Ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι φόβοι τε καὶ θάρρη ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τίνος ἂν εἶεν; ἢ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης ψυχῆς σώματι, ἢ τρίτου τινὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· ἢ γὰρ τοῦτο μῖγμα, ἢ ἄλλο ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων γινόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ δοξαζόμενα. καὶ οὖν καὶ διάνοια καὶ δόξα ζητητέαι, πότερα ὧν τὰ πάθη, ἢ αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλως. καὶ τὰς νοήσεις δὲ θεωρητέον πῶς καὶ τίνος, καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπισκοποῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιούμενον τί ποτ’ ἂν εἴη. καὶ πρότερον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τίνος; ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι προσήκει, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάθη ἢ αἰσθήσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.
Pleasures and distresses, fears and feelings of confidence, desires and aversions, and pain: whose would these be? They belong either to the soul, or to the soul when it uses a body, or to some third thing made from both. And this last can be taken in two ways: either it is the mixture itself, or something else, different, that comes from the mixture. The same goes for whatever results from these affections: what is done and what is believed. So discursive thought and opinion must also be examined. Do they belong to the same thing as the affections, or do some belong to it in this way and others in another? We must also consider acts of thinking, how they happen and whose they are. And we must ask what this very thing is that examines these questions and carries out the inquiry and the judging. Before all this: whose is perceiving? That is where we ought to begin, since the affections are either perceptions of some kind or do not occur without perception.
πρῶτον δὲ ψυχὴν ληπτέον, πότερον ἄλλο μὲν ψυχή, ἄλλο δὲ ψυχῇ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, σύνθετόν τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἤδη δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰ ἐπιτρέψει καὶ οὕτως ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅλως ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις χείρους καὶ βελτίους. ἤ, εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι, εἶδός τι ἂν εἴη ψυχὴ ἄδεκτον τούτων ἁπασῶν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὧν ἐποιστικὸν ἄλλῳ, ἑαυτῷ δὲ συμφυᾶ ἔχον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἥντινα ἂν φήνῃ ὁ λόγος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατον ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἀπαθὲς εἶναι, ἄλλῳ ἑαυτοῦ πως διδόν, αὐτὸ δὲ παρ’ ἄλλου μηδὲν ἢ ὅσον παρὰ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν, ὧν μὴ ἀποτέτμηται κρειττόνων ὄντων.
First we must find out whether soul is one thing and being-soul another. If so, soul is something composite. Then it is no longer absurd for it to receive such affections and for them to be its own, if the argument allows even this. The same holds in general for better and worse states and dispositions. Or, if soul and being-soul are the same, soul would be a form, unable to receive any of these activities, which it brings to something else. It would have within itself an activity native to it, whatever the argument shows that to be. For in that case it is also true to call it immortal, if what is immortal and imperishable must be unaffected. It gives something of itself, in a way, to another, but itself has nothing from another, except what it has from what is prior to it. It is not cut off from those, since they are better.
τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ φοβοῖτο τοιοῦτον ἄδεκτον ὂν παντὸς τοῦ ἔξω; ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν φοβείσθω, ὃ δύναται παθεῖν. οὐδὲ θαρρεῖ τοίνυν· τούτοις γὰρ θάρρος, οἷς ἂν τὰ φοβερὰ παρῇ. ἐπιθυμίαι δὲ [πῶς], αἳ διὰ σώματος ἀποπληροῦνται κενουμένου καὶ πληρουμένου, ἄλλου τοῦ πληρουμένου καὶ κενουμένου ὄντος. πῶς δὲ μίξεως [δεκτικόν], εἰ τὸ οὐσιῶδες ἄμικτον. πῶς δὲ ἐπεισαγωγῆς τινων; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σπεύδοι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τὸ δ’ ἀλγεῖν ἔτι πόρρω. λυπεῖσθαι δὲ πῶς ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι; αὔταρκες γὰρ τό γε ἁπλοῦν ἐν οὐσίᾳ, οἷόν ἐστι μένον ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ αὑτοῦ. ἥδεται δὲ προσγενομένου τίνος, οὐδενὸς οὐδ’ ἀγαθοῦ προσιόντος; ὃ γάρ ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἀεί.
For what would such a thing fear, when it cannot receive anything from outside? Let fear belong, then, to what can be affected. Nor is it confident, then: confidence belongs to those to whom frightening things are present. And desires [how?], which are satisfied through the body as it is emptied and filled, and what is filled and emptied is something else. And how [could it receive] mixture, if what is essential is unmixed? How could anything be brought into it? It would then be hurrying toward not being what it is. Pain is still further off. And how could it be distressed, or over what? What is simple in its being is self-sufficient, since it is such as to remain in its own being. Will it feel pleasure when something comes to it, when nothing comes to it, not even a good? For what it is, it always is.
καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἴσθησις ἔσται οὐδὲ διάνοια οὐδὲ δόξα περὶ αὐτό· αἴσθησις γὰρ παραδοχὴ εἴδους ἢ ἀπαθοῦς σώματος, διάνοια δὲ καὶ δόξα ἐπ’ αἴσθησιν. περὶ δὲ νοήσεως ἐπισκεπτέον πῶς, εἰ ταύτην αὐτῇ καταλείψομεν· καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς αὖ καθαρᾶς, εἰ συμβαίνει περὶ αὐτὴν μόνην οὖσαν.
Nor, again, will perception, discursive thought or opinion have anything to do with it. Perception is the reception of a form, or of an unaffected body, and discursive thought and opinion depend on perception. As for thinking, we must consider how it works, if we are going to leave this to the soul. We must also ask about pure pleasure, whether it occurs to the soul when it is alone.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν σώματι θετέον ψυχήν, οὖσαν εἴτε πρὸ τούτου, εἴτ’ ἐν τούτῳ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ αὐτῆς ζῷον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη. χρωμένη μὲν οὖν σώματι οἷα ὀργάνῳ οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται δέξασθαι τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ὀργάνων παθήματα οἱ τεχνῖται· αἴσθησιν δὲ τάχ’ ἂν ἀναγκαίως, εἴπερ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῷ ὀργάνῳ γινωσκούσῃ τὰ ἔξωθεν παθήματα ἐξ αἰσθήσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι ὄμμασίν ἔστιν ὁρᾶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ βλάβαι περὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ὥστε καὶ λῦπαι καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ ὅλως ὅ τι περ ἂν περὶ σῶμα πᾶν γίγνηται· ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ζητούσης τὴν θεραπείαν τοῦ ὀργάνου. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς αὐτὴν ἥξει τὰ πάθη; σῶμα μὲν γὰρ σώματι ἄλλῳ μεταδώσει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, σῶμα δὲ ψυχῇ πῶς;
But we must place soul in body, whether it exists before this body or in it, since it is from body and soul together that the whole has been called a living being. If it uses the body as a tool, it is not forced to receive the affections that come through the body, any more than craftsmen receive the affections of their tools. Perception, though, it might perhaps have to receive, if it must use the tool and know the external affections through perception, since using eyes is seeing. But seeing can also be damaged, and so there are distresses and pain, and in general whatever happens to the body as a whole. So there are desires too, as the soul seeks care for its tool. But how will the affections reach the soul from the body? A body will pass on what is its own to another body. But how will a body pass anything on to a soul?
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν οἷον ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλο παθεῖν. μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ ᾧ χρῆται, χωρίς ἐστιν ἑκάτερον· χωρίζει γοῦν ὁ τὸ χρώμενον διδούς. ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ χωρίσαι διὰ φιλοσοφίας αὐτὸ πῶς εἶχεν; ἢ ἐμέμικτο. ἀλλὰ εἰ ἐμέμικτο, ἢ κρᾶσίς τις ἦν, ἢ ὡς διαπλακεῖσα, ἢ ὡς εἶδός τι κεχωρισμένον, ἢ εἶδος ἐφαπτόμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐκείνως· λέγω δὴ τὸ μὲν κεχωρισμένον, ὅπερ τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ μεμιγμένον ὁπωσοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ ὂν ἐν τάξει τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ἵνα τοῦτο ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ αὐτὸ ἐπιστρέφῃ πρὸς τὸ χρώμενον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον ἀπάγῃ, ὅσον μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ὡς μὴ ἀεὶ χρῆσθαι.
That would be like one thing being affected because another is. For as long as one is the user and the other what is used, each is separate. At any rate, whoever makes soul the user separates them. But before one separates it through philosophy, how was it? It was mixed, presumably. But if it was mixed, there are several options. It was some kind of blend. Or it was woven through. Or it was like a separate form, or a form in contact, like the pilot. Or one part of it was in one way and another part in another. I mean that one part is separate, namely the user, and another is mixed in some way and ranks with what is used. Then philosophy can turn this part, too, back toward the user, and lead the user away from what it uses, as far as is not absolutely necessary, so that it does not always use it.
θῶμεν τοίνυν μεμῖχθαι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μέμικται, τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔσται βέλτιον, τὸ δὲ [βέλτιον] χεῖρον· καὶ βέλτιον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ζωῆς μεταλαβόν, χεῖρον δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ θανάτου καὶ ἀλογίας. τὸ δὴ ἀφαιρεθὲν ὁπωσοῦν ζωῆς πῶς ἂν προσθήκην λάβοι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; τοὐναντίον δ’ ἂν τὸ σῶμα ζωὴν λαβὸν τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως παθημάτων μεταλαμβάνον. τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ὀρέξεται· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀπολαύσει ὧν ὀρέγεται καὶ φοβήσεται περὶ αὑτοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ οὐ τεύξεται τῶν ἡδέων καὶ φθαρήσεται. ζητητέον δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μίξεως, μήποτε οὐ δυνατὸς ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι μεμῖχθαι λευκῷ γραμμήν, φύσιν ἄλλην ἄλλῃ.
Let us suppose, then, that it has been mixed. But if it is mixed, the worse will become better, and the [better] worse. The body becomes better by getting a share of life, and the soul worse by getting a share of death and irrationality. Then how could what has lost life in some way gain perceiving as an addition? On the contrary, it would be the body, having received life, that partakes of perception and of the affections that come from perception. So this is what will desire, since this is what will enjoy what it desires. And it will fear for itself, since this is what will miss out on pleasant things and will perish. We must also investigate the manner of the mixture. Perhaps it is not possible at all, as if someone said a line had been mixed with white: one nature with another of a different kind.
τὸ δὲ διαπλακεῖσα οὐ ποιεῖ ὁμοπαθῆ τὰ διαπλακέντα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ διαπλακὲν καὶ ἔστι ψυχὴν διαπεφοιτηκυῖαν μήτι πάσχειν τὰ ἐκείνου πάθη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ οὕτω, δι’ ὅλου ὡς διαπεπλέχθαι. οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὖν πείσεται τὰ σώματος πάθη, ὅτι διαπέπλεκται, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ἔσται ἐν τῷ σώματι. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ὡς χωριστὸν εἶδος ἔσται, εἴπερ οὐσία, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον· εἰ δὲ ὡς τῷ πελέκει τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ σιδήρῳ, καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον ποιήσει ἃ ποιεῖ ὁ σίδηρος ὁ οὕτως ἐσχηματισμένος, κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα μέντοι, μᾶλλον ἂν τῷ σώματι διδοῖμεν ὅσα κοινὰ πάθη, τῷ μέντοι τοιούτῳ, τῷ φυσικῷ, ὀργανικῷ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντι.
Being woven through does not make the interwoven things share the same affections. What is woven through can be unaffected. The soul can pass right through and not undergo the body’s affections, just like light, especially if it is woven through the whole in this way. So it will not undergo the body’s affections just because it is interwoven. Rather, it will be in the body as form is in matter. But first, it will be like a separable form, if it is a substance, and even more so if it is there as the user. But suppose it is like the shape of an axe in the iron, and the compound will do what iron so shaped does, in virtue of its shape, that is. Then we should rather assign the shared affections to the body. But to body of this kind: natural, equipped with organs, having life potentially.
καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπόν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν λέγειν, ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῷον μᾶλλον.
Indeed, he says it is absurd to say that the soul weaves, and so also that it desires and is distressed. It is rather the living being that does these things.
ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῷον ἢ τὸ σῶμα δεῖ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε, ἢ τὸ κοινόν, ἢ ἕτερόν τι τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γεγενημένον. ὅπως δ’ ἂν ἔχῃ, ἤτοι ἀπαθῆ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάττειν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γενομένην ἄλλῳ τοῦ τοιούτου, ἢ συμπάσχειν καὶ αὐτήν· καὶ ἢ ταὐτὸν πάσχουσαν πάθημα πάσχειν, ἢ ὅμοιόν τι, οἷον ἄλλως μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δὲ συναμφότερον οἷον λυπεῖσθαι πῶς; ἆρα, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος οὑτωσὶ διατεθέντος καὶ μέχρις αἰσθήσεως διελθόντος τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἰς ψυχὴν τελευτώσης; ἀλλ’ ἡ αἴσθησις οὔπω δῆλον πῶς.
But by “the living being” we must mean either the body of this kind, or the common entity, or some other third thing that has come from both. Whichever it is, either we must keep the soul unaffected while it causes this sort of thing in something else, or it is affected along with it. In that case it undergoes either the same affection or a similar one. For instance, the living being desires in one way, and the desiring part is active or affected in another. The body of this kind we must consider later. But how is the compound distressed, for instance? Is it that the body is disposed in a certain way, the affection passes as far as perception, and the perception ends in soul? But how perception works is not yet clear.
ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἡ λύπη ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ κρίσεως λάβῃ τοῦ κακόν τι παρεῖναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἤ τινι τῶν οἰκείων, εἶτ’ ἐντεῦθεν τροπὴ λυπηρὰ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ ζῷον γένηται; ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς δόξης οὔπω δῆλον τίνος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου· εἶτα ἡ μὲν δόξα ἡ περὶ τὸ κακὸν τὸ τῆς λύπης οὐκ ἔχει πάθος· καὶ γὰρ δυνατὸν τῆς δόξης παρούσης μὴ πάντως ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, μηδ’ αὖ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι δόξης τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι γενομένης, μηδ’ αὖ ἀγαθοῦ δόξης κινεῖσθαι τὴν ὄρεξιν. πῶς οὖν κοινὰ ταῦτα; ἤ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς τοῦ θυμικοῦ καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ ἡ ἐπί τι ἔκτασις;
Or is it that distress begins from an opinion and judgment that something bad is present, either to oneself or to someone close, and that a distressing change then passes from there into the body and, in general, into the whole living being? But here too it is not yet clear whose the opinion is, the soul’s or the compound’s. Then, the opinion about the bad does not contain the affection of distress. It is possible for the opinion to be present and distress not to follow at all. In the same way, anger need not arise when one has formed the opinion of being slighted, and desire need not be stirred by the opinion of a good. So how are these things common? Is it because desire belongs to the desiring part, anger to the spirited part, and, in general, reaching out toward something to the appetitive part?
ἀλλ’ οὕτως οὐκέτι κοινὰ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης, ἢ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι δεῖ αἷμα καὶ χολὴν ζέσαι καί πως διατεθὲν τὸ σῶμα τὴν ὄρεξιν κινῆσαι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀφροδισίων. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις μὴ κοινὸν πάθημα ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἔσται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ πάντα τῷ κοινῷ δίδωσιν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ ὀρεγομένου ἀφροδισίων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν, ἔσται δὲ ἄλλως καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐπιθυμοῦν. καὶ πῶς; ἆρα ἄρξει μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπακολουθήσει δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἀλλὰ πῶς ὅλως ἐπεθύμησεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κεκινημένου; ἀλλ’ ἄρξει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ πρότερον οὑτωσὶ διατεθέντος πόθεν ἄρξεται;
But then they will no longer be common. They will belong to the soul alone, or to the body too, since blood and bile must boil and the body must be in some state to stir desire, as in the case of sex. Desire for the good, however, will not be a common affection but the soul’s, as other things are too; the argument does not give everything to the common entity. Yet when a man desires sex, it will be the man who desires, and in another way it will be the desiring part that desires. And how? Will the man begin the desire and the desiring part follow? But how could the man desire at all if the desiring part had not been moved? Then the desiring part will begin. But where will it begin from, if the body has not first been disposed in this way?
ἀλλ’ ἴσως βέλτιον εἰπεῖν καθόλου τῷ παρεῖναι τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ ἐνεργοῦντα κατ’ αὐτάς, αὐτὰς δὲ ἀκινήτους εἶναι χορηγούσας τὸ δύνασθαι τοῖς ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτό ἐστι, πάσχοντος τοῦ ζῴου τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ζῆν τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ δοῦσαν ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ ἔχοντος ὄντων. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅλως οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ἔσται· ἢ τὸ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ζῆν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔσται· καὶ ἡ δύναμις δὲ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ σώματος κίνησις οὖσα εἰς ψυχὴν τελευτᾷ, πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται; ἢ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αἰσθητικῆς παρούσης τῷ ταύτην παρεῖναι αἰσθήσεται. τί [οὖν] αἰσθήσεται; τὸ συναμφότερον.
But perhaps it is better to say, in general, that when powers are present it is the things that have them that act in accordance with them, while the powers themselves are unmoved and supply the capacity to those that have them. But if so, when the living being is affected, what gives the compound its cause of life must itself be unaffected, while the affections and activities belong to what has it. But if so, living as a whole will also belong not to the soul but to the compound. Or rather, the life of the compound will not be the soul’s. And the perceptive power will not perceive; what has the power will. But if perception, being a movement through the body, ends in soul, how will the soul not perceive? Or rather, with the perceptive power present, it will perceive by that power’s being present. What will perceive [then]? The compound.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ δύναμις μὴ κινήσεται, πῶς ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον μὴ συναριθμουμένης ψυχῆς μηδὲ τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως;
But if the power is not going to be moved, how is it still the compound that perceives, when neither soul nor the soul’s power is counted in?
ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἔσται τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ παρεῖναι οὐχ αὑτὴν δούσης τῆς τοιαύτης εἰς τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ εἰς θάτερον, ἀλλὰ ποιούσης ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τοιούτου καί τινος οἷον φωτὸς τοῦ παρ’ αὐτῆς δοθέντος τὴν τοῦ ζῴου φύσιν ἕτερόν τι, οὗ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα ζῴου πάθη εἴρηται. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡμεῖς αἰσθανόμεθα; ἤ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπηλλάγημεν τοῦ τοιούτου ζῴου, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἡμῖν τιμιώτερα εἰς τὴν ὅλην ἀνθρώπου οὐσίαν ἐκ πολλῶν οὖσαν πάρεστι. τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμιν οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶναι δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγιγνομένων τῷ ζῴῳ τύπων ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι μᾶλλον· νοητὰ γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα· ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν ἔξω εἴδωλον εἶναι ταύτης, ἐκείνην δὲ ἀληθεστέραν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὖσαν εἰδῶν μόνον ἀπαθῶς εἶναι θεωρίαν.
Or rather, it will be the compound, by the soul’s presence. The soul does not give itself, as it is, to the compound or to the other member. Out of the body of this kind and a sort of light given from itself, it makes the nature of the living being, which is something different. Perceiving belongs to this, along with all the other affections said to belong to the living being. But how do we perceive? Because we have not been released from such a living being, even if other, more valuable things are also present in us, contributing to the whole being of a human, which is made of many. The soul’s power of perceiving should not be perception of sensible things. It should rather be the power to apprehend the impressions that perception produces in the living being, for these are already intelligible. So external perception is an image of this one. This one is truer in its being: a contemplation of forms alone, without being affected.
ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφ’ ὧν ψυχὴ ἤδη παραδέχεται μόνη τὴν τοῦ ζῴου ἡγεμονίαν, διάνοιαι δὴ καὶ δόξαι καὶ νοήσεις· ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα. τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡμέτερα, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄνω ἐφεστηκότες τῷ ζῴῳ. κωλύσει δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ σύμπαν ζῷον λέγειν, μικτὸν μὲν τὰ κάτω, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθὴς σχεδόν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὸ λεοντῶδες καὶ τὸ ποικίλον ὅλως θηρίον. συνδρόμου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν λογιζώμεθα, ἡμεῖς λογιζόμεθα τῷ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἐνεργήματα.
From these forms, through which the soul alone now takes over the leadership of the living being, come discursive thoughts, opinions and acts of thinking. And this is where we most of all are. What comes before these is ours, but we are what, from here upward, presides over the living being. Nothing prevents us from calling the whole a living being, mixed in its lower parts, while from here on it is more or less the true human being. Those lower parts are “the lion-like” and, in general, “the many-colored beast.” For since the human being coincides with the rational soul, when we reason it is we who reason, because acts of reasoning are activities of soul.
πρὸς δὲ τὸν νοῦν πῶς; νοῦν δὲ λέγω οὐχ ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἕξιν οὖσαν (τῶν) παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν. ἢ ἔχομεν καὶ τοῦτον ὑπεράνω ἡμῶν. ἔχομεν δὲ ἢ κοινὸν ἢ ἴδιον, ἢ καὶ κοινὸν πάντων καὶ ἴδιον· κοινὸν μέν, ὅτι ἀμέριστος καὶ εἷς καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ἴδιον δέ, ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτὸν ὅλον ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ. ἔχομεν οὖν καὶ τὰ εἴδη διχῶς, ἐν μὲν ψυχῇ οἷον ἀνειλιγμένα καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένα, ἐν δὲ νῷ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα. πρὸς δὲ θεὸν πῶς;
And how do we stand toward Intellect? By Intellect I do not mean the state the soul has, which is (one of the things) that come from Intellect, but Intellect itself. We have this too, as something above us. We have it either as common or as our own, or rather as both common to all and our own. It is common because it is undivided and one and the same everywhere; our own because each of us has the whole of it in the first soul. So we also have the Forms in two ways: in soul, as it were unrolled and as it were separated out; in Intellect, all together. And how do we stand toward god?
ἢ ὡς ἐποχούμενον τῇ νοητῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ὄντως, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τρίτους ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου, φησί, τῆς ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς, ἣν δὴ δεῖ νοεῖν οὕτω μεριστὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅτι δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν τοῖς σώματος μεγέθεσιν, ὁπόσον ἂν ζῷον ᾖ ἕκαστον, ἐπεὶ κἀν τῷ παντὶ ὅλῳ οὖσα μία· ἤ, ὅτι φαντάζεται τοῖς σώμασι παρεῖναι ἐλλάμπουσα εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσα οὐκ ἐξ αὑτῆς καὶ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μένουσα μὲν αὐτή, εἴδωλα δὲ αὑτῆς διδοῦσα, ὥσπερ πρόσωπον ἐν πολλοῖς κατόπτροις.
Or rather, as riding upon the intelligible nature and on what really is; and we are third from there, from the “undivided” nature, he says, which is above, and from “the nature divided about bodies.” We should understand this nature as divided about bodies in one of two senses. It gives itself to the magnitudes of body, however large each living being is, since even in the whole All it is one. Or it appears to be present to bodies by shining into them and making living beings, not out of itself and body. It remains itself, and gives images of itself, like a face in many mirrors.
πρῶτον δὲ εἴδωλον αἴσθησις ἡ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ· εἶτα ἀπὸ ταύτης αὖ πᾶν ἄλλο εἶδος λέγεται ψυχῆς, ἕτερον ἀφ’ ἑτέρου ἀεί, καὶ τελευτᾷ μέχρι γεννητικοῦ καὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ὅλως ποιήσεως ἄλλου καὶ ἀποτελεστικοῦ ἄλλου παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐπεστραμμένης αὐτῆς τῆς ποιούσης πρὸς τὸ ἀποτελούμενον.
The first image is the perception in the common entity. Then from this, in turn, every other form of soul is spoken of, each one always from another. It ends with the generative and growth-producing form and, in general, with what makes and brings to completion something other than the soul that makes it, since the making soul itself is turned toward what it is completing.
ἔσται τοίνυν ἐκείνης ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φύσις ἀπηλλαγμένη αἰτίας κακῶν, ὅσα ἄνθρωπος καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ταῦτα καὶ τὸ κοινόν, ὡς εἴρηται. ἀλλ’ εἰ δόξα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διάνοια, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος; ψευδὴς γὰρ δόξα καὶ πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν πράττεται τῶν κακῶν. ἢ πράττεται μὲν τὰ κακὰ ἡττωμένων ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος· πολλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς· ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ θυμοῦ ἢ εἰδώλου κακοῦ· ἡ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν λεγομένη διάνοια φαντασία οὖσα οὐκ ἀνέμεινε τὴν τοῦ διανοητικοῦ κρίσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπράξαμεν τοῖς χείροσι πεισθέντες, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὶν τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐπικρῖναι ψευδῆ ὁρᾶν συμβαίνει τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει. ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐκ ἐφήψατο, ὥστε ἀναμάρτητος.
So the nature of that soul of ours will be free of responsibility for the evils a human does and suffers, since these concern the living being, the common entity, as has been said. But if opinion and discursive thought belong to the soul, how is it free of fault? Opinion can be false, and many bad things are done in accordance with it. Or rather, bad things are done when we are overcome by what is worse in us, for we are many. We are overcome by desire, or anger, or a bad image. What is called thought about falsehoods is imagination, which did not wait for the judgment of the reasoning part. We acted persuaded by the worse parts, just as in perception the common perception sometimes sees falsely before the reasoning part has passed judgment. Intellect was not in contact with it, and so it is free of fault.
ἢ οὕτω δὴ λεκτέον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἢ ἐφηψάμεθα τοῦ ἐν τῷ νῷ νοητοῦ ἢ οὔ, (ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν)· δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ πρόχειρον ἔχειν. διείλομεν δὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῷ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι, ὅσα δὲ οὐ δεῖται σώματος εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ταῦτα ἴδια ψυχῆς εἶναι καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίκρισιν ποιουμένην τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τύπων εἴδη ἤδη θεωρεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν οἷον συναισθήσει, τήν γε κυρίως τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀληθοῦς διάνοιαν· νοήσεων γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ διάνοια ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλάκις πρὸς τἄνδον ὁμοιότης καὶ κοινωνία.
Or perhaps we should put it like this. Either we were in contact with what is intelligible in Intellect or we were not (or with what is in us), since it is possible to have it and not have it at hand. Now we distinguished what is common from what is the soul’s own as follows. What is common is bodily and does not exist without body. Whatever does not need body for its activity is the soul’s own. Discursive thought, when it judges the impressions that come from perception, is already contemplating forms. It contemplates them as it were by self-awareness, at least the discursive thought that belongs properly to the true soul. For true discursive thought is an activity of acts of thinking, and is often a likeness and communion of outer things with those within.
ἀτρεμήσει οὖν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ· αἱ δὲ τροπαὶ καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐν ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν συνηρτημένων καὶ τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὅ τι δήποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο, ὡς εἴρηται, παθημάτων.
So the soul will be at rest none the less, toward itself and in itself. The changes and the turmoil in us come from what is attached to us and from the affections of the common entity, whatever exactly that is, as has been said.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡμεῖς ἡ ψυχή, πάσχομεν δὲ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς, ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη πάσχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὖ ποιήσει ἃ ποιοῦμεν. ἢ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἔφαμεν ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα οὔπω κεχωρισμένων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἃ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φαμεν πάσχειν. διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου, ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἤδη· θηρίον δὲ ζῳωθὲν τὸ σῶμα. ὁ δ’ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὁ καθαρὸς τούτου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει, αἳ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χωριζομένῃ ψυχῇ ἵδρυνται, χωριζομένῃ δὲ καὶ χωριστῇ ἔτι ἐνταῦθα οὔσῃ· ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν αὕτη παντάπασιν ἀποστῇ, καὶ ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐλλαμφθεῖσα ἀπελήλυθε συνεπομένη. αἱ δ’ ἀρεταὶ αἱ μὴ φρονήσει, ἔθεσι δὲ ἐγγινόμεναι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι, τοῦ κοινοῦ· τούτου γὰρ αἱ κακίαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φθόνοι καὶ ζῆλοι καὶ ἔλεοι.
But if we are the soul, and we undergo these things, then the soul would undergo them, and again it will do what we do. Or rather, we said that the common entity is ours too, especially while we have not yet been separated. After all, we say that we suffer what our body suffers. So “we” is double: either with the beast counted in, or what is already above it. The beast is the body that has been brought to life. The true human being is another, the pure one. He has the virtues that belong to thinking, which are seated in the soul itself as it separates, separating and separable even while it is still here. For when this soul withdraws completely, what was illuminated by it also goes away, following along. But the virtues that come not from understanding but from habit and training belong to the common entity. The vices belong to it too, since so do envy, jealousy and pity.
φιλίαι δὲ τίνος; ἢ αἱ μὲν τούτου, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἔνδον ἀνθρώπου.
And whose are friendships? Some belong to the common entity, others to the inner human being.
παίδων δὲ ὄντων ἐνεργεῖ μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ συνθέτου, ὀλίγα δὲ ἐλλάμπει ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰς αὐτό. ὅταν δ’ ἀργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω· εἰς ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, ὅταν μέχρι τοῦ μέσου ἥκῃ. τί οὖν; οὐχ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου; ἀλλ’ ἀντίληψιν δεῖ γενέσθαι· οὐ γάρ, ὅσα ἔχομεν, τούτοις χρώμεθα ἀεί, ἀλλ’ ὅταν τὸ μέσον τάξωμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, (ἢ) ὅσα ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἕξεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγομεν. τὰ δὲ θηρία πῶς τὸ ζῷον ἔχει;
When we are children, the powers of the compound are active, and little shines into it from above. When it is inactive toward us, it is active toward what is above. It is active toward us when it reaches as far as the middle. What then? Are we not also what comes before this? Yes, but it must be apprehended. We do not always use everything we have, only when we direct the middle part either toward what is above or toward the opposite, (or) whatever we bring from potentiality or a settled state into activity. And how do animals have the living being?
ἢ εἰ μὲν ψυχαὶ εἶεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπειοι, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἁμαρτοῦσαι, οὐ τῶν θηρίων γίνεται τοῦτο, ὅσον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ παρὸν οὐ πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἡ συναίσθησις τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδωλον μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔχει· σῶμα δὴ τοιόνδε οἷον ποιωθὲν ψυχῆς εἰδώλῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ εἰσέδυ, ἐλλάμψει ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῷον γενόμενόν ἐστιν.
If there are human souls in them that have done wrong, as is said, then this soul, insofar as it is separable, does not come to belong to the animals. It is present, but not present to them. Their self-awareness has the image of soul along with the body. The body, then, is of this kind, qualified as it were by an image of soul. If no human soul has entered, then such a living being has come about by illumination from the whole Soul.
Faultless soul and punished soul
Plotinus reconciles the soul’s freedom from fault with punishment by assigning faults to the composite.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχή, πῶς αἱ δίκαι; ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀσυμφωνεῖ παντὶ λόγῳ, ὅς φησιν αὐτὴν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ καθαρθῆναι καὶ διδόναι δίκας (καὶ) ἐν ᾅδου καὶ μετενσωματοῦσθαι. προσθετέον μὲν οὖν ὅτῳ τις βούλεται λόγῳ· τάχα δ’ ἄν τις ἐξεύροι καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ μαχοῦνται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον διδοὺς τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος ἓν ἁπλοῦν πάντη ἐτίθετο τὸ αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι λέγων, ὁ δ’ ἁμαρτεῖν διδοὺς συμπλέκει μὲν καὶ προστίθησιν αὐτῇ καὶ ἄλλο ψυχῆς εἶδος τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ἔχον πάθη· σύνθετος οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἡ ψυχὴ αὕτη γίνεται καὶ πάσχει δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἁμαρτάνει τὸ σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ διδὸν δίκην αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο.
But if the soul is free of fault, how can there be punishments? Yet this argument is out of tune with every argument that says the soul errs, is purified, and pays penalties (both) in Hades and by passing into new bodies. One may side with whichever argument one likes, but perhaps one could find a way in which they will not conflict. The argument that grants the soul freedom from fault made it one thing, simple in every way, saying that soul and being-soul are the same. The one that grants that it errs weaves together with it, and adds to it, another form of soul, which has the terrible affections. So the soul becomes composite, the product of them all. It is affected as a whole, and it is the composite that errs. And this is what pays the penalty in its case, not that other.
ὅθεν φησί· ‘τεθεάμεθα γὰρ αὐτήν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες.’ δεῖ δὲ περικρούσαντας τὰ προστεθέντα, εἴπερ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν, φησίν, αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὧν ἐφάπτεται καὶ τίσι συγγενὴς οὖσα ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστιν. ἄλλη οὖν ζωὴ καὶ ἄλλαι ἐνέργειαι καὶ τὸ κολαζόμενον ἕτερον· ἡ δὲ ἀναχώρησις καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς οὐ μόνον τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅπαντος τοῦ προστεθέντος. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡ προσθήκη· ἢ ὅλως ἡ γένεσις τοῦ ἄλλου ψυχῆς εἴδους.
That is why he says: “We have seen it like those who see Glaucus of the sea.” But if one wants to see its nature, he says, one must knock off what has grown onto it. One must look to its love of wisdom, to see what it lays hold of and by kinship with what it is what it is. So there is another life and other activities, and what is punished is something else. The withdrawal and the separation is not only from this body but also from everything that has been added. For the addition comes about in coming into being; or rather, coming into being as a whole is the coming into being of the other form of soul.
τὸ δὲ πῶς ἡ γένεσις εἴρηται, ὅτι καταβαινούσης, ἄλλου του ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γινομένου τοῦ καταβαίνοντος ἐν τῇ νεύσει. ἆρ’ οὖν ἀφίησι τὸ εἴδωλον; καὶ ἡ νεῦσις δὲ πῶς οὐχ ἁμαρτία; ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ νεῦσις ἔλλαμψις πρὸς τὸ κάτω, οὐχ ἁμαρτία, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἡ σκιά, ἀλλ’ αἴτιον τὸ ἐλλαμπόμενον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη, οὐκ ἔχει ὅποι ἐλλάμψει. καταβαίνειν οὖν καὶ νεύειν λέγεται τῷ συνεζηκέναι αὐτῇ τὸ ἐλλαμφθὲν παρ’ αὐτῆς. ἀφίησιν οὖν τὸ εἴδωλον, εἰ μὴ ἐγγὺς τὸ ὑποδεξόμενον· ἀφίησι δὲ οὐ τῷ ἀποσχισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μηκέτι εἶναι· οὐκέτι δὲ ἔστιν, ἐὰν ἐκεῖ βλέπῃ ὅλη.
How this coming into being happens has already been said: when soul descends, something else comes from it, and this is what descends in the inclination. Does it then let go of the image? And how is the inclination not a fault? But if the inclination is an illumination toward what is below, it is not a fault, any more than a shadow is. What is responsible is what is illuminated: if that did not exist, it would have nowhere to shine. So soul is said to descend and incline because what it illuminates lives with it. It lets go of the image, then, if what is to receive it is not near. It lets go not by the image being cut off, but by its no longer existing. And it no longer exists if the soul looks There with the whole of itself.
χωρίζειν δὲ ἔοικεν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ διδοὺς ἐν ᾅδου, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐν θεοῖς εἶναι ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν λόγων κατεχόμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ὅτι ἐν ᾅδου· ἐμέρισε δ’ οὖν. τάχα δ’ ἂν οὕτω πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος εἴη· ὅτι δὴ πρακτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων Ἡρακλῆς καὶ ἀξιωθεὶς διὰ καλοκαγαθίαν θεὸς εἶναι, ὅτι πρακτικός, ἀλλ’ οὐ θεωρητικὸς ἦν, ἵνα ἂν ὅλος ἦν ἐκεῖ, ἄνω τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔτι ἐστί τι αὐτοῦ καὶ κάτω.
The poet seems to separate this in the case of Heracles. He gives his image a place in Hades, but places Heracles himself among the gods, held by both stories, that he is among the gods and that he is in Hades. At any rate, he divided him. Perhaps the story would be persuasive like this. Heracles had practical virtue and for his nobility was judged worthy to be a god. But because he was a man of action and not of contemplation, he is above, and yet something of him is also below. If he had been a man of contemplation, he would have been wholly There.
τὸ δὲ ἐπισκεψάμενον περὶ τούτων ἡμεῖς ἢ ἡ ψυχή; ἢ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ. τὸ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ πῶς; ἆρα τῷ ἔχειν ἐπεσκέψατο; ἢ ᾗ ψυχή. οὔκουν κινήσεται. ἢ κίνησιν τὴν τοιαύτην δοτέον αὐτῇ, ἣ μὴ σωμάτων, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ζωή. καὶ ἡ νόησις δὲ ἡμῶν οὕτως, ὅτι καὶ νοερὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ κρείττων ἡ νόησις, καὶ ὅταν ψυχὴ νοῇ, καὶ ὅταν νοῦς ἐνεργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς· μέρος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἡμῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἄνιμεν.
And what has examined these matters: is it we or the soul? It is we, but by the soul. And how “by the soul”? Did we examine by having it? Or rather, by being soul. So it will not be moved? Or rather, we must grant it movement of a kind that is not that of bodies but is its own life. And our thinking is ours in this way too: the soul is intellectual, and thinking is a higher life, both when soul thinks and when Intellect is active in us. For Intellect too is a part of us, and toward it we ascend.