Laches

LysimachusYou’ve watched the man fighting in armor, Nicias and Laches. Melesias here and I asked you to watch with us, but we didn’t tell you why at the time. We’ll tell you now, because we think that with you, at least, we ought to speak frankly. There are people who laugh at this sort of thing. If 178b someone asks their advice, they won’t say what they really think. Instead they guess at what the person consulting them wants to hear and say something other than their own opinion. But we thought you were capable of judging, and that once you had judged you would simply say what you think. So we’ve brought you in to advise us on what we’re about to put to you. Here, then, 179a is the matter I’ve been making such a long preamble about.note

NiciasFor my part, Lysimachus and Melesias, I commend your plan and I’m ready to join you. And I think Laches here is too.

LachesYou think right, Nicias. What Lysimachus was just saying about his own father and Melesias’ seems to me very well said. It applies to them, to us, and to everyone who handles the affairs of cities. What he describes is pretty much what happens to them, with their children and everything else: their private affairs get slighted and neglected. So you’re right about that, Lysimachus. But it surprises me that you invite us to advise you on the young men’s 180c education and don’t invite Socrates here. First of all, he’s from your deme. And then he’s always spending his time wherever there’s any of the sort of thing you’re looking for for the young, some fine subject or pursuit.note

LysimachusWhat do you mean, Laches? Has Socrates here taken an interest in anything of this kind?

LachesVery much so, Lysimachus.

NiciasI could tell you that just as well as Laches could. Only recently he introduced me to a music teacher for my 180d son: Damon, the pupil of Agathocles. He’s the most accomplished of men, not only in music but in every other respect you could want, and well worth having as a companion for young men of that age.note

LysimachusYou see, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, men of my age don’t really know the younger ones anymore, since our age keeps us at home most of the time. But if you, son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice to give your fellow demesman here, 180e you should give it. And you owe it to us, since you happen to be a friend of ours through your father. Your father and I were always comrades and friends, and he died before we ever had any disagreement. And something has just come back to me while these men were talking. When these boys are talking with each other at home, they often mention Socrates and praise him highly. But I’ve never asked them 181a whether they meant the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, boys, is this the Socrates you were always talking about?

SonsYes, father, that’s him.

LysimachusBy Hera, Socrates, I’m glad you keep your father’s name standing tall. He was the best of men. And I’m glad above all that our families will be close, so that what’s yours will be ours and what’s ours will be yours.

LachesYes, Lysimachus, and don’t let the man go. I’ve seen him elsewhere, too, keeping not only his father 181b but his fatherland standing tall. In the retreat from Delium he withdrew alongside me. I tell you, if the others had been willing to be like him, our city would be standing tall and wouldn’t have taken such a fall back then.note

LysimachusSocrates, this is truly fine praise you’re receiving now. It comes from men worth trusting, and it’s for the very things they’re praising you for. So you can be sure that I’m delighted to hear you’re so well thought of, and you must count me among those most well disposed 181c toward you. You really should have been visiting us before now and thinking of us as family, as was only right. But from this day on, now that we’ve recognized one another, don’t do otherwise. Spend time with us and get to know us and these young people, so that you and they, too, may keep our friendship alive. Well, you’ll do that, and we’ll remind you again. But about what we started with, what do you all say? What do you think? Is the subject suitable for the boys or not, learning to fight in armor?

SocratesWell, Lysimachus, I’ll try to advise you on this too, if I can, and to do everything else you invite me to. But since I’m younger than these men and less experienced, it seems most right to me to hear first what they have to say and learn from them. Then, if I have something to add beyond what they say, I’ll try to teach and persuade both you and them. So, Nicias, why doesn’t one of you speak?

NiciasNothing to stop us, Socrates. I too 181e think it’s useful in many ways for young men to know this subject. For one thing, it’s good that they spend their time on this, rather than in the places young men like to pass the time when they have leisure. It also necessarily improves the condition of the body, since it’s inferior to none of the gymnastic exercises and takes no less 182a effort. At the same time, this exercise, along with horsemanship, is especially fitting for a free man. In the contest we are competitors in, the struggle that lies before us, the only people in training are those who train with these instruments of war.

LachesWell, Nicias, it’s hard to say of any subject at all that it shouldn’t be learned. It seems good to know everything. So with this armor-fighting business: 182e if it is a genuine subject, as those who teach it claim and as Nicias says, it should be learned. But it may not be a real subject, and the people who promise to teach it may be deceiving us. Or it may be a subject, but not a very serious one. In either case, why would anyone need to learn it? I say this about it because of the following. I think that if there were anything to it, it wouldn’t have escaped the Spartans. They care about nothing else in life but seeking out and practicing 183a whatever might give them an edge over others in war, if they learned and practiced it.

LysimachusYes, I do ask you, Socrates. Our council seems to me to need, as it were, 184d someone to cast the deciding vote. If these two had agreed, there’d be less need for that sort of thing. But as it is, you see, Laches has voted the opposite way from Nicias. So it would be good to hear from you too which of the two men you’re voting with.

SocratesWhat’s this, Lysimachus? Are you going to follow whichever side gets the approval of the majority of us?

LysimachusWhy, what else could anyone do, Socrates?

SocratesAnd you, Melesias, would you do the same? Suppose 184e you had to decide what your son should practice for an athletic contest. Would you be persuaded by the majority of us, or by whichever of us happened to have been taught and trained by a good trainer?

MelesiasBy that one, naturally, Socrates.

SocratesSo you’d be persuaded by him rather than by the four of us?

MelesiasProbably.

SocratesYes, because I think anything that’s going to be judged well has to be judged by knowledge, not by numbers.

MelesiasOf course.

SocratesThen now, too, we must first consider this very question: 185a is any one of us an expert in what we’re deliberating about, or not? If there is one, we must listen to him, even though he’s only one, and let the others be. If not, we must look for someone else. Or do you think it’s some small matter that you and Lysimachus are risking right now? Isn’t it that possession which happens to be the greatest you have? Whether the sons turn out good or the opposite, the father’s whole household will be run accordingly, depending on what sort of people the children become.

MelesiasThat’s true.

SocratesSo we must take great forethought about it.

MelesiasVery much so.

SocratesSo how would we go about it, as I was just saying, if we wanted to find out which of us is the greatest expert in athletic contests? Wouldn’t it be the one who had learned and practiced it, and who had also had good teachers of that very thing?

MelesiasI think so.

SocratesAnd even before that, shouldn’t we ask what this thing is that we’re looking for teachers of?

MelesiasWhat do you mean?

SocratesMaybe it’ll be clearer this way. I don’t think we agreed at the start on what exactly it is that we’re deliberating and inquiring about, when we ask which of us is an expert and has acquired teachers 185c for that purpose, and which of us isn’t.

NiciasBut Socrates, aren’t we considering fighting in armor, and whether the young men should learn it or not?

SocratesCertainly, Nicias. But when someone is considering a medicine for the eyes, and whether he should apply it or not, do you think his deliberation is then about the medicine or about the eyes?

NiciasAbout the eyes.

SocratesAnd when someone considers whether a bridle should be put on a horse or not, and when, then presumably he’s deliberating about the horse and not about the bridle?

NiciasTrue.

SocratesIn a word, then, when someone considers one thing for the sake of another, his deliberation is about the thing for whose sake he was considering it. It isn’t about the thing he was looking into for the sake of something else.

NiciasNecessarily.

SocratesSo we must also consider whether our adviser is an expert in caring for that thing, the one for whose sake we’re conducting our inquiry.

NiciasCertainly.

SocratesNow, aren’t we saying that we’re considering a subject of learning for the sake of the young men’s souls?

NiciasYes.

SocratesThen this is what we must consider: whether any of us is an expert in the care of the soul, able to care for it well, and has had good teachers.

LachesWhat, Socrates? Haven’t you ever seen people who became more expert in some things without teachers than with them?

SocratesI have, Laches. But you wouldn’t be willing to trust them if they claimed to be good craftsmen. Not unless they could show you some well-executed product of their craft, one or more.

LachesThat much is true.

SocratesSo we ought to do the same, Laches and Nicias. Lysimachus and Melesias have called us in to advise them about their two sons, because they’re eager for the boys’ souls to become as good as possible. If we say we have teachers, we should point them out: teachers who were good themselves to begin with, who have cared for the souls of many young men, and who then 186b clearly taught us as well. Or if one of us says he never had a teacher himself, he should at least be able to tell of his own works and point to people, Athenians or foreigners, slaves or free, who by common agreement have become good because of him. And if we have none of this to show, we should tell them to look elsewhere, and not risk corrupting the sons of our friends and so earning the gravest blame from those closest to us.

LysimachusGentlemen, I think Socrates is speaking well. 187c But whether you’re willing to be questioned about such things and give an account of yourselves is for you to decide, Nicias and Laches. For Melesias here and me, it would obviously be a pleasure if you’d agree to talk through everything Socrates asks. In fact, that’s where I began at the start. I told you we’d called you in for advice because we assumed you’d naturally given thought to such matters, especially since your boys, like ours, are almost old enough 187d to be educated. So if you don’t mind, speak up and look into it together with Socrates, giving and receiving accounts from one another. He’s right about this too, that we’re deliberating now about the most important of our concerns.

NiciasLysimachus, it really seems to me that you know Socrates only through his father, and haven’t had anything to do with him except 187e as a child, when he may have tagged along with his father and come up to you among your fellow demesmen, at a temple or some other gathering of the deme. Clearly you haven’t yet met the man since he’s grown up.

LysimachusWhy do you say that, Nicias?

NiciasYou don’t seem to know that anyone who gets as close to Socrates in discussion as a relative is by birth, and keeps company with him in conversation, is bound to be led around by his argument without stopping, even if he starts out talking about something else, until he finds himself giving an account of himself: the way 188a he lives now and the way he has lived his life up to now. And once he’s fallen into that, Socrates won’t let him go until he has tested every bit of it thoroughly.

SocratesIt looks as if we won’t be able to complain that you aren’t ready to give advice and to join in the inquiry.

LysimachusWell, it’s our job, Socrates, since I count you as one of us. So look into it for me, on the young men’s behalf: what we need to find out from these two. Talk with them and give us your advice. Because of my age I now forget most of what I mean to ask, and what I hear, too. And if other talk comes up in between, I hardly 189d remember anything. So you all speak and go through among yourselves the question we’ve set. I’ll listen, and once I’ve listened, I’ll do whatever you think best, together with Melesias here.

SocratesWe have to do as Lysimachus and Melesias say, Nicias and Laches. Now the questions we were just trying to look into, who our teachers in this kind of education have been and whom else we’ve made better, perhaps it wasn’t a bad idea 189e to examine ourselves on things like that. But I think another kind of inquiry leads to the same point, and might even start a little closer to the beginning. Suppose we happen to know about something, whatever it is, that when it’s added to another thing it makes that thing better, and suppose we’re also able to make it be added. Then clearly we know the thing itself on which we could advise people about how to acquire it most easily and best. Perhaps you don’t understand what I mean. You’ll understand more easily this way.

LachesThat’s true, Socrates.

SocratesAnd now, Laches, aren’t these two calling us in to advise them how excellence might be added to their sons’ souls and make them better?

LachesCertainly.

SocratesThen don’t we need to have this at least, a knowledge of what excellence is? If we didn’t know at all what excellence actually is, how could we 190c advise anyone about how best to acquire it?

LachesWe couldn’t, it seems to me, Socrates.

SocratesThen we claim, Laches, to know what it is.

LachesYes, we do claim that.

SocratesAnd if we know something, surely we can also say what it is.

LachesOf course.

SocratesThen let’s not look at the whole of excellence straight away, my friend, since that might be too big a job. Let’s first take some part of it and see whether we’re in a position to know it. That way, 190d most likely, the inquiry will be easier for us.

LachesAll right, Socrates, let’s do it the way you want.

SocratesSo which of the parts of excellence should we choose? Isn’t it obviously the one that learning to fight in armor seems to aim at? And most people think that’s courage, don’t they?

LachesThey certainly do.

SocratesThen let’s first try to say, Laches, what courage is. After that we’ll look 190e at how it might be added to the young men, so far as it can come from pursuits and studies. Come on, try to answer my question: what is courage?

SocratesWell said, Laches. But perhaps I’m to blame for not speaking clearly, since you answered not the question I had in mind but a different one.

LachesWhat do you mean, Socrates?

SocratesI’ll explain, if I can. The man you describe is brave, I suppose: the one who stays at his post in the ranks and fights the enemy.

LachesThat’s what I say, anyway.

SocratesSo do I. But what about this other man, who fights the enemy while retreating, instead of standing his ground?

LachesRetreating how?

SocratesThe way the Scythians, I believe, are said to fight just as well while fleeing as while pursuing. And Homer, praising Aeneas’ horses, said that they knew how “swiftly, this way and that, 191b to pursue and to flee.” He praised Aeneas himself for the same thing, for his knowledge of fear, calling him a “master of fear.”note

LachesAnd he was right, Socrates, because he was talking about chariots. And you’re talking about Scythian horsemen. Their cavalry fights that way, but heavy infantry, Greek infantry at least, fights the way I say.

SocratesExcept perhaps for the Spartans, Laches. They say that at Plataea, 191c when the Spartans came up against the troops with wicker shields, they weren’t willing to stand their ground and fight them, but retreated. Then, when the Persian ranks broke up, they turned around and fought like cavalry, and that’s how they won the battle there.note

LachesThat’s true.

SocratesSo this is what I meant just now when I said I was to blame for your not answering well, because I didn’t ask well. I wanted 191d to learn from you not only about those who are brave in the infantry but also in the cavalry and in every kind of warfare, and not only those in war but also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and all who are brave in the face of illness or poverty, or in politics, too. And again, not only those who are brave against pains or fears, but also those who are formidable at fighting desires or pleasures, 191e whether by standing their ground or by turning back. For there are people, Laches, who are brave in things like these too—

LachesVery much so, Socrates.

SocratesSo all of these are brave. But some have acquired their courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires, and some in fears. And others, I think, have acquired cowardice in these same things.

LachesCertainly.

SocratesWhat is each of these two things? That’s what I was asking. So try again and say first what courage is, the thing that’s the same in all of these. Or don’t you see yet what I mean?

LachesNot really.

SocratesWell, I mean something like this. Suppose I were asking what quickness is. We find it in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other things. In fact we have it in pretty much anything worth mentioning, in what we do with our hands or legs, our mouth and voice, or our mind. Or wouldn’t you put it that way too?

LachesCertainly.

SocratesSo if someone asked me, “Socrates, what do you say it is, this thing that you call quickness in all of them?” I’d tell 192b him that what I call quickness is the power that gets a lot done in a short time, whether in speech or in running or in anything else.

LachesAnd you’d be right.

SocratesThen you try too, Laches, to say in the same way what power courage is, the power that’s the same in pleasure and in pain and in all the things we just said it was found in, and that’s why it’s been called courage.

LachesWell, it seems to me to be a kind of endurance of the soul, if 192c I have to say what courage is by nature in all of them.

SocratesYou do have to, if we’re going to answer the question for ourselves. Now here’s how it looks to me: I don’t think every kind of endurance looks to you like courage. I infer this from the following. I’m fairly sure, Laches, that you consider courage one of the very fine things.

LachesYou can be sure it’s one of the finest.

SocratesNow endurance joined with understanding is fine and good?

LachesCertainly.

SocratesWhat about endurance joined with folly? Isn’t that, on the contrary, harmful and destructive?

LachesYes.

SocratesThen will you call something like that fine, when it’s destructive and harmful?

LachesIt wouldn’t be right to, Socrates.

SocratesSo you won’t agree that this kind of endurance is courage, since it isn’t fine, and courage is something fine.

LachesThat’s true.

SocratesThen by your account it’s wise endurance that would be courage.

LachesIt seems so.

SocratesLet’s see, then: wise about what? About everything, great and small? For instance, suppose someone shows endurance in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending it he’ll gain more. Would you call him brave?

LachesBy Zeus, I wouldn’t.

SocratesOr suppose someone is a doctor, and his son or someone else has pneumonia and begs him for something to drink or eat, 193a and he doesn’t give in but endures?

LachesNo, that’s not courage at all either.

SocratesNow take a man in war who endures and is willing to fight, on the basis of wise calculation. He knows that others will come to his aid, that he’ll be fighting against fewer and weaker men than those on his side, and that he also holds the stronger position. Would you say this man, enduring with that kind of understanding and preparation, is braver than the man in the opposing camp who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

LachesThe man in the opposing camp, I’d say, Socrates.

SocratesAnd yet his endurance is more foolish than the other man’s.

LachesThat’s true.

SocratesSo you’ll also say that the man who endures in a cavalry battle with a knowledge of horsemanship is less brave than the one without that knowledge.

LachesI think so.

SocratesAnd the same for the man who endures with skill at slinging or archery or some other art.

LachesCertainly.

SocratesAnd people who are willing to go down into a well and dive, and to endure in that work, or in any other work like it, without being skilled at it—you’ll say they’re braver than those who are skilled at it.

LachesWhat else could anyone say, Socrates?

SocratesNothing, if that’s what he thought.

LachesWell, it’s what I think.

SocratesAnd yet, Laches, people like that take risks and endure more foolishly than those who do it with skill.

LachesApparently.

SocratesNow didn’t foolish daring and endurance turn out earlier to be shameful and harmful?

LachesCertainly.

SocratesWhereas courage was agreed to be something fine.

LachesYes, that was agreed.

SocratesBut now we’re saying the opposite, that the shameful thing, foolish endurance, is courage.

LachesIt seems we are.

SocratesSo do you think we’re speaking well?

LachesBy Zeus, Socrates, I certainly don’t.

SocratesSo it seems, Laches, that by your own account you and I aren’t tuned to the Dorian mode. 193e Our deeds aren’t in harmony with our words. In deed, it seems, someone might say we have a share of courage. But in word, I imagine, he wouldn’t, if he heard us talking just now.

LachesThat’s perfectly true.

SocratesWell then? Do you think it’s a fine thing for us to be in this state?

LachesNot in the least.

SocratesThen shall we obey what we’re saying, at least this far?

LachesHow far? And obey what?

SocratesThe argument that tells us to endure. So, if you’re willing, let’s stand firm in our search and endure. That way courage itself won’t laugh at us for not searching for it courageously, in case endurance turns out after all to be courage.

LachesI’m ready not to quit before the end, Socrates. Mind you, I’m not used to arguments like this. But a kind of competitive spirit has taken hold of me over what’s been said, and I’m honestly annoyed 194b that I can’t put what I think into words this way. I do seem to myself to understand what courage is. But somehow it slipped away from me just now, so I couldn’t pin it down in words and say what it is.

SocratesWell, my friend, a good hunter has to keep up the chase and not give up.

LachesAbsolutely.

SocratesThen shall we call Nicias here to join the hunt too, in case he’s better at finding a way than we are?

LachesYes, let’s. Why not?

SocratesCome on, then, Nicias. Your friends are caught in a storm of argument and don’t know where to turn. Help us, if you have any power to. You can see how stuck we are. Tell us what you think courage is, and free us from our perplexity. At the same time you’ll make your own thinking secure by putting it into words.

NiciasWell, Socrates, it seems to me you two have been defining courage badly for some time now. You’re not making use of something I’ve heard you say, and say well.

SocratesWhat’s that, Nicias?

NiciasI’ve often heard you say that each of us is good at the things he’s wise about, and bad at the things he’s ignorant of.

SocratesBy Zeus, Nicias, that’s true.

NiciasSo if the brave man is good, clearly he’s wise.

SocratesDid you hear that, Laches?

LachesI did, and I don’t really understand what he means.

SocratesBut I think I do. I think the man is saying that courage is a kind of wisdom.

LachesWhat kind of wisdom, Socrates?

SocratesIsn’t that a question for him?

LachesIt is.

SocratesGo on, then, Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom courage would be on your account. Surely it isn’t the wisdom of playing the pipes.

NiciasNot at all.

SocratesNor of playing the lyre.

NiciasCertainly not.

SocratesThen what is it? Knowledge of what?

LachesYou’re asking him exactly the right question, Socrates. Let him tell us what he says it is.

LachesWhat a strange thing to say, Socrates!

SocratesWhat did you have in mind when you said that, Laches?

LachesWhat did I have in mind? Wisdom is surely something separate from courage.

SocratesNicias, at any rate, says it isn’t.

LachesNo, by Zeus, he doesn’t. That’s exactly why he’s talking nonsense.

SocratesThen let’s teach him instead of abusing him.

NiciasNo, Socrates. It seems to me Laches wants me to be shown up as saying nothing too, since he was just shown up 195b that way himself.

LachesAbsolutely, Nicias, and I’ll try to prove it, because you’re saying nothing. Take an obvious case. In illness, isn’t it doctors who know what’s to be feared? Or do you think it’s the brave who know? Or do you call doctors brave?

NiciasNot in the least.

LachesNor farmers either, I suppose. And yet they surely know what’s to be feared in farming. All the other craftsmen know what’s to be feared and 195c what’s to be dared in their own crafts. But that doesn’t make them any braver.

SocratesWhat do you think Laches is saying, Nicias? He does seem to be saying something.

NiciasYes, he’s saying something. It just isn’t true.

SocratesHow so?

NiciasBecause he thinks doctors know something more about the sick than how to tell what’s healthy and what’s diseased. Surely that’s all they know. If for someone being healthy is more to be feared than being sick, do you think the doctors know that, Laches? Or don’t you think that for many people it would be better not to get up from their sickness than to get up? Tell me this. 195d Do you say it’s better for everyone to live, and that for many it isn’t better to be dead?

LachesI do think that much, at least.

NiciasThen do you think the same things are to be feared by those who’d be better off dead and by those who’d be better off alive?

LachesI don’t.

NiciasWell, do you grant the knowledge of this to doctors, or to any other craftsman? Or only to the one who knows what is to be feared and what isn’t, the man I call brave?

SocratesDo you see what he means, Laches?

LachesI do. He’s calling seers the brave ones. Who else will know whether it’s better for someone to live or to die? So tell me, Nicias, which is it? Do you admit to being a seer, or are you neither a seer nor brave?

NiciasWhat? So now you think it’s the seer’s business to know what’s to be feared and what’s to be dared?

LachesI do. Whose else?

NiciasFar more the man I’m talking about, my good friend. A seer only has to know the signs of what’s going to happen: whether someone will meet with death, or illness, or loss of property, 196a or victory or defeat, in war or in any other contest. But whether it’s better for someone to suffer these things or not, why should judging that be the seer’s business any more than anyone else’s?

LachesWell, I don’t understand what he’s getting at, Socrates. He doesn’t make clear that the brave man he means is a seer, or a doctor, or anyone else at all, unless he’s saying it’s some god. It looks to me as if Nicias isn’t willing 196b to admit like a man of honor that he’s saying nothing. Instead he twists this way and that to hide his own perplexity. Yet you and I could have twisted around like that just now, if we’d wanted to avoid seeming to contradict ourselves. If we were arguing in a law court, there might be some point in doing this. But in a gathering like this one, why would anyone dress himself up for nothing with empty words?

SocratesI don’t see any point either, Laches. But let’s make sure Nicias doesn’t think he’s saying something real, and isn’t just saying it for argument’s sake. Let’s ask him more clearly what exactly he has in mind. If he turns out to be saying something, we’ll agree with him. If not, we’ll teach him.

LachesYou ask him, then, Socrates, if you want to. I’ve probably asked enough.

SocratesNothing’s stopping me. The questioning will be on behalf of us both.

LachesCertainly.

SocratesTell me, then, Nicias—or rather tell us, since Laches and I are partners 196d in this argument—do you say courage is knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared?

NiciasI do.

SocratesAnd that this isn’t something every man can know, since neither a doctor nor a seer will know it, nor will he be brave, unless he acquires this particular knowledge as well? Isn’t that what you were saying?

NiciasYes, it is.

SocratesSo really, as the proverb says, it isn’t something “any pig would know,” and no pig could become brave.note

NiciasI don’t think so.

SocratesClearly, then, Nicias, you don’t believe even the Crommyonian sow was brave. I’m not joking. I think anyone who says this has to deny courage to every wild animal. Otherwise he has to grant that some animal is so wise that a lion, or a leopard, or some boar knows what few human beings know, because it’s so hard to know. Anyone who defines courage as you do has to say that a lion and a deer, a bull and a monkey, are equally suited by nature for courage.note

LachesBy the gods, that’s well said, Socrates. Give us an honest answer, Nicias. Do you say these animals, which we all agree are brave, are wiser than we are? Or do you dare to go against everyone and not even call them brave?

NiciasNo, Laches. I don’t call animals brave, or anything else that has no fear of what’s to be feared because it lacks sense. I call it fearless and stupid. Or do you think I call all children 197b brave too, who are afraid of nothing because they have no sense? No. I think being fearless and being brave aren’t the same thing. In my view very few people have courage and forethought. But a great many have boldness, daring, and fearlessness without forethought: men, women, children, and animals. So the actions that you and most people call brave, I 197c call bold. The brave ones are the wise ones I’m talking about.

LachesLook, Socrates, how nicely he dresses himself up with this argument—or so he thinks. And the men everyone agrees are brave, he’s trying to rob of that honor.

NiciasNot you, Laches—don’t worry. I say you’re wise, and Lamachus too, given that you’re both brave, and plenty of other Athenians as well.note

LachesI won’t answer that, though I could, so you won’t say I really am a man from Aixone.note

SocratesDon’t say anything, Laches. In fact I don’t think you’ve even noticed where he got this wisdom. It’s from our friend Damon, and Damon spends a lot of time with Prodicus, who’s thought to be the best of the sophists at drawing distinctions between words like these.note

LachesWell, Socrates, that sort of hair-splitting suits a sophist better than a man the city thinks fit to lead it.

SocratesSurely, my dear friend, it suits a man in charge of the greatest affairs to have the greatest understanding. But I think Nicias deserves to be examined, to see what he has in view when he gives the name courage to this.

LachesExamine him yourself, then, Socrates.

SocratesThat’s what I intend to do, my good friend. But don’t think I’ll let you off your share in the argument. Pay attention and examine what’s said along with me.

LachesAll right, if you think I have to.

SocratesI do. Now, Nicias, tell us again from 198a the beginning. You know that at the start of the discussion we were examining courage as a part of excellence?

NiciasCertainly.

SocratesAnd you too answered on the basis that it’s a part, and that there are other parts as well, which all together are called excellence?

NiciasOf course.

SocratesThen do you mean the same parts I do? Besides courage I count moderation, justice, and a few others of that kind. Don’t you?

NiciasCertainly.

SocratesHold on, then. We agree on that. Now let’s look into what’s to be feared and what’s to be dared, so you don’t think one thing and we another. We’ll tell you what we think, and if you don’t agree, you’ll teach us. We think that what’s to be feared is whatever causes fear, and what’s to be dared is whatever doesn’t. And fear is caused not by evils that have already happened or are present, but by evils that are expected, since fear is the expectation of an evil to come. Or don’t you share this view, Laches?

LachesVery much so, Socrates.

SocratesThere’s our view, then, Nicias. We say that what’s to be feared is evils to come, and what’s to be dared is things to come that are either not evil or good. Do you put it this way, or some other way?

NiciasThis way.

SocratesAnd it’s knowledge of these that you call courage?

NiciasExactly.

SocratesThen let’s look at a third point too, and see whether you and we agree on it.

NiciasWhat point is that?

SocratesI’ll explain. My friend here and I think that, for any subject there’s knowledge of, it isn’t one knowledge that knows how past things happened, another how present things are happening, and another how what hasn’t happened yet might best happen and will happen. It’s the same knowledge.

LachesWe shall.

SocratesWell, Nicias? Do you agree with us that the same knowledge understands the same things, whether they’re future, present, or past?

NiciasI do. That’s how it seems to me, Socrates.

SocratesThen, my good friend, courage is knowledge of what is to be feared 199b and what is to be dared, as you say. Isn’t that so?

NiciasYes.

SocratesAnd it’s been agreed that the things to be dared are future goods, and the things to be feared are future evils.

NiciasCertainly.

SocratesAnd that the same knowledge deals with the same things, whether they’re in the future or in any state at all.

NiciasThat’s right.

SocratesSo courage isn’t only knowledge of what’s to be feared and what’s to be dared. It understands goods and evils not only in the future, but also in the present and the past 199c and in any state at all, just as the other kinds of knowledge do.

NiciasSo it seems.

SocratesSo, Nicias, the answer you gave us covers only about a third of courage. Yet we were asking what courage is as a whole. And now, it seems, on your account courage isn’t only knowledge of what’s to be feared and what’s to be dared. It would be more or less knowledge of all goods and evils in any state at all. That, 199d on your revised account, is what courage would be. Do you accept the change, Nicias, or what do you say?

NiciasI accept it, Socrates.

SocratesThen do you think, my remarkable friend, that a man like this would lack any part of excellence, if he really knew all good things, and exactly how they come about, will come about, and have come about, and the same for evil things? Do you think he’d be lacking in moderation, or in justice and piety? He alone, in dealings with gods and with human beings alike, is the one whose task it is to guard against what’s to be feared and what 199e isn’t, and to secure good things, since he knows how to deal with them rightly.

NiciasI think there’s something in what you say, Socrates.

SocratesThen, Nicias, what you’re describing now wouldn’t be a part of excellence, but excellence as a whole.

NiciasSo it seems.

SocratesAnd yet we said courage was one of the parts of excellence.

NiciasWe did.

SocratesBut what we’re describing now doesn’t appear to be a part.

NiciasIt doesn’t seem so.

SocratesSo we haven’t found what courage is, Nicias.

NiciasApparently not.

LachesAnd here I was, my dear Nicias, thinking you’d find it, 200a since you looked down on me while I was answering Socrates. I had very high hopes that you’d track it down with the wisdom you got from Damon.

NiciasVery nice, Laches. You think it no longer matters that you yourself were just shown to know nothing about courage. All you care about is whether I’ll be shown up as another of the same sort. It won’t make any difference to you anymore, it seems, that you and I both know nothing of what a man who thinks he amounts to something ought to understand. You, 200b it seems to me, are doing a thoroughly human thing: looking not at yourself but at others. As for me, I think what I’ve said on our subject has been reasonable enough for now. And if any of it hasn’t been put adequately, I’ll correct it later with the help of Damon—whom you think you can laugh at, though you’ve never even laid eyes on him—and of others. And once I’ve made it secure, I’ll teach you too, and I won’t begrudge it. You seem 200c to me to be in great need of learning.

LachesYou’re a wise man, Nicias, no doubt about it. All the same, my advice to Lysimachus here and Melesias is to say goodbye to you and me where the boys’ education is concerned, and, as I said from the start, not to let Socrates here go. If my own boys were of that age, I’d do exactly the same.

NiciasI agree with that too. If Socrates is willing to take care of the young men, they shouldn’t look for anyone else. In fact, 200d I’d be delighted to entrust Niceratus to him, if he were willing. But every time I bring up the subject with him, he introduces me to other people and won’t do it himself. Still, Lysimachus, see whether Socrates might listen to you more.note

LysimachusThat would only be fair, Nicias, since I’d be willing to do a great deal for him that I wouldn’t be willing to do for many others. So what do you say, Socrates? Will you listen to us and share our eagerness for the boys to become as good as possible?

SocratesYes, Lysimachus, it would be a terrible thing to be unwilling to share anyone’s eagerness to become as good as possible. Now if, in the conversations just now, I had seemed to know and these two not to, it would be right to call on me above all for this work. But as it is, we all ended up equally at a loss. So why would anyone choose any one of us over the others? In my own view, 201a none of us. But since that’s how things stand, see whether my advice seems worth anything to you. I say, gentlemen—and this stays between us—that we should all join together in looking for the best teacher we can find, first for ourselves, since we need one, and then for the young men, sparing neither money nor anything else. What I don’t advise is that we leave ourselves as we are now.

LysimachusI like what you say, Socrates. And the older I am, the more eager I am to learn along with the young men. But do this for me. Tomorrow 201c at dawn, come to my house—don’t fail me—so we can consult about these very matters. For now, let’s bring our gathering to a close.

SocratesI’ll do that, Lysimachus. I’ll come to you tomorrow, god willing.