayeur, mais luy me voyant mussé dans vn coing de sa loge, s’approcha tout doucement de moy, me presentant sa patte offencee, et me la montrant comme pour demander secours: ie luy ostay lors vn grand escot qu’il y auoit, et m’estant vn peu appriuoisé à luy, pressant sa playe en fis sortir l’ordure qui s’y amassoit, l’essuyay, et nettoyay le plus proprement que ie peux.

    The sun being extremely fierce around noon and the heat unbearable, I came upon a hidden, inaccessible cave and threw myself into it. Soon afterwards this lion arrived, with a bloody, wounded paw, all plaintive and moaning from the pain it was suffering. At its arrival I was very frightened; but seeing me hiding in a corner of its den, it came up to me very gently, holding out its injured paw and showing it to me as if asking for help. I then pulled out a large splinter that was in it, and having grown a little used to the lion, I pressed the wound and squeezed out the matter that had collected in it, wiped it, and cleaned it as neatly as I could.

    Luy se sentant allegé de son mal, et soulagé de cette douleur, se prit à reposer, et à dormir, ayant tousiours sa patte entre mes mains. De là en hors luy et moy vesquismes ensemble en cette cauerne trois ans entiers de mesmes viandes: car des bestes qu’il tuoit à sa chasse, il m’en apportoit les meilleurs endroits, que ie faisois cuire au soleil à faute de feu, et m’en nourrissois.

    Feeling relieved of its trouble and eased of that pain, it lay down to rest and sleep, with its paw still in my hands. From then on, the lion and I lived together in that cave for three whole years on the same food; for of the beasts it killed in its hunting it brought me the best parts, which I cooked in the sun for lack of fire, and I lived on them.

    A la longue, m’estant ennuyé de cette vie brutale et sauuage, comme ce lyon estoit allé vn iour à sa queste accoustumee, ie partis de là, et à ma troisiesme iournee fus surpris par les soldats, qui me menerent d’Affrique en cette ville à mon maistre, lequel soudain me condamna à mort, et à estre abandonné aux bestes. Or à ce que ie voy ce lyon fut aussi pris bien tost apres, qui m’a à cette heure voulu recompenser du bien-fait et guerison qu’il auoit reçeu de moy. Voyla l’histoire qu’Androdus recita à l’Empereur, laquelle il fit aussi entendre de main à main au peuple.

    In the end, having grown weary of this brutish and wild life, one day when the lion had gone off on its usual hunt, I left; and on my third day’s march I was caught by soldiers, who brought me from Africa to this city, to my master, who at once condemned me to death and to be thrown to the beasts. Now, as far as I can see, this lion was also caught soon afterwards, and has now wished to repay me for the kindness and the cure it had received from me. That is the story Androdus told the Emperor, which he also had passed along from hand to hand to the people.

    Parquoy à la requeste de tous il fut mis en liberté, et absous de cette condamnation, et par ordonnance du peuple luy fut faict present de ce lyon. Nous voyions depuis, dit Appion, Androdus conduisant ce lyon à tout vne petite laisse, se promenant par les tauernes à Rome, receuoir l’argent qu’on luy donnoit: le lyon se laisser couurir des fleurs qu’on luy iettoit, et chacun dire en les rencontrant: Voyla le lyon hoste de l’homme, voyla l’homme medecin du lyon.

    So at everyone’s request he was set free and absolved of his sentence, and by order of the people the lion was given to him as a present. Afterwards, says Apion, we saw Androdus leading this lion on a little leash, going round the taverns in Rome and receiving the money people gave him, the lion letting itself be covered with the flowers they threw at it, and everyone saying when they met them: “There is the lion, the man’s host; there is the man, the lion’s physician.”

    Nous pleurons souuent la perte des bestes que nous aymons, aussi font elles la nostre. Pòst, bellator equus, positis insignibus, Æthon / It lacrymans, guttisque humectat grandibus ora.

    We often weep for the loss of the beasts we love; so do they for ours. Then came his warhorse Aethon, his trappings laid aside, / walking in tears, and wetting his face with great drops.

    Comme aucunes de nos nations ont les femmes en commun, aucunes à chacun la sienne: cela ne se voit-il pas aussi entre les bestes, et des mariages mieux gardez que les nostres?

    Just as some of our nations hold their women in common, and in others each man has his own, is this not also seen among beasts—and marriages better kept than ours?

    Quant à la societé et confederation qu’elles dressent entre elles pour se liguer ensemble, et s’entresecourir, il se voit des bœufs, des porceaux, et autres animaux, qu’au cry de celuy que vous offencez, toute la trouppe accourt à son aide, et se ralie pour sa deffence. L’escare, quand il a aualé l’ameçon du pescheur, ses compagnons s’assemblent en foule autour de luy, et rongent la ligne: et si d’auenture il y en a vn, qui ait donné dedans la nasse, les autres luy baillent la queuë par dehors, et luy la serre tant qu’il peut à belles dents: ils le tirent ainsin au dehors et l’entrainent.

    As for the society and confederation they form among themselves, to league together and help one another, we see oxen, pigs and other animals where, at the cry of the one you are hurting, the whole herd runs to its aid and rallies to defend it. When the parrot fish has swallowed the fisherman’s hook, its companions gather in a crowd around it and gnaw through the line; and if by chance one of them has got into the trap, the others hold out their tails to it from outside, and it grips them with its teeth as hard as it can: in this way they pull it out and drag it away.

    Les barbiers, quand l’vn de leurs compagnons est engagé, mettent la ligne contre leur dos, dressant vne espine qu’ils ont dentelee comme vne scie, à tout laquelle ils la scient et coupent.

    The fish called barbers, when one of their companions is caught, set the line against their back, raising a spine they have, toothed like a saw, with which they saw through it and cut it.

    Quant aux particuliers offices, que nous tirons l’vn de l’autre, pour le seruice de la vie, il s’en void plusieurs pareils exemples parmy elles. Ils tiennent que la balaine ne marche iamais qu’elle n’ait au deuant d’elle vn petit poisson semblable au goujon de mer, qui s’appelle pour cela la guide: la baleine le suit, se laissant mener et tourner aussi facilement, que le timon fait retourner la nauire: et en recompense aussi, au lieu que toute autre chose, soit beste ou vaisseau, qui entre dans l’horrible chaos de la bouche de ce monstre, est incontinent perdu et englouty, ce petit poisson s’y retire en toute seureté, et y dort, et pendant son sommeil la baleine ne bouge: mais aussi tost qu’il sort, elle se met à le suyure sans cesse: et si de fortune elle l’escarte, elle va errant çà et là, et souuent se froissant contre les rochers, comme vn vaisseau qui n’a point de gouuernail.

    As for the particular services we get from one another for the needs of life, many similar examples are seen among them. They hold that the whale never moves without having in front of it a little fish like the sea gudgeon, which for that reason is called the guide. The whale follows it, letting itself be led and turned as easily as the rudder turns the ship. And in return, whereas everything else, beast or vessel, that enters the horrible chaos of this monster’s mouth is at once lost and swallowed up, this little fish takes refuge there in complete safety and sleeps there; and while it sleeps the whale does not stir. But as soon as it comes out, the whale starts following it without stopping; and if by chance it loses it, it wanders here and there, often crashing against the rocks, like a ship without a rudder.

    Ce que Plutarque tesmoigne auoir veu en l’isle d’Anticyre. Il y a vne pareille societé entre le petit oyseau qu’on nomme le roytelet, et le crocodile: le roytelet sert de sentinelle à ce grand animal: et si l’ichneumon son ennemy s’approche pour le combattre, ce petit oyseau, de peur qu’il ne le surprenne endormy, va de son chant et à coup de bec l’esueillant, et l’aduertissant de son danger.

    Plutarch testifies that he saw this on the island of Anticyra. There is a similar partnership between the little bird called the wren and the crocodile. The wren serves as sentinel to this great animal; and if its enemy the ichneumon approaches to fight it, this little bird, for fear it may catch the crocodile asleep, wakes it with its song and with pecks of its beak, warning it of its danger.

    Il vit des demeurans de ce monstre, qui le reçoit familierement en sa bouche, et luy permet de becqueter dans ses machoueres, et entre ses dents, et y recueillir les morceaux de chair qui y sont demeurez: et s’il veut fermer la bouche, il l’aduertit premierement d’en sortir en la serrant peu à peu sans l’estreindre et l’offencer.

    The bird lives on this monster’s leftovers; the crocodile receives it familiarly into its mouth and lets it peck about in its jaws and between its teeth, gathering the bits of flesh left there. And when it wants to close its mouth, it first warns the bird to come out by closing it little by little, without squeezing or hurting it.

    Cette coquille qu’on nomme la nacre, vit aussi ainsin auec le pinnothere, qui est vn petit animal de la sorte d’vn cancre, luy seruant d’huissier et de portier assis à l’ouuerture de cette coquille, qu’il tient continuellement entrebaaillee et ouuerte, iusques à ce qu’il y voye entrer quelque petit poisson propre à leur prise: car lors il entre dans la nacre, et luy va pinsant la chair viue, et la contraint de fermer sa coquille: lors eux deux ensemble mangent la proye enfermee dans leur fort. En la maniere de viure des tuns, on y remarque vne singuliere science des trois parties de la mathematique.

    The shellfish called the pinna also lives in this way with the pinnotheres, a little creature of the crab kind, which serves it as usher and doorkeeper, sitting at the opening of the shell, which it keeps continually ajar and open until it sees some little fish come in that is fit for their catch. Then it goes into the pinna and pinches its living flesh, forcing it to close its shell; and then the two of them together eat the prey shut up in their fortress. In the way tuna live, one observes a singular knowledge of the three parts of mathematics.

    Quant à l’astrologie, ils l’enseignent à l’homme: car ils s’arrestent au lieu où le solstice d’hyuer les surprend, et n’en bougent iusques à l’equinoxe ensuyuant: voyla pourquoy Aristote mesme leur concede volontiers cette science. Quant à la geometrie et arithmetique, ils font tousiours leur bande de figure cubique, carree en tout sens, et en dressent vn corps de bataillon, solide, clos, et enuironné tout à l’entour, à six faces toutes esgalles: puis nagent en cette ordonnance carree, autant large derriere que deuant, de façon que qui en void et compte vn rang, il peut aisément nombrer toute la trouppe, d’autant que le nombre de la profondeur est esgal à la largeur, et la largeur, à la longueur.

    As for astronomy, they teach it to man: for they stop at the place where the winter solstice overtakes them and do not stir from it until the following equinox. That is why Aristotle himself readily grants them this science. As for geometry and arithmetic, they always form their school in a cubic figure, square in every direction, and make of it a solid battalion, closed and enclosed all around, with six equal faces. Then they swim in this square formation, as wide behind as in front, so that whoever sees and counts one rank can easily number the whole troop, since the number in depth is equal to the breadth, and the breadth to the length.

    Quant à la magnanimité, il est malaisé de luy donner vn visage plus apparent, qu’en ce faict du grand chien, qui fut enuoyé des Indes au Roy Alexandre: on luy presenta premierement vn cerf pour le combattre, et puis vn sanglier, et puis vn ours, il n’en fit compte, et ne daigna se remuer de sa place: mais quand il veid vn lyon, il se dressa incontinent sur ses pieds, montrant manifestement qu’il declaroit celuy-là seul digne d’entrer en combat auecques luy.

    As for magnanimity, it is hard to give it a more evident face than in the case of the great dog sent from the Indies to King Alexander. They first set a stag before it to fight, then a boar, then a bear: it took no notice of them and did not deign to stir from its place. But when it saw a lion, it immediately rose to its feet, showing plainly that it declared that one alone worthy to enter into combat with it.

    Touchant la repentance et recognoissance des fautes, on recite d’vn elephant, lequel ayant tué son gouuerneur par impetuosité de cholere, en print vn dueil si extreme, qu’il ne voulut onques puis manger, et se laissa mourir.

    Concerning repentance and the acknowledgment of faults, they tell of an elephant which, having killed its keeper in a fit of anger, mourned so deeply that it would never eat again, and let itself die.

    Quant à la clemence, on recite d’vn tygre, la plus inhumaine beste de toutes, que luy ayant esté baillé vn cheureau, il souffrit deux iours la faim auant que de le vouloir offencer, et le troisiesme il brisa la cage où il estoit enfermé, pour aller chercher autre pasture, ne se voulant prendre au cheureau, son familier et son hoste.

    As for clemency, they tell of a tiger, the most inhuman beast of all, which, having been given a kid, went hungry for two days rather than harm it, and on the third broke the cage in which it was shut up to go and look for other fodder, not wishing to attack the kid, its familiar and its guest.

    Et quant aux droicts de la familiarité et conuenance, qui se dresse par la conuersation, il nous aduient ordinairement d’appriuoiser des chats, des chiens, et des lieures ensemble.

    And as for the rights of familiarity and fellow-feeling that grow up from living together, we commonly tame cats, dogs and hares together.

    Mais ce que l’experience apprend à ceux qui voyagent par mer, et notamment en la mer de Sicile, de la condition des halcyons, surpasse toute humaine cogitation. De quelle espece d’animaux a iamais Nature tant honoré les couches, la naissance, et l’enfantement? car les poëtes disent bien qu’vne seule isle de Delos, estant au parauant vagante, fut affermie pour le seruice de l’enfantement de Latone: mais Dieu a voulu que toute la mer fust arrestée, affermie et applanie, sans vagues, sans vents et sans pluye, cependant que l’halcyon fait ses petits, qui est iustement enuiron le solstice, le plus court iour de l’an: et par son priuilege nous auons sept iours et sept nuicts, au fin cœur de l’hyuer, que nous pouuons nauiguer sans danger.

    But what experience teaches those who travel by sea, and notably in the Sicilian sea, about the nature of halcyons surpasses all human thought. What species of animal has Nature ever so honored in its lying-in, birth and bringing forth? The poets do say that a single island, Delos, which had drifted until then, was made fast to serve for the delivery of Latona; but God willed that the whole sea should be stilled, made firm and smooth, without waves, without winds and without rain, while the halcyon brings forth its young, which is just about the solstice, the shortest day of the year. And by its privilege we have seven days and seven nights, in the very heart of winter, when we can sail without danger.

    Latona (Leto) gave birth to Apollo and Artemis on Delos; the halcyon’s calm is the origin of “halcyon days.”

    Leurs femelles ne recognoissent autre masle que le leur propre: l’assistent toute leur vie sans iamais l’abandonner: s’il vient à estre debile et cassé, elles le chargent sur leurs espaules, le portent par tout, et le seruent iusques à la mort.

    Their females acknowledge no male but their own; they stay with him all their lives without ever abandoning him; if he grows weak and broken down, they carry him on their shoulders, take him everywhere, and serve him until death.

    Mais aucune suffisance n’a encores peu atteindre à la cognoissance de cette merueilleuse fabrique, dequoy l’halcyon compose le nid pour ses petits, ny en deuiner la matiere.

    But no ability has yet been able to attain knowledge of the marvelous structure from which the halcyon makes the nest for its young, nor to guess its material.

    Plutarque, qui en a veu et manié plusieurs, pense que ce soit des arestes de quelque poisson qu’elle conioinct et lie ensemble, les entrelassant les vnes de long, les autres de trauers, et adioustant des courbes et des arrondissemens, tellement qu’en fin elle en forme vn vaisseau rond prest à voguer: puis quand elle a paracheué de le construire, elle le porte au batement du flot marin, là où la mer le battant tout doucement, luy enseigne à radouber ce qui n’est pas bien lié, et à mieux fortifier aux endroits où elle void que sa structure se desmeut, et se lasche pour les coups de mer: et au contraire ce qui est bien ioinct, le batement de la mer le vous estreinct, et vous le serre de sorte, qu’il ne se peut ny rompre ny dissoudre, ou endommager à coups de pierre, ny de fer, si ce n’est à toute peine.

    Plutarch, who saw and handled several of them, thinks it is made of the bones of some fish, which the bird joins and binds together, interlacing some lengthwise and others crosswise, and adding curves and roundings, so that in the end it forms a round vessel ready to sail. Then, when it has finished building it, it carries it to where the waves break, and there the sea, beating on it very gently, shows it how to mend what is not well bound and how to strengthen the places where it sees the structure shifting and loosening under the blows of the sea. And, on the other hand, whatever is well joined the beating of the sea tightens and presses together so that it cannot be broken or dissolved, or damaged by blows of stone or iron, except with great difficulty.

    Et ce qui plus est à admirer, c’est la proportion et figure de la concauité du dedans: car elle est composée et proportionnée, de maniere qu’elle ne peut receuoir ny admettre autre chose, que l’oiseau qui l’a bastie: car à toute autre chose, elle est impenetrable, close, et fermée, tellement qu’il ny peut rien entrer, non pas l’eau de la mer seulement. Voyla vne description bien claire de ce bastiment et empruntée de bon lieu: toutesfois il me semble qu’elle ne nous esclaircit pas encore suffisamment la difficulté de cette architecture. Or de quelle vanité nous peut-il partir, de loger au dessoubs de nous, et d’interpreter desdaigneusement les effects que nous ne pouuons imiter ny comprendre?

    And what is most to be wondered at is the proportion and shape of the hollow inside. It is made and proportioned in such a way that it can receive or admit nothing but the bird that built it; to anything else it is impenetrable, closed and shut, so that nothing can get in, not even sea water. There is a very clear description of this building, and borrowed from a good source; and yet it seems to me that it still does not sufficiently clear up for us the difficulty of this architecture. Now, from what vanity can it come in us to rank beneath ourselves, and to interpret disdainfully, the works we can neither imitate nor understand?

    Pour suyure encore vn peu plus loing cette equalité et correspondance de nous aux bestes, le priuilege dequoy nostre ame se glorifie, de ramener à sa condition, tout ce qu’elle conçoit, de despouiller de qualitez mortelles, et corporelles, tout ce qui vient à elle, de renger les choses qu’elle estime dignes de son accointance, à desuestir et despouiller leurs conditions corruptibles, et leur faire laisser à part, comme vestemens superflus et viles, l’espesseur, la longueur, la profondeur, le poids, la couleur, l’odeur, l’aspreté, la polisseure, la dureté, la mollesse, et tous accidents sensibles, pour les accommoder à sa condition immortelle et spirituelle: de maniere que Rome et Paris, que i’ay en l’ame, Paris que i’imagine, ie l’imagine et le comprens, sans grandeur et sans lieu, sans pierre, sans plastre, et sans bois: ce mesme priuilege, dis-ie, semble estre bien euidemment aux bestes.

    To pursue this equality and correspondence between us and the beasts a little further: our soul glories in the privilege of bringing everything it conceives back to its own condition; of stripping everything that comes to it of mortal and bodily qualities; of compelling the things it deems worthy of its acquaintance to doff and strip off their corruptible conditions, and to leave aside, like superfluous and vile garments, thickness, length, depth, weight, color, smell, roughness, smoothness, hardness, softness and all sensible accidents, so as to fit them to its own immortal and spiritual condition. So it is that Rome and Paris, which I have in my mind—Paris, which I imagine—I imagine and grasp without size and without place, without stone, without plaster and without wood. This same privilege, I say, seems quite evidently to belong to the beasts.

    Car vn cheual accoustumé aux trompettes, aux harquebusades, et aux combats, que nous voyons tremousser et fremir en dormant, estendu sur sa litiere, comme s’il estoit en la meslée, il est certain qu’il conçoit en son ame vn son de tabourin sans bruict, vne armée sans armes et sans corps. Quippe videbis equos fortes, cùm membra iacebunt / In somnis, sudare tamen, spiraréque sæpe, / Et quasi de palma summas contendere vires. Ce lieure qu’vn leurier imagine en songe, apres lequel nous le voyons haleter en dormant, alonger la queuë, secoüer les iarrets, et representer parfaictement les mouuemens de sa course: c’est vn lieure sans poil et sans os.

    For a horse accustomed to trumpets, to arquebus fire and to battle, which we see quivering and trembling in its sleep, stretched out on its litter as if it were in the fray—it is certain that it conceives in its soul the sound of a drum without noise, an army without weapons and without bodies. Indeed you will see brave horses, when their limbs lie / in sleep, sweat nonetheless, and pant again and again, / and strain their utmost strength as if for the prize. That hare which a greyhound imagines in its dream, after which we see it panting in its sleep, stretching out its tail, jerking its hocks and perfectly reproducing the movements of its run: it is a hare without fur and without bones.

    Venantúmque canes in molli sæpe quiete, / Iactant crura tamen subitò, vocésque repente / Mittunt, et crebras reducunt naribus auras, / Vt vestigia si teneant inuenta ferarum: / Experge factique, sequuntur inania sæpe / Ceruorum simulacra, fugæ quasi dedita cernant; / Donec discussis redeant erroribus ad se. Les chiens de garde, que nous voyons souuent gronder en songeant, et puis iapper tout à faict, et s’esueiller en sursaut, comme s’ils apperceuoient quelque estranger arriuer; cet estranger que leur ame void, c’est vn homme spirituel, et imperceptible, sans dimension, sans couleur, et sans estre: Consueta domi catulorum blanda propago / Degere, sæpe leuem ex oculis volucrémque soporem / Discutere, et corpus de terra corripere instant, / Proinde quasi ignotas facies atque ora tuantur.

    And hunters’ dogs, often in gentle rest, / suddenly toss their legs nonetheless, and all at once let out / cries, and draw in quick breaths through their nostrils, / as if they had found and were holding the tracks of wild beasts; / and once awake, they often chase the empty / images of stags, as if they saw them in flight, / until they shake off their delusions and come back to themselves. The watchdogs that we often see growling in their dreams, and then barking outright and waking with a start, as if they saw some stranger arriving: that stranger whom their soul sees is a spiritual and imperceptible man, without dimension, without color and without being. The fawning brood of puppies, used to living / indoors, often hasten to shake light, fluttering sleep from their eyes / and to spring up from the ground, / as if they beheld unknown faces and features.

    The beauty of bodies

    Ideals of beauty vary everywhere, and many animals are more beautiful than we are.

    Quant à la beauté du corps, auant passer outre, il me faudroit sçauoir si nous sommes d’accord de sa description. Il est vray-semblable que nous ne sçauons guere, que c’est que beauté en nature et en general, puisque à l’humaine et nostre beauté nous donnons tant de formes diuerses, de laquelle, s’il y auoit quelque prescription naturelle, nous la recognoistrions en commun, comme la chaleur du feu. Nous en fantasions les formes à nostre appetit.

    As for bodily beauty, before going further I would need to know whether we agree on how to describe it. It is likely that we hardly know what beauty is in nature and in general, since we give so many different forms to our own human beauty; if there were some natural rule for it, we would all recognize it in common, like the heat of fire. We fancy its forms to suit our appetite.

    Turpis Romano Belgicus ore color. Les Indes la peignent noire et basannée, aux leures grosses et enflées, au nez plat et large: et chargent de gros anneaux d’or le cartilage d’entre les nazeaux, pour le faire pendre iusques à la bouche, comme aussi la balieure, de gros cercles enrichis de pierreries, si qu’elle leur tombe sur le menton, et est leur grace de montrer leurs dents iusques au dessous des racines. Au Peru les plus grandes oreilles sont les plus belles, et les estendent autant qu’ils peuuent par artifice.

    A Belgian complexion is ugly on a Roman face. The Indies paint beauty black and swarthy, with thick, swollen lips and a flat, broad nose; and they load the cartilage between the nostrils with big gold rings to make it hang down to the mouth, and likewise the lower lip with large hoops set with precious stones, so that it falls onto the chin; and it is their idea of grace to show their teeth down below the roots. In Peru the biggest ears are the most beautiful, and they stretch them artificially as far as they can.

    Propertius, Elegies II.18.

    Et vn homme d’auiourdhuy, dit auoir veu en vne nation Orientale, ce soing de les agrandir, en tel credit, et de les charger de poisants ioyaux, qu’à touts coups il passoit son bras vestu au trauers d’vn trou d’oreille. Il est ailleurs des nations, qui noircissent les dents auec grand soing, et ont à mespris de les voir blanches: ailleurs ils les teignent de couleur rouge. Non seulement en Basque les femmes se trouuent plus belles la teste rase: mais assez ailleurs: et qui plus est, en certaines contrées glaciales, comme dit Pline.

    And a man of our own day says he saw in an Eastern nation this care to enlarge them, and to load them with heavy jewels, held in such esteem that he could pass his arm, sleeve and all, through the hole of an ear whenever he liked. Elsewhere there are nations that blacken their teeth with great care and scorn to see them white; elsewhere they dye them red. Not only in the Basque country do women think themselves more beautiful with shaven heads, but in plenty of other places too; and what is more, in certain icy regions, as Pliny says.

    Les Mexicanes content entre les beautez, la petitesse du front, et où elles se font le poil par tout le reste du corps, elles le nourrissent au front, et peuplent par art: et ont en si grande recommandation la grandeur des tetins, qu’elles affectent de pouuoir donner la mammelle à leurs enfans par dessus l’espaule. Nous formerions ainsi la laideur. Les Italiens la façonnent grosse et massiue: les Espagnols vuidée et estrillée: et entre nous, l’vn la fait blanche, l’autre brune: l’vn molle et delicate, l’autre forte et vigoureuse: qui y demande de la mignardise, et de la douceur, qui de la fierté et majesté.

    Mexican women count a small forehead among the beauties; and while they remove the hair everywhere else on their bodies, on the forehead they cultivate it and thicken it by art. And they hold large breasts in such high regard that they make a point of being able to give their children the breast over their shoulder. That is how we would fashion ugliness. The Italians make beauty plump and massive; the Spanish, lean and spare; and among us, one makes it fair, another dark; one soft and delicate, another strong and vigorous; one asks for daintiness and sweetness in it, another for pride and majesty.

    Tout ainsi que la preferance en beauté, que Platon attribue à la figure spherique, les Epicuriens la donnent à la pyramidale plustost, ou carrée: et ne peuuent aualer vn Dieu en forme de boule.

    In just the same way, the preference in beauty that Plato gives to the spherical figure the Epicureans give rather to the pyramid, or the square; and they cannot swallow a god in the shape of a ball.

    Mais quoy qu’il en soit, Nature ne nous a non plus priuilegiez en cela qu’au demeurant, sur ses loix communes. Et si nous nous iugeons bien, nous trouuerons que s’il est quelques animaux moins fauorisez en cela que nous, il y en a d’autres, et en grand nombre, qui le sont plus. A multis animalibus decore vincimur: voyre des terrestres nos compatriotes. Car quant aux marins, laissant la figure, qui ne peut tomber en proportion, tant elle est autre: en couleur, netteté, polissure, disposition, nous leur cedons assez: et non moins, en toutes qualitez, aux aërées.

    But however that may be, Nature has no more privileged us in this than in the rest, above her common laws. And if we judge ourselves rightly, we will find that if there are some animals less favored than we are in this respect, there are others, and many of them, that are more so. We are surpassed in beauty by many animals: indeed even by the land animals, our compatriots. For as for the creatures of the sea, leaving aside shape, which is so different that no comparison is possible, in color, clearness, smoothness and arrangement we yield to them a good deal; and no less, in all qualities, to the creatures of the air.

    Seneca, Letters 124.

    Et cette prerogatiue que les poëtes font valoir de nostre stature droicte, regardant vers le ciel son origine, Pronáque cùm spectent animalia cætera terram, / Os homini sublime dedit, cœlúmque videre / Iussit, et erectos ad sydera tollere vultus. elle est vrayement poëtique: car il y a plusieurs bestioles, qui ont la veuë renuersée tout à faict vers le ciel: et l’encoleure des chameaux, et des austruches, ie la trouue encore plus releuée et droite que la nostre. Quels animaux n’ont la face au haut, et ne l’ont deuant, et ne regardent vis à vis, comme nous: et ne descouurent en leur iuste posture autant du ciel et de la terre que l’homme?

    And that prerogative the poets make so much of, our upright stature, looking toward heaven, its origin: And while the other animals stoop and look at the earth, / to man he gave an uplifted face, and bade him look at the sky / and raise his eyes erect toward the stars. it is truly poetic. For there are many little creatures whose gaze is turned entirely toward the sky; and the necks of camels and ostriches I find even higher and more upright than ours. What animals do not have their face on top and in front, and look straight ahead as we do, and do not take in, in their natural posture, as much of sky and earth as man?

    Et quelles qualitez de nostre corporelle constitution en Platon et en Cicero ne peuuent seruir à mille sortes de bestes? Celles qui nous retirent le plus, ce sont les plus laides, et les plus abiectes de toute la bande: car pour l’apparence exterieure et forme du visage, ce sont les magots: Simia quàm similis, turpissima bestia, nobis! pour le dedans et parties vitales, c’est le pourceau.

    And what qualities of our bodily constitution, as described in Plato and in Cicero, cannot apply to a thousand kinds of beasts? Those that resemble us most are the ugliest and most abject of the whole crew: for outward appearance and the shape of the face, it is the apes, How like us is the ape, the ugliest of beasts! for the inside and the vital organs, it is the pig.

    A line of Ennius quoted by Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.

    Certes quand i’imagine l’homme tout nud (ouy en ce sexe qui semble auoir plus de part à la beauté) ses tares, sa subiection naturelle, et ses imperfections, ie trouue que nous auons eu plus de raison que nul autre animal, de nous couurir. Nous auons esté excusables d’emprunter ceux que Nature auoit fauorisé en cela plus que nous, pour nous parer de leur beauté, et nous cacher soubs leur despouille, de laine, plume, poil, soye. Remerquons au demeurant, que nous sommes le seul animal, duquel le defaut offence nos propres compagnons, et seuls qui auons à nous desrober en nos actions naturelles, de nostre espece.

    Indeed, when I picture man stark naked (yes, even in the sex that seems to have the larger share of beauty), with his blemishes, his natural subjection and his imperfections, I find that we have had more reason than any other animal to cover ourselves. We could be excused for borrowing from the creatures Nature had favored more than us in this respect, to deck ourselves out in their beauty and hide under their spoils: wool, feathers, fur, silk. Let us note, moreover, that we are the only animal whose defects offend our own companions, and the only ones who must hide from our own species in our natural actions.

    Vrayement c’est aussi vn effect digne de consideration, que les maistres du mestier ordonnent pour remede aux passions amoureuses, l’entiere veuë et libre du corps qu’on recherche: que pour refroidir l’amitié, il ne faille que voir librement ce qu’on ayme. Ille quòd obscœnas in aperto corpore partes / Viderat, in cursu qui fuit, hæsit amor. Et encore que cette recepte puisse à l’auenture partir d’vne humeur vn peu delicate et refroidie: si est-ce vn merueilleux signe de nostre defaillance, que l’vsage et la cognoissance nous dégoute les vns des autres. Ce n’est pas tant pudeur, qu’art et prudence, qui rend nos dames si circonspectes, à nous refuser l’entrée de leurs cabinets, auant qu’elles soyent peintes et parées pour la montre publique.

    Truly, it is also a fact worth considering that the masters of the craft prescribe, as a remedy for the passions of love, a full and free sight of the body one desires: to cool one’s affection, one need only look freely at what one loves. That man, because he had seen the obscene parts of the body laid bare, / found his love, which had been in full course, stopped short. And although this prescription may perhaps come from a somewhat fastidious and chilly temperament, it is still a remarkable sign of our deficiency that familiarity and acquaintance make us disgusted with one another. It is not so much modesty as skill and prudence that makes our ladies so careful to refuse us entry to their private rooms before they are painted and dressed for public display.

    Ovid, Remedies of Love.

    Nec veneres nostras hoc fallit, quò magis ipsæ / Omnia summopere hos vitæ postscenia celant, / Quos retinere volunt adstrictóque esse in amore. Là où en plusieurs animaux, il n’est rien d’eux que nous n’aimions, et qui ne plaise à nos sens: de façon que de leurs excremens mesmes et de leur descharge, nous tirons non seulement de la friandise au manger, mais nos plus riches ornemens et parfums. Ce discours ne touche que nostre commun ordre, et n’est pas si sacrilege d’y vouloir comprendre ces diuines, supernaturelles et extraordinaires beautez, qu’on voit par fois reluire entre nous, comme des astres soubs vn voile corporel et terrestre.

    Nor are our Venuses unaware of this; all the more do they / take the utmost pains to hide this whole backstage of life / from those they wish to keep bound fast in love. Whereas in many animals there is nothing that we do not love and that does not please our senses. From their very excrements and discharges we draw not only delicacies to eat but our richest ornaments and perfumes. This reasoning concerns only the common run of us. I am not so sacrilegious as to try to include those divine, supernatural and extraordinary beauties that we sometimes see shining among us, like stars under a bodily and earthly veil.

    Au demeurant la part mesme que nous faisons aux animaux, des faueurs de Nature, par nostre confession, elle leur est bien auantageuse. Nous nous attribuons des biens imaginaires et fantastiques, des biens futurs et absens, desquels l’humaine capacité ne se peut d’elle mesme respondre: ou des biens que nous nous attribuons faucement, par la licence de nostre opinion, comme la raison, la science et l’honneur: et à eux, nous laissons en partage des biens essentiels, maniables et palpables, la paix, le repos, la securité, l’innocence et la santé: la santé, dis-ie, le plus beau et le plus riche present, que Nature nous sçache faire.

    For the rest, the very share of Nature’s favors that we allot to the animals is, by our own admission, very much to their advantage. We attribute to ourselves imaginary and fanciful goods, future and absent goods, for which human capacity cannot of itself answer. Or we falsely attribute to ourselves goods through the license of our opinion, such as reason, knowledge and honor. And to them we leave as their share essential, tangible and palpable goods: peace, rest, security, innocence and health—health, I say, the finest and richest gift that Nature can give us.

    De façon que la Philosophie, voire la Stoïque, ose bien dire qu’Heraclitus et Pherecydes, s’ils eussent peu eschanger leur sagesse auecques la santé, et se deliurer par ce marché, l’vn de l’hydropisie, l’autre de la maladie pediculaire qui le pressoit, ils eussent bien faict. Par où ils donnent encore plus grand prix à la sagesse, la comparant et contrepoisant à la santé, qu’ils ne font en cette autre proposition, qui est aussi des leurs. Ils disent que si Circé eust presenté à Vlysses deux breuuages, l’vn pour faire deuenir vn homme de fol sage, l’autre de sage fol, qu’Vlysses eust deu plustost accepter celuy de la folie, que de consentir que Circé eust changé sa figure humaine en celle d’vne beste.

    So much so that Philosophy, even the Stoic kind, dares to say this of Heraclitus and Pherecydes: if they could have exchanged their wisdom for health, and by that bargain rid themselves, the one of dropsy, the other of the lice disease that afflicted him, they would have done well. In this they set an even higher value on wisdom, by comparing it and weighing it against health, than they do in another proposition that is also theirs. They say that if Circe had offered Ulysses two potions, one to make a man wise instead of foolish, the other foolish instead of wise, Ulysses ought rather to have accepted the potion of folly than consent to Circe’s changing his human shape into that of a beast.

    Et disent que la sagesse mesme eust parlé à luy en cette maniere: Quitte moy, laisse moy là, plustost que de me loger sous la figure et corps d’un asne. Comment? cette grande et diuine sapience, les philosophes la quittent donc, pour ce voile corporel et terrestre? Ce n’est donc plus par la raison, par le discours, et par l’ame, que nous excellons sur les bestes: c’est par nostre beauté, nostre beau teint, et nostre belle disposition de membres, pour laquelle il nous faut mettre nostre intelligence, nostre prudence, et tout le reste à l’abandon. Or i’accepte cette naïfue et franche confession. Certes ils ont cogneu que ces parties là, dequoy nous faisons tant de feste, que ce n’est vaine fantasie.

    And they say that wisdom herself would have spoken to him thus: “Leave me, let me go, rather than lodge me in the shape and body of an ass.” What? So the philosophers abandon this great and divine wisdom for the sake of this bodily and earthly veil? Then it is no longer by reason, by reasoning and by the soul that we excel the beasts. It is by our beauty, our fair complexion and the fine arrangement of our limbs, for which we must throw away our intelligence, our prudence and all the rest. Well, I accept this natural and frank confession. Surely they recognized that those qualities we make such a fuss about are nothing but empty fancy.

    Quand les bestes auroient donc toute la vertu, la science, la sagesse et suffisance Stoique, ce seroyent tousiours des bestes: ny ne seroyent comparables à vn homme miserable, meschant et insensé. Car en fin tout ce qui n’est comme nous sommes, n’est rien qui vaille. Et Dieu pour se faire valoir, il faut qu’il y retire, comme nous dirons tantost. Par où il appert que ce n’est par vray discours, mais par vne fierté folle et opiniastreté, que nous nous preferons aux autres animaux, et nous sequestrons de leur condition et societé.

    So even if the beasts had all the virtue, knowledge, wisdom and competence of the Stoics, they would still be beasts, and could not be compared with a wretched, wicked and senseless man. For in the end, whatever is not as we are is worth nothing. And God himself, to be esteemed, must resemble us, as we shall say presently. From which it is plain that it is not by true reasoning but by a foolish pride and obstinacy that we prefer ourselves to the other animals and set ourselves apart from their condition and company.

    What reason costs us

    Our share is passions, anxieties and vices, and learning eases none of them.

    Mais pour reuenir à mon propos, nous auons pour nostre part, l’inconstance, l’irresolution, l’incertitude, le deuil, la superstition, la solicitude des choses à venir, voire apres nostre vie, l’ambition, l’auarice, la ialousie, l’enuie, les appetits desreglez, forcenez et indomptables, la guerre, la mensonge, la desloyauté, la detraction, et la curiosité. Certes nous auons estrangement surpayé ce beau discours, dequoy nous nous glorifions, et cette capacité de iuger et cognoistre, si nous l’auons achetée au prix de ce nombre infiny des passions, ausquelles nous sommes incessamment en prinse.

    But to return to my subject: we have for our share inconstancy, irresolution, uncertainty, grief, superstition, anxiety about things to come, even after our life, ambition, avarice, jealousy, envy, unruly, frenzied and untamable appetites, war, lying, disloyalty, slander and curiosity. Truly, we have paid a strangely excessive price for this fine reasoning we glory in, and this capacity to judge and know, if we have bought it at the cost of this infinite number of passions that constantly have us in their grip.

    S’il ne nous plaist de faire encore valoir, comme fait bien Socrates, cette notable prerogatiue sur les bestes, que où Nature leur a prescript certaines saisons et limites à la volupté Venerienne, elle nous en a lasché la bride à toutes heures et occasions. Vt vinum ægrotis, quia prodest rarò, nocet sæpissime, melius est non adhibere omnino, quàm, spe dubiæ salutis, in apertam perniciem incurrere: Sic, haud scio, an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, solertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sint multis, admodum paucis salutaria, non dari omnino, quàm tam munificè et tam largè dari. De quel fruit pouuons nous estimer auoir esté à Varro et Aristote, cette intelligence de tant de choses? Les a elle exemptez des incommoditez humaines?

    Unless we also choose to make much, as Socrates indeed does, of this notable prerogative over the beasts: whereas Nature has prescribed certain seasons and limits for them in the pleasures of Venus, she has given us free rein at all hours and on all occasions. As with wine for the sick: since it seldom helps and very often harms, it is better not to give it at all than, in the hope of a doubtful recovery, to run into certain ruin. So I do not know whether it would not have been better for the human race that this swift movement of thought, this sharpness, this ingenuity that we call reason, should not have been given at all, since it is pernicious to many and wholesome to very few, rather than given so bountifully and so lavishly. What fruit can we suppose that their understanding of so many things brought Varro and Aristotle? Did it exempt them from human troubles?

    Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods.

    ont-ils esté deschargez des accidents qui pressent vn crocheteur? ont ils tiré de la logique quelque consolation à la goute? pour auoir sçeu comme cette humeur se loge aux iointures, l’en ont ils moins sentie? sont ils entrez en composition de la mort, pour sçauoir qu’aucunes nations s’en resiouissent: et du cocuage, pour sçauoir les femmes estre communes en quelque region? Au rebours, ayans tenu le premier rang en sçauoir, l’vn entre les Romains, l’autre, entre les Grecs, et en la saison où la science fleurissoit le plus, nous n’auons pas pourtant appris qu’ils ayent eu aucune particuliere excellence en leur vie: voire le Grec a assez affaire à se descharger d’aucunes tasches notables en la sienne.

    Were they relieved of the mishaps that weigh on a porter? Did they draw from logic any consolation for the gout? For knowing how that humor lodges in the joints, did they feel it any less? Did they come to terms with death because they knew that some nations rejoice in it, or with cuckoldry because they knew that in some region wives are held in common? On the contrary: the one held first rank in learning among the Romans, the other among the Greeks, and at the time when learning flourished most. Yet we have not heard that they had any particular excellence in their lives; indeed the Greek has his work cut out clearing himself of certain notable stains on his.

    A on trouué que la volupté et la santé soyent plus sauoureuses à celuy qui sçait l’astrologie, et la grammaire: Illiterati num minus nerui rigent? et la honte et pauureté moins importunes? Scilicet et morbis et debilitate carebis, / Et luctum et curam effugies, et tempora vitæ / Longa tibi post hæc facto meliore dabuntur.

    Has anyone found that pleasure and health taste better to the man who knows astrology and grammar? Are the sinews of the unlettered any less stiff? Or that shame and poverty are less troublesome? No doubt you will be free of sickness and frailty, / you will escape grief and care, and a long span of life / will be granted you hereafter under a better fate.

    Horace, Epodes; then Juvenal, Satires.

    I’ay veu en mon temps, cent artisans, cent laboureurs, plus sages et plus heureux que des recteurs de l’vniuersité: et lesquels i’aimerois mieux ressembler. La doctrine, ce m’est aduis, tient rang entre les choses necessaires à la vie, comme la gloire, la noblesse, la dignité, ou pour le plus comme la richesse, et telles autres qualitez qui y seruent voyrement, mais de loing, et plus par fantasie que par nature. Il ne nous faut guere non plus d’offices, de regles, et de loix de viure, en nostre communauté, qu’il en faut aux grues et formis en la leur. Et neantmoins nous voyons qu’elles s’y conduisent tres ordonnément, sans erudition.

    In my time I have seen a hundred craftsmen, a hundred plowmen, wiser and happier than university rectors, and whom I would rather resemble. Learning, in my view, ranks among the things necessary to life in the way that glory, nobility and rank do, or at most wealth, and other such qualities. They do serve life, but from a distance, and more in fancy than by nature. We need hardly more offices, rules and laws of living in our community than cranes and ants need in theirs. And yet we see that they conduct themselves in a very orderly way without any erudition.

    Si l’homme estoit sage, il prendroit le vray prix de chasque chose, selon qu’elle seroit la plus vtile et propre à sa vie. Qui nous contera par nos actions et deportemens, il s’en trouuera plus grand nombre d’excellens entre les ignorans, qu’entre les sçauans; ie dy en toute sorte de vertu. La vieille Rome me semble en auoir bien porté de plus grande valeur, et pour la paix, et pour la guerre, que cette Rome sçauante, qui se ruina soy-mesme. Quand le demeurant seroit tout pareil, aumoins la preud’hommie et l’innocence demeureroient du costé de l’ancienne: car elle loge singulierement bien auec la simplicité. Mais ie laisse ce discours, qui me tireroit plus loing, que ie ne voudrois suyure.

    If man were wise, he would set the true value on each thing according to how useful and suited it was to his life. If we are counted by our actions and conduct, a greater number of excellent men will be found among the ignorant than among the learned—I mean in every kind of virtue. Old Rome seems to me to have produced men of far greater worth, both for peace and for war, than that learned Rome which ruined itself. Even if all the rest were equal, at least integrity and innocence would remain on the side of the old Rome, for integrity dwells singularly well with simplicity. But I leave this subject, which would draw me further than I would care to follow.

    I’en diray seulement encore cela, que c’est la seule humilité et submission, qui peut effectuer vn homme de bien. Il ne faut pas laisser au iugement de chacun la cognoissance de son deuoir: il le luy faut prescrire, non pas le laisser choisir à son discours: autrement selon l’imbecillité et varieté infinie de nos raisons et opinions, nous nous forgerions en fin des deuoirs, qui nous mettroient à nous manger les vns les autres, comme dit Epicurus.

    I will say only this further: it is humility and submission alone that can make a good man. We must not leave the knowledge of his duty to each man’s judgment. It must be prescribed to him, not left to the choice of his reasoning. Otherwise, given the weakness and infinite variety of our reasons and opinions, we would end by forging ourselves duties that would set us to eating one another, as Epicurus says.

    La premiere loy, que Dieu donna iamais à l’homme, ce fut vne loy de pure obeyssance: ce fut vn commandement, nud et simple où l’homme n’eust rien à cognoistre et à causer, d’autant que l’obeyr est le propre office d’vne ame raisonnable, recognoissant vn celeste, superieur et bien-facteur. De l’obeyr et ceder naist toute autre vertu, comme du cuider, tout peché. Et au rebours: la premiere tentation qui vint à l’humaine nature de la part du diable, sa premiere poison, s’insinua en nous, par les promesses qu’il nous fit de science et de cognoissance, Eritis sicut dij, scientes bonum et malum. Et les Sereines, pour piper Vlysse en Homere, et l’attirer en leurs dangereux et ruineux laqs, luy offrent en don la science.

    The first law that God ever gave to man was a law of pure obedience. It was a bare and simple commandment, in which man had nothing to understand or to argue about, since obeying is the proper function of a rational soul that recognizes a heavenly superior and benefactor. From obeying and yielding springs every other virtue, as from presumption springs every sin. Conversely, the first temptation that came to human nature from the devil, his first poison, worked its way into us through the promises he made us of knowledge and understanding: You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. And the Sirens, to trick Ulysses in Homer and lure him into their dangerous and ruinous snares, offer him knowledge as a gift.

    Genesis 3:5. In the Odyssey (Book XII) the Sirens promise that whoever listens to them will leave knowing more.

    La peste de l’homme c’est l’opinion de sçauoir. Voyla pourquoy l’ignorance nous est tant recommandée par nostre religion, comme piece propre à la creance et à l’obeyssance. Cauete, ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanes seductiones, secundum elementa mundi. En cecy y a il vne generalle conuenance entre tous les philosophes de toutes sectes, que le souuerain bien consiste en la tranquillité de l’ame et du corps. Mais où la trouuons nous? Ad summum sapiens vno minor est Ioue: diues, / Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum: / Præcipuè sanus, nisi cùm pituita molesta est.

    Man’s plague is the opinion that he knows. That is why our religion so commends ignorance to us, as something suited to belief and obedience. Beware lest any man deceive you through philosophy and vain seductions, according to the elements of the world. On one point there is general agreement among all philosophers of all schools: the sovereign good consists in tranquillity of soul and body. But where do we find it? In short, the wise man is inferior only to Jupiter: rich, / free, honored, handsome, in a word king of kings; / above all healthy—except when he is plagued by phlegm.

    Saint Paul, Colossians 2:8; then Horace, Epistles I.1.

    Il semble à la verité, que Nature, pour la consolation de nostre estat miserable et chetif, ne nous ait donné en partage que la presumption. C’est ce que dit Epictete, que l’homme n’a rien proprement sien, que l’vsage de ses opinions. Nous n’auons que du vent et de la fumée en partage. Les Dieux ont la santé en essence, dit la philosophie, et la maladie en intelligence: l’homme au rebours, possede ses biens par fantasie, les maux en essence. Nous auons eu raison de faire valoir les forces de nostre imagination: car tous nos biens ne sont qu’en songe.

    It seems indeed that Nature, to console us in our wretched and puny state, has given us nothing for our share but presumption. That is what Epictetus says: man has nothing properly his own but the use of his opinions. We have nothing but wind and smoke for our share. The gods have health in essence, says philosophy, and sickness only in understanding. Man, on the contrary, possesses his goods in fancy and his ills in essence. We have been right to make much of the powers of our imagination, for all our goods exist only in dreams.

    Oyez brauer ce pauure et calamiteux animal. Il n’est rien, dit Cicero, si doux que l’occupation des lettres: de ces lettres, dis-ie, par le moyen desquelles l’infinité des choses, l’immense grandeur de Nature, les cieux en ce monde mesme, et les terres, et les mers nous sont descouuertes: ce sont elles qui nous ont appris la religion, la moderation, la grandeur de courage: et qui ont arraché nostre ame des tenebres, pour luy faire voir toutes choses hautes, basses, premieres, dernieres, et moyennes: ce sont elles qui nous fournissent dequoy bien et heureusement viure, et nous guident à passer nostre aage sans desplaisir et sans offence. Cestuy-cy ne semble il pas parler de la condition de Dieu tout-viuant et tout-puissant?

    Listen to this poor, calamitous animal boasting. “Nothing,” says Cicero, “is so sweet as the pursuit of letters—of those letters, I mean, by means of which the infinity of things, the immense grandeur of Nature, the heavens in this very world, and the lands and the seas are revealed to us. It is they that have taught us religion, moderation, greatness of courage. They have snatched our soul from the darkness to let it see all things, high, low, first, last and in between. It is they that furnish us with the means to live well and happily, and guide us to pass our lives without displeasure and without offense.” Does this man not seem to be speaking of the condition of the ever-living and almighty God?

    Et quant à l’effect, mille femmelettes ont vescu au village vne vie plus equable, plus douce, et plus constante, que ne fut la sienne. Deus ille fuit Deus, inclute Memmi, / Qui princeps vitæ rationem inuenit eam, quæ / Nunc appellatur Sapientia, quique per artem / Fluctibus è tantis vitam tantisque tenebris, / In tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locauit. Voyla des paroles tresmagnifiques et belles: mais vn bien leger accident, mit l’entendement de cestuy-cy en pire estat, que celuy du moindre berger: nonobstant ce Dieu precepteur et cette diuine sapience. De mesme impudence est cette promesse du liure de Democritus: Ie m’en vay parler de toutes choses.

    And as for the result, a thousand simple village women have lived a more even, gentler and steadier life than his was. He was a god, a god, illustrious Memmius, / who first discovered that rule of life which / is now called Wisdom, and who by his skill / from such great storms and such great darkness / set life in so calm and so clear a light. Those are very magnificent and fine words. But a very slight accident put the understanding of this man in a worse state than that of the lowliest shepherd, for all his divine teacher and his divine wisdom. Of the same impudence is the promise in Democritus’s book: “I am going to speak of all things.”

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V, praising Epicurus. Tradition held that Lucretius was driven mad by a love potion.

    Et ce sot tiltre qu’Aristote nous preste, de Dieux mortels: et ce iugement de Chrysippus, que Dion estoit aussi vertueux que Dieu. Et mon Seneca recognoist, dit-il, que Dieu luy a donné le viure: mais qu’il a de soy le bien viure. Conformément à cet autre, In virtute verè gloriamur: quod non contingeret, si id donum à Deo non à nobis haberemus. Cecy est aussi de Seneca: Que le sage a la fortitude pareille à Dieu: mais en l’humaine foiblesse, par où il le surmonte. Il n’est rien si ordinaire que de rencontrer des traicts de pareille temerité.

    And that foolish title Aristotle lends us, of “mortal gods”; and that judgment of Chrysippus, that Dion was as virtuous as God. And my Seneca acknowledges, he says, that God gave him life, but that living well he has from himself. In keeping with that other one: We rightly glory in virtue, which would not be the case if we had it as a gift from God and not from ourselves. This too is from Seneca: the wise man has fortitude equal to God’s, but in the midst of human weakness, and in that he surpasses him. There is nothing more common than to come across strokes of similar rashness.

    Il n’y a aucun de nous qui s’offence tant de se voir apparier à Dieu, comme il fait de se voir deprimer au rang des autres animaux: tant nous sommes plus ialoux de nostre interest, que de celuy de nostre createur.

    There is not one of us who is as offended at seeing himself matched with God as he is at seeing himself lowered to the rank of the other animals: so much more jealous are we of our own interest than of our creator’s.

    Mais il faut mettre aux pieds cette sotte vanité, et secouër viuement et hardiment les fondemens ridicules, sur quoy ces fausses opinions se bastissent. Tant qu’il pensera auoir quelque moyen et quelque force de soy, iamais l’homme ne recognoistra ce qu’il doit à son maistre: il fera tousiours de ses œufs poulles, comme on dit: il le faut mettre en chemise. Voyons quelque notable exemple de l’effect de sa philosophie. Possidonius estant pressé d’vne si douloureuse maladie, qu’elle luy faisoit tordre les bras, et grincer les dents, pensoit bien faire la figue à la douleur pour s’escrier contre elle: Tu as beau faire, si ne diray-ie pas que tu sois mal.

    But we must trample this foolish vanity underfoot, and shake boldly and vigorously the ridiculous foundations on which these false opinions are built. As long as he thinks he has some means and some power of his own, man will never recognize what he owes to his master. He will always be counting his eggs as hens, as the saying goes. He must be stripped down to his shirt. Let us look at some notable example of the effect of his philosophy. Posidonius was gripped by an illness so painful that it made him twist his arms and grind his teeth. He thought he was thumbing his nose at the pain by crying out against it: “Do your worst, still I will not say that you are an evil.”

    Il sent mesmes passions que mon laquays, mais il se braue sur ce qu’il contient aumoins sa langue sous les loix de sa secte. Re succumbere non oportebat verbis gloriantem. Archesilas estant malade de la goutte, Carneades qui le vint visiter, s’en retournoit tout fasché: il le rappella, et luy montrant ses pieds et sa poittrine: Il n’est rien venu de là icy, luy dit-il. Cestuy cy a vn peu meilleure grace: car il sent auoir du mal, et en voudroit estre depestré. Mais de ce mal pourtant son cœur n’en est pas abbatu et affoibly. L’autre se tient en sa roideur, plus, ce crains-ie, verbale qu’essentielle. Et Dionysius Heracleotes affligé d’vne cuison vehemente des yeux, fut rangé à quitter ces resolutions Stoïques.

    He feels the same sufferings as my lackey, but he prides himself on at least keeping his tongue within the laws of his school. He who boasted in words ought not to have given way in deeds. When Arcesilaus was ill with gout, Carneades, who had come to visit him, was going away much distressed. Arcesilaus called him back and, pointing to his feet and his chest, said: “Nothing has come from there to here.” This one shows a little better grace, for he feels that he is in pain and would like to be rid of it; yet his heart is not cast down or weakened by that pain. The other holds to his stiffness, which is, I fear, more verbal than real. And Dionysius of Heraclea, afflicted with a violent burning in the eyes, was brought to give up those Stoic resolutions.

    The comforts of ignorance

    Simplicity spares pain better than philosophy, whose remedies end in ignorance and death.

    Mais quand la science feroit par effect ce qu’ils disent, d’émousser et rabattre l’aigreur des infortunes qui nous suyuent, que fait elle, que ce que fait beaucoup plus purement l’ignorance et plus euidemment? Le philosophe Pyrrho courant en mer le hazard d’vne grande tourmente, ne presentoit à ceux qui estoyent auec luy à imiter que la securité d’vn porceau, qui voyageoit auecques eux, regardant cette tempeste sans effroy. La philosophie au bout de ses preceptes nous renuoye aux exemples d’vn athlete et d’vn muletier: ausquels on void ordinairement beaucoup moins de ressentiment de mort, de douleurs, et d’autres inconueniens, et plus de fermeté, que la science n’en fournit onques à aucun, qui n’y fust nay et preparé de soy-mesmes par habitude naturelle.

    But even if learning did in fact do what they say, blunting and dulling the sharpness of the misfortunes that dog us, what does it do but what ignorance does much more purely and more evidently? The philosopher Pyrrho, caught at sea in a great storm, offered those who were with him nothing to imitate but the composure of a pig that was traveling with them, watching the tempest without fear. Philosophy, at the end of its precepts, sends us back to the examples of an athlete and a muleteer. In them we commonly see much less feeling of death, pain and other troubles, and more firmness, than learning ever supplied to anyone who was not born to it and prepared for it of himself by natural disposition.

    Qui fait qu’on incise et taille les tendres membres d’vn enfant et ceux d’vn cheual plus aisément que les nostres, si ce n’est l’ignorance? Combien en a rendu de malades la seule force de l’imagination? Nous en voyons ordinairement se faire saigner, purger, et medeciner pour guerir des maux qu’ils ne sentent qu’en leur discours. Lors que les vrais maux nous faillent, la science nous preste les siens: cette couleur et ce teint vous presagent quelque defluxion caterreuse: cette saison chaude vous menasse d’vne émotion fieureuse: cette coupeure de la ligne vitale de vostre main gauche, vous aduertit de quelque notable et voisine indisposition. Et en fin elle s’en addresse tout detroussément à la santé mesme.

    What makes it easier to cut and carve the tender limbs of a child, or those of a horse, than ours, if not ignorance? How many has the mere power of imagination made ill? We commonly see people having themselves bled, purged and dosed to cure ills they feel only in their reasoning. When real ills fail us, learning lends us its own: this color and this complexion portend some catarrhal discharge; this hot season threatens you with a feverish attack; this break in the life line of your left hand warns you of some notable and imminent illness. And in the end it goes straight for health itself.

    Cette allegresse et vigueur de ieunesse, ne peut arrester en vne assiette, il luy faut desrober du sang et de la force, de peur qu’elle ne se tourne contre vous mesmes. Comparés la vie d’vn homme asseruy à telles imaginations, à celle d’vn laboureur, se laissant aller apres son appetit naturel, mesurant les choses au seul sentiment present, sans science et sans prognostique, qui n’a du mal que lors qu’il l’a: où l’autre a souuent la pierre en l’ame auant qu’il l’ait aux reins: comme s’il n’estoit point assez à temps pour souffrir le mal lors qu’il y sera, il l’anticipe par fantasie, et luy court au deuant.

    This liveliness and vigor of youth cannot stay settled; you must draw off some of its blood and strength, lest it turn against you. Compare the life of a man enslaved to such fancies with that of a plowman. The plowman follows his natural appetite and measures things only by present sensation, without learning and without prognosis; he suffers only when he is ill. The other often has the stone in his soul before he has it in his kidneys. As if it were not soon enough to suffer the illness when it comes, he anticipates it in fancy and runs out to meet it.

    Ce que ie dy de la medecine, se peut tirer par exemple generalement à toute science. De là est venuë cette ancienne opinion des philosophes, qui logeoient le souuerain bien à la recognoissance de la foiblesse de nostre iugement. Mon ignorance me preste autant d’occasion d’esperance que de crainte: et n’ayant autre regle de ma santé, que celle des exemples d’autruy, et des euenemens que ie vois ailleurs en pareille occasion, i’en trouue de toutes sortes: et m’arreste aux comparaisons, qui me sont plus fauorables.

    What I say of medicine can be extended by way of example to every kind of learning. From this came that ancient opinion of the philosophers who placed the sovereign good in recognizing the weakness of our judgment. My ignorance gives me as much reason for hope as for fear. I have no other rule for my health than the examples of others and the outcomes I see elsewhere on similar occasions; I find some of every kind, and fix on the comparisons that are most favorable to me.

    Ie reçois la santé les bras ouuerts, libre, plaine, et entiere: et aiguise mon appetit à la iouïr, d’autant plus qu’elle m’est à present moins ordinaire et plus rare: tant s’en faut que ie trouble son repos et sa douceur, par l’amertume d’vne nouuelle et contrainte forme de viure.

    I welcome health with open arms, free, full and entire, and I sharpen my appetite to enjoy it, all the more because it is now less usual and rarer for me. So far am I from disturbing its rest and sweetness with the bitterness of a new and constrained way of life.

    Les bestes nous montrent assez combien l’agitation de nostre esprit nous apporte de maladies. Ce qu’on nous dit de ceux du Bresil, qu’ils ne mouroyent que de vieillesse, on l’attribue à la serenité et tranquillité de leur air, ie l’attribue plustost à la tranquillité et serenité de leur ame, deschargée de toute passion, pensée et occupation tendue ou desplaisante: comme gents qui passoyent leur vie en vne admirable simplicité et ignorance, sans lettres, sans loy, sans Roy, sans relligion quelconque.

    The beasts show us well enough how many illnesses the agitation of our mind brings us. We are told of the people of Brazil that they died only of old age, and this is attributed to the serenity and calm of their air. I attribute it rather to the calm and serenity of their souls, free of any passion and of any tense or unpleasant thought or occupation, as people who spent their lives in an admirable simplicity and ignorance, without letters, without law, without king, without any religion whatever.

    Et d’où vient ce qu’on trouue par experience, que les plus grossiers et plus lourds sont plus fermes et plus desirables aux executions amoureuses? et que l’amour d’vn muletier se rend souuent plus acceptable, que celle d’vn gallant homme? sinon qu’en cettuy-cy l’agitation de l’ame trouble sa force corporelle, la rompt, et lasse: comme elle lasse aussi et trouble ordinairement soy-mesmes? Qui la desment, qui la iette plus coustumierement à la manie, que sa promptitude, sa pointe, son agilité, et en fin sa force propre? Dequoy se fait la plus subtile folie que de la plus subtile sagesse?

    And how else do we explain what experience shows, that the coarsest and dullest men are firmer and more desirable in the performance of love, and that a muleteer’s love is often more welcome than a gentleman’s? Is it not that in the gentleman the agitation of the soul disturbs his bodily strength, breaks it and wearies it, just as it also commonly wearies and disturbs itself? What unhinges the soul, what more often throws it into madness, than its own quickness, its keenness, its agility, in short its own strength? What is the subtlest folly made of, if not the subtlest wisdom?

    Comme des grandes amitiez naissent des grandes inimitiez, des santez vigoreuses les mortelles maladies: ainsi des rares et vifues agitations de noz ames, les plus excellentes manies, et plus detraquées: il n’y a qu’vn demy tour de cheuille à passer de l’vn à l’autre. Aux actions des hommes insensez, nous voyons combien proprement s’aduient la folie, auec les plus vigoureuses operations de nostre ame. Qui ne sçait combien est imperceptible le voisinage d’entre la folie auec les gaillardes eleuations d’vn esprit libre; et les effects d’vne vertu supreme et extraordinaire? Platon dit les melancholiques plus disciplinables et excellens: aussi n’en est-il point qui ayent tant de propension à la folie. Infinis esprits se treuuent ruinez par leur propre force et soupplesse.

    Just as great enmities are born of great friendships, and mortal illnesses of vigorous health, so from the rare and vivid agitations of our souls come the most remarkable and most deranged manias: it takes only half a turn of the peg to pass from the one to the other. In the actions of madmen we see how neatly folly fits in with the most vigorous operations of our soul. Who does not know how imperceptible is the borderline between folly and the lively flights of a free mind, and the effects of a supreme and extraordinary virtue? Plato says that melancholics are the most teachable and the most excellent; and indeed there are none so prone to madness. Countless minds are found ruined by their own strength and suppleness.

    Quel sault vient de prendre de sa propre agitation et allegresse, l’vn des plus iudicieux, ingenieux et plus formés à l’air de cette antique et pure poësie, qu’autre poëte Italien aye de long temps esté? N’a-t-il pas dequoy sçauoir gré à cette sienne viuacité meurtriere? à cette clarté qui l’a aueuglé? à cette exacte, et tendue apprehension de la raison, qui l’a mis sans raison? à la curieuse et laborieuse queste des sciences, qui l’a conduit à la bestise? à cette rare aptitude aux exercices de l’ame, qui l’a rendu sans exercice et sans ame?

    What a fall, through his own agitation and liveliness, has just been taken by one of the most judicious and ingenious of poets, more deeply formed in the manner of that ancient and pure poetry than any other Italian poet has been for a long time! Has he not good reason to be grateful to that murderous liveliness of his? to that brightness which has blinded him? to that exact and intense grasp of reason which has left him without reason? to that curious and laborious quest for knowledge which has led him to stupidity? to that rare aptitude for the exercises of the mind, which has left him with no exercise and no mind?

    Torquato Tasso, confined as insane in the hospital of Sant’Anna at Ferrara from 1579 to 1586; Montaigne passed through Ferrara in 1580.

    I’eus plus de despit encore que de compassion, de le voir à Ferrare en si piteux estat suruiuant à soy-mesmes, mescognoissant et soy et ses ouurages; lesquels sans son sçeu, et toutesfois à sa veuë, on a mis en lumiere incorrigez et informes.

    I felt even more vexation than pity at seeing him in Ferrara in so pitiful a state, outliving himself, not knowing himself or his works. Without his knowledge and yet before his eyes, they have been published uncorrected and unshaped.

    Voulez vous vn homme sain, le voulez vous reglé, et en ferme et seure posture? affublez le de tenebres d’oisiueté et de pesanteur. Il nous faut abestir pour nous assagir: et nous esblouir, pour nous guider.

    Do you want a man healthy? Do you want him orderly, in a firm and steady posture? Wrap him in the darkness of idleness and dullness. We must be stupefied to be made wise, and blinded to be guided.

    Et si on me dit que la commodité d’auoir l’appetit froid et mousse aux douleurs et aux maux, tire apres soy cette incommodité, de nous rendre aussi par consequent moins aiguz et frians, à la iouyssance des biens et des plaisirs: cela est vray: mais la misere de nostre condition porte, que nous n’auons tant à iouyr qu’à fuir, et que l’extreme volupté ne nous touche pas comme vne legere douleur: Segnius homines bona quàm mala sentiunt: nous ne sentons point l’entiere santé, comme la moindre des maladies: *Pungit / In cute vix summa violatum plagula corpus, / Quando valere nihil quemquam mouet.

    Someone may tell me that the advantage of having a cold and blunted sensibility to pains and ills brings with it a disadvantage: it also makes us, in consequence, less keen and eager in the enjoyment of goods and pleasures. That is true. But the wretchedness of our condition is such that we have less to enjoy than to flee, and the greatest pleasure does not touch us as much as a slight pain. Men feel good things less keenly than bad. We do not feel perfect health as we feel the least of illnesses: *We feel the sting / when the body is hurt by a little wound that barely grazes the skin, / while being well moves no one at all.

    Livy; then Latin verses by Étienne de La Boétie, Montaigne’s friend.

    Hoc iuuat vnum, / Quòd me non torquet latus, aut pes: cætera quisquam / Vix queat aut sanum sese, aut sentire valentem. Nostre bien estre, ce n’est que la priuation d’estre mal. Voyla pourquoy la secte de philosophie, qui a le plus faict valoir la volupté, encore l’a elle rengée à la seule indolence. Le n’auoir point de mal, c’est le plus auoir de bien, que l’homme puisse esperer: comme disoit Ennius. Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali.*

    This alone delights me: / that my side or my foot does not torment me; beyond that, one / could hardly tell oneself to be sound or feel oneself to be well. Our well-being is nothing but the absence of being ill. That is why the school of philosophy that made the most of pleasure still reduced it to mere freedom from pain. To have no pain is to have the most good that man can hope for, as Ennius said: He has good aplenty who has nothing bad.*

    Car ce mesme chatouillement et aiguisement, qui se rencontre en certains plaisirs, et semble nous enleuer au dessus de la santé simple, et de l’indolence; cette volupté actiue, mouuante, et ie ne sçay comment cuisante et mordante, celle là mesme, ne vise qu’à l’indolence, comme à son but. L’appetit qui nous rauit à l’accointance des femmes, il ne cherche qu’à chasser la peine que nous apporte le desir ardent et furieux, et ne demande qu’à l’assouuir, et se loger en repos, et en l’exemption de cette fieure. Ainsi des autres. Ie dy donc, que si la simplesse nous achemine à point n’auoir de mal, elle nous achemine à vn tres-heureux estat selon nostre condition.

    Consider the tickling and sharpening found in certain pleasures, which seems to lift us above simple health and freedom from pain. That active, moving pleasure, somehow burning and biting—even that aims only at freedom from pain as its goal. The appetite that carries us away into intimacy with women seeks only to drive out the torment brought on by ardent and furious desire. It asks only to satisfy it and come to rest, freed from that fever. And so with the others. I say, then, that if simplicity leads us to having no pain, it leads us to a very happy state, given our condition.

    Si ne la faut-il point imaginer si plombée, qu’elle soit du tout sans sentiment. Car Crantor auoit bien raison de combattre l’indolence d’Epicurus, si on la bastissoit si profonde que l’abort mesme et la naissance des maux en fust à dire. Ie ne louë point cette indolence qui n’est ny possible, ny desirable. Ie suis content de n’estre pas malade: mais si ie le suis, ie veux sçauoir que ie le suis, et si on me cauterise ou incise, ie le veux sentir. De vray, qui desracineroit la cognoissance du mal, il extirperoit quand et quand la cognoissance de la volupté, et en fin aneantiroit l’homme.

    Yet we must not imagine it so leaden as to be wholly without feeling. Crantor was quite right to attack Epicurus’s freedom from pain, if it were built so deep that even the approach and onset of ills were missing. I do not praise that freedom from pain which is neither possible nor desirable. I am content not to be ill; but if I am, I want to know that I am, and if I am cauterized or cut, I want to feel it. In truth, whoever rooted out the knowledge of pain would at the same time extirpate the knowledge of pleasure, and in the end annihilate man.

    Istud nihil dolere, non sine magna mercede contingit immanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore. Le mal est à l’homme bien à son tour. Ny la douleur ne luy est tousiours à fuïr, ny la volupté tousiours à suiure.

    This freedom from all pain is not achieved without a great price: inhumanity in the mind, insensibility in the body. Pain, in its turn, is good for man. Neither is pain always to be fled, nor pleasure always to be pursued.

    C’est vn tres-grand auantage pour l’honneur de l’ignorance, que la science mesme nous reiecte entre ses bras, quand elle se trouue empeschée à nous roidir contre la pesanteur des maux: elle est contrainte de venir à cette composition, de nous lascher la bride, et donner congé de nous sauuer en son giron, et nous mettre soubs sa faueur à l’abri des coups et iniures de la Fortune. Car que veut elle dire autre chose, quand elle nous presche de retirer notre pensée des maux qui nous tiennent, et l’entretenir des voluptez perdues; et de nous seruir pour consolation des maux presens, de la souuenance des biens passez, et d’appeller à nostre secours vn contentement esuanouy, pour l’opposer à ce qui nous presse?

    It is a very great point in ignorance’s honor that learning itself throws us back into its arms when it finds itself at a loss to stiffen us against the weight of our ills. Learning is forced to come to this compromise: to give us free rein, to allow us to take refuge in ignorance’s lap and to shelter, under its protection, from the blows and injuries of Fortune. For what else does it mean when it preaches that we should withdraw our thoughts from the ills that grip us and occupy them with lost pleasures? Or that we should use the memory of past goods as consolation for present ills, and call to our aid a vanished contentment to set against what is pressing us?

    Leuationes ægritudinum in auocatione à cogitanda molestia, et reuocatione ad contemplandas voluptates ponit, si ce n’est qu’où la force luy manque, elle veut vser de ruse, et donner vn tour de soupplesse et de iambe, où la vigueur du corps et des bras vient à luy faillir. Car non seulement à vn philosophe, mais simplement à vn homme rassis, quand il sent par effect l’alteration cuisante d’vne fieure chaude, quelle monnoye est-ce, de le payer de la souuenance de la douceur du vin Grec? Ce seroit plustost luy empirer son marché, Che ricordarsi il ben doppia la noia.

    He places the relief of distress in calling the mind away from thinking of its trouble and back to the contemplation of pleasures—unless it is that, where strength fails it, learning wants to use cunning, and to try a nimble trick and a trip of the leg where the vigor of body and arms fails it. Take not just a philosopher but simply a level-headed man, when he actually feels the burning disturbance of a high fever: what sort of coin is it to pay him with the memory of the sweetness of Greek wine? It would rather make his bargain worse: For remembering good doubles the pain.

    Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, on Epicurus.

    De mesme condition est cet autre conseil, que la Philosophie donne; de maintenir en la memoire seulement le bonheur passé, et d’en effacer les desplaisirs que nous auons soufferts; comme si nous auions en nostre pouuoir la science de l’oubly: et conseil duquel nous valons moins encore vn coup. Suauis est laborum præteritorum memoria. Comment? la Philosophie qui me doit mettre les armes à la main, pour combattre la Fortune; qui me doit roidir le courage pour fouller aux pieds toutes les aduersitez humaines, vient elle à cette mollesse, de me faire conniller par ces destours coüards et ridicules? Car la memoire nous represente, non pas ce que nous choisissons, mais ce qui luy plaist.

    Of the same kind is that other counsel Philosophy gives: to keep in memory only past happiness and erase from it the displeasures we have suffered—as if we had the art of forgetting in our power; and a counsel that leaves us worse off yet again. The memory of past toils is sweet. What? Philosophy ought to put weapons in my hand to fight Fortune; it ought to stiffen my courage to trample underfoot all human adversities. Does it sink to such softness as to make me dodge like a rabbit through these cowardly and ridiculous byways? For memory presents to us not what we choose, but what it pleases.

    Voire il n’est rien qui imprime si viuement quelque chose en nostre souuenance, que le desir de l’oublier. C’est vne bonne maniere de donner en garde, et d’empreindre en nostre ame quelque chose, que de la solliciter de la perdre. Et cela est faulx, Est situm in nobis, vt et aduersa quasi perpetua obliuione obruamus, et secunda iucundè et suauiter meminerimus. Et cecy est vray, Memini etiam quæ nolo: obliuisci non possum quæ volo. Et de qui est ce conseil? de celuy, qui se vnus sapientem profiteri sit ausus: Qui genus humanum ingenio superauit, et omnes / Præstrinxit stellas, exortus vti ætherius sol. De vuider et desmunir la memoire, est-ce pas le vray et propre chemin à l’ignorance?

    Indeed, nothing imprints something so vividly on our memory as the desire to forget it. A good way to entrust something to our soul’s keeping and stamp it there is to urge the soul to lose it. And this is false: It is in our power to bury adversity in an almost perpetual oblivion, and to remember prosperity pleasantly and sweetly. And this is true: I remember even what I would rather not; I cannot forget what I would. And whose counsel is this? His who alone dared to proclaim himself wise: Who surpassed the human race in genius, and outshone / all the stars, as the sun risen in the sky. Is not emptying and stripping the memory the true and proper road to ignorance?

    Epicurus, as described by Cicero and by Lucretius.

    Iners malorum remedium ignorantia est. Nous voyons plusieurs pareils preceptes, par lesquels on nous permet d’emprunter du vulgaire des apparences friuoles, où la raison viue et forte ne peut assez: pourueu qu’elles nous seruent de contentement et de consolation. Où ils ne peuuent guérir la playe, ils sont contents de l’endormir et pallier. Ie croy qu’ils ne me nieront pas cecy, que s’ils pouuoyent adiouster de l’ordre, et de la constance, en vn estat de vie, qui se maintinst en plaisir et en tranquillité par quelque foiblesse et maladie de iugement, qu’ils ne l’acceptassent: Potare, et spargere flores / Incipiam, patiárque vel inconsultus haberi. Il se trouueroit plusieurs philosophes de l’aduis de Lycas.

    Ignorance is a sluggish remedy for ills. We see several similar precepts by which we are allowed to borrow frivolous appearances from the common people where lively, strong reason does not suffice, provided they serve us for contentment and consolation. Where they cannot heal the wound, they are content to numb it and dress it over. I believe they will not deny me this: if they could add order and constancy to a state of life kept in pleasure and tranquillity through some weakness and sickness of judgment, they would accept it. I shall begin to drink and scatter flowers, / and even put up with being thought reckless. There would be many philosophers of Lycas’s opinion.

    Seneca, Oedipus; then Horace, Epistles I.5. Horace tells the story that follows in Epistles II.2.

    Cettuy-cy ayant au demeurant ses mœurs bien reglées, viuant doucement et paisiblement en sa famille, ne manquant à nul office de son deuoir envers les siens et estrangers, se conseruant tresbien des choses nuisibles, s’estoit par quelque alteration de sens imprimé en la ceruelle vne resuerie. C’est qu’il pensoit estre perpetuellement aux theatres à y voir des passetemps, des spectacles, et des plus belles comedies du monde. Guery qu’il fut par les medecins, de cette humeur peccante, à peine qu’il ne les mist en procés pour le restablir en la douceur de ces imaginations. *Pol!

    This man was otherwise well-regulated in his ways, living gently and peaceably in his household, failing in no duty toward his own people or toward strangers, and guarding himself very well against harmful things. Yet through some disorder of the senses he had got a delusion fixed in his brain: he thought he was perpetually at the theater watching entertainments, spectacles and the finest comedies in the world. When the doctors had cured him of this morbid humor, he very nearly sued them to be restored to the sweetness of those fancies. *Good heavens!

    me occidistis, amici, / Non seruastis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas, / Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.* D’vne pareille resuerie à celle de Thrasylaus, fils de Pythodorus, qui se faisoit à croire que tous les nauires qui relaschoient du port de Pyrée, et y abordoient, ne trauailloyent que pour son seruice: se resiouyssant de la bonne fortune de leur nauigation, les recueillant auec ioye. Son frere Crito l’ayant faict remettre en son meilleur sens, il regrettoit cette sorte de condition, en laquelle il auoit vescu en liesse, et deschargé de tout desplaisir.

    you have killed me, my friends, / not saved me, he said; you have wrenched my pleasure from me / and taken away by force my mind’s most delightful illusion.* His was a delusion like that of Thrasylaus, son of Pythodorus, who made himself believe that all the ships that put out from the port of Piraeus and came into it were working only for his service. He rejoiced in the good fortune of their voyages and welcomed them with joy. When his brother Crito had him restored to his better senses, he missed that condition in which he had lived in gladness, free of all displeasure.

    C’est ce que dit ce vers ancien Grec, qu’il y a beaucoup de commodité à n’estre pas si aduisé: Εν τω φρονειν γαρ μηδεν, ἡδιστος βιος Et l’Ecclesiaste; En beaucoup de sagesse, beaucoup de desplaisir: et, Qui acquiert science, s’acquiert du trauail et tourment.

    That is what this ancient Greek line says, that there is great advantage in not being so wise: For life is sweetest when one knows nothing. And Ecclesiastes: “In much wisdom is much grief”; and “He who acquires knowledge acquires toil and torment.”

    Sophocles, Ajax; Ecclesiastes 1:18.

    Cela mesme, à quoy la Philosophie consent en general, cette derniere recepte qu’elle ordonne à toute sorte de necessitez, qui est de mettre fin à la vie, que nous ne pouuons supporter: Placet? pare. Non placet? quacumque vis exi. Pungit dolor? vel fodiat sanè? si nudus es, da iugulum: sin tectus armis Vulcanijs, id est fortitudine, resiste: et ce mot des Grecs conuiues qu’ils y appliquent, Aut bibat, aut abeat: qui sonne plus sortablement en la langue d’vn Gascon, qu’en celle de Ciceron, qui change volontiers en V. le B: *Viuere si rectè nescis, decede peritis.

    That very thing to which Philosophy generally consents, the last remedy it prescribes for every kind of necessity, which is to put an end to the life we cannot bear: Does it please you? Bear it. Does it not? Leave by whatever way you like. Does pain sting you? Or even pierce you through? If you are naked, offer your throat; but if you are covered by the arms of Vulcan, that is, by fortitude, resist. And that saying of the Greek drinking companions which they apply to it, Let him drink or let him leave—which sounds more apt on a Gascon’s tongue than on Cicero’s, since a Gascon readily changes B into V: *If you do not know how to live rightly, make way for those who do.

    Gascons confused b and v, so bibat (“let him drink”) could become vivat (“let him live”): “let him live or let him leave.”

    / Lusisti satis, edisti satis, atque bibisti: / Tempus abire tibi est, ne potum largius æquo / Rideat, et pulset lasciua decentius ætas.* qu’est-ce autre chose qu’vne confession de son impuissance; et vn renuoy, non seulement à l’ignorance, pour y estre à couuert, mais à la stupidité mesme, au non sentir, et au non estre?

    / You have played enough, eaten enough and drunk enough: / it is time for you to leave, lest, having drunk more than your share, / you be laughed at and jostled by an age to which wantonness is more becoming.* What is all this but a confession of Philosophy’s impotence, and a referral not only to ignorance, to be sheltered there, but to stupidity itself, to not feeling and to not being?

    Horace, Epistles II.2.

    Democritum postquàm matura vetustas / Admonuit memorem, motus languescere mentis: / Sponte sua letho caput obuius obtulit ipse. C’est ce que disoit Antisthenes, qu’il falloit faire prouision ou de sens pour entendre, ou de licol pour se pendre: et ce que Chrysippus alleguoit sur ce propos du poëte Tyrtæus, De la vertu, ou de mort approcher. Et Crates disoit, que l’amour se guerissoit par la faim, sinon par le temps: et à qui ces deux moyens ne plairoyent, par la hart. Celuy Sextius, duquel Seneque et Plutarque parlent auec si grande recommandation, s’estant ietté, toutes choses laissées, à l’estude de la philosophie, delibera de se precipiter en la mer, voyant le progrez de ses estudes trop tardif et trop long.

    When ripe old age had warned Democritus / that the motions of his mind were growing feeble, / he went of his own accord to meet death and offered it his head. That is what Antisthenes said: one must lay in a supply either of sense to understand or of a halter to hang oneself. And Chrysippus cited on this subject the poet Tyrtaeus: Either to virtue or to death draw near. And Crates said that love was cured by hunger, or else by time, and for those who liked neither of these remedies, by the rope. That Sextius of whom Seneca and Plutarch speak with such high praise had left everything else and thrown himself into the study of philosophy. Seeing the progress of his studies too slow and too long, he resolved to throw himself into the sea.

    Il couroit à la mort, au deffault de la science. Voicy les mots de la loy, sur ce subject: Si d’auenture il suruient quelque grand inconuenient qui ne se puisse remedier, le port est prochain: et se peut-on sauuer à nage, hors du corps, comme hors d’vn esquif qui faict eau: car c’est la crainte de mourir, non pas le desir de viure, qui tient le fol attaché au corps.

    He was running to death for lack of knowledge. Here are the words of the law on this subject: “If by chance some great trouble befalls that cannot be remedied, the harbor is near, and one may save oneself by swimming out of the body as out of a leaking skiff; for it is the fear of dying, not the desire to live, that keeps the fool attached to the body.”

    Comme la vie se rend par la simplicité plus plaisante, elle s’en rend aussi plus innocente et meilleure, comme ie commençois tantost à dire. Les simples, dit S. Paul, et les ignorans, s’esleuent et se saisissent du ciel; et nous, à tout nostre sçauoir, nous plongeons aux abismes infernaux.

    As life becomes pleasanter through simplicity, so it also becomes more innocent and better, as I was beginning to say a while ago. The simple and the ignorant, says Saint Paul, rise up and take hold of heaven; and we, with all our learning, plunge into the abysses of hell.

    The words are in fact Saint Augustine’s (Confessions VIII.8).

    Ie ne m’arreste ny à Valentian, ennemy declaré de la science et des lettres, ny à Licinius, tous deux Empereurs Romains, qui les nommoient le venin et la peste de tout estat politique: ny à Mahumet, qui, comme i’ay entendu, interdict la science à ses hommes: mais l’exemple de ce grand Lycurgus et son authorité doit certes auoir grand poix, et la reuerence de cette diuine police Lacedemonienne, si grande, si admirable, et si long temps fleurissante en vertu et en bon heur, sans aucune institution ny exercice de lettres.

    I do not dwell on Valentinian, a declared enemy of learning and letters, nor on Licinius, both Roman emperors, who called them the poison and plague of every body politic; nor on Muhammad, who, as I have heard, forbade learning to his followers. But the example and authority of the great Lycurgus must certainly carry great weight. So must the reverence due to that divine Spartan government, so great, so admirable, and flourishing so long in virtue and happiness without any teaching or practice of letters.

    Ceux qui reuiennent de ce monde nouueau qui a esté descouuert du temps de nos peres, par les Espagnols, nous peuuent tesmoigner combien ces nations, sans magistrat, et sans loy, viuent plus legitimement et plus reglément que les nostres, où il y a plus d’officiers et de loix, qu’il n’y a d’autres hommes, et qu’il n’y a d’actions. Di cittatorie piene e di libelli, / D’esamine e di carte, di procure / Hanno le mani e il seno, e gran fastelli / Di chiose, di consigli e di letture, / Per cui le facultà de pouerelli / Non sono mai ne le citta sicure, / Hanno dietro e dinanzi e d’ambi i lati, / Notai, procuratori ed aduocati.

    Those who come back from that new world discovered by the Spaniards in our fathers’ time can testify to us how much more lawfully and orderly those nations live, without magistrate and without law, than ours. Here there are more officers and laws than there are other men, and than there are actions. With summonses and with writs, / with examinations and papers and proxies / their hands and bosoms are full, and great bundles / of glosses, counsels and readings, / through which the goods of poor folk / are never safe in the cities; / behind them, before them and on either side they have / notaries, attorneys and advocates.

    Ariosto, Orlando Furioso XIV.

    C’estoit ce que disoit vn Senateur Romain des derniers siecles, que leurs predecesseurs auoyent l’aleine puante à l’ail, et l’estomach musqué de bonne conscience: et qu’au rebours, ceux de son temps ne sentoient au dehors que le parfum, puans au dedans à toute sorte de vices: c’est à dire, comme ie pense, qu’ils auoyent beaucoup de sçauoir et de suffisance, et grand faute de preud’hommie. L’inciuilité, l’ignorance, la simplesse, la rudesse s’accompagnent volontiers de l’innocence: la curiosité, la subtilité, le sçauoir trainent la malice à leur suite: l’humilité, la crainte, l’obéissance, la debonnaireté, qui sont les pieces principales pour la conseruation de la societé humaine, demandent vne ame vuide, docile et presumant peu de soy.

    That is what a Roman senator of the later centuries said: their forebears had breath stinking of garlic and stomachs perfumed with the musk of a good conscience; those of his own time, on the contrary, smelled outwardly only of perfume, while within they stank of every kind of vice. That is to say, I think, that they had much learning and ability and a great lack of integrity. Want of polish, ignorance, simplicity and roughness readily keep company with innocence. Curiosity, subtlety and learning bring malice in their train. Humility, fear, obedience and gentleness, which are the chief elements for preserving human society, require a soul that is empty, docile and presuming little of itself.

    Les Chrestiens ont vne particuliere cognoissance, combien la curiosité est vn mal naturel et originel en l’homme. Le soing de s’augmenter en sagesse et en science, ce fut la premiere ruine du genre humain; c’est la voye, par où il s’est precipité à la damnation eternelle. L’orgueil est sa perte et sa corruption: c’est l’orgueil qui iette l’homme à quartier des voyes communes, qui luy fait embrasser les nouuelletez, et aymer mieux estre chef d’vne trouppe errante, et desuoyée, au sentier de perdition, aymer mieux estre regent et precepteur d’erreur et de mensonge, que d’estre disciple en l’eschole de verité, se laissant mener et conduire par la main d’autruy, à la voye battuë et droicturiere.

    Christians have a special knowledge of how natural and original an evil curiosity is in man. The urge to increase in wisdom and knowledge was the first ruin of the human race; it is the road by which it hurled itself into eternal damnation. Pride is its downfall and corruption. It is pride that drives man off the common roads and makes him embrace novelties. It makes him prefer to be the leader of a wandering band gone astray on the path of perdition, prefer to be master and teacher of error and falsehood, rather than a pupil in the school of truth, letting himself be led and guided by another’s hand along the beaten and righteous road.

    C’est à l’aduanture ce que dit ce mot Grec ancien, que la superstition suit l’orgueil, et luy obeit comme à son pere: ἡ δεισιδαιμονια χαταπερ πατρι τω τυφω πειτεται. O cuider, combien tu nous empesches! Apres que Socrates fut aduerty, que le Dieu de sagesse luy auoit attribué le nom de Sage, il en fut estonné: et se recherchant et secouant par tout, n’y trouuoit aucun fondement à cette diuine sentence. Il en sçauoit de iustes, temperants, vaillants, sçauants comme luy: et plus eloquents, et plus beaux, et plus vtiles au païs.

    That is perhaps what the ancient Greek saying means, that superstition follows pride and obeys it as its father: Superstition obeys pride as a father. O presumption, how you hamper us! When Socrates was told that the god of wisdom had given him the name of Wise, he was stunned. Searching and shaking himself through and through, he could find no ground for this divine pronouncement. He knew men as just, temperate, valiant and learned as he, and more eloquent, handsomer and more useful to the country.

    En fin il se resolut, qu’il n’estoit distingué des autres, et n’estoit sage que par ce qu’il ne se tenoit pas tel: et que son Dieu estimoit bestise singuliere à l’homme, l’opinion de science et de sagesse: et que sa meilleure doctrine estoit la doctrine de l’ignorance, et la simplicité sa meilleure sagesse. La saincte Parole declare miserables ceux d’entre nous, qui s’estiment: Bourbe et cendre, leur dit-elle, qu’as-tu à te glorifier? et ailleurs, Dieu a faict l’homme semblable à l’ombre, de laquelle qui iugera, quand par l’esloignement de la lumiere elle sera esuanouye? Ce n’est rien que de nous.

    At last he concluded that he was distinguished from others, and was wise, only because he did not consider himself so; that his god regarded the opinion of knowledge and wisdom as a singular stupidity in man; and that his best teaching was the teaching of ignorance, and simplicity his best wisdom. Holy Scripture declares wretched those of us who think highly of themselves: “Mire and ashes,” it says to them, “what have you to glory in?” And elsewhere: “God has made man like the shadow”—and who will judge of the shadow when, the light having gone, it has vanished? We are nothing at all.

    Il s’en faut tant que nos forces conçoiuent la haulteur diuine, que des ouurages de nostre createur, ceux-là portent mieux sa marque, et sont mieux siens, que nous entendons le moins. C’est aux Chrestiens vne occasion de croire, que de rencontrer vne chose incroyable. Elle est d’autant plus selon raison, qu’elle est contre l’humaine raison. Si elle estoit selon raison, ce ne seroit plus miracle; et si elle estoit selon quelque exemple, ce ne seroit plus chose singuliere. Melius scitur Deus nesciendo, dit S. Augustin. Et Tacitus, Sanctius est ac reuerentius de actis Deorum credere quàm scire. Et Platon estime qu’il y ayt quelque vice d’impieté à trop curieusement s’enquerir et de Dieu, et du monde, et des causes premieres des choses.

    Our powers are so far from conceiving the divine loftiness that, of our creator’s works, those that bear his mark best and are most his own are the ones we understand least. For Christians, coming upon something incredible is a reason to believe. It is all the more in accordance with reason for being against human reason. If it were in accordance with reason, it would no longer be a miracle; and if it followed some precedent, it would no longer be singular. God is better known by not knowing, says Saint Augustine. And Tacitus: It is holier and more reverent to believe in the deeds of the gods than to know them. And Plato holds that there is some taint of impiety in inquiring too curiously into God, the world and the first causes of things.

    Atque illum quidem parentem huius vniuersitatis inuenire difficile: et, quum iam inueneris, indicare in vulgus, nefas, dit Ciceron. Nous disons bien puissance, verité, iustice: ce sont parolles qui signifient quelque chose de grand: mais cette chose là, nous ne la voyons aucunement, ny ne la conceuons. Nous disons que Dieu craint, que Dieu se courrouce, que Dieu ayme. Immortalia mortali sermone notantes. Ce sont toutes agitations et esmotions, qui ne peuuent loger en Dieu selon nostre forme, ny nous l’imaginer selon la sienne: c’est à Dieu seul de se cognoistre et interpreter ses ouurages: et le fait en nostre langue, improprement, pour s’aualler et descendre à nous, qui sommes à terre couchez.

    To find the father of this universe is difficult; and when you have found him, to reveal him to the multitude is a sin, says Cicero. We do say power, truth, justice: these are words that signify something great; but that thing we do not see at all, nor conceive. We say that God fears, that God grows angry, that God loves. Marking immortal things with mortal words. These are all agitations and emotions that cannot dwell in God in our form, nor can we imagine him in his. It is for God alone to know himself and interpret his works. He does it in our language, improperly, to lower himself and come down to us, who lie prostrate on the ground.

    La prudence comment luy peut elle conuenir, qui est l’eslite entre le bien et le mal: veu que nul mal ne le touche? Quoy la raison et l’intelligence, desquelles nous nous seruons pour par les choses obscures arriuer aux apparentes: veu qu’il n’y a rien d’obscur à Dieu? La iustice, qui distribue à chacun ce qui luy appartient, engendrée pour la société et communauté des hommes, comment est-elle en Dieu? La temperance, comment? qui est la moderation des voluptez corporelles, qui n’ont nulle place en la diuinité. La fortitude à porter la douleur, le labeur, les dangers, luy appartiennent aussi peu: ces trois choses n’ayans nul accés pres de luy. Parquoy Aristote le tient egallement exempt de vertu et de vice.

    How can prudence suit him, prudence being the choice between good and evil, seeing that no evil touches him? What of reason and intelligence, which we use to arrive at what is plain by way of what is obscure, seeing that nothing is obscure to God? Justice, which gives each his due and was born for the society and community of men—how is it in God? And temperance, how? It is the moderation of bodily pleasures, which have no place in the divinity. Fortitude in bearing pain, toil and dangers belongs to him just as little, since those three things have no access to him. That is why Aristotle holds him equally exempt from virtue and from vice.

    Neque gratia neque ira teneri potest, quòd quæ talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia.

    He can be held by neither favor nor anger, for all such things would be marks of weakness.

    Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods.

    La participation que nous auons à la cognoissance de la verité, quelle qu’elle soit, ce n’est point par nos propres forces que nous l’auons acquise. Dieu nous a assez appris cela par les tesmoings, qu’il a choisi du vulgaire, simples et ignorans, pour nous instruire de ses admirables secrets. Nostre foy ce n’est pas nostre acquest, c’est vn pur present de la liberalité d’autruy. Ce n’est pas par discours ou par nostre entendement que nous auons receu nostre religion, c’est par authorité et par commandement estranger. La foiblesse de nostre iugement nous y aide plus que la force, et nostre aueuglement plus que nostre clair-voyance. C’est par l’entremise de nostre ignorance, plus que de nostre science, que nous sommes sçauans de diuin sçauoir.

    Whatever share we have in the knowledge of truth, it is not by our own strength that we have acquired it. God has taught us this plainly enough through the witnesses he chose from among the common people, simple and ignorant men, to instruct us in his wonderful secrets. Our faith is not something we have earned; it is a pure gift from another’s generosity. It is not by reasoning or by our own understanding that we have received our religion; it is by outside authority and command. The weakness of our judgment helps us to it more than its strength, and our blindness more than our clear sight. It is through the agency of our ignorance, more than of our knowledge, that we are learned in divine learning.

    Ce n’est pas merueille, si nos moyens naturels et terrestres ne peuuent conceuoir cette cognoissance supernaturelle et celeste: apportons y seulement du nostre, l’obeissance et la subiection: car comme il est escrit; Ie destruiray la sapience des sages, et abbattray la prudence des prudens. Où est le sage? où est l’escriuain? où est le disputateur de ce siecle? Dieu n’a-il pas abesty la sapience de ce monde? Car puis que le monde n’a point cogneu Dieu par sapience, il luy a pleu par la vanité de la predication, sauuer les croyans.

    It is no wonder if our natural, earthly means cannot grasp that supernatural, heavenly knowledge. Let us bring to it only what is ours: obedience and submission. For, as it is written: “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring down the prudence of the prudent. Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For since the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased him to save those who believe through the foolishness of preaching.”

    Saint Paul, 1 Corinthians 1:19–21, quoting Isaiah 29:14.

    What the philosophers found

    After long inquiry the wisest learned only their own ignorance.

    Si me faut-il voir en fin, s’il est en la puissance de l’homme de trouuer ce qu’il cherche: et si cette queste, qu’il a employé depuis tant de siecles, l’a enrichy de quelque nouuelle force, et de quelque verité solide. Ie croy qu’il me confessera, s’il parle en conscience, que tout l’acquest qu’il a retiré d’vne si longue poursuite, c’est d’auoir appris à recognoistre sa foiblesse. L’ignorance qui estoit naturellement en nous, nous l’auons par longue estude confirmée et auerée.

    Still, I must see at last whether it is in man’s power to find what he is looking for, and whether this quest, on which he has spent so many centuries, has enriched him with some new strength and some solid truth. I think he will admit to me, if he speaks in good conscience, that all the gain he has drawn from so long a pursuit is to have learned to recognize his own weakness. The ignorance that was naturally in us we have, by long study, confirmed and verified.

    Il est aduenu aux gens veritablement sçauans, ce qui aduient aux espics de bled: ils vont s’esleuant et se haussant la teste droite et fiere, tant qu’ils sont vuides; mais quand ils sont pleins et grossis de grain en leur maturité, ils commencent à s’humilier et baisser les cornes. Pareillement les hommes, ayans tout essayé, tout sondé, et n’ayans trouué en cet amas de science et prouision de tant de choses diuerses, rien de massif et de ferme, et rien que vanité, ils ont renoncé à leur presumption, et recogneu leur condition naturelle. C’est ce que Velleius reproche à Cotta, et à Cicero, qu’ils ont appris de Philo, n’auoir rien appris.

    What has happened to the truly learned is what happens to ears of wheat: they keep rising and lifting their heads, straight and proud, as long as they are empty; but when they are full and swollen with grain at their ripeness, they begin to humble themselves and lower their horns. In the same way men, having tried everything and sounded everything, and having found in that heap of knowledge and store of so many different things nothing solid and firm, nothing but vanity, have given up their presumption and recognized their natural condition. That is what Velleius reproaches Cotta and Cicero with: that they had learned from Philo that they had learned nothing.

    Velleius and Cotta are speakers in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods; Philo of Larissa, head of the Academy, was Cicero’s teacher.

    Pherecydes, l’vn des sept sages, escriuant à Thales, comme il expiroit, I’ay, dit-il, ordonné aux miens, apres qu’ils m’auront enterré, de te porter mes escrits. S’ils contentent et toy et les autres sages, publie les: sinon, supprime les. Ils ne contiennent nulle certitude qui me satisface à moy-mesme. Aussi ne fay-ie pas profession de sçauoir la verité, ny d’y atteindre. I’ouure les choses plus que ie ne les descouure. Le plus sage homme qui fut onques, quand on luy demanda ce qu’il sçauoit, respondit, qu’il sçauoit cela, qu’il ne sçauoit rien.

    Pherecydes, one of the seven sages, writing to Thales as he was dying, said: “I have ordered my people, after they have buried me, to bring you my writings. If they satisfy you and the other sages, publish them; if not, suppress them. They contain no certainty that satisfies even me. Nor do I profess to know the truth, or to reach it. I open things up more than I uncover them.” The wisest man who ever lived, when asked what he knew, answered that he knew this much: that he knew nothing.

    Pherecydes of Syros, Greek thinker of the 6th century BC. The wisest man is Socrates.

    Il verifioit ce qu’on dit, que la plus grand part de ce que nous sçauons, est la moindre de celles que nous ignorons: c’est à dire, que ce mesme que nous pensons sçauoir, c’est vne piece, et bien petite, de nostre ignorance.

    He was bearing out the saying that the greatest part of what we know is the least of the parts we do not know; that is to say, the very thing we think we know is a piece, and a very small one, of our ignorance.

    Nous sçauons les choses en songe, dit Platon, et les ignorons en verité. Omnes penè veteres, nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbecilles animos, breuia curricula vitæ. Cicero mesme, qui deuoit au sçauoir tout son vaillant, Valerius dit que, sur sa vieillesse, il commença à desestimer les lettres. Et pendant qu’il les traictoit, c’estoit sans obligation d’aucun party: suiuant ce qui luy sembloit probable, tantost en l’vne secte, tantost en l’autre: se tenant tousiours soubs la dubitation de l’Academie. Dicendum est, sed ita vt nihil affirmem: quæram omnia, dubitans plerumque et mihi diffidens.

    We know things in a dream, says Plato, and are ignorant of them in reality. Almost all the ancients said that nothing can be known, nothing perceived, nothing understood; that the senses are narrow, minds weak, and the course of life short. As for Cicero himself, who owed all his worth to learning, Valerius says that in his old age he began to think little of letters. And while he was engaged with them, it was without allegiance to any party: he followed what seemed probable to him, now in one school, now in another, always keeping within the doubt of the Academy. I must speak, but in such a way as to affirm nothing; I will inquire into everything, mostly doubting and distrusting myself.

    I’auroy trop beau ieu, si ie vouloy considerer l’homme en sa commune façon et en gros: et le pourroy faire pourtant par sa regle propre; qui iuge la verité non par le poids des voix, mais par le nombre. Laissons là le peuple, Qui vigilans stertit, / Mortua cui vita est propè iam viuo atque videnti, qui ne se sent point, qui ne se iuge point, qui laisse la plus part de ses facultez naturelles oisiues. Ie veux prendre l’homme en sa plus haulte assiette.

    I would have too easy a game if I chose to consider man in his ordinary state and in the mass; and yet I could do it by his own rule, which judges truth not by the weight of the votes but by their number. Let us leave aside the people, Who snores while awake, / Whose life is all but dead while he still lives and sees, who does not feel himself, does not judge himself, and leaves most of his natural faculties idle. I want to take man at his highest station.

    Considerons-le en ce petit nombre d’hommes excellens et triez, qui ayants esté douez d’vne belle et particuliere force naturelle, l’ont encore roidie et aiguisée par soin, par estude et par art, et l’ont montée au plus hault poinct de sagesse, où elle puisse atteindre. Ils ont manié leur ame à tout sens, et à tout biais, l’ont appuyée et estançonnée de tout le secours estranger, qui luy a esté propre, et enrichie et ornée de tout ce qu’ils ont peu emprunter pour sa commodité, du dedans et dehors du monde: c’est en eux que loge la haulteur extreme de l’humaine nature. Ils ont reglé le monde de polices et de loix.

    Let us consider him in that small number of excellent, select men who, endowed with a fine and singular natural power, have further stiffened and sharpened it by care, study and skill, and raised it to the highest point of wisdom it can reach. They have handled their minds in every direction and from every angle; they have propped and shored them up with every outside aid that suited them, and enriched and adorned them with all they could borrow for their benefit, from within the world and outside it. It is in them that the utmost height of human nature resides. They have regulated the world with governments and laws.

    Ils l’ont instruit par arts et sciences, et instruit encore par l’exemple de leurs mœurs admirables. Ie ne mettray en compte, que ces gens-là, leur tesmoignage, et leur experience. Voyons iusques où ils sont allez, et à quoy ils se sont tenus. Les maladies et les desfauts que nous trouuerons en ce college-là, le monde les pourra hardiment bien aduouër pour siens.

    They have instructed it with arts and sciences, and instructed it further by the example of their admirable conduct. I shall take into account only these men, their testimony and their experience. Let us see how far they have gone and where they have stopped. Whatever ailments and defects we find in that company, the world may boldly own as its own.

    Three answers: found, unfindable, still seeking

    Dogmatists, Academics and Pyrrhonists; the Pyrrhonists suspend judgment and live by appearances.

    Quiconque cherche quelque chose, il en vient à ce poinct, ou qu’il dit, qu’il l’a trouuée; ou qu’elle ne se peut trouuer; ou qu’il en est encore en queste. Toute la Philosophie est despartie en ces trois genres. Son dessein est de chercher la verité, la science, et la certitude. Les Peripateticiens, Epicuriens, Stoiciens, et autres, ont pensé l’auoir trouuée. Ceux-cy ont estably les sciences, que nous auons, et les ont traictées, comme notices certaines. Clitomachus, Carneades, et les Academiciens, ont desesperé de leur queste; et iugé que la verité ne se pouuoit conceuoir par nos moyens. La fin de ceux-cy, c’est la foiblesse et humaine ignorance. Ce party a eu la plus grande suitte, et les sectateurs les plus nobles.

    Whoever is looking for something comes to this point: either he says he has found it, or that it cannot be found, or that he is still searching for it. All philosophy is divided into these three kinds. Its aim is to seek truth, knowledge and certainty. The Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics and others thought they had found it. These established the sciences we have and treated them as certain knowledge. Clitomachus, Carneades and the Academics despaired of their quest and judged that truth could not be grasped by our means. The end these men reach is weakness and human ignorance. This party had the largest following and the noblest adherents.

    Carneades (2nd century BC) led the skeptical New Academy; Clitomachus was his pupil and successor.

    Pyrrho et autres Sceptiques ou Epechistes, de qui les dogmes plusieurs anciens ont tenu tirez d’Homere, des sept sages, et d’Archilochus, et d’Eurypides, et y attachent Zeno, Democritus, Xenophanes, disent, qu’ils sont encore en cherche de la verité. Ceux-cy iugent, que ceux-là qui pensent l’auoir trouuée, se trompent infiniement; et qu’il y a encore de la vanité trop hardie, en ce second degré, qui asseure que les forces humaines ne sont pas capables d’y atteindre. Car cela, d’establir la mesure de nostre puissance, de cognoistre et iuger la difficulté des choses, c’est vne grande et extreme science, de laquelle ils doubtent que l’homme soit capable. Nil sciri quisquis putat, id quoque nescit, / An sciri possit, quo se nil scire fatetur.

    Pyrrho and the other Skeptics or Ephectics—whose doctrines several ancients held to be drawn from Homer, the seven sages, Archilochus and Euripides, and to whom they attach Zeno, Democritus and Xenophanes—say that they are still searching for the truth. They judge that those who think they have found it are infinitely mistaken, and that there is also too bold a vanity in the second degree, which asserts that human powers are not capable of reaching it. For that—establishing the measure of our power, knowing and judging the difficulty of things—is a great and supreme knowledge, of which they doubt that man is capable. Whoever thinks nothing can be known does not know this either: / Whether it can be known, since he admits he knows nothing.

    Ephectics: “those who suspend judgment,” from the Greek epechein, to hold back.

    L’ignorance qui se sçait, qui se iuge, et qui se condamne, ce n’est pas vne entiere ignorance. Pour l’estre, il faut qu’elle s’ignore soy-mesme. De façon que la profession des Pyrrhoniens est, de bransler, doubter, et enquerir, ne s’asseurer de rien, de rien ne se respondre. Des trois actions de l’ame, l’imaginatiue, l’appetitiue, et la consentante, ils en reçoiuent les deux premieres: la derniere, ils la soustiennent, et la maintiennent ambigue, sans inclination, ny approbation d’vne part ou d’autre, tant soit-elle legere.

    Ignorance that knows itself, judges itself and condemns itself is not complete ignorance. To be complete, it must be ignorant of itself. So the profession of the Pyrrhonists is to waver, doubt and inquire, to be sure of nothing, to vouch for nothing. Of the three actions of the soul—imagining, desiring and assenting—they accept the first two; the last they hold in suspense and keep ambiguous, without inclination or approval one way or the other, however slight.

    Zenon peignoit de geste son imagination sur cette partition des facultez de l’ame: La main espanduë et ouuerte, c’estoit apparence: la main à demy serrée, et les doigts vn peu croches, consentement: le poing fermé, comprehension: quand de la main gauche il venoit encore à clorre ce poing plus estroit, science. Or cette assiette de leur iugement droicte, et inflexible, receuant tous obiects sans application et consentement, les achemine à leur Ataraxie; qui est vne condition de vie paisible, rassise, exempte des agitations que nous receuons par l’impression de l’opinion et science, que nous pensons auoir des choses. D’où naissent la crainte, l’auarice, l’enuie, les desirs immoderez, l’ambition, l’orgueil, la superstition, l’amour de nouuelleté, la rebellion, la desobeyssance, l’opiniastreté, et la pluspart des maux corporels.

    Zeno used to depict by gesture his notion of this division of the faculties of the soul. The hand spread flat and open was appearance; the hand half closed, with the fingers a little curled, assent; the closed fist, comprehension; and when he went on to clench that fist still tighter with his left hand, knowledge. Now this stance of their judgment, straight and inflexible, receiving all objects without applying itself or assenting to them, leads them to their Ataraxy, which is a condition of life that is peaceful, settled and free from the agitations we receive from the impression of the opinion and knowledge we think we have of things. From these arise fear, avarice, envy, immoderate desires, ambition, pride, superstition, love of novelty, rebellion, disobedience, obstinacy, and most bodily ills.

    Ataraxy: Greek ataraxia, “freedom from disturbance.”

    Voire ils s’exemptent par là, de la ialousie de leur discipline. Car ils debattent d’vne bien molle façon. Ils ne craignent point la reuenche à leur dispute. Quand ils disent que le poisant va contre-bas, ils seroient bien marris qu’on les en creust; et cherchent qu’on les contredie, pour engendrer la dubitation et surseance de iugement, qui est leur fin. Ils ne mettent en auant leurs propositions, que pour combattre celles qu’ils pensent, que nous ayons en nostre creance. Si vous prenez la leur, ils prendront aussi volontiers la contraire à soustenir: tout leur est vn: ils n’y ont aucun choix. Si vous establissez que la neige soit noire, ils argumentent au rebours, qu’elle est blanche.

    Indeed they thereby spare themselves any jealousy on behalf of their own school. For they argue in a very easygoing way. They do not fear retaliation in debate. When they say that heavy things go downward, they would be very sorry to be believed; they want to be contradicted, so as to produce the doubt and suspension of judgment that is their goal. They put forward their propositions only to fight those they think we hold in our belief. If you take theirs, they will just as willingly take up the opposite to defend: it is all one to them; they have no preference. If you lay it down that snow is black, they argue on the contrary that it is white.

    Si vous dites qu’elle n’est ny l’vn, ny l’autre, c’est à eux à maintenir qu’elle est tous les deux. Si par certain iugement vous tenez, que vous n’en sçauez rien, ils vous maintiendront que vous le sçauez. Ouï, et si par vn axiome affirmatif vous asseurez que vous en doutez, ils vous iront debattant que vous n’en doutez pas; ou que vous ne pouuez iuger et establir que vous en doutez.

    If you say it is neither one nor the other, it is up to them to maintain that it is both. If you hold, by a definite judgment, that you know nothing about it, they will maintain that you do know. Yes, and if by an affirmative axiom you assert that you doubt it, they will go on arguing that you do not doubt it, or that you cannot judge and establish that you doubt it.

    Et par cette extremité de doubte, qui se secoue soy-mesme, ils se separent et se diuisent de plusieurs opinions, de celles mesmes, qui ont maintenu en plusieurs façons, le doubte et l’ignorance. Pourquoy ne leur sera-il permis, disent-ils, comme il est entre les dogmatistes, à l’vn dire vert, à l’autre iaulne, à eux aussi de doubter? Est-il chose qu’on vous puisse proposer par l’aduouer ou refuser, laquelle il ne soit pas loisible de considerer comme ambigue?

    And by this extreme of doubt, which shakes even itself, they separate and divide themselves from many opinions, even from those that have upheld doubt and ignorance in various ways. Why should they not be allowed, they say, to doubt as well—just as among the dogmatists one may say green and another yellow? Is there anything that can be put to you for you to accept or reject which it is not permissible to consider ambiguous?

    Et où les autres sont portez, ou par la coustume de leur païs, ou par l’institution des parens, ou par rencontre, comme par vne tempeste, sans iugement et sans choix, voire le plus souuent auant l’aage de discretion, à telle ou telle opinion, à la secte ou Stoïque ou Epicurienne, à laquelle ils se treuuent hypothequez, asseruiz et collez, comme à vne prise qu’ils ne peuuent desmordre: ad quamcumque disciplinam, velut tempestate, delati, ad eam, tanquam ad saxum, adhærescunt: pourquoy, à ceux-cy, ne sera-il pareillement concedé, de maintenir leur liberté, et considerer les choses sans obligation et seruitude? Hoc liberiores et solutiores, quòd integra illis est iudicandi potestas. N’est-ce pas quelque aduantage, de se trouuer desengagé de la necessité, qui bride les autres?

    Others are carried—by the custom of their country, or by their upbringing at their parents’ hands, or by chance, as if by a storm, without judgment or choice, indeed most often before the age of discretion—to this or that opinion, to the Stoic or the Epicurean school, to which they find themselves mortgaged, enslaved and stuck fast, as to a prey they cannot let go of: to whatever doctrine they have been carried, as by a storm, they cling to it as to a rock. Why, then, should these men not likewise be granted the right to keep their freedom and to consider things without obligation and servitude? Freer and less bound in this, that their power of judging is intact. Is it not some advantage to find oneself released from the necessity that curbs others?

    Vaut-il pas mieux demeurer en suspens que de s’infrasquer en tant d’erreurs que l’humaine fantasie a produictes? Vaut-il pas mieux suspendre sa persuasion, que de se mesler à ces diuisions seditieuses et querelleuses? Qu’iray-ie choisir? Ce qu’il vous plaira, pourueu que vous choisissiez. Voila vne sotte responce: à laquelle il semble pourtant que tout le dogmatisme arriue: par qui il ne nous est pas permis d’ignorer ce que nous ignorons. Prenez le plus fameux party, iamais il ne sera si seur, qu’il ne vous faille pour le deffendre, attaquer et combattre cent et cent contraires partis. Vaut-il pas mieux se tenir hors de cette meslée?

    Is it not better to remain in suspense than to entangle oneself in all the errors human fancy has produced? Is it not better to suspend one’s conviction than to get mixed up in these seditious and quarrelsome divisions? What shall I choose? “Whatever you like, as long as you choose.” That is a foolish answer; and yet it seems that all dogmatism comes to it, since dogmatism does not allow us to be ignorant of what we are ignorant of. Take the most famous party: it will never be so secure that, to defend it, you will not have to attack and fight hundreds upon hundreds of opposing parties. Is it not better to stay out of this fray?

    Il vous est permis d’espouser comme vostre honneur et vostre vie, la creance d’Aristote sur l’eternité de l’ame, et desdire et desmentir Platon là dessus, et à eux il sera interdit d’en doubter? S’il est loisible à Panætius de soustenir son iugement autour des aruspices, songes, oracles, vaticinations, desquelles choses les Stoiciens ne doubtent aucunement: pourquoy vn sage n’osera-il en toutes choses, ce que cettuy-cy ose en celles qu’il a apprinses de ses maistres: establies du commun consentement de l’eschole, de laquelle il est sectateur et professeur? Si c’est vn enfant qui iuge, il ne sçait que c’est: si c’est vn sçauant, il est præoccuppé.

    You are allowed to embrace, as you would your honor and your life, Aristotle’s belief about the eternity of the soul, and to contradict and refute Plato on that point; and they are to be forbidden to doubt it? If Panaetius may withhold his judgment about haruspices, dreams, oracles and prophecies, things the Stoics do not doubt in the least, why should a wise man not dare in all things what this man dares in those he learned from his masters, established by the common consent of the school of which he is a follower and teacher? If it is a child who judges, he does not know what it is about; if it is a learned man, he is prejudiced.

    Panaetius of Rhodes, Stoic philosopher of the 2nd century BC. Haruspices were diviners who read the entrails of sacrificed animals.

    Ils se sont reseruez vn merueilleux aduantage au combat, s’estans deschargez du soin de se couurir. Il ne leur importe qu’on les frappe, pourueu qu’ils frappent; et font leurs besongnes de tout. S’ils vainquent, vostre proposition cloche; si vous, la leur: s’ils faillent, ils verifient l’ignorance; si vous faillez, vous la verifiez: s’ils prouuent que rien ne se sçache, il va bien; s’ils ne le sçauent pas prouuer, il est bon de mesmes: Vt quum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta inueniuntur, facilius ab vtraque parte assertio sustineatur.

    They have kept a marvelous advantage for themselves in combat, having relieved themselves of the trouble of guarding. It does not matter to them if they are struck, so long as they strike; and they turn everything to account. If they win, your proposition limps; if you win, theirs does. If they fail, they confirm ignorance; if you fail, you confirm it. If they prove that nothing is known, well and good; if they cannot prove it, that is just as good. So that, when equal weights are found on opposite sides of the same question, it is easier to withhold assertion on both sides.

    Et font estat de trouuer bien plus facilement, pourquoy vne chose soit fausse, que non pas qu’elle soit vraye; et ce qui n’est pas, que ce qui est: et ce qu’ils ne croyent pas, que ce qu’ils croyent. Leurs façons de parler sont, Ie n’establis rien: Il n’est non plus ainsi qu’ainsin, ou que ny l’vn ny l’autre: Ie ne le comprens point. Les apparences sont egales par tout: la loy de parler, et pour et contre, est pareille. Rien ne semble vray qui ne puisse sembler faux. Leur mot sacramental, c’est επεχω; c’est à dire, ie soustiens, ie ne bouge. Voyla leurs refreins, et autres de pareille substance. Leur effect, c’est vne pure, entiere, et tres-parfaicte surceance et suspension de iugement.

    And they claim to find far more easily why a thing is false than that it is true; what is not than what is; and what they do not believe than what they believe. Their ways of speaking are: “I establish nothing.” “It is no more so than so, or than neither.” “I do not grasp it.” “Appearances are equal everywhere; the law of speaking for and against is the same.” “Nothing seems true that cannot seem false.” Their sacramental word is epechō, that is to say, “I hold back, I do not budge.” Those are their refrains, and others of like substance. Their result is a pure, complete and most perfect deferral and suspension of judgment.

    Ils se seruent de leur raison, pour enquerir et pour debattre: mais non pas pour arrester et choisir. Quiconque imaginera vne perpetuelle confession d’ignorance, vn iugement sans pente, et sans inclination, à quelque occasion que ce puisse estre, il conçoit le Pyrrhonisme. I’exprime cette fantasie autant que ie puis, par ce que plusieurs la trouuent difficile à conceuoir; et les autheurs mesmes la representent vn peu obscurement et diuersement.

    They use their reason to inquire and debate, but not to settle and choose. Whoever imagines a perpetual confession of ignorance, a judgment without slant or inclination on any occasion whatever, conceives Pyrrhonism. I express this notion as well as I can, because many find it hard to conceive, and the authors themselves present it somewhat obscurely and in different ways.

    Quant aux actions de la vie, ils sont en cela de la commune façon. Ils se prestent et accommodent aux inclinations naturelles, à l’impulsion et contrainte des passions, aux constitutions des loix et des coustumes, et à la tradition des arts: non enim nos Deus ista scire, sed tantummodo vti voluit. Ils laissent guider à ces choses là, leurs actions communes, sans aucune opination ou iugement. Qui fait que ie ne puis pas bien assortir à ce discours, ce qu’on dit de Pyrrho. Ils le peignent stupide et immobile, prenant vn train de vie farouche et inassociable, attendant le hurt des charrettes, se presentant aux precipices, refusant de s’accommoder aux loix. Cela est encherir sur sa discipline.

    As for the actions of life, in these they follow the common way. They lend and adapt themselves to natural inclinations, to the impulse and constraint of the passions, to the ordinances of laws and customs, and to the tradition of the arts. For God did not want us to know these things, but only to use them. They let these things guide their ordinary actions, without any opinion or judgment. That is why I cannot quite reconcile with this account what is said of Pyrrho. They portray him as stupid and immobile, adopting a wild, unsociable way of life, waiting for carts to run into him, walking up to precipices, refusing to conform to the laws. That is going beyond his doctrine.

    Il n’a pas voulu se faire pierre ou souche: il a voulu se faire homme viuant, discourant, et raisonnant, iouyssant de tous plaisirs et commoditez naturelles, embesoignant et se seruant de toutes ses pieces corporelles et spirituelles, en regle et droicture. Les priuileges fantastiques, imaginaires, et faulx, que l’homme s’est vsurpé, de regenter, d’ordonner, d’establir, il les a de bonne foy renoncez et quittez. Si n’est-il point de secte, qui ne soit contrainte de permettre à son sage de suiure assez de choses non comprinses, ny perceuës ny consenties, s’il veut viure.

    He did not try to make himself a stone or a stump; he tried to make himself a living man, thinking and reasoning, enjoying all natural pleasures and comforts, employing and using all his bodily and mental parts in due order and rightness. The fantastic, imaginary and false privileges man has usurped—of ruling, ordering, establishing—he renounced and gave up in good faith. And yet there is no school that is not forced to allow its wise man to follow many things not grasped, nor perceived, nor assented to, if he wants to live.

    Et quand il monte en mer, il suit ce dessein, ignorant s’il luy sera vtile: et se plie, à ce que le vaisseau est bon, le pilote experimenté, la saison commode: circonstances probables seulement. Apres lesquelles il est tenu d’aller, et se laisser remuer aux apparances, pourueu qu’elles n’ayent point d’expresse contrarieté. Il a vn corps, il a vne ame: les sens le poussent, l’esprit l’agite. Encore qu’il ne treuue point en soy cette propre et singuliere marque de iuger, et qu’il s’apperçoiue, qu’il ne doit engager son consentement, attendu qu’il peut estre quelque faulx pareil à ce vray: il ne laisse de conduire les offices de sa vie pleinement et commodement.

    And when he goes to sea, he follows that plan without knowing whether it will be useful to him, and relies on the ship being sound, the pilot experienced, the season favorable—probable circumstances only. He is bound to go by them and let himself be moved by appearances, provided they show no express contradiction. He has a body, he has a soul; the senses push him, the mind stirs him. Although he does not find in himself that proper and distinctive mark for judging, and realizes that he must not commit his assent, since there may be some falsehood resembling this truth, he still carries out the duties of his life fully and conveniently.

    Combien y a il d’arts, qui font profession de consister en la coniecture, plus qu’en la science? qui ne decident pas du vray et du faulx, et suiuent seulement ce qu’il semble? Il y a, disent-ils, et vray et faulx, et y a en nous dequoy le chercher, mais non pas dequoy l’arrester à la touche. Nous en valons bien mieux, de nous laisser manier sans inquisition, à l’ordre du monde. Vne ame garantie de preiugé, a vn merueilleux auancement vers la tranquillité. Gents qui iugent et contrerollent leurs iuges, ne s’y soubsmettent iamais deuëment.

    How many arts are there that profess to consist in conjecture more than in knowledge, that do not decide between true and false but merely follow what seems to be so? There is, they say, both true and false, and there is in us the means to seek it, but not to try it on the touchstone. We are much the better for letting ourselves be handled by the order of the world without inquiring. A soul kept free of prejudice has come a marvelous way toward tranquility. People who judge and check up on their judges never submit to them as they should.

    Combien et aux loix de la religion, et aux loix politiques se trouuent plus dociles et aisez à mener, les esprits simples et incurieux, que ces esprits surueillants et pedagogues des causes diuines et humaines? Il n’est rien en l’humaine inuention, où il y ait tant de verisimilitude et d’vtilité. Cette-cy presente l’homme nud et vuide, recognoissant sa foiblesse naturelle, propre à receuoir d’en hault quelque force estrangere, desgarni d’humaine science, et d’autant plus apte à loger en soy la diuine, aneantissant son iugement, pour faire plus de place à la foy: ny mescreant ny establissant aucun dogme contre les loix et obseruances communes, humble, obeïssant, disciplinable, studieux; ennemy iuré d’heresie, et s’exemptant par consequent des vaines et irreligieuses opinions introduites par les fauces sectes.

    How much more docile and easy to lead, under the laws both of religion and of the state, are simple and incurious minds than those minds that keep watch over causes divine and human and lecture on them? There is nothing in human invention that has so much likelihood and usefulness. This one presents man naked and empty, acknowledging his natural weakness, fit to receive some outside strength from on high; stripped of human knowledge, and all the more apt to lodge divine knowledge within him; annihilating his judgment to make more room for faith; neither disbelieving nor establishing any dogma against common laws and observances; humble, obedient, teachable, eager to learn; a sworn enemy of heresy, and consequently free of the vain and irreligious opinions introduced by false sects.

    C’est vne carte blanche preparée à prendre du doigt de Dieu telles formes qu’il luy plaira d’y grauer. Plus nous nous renuoyons et commettons à Dieu, et renonçons à nous, mieux nous en valons. Accepte, dit l’Ecclesiaste, en bonne part les choses au visage et au goust qu’elles se presentent à toy, du iour à la iournée: le demeurant est hors de ta cognoissance. Dominus nouit cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanæ sunt.

    It is a blank page, prepared to take from the finger of God whatever forms he pleases to engrave on it. The more we refer and commit ourselves to God and renounce ourselves, the better off we are. “Accept in good part,” says Ecclesiastes, “things in the aspect and taste with which they present themselves to you, from day to day; the rest is beyond your knowledge.” The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain.

    Psalm 94:11, quoted by Saint Paul in 1 Corinthians 3:20.

    Dogmatists who doubt

    Even the dogmatists, Plato and Aristotle among them, wrote in a spirit of inquiry.

    Voila comment, des trois generales sectes de Philosophie, les deux font expresse profession de dubitation et d’ignorance: et en celle des dogmatistes, qui est troisiesme, il est aysé à descouurir, que la plus part n’ont pris le visage de l’asseurance que pour auoir meilleure mine. Ils n’ont pas tant pensé nous establir quelque certitude, que nous montrer iusques où ils estoient allez en cette chasse de la verité, quam docti fingunt magis quàm norunt. Timæus ayant à instruire Socrates de ce qu’il sçait des Dieux, du monde, et des hommes, propose d’en parler comme vn homme à vn homme; et qu’il suffit, si ses raisons sont probables, comme les raisons d’vn autre: car les exactes raisons n’estre en sa main, ny en mortelle main.

    So it is that, of the three general schools of philosophy, two make express profession of doubt and ignorance; and in that of the dogmatists, which is the third, it is easy to discover that most of them put on a face of assurance only to look better. They did not so much think to establish some certainty for us as to show us how far they had gone in this hunt for truth, which the learned imagine rather than know. Timaeus, having to instruct Socrates in what he knows of the gods, the world and men, proposes to speak of it as a man to a man, and says it is enough if his reasons are probable, like another man’s; for exact reasons are not in his hands, nor in any mortal hands.

    Timaeus is the main speaker in Plato’s dialogue of that name.

    Ce que l’vn de ses sectateurs a ainsin imité: Vt potero, explicabo: nec tamen, vt Pythius Apollo, certa vt sint et fixa, quæ dixero: sed, vt homunculus, probabilia coniectura sequens. Et cela sur le discours du mespris de la mort: discours naturel et populaire. Ailleurs il l’a traduit, sur le propos mesme de Platon. *Si fortè, de Deorum natura ortúque mundi disserentes, minus id quod habemus in animo consequimur, haud erit mirum.

    One of his followers imitated this as follows: I will explain as best I can; yet not like Pythian Apollo, so that what I say is certain and fixed, but like a mere man, following probabilities by conjecture. And that on the subject of contempt for death, a natural and popular subject. Elsewhere he translated it, on the very words of Plato: *If perhaps, in discussing the nature of the gods and the origin of the world, we do not attain what we have in mind, it will be no wonder.

    Cicero, Tusculan Disputations I.9; the second passage is from his Latin translation of Plato’s Timaeus.

    Æquum est enim meminisse, et me, qui disseram, hominem esse, et vos qui iudicetis: vt, si probabilia dicentur, nihil vltrà requiratis.* Aristote nous entasse ordinairement vn grand nombre d’autres opinions, et d’autres creances, pour y comparer la sienne, et nous faire voir de combien il est allé plus outre, et combien il approche de plus pres la verisimilitude. Car la verité ne se iuge point par authorité et tesmoignage d’autruy. Et pourtant euita religieusement Epicurus d’en alleguer en ses escrits.

    For it is right to remember that both I who discuss and you who judge are men; so that, if probable things are said, you should ask for nothing further.* Aristotle usually heaps up for us a great number of other opinions and other beliefs, to compare his own with them and show us how much further he has gone and how much closer he comes to likelihood. For truth is not judged by the authority and testimony of others. And that is why Epicurus scrupulously avoided citing any in his writings.

    Cettuy-là est le prince des dogmatistes, et si nous apprenons de luy, que le beaucoup sçauoir apporte l’occasion de plus doubter. On le void à escient se couurir souuent d’obscurité si espesse et inextricable, qu’on n’y peut rien choisir de son aduis. C’est par effect vn Pyrrhonisme soubs vne forme resolutiue. Oyez la protestation de Cicero, qui nous explique la fantasie d’autruy par la sienne. *Qui requirunt, quid de quaque re ipsi sentiamus: curiosius id faciunt, quàm necesse est. Hæc in philosophia ratio, contra omnia disserendi, nullamque rem apertè iudicandi, profecta à Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata à Carneade, vsque ad nostram viget ætatem.

    Aristotle is the prince of the dogmatists; and yet we learn from him that knowing much brings occasion for doubting more. He can be seen deliberately wrapping himself, often, in a darkness so thick and inextricable that one cannot make out his opinion in it. It is in effect Pyrrhonism in an affirmative form. Hear the declaration of Cicero, who explains another’s notion to us by his own: *Those who ask what we ourselves think about each thing show more curiosity than is necessary. This method in philosophy, of arguing against everything and judging nothing openly, begun by Socrates, taken up again by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades, flourishes down to our own time.

    Hi sumus, qui omnibus veris falsa quædam adiuncta esse dicamus, tanta similitudine, vt in ijs nulla insit certè iudicandi et assentiendi nota.* Pourquoy, non Aristote seulement, mais la plus part des philosophes, ont ils affecté la difficulté, si ce n’est pour faire valoir la vanité du subject, et amuser la curiosité de nostre esprit, luy donnant où se paistre, à ronger cet os creuz et descharné? Clytomachus affermoit n’auoir iamais sçeu, par les escrits de Carneades, entendre de quelle opinion il estoit. Pourquoy a euité aux siens Epicurus, la facilité, et Heraclytus en a esté surnommé σχοτεινος?

    We are those who say that some falsehoods are joined to all truths, with such a likeness that there is no sure mark in them for judging and assenting.* Why have not only Aristotle but most philosophers affected difficulty, if not to enhance the worth of the vanity of the subject and to keep our mind’s curiosity busy, giving it something to feed on by gnawing at this hollow, fleshless bone? Clitomachus asserted that he had never been able to understand from Carneades’ writings what his opinion was. Why did Epicurus avoid ease in his writings, and why was Heraclitus nicknamed “the Obscure”?

    La difficulté est vne monoye que les sçauans employent, comme les joueurs de passe-passe pour ne descouurir la vanité de leur art: et de laquelle l’humaine bestise se paye aysément. Clarus ob obscuram linguam, magis inter inanes: / Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amántque, / Inuersis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt.

    Difficulty is a coin that the learned use, like conjurers, so as not to reveal the vanity of their art, and one with which human stupidity is easily paid. Famous for his obscure speech, especially among the empty-headed: / For fools admire and love above all / What they see hidden beneath twisted words.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, speaking of Heraclitus.

    Cicero reprend aucuns de ses amis d’auoir accoustumé de mettre à l’astrologie, au droit, à la dialectique, et à la geometrie, plus de temps, que ne meritoyent ces arts: et que cela les diuertissoit des deuoirs de la vie, plus vtiles et honnestes. Les philosophes Cyrenaïques mesprisoyent esgalement la physique et la dialectique. Zenon tout au commencement des liures de la republique, declaroit inutiles toutes les liberales disciplines. Chrysippus disoit, que ce que Platon et Aristote auoyent escrit de la logique, ils l’auoyent escrit par ieu et par exercice: et ne pouuoit croire qu’ils eussent parlé à certes d’vne si vaine matiere.

    Cicero rebukes some of his friends for habitually spending more time on astrology, law, dialectic and geometry than these arts deserved, saying that this diverted them from the duties of life, which are more useful and honorable. The Cyrenaic philosophers despised physics and dialectic alike. Zeno, at the very beginning of his books on the Republic, declared all the liberal disciplines useless. Chrysippus said that what Plato and Aristotle had written on logic they had written in play and as an exercise, and he could not believe they had spoken in earnest about so vain a subject.

    Plutarque le dit de la metaphysique, Epicurus l’eust encores dict de la rhetorique, de la grammaire, poësie, mathematique, et hors la physique, de toutes les autres sciences: et Socrates de toutes, sauf celle des mœurs et de la vie. De quelque chose qu’on s’enquist à luy, il ramenoit en premier lieu tousiours l’enquerant à rendre compte des conditions de sa vie, presente et passée, lesquelles il examinoit et iugeoit: estimant tout autre apprentissage subsecutif à celuy-la et supernumeraire. Parum mihi placeant eæ litteræ quæ ad virtutem doctoribus nihil profuerunt. La plus part des arts ont esté ainsi mesprisés par le mesme sçauoir. Mais ils n’ont pas pensé qu’il fust hors de propos, d’exercer leur esprit és choses mesmes, où il n’y auoit nulle solidité profitable.

    Plutarch says this of metaphysics; Epicurus would have said it also of rhetoric, grammar, poetry, mathematics and, apart from physics, of all the other sciences; and Socrates of all of them except the science of morals and of life. Whatever anyone asked him about, he always first brought the questioner back to giving an account of the conditions of his life, present and past, which he examined and judged, considering all other learning subordinate to that and superfluous. I would care little for those letters that did their teachers no good toward virtue. Most of the arts have thus been despised by learning itself. But they did not think it out of place to exercise their minds even on things in which there was no profitable solidity.

    Au demeurant, les vns ont estimé Plato dogmatiste, les autres dubitateur, les autres en certaines choses l’vn, et en certaines choses l’autre. Le conducteur de ses dialogismes, Socrates, va tousiours demandant et esmouuant la dispute, iamais l’arrestant, iamais satisfaisant: et dit n’auoir autre science, que la science de s’opposer. Homere leur autheur a planté egalement les fondements à toutes les sectes de philosophie, pour montrer, combien il estoit indifferent par où nous allassions. De Platon nasquirent dix sectes diuerses, dit-on. Aussi, à mon gré, iamais instruction ne fut titubante, et rien asseuerante, si la sienne ne l’est.

    For the rest, some have considered Plato a dogmatist, others a doubter, others one in certain things and the other in others. The leader of his dialogues, Socrates, is always asking questions and stirring up the debate, never settling it, never satisfying; and he says he has no other knowledge than the knowledge of how to oppose. Homer, their author, laid the foundations equally for all the schools of philosophy, to show how little it mattered which way we went. From Plato sprang ten different schools, they say. And indeed, to my mind, no teaching was ever wavering and noncommittal if his is not.

    Socrates disoit, que les sages femmes en prenant ce mestier de faire engendrer les autres, quittent le mestier d’engendrer elles. Que luy par le tiltre de sage homme, que les Dieux luy auoyent deferé, s’estoit aussi desfaict en son amour virile et mentale, de la faculté d’enfanter: se contentant d’ayder et fauorir de son secours les engendrants: ouurir leur nature; graisser leurs conduits: faciliter l’yssue de leur enfantement: iuger d’iceluy: le baptizer: le nourrir: le fortifier: l’emmaillotter, et circoncir: exerçant et maniant son engin, aux perils et fortunes d’autruy.

    Socrates used to say that midwives, in taking up the trade of making others give birth, give up the trade of giving birth themselves; that he, by the title of wise man that the gods had conferred on him, had likewise rid himself, in his manly and mental love, of the faculty of bearing children, content to help and favor with his aid those who were begetting: to open their nature, grease their passages, ease the issue of their delivery, judge it, baptize it, feed it, strengthen it, swaddle it and circumcise it—exercising and handling his wits at the risks and fortunes of others.

    The French sage-femme, midwife, means literally “wise woman,” hence Montaigne’s play on sage homme, “wise man.”

    Il est ainsi de la plus part des autheurs de ce tiers genre, comme les anciens ont remerqué des escripts d’Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, et autres. Ils ont vne forme d’escrire douteuse en substance et en dessein, enquerant plustost qu’instruisant: encore qu’ils entresement leur stile de cadances dogmatistes. Cela se voit il pas aussi bien en Seneque et en Plutarque? combien disent ils tantost d’vn visage, tantost d’vn autre, pour ceux qui y regardent de prez? Et les reconciliateurs des iurisconsultes deuoyent premierement les concilier chacun à soy. Platon me semble auoir aymé cette forme de philosopher par dialogues, à escient, pour loger plus decemment en diuerses bouches la diuersité et variation de ses propres fantasies.

    So it is with most authors of this third kind, as the ancients noted of the writings of Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes and others. They have a way of writing that is doubtful in substance and intent, inquiring rather than teaching, even though they sprinkle their style with dogmatic cadences. Is this not seen just as clearly in Seneca and Plutarch? How much do they say now with one face, now with another, for those who look closely? And the reconcilers of the jurists ought first to reconcile each of them with himself. Plato seems to me to have liked this form of philosophizing in dialogues deliberately, so as to lodge more fittingly in different mouths the diversity and variation of his own notions.

    Diuersement traitter les matieres, est aussi bien les traitter, que conformement, et mieux: à sçauoir plus copieusement et vtilement. Prenons exemple de nous. Les arrests font le point extreme du parler dogmatiste et resolutif: si est ce que ceux que noz parlements presentent au peuple, les plus exemplaires, propres à nourrir en luy la reuerence qu’il doit à cette dignité, principalement par la suffisance des personnes qui l’exercent, prennent leur beauté, non de la conclusion, qui est à eux quotidienne, et qui est commune à tout iuge, tant comme de la disceptation et agitation des diuerses et contraires ratiocinations, que la matiere du droit souffre.

    To treat subjects in different ways is just as much treating them as to treat them uniformly, and better: that is, more abundantly and usefully. Let us take an example from ourselves. Court rulings are the extreme point of dogmatic and decisive speech; and yet the most exemplary ones that our parlements present to the people, those fit to nourish in them the reverence they owe to that dignity, chiefly through the ability of the persons who hold it, draw their beauty not so much from the conclusion, which is their daily business and common to every judge, as from the debate and agitation of the various and contrary reasonings that the matter of law admits.

    Et le plus large champ aux reprehensions des vns philosophes à l’encontre des autres, se tire des contradictions et diuersitez, en quoy chacun d’eux se trouue empestré: ou par dessein, pour montrer la vacillation de l’esprit humain autour de toute matiere, ou forcé ignoramment, par la volubilité et incomprehensibilité de toute matiere. Que signifie ce refrein? en vn lieu glissant et coulant suspendons nostre creance: car, comme dit Eurypides, Les œuures de Dieu en diuerses / Façons, nous donnent des trauerses. Semblable à celuy qu’Empedocles semoit souuent en ses liures, comme agité d’vne diuine fureur, et forcé de la verité.

    And the widest field for the criticisms of some philosophers against others comes from the contradictions and inconsistencies in which each of them finds himself entangled—either by design, to show how the human mind wavers about every subject, or forced to it unwittingly by the fluidity and incomprehensibility of every subject. What is the meaning of this refrain: “In a slippery and flowing place, let us suspend our belief”? For, as Euripides says, The works of God in diverse / Ways keep thwarting us. It is like the refrain Empedocles often scattered through his books, as if stirred by a divine frenzy and compelled by the truth.

    Non non, nous ne sentons rien, nous ne voyons rien, toutes choses nous sont occultes, il n’en est aucune de laquelle nous puissions establir quelle elle est: reuenant à ce mot diuin, Cogitationes mortalium timidæ, et incertæ adinuentiones nostræ, et providentiæ.

    No, no, we feel nothing, we see nothing; all things are hidden from us; there is not one of which we can establish what it is. This comes back to that divine saying: The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our devices and our foresight uncertain.

    Wisdom of Solomon 9:14.

    Il ne faut pas trouuer estrange, si gens desesperez de la prise n’ont pas laissé d’auoir plaisir à la chasse, l’estude estant de soy vne occupation plaisante: et si plaisante, que parmy les voluptez, les Stoïciens defendent aussi celle qui vient de l’exercitation de l’esprit, y veulent de la bride, et trouuent de l’intemperance à trop sçauoir.

    We should not find it strange if people who despaired of the catch have not stopped enjoying the hunt, study being in itself a pleasant occupation—so pleasant that among the pleasures the Stoics forbid also the one that comes from exercising the mind; they want it bridled, and find intemperance in knowing too much.

    Democritus ayant mangé à sa table des figues, qui sentoient le miel, commença soudain à chercher en son esprit, d’où leur venoit cette douceur inusitee, et pour s’en esclaircir, s’alloit leuer de table, pour voir l’assiette du lieu où ces figues auoyent esté cueillies: sa chambriere, ayant entendu la cause de ce remuëment, luy dit en riant, qu’il ne se penast plus pour cela, car c’estoit qu’elle les auoit mises en vn vaisseau, où il y auoit eu du miel. Il se despita, dequoy elle luy auoit osté l’occasion de cette recherche, et desrobé matiere à sa curiosité. Va, luy dit-il, tu m’as faict desplaisir, ie ne lairray pourtant d’en chercher la cause, comme si elle estoit naturelle.

    Democritus, having eaten at his table some figs that tasted of honey, at once began to search his mind for the source of this unusual sweetness; and to clear the matter up he was getting up from the table to go and see the lie of the place where the figs had been picked. His maidservant, having learned the reason for this stir, told him with a laugh not to trouble himself any more about it, for it was because she had put them in a vessel that had held honey. He was annoyed that she had taken away the occasion for this research and robbed his curiosity of its material. “Go,” he said, “you have displeased me; I shall look for the cause all the same, as if it were natural.”

    Et volontiers n’eust failly de trouuer quelque raison vraye, à vn effect faux et supposé. Cette histoire d’vn fameux et grand philosophe, nous represente bien clairement cette passion studieuse, qui nous amuse à la poursuyte des choses, de l’acquest desquelles nous sommes desesperez. Plutarque recite vn pareil exemple de quelqu’vn, qui ne vouloit pas estre esclaircy de ce, dequoy il estoit en doute, pour ne perdre le plaisir de le chercher: comme l’autre, qui ne vouloit pas que son medecin luy ostast l’alteration de la fieure, pour ne perdre le plaisir de l’assouuir en beuuant.

    And he would very likely have found some true reason for a false and supposed effect. This story of a famous and great philosopher shows us very clearly that studious passion which keeps us busy pursuing things we despair of acquiring. Plutarch tells a similar example of someone who did not want to be enlightened about what he was in doubt of, so as not to lose the pleasure of looking for it; like the other man who did not want his doctor to take away the thirst of his fever, so as not to lose the pleasure of quenching it by drinking.

    Satius est superuacua discere, quàm nihil. Tout ainsi qu’en toute pasture il y a le plaisir souuent seul, et tout ce que nous prenons, qui est plaisant, n’est pas tousiours nutritif, ou sain: pareillement ce que nostre esprit tire de la science, ne laisse pas d’estre voluptueux, encore qu’il ne soit ny alimentant ny salutaire.

    It is better to learn superfluous things than nothing. Just as in all eating there is often pleasure alone, and not everything pleasant that we take is always nourishing or healthy, so what our mind draws from knowledge does not cease to be pleasurable even though it is neither nourishing nor wholesome.

    Voicy comme ils disent: La consideration de la nature est vne pasture propre à nos esprits, elle nous esleue et enfle, nous fait desdaigner les choses basses et terriennes, par la comparaison des superieures et celestes: la recherche mesme des choses occultes et grandes est tresplaisante, voire à celuy qui n’en acquiert que la reuerence, et crainte d’en iuger. Ce sont des mots de leur profession. La vaine image de cette maladiue curiosité, se voit plus expressement encores en cet autre exemple, qu’ils ont par honneur si souuent en la bouche. Eudoxus souhaittoit et prioit les Dieux, qu’il peust vne fois voir le soleil de pres, comprendre sa forme, sa grandeur, et sa beauté, à peine d’en estre bruslé soudainement.

    This is how they put it: the contemplation of nature is food suited to our minds; it lifts us up and swells us, and makes us disdain low and earthly things by comparison with the higher and heavenly ones; the very search for hidden and great things is most pleasant, even to one who gains from it only reverence and fear of judging them. These are the words of their profession. The vain image of this sickly curiosity is seen more expressly still in this other example, which they cite so often and with honor. Eudoxus wished and prayed to the gods that he might once see the sun up close and grasp its form, its size and its beauty, even at the cost of being burned up by it at once.

    Eudoxus of Cnidus, Greek astronomer and mathematician of the 4th century BC.

    Il veut au prix de sa vie, acquerir vne science, de laquelle l’vsage et possession luy soit quand et quand ostée. Et pour cette soudaine et volage cognoissance, perdre toutes autres cognoissances qu’il a, et qu’il peut acquerir par apres.

    He wants, at the price of his life, to acquire a knowledge whose use and possession would be taken from him at the same instant; and for this sudden and fleeting knowledge, to lose all the other knowledge he has and could acquire afterward.

    Ie ne me persuade pas aysement, qu’Epicurus, Platon, et Pythagoras nous ayent donné pour argent contant leurs Atomes, leurs Idées, et leurs Nombres. Ils estoyent trop sages pour establir leurs articles de foy, de chose si incertaine, et si debattable. Mais en cette obscurité et ignorance du monde, chacun de ces grands personnages, s’est trauaillé d’apporter vne telle quelle image de lumiere: et ont promené leur ame à des inuentions, qui eussent au moins vne plaisante et subtile apparence, pourueu que toute fausse, elle se peust maintenir contre les oppositions contraires: Vnicuique ista pro ingenio finguntur, non ex scientiæ vi.

    I am not easily persuaded that Epicurus, Plato and Pythagoras handed us their Atoms, their Ideas and their Numbers as ready cash. They were too wise to make their articles of faith out of something so uncertain and so debatable. But in this darkness and ignorance of the world, each of these great figures strove to bring some sort of image of light, and they walked their minds through inventions that would at least have a pleasing and subtle appearance, provided that, false as it was, it could hold up against opposing objections. These things are imagined by each according to his wit, not by the power of knowledge.

    Vn ancien, à qui on reprochoit, qu’il faisoit profession de la Philosophie, de laquelle pourtant en son iugement, il ne tenoit pas grand compte, respondit que cela, c’estoit vrayement philosopher.

    An ancient, who was reproached for professing philosophy when in his own judgment he took no great account of it, replied that this was truly philosophizing.

    Ils ont voulu considerer tout, balancer tout, et ont trouué cette occupation propre à la naturelle curiosité qui est en nous. Aucunes choses, ils les ont escrites pour le besoin de la societé publique, comme leurs religions: et a esté raisonnable pour cette consideration, que les communes opinions, ils n’ayent voulu les esplucher au vif, aux fins de n’engendrer du trouble en l’obeyssance des loix et coustumes de leur pays.

    They wanted to consider everything and weigh everything, and found this occupation suited to the natural curiosity that is in us. Some things they wrote for the needs of public society, such as their religions; and it was reasonable, for that consideration, that they did not want to strip common opinions to the quick, so as not to breed trouble in the obedience owed to the laws and customs of their country.

    Platon traitte ce mystere d’vn ieu assez descouuert. Car où il escrit selon soy, il ne prescrit rien à certes. Quand il fait le legislateur, il emprunte vn style regentant et asseuerant: et si y mesle hardiment les plus fantastiques de ses inuentions: autant vtiles à persuader à la commune, que ridicules à persuader à soy-mesme: sçachant combien nous sommes propres à receuoir toutes impressions, et sur toutes, les plus farouches et enormes.

    Plato handles this mystery with a fairly open hand. For where he writes on his own account, he prescribes nothing in earnest. When he plays the legislator, he borrows a domineering and assertive style, and boldly mixes into it the most fantastic of his inventions, as useful for persuading the common people as they are ridiculous for persuading himself, knowing how apt we are to receive any impression, and above all the wildest and most monstrous.

    Et pourtant en ses loix, il a grand soing, qu’on ne chante en publiq que des poësies, desquelles les fabuleuses feintes tendent à quelque vtile fin: estant si facile d’imprimer touts fantosmes en l’esprit humain, que c’est iniustice de ne le paistre plustost de mensonges profitables, que de mensonges ou inutiles ou dommageables. Il dit tout destrousseement en sa Republique, que pour le profit des hommes, il est souuent besoin de les piper. Il est aisé à distinguer, les vnes sectes auoir plus suiuy la verité, les autres l’vtilité, par où celles cy ont gaigné credit.

    And so in his Laws he takes great care that nothing be sung in public but poems whose fabulous fictions tend to some useful end; it being so easy to imprint any phantoms on the human mind that it is unjust not to feed it on profitable lies rather than on lies that are useless or harmful. He says quite bluntly in his Republic that for men’s benefit it is often necessary to deceive them. It is easy to see that some schools have followed truth more, others usefulness, and that the latter have gained credit by it.

    C’est la misere de nostre condition, que souuent ce qui se presente à nostre imagination pour le plus vray, ne s’y presente pas pour le plus vtile à nostre vie. Les plus hardies sectes, Epicurienne, Pyrrhonienne, nouuelle Academique, encore sont elles contrainctes de se plier à la loy ciuile, au bout du compte.

    It is the misery of our condition that often what presents itself to our imagination as truest does not present itself as most useful to our life. The boldest schools—Epicurean, Pyrrhonian, New Academic—are still compelled, when all is said and done, to bow to civil law.

    Il y a d’autres subiects qu’ils ont belutez, qui à gauche, qui à dextre, chacun se trauaillant d’y donner quelque visage, à tort ou à droit. Car n’ayans rien trouué de si caché, dequoy ils n’ayent voulu parler, il leur est souuent force de forger des coniectures foibles et foles: non qu’ils les prinssent eux mesmes pour fondement, ne pour establir quelque verité, mais pour l’exercice de leur estude. Non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quàm exercere ingenia materiæ difficultate videntur voluisse. Et si on ne le prenoit ainsi, comme couuririons nous vne si grande inconstance, varieté, et vanité d’opinions, que nous voyons auoir esté produites par ces ames excellentes et admirables?

    There are other subjects they have sifted, some to the left, some to the right, each striving to give it some face, rightly or wrongly. For since they found nothing so hidden that they did not want to speak of it, they are often forced to forge weak and foolish conjectures—not that they themselves took them as a foundation, or to establish some truth, but as an exercise for their study. They seem not so much to have believed what they said as to have wished to exercise their wits on the difficulty of the subject. And if we did not take it so, how would we cover up so great an inconstancy, variety and vanity of opinions as we see produced by those excellent and admirable minds?

    Measuring God by ourselves

    Human opinions about God, from the philosophers to the myths, show only our own image.

    Car pour exemple, qu’est-il plus vain, que de vouloir deuiner Dieu par nos analogies et coniectures: le regler, et le monde, à nostre capacité et à nos loix? et nous seruir aux despens de la diuinité, de ce petit eschantillon de suffisance qu’il luy a pleu despartir à nostre naturelle condition? et par ce que nous ne pouuons estendre nostre veuë iusques en son glorieux siege, l’auoir ramené ça bas à nostre corruption et à nos miseres?

    For example, what is more vain than trying to divine God by our analogies and conjectures, to regulate him and the world to our capacity and our laws? And to use, at the expense of the divinity, that little sample of ability that it has pleased him to dispense to our natural condition? And, because we cannot extend our sight as far as his glorious throne, to have brought him down here to our corruption and our miseries?

    De toutes les opinions humaines et anciennes touchant la religion, celle là me semble auoir eu plus de vray-semblance et plus d’excuse, qui recognoissoit Dieu comme vne puissance incomprehensible, origine et conseruatrice de toutes choses, toute bonté, toute perfection, receuant et prenant en bonne part l’honneur et la reuerence, que les humains luy rendoient soubs quelque visage, soubs quelque nom et en quelque maniere que ce fust. Iupiter omnipotens, rerum, regúmque, Deûmque, / Progenitor, genitrixque. Ce zele vniuersellement a esté veu du ciel de bon œil. Toutes polices ont tiré fruit de leur deuotion. Les hommes, les actions impies, ont eu par tout les euenements sortables.

    Of all the human and ancient opinions concerning religion, the one that seems to me to have had the most likelihood and the most excuse is the one that recognized God as an incomprehensible power, origin and preserver of all things, all goodness, all perfection, receiving and taking in good part the honor and reverence that humans paid him under whatever face, whatever name and in whatever manner it might be. Almighty Jupiter, of things, of kings and of gods / The father and the mother. This zeal has everywhere been looked on with favor by heaven. All states have reaped fruit from their devotion. Impious men and impious actions have everywhere met with fitting outcomes.

    Lines of Valerius Soranus, quoted by Saint Augustine, City of God VII.9.

    Les histoires payennes recognoissent de la dignité, ordre, iustice, et des prodiges et oracles employez à leur profit et instruction, en leurs religions fabuleuses: Dieu par sa misericorde daignant à l’aduenture fomenter par ces benefices temporels, les tendres principes d’vne telle quelle brute cognoissance, que la raison naturelle leur donnoit de luy, au trauers des fausses images de leurs songes. Non seulement fausses, mais impies aussi et iniurieuses, sont celles que l’homme a forgé de son inuention. Et de toutes les religions, que Sainct Paul trouua en credit à Athenes, celle qu’ils auoyent dediée à vne diuinité cachée et incognue, luy sembla la plus excusable.

    Pagan histories recognize dignity, order and justice in their fabulous religions, and prodigies and oracles employed for their benefit and instruction: God in his mercy perhaps deigning to foster, by these temporal benefits, the tender beginnings of the crude sort of knowledge of him that natural reason gave them through the false images of their dreams. Not only false, but impious and insulting too, are those that man has forged by his own invention. And of all the religions that Saint Paul found in favor at Athens, the one they had dedicated to a hidden and unknown divinity seemed to him the most excusable.

    Acts 17:23, the altar “to an unknown god.”

    Pythagoras adombra la verité de plus pres: iugeant que la cognoissance de cette cause premiere, et estre des estres, deuoit estre indefinie, sans prescription, sans declaration: que ce n’estoit autre chose, que l’extreme effort de nostre imagination, vers la perfection: chacun en amplifiant l’idée selon sa capacité.

    Pythagoras outlined the truth more closely, judging that the knowledge of this first cause and being of beings must be undefined, without prescription, without declaration; that it was nothing else than the utmost effort of our imagination toward perfection, each man enlarging the idea according to his capacity.

    Mais si Numa entreprint de conformer à ce proiect la deuotion de son peuple: l’attacher à vne religion purement mentale, sans obiect prefix, et sans meslange materiel: il entreprint chose de nul vsage. L’esprit humain ne se sçauroit maintenir vaguant en cet infini de pensées informes: il les luy faut compiler à certaine image à son modelle. La majesté diuine s’est ainsi pour nous aucunement laissé circonscrire aux limites corporels. Ses sacrements supernaturels et celestes, ont des signes de nostre terrestre condition. Son adoration s’exprime par offices et paroles sensibles: car c’est l’homme, qui croid et qui prie. Ie laisse à part les autres arguments qui s’employent à ce subiect.

    But if Numa undertook to shape the devotion of his people to this plan—to attach it to a purely mental religion, with no set object and no material admixture—he undertook something of no use. The human mind cannot keep itself wandering in this infinity of formless thoughts; it must compile them into some image on its own model. Thus the divine majesty has in some measure let itself be confined for us within bodily limits. Its supernatural and heavenly sacraments bear signs of our earthly condition. Its worship is expressed in rites and words perceptible to the senses, for it is man who believes and prays. I leave aside the other arguments used on this subject.

    Numa Pompilius, the legendary second king of Rome, credited with founding its religious institutions.

    Mais à peine me feroit on accroire, que la veuë de noz crucifix, et peinture de ce piteux supplice, que les ornements et mouuements ceremonieux de noz eglises, que les voix accommodées à la deuotion de nostre pensée, et cette esmotion des sens n’eschauffent l’ame des peuples, d’vne passion religieuse, de tres-vtile effect.

    But it would be hard to make me believe that the sight of our crucifixes and the painting of that piteous torment, that the ornaments and ceremonial movements of our churches, that the voices attuned to the devotion of our thought, and this stirring of the senses do not warm the souls of the people with a religious passion of very useful effect.

    De celles ausquelles on a donné corps comme la necessité l’a requis, parmy cette cecité vniuerselle, ie me fusse, ce me semble, plus volontiers attaché à ceux qui adoroient le soleil, *La lumiere commune, / L’œil du monde: et si Dieu au chef porte des yeux, / Les rayons du soleil sont ses yeux radieux, / Qui donnent vie à tous, nous maintiennent et gardent, / Et les faicts des humains en ce monde regardent: / Ce beau, ce grand soleil, qui nous faict les saisons, / Selon qu’il entre ou sort de ses douze maisons: / Qui remplit l’vniuers de ses vertus cognues:

    Of those religions to which a body has been given, as necessity required, amid this universal blindness, I would, it seems to me, have more willingly attached myself to those who worshiped the sun, *The common light, / The eye of the world; and if God has eyes in his head, / The rays of the sun are his radiant eyes, / Which give life to all, maintain and guard us, / And watch over the deeds of humans in this world: / This fine, this great sun, which makes the seasons for us, / As it enters or leaves its twelve houses: / Which fills the universe with its known powers:

    Pierre de Ronsard, Remonstrance to the People of France (1563). The twelve houses are the signs of the zodiac.

    / Qui d’vn traict de ses yeux nous dissipe les nuës: / L’esprit, l’ame du monde, ardant et flamboyant, / En la course d’vn iour tout le ciel tournoyant, / Plein d’immense grandeur, rond, vagabond et ferme: / Lequel tient dessoubs luy tout le monde pour terme: / En repos sans repos, oysif, et sans seiour, / Fils aisné de nature, et le pere du iour.* D’autant qu’outre cette sienne grandeur et beauté, c’est la piece de cette machine, que nous descouurons la plus esloignée de nous: et par ce moyen si peu cognuë, qu’ils estoyent pardonnables, d’en entrer en admiration et reuerence.

    / Which with one glance of its eyes scatters the clouds for us: / The spirit, the soul of the world, burning and blazing, / In the course of one day circling the whole sky, / Full of immense greatness, round, wandering and fixed: / Which holds the whole world beneath it as its bound: / At rest without rest, idle, and never pausing, / Eldest son of nature, and the father of day.* For besides its grandeur and beauty, it is the part of this machine that we find farthest from us, and therefore so little known that they were pardonable for falling into admiration and reverence of it.

    Thales, qui le premier s’enquesta de telle matiere, estima Dieu vn esprit, qui fit d’eau toutes choses. Anaximander, que les Dieux estoyent mourants et naissants à diuerses saisons: et que c’estoyent des mondes infinis en nombre. Anaximenes, que l’air estoit Dieu, qu’il estoit produit et immense, tousiours mouuant. Anaxagoras le premier a tenu, la description et maniere de toutes choses, estre conduitte par la force et raison d’vn esprit infini. Alcmæon a donné la diuinité au soleil, à la lune, aux astres, et à l’ame. Pythagoras a faict Dieu, vn esprit espandu par la nature de toutes choses, d’où noz ames sont déprinses. Parmenide, vn cercle entournant le ciel, et maintenant le monde par l’ardeur de la lumiere.

    Thales, who was the first to inquire into such matters, considered God a mind that made all things out of water. Anaximander held that the gods were dying and being born at different seasons, and that they were worlds infinite in number. Anaximenes, that air was God, that it was produced and immense, always moving. Anaxagoras was the first to hold that the design and manner of all things was directed by the power and reason of an infinite mind. Alcmaeon gave divinity to the sun, the moon, the stars and the soul. Pythagoras made God a mind spread through the nature of all things, from which our souls are detached. Parmenides, a circle encircling the sky and sustaining the world by the heat of its light.

    This catalogue of opinions on the gods is drawn largely from Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, Book I.

    Empedocles disoit estre des Dieux, les quatre natures, desquelles toutes choses sont faittes. Protagoras, n’auoir rien que dire, s’ils sont ou non, ou quels ils sont. Democritus, tantost que les images et leurs circuitions sont Dieux: tantost cette nature, qui eslance ces images: et puis, nostre science et intelligence. Platon dissipe sa creance à diuers visages. Il dit au Timée, le pere du monde ne se pouuoir nommer. Aux Loix, qu’il ne se faut enquerir de son estre. Et ailleurs en ces mesmes liures il fait le monde, le ciel, les astres, la terre, et nos ames Dieux, et reçoit en outre ceux qui ont esté receuz par l’ancienne institution en chasque republique. Xenophon rapporte vn pareil trouble de la discipline de Socrates.

    Empedocles said that the gods were the four natures of which all things are made. Protagoras, that he had nothing to say about whether they exist or not, or what they are. Democritus said sometimes that images and their revolutions are gods; sometimes that the nature which sends forth these images is; and then, that our knowledge and understanding are. Plato scatters his belief among various guises. In the Timaeus he says that the father of the world cannot be named; in the Laws, that we must not inquire into his being. And elsewhere in these same books he makes the world, the sky, the stars, the earth and our souls gods, and accepts besides those that have been accepted by ancient custom in each state. Xenophon reports a similar confusion in the teaching of Socrates.

    Tantost qu’il ne se faut enquerir de la forme de Dieu: et puis il luy fait establir que le soleil est Dieu, et l’ame Dieu: qu’il n’y en a qu’vn, et puis qu’il y en a plusieurs. Speusippus neueu de Platon, fait Dieu certaine force gouuernant les choses, et qu’elle est animale. Aristote, à cette heure, que c’est l’esprit, à cette heure le monde: à cette heure il donne vn autre maistre à ce monde, et à cette heure fait Dieu l’ardeur du ciel. Xenocrates en fait huict. Les cinq nommez entre les planetes, le sixiesme composé de toutes les estoiles fixes, comme de ses membres: le septiesme et huictiesme, le soleil et la lune.

    Sometimes he says we must not inquire into the form of God; and then Xenophon has him lay down that the sun is God, and the soul is God; that there is only one, and then that there are several. Speusippus, Plato’s nephew, makes God a certain force that governs things, and says that it is a living being. Aristotle says now that it is mind, now the world; now he gives this world another master, and now he makes God the fire of the heavens. Xenocrates makes eight: the five that are named among the planets; the sixth composed of all the fixed stars, as its members; the seventh and eighth, the sun and the moon.

    Heraclides Ponticus ne fait que vaguer entre ses aduis, et en fin priue Dieu de sentiment: et le fait remuant de forme à autre, et puis dit que c’est le ciel et la terre. Theophraste se promeine de pareille irresolution entre toutes ses fantasies: attribuant l’intendance du monde tantost à l’entendement, tantost au ciel, tantost aux estoilles. Strato, que c’est Nature ayant la force d’engendrer, augmenter et diminuer, sans forme et sentiment. Zeno, la loy naturelle, commandant le bien et prohibant le mal: laquelle loy est vn animant: et oste les Dieux accoustumez, Iupiter, Iuno, Vesta, Diogenes Apolloniates, que c’est l’aage. Xenophanes faict Dieu rond, voyant, oyant, non respirant, n’ayant rien de commun auec l’humaine nature.

    Heraclides Ponticus does nothing but wander among his opinions, and in the end deprives God of feeling, and makes him shift from one form to another, and then says that he is the sky and the earth. Theophrastus strolls with the same irresolution among all his notions, attributing the governance of the world now to the understanding, now to the sky, now to the stars. Strato, that it is Nature, having the power to beget, increase and diminish, without form or feeling. Zeno, that it is natural law, commanding good and forbidding evil, which law is a living being; and he does away with the customary gods, Jupiter, Juno, Vesta. Diogenes of Apollonia, that it is age. Xenophanes makes God round, seeing, hearing, not breathing, having nothing in common with human nature.

    Cicero, Montaigne’s source, has Diogenes say that God is air.

    Aristo estime la forme de Dieu incomprenable, le priue de sens, et ignore s’il est animant ou autre chose. Cleanthes, tantost la raison, tantost le monde, tantost l’ame de Nature, tantost la chaleur supreme entourant et enuelopant tout. Perseus auditeur de Zenon, a tenu, qu’on a surnommé Dieux, ceux qui auoyent apporté quelque notable vtilité à l’humaine vie, et les choses mesmes profitables. Chrysippus faisoit vn amas confus de toutes les precedentes sentences, et compte entre mille formes de Dieux qu’il fait, les hommes aussi, qui sont immortalisez. Diagoras et Theodorus nioyent tout sec, qu’il y eust des Dieux.

    Aristo considers the form of God incomprehensible, deprives him of the senses, and does not know whether he is a living being or something else. Cleanthes says sometimes reason, sometimes the world, sometimes the soul of Nature, sometimes the supreme heat that surrounds and envelops everything. Perseus, a pupil of Zeno, held that the name of gods was given to those who had brought some notable benefit to human life, and to the useful things themselves. Chrysippus made a confused heap of all the foregoing views, and among the thousand forms of gods he creates he counts also men who have been immortalized. Diagoras and Theodorus flatly denied that there were any gods.

    Epicurus faict les Dieux luisants, transparents, et perflables, logez, comme entre deux forts, entre deux mondes, à couuert des coups: reuestus d’vne humaine figure et de nos membres, lesquels membres leur sont de nul vsage. Ego Deùm genus esse semper dixi, et dicam cælitum, / Sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus.

    Epicurus makes the gods shining, transparent and open to the passage of air, lodged, as between two forts, between two worlds, sheltered from blows; clothed in human shape and with our limbs, which limbs are of no use to them. I have always said, and will say, that there is a race of heavenly gods, / But I do not think they care what the human race does.

    Ennius, quoted by Cicero in On Divination.

    Fiez vous à vostre philosophie: vantez vous d’auoir trouué la feue au gasteau, à voir ce tintamarre de tant de ceruelles philosophiques. Le trouble des formes mondaines, a gaigné sur moy, que les diuerses mœurs et fantaisies aux miennes, ne me desplaisent pas tant, comme elles m’instruisent; ne m’enorgueillissent pas tant comme elles m’humilient en les conferant. Et tout autre choix que celuy qui vient de la main expresse de Dieu, me semble choix de peu de prerogatiue. Les polices du monde ne sont pas moins contraires en ce subiect, que les escholes: par où nous pouuons apprendre, que la Fortune mesme n’est pas plus diuerse et variable, que nostre raison, ny plus aueugle et inconsiderée.

    Trust in your philosophy! Boast that you have found the bean in the cake, when you see this din from so many philosophical brains! The confusion of worldly forms has won this much from me: that customs and notions different from mine do not so much displease me as instruct me, and do not so much make me proud as humble me when I compare them. And any choice other than the one that comes from the express hand of God seems to me a choice with little claim to preference. The governments of the world are no less at odds on this subject than the schools; from which we can learn that Fortune herself is no more diverse and changeable than our reason, nor more blind and heedless.

    Whoever found the bean baked into the Twelfth Night cake was crowned king of the feast.

    Les choses les plus ignorées sont plus propres à estre deifiées. Parquoy de faire de nous des Dieux, comme l’ancienneté, cela surpasse l’extreme foiblesse de discours. I’eusse encore plustost suyuy ceux qui adoroient le serpent, le chien et le bœuf: d’autant que leur nature et leur estre nous est moins cognu; et auons plus de loy d’imaginer ce qu’il nous plaist de ces bestes-là, et leur attribuer des facultez extraordinaires.

    The things we know least are the fittest to be deified. Therefore to make gods of ourselves, as antiquity did, goes beyond the utmost feebleness of reasoning. I would sooner have followed those who worshipped the serpent, the dog and the ox, since their nature and their being are less known to us, and we have more license to imagine what we please about those beasts and to attribute extraordinary faculties to them.

    Mais d’auoir faict des Dieux de nostre condition, de laquelle nous deuons cognoistre l’imperfection, leur auoir attribué le desir, la cholere, les vengeances, les mariages, les generations, et les parenteles, l’amour, et la ialousie, nos membres et nos os, nos fieures et nos plaisirs, nos morts et sepultures, il faut que cela soit party d’vne merueilleuse yuresse de l’entendement humain. *Quæ procul vsque adeo diuino ab numine distant, / Inque Deûm numero quæ sint indigna videri.

    But to have made gods of our own condition, whose imperfection we ought to know; to have attributed to them desire, anger, vengeance, marriages, procreation and kinship, love and jealousy, our limbs and our bones, our fevers and our pleasures, our deaths and burials—that must have come from an astonishing drunkenness of the human understanding. *Things so very far removed from the divine power, / And unworthy to be seen among the number of the gods.

    Formæ, ætates, vestitus, ornatus noti sunt: genera, coniugia, cognationes, omniáque traducta ad similitudinem imbecillitatis humanæ: nam et perturbatis animis inducuntur: accipimus enim Deorum cupiditates, ægritudines, iracundias. Comme d’auoir attribué la diuinité non seulement à la foy, à la vertu, à l’honneur, concorde, liberté, victoire, pieté: mais aussi à la volupté, fraude, mort, enuie, vieillesse, misere: à la peur, à la fieure, et à la male fortune, et autres iniures de nostre vie, fresle et caduque. Quid iuuat hoc, templis nostros inducere mores? / O curuæ in terris animæ et cælestium inanes!*

    Their forms, ages, clothing and ornaments are known; their lineages, marriages, kinships, and everything else has been made to resemble human weakness; for they are even portrayed with troubled minds: we hear of the lusts, the sorrows, the rages of the gods. It is like having attributed divinity not only to faith, virtue, honor, concord, liberty, victory and piety, but also to pleasure, fraud, death, envy, old age and misery; to fear, to fever and to ill fortune, and to the other injuries of our frail and perishable life. What good is it to bring our ways into the temples? / O souls bent down to earth and empty of heavenly things!*

    The prose is from Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods; the verse is from Persius, Satires II.

    Les Ægyptiens d’vne impudente prudence, defendoyent sur peine de la hart, que nul eust à dire que Serapis et Isis leurs Dieux, eussent autres fois esté hommes: et nul n’ignoroit, qu’ils ne l’eussent esté. Et leur effigie representée le doigt sur la bouche, signifioit, dit Varro, cette ordonnance mysterieuse à leurs prestres, de taire leur origine mortelle, comme par raison necessaire anullant toute leur veneration. Puis que l’homme desiroit tant de s’apparier à Dieu, il eust mieux faict, dit Cicero, de ramener à soy les conditions diuines, et les attirer çà bas, que d’envoyer là haut sa corruption et sa misere: mais à le bien prendre, il a fait en plusieurs façons, et l’vn, et l’autre, de pareille vanité d’opinion.

    The Egyptians, with shameless prudence, forbade on pain of hanging that anyone should say that Serapis and Isis, their gods, had once been human; and no one was unaware that they had been. And their image, shown with a finger to the lips, signified, says Varro, this mysterious command to their priests to keep silent about their mortal origin, since by necessary reason that would annul all veneration for them. Since man so desired to make himself God’s equal, he would have done better, says Cicero, to bring the divine qualities down to himself and draw them here below, than to send his corruption and misery up there. But rightly considered, he has done both, in several ways, with equal vanity of opinion.

    Quand les philosophes espeluchent la hierarchie de leurs Dieux, et font les empressez à distinguer leurs alliances, leurs charges, et leur puissance, ie ne puis pas croire qu’ils parlent à certes. Quand Platon nous dechiffre le verger de Pluton, et les commoditez ou peines corporelles, qui nous attendent encore apres la ruine et aneantissement de nos corps, et les accommode au ressentiment, que nous auons en cette vie: Secreti celant calles, et myrtea circùm / Sylua tegit; curæ non ipsa in morte relinquunt. Quand Mahumet promet aux siens vn paradis tapissé, paré d’or et de pierreries, peuplé de garses d’excellente beauté, de vins, et de viures singuliers, ie voy bien que ce sont des moqueurs qui se plient à nostre bestise, pour nous emmieller et attirer par ces opinions et esperances, conuenables à nostre mortel appetit.

    When philosophers pick apart the hierarchy of their gods and bustle about distinguishing their alliances, their offices and their power, I cannot believe they are speaking in earnest. When Plato deciphers for us Pluto’s orchard, and the bodily comforts or pains that still await us after the ruin and annihilation of our bodies, and fits them to the feelings we have in this life: Hidden paths conceal them, and a myrtle wood / Surrounds them; their cares do not leave them even in death. When Muhammad promises his followers a paradise hung with tapestries, adorned with gold and precious stones, peopled with girls of surpassing beauty, with wines and choice foods, I see clearly that these are mockers who bend to our stupidity, to sweeten us with honey and lure us with these notions and hopes suited to our mortal appetite.

    Virgil, Aeneid VI, on the lovers in the underworld.

    Si sont aucuns des nostres tombez en pareil erreur, se promettants apres la resurrection vne vie terrestre et temporelle, accompagnée de toutes sortes de plaisirs et commoditez mondaines. Croyons nous que Platon, luy qui a eu ses conceptions si celestes, et si grande accointance à la diuinité, que le surnom luy en est demeuré, ait estimé que l’homme, cette pauure creature, eust rien en luy d’applicable à cette incomprehensible puissance? et qu’il ait creu que nos prises languissantes fussent capables, ny la force de nostre sens assez robuste, pour participer à la beatitude, ou peine eternelle?

    Indeed some of our own have fallen into the same error, promising themselves after the resurrection an earthly and temporal life, accompanied by every kind of worldly pleasure and comfort. Do we believe that Plato—he whose conceptions were so heavenly, and whose acquaintance with divinity was so close that the surname has stayed with him—thought that man, that poor creature, had anything in him applicable to that incomprehensible power? And that he believed our feeble grasp capable, or the strength of our senses robust enough, to share in eternal bliss or eternal pain?

    Plato was traditionally called “the divine Plato.”

    Il faudroit luy dire de la part de la raison humaine: Si les plaisirs que tu nous promets en l’autre vie, sont de ceux que i’ay senti çà bas, cela n’a rien de commun auec l’infinité. Quand tous mes cinq sens de nature, seroient combles de liesse, et cette ame saisie de tout le contentement qu’elle peut desirer et esperer, nous sçauons ce qu’elle peut: cela, ce ne seroit encore rien. S’il y a quelque chose du mien, il n’y a rien de diuin: si cela n’est autre, que ce qui peut appartenir à cette nostre condition presente, il ne peut estre mis en compte. Tout contentement des mortels est mortel.

    One would have to tell him, on behalf of human reason: If the pleasures you promise us in the other life are of the kind I have felt here below, that has nothing in common with infinity. Even if all five of my natural senses were filled to the brim with joy, and this soul seized with all the contentment it can desire and hope for—and we know what it is capable of—that would still be nothing. If there is anything of mine in it, there is nothing divine in it; if it is nothing other than what can belong to this present condition of ours, it cannot be taken into account. All the contentment of mortals is mortal.

    La recognoissance de nos parens, de nos enfans, et de nos amis, si elle nous peut toucher et chatouïller en l’autre monde, si nous tenons encores à vn tel plaisir, nous sommes dans les commoditez terrestres et finies. Nous ne pouuons dignement conceuoir la grandeur de ces hautes et diuines promesses, si nous les pouuons aucunement conceuoir. Pour dignement les imaginer, il les faut imaginer inimaginables, indicibles et incomprehensibles, et parfaictement autres, que celles de nostre miserable experience. Oeuil ne sçauroit voir, dit Sainct Paul: et ne peut monter en cœur d’homme, l’heur que Dieu prepare aux siens.

    If recognizing our parents, our children and our friends can touch and tickle us in the other world, if we still cling to such a pleasure, then we are among earthly and finite comforts. We cannot worthily conceive the greatness of those lofty and divine promises, if we can conceive them at all. To imagine them worthily, we must imagine them unimaginable, unspeakable and incomprehensible, and wholly different from those of our wretched experience. Eye cannot see, says Saint Paul, nor can it enter into the heart of man, the happiness that God prepares for his own.

    1 Corinthians 2:9.

    Et si pour nous en rendre capables, on reforme et rechange nostre estre, comme tu dis Platon par tes purifications, ce doit estre d’vn si extreme changement et si vniuersel, que par la doctrine physique, ce ne sera plus nous: Hector erat tunc cùm bello certabat, at ille / Tractus ab Æmonio non erat Hector equo; ce sera quelque autre chose qui receura ces recompenses. Quod mutatur, dissoluitur, interit ergo: / Traiiciuntur enim partes atque ordine migrant.

    And if, to make us capable of them, our being is reshaped and changed, as you say, Plato, by your purifications, it must be by so extreme and so universal a change that, by the teaching of physics, it will no longer be us: Hector he was while he fought in war; but the one / Dragged behind the Thessalian horses was not Hector; it will be something else that receives those rewards. What is changed is dissolved, and therefore perishes; / For its parts are shifted and move out of their order.

    The first quotation is from Ovid, Tristia III; the second from Lucretius.

    Car en la Metempsycose de Pythagoras, et changement d’habitation qu’il imaginoit aux ames, pensons nous que le lyon, dans lequel est l’ame de Cæsar, espouse les passions, qui touchoient Cæsar, ny que ce soit luy? Si c’estoit encore luy, ceux là auroyent raison, qui combattants cette opinion contre Platon, luy reprochent que le fils se pourroit trouuer à cheuaucher sa mere, reuestuë d’vn corps de mule, et semblables absurditez. Et pensons nous qu’és mutations qui se font des corps des animaux en autres de mesme espece, les nouueaux venus ne soyent autres que leurs predecesseurs? Des cendres d’vn phœnix s’engendre, dit-on, vn ver, et puis vn autre phœnix: ce second phœnix, qui peut imaginer, qu’il ne soit autre que le premier?

    For in the metempsychosis of Pythagoras, the change of dwelling he imagined for souls, do we think that the lion in which Caesar’s soul dwells takes on the passions that moved Caesar, or that it is he? If it were still he, those would be right who, attacking this opinion in Plato, reproach him that a son might find himself riding his mother, clothed in the body of a mule, and similar absurdities. And do we think that in the changes made from the bodies of animals into others of the same species, the newcomers are no different from their predecessors? From the ashes of a phoenix, they say, is born a worm, and then another phoenix: who can imagine that this second phoenix is no other than the first?

    Les vers qui font nostre soye, on les void comme mourir et assecher, et de ce mesme corps se produire vn papillon, et de là vn autre ver, qu’il seroit ridicule estimer estre encores le premier. Ce qui a cessé vne fois d’estre, n’est plus: Nec si materiam nostram collegerit ætas / Post obitum, rursúmque redegerit, vt sita nunc est, / Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitæ, / Pertineat quidquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, / Interrupta semel cùm sit repetentia nostra. Et quand tu dis ailleurs Platon, que ce sera la partie spirituelle de l’homme, à qui il touchera de iouyr des recompenses de l’autre vie, tu nous dis chose d’aussi peu d’apparence.

    The worms that make our silk—we see them, as it were, die and dry up, and from that same body a moth come forth, and from that another worm, which it would be ridiculous to think is still the first. What has once ceased to be is no more: Nor, if time should gather up our matter after death / And put it back again as it is now arranged, / And the light of life were given to us once more, / Would that event concern us in the least, / Once the thread of our memory had been broken. And when you say elsewhere, Plato, that it will be the spiritual part of man that is to enjoy the rewards of the other life, you tell us something just as improbable.

    Scilicet auolsus radicibus vt nequit vllam / Dispicere ipse oculus rem seorsum corpore toto. Car à ce compte ce ne sera plus l’homme, ny nous par consequent, à qui touchera cette iouyssance. Car nous sommes bastis de deux pieces principales essentielles, desquelles la separation, c’est la mort et ruyne de nostre estre. Inter enim iacta est vitaï pausa, vagèque / Deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes. Nous ne disons pas que l’homme souffre, quand les vers luy rongent ses membres, dequoy il viuoit, et que la terre les consomme: Et nihil hoc ad nos, qui coitu coniugióque / Corporis atque animæ consistimus vniter apti.

    Just as the eye, torn out by its roots, / Cannot see anything when separated from the whole body. For on that reckoning it will no longer be the man, nor consequently us, to whom that enjoyment will fall. For we are built of two principal, essential parts, whose separation is the death and ruin of our being. For a break in life has been thrust between, and all the motions / Have wandered off, scattered far and wide, away from the senses. We do not say that the man suffers when the worms gnaw the limbs he lived by, and the earth consumes them: And this is nothing to us, who exist as one whole / Formed by the union and marriage of body and soul.

    D’auantage, sur quel fondement de leur iustice peuuent les Dieux recognoistre et recompenser à l’homme apres sa mort ses actions bonnes et vertueuses: puis que ce sont eux mesmes, qui les ont acheminées et produites en luy? Et pourquoy s’offencent ils et vengent sur luy les vitieuses, puis qu’ils l’ont eux-mesmes produict en cette condition fautiue, et que d’vn seul clin de leur volonté, ils le peuuent empescher de faillir? Epicurus opposeroit-il pas cela à Platon, auec grand’apparence de l’humaine raison, s’il ne se couuroit souuent par cette sentence. Qu’il est impossible d’establir quelque chose de certain, de l’immortelle nature, par la mortelle? Elle ne fait que fouruoyer par tout, mais specialement quand elle se mesle des choses diuines.

    Moreover, on what foundation of their justice can the gods recognize and reward man after his death for his good and virtuous actions, since it was they themselves who set them going and produced them in him? And why are they offended by his vicious actions and why do they avenge them on him, since they themselves produced him in this faulty condition, and with a single wink of their will they could keep him from going wrong? Would not Epicurus set this against Plato, with great plausibility in human reason, if he did not often shelter behind this maxim: that it is impossible to establish anything certain about immortal nature by means of mortal nature? Mortal nature does nothing but go astray everywhere, but especially when it meddles with divine things.

    Qui le sent plus euidemment que nous? Car encores que nous luy ayons donné des principes certains et infallibles, encore que nous esclairions ses pas par la saincte lampe de la verité, qu’il a pleu à Dieu nous communiquer: nous voyons pourtant iournellement, pour peu qu’elle se démente du sentier ordinaire, et qu’elle se destourne ou escarte de la voye tracée et battuë par l’Eglise, comme tout aussi tost elle se perd, s’embarrasse et s’entraue, tournoyant et flotant dans cette mer vaste, trouble, et ondoyante des opinions humaines, sans bride et sans but. Aussi tost qu’elle pert ce grand et commun chemin, elle se va diuisant et dissipant en mille routes diuerses.

    Who feels this more plainly than we do? For although we have given it certain and infallible principles, although we light its steps with the holy lamp of truth that it has pleased God to impart to us, we nevertheless see every day that as soon as it strays ever so little from the ordinary path, and turns aside or wanders from the road traced and trodden by the Church, at once it loses itself, entangles and fetters itself, whirling and drifting on this vast, troubled and billowing sea of human opinions, without bridle and without goal. As soon as it loses that great common highway, it goes dividing and scattering into a thousand different routes.

    L’homme ne peut estre que ce qu’il est, ny imaginer que selon sa portée. C’est plus grande presomption, dit Plutarque, à ceux qui ne sont qu’hommes, d’entreprendre de parler et discourir des Dieux, et des demy-Dieux, que ce n’est à vn homme ignorant de musique, vouloir iuger de ceux qui chantent: ou à vn homme qui ne fut iamais au camp, vouloir disputer des armes et de la guerre, en presumant comprendre par quelque legere coniecture, les effects d’vn art qui est hors de sa cognoissance.

    Man can be only what he is, and imagine only according to his reach. It is greater presumption, says Plutarch, for those who are only men to undertake to speak and reason about gods and demigods than it is for a man ignorant of music to try to judge singers, or for a man who was never in an army camp to try to argue about arms and war, presuming to understand by some slight conjecture the workings of a skill that lies outside his knowledge.

    L’ancienneté pensa, ce croy-ie, faire quelque chose pour la grandeur diuine, de l’apparier à l’homme, la vestir de ses facultez, et estrener de ses belles humeurs et plus honteuses necessitez: luy offrant de nos viandes à manger, de nos danses, mommeries et farces à la resiouïr: de nos vestemens à se couurir, et maisons à loger, la caressant par l’odeur des encens et sons de la musique, festons et bouquets, et pour l’accommoder à noz vicieuses passions, flatant sa iustice d’vne inhumaine vengeance: l’esiouïssant de la ruine et dissipation des choses par elle creées et conseruées.

    Antiquity thought, I believe, that it was doing something for the divine greatness by likening it to man, clothing it with his faculties, and presenting it with his fine moods and his most shameful necessities: offering it our foods to eat, our dances, mummeries and farces to amuse it, our clothes to cover itself and our houses to live in; caressing it with the scent of incense and the sound of music, with garlands and nosegays; and, to fit it to our vicious passions, flattering its justice with an inhuman vengeance, delighting it with the ruin and destruction of the things it had created and preserved.

    Comme Tiberius Sempronius, qui fit brusler pour sacrifice à Vulcan, les riches despouilles et armes qu’il auoit gaigné sur les ennemis en la Sardeigne: et Paul Æmyle, celles de Macedoine, à Mars et à Minerue. Et Alexandre, arriué à l’Ocean Indique, ietta en mer en faueur de Thetis, plusieurs grands vases d’or: remplissant en outre ses autels d’vne boucherie non de bestes innocentes seulement, mais d’hommes aussi: ainsi que plusieurs nations, et entre autres la nostre, auoyent en vsage ordinaire. Et croy qu’il n’en est aucune exempte d’en auoir faict essay. Sulmone creatos / Quattuor hic iuuenes totidem, quos educat Vfens, / Viuentes rapit, inferias quos immolet vmbris. Les Getes se tiennent immortels, et leur mourir n’est que s’acheminer vers leur Dieu Zamolxis.

    Like Tiberius Sempronius, who had the rich spoils and arms he had won from the enemy in Sardinia burned as a sacrifice to Vulcan; and Paulus Aemilius those of Macedonia, to Mars and Minerva. And Alexander, having reached the Indian Ocean, threw several great golden vessels into the sea in honor of Thetis, filling his altars besides with a slaughter not only of innocent beasts but of men too—as several nations, and among others our own, commonly practiced. And I believe there is none that has not tried it. Four young men born at Sulmo, / And as many reared by the Ufens, he seizes here / Alive, to sacrifice them as offerings to the shades. The Getae consider themselves immortal, and for them dying is merely setting out toward their god Zamolxis.

    The verse is Virgil, Aeneid X, on Aeneas taking captives to sacrifice at Pallas’s funeral; the Getae, a Thracian people, are described by Herodotus.

    De cinq en cinq ans ils depeschent vers luy quelqu’vn d’entre eux, pour le requerir des choses necessaires. Ce deputé est choisi au sort. Et la forme de le depescher apres l’auoir de bouche informé de sa charge, est, que de ceux qui l’assistent, trois tiennent debout autant de iauelines, sur lesquelles les autres le lancent à force de bras. S’il vient à s’enferrer en lieu mortel, et qu’il trespasse soudain, ce leur est certain argument de faueur diuine: s’il en eschappe, ils l’estiment meschant et execrable, et en deputent encore vn autre de mesmes.

    Every five years they dispatch one of their number to him, to ask him for the things they need. This envoy is chosen by lot. And the manner of dispatching him, after he has been told his errand by word of mouth, is this: of those attending him, three hold up as many javelins, onto which the others hurl him with all the strength of their arms. If he happens to be pierced in a mortal spot and dies at once, that is a sure sign to them of divine favor; if he survives, they consider him wicked and accursed, and send off yet another in the same way.

    Amestris mere de Xerxes, deuenuë vieille, fit pour vne fois enseuelir touts vifs quatorze iouuenceaux des meilleures maisons de Perse, suyuant la religion du pays, pour gratifier à quelque Dieu sousterrain. Encore auiourd’huy les idoles de Themixtitan se cimentent du sang des petits enfants: et n’aiment sacrifice que de ces pueriles et pures ames: iustice affamée du sang de l’innocence. Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum! Les Carthaginois immoloient leurs propres enfans à Saturne: et qui n’en auoit point, en achetoit, estant cependant le pere et la mere tenus d’assister à cet office, auec contenance gaye et contente.

    Amestris, mother of Xerxes, having grown old, once had fourteen young men from the best families of Persia buried alive at one time, following the religion of the country, to gratify some underground god. Even today the idols of Temixtitan are cemented with the blood of little children, and they like no sacrifice but these young and pure souls: a justice starved for the blood of innocence. So many evils could religion prompt! The Carthaginians sacrificed their own children to Saturn, and anyone who had none bought some; the father and mother, meanwhile, were obliged to attend this rite with a cheerful and contented face.

    Temixtitan is Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital (now Mexico City); the Latin line is Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.

    C’estoit vne estrange fantasie, de vouloir payer la bonté diuine, de nostre affliction. Comme les Lacedemoniens qui mignardoient leur Diane, par bourrellement des ieunes garçons, qu’ils faisoyent fouëter en sa faueur, souuent iusques à la mort.

    It was a strange notion, to want to pay divine goodness with our affliction. Like the Lacedaemonians, who pampered their Diana by tormenting young boys, whom they had whipped in her honor, often to death.

    C’estoit vne humeur farouche, de vouloir gratifier l’architecte de la subuersion de son bastiment: et de vouloir garentir la peine deuë aux coulpables, par la punition des non coulpables: et que la pauure Iphigenia au port d’Aulide, par sa mort et par son immolation deschargeast enuers Dieu l’armée des Grecs des offences qu’ils auoyent commises: Et casta incestè nubendi tempore in ipso / Hostia concideret mactatu mœsta parentis: et ces deux belles et genereuses ames des deux Decius, pere et fils, pour propitier la faueur des Dieux enuers les affaires Romaines, s’allassent ietter à corps perdu à trauers le plus espez des ennemis. Quæ fuit tanta Deorum iniquitas, vt placari populo Romano non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent?

    It was a ferocious notion, to want to gratify the architect by overthrowing his building; and to want to spare the guilty their due penalty by punishing the guiltless; and that poor Iphigenia, at the port of Aulis, should by her death and sacrifice absolve the Greek army before God of the offenses they had committed: And that, a chaste victim, at the very time of her marriage, she should fall unchastely, / A sorrowing sacrifice, slain by her father’s stroke; and that those two fine and noble souls, the two Decii, father and son, to win the gods’ favor for Roman affairs, should go and hurl themselves headlong into the thickest of the enemy. What great injustice was it in the gods that they could not be appeased toward the Roman people unless such men had died?

    Publius Decius Mus, father and son, each vowed himself to death in battle (340 and 295 BC) to win victory for Rome; the prose quotation is from Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods III.

    Ioint que ce n’est pas au criminel de se faire fouëter à sa mesure, et à son heure: c’est au iuge, qui ne met en compte de chastiment, que la peine qu’il ordonne: et ne peut attribuer à punition ce qui vient à gré à celuy qui le souffre. La vengeance diuine presuppose nostre dissentiment entier, pour sa iustice, et pour nostre peine. Et fut ridicule l’humeur de Polycrates tyran de Samos, lequel pour interrompre le cours de son continuel bon heur, et le compenser, alla ietter en mer le plus cher et precieux ioyau qu’il eust, estimant que par ce malheur aposté, il satisfaisoit à la reuolution et vissicitude de la Fortune.

    Besides, it is not for the criminal to have himself whipped by his own measure and at his own time; it is for the judge, who counts as chastisement only the penalty he orders, and cannot regard as punishment what is welcome to the one who suffers it. Divine vengeance presupposes our complete unwillingness, for its justice and for our penalty. And ridiculous was the whim of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, who, to interrupt the course of his continual good fortune and make up for it, went and threw into the sea the dearest and most precious jewel he had, thinking that by this staged misfortune he was paying his due to the turns and vicissitudes of Fortune.

    Et elle pour se moquer de son ineptie, fit que ce mesme ioyau reuinst encore en ses mains, trouué au ventre d’vn poisson. Et puis à quel vsage, les deschirements et desmembrements des Corybantes, des Menades, et en noz temps des Mahometans, qui s’esbalaffrent le visage, l’estomach, les membres, pour gratifier leur prophete: veu que l’offence consiste en la volonté, non en la poictrine, aux yeux, aux genitoires, en l’embonpoinct, aux espaules, et au gosier?

    And she, to mock his foolishness, made that same jewel come back into his hands, found in the belly of a fish. And then, what is the use of the tearings and dismemberings of the Corybantes, of the Maenads, and in our own times of the Muslims who slash their faces, chests and limbs to gratify their prophet—seeing that the offense lies in the will, not in the breast, the eyes, the genitals, the fleshiness, the shoulders or the throat?

    The Corybantes were the frenzied priests of Cybele; the Maenads, the ecstatic women followers of Bacchus.

    Tantus est perturbatæ mentis et sedibus suis pulsæ furor, vt sic Dij placentur, quemadmodum ne homines quidem sæuiunt. Cette contexture naturelle regarde par son vsage, non seulement nous, mais aussi le seruice de Dieu et des autres hommes: c’est iniustice de l’affoler à notre escient, comme de nous tuer pour quelque pretexte que ce soit. Ce semble estre grand lascheté et trahison, de mastiner et corrompre les functions du corps, stupides et serues, pour espargner à l’ame, la solicitude de les conduire selon raison. Vbi iratos Deos timent, qui sic propitios habere merentur? In regiæ libidinis voluptatem castrati sunt quidam; sed nemo sibi, ne vir esset, iubente Domino, manus intulit. Ainsi remplissoyent ils leur religion de plusieurs mauuais effects.

    Such is the frenzy of the mind when it is disturbed and driven from its seat that the gods are appeased in ways in which not even men rage. This natural fabric of ours, by its use, concerns not only ourselves but also the service of God and of other men; it is injustice to damage it knowingly, as it is to kill ourselves on any pretext whatever. It seems great cowardice and treachery to maul and corrupt the functions of the body, dull and servile as they are, in order to spare the soul the trouble of directing them according to reason. Where do they fear the gods’ anger, who think they earn their favor in this way? Some men have been castrated for the pleasure of a king’s lust; but no one, at a master’s command, has laid hands on himself so as not to be a man. Thus they filled their religion with many evil effects.

    Both Latin passages are from Saint Augustine, City of God VI, quoting Seneca.

    Sæpius olim / Religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta.

    All too often in the past / Religion has given birth to criminal and impious deeds.

    Setting bounds to God

    We tie God to our laws of nature and our grammar, though nothing of ours fits him.

    Or rien du nostre ne se peut apparier ou raporter en quelque façon que ce soit, à la nature diuine, qui ne la tache et marque d’autant d’imperfection. Cette infinie beauté, puissance, et bonté, comment peut elle souffrir quelque correspondance et similitude à chose si abiecte que nous sommes, sans vn extreme interest et dechet de sa diuine grandeur? Infirmum Dei fortius est hominibus: et stultum Dei sapientius est hominibus. Stilpon le philosophe interrogé si les Dieux s’esiouïssent de nos honneurs et sacrifices: Vous estes indiscret, respondit il: retirons nous à part, si vous voulez parler de cela.

    Now nothing of ours can be likened or related in any way whatsoever to the divine nature without staining and marking it with just so much imperfection. How can that infinite beauty, power and goodness admit any correspondence and likeness to so abject a thing as we are, without extreme injury and loss to its divine greatness? The weakness of God is stronger than men, and the foolishness of God is wiser than men. Stilpo the philosopher, asked whether the gods rejoice in our honors and sacrifices, replied: “You are indiscreet; let us step aside if you want to talk about that.”

    1 Corinthians 1:25.

    Toutesfois nous luy prescriuons des bornes, nous tenons sa puissance assiegée par nos raisons (i’appelle raison nos resueries et nos songes, auec la dispense de la philosophie, qui dit, le fol mesme et le meschant, forcener par raison: mais que c’est vne raison de particuliere forme) nous le voulons asseruir aux apparences vaines et foibles de nostre entendement, luy qui a faict et nous et nostre cognoissance. Par ce que rien ne se fait de rien, Dieu n’aura sçeu bastir le monde sans matiere. Quoy, Dieu nous a-il mis en main les clefs et les derniers ressorts de sa puissance? S’est-il obligé à n’outrepasser les bornes de nostre science?

    Yet we prescribe limits to him, we hold his power besieged by our reasons (I call reason our ravings and our dreams, with the dispensation of philosophy, which says that even the fool and the wicked man rave by reason, but that it is a reason of a particular kind); we want to subject him to the vain and feeble appearances of our understanding—him who made both us and our knowledge. Because nothing is made from nothing, God will not have been able to build the world without matter. What! Has God put into our hands the keys and the ultimate springs of his power? Has he bound himself not to go beyond the limits of our knowledge?

    Mets le cas, ô homme, que tu ayes peu remarquer icy quelques traces de ses effects: penses-tu qu’il y ayt employé tout ce qu’il a peu, et qu’il ayt mis toutes ses formes et toutes ses idées, en cet ouurage? Tu ne vois que l’ordre et la police de ce petit caueau où tu és logé, au moins si tu la vois: sa diuinité a vne iurisdiction infinie au delà: cette piece n’est rien au prix du tout: Omnia cùm cœlo terráque marique, / Nil sunt ad summam summaï totius omnem. C’est vne loy municipale que tu allegues, tu ne sçays pas quelle est l’vniuerselle.

    Suppose, O man, that you have been able to make out a few traces of his works here: do you think he has spent on this work all that he could, and put into it all his forms and all his ideas? You see only the order and government of this little cell in which you are lodged—at least if you see that much; his divinity has an infinite jurisdiction beyond it; this piece is nothing compared to the whole: All things, with sky and earth and sea, / Are nothing beside the total sum of the whole sum. It is a local bylaw that you cite; you do not know what the universal law is.

    Attache toy à ce à quoy tu és subiect, mais non pas luy: il n’est pas ton confraire, ou concitoyen, ou compaignon. S’il s’est aucunement communiqué à toy, ce n’est pas pour se raualer à ta petitesse, ny pour te donner le contrerolle de son pouuoir. Le corps humain ne peut voler aux nuës, c’est pour toy: le soleil bransle sans seiour sa course ordinaire: les bornes des mers et de la terre ne se peuuent confondre: l’eau est instable et sans fermeté: vn mur est sans froissure impenetrable à un corps solide; l’homme ne peut conseruer sa vie dans les flammes: il ne peut estre et au ciel et en la terre, et en mille lieux ensemble corporellement.

    Bind yourself to what you are subject to, but do not bind him: he is not your colleague, or fellow citizen, or companion. If he has revealed himself to you in some degree, it is not to lower himself to your littleness, nor to give you oversight of his power. The human body cannot fly to the clouds: that is for you. The sun moves ceaselessly on its ordinary course; the boundaries of sea and land cannot be confounded; water is unstable and without firmness; a wall without a breach is impenetrable to a solid body; man cannot preserve his life in flames; he cannot be bodily in heaven and on earth and in a thousand places at once.

    C’est pour toy qu’il a faict ces regles: c’est toy qu’elles attaquent. Il a tesmoigné aux Chrestiens qu’il les a toutes franchies quand il luy a pleu. De vray pourquoy tout puissant, comme il est, auroit il restreint ses forces à certaine mesure? en faueur de qui auroit il renoncé son priuilege?

    It is for you that he made these rules; it is you they bind. He has shown Christians that he has overstepped them all whenever it pleased him. Indeed, why, all-powerful as he is, would he have restricted his strength to a certain measure? In whose favor would he have renounced his privilege?

    Ta raison n’a en aucune autre chose plus de verisimilitude et de fondement, qu’en ce qu’elle te persuade la pluralité des mondes, Terrámque, et solem, lunam, mare, cætera quæ sunt, / Non esse vnica, sed numero magis innumerali. Les plus fameux esprits du temps passé, l’ont creuë; et aucuns des nostres mesmes, forcez par l’apparence de la raison humaine. D’autant qu’en ce bastiment, que nous voyons, il n’y a rien seul et vn, Cùm in summa res nulla sit vna, / Vnica quæ gignatur, et vnica soláque crescat: et que toutes les especes sont multipliées en quelque nombre. Par où il semble n’estre pas vray-semblable, que Dieu ait faict ce seul ouurage sans compaignon?

    There is nothing in which your reason has more probability and foundation than when it persuades you of the plurality of worlds: That the earth and the sun, the moon, the sea, and all the rest that exist, / Are not unique, but rather numberless in number. The most famous minds of the past believed it, and even some of our own, compelled by the appearance of human reason. For in this structure that we see there is nothing single and alone, Since in the sum of things there is no one thing / That is born unique and grows unique and alone, and all species are multiplied in some number. From which it seems improbable that God made this one work without a companion?

    et que la matiere de cette forme ayt esté toute espuisée en ce seul indiuidu. Quare etiam atque etiam tales fateare necesse est, / Esse alios alibi congressus materiaï, / Qualis hic est auido complexu quem tenet æther. Notamment si c’est vn animant, comme ses mouuemens le rendent si croyable, que Platon l’asseure, et plusieurs des nostres ou le confirment, ou ne l’osent infirmer: non plus que cette ancienne opinion, que le ciel, les estoilles, et autres membres du monde, sont creatures composées de corps et ame: mortelles, en consideration de leur composition: mais immortelles par la determination du createur.

    and that the matter of this form has been entirely used up in this single individual. Wherefore you must admit again and again / That there are elsewhere other gatherings of matter / Like this one, which the ether holds in its greedy embrace. Especially if it is a living being, as its movements make so credible that Plato affirms it, and many of our own either confirm it or dare not deny it; no more than they deny that ancient opinion that the sky, the stars and the other members of the world are creatures composed of body and soul: mortal by reason of their composition, but immortal by the decree of the creator.

    Or s’il y a plusieurs mondes, comme Democritus, Epicurus et presque toute la philosophie a pensé, que sçauons nous si les principes et les regles de cestuy-cy touchent pareillement les autres? Ils ont à l’auanture autre visage et autre police. Epicurus les imagine ou semblables, ou dissemblables. Nous voyons en ce monde vne infinie difference et varieté, pour la seule distance des lieux. Ny le bled ny le vin se voit, ny aucun de nos animaux, en ce nouueau coin du monde, que nos peres ont descouuert: tout y est diuers. Et au temps passé, voyez en combien de parties du monde on n’auoit cognoissance ny de Bacchus, ny de Ceres.

    Now if there are several worlds, as Democritus, Epicurus and almost all philosophy have thought, how do we know whether the principles and rules of this one apply likewise to the others? Perhaps they have a different face and a different order. Epicurus imagines them either similar or dissimilar. We see in this world an infinite difference and variety merely from distance of place. Neither wheat nor wine is to be seen, nor any of our animals, in that new corner of the world which our fathers discovered; everything there is different. And in times past, see in how many parts of the world people had no knowledge of either Bacchus or Ceres.

    Qui en voudra croire Pline et Herodote, il y a des especes d’hommes en certains endroits, qui ont fort peu de ressemblance à la nostre. Et y a des formes mestisses et ambigues, entre l’humaine nature et la brutale.

    If you will believe Pliny and Herodotus, there are species of men in certain places that bear very little resemblance to ours. And there are mixed and ambiguous forms between human nature and that of beasts.

    Il y a des contrées où les hommes naissent sans teste, portant les yeux et la bouche en la poitrine: où ils sont tous androgynes: où ils marchent de quatre pates: où ils n’ont qu’vn œil au front, et la teste plus semblable à celle d’vn chien qu’à la nostre: où ils sont moitié poisson par embas, et viuent en l’eau: où les femmes accouchent à cinq ans, et n’en viuent que huict: où ils ont la teste si dure et la peau du front, que le fer n’y peut mordre, et rebouche contre: où les hommes sont sans barbe: des nations, sans vsage de feu: d’autres qui rendent le sperme de couleur noire.

    There are regions where men are born without heads, with their eyes and mouth in their chests; where they are all androgynous; where they walk on all fours; where they have only one eye, in the forehead, and a head more like a dog’s than ours; where they are half fish from the waist down and live in the water; where the women give birth at five years old and live only to eight; where their heads and the skin of their foreheads are so hard that iron cannot bite into them but is blunted against them; where the men are beardless; nations without the use of fire; others that emit black sperm.

    Quoy ceux qui naturellement se changent en loups, en iumens, et puis encore en hommes? Et s’il est ainsi, comme dit Plutarque, qu’en quelque endroit des Indes, il y aye des hommes sans bouche, se nourrissans de la senteur de certaines odeurs, combien y a il de nos descriptions faulces? Il n’est plus risible, ny à l’aduanture capable de raison et de societé. L’ordonnance et la cause de nostre bastiment interne, seroyent pour la plus part hors de propos.

    What about those who naturally change into wolves, into mares, and then back into men? And if it is true, as Plutarch says, that in some part of the Indies there are men without mouths who feed on the smell of certain scents, how many of our descriptions are false? Man is no longer capable of laughter, nor perhaps of reason and society. The arrangement and purpose of our inner structure would for the most part be beside the point.

    The schools defined man as the animal capable of laughter, reason and society.

    Dauantage, combien y a il de choses en nostre cognoissance, qui combattent ces belles regles que nous auons taillées et prescriptes à Nature? Et nous entreprendrons d’y attacher Dieu mesme! Combien de choses appellons nous miraculeuses, et contre Nature? Cela se fait par chaque homme, et par chasque nation, selon la mesure de son ignorance. Combien trouuons nous de proprietez occultes et de quint’essences? car aller selon Nature pour nous, ce n’est qu’aller selon nostre intelligence, autant qu’elle peut suiure, et autant que nous y voyons: ce qui est audelà, est monstrueux et desordonné.

    Moreover, how many things are there within our knowledge that run counter to these fine rules we have cut out and prescribed for Nature? And we will undertake to tie God himself to them! How many things do we call miraculous and contrary to Nature? Every man and every nation does so according to the measure of its ignorance. How many occult properties and quintessences do we find? For to go according to Nature, for us, is only to go according to our understanding, as far as it can follow and as far as we can see; whatever lies beyond is monstrous and disordered.

    Or à ce compte, aux plus aduisez et aux plus habiles tout sera donc monstrueux: car à ceux là, l’humaine raison a persuadé, qu’elle n’auoit ny pied, ny fondement quelconque: non pas seulement pour asseurer si la neige est blanche: et Anaxagoras la disoit noire: s’il y a quelque chose, ou s’il n’y a nulle chose: s’il y a science, ou ignorance: ce que Metrodorus Chius nioit l’homme pouuoir dire. Ou si nous viuons; comme Eurypides est en doubte, si la vie que nous viuons est vie, ou si c’est ce que nous appellons mort, qui soit vie: Τις δ’ οιδεν ει ζην τουθ’ ο κεκληται θανειν, / Το ζην δε θνεισκειν εστι? Et non sans apparence.

    Now on that reckoning, to the most perceptive and the ablest, everything will be monstrous; for human reason has persuaded them that it had no footing or foundation whatsoever—not even to determine whether snow is white (and Anaxagoras said it was black); whether there is something or nothing; whether there is knowledge or ignorance, which Metrodorus of Chios denied man could say; or whether we are alive—as Euripides is in doubt whether the life we live is life, or whether it is what we call death that is life: Who knows whether living is what is called dying, / And dying is living? And not without plausibility.

    Car pourquoy prenons nous tiltre d’estre, de cet instant, qui n’est qu’vne eloise dans le cours infini d’vne nuict eternelle, et vne interruption si briefue de nostre perpetuelle et naturelle condition? la mort occupant tout le deuant et tout le derriere de ce moment, et encore vne bonne partie de ce moment. D’autres iurent qu’il n’y a point de mouuement, que rien ne bouge: comme les suiuants de Melissus. Car s’il n’y a qu’vn, ny ce mouuement sphærique ne luy peut seruir, ny le mouuement de lieu à autre, comme Platon preuue. Qu’il n’y a ny generation ny corruption en Nature. Protagoras dit qu’il n’y a rien en Nature, que le doubte.

    For why do we claim the title of being on the strength of this instant, which is but a flash of lightning in the infinite course of an eternal night, and so brief an interruption of our perpetual and natural condition—death occupying all that comes before and all that comes after this moment, and a good part of the moment as well? Others swear that there is no movement, that nothing stirs, like the followers of Melissus. For if there is only One, neither spherical motion can serve it, nor movement from one place to another, as Plato proves. Others, that there is neither generation nor corruption in Nature. Protagoras says there is nothing in Nature but doubt.

    Que de toutes choses on peut esgalement disputer: et de cela mesme, si on peut egalement disputer de toutes choses. Mansiphanes, que des choses, qui semblent, rien est non plus que non est. Qu’il n’y a autre certain que l’incertitude. Parmenides, que de ce qu’il semble, il n’est aucune chose en general. Qu’il n’est qu’vn. Zenon, qu’vn mesme n’est pas. Et qu’il n’y a rien. Si vn estoit, il seroit ou en vn autre, ou en soy-mesme. S’il est en vn autre, ce sont deux. S’il est en soy-mesme, ce sont encore deux, le comprenant, et le comprins. Selon ces dogmes, la nature des choses n’est qu’vne ombre ou fausse ou vaine.

    That one can argue equally about everything, and about that very point, whether one can argue equally about everything. Nausiphanes, that of the things that seem to be, none is any more than it is not; that nothing is certain but uncertainty. Parmenides, that of what seems to be, nothing exists in general; that there is only One. Zeno, that not even One exists, and that there is nothing. If One existed, it would be either in another or in itself. If it is in another, there are two. If it is in itself, there are still two, the container and the contained. According to these doctrines, the nature of things is nothing but a shadow, either false or empty.

    The French has “Mansiphanes,” a slip for Nausiphanes, a teacher of Epicurus; these views come from Seneca, Letters 88.

    Il m’a tousiours semblé qu’à vn homme Chrestien cette sorte de parler est pleine d’indiscretion et d’irreuerence: Dieu ne peut mourir, Dieu ne se peut desdire, Dieu ne peut faire cecy, ou cela. Ie ne trouue pas bon d’enfermer ainsi la puissance diuine soubs les loix de nostre parolle. Et l’apparence qui s’offre à nous, en ces propositions, il la faudroit representer plus reueremment et plus religieusement.

    It has always seemed to me that for a Christian this way of speaking is full of indiscretion and irreverence: God cannot die, God cannot go back on his word, God cannot do this or that. I do not think it right to confine the divine power in this way under the laws of our speech. And the appearance that presents itself to us in these propositions ought to be expressed more reverently and more religiously.

    Nostre parler a ses foiblesses et ses deffaults, comme tout le reste. La plus part des occasions des troubles du monde sont Grammariens. Noz procez ne naissent que du debat de l’interpretation des loix; et la plus part des guerres, de cette impuissance de n’auoir sçeu clairement exprimer les conuentions et traictez d’accord des Princes. Combien de querelles et combien importantes a produit au monde le doubte du sens de cette syllabe, Hoc? Prenons la clause que la logique mesmes nous presentera pour la plus claire. Si vous dictes, Il faict beau temps, et que vous dissiez verité, il faict donc beau temps. Voyla pas vne forme de parler certaine? Encore nous trompera elle.

    Our speech has its weaknesses and its defects, like everything else. Most of the occasions of the world’s troubles are grammatical. Our lawsuits arise only from debate over the interpretation of laws, and most wars from the inability to express clearly the conventions and treaties of agreement between princes. How many quarrels, and how momentous, have been produced in the world by doubt about the meaning of that one syllable, Hoc? Let us take the clause that logic itself will present to us as the clearest. If you say, “The weather is fine,” and you are telling the truth, then the weather is fine. Is that not a sure form of speech? Yet even it will deceive us.

    Hoc (“this”) opens the words of consecration, “This is my body,” whose meaning Catholics and Protestants disputed.

    Qu’il soit ainsi, suyuons l’exemple: si vous dites, Ie ments, et que vous dissiez vray, vous mentez donc. L’art, la raison, la force de la conclusion de cette-cy, sont pareilles à l’autre, toutesfois nous voyla embourbez. Ie voy les philosophes Pyrrhoniens qui ne peuuent exprimer leur generale conception en aucune maniere de parler: car il leur faudroit vn nouueau langage. Le nostre est tout formé de propositions affirmatiues, qui leur sont du tout ennemies. De façon que quand ils disent, Ie doubte, on les tient incontinent à la gorge, pour leur faire auouër, qu’aumoins assurent et sçauent ils cela, qu’ils doubtent. Ainsin on les a contraints de se sauuer dans cette comparaison de la medecine, sans laquelle leur humeur seroit inexplicable.

    To show that this is so, let us follow the example: if you say, “I am lying,” and you are telling the truth, then you are lying. The method, the reasoning and the force of the conclusion are the same in this one as in the other; and yet here we are stuck in the mud. I see that the Pyrrhonist philosophers cannot express their general conception in any manner of speech, for they would need a new language. Ours is made up entirely of affirmative propositions, which are wholly hostile to them. So that when they say “I doubt,” they are at once seized by the throat and made to admit that at least they affirm and know this: that they doubt. Thus they have been forced to take refuge in this comparison from medicine, without which their attitude would be inexplicable.

    Famous passage What do I know?The skeptic’s question that Montaigne took as his motto, with the emblem of a pair of scales.

    Quand ils prononcent, I’ignore, ou, Ie doubte, ils disent que cette proposition s’emporte elle mesme quant et quant le reste: ny plus ny moins que la rubarbe, qui pousse hors les mauuaises humeurs, et s’emporte hors quant et quant elle mesmes. Cette fantasie est plus seurement conceuë par interrogation: Que sçay-ie? comme ie la porte à la deuise d’vne balance.

    When they pronounce “I do not know” or “I doubt,” they say that this proposition carries itself away along with the rest, no more and no less than rhubarb, which expels the bad humors and carries itself out along with them. This notion is more surely grasped in the form of a question: “What do I know?”—as I bear it as my motto, with a pair of scales.

    In 1576 Montaigne had a medal struck showing a balance with the motto “Que sais-je?”

    Voyez comment on se preuault de cette sorte de parler pleine d’irreuerence. Aux disputes qui sont à present en nostre religion, si vous pressez trop les aduersaires, ils vous diront tout destroussément, qu’il n’est pas en la puissance de Dieu de faire que son corps soit en paradis et en la terre, et en plusieurs lieux ensemble. Et ce mocqueur ancien comment il en faict son profit.

    See how people take advantage of this irreverent way of speaking. In the disputes now going on in our religion, if you press your opponents too hard, they will tell you point-blank that it is not in God’s power to make his body be in paradise and on earth and in several places at once. And see how that ancient mocker makes use of it.

    The Protestants denied Christ’s bodily presence in the Eucharist; the “ancient mocker” is Pliny the Elder, Natural History II.

    Au moins, dit-il, est-ce vne non legere consolation à l’homme, de ce qu’il voit Dieu ne pouuoir pas toutes choses: car il ne se peut tuer quand il le voudroit, qui est la plus grande faueur que nous ayons en nostre condition: il ne peut faire les mortels immortels, ny reuiure les trespassez, ny que celuy qui a vescu n’ait point vescu, celuy qui a eu des honneurs, ne les ait point eus, n’ayant autre droit sur le passé que de l’oubliance. Et afin que cette societé de l’homme à Dieu, s’accouple encore par des exemples plaisans, il ne peut faire que deux fois dix ne soyent vingt. Voyla ce qu’il dit, et qu’vn Chrestien deuroit euiter de passer par sa bouche.

    At least, he says, it is no slight consolation to man to see that God cannot do everything: for he cannot kill himself when he wishes, which is the greatest favor we have in our condition; he cannot make mortals immortal, nor bring the dead back to life, nor make one who has lived not to have lived, nor one who has had honors not to have had them, having no other power over the past than forgetfulness. And so that this fellowship between man and God may be coupled further by amusing examples, he cannot make twice ten not be twenty. That is what he says, and what a Christian ought to avoid letting pass his lips.

    Là où au rebours, il semble que les hommes recherchent cette folle fierté de langage pour ramener Dieu à leur mesure. Cras vel atra / Nube polum Pater occupato, / Vel sole puro, non tamen irritum / Quodcumque retro est efficiet, neque / Diffinget infectúmque reddet, / Quod fugiens semel hora vexit. Quand nous disons que l’infinité des siecles tant passez qu’auenir n’est à Dieu qu’vn instant: que sa bonté, sapience, puissance sont mesme chose auecques son essence; nostre parole le dit, mais nostre intelligence ne l’apprehende point.

    Whereas, on the contrary, it seems that men seek out this mad arrogance of language to bring God down to their measure. Tomorrow let the Father fill the sky / With black cloud, / Or with pure sunlight; yet he will not make void / Whatever lies behind us, nor / Reshape and render undone / What the fleeting hour has once carried off. When we say that the infinity of ages, past as well as to come, is but an instant to God; that his goodness, wisdom and power are one and the same thing as his essence—our speech says it, but our understanding does not grasp it.

    Horace, Odes III.29.

    Et toutesfois nostre outrecuidance veut faire passer la diuinité par nostre estamine. Et de là s’engendrent toutes les resueries et erreurs, desquelles le monde se trouue saisi, ramenant et poisant à sa balance, chose si esloignée de son poix. Mirum quò procedat improbitas cordis humani, paruulo aliquo inuitata successu. Combien insolemment rabroüent Epicurus les Stoiciens, sur ce qu’il tient l’estre veritablement bon et heureux, n’appartenir qu’à Dieu, et l’homme sage n’en auoir qu’vn ombrage et similitude? Combien temerairement ont ils attaché Dieu à la destinée! (à la mienne volonté qu’aucuns du surnom de Chrestiens ne le facent pas encore) et Thales, Platon, et Pythagoras, l’ont asseruy à la necessité.

    And yet our presumption insists on passing the divinity through our sieve. And from this arise all the ravings and errors that have taken hold of the world, as it brings down and weighs on its own scales a thing so far removed from its weight. It is wonderful how far the wickedness of the human heart will go, when lured on by the slightest success. How insolently the Stoics rebuke Epicurus for holding that being truly good and happy belongs only to God, and that the wise man has only a shadow and likeness of it? How rashly they have bound God to destiny! (Would to God that some who bear the name of Christians did not still do so.) And Thales, Plato and Pythagoras have enslaved him to necessity.

    Pliny the Elder, Natural History II.

    Cette fierté de vouloir descouurir Dieu par nos yeux, a faict qu’vn grand personnage des nostres a attribué à la diuinité vne forme corporelle. Et est cause de ce qui nous aduient tous les iours, d’attribuer à Dieu, les euenements d’importance, d’vne particuliere assignation. Par ce qu’ils nous poisent, il semble qu’ils luy poisent aussi, et qu’il y regarde plus entier et plus attentif, qu’aux euenemens qui nous sont legers, ou d’vne suitte ordinaire. Magna Dij curant, parua negligunt. Escoutez son exemple: il vous esclaircira de sa raison: Nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant.

    This arrogance of wanting to discover God with our eyes led a great man of our faith to attribute a bodily form to the divinity. And it is the cause of what happens to us every day: attributing important events to God by special assignment. Because they weigh on us, it seems they weigh on him too, and that he watches them more fully and attentively than events that are light to us or follow an ordinary course. The gods attend to great things and neglect small ones. Listen to his example; it will make his reasoning clear to you: Nor indeed do kings attend to all the smallest matters in their kingdoms.

    The “great man” is Tertullian; the Latin is from Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II.

    Comme si à ce Roy là, c’estoit plus et moins de remuer vn empire, ou la feuille d’vn arbre: et si sa prouidence s’exerçoit autrement, inclinant l’euenement d’vne battaille, que le sault d’vne puce. La main de son gouuernement, se preste à toutes choses de pareille teneur, mesme force, et mesme ordre: nostre interest n’y apporte rien: noz mouuements et noz mesures ne le touchent pas. Deus ita artifex magnus in magnis, vt minor non sit in paruis. Nostre arrogance nous remet tousiours en auant cette blasphemeuse appariation. Par ce que noz occupations nous chargent, Straton a estreiné les Dieux de toute immunité d’offices, comme sont leurs prestres.

    As if, to that King, moving an empire or moving the leaf of a tree were more or less of a task; and as if his providence worked differently in tipping the outcome of a battle than in the leap of a flea. The hand of his government lends itself to all things with the same tenor, the same force and the same order; our interest adds nothing to it; our motions and our measures do not touch it. God is so great an artificer in great things that he is no lesser one in small. Our arrogance always brings this blasphemous comparison back to the fore. Because our occupations burden us, Strato granted the gods complete exemption from duties, as their priests have.

    Saint Augustine, City of God XI.

    Il fait produire et maintenir toutes choses à Nature: et de ses poids et mouuements construit les parties du monde: deschargeant l’humaine nature de la crainte des iugements diuins. Quod beatum æternúmque sit, id nec habere negotij quicquam, nec exhibere alteri. Nature veut qu’en choses pareilles il y ait relation pareille. Le nombre donc infini des mortels conclud vn pareil nombre d’immortels: les choses infinies, qui tuent et ruinent, en presupposent autant qui conseruent et profitent.

    He has Nature produce and maintain all things, and constructs the parts of the world out of its weights and motions, relieving human nature of the fear of divine judgments. What is blessed and eternal neither has any trouble itself nor causes any to another. Nature wills that in like things there should be like proportion. The infinite number of mortals therefore implies an equal number of immortals; the infinite things that kill and destroy presuppose as many that preserve and benefit.

    Comme les ames des Dieux, sans langue, sans yeux, sans oreilles, sentent entre elles chacune, ce que l’autre sent, et iugent noz pensées: ainsi les ames des hommes, quand elles sont libres et déprinses du corps, par le sommeil, ou par quelque rauissement, deuinent, prognostiquent, et voyent choses, qu’elles ne sçauroyent veoir meslées aux corps. Les hommes, dit Sainct Paul, sont deuenus fols cuidans estre sages, et ont mué la gloire de Dieu incorruptible, en l’image de l’homme corruptible.

    Just as the souls of the gods, without tongues, without eyes, without ears, each feel among themselves what the other feels, and judge our thoughts, so the souls of men, when they are free and released from the body by sleep or by some trance, divine, foretell and see things they could not see when mingled with bodies. Men, says Saint Paul, have become fools thinking themselves wise, and have changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the image of corruptible man.

    Romans 1:22–23.

    Voyez vn peu ce bastelage des deifications anciennes. Apres la grande et superbe pompe de l’enterrement, comme le feu venoit à prendre au hault de la pyramide, et saisir le lict du trespassé, ils laissoient en mesme temps eschapper vn aigle, lequel s’en volant à mont, signifioit que l’ame s’en alloit en paradis. Nous auons mille medailles, et notamment de cette honneste femme de Faustine, où cet aigle est representé, emportant à la cheuremorte vers le ciel ces ames deifiées. C’est pitié que nous nous pippons de nos propres singeries et inuentions, Quod finxere timent; comme les enfans qui s’effrayent de ce mesme visage qu’ils ont barbouillé et noircy à leur compagnon.

    Just look at the trickery of the ancient deifications. After the grand and splendid pomp of the funeral, as the fire began to catch the top of the pyramid and seize the bier of the deceased, they released at that same moment an eagle, which, flying upward, signified that the soul was going to paradise. We have a thousand medals, notably of that respectable woman Faustina, on which this eagle is shown carrying these deified souls up to heaven piggyback. It is a pity that we fool ourselves with our own monkey tricks and inventions, They fear what they have invented, like children who are frightened by the very face they have daubed and blackened on their playmate.

    Faustina, wife of Marcus Aurelius, was reputed to be unfaithful; the Latin is from Lucan, Pharsalia I.

    Quasi quicquam infelicius sit homine, cui sua figmenta dominantur. C’est bien loin d’honorer celuy qui nous a faicts, que d’honorer celuy que nous auons faict. Auguste eut plus de temples que Iupiter, seruis auec autant de religion et creance de miracles. Les Thasiens en recompense des biensfaicts qu’ils auoyent receuz d’Agesilaus, luy vindrent dire qu’ils l’auoyent canonisé: Vostre nation, leur dit-il, a elle ce pouuoir de faire Dieu qui bon luy semble? Faictes en pour voir l’vn d’entre vous, et puis quand i’auray veu comme il s’en sera trouué, ie vous diray grand-mercy de vostre offre. L’homme est bien insensé: il ne sçauroit forger vn ciron, et forge des Dieux à douzaines.

    As if anything could be more wretched than man, ruled by his own fictions. Honoring the one we have made is a far cry from honoring the one who made us. Augustus had more temples than Jupiter, served with as much devotion and belief in miracles. The Thasians, in return for the benefits they had received from Agesilaus, came to tell him that they had canonized him. “Has your nation,” he said to them, “the power to make a god of whomever it pleases? Make one of one of yourselves, by way of trial, and then, when I have seen how he fares, I will thank you heartily for your offer.” Man is truly out of his mind: he could not make a mite, and he makes gods by the dozen.

    Pliny the Elder, Natural History II.

    Oyez Trismegiste louant nostre suffisance: De toutes les choses admirables a surmonté l’admiration, que l’homme ayt peu trouuer la diuine nature, et la faire.

    Hear Trismegistus praising our ability: Of all wonderful things, the one that has surpassed all wonder is that man should have been able to find the divine nature and to make it.

    Hermes Trismegistus, the legendary author of the Hermetic writings; the passage is from the Asclepius.

    Voicy des arguments de l’escole mesme de la philosophie. Nosse cui Diuos et cœli numina soli, / Aut soli nescire, datum. Si Dieu est, il est animal, s’il est animal, il a sens, et s’il a sens, il est subject à corruption. S’il est sans corps, il est sans ame, et par consequent sans action: et s’il a corps, il est perissable. Voyla pas triomphé? Nous sommes incapables d’auoir faict le monde: il y a donc quelque nature plus excellente, qui y a mis la main. Ce seroit vne sotte arrogance de nous estimer la plus parfaicte chose de cet vniuers. Il y a donc quelque chose de meilleur. Cela c’est Dieu.

    Here are some arguments from the school of philosophy itself. To whom alone it is given to know the gods and the powers of heaven, / or alone not to know them. If God exists, he is a living being; if he is a living being, he has senses; and if he has senses, he is subject to corruption. If he is without a body, he is without a soul, and therefore without action; and if he has a body, he is perishable. Isn’t that a triumph? We are incapable of having made the world; so there is some more excellent nature that put its hand to it. It would be foolish arrogance to think ourselves the most perfect thing in this universe. So there is something better. That is God.

    Quand vous voyez vne riche et pompeuse demeure, encore que vous ne sçachiez qui en est le maistre; si ne direz vous pas qu’elle soit faicte pour des rats. Et cette diuine structure, que nous voyons du palais celeste, n’auons nous pas à croire, que ce soit le logis de quelque maistre plus grand que nous ne sommes? Le plus hault est-il pas tousiours le plus digne? Et nous sommes placez au plus bas. Rien sans ame et sans raison ne peut produire vn animant capable de raison. Le monde nous produit: il a donc ame et raison. Chasque part de nous est moins que nous. Nous sommes part du monde.

    When you see a rich and magnificent dwelling, even if you do not know who its master is, you will still not say that it was built for rats. And this divine structure that we see of the celestial palace—must we not believe that it is the home of some master greater than we are? Is the highest not always the most worthy? And we are placed at the very bottom. Nothing without soul and reason can produce a living being capable of reason. The world produces us; so it has soul and reason. Each part of us is less than we are. We are part of the world.

    Le monde est donc fourny de sagesse et de raison, et plus abondamment que nous ne sommes. C’est belle chose que d’auoir vn grand gouuernement. Le gouuernement du monde appartient donc à quelque heureuse nature. Les astres ne nous font pas de nuisance: ils sont donc pleins de bonté. Nous auons besoing de nourriture, aussi ont donc les Dieux, et se paissent des vapeurs de ça bas. Les biens mondains ne sont pas biens à Dieu: ce ne sont donc pas biens à nous. L’offenser, et l’estre offencé sont egalement tesmoignages d’imbecillité: c’est donc follie de craindre Dieu. Dieu est bon par sa nature: l’homme par son industrie, qui est plus. La sagesse diuine, et l’humaine sagesse n’ont autre distinction, sinon que celle-la est eternelle.

    So the world is endowed with wisdom and reason, and more abundantly than we are. It is a fine thing to hold great power of government. So the government of the world belongs to some blessed nature. The stars do us no harm; so they are full of goodness. We need nourishment; so the gods need it too, and they feed on the vapors from down here. Worldly goods are not goods to God; so they are not goods to us. To offend and to be offended are equally signs of weakness; so it is folly to fear God. God is good by his nature, man by his own effort, which is more. Divine wisdom and human wisdom differ in nothing except that the former is eternal.

    Or la durée n’est aucune accession à la sagesse. Parquoy nous voyla compagnons. Nous auons vie, raison et liberté, estimons la bonté, la charité, et la iustice: ces qualitez sont donc en luy. Somme le bastiment et le desbastiment, les conditions de la diuinité, se forgent par l’homme selon la relation à soy. Quel patron et quel modele! Estirons, esleuons, et grossissons les qualitez humaines tant qu’il nous plaira. Enfle toy pauure homme, et encore, et encore, et encore, Non, si te ruperis, inquit. Profectò non Deum, quem cogitare non possunt, sed semetipsos pro illo cogitantes, non illum, sed seipsos, non illi, sed sibi comparant.

    Now duration adds nothing to wisdom. So there we are, partners. We have life, reason and liberty, and we value goodness, charity and justice; so these qualities are in him. In short, the building up and the pulling down of divinity, its very conditions, are forged by man according to their relation to himself. What a pattern, what a model! Let us stretch, raise and swell human qualities as much as we please. Puff yourself up, poor man, and more, and more, and more: “Not even if you burst,” he said. Surely it is not God, whom they cannot conceive, but themselves, conceiving themselves in his place; it is not him but themselves that they compare, and not with him but with themselves.

    The first words echo Horace’s fable of the frog who puffed herself up to rival an ox (Satires II.3); the rest is from Augustine, City of God XII.15.

    Es choses naturelles les effects ne rapportent qu’à demy leurs causes. Quoy cette-cy? elle est au dessus de l’ordre de Nature, sa condition est trop hautaine, trop esloignée, et trop maistresse, pour souffrir que noz conclusions l’attachent et la garottent. Ce n’est par nous qu’on y arriue, cette routte est trop basse. Nous ne sommes non plus pres du ciel sur le mont Senis, qu’au fond de la mer: consultez en pour voir auec vostre astrolabe.

    In natural things, effects only half reflect their causes. What about this cause? It is above the order of Nature; its condition is too lofty, too remote and too sovereign to allow our conclusions to bind and fetter it. It is not through ourselves that we reach it; that road runs too low. We are no nearer to heaven on Mont Cenis than at the bottom of the sea: just check it with your astrolabe.

    Mont Cenis: a high Alpine pass between Savoy and Italy.

    Ils ramenent Dieu iusques à l’accointance charnelle des femmes, à combien de fois, à combien de generations. Paulina femme de Saturninus, matrone de grande reputation à Rome, pensant coucher auec le Dieu Serapis, se trouue entre les bras d’vn sien amoureux, par le macquerellage des prestres de ce temple. Varro le plus subtil et le plus sçauant autheur Latin, en ses liures de la Theologie, escrit, que le secrestin de Hercules, iectant au sort d’vne main pour soy, de l’autre, pour Hercules, ioüa contre luy vn soupper et vne garse: s’il gaignoit, aux despens des offrandes: s’il perdoit, aux siens. Il perdit, paya son soupper et sa garse.

    They bring God down even to carnal intercourse with women—how many times over, how many generations of offspring! Paulina, wife of Saturninus, a matron of high repute in Rome, thinking she was sleeping with the god Serapis, found herself in the arms of one of her admirers, through the pandering of the priests of that temple. Varro, the subtlest and most learned of Latin authors, writes in his books on theology that the sacristan of Hercules, casting lots with one hand for himself and with the other for Hercules, played the god for a supper and a girl: if he won, at the expense of the offerings; if he lost, at his own. He lost, and paid for his supper and his girl.

    The story of Paulina is told by the Jewish historian Josephus (Jewish Antiquities XVIII).

    Son nom fut Laurentine, qui veid de nuict ce Dieu entre ses bras, luy disant au surplus, que le lendemain, le premier qu’elle rencontreroit, la payeroit celestement de son salaire. Ce fut Taruncius, ieune homme riche, qui la mena chez luy, et auec le temps la laissa heritiere. Elle à son tour, esperant faire chose aggreable à ce Dieu, laissa heritier le peuple Romain. Pourquoy on luy attribua des honneurs diuins. Comme s’il ne suffisoit pas, que par double estoc Platon fust originellement descendu des Dieux, et auoir pour autheur commun de sa race, Neptune: il estoit tenu pour certain à Athenes, qu’Ariston ayant voulu iouïr de la belle Perictyone, n’auoit sçeu.

    Her name was Larentia, and at night she saw this god in her arms; he told her besides that the first man she met the next day would pay her wages on heaven’s behalf. It was Taruncius, a rich young man, who took her home with him and in time left her his heir. She in turn, hoping to do something pleasing to the god, left the Roman people her heir. For which she was granted divine honors. As if it were not enough that Plato was descended from the gods on both sides of his family, and had Neptune as the common founder of his line, it was held for certain in Athens that Ariston, wanting to enjoy the beautiful Perictione, had been unable to.

    Acca Larentia, honored at the Roman festival of the Larentalia; Montaigne follows Augustine’s account (City of God VI.7).

    Et fut aduerti en songe par le Dieu Apollo, de la laisser impollue et intacte, iusques à ce qu’elle fust accouchée. C’estoient les pere et mere de Platon. Combien y a il és histoires, de pareils cocuages, procurez par les Dieux, contre les pauures humains? et des maris iniurieusement descriez en faueur des enfants? En la religion de Mahomet, il se trouue par la croyance de ce peuple, assés de Merlins: assauoir enfants sans pere, spirituels, nays diuinement au ventre des pucelles: et portent vn nom, qui le signifie en leur langue.

    And he was warned in a dream by the god Apollo to leave her unsullied and untouched until she had given birth. These were Plato’s father and mother. How many such cuckoldings are there in the histories, contrived by the gods against poor human beings? And how many husbands insultingly disparaged to glorify the children? In the religion of Muhammad, according to the belief of that people, there are plenty of Merlins: that is, children without fathers, spiritual, born divinely in the wombs of virgins; and they bear a name that means this in their language.

    Merlin, the enchanter of Arthurian romance, was said to have been fathered by a spirit on a mortal woman.

    Il nous faut noter, qu’à chasque chose, il n’est rien plus cher, et plus estimable que son estre (le lyon, l’aigle, le daulphin, ne prisent rien au dessus de leur espece) et que chacune rapporte les qualitez de toutes autres choses à ses propres qualitez. Lesquelles nous pouuons bien estendre et racourcir, mais c’est tout; car hors de ce rapport, et de ce principe, nostre imagination ne peut aller, ne peut rien diuiner autre, et est impossible qu’elle sorte de là, et qu’elle passe au delà. D’où naissent ces anciennes conclusions. De toutes les formes, la plus belle est celle de l’homme: Dieu donc est de cette forme.

    We must note that to each thing nothing is dearer or more estimable than its own being (the lion, the eagle, the dolphin prize nothing above their own species), and that each relates the qualities of all other things to its own qualities. These we can certainly stretch or shorten, but that is all; for outside this relation and this principle our imagination cannot go, cannot divine anything else, and it is impossible for it to get out of there and pass beyond. Hence these ancient conclusions. Of all forms, the most beautiful is that of man; so God has this form.

    Nul ne peut estre heureux sans vertu: ny la vertu estre sans raison: et nulle raison loger ailleurs qu’en l’humaine figure: Dieu est donc reuestu de l’humaine figure. Ita est informatum anticipatumque mentibus nostris, vt homini, quum de Deo cogitet, forma occurrat humana. Pourtant disoit plaisamment Xenophanes, que si les animaux se forgent des Dieux, comme il est vray-semblable qu’ils facent, ils les forgent certainement de mesme eux, et se glorifient, comme nous.

    No one can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, and no reason can lodge anywhere but in human shape; so God is clothed in human shape. So firmly is it shaped and fixed beforehand in our minds that when a man thinks of God, a human form comes to him. That is why Xenophanes said wittily that if animals forge gods for themselves, as it is likely they do, they surely forge them in their own image, and glorify themselves as we do.

    Xenophanes: Greek poet and philosopher of the 6th century BC, a critic of gods made in human likeness.

    Car pourquoy ne dira un oyson ainsi: Toutes les pieces de l’vniuers me regardent, la terre me sert à marcher, le soleil à m’esclairer, les estoilles à m’inspirer leurs influances: i’ay telle commodité des vents, telle des eaux: il n’est rien que cette voute regarde si fauorablement que moy: ie suis le mignon de Nature? Est-ce pas l’homme qui me traicte, qui me loge, qui me sert: C’est pour moy qu’il fait et semer et moudre: s’il me mange, aussi fait-il bien l’homme son compagnon; et si fay-ie moy les vers qui le tuent, et qui le mangent. Autant en diroit une gruë; et plus magnifiquement encore pour la liberté de son vol, et la possession de cette belle et haulte region.

    For why should a gosling not say this: “All the parts of the universe look to me; the earth serves me to walk on, the sun to light my way, the stars to breathe their influences into me; I get such-and-such a benefit from the winds, such-and-such from the waters; there is nothing this vault looks on so favorably as me; I am Nature’s darling. Is it not man who tends me, houses me, serves me? It is for me that he has the sowing and the milling done. If he eats me, so too does man eat his fellow man; and so do I eat the worms that kill and eat him”? A crane would say as much, and still more grandly, because of the freedom of its flight and its possession of that fine high region.

    Tam blanda conciliatrix, et tam sui est Iena ipsa natura.

    So flattering a go-between, and so much her own procuress, is nature herself.

    Or donc par ce mesme train, pour nous sont les destinées, pour nous le monde, il luict, il tonne pour nous; et le createur, et les creatures, tout est pour nous. C’est le but et le poinct où vise l’vniuersité des choses. Regardés le registre que la philosophie a tenu deux mille ans, et plus, des affaires celestes: les Dieux n’ont agi, n’ont parlé, que pour l’homme: elle ne leur attribue autre consultation, et autre vacation. Les voyla contre nous en guerre.

    Well then, by this same line of reasoning, the fates are for us, the world is for us; it shines, it thunders for us; creator and creatures alike, everything is for us. That is the goal and the target at which the whole universe of things aims. Look at the record of heavenly affairs that philosophy has kept for two thousand years and more: the gods have acted, have spoken, only for man; philosophy gives them no other deliberation and no other occupation. Here they are at war against us.

    Domitósque Herculea manu / Telluris iuuenes, vnde periculum / Fulgens contremuit domus / Saturni veteris. Les voicy partisans de noz troubles, pour nous rendre la pareille de ce que tant de fois nous sommes partisans des leurs: Neptunus muros magnóque emula tridenti / Fundamenta quatit, totámque à sedibus vrbem / Eruit: hîc Iuno Scæas sæuissima portas / Prima tenet. Les Cauniens, pour la ialousie de la domination de leurs Dieux propres, prennent armes en dos, le iour de leur deuotion, et vont courant toute leur banlieue, frappant l’air par-cy par-là, à tout leurs glaiues, pourchassant ainsin à outrance, et bannissant les Dieux estrangers de leur territoire. Leurs puissances sont retranchées selon nostre necessité.

    And the sons of Earth tamed / by Hercules’ hand, a peril at which / the shining house of old Saturn / trembled. Here they are taking sides in our troubles, to pay us back for the many times we have taken sides in theirs: Neptune shakes the walls and the foundations loosened / by his great trident, and tears the whole city from its seat / and overturns it; here Juno, most cruel, is first to seize / the Scaean gates. The Caunians, jealous for the dominion of their own gods, put on their armor on their feast day and go running all over their surrounding district, striking the air here and there with their swords, thus hunting the foreign gods down to the last and driving them out of their territory. The gods’ powers are cut down to suit our needs.

    The Caunians lived at Caunus in Caria, in Asia Minor; the custom is reported by Herodotus (I.172).

    Qui guerit les cheuaux, qui les hommes, qui la peste, qui la teigne, qui la toux, qui vne sorte de gale, qui vne autre: adeo minimis etiam rebus praua religio inserit Deos: qui fait naistre les raisins, qui les aux: qui a la charge de la paillardise, qui de la marchandise: à chasque race d’artisans, vn Dieu: qui a sa prouince en Orient, et son credit, qui en Ponant, *Hîc illius arma, / Hîc currus fuit. / O Sancte Apollo, qui vmbilicum certum terrarum obtines!

    One heals horses, another men, one the plague, one ringworm, one the cough, one one kind of itch, another another: so far does perverse religion thrust gods even into the smallest things; one makes grapes grow, another garlic; one is in charge of lechery, another of trade; for each kind of craftsman a god; one has his province and his authority in the East, another in the West: *Here were her arms, / here her chariot. / O holy Apollo, who hold the sure navel of the earth!

    / Pallada Cecropidæ, Minoïa Creta Dianam, / Vulcanum tellus Hipsipylæa colit, / Iunonem Sparte, Pelopeïadèsque Micenæ; / Pinigerum Fauni Mænalis ora caput, / Mars Latio venerandus. Qui n’a qu’vn bourg ou vne famille en sa possession: qui loge seul, qui en compagnie, ou volontaire ou necessaire. Iunctáque sunt magno templa nepotis auo.* Il en est de si chetifs et populaires, car le nombre s’en monte iusques à trente six mille, qu’il en faut entasser bien cinq ou six à produire vn espic de bled, et en prennent leurs noms diuers. Trois à vne porte: celuy de l’ais, celuy du gond, celuy du seuil. Quatre à vn enfant, protecteurs de son maillot, de son boire, de son manger, de son tetter.

    / The sons of Cecrops worship Pallas, Minoan Crete Diana, / the land of Hypsipyle Vulcan, / Sparta and Pelops’ Mycenae Juno; / the land of Maenalus the pine-crowned head of Faunus; / Mars is to be revered in Latium. One has only a village or a family in his possession; one lives alone, another in company, by choice or by necessity. And the grandson’s temple is joined to his great-grandfather’s.* Some are so puny and plebeian (for their number rises to thirty-six thousand) that five or six of them have to be heaped together to produce one ear of wheat, and they take their various names from it. Three for a door: the god of the panel, the god of the hinge, the god of the threshold. Four for a child: protectors of its swaddling clothes, its drinking, its eating, its suckling.

    Aucuns certains, aucuns incertains et doubteux. Aucuns, qui n’entrent pas encore en paradis. Quos, quoniam cœli nondum dignamur honore, / Quas dedimus, certè terras habitare sinamus. Il en est de physiciens, de poëtiques, de ciuils. Aucuns, moyens entre la diuine et humaine nature, mediateurs, entremetteurs de nous à Dieu. Adorez par certain second ordre d’adoration, et diminutif. Infinis en tiltres et offices: les vns bons, les autres mauuais. Il en est de vieux et cassez, et en est de mortels. Car Chrysippus estimoit qu’en la derniere conflagration du monde tous les Dieux auroyent à finir, sauf Iuppiter. L’homme forge mille plaisantes societez entre Dieu et luy. Est-il pas son compatriote? Iouis incunabula Creten.

    Some certain, some uncertain and doubtful. Some who are not yet admitted to paradise: Since we do not yet deem them worthy of the honor of heaven, / let us at least allow them to dwell in the lands we have given them. There are gods of the natural philosophers, gods of the poets, gods of the state. Some are midway between divine and human nature, mediators, go-betweens between us and God, worshiped with a certain secondary, lesser order of worship. Endless in titles and offices: some good, others bad. There are old, broken-down ones, and there are mortal ones. For Chrysippus held that in the final conflagration of the world all the gods would come to an end except Jupiter. Man forges a thousand amusing partnerships between God and himself. Is God not his fellow countryman? Crete, the cradle of Jove.

    Voicy l’excuse, que nous donnent, sur la consideration de ce subject, Sceuola grand pontife, et Varron grand theologien, en leur temps: Qu’il est besoin que le peuple ignore beaucoup de choses vrayes, et en croye beaucoup de fausses. Quum veritatem, qua liberetur, inquirat: credatur ei expedire, quod fallitur. Les yeux humains ne peuuent apperceuoir les choses que par les formes de leur cognoissance. Et ne nous souuient pas quel sault print le miserable Phaëthon pour auoir voulu manier les renes des cheuaux de son pere, d’vne main mortelle. Nostre esprit retombe en pareille profondeur, se dissipe et se froisse de mesme, par sa temerité.

    Here is the excuse given us, on reflecting about this subject, by Scaevola, the high pontiff, and Varro, the great theologian of their day: that the people must be ignorant of many true things and believe many false ones. Since he seeks the truth that would set him free, let us believe it is good for him to be deceived. Human eyes can perceive things only through the forms of their own knowledge. And we do not remember what a fall wretched Phaethon took for trying to handle the reins of his father’s horses with a mortal hand. Our mind falls back into a like abyss, and is scattered and shattered in the same way, by its rashness.

    Quintus Mucius Scaevola, Roman jurist and chief pontiff; Montaigne takes both opinions from Augustine, City of God IV.

    Si vous demandez à la philosophie de quelle matiere est le soleil, que vous respondra elle, sinon, de fer, et de pierre, ou autre estoffe de son vsage? S’enquiert-on à Zenon que c’est que Nature? Vn feu, dit-il, artiste, propre à engendrer, procedant reglément. Archimedes maistre de cette science qui s’attribue la presseance sur toutes les autres en verité et certitude: Le soleil, dit-il, est vn Dieu de fer enflammé. Voyla pas vne belle imagination produicte de l’ineuitable necessité des demonstrations geometriques?

    If you ask philosophy what the sun is made of, what will it answer, if not iron and stone, or some other stuff it is used to? Ask Zeno what Nature is: “A fire,” he says, “artful, fit for generating, proceeding methodically.” Archimedes, master of that science which claims precedence over all others in truth and certainty, says: “The sun is a god of red-hot iron.” Isn’t that a fine notion, produced by the inescapable necessity of geometrical demonstrations?

    Non pourtant si ineuitable et vtile, que Socrates n’ayt estimé, qu’il suffisoit d’en sçauoir, iusques à pouuoir arpenter la terre qu’on donnoit et receuoit: et que Polyænus, qui en auoit esté fameux et illustre docteur, ne les ayt prises à mespris, comme pleines de fauceté, et de vanité apparente, après qu’il eut gousté les doux fruicts des iardins poltronesques d’Epicurus. Socrates en Xenophon sur ce propos d’Anaxagoras, estimé par l’antiquité entendu au dessus de touts autres, és choses celestes et diuines, dit, qu’il se troubla du cerueau, comme font tous hommes, qui perscrutent immoderément les cognoissances, qui ne sont de leur appartenance.

    Not so inescapable and useful, however, that Socrates did not think it enough to know as much of it as would let one survey the land one gave and received; or that Polyaenus, who had been a famous and illustrious teacher of it, did not come to scorn these demonstrations as full of falsity and obvious vanity, once he had tasted the sweet fruits of Epicurus’ idle gardens. Socrates, in Xenophon, speaking of Anaxagoras, whom antiquity considered more expert than anyone else in heavenly and divine matters, says that he went wrong in the head, as do all men who pry immoderately into kinds of knowledge that are not their business.

    Polyaenus: a mathematician who became a disciple and friend of Epicurus.

    Sur ce qu’il faisoit le soleil vne pierre ardente, il ne s’aduisoit pas, qu’vne pierre ne luit point au feu, et, qui pis est, qu’elle s’y consomme. En ce qu’il faisoit vn, du soleil et du feu, que le feu ne noircit pas ceux qu’il regarde: que nous regardons fixement le feu: que le feu tue les plantes et les herbes. C’est à l’aduis de Socrates, et au mien aussi, le plus sagement iugé du ciel, que n’en iuger point. Platon ayant à parler des daimons au Timée: C’est entreprinse, dit-il, qui surpasse nostre portée: il en faut croire ces anciens, qui se sont dicts engendrez d’eux.

    When he made the sun a burning stone, he did not notice that a stone does not shine in fire and, what is worse, is consumed by it. When he made the sun and fire one and the same, he did not notice that fire does not blacken those it looks upon; that we can stare at fire; that fire kills plants and grasses. In the opinion of Socrates, and in mine too, the wisest judgment about heaven is to make none. Plato, having to speak of daimons in the Timaeus, says: “It is an undertaking beyond our reach; we must believe those ancients who said they were begotten by them.

    C’est contre raison de refuser foy aux enfants des Dieux, encore que leur dire ne soit estably par raisons necessaires, ny vray-semblables: puis qu’ils nous respondent, de parler de choses domestiques et familieres.

    It is against reason to refuse belief to the children of the gods, even though what they say is not established by necessary or even probable reasons, since they assure us they are speaking of domestic, family matters.”

    The heavens and the body

    Our sciences of the stars and of man are poetic fictions built on guesses.

    Voyons si nous auons quelque peu plus de clarté en la cognoissance des choses humaines et naturelles. N’est-ce pas vne ridicule entreprinse, à celles ausquelles par nostre propre confession nostre science ne peut atteindre, leur aller forgeant vn autre corps, et prestant vne forme faulce de nostre inuention: comme il se void au mouuement des planetes, auquel d’autant que nostre esprit ne peut arriuer, ny imaginer sa naturelle conduite, nous leur prestons du nostre, des ressors materiels, lourds, et corporels: Temo aureus, aurea summæ / Curuatura rotæ, radiorum argenteus ordo. Vous diriez que nous auons eu des cochers, des charpentiers, et des peintres, qui sont allez dresser là hault des engins à diuers mouuemens, et ranger les roüages et entrelassemens des corps celestes bigarrez en couleur, autour du fuseau de la necessité, selon Platon.

    Let us see whether we have a little more clarity in our knowledge of human and natural things. Is it not a ridiculous undertaking, for things that by our own admission our knowledge cannot reach, to go forging them another body and lending them a false form of our own invention? We see this in the movement of the planets: since our mind cannot reach it or imagine how it naturally proceeds, we lend them something of our own—material springs, heavy and corporeal: Golden was the pole, golden the curve / of the wheel’s rim, silver the row of spokes. You would think we had had coachmen, carpenters and painters who went up there to set up machines with various motions, and to arrange the wheelwork and interlacings of the heavenly bodies, painted in many colors, around the spindle of Necessity, as Plato has it.

    Mundus domus est maxima rerum, / Quam quinque altitonæ fragmine zonæ / Cingunt, per quam limbus pictus bis sex signis / Stellimicantibus, altus in obliquo æthere, lunæ / Bigas acceptat. Ce sont tous songes et fanatiques folies. Que ne plaist-il vn iour à Nature nous ouurir son sein, et nous faire voir au propre, les moyens et la conduicte de ses mouuements, et y preparer nos yeux? O Dieu quels abus, quels mescomtes nous trouuerions en nostre pauure science! Ie suis trompé, si elle tient vne seule chose, droictement en son poinct: et m’en partiray d’icy plus ignorant toute autre chose, que mon ignorance.

    The world is the greatest house of all things, / which five high-thundering zones in their segments / gird, and through which a band painted with twice six / star-glittering signs, high in the slanting ether, / receives the moon’s two-horse chariot. These are all dreams and frenzied follies. Why will Nature not be pleased one day to open her bosom to us, show us exactly the means and workings of her movements, and prepare our eyes for it? O God, what errors, what miscalculations we would find in our poor science! I am much mistaken if it holds a single thing exactly right; and I shall leave this place more ignorant of everything else than of my ignorance.

    Lines attributed to Varro.

    Ay-ie pas veu en Platon ce diuin mot, que Nature n’est rien qu’vne poësie ainigmatique? Comme, peut estre, qui diroit, vne peinture voilée et tenebreuse, entreluisant d’vne infinie varieté de faux iours à exercer noz coniectures. Latent ista omnia crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris: vt nulla acies humani ingenij tanta sit, quæ penetrare in cœlum, terram intrare possit. Et certes la philosophie n’est qu’vne poësie sophistiquée. D’où tirent ces autheurs anciens toutes leurs authoritez, que des poëtes? Et les premiers furent poetes eux mesmes, et la traicterent en leur art. Platon n’est qu’vn poete descousu. Toutes les sciences sur-humaines s’accoustrent du stile poetique.

    Did I not see in Plato that divine saying, that Nature is nothing but an enigmatic poem? As one might say, perhaps, a veiled and shadowy painting, glimmering with an infinite variety of false lights to exercise our conjectures. All these things lie hidden, concealed and wrapped in thick darkness, so that no human intellect is keen enough to penetrate heaven or to enter the earth. And certainly philosophy is nothing but adulterated poetry. Where do those ancient authors get all their authorities, if not from the poets? And the first philosophers were poets themselves, and treated philosophy in their art. Plato is nothing but a rambling poet. All the superhuman sciences dress themselves up in the poetic style.

    Tout ainsi que les femmes employent des dents d’yuoire, où les leurs naturelles leur manquent, et au lieu de leur vray teint, en forgent vn de quelque matiere estrangere: comme elles font des cuisses de drap et de feutre, et de l’embonpoinct de coton: et au veu et sçeu d’vn chacun s’embellissent d’vne beauté fauce et empruntée: ainsi fait la science (et nostre droict mesme a, dit-on, des fictions legitimes sur lesquelles il fonde la verité de sa iustice) elle nous donne en payement et en presupposition, les choses qu’elle mesmes nous apprend estre inuentées: car ces epicycles, excentriques, concentriques, dequoy l’astrologie s’aide à conduire le bransle de ses estoilles, elle nous les donne, pour le mieux qu’elle ait sçeu inuenter en ce subject: comme aussi au reste, la philosophie nous presente, non pas ce qui est, ou ce qu’elle croit, mais ce qu’elle forge ayant plus d’apparence et de gentillesse.

    Women use ivory teeth where their natural ones are missing, and instead of their true complexion forge one out of some foreign material; they make thighs of cloth and felt, and plumpness out of cotton, and in full view and knowledge of everyone embellish themselves with a false and borrowed beauty. Science does just the same. (Even our law, they say, has legitimate fictions on which it founds the truth of its justice.) Science hands us, as payment and as premises, the very things it tells us are invented. For those epicycles, eccentrics and concentrics with which astronomy helps itself to steer the motion of its stars—it gives them to us as the best it has been able to invent on that subject; just as, for the rest, philosophy presents us not with what is, or with what it believes, but with what it forges as having the most plausibility and charm.

    Platon sur le discours de l’estat de nostre corps et de celuy des bestes: Que ce, que nous auons dict, soit vray, nous en asseurerions, si nous auions sur cela confirmation d’vn oracle. Seulement nous asseurons, que c’est le plus vray-semblablement, que nous ayons sçeu dire.

    Plato, discussing the state of our body and that of beasts, says: “That what we have said is true, we would affirm if we had confirmation of it from an oracle. We affirm only that it is the most probable thing we have been able to say.”

    Ce n’est pas au ciel seulement qu’elle enuoye ses cordages, ses engins et ses rouës: considerons vn peu ce qu’elle dit de nous mesmes et de nostre contexture. Il n’y a pas plus de retrogradation, trepidation, accession, reculement, rauissement, aux astres et corps celestes, qu’ils en ont forgé en ce pauure petit corps humain. Vrayement ils ont eu par là, raison de l’appeller le petit monde, tant ils ont employé de pieces, et de visages à le maçonner et bastir. Pour accommoder les mouuemens qu’ils voyent en l’homme, les diuerses functions et facultez que nous sentons en nous, en combien de parties ont ils diuisé nostre ame? en combien de sieges logée?

    It is not only to the heavens that philosophy sends its ropes, its machines and its wheels; let us consider a little what it says about ourselves and our makeup. There is no more retrogradation, trepidation, accession, recession and rapture in the stars and heavenly bodies than they have forged in this poor little human body. Truly they had good reason to call it the little world, so many pieces and facets did they use to build and put it together. To account for the movements they see in man, and the various functions and faculties we feel in ourselves, into how many parts have they divided our soul? In how many seats have they lodged it?

    à combien d’ordres et d’estages ont-ils departy ce pauure homme, outre les naturels et perceptibles? et à combien d’offices et de vacations? Ils en font vne chose publique imaginaire. C’est vn subject qu’ils tiennent et qu’ils manient: on leur laisse toute puissance de le descoudre, renger, rassembler, et estoffer, chacun à sa fantasie; et si ne le possedent pas encore. Non seulement en verité, mais en songe mesmes, ils ne le peuuent regler, qu’il ne s’y trouue quelque cadence, ou quelque son, qui eschappe à leur architecture, toute enorme qu’elle est, et rapiecée de mille lopins faux et fantastiques. Et ce n’est pas raison de les excuser.

    Into how many orders and stories have they divided up this poor man, beyond the natural and perceptible ones? And into how many offices and occupations? They make him an imaginary commonwealth. He is a subject they hold and handle; they are given full power to unstitch him, arrange him, reassemble him and stuff him, each according to his fancy; and still they do not master him. Not only in reality but even in dreams, they cannot regulate him without some cadence or some sound escaping their architecture, enormous as it is, and patched together from a thousand false and fantastic scraps. And it is not right to excuse them.

    Car aux peintres, quand ils peignent le ciel, la terre, les mers, les monts, les isles escartées, nous leur condonons, qu’ils nous en rapportent seulement quelque marque legere: et comme de choses ignorées, nous contentons d’vn tel quel ombrage et feint. Mais quand ils nous tirent apres le naturel, ou autre subject, qui nous est familier et cognu, nous exigeons d’eux vne parfaicte et exacte representation des lineaments, et des couleurs: et les mesprisons, s’ils y faillent.

    For with painters, when they paint the sky, the earth, the seas, the mountains, the distant islands, we let them off with giving us only some slight indication; and since these things are unknown to us, we are content with any sort of shadowy, imagined rendering. But when they draw us from life, or some other subject that is familiar and known to us, we demand of them a perfect and exact representation of the lines and colors, and we despise them if they fail.

    Ie sçay bon gré à la garce Milesienne, qui voyant le philosophe Thales s’amuser continuellement à la contemplation de la voute celeste, et tenir tousiours les yeux esleuez contre-mont, luy mit en son passage quelque chose à le faire broncher, pour l’aduertir, qu’il seroit temps d’amuser son pensement aux choses qui estoient dans les nues, quand il auroit pourueu à celles qui estoient à ses pieds. Elle luy conseilloit certes bien, de regarder plustost à soy qu’au ciel.

    I am grateful to the Milesian girl who, seeing the philosopher Thales constantly absorbed in contemplating the vault of heaven, his eyes always raised upward, put something in his path to make him stumble, to warn him that it would be time to occupy his thoughts with things in the clouds once he had seen to those at his feet. She certainly gave him good advice: to look at himself rather than at the sky.

    Car, comme dit Democritus par la bouche de Cicero, Quod est ante pedes, nemo spectat: cœli scrutantur plagas. Mais nostre condition porte, que la cognoissance de ce que nous auons entre mains, est aussi esloignée de nous, et aussi bien au dessus des nuës, que celle des astres. Comme dit Socrates en Platon, qu’à quiconque se mesle de la philosophie, on peut faire le reproche que fait cette femme à Thales, qu’il ne void rien de ce qui est deuant luy. Car tout philosophe ignore ce que fait son voisin: ouï et ce qu’il fait luy-mesme, et ignore ce qu’ils sont tous deux, ou bestes, ou hommes.

    For, as Democritus says through the mouth of Cicero, No one looks at what lies before his feet; they scan the regions of the sky. But our condition is such that the knowledge of what we have in our hands is as far from us, and as high above the clouds, as that of the stars. As Socrates says in Plato, anyone who meddles with philosophy may be reproached as that woman reproached Thales: he sees nothing of what is in front of him. For every philosopher is ignorant of what his neighbor is doing—yes, and of what he himself is doing—and is ignorant of what they both are, beasts or men.

    Ces gens icy, qui trouuent les raisons de Sebonde trop foibles, qui n’ignorent rien, qui gouuernent le monde, qui sçauent tout: Quæ mare compescant causæ, quid temperet annum, / Stellæ sponte sua, iussæue vagentur et errent: / Quid premat obscurum Lunæ, quid proferat orbem, / Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors: n’ont ils pas quelquesfois sondé parmy leurs liures, les difficultez qui se presentent, à cognoistre leur estre propre?

    These people who find Sebond’s arguments too weak, who are ignorant of nothing, who govern the world, who know everything—What causes restrain the sea, what governs the year, / whether the stars wander and stray of their own will or by command, / what darkens the moon’s orb, what brings it forth, / what the discordant concord of things intends and can do—have they never, among their books, sounded the difficulties that arise in knowing their own being?

    Nous voyons bien que le doigt se meut, et que le pied se meut, qu’aucunes parties se branslent d’elles mesmes sans nostre congé, et que d’autres nous les agitons par nostre ordonnance, que certaine apprehension engendre la rougeur, certaine autre la palleur, telle imagination agit en la rate seulement, telle autre au cerueau, l’vne nous cause le rire, l’autre le pleurer, telle autre transit et estonne tous noz sens, et arreste le mouuement de noz membres, à tel object l’estomach se sousleue, à tel autre quelque partie plus basse.

    We see well enough that the finger moves and the foot moves; that some parts stir by themselves without our leave, while others we move at our command; that a certain apprehension makes us blush, another turn pale; one notion acts only on the spleen, another on the brain; one makes us laugh, another weep; another chills and stuns all our senses and stops the movement of our limbs; at one sight the stomach heaves, at another some lower part.

    Mais comme vne impression spirituelle, face vne telle faucée dans vn subject massif, et solide, et la nature de la liaison et cousture de ces admirables ressorts, iamais homme ne l’a sçeu: Omnia incerta ratione, et in naturæ maiestate abdita, dit Pline; et S. Augustin, Modus, quo corporibus adhærent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendi ab homine potest: et hoc ipse homo est. Et si ne le met on pas pourtant en doubte: car les opinions des hommes, sont receuës à la suitte des creances anciennes, par authorité et à credit, comme si c’estoit religion et loy.

    But how a spiritual impression can make such a breach in a massive and solid substance, and what is the nature of the linkage and stitching of these wonderful springs, no man has ever known. All things uncertain to reason and hidden in the majesty of nature, says Pliny; and Saint Augustine: The manner in which spirits cling to bodies is altogether marvelous and cannot be comprehended by man; and this is man himself. And yet no one calls it into question; for men’s opinions are accepted in the wake of ancient beliefs, on authority and on credit, as if they were religion and law.

    On reçoit comme vn iargon ce qui en est communement tenu: on reçoit cette verité, auec tout son bastiment et attelage d’argumens et de preuues, comme vn corps ferme et solide, qu’on n’esbranle plus, qu’on ne iuge plus. Au contraire, chacun à qui mieux mieux, va plastrant et confortant cette creance receue, de tout ce que peut sa raison, qui est vn vtil soupple contournable, et accommodable à toute figure. Ainsi se remplit le monde et se confit en fadeze et en mensonge.

    What is commonly held about it is taken in like a jargon; this truth is accepted, with its whole structure and apparatus of arguments and proofs, as a firm and solid body that is no longer shaken, no longer judged. On the contrary, everyone vies with everyone else in plastering and propping up this accepted belief with all that his reason can do—and reason is a pliant tool, bendable and adaptable to any shape. Thus the world is filled with, and steeped in, nonsense and lies.

    Ce qui fait qu’on ne doubte de guere de choses, c’est que les communes impressions on ne les essaye iamais; on n’en sonde point le pied, où git la faute et la foiblesse: on ne debat que sur les branches: on ne demande pas si cela est vray, mais s’il a esté ainsin ou ainsin entendu. On ne demande pas si Galen a rien dict qui vaille: mais s’il a dict ainsin, ou autrement. Vrayement c’estoit bien raison que cette bride et contrainte de la liberté de noz iugements, et cette tyrannie de noz creances, s’estendist iusques aux escholes et aux arts. Le Dieu de la science scholastique, c’est Aristote: c’est religion de debattre de ses ordonnances, comme de celles de Lycurgus à Sparte.

    What makes us doubt so few things is that we never test common impressions; we do not probe their footing, where the fault and weakness lie; we argue only about the branches. We do not ask whether a thing is true, but whether it was understood this way or that. We do not ask whether Galen said anything worthwhile, but whether he said it this way or otherwise. Truly it was very reasonable that this curb and constraint on the freedom of our judgments, and this tyranny over our beliefs, should extend even to the schools and the arts. The god of scholastic learning is Aristotle; it is a religious offense to debate his decrees, as it was those of Lycurgus at Sparta.

    Sa doctrine nous sert de loy magistrale: qui est à l’aduanture autant faulce que vne autre. Ie ne sçay pas pourquoy ie n’acceptasse autant volontiers ou les idées de Platon, ou les atomes d’Epicurus, ou le plein et le vuide de Leucippus et Democritus, ou l’eau de Thales, ou l’infinité de Nature d’Anaximander, ou l’air de Diogenes, ou les nombres et symmetrie de Pythagoras, ou l’infiny de Parmenides, ou l’vn de Musæus, ou l’eau et le feu d’Apollodorus, ou les parties similaires d’Anaxagoras, ou la discorde et amitié d’Empedocles, ou le feu de Heraclitus, ou toute autre opinion, (de cette confusion infinie d’aduis et de sentences, que produit cette belle raison humaine par sa certitude et clair-voyance, en tout ce dequoy elle se mesle) que ie feroy l’opinion d’Aristote, sur ce subject des principes des choses naturelles: lesquels principes il bastit de trois pieces, matiere, forme, et priuation.

    His doctrine serves us as magisterial law, though it may well be as false as any other. I do not see why I should not accept just as readily the Ideas of Plato, or the atoms of Epicurus, or the plenum and void of Leucippus and Democritus, or the water of Thales, or Anaximander’s infinity of Nature, or the air of Diogenes, or the numbers and proportion of Pythagoras, or the infinite of Parmenides, or the One of Musaeus, or the water and fire of Apollodorus, or the like parts of Anaxagoras, or the discord and friendship of Empedocles, or the fire of Heraclitus, or any other opinion (out of that infinite confusion of views and pronouncements that this fine human reason produces, through its certainty and clear-sightedness, in everything it meddles with)—as readily as I would the opinion of Aristotle on this subject of the principles of natural things. These principles he builds out of three pieces: matter, form and privation.

    Et qu’est-il plus vain que de faire l’inanité mesme, cause de la production des choses? La priuation c’est vne negatiue: de quelle humeur en a-il peu faire la cause et origine des choses qui sont? Cela toutesfois ne s’oseroit esbranler que pour l’exercice de la logique. On n’y debat rien pour le mettre en doute, mais pour deffendre l’autheur de l’escole des obiections estrangeres: son authorité c’est le but, au delà duquel il n’est pas permis de s’enquerir.

    And what is more vain than to make emptiness itself the cause of the production of things? Privation is a negative: what notion could have led him to make it the cause and origin of things that exist? Yet no one would dare to shake that, except as an exercise in logic. Nothing is debated there in order to cast doubt on it, but to defend the founder of the school against outside objections; his authority is the goal, beyond which no inquiry is permitted.

    Il est bien aisé sur des fondemens auouez, de bastir ce qu’on veut; car selon la loy et ordonnance de ce commencement, le reste des pieces du bastiment se conduit aisément, sans se dementir. Par cette voye nous trouuons nostre raison bien fondée, et discourons à boule-veuë. Car nos maistres præoccupent et gaignent auant main, autant de lieu en nostre creance, qu’il leur en faut pour conclurre apres ce qu’ils veulent; à la mode des geometriens par leurs demandes auouées: le consentement et approbation que nous leurs prestons, leur donnant dequoy nous trainer à gauche et à dextre, et nous pyrouetter à leur volonté.

    It is very easy to build whatever you like on agreed foundations; for in keeping with the law and ordering of this beginning, the remaining parts of the building go up easily without contradicting one another. By this route we find our reason well founded, and we reason away blindly. For our masters occupy and win in advance as much ground in our belief as they need in order to conclude afterward whatever they like, in the manner of geometers with their granted postulates: the consent and approval we lend them gives them the means to drag us left and right and spin us around at their will.

    Quiconque est creu de ses presuppositions, il est nostre maistre et nostre Dieu: il prendra le plant de ses fondemens si ample et si aisé, que par iceux il nous pourra monter, s’il veut, iusques aux nuës. En cette pratique et negotiation de science, nous auons pris pour argent content le mot de Pythagoras, que chaque expert doit estre creu en son art. Le dialecticien se rapporte au grammairien de la signification des mots: le rhetoricien emprunte du dialecticien les lieux des argumens: le poëte, du musicien les mesures: le geometrien, de l’arithmeticien les proportions: les metaphysiciens prennent pour fondement les coniectures de la physique. Car chasque science a ses principes presupposez, par où le iugement humain est bridé de toutes parts.

    Whoever is believed in his presuppositions is our master and our God: he will lay out the ground plan of his foundations so broad and easy that by them he can lift us, if he wishes, up to the clouds. In this practice and business of knowledge we have taken at face value Pythagoras’ saying that every expert should be believed in his own field. The logician refers to the grammarian for the meaning of words; the rhetorician borrows the topics of argument from the logician; the poet borrows his meters from the musician; the geometer his proportions from the arithmetician; the metaphysicians take the conjectures of physics as their foundation. For each science has its presupposed principles, by which human judgment is reined in on every side.

    Si vous venez à chocquer cette barriere, en laquelle gist la principale erreur, ils ont incontinent cette sentence en la bouche; qu’il ne faut pas debattre contre ceux qui nient les principes. Or n’y peut-il auoir des principes aux hommes, si la diuinité ne les leur a reuelez: de tout le demeurant, et le commencement, et le milieu et la fin, ce n’est que songe et fumée. A ceux qui combattent par presupposition, il leur faut presupposer au contraire, le mesme axiome, dequoy on debat. Car toute presupposition humaine, et toute enunciation, a autant d’authorité que l’autre, si la raison n’en faict la difference. Ainsin il les faut toutes mettre à la balance: et premierement les generalles, et celles qui nous tyrannisent.

    If you happen to run into this barrier, where the principal error lies, they immediately have this maxim on their lips: that one must not argue with those who deny first principles. Now there can be no principles for men unless the divinity has revealed them; all the rest—beginning, middle and end—is nothing but dream and smoke. Against those who fight by presupposition, we must presuppose the contrary of the very axiom under dispute. For every human presupposition, and every proposition, has as much authority as any other, unless reason makes the difference. So they must all be put on the scales—and first the general ones, and those that tyrannize over us.

    La persuasion de la certitude, est vn certain tesmoignage de folie, et d’incertitude extreme. Et n’est point de plus folles gents, ny moins philosophes, que les Philodoxes de Platon. Il faut sçauoir si le feu est chault, si la neige est blanche, s’il y a rien de dur ou de mol en nostre cognoissance.

    The conviction of certainty is a certain sign of folly and of extreme uncertainty. And there are no people more foolish, or less philosophical, than Plato’s philodoxes. We need to know whether fire is hot, whether snow is white, whether there is anything hard or soft within our knowledge.

    Philodoxes: Plato’s term (Republic V) for “lovers of opinion,” as opposed to philosophers, lovers of wisdom.

    Et quant à ces responses, dequoy il se fait des comtes anciens: comme à celuy qui mettoit en doubte la chaleur, à qui on dit qu’il se iettast dans le feu: à celuy qui nioit la froideur de la glace, qu’il s’en mist dans le sein: elles sont tres-indignes de la profession philosophique. S’ils nous eussent laissé en nostre estat naturel, receuans les apparences estrangeres selon qu’elles se presentent à nous par nos sens; et nous eussent laissé aller apres nos appetits simples, et reglez par la condition de nostre naissance, ils auroient raison de parler ainsi.

    As for those retorts told in old stories—as to the man who doubted heat, who was told to throw himself into the fire, or to the man who denied that ice was cold, who was told to put some in his bosom—they are thoroughly unworthy of the philosophical profession. If they had left us in our natural state, receiving outward appearances as they present themselves to us through our senses, and had let us follow our simple appetites, regulated by the condition of our birth, they would be right to talk like that.

    Mais c’est d’eux que nous auons appris de nous rendre iuges du monde: c’est d’eux que nous tenons cette fantasie, que la raison humaine est contrerolleuse generalle de tout ce qui est au dehors et au dedans de la voute celeste, qui embrasse tout, qui peut tout: par le moyen de laquelle tout se sçait, et cognoist. Cette response seroit bonne parmy les Canibales, qui iouyssent l’heur d’vne longue vie, tranquille, et paisible, sans les preceptes d’Aristote, et sans la cognoissance du nom de la physique. Cette response vaudroit mieux à l’aduenture, et auroit plus de fermeté, que toutes celles qu’ils emprunteront de leur raison et de leur inuention.

    But it is from them that we have learned to set ourselves up as judges of the world; it is from them that we get this notion that human reason is controller-general of all that is outside and inside the vault of heaven, that it embraces everything, can do everything, and that through it everything is known and understood. That retort would do well among the Cannibals, who enjoy the happiness of a long, tranquil and peaceful life without the precepts of Aristotle and without even knowing the name of physics. That retort would perhaps be worth more, and have more firmness, than all those they will borrow from their reason and their invention.

    The Cannibals: the Brazilian peoples described in “Of Cannibals” (I.31).

    De cette-cy seroient capables auec nous, tous les animaux, et tout ce, où le commandement est encor pur et simple de la loy naturelle: mais eux ils y ont renoncé. Il ne faut pas qu’ils me dient, il est vray, car vous le voyez et sentez ainsin: il faut qu’ils me dient, si ce que ie pense sentir, ie le sens pourtant en effect: et si ie le sens, qu’ils me dient apres pourquoy ie le sens, et comment, et quoy: qu’ils me dient le nom, l’origine, les tenans et aboutissans de la chaleur, du froid; les qualitez de celuy qui agit, et de celuy qui souffre: ou qu’ils me quittent leur profession, qui est de ne receuoir ny approuuer rien, que par la voye de la raison: c’est leur touche à toutes sortes d’essais.

    All animals would be capable of this retort along with us, and everything in which the command of natural law is still pure and simple; but these men have renounced it. They must not tell me, “It is true, for you see it and feel it so”; they must tell me whether what I think I feel I actually do feel; and if I feel it, let them then tell me why I feel it, and how, and what; let them tell me the name, the origin, the bounds and boundaries of heat and cold, the qualities of what acts and of what is acted upon; or else let them give up their profession, which is to accept or approve nothing except by way of reason. That is their touchstone for every kind of trial.

    Mais certes c’est vne touche pleine de fauceté, d’erreur, de foiblesse, et defaillance.

    But truly it is a touchstone full of falsity, error, weakness and failure.

    Par où la voulons nous mieux esprouuer, que par elle mesme? S’il ne la faut croire parlant de soy, à peine sera elle propre à iuger des choses estrangeres: si elle cognoist quelque chose, aumoins sera-ce son estre et son domicile. Elle est en l’ame, et partie, ou effect d’icelle: car la vraye raison et essentielle, de qui nous desrobons le nom à fauces enseignes, elle loge dans le sein de Dieu, c’est là son giste et sa retraite, c’est de là où elle part, quand il plaist à Dieu nous en faire voir quelque rayon: comme Pallas saillit de la teste de son pere, pour se communiquer au monde.

    How better can we test it than by itself? If it is not to be believed when speaking of itself, it will hardly be fit to judge of things outside it; if it knows anything, it must at least be its own being and dwelling. It is in the soul, and is a part or an effect of it; for true and essential reason, whose name we steal under false colors, lodges in the bosom of God. That is its home and its retreat; it is from there that it sets out when God is pleased to show us some ray of it, as Pallas sprang from her father’s head to communicate herself to the world.

    What is the soul?

    The philosophers disagree about the soul’s nature, seat, origin and survival.

    Or voyons ce que l’humaine raison nous a appris de soy et de l’ame: non de l’ame en general, de laquelle quasi toute la philosophie rend les corps celestes et les premiers corps participants: ny de celle que Thales attribuoit aux choses mesmes, qu’on tient inanimées, conuié par la consideration de l’aimant: mais de celle qui nous appartient, que nous deuons mieux cognoistre. Ignoratur enim quæ sit natura animaï: / Nata sit, an contrà nascentibus insinuetur, / Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta; / An tenebras Orci visat, vastásque lacunas, / An pecudes alias diuinitus insinuet se.

    Now let us see what human reason has taught us about itself and about the soul: not the soul in general, in which nearly all philosophy makes the heavenly bodies and the primary bodies share; nor the soul that Thales attributed even to things considered inanimate, prompted by thinking about the magnet; but the soul that belongs to us, which we ought to know better. For no one knows what the nature of the soul is: / whether it is born, or on the contrary slips into us at birth, / and whether it perishes together with us, torn apart by death, / or visits the darkness of Orcus and its vast pools, / or by divine will slips into other creatures.

    A Crates et Dicæarchus, qu’il n’y en auoit du tout point, mais que le corps s’esbranloit ainsi d’vn mouuement naturel: à Platon, que c’estoit vne substance se mouuant de soy-mesme: à Thales, vne nature sans repos: à Asclepiades, vne exercitation des sens: à Hesiodus et Anaximander, chose composée de terre et d’eau: à Parmenides, de terre et de feu: à Empedocles, de sang: Sanguineam vomit ille animam: à Possidonius, Cleanthes et Galen, vne chaleur ou complexion chaleureuse, Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo: à Hippocrates, vn esprit espandu par le corps: à Varro, vn air receu par la bouche, eschauffé au poulmon, attrempé au cœur, et espandu par tout le corps: à Zeno, la quint’-essence des quatre elemens: à Heraclides Ponticus, la lumiere: à Xenocrates, et aux Ægyptiens, vn nombre mobile: aux Chaldées, vne vertu sans forme determinée.

    According to Crates and Dicaearchus, there was no soul at all, but the body moved thus by a natural motion; to Plato, it was a substance moving of itself; to Thales, a nature without rest; to Asclepiades, an exercise of the senses; to Hesiod and Anaximander, a thing composed of earth and water; to Parmenides, of earth and fire; to Empedocles, of blood: He vomits forth his blood-red soul; to Posidonius, Cleanthes and Galen, a heat or a hot constitution: Fiery is their vigor, and heavenly their origin; to Hippocrates, a spirit spread through the body; to Varro, an air taken in through the mouth, warmed in the lungs, tempered in the heart and spread throughout the body; to Zeno, the quintessence of the four elements; to Heraclides Ponticus, light; to Xenocrates and the Egyptians, a moving number; to the Chaldeans, a power without determinate form.

    Habitum quemdam vitalem corporis esse, / Harmoniam Græci quam dicunt. N’oublions pas Aristote, ce qui naturellement fait mouuoir le corps, qu’il nomme entelechie: d’vne autant froide inuention que nulle autre: car il ne parle ny de l’essence, ny de l’origine, ny de la nature de l’ame, mais en remerque seulement l’effect. Lactance, Seneque, et la meilleure part entre les dogmatistes, ont confessé que c’estoit chose qu’ils n’entendoient pas. Et apres tout ce denombrement d’opinions: Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit, dit Cicero. Ie connoy par moy, dit S. Bernard, combien Dieu est incomprehensible, puis que les pieces de mon estre propre, ie ne les puis comprendre.

    That it is a certain vital disposition of the body, / which the Greeks call harmony. Let us not forget Aristotle: the soul is what naturally makes the body move, which he calls entelechy—an invention as frigid as any other; for he speaks neither of the essence, nor of the origin, nor of the nature of the soul, but merely notes its effect. Lactantius, Seneca and most of the dogmatists have confessed that it was something they did not understand. And after this whole roll call of opinions: Which of these opinions is true, some god must see, says Cicero. “I know from myself,” says Saint Bernard, “how incomprehensible God is, since I cannot comprehend the parts of my own being.”

    Entelechy: Aristotle’s term for the realized form of a thing; he defined the soul as the first entelechy of a natural body.

    Heraclitus, qui tenoit, tout estre plein d’ames et de daimons, maintenoit pourtant, qu’on ne pouuoit aller tant auant vers la cognoissance de l’ame, qu’on y peust arriuer, si profonde estre son essence.

    Heraclitus, who held that everything was full of souls and daimons, nevertheless maintained that one could not go far enough toward knowledge of the soul to reach it, so deep was its essence.

    Il n’y a pas moins de dissension, ny de debat à la loger. Hippocrates et Hierophilus la mettent au ventricule du cerueau: Democritus et Aristote, par tout le corps: Vt bona sæpe valet udo cùm dicitur esse / Corporis, et non est tamen hæc pars vlla valentis. Epicurus, en l’estomach: Hîc exultat enim pauor ac metus, hæc loca circúm / Lætitiæ mulcent. Les Stoïciens, autour et dedans le cœur: Erasistratus, ioignant la membrane de l’epicrane: Empedocles, au sang: comme aussi Moyse, qui fut la cause pourquoy il defendit de manger le sang des bestes, auquel leur ame est iointe: Galen a pensé que chaque partie du corps ait son ame: Strato l’a logée entre les deux sourcils: Qua facie quidem sit animus, aut vbi habitet, ne quærendum quidem est: dit Cicero.

    There is no less dissension and debate about where to lodge it. Hippocrates and Herophilus put it in the ventricle of the brain; Democritus and Aristotle throughout the body: As health is often said to belong / to the body, and yet it is no part of the healthy man. Epicurus in the stomach: For here dread and fear leap up; around these parts / joys soothe us. The Stoics around and within the heart; Erasistratus next to the membrane of the epicranium; Empedocles in the blood, as did Moses too, which was why he forbade eating the blood of beasts, to which their soul is joined. Galen thought that each part of the body has its own soul. Strato lodged it between the two eyebrows. What form the mind may have, or where it dwells, should not even be asked, says Cicero.

    Ie laisse volontiers à cet homme ses mots propres. Iroy-ie à l’éloquence alterer son parler? Ioint qu’il y a peu d’acquest à desrober la matiere de ses inuentions. Elles sont et peu frequentes, et peu roides, et peu ignorées. Mais la raison pourquoy Chrysippus l’argumente autour du cœur, comme les autres de sa secte, n’est pas pour estre oubliée: C’est par ce, dit-il, que quand nous voulons asseurer quelque chose, nous mettons la main sur l’estomach: et quand nous voulons prononcer, εγω, qui signifie moy, nous baissons vers l’estomach la machouëre d’embas.

    I gladly leave this man his own words. Should I go altering the speech of eloquence itself? Besides, there is little to gain by stealing the substance of his ideas: they are neither frequent, nor forceful, nor unknown. But the reason why Chrysippus argues that the soul is around the heart, like the others of his sect, deserves not to be forgotten. It is because, he says, when we want to affirm something we put our hand on our chest; and when we want to pronounce εγω, which means “I,” we drop our lower jaw toward the chest.

    Ce lieu ne se doit passer, sans remerquer la vanité d’vn si grand personnage: car outre ce que ces considerations sont d’elles mesmes infiniment legeres, la derniere ne preuue qu’aux Grecs, qu’ils ayent l’ame en cet endroit là. Il n’est iugement humain, si tendu, qui ne sommeille par fois. Que craignons nous à dire? Voyla les Stoiciens peres de l’humaine prudence, qui trouuent, que l’ame d’vn homme accablé sous vne ruine, traine et ahanne long temps à sortir, ne se pouuant desmesler de la charge, comme vne sourix prinse à la trapelle.

    This passage must not be passed over without remarking the vanity of so great a man: for besides the fact that these considerations are in themselves infinitely trivial, the last one proves only for the Greeks that they have their soul in that spot. There is no human judgment so taut that it does not doze at times. Why are we afraid to say it? There are the Stoics, fathers of human wisdom, who find that the soul of a man crushed under a collapsed building drags and labors a long time to get out, unable to free itself from the weight, like a mouse caught in a trap.

    Aucuns tiennent, que le monde fut faict pour donner corps par punition, aux esprits decheus par leur faute, de la pureté en quoy ils auoyent esté creés: la premiere creation n’ayant esté qu’incorporelle: et que selon qu’ils se sont plus ou moins esloignez de leur spiritualité, on les incorpore plus et moins alaigrement ou lourdement. De là vient la varieté de tant de matiere creée. Mais l’esprit, qui fut pour sa peine inuesti du corps du soleil, deuoit auoir vne mesure d’alteration bien rare et particuliere.

    Some hold that the world was made to give bodies, as punishment, to spirits that had fallen by their own fault from the purity in which they had been created—the first creation having been only incorporeal—and that according as they have strayed more or less from their spirituality, they are embodied more or less lightly or heavily. Hence the variety of so much created matter. But the spirit that was clothed, as its penalty, with the body of the sun must have undergone a very rare and peculiar degree of alteration.

    This is the view of Origen (3rd century AD), as reported by Augustine, City of God XI.23.

    Les extremitez de nostre perquisition tombent toutes en esblouyssement. Comme dit Plutarque de la teste des histoires, qu’à la mode des chartes, l’orée des terres cognuës est saisie de marests, forests profondes, deserts et lieux inhabitables. Voyla pourquoy les plus grossieres et pueriles rauasseries, se trouuent plus en ceux qui traittent les choses plus hautes, et plus auant: s’abysmants en leur curiosité et presomption. La fin et le commencement de science, se tiennent en pareille bestise. Voyez prendre à mont l’essor à Platon en ses nuages poëtiques. Voyez chez luy le iargon des Dieux. Mais à quoy songeoit-il, quand il definit l’homme, vn animal à deux pieds, sans plume: fournissant à ceux qui auoyent enuie de se moquer de luy, vne plaisante occasion?

    The outer limits of our inquiry all end in dazzlement. As Plutarch says of the earliest parts of histories, it is as on maps, where the edges of the known lands are taken up by marshes, deep forests, deserts and uninhabitable places. That is why the crudest and most childish ravings are found most in those who treat the highest matters and go furthest, sinking into the abyss of their curiosity and presumption. The end and the beginning of knowledge are equally stupid. Watch Plato take flight upward into his poetic clouds; see in his works the jargon of the gods. But what was he dreaming of when he defined man as a two-footed animal without feathers, giving those who wanted to make fun of him an amusing opportunity?

    Plutarch makes this comparison at the opening of his Life of Theseus.

    car ayans plumé vn chapon vif, ils alloyent le nommant, l’homme de Platon.

    for, having plucked a live capon, they went about calling it “Plato’s man.”

    Et quoy les Epicuriens, de quelle simplicité estoyent ils allez premierement imaginer, que leurs atomes, qu’ils disoyent estre des corps ayants quelque pesanteur, et vn mouuement naturel contre bas, eussent basti le monde: iusques à ce qu’ils fussent auisez par leurs aduersaires, que par cette description, il n’estoit pas possible qu’ils se ioignissent et se prinsent l’vn à l’autre, leur cheute estant ainsi droite et perpendiculaire, et engendrant par tout des lignes paralleles? Parquoy il fut force, qu’ils y adioustassent depuis vn mouuement de costé, fortuite: et qu’ils fournissent encore à leurs atomes, des queuës courbes et crochuës, pour les rendre aptes à s’attacher et se coudre. Et lors mesme, ceux qui les poursuyuent de cette autre consideration, les mettent ils pas en peine?

    And what of the Epicureans? How simple-minded they were, first to imagine that their atoms, which they said were bodies having some weight and a natural downward motion, had built the world—until their opponents pointed out to them that by this description the atoms could not possibly join and cling to one another, since their fall was straight and perpendicular and produced parallel lines everywhere. So they were forced to add afterward a chance sideways motion, and to furnish their atoms besides with curved and hooked tails, to make them fit to attach and stitch themselves together. And even then, do not those who press them with this other consideration put them in difficulty?

    Si les atomes ont par sort formé tant de sortes de figures, pourquoy ne se sont ils iamais rencontrez à faire vne maison et vn soulier? Pourquoy de mesme ne croid on, qu’vn nombre infini de lettres Grecques versées emmy la place, seroyent pour arriuer à la contexture de l’Iliade?

    If the atoms have by chance formed so many kinds of shapes, why have they never happened to come together to make a house or a shoe? Why, by the same token, do we not believe that an infinite number of Greek letters poured out in the middle of the marketplace might arrive at the text of the Iliad?

    Ce qui est capable de raison, dit Zenon, est meilleur, que ce qui n’en est point capable: il n’est rien meilleur que le monde: il est donc capable de raison. Cotta par cette mesme argumentation fait le monde mathematicien: et le fait musicien et organiste, par cette autre argumentation aussi de Zenon: Le tout est plus que la partie: nous sommes capables de sagesse, et sommes parties du monde: il est donc sage. Il se void infinis pareils exemples, non d’argumens faux seulement, mais ineptes, ne se tenans point, et accusans leurs autheurs non tant d’ignorance que d’imprudence, és reproches que les philosophes se font les vns aux autres sur les dissentions de leurs opinions, et de leurs sectes.

    “That which is capable of reason,” says Zeno, “is better than that which is not capable of it; there is nothing better than the world; therefore it is capable of reason.” Cotta, by this same argument, makes the world a mathematician; and he makes it a musician and organ player by this other argument, also Zeno’s: “The whole is more than the part; we are capable of wisdom, and we are parts of the world; therefore it is wise.” There are countless similar examples—of arguments not just false but inept, that do not hold together and accuse their authors not so much of ignorance as of imprudence—in the reproaches philosophers throw at one another over the disagreements between their opinions and their sects.

    Qui fagoteroit suffisamment vn amas des asneries de l’humaine sapience, il diroit merueilles. I’en assemble volontiers, comme vne montre, par quelque biais non moins vtile que les instructions plus moderees. Iugeons par là ce que nous auons à estimer de l’homme, de son sens et de sa raison, puis qu’en ces grands personnages, et qui ont porté si haut l’humaine suffisance, il s’y trouue des deffauts si apparens et si grossiers. Moy i’aime mieux croire qu’ils ont traitté la science casuelement ainsi, qu’vn iouët à toutes mains, et se sont esbatus de la raison, comme d’vn instrument vain et friuole, mettans en auant toutes sortes d’inuentions et de fantasies tantost plus tenduës, tantost plus lasches.

    Anyone who bundled together a good heap of the follies of human wisdom would have wonders to tell. I gladly collect some of them, as a sample, from an angle that is no less useful than more measured teachings. Let us judge from this what we are to think of man, of his sense and his reason, since these great figures, who carried human ability so high, show such obvious and gross defects. For my part, I would rather believe that they treated knowledge casually, as a toy for any hand to play with. They amused themselves with reason as with an idle and frivolous instrument, putting forward all sorts of inventions and notions, some more taut, some more slack.

    Ce mesme Platon, qui definit l’homme comme vne poulle, dit ailleurs apres Socrates, qu’il ne sçait à la verité que c’est que l’homme, et que c’est l’vne des pieces du monde d’autant difficile cognoissance. Par cette varieté et instabilité d’opinions, ils nous menent comme par la main tacitement à cette resolution de leur irresolution. Ils font profession de ne presenter pas tousiours leur auis à visage descouuert et apparent: ils l’ont caché tantost soubs des vmbrages fabuleux de la poësie, tantost soubs quelque autre masque: car nostre imperfection porte encores cela, que la viande crue n’est pas tousiours propre à nostre estomach: il la faut assecher, alterer et corrompre.

    This same Plato, who defines man as if he were a hen, says elsewhere, following Socrates, that he truly does not know what man is, and that man is one of the parts of the world hardest to know. By this variety and instability of opinions they lead us silently, as if by the hand, to this resolution of their irresolution. They make a point of not always presenting their views openly, with their faces uncovered. They have hidden them sometimes under the fabulous shadows of poetry, sometimes under some other mask. For our imperfection also means that raw food does not always suit our stomach: it has to be dried, altered and corrupted.

    Ils font de mesmes: ils obscurcissent par fois leurs naïfues opinions et iugemens, et les falsifient pour s’accommoder à l’vsage publique. Ils ne veulent pas faire profession expresse d’ignorance, et de l’imbecillité de la raison humaine, pour ne faire peur aux enfans: mais ils nous la descouurent assez soubs l’apparence d’vne science trouble et inconstante.

    They do the same: they sometimes obscure their natural opinions and judgments, and falsify them to suit public usage. They do not want to make an express profession of ignorance and of the feebleness of human reason, so as not to frighten the children; but they reveal it to us clearly enough under the appearance of a muddled and inconstant knowledge.

    Ie conseillois en Italie à quelqu’vn qui estoit en peine de parler Italien, que pourueu qu’il ne cherchast qu’à se faire entendre, sans y vouloir autrement exceller, qu’il employast seulement les premiers mots qui luy viendroyent à la bouche, Latins, François, Espagnols, ou Gascons, et qu’en y adioustant la terminaison Italienne, il ne faudroit iamais à rencontrer quelque idiome du pays, ou Thoscan, ou Romain, ou Venetien, ou Piemontois, ou Napolitain, et de se ioindre à quelqu’vne de tant de formes. Ie dis de mesme de la philosophie: elle a tant de visages et de varieté, et a tant dict, que tous nos songes et resueries s’y trouuent.

    When I was in Italy, I advised someone who was struggling to speak Italian that, provided he sought only to make himself understood and had no wish to excel at it, he should simply use the first words that came to his mouth, Latin, French, Spanish or Gascon. By adding the Italian ending he would never fail to hit upon some dialect of the country, Tuscan, Roman, Venetian, Piedmontese or Neapolitan, and to fall in with one of its many forms. I say the same of philosophy: it has so many faces and so much variety, and has said so much, that all our dreams and ravings are to be found in it.

    L’humaine phantasie ne peut rien conceuoir en bien et en mal qui n’y soit: Nihil tam absurdè dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum. Et i’en laisse plus librement aller mes caprices en public: d’autant que bien qu’ils soyent nez chez moy, et sans patron, ie sçay qu’ils trouueront leur relation à quelque humeur ancienne, et ne faudra quelqu’vn de dire: Voyla d’où il le print. Mes mœurs sont naturelles: ie n’ay point appellé à les bastir, le secours d’aucune discipline.

    Human fancy can conceive nothing, good or bad, that is not in it: Nothing can be said so absurd that it has not been said by some philosopher. And so I let my whims go out in public all the more freely. Although they were born at home and without a model, I know they will find some link with an ancient temperament, and someone will not fail to say: “That is where he took it from.” My ways are natural: I have not called on the help of any discipline to build them.

    Cicero, On Divination.

    Mais toutes imbecilles qu’elles sont, quand l’enuie m’a prins de les reciter, et que pour les faire sortir en publiq, vn peu plus decemment, ie me suis mis en deuoir de les assister, et de discours, et d’exemples: ç’a esté merueille à moy mesme, de les rencontrer par cas d’aduenture, conformes à tant d’exemples et discours philosophiques. De quel regiment estoit ma vie, ie ne l’ay appris qu’apres qu’elle est exploittée et employée. Nouuelle figure: Vn philosophe impremedité et fortuit.

    But feeble as they are, when the desire took me to set them down, and when, to send them out in public a little more decently, I undertook to support them with both reasonings and examples, it was a marvel even to me to find them, quite by chance, in conformity with so many philosophical examples and reasonings. Which rule my life was governed by I learned only after it had been lived and spent. A new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher.

    Pour reuenir à nostre ame, ce que Platon a mis la raison au cerueau, l’ire au cœur, et la cupidité au foye, il est vray-semblable que ç’a esté plustost vne interpretation des mouuemens de l’ame, qu’vne diuision, et separation qu’il en ayt voulu faire, comme d’vn corps en plusieurs membres.

    To return to our soul: when Plato placed reason in the brain, anger in the heart and appetite in the liver, it is likely that this was an interpretation of the movements of the soul rather than a division and separation he meant to make of it, as of a body into several limbs.

    Et la plus vray-semblable de leurs opinions est, que c’est tousiours vne ame, qui par sa faculté ratiocine, se souuient, comprend, iuge, desire et exerce toutes ses autres operations par diuers instrumens du corps, comme le nocher gouuerne son nauire selon l’experience qu’il en a, ores tendant ou laschant vne corde, ores haussant l’antenne, ou remuant l’auiron, par vne seule puissance conduisant diuers effets: et qu’elle loge au cerueau: ce qui appert de ce que les blessures et accidens qui touchent cette partie, offensent incontinent les facultez de l’ame: de là il n’est pas inconuenient qu’elle s’escoule par le reste du corps: Medium non deserit vnquam / Cœli Phœbus iter: radiis tamen omnia lustrat. comme le soleil espand du ciel en hors sa lumiere et ses puissances, et en remplit le monde.

    And the most likely of their opinions is that it is always one soul which, by its faculty, reasons, remembers, understands, judges, desires and performs all its other operations through various instruments of the body. So a helmsman steers his ship according to his experience of it, now tightening or slackening a rope, now raising the yard, now plying the oar, bringing about different effects by a single power. And it lodges in the brain: this is evident from the fact that wounds and injuries affecting that part immediately impair the faculties of the soul. From there it is not inconsistent that it should flow through the rest of the body: Phoebus never leaves the middle / course of the sky, yet with his rays he lights up all things, as the sun spreads its light and its powers outward from the sky and fills the world with them.

    Claudian, On the Sixth Consulship of Honorius.

    Cætera pars animæ, per totum dissita corpus / Paret, et ad numen mentis moménque mouetur.

    The rest of the soul, spread throughout the body, / obeys, and moves at the will and impulse of the mind.

    Aucuns ont dict, qu’il y auoit vne ame generale, comme vn grand corps, duquel toutes les ames particulieres estoyent extraictes, et s’y en retournoyent, se remeslant tousiours à cette matiere vniuerselle: Deum namque ire per omnes / Terrásque, tractúsque maris, cœlúmque profundum: / Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum, / Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas: / Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac resoluta referri / Omnia: nec morti esse locum: d’autres, qu’elles ne faisoyent que s’y resioindre et r’attacher: d’autres, qu’elle estoyent produites de la substance diuine: d’autres, par les anges, de feu et d’air. Aucuns, de toute ancienneté: aucuns, sur l’heure mesme du besoin. Aucuns les font descendre du rond de la lune, et y retourner.

    Some have said that there was a universal soul, like a great body, from which all individual souls were drawn and to which they returned, always mingling again with that universal matter: For God, they say, pervades all / lands, the stretches of the sea and the depths of the sky; / from him flocks, herds, men, every kind of wild beast, / each at its birth, draws its slender life; / to him, surely, all things are afterwards returned and, dissolved, carried / back; and there is no room for death. Others, that they merely rejoined and reattached themselves to it; others, that they were produced from the divine substance; others, that they were made by the angels, out of fire and air. Some say they have existed from all antiquity; some, that they are made at the very hour of need. Some make them come down from the circle of the moon and return there.

    Virgil, Georgics.

    Le commun des anciens, qu’elles sont engendrées de pere en fils, d’vne pareille maniere et production que toutes autres choses naturelles: argumentants cela par la ressemblance des enfans aux peres, Instillata patris virtus tibi: / Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis: et qu’on void escouler des peres aux enfans, non seulement les marques du corps, mais encores vne ressemblance d’humeurs, de complexions, et inclinations de l’ame: *Denique cur acris violentia triste leonum / Seminium sequitur? dolus vulpibus, et fuga ceruis / A patribus datur, et patrius pauor incitat artus?

    The common view of the ancients was that they are begotten from father to son, in the same way and by the same process as all other natural things. They argued this from the likeness of children to their fathers: Your father’s virtue was instilled in you; / the brave are born of the brave and good. They argued it also from the fact that we see passing from fathers to children not only bodily marks but also a resemblance of temperaments, constitutions and inclinations of the soul: *Why, then, does fierce violence go with the grim / breed of lions? Why are cunning to foxes and flight to deer / handed down by their fathers, and why does inherited fear quicken their limbs?

    The second line is from Horace, Odes; the poems that follow are Lucretius, On the Nature of Things.

    / Si non certa suo quia semine seminióque, / Vis animi pariter crescit cum corpore toto?* que là dessus se fonde la iustice diuine, punissant aux enfans la faute des peres: d’autant que la contagion des vices paternels est aucunement empreinte en l’ame des enfans, et que le desreglement de leur volonté les touche.

    / Is it not because a fixed power of mind, from its own seed and breed, / grows along with the whole body?* They held that divine justice is founded on this, punishing in the children the fault of the fathers, inasmuch as the contagion of the fathers’ vices is in some measure imprinted on the children’s souls, and the disorder of their fathers’ will affects them.

    Dauantage, que si les ames venoyent d’ailleurs, que d’vne suitte naturelle, et qu’elles eussent esté quelque autre chose hors du corps, elles auroyent recordation de leur estre premier; attendu les naturelles facultez, qui luy sont propres, de discourir, raisonner et se souuenir. Si in corpus nascentibus insinuatur, / Cur super anteactam ætatem meminesse nequimus, / Nec vestigia gestarum rerum vlla tenemus? Car pour faire valoir la condition de nos ames, comme nous voulons, il les faut presupposer toutes sçauantes, lors qu’elles sont en leur simplicité et pureté naturelle. Par ainsin elles eussent esté telles, estans exemptes de la prison corporelle, aussi bien auant que d’y entrer, comme nous esperons qu’elles seront apres qu’elles en seront sorties.

    Moreover, they held that if souls came from anywhere other than natural succession, and had been something else outside the body, they would remember their first existence, given the natural faculties proper to it of reasoning, arguing and remembering: If the soul is slipped into us at birth, / why can we not remember the time gone by, / nor keep any traces of things done? For to give our souls the standing we want them to have, we must suppose them all-knowing when they are in their natural simplicity and purity. So they would have been such, being free of the bodily prison, before entering it, just as we hope they will be after they have left it.

    Et de ce sçauoir, il faudroit qu’elles se ressouuinssent encore estans au corps, comme disoit Platon, que ce que nous apprenions, n’estoit qu’vn ressouuenir de ce que nous auions sçeu: chose que chacun par experience peut maintenir estre fauce. En premier lieu d’autant qu’il ne nous ressouuient iustement que de ce qu’on nous apprend: et que si la memoire faisoit purement son office, aumoins nous suggereroit elle quelque traict outre l’apprentissage.

    And they would have to remember this knowledge while still in the body, as Plato said, claiming that what we learned was only a remembering of what we had known—a thing that anyone can maintain from experience to be false. In the first place, because we remember precisely only what we are taught; and if memory performed its office purely, it would at least prompt us with some item beyond what we had learned.

    Secondement ce qu’elle sçauoit estant en sa pureté, c’estoit vne vraye science, cognoissant les choses comme elles sont, par sa diuine intelligence: là où icy on luy fait receuoir la mensonge et le vice, si on l’en instruit; en quoy elle ne peut employer sa reminiscence, cette image et conception n’ayant iamais logé en elle.

    Secondly, what the soul knew when it was in its purity was true knowledge, knowing things as they are by its divine intelligence; whereas here it is made to receive falsehood and vice, if it is taught them. In this it cannot use its reminiscence, since that image and conception never lodged in it.

    De dire que la prison corporelle estouffe de maniere ses facultez naifues, qu’elles y sont toutes esteintes: cela est premierement contraire à cette autre creance, de recognoistre ses forces si grandes, et les operations que les hommes en sentent en cette vie, si admirables, que d’en auoir conclu cette diuinité et eternité passée, et l’immortalité à venir; Nam si tantopere est animi mutata potestas, / Omnis vt actarum exciderit retinentia rerum, / Non, vt opinor, ea ab letho iam longior errat.

    To say that the bodily prison so stifles its natural faculties that they are all extinguished there: this is, first, contrary to that other belief, which recognizes its powers as so great, and the operations men feel of them in this life as so admirable, that it has concluded from them that the soul possesses that past divinity and eternity, and the immortality to come. For if the power of the mind has been so changed / that all memory of things done has slipped away, / that, I think, is not far from death.

    En outre, c’est icy chez nous, et non ailleurs, que doiuent estre considerées les forces et les effects de l’ame: tout le reste de ses perfections, luy est vain et inutile: c’est de l’estat present, que doit estre payée et recognue toute son immortalité, et de la vie de l’homme, qu’elle est comtable seulement.

    Besides, it is here, at home with us, and nowhere else, that the powers and effects of the soul must be considered; all the rest of its perfections are vain and useless to it. It is from its present state that its whole immortality must be paid for and acknowledged, and it is to the life of man alone that it is accountable.

    Ce seroit iniustice de luy auoir retranché ses moyens et ses puissances, de l’auoir desarmée, pour du temps de sa captiuité et de sa prison, de sa foiblesse et maladie, du temps où elle auroit esté forcée et contrainte, tirer le iugement et vne condemnation de durée infinie et perpetuelle: et de s’arrester à la consideration d’vn temps si court, qui est à l’aduenture d’vne ou de deux heures, ou au pis aller, d’vn siecle (qui n’ont non plus de proportion à l’infinité qu’vn instant) pour de ce moment d’interualle, ordonner et establir definitiuement de tout son estre. Ce seroit vne disproportion inique, de tirer vne recompense eternelle en consequence d’vne si courte vie.

    It would be unjust to have cut off its means and powers, to have disarmed it, and then, from the time of its captivity and imprisonment, of its weakness and sickness, the time when it had been forced and constrained, to draw a judgment and a condemnation of infinite and perpetual duration. It would be unjust to dwell on so short a time—perhaps an hour or two, or at worst a century, which bear no more proportion to infinity than an instant—in order to ordain and settle definitively its whole being on the strength of that moment’s interval. It would be an unfair disproportion to draw an eternal reward as the consequence of so short a life.

    Platon, pour se sauuer de cet inconuenient, veut que les payements futurs se limitent à la durée de cent ans, relatiuement à l’humaine durée: et des nostres assez leur ont donné bornes temporelles.

    Plato, to escape this difficulty, would have future payments limited to a hundred years, in proportion to the human span; and many of our own writers have given them limits in time.

    Par ainsin ils iugeoyent, que sa generation suyuoit la commune condition des choses humaines: comme aussi sa vie, par l’opinion d’Epicurus et de Democritus, qui a esté la plus receuë, suyuant ces belles apparences: Qu’on la voyoit naistre; à mesme que le corps en estoit capable; on voyoit esleuer ses forces comme les corporelles; on y recognoissoit la foiblesse de son enfance, et auec le temps sa vigueur et sa maturité: et puis sa declination et sa vieillesse, et en fin sa decrepitude:

    Thus they judged that its generation followed the common condition of human things; and so did its life, according to the opinion of Epicurus and Democritus, which has been the most widely received, following these fine appearances: that it was seen to be born as soon as the body was capable of it; its powers were seen to grow like the bodily ones; one recognized in it the weakness of its childhood, and in time its vigor and maturity; and then its decline and old age, and at last its decrepitude:

    Gigni pariter cum corpore, et vnà / Crescere sentimus, paritérque senescere mentem. Ils l’apperceuoient capable de diuerses passions et agitée de plusieurs mouuemens penibles, d’où elle tomboit en lassitude et en douleur, capable d’alteration et de changement, d’allegresse, d’assopissement, et de langueur, subjecte à ses maladies et aux offences, comme l’estomach ou le pied: Mentem sanari, corpus vt ægrum / Cernimus, et flecti medicina posse videmus: esblouye et troublée par la force du vin: desmue de son assiette, par les vapeurs d’vne fieure chaude: endormie par l’application d’aucuns medicamens, et reueillée par d’autres.

    We feel that the mind is born together with the body, / grows along with it, and with it grows old. They perceived it to be capable of various passions and stirred by many painful movements, from which it fell into weariness and pain; capable of alteration and change, of cheerfulness, torpor and languor; subject to its own diseases and injuries, like the stomach or the foot: We see that the mind is healed, just like a sick body, / and see that it can be swayed by medicine. They saw it dazzled and disturbed by the strength of wine; dislodged from its seat by the vapors of a burning fever; put to sleep by the application of certain drugs, and woken by others.

    Corpoream naturam animi esse necesse est, / Corporeis quoniam telis ictúque laborat. On luy voyoit estonner et renuerser toutes ses facultez par la seule morsure d’vn chien malade, et n’y auoir nulle si grande fermeté de discours, nulle suffisance, nulle vertu, nulle resolution philosophique, nulle contention de ses forces, qui la peust exempter de la subjection de ces accidens: la saliue d’vn chetif mastin versée sur la main de Socrates, secouër toute sa sagesse et toutes ses grandes et si reglées imaginations, les aneantir de maniere qu’il ne restast aucune trace de sa cognoissance premiere: *Vis. . . . . . . animaï / Conturbatur, et . . . . .

    The nature of the mind must be bodily, / since it suffers from bodily weapons and blows. It was seen to have all its faculties stunned and overthrown by the mere bite of a sick dog. No firmness of reasoning was so great, no ability, no virtue, no philosophical resolution, no straining of its powers, that could exempt it from subjection to these accidents. The saliva of a wretched cur dropped on Socrates’ hand could shake all his wisdom and all his great and well-ordered thoughts, and annihilate them so that no trace of his former knowledge remained: *The power . . . . . . . of the soul / is thrown into confusion and . . . . .

    diuisa seorsum / Disiectatur, eodem illo distracta veneno: et ce venin ne trouuer non plus de resistance en cette ame, qu’en celle d’vn enfant de quatre ans: venin capable de faire deuenir toute la philosophie, si elle estoit incarnée, furieuse et insensée: si que Caton, qui tordoit le col à la mort mesme et à la fortune, ne peust souffrir la veuë d’vn miroir, ou de l’eau, accablé d’espouuantement et d’effroy, quand il seroit tombé par la contagion d’vn chien enragé, en la maladie que les medecins nomment Hydroforbie. Vis morbi distracta per artus / Turbat agens animam, spumantes æquore salso / Ventorum vt validis feruescunt viribus vndæ.*

    split apart, / is scattered, torn asunder by that same poison. And this venom would meet no more resistance in that soul than in the soul of a child of four: a venom capable of making all philosophy, if it were made flesh, raving and mad. So Cato, who wrung the neck of death itself and of Fortune, could not have borne the sight of a mirror or of water, overwhelmed with terror and dread, had he fallen, through the contagion of a mad dog, into the disease that physicians call hydrophobia. The force of the disease, spread through the limbs, / drives the soul and throws it into turmoil, as on the salt sea / the waves foam and seethe under the mighty force of the winds.*

    Or quant à ce poinct, la philosophie a bien armé l’homme pour la souffrance de tous autres accidens, ou de patience, ou si elle couste trop à trouuer, d’vne deffaitte inffallible, en se desrobant tout à faict du sentiment: mais ce sont moyens, qui seruent à vne ame estant à soy, et en ses forces, capable de discours et de deliberation: non pas à cet inconuenient, où chez vn philosophe, vne ame deuient l’ame d’vn fol, troublée, renuersée, et perdue.

    Now on this point, philosophy has indeed armed man to endure all other accidents, either with patience or, if that costs too much to find, with an infallible way out, by escaping feeling altogether. But these are means that serve a soul that is its own master and in full possession of its powers, capable of reasoning and deliberation. They do not serve in this misfortune, where in a philosopher a soul becomes the soul of a fool, disturbed, overturned and lost.

    Ce que plusieurs occasions produisent, comme vne agitation trop vehemente, que, par quelque forte passion, l’ame peut engendrer en soy-mesme: ou vne blessure en certain endroit de la personne: ou vne exhalation de l’estomach, nous iectant à vn esblouyssement et tournoyement de teste: Morbis in corporis auius errat / Sæpe animus; dementit enim, deliráque fatur, / Interdúmque graui lethargo fertur in altum / Æternúmqùe soporem, oculis nutúque cadenti.

    This can be produced by many causes: by too violent an agitation, which the soul can generate within itself through some strong passion; or by a wound in a certain part of the person; or by an exhalation from the stomach, throwing us into dizziness and a spinning of the head: In diseases of the body the mind often wanders astray; / for it loses its reason and speaks wild words, / and sometimes, under a heavy lethargy, is carried off into a deep / and endless sleep, with drooping eyes and nodding head.

    Les philosophes n’ont, ce me semble, guere touché cette corde, non plus qu’vne autre de pareille importance. Ils ont ce dilemme tousiours en la bouche, pour consoler nostre mortelle condition: Ou l’ame est mortelle, ou immortelle: Si mortelle, elle sera sans peine: Si immortelle, elle ira en amendant. Ils ne touchent iamais l’autre branche: Quoy, si elle va en empirant? Et laissent aux poëtes les menaces des peines futures. Mais par là ils se donnent vn beau ieu. Ce sont deux omissions qui s’offrent à moy souvent en leurs discours. Ie reuiens à la premiere.

    Philosophers have hardly touched this string, it seems to me, any more than another of equal importance. They always have this dilemma in their mouths to console our mortal condition: either the soul is mortal or immortal; if mortal, it will be free of suffering; if immortal, it will go on improving. They never touch the other branch: what if it goes on getting worse? And they leave the threats of future punishment to the poets. But in this way they give themselves an easy game. These are two omissions that often strike me in their discourses. I return to the first.

    Cette ame pert l’vsage du souuerain bien Stoïque, si constant et si ferme. Il faut que nostre belle sagesse se rende en cet endroit, et quitte les armes. Au demeurant, ils consideroient aussi par la vanité de l’humaine raison, que le meslange et société de deux pieces si diuerses, comme est le mortel et l’immortel, est inimaginable: Quippe etenim mortale æterno iungere, et vnà / Consentire putare, et fungi mutua posse, / Desipere est. Quid enim diuersius esse putandum est, / Aut magis inter se disiunctum discrepitánsque, / Quàm, mortale quod est, immortali atque perenni / Iunctum in concilio sæuas tolerare procellas?

    This soul loses the use of the Stoic sovereign good, so constant and so firm. Our fine wisdom must surrender at this point and lay down its arms. For the rest, they also considered, through the vanity of human reason, that the mixture and partnership of two pieces as different as the mortal and the immortal is unimaginable: For to join the mortal to the eternal, and to think / that they can agree together and serve each other in turn, / is madness. For what can be thought more unlike, / or more disjoined and at odds with itself, / than that a mortal thing, joined to the immortal and everlasting, / should endure fierce storms in union?

    Dauantage ils sentoyent l’ame s’engager en la mort, comme le corps. Simul æuo fessa fatiscit. Ce que, selon Zeno, l’image du sommeil nous montre assez. Car il estime que c’est vne defaillance et cheute de l’ame aussi bien que du corps.

    Moreover, they felt that the soul was drawn into death, like the body: Worn out by age, it gives way along with it. This, according to Zeno, the image of sleep shows us clearly enough; for he holds that sleep is a fainting and falling of the soul as well as of the body.

    Contrahi animum, et quasi labi putat atque decidere. Et ce qu’on aperceuoit en aucuns, sa force, et sa vigueur se maintenir en la fin de la vie, ils le rapportoyent à la diuersité des maladies, comme on void les hommes en cette extremité, maintenir, qui vn sens, qui vn autre, qui l’ouïr, qui le fleurer, sans alteration: et ne se voit point d’affoiblissement si vniuersel, qu’il n’y reste quelques parties entieres et vigoureuses: Non alio pacto, quàm si pes cùm dolet ægri, / In nullo caput interea sit fortè dolore.

    He thinks the mind contracts, and as it were slips and falls. And when the soul’s strength and vigor were seen in some people to hold up at the end of life, they attributed this to the diversity of diseases. So we see men in that extremity keep one sense or another unimpaired, one hearing, another smell; and no weakening is so universal that some parts do not remain whole and vigorous: Just as when a sick man’s foot hurts, / his head meanwhile may happen to feel no pain.

    La veuë de nostre iugement se rapporte à la verité, comme fait l’œil du chat-huant, à la splendeur du soleil, ainsi que dit Aristote. Par où le sçaurions nous mieux conuaincre que par si grossiers aueuglemens en vne si apparente lumiere? Car l’opinion contraire, de l’immortalité de l’ame, laquelle Cicero dit auoir esté premierement introduitte, au moins du tesmoignage des liures, par Pherecydes Syrius du temps du Roy Tullus (d’autres en attribuent l’inuention à Thales: et autres à d’autres) c’est la partie de l’humaine science traictée auec plus de reseruation et de doute. Les dogmatistes les plus fermes, sont contraints en cet endroit principalement, de se reietter à l’abry des ombrages de l’Academie.

    The sight of our judgment relates to truth as the owl’s eye does to the brightness of the sun, as Aristotle says. How could we better convict it than by such gross blindness in so evident a light? For the contrary opinion, the immortality of the soul, is the part of human knowledge treated with the most reserve and doubt. Cicero says it was first introduced, at least on the testimony of books, by Pherecydes of Syros in the time of King Tullus (others attribute its invention to Thales, and others to others). The firmest dogmatists are forced, at this point above all, to fall back on the shelter of the shades of the Academy.

    Tullus Hostilius, legendary third king of Rome.

    Nul ne sçait ce qu’Aristote a estably de ce subiect, non plus que touts les anciens en general, qui le manient d’vne vacillante creance: rem gratissimam promittentium magis quàm probantium. Il s’est caché soubs le nuage des paroles et sens difficiles, et non intelligibles, et a laissé à ses sectateurs, autant à debattre sur son iugement que sur la matiere.

    No one knows what Aristotle laid down on this subject, any more than the ancients in general, who handle it with wavering belief: promising a most welcome thing rather than proving it. He hid behind a cloud of difficult and unintelligible words and meanings, and left his followers as much to debate about his judgment as about the matter itself.

    Seneca, Letters.

    Deux choses leur rendoient cette opinion plausible: l’vne, que sans l’immortalité des ames, il n’y auroit plus dequoy asseoir les vaines esperances de la gloire, qui est vne consideration de merueilleux credit au monde: l’autre, que c’est vne tres-vtile impression, comme dit Platon, que les vices, quand ils se desroberont de la veuë et cognoissance de l’humaine iustice, demeurent tousiours en butte à la diuine, qui les poursuyura, voire apres la mort des coulpables. Vn soing extreme tient l’homme d’alonger son estre; il y a pourueu par toutes ses pieces. Et pour la conseruation du corps, sont les sepultures: pour la conseruation du nom, la gloire. Il a employé toute son opinion à se rebastir, impatient de sa fortune, et à s’estançonner par ses inuentions.

    Two things made this opinion plausible to them. One was that without the immortality of souls there would no longer be anything on which to rest the vain hopes of glory, a consideration that carries wonderful weight in the world. The other was that it is a very useful impression, as Plato says, that vices, when they slip out of the sight and knowledge of human justice, always remain a target for divine justice, which will pursue them even after the death of the guilty. Man is gripped by an extreme concern to prolong his being; he has provided for it with every means he has. For the preservation of the body there are tombs; for the preservation of the name, glory. Impatient of his lot, he has spent all his imagination on rebuilding himself and propping himself up with his inventions.

    L’ame par son trouble et sa foiblesse, ne pouuant tenir sur son pied, va questant de toutes parts des consolations, esperances et fondements, et des circonstances estrangeres, où elle s’attache et se plante. Et pour legers et fantastiques que son inuention les luy forge, s’y repose plus seurement qu’en soy, et plus volontiers. Mais les plus aheurtez à cette si iuste et claire persuasion de l’immortalité de nos esprits; c’est merueille comme ils se sont trouuez courts et impuissans à l’establir par leurs humaines forces. Somnia sunt non docentis, sed optantis: disoit vn ancien.

    The soul, unable to stand on its own feet because of its turmoil and weakness, goes searching on every side for consolations, hopes and foundations, and for outside circumstances to which it can cling and in which it can take root. And however flimsy and fantastic the things its invention forges for it, it rests on them more securely than on itself, and more willingly. But as for those most obstinately attached to this just and clear persuasion of the immortality of our spirits, it is a wonder how short and powerless they have found themselves when trying to establish it by their human powers. These are the dreams not of one who teaches, but of one who wishes, said an ancient.

    Cicero, Academica.

    L’homme peut recognoistre par ce tesmoignage, qu’il doit à la fortune et au rencontre, la verité qu’il descouure luy seul; puis que lors mesme, qu’elle luy est tombée en main, il n’a pas dequoy la saisir et la maintenir, et que sa raison n’a pas la force de s’en preualoir. Toutes choses produites par nostre propre discours et suffisance, autant vrayes que fauces, sont subiectes à incertitude et debat. C’est pour le chastiment de nostre fierté, et instruction de nostre misere et incapacité, que Dieu produisit le trouble, et la confusion de l’ancienne tour de Babel. Tout ce que nous entreprenons sans son assistance, tout ce que nous voyons sans la lampe de sa grace, ce n’est que vanité et folie.

    Man can recognize from this testimony that he owes to fortune and chance any truth he discovers on his own, since even when it has fallen into his hands he lacks the means to grasp it and hold on to it, and his reason lacks the strength to make use of it. All things produced by our own reasoning and ability, the true as well as the false, are subject to uncertainty and debate. It was to punish our pride and to teach us our misery and incapacity that God produced the turmoil and confusion of the ancient tower of Babel. All that we undertake without his help, all that we see without the lamp of his grace, is nothing but vanity and folly.

    L’essence mesme de la verité, qui est vniforme et constante, quand la fortune nous en donne la possession, nous la corrompons et abastardissons par nostre foiblesse. Quelque train que l’homme prenne de soy, Dieu permet qu’il arriue tousiours à cette mesme confusion, de laquelle il nous represente si viuement l’image par le iuste chastiement, dequoy il batit l’outrecuidance de Nemroth, et aneantit les vaines entreprinses du bastiment de sa pyramide. Perdam sapientiam sapientium, et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo. La diuersité d’idiomes et de langues, dequoy il troubla cet ouurage, qu’est-ce autre chose, que cette infinie et perpetuelle altercation et discordance d’opinions et de raisons, qui accompaigne et embrouille le vain bastiment de l’humaine science? Et l’embrouille vtilement.

    The very essence of truth, which is uniform and constant, we corrupt and debase by our weakness when fortune grants us possession of it. Whatever course man takes on his own, God allows him always to arrive at that same confusion. He shows us its image so vividly in the just punishment with which he struck down the presumption of Nimrod and brought to nothing the vain enterprise of building his pyramid. I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and reject the understanding of the prudent. The diversity of idioms and tongues with which he confounded that work—what else is it but this infinite and perpetual wrangling and discord of opinions and reasons that accompanies and entangles the vain edifice of human knowledge? And entangles it usefully.

    The quotation is from Saint Paul, 1 Corinthians 1:19; tradition made Nimrod the builder of the tower of Babel.

    Qui nous tiendroit, si nous auions un grain de connoissance? Ce sainct m’a faict grand plaisir: Ipsa vtilitatis occultatio, aut humilitatis exercitatio est, aut elationis attritio. Iusques à quel poinct de presomption et d’insolence, ne portons nous nostre aueuglement et nostre bestise?

    Who could hold us back if we had a grain of knowledge? This saint has given me great pleasure: The very concealment of what is useful serves either to exercise humility or to wear down pride. To what pitch of presumption and insolence do we not carry our blindness and our stupidity?

    Saint Augustine, The City of God.

    Mais pour reprendre mon propos: c’estoit vrayement bien raison, que nous fussions tenus à Dieu seul, et au benefice de sa grace, de la verité d’vne si noble creance, puis que de sa seule liberalité, nous receuons le fruict de l’immortalité, lequel consiste en la iouyssance de la beatitude eternelle. Confessons ingenuement, que Dieu seul nous l’a dict, et la foy: car leçon n’est-ce pas de Nature et de nostre raison. Et qui retentera son estre et ses forces, et dedans et dehors, sans ce priuilege diuin: qui verra l’homme, sans le flatter, il n’y verra ny efficace, ny faculté, qui sente autre chose que la mort et la terre. Plus nous donnons, et deuons, et rendons à Dieu, nous en faisons d’autant plus chrestiennement.

    But to take up my subject again: it was truly most reasonable that we should be beholden to God alone, and to the gift of his grace, for the truth of so noble a belief, since it is from his liberality alone that we receive the fruit of immortality, which consists in the enjoyment of eternal bliss. Let us frankly confess that God alone has told us so, and faith; for this is no lesson of Nature or of our reason. Whoever re-examines man’s being and powers, within and without, apart from this divine privilege, whoever looks at man without flattering him, will see in him no efficacy or faculty that smells of anything but death and earth. The more we give, and owe, and render to God, the more Christianly we act.

    Ce que ce philosophe Stoïcien dit tenir du fortuit consentement de la voix populaire, valoit-il pas mieux qu’il le tinst de Dieu? Cùm de animorum æternitate disserimus, non leue momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. Vtor hac publica persuasione.

    What that Stoic philosopher says he takes from the chance agreement of popular opinion—would it not have been better for him to take it from God? When we discuss the eternity of souls, the consensus of men who either fear or worship the powers of the underworld carries no slight weight with us. I make use of this general persuasion.

    Seneca, Letters.

    Or la foiblesse des argumens humains sur ce subiect, se connoist singulierement par les fabuleuses circonstances, qu’ils ont adioustees à la suite de cette opinion, pour trouuer de quelle condition estoit cette nostre immortalité. Laissons les Stoïciens, Vsuram nobis largiuntur tanquam cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant: qui donnent aux ames vne vie au delà de ceste cy, mais finie.

    Now the weakness of human arguments on this subject shows most clearly in the fabulous details they have added in the wake of this opinion, in trying to find out what kind of condition this immortality of ours was. Let us leave aside the Stoics—They grant us a long lease of life, like crows: they say our souls will last a long time, but deny that they will last forever—who give souls a life beyond this one, but a finite one.

    Cicero, Tusculan Disputations; crows were proverbially long-lived.

    La plus vniuerselle et plus receuë fantaisie, et qui dure iusques à nous, ç’a esté celle, de laquelle on fait autheur Pythagoras; non qu’il en fust le premier inuenteur, mais d’autant qu’elle receut beaucoup de poix, et de credit, par l’authorité de son approbation: C’est que les ames au partir de nous, ne faisoient que rouler de l’vn corps à vn autre, d’vn lyon à un cheual, d’vn cheual à vn Roy, se promenants ainsi sans cesse, de maison en maison. Et luy, disoit se souuenir auoir esté Æthalides, depuis Euphorbus, en apres Hermotimus, en fin de Pyrrhus estre passé en Pythagoras: ayant memoire de soy de deux cents six ans.

    The most universal and most widely received fancy, which has lasted down to our time, was the one attributed to Pythagoras—not that he invented it, but because it gained much weight and credit from the authority of his approval. It is that souls, on leaving us, merely rolled from one body to another, from a lion to a horse, from a horse to a king, wandering thus endlessly from house to house. And he himself said that he remembered having been Aethalides, then Euphorbus, after that Hermotimus, and finally that he had passed from Pyrrhus into Pythagoras, so that his memory of himself went back two hundred and six years.

    Adioustoyent aucuns, que ces mesmes ames remontent au ciel par fois, et en deuallent encores: O pater, ànne aliquas ad cœlum hinc ire putandum est / Sublimes animas, iterúmque ad tarda reuerti / Corpora? quæ lucis miseris tam dira cupido?

    Some added that these same souls sometimes go back up to heaven and come down again: O father, must we think that some souls go up from here to the sky, / on high, and come back again to sluggish / bodies? What dreadful longing for the light do these wretches have?

    Virgil, Aeneid.

    Origene les fait aller et venir eternellement du bon au mauuais estat. L’opinion que Varro recite, est, qu’en quatre cens quarante ans de reuolution elles se reioignent à leur premier corps. Chrysippus, que cela doibt aduenir apres certain espace de temps incognu et non limité. Platon (qui dit tenir de Pindare et de l’ancienne poësie cette croyance) des infinies vicissitudes de mutation, ausquelles l’ame est preparée, n’ayant ny les peines, ny les recompenses en l’autre monde, que temporelles, comme sa vie en cestuy-cy n’est que temporelle, conclud en elle vne singuliere sçience des affaires du ciel, de l’enfer, et d’icy, où elle a passé, repassé, et seiourné à plusieurs voyages: matiere à sa reminiscence.

    Origen makes them come and go eternally between a good and a bad state. The opinion Varro reports is that after a cycle of four hundred and forty years they rejoin their first body; Chrysippus, that this must happen after a certain space of time, unknown and unlimited. Plato says he takes this belief from Pindar and the ancient poets. From the infinite vicissitudes of change to which the soul is destined—since in the other world its punishments and rewards are only temporary, as its life in this one is only temporary—he concludes that it has a singular knowledge of the affairs of heaven, of hell and of this world, through which it has passed, passed again, and sojourned on many journeys: matter for its reminiscence.

    Voicy son progrés ailleurs: Qui a bien vescu, il se reioint à l’astre, auquel il est assigné: qui mal, il passe en femme: et si lors mesme il ne se corrige point, il se rechange en beste de condition conuenable à ses mœurs vicieuses: et ne verra fin à ses punitions, qu’il ne soit reuenu à sa naïue constitution, s’estant par la force de la raison défaict des qualitez grossieres, stupides, et elementaires, qui estoyent en luy. Mais ie ne veux oublier l’obiection que font les Epicuriens à cette transmigration de corps en autre. Elle est plaisante. Ils demandent quel ordre il y auroit, si la presse des mourans venoit à estre plus grande que des naissans.

    Here is its progress as he describes it elsewhere: whoever has lived well rejoins the star to which he is assigned; whoever has lived badly passes into a woman. And if even then he does not mend his ways, he changes again into a beast whose nature suits his vicious habits, and he will see no end to his punishments until he has returned to his natural constitution, having rid himself by the force of reason of the gross, stupid and elemental qualities that were in him. But I do not want to forget the objection the Epicureans raise to this transmigration from one body to another. It is amusing. They ask what order there would be if the crowd of the dying happened to be greater than that of the newborn.

    Plato, Timaeus.

    Car les ames deslogées de leur giste seroyent à se fouler à qui prendroit place la premiere dans ce nouuel estuy. Et demandent aussi, à quoy elles passeroient leur temps, ce pendant qu’elles attendroient qu’vn logis leur fust appresté: ou au rebours s’il naissoit plus d’animaux, qu’il n’en mourroit, ils disent que les corps seroient en mauuais party, attendant l’infusion de leur ame, et en aduiendroit qu’aucuns d’iceux se mourroient auant que d’auoir esté viuans.

    For the souls turned out of their lodging would be jostling one another over who should take the first place in this new case. They also ask how the souls would pass their time while waiting for a lodging to be got ready for them. Or, conversely, if more animals were born than died, they say the bodies would be in a bad way waiting for their soul to be poured in, and it would happen that some of them would die before they had ever been alive.

    Denique connubia ad veneris, partúsque ferarum, / Esse animas præsto deridiculum esse videtur, / Et spectare immortales mortalia membra / Innumero numero, certaréque præproperanter / Inter se, quæ prima potissimáque insinuetur. D’autres ont arresté l’ame au corps des trespassez, pour en animer les serpents, les vers, et autres bestes, qu’on dit s’engendrer de la corruption de nos membres, voire et de nos cendres. D’autres la diuisent en vne partie mortelle, et l’autre immortelle. Autres la font corporelle, et ce neantmoins immortelle. Aucuns la font immortelle, sans science et sans cognoissance. Il y en a aussi des nostres mesmes qui ont estimé, que des ames des condamnez, il s’en faisoit des diables: comme Plutarque pense, qu’il se face des dieux de celles qui sont sauuées.

    Lastly, it seems ridiculous that souls should stand ready / at the matings of Venus and the births of beasts, / and that immortal souls should wait for mortal limbs / in numberless numbers, and compete in headlong haste / among themselves as to which shall be the first and chief to slip in. Others have kept the soul in the bodies of the dead, to animate the snakes, worms and other creatures said to be generated from the decay of our limbs, and even from our ashes. Others divide it into a mortal part and an immortal part. Others make it bodily and yet immortal. Some make it immortal but without knowledge or understanding. There are even some of our own who have thought that devils were made from the souls of the damned, just as Plutarch thinks that gods are made from the souls of the saved.

    Car il est peu de choses que cet autheur là establisse d’vne façon de parler si resolue, qu’il fait ceste-cy: maintenant par tout ailleurs vne maniere dubitatrice et ambigue. Il faut estimer, dit-il, et croire fermement, que les ames des hommes vertueux selon nature et selon iustice diuine, deuiennent d’hommes saincts, et de saincts demy-dieux, et de demy-dieux, apres qu’ils sont parfaictement, comme és sacrifices de purgation, nettoyez et purifiez, estans deliurez de toute passibilité et de toute mortalité, ils deuiennent, non par aucune ordonnance ciuile, mais à la verité, et selon raison vray-semblable, dieux entiers et parfaicts, en receuant vne fin tres heureuse et tres-glorieuse.

    For there are few things that this author asserts in as decided a manner as he does this one; everywhere else he keeps to a doubtful and ambiguous manner. We must judge, he says, and firmly believe, that the souls of virtuous men, according to nature and divine justice, become saints after being men, and demigods after being saints. And from demigods, once they have been perfectly cleansed and purified, as in sacrifices of purification, and delivered from all liability to suffering and all mortality, they become, not by any civil decree but in truth and according to probable reason, whole and perfect gods, receiving a most happy and most glorious end.

    Plutarch, Life of Romulus.

    Mais qui le voudra voir, luy, qui est des plus retenus pourtant et moderez de la bande, s’escarmoucher auec plus de hardiesse, et nous conter ses miracles sur ce propos, ie le renuoye à son discours de la lune, et du Dæmon de Socrates, là où aussi euidemment qu’en nul autre lieu, il se peut aduerer, les mysteres de la philosophie auoir beaucoup d’estrangetez communes auec celles de la poësie: l’entendement humain se perdant à vouloir sonder et contreroller toutes choses iusques au bout: tout ainsi comme, lassez et trauaillez de la longue course de nostre vie, nous retombons en enfantillage. Voyla les belles et certaines instructions, que nous tirons de la science humaine, sur le subiect de nostre ame.

    But whoever wants to see him—though he is one of the most restrained and moderate of the band—skirmishing more boldly and telling us his marvels on this subject, I refer to his discourse on the moon and on the daemon of Socrates. There, as evidently as anywhere, it can be verified that the mysteries of philosophy have many oddities in common with those of poetry: the human understanding loses itself in trying to sound and scrutinize all things to the very end. Just so, weary and worn out by the long course of our life, we fall back into childishness. Those are the fine and certain teachings we draw from human knowledge on the subject of our soul.

    Plutarch’s dialogues On the Face in the Moon and On the Sign of Socrates.

    Doctors and generation

    Even about our own bodies, physicians and philosophers contradict one another.

    Il n’y a point moins de temerité en ce qu’elle nous apprend des parties corporelles. Choisissons en vn, ou deux exemples: car autrement nous nous perdrions dans cette mer trouble et vaste des erreurs medecinales. Sçachons, si on s’accorde au moins en cecy, de quelle matiere les hommes se produisent les vns des autres. Car quant à leur premiere production, ce n’est pas merueille, si en chose si haute et ancienne, l’entendement humain se trouble et dissipe. Archelaüs le physicien, duquel Socrates fut le disciple et le mignon, selon Aristoxenus, disoit, et les hommes et les animaux auoir esté faicts d’vn limon laicteux, exprimé par la chaleur de la terre.

    There is no less rashness in what it teaches us about the parts of the body. Let us pick one or two examples, for otherwise we would lose ourselves in this vast and murky sea of medical errors. Let us find out whether there is agreement at least on this: from what matter men produce one another. For as to their first production, it is no wonder if, in a matter so lofty and so ancient, the human understanding is confused and scattered. Archelaus the natural philosopher, whose disciple and favorite Socrates was, according to Aristoxenus, said that both men and animals had been made from a milky slime squeezed out by the heat of the earth.

    Pythagoras dit nostre semence estre l’escume de nostre meilleur sang: Platon, l’escoulement de la moëlle de l’espine du dos: ce qu’il argumente de ce, que cet endroit se sent le premier, de la lasseté de la besongne: Alcmeon, partie de la substance du cerueau: et qu’il soit ainsi, dit-il, les yeux troublent à ceux qui se trauaillent outre mesure à cet exercice: Democritus, vne substance extraite de toute la masse corporelle: Epicurus, extraicte de l’ame et du corps: Aristote, vn excrement tiré de l’aliment du sang le dernier qui s’espand en nos membres: autres, du sang, cuit et digeré par la chaleur des genitoires: ce qu’ils iugent de ce qu’aux extremes efforts, on rend des gouttes de pur sang: enquoy il semble qu’il y ayt plus d’apparence, si on peut tirer quelque apparence d’vne confusion si infinie.

    Pythagoras says our seed is the foam of our best blood; Plato, that it is the outflow of the marrow of the spine, which he argues from the fact that this place is the first to feel the fatigue of the work; Alcmaeon, that it is part of the substance of the brain—and to show that this is so, he says, the eyes of those who exert themselves beyond measure at this exercise grow dim. Democritus says it is a substance extracted from the whole mass of the body; Epicurus, extracted from the soul and the body; Aristotle, a residue drawn from the final nourishment of the blood, the last to spread through our limbs. Others say it comes from the blood, cooked and digested by the heat of the genitals, which they judge from the fact that in extreme efforts drops of pure blood are emitted. This seems the most likely, if any likelihood can be drawn from so infinite a confusion.

    Or pour mener à effect cette semence, combien en font-ils d’opinions contraires? Aristote et Democritus tiennent que les femmes n’ont point de sperme: et que ce n’est qu’vne sueur qu’elles eslancent par la chaleur du plaisir et du mouuement, qui ne sert de rien à la generation. Galen au contraire, et ses suyuans, que sans la rencontre des semences, la generation ne se peut faire. Voyla les medecins, les philosophes, les iurisconsultes, et les theologiens, aux prises pesle mesle auec nos femmes, sur la dispute, à quels termes les femmes portent leur fruict. Et moy ie secours par l’exemple de moy-mesme, ceux d’entre eux, qui maintiennent la grossesse d’onze moys.

    Now as for bringing this seed to fruition, how many contrary opinions do they hold! Aristotle and Democritus hold that women have no sperm, and that it is only a sweat they emit through the heat of pleasure and movement, which plays no part in generation. Galen, on the contrary, and his followers hold that generation cannot take place without the meeting of the two seeds. There you have the physicians, the philosophers, the jurists and the theologians grappling pell-mell with our women over the question of the term for which women carry their fruit. And I, for my part, come to the aid, with my own example, of those among them who uphold the eleven-month pregnancy.

    Le monde est basty de cette experience, il n’est si simple femmelette qui ne puisse dire son aduis sur toutes ces contestations, et si nous n’en sçaurions estre d’accord.

    The world is built on this experience; there is no woman so simple that she cannot give her opinion on all these disputes; and yet we cannot agree about them.

    En voyla assez pour verifier que l’homme n’est non plus instruit de la cognoissance de soy, en la partie corporelle, qu’en la spirituelle. Nous l’auons proposé luy mesmes à soy, et sa raison, à sa raison, pour voir ce qu’elle nous en diroit. Il me semble assez auoir montré combien peu elle s’entend en elle mesme. Et, qui ne s’entend en soy, en quoy se peut il entendre? Quasi veró mensuram vllius rei possit agere, qui sui nesciat. Vrayement Protagoras nous en comtoit de belles, faisant l’homme la mesure de toutes choses, qui ne sçeut iamais seulement la sienne. Si ce n’est luy, sa dignité ne permettra pas qu’autre creature ayt cet aduantage.

    That is enough to show that man is no better instructed in knowledge of himself in his bodily part than in his spiritual part. We have set him before himself, and his reason before his reason, to see what it would tell us about it. I think I have shown well enough how little it understands itself. And he who does not understand himself, what can he understand? As if indeed one could take the measure of anything who does not know his own. Truly, Protagoras told us fine tales when he made man, who never even knew his own measure, the measure of all things. If it is not man, his dignity will not allow any other creature to have this advantage.

    Pliny the Elder, Natural History.

    Or luy estant en soy si contraire, et l’vn iugement subuertissant l’autre sans cesse, cette fauorable proposition n’estoit qu’vne risée, qui nous menoit à conclurre par necessité la neantise du compas et du compasseur. Quand Thales estime la cognoissance de l’homme tres-difficile à l’homme, il luy apprend, la cognoissance de toute autre chose luy estre impossible.

    Now since man is so self-contradictory, one judgment ceaselessly overturning another, this flattering proposition was only a joke, which forced us to conclude the nothingness of both the measure and the measurer. When Thales holds that knowledge of man is very difficult for man, he teaches him that knowledge of everything else is impossible for him.

    A warning to his reader

    This desperate argument is for extreme need; keep to the common road and bridle the mind.

    Vous, pour qui i’ay pris la peine d’estendre vn si long corps, contre ma coustume, ne refuyrez point de maintenir vostre Sebonde, par la forme ordinaire d’argumenter, dequoy vous estes tous les iours instruite, et exercerez en cela vostre esprit et vostre estude: car ce dernier tour d’escrime icy, il ne le faut employer que comme vn extreme remede. C’est vn coup desesperé, auquel il faut abandonner vos armes, pour faire perdre à vostre aduersaire les siennes: et vn tour secret, duquel il se faut seruir rarement et reseruément. C’est grande temerité de vous perdre pour perdre vn autre. Il ne faut pas vouloir mourir pour se venger, comme fit Gobrias.

    You, for whom I have taken the trouble to stretch out so long a body, contrary to my habit, will not shrink from defending your Sebond by the ordinary form of argument in which you are instructed every day, and you will exercise your mind and your study in that. For this last fencing trick should be used only as an extreme remedy. It is a desperate thrust, in which you must abandon your own weapons to make your adversary lose his; and a secret trick, to be used rarely and with reserve. It is great rashness to destroy yourself in order to destroy another. One must not wish to die to take revenge, as Gobryas did.

    The unnamed lady addressed here is traditionally identified as Margaret of Valois, Queen of Navarre.

    Car estant aux prises bien estroictes auec vn Seigneur de Perse, Darius y suruenant l’espée au poing, qui craignoit de frapper, de peur d’assener Gobrias: il luy cria, qu’il donnast hardiment, quand il deuroit donner au trauers tous les deux. I’ay veu reprouuer pour iniustes, des armes et conditions de combat singulier desesperées, et ausquelles celuy qui les offroit, mettoit luy et son compaignon en termes d’vne fin à tous deux ineuitable.

    For he was locked in a close struggle with a Persian lord when Darius came up sword in hand and was afraid to strike for fear of hitting Gobryas; and Gobryas shouted to him to strike boldly, even if he ran them both through. I have seen weapons and conditions of single combat condemned as unjust because they were desperate, and because the man who proposed them put himself and his opponent in a position where an end for both was inevitable.

    Gobryas was one of the Persian nobles who helped Darius overthrow the usurper known as the false Smerdis, in 522 BC.

    Les Portugais prindrent en la mer des Indes certains Turcs prisonniers: lesquels impatiens de leur captiuité, se resolurent, et leur succeda, frottant des clous de nauire l’vn à l’autre, et faisans tomber vne estincelle de feu dans les caques de poudre (qu’il y auoit en l’endroit où ils estoyent gardez) d’embraser et mettre en cendre eux, leurs maistres et le vaisseau. Nous secouons icy les limites et dernieres clostures des sciences: ausquelles l’extremité est vitieuse, comme en la vertu. Tenez vous dans la route commune, il ne fait mie bon estre si subtil et si fin.

    The Portuguese captured some Turks in the Indian Ocean. These prisoners, impatient of their captivity, resolved to set fire to themselves, their masters and the ship and burn them all to ashes—and they succeeded—by rubbing ship’s nails against one another and letting a spark fall into the kegs of powder in the place where they were kept. We are shaking here the limits and last enclosures of the sciences, in which extremity is a vice, as it is in virtue. Keep to the common road; it is no good at all being so subtle and so clever.

    Souuienne vous de ce que dit le prouerbe Thoscan, Chi troppo s’assottiglia, si scauezza. Ie vous conseille en vos opinions et en vos discours, autant qu’en vos mœurs, et en toute autre chose, la moderation et l’attrempance, et la fuite de la nouuelleté et de l’estrangeté. Toutes les voyes extrauagantes me faschent. Vous qui par l’authorité que vostre grandeur vous apporte, et encores plus par les auantages que vous donnent les qualitez plus vostres, pouuez d’vn clin d’œil commander à qui il vous plaist, deuiez donner cette charge à quelqu’un, qui fist profession des lettres, qui vous eust bien autrement appuyé et enrichy cette fantasie. Toutesfois en voicy assez, pour ce que vous en auez à faire.

    Remember what the Tuscan proverb says: Whoever makes himself too fine breaks. I recommend to you, in your opinions and your reasonings as much as in your conduct and in everything else, moderation and temperance, and the avoidance of novelty and strangeness. All roads that stray off the beaten track annoy me. You who, by the authority your greatness brings you, and still more by the advantages that the qualities more truly your own give you, can command anyone you please with a wink, should have given this task to someone who made a profession of letters; he would have supported and enriched this notion for you quite differently. However, here is enough for what you need of it.

    Epicurus disoit des loix, que les pires nous estoyent si necessaires, que sans elles, les hommes s’entremangeroient les vns les autres. Et Platon verifie que sans loix, nous viurions comme bestes. Nostre esprit est vn vtil vagabond, dangereux et temeraire: il est malaisé d’y ioindre l’ordre et la mesure: de mon temps ceux qui ont quelque rare excellence au dessus des autres, et quelque viuacité extraordinaire, nous les voyons quasi tous, desbordez en licence d’opinions, et de mœurs: c’est miracle s’il s’en rencontre vn rassis et sociable. On a raison de donner à l’esprit humain les barrieres les plus contraintes qu’on peut.

    Epicurus said of laws that even the worst were so necessary to us that without them men would eat one another. And Plato confirms that without laws we would live like beasts. Our mind is a wandering, dangerous and reckless tool; it is hard to join order and measure to it. In my time, those who have some rare excellence above the rest, and some extraordinary liveliness, we see almost all of them overflowing into license of opinions and of morals. It is a miracle if one of them turns out settled and sociable. There is good reason to set the tightest barriers we can around the human mind.

    En l’estude, comme au reste, il luy faut compter et regler ses marches: il luy faut tailler par art les limites de sa chasse. On le bride et garotte de religions, de loix, de coustumes, de science, de preceptes, de peines, et recompenses mortelles et immortelles: encores voit-on que par sa volubilité et dissolution, il eschappe à toutes ces liaisons. C’est vn corps vain, qui n’a par où estre saisi et assené: vn corps diuers et difforme, auquel on ne peut asseoir nœud ny prise.

    In study, as in everything else, its steps must be counted and regulated for it; the limits of its hunting ground must be marked out for it by art. It is bridled and bound with religions, laws, customs, knowledge, precepts, and punishments and rewards both mortal and immortal; and still we see that by its volatility and looseness it escapes all these bonds. It is an empty body with nothing by which it can be seized or struck; a varied and shapeless body on which no knot or hold can be fastened.

    Certes il est peu d’ames si reglées, si fortes et bien nées, à qui on se puisse fier de leur propre conduicte: et qui puissent auec moderation et sans temerité, voguer en la liberté de leurs iugemens, au delà des opinions communes. Il est plus expedient de les mettre en tutelle. C’est vn outrageux glaiue à son possesseur mesme, que l’esprit, à qui ne sçait s’en armer ordonnément et discrettement. Et n’y a point de beste, à qui il faille plus iustement donner des orbieres, pour tenir sa veuë subjecte, et contrainte deuant ses pas; et la garder d’extrauaguer ny çà ny là, hors les ornieres que l’vsage et les loix luy tracent.

    Certainly there are few souls so well ordered, so strong and so well born that they can be trusted to their own guidance, and that can sail with moderation and without rashness in the freedom of their judgments beyond common opinions. It is more expedient to put them under guardianship. The mind is a dangerous sword, even to its owner, for anyone who does not know how to arm himself with it in an orderly and discreet way. And there is no beast that more rightly needs blinkers, to keep its gaze subject and confined to what is in front of its feet, and to keep it from straying here or there out of the ruts that usage and the laws trace for it.

    Parquoy il vous siera mieux de vous resserrer dans le train accoustumé, quel qu’il soit, que de ietter vostre vol à cette licence effrenée. Mais si quelqu’vn de ces nouueaux docteurs, entreprend de faire l’ingenieux en vostre presence, aux despens de son salut et du vostre: pour vous deffaire de cette dangereuse peste, qui se respand tous les iours en vos cours, ce preseruatif à l’extreme necessité, empeschera que la contagion de ce venin n’offencera, ny vous, ny vostre assistance.

    Therefore it will suit you better to keep within the accustomed track, whatever it may be, than to launch your flight into this unbridled license. But if one of these new doctors undertakes to play the clever man in your presence, at the expense of his salvation and of yours, then, to rid yourself of this dangerous plague that is spreading every day in your courts, this preservative, used in extreme necessity, will prevent the contagion of this venom from harming either you or your company.

    La liberté donc et gaillardise de ces esprits anciens, produisoit en la philosophie et sciences humaines, plusieurs sectes d’opinions differentes, chacun entreprenant de iuger et de choisir pour prendre party. Mais à present, que les hommes vont tous vn train: qui certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis addicti et consecrati sunt, vt étiam, quæ non probant, cogantur defendere: et que nous receuons les arts par ciuile authorité et ordonnance: si que les escholes n’ont qu’vn patron et pareille institution et discipline circonscripte, on ne regarde plus ce que les monnoyes poisent et valent, mais chacun à son tour, les reçoit selon le prix, que l’approbation commune et le cours leur donne: on ne plaide pas de l’alloy, mais de l’vsage: ainsi se mettent egallement toutes choses.

    So the freedom and boldness of those ancient minds produced in philosophy and the human sciences many sects of differing opinions, each man undertaking to judge and choose in order to take sides. But now men all go the same way: they are bound and dedicated to certain fixed and settled opinions, so that they are forced to defend even what they do not approve. We receive the arts by civil authority and decree, so that the schools have only one pattern and a like, circumscribed education and discipline. Now people no longer look at what the coins weigh and are worth; each in turn accepts them at the value that common approval and currency give them. People argue not about the alloy but about the use. And so all things pass on equal terms.

    Cicero, Tusculan Disputations.

    On reçoit la medecine, comme la geometrie; et les battelages, les enchantemens, les liaisons, le commerce des esprits des trespassez, les prognostications, les domifications, et iusques à cette ridicule poursuitte de la pierre philosophale, tout se met sans contredict.

    Medicine is accepted like geometry; and conjuring tricks, enchantments, binding spells, dealings with the spirits of the dead, prognostications, the casting of astrological houses, and even that ridiculous quest for the philosopher’s stone—everything passes without contradiction.

    Il ne faut que sçauoir, que le lieu de Mars loge au milieu du triangle de la main, celuy de Venus au pouce, et de Mercure au petit doigt: et que quand la mensale couppe le tubercle de l’enseigneur, c’est signe de cruauté: quand elle faut soubs le mitoyen, et que la moyenne naturelle fait vn angle auec la vitale, soubs mesme endroit, que c’est signe d’vne mort miserable: que si à vne femme, la naturelle est ouuerte, et ne ferme point l’angle auec la vitale, cela denote qu’elle sera mal chaste. Ie vous appelle vous mesme à tesmoin, si auec cette science, vn homme ne peut passer auec reputation et faueur parmy toutes compagnies.

    You need only know that the place of Mars lies in the middle of the triangle of the hand, that of Venus at the thumb, and that of Mercury at the little finger. When the table line cuts the mount of the forefinger, it is a sign of cruelty; when it stops short below the middle finger, and the natural middle line makes an angle with the life line at the same spot, it is a sign of a wretched death; if in a woman the natural line is open and does not close the angle with the life line, this shows that she will not be very chaste. I call you yourself to witness whether, with this science, a man cannot pass with reputation and favor in any company.

    Where knowledge stops

    Neither the Academics’ probability nor any rule can fix the limits of what we know.

    Theophrastus disoit, que l’humaine cognoissance, acheminée par les sens, pouuoit iuger des causes des choses iusques à certaine mesure, mais qu’estant arriuée aux causes extremes et premieres, il falloit qu’elle s’arrestast, et qu’elle rebouchast: à cause ou de sa foiblesse, ou de la difficulté des choses. C’est vne opinion moyenne et douce; que nostre suffisance nous peut conduire iusques à la cognoissance d’aucunes choses, et qu’elle a certaines mesures de puissance, outre lesquelles c’est temerité de l’employer. Cette opinion est plausible, et introduicte par gens de composition: mais il est malaisé de donner bornes à nostre esprit: il est curieux et auide, et n’a point occasion de s’arrester plus tost à mille pas qu’à cinquante.

    Theophrastus said that human knowledge, guided by the senses, could judge the causes of things up to a certain point, but that on reaching the ultimate and first causes it had to stop and be blunted, either because of its weakness or because of the difficulty of things. It is a moderate and gentle opinion: that our ability can lead us to the knowledge of some things, and that its power has certain limits, beyond which it is rash to use it. This opinion is plausible and was put forward by people of a conciliatory disposition. But it is hard to set bounds to our mind: it is curious and greedy, and has no reason to stop at a thousand paces rather than at fifty.

    Ayant essayé par experience, que ce à quoy l’vn s’estoit failly, l’autre y est arriué: et que ce qui estoit incogneu à vn siecle, le siecle suyuant l’a esclaircy: et que les sciences et les arts ne se iettent pas en moule, ains se forment et figurent peu à peu, en les maniant et pollissant à plusieurs fois, comme les ours façonnent leurs petits en les leschant à loisir: ce que ma force ne peut descouurir, ie ne laisse pas de le sonder et essayer:

    I have found by experience that where one man failed, another has succeeded; that what was unknown to one century, the following century has made clear; and that the sciences and the arts are not cast in a mold, but are formed and shaped little by little, by being handled and polished many times over, as bears shape their cubs by licking them at leisure. So what my strength cannot discover, I still keep probing and trying out;

    et en retastant et pestrissant cette nouuelle matiere, la remuant et l’eschauffant, i’ouure à celuy qui me suit, quelque facilité pour en iouyr plus à son ayse, et la luy rends plus soupple, et plus maniable: Vt Hymettia sole / Cera remollescit, tractatáque pollice multas / Vertitur in facies, ipsóque fit vtilis vsu. Autant en fera le second au tiers: qui est cause que la difficulté ne me doit pas desesperer; ny aussi peu mon impuissance, car ce n’est que la mienne.

    and by handling and kneading this new matter again, stirring and warming it, I give the one who comes after me some ease in enjoying it more comfortably, and make it more supple and more manageable for him: As Hymettian wax softens in the sun, / and, worked by the thumb, turns into many / shapes, and is made useful by use itself. The second will do as much for the third. That is why difficulty must not make me despair, nor my powerlessness either, for it is only mine.

    Ovid, Metamorphoses.

    L’homme est capable de toutes choses, comme d’aucunes. Et s’il aduouë, comme dit Theophrastus, l’ignorance des causes premieres et des principes, qu’il me quitte hardiment tout le reste de sa science. Si le fondement luy faut, son discours est par terre. Le disputer et l’enquerir, n’a autre but et arrest que les principes: si cette fin n’arreste son cours, il se iecte à vne irresolution infinie. Non potest aliud alio magis minùsue comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum vna est definitio comprehendendi. Or il est vray-semblable que si l’ame sçauoit quelque chose, elle se sçauroit premierement elle mesme; et si elle sçauoit quelque chose hors d’elle, ce seroit son corps et son estuy, auant toute autre chose.

    Man is capable of all things just as much as of some. And if he admits, as Theophrastus says, that he is ignorant of first causes and principles, let him boldly hand over to me all the rest of his knowledge. If the foundation fails him, his reasoning lies flat on the ground. Disputing and inquiring have no other goal or stopping point than principles; if that end does not halt his course, he plunges into endless irresolution. One thing cannot be grasped more or less than another, since there is one single definition of grasping for all things. Now it is likely that if the soul knew anything, it would first of all know itself; and if it knew anything outside itself, that would be its body and its case, before anything else.

    Cicero, Academica.

    Si on void iusques auiourd’huy les dieux de la medecine se debattre de nostre anatomie, Mulciber in Troiam, pro Troia stabat Apollo: quand attendons nous qu’ils en soyent d’accord? Nous nous sommes plus voisins, que ne nous est la blancheur de la nege, ou la pesanteur de la pierre. Si l’homme ne se cognoist, comment cognoist-il ses functions et ses forces? Il n’est pas à l’aduanture, que quelque notice veritable ne loge chez nous; mais c’est par hazard. Et d’autant que par mesme voye, mesme façon et conduitte, les erreurs se reçoiuent en nostre ame, elle n’a pas dequoy les distinguer, ny dequoy choisir la verité du mensonge.

    If we see the gods of medicine still quarreling to this day over our anatomy, Mulciber was against Troy, Apollo stood for Troy: when can we expect them to agree? We are nearer to ourselves than the whiteness of snow or the weight of stone is to us. If man does not know himself, how can he know his functions and his powers? It is not impossible, perhaps, that some true notion lodges in us; but if so, it is by chance. And since errors are received into our soul by the same road, in the same manner and by the same conduct, the soul has nothing by which to tell them apart, nor to choose truth over falsehood.

    Ovid, Tristia; Mulciber is Vulcan, who sided with the Greeks against Troy.

    Les Academiciens receuoyent quelque inclination de iugement; et trouuoyent trop crud, de dire qu’il n’estoit pas plus vray-semblable que la nege fust blanche, que noire; et que nous ne fussions non plus asseurez du mouuement d’vne pierre, qui part de nostre main, que de celuy de la huictiesme sphere. Et pour euiter cette difficulté et estrangeté, qui ne peut à la verité loger en nostre imagination, que malaisément; quoy qu’ils establissent que nous n’estions aucunement capables de sçauoir, et que la verité est engoufrée dans des profonds abysmes, où la veuë humaine ne peut penetrer: si aduouoyent ils, les vnes choses plus vray-semblables que les autres; et receuoyent en leur iugement cette faculté, de se pouuoir incliner plustost à vne apparence, qu’à vne autre.

    The Academics allowed some inclination of judgment. They found it too crude to say that it was no more likely that snow was white than black, and that we were no more certain of the motion of a stone leaving our hand than of that of the eighth sphere. To avoid this difficulty and strangeness, which in truth can find room in our imagination only with great difficulty, they did lay it down that we were in no way capable of knowing, and that truth is swallowed up in deep abysses where human sight cannot penetrate. Yet they admitted that some things are more likely than others, and granted their judgment the faculty of inclining toward one appearance rather than another.

    In ancient astronomy the eighth sphere was the sphere of the fixed stars.

    Ils luy permettoyent cette propension, luy deffendant toute resolution. L’aduis des Pyrrhoniens est plus hardy, et quant et quant plus vray-semblable. Car cette inclination Academique, et cette propension à vne proposition plustost qu’à vne autre, qu’est-ce autre chose que la recognoissance de quelque plus apparente verité, en cette-cy qu’en celle-là? Si nostre entendement est capable de la forme, des lineamens, du port, et du visage, de la verité, il la verroit entiere, aussi bien que demie, naissante, et imperfaicte.

    They allowed it this leaning, while forbidding it any decision. The view of the Pyrrhonists is bolder, and at the same time more likely. For this Academic inclination, this leaning toward one proposition rather than another—what else is it but the recognition of some more apparent truth in this one than in that? If our understanding were capable of grasping the form, the features, the bearing and the face of truth, it would see it whole just as well as half, nascent and imperfect.

    Cette apparence de verisimilitude, qui les fait prendre plustost à gauche qu’à droite, augmentez la; cette once de verisimilitude, qui incline la balance, multipliez la de cent, de mille onces; il en aduiendra en fin, que la balance prendra party tout à faict, et arrestera vn chois et vne verité entiere. Mais comment se laissent ils plier à la vray-semblance, s’ils ne cognoissent le vray? Comment cognoissent ils la semblance de ce, dequoy ils ne cognoissent pas l’essence? Ou nous pouuons iuger tout à faict, ou tout à faict nous ne le pouuons pas.

    That appearance of likelihood which makes them turn left rather than right: increase it. That ounce of likelihood which tips the scale: multiply it by a hundred, by a thousand ounces. In the end the scale will come down wholly on one side and settle on one choice and one whole truth. But how do they let themselves be bent toward what is like the truth, if they do not know the true? How do they know the likeness of something whose essence they do not know? Either we can judge absolutely, or absolutely we cannot.

    Si noz facultez intellectuelles et sensibles, sont sans fondement et sans pied, si elles ne font que flotter et vanter, pour neant laissons nous emporter nostre iugement à aucune partie de leur operation, quelque apparence qu’elle semble nous presenter. Et la plus seure assiette de nostre entendement, et la plus heureuse, ce seroit celle-là, où il se maintiendroit rassis, droit, inflexible, sans bransle et sans agitation. Inter visa vera, aut falsa, ad animi assensum, nihil interest. Que les choses ne logent pas chez nous en leur forme et en leur essence, et n’y facent leur entrée de leur force propre et authorité, nous le voyons assez.

    If our intellectual and sensory faculties have no foundation and no footing, if all they do is float and drift with the wind, then it is pointless to let our judgment be carried along by any part of their operation, whatever appearance it may seem to present to us. The surest and happiest position for our understanding would be one in which it kept itself settled, upright, unbending, without wavering and without agitation. Between true and false appearances there is no difference as far as the mind’s assent is concerned. That things do not lodge in us in their own form and essence, and do not make their entry by their own force and authority, we see clearly enough.

    Par ce que s’il estoit ainsi, nous les receurions de mesme façon: le vin seroit tel en la bouche du malade, qu’en la bouche du sain. Celuy qui a des creuasses aux doigts, ou qui les a gourdz, trouueroit vne pareille durté au bois ou au fer, qu’il manie, que fait vn autre. Les subjets estrangers se rendent donc à nostre mercy, ils logent chez nous, comme il nous plaist. Or si de nostre part nous receuions quelque chose sans alteration, si les prises humaines estoient assez capables et fermes, pour saisir la verité par noz propres moyens, ces moyens estans communs à tous les hommes, cette verité se reiecteroit de main en main de l’vn à l’autre.

    For if that were so, we would all receive them in the same way: wine would taste the same in the mouth of a sick man as in the mouth of a healthy one. A man with chapped or numb fingers would find the wood or iron he handles just as hard as another man does. Outside objects therefore surrender to our mercy; they lodge in us as we please. Now if for our part we received anything without altering it, if the human grip were capable and firm enough to seize truth by our own means, then, since those means are common to all men, this truth would be passed from hand to hand, from one man to another.

    Et au moins se trouueroit-il vne chose au monde, de tant qu’il y en a, qui se croiroit par les hommes d’vn consentement vniuersel. Mais ce, qu’il ne se void aucune proposition, qui ne soit debattue et controuersée entre nous, ou qui ne le puisse estre, montre bien que nostre iugement naturel ne saisit pas bien clairement ce qu’il saisit: car mon iugement ne le peut faire receuoir au iugement de mon compagnon: qui est signe qui ie l’ay saisi par quelque autre moyen, que par vne naturelle puissance, qui soit en moy et en tous les hommes.

    And there would be at least one thing in the world, out of all there are, that men would believe by universal consent. But the fact that no proposition can be found that is not debated and disputed among us, or could not be, shows clearly that our natural judgment does not grasp very clearly what it grasps. For my judgment cannot make my companion’s judgment accept it—which is a sign that I have grasped it by some other means than a natural power that is in me and in all men.

    Laissons à part cette infinie confusion d’opinions, qui se void entre les philosophes mesmes, et ce debat perpetuel et vniuersel en la cognoissance des choses. Car cela est presupposé tres-veritablement, que d’aucune chose les hommes, ie dy les sçauans, les mieux nais, les plus suffisans, ne sont d’accord: non pas que le ciel soit sur nostre teste: car ceux qui doubtent de tout, doubtent aussi de cela: et ceux qui nient que nous puissions comprendre aucune chose, disent que nous n’auons pas compris que le ciel soit sur nostre teste: et ces deux opinions sont, en nombre, sans comparaison les plus fortes.

    Let us leave aside the infinite confusion of opinions that is seen even among the philosophers, and this perpetual and universal debate about the knowledge of things. For it is taken for granted, and very truly, that men—I mean the learned, the best-born, the most able—agree about nothing: not even that the sky is over our heads. For those who doubt everything doubt that too; and those who deny that we can comprehend anything say that we have not comprehended that the sky is over our heads. And these two opinions are, in numbers, incomparably the strongest.

    A judgment that shifts with the body

    Health, mood, passion and argument change what we hold true from hour to hour.

    Outre cette diuersité et diuision infinie, par le trouble que nostre iugement nous donne à nous mesmes, et l’incertitude que chacun sent en soy, il est aysé à voir qu’il a son assiette bien mal asseurée. Combien diuersement iugeons nous des choses? combien de fois changeons nous noz fantasies? Ce que ie tiens auiourd’huy, et ce que ie croy, ie le tiens, et le croy de toute ma croyance: tous mes vtils et tous mes ressorts empoignent cette opinion, et m’en respondent, sur tout ce qu’ils peuuent: ie ne sçaurois embrasser aucune verité ny conseruer auec plus d’asseurance, que ie fay cette-cy.

    Besides this infinite diversity and division, it is easy to see, from the confusion our judgment throws us into and the uncertainty each man feels within himself, that its footing is very insecure. How variously we judge things! How often we change our notions! What I hold today and what I believe, I hold and believe with all my belief; all my tools and all my springs seize on this opinion and vouch for it as far as they can. I could not embrace any truth, or keep hold of it, with more assurance than I do this one.

    I’y suis tout entier; i’y suis voyrement: mais ne m’est-il pas aduenu non vne fois, mais cent, mais mille, et tous les iours, d’auoir embrassé quelque autre chose à tout ces mesmes instrumens, en cette mesme condition, que depuis i’ay iugée fauce? Au moins faut-il deuenir sage à ses propres despens. Si ie me suis trouué souuent trahy soubs cette couleur, si ma touche se trouue ordinairement faulce, et ma balance inegale et iniuste, quelle asseurance en puis-ie prendre à cette fois, plus qu’aux autres? N’est-ce pas sottise, de me laisser tant de fois pipper à vn guide?

    I am wholly in it; I am truly in it. But has it not happened to me—not once, but a hundred times, a thousand times, every day—that I embraced some other thing with these same instruments, in this same condition, which I have since judged to be false? At least one ought to grow wise at one’s own expense. If I have often found myself betrayed under this guise, if my touchstone usually proves false and my scale uneven and unjust, what assurance can I take from it this time, more than the others? Isn’t it foolish to let myself be cheated so many times by the same guide?

    Toutesfois, que la Fortune nous remue cinq cens fois de place, qu’elle ne face que vuyder et remplir sans cesse, comme dans vn vaisseau, dans nostre croyance, autres et autres opinions, tousiours la presente et la derniere c’est la certaine, et l’infaillible. Pour cette-cy, il faut abandonner les biens, l’honneur, la vie, et le salut, et tout, Posterior res illa reperta, / Perdit, et immutat sensus ad pristina quæque. Quoy qu’on nous presche, quoy que nous apprenions, il faudroit tousiours se souuenir que c’est l’homme qui donne, et l’homme qui reçoit; c’est vne mortelle main qui nous le presente; c’est vne mortelle main qui l’accepte.

    And yet let Fortune move us five hundred times from our place, let her do nothing but empty and refill our belief endlessly, as she might a vessel, with one opinion after another: always the present and latest one is the certain, the infallible one. For this one we must give up goods, honor, life, salvation, everything. The thing found later spoils the old, / And turns our feelings against all that came before. Whatever we are preached, whatever we learn, we should always remember that it is man who gives and man who receives; it is a mortal hand that offers it to us; it is a mortal hand that accepts it.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things.

    Les choses qui nous viennent du ciel, ont seules droict et authorité de persuasion, seules merque de verité: laquelle aussi ne voyons nous pas de nos yeux, ny ne la receuons par nos moyens: cette saincte et grande image ne pourroit pas en vn si chetif domicile, si Dieu pour cet vsage ne le prepare, si Dieu ne le reforme et fortifie par sa grace et faueur particuliere et supernaturelle. Aumoins deuroit nostre condition fautiue, nous faire porter plus moderément et retenuement en nos changemens. Il nous deuroit souuenir, quoy que nous receussions en l’entendement, que nous receuons souuent des choses fauces, et que c’est par ces mesmes vtils qui se dementent et qui se trompent souuent.

    Only the things that come to us from heaven have the right and authority to persuade; only they bear the mark of truth. And that truth, too, we do not see with our own eyes, nor receive by our own means: that great and holy image could not dwell in so wretched a lodging unless God prepares it for that use, unless God reforms and strengthens it by his particular and supernatural grace and favor. At the least, our faulty condition ought to make us behave with more moderation and restraint in our changes. We ought to remember, whatever we take into our understanding, that we often take in false things, and that we do so by these same tools, which often contradict themselves and are often deceived.

    Or n’est-il pas merueille, s’ils se dementent, estans si aysez à incliner et à tordre par bien legeres occurrences. Il est certain que nostre apprehension, nostre iugement et les facultez de nostre ame en general, souffrent selon les mouuemens et alterations du corps, lesquelles alterations sont continuelles. N’auons nous pas l’esprit plus esueillé, la memoire plus prompte, le discours plus vif, en santé qu’en maladie? La ioye et la gayeté ne nous font elles pas receuoir les subjects qui se presentent à nostre ame, d’vn tout autre visage, que le chagrin et la melancholie? Pensez vous que les vers de Catulle ou de Sappho, rient à vn vieillard auaricieux et rechigné, comme à vn ieune homme vigoureux et ardent?

    Now it is no wonder if they contradict themselves, since they are so easily bent and twisted by very slight occurrences. It is certain that our apprehension, our judgment and the faculties of our soul in general are affected by the movements and alterations of the body, and those alterations are continual. Is our mind not more alert, our memory quicker, our reasoning livelier, in health than in sickness? Do joy and gaiety not make us receive whatever presents itself to our soul with quite another face than gloom and melancholy do? Do you think the verses of Catullus or Sappho smile on a miserly, crabbed old man as they do on a vigorous and ardent young one?

    Cleomenes fils d’Anaxandridas estant malade, ses amis luy reprochoyent qu’il auoit des humeurs et fantasies nouuelles, et non accoustumées: le croy bien, fit-il, aussi ne suis-ie pas celuy que ie suis estant sain: estant autre, aussi sont autres mes opinions et fantasies. En la chicane de nos palais, ce mot est en vsage, qui se dit des criminels qui rencontrent les iuges en quelque bonne trampe, douce et debonnaire, gaudeat de bona fortuna. Car il est certain que les iugemens se rencontrent par fois plus tendus à la condemnation, plus espineux et aspres, tantost plus faciles, aysez, et enclins à l’excuse.

    When Cleomenes, son of Anaxandridas, was ill, his friends reproached him for having new and unaccustomed moods and fancies. “I can well believe it,” he said; “I am not the same man I am when I am well. Being someone else, my opinions and fancies are something else too.” In the wrangling of our law courts a phrase is in use, said of criminals who find the judges in a good temper, mild and kindly: let him rejoice in his good fortune. For it is certain that judgments are at times more bent on condemnation, thornier and harsher, and at other times more lenient, easygoing and inclined to excuse.

    Tel qui rapporte de sa maison la douleur de la goutte, la ialousie, ou le larrecin de son valet, ayant toute l’ame teinte et abbreuuée de colere, il ne faut pas doubter que son iugement ne s’en altere vers cette part là. Ce venerable Senat d’Areopage, iugeoit de nuict, de peur que la veue des poursuiuans corrompist sa iustice. L’air mesme et la serenité du ciel, nous apporte quelque mutation, comme dit ce vers Grec en Cicero, Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse / Iuppiter, auctifera lustrauit lampade terras. Ce ne sont pas seulement les fieures, les breuuages, et les grands accidens, qui renuersent nostre iugement: les moindres choses du monde le tourneuirent.

    When a man brings back from home the pain of gout, or jealousy, or a theft by his servant, and his whole soul is tinged and soaked with anger, there is no doubt that his judgment is altered in that direction. That venerable senate of the Areopagus judged by night, for fear that the sight of the petitioners might corrupt its justice. Even the air and the clearness of the sky bring about some change in us, as that Greek verse in Cicero says: Men’s minds are such as the light with which Father Jupiter himself / Has lit the lands with his fruitful torch. It is not only fevers, drinks and great accidents that overturn our judgment: the slightest things in the world spin it around.

    The Areopagus was the ancient council and court of Athens; the verse is Cicero’s rendering of Homer, Odyssey XVIII.

    Et ne faut pas doubter, encores que nous ne le sentions pas, que si la fieure continue peut atterrer nostre ame, que la tierce n’y apporte quelque alteration selon la mesure et proportion. Si l’apoplexie assoupit et esteint tout à faict la veuë de nostre intelligence, il ne faut pas doubter que le morfondement ne l’esblouisse. Et par consequent, à peine se peut-il rencontrer vne seule heure en la vie, où nostre iugement se trouue en sa deuë assiette, nostre corps estant subiect à tant de continuelles mutations, et estoffé de tant de sortes de ressorts, que i’en croy les medecins, combien il est malaisé, qu’il n’y en ayt tousiours quelq’vn qui tire de trauers.

    And there is no doubt, though we do not feel it, that if a continuous fever can lay our soul low, a tertian fever brings it some alteration in due measure and proportion. If apoplexy puts the sight of our intelligence to sleep and puts it out altogether, there is no doubt that a chill dims it. And consequently there can hardly be found a single hour in life when our judgment is in its proper seat, our body being subject to so many continual changes, and furnished with so many kinds of springs, that—I take the physicians’ word for it—it is hard for there not always to be one of them pulling askew.

    Au demeurant, cette maladie ne se descouure pas si aisément, si elle n’est du tout extreme et irremediable: d’autant que la raison va tousiours torte, boiteuse, et deshanchée: et auec le mensonge comme auec la verité. Par ainsin, il est malaisé de descouurir son mescompte, et desreglement. I’appelle tousiours raison, cette apparence de discours que chacun forge en soy: cette raison, de la condition de laquelle, il y en peut avoir cent contraires autour d’vn mesme subject: c’est vn instrument de plomb, et de cire, alongeable, ployable, et accommodable à tout biais et à toutes mesures: il ne reste que la suffisance de le sçauoir contourner.

    Moreover, this sickness is not easily detected unless it is utterly extreme and past remedy, since reason always goes crooked, lame and out of joint, and with falsehood as readily as with truth. So it is hard to discover its miscalculations and disorders. I always call reason that semblance of reasoning that each man forges within himself: that reason of which, by its very nature, there can be a hundred contrary versions about one and the same subject. It is an instrument of lead and of wax, stretchable, bendable, adaptable to every bias and every measure; all that is needed is the skill to know how to shape it.

    Quelque bon dessein qu’ait vn iuge, s’il ne s’escoute de pres, à quoy peu de gens s’amusent; l’inclination à l’amitié, à la parenté, à la beauté, et à la vengeance, et non pas seulement choses si poisantes, mais cet instinct fortuite, qui nous fait fauoriser vne chose plus qu’vne autre, et qui nous donne sans le congé de la raison, le choix, en deux pareils subjects, ou quelque vmbrage de pareille vanité, peuuent insinuer insensiblement en son iugement, la recommendation ou deffaueur d’vne cause, et donner pente à la balance.

    However good a judge’s intentions, if he does not listen closely to himself—which few people bother to do—then the pull of friendship, of kinship, of beauty and of revenge can imperceptibly slip into his judgment a bias for or against a case, and tip the scale. And not only such weighty things: so can that random instinct which makes us favor one thing over another, and which gives us, without reason’s leave, the choice between two like objects, or some shadow of a similar vanity.

    Moy qui m’espie de plus prez, qui ay les yeux incessamment tendus sur moy, comme celuy qui n’a pas fort affaire ailleurs, Quis sub Arcto / Rex gelidæ metuatur oræ, / Quid Tyridatem terreat, vnicè / Securus, à peine oseroy-ie dire la vanité et la foiblesse que ie trouue chez moy. I’ay le pied si instable et si mal assis, ie le trouue si aysé à crouler, et si prest au branle, et ma veue si desreglée, qu’à iun ie me sens autre, qu’apres le repas: si ma santé me rid, et la clarté d’vn beau iour, me voyla honneste homme: si i’ay vn cor qui me presse l’orteil, me voylà renfroigné, mal plaisant et inaccessible.

    I who spy on myself more closely, who keep my eyes constantly fixed on myself, like a man who has not much business elsewhere—What king of the frozen shore / Beneath the Bear is feared, / What alarms Tiridates—wholly / Unconcerned—I would hardly dare tell the vanity and weakness I find in myself. My footing is so unsteady and so poorly set, I find it so quick to give way and so ready to wobble, and my sight so unruly, that fasting I feel myself a different man from what I am after a meal. If my health smiles on me, and the brightness of a fine day, I am a perfectly decent fellow; if I have a corn pinching my toe, I am sullen, disagreeable and unapproachable.

    Horace, Odes I.26; Tiridates was a pretender to the Parthian throne.

    Vn mesme pas de cheual me semble tantost rude, tantost aysé; et mesme chemin à cette heure plus court, vne autre fois plus long: et vne mesme forme ores plus ores moins aggreable. Maintenant ie suis à tout faire, maintenant à rien faire: ce qui m’est plaisir à cette heure, me sera quelquefois peine. Il se fait mille agitations indiscrettes et casueles chez moy. Ou l’humeur melancholique me tient, ou la cholerique; et de son authorité priuée, à cett’heure le chagrin predomine en moy, à cette heure l’allegresse.

    The same pace of my horse seems to me now rough, now easy; the same road now shorter, another time longer; the same shape now more, now less pleasing. One moment I am ready to do anything, the next to do nothing; what is a pleasure to me now will at some other time be a burden. A thousand heedless, haphazard stirrings go on inside me. Either the melancholy humor has hold of me, or the choleric; and on its own private authority, now gloom prevails in me, now cheerfulness.

    Quand ie prens des liures, i’auray apperceu en tel passage des graces excellentes, et qui auront feru mon ame; qu’vn’autre fois i’y retombe, i’ay beau le tourner et virer, i’ay beau le plier et le manier, c’est vne masse incognue et informe pour moy. En mes escris mesmes, ie ne retrouue pas tousiours l’air de ma premiere imagination: ie ne sçay ce que i’ay voulu dire: et m’eschaude souuent à corriger, et y mettre vn nouueau sens, pour auoir perdu le premier qui valloit mieux.

    When I take up books, I may have seen in some passage excellent graces that struck my soul; let me come back to it another time, and turn it and twist it as I may, bend it and handle it as I may, it is an unknown and shapeless lump to me. Even in my own writings I do not always recover the drift of my first conception: I do not know what I meant to say. And I often burn my fingers correcting it and putting in a new meaning, because I have lost the first one, which was better.

    Ie ne fay qu’aller et venir: mon iugement ne tire pas tousiours auant, il flotte, il vague, Velut minuta magno / Deprensa nauis in mari, vesaniente vento. Maintes-fois, comme il m’aduient de faire volontiers, ayant pris pour exercice et pour esbat, à maintenir vne contraire opinion à la mienne, mon esprit s’appliquant et tournant de ce costé-là, m’y attache si bien, que ie ne trouue plus la raison de mon premier aduis, et m’en despars. Ie m’entraine quasi où ie panche, comment que ce soit, et m’emporte de mon poix.

    I do nothing but come and go. My judgment does not always move forward; it floats, it wanders, Like a tiny boat caught on the great sea / In a raging wind. Many times—as I often like to do—I have taken it up as an exercise and a pastime to defend an opinion contrary to my own, and my mind, applying itself and turning that way, ties me to it so firmly that I can no longer find the reason for my first view, and I give it up. I am carried almost wherever I lean, whatever the case, and swept away by my own weight.

    Catullus.

    Chacun à peu pres en diroit autant de soy, s’il se regardoit comme moy. Les prescheurs sçauent, que l’emotion qui leur vient en parlant, les anime vers la creance: et qu’en cholere nous nous addonnons plus à la deffence de nostre proposition, l’imprimons en nous, et l’embrassons auec plus de vehemence et d’approbation, que nous ne faisons estans en nostre sens froid et reposé. Vous recitez simplement vne cause à l’aduocat, il vous y respond chancellant et doubteux: vous sentez qu’il luy est indifferent de prendre à soustenir l’vn ou l’autre party: l’auez vous bien payé pour y mordre, et pour s’en formaliser, commence-il d’en estre interessé, y a-il eschauffé sa volonté?

    Almost anyone would say as much of himself if he looked at himself as I do. Preachers know that the emotion that comes over them as they speak quickens them toward belief, and that in anger we throw ourselves harder into the defense of our proposition, stamp it on ourselves and embrace it with more vehemence and approval than we do in our cool and calm senses. You lay out your case plainly to a lawyer: he answers you hesitant and doubtful; you feel that it makes no difference to him whether he takes up one side or the other. Have you paid him well to get his teeth into it and take it to heart? Does he begin to have a stake in it, has his will warmed to it?

    sa raison et sa science s’y eschauffent quant et quant: voylà vne apparente et indubitable verité, qui se presente à son entendement: il y descouure vne toute nouuelle lumiere, et le croit à bon escient, et se le persuade ainsi. Voire ie ne sçay si l’ardeur qui naist du despit, et de l’obstination, à l’encontre de l’impression et violence du magistrat, et du danger: ou l’interest de la reputation, n’ont enuoyé tel homme soustenir iusques au feu, l’opinion pour laquelle entre ses amys, et en liberté, il n’eust pas voulu s’eschauder le bout du doigt.

    his reason and his learning warm to it at the same time. Here is an evident and indubitable truth presenting itself to his understanding; he discovers an entirely new light in it, believes it in earnest, and so persuades himself. Indeed, I do not know whether the ardor born of spite and obstinacy against the pressure and violence of the magistrate and of danger, or concern for reputation, has not sent many a man to uphold, all the way to the stake, an opinion for which, among his friends and at liberty, he would not have been willing to burn the tip of his finger.

    Les secousses et esbranlemens que nostre ame reçoit par les passions corporelles, peuuent beaucoup en elle: mais encore plus les siennes propres: ausquelles elle est si fort prinse, qu’il est à l’aduanture soustenable, qu’elle n’a aucune autre alleure et mouuement, que du souffle de ses vents, et que sans leur agitation elle resteroit sans action, comme vn nauire en pleine mer, que les vents abandonnent de leur secours. Et qui maintiendroit cela, suiuant le party des Peripateticiens, ne nous feroit pas beaucoup de tort, puis qu’il est cognu, que la pluspart des plus belles actions de l’ame, procedent et ont besoin de cette impulsion des passions. La vaillance, disent-ils, ne se peut parfaire sans l’assistance de la cholere.

    The jolts and shocks our soul receives from bodily passions can do much to it; but its own passions can do still more. It is so firmly in their grip that it is perhaps arguable that it has no other gait or motion than what comes from the breath of their winds, and that without their stirring it would lie inactive, like a ship on the open sea that the winds have deserted. And anyone who maintained this, following the party of the Peripatetics, would do us no great wrong, since it is known that most of the finest actions of the soul proceed from this impulse of the passions and need it. Valor, they say, cannot be perfected without the help of anger.

    Semper Aiax fortis, fortissimus tamen in furore. Ny ne court on sus aux meschants, et aux ennemis, assez vigoureusement, si on n’est courroucé. Et veulent que l’aduocat inspire le courroux aux iuges, pour en tirer iustice.

    Ajax was always brave, but bravest in his fury. Nor do we fall upon the wicked and our enemies vigorously enough unless we are angry. And they would have the advocate stir up anger in the judges, to get justice out of them.

    Cicero, Tusculan Disputations.

    Les cupiditez emeurent Themistocles, emeurent Demosthenes: et ont poussé les philosophes aux trauaux, veillées, et peregrinations: nous meinent à l’honneur, à la doctrine, à la santé, fins vtiles. Et cette lascheté d’ame à souffrir l’ennuy et la fascherie, sert à nourrir en la conscience, la penitence et la repentance: et à sentir les fleaux de Dieu, pour nostre chastiment, et les fleaux de la correction politique. La compassion sert d’aiguillon à la clemence; et la prudence de nous conseruer et gouuerner, est esueillée par nostre crainte: et combien de belles actions par l’ambition? combien par la presomption? Aucune eminente et gaillarde vertu en fin, n’est sans quelque agitation desreglée.

    Desires moved Themistocles, moved Demosthenes, and have driven philosophers to labors, sleepless nights and travels; they lead us to honor, to learning, to health—useful ends. And that weakness of soul in bearing grief and vexation serves to nourish penance and repentance in the conscience, and to make us feel the scourges of God for our chastisement, and the scourges of public punishment. Compassion serves as a spur to clemency; and the prudence to preserve and govern ourselves is awakened by our fear. And how many fine actions come from ambition? How many from presumption? In short, no eminent and spirited virtue is without some unruly agitation.

    Seroit-ce pas l’vne des raisons qui auroit meu les Epicuriens, à descharger Dieu de tout soin et sollicitude de nos affaires: d’autant que les effects mesmes de sa bonté ne se pouuoient exercer enuers nous, sans esbranler son repos, par le moyen des passions, qui sont comme des piqueures et sollicitations acheminans l’ame aux actions vertueuses? ou bien ont ils creu autrement, et les ont prinses, comme tempestes, qui desbauchent honteusement l’ame de sa tranquillité? Vt maris tranquillitas intelligitur, nulla, ne minima quidem, aura fluctus commouente: sic animi quietus et placatus status cernitur, quum perturbatio nulla est, qua moueri queat.

    Might this not be one of the reasons that moved the Epicureans to relieve God of all care and concern for our affairs? For even the effects of his goodness could not be exercised toward us without disturbing his repose, by means of the passions, which are like goads and promptings that lead the soul to virtuous actions. Or did they think otherwise, and take the passions for storms that shamefully lure the soul away from its tranquillity? As the calm of the sea is understood when not even the slightest breeze stirs the waves, so the quiet and peaceful state of the soul is discerned when there is no disturbance that can move it.

    Quelles differences de sens et de raison, quelle contrarieté d’imaginations nous presente la diuersité de nos passions? Quelle asseurance pouuons nous doncq prendre de chose si instable et si mobile, subjecte par sa condition à la maistrise du trouble, n’allant iamais qu’vn pas forcé et emprunté? Si nostre iugement est en main à la maladie mesmes, et à la perturbation, si c’est de la folie et de la temerité, qu’il est tenu de receuoir l’impression des choses, quelle seurté pouuons nous attendre de luy?

    What differences of sense and reason, what contrary imaginings the diversity of our passions presents to us! What assurance, then, can we take from a thing so unstable and so changeable, by its very condition subject to the mastery of disturbance, never moving except at a forced and borrowed pace? If our judgment is in the hands of sickness itself and of disturbance, if it is from folly and rashness that it must receive the impression of things, what security can we expect from it?

    N’y a il point de hardiesse à la philosophie, d’estimer des hommes qu’ils produisent leurs plus grands effects, et plus approchans de la diuinité, quand ils sont hors d’eux, et furieux et insensez? Nous nous amendons par la priuation de nostre raison, et son assoupissement. Les deux voies naturelles, pour entrer au cabinet des Dieux, et y preueoir le cours des destinées, sont la fureur et le sommeil. Cecy est plaisant à considerer. Par la dislocation, que les passions apportent à nostre raison, nous deuenons vertueux: par son extirpation, que la fureur ou l’image de la mort apporte, nous deuenons prophetes et deuins. Iamais plus volontiers ie ne l’en creu.

    Is it not rather bold of philosophy to hold that men produce their greatest effects, those closest to divinity, when they are beside themselves, frenzied and out of their minds? We improve through the loss of our reason and its slumber. The two natural ways of entering the cabinet of the gods and foreseeing there the course of destiny are frenzy and sleep. This is amusing to consider. By the dislocation the passions bring to our reason, we become virtuous; by its uprooting, which frenzy or the image of death brings, we become prophets and soothsayers. Never have I been more glad to take philosophy’s word for it.

    C’est vn pur enthousiasme, que la saincte verité a inspiré en l’esprit philosophique, qui luy arrache contre sa proposition, que l’estat tranquille de nostre ame, l’estat rassis, l’estat plus sain, que la philosophie luy puisse acquerir, n’est pas son meilleur estat. Nostre veillée est plus endormie que le dormir: nostre sagesse moins sage que la folie: noz songes vallent mieux, que noz discours: la pire place, que nous puissions prendre, c’est en nous.

    It is a pure enthusiasm, breathed by holy truth into the philosophical mind, that wrings from it, against its own thesis, the admission that the tranquil state of our soul—the settled state, the healthiest state that philosophy can win for it—is not its best state. Our waking is more asleep than sleep; our wisdom less wise than folly; our dreams are worth more than our reasonings; the worst place we can take is in ourselves.

    “Enthusiasm” in its Greek sense: possession or inspiration by a god.

    Mais pense elle pas, que nous ayons l’aduisement de remarquer, que la voix, qui fait l’esprit, quand il est deprins de l’homme, si clair-voyant, si grand, si parfaict, et pendant qu’il est en l’homme, si terrestre, ignorant et tenebreux, c’est vne voix partant de l’esprit qui est en l’homme terrestre, ignorant et tenebreux: et à cette cause voix infiable et incroyable?

    But does philosophy not think we have the wit to notice that the voice which makes the spirit so clear-sighted, so great, so perfect when it is detached from man, and so earthly, ignorant and dark while it is in man, is a voice coming from the spirit that is in earthly, ignorant and dark man—and for that very reason a voice not to be trusted or believed?

    Ie n’ay point grande experience de ces agitations vehementes, estant d’vne complexion molle et poisante; desquelles la pluspart surprennent subitement nostre ame, sans luy donner loisir de se recognoistre. Mais cette passion, qu’on dit estre produite par l’oisiueté, au cœur des ieunes hommes, quoy qu’elle s’achemine auec loisir et d’vn progrés mesuré, elle represente bien euidemment, à ceux qui ont essayé de s’opposer à son effort, la force de cette conuersion et alteration, que nostre iugement souffre.

    I have no great experience of these violent agitations, being of a soft and sluggish constitution; most of them seize our soul suddenly, without giving it time to collect itself. But that passion which is said to be bred by idleness in the hearts of young men, although it advances at leisure and at a measured pace, shows very plainly, to those who have tried to resist its force, the power of the conversion and alteration our judgment undergoes.

    I’ay autrefois entrepris de me tenir bandé pour la soutenir et rabattre: car il s’en faut tant que ie sois de ceux, qui conuient les vices, que ie ne les suis pas seulement, s’ils ne m’entrainent: ie la sentois naistre, croistre, et s’augmenter en despit de ma resistance: et en fin tout voyant et viuant, me saisir et posseder, de façon que, comme d’vne yuresse, l’image des choses me commençoit à paroistre autre que de coustume:

    I once undertook to keep myself braced to withstand it and beat it back; for I am so far from being one of those who invite vices that I do not even follow them unless they drag me along. I felt it being born, growing and increasing in spite of my resistance, and at last, fully seeing and alive as I was, seizing and possessing me, so that, as in drunkenness, the image of things began to look different to me than usual:

    ie voyois euidemment grossir et croistre les aduantages du subject que i’allois desirant, et aggrandir et enfler par le vent de mon imagination: les difficultez de mon entreprise, s’aiser et se planir; mon discours et ma conscience, se tirer arriere: mais ce feu estant euaporé, tout à vn instant, comme de la clarté d’un esclair, mon ame reprendre vne autre sorte de veuë, autre estat, et autre iugement: les difficultez de la retraite, me sembler grandes et inuincibles, et les mesmes choses de bien autre goust et visage, que la chaleur du desir ne me les auoit presentées.

    I clearly saw the attractions of the object I was pursuing swell and grow, enlarged and puffed up by the wind of my imagination; the difficulties of my enterprise ease and level out; my reason and my conscience draw back. But once that fire had burned off, all in an instant, as with a flash of lightning, my soul took on another kind of sight, another state and another judgment: the difficulties of retreat seemed to me great and insurmountable, and the same things had quite another taste and face than the heat of desire had shown me.

    Lequel plus veritablement, Pyrrho n’en sçait rien. Nous ne sommes iamais sans maladie. Les fieures ont leur chaud et leur froid: des effects d’une passion ardente, nous retombons aux effects d’vne passion frilleuse.

    Which of the two views is the truer? Pyrrho knows nothing about it. We are never free of sickness. Fevers have their hot and their cold: from the effects of a burning passion we fall back into the effects of a shivering one.

    Autant que ie m’estois ietté en auant, ie me relance d’autant en arriere. Qualis vbi alterno procurrens gurgite pontus, / Nunc ruit ad terras, scopulosque superiacit vndam, / Spumeus, extremámque sinu perfùndit arenam; / Nunc rapidus retro atque æstu reuoluta resorbens / Saxa, fugit, littúsque vado labente relinquit.

    As far as I had thrown myself forward, I throw myself back just as far. As when the sea, surging on in alternating flood, / Now rushes upon the land and flings its foaming wave over the rocks, / And floods the farthest sand with its curve; / Now runs swiftly back, sucking in the stones rolled by the surge, / And flees, leaving the shore as the shallows slip away.

    Virgil, Aeneid XI.

    Holding to the old beliefs

    Knowing his own fickleness, he keeps his first opinions; Copernicus shows how doctrines rise and fall.

    Or de la cognoissance de cette mienne volubilité, i’ay par accident engendré en moy quelque constance d’opinions: et n’ay guere alteré les miennes premieres et naturelles. Car quelque apparence qu’il y ayt en la nouuelleté, ie ne change pas aisément, de peur que i’ay de perdre au change. Et puis que ie ne suis pas capable de choisir, ie prens le choix d’autruy, et me tiens en l’assiette où Dieu m’a mis. Autrement ie ne me sçauroy garder de rouler sans cesse. Ainsi me suis-ie, par la grace de Dieu, conserué entier, sans agitation et trouble de conscience, aux anciennes creances de nostre religion, au trauers de tant de sectes et de diuisions, que nostre siecle a produites.

    Now from knowing this changeableness of mine I have, by accident, bred in myself a certain constancy of opinion, and I have scarcely altered my first and natural opinions. For however attractive novelty may look, I do not change easily, for fear of losing in the exchange. And since I am not capable of choosing, I take the choice of others, and stay in the position where God has put me. Otherwise I could not keep myself from rolling about endlessly. In this way, by the grace of God, I have kept myself whole, without agitation or trouble of conscience, in the ancient beliefs of our religion, through all the sects and divisions our age has produced.

    Les escrits des anciens, ie dis les bons escrits, pleins et solides, me tentent, et remuent quasi où ils veulent: celuy que i’oy, me semble tousiours le plus roide: ie les trouue auoir raison chacun à son tour, quoy qu’ils se contrarient. Cette aisance que les bons esprits ont, de rendre ce qu’ils veulent vray-semblable; et qu’il n’est rien si estrange, à quoy ils n’entreprennent de donner assez de couleur, pour tromper vne simplicité pareille à la mienne, cela montre euidemment la foiblesse de leur preuue.

    The writings of the ancients—I mean the good writings, full and solid—tempt me and move me almost wherever they please. The one I am listening to always seems to me the strongest; I find each of them right in turn, though they contradict one another. This ease that good minds have in making whatever they like seem probable, and the fact that there is nothing so strange that they will not undertake to give it enough color to deceive a simplicity like mine, show plainly the weakness of their proof.

    Le ciel et les estoilles ont branslé trois mille ans, tout le monde l’auoit ainsi creu, iusques à ce que Cleanthes le Samien, ou, selon Theophraste, Nicetas Syracusien s’aduisa de maintenir que c’estoit la terre qui se mouuoit, par le cercle oblique du Zodiaque tournant à l’entour de son aixieu. Et de nostre temps Copernicus a si bien fondé cette doctrine, qu’il s’en sert tres-reglément à toutes les consequences astrologiennes. Que prendrons nous de là, sinon qu’il ne nous doit chaloir lequel ce soit des deux? Et qui sçait qu’vne tierce opinion d’icy à mille ans, ne renuerse les deux precedentes?

    The heavens and the stars had been moving for three thousand years; everyone had believed so, until Cleanthes of Samos or, according to Theophrastus, Nicetas of Syracuse took it into his head to maintain that it was the earth that moved, turning about its axis along the oblique circle of the zodiac. And in our time Copernicus has grounded this doctrine so well that he uses it quite systematically for all astronomical deductions. What are we to conclude from this, except that we need not care which of the two it is? And who knows whether, a thousand years from now, a third opinion will not overturn the two before it?

    The Samian astronomer who moved the earth was in fact Aristarchus, whom Cleanthes attacked; Copernicus (1473–1543) published On the Revolutions in 1543.

    Sic voluenda ætas commutat tempora rerum: / Quod fuit in pretio, fit nullo denique honore; / Porro aliud succedit, et è contemptibus exit, / Inque dies magis appetitur, florétque repertum / Laudibus, et miro est mortales inter honore.

    Thus rolling time changes the seasons of things: / What was prized falls at last into no esteem; / Then something else takes its place and rises out of contempt, / And is sought more every day, and once found it flourishes / With praise, and is held in wondrous honor among mortals.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things.

    Ainsi quand il se presente à nous quelque doctrine nouuelle, nous auons grande occasion de nous en deffier, et de considerer qu’auant qu’elle fust produite, sa contraire estoit en vogue: et comme elle a esté renuersée par cette-cy, il pourra naistre à l’aduenir vne tierce inuention, qui choquera de mesme la seconde. Auant que les principes qu’Aristote a introduicts, fussent en credit, d’autres principes contentoient la raison humaine, comme ceux-cy nous contentent à cette heure. Quelles lettres ont ceux-cy, quel priuilege particulier, que le cours de nostre inuention s’arreste à eux, et qu’à eux appartient pour tout le temps aduenir, la possession de nostre creance? ils ne sont non plus exempts du boute-hors, qu’estoient leurs deuanciers.

    So when some new doctrine presents itself to us, we have good reason to distrust it, and to consider that before it was put forward its opposite was in vogue; and that, just as that one was overturned by this one, a third invention may arise in the future that will knock down the second in the same way. Before the principles Aristotle introduced were accepted, other principles satisfied human reason, as these satisfy us now. What letters patent do these hold, what special privilege, that the course of our invention should stop at them, and that possession of our belief should belong to them for all time to come? They are no more exempt from eviction than their predecessors were.

    Quand on me presse d’vn nouuel argument, c’est à moy à estimer que ce, à quoy ie ne puis satisfaire, vn autre y satisfera. Car de croire toutes les apparences, desquelles nous ne pouuons nous deffaire, c’est vne grande simplesse. Il en aduiendroit par là, que tout le vulgaire, et nous sommes tous du vulgaire, auroit sa creance contournable, comme vne girouette: car son ame estant molle et sans resistance, seroit forcée de receuoir sans cesse, autres et autres impressions, la derniere effaçant tousiours la trace de la precedente. Celuy qui se trouue foible, il doit respondre suiuant la pratique, qu’il en parlera à son conseil, ou s’en rapporter aux plus sages, desquels il a receu son apprentissage.

    When someone presses me with a new argument, it is up to me to reckon that what I cannot answer, someone else will. For to believe every appearance we cannot shake off is great simple-mindedness. It would follow that all the common people—and we are all common people—would have a belief that turned like a weathervane; for their soul, being soft and without resistance, would be forced to receive impression after impression endlessly, the last always wiping out the trace of the one before. A man who finds himself weak should answer, as they do in legal practice, that he will speak to his counsel about it, or else refer the matter to the wisest, from whom he received his training.

    Combien y a-t-il que la medecine est au monde? On dit qu’vn nouueau venu, qu’on nomme Paracelse, change et renuerse tout l’ordre des regles anciennes, et maintient que iusques à cette heure, elle n’a seruy qu’à faire mourir les hommes. Ie croy qu’il verifiera aisément cela. Mais de mettre ma vie à la preuue de sa nouuelle experience, ie trouue que ce ne seroit pas grand’sagesse. Il ne faut pas croire à chacun, dit le precepte, par ce que chacun peut dire toutes choses.

    How long has medicine been in the world? They say that a newcomer called Paracelsus is changing and overturning the whole order of the ancient rules, and maintains that until now medicine has served only to kill people. I believe he will easily prove that. But to stake my life on the test of his new experiments would not, I think, be great wisdom. We must not believe everyone, says the precept, because everyone can say anything.

    Paracelsus (1493–1541), Swiss physician and alchemist who attacked the medicine of Galen.

    Vn homme de cette profession de nouuelletez, et de reformations physiques, me disoit, il n’y a pas long temps, que tous les anciens s’estoient notoirement mescontez en la nature et mouuemens des vents, ce qu’il me feroit tres-euidemment toucher à la main, si ie voulois l’entendre. Apres que i’euz eu vn peu de patience à ouyr ses arguments, qui auoient tout plein de verisimilitude: Comment donc, luy fis-ie, ceux qui nauigeoient soubs les loix de Theophraste, alloient-ils en Occident, quand ils tiroient en Leuant? alloient-ils à costé, ou à reculons? C’est la fortune, me respondit-il: tant y a qu’ils se mescontoient. Ie luy repliquay lors, que i’aymois mieux suiure les effects, que la raison.

    A man who made a profession of novelties and reforms in natural science told me not long ago that all the ancients had plainly been wrong about the nature and movements of the winds, and that he would make me touch it with my own hand, most evidently, if I would listen to him. After I had patiently heard his arguments, which were full of plausibility, I said to him: “How then did those who sailed under the laws of Theophrastus go west when they were heading east? Did they go sideways, or backward?” “It was chance,” he answered; “in any case, they were mistaken.” I replied then that I would rather follow the results than the reasoning.

    Or ce sont choses, qui se choquent souuent: et m’a lon dict qu’en la geometrie, qui pense auoir gaigné le hault poinct de certitude parmy les sciences, il se trouue des demonstrations ineuitables, subuertissans la verité de l’experience. Comme Iacques Peletier me disoit chez moy, qu’il auoit trouué deux lignes s’acheminans l’vne vers l’autre pour se ioindre, qu’il verifioit toutefois ne pouuoir iamais iusques à l’infinité, arriuer à se toucher. Et les Pyrrhoniens ne se seruent de leurs argumens et de leur raison, que pour ruiner l’apparence de l’experience: et est merueille, iusques où la soupplesse de nostre raison, les a suiuis à ce dessein de combattre l’euidence des effects.

    Now these are things that often clash. I have been told that in geometry, which thinks it has reached the highest point of certainty among the sciences, there are irrefutable demonstrations that subvert the truth of experience. Jacques Peletier, for instance, told me in my own house that he had found two lines moving toward each other to meet, which he nevertheless proved could never, even to infinity, come to touch. And the Pyrrhonists use their arguments and their reason only to ruin the evidence of experience; and it is a marvel how far the suppleness of our reason has followed them in this design of fighting against the evidence of facts.

    Peletier is describing an asymptote.

    Car ils verifient que nous ne nous mouuons pas, que nous ne parlons pas, qu’il n’y a point de poisant ou de chault, auecques vne pareille force d’argumentations, que nous verifions les choses plus vray-semblables. Ptolomeus, qui a esté vn grand personnage, auoit estably les bornes de nostre monde: tous les philosophes anciens ont pensé en tenir la mesure, sauf quelques isles escartées, qui pouuoient eschapper à leur cognoissance: c’eust esté pyrrhoniser, il y a mille ans, que de mettre en doubte la science de la cosmographie, et les opinions qui en estoient receuës d’vn chacun: c’estoit heresie d’aduouer des Antipodes: voila de nostre siecle vne grandeur infinie de terre ferme, non pas vne isle, ou vne contrée particuliere, mais vne partie esgale à peu pres en grandeur, à celle que nous cognoissions, qui vient d’estre descouuerte.

    For they prove that we do not move, that we do not speak, that nothing is heavy or hot, with the same force of argument with which we prove the most probable things. Ptolemy, who was a great man, had set the bounds of our world; all the ancient philosophers thought they had its measure, except for a few remote islands that might escape their knowledge. A thousand years ago it would have been Pyrrhonizing to cast doubt on the science of cosmography and the opinions everyone had accepted from it; it was heresy to admit the Antipodes. And now, in our own century, an infinite expanse of mainland—not an island or a particular region, but a part roughly equal in size to the one we knew—has just been discovered.

    Claudius Ptolemy (2nd century AD), astronomer and geographer of Alexandria.

    Les geographes de ce temps, ne faillent pas d’asseurer, que mes-huy tout est trouué et que tout est veu; Nam quod adest præsto, placet, et pollere videtur. Sçauoir mon si Ptolomée s’y est trompé autrefois, sur les fondemens de sa raison, si ce ne seroit pas sottise de me fier maintenant à ce que ceux-cy en disent: et s’il n’est pas plus vraysemblable, que ce grand corps, que nous appellons le monde, est chose bien autre que nous ne iugeons.

    The geographers of our time do not fail to assure us that by now everything has been found and everything seen; For what is at hand pleases us, and seems the best. The question is whether, since Ptolemy was once mistaken on the foundations of his reasoning, it would not be foolish of me to trust now what these men say about it; and whether it is not more likely that this great body we call the world is something quite other than we judge.

    Platon dit, qu’il change de visage à tout sens: que le ciel, les estoilles et le soleil, renuersent par fois le mouuement, que nous y voyons: changeant l’Orient à l’Occident. Les prestres Ægyptiens dirent à Herodote, que depuis leur premier Roy, dequoy il y auoit onze mille tant d’ans (et de tous leurs Roys ils luy feirent veoir les effigies en statues tirées apres le vif) le soleil auoit changé quatre fois de routte: que la mer et la terre se changent alternatiuement, l’vne en l’autre: que la naissance du monde est indeterminée. Aristote, Cicero de mesmes.

    Plato says that it changes its face in every respect; that the heavens, the stars and the sun sometimes reverse the motion we see in them, changing east into west. The Egyptian priests told Herodotus that since their first king, eleven thousand and some years earlier (and they showed him the likenesses of all their kings in statues taken from life), the sun had changed its course four times; that sea and land turn alternately into each other; that the birth of the world cannot be determined. Aristotle and Cicero say the same.

    Et quelqu’vn d’entre nous, qu’il est de toute eternité, mortel et renaissant, à plusieurs vicissitudes: appellant à tesmoins Salomon et Isaïe: pour euiter ces oppositions, que Dieu a esté quelque fois createur sans creature: qu’il a esté oisif: qu’il s’est desdict de son oisiueté, mettant la main à cet ouurage: et qu’il est par consequent subiect au changement. En la plus fameuse des Grecques escholes, le monde est tenu vn Dieu, faict par vn autre Dieu plus grand: et est composé d’vn corps et d’vne ame, qui loge en son centre, s’espandant par nombres de musique, à sa circonference: diuin, tres-heureux, tres-grand, tres-sage, eternel.

    And one of our own writers says that the world has existed from all eternity, dying and being reborn through many vicissitudes, calling Solomon and Isaiah as witnesses, so as to avoid these objections: that God was once a creator without a creature; that he was idle; that he went back on his idleness by setting his hand to this work; and that he is consequently subject to change. In the most famous of the Greek schools, the world is held to be a god, made by another, greater god. It is composed of a body and a soul, which dwells at its center and spreads out in musical numbers to its circumference: divine, most happy, most great, most wise, eternal.

    The school is Plato’s Academy; the description follows Plato’s Timaeus.

    En luy sont d’autres Dieux, la mer, la terre, les astres, qui s’entretiennent d’vne harmonieuse et perpetuelle agitation et danse diuine: tantost se rencontrans, tantost s’esloignans: se cachans, montrans, changeans de rang, ores auant, et ores derriere. Heraclitus establissoit le monde estre composé par feu, et par l’ordre des destinées, se deuoir enflammer et resoudre en feu quelque iour, et quelque iour encore renaistre. Et des hommes dit Apulée: sigillatim mortales, cunctim perpetui. Alexandre escriuit à sa mere, la narration d’vn prestre Ægyptien, tirée de leurs monuments, tesmoignant l’ancienneté de cette nation infinie, et comprenant la naissance et progrez des autres païs au vray. Cicero et Diodorus disent de leur temps, que les Chaldeens tenoient registre de quatre cens mille tant d’ans.

    Within it are other gods—the sea, the earth, the stars—which keep one another company in a harmonious and perpetual motion, a divine dance: now meeting, now moving apart; hiding and showing themselves, changing rank, now in front, now behind. Heraclitus held that the world was made of fire and that, by the order of the fates, it was bound one day to burst into flame and dissolve into fire, and one day to be born again. And of men Apuleius says: mortal one by one, everlasting all together. Alexander wrote to his mother the account of an Egyptian priest, drawn from their records, attesting the boundless antiquity of that nation and giving the true birth and progress of other countries. Cicero and Diodorus say that in their time the Chaldeans kept records going back four hundred thousand and some years.

    Aristote, Pline, et autres, que Zoroastre viuoit six mille ans auant l’aage de Platon. Platon dit, que ceux de la ville de Saïs, ont des memoires par escrit, de huict mille ans: et que la ville d’Athenes fut bastie mille ans auant ladicte ville de Saïs. Epicurus, qu’en mesme temps que les choses sont icy comme nous les voyons, elles sont toutes pareilles, et en mesme façon, en plusieurs autres mondes. Ce qu’il eust dict plus asseurément, s’il eust veu les similitudes, et conuenances de ce nouueau monde des Indes Occidentales, auec le nostre, present et passé, en si estranges exemples.

    Aristotle, Pliny and others say that Zoroaster lived six thousand years before Plato’s time. Plato says that the people of the city of Saïs have written records going back eight thousand years, and that the city of Athens was built a thousand years before the said city of Saïs. Epicurus says that at the same time as things are here as we see them, they are exactly alike, and in the same fashion, in many other worlds. He would have said so with more confidence if he had seen the similarities and correspondences between this new world of the West Indies and ours, present and past, in such strange examples.

    Saïs was an ancient city in the Nile delta; Plato reports this in the Timaeus.

    En verité considerant ce qui est venu à nostre science du cours de cette police terrestre, ie me suis souuent esmerueillé de voir en vne tres-grande distance de lieux et de temps, les rencontres d’un si grand nombre d’opinions populaires, sauuages, et des mœurs et creances sauuages, et qui par aucun biais ne semblent tenir à nostre naturel discours. C’est vn grand ouurier de miracles que l’esprit humain. Mais cette relation a ie ne sçay quoy encore de plus heteroclite: elle se trouue aussi en noms, et en mille autres choses.

    Truly, considering what has come to our knowledge of the course of human affairs on this earth, I have often marveled to see, across very great distances of place and time, the agreement of so great a number of wild popular opinions, and of wild customs and beliefs, which by no route seem to derive from our natural reasoning. The human mind is a great worker of miracles. But this correspondence has something still more extraordinary about it: it is found in names as well, and in a thousand other things.

    Car on y trouua des nations, n’ayans, que nous sçachions, iamais ouy nouuelles de nous, où la circoncision estoit en credit: où il y auoit des estats et grandes polices maintenuës par des femmes, sans hommes: où nos ieusnes et nostre caresme estoit representé, y adioustant l’abstinence des femmes: où nos croix estoient en diuerses façons en credit, icy on en honoroit les sepultures, on les appliquoit là, et nommément celle de S.

    For nations were found there that had never, as far as we know, heard any news of us, where circumcision was held in honor; where there were states and great governments maintained by women, without men; where our fasts and our Lent were reproduced, with abstinence from women added; where our crosses were held in honor in various ways: here graves were honored with them, there they were used—and in particular that of Saint

    André, à se deffendre des visions nocturnes, et à les mettre sur les couches des enfans contre les enchantements: ailleurs ils en rencontrerent vne de bois de grande hauteur, adorée pour Dieu de la pluye, et celle là bien fort auant dans la terre ferme: on y trouua vne bien expresse image de nos penitentiers: l’vsage des mitres, le cœlibat des prestres, l’art de deuiner par les entrailles des animaux sacrifiez: l’abstinence de toute sorte de chair et poisson, à leur viure, la façon aux prestres d’vser en officiant de langue particuliere, et non vulgaire: et cette fantasie, que le premier Dieu fut chassé par vn second son frere puisné; qu’ils furent creés auec toutes commoditez, lesquelles on leur a depuis retranchées pour leur peché;

    Andrew—to protect people from visions in the night, and were placed on children’s beds against enchantments; elsewhere they came upon a very tall wooden one, worshipped as the god of rain, and that one far inland. There they found a very clear likeness of our confessors; the use of miters, the celibacy of priests, the art of divining by the entrails of sacrificed animals; abstinence from every kind of meat and fish in their diet; the practice of priests using a special language in their services, not the common tongue; and this notion, that the first god was driven out by a second, his younger brother; that they were created with every comfort, which has since been cut off from them for their sin;

    changé leur territoire, et empiré leur condition naturelle: qu’autresfois ils ont esté submergez par l’inondation des eaux celestes, qu’il ne s’en sauua que peu de familles, qui se ietterent dans les haults creux des montagnes, lesquels creux ils boucherent, si que l’eau n’y entra point, ayans enfermé là dedans, plusieurs sortes d’animaux; que quand ils sentirent la pluye cesser, ils mirent hors des chiens, lesquels estans reuenus nets et mouillez, ils iugerent l’eau n’estre encore guere abaissée; depuis en ayans faict sortir d’autres, et les voyans reuenir bourbeux, ils sortirent repeupler le monde, qu’ils trouuerent plein seulement de serpens.

    that their territory was changed and their natural condition made worse; that they were once submerged by a flood of waters from the sky, and only a few families were saved, who took refuge in the high caves of the mountains and stopped up those caves so that the water did not get in, having shut up several kinds of animals inside with them; that when they felt the rain stop, they let out some dogs, and when these came back clean and wet, they judged that the water had not yet gone down much; later, having let out others and seeing them come back muddy, they went out to repeople the world, which they found full of nothing but serpents.

    On rencontra en quelque endroit, la persuasion du iour du iugement, si qu’ils s’offençoient merueilleusement contre les Espagnols qui espandoient les os des trespassez, en fouillant les richesses des sepultures, disans que ces os escartez ne se pourroient facilement reioindre: la trafique par eschange, et non autre, foires et marchez pour cet effect: des nains et personnes difformes, pour l’ornement des tables des Princes: l’vsage de la fauconnerie selon la nature de leurs oyseaux; subsides tyranniques: delicatesses de iardinages; dances, saults bateleresques; musique d’instrumens; armoiries; ieux de paulme; ieu de dez et de sort, auquel ils s’eschauffent souuent, iusques à s’y iouer eux mesmes, et leur liberté: medecine non autre que de charmes: la forme d’escrire par figures: creance d’vn seul premier homme pere de tous les peuples;

    In one place they came upon belief in the day of judgment, so that the people were wonderfully offended at the Spaniards who scattered the bones of the dead while rifling the riches of the graves, saying that these scattered bones could not easily be put back together; trade by barter and no other kind, with fairs and markets for the purpose; dwarfs and deformed persons kept to adorn princes’ tables; the practice of falconry suited to the nature of their birds; tyrannical taxes; refinements of gardening; dances and acrobats’ leaps; instrumental music; coats of arms; ball games; games of dice and chance, in which they often get so heated that they stake themselves and their liberty; medicine consisting of nothing but charms; writing by means of pictures; belief in a single first man, father of all peoples;

    adoration d’vn Dieu qui vesquit autrefois homme en parfaicte virginité, ieusne, et pœnitence, preschant la loy de nature, et des ceremonies de la religion, et qui disparut du monde, sans mort naturelle: l’opinion des geants: l’vsage de s’enyurer de leurs breuuages, et de boire d’autant: ornemens religieux peints d’ossemens et testes de morts, surplys, eau-beniste, aspergez; femmes et seruiteurs, qui se presentent à l’enuy à se brusler et enterrer, auec le mary ou maistre trespassé: loy que les aisnez succedent à tout le bien, et n’est reserué aucune part au puisné, que d’obeissance: coustume à la promotion de certain office de grande authorité, que celuy qui est promeu prend vn nouueau nom, et quitte le sien: de verser de la chaulx sur le genou de l’enfant freschement nay, en luy disant, Tu és venu de pouldre, et retourneras en pouldre: l’art des augures.

    the worship of a god who once lived as a man in perfect virginity, fasting and penance, preaching the law of nature and the ceremonies of religion, and who vanished from the world without a natural death; the belief in giants; the habit of getting drunk on their drinks and drinking deep; religious ornaments painted with bones and skulls, surplices, holy water, sprinklers; wives and servants vying with one another to offer themselves to be burned and buried with their dead husband or master; a law that the eldest inherits all the property, and nothing is left to the younger but obedience; a custom that on promotion to a certain office of great authority the man promoted takes a new name and gives up his own; the custom of pouring lime on the knee of a newborn child, saying to him, “You came from dust, and to dust you shall return”; the art of augury.

    Ces vains ombrages de nostre religion, qui se voient en aucuns de ces exemples, en tesmoignent la dignité et la diuinité. Non seulement elle s’est aucunement insinuée en toutes les nations infideles de deça, par quelque imitation, mais à ces barbares aussi comme par vne commune et supernaturelle inspiration: car on y trouua aussi la creance du purgatoire, mais d’vne forme nouuelle; ce que nous donnons au feu, ils le donnent au froid, et imaginent les ames, et purgées, et punies, par la rigueur d’vne extreme froidure.

    These empty shadows of our religion that can be seen in some of these examples bear witness to its dignity and divinity. Not only has it in some way worked its way, by a kind of imitation, into all the infidel nations on this side of the world, but into these barbarous peoples too, as if by a common and supernatural inspiration. For they also found there a belief in purgatory, but in a new form: what we assign to fire, they assign to cold, and they imagine souls both purged and punished by the rigor of extreme cold.

    Et m’aduertit cet exemple, d’vne autre plaisante diuersité: car comme il s’y trouua des peuples qui aymoyent à deffubler le bout de leur membre, et en retranchoyent la peau à la Mahumetane et à la Iuifue, il s’en trouua d’autres, qui faisoient si grande conscience de le deffubler, qu’à tout des petits cordons, ils portoient leur peau bien soigneusement estiree et attachee au dessus, de peur que ce bout ne vist l’air.

    And this example reminds me of another amusing diversity. Just as some peoples were found there who liked to uncover the end of their member, and cut off the skin in the Muslim and Jewish fashion, others were found who had such scruples about uncovering it that they wore the skin very carefully stretched over it and tied on top with little cords, for fear that the end should see the air.

    Et de cette diuersité aussi, que comme nous honorons les Roys et les festes, en nous parant des plus honnestes vestements que nous ayons: en aucunes regions, pour montrer toute disparité et submission à leur Roy, les subiects se presentoyent à luy, en leurs plus viles habillements, et entrants au palais prennent quelque vieille robe deschiree sur la leur bonne, à ce que tout le lustre, et l’ornement soit au maistre. Mais suyuons.

    And this diversity too: just as we honor kings and festivals by dressing in the finest clothes we have, in some regions, to show their complete inequality and submission to their king, subjects presented themselves to him in their meanest clothes, and on entering the palace they put some old torn robe over their good one, so that all the luster and ornament should belong to the master. But let us go on.

    Climate, desire and the sovereign good

    Our minds vary with the soil, and we cannot even agree on what to wish for.

    Si Nature enserre dans les termes de son progrez ordinaire, comme toutes autres choses, aussi les creances, les iugemens, et opinions des hommes: si elles ont leur reuolution, leur saison, leur naissance, leur mort, comme les choux: si le ciel les agite, et les roule à sa poste, quelle magistrale authorité et permanante, leur allons nous attribuant?

    If Nature encloses men’s beliefs, judgments and opinions within the bounds of her ordinary progress, as she does all other things; if they have their cycle, their season, their birth and their death, like cabbages; if the heavens stir them and roll them about as they please, what masterly and permanent authority are we going to attribute to them?

    Si par experience nous touchons à la main que la forme de nostre estre despend de l’air, du climat, et du terroir où nous naissons: non seulement le tainct, la taille, la complexion et les contenances, mais encore les facultez de l’ame: Et plaga cæli non solùm ad robur corporum, sed etiam animorum facit, dit Vegece: et que la Deesse fundatrice de la ville d’Athenes, choisit à la situer, vne temperature de pays, qui fist les hommes prudents, comme les prestres d’Ægypte apprindrent à Solon: Athenis tenue cælum: ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici: crassum Thebis: itaque pingues Thebani, et valentes: en maniere qu’ainsi que les fruicts naissent diuers, et les animaux, les hommes naissent aussi plus et moins belliqueux, iustes, temperans et dociles:

    Experience lets us touch with our own hands that the form of our being depends on the air, the climate and the soil where we are born. This holds not only for our complexion, our build, our constitution and our bearing, but also for the faculties of the soul: And the climate contributes not only to the strength of the body but also to that of the mind, says Vegetius. The goddess who founded the city of Athens chose for its site a climate that would make men wise, as the priests of Egypt taught Solon: At Athens the air is thin, which is also why the Athenians are thought sharper; at Thebes it is thick, and so the Thebans are dull and sturdy. So, just as fruits and animals are born different, men too are born more or less warlike, just, temperate and docile:

    Vegetius was a Roman writer on military matters (late 4th century AD); the second quotation is from Cicero, On Fate.

    icy subiects au vin, ailleurs au larecin ou à la paillardise: icy enclins à superstition, ailleurs à la mescreance: icy à la liberté, icy à la seruitude: capables d’vne science ou d’vn art: grossiers ou ingenieux: obeyssans ou rebelles: bons ou mauuais, selon que porte l’inclination du lieu où ils sont assis, et prennent nouuelle complexion, si on les change de place, comme les arbres: qui fut la raison, pour laquelle Cyrus ne voulut accorder aux Perses d’abandonner leur pays aspre et bossu, pour se transporter en vn autre doux et plain: disant que les terres grasses et molles font les hommes mols, et les fertiles les esprits infertiles.

    here given to wine, elsewhere to theft or lechery; here inclined to superstition, elsewhere to unbelief; here to liberty, here to servitude; capable of one science or one art; dull or clever; obedient or rebellious; good or bad, according to the inclination of the place where they are set; and they take on a new constitution if they are moved, like trees. That was why Cyrus would not allow the Persians to leave their harsh and hilly country for another that was gentle and flat. Rich, soft lands, he said, make soft men, and fertile lands make infertile minds.

    Si nous voyons tantost fleurir vn art, vne creance, tantost vne autre, par quelque influance celeste: tel siecle produire telles natures, et incliner l’humain genre à tel ou tel ply: les esprits des hommes tantost gaillars, tantost maigres, comme nos champs: que deuiennent toutes ces belles prerogatiues dequoy nous allons flattants? Puis qu’vn homme sage se peut mesconter, et cent hommes, et plusieurs nations: voire et l’humaine nature selon nous, se mesconte plusieurs siecles, en cecy ou en cela: quelle seureté auons nous que par fois elle cesse de se mesconter, et qu’en ce siecle elle ne soit en mescompte?

    We see one art or one belief flourish now, another later, through some influence of the heavens. We see one age produce one kind of nature and bend the human race this way or that, and men’s minds grow now lush, now lean, like our fields. If so, what becomes of all those fine prerogatives we keep flattering ourselves with? One wise man can be mistaken, and so can a hundred men and many nations. Indeed, by our own account, human nature itself has been mistaken for many centuries about this or that. So what assurance have we that at some point it stops being mistaken, and that it is not in error in this century?

    Il me semble entre autres tesmoignages de nostre imbecillité, que celuy-cy ne merite pas d’estre oublié, que par desir mesme, l’homme ne sçache trouuer ce qu’il luy faut: que non par iouyssance, mais par imagination et par souhait, nous ne puissions estre d’accord de ce dequoy nous auons besoing pour nous contenter. Laissons à nostre pensée tailler et coudre à son plaisir: elle ne pourra pas seulement desirer ce qui luy est propre, et le satisfaire. Quid enim ratione timemus / Aut cupimus? quid tam dextro pede concipis, vt te / Conatus non pœniteat, votique peracti? C’est pourquoy Socrates ne requeroit les Dieux, sinon de luy donner ce qu’ils sçauoient luy estre salutaire.

    Among the other proofs of our feebleness, it seems to me that this one deserves not to be forgotten: that even in desire man cannot find what he needs; that not in enjoyment, but in imagination and in wishing, we cannot agree on what we need to content us. Let our thought cut and sew as it pleases: it will not even be able to desire what is right for it, and satisfy itself. For what do we fear / Or desire with reason? What do you plan so auspiciously that you / Do not regret the attempt and the wish fulfilled? That is why Socrates asked the gods only to give him what they knew to be good for him.

    Juvenal, Satires X; the Latin quotations in the next chunks up to “Man is dearer to them” come from the same satire.

    Et la priere des Lacedemoniens publique et priuée portoit, simplement les choses bonnes et belles leur estre octroyées: remettant à la discretion de la puissance supreme le tirage et choix d’icelles. Coniugium petimus, partúmque vxoris; at illi / Notum qui pueri, qualisque futura sit vxor. Et le Chrestien supplie Dieu que sa volonté soit faicte: pour ne tomber en l’inconuenient que les poëtes feignent du Roy Midas.

    And the prayer of the Spartans, public and private, simply asked that good and beautiful things be granted them, leaving the selection and choice of them to the discretion of the supreme power. We ask for a wife and for children by her; but he alone knows / What the children will be, and what kind of wife. And the Christian prays God that his will be done, so as not to fall into the trouble that the poets invent about King Midas.

    Il requit les Dieux que tout ce qu’il toucheroit se conuertist en or: sa priere fut exaucée, son vin fut or, son pain or, et la plume de sa couche, et d’or sa chemise et son vestement: de façon qu’il se trouua accablé soubs la iouyssance de son desir, et estrené d’vne insupportable commodité: il luy falut desprier ses prieres: Attonitus nouitate mali, diuésque misérque, / Effugere optat opes, et, quæ modò vouerat, odit. Disons de moy-mesme. Ie demandois à la Fortune autant qu’autre chose, l’ordre Sainct Michel estant ieune: car c’estoit lors l’extreme marque d’honneur de la noblesse Françoise, et tres-rare. Elle me l’a plaisamment accordé.

    He asked the gods that everything he touched should turn to gold. His prayer was granted: his wine was gold, his bread gold, and the feathers of his bed, and gold his shirt and his clothes. He found himself crushed under the fulfillment of his desire, presented with an unbearable convenience, and he had to unpray his prayers: Stunned by the strangeness of the evil, both rich and wretched, / He longs to escape his wealth, and hates what he had just prayed for. Let me speak of myself. When I was young I asked Fortune for the Order of Saint Michael as much as for anything else, for it was then the highest mark of honor of the French nobility, and very rare. She granted it to me, in an amusing way.

    Ovid, Metamorphoses XI.

    Au lieu de me monter et hausser de ma place, pour y aueindre, elle m’a bien plus gratieusement traitté, elle l’a rauallé et rabaissé iusques à mes espaules et au dessoubs. Cleobis et Biton, Trophonius et Agamedes, ayans requis ceux là leur Deesse, ceux-cy leur Dieu, d’vne recompense digne de leur pieté, eurent la mort pour present: tant les opinions celestes sur ce qu’il nous faut, sont diuerses aux nostres.

    Instead of raising me and lifting me from my place to reach it, she treated me far more graciously: she lowered it and brought it down to my shoulders, and below. Cleobis and Biton asked their goddess, and Trophonius and Agamedes their god, for a reward worthy of their piety, and they received death as their gift: so different are the opinions of heaven about what we need from our own.

    Cleobis and Biton, sons of a priestess of Hera, and Trophonius and Agamedes, builders of Apollo’s temple at Delphi, each died peacefully after asking for the best gift the gods could give.

    Dieu pourroit nous ottroyer les richesses, les honneurs, la vie et la santé mesme, quelquefois à nostre dommage: car tout ce qui nous est plaisant, ne nous est pas tousiours salutaire: si au lieu de la guerison, il nous envoye la mort, ou l’empirement de nos maux: Virga tua et baculus tuus ipsa me consolata sunt: il le fait par les raisons de sa providence, qui regarde bien plus certainement ce qui nous est deu, que nous ne pouuons faire: et la deuons prendre en bonne part, comme d’vne main tres-sage et tres-amie.

    God could grant us riches, honors, life and even health, sometimes to our harm, for not everything that pleases us is always good for us. If instead of healing he sends us death, or a worsening of our ills—Your rod and your staff, they have comforted me—he does it for reasons of his providence, which sees far more surely than we can what is due to us. We must take it in good part, as coming from a most wise and most loving hand.

    Psalm 23 (22 in the Latin Bible).

    Si consilium vis / Permittes ipsis expendere numinibus, quid / Conueniat nobis, rebúsque sit vtile nostris: / Charior est illis homo quàm sibi. Car de les requerir des honneurs, des charges, c’est les requerir, qu’ils vous iettent à vne bataille, ou au ieu des dez, ou telle autre chose, de laquelle l’issue vous est incognue, et le fruict doubteux.

    If you want advice, / You will leave it to the gods themselves to weigh what / Suits us and what is useful for our affairs: / Man is dearer to them than he is to himself. For to ask them for honors and offices is to ask them to throw you into a battle, or a game of dice, or some such thing whose outcome is unknown to you and whose fruit is doubtful.

    Il n’est point de combat si violent entre les philosophes, et si aspre, que celuy qui se dresse sur la question du souuerain bien de l’homme: duquel par le calcul de Varro, nasquirent deux cens quatre vingtz sectes. Qui autem de summo bono dissentit, de tota philosophiæ ratione disputat. Tres mihi conuiuæ propè dissentire videntur, / Poscentes vario multum diuersa palato: / Quid dem? quid non dem? Renuis tu quod iubet alter; / Quod petis, id sanè est inuisum acidúmque duobus. Nature deuroit ainsi respondre à leurs contestations, et à leurs debats.

    There is no combat among philosophers so violent and so bitter as the one that arises over the question of man’s sovereign good, from which, by Varro’s reckoning, two hundred and eighty sects were born. But whoever disagrees about the supreme good disagrees about the whole system of philosophy. Three guests seem to me almost at odds, / Calling for very different things with their different palates: / What should I give? What not give? You refuse what the other orders; / What you ask for is surely odious and sour to the other two. This is how Nature ought to answer their disputes and their debates.

    Varro (116–27 BC) was the most learned Roman scholar of his day. The quotations are from Cicero, On Ends, and Horace, Epistles II.2.

    Les uns disent nostre bien estre, loger en la vertu: d’autres, en la volupté: d’autres, au consentir à Nature: qui en la science: qui à n’auoir point de douleur: qui à ne se laisser emporter aux apparences: et à cette fantasie semble retirer cet’ autre, de l’ancien Pythagoras: Nil admirari, propè res est vna, Numaci, / Soláque, quæ possit facere et seruare beatum, qui est la fin de la secte Pyrrhonienne. Aristote attribue à magnanimité, rien n’admirer. Et disoit Archésilas, les soustenemens et l’estat droit et inflexible du iugement, estre les biens: mais les consentemens et applications estre les vices et les maux. Il est vray qu’en ce qu’il l’establissoit par axiome certain, il se départoit du Pyrrhonisme.

    Some say our good lies in virtue; others, in pleasure; others, in consenting to Nature; one says in knowledge, one in having no pain, one in not letting oneself be carried away by appearances. And this notion seems to resemble that other one of ancient Pythagoras: To marvel at nothing is almost the one and only thing, Numicius, / That can make a man happy and keep him so, which is the goal of the Pyrrhonist sect. Aristotle ascribes marveling at nothing to magnanimity. And Arcesilaus said that suspensions of judgment, and its upright and unbending state, were goods, while assents and adherences were vices and evils. True, by establishing this as a certain axiom he departed from Pyrrhonism.

    Horace, Epistles I.6.

    Les Pyrrhoniens, quand ils disent que le souuerain bien c’est l’Ataraxie, qui est l’immobilité du iugement, ils ne l’entendent pas dire d’vne façon affirmatiue, mais le mesme bransle de leur ame, qui leur fait fuir les precipices, et se mettre à couuert du serein, celuy là mesme leur presente cette fantasie, et leur en fait refuser vne autre.

    When the Pyrrhonists say that the sovereign good is Ataraxia, which is the immobility of judgment, they do not mean to say it in an affirmative way. The same motion of their soul that makes them flee precipices and take shelter from the evening damp presents this notion to them and makes them reject another.

    Combien ie desire, que pendant que ie vis, ou quelque autre, ou Iustus Lipsius, le plus sçauant homme qui nous reste, d’vn esprit tres-poly et iudicieux, vrayement germain à mon Turnebus, eust et la volonté, et la santé, et assez de repos, pour ramasser en vn registre, selon leurs diuisions et leurs classes, sincerement et curieusement, autant que nous y pouuons voir, les opinions de l’ancienne philosophie sur le subiect de nostre estre et de nos mœurs, leurs controuerses, le credit et suitte des pars, l’application de la vie des autheurs et sectateurs, à leurs preceptes, és accidens memorables et exemplaires! Le bel ouurage et vtile que ce seroit!

    How I wish that, while I am alive, someone—or Justus Lipsius, the most learned man we have left, with a most polished and judicious mind, a true brother to my Turnebus—had the will, the health and enough leisure to gather into a register, according to their divisions and classes, sincerely and carefully, as far as we can see into it, the opinions of ancient philosophy on the subject of our being and our conduct! It would set out their controversies, the standing and following of each party, and how the lives of the authors and their followers matched their precepts in memorable and exemplary circumstances. What a fine and useful work that would be!

    Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), Flemish humanist who corresponded with Montaigne.

    Laws and natural law

    Laws change from country to country; no natural law is accepted everywhere.

    Au demeurant, si c’est de nous que nous tirons le reglement de nos mœurs, à quelle confusion nous reiettons nous? Car ce que nostre raison nous y conseille de plus vray-semblable, c’est generalement à chacun d’obeyr aux loix de son pays, comme est l’aduis de Socrates inspiré, dit-il, d’vn conseil diuin. Et par là que veut elle dire, sinon que nostre deuoir n’a autre regle que fortuite? La verité doit auoir vn visage pareil et vniuersel. La droiture et la iustice, si l’homme en cognoissoit, qui eust corps et veritable essence, il ne l’attacheroit pas à la condition des coustumes de cette contrée, ou de celle là: ce ne seroit pas de la fantasie des Perses ou des Indes, que la vertu prendroit sa forme.

    For the rest, if it is from ourselves that we draw the rule of our conduct, into what confusion do we cast ourselves? For the most probable advice our reason gives us on this is, in general, that each man should obey the laws of his country, as was the opinion of Socrates, inspired, he says, by divine counsel. And what does reason mean by that, except that our duty has no rule but a fortuitous one? Truth must have a face that is the same everywhere and universal. If man knew any rectitude and justice that had body and true essence, he would not tie it to the condition of the customs of this region or that; virtue would not take its shape from the notions of the Persians or the Indians.

    Il n’est rien subiect à plus continuelle agitation que les loix. Depuis que ie suis nay, i’ay veu trois et quatre fois, rechanger celles des Anglois noz voisins, non seulement en subiect politique, qui est celuy qu’on veut dispenser de constance, mais au plus important subiect qui puisse estre, à sçauoir de la religion. Dequoy i’ay honte et despit, d’autant plus que c’est vne nation, à laquelle ceux de mon quartier ont eu autrefois vne si priuée accointance, qu’il reste encore en ma maison aucunes traces de nostre ancien cousinage.

    Nothing is subject to more continual agitation than laws. Since I was born I have seen the laws of the English, our neighbors, change three and four times. This happened not only in political matters, which is the area people like to excuse from constancy, but in the most important matter there can be, namely religion. It makes me ashamed and vexed, all the more because the people of my region once had so close an acquaintance with that nation that some traces of our old kinship still remain in my house.

    Guyenne, Montaigne’s region, was ruled by the English crown from 1152 until 1453.

    Et chez nous icy, i’ay veu telle chose qui nous estoit capitale, deuenir legitime: et nous qui en tenons d’autres, sommes à mesmes, selon l’incertitude de la fortune guerriere, d’estre vn iour criminels de læse majesté humaine et diuine, nostre iustice tombant à la mercy de l’iniustice: et en l’espace de peu d’années de possession, prenant vne essence contraire. Comment pouuoit ce Dieu ancien plus clairement accuser en l’humaine cognoissance l’ignorance de l’estre diuin: et apprendre aux hommes, que leur religion n’estoit qu’vne piece de leur inuention, propre à lier leur societé, qu’en declarant, comme il fit, à ceux qui en recherchoient l’instruction de son trepied, que le vray culte à chacun, estoit celuy qu’il trouuoit obserué par l’vsage du lieu, où il estoit?

    And here at home I have seen something that was a capital crime for us become lawful; and we who hold to other things are liable, depending on the uncertain fortunes of war, to be one day guilty of high treason against human and divine majesty, our justice falling to the mercy of injustice and, after a few years of possession, taking on a contrary essence. How could that ancient god more clearly expose human knowledge’s ignorance of the divine being, and teach men that their religion was only a piece of their own invention, fit to bind their society together, than by declaring, as he did, to those who sought instruction about it from his tripod, that the true worship for each man was the one he found observed by the practice of the place where he was?

    Apollo, whose oracle at Delphi spoke through a priestess seated on a tripod; Xenophon reports this answer.

    O Dieu, quelle obligation n’auons nous à la benignité de nostre souuerain createur, pour auoir desniaisé nostre creance de ces vagabondes et arbitraires deuotions, et l’auoir logée sur l’eternelle base de sa saincte parolle? Que nous dira donc en cette necessité la philosophie? que nous suyuions les loix de nostre pays? c’est à dire cette mer flottante des opinions d’vn peuple, ou d’vn Prince, qui me peindront la iustice d’autant de couleurs, et la reformeront en autant de visages, qu’il y aura en eux de changemens de passion. Ie ne puis pas auoir le iugement si flexible. Quelle bonté est-ce, que ie voyois hyer en credit, et demain ne l’estre plus: et que le traiect d’vne riuiere fait crime?

    O God, what an obligation we owe to the kindness of our sovereign Creator for having cured our belief of those wandering and arbitrary devotions and set it on the eternal foundation of his holy word! What then will philosophy tell us in this necessity? That we should follow the laws of our country? That is, that drifting sea of the opinions of a people or a prince, which will paint justice for me in as many colors, and reshape it into as many faces, as there are changes of passion in them? I cannot have so flexible a judgment. What kind of goodness is it that I saw esteemed yesterday and will see discredited tomorrow, and that crossing a river turns into a crime?

    Quelle verité est-ce que ces montaignes bornent mensonge au monde qui se tient au delà?

    What kind of truth is it that these mountains bound, and that becomes a lie in the world beyond them?

    Mais ils sont plaisans, quand pour donner quelque certitude aux loix, ils disent qu’il y en a aucunes fermes, perpetuelles et immuables, qu’ils nomment naturelles, qui sont empreintes en l’humain genre par la condition de leur propre essence: et de celles là, qui en fait le nombre de trois, qui de quatre, qui plus, qui moins: signe, que c’est vne marque aussi douteuse que le reste. Or ils sont si defortunez (car comment puis-ie nommer cela, sinon defortune, que d’vn nombre de loix si infiny, il ne s’en rencontre aumoins vne que la fortune et temerité du sort ait permis estre vniuersellement receuë par le consentement de toutes les nations?)

    But they are amusing when, to give some certainty to the laws, they say that there are some laws that are firm, perpetual and immutable, which they call natural, imprinted on the human race by the condition of its very essence. Of these, one man makes the number three, another four, one more, one less—a sign that this mark is as doubtful as the rest. Now they are so unlucky (for what can I call it but bad luck, that out of so infinite a number of laws there should not be found even one that the fortune and rashness of chance has allowed to be universally accepted by the consent of all nations?)

    ils sont, dis-ie, si miserables, que de ces trois ou quatre loix choisies, il n’en y a vne seule, qui ne soit contredite et desaduoüee, non par vne nation, mais par plusieurs. Or c’est la seule enseigne vray-semblable, par laquelle ils puissent argumenter aucunes loix naturelles, que l’vniuersité de l’approbation: car ce que Nature nous auroit veritablement ordonné, nous l’ensuyurions sans doubte d’vn commun consentement: et non seulement toute nation, mais tout homme particulier, ressentiroit la force et la violence, que luy feroit celuy, qui le voudroit pousser au contraire de cette loy. Qu’ils m’en montrent pour voir, vne de cette condition.

    they are, I say, so wretched that of these three or four chosen laws there is not a single one that is not contradicted and disavowed, not by one nation but by several. Now the only plausible sign by which they could argue for any natural laws is universal approval. For what Nature had truly ordained for us we would undoubtedly follow by common consent; and not only every nation but every individual would feel the force and violence done to him by anyone who tried to push him against that law. Let them show me one of that kind, just so I can see it.

    Protagoras et Ariston ne donnoyent autre essence à la iustice des loix, que l’authorité et opinion du legislateur: et que cela mis à part, le bon et l’honneste perdoyent leurs qualitez, et demeuroyent des noms vains, de choses indifferentes. Thrasymachus en Platon estime qu’il n’y a point d’autre droit que la commodité du superieur. Il n’est chose, en quoy le monde soit si diuers qu’en coustumes et loix. Telle chose est icy abominable, qui apporte recommandation ailleurs: comme en Lacedemone la subtilité de desrober.

    Protagoras and Ariston gave the justice of laws no other essence than the authority and opinion of the legislator. Set that aside, they said, and the good and the honorable lost their qualities and remained empty names for indifferent things. Thrasymachus, in Plato, holds that there is no other right than the advantage of the stronger. There is nothing in which the world is so diverse as in customs and laws. A thing that is abominable here wins commendation elsewhere, as skill in stealing did in Sparta.

    Les mariages entre les proches sont capitalement defendus entre nous, ils sont ailleurs en honneur, Gentes esse feruntur, / In quibus et nato genitrix, et nata parenti / Iungitur, et pietas geminato crescit amore. Le meurtre des enfans, meurtre des peres, communication de femmes, trafique de voleries, licence à toutes sortes de voluptez: il n’est rien en somme si extreme, qui ne se trouue receu par l’vsage de quelque nation.

    Marriages between close relatives are forbidden among us on pain of death; elsewhere they are held in honor. There are said to be peoples / Among whom mother is joined to son, and daughter to father, / And their devotion grows with doubled love. The murder of children, the murder of fathers, the sharing of wives, the trade in stolen goods, license for every kind of pleasure: in short, there is nothing so extreme that it is not found accepted by the practice of some nation.

    Ovid, Metamorphoses X.

    Il est croyable qu’il y a des loix naturelles: comme il se voit és autres creatures: mais en nous elles sont perduës, cette belle raison humaine s’ingerant par tout de maistriser et commander, brouillant et confondant le visage des choses, selon sa vanité et inconstance. Nihil itaque amplius nostrum est: quod nostrum dico, artis est. Les subiets ont diuers lustres et diuerses considerations: c’est de là que s’engendre principalement la diversité d’opinions. Vne nation regarde vn subiect par vn visage, et s’arreste à celuy là: l’autre par vn autre.

    It is credible that there are natural laws, as can be seen in other creatures; but in us they are lost, because that fine human reason meddles everywhere to master and command, muddling and confusing the face of things according to its vanity and inconstancy. So nothing is ours any longer; what I call ours is the product of art. Subjects have different lights and different aspects, and it is chiefly from this that diversity of opinions arises. One nation looks at a subject from one side and stops there; another from another side.

    Il n’est rien si horrible à imaginer, que de manger son pere. Les peuples qui auoyent anciennement cette coustume, la prenoyent toutesfois pour tesmoignage de pieté et de bonne affection, cherchant par là à donner à leurs progeniteurs la plus digne et honorable sepulture: logeants en eux mesmes et comme en leurs moelles, les corps de leurs peres et leurs reliques: les viuifiants aucunement et regenerants par la transmutation en leur chair viue, au moyen de la digestion et du nourrissement. Il est aysé à considerer quelle cruauté et abomination c’eust esté à des hommes abreuuez et imbus de cette superstition, de ietter la despouille des parens à la corruption de la terre, et nourriture des bestes et des vers.

    There is nothing so horrible to imagine as eating one’s father. Yet the peoples who had this custom in ancient times took it as a mark of piety and good affection. By it they sought to give their forebears the worthiest and most honorable burial, lodging the bodies and remains of their fathers in themselves, as if in their very marrow. In some way they brought them back to life and regenerated them by transforming them into their own living flesh through digestion and nourishment. It is easy to see what a cruelty and abomination it would have been for men steeped and imbued in this superstition to throw their parents’ remains to rot in the earth and feed the beasts and the worms.

    Lycurgus considera au larrecin, la viuacité, diligence, hardiesse, et adresse, qu’il y a à surprendre quelque chose de son voisin, et l’vtilité qui reuient au public, que chacun en regarde plus curieusement à la conseruation de ce qui est sien: et estima que de cette double institution, à assaillir et à defendre, il s’en tiroit du fruit à la discipline militaire (qui estoit la principale science et vertu, à quoy il vouloit duire cette nation) de plus grande consideration, que n’estoit le desordre et l’iniustice de se preualoir de la chose d’autruy.

    Lycurgus considered, in theft, the quickness, diligence, boldness and skill it takes to snatch something from one’s neighbor. He also weighed the benefit to the public, since everyone then looks more carefully to the keeping of what is his. He judged that this double training, in attack and in defense, brought benefits to military discipline (which was the principal science and virtue in which he wanted to train that nation) of greater consequence than the disorder and injustice of seizing another’s property.

    Dionysius le tyran offrit à Platon vne robbe à la mode de Perse, longue, damasquinée, et parfumée: Platon la refusa, disant, qu’estant nay homme, il ne vestiroit pas volontiers de robbe de femme: mais Aristippus l’accepta, auec cette responce, que nul accoustrement ne pouuoit corrompre vn chaste courage. Ses amis tançoient sa lascheté de prendre si peu à cœur, que Dionysius luy eust craché au visage: Les pescheurs, dit-il, souffrent bien d’estre baignés des ondes de la mer, depuis la teste iusqu’aux pieds, pour attraper vn goujon. Diogenes lauoit ses choulx, et le voyant passer, Si tu sçavois viure de choulx, tu ne ferois pas la cour à vn tyran.

    Dionysius the tyrant offered Plato a robe in the Persian fashion, long, damasked and perfumed. Plato refused it, saying that, having been born a man, he would not willingly wear a woman’s robe; but Aristippus accepted it, replying that no attire could corrupt a chaste heart. His friends reproached him for his spinelessness in taking so lightly the fact that Dionysius had spat in his face. “Fishermen,” he said, “put up with being drenched by the sea waves from head to foot to catch a gudgeon.” Diogenes was washing his cabbages and, seeing him pass by, said: “If you knew how to live on cabbages, you would not pay court to a tyrant.”

    A quoy Aristippus, Si tu sçauois viure entre les hommes, tu ne lauerois pas des choulx. Voylà comment la raison fournit d’apparence à diuers effects. C’est vn pot à deux ances, qu’on peut saisir à gauche et à dextre. Bellum, ô terra hospita, portas: / Bello armantur equi, bellum hæc armenta minantur: / Sed tamen ijdem olim curru succedere sueti / Quadrupedes, et frena iugo concordia ferre, / Spes est pacis.

    To which Aristippus replied: “If you knew how to live among men, you would not be washing cabbages.” That is how reason lends plausibility to different courses. It is a pot with two handles, which can be grabbed by the left or by the right. It is war you bring us, O land that receives us: / Horses are armed for war; war is what these herds threaten. / But still, these same beasts were once used to drawing the chariot, / And to bearing the bridle in harmony under the yoke: / There is hope of peace.

    Virgil, Aeneid III.

    On preschoit Solon de n’espandre pour la mort de son fils des armes impuissantes et inutiles: Et c’est pour cela, dit-il, que plus iustement ie les espans, qu’elles sont inutiles et impuissantes. La femme de Socrates rengregeoit son deuil par telle circonstance, O qu’iniustement le font mourir ces meschants iuges! Aimerois tu donc mieux que ce fust iustement? luy repliqua il. Nous portons les oreilles percées, les Grecs tenoient cela pour vne marque de seruitude. Nous nous cachons pour iouïr de nos femmes, les Indiens le font en public. Les Scythes immoloyent les estrangers en leurs temples, ailleurs les temples seruent de franchise. Inde furor vulgi, quòd numina vicinorum / Odit quisque locus, cùm solos credat habendos / Esse Deos quos ipse colit.

    Solon was urged not to shed powerless and useless tears for the death of his son. “That is exactly why I am right to shed them,” he said, “because they are useless and powerless.” Socrates’ wife was aggravating her grief with this circumstance: “Oh, how unjustly these wicked judges are putting him to death!” “Would you rather it were justly, then?” he replied. We wear pierced ears; the Greeks considered that a mark of slavery. We hide to enjoy our wives; the Indians do it in public. The Scythians sacrificed foreigners in their temples; elsewhere temples serve as sanctuaries. Hence the fury of the crowd: each place hates / The gods of its neighbors, believing that the only gods to be held / As gods are those it worships itself.

    Juvenal, Satires XV.

    I’ay ouy parler d’vn iuge, lequel où il rencontroit vn aspre conflit entre Bartolus et Baldus, et quelque matiere agitée de plusieurs contrarietez, mettoit en marge de son liure. Question pour l’amy, c’est à dire que la verité estoit si embrouillée et debatue, qu’en pareille cause, il pourroit fauoriser celle des parties que bon luy sembleroit. Il ne tenoit qu’à faute d’esprit et de suffisance, qu’il ne peust mettre par tout, Question pour l’amy. Les aduocats et les iuges de nostre temps, trouuent à toutes causes, assez de biais pour les accommoder où bon leur semble. A vne science si infinie, dépendant de l’authorité de tant d’opinions, et d’vn subiect si arbitraire, il ne peut estre, qu’il n’en naisse vne confusion extreme de iugemens.

    I have heard of a judge who, wherever he came across a sharp conflict between Bartolus and Baldus, or some matter tossed about by many contradictions, would write in the margin of his book: “Question for a friend.” That is to say, the truth was so tangled and disputed that in a similar case he could favor whichever party he pleased. It was only for lack of wit and ability that he did not write “Question for a friend” everywhere. The lawyers and judges of our time find in every case enough angles to bend it wherever they please. In a science so infinite, depending on the authority of so many opinions, and in so arbitrary a subject, an extreme confusion of judgments cannot fail to arise.

    Bartolus of Sassoferrato and his pupil Baldus de Ubaldis, 14th-century Italian jurists whose commentaries on Roman law were standard authorities.

    Aussi n’est-il guere si clair procés, auquel les aduis ne se trouuent diuers: ce qu’vne compaignie a iugé, l’autre le iuge au contraire, et elle mesmes au contraire vne autre fois. Dequoy nous voyons des exemples ordinaires, par cette licence, qui tache merueilleusement la cerimonieuse authorité et lustre de nostre iustice, de ne s’arrester aux arrests, et courir des vns aux autres iuges, pour decider d’vne mesme cause.

    So there is hardly a lawsuit so clear that opinions do not differ on it: what one court has judged, another judges the opposite way, and the same court judges the opposite way another time. We see ordinary examples of this in that license—which marvelously stains the ceremonious authority and luster of our justice—of not resting content with rulings, and of running from one set of judges to another to decide the same case.

    Quant à la liberté des opinions philosophiques, touchant le vice et la vertu, c’est chose où il n’est besoing de s’estendre: et où il se trouue plusieurs aduis, qui valent mieux teus que publiez aux foibles esprits. Arcesilaus disoit n’estre considerable en la paillardise, de quel costé et par où on le fust. Et obscœnas voluptates, si natura requirit non genere, aut loco, aut ordine, sed forma, ætate, figura metiendas Epicurus putat. Ne amores quidem sanctos à sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. Quæramus ad quam vsque ætatem iuuenes amandi sint. Ces deux derniers lieux Stoïques, et sur ce propos, le reproche de Diogarchus à Platon mesme, montrent combien la plus saine philosophie souffre de licences esloignées de l’vsage commun, et excessiues.

    As for the freedom of philosophical opinions on vice and virtue, I need not enlarge on it; there are many views on it that are better kept quiet than published to weak minds. Arcesilaus said that in lechery it was of no importance from which side, or by which way, one was taken. And as for obscene pleasures, if nature requires them, Epicurus thinks they should be measured not by birth, place or rank, but by beauty, age and figure. Nor do they think holy loves are foreign to the wise man. Let us inquire up to what age young men may be loved. These last two Stoic passages, and on this subject the reproach of Dicaearchus to Plato himself, show how much excessive license, far removed from common practice, even the soundest philosophy allows.

    The Latin passages are from Cicero and Seneca. Dicaearchus was a pupil of Aristotle.

    Les loix prennent leur authorité de la possession et de l’vsage: il est dangereux de les ramener à leur naissance: elles grossissent et s’annoblissent en roulant, comme nos riuieres: suyuez les contremont iusques à leur source, ce n’est qu’vn petit surjon d’eau à peine recognoissable, qui s’enorgueillit ainsin, et se fortifie, en vieillissant. Voyez les anciennes considerations, qui ont donné le premier branle à ce fameux torrent, plein de dignité, d’horreur et de reuerence: vous les trouuerez si legeres et si delicates, que ces gens icy qui poisent tout, et le ramenent à la raison, et qui ne reçoiuent rien par authorité et à credit, il n’est pas merueille s’ils ont leurs iugements souuent tres-esloignez des iugemens publiques.

    Laws take their authority from possession and usage; it is dangerous to trace them back to their birth. They swell and grow nobler as they roll along, like our rivers: follow them upstream to their source, and it is only a little trickle of water, barely recognizable, that grows proud in this way and gathers strength as it ages. Look at the ancient considerations that gave the first push to this famous torrent, full of dignity, awe and reverence: you will find them so light and so flimsy that it is no wonder these people here, who weigh everything and bring it back to reason, and accept nothing on authority and on trust, often hold judgments very far from public ones.

    Gens qui prennent pour patron l’image premiere de Nature, il n’est pas merueille, si en la pluspart de leurs opinions, ils gauchissent la voye commune. Comme pour exemple: peu d’entre eux eussent approuué les conditions contrainctes de nos mariages: et la plus part ont voulu les femmes communes, et sans obligation. Ils refusoient nos ceremonies. Chrysippus disoit, qu’vn philosophe fera vne douzaine de culebutes en public, voire sans haut de chausses, pour vne douzaine d’oliues. A peine eust il donné aduis à Clisthenes de refuser la belle Agariste sa fille, à Hippoclides, pour luy auoir veu faire l’arbre fourché sur vne table.

    People who take as their model the original image of Nature—it is no wonder if in most of their opinions they swerve from the common path. For example, few of them would have approved of the constrained conditions of our marriages, and most of them wanted women to be held in common and without obligation. They rejected our ceremonies. Chrysippus said that a philosopher will turn a dozen somersaults in public, even without breeches, for a dozen olives. He would hardly have advised Cleisthenes to refuse his beautiful daughter Agariste to Hippocleides for having seen him stand on his head on a table.

    Herodotus tells how Hippocleides, the favored suitor, lost Agariste by dancing on his head on a table at the wedding feast.

    Metrocles lascha vn peu indiscretement vn pet en disputant, en presence de son eschole: et se tenoit en sa maison caché de honte, iusques à ce que Crates le fut visiter: et adioustant à ses consolations et raisons, l’exemple de sa liberté, se mettant à peter à l’enuy auec luy, il luy osta ce scrupule: et de plus, le retira à sa secte Stoïque, plus franche, de la secte Peripatetique plus ciuile, laquelle iusque lors il auoit suiuy. Ce que nous appellons honnesteté, de n’oser faire à descouuert, ce qui nous est honneste de faire à couuert, ils l’appelloient sottise: et de faire le fin à taire et desaduoüer ce que nature, coustume, et nostre desir publient et proclament de nos actions, ils l’estimoyent vice.

    Metrocles, while disputing in front of his school, rather indiscreetly let out a fart, and kept himself hidden at home for shame until Crates came to visit him. Crates added to his consolations and arguments the example of his own freedom, starting to fart in competition with him. In this way he rid Metrocles of his scruple, and moreover drew him over to his own Stoic sect, which was freer, from the Peripatetic sect, more polite, which he had followed until then. What we call decency—not daring to do openly what it is decent for us to do in private—they called foolishness. And to play the sly one by concealing and disowning what nature, custom and our desire publish and proclaim of our actions, they considered a vice.

    The story is told by Diogenes Laertius; Crates was in fact a Cynic.

    Et leur sembloit, que c’estoit affoller les mysteres de Venus, que de les oster du retiré sacraire de son temple, pour les exposer à la veuë du peuple: et que tirer ses jeux hors du rideau, c’estoit les perdre. C’est chose de poix, que la honte: la recelation, reseruation, circonscription, parties de l’estimation. Que la volupté tres ingenieusement faisoit instance, sous le masque de la vertu, de n’estre prostituée au milieu des quarrefours, foulée des pieds et des yeux de la commune, trouuant à dire la dignité et commodité de ses cabinets accoustumez.

    And it seemed to them that it was spoiling the mysteries of Venus to take them out of the secluded sanctuary of her temple and expose them to the people’s view, and that to bring her games out from behind the curtain was to ruin them. Shame is a weighty thing; concealment, reserve and limits are part of what gives a thing its value. It also seemed to them that pleasure, very cleverly, under the mask of virtue, pleaded not to be prostituted in the middle of the crossroads and trampled by the feet and eyes of the common people, since it missed the dignity and comfort of its usual private rooms.

    De là disent aucuns, que d’oster les bordels publiques, c’est non seulement espandre par tout la paillardise, qui estoit assignée à ce lieu là, mais encore esguillonner les hommes vagabonds et oisifs à ce vice, par la malaisance. Mœchus es Aufidiæ, qui vir, Coruine, fuisti; / Riualis fuerat qui tuus, ille vir est. / Cur aliena placet tibi, quæ tua non placet vxor? / Nunquid securus non potes arrigere? Cette experience se diuersifie en mille exemples. *Nullus in vrbe fuit tota, qui tangere vellet / Vxorem gratis Cæciliane tuam, / Dum licuit: sed nunc, positis custodibus, ingens / Turba fututorum est.

    Hence some say that abolishing public brothels not only spreads everywhere the lechery that was confined to those places, but also goads idle, wandering men into this vice by the very difficulty. You are Aufidia’s lover, Corvinus, you who were her husband; / The man who was your rival is now her husband. / Why does another man’s wife please you, when as your own she did not? / Is it that you cannot get an erection when you feel safe? This experience varies in a thousand examples. *There was no one in the whole city willing to touch / Your wife, Caecilianus, even for free, / As long as it was allowed; but now that you have set guards, a huge / Crowd of men is eager to bed her.

    Martial, Epigrams III.70 and I.73.

    Ingeniosus homo es.* On demanda à vn philosophe qu’on surprit à mesme, ce qu’il faisoit: il respondit tout froidement, Ie plante vn homme: ne rougissant non plus d’estre rencontré en cela, que si on l’eust trouué plantant des aulx.

    You are a clever man.* A philosopher who was caught in the act was asked what he was doing. He answered quite coolly, “I am planting a man,” blushing no more at being found at it than if he had been caught planting garlic.

    C’est, comme i’estime, d’vne opinion tendre, respectueuse, qu’vn grand et religieux autheur tient cette action, si necessairement obligée à l’occultation et à la vergongne, qu’en la licence des embrassements Cyniques, il ne se peut persuader, que la besoigne en vinst à sa fin: ains qu’elle s’arrestoit à representer des mouuements lascifs seulement, pour maintenir l’impudence de la profession de leur eschole: et que pour eslancer ce que la honte auoit contrainct et retiré, il leur estoit encore apres besoin de chercher l’ombre. Il n’auoit pas veu assez auant en leur desbauche. Car Diogenes exerçant en publiq sa masturbation, faisoit souhait en presence du peuple assistant, de pouuoir ainsi saouler son ventre en le frottant.

    It is, I believe, out of a tender and respectful opinion that a great and religious author holds this act to be so necessarily bound to concealment and shame that he cannot persuade himself that, in the license of the Cynics’ embraces, the business ever came to its end. He believes instead that it stopped at merely representing lascivious movements, to keep up the impudence their school professed, and that to release what shame had constrained and held back, they still needed afterwards to seek the shade. He had not looked far enough into their debauchery. For Diogenes, masturbating in public, expressed the wish, in front of the people standing around, that he could satisfy his belly in the same way by rubbing it.

    Saint Augustine, City of God XIV.20.

    A ceux qui luy demandoyent, pourquoy il ne cherchoit lieu plus commode à manger, qu’en pleine ruë: C’est, respondoit il, que i’ay faim en pleine ruë. Les femmes philosophes, qui se mesloyent à leur secte, se mesloyent aussi à leur personne, en tout lieu, sans discretion: et Hipparchia ne fut receuë en la societé de Crates, qu’en condition de suyure en toutes choses les vz et coustumes de sa regle. Ces philosophes icy donnoient extreme prix à la vertu: et refusoyent toutes autres disciplines que la morale: si est-ce qu’en toutes actions ils attribuoyent la souueraine authorité à l’election de leur sage, et au dessus des loix: et n’ordonnoyent aux voluptez autre bride, que la moderation, et la conseruation de la liberté d’autruy.

    To those who asked him why he did not look for a more convenient place to eat than the middle of the street, he replied: “Because I am hungry in the middle of the street.” The women philosophers who mingled with their sect also mingled with their persons, anywhere, without discretion; and Hipparchia was admitted into Crates’ company only on condition that she follow the usages and customs of his rule in all things. These philosophers set extreme value on virtue and rejected all disciplines other than ethics. Yet in all actions they gave sovereign authority to the choice of their wise man, even above the laws, and put no other bridle on pleasures than moderation and respect for the freedom of others.

    Hipparchia of Maroneia (4th century BC), Cynic philosopher and wife of Crates.

    Interpreting texts

    Any meaning can be drawn from a text, as Homer and Plato show.

    Heraclitus et Protagoras, de ce que le vin semble amer au malade, et gracieux au sain: l’auiron tortu dans l’eau, et droit à ceux qui le voyent hors de là: et de pareilles apparences contraires qui se trouuent aux subiects, argumenterent que tous subiects auoyent en eux les causes de ces apparences: et qu’il y auoit au vin quelque amertume, qui se rapportoit au goust du malade; l’auiron, certaine qualité courbe, se rapportant à celuy qui le regarde dans l’eau. Et ainsi de tout le reste. Qui est dire, que tout est en toutes choses, et par consequent rien en aucune: car rien n’est, où tout est.

    Heraclitus and Protagoras observed that wine seems bitter to the sick man and pleasant to the healthy one, that an oar looks bent in the water and straight to those who see it out of the water, and that similar contrary appearances are found in objects. From this they argued that all objects contained in themselves the causes of these appearances: that there was some bitterness in the wine that answered to the sick man’s taste, and in the oar a certain bent quality that answered to the person looking at it in the water. And so with all the rest. Which is to say that everything is in all things, and consequently nothing is in any; for nothing is where everything is.

    Cette opinion me ramentoit l’experience que nous auons, qu’il n’est aucun sens ny visage, ou droict, ou amer, ou doux, ou courbe, que l’esprit humain ne trouue aux escrits, qu’il entreprend de fouïller. En la parole la plus nette, pure, et parfaicte, qui puisse estre, combien de fauceté et de mensonge a lon faict naistre? quelle heresie n’y a trouué des fondements assez, et tesmoignages, pour entreprendre et pour se maintenir? C’est pour cela, que les autheurs de telles erreurs, ne se veulent iamais departir de cette preuue du tesmoignage de l’interpretation des mots.

    This opinion reminds me of what experience shows us: there is no sense or aspect, straight or bitter or sweet or bent, that the human mind does not find in the writings it sets out to dig into. In the clearest, purest and most perfect word there can be, how much falsehood and lying have people made to spring up? What heresy has not found in it foundations and testimonies enough to launch itself and keep itself going? That is why the authors of such errors never want to give up this proof by the testimony of the interpretation of words.

    Vn personnage de dignité, me voulant approuuer par authorité, cette queste de la pierre philosophale, où il est tout plongé: m’allegua dernierement cinq ou six passages de la Bible, sur lesquels, il disoit, s’estre premierement fondé pour la descharge de sa conscience: (car il est de profession ecclesiastique) et à la verité l’inuention n’en estoit pas seulement plaisante, mais encore bien proprement accommodée à la deffence de cette belle science.

    A person of rank, wanting to justify to me by authority this quest for the philosopher’s stone in which he is completely immersed, recently cited five or six passages of the Bible on which, he said, he had first based himself to clear his conscience (for he is a churchman by profession). And to tell the truth, the idea was not only amusing but also very aptly suited to the defense of that fine science.

    Par cette voye, se gaigne le credit des fables diuinatrices. Il n’est prognostiqueur, s’il a cette authorité, qu’on le daigne feuilleter, et rechercher curieusement tous les plis et lustres de ses paroles, à qui on ne face dire tout ce qu’on voudra, comme aux Sybilles. Il y a tant de moyens d’interpretation, qu’il est malaisé que de biais, ou de droit fil, vn esprit ingenieux ne rencontre en tout subiect, quelque air, qui luy serue à son poinct. Pourtant se trouue vn stile nubileux et doubteux, en si frequent et ancien vsage. Que l’autheur puisse gaigner cela, d’attirer et embesoigner à soy la posterité. Ce que non seulement la suffisance, mais autant, ou plus, la faueur fortuite de la matiere peut gaigner.

    This is how prophetic fables win credit. Take any prognosticator with enough authority that people deign to leaf through him and search carefully through all the folds and glints of his words: he can be made to say anything one likes, as with the Sibyls. There are so many ways of interpreting that it is hard for an ingenious mind not to find, on any subject, obliquely or straight on, some air that serves its purpose. That is why a cloudy and ambiguous style has been in such frequent and ancient use. Let the author only manage to attract posterity and keep it busy with him—something that not only ability but as much, or more, the fortuitous favor of the subject matter can achieve.

    Qu’au demeurant il se presente par bestise ou par finesse, vn peu obscurement et diuersement: ne luy chaille. Nombre d’esprits le belutants et secoüants, en exprimeront quantité de formes, ou selon, ou à costé, ou au contraire de la sienne, qui luy feront toutes honneur. Il se verra enrichi des moyens de ses disciples, comme les regents du Landit. C’est ce qui a faict valoir plusieurs choses de neant, qui a mis en credit plusieurs escrits, et chargé de toute sorte de matiere qu’on a voulu: vne mesme chose receuant mille et mille, et autant qu’il nous plaist d’images et considerations diuerses.

    For the rest, whether he presents himself somewhat obscurely and ambiguously out of stupidity or out of cunning, let him not care. Many minds sifting and shaking him will squeeze out a quantity of forms, in line with his own, or beside it, or contrary to it, and all of them will do him honor. He will find himself enriched by his disciples’ means, like the schoolmasters at the Lendit fair. This is what has given value to many worthless things, what has brought many writings into credit and loaded them with every kind of matter one wanted: one and the same thing receiving thousands upon thousands of different images and interpretations, as many as we please.

    The Lendit fair at Saint-Denis, near Paris, was the occasion on which students brought their masters their yearly fees.

    Est-il possible qu’Homere aye voulu dire tout ce qu’on luy fait dire: et qu’il se soit presté à tant et si diuerses figures, que les theologiens, legislateurs, capitaines, philosophes, toute sorte de gents, qui traittent sciences, pour diuersement et contrairement qu’ils les traittent, s’appuyent de luy, s’en rapportent à luy: Maistre general à touts offices, ouurages, et artisans: General Conseiller à toutes entreprises? Quiconque a eu besoing d’oracles et de predictions, en y a trouué pour son faict.

    Is it possible that Homer meant to say everything he is made to say, and that he lent himself to so many and such different shapes? Theologians, legislators, captains, philosophers, every sort of people who deal with the sciences, however differently and contrarily they treat them, lean on him and appeal to him: General Master of all offices, works and craftsmen; General Counselor in all undertakings. Whoever has needed oracles and predictions has found in him what suited his case.

    Vn personnage sçauant et de mes amis, c’est merueille quels rencontres et combien admirables il y faict naistre, en faueur de nostre religion: et ne se peut aysément departir de cette opinion, que ce ne soit le dessein d’Homere, (si luy est cet autheur aussi familier qu’à homme de nostre siecle). Et ce qu’il trouue en faueur de la nostre, plusieurs anciennement l’auoient trouué en faueur des leurs.

    A learned man, a friend of mine—it is a wonder what coincidences, and how admirable, he brings out of Homer in favor of our religion. He cannot easily be shaken from the opinion that this was Homer’s design (and yet he knows this author as well as any man of our century). And what he finds in favor of our religion, many in ancient times had found in favor of theirs.

    Voyez demener et agiter Platon, chacun s’honorant de l’appliquer à soy, le couche du costé qu’il le veut. On le promeine et l’insere à toutes les nouuelles opinions, que le monde reçoit: et le differente lon à soy-mesmes selon le different cours des choses. On fait desaduoüer à son sens, les mœurs licites en son siecle, d’autant qu’elles sont illicites au nostre. Tout cela, viuement et puissamment, autant qu’est puissant et vif l’esprit de l’interprete.

    See how Plato is tossed and turned about: everyone, honoring himself by applying Plato to himself, lays him on whatever side he wants. He is paraded about and inserted into all the new opinions the world takes up, and made to differ from himself according to the different course of things. His meaning is made to disavow morals that were lawful in his century, because they are unlawful in ours. All this is done vividly and powerfully, as powerfully and vividly as the interpreter’s mind allows.

    Sur ce mesme fondement qu’auoit Heraclitus, et cette sienne sentence, Que toutes choses auoyent en elles les visages qu’on y trouuoit, Democritus en tiroit vne toute contraire conclusion: c’est que les subiects n’auoient du tout rien de ce que nous y trouuions: et de ce que le miel estoit doux à l’vn, et amer à l’autre, il argumentoit, qu’il n’estoit ny doux, ny amer. Les Pyrrhoniens diroient qu’ils ne sçauent s’il est doux ou amer, ou ny l’vn ny l’autre, ou tous les deux: car ceux-cy gaignent tousiours le haut poinct de la dubitation.

    From the same foundation as Heraclitus, and from that maxim of his that all things had in them the aspects people found in them, Democritus drew an entirely contrary conclusion: that objects had absolutely nothing of what we found in them. Because honey was sweet to one person and bitter to another, he argued that it was neither sweet nor bitter. The Pyrrhonists would say that they do not know whether it is sweet or bitter, or neither, or both; for they always reach the highest point of doubt.

    Les Cyrenayens tenoyent, que rien n’estoit perceptible par le dehors, et que cela estoit seulement perceptible, qui nous touchoit par l’interne attouchement, comme la douleur et la volupté: ne recognoissants ny ton, ny couleur, mais certaines affections seulement, qui nous en venoyent: et que l’homme n’auoit autre siege de son iugement. Protagoras estimoit estre vray à chacun, ce qui semble à chacun. Les Epicuriens logent aux sens tout iugement, et en la notice des choses, et en la volupté. Platon a voulu, le iugement de la verité, et la verité mesme retirée des opinions et des sens, appartenir à l’esprit et à la cogitation.

    The Cyrenaics held that nothing was perceptible from outside, and that only what touched us by internal contact was perceptible, such as pain and pleasure. They recognized neither sound nor color, but only certain affections that came to us from them, and they held that man had no other seat for his judgment. Protagoras thought that whatever seems true to each man is true for him. The Epicureans place all judgment in the senses, both in the knowledge of things and in pleasure. Plato wanted the judgment of truth, and truth itself, withdrawn from opinions and from the senses, to belong to the mind and to thought.

    The senses

    All knowledge comes through the senses, which may be too few and are easily deceived.

    Ce propos m’a porté sur la consideration des sens, ausquels git le plus grand fondement et preuue de nostre ignorance. Tout ce qui se cognoist, il se cognoist sans doubte par la faculté du cognoissant: car puis que le iugement vient de l’operation de celuy qui iuge, c’est raison que cette operation il la parface par ses moyens et volonté, non par la contraincte d’autruy: comme il aduiendroit, si nous cognoissions les choses par la force et selon la loy de leur essence. Or toute cognoissance s’achemine en nous par les sens, ce sont nos maistres: Via qua munita fidei / Proxima fert humanum in pectus, templáque mentis. La science commence par eux, et se resout en eux.

    This discussion has brought me to consider the senses, in which lies the greatest foundation and proof of our ignorance. Whatever is known is undoubtedly known through the faculty of the knower. For since judgment comes from the operation of the one who judges, it stands to reason that he carries out this operation by his own means and will, not under constraint from something else—as would happen if we knew things by the force and according to the law of their essence. Now all knowledge makes its way into us through the senses; they are our masters: The paved road by which belief / Most directly enters the human heart and the temples of the mind. Knowledge begins with them and is resolved into them.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.

    Apres tout, nous ne sçaurions non plus qu’vne pierre, si nous ne sçauions, qu’il y a son, odeur, lumiere, faueur, mesure, poix, mollesse, durté, aspreté, couleur, polisseure, largeur, profondeur. Voyla le plant et les principes de tout le bastiment de nostre science. Et selon aucuns, science n’est rien autre chose, que sentiment. Quiconque me peut pousser à contredire les sens, il me tient à la gorge, il ne me sçauroit faire reculer plus arriere. Les sens sont le commencement et la fin de l’humaine cognoissance. *Inuenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam / Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli.

    After all, we would know no more than a stone if we did not know that there are sound, smell, light, taste, measure, weight, softness, hardness, roughness, color, smoothness, breadth and depth. There you have the ground plan and the principles of the whole edifice of our knowledge. And according to some, knowledge is nothing but sensation. Whoever can push me into contradicting the senses has me by the throat; he could not drive me back any farther. The senses are the beginning and the end of human knowledge. *You will find that the notion of truth was first created / By the senses, and that the senses cannot be refuted.

    / Quid maiore fide porro quàm sensus haberi / Debet?* Qu’on leur attribue le moins qu’on pourra, tousiours faudra il leur donner cela, que par leur voye et entremise s’achemine toute nostre instruction. Cicero dit que Chrysippus ayant essayé de rabattre de la force des sens et de leur vertu, se representa à soy-mesmes des argumens au contraire, et des oppositions si vehementes, qu’il n’y peut satisfaire. Surquoy Carneades, qui maintenoit le contraire party, se vantoit de se seruir des armes mesmes et paroles de Chrysippus, pour le combattre: et s’escrioit à cette cause contre luy: O miserable, ta force t’a perdu.

    / What, then, should be held more worthy of belief / Than the senses?* However little we may grant them, we must always grant them this: all our learning makes its way through their channel and mediation. Cicero says that Chrysippus, having tried to reduce the force and power of the senses, put to himself arguments to the contrary and objections so vehement that he could not answer them. Whereupon Carneades, who maintained the opposite side, boasted of using Chrysippus’ very weapons and words to fight him, and so cried out against him: “Wretch, your own strength has undone you.”

    Il n’est aucun absurde, selon nous, plus extreme, que de maintenir que le feu n’eschauffe point, que la lumiere n’esclaire point, qu’il n’y a point de pesanteur au fer, ny de fermeté, qui sont notices que nous apportent les sens; ny creance, ou science en l’homme, qui se puisse comparer à celle-là en certitude.

    There is no absurdity, in our view, more extreme than to maintain that fire does not heat, that light does not illuminate, that there is no weight or solidity in iron—notions the senses bring us; nor is there any belief or knowledge in man that can compare with these in certainty.

    La premiere consideration que i’ay sur le subiect des sens, est que ie mets en doubte que l’homme soit prouueu de tous sens naturels. Ie voy plusieurs animaux, qui viuent vne vie entiere et parfaicte, les vns sans la veuë, autres sans l’ouye: qui sçait si à nous aussi il ne manque pas encore vn, deux, trois, et plusieurs autres sens? Car s’il en manque quelqu’vn, nostre discours n’en peut découurir le défaut. C’est le priuilege des sens, d’être l’extreme borne de nostre aperceuance. Il n’y a rien au delà d’eux, qui nous puisse seruir à les descouurir: voire ny l’vn sens n’en peut descouurir l’autre.

    My first consideration on the subject of the senses is that I doubt whether man is provided with all the natural senses. I see many animals that live a complete and perfect life, some without sight, others without hearing. Who knows whether we too may not still lack one, two, three or many other senses? For if we lack one, our reason cannot discover the lack. It is the privilege of the senses to be the outermost limit of our perception. There is nothing beyond them that can help us discover them; indeed, not even one sense can discover another.

    An poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an aures / Tactus, an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris, / An confutabunt nares, oculiue reuincent? Ils font trestous, la ligne extreme de nostre faculté. Seorsum cuique potestas / Diuisa est, sua vis cuique est. Il est impossible de faire conceuoir à vn homme naturellement aueugle, qu’il n’y void pas, impossible de luy faire desirer la veuë et regretter son defaut. Parquoy, nous ne deuons prendre aucune asseurance de ce que nostre ame est contente et satisfaicte de ceux que nous auons: veu qu’elle n’a pas dequoy sentir en cela sa maladie et son imperfection, si elle y est.

    Can the ears correct the eyes, or touch / Correct the ears? Or will the taste of the mouth refute this touch, / Or will the nose confute it, or the eyes overturn it? Every one of them marks the outermost line of our faculty. Each has its own separate power, / Each its own force. It is impossible to make a man born blind conceive that he does not see; impossible to make him desire sight and regret its absence. Therefore we should take no assurance from the fact that our soul is content and satisfied with the senses we have, since it has no means of feeling its sickness and imperfection in this respect, if there is any.

    Il est impossible de dire chose à cet aueugle, par discours, argument, ny similitude, qui loge en son imagination aucune apprehension, de lumiere, de couleur, et de veuë. Il n’y a rien plus arriere, qui puisse pousser le sens en euidence. Les aueugles nais, qu’on void desirer à voir, ce n’est pas pour entendre ce qu’ils demandent: ils ont appris de nous, qu’ils ont à dire quelque chose, qu’ils ont quelque chose à desirer, qui est en nous, laquelle ils nomment bien, et ses effects et consequences: mais ils ne sçauent pourtant pas que c’est, ny ne l’apprehendent ny pres ny loing.

    It is impossible to tell this blind man anything, by reasoning, argument or comparison, that will lodge in his imagination any apprehension of light, color or sight. There is nothing further back that can bring the sense into evidence. As for those born blind whom we see wishing they could see, it is not because they understand what they are asking for. They have learned from us that they lack something, that there is something in us for them to desire. They name it well enough, along with its effects and consequences; but they still do not know what it is, and do not grasp it, either closely or from afar.

    I’ay veu vn Gentil-homme de bonne maison, aueugle nay, aumoins aueugle de tel aage, qu’il ne sçait que c’est que de veuë: il entend si peu ce qui luy manque, qu’il vse et se sert comme nous, des paroles propres au voir, et les applique d’vne mode toute sienne et particuliere. On luy presentoit vn enfant duquel il estoit parrain, l’ayant pris entre ses bras: Mon Dieu, dit-il, le bel enfant, qu’il le fait beau voir, qu’il a le visage gay. Il dira comme l’vn d’entre nous, Cette sale a vne belle veuë, il fait clair, il fait beau soleil.

    I have seen a gentleman of good family who was born blind, or at least blind from such an early age that he does not know what sight is. He understands so little what he lacks that he uses words that belong to seeing just as we do, and applies them in a way entirely his own. When they presented him with a child to whom he was godfather, he took it in his arms and said: “My God, what a beautiful child! How lovely it is to see! What a cheerful face he has!” He will say, like any one of us: “This room has a fine view”; “It is bright”; “The sun is shining beautifully.”

    Il y a plus: car par ce que ce sont nos exercices que la chasse, la paume, la bute, et qu’il l’a ouy dire, il s’y affectionne et s’y embesoigne: et croid y auoir la mesme part, que nous y auons: il s’y picque et s’y plaist, et ne les reçoit pourtant que par les oreilles. On luy crie, que voyla vn liéure, quand on est en quelque belle splanade, où il puisse picquer: et puis on luy dit encore, que voyla vn lieure pris: le voyla aussi fier de sa prise, comme il oit dire aux autres, qu’ils le sont.

    There is more. Because hunting, tennis and target shooting are our pastimes, and he has heard about them, he grows fond of them and takes part in them, and believes he has the same share in them that we have. He gets keen and takes pleasure in them, and yet he receives them only through his ears. Someone shouts to him that there is a hare, when they are on some fine open ground where he can spur his horse on; and then they tell him that the hare has been caught, and there he is, as proud of his catch as he hears others say they are.

    L’esteuf, il le prend à la main gauche, et le pousse à tout sa raquette: de la harquebouse, il en tire à l’aduenture, et se paye de ce que ses gens luy disent, qu’il est ou haut, ou costier.

    He takes the ball in his left hand and strikes it with his racket; he fires the arquebus at random, and is satisfied when his people tell him he has shot high or wide.

    Que sçait-on si le genre humain fait vne sottise pareille, à faute de quelque sens, et que par ce defaut, la plus part du visage des choses nous soit caché? Que sçait-on, si les difficultez que nous trouuons en plusieurs ouurages de Nature, viennent de là? et si plusieurs effets des animaux qui excedent nostre capacité, sont produicts par la faculté de quelque sens, que nous ayons à dire? et si aucuns d’entre eux ont vne vie plus pleine par ce moyen, et entiere que la nostre?

    How do we know that the human race is not committing a similar folly for lack of some sense, and that through this defect most of the face of things is not hidden from us? How do we know whether the difficulties we find in many works of Nature come from this? Or whether many feats of animals that exceed our capacity are produced by the faculty of some sense we lack? Or whether some of them have, by this means, a fuller and more complete life than ours?

    Nous saisissons la pomme quasi par tous nos sens: nous y trouuons de la rougeur, de la polisseure, de l’odeur et de la douceur: outre cela, elle peut auoir d’autres vertus, comme d’asseicher ou restreindre, ausquelles nous n’auons point de sens qui se puisse rapporter. Les proprietez que nous appellons occultes en plusieurs choses, comme à l’aymant d’attirer le fer, n’est-il pas vraysemblable qu’il y a des facultez sensitiues en Nature propres à les iuger et à les apperceuoir, et que le defaut de telles facultez, nous apporte l’ignorance de la vraye essence de telles choses?

    We grasp the apple with almost all our senses: we find in it redness, smoothness, smell and sweetness. Beyond that, it may have other properties, such as drying or binding, to which no sense we have can correspond. As for the properties we call occult in many things, such as the magnet’s power to attract iron, is it not likely that there are sensory faculties in Nature suited to judge and perceive them, and that our lack of such faculties leaves us ignorant of the true essence of such things?

    C’est à l’auanture quelque sens particulier, qui descouure aux coqs l’heure du matin et de minuict, et les esmeut à chanter: qui apprend aux poulles, avaut tout vsage et experience, de craindre vn esparuier, et non vne oye, ny vn paon, plus grandes bestes: qui aduertit les poulets de la qualité hostile, qui est au chat contr’eux, et à ne se deffier du chien: s’armer contre le miaulement, voix aucunement flatteuse, non contre l’abayer, voix aspre et quereleuse. Aux freslons, aux formis, et aux rats, de choisir tousiours le meilleur formage et la meilleure poire, auant que d’y auoir tasté, et qui achemine le cerf, l’elephant et le serpent à la cognoissance de certaine herbe propre à leur guerison.

    Perhaps it is some particular sense that reveals to roosters the hour of morning and of midnight and moves them to crow. Perhaps such a sense teaches hens, before any practice or experience, to fear a sparrowhawk and not a goose or a peacock, which are larger creatures. It may warn chicks of the hostility the cat bears them, and teach them not to distrust the dog—to arm themselves against the mewing, a rather flattering voice, and not against the barking, a harsh and quarrelsome one. It may teach hornets, ants and rats always to choose the best cheese and the best pear before having tasted them, and lead the stag, the elephant and the snake to know a certain herb fit to heal them.

    Il n’y a sens, qui n’ait vne grande domination, et qui n’apporte par son moyen vn nombre infiny de cognoissances. Si nous auions à dire l’intelligence des sons, de l’harmonie, et de la voix, cela apporteroit vne confusion inimaginable à tout le reste de nostre science. Car outre ce qui est attaché au propre effect de chaque sens, combien d’argumens, de consequences, et de conclusions tirons nous aux autres choses par la comparaison de l’vn sens à l’autre?

    There is no sense that does not hold great sway, and that does not bring us, by its means, an infinite number of pieces of knowledge. If we lacked the understanding of sounds, of harmony and of the voice, it would bring unimaginable confusion into all the rest of our knowledge. For besides what is bound up with the proper effect of each sense, how many arguments, inferences and conclusions do we draw about other things by comparing one sense with another?

    Qu’vn homme entendu, imagine l’humaine nature produicte originellement sans la veuë, et discoure combien d’ignorance et de trouble luy apporteroit vn tel defaut, combien de tenebres et d’aueuglement en nostre ame: on verra par là, combien nous importe, à la cognoissance de la verité, la priuation d’vn autre tel sens, ou de deux, ou de trois, si elle est en nous. Nous auons formé vne verité par la consultation et concurrence de nos cinq sens: mais à l’aduenture falloit-il l’accord de huict, ou de dix sens, et leur contribution, pour l’apperceuoir certainement et en son essence.

    Let an intelligent man imagine human nature produced originally without sight. Let him work out how much ignorance and confusion such a lack would bring it, how much darkness and blindness in our soul. From that we shall see how much it matters to our knowledge of the truth to be deprived of another such sense, or of two, or of three, if we are. We have formed a truth by the consultation and concurrence of our five senses. But perhaps it would take the agreement and contribution of eight or ten senses to perceive it with certainty and in its essence.

    Les sectes qui combatent la science de l’homme, elles la combatent principalement par l’incertitude et foiblesse de nos sens. Car puis que toute cognoissance vient en nous par leur entremise et moyen, s’ils faillent au rapport qu’ils nous font, s’ils corrompent ou alterent ce, qu’ils nous charrient du dehors, si la lumiere qui par eux s’écoule en nostre ame est obscurcie au passage, nous n’auons plus que tenir.

    The sects that attack human knowledge attack it chiefly through the uncertainty and weakness of our senses. For all knowledge comes into us by their agency and means. So if they fail in the report they give us, if they corrupt or alter what they carry in to us from outside, if the light that flows through them into our soul is darkened on the way, we have nothing left to hold on to.

    De cette extreme difficulté sont nées toutes ces fantasies: que chaque subiect a en soy tout ce que nous y trouuons: qu’il n’a rien de ce que nous y pensons trouuer: et celle des Epicuriens, que le soleil n’est non plus grand que ce que nostre veuë le iuge: Quicquid id est, nihilo fertur maiore figura, / Quàm, nostris oculis quam cernimus, esse videtur: que les apparences, qui representent vn corps grand, à celuy qui en est voisin, et plus petit, à celuy qui en est esloigné, sont toutes deux vrayes: Nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum; / Proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli: et resolument qu’il n’y a aucune tromperie aux sens: qu’il faut passer à leur mercy, et chercher ailleurs des raisons pour excuser la difference et contradiction que nous y trouuons.

    From this extreme difficulty have arisen all these notions: that each object has in itself everything we find in it; that it has nothing of what we think we find in it; and the notion of the Epicureans, that the sun is no bigger than our sight judges it to be: Whatever it is, it moves with no greater shape / Than it seems to have to our eyes that see it: that the appearances that show a body as large to someone near it, and as smaller to someone far from it, are both true: Yet we do not grant that the eyes are deceived one whit; / So do not pin this fault of the mind on the eyes: and, resolutely, that there is no deception at all in the senses; that we must put ourselves at their mercy, and look elsewhere for reasons to excuse the difference and contradiction we find in them.

    Voyre inuenter toute autre mensonge et resuerie (ils en viennent iusques là) plustost que d’accuser les sens. Timagoras iuroit, que pour presser ou biaiser son œuil, il n’auoit iamais apperceu doubler la lumiere de la chandelle: et que cette semblance venoit du vice de l’opinion, non de l’instrument. De toutes les absurditez la plus absurde aux Epicuriens, est, desauoüer la force et l’effect des sens. *Proinde quod in quoque est his visum tempore, verum est.

    Indeed, they would invent any other lie or fantasy whatever (they go that far) rather than accuse the senses. Timagoras swore that, however he pressed or twisted his eye, he had never seen the candle’s light double, and that this appearance came from a fault of opinion, not of the instrument. Of all absurdities, the most absurd for the Epicureans is to deny the force and effect of the senses. *Therefore whatever is seen by them at any time is true.

    Timagoras: an Epicurean philosopher mentioned by Cicero in the Academica.

    / Et, si non potuit ratio dissoluere causam, / Cur ea quæ fuerint iuxtim quadrata, procul sint / Visa rotunda: tamen præstat rationis egentem / Reddere mendosè causas vtriusque figuræ, / Quàm manibus manifesta suis emittere quæquam, / Et violare fidem primam, et conuellere tota / Fundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salúsque.

    / And if reason cannot unravel the cause / Why things that were square close at hand / Seem round from afar, still it is better, for want of reason, / To give faulty causes for each of the two shapes / Than to let slip from our hands things plain to see, / And violate our first trust, and tear up all / The foundations on which life and safety rest.

    / Non modò enim ratio ruat omnis, vita quoque ipsa / Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis, / Præcipitésque locos vitare, et cætera quæ sint / In genere hoc fugienda.* Ce conseil desesperé et si peu philosophique, ne represente autre chose, sinon que l’humaine science ne se peut maintenir que par raison des-raisonnable, folle et forcenée: mais qu’encore vaut-il mieux, que l’homme, pour se faire valoir, s’en serue, et de tout autre remede, tant fantastique soit-il, que d’aduoüer sa necessaire bestise: verité si desaduantageuse. Il ne peut fuïr, que les sens ne soyent les souuerains maistres de sa cognoissance: mais ils sont incertains et falsifiables à toutes circonstances.

    / For not only would all reason collapse; life itself / Would fall at once, unless you dared to trust the senses / And shun steep places and the other things / Of this kind that must be avoided.* This desperate and so unphilosophical advice amounts to nothing but this: that human knowledge can only maintain itself by unreasonable, mad and frenzied reason. But even so, it is better for man, in order to make himself count for something, to use that reason, and any other remedy however fantastic, than to admit his necessary stupidity—a truth so much to his disadvantage. He cannot escape the fact that the senses are the sovereign masters of his knowledge; but they are uncertain and open to falsification in every circumstance.

    C’est-là, où il faut battre à outrance: et, si les forces iustes nous faillent, comme elles font, y employer l’opiniastreté, la temerité, l’impudence. Au cas, que ce que disent les Epicuriens soit vray, à sçauoir, que nous n’auons pas de science, si les apparences des sens sont fauces: et ce que disent les Stoïciens, s’il est aussi vray, que les apparences des sens sont si fauces qu’elles ne nous peuuent produire aucune science: nous concluerons aux despens de ces deux grandes sectes dogmatistes, qu’il n’y a point de science.

    That is the point where we must strike with all our might, and, if legitimate strength fails us, as it does, bring in stubbornness, rashness and impudence. Suppose what the Epicureans say is true, namely that we have no knowledge if the appearances of the senses are false; and suppose what the Stoics say is also true, that the appearances of the senses are so false that they cannot produce any knowledge for us. Then we shall conclude, at the expense of these two great dogmatist sects, that there is no knowledge.

    Quant à l’erreur et incertitude de l’operation des sens, chacun s’en peut fournir autant d’exemples qu’il luy plaira: tant les faultes et tromperies qu’ils nous font, sont ordinaires. Au retentir d’vn valon, le son d’vne trompette semble venir deuant nous, qui vient d’vne lieuë derriere. *Extantésque procul medio de gurgite montes, / Iïdem apparent, longè diuersi licet. / Et fugere ad puppim colles campique videntur / Quos agimus propter nauim.

    As for the error and uncertainty in the working of the senses, anyone can furnish himself with as many examples as he likes, so common are the faults and deceptions they practice on us. When a valley echoes, the sound of a trumpet seems to come from in front of us when it comes from a league behind. *And mountains rising far off from the middle of the sea / Appear as one, though they are far apart. / And the hills and plains seem to flee toward the stern / As we drive our ship past them.

    / Vbi in medio nobis equus acer obhæsit / Flumine, equi corpus transuersum ferre videtur / Vis, et in aduersum flumen contrudere raptim.* A manier vne balle d’arquebuse, soubs le second doigt, celuy du milieu estant entrelassé par dessus, il faut extremement se contraindre, pour aduoüer, qu’il n’y en ait qu’vne, tant le sens nous en represente deux. Car que les sens soyent maintesfois maistres du discours, et le contraignent de receuoir des impressions qu’il sçait et iuge estre faulces, il se void à tous coups.

    / When our spirited horse has stuck fast in midstream, / A force seems to carry the horse’s body sideways / And to thrust it swiftly upstream.* If you handle an arquebus ball under your forefinger, with the middle finger crossed over it, you have to strain yourself extremely to admit that there is only one, so strongly does the sense show us two. For that the senses are often masters of our reasoning, and force it to receive impressions it knows and judges to be false, is seen at every turn.

    Ie laisse à part celuy de l’attouchement, qui a ses functions plus voisines, plus viues et substantielles, qui renuerse tant de fois par l’effect de la douleur qu’il apporte au corps, toutes ces belles resolutions Stoïques, et contraint de crier au ventre, celuy qui a estably en son ame ce dogme auec toute resolution, que la colique, comme toute autre maladie et douleur, est chose indifferente, n’ayant la force de rien rabbattre du souuerain bon-heur et felicité, en laquelle le sage est logé par sa vertu.

    I leave aside the sense of touch, whose functions are closer, more lively and substantial. By the effect of the pain it brings the body it so often overturns all those fine Stoic resolutions. It forces a man to cry out over his belly—a man who has established in his soul, with all resolution, the dogma that colic, like every other illness and pain, is a matter of indifference, having no power to diminish in any way the sovereign happiness and felicity in which the wise man is lodged by his virtue.

    Il n’est cœur si mol, que le son de nos tabourins et de nos trompettes n’eschauffe, ny si dur que la douceur de la musique n’esueille et ne chatouille: ny ame si reuesche, qui ne se sente touchée de quelque reuerence, à considerer cette vastité sombre de noz eglises, la diuersité d’ornemens, et ordre de noz ceremonies, et ouyr le son deuotieux de noz orgues, et l’harmonie si posée, et religieuse de noz voix. Ceux mesme qui y entrent auec mespris, sentent quelque frisson dans le cœur, et quelque horreur, qui les met en deffiance de leur opinion.

    There is no heart so soft that the sound of our drums and trumpets does not fire it, nor so hard that the sweetness of music does not rouse and tickle it. There is no soul so crabbed that it does not feel touched by some reverence as it considers the dark vastness of our churches, the variety of ornaments and the order of our ceremonies, and hears the devout sound of our organs and the so composed and religious harmony of our voices. Even those who enter with contempt feel a certain shiver in the heart, and a certain awe, which makes them distrust their own opinion.

    Quant à moy, ie ne m’estime point assez fort, pour ouyr en sens rassis, des vers d’Horace, et de Catulle, chantez d’vne voix suffisante, par vne belle et ieune bouche. Et Zenon auoit raison de dire, que la voix estoit la fleur de la beauté. On m’a voulu faire accroire, qu’vn homme que tous nous autres François cognoissons, m’auoit imposé, en me recitant des vers, qu’il auoit faicts: qu’ils n’estoyent pas tels sur le papier, qu’en l’air: et que mes yeux en feroyent contraire iugement à mes oreilles: tant la prononciation a de credit à donner prix et façon aux ouurages, qui passent à sa mercy.

    As for me, I do not reckon myself strong enough to hear verses of Horace and Catullus sung in an accomplished voice by a lovely young mouth and keep a level head. And Zeno was right to say that the voice was the flower of beauty. Someone once tried to make me believe that a man whom all of us French know had taken me in by reciting to me verses he had written; that they were not the same on paper as in the air; and that my eyes would judge them otherwise than my ears had. So much credit has delivery in giving value and shape to the works that pass into its hands.

    Surquoy Philoxenus ne fut pas fascheux, en ce, qu’oyant vn, donner mauuais ton à quelque sienne composition, il se print à fouler aux pieds, et casser de la brique, qui estoit à luy: disant, Ie romps ce qui est à toy, comme tu corromps ce qui est à moy. A quoy faire, ceux mesmes qui se sont donnez la mort d’vne certaine resolution, destournoyent-ils la face, pour ne voir le coup qu’ils se faisoyent donner? et ceux qui pour leur santé desirent et commandent qu’on les incise et cauterise, ne peuuent soustenir la veuë des apprests, vtils et operation du chirurgien, attendu que la veuë ne doit auoir aucune participation à cette douleur?

    On which point Philoxenus was not being unreasonable when, hearing someone give a bad tone to one of his compositions, he began trampling and breaking some bricks that belonged to the man, saying: “I am breaking what is yours, as you are spoiling what is mine.” Why did even those who put themselves to death with firm resolution turn their faces away so as not to see the blow they were having dealt them? And why can those who for their health desire and order that they be cut and cauterized not bear the sight of the surgeon’s preparations, instruments and operation, given that sight is to have no share in that pain?

    Philoxenus: Greek dithyrambic poet (c. 435–380 BC).

    Cela ne sont ce pas propres exemples à verifier l’authorité que les sens ont sur le discours? Nous auons beau sçauoir que ces tresses sont empruntées d’vn page ou d’vn lacquais: que cette rougeur est venue d’Espaigne, et cette blancheur et polisseure, de la mer Oceane: encore faut-il que la veuë nous force d’en trouuer le subject plus aimable et plus agreable, contre toute raison. Car en cela il n’y a rien du sien. *Auferimur cultu, gemmis: auróque teguntur / Crimina, pars minima est ipsa puella sui.

    Are these not apt examples to prove the authority the senses have over reasoning? It is no use our knowing that these tresses were borrowed from a page or a lackey, that this rosiness came from Spain, and this whiteness and smoothness from the Ocean sea: our sight still forces us to find their owner more lovable and more pleasing, against all reason. For in all this there is nothing of her own. *We are carried away by finery; gems and gold cover / Faults; the girl herself is the smallest part of herself.

    / Sæpe vbi sit quod ames inter tam multa requiras: / Decipit hac oculos ægide, diues amor. Combien donnent à la force des sens les poëtes, qui font Narcisse esperdu de l’amour de son ombre: Cunctáque miratur, quibus est mirabilis ipse; / Se cupit imprudens; et qui probat, ipse probatur; / Dûmque petit, petitur: paritérque accendit et ardent: et l’entendement de Pygmalion si troublé par l’impression de la veuë de sa statue d’iuoire, qu’il l’aime et la serue pour viue: Oscula dat reddique putat, sequitúrque tenétque, / Et credit tactis digitos infidere membris, / Et metuit pressos veniat ne liuor in artus.*

    / Often you must search, amid so much, for where the thing you love is: / With this aegis rich Love deceives the eyes. How much the poets grant to the power of the senses when they make Narcissus distraught with love for his reflection: He admires everything for which he himself is admired; / Unwittingly he desires himself; he who approves is himself approved; / While he seeks, he is sought; he kindles and burns at once: and Pygmalion’s understanding so disturbed by the impression the sight of his ivory statue makes on him that he loves it and serves it as if it were alive: He gives it kisses and thinks they are returned; he pursues it and holds it, / And believes his fingers sink into the limbs he touches, / And fears a bruise may appear on the limbs he presses.*

    Qu’on loge vn philosophe dans vne cage de menus filets de fer clair-semez, qui soit suspendue au hault des tours nostre Dame de Paris; il verra par raison euidente, qu’il est impossible qu’il en tombe; et si ne se sçauroit garder, s’il n’a accoustumé le mestier des couureurs, que la veuë de cette haulteur extreme, ne l’espouuante et ne le transisse. Car nous auons assez affaire de nous asseurer aux galeries, qui sont en nos clochers, si elles sont façonnées à iour, encores qu’elles soyent de pierre. Il y en a qui n’en peuuent pas seulement porter la pensée.

    Put a philosopher in a cage made of thin, widely spaced iron bars, and hang it from the top of the towers of Notre-Dame in Paris. He will see by evident reason that it is impossible for him to fall out of it; and yet, unless he is used to the roofer’s trade, he could not keep the sight of that extreme height from terrifying and paralyzing him. For we have quite enough trouble feeling safe in the galleries of our bell towers if they are of openwork, even though they are made of stone. There are some who cannot even bear the thought of it.

    Qu’on iette vne poultre entre ces deux tours d’vne grosseur telle qu’il nous la faut à nous promener dessus, il n’y a sagesse philosophique de si grande fermeté, qui puisse nous donner courage d’y marcher, comme nous ferions si elle estoit à terre. I’ay souuent essayé cela, en noz montaignes de deça, et si suis de ceux qui ne s’effrayent que mediocrement de telles choses, que ie ne pouuoy souffrir la veuë de cette profondeur infinie, sans horreur et tremblement de iarrets et de cuisses, encores qu’il s’en fallust bien ma longueur, que ie ne fusse du tout au bord, et n’eusse sçeu choir, si ie ne me fusse porté à escient au danger.

    Lay a beam between those two towers, as wide as we need to walk on it: there is no philosophical wisdom so firm that it could give us the courage to walk along it as we would if it were on the ground. I have often tried this in our mountains hereabouts. And yet, though I am one of those who are only moderately frightened by such things, I could not bear the sight of that infinite depth without horror and trembling in my hams and thighs—even though I was a good full body’s length from the very edge, and could not have fallen unless I had deliberately put myself in danger.

    I’y remarquay aussi, quelque haulteur qu’il y eust, pourueu qu’en cette pente il s’y presentast vn arbre, ou bosse de rocher, pour soustenir vn peu la veuë, et la diuiser, que cela nous allege et donne asseurance; comme si c’estoit chose dequoy à la cheute nous peussions receuoir secours: mais que les precipices coupez et vniz, nous ne les pouuons pas seulement regarder sans tournoyement de teste: vt despici sine vertigine simul oculornm animique non possit: qui est vne euidente imposture de la veuë. Ce fut pourquoy ce beau philosophe se creua les yeux, pour descharger l’ame de la desbauche qu’elle en receuoit, et pouuoir philosopher plus en liberté.

    I also noticed there that, however great the height, provided some tree or jutting rock appeared on the slope to support the eye a little and break up the view, this relieves us and gives us confidence, as if it were something that could help us when we fell. But sheer, smooth precipices we cannot even look at without our heads spinning: so that one cannot look down without dizziness of eyes and mind alike: which is an evident imposture of sight. That was why that fine philosopher put out his eyes: to free his soul of the debauchery it received from them, and to be able to philosophize more freely.

    The Latin is from Livy. The philosopher is Democritus, who according to legend blinded himself to think more freely.

    Mais à ce comte, il se deuoit aussi faire estoupper les oreilles, que Theophrastus dit estre le plus dangereux instrument que nous ayons pour receuoir des impressions violentes à nous troubler et changer; et se deuoit priuer en fin de tous les autres sens; c’est à dire de son estre et de sa vie. Car ils ont tous cette puissance, de commander nostre discours et nostre ame. Fit etiam sæpe specie quadam, sæpe vocum grauitate et cantibus, vt pellantur animi vehementius: sæpe etiam cura et timore. Les medecins tiennent, qu’il y a certaines complexions, qui s’agitent par aucuns sons et instrumens iusques à la fureur.

    But by that reckoning he should also have had his ears stopped, which Theophrastus says are the most dangerous instrument we have for receiving violent impressions that disturb and change us; and in the end he should have deprived himself of all the other senses too—that is to say, of his being and his life. For they all have this power of commanding our reasoning and our soul. It also often happens that minds are stirred more powerfully by some sight, often by the gravity of voices and by songs; often too by care and fear. Physicians hold that there are certain constitutions which are agitated to the point of frenzy by certain sounds and instruments.

    Theophrastus (c. 371–287 BC), Aristotle’s successor as head of his school. The Latin is from Cicero, On Divination.

    I’en ay veu, qui ne pouuoient ouyr ronger vn os soubs leur table sans perdre patience: et n’est guere homme, qui ne se trouble à ce bruit aigre et poignant, que font les limes en raclant le fer: comme à ouyr mascher pres de nous, ou ouyr parler quelqu’vn, qui ayt le passage du gosier ou du nez empesché, plusieurs s’en esmeuuent, iusques à la colere et la haine. Ce flusteur protocole de Gracchus, qui amollissoit, roidissoit, et contournoit la voix de son maistre, lors qu’il haranguoit à Rome, à quoy seruoit il, si le mouuement et qualité du son, n’auoit force à esmouuoir et alterer le iugement des auditeurs?

    I have seen people who could not hear a bone being gnawed under their table without losing patience. And there is hardly a man who is not upset by that sharp, piercing noise files make when they scrape iron; just as, on hearing someone chew near us, or hearing someone talk whose throat or nose is blocked, many people are moved to anger and hatred. That flute-player who prompted Gracchus, who softened, stiffened and modulated his master’s voice when he was haranguing in Rome—what was he for, if the movement and quality of sound had no power to move and alter the judgment of the listeners?

    Gaius Gracchus, Roman tribune (2nd century BC), kept a flute-player behind him to give him the pitch while he spoke, as Plutarch reports.

    Vrayement il y a bien dequoy faire si grande feste de la fermeté de cette belle piece, qui se laisse manier et changer au bransle et accidens d’vn si leger vent.

    Truly, there is good reason to make such a fuss about the firmness of this fine piece of work, which lets itself be handled and changed by the motion and chance gusts of so light a wind.

    Waking and dreaming

    Passions alter what we perceive, and our waking may be another kind of sleep.

    Cette mesme pipperie, que les sens apportent à nostre entendement, ils la reçoiuent à leur tour. Nostre ame par fois s’en reuenche de mesme, ils mentent, et se trompent à l’enuy. Ce que nous voyons et oyons agitez de colere, nous ne l’oyons pas tel qu’il est. Et solem geminum, et duplices se ostendere Thebas. L’obiect que nous aymons, nous semble plus beau qu’il n’est: Multimodis igitur prauas turpésque videmus / Esse in deliciis, summóque in honore vigere: et plus laid celuy que nous auons à contre-cœur. A vn homme ennuyé et affligé, la clarté du iour semble obscurcie et tenebreuse. Noz sens sont non seulement alterez, mais souuent hebetez du tout, par les passions de l’ame.

    This same cheating that the senses bring to our understanding, they receive in their turn. Our soul sometimes takes its revenge in the same way: they vie with each other in lying and deceiving. What we see and hear when stirred by anger, we do not hear as it is. And the sun appears double, and Thebes twofold. The object we love seems to us more beautiful than it is: So we see women misshapen and ugly in many ways / Being adored and flourishing in the highest honor: and the one we dislike seems uglier. To a man in grief and affliction, the light of day seems dimmed and dark. Our senses are not only altered but often utterly dulled by the passions of the soul.

    The first Latin line is from Virgil, Aeneid, describing the madness of Pentheus.

    Combien de choses voyons nous, que nous n’apperceuons pas, si nous auons nostre esprit empesché ailleurs? In rebus quoque apertis noscere possis, / Si non aduertas animum, proinde esse, quasi omni / Tempore semotæ fuerint, longéque remotæ. Il semble que l’ame retire au dedans, et amuse les puissances des sens. Par ainsin et le dedans et le dehors de l’homme est plein de foiblesse et de mensonge.

    How many things do we see that we do not notice, if our mind is busy elsewhere? Even in things plainly in view you can perceive / That, if you do not turn your mind to them, it is as if / They had been all the time apart and far removed. It seems that the soul draws the powers of the senses inward and keeps them occupied. Thus both the inside and the outside of man are full of weakness and falsehood.

    Ceux qui ont apparié nostre vie à vn songe, ont eu de la raison, à l’aduanture plus qu’ils ne pensoyent. Quand nous songeons, nostre ame vit, agit, exerce toutes ses facultez, ne plus ne moins que quand elle veille; mais si plus mollement et obscurement; non de tant certes, que la difference y soit, comme de la nuict à vne clarté vifue: ouy, comme de la nuict à l’ombre: là elle dort, icy elle sommeille: plus et moins; ce sont tousiours tenebres, et tenebres Cymmeriennes. Nous veillons dormants, et veillants dormons. Ie ne voy pas si clair dans le sommeil: mais quant au veiller, ie ne le trouue iamais assez pur et sans nuage.

    Those who have likened our life to a dream were right—perhaps more than they thought. When we dream, our soul lives, acts and exercises all its faculties neither more nor less than when it is awake. If it does so more softly and dimly, it is certainly not by so much that the difference is like that between night and bright daylight—rather, like that between night and shade. There it sleeps, here it dozes: more and less; it is always darkness, and Cimmerian darkness. We wake sleeping, and waking sleep. I do not see so clearly in sleep; but as for waking, I never find it pure and cloudless enough.

    In Homer’s Odyssey the Cimmerians live in perpetual mist and darkness at the edge of the world.

    Encore le sommeil en sa profondeur, endort par fois les songes: mais nostre veiller n’est iamais si esueillé, qu’il purge et dissipe bien à poinct les resueries, qui sont les songes des veillants, et pires que songes. Nostre raison et nostre ame receuant les fantasies et opinions, qui luy nayssent en dormant, et authorizant les actions de noz songes de pareille approbation, qu’elle fait celles du iour: pourquoy ne mettons nous en doubte, si nostre penser, nostre agir, est pas vn autre songer, et nostre veiller, quelque espece de dormir?

    Sleep, in its depths, even puts dreams to sleep at times; but our waking is never so wide awake that it properly purges and dispels the reveries, which are the dreams of the waking, and worse than dreams. Our reason and our soul accept the notions and opinions that arise in them while sleeping, and authorize the actions of our dreams with the same approval they give to those of the day. Why, then, do we not call in doubt whether our thinking and our acting are not another kind of dreaming, and our waking some kind of sleep?

    Animals and the senses

    Beasts perceive differently from us, so we cannot know which perception is true.

    Si les sens sont noz premiers iuges, ce ne sont pas les nostres qu’il faut seuls appeller au conseil: car en cette faculté, les animaux ont autant ou plus de droit que nous. Il est certain qu’aucuns ont l’ouye plus aigue que l’homme, d’autres la veue, d’autres le sentiment, d’autres l’attouchement ou le goust. Democritus disoit que les Dieux et les bestes auoyent les facultez sensitiues beaucoup plus parfaictes que l’homme. Or entre les effects de leurs sens, et les nostres, la difference est extreme. Nostre saliue nettoye et asseche noz playes, elle tue le serpent. *Tantáque in his rebus distantia differitásque est, / Vt quod aliis cibus est, aliis fuat acre venenum.

    If the senses are our first judges, it is not ours alone that we must call into council; for in this faculty animals have as much right as we have, or more. It is certain that some have keener hearing than man, others keener sight, others keener smell, others keener touch or taste. Democritus said that the gods and the beasts had far more perfect sensory faculties than man. Now between the effects of their senses and ours the difference is extreme. Our saliva cleans and dries our wounds; it kills the snake. *And so great is the distance and difference in these things / That what is food for some is bitter poison for others.

    / Sæpe etenim serpens, hominis contacta saliua, / Disperit, ac sese mandendo conficit ipsa.* Quelle qualité donnerons nous à la saliue, ou selon nous, ou selon le serpent? Par quel des deux sens verifierons nous sa veritable essence que nous cherchons? Pline dit qu’il y a aux Indes certains lieures marins, qui nous sont poison, et nous à eux: de maniere que du seul attouchement nous les tuons. Qui sera veritablement poison, ou l’homme, ou le poisson? à qui en croirons nous, ou au poisson de l’homme, ou à l’homme du poisson? Quelque qualité d’air infecte l’homme qui ne nuit point au bœuf; quelque autre le bœuf, qui ne nuit point à l’homme; laquelle des deux sera en verité et en nature pestilente qualité?

    / For often a snake, touched by human saliva, / Perishes and destroys itself by biting itself.* What quality shall we assign to saliva—the one it has for us, or the one it has for the snake? By which of the two senses shall we verify the true essence we are looking for? Pliny says that in the Indies there are certain sea hares that are poison to us, and we to them, so that we kill them by a mere touch. Which will truly be poison, the man or the fish? Whom shall we believe, the fish about the man, or the man about the fish? Some quality of the air infects man that does no harm to the ox; some other infects the ox that does no harm to man. Which of the two will be, in truth and in nature, a pestilent quality?

    Ceux qui ont la iaunisse, ils voyent toutes choses iaunastres et plus pasles que nous: Lurida præterea fiunt quæcunque tuentur / Arquati. Ceux qui ont cette maladie que les medecins nomment Hyposphragma, qui est vne suffusion de sang soubs la peau, voient toutes choses rouges et sanglantes. Ces humeurs, qui changent ainsi les operations de nostre veuë, que sçauons nous si elles predominent aux bestes, et leur sont ordinaires? Car nous en voyons les vnes, qui ont les yeux iaunes, comme noz malades de iaunisse, d’autres qui les ont sanglans de rougeur: à celles là, il est vray-semblable, que la couleur des obiects paroist autre qu’à nous: quel iugement des deux sera le vray?

    Those who have jaundice see everything as yellowish and paler than we do: Besides, whatever the jaundiced look at / Turns sallow. Those who have the illness physicians call hyposphragma, which is an effusion of blood under the skin, see everything as red and bloody. These humors that thus change the workings of our sight—how do we know whether they predominate in animals and are normal for them? For we see some that have yellow eyes, like our jaundice patients, and others that have them bloodshot with redness. To these it is likely that the color of objects appears different from what it is to us. Which of the two judgments will be the true one?

    Car il n’est pas dict, que l’essence des choses, se rapporte à l’homme seul. La dureté, la blancheur, la profondeur, et l’aigreur, touchent le seruice et science des animaux, comme la nostre: Nature leur en a donné l’vsage comme à nous. Quand nous pressons l’œil, les corps que nous regardons, nous les apperceuons plus longs et estendus: plusieurs bestes ont l’œil ainsi pressé: cette longueur est donc à l’aduanture la veritable forme de ce corps, non pas celle que noz yeux luy donnent en leur assiette ordinaire.

    For it is nowhere laid down that the essence of things relates to man alone. Hardness, whiteness, depth and sourness concern the use and knowledge of animals as they do ours: Nature has given them the use of these as she has given it to us. When we press on the eye, we perceive the bodies we look at as longer and stretched out. Many beasts have their eyes pressed like that; so this length is perhaps the true form of that body, not the one our eyes give it in their ordinary position.

    Si nous serrons l’œil par dessoubs, les choses nous semblent doubles: Bina lucernarum florentia lumina flammis, / Et duplices hominum facies, et corpora bina. Si nous auons les oreilles empeschées de quelque chose, ou le passage de l’ouye resserré, nous receuons le son autre, que nous ne faisons ordinairement: les animaux qui ont les oreilles velues, ou qui n’ont qu’vn bien petit trou au lieu de l’oreille, ils n’oyent par consequent pas ce que nous oyons, et reçoiuent le son autre.

    If we squeeze the eye from below, things seem double to us: The lamps’ flowering lights with twin flames, / And men’s faces double, and bodies twofold. If our ears are blocked by something, or the passage of hearing is narrowed, we receive sound differently from usual. Animals that have hairy ears, or have only a tiny hole instead of an ear, consequently do not hear what we hear, and receive sound differently.

    Nous voyons aux festes et aux theatres, qu’opposant à la lumiere des flambeaux, vne vitre teinte de quelque couleur, tout ce qui est en ce lieu, nous appert ou vert, ou iaune, ou violet: Et vulgò faciunt id lutea russáque vela, / Et ferrugina, cùm, magnis intenta theatris, / Per malos volgata trabésque trementia pendent: / Namque ibi consessum caueai subter, et omnem / Scenai speciem, patrum, matrúmque, deroúmque / Inficiunt, cogùntque suo volitare colore. Il est vray-semblable que les yeux des animaux, que nous voyons estre de diuerse couleur, leur produisent les apparences des corps de mesmes leurs yeux.

    We see at festivals and in theaters that when a pane of glass tinted some color is placed before the light of the torches, everything in the place appears to us green, or yellow, or violet: And yellow, red and dark purple awnings commonly do this, / When, stretched over great theaters, / Spread across masts and beams, they hang quivering: / For there they stain the seated crowd below in the tiers, / And the whole show of the stage, the senators, the matrons, the gods, / And make them flutter in their own color. It is likely that the eyes of animals, which we see to be of various colors, produce for them appearances of bodies in the same color as their eyes.

    Pour le iugement de l’operation des sens, il faudroit donc que nous en fussions premierement d’accord auec les bestes, secondement entre nous mesmes. Ce que nous ne sommes aucunement: et entrons en debat tous les coups de ce que l’vn oyt, void, ou gouste, quelque chose autrement qu’vn autre: et debattons autant que d’autre chose, de la diuersité des images que les sens nous rapportent. Autrement oit, et voit par la regle ordinaire de nature, et autrement gouste, vn enfant qu’vn homme de trente ans: et cettuy-cy autrement qu’vn sexagenaire. Les sens sont aux vns plus obscurs et plus sombres, aux autres plus ouuerts et plus aigus. Nous receuons les choses autres et autres selon que nous sommes, et qu’il nous semble.

    To judge the working of the senses, then, we would first have to agree about it with the beasts, and second among ourselves. This we do not do at all. We fall into dispute every time one person hears, sees or tastes something differently from another, and we argue about the diversity of the images the senses bring us as much as about anything else. By the ordinary rule of nature a child hears, sees and tastes otherwise than a man of thirty, and he otherwise than a man of sixty. In some people the senses are duller and darker, in others more open and keener. We receive things differently, and differently again, according to what we are and how they seem to us.

    Or nostre sembler estant si incertain et controuersé, ce n’est plus miracle, si on nous dit, que nous pouuons auouër que la neige nous apparoist blanche, mais que d’establir si de son essence elle est telle, et à la verité, nous ne nous en sçaurions respondre: et ce commencement esbranlé, toute la science du monde s’en va necessairement à vau-l’eau. Quoy, que noz sens mesmes s’entr’empeschent l’vn l’autre? vne peinture semble esleuée à la veue, au maniement elle semble plate: dirons nous que le musque soit aggreable ou non, qui resiouit nostre sentiment, et offence nostre goust?

    Now since our seeming is so uncertain and disputed, it is no longer a wonder if we are told that we may admit that snow appears white to us, but that as to establishing whether it is so in its essence and in truth, we could not vouch for it. And with this starting point shaken, all the knowledge in the world is necessarily swept away downstream. What of the fact that our senses themselves get in each other’s way? A painting seems raised to the eye; to the touch it seems flat. Shall we say that musk is pleasant or not, when it delights our smell and offends our taste?

    Il y a des herbes et des vnguens propres à vne partie du corps, qui en blessent vne autre: le miel est plaisant au goust, mal plaisant à la veue. Ces bagues qui sont entaillées en forme de plumes, qu’on appelle en deuise, pennes sans fin, il n’y a œil qui en puisse discerner la largeur, et qui se sçeust deffendre de cette pipperie, que d’vn costé elle n’aille en eslargissant, et s’appointant et estressissant par l’autre, mesmes quand on la roulle autour du doigt: toutesfois au maniement elle vous semble equable en largeur et par tout pareille.

    There are herbs and ointments good for one part of the body that injure another. Honey is pleasant to the taste, unpleasant to the sight. Those rings carved in the form of feathers, which in the language of devices are called “endless feathers”: there is no eye that can make out their width, and that could defend itself against the illusion that the ring widens on one side and narrows to a point on the other, even when you turn it around your finger. Yet to the touch it seems to you of even width and the same all around.

    A lover’s emblem punning on pennes (feathers) and peines (pains): “endless pains.”

    Ces personnes qui pour aider leur volupté, se seruoyent anciennement de miroirs, propres à grossir et aggrandir l’obiect qu’ils representent, affin que les membres qu’ils auoient à embesongner, leur pleussent d’auantage par cette accroissance oculaire: auquel des deux sens donnoient-ils gaigné, ou à la veue qui leur representoit ces membres gros et grands à souhait, ou à l’attouchement qui les leur presentoit petits et desdaignables? Sont-ce nos sens qui prestent au subject ces diuerses conditions, et que les subjects n’en ayent pourtant qu’vne?

    Those people who in ancient times, to aid their pleasure, used mirrors designed to swell and enlarge the object they reflected, so that the members they had to put to work might please them more through this increase to the eye: to which of the two senses did they award the victory? To sight, which showed them those members as big and large as they could wish, or to touch, which presented them as small and contemptible? Is it our senses that lend the object these various conditions, while the objects nevertheless have only one?

    Montaigne has in mind Hostius Quadra, whose mirrors Seneca describes in his Natural Questions.

    Comme nous voyons du pain que nous mangeons; ce n’est que pain, mais nostre vsage en fait des os, du sang, de la chair, des poils, et des ongles: Vt cibus, in membra atque artus cùm diditur omnes, / Disperit, atque aliam naturam sufficit ex se. L’humeur que succe la racine d’vn arbre, elle se fait tronc, feuille et fruict: l’air n’estant qu’vn, il se fait par l’application à vne trompette, diuers en mille sortes de sons. Sont-ce, dis-ie, noz sens qui façonnent de mesme, de diuerses qualitez ces subjects; ou s’ils les ont telles? Et sur ce doubte, que pouuons nous resoudre de leur veritable essence?

    It is as we see with the bread we eat: it is only bread, but our use of it makes it into bones, blood, flesh, hair and nails: As food, when distributed into all the limbs and members, / Perishes and supplies from itself another nature. The sap that the root of a tree sucks up becomes trunk, leaf and fruit; and air, though it is one, becomes, when applied to a trumpet, varied into a thousand kinds of sounds. Is it, I say, our senses that likewise fashion these objects with various qualities, or do the objects really have them? And in this doubt, what can we decide about their true essence?

    D’auantage puis que les accidens des maladies, de la resuerie, ou du sommeil, nous font paroistre les choses autres, qu’elles ne paroissent aux sains, aux sages, et à ceux qui veillent: n’est-il pas vray-semblable que nostre assiette droicte, et noz humeurs naturelles, ont aussi dequoy donner vn estre aux choses, se rapportant à leur condition, et les accommoder à soy, comme font les humeurs desreglées: et nostre santé aussi capable de leur fournir son visage, comme la maladie? Pourquoy n’a le temperé quelque forme des obiects relatiue à soy, comme l’intemperé: et ne leur imprimera-il pareillement son charactere? Le desgousté charge la fadeur au vin; le sain la saueur; l’alteré la friandise.

    Moreover, the accidents of illness, of delirium or of sleep make things appear to us otherwise than they appear to the healthy, the wise and the waking. Is it not likely, then, that our upright condition and our natural humors also have the means to give things a being that corresponds to their own condition, and to adapt them to themselves, as disordered humors do; and that our health is as capable of lending them its own face as illness is? Why should the temperate man not have some form of objects relative to himself, as the intemperate man has, and why should he not likewise stamp them with his own character? The man with no appetite blames the wine for being flat; the healthy man credits it with flavor; the thirsty man with deliciousness.

    Or nostre estat accommodant les choses à soy, et les transformant selon soy, nous ne sçauons plus quelles sont les choses en verité, car rien ne vient à nous que falsifié et alteré par noz sens. Où le compas, l’esquarre, et la regle sont gauches, toutes les proportions qui s’en tirent, tous les bastimens qui se dressent à leur mesure, sont aussi necessairement manques et deffaillans. L’incertitude de noz sens rend incertain tout ce qu’ils produisent.

    Now since our condition adapts things to itself and transforms them according to itself, we no longer know what things are in truth; for nothing comes to us except falsified and altered by our senses. Where the compass, the square and the rule are crooked, all the proportions drawn from them, all the buildings put up to their measure, are also necessarily faulty and defective. The uncertainty of our senses makes uncertain everything they produce.

    Denique vt in fabrica, si praua est regula prima, / Normáque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, / Et libella aliqua si ex parte claudicat hilum, / Omnia mendosè fieri, atque obstipa necessum est, / Praua, cubantia, prona, supina, atque absona tecta, / Iam ruere vt quædam videantur velle, ruántque / Prodita iudiciis fallacibus omnia primis. / Hic igitur ratio tibi rerum praua necesse est, / Falsáque sit falsis quæcumque à sensibus orta est. Au demeurant, qui sera propre à iuger de ces differences?

    Finally, as in a building, if the first rule is warped, / And if the square is false and departs from straight lines, / And if the level is off in any part the least bit, / Everything must be made faulty and askew, / The roofs warped, leaning, tilting forward and back, out of all proportion, / So that some parts seem about to fall, and do fall, / All betrayed by those first false judgments: / So too your reasoning about things must be warped / And false, whatever springs from false senses. For the rest, who will be fit to judge these differences?

    Comme nous disons aux debats de la religion, qu’il nous faut vn iuge non attaché à l’vn ny à l’autre party, exempt de choix et d’affection, ce qui ne se peut parmy les Chrestiens: il aduient de mesme en cecy: car s’il est vieil, il ne peut iuger du sentiment de la vieillesse, estant luy mesme partie en ce debat: s’il est ieune, de mesme: sain, de mesme, de mesme malade, dormant, et veillant: il nous faudroit quelqu’vn exempt de toutes ces qualitez, afin que sans præoccupation de iugement, il iugeast de ces propositions, comme à luy indifferentes: et à ce compte il nous faudroit vn iuge qui ne fust pas.

    We say in religious disputes that we need a judge attached to neither party, free of preference and affection—which is not possible among Christians. It is the same in this matter. For if he is old, he cannot judge of the perception of old age, being himself a party to the dispute; if he is young, the same; healthy, the same; and the same if he is sick, sleeping or waking. We would need someone free of all these qualities, so that, without prejudgment, he might judge these propositions as matters indifferent to him. And by that reckoning we would need a judge who did not exist.

    No firm ground

    Neither senses nor reason can settle the dispute; everything flows and changes.

    Pour iuger des apparences que nous receuons des subjects, il nous faudroit vn instrument iudicatoire: pour verifier cet instrument, il nous y faut de la demonstration: pour verifier la demonstration, vn instrument, nous voila au rouet. Puis que les sens ne peuuent arrester nostre dispute, estans pleins eux-mesmes d’incertitude, il faut que ce soit la raison: aucune raison ne s’establira sans vne autre raison, nous voyla à reculons iusques à l’infiny.

    To judge the appearances we receive from objects, we would need a judging instrument; to verify that instrument, we need demonstration; to verify the demonstration, an instrument: there we are, going around in a circle. Since the senses cannot settle our dispute, being full of uncertainty themselves, it must be reason. But no reason can be established without another reason: there we are, going backward to infinity.

    Nostre fantasie ne s’applique pas aux choses estrangeres, ains elle est conceue par l’entremise des sens, et les sens ne comprennent pas le subject estranger, ains seulement leurs propres passions: et par ainsi la fantasie et apparence n’est pas du subject, ains seulement de la passion et souffrance du sens; laquelle passion, et subject, sont choses diuerses: parquoy qui iuge par les apparences, iuge par chose autre que le subject. Et de dire que les passions des sens, rapportent à l’ame, la qualité des subjects estrangers par ressemblance; comment se peut l’ame et l’entendement asseurer de cette ressemblance, n’ayant de soy nul commerce, auec les subjects estrangers? Tout ainsi comme, qui ne cognoist pas Socrates, voyant son pourtraict, ne peut dire qu’il luy ressemble.

    Our notion is not applied to external things; rather, it is conceived through the medium of the senses. And the senses do not grasp the external object, but only their own affections. So the notion and appearance is not of the object, but only of the affection and impression received by the sense; and that affection and the object are different things. Therefore whoever judges by appearances judges by something other than the object. And as for saying that the affections of the senses convey to the soul the quality of external objects by resemblance: how can the soul and the understanding be sure of that resemblance, having of themselves no dealings with external objects? Just so, someone who does not know Socrates cannot, on seeing his portrait, say that it resembles him.

    Or qui voudroit toutesfois iuger par les apparences: si c’est par toutes, il est impossible, car elles s’entr’empeschent par leurs contrarietez et discrepances, comme nous voyons par experience. Sera ce qu’aucunes apparences choisies reglent les autres? Il faudra verifier cette choisie par vne autre choisie, la seconde par la tierce: et par ainsi ce ne sera iamais faict. Finalement, il n’y a aucune constante existence, ny de nostre estre, ny de celuy des obiects. Et nous, et nostre iugement, et toutes choses mortelles, vont coulant et roulant sans cesse. Ainsin il ne se peut establir rien de certain de l’vn à l’autre, et le iugeant, et le iugé, estans en continuelle mutation et branle.

    Now suppose someone wanted to judge by appearances nevertheless. If by all of them, it is impossible, for they get in each other’s way by their contradictions and discrepancies, as we see by experience. Shall it be that some selected appearances govern the others? This selected one will have to be verified by another selected one, the second by a third, and so it will never be done. Finally, there is no constant existence, either of our being or of that of objects. And we, and our judgment, and all mortal things, go flowing and rolling ceaselessly. Thus nothing certain can be established from one to the other, both the judging and the judged being in continual change and motion.

    Being and passing

    Only God truly is; man can rise above himself only by God’s grace.

    Famous passage We have no communication with beingThe Apology’s close: all things flow, and only God truly is.

    Nous n’auons aucune communication à l’estre, par ce que toute humaine nature est tousiours au milieu, entre le naistre et le mourir, ne baillant de soy qu’vne obscure apparence et ombre, et vne incertaine et debile opinion. Et si de fortune vous fichez vostre pensée à vouloir prendre son estre, ce sera ne plus ne moins que qui voudroit empoigner l’eau: car tant plus il serrera et pressera ce qui de sa nature coule par tout, tant plus il perdra ce qu’il vouloit tenir et empoigner.

    We have no communication with being, because all human nature is always midway between birth and death, offering of itself only a dim appearance and shadow, and an uncertain and feeble opinion. And if by chance you fix your thought on trying to grasp its being, it will be neither more nor less than if someone tried to grip water: for the more he squeezes and presses what by its nature flows everywhere, the more he will lose what he wanted to hold and grip.

    From here to the end of the essay’s argument Montaigne follows, almost word for word, Amyot’s French translation of Plutarch’s essay On the E at Delphi.

    Ainsi veu que toutes choses sont subjectes à passer d’vn changement en autre, la raison qui y cherche vne reelle subsistance, se trouue deceuë, ne pouuant rien apprehender de subsistant et permanant: par ce que tout ou vient en estre, et n’est pas encore du tout, ou commence à mourir auant qu’il soit nay. Platon disoit que les corps n’auoient iamais existence, ouy bien naissance, estimant qu’Homere eust faict l’Ocean pere des Dieux, et Thetis la mere: pour nous montrer, que toutes choses sont en fluxion, muance et variation perpetuelle. Opinion commune à tous les philosophes auant son temps, comme il dit: sauf le seul Parmenides, qui refusoit mouuement aux choses: de la force duquel il fait grand cas.

    Thus, since all things are subject to pass from one change to another, reason, seeking a real substance in them, finds itself disappointed, being unable to apprehend anything subsistent and permanent; because everything is either coming into being and does not yet entirely exist, or is beginning to die before it is born. Plato said that bodies never had existence, but only birth, believing that Homer had made Ocean the father of the gods and Thetis the mother in order to show us that all things are in perpetual flux, change and variation. This, as he says, was an opinion common to all the philosophers before his time—except Parmenides alone, who denied motion to things, and whose force he makes much of.

    Homer (Iliad, Book XIV) actually names Tethys, the wife of Ocean, as the mother of the gods.

    Pythagoras, que toute matiere est coulante et labile. Les Stoiciens, qu’il n’y a point de temps present, et que ce que nous appellons present, n’est que la iointure et assemblage du futur et du passé: Heraclitus, que iamais homme n’estoit deux fois entré en mesme riuiere: Epicharmus, que celuy qui a pieça emprunté de l’argent, ne le doit pas maintenant; et que celuy qui cette nuict a esté conuié à venir ce matin disner, vient auiourd’huy non conuié; attendu que ce ne sont plus eux, ils sont deuenus autres: et qu’il ne se pouuoit trouuer vne substance mortelle deux fois en mesme estat: car par soudaineté et legereté de changement, tantost elle dissipe tantost elle rassemble, elle vient, et puis s’en va, de façon, que ce qui commence à naistre, ne paruient iamais iusques à perfection d’estre.

    Pythagoras said that all matter is flowing and unstable; the Stoics, that there is no present time, and that what we call present is only the joint and junction of future and past; Heraclitus, that no man had ever stepped twice into the same river; Epicharmus, that he who borrowed money long ago does not owe it now, and that he who was invited last night to come to dinner this morning comes today uninvited, since they are no longer themselves: they have become others. And he said that a mortal substance could not be found twice in the same state: for by the suddenness and lightness of its change, now it scatters, now it gathers again; it comes, and then it goes; so that what begins to be born never reaches the perfection of being.

    Pourautant que ce naistre n’acheue iamais, et iamais n’arreste, comme estant à bout, ains depuis la semence, va tousiours se changeant et muant d’vn à autre. Comme de semence humaine se fait premierement dans le ventre de la mere vn fruict sans forme: puis vn enfant formé, puis estant hors du ventre, vn enfant de mammelle; apres il deuient garçon; puis consequemment vn iouuenceau; apres vn homme faict; puis vn homme d’aage; à la fin decrepite vieillard. De maniere que l’aage et generation subsequente va tousiours deffaisant et gastant la precedente.

    For this birth is never completed and never stops, as if it had reached its end; rather, from the seed onward it is always changing and shifting from one thing to another. Thus from human seed there is first made, in the mother’s womb, a formless fruit; then a formed child; then, once out of the womb, a nursing infant; after that he becomes a boy; then in turn a youth; after that a grown man; then a man of years; and at last a decrepit old man. So that each later age and generation is always undoing and spoiling the one before.

    Mutat enim mundi naturam totius ætas, / Ex alióque alius status excipere omnia debet, / Nec manet vlla sui similis res: omnia migrant, / Omnia commutat natura et vertere cogit. Et puis nous autres sottement craignons vne espece de mort, là où nous en auons desia passé et en passons tant d’autres. Car non seulement, comme disoit Heraclitus, la mort du feu est generation de l’air, et la mort de l’air, generation de l’eau. Mais encor plus manifestement le pouuons nous voir en nous mesmes.

    For time changes the nature of the whole world, / And one state must succeed another in all things, / Nor does anything remain like itself: all things move on, / Nature alters all things and compels them to turn. And then we foolishly fear one kind of death, when we have already passed through so many others, and are passing through them still. For not only, as Heraclitus said, is the death of fire the birth of air, and the death of air the birth of water; we can see it even more plainly in ourselves.

    La fleur d’aage se meurt et passe quand la vieillesse suruient: et la ieunesse se termine en fleur d’aage d’homme faict: l’enfance en la ieunesse: et le premier aage meurt en l’enfance: et le iour d’hier meurt en celuy du iourd’huy, et le iourd’huy mourra en celuy de demain: et n’y a rien qui demeure, ne qui soit tousiours vn. Car qu’il soit ainsi, si nous demeurons tousiours mesmes et vns, comment est-ce que nous nous esiouyssons maintenant d’vne chose, et maintenant d’vne autre? comment est-ce que nous aymons choses contraires, ou les hayssons, nous les louons, ou nous les blasmons? comment auons nous differentes affections, ne retenants plus le mesme sentiment en la mesme pensée?

    The prime of life dies and passes when old age comes on; youth ends in the prime of the grown man; childhood in youth; infancy dies in childhood; yesterday dies in today, and today will die in tomorrow; and there is nothing that remains or is always one. For that this is so: if we remain always the same and one, how is it that we take delight now in one thing and now in another? How is it that we love contrary things, or hate them, praise them or blame them? How do we have different affections, no longer retaining the same feeling in the same thought?

    Car il n’est pas vray-semblable que sans mutation nous prenions autres passions: et ce qui souffre mutation ne demeure pas vn mesme: et s’il n’est pas vn mesme, il n’est donc pas aussi: ains quant et l’estre tout vn, change aussi l’estre simplement, deuenant tousiours autre d’vn autre. Et par consequent se trompent et mentent les sens de nature, prenans ce qui apparoist, pour ce qui est, à faute de bien sçauoir que c’est qui est.

    For it is not likely that we take on different passions without changing; and what undergoes change does not remain one and the same; and if it is not one and the same, then it also is not. Rather, together with its being one and the same, its being outright changes too, as it becomes ever other from another. And consequently our natural senses deceive and lie, taking what appears for what is, for want of really knowing what it is that is.

    Mais qu’est-ce donc qui est veritablement? ce qui est eternel: c’est à dire, qui n’a iamais eu de naissance, ny n’aura iamais fin, à qui le temps n’apporte iamais aucune mutation. Car c’est chose mobile que le temps, et qui apparoist comme en ombre, auec la matiere coulante et fluante tousiours, sans iamais demeurer stable ny permanente: à qui appartiennent ces mots, deuant et apres, et, a esté, ou sera. Lesquels tout de prime face montrent euidemment, que ce n’est pas chose qui soit: car ce seroit grande sottise et fauceté toute apparente, de dire que cela soit, qui n’est pas encore en estre, ou qui desia a cessé d’estre.

    But what, then, truly is? What is eternal: that is to say, what has never had birth and will never have an end, and to which time never brings any change. For time is a mobile thing, which appears as if in shadow, along with matter that is forever flowing and running, never stable or permanent. To time belong these words, before and after, and has been, or will be. These show plainly at first sight that it is not a thing that is; for it would be great folly and manifest falsehood to say that something is which is not yet in being, or which has already ceased to be.

    Et quant à ces mots, present, instant, maintenant, par lesquels il semble que principalement nous soustenons et fondons l’intelligence du temps, la raison le descouurant, le destruit tout sur le champ: car elle le fend incontinent, et le partit en futur et en passé: comme le voulant voir necessairement desparty en deux. Autant en aduient-il à la nature, qui est mesurée, comme au temps, qui la mesure: car il n’y a non plus en elle rien qui demeure, ne qui soit subsistant, ains y sont toutes choses ou nées, ou naissantes, ou mourantes.

    And as for these words, present, instant, now, on which it seems we chiefly support and ground our understanding of time: reason, discovering what it is, destroys it on the spot. For it immediately splits it and divides it into future and past, as if wishing to see it necessarily parted in two. The same happens to nature, which is measured, as to time, which measures it: for there is nothing in nature either that remains or that subsists; rather, all things in it are either born, or being born, or dying.

    Au moyen dequoy ce seroit peché de dire de Dieu, qui est le seul qui est, que il fut, ou il sera: car ces termes là sont declinaisons, passages, ou vicissitudes de ce qui ne peut durer, ny demeurer en estre. Parquoy il faut conclure Dieu seul est, non point selon aucune mesure du temps, mais selon vne eternité immuable et immobile, non mesurée par temps, ny subjecte à aucune declinaison: deuant lequel rien n’est, ny ne sera apres, ny plus nouueau ou plus recent; ains vn realement estant, qui par vn seul maintenant emplit le tousiours, et n’y a rien, qui veritablement soit, que luy seul: sans qu’on puisse dire, il a esté, ou, il sera, sans commencement et sans fin.

    For which reason it would be a sin to say of God, who is the only one who is, that he was or he will be: for those terms are declensions, passages or vicissitudes of what cannot endure or remain in being. Therefore we must conclude that God alone is—not according to any measure of time, but according to an eternity immutable and immobile, not measured by time nor subject to any declension; before whom nothing is, nor will be after, nor is anything newer or more recent; but one who really is, who with a single now fills the always; and there is nothing that truly is but he alone—without our being able to say he has been, or he will be—without beginning and without end.

    A cette conclusion si religieuse, d’vn homme payen, ie veux ioindre seulement ce mot, d’vn tesmoing de mesme condition, pour la fin de ce long et ennuyeux discours, qui me fourniroit de matiere sans fin. O la vile chose, dit-il, et abiecte, que l’homme, s’il ne s’esleue au dessus de l’humanité! Voyla vn bon mot, et vn vtile desir: mais pareillement absurde. Car de faire la poignée plus grande que le poing, la brassée plus grande que le bras, et d’esperer eniamber plus que de l’estenduë de noz iambes, cela est impossible et monstrueux: ny que l’homme se monte au dessus de soy et de l’humanité: car il ne peut voir que de ses yeux, ny saisir que de ses prises.

    To this so religious conclusion of a pagan I want only to add this saying of a witness of the same condition, to bring to an end this long and tiresome discourse, which could supply me with endless matter. “Oh, what a vile and abject thing man is,” he says, “if he does not raise himself above humanity!” That is a good saying and a useful desire, but equally absurd. For to make the handful bigger than the hand, the armful bigger than the arm, and to hope to stride farther than our legs can reach, is impossible and monstrous; nor can man mount above himself and humanity. For he can see only with his own eyes, and seize only with his own grip.

    The saying is Seneca’s, from the preface to his Natural Questions.

    Il s’esleuera si Dieu luy preste extraordinairement la main. Il s’esleuera abandonnant et renonçant à ses propres moyens, et se laissant hausser et sousleuer par les moyens purement celestes. C’est à nostre foy Chrestienne, non à sa vertu Stoïque, de pretendre à cette diuine et miraculeuse metamorphose.

    He will rise if God, by special favor, lends him a hand. He will rise by abandoning and renouncing his own means, and letting himself be raised and lifted up by purely heavenly ones. It is for our Christian faith, not for his Stoic virtue, to aspire to that divine and miraculous metamorphosis.