Ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, βούλεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ φεύγειν τὰ κακά, φευκτέον ἐντεῦθεν. τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; θεῷ, φησιν, ὁμοιωθῆναι. τοῦτο δέ, εἰ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι μετὰ φρονήσεως γενοίμεθα καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀρετῇ. εἰ οὖν ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ἆρα ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι; καὶ δὴ καὶ τίνι (θεῷ); ἆρ’ οὖν τῷ μᾶλλον δοκοῦντι ταῦτα ἔχειν καὶ δὴ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν ταύτῃ ἡγουμένῳ, ᾧ φρόνησις θαυμαστὴ ὑπάρχει; καὶ γὰρ εὔλογον ἐνταῦθα ὄντας τούτῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητήσιμον, εἰ καὶ τούτῳ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι· οἷον σώφρονι [ἢ] ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, ᾧ μήτε τι δεινόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξωθεν· μήτε προσιὸν ἡδύ, οὗ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἂν γένοιτο μὴ παρόντος, ἵν’ ἔχῃ ἢ ἕλῃ.
Since evils are here and haunt this place of necessity, and the soul wants to flee evils, we must flee from here. What, then, is the flight? Becoming like god, he says. And this happens if we become just and holy with understanding, and in general if we live in virtue. If, then, we become like by virtue, is it like something that has virtue? And like which (god)? Is it the one who seems more to have these, that is, the Soul of the cosmos and the ruling principle in it, which has a wondrous understanding? It is reasonable, after all, that while we are here we should become like this. Or rather, first of all it is disputable whether even this has all the virtues. Take being moderate [or] brave. Nothing is frightening to it, since nothing is outside it. Nor does anything pleasant come to it whose absence could give rise to a desire to have it or seize it.
εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ὀρέξει ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν ἐκεῖθεν ὁ κόσμος καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. ἆρ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνο ταύτας ἔχει; ἢ οὐκ εὔλογον τάς γε πολιτικὰς λεγομένας ἀρετὰς ἔχειν, φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ περὶ τὸ θυμούμενον, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸς λογισμόν, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἑκάστου τούτων ὁμοῦ οἰκειοπραγίαν ἀρχῆς πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὁμοιούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς μείζους τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι χρωμένας; ἀλλ’ εἰ κατ’ ἄλλας, κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὅλως οὔ; ἢ ἄλογον μηδ’ ὁπωσοῦν ὁμοιοῦσθαι κατὰ ταύτας — τούτους γοῦν καὶ θείους ἡ φήμη λέγει καὶ λεκτέον ἀμηγέπη ὡμοιῶσθαι — κατὰ δὲ τὰς μείζους τὴν ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι.
But if it too is in desire for the intelligibles, as our souls are, then clearly our order and our virtues come from there as well. Does that, then, have these virtues? Or rather, it is not reasonable for it to have at least the so-called civic virtues. These are understanding, which concerns the reasoning part; courage, which concerns the spirited part; moderation, which lies in a kind of agreement and harmony of the desiring part with reason; and justice, each of these parts together doing its own work in ruling and being ruled. Then do we not become like by the civic virtues, but by the greater ones that use the same name? But if by others, are we not like by the civic ones at all? Or rather, it would be unreasonable for there to be no likeness at all by these. Tradition, at least, calls people who have them godlike, and we must say they have become like in some way. Still, the likeness itself is by the greater ones.
ἀλλ’ ἑκατέρως γε συμβαίνει ἀρετὰς ἔχειν κἂν εἰ μὴ τοιαύτας. εἰ οὖν τις συγχωρεῖ ὁμοιοῦσθαι δύνασθαι, ἄλλως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλλας καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρετὰς ὡμοιωμένων, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡμᾶς ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀρεταῖς ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ μὴ ἀρετὴν κεκτημένῳ. καὶ πῶς; ὧδε· εἴ τι θερμότητος παρουσίᾳ θερμαίνεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὅθεν ἡ θερμότης ἐλήλυθε θερμαίνεσθαι; καὶ εἴ τι πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμόν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμαίνεσθαι; ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρότερον εἴποι ἄν τις καὶ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ εἶναι θερμότητα, ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον, ὥστε τὸν λόγον ποιεῖν τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ἑπόμενον ἐπακτὸν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἐκείνῳ δέ, ὅθεν μιμησαμένη ἔχει, σύμφυτον· πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς λόγον τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἀρετὴν εἶναι· ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι μείζονα.
But either way it turns out that one has virtues, even if not of this kind. So if one grants that we can become like, even though we stand differently toward different virtues and have not become like by the civic ones, nothing prevents us from becoming like, by our own virtues, to what has not acquired virtue. How? Like this. If something is heated by the presence of heat, must the source the heat came from also be heated? And if something is hot by the presence of fire, must fire itself be heated by the presence of fire? To the first point one might reply that there is heat in fire too, but innate heat. Then the argument, following the analogy, would make virtue something brought into the soul from outside, but innate in that from which the soul has it by imitation. And to the argument from fire one might reply that it would make that principle virtue itself. But we hold it to be greater than virtue.
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὗ μεταλαμβάνει ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τῷ ἀφ’ οὗ, οὕτως ἔδει λέγειν· νῦν δὲ ἕτερον μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦτο. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκία ἡ αἰσθητὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ νοητῇ, καίτοι ὡμοίωται· καὶ τάξεως δὲ καὶ κόσμου μεταλαμβάνει ἡ οἰκία ἡ αἰσθητὴ κἀκεῖ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστι τάξις οὐδὲ κόσμος οὐδὲ συμμετρία. οὕτως οὖν κόσμου καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὁμολογίας μεταλαμβάνοντες ἐκεῖθεν καὶ τούτων ὄντων τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνθάδε, οὐ δεομένων δὲ τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογίας οὐδὲ κόσμου οὐδὲ τάξεως, οὐδ’ ἂν ἀρετῆς εἴη χρεία καὶ ὁμοιοίμεθα δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς ἐκεῖ δι’ ἀρετῆς παρουσίαν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον κἀκεῖ ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐπείπερ ἡμεῖς ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ταυτί· δεῖ δὲ πειθὼ ἐπάγειν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ μένοντας ἐπὶ τῆς βίας.
Now if what the soul participates in were the same as its source, we would have to speak like that. But as it is, that is one thing and this is another. For the sensible house is not the same as the intelligible one, although it has been made like it. The sensible house participates in arrangement and order, but There, in its rational principle, there is no arrangement, order or proportion. So it is with us. We participate in order, arrangement and harmony from there, and these belong to virtue here. But the things there have no need of harmony, order or arrangement, and so they would have no need of virtue either. And we become like the things there none the less, through the presence of virtue. That is enough to show that virtue need not exist There as well, given that we become like by virtue. But we must add persuasion to the argument, and not stop at compulsion.
πρῶτον τοίνυν τὰς ἀρετὰς ληπτέον, καθ’ ἅς φαμεν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ εὕρωμεν, ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν μίμημα ὂν ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ οἷον ἀρχέτυπον ὂν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐπισημηνάμενοι, ὡς ἡ ὁμοίωσις διττή· καὶ ἡ μέν τις ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀπαιτεῖ, ὅσα ἐπίσης ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡμοίωται πρὸς ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλον τρόπον ληπτέον οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἀπαιτοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἕτερον, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον ὡμοίωται. τί ποτε οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἥ τε σύμπασα καὶ ἑκάστη; σαφέστερος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἐφ’ ἑκάστης· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὅ τι κοινόν, καθ’ ὃ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ῥᾳδίως ἔσται.
First, then, we must take the virtues by which we say we become like, in order to find this very thing. In us, as an imitation, it is virtue; There, as an archetype so to speak, it is not virtue. We should note that likeness is twofold. One kind requires something the same in the like things, when they have been made like equally from the same source. But sometimes one thing has been made like another while the other is primary. It does not reciprocate and is not called like the first. There we must take likeness in another way. It does not require the same form, but rather a different one, since the likeness is of the other kind. What, then, is virtue, both as a whole and each virtue? The account will be clearer if we take each one. In this way what is common to them, by which they are all virtues, will easily become clear.
αἱ μὲν τοίνυν πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, ἃς ἄνω που εἴπομεν, κατακοσμοῦσι μένοντας [ἔτι καὶ ἔχοντας ἐνταῦθα] καὶ ἀμείνους ποιοῦσιν ὁρίζουσαι καὶ μετροῦσαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀφαιροῦσαι τῷ ὅλως ἀμείνονι καὶ τῷ ὡρίσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀμέτρων καὶ ἀορίστων ἔξω εἶναι τὸ μεμετρημένον· καὶ αὐταὶ ὁρισθεῖσαι ᾗ μέτρα γε ἐν ὕλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ὡμοίωνται τῷ ἐκεῖ μέτρῳ καὶ ἔχουσιν ἴχνος τοῦ ἐκεῖ ἀρίστου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντη ἄμετρον ὕλη ὂν πάντη ἀνωμοίωται· καθ’ ὅσον δὲ μεταλαμβάνει εἴδους, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὁμοιοῦται ἀνειδέῳ ἐκείνῳ ὄντι. μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἐγγὺς μεταλαμβάνει· ψυχὴ δὲ ἐγγυτέρω σώματος καὶ συγγενέστερον ταύτῃ καὶ πλέον μεταλαμβάνει, ὥστε καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν θεὸς φαντασθεῖσα, μὴ τὸ πᾶν θεοῦ τοῦτο ᾖ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν αὗται ὁμοιοῦνται.
The civic virtues, then, which we mentioned above, give order to us while we remain [still and have them here] and make us better. They set bounds and measure to our desires and, in general, our affections, and they remove false opinions. They do this by what is better in every way, by being bounded, and because what is measured lies outside the unmeasured and the unbounded. And being themselves bounded, insofar as they are measures in the soul as their matter, they have been made like the measure There and have a trace of the best There. For what is wholly unmeasured, being matter, is wholly unlike. But insofar as it participates in form, so far it becomes like that which is formless. What is near participates more. Soul is nearer than body and more akin, so it participates more, so much so that it can deceive by appearing as a god, as though this were the whole of god. This, then, is how these virtues make us like.
ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλην ὑποφαίνει ὡς τῆς μείζονος ἀρετῆς οὖσαν, περὶ ἐκείνης λεκτέον· ἐν ᾧ καὶ σαφέστερον ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ἥτις ἡ μείζων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι ἔστι παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἑτέρα. λέγων δὴ ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τὴν πρὸς θεὸν φυγὴν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς διδούς, ἀλλὰ προστιθεὶς πολιτικάς γε, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ καθάρσεις λέγων ἁπάσας δῆλός τέ ἐστι διττὰς τιθεὶς καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν οὐ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τιθείς. πῶς οὖν λέγομεν ταύτας καθάρσεις καὶ πῶς καθαρθέντες μάλιστα ὁμοιούμεθα;
But since he hints that there is another likeness, belonging to the greater virtue, we must speak about that one. In doing so, the being of civic virtue will also become clearer, as well as what the greater virtue is in its being, and in general that there is another besides the civic. Plato says that likeness to god is a flight from things here. He does not give the virtues of civic life the name without qualification, but adds “civic.” And elsewhere he calls them all purifications. So he clearly posits two kinds, and does not place likeness in the civic kind. In what sense, then, do we call these purifications, and how is it that by being purified we become most like?
ἢ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυρμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ ὁμοπαθὴς γινομένη αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζουσα, εἴη ἂν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, εἰ μήτε συνδοξάζοι, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἐνεργοῖ· ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· μήτε ὁμοπαθὴς εἴη· ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν· μήτε φοβοῖτο ἀφισταμένη τοῦ σώματος· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνδρίζεσθαι· ἡγοῖτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνοι· δικαιοσύνη δ’ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἣν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς οὕτως ἐστίν, εἴ τις ὁμοίωσιν λέγοι πρὸς θεόν, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· καθαρὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοιαύτη, ὡς τὸ μιμούμενον ἔχειν φρόνησιν. τί οὖν; οὐ κἀκεῖνο οὕτως διάκειται; ἢ οὐ διάκειται, ψυχῆς δὲ ἡ διάθεσις.
Since the soul is bad when it is mixed up with the body, shares its affections and joins it in all its opinions, it would be good and have virtue if it did not share its opinions but acted alone. That is thinking and understanding. It would also be good if it did not share the body’s affections, which is being moderate; if it did not fear being separated from the body, which is being brave; and if reason and intellect led and the rest did not resist, which would be justice. If one called such a disposition of the soul, in which it thinks and is in this way unaffected, likeness to god, one would not be wrong. For the divine too is pure, and its activity is such that what imitates it has understanding. What then? Is that too disposed in this way? Or rather, it is not disposed at all; disposition belongs to soul.
νοεῖ τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἄλλως· τῶν δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν ἑτέρως, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως. πάλιν οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ὁμώνυμον; οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἐκείνου ἑτέρως. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ὡς οὖν μεμιμημένος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ ἑρμηνεὺς ὢν ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ἡ δὴ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς· νοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα.
And the soul thinks in another way. Of the things There, one thinks in a different way, and the other does not think at all. Is “thinking,” then, again just a shared name? Not at all: one thinks primarily, the other thinks in a different way, derived from it. For as the word spoken aloud is an imitation of the word in the soul, so the word in the soul is an imitation of the word in something else. So as the uttered word is an imitation in relation to the word in the soul, so the word in the soul, as its interpreter, is an imitation in relation to what is before it. Virtue, then, belongs to soul. It does not belong to Intellect, nor to what is beyond.
ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ἡ κάθαρσις ταὐτὸν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ, ἢ προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, ἕπεται δὲ ἡ ἀρετή, καὶ πότερον ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι. [ἡ γοῦν ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι] ἀτελεστέρα τῆς ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι, [τὸ γὰρ κεκαθάρθαι] οἷον τέλος ἤδη. ἀλλὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου παντός, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ. ἤ, εἰ πρὸ τῆς καθάρσεως ἀγαθὸν ἦν, ἡ κάθαρσις ἀρκεῖ; ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, τό δὲ καταλειπόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ἡ κάθαρσις. καὶ τί τὸ καταλειπόμενόν ἐστι ζητητέον· ἴσως γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν ἡ φύσις ἡ καταλειπομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐν κακῷ. ἆρ’ οὖν ἀγαθοειδῆ λεκτέον; ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ μένειν ἐν τῷ ὄντως ἀγαθῷ· πέφυκε γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄμφω.
We must ask whether purification is the same as virtue of this kind, or whether purification comes first and virtue follows. We must also ask whether virtue lies in being purified or in having been purified. [That which lies in being purified, at any rate,] is less complete than that which lies in having been purified, [for having been purified] is already a kind of end. But having been purified is the removal of everything foreign, and the good is something other than that. Or: if it was good before the purification, is purification enough? Purification will be enough, then; but what remains will be the good, not the purification. And we must ask what it is that remains. For perhaps the nature that remains was not the good either, or it would not have come to be in evil. Should we then call it good-like? Or rather, not able to remain in what is really good, since by nature it inclines both ways.
τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς τὸ συνεῖναι τῷ συγγενεῖ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. δεῖ οὖν καθηραμένην συνεῖναι. συνέσται δὲ ἐπιστραφεῖσα. ἆρ’ οὖν μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπιστρέφεται; ἢ μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπέστραπται. τοῦτο οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτῆς; ἢ τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς. τί οὖν τοῦτο; θέα καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὀφθέντος ἐντεθεὶς καὶ ἐνεργῶν, ὡς ἡ ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ’ ἀναμιμνήσκεται; ἢ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφώτιστα. ἵνα δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γνῶ αὐτὰ ἐνόντα, δεῖ προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίζοντι. εἶχε δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους· δεῖ οὖν τὸν τύπον τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ὧν καὶ οἱ τύποι, ἐφαρμόσαι.
Its good, then, is to be with what is akin to it, and its bad to be with its opposites. So it must be purified and then be with what is akin to it, and it will be with it by turning back. Does it turn back, then, after purification? Or rather, after purification it has turned back. Is this, then, its virtue? Or rather, its virtue is what comes to be in it from the turning back. And what is that? A vision, and an impression of what was seen, set in it and active, as sight is in relation to what is seen. So did it not have these things, and does it not recollect them? It had them, but not active: stored away and unlit. For them to be lit up, and for it then to know they are within it, it must apply itself to what gives light. And it did not have the things themselves, only impressions. So it must fit the impression to the true things of which the impressions are.
τάχα δὲ καὶ οὕτω λέγεται ἔχειν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀλλότριος καὶ μάλιστα δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριος, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ παρὼν ἀλλότριος. ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἐὰν μηδ’ ὅλως ἐνεργῶμεν κατ’ αὐτάς, ἀλλότριαι.
Perhaps it is also said to have them in this sense: Intellect is not foreign to it, and least of all foreign when it looks toward Intellect. Otherwise, even though present, Intellect is foreign. For branches of knowledge too are foreign to us, if we are not active in them at all.
ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πόσον ἡ κάθαρσις λεκτέον· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὁμοίωσις τίνι φανερὰ καὶ ἡ ταυτότης τίνι θεῷ. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μάλιστα ζητεῖν θυμὸν πῶς [καθαίρει] καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, λύπην καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ, καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπὸ σώματος ἐπὶ πόσον δυνατόν. ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ σώματος ἴσως μὲν καὶ τοῖς οἷον τόποις συνάγουσαν ἑαυτήν, πάντως [γε] μὴν ἀπαθῶς ἔχουσαν καὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τῶν ἡδονῶν [καὶ τὰς] αἰσθήσεις.
But we must say how far purification goes. In this way it will also become clear which god the likeness is to, and which god the identity is with. This means, above all, asking how [it purifies] anger and desire and all the rest, distress and its kin, and how far separation from the body is possible. From the body, perhaps, by gathering itself together even, as it were, in place. But [at any rate] wholly by being unaffected, and by taking the necessary pleasures [and the] perceptions
μόνον ποιουμένην ἰατρεύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγὰς πόνων, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλοῖτο, τὰς δὲ ἀλγηδόνας ἀφαιροῦσαν καί, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε, πρᾴως φέρουσαν καὶ ἐλάττους τιθεῖσαν τῷ μὴ συμπάσχειν· τὸν δὲ θυμὸν ὅσον οἷόν τε ἀφαιροῦσαν καί, εἰ δυνατόν, πάντη, εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ γοῦν αὐτὴν συνοργιζομένην, ἀλλ’ ἄλλου εἶναι τὸ ἀπροαίρετον, τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον ὀλίγον εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενές· τὸν δὲ φόβον πάντη — περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ φοβήσεται· τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον καὶ ἐνταῦθα — πλήν γε ἐν νουθετήσει. ἐπιθυμία δὲ ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς φαύλου, δῆλον· σίτων δὲ καὶ ποτῶν πρὸς ἄνεσιν οὐκ αὐτὴ ἕξει· οὐδὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων δέ· εἴ δ’ ἄρα, φυσικῶν, οἶμαι, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ἐχόντων· εἴ δ’ ἄρα, ὅσον μέχρι φαντασίας προπετοῦς καὶ ταύτης.
only as remedies and releases from pain, so as not to be troubled. It removes pains, and if that is not possible, bears them gently and makes them smaller by not sharing the affection. It removes anger as far as possible, and entirely if it can. If not, at least it is not angry along with it; the involuntary belongs to something else, and the involuntary is slight and weak. Fear it removes entirely, for it will be afraid of nothing (here too there is the involuntary), except as a warning. As for desire, it is clear that it will be for nothing base. It will not itself have desire for food and drink, for relief; nor for sex either. If at all, I think, it will be for what is natural, and without even the involuntary. If at all, only as far as an impulsive imagining, and that alone.
ὅλως δὲ αὐτὴ μὲν πάντως τούτων καθαρὰ ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄλογον δὲ βουλήσεται καὶ αὐτὸ καθαρὸν ποιῆσαι, ὥστε μηδὲ πλήττεσθαι· εἰ δ’ ἄρα, μὴ σφόδρα, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγας τὰς πληγὰς αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ εὐθὺς λυομένας τῇ γειτονήσει· ὥσπερ εἴ τις σοφῷ γειτονῶν ἀπολαύοι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ γειτνιάσεως ἢ ὅμοιος γινόμενος ἢ αἰδούμενος, ὡς μηδὲν τολμᾶν ποιεῖν ὧν ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ θέλει. οὔκουν ἔσται μάχη· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ παρὼν ὁ λόγος, ὃν τὸ χεῖρον αἰδέσεται, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χεῖρον δυσχερᾶναι, ἐάν τι ὅλως κινηθῇ, ὅτι μὴ ἡσυχίαν ἦγε παρόντος τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ ἀσθένειαν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιτιμῆσαι.
In general, the soul itself will be pure of all these things, and it will want to make the irrational part pure as well, so that it is not even struck. Or if it is, not violently: its blows will be few and at once dissolved by the nearness of reason. It is like someone living next to a wise man, who benefits from the wise man’s neighborhood, either by becoming like him or by feeling such respect that he does not dare do anything the good man does not want. So there will be no conflict. The presence of reason is enough, and the worse part will respect it. Even the worse part itself will be vexed, if it is moved at all, that it did not keep quiet while its master was present, and it will reproach itself for its weakness.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτία, ἀλλὰ κατόρθωσις ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλ’ ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀπροαίρετον γίγνοιτο, θεὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δαίμων διπλοῦς ὤν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχων σὺν αὑτῷ ἄλλον ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα· εἰ δὲ μηδέν, θεὸς μόνον· θεὸς δὲ τῶν ἑπομένων τῷ πρώτῳ. αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃς ἦλθεν ἐκεῖθεν καὶ τὸ καθ’ αὑτόν, εἰ γένοιτο οἷος ἦλθεν, ἐκεῖ ἐστι· νῷ δὲ συνῳκίσθη ἐνθάδε ἥκων καὶ τοῦτον αὑτῷ ὁμοιώσει κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνου, ὥστε, εἰ δυνατόν, ἄπληκτον εἶναι ἢ ἄπρακτόν γε τῶν μὴ δοκούντων τῷ δεσπότῃ. τίς οὖν ἑκάστη ἀρετὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ; ἢ σοφία μὲν [καὶ φρόνησις] ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὧν νοῦς ἔχει· νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ.
None of these things, then, is a fault; for a human being it is right action. But our concern is not to be without fault but to be god. If, then, some such involuntary movement still occurs, a person like this would be a god and a spirit, being double. Or rather, he would have with him another, who has a different virtue. If nothing of the kind occurs, he is a god only, one of the gods who follow the First. For he himself is the one who came from There, and his own self, if he became as he was when he came, is There. Coming here, he has been made to live with intellect. He will make this like himself as far as its capacity allows, so that, if possible, it is not struck, or at least does not do what the master does not approve. What, then, is each virtue for such a person? Wisdom [and understanding] lies in the contemplation of what Intellect has; Intellect has it by contact.
διττὴ δὴ ἑκατέρα, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὖσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ. κἀκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετή. ἐκεῖ οὖν τί; ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρετή. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοδικαιοσύνη καὶ ἑκάστη ἀρετή, ἀλλ’ οἷον παράδειγμα· τὸ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρετή. τινὸς γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή· αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον αὑτοῦ, οὐχὶ δ’ ἄλλου τινός. δικαιοσύνη δὲ εἴπερ οἰκειοπραγία, ἆρα ἀεὶ ἐν πλήθει μερῶν; ἢ ἡ μὲν ἐν πλήθει, ὅταν πολλὰ ᾖ τὰ μέρη, ἡ δὲ ὅλως οἰκειοπραγία, κἂν ἑνὸς ᾖ.
Each of these is twofold, then: one is in Intellect, the other in soul. There it is not virtue; in soul it is virtue. What, then, is it There? Its activity, and what it is. Here, what is in something else and comes from There is virtue. For neither Justice itself nor each virtue itself is virtue, but a model, as it were; what comes from it in soul is virtue. For virtue is somebody’s, but each thing itself belongs to itself and not to anything else. If justice is “doing one’s own,” is it always found in a plurality of parts? Or rather, one kind is in a plurality, when there are many parts, but the other is doing one’s own simply, even if it belongs to one thing.
ἡ γοῦν ἀληθὴς αὐτοδικαιοσύνη ἑνὸς πρὸς αὑτό, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ὥστε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνη ἡ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἀπάθεια καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει ἀπαθὲς ὂν τὴν φύσιν· αὐτὴ δὲ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ τῷ χείρονι συνοίκῳ.
True Justice itself, at any rate, is a relation of one thing to itself, in which there is not one part and another. So for the soul too, the higher justice is acting toward Intellect, and moderation is the turning inward toward Intellect. Courage is being unaffected, in likeness to what it looks toward, which is unaffected by nature. In the soul this comes from virtue, so that it does not share the affections of the worse partner it lives with.
ἀντακολουθοῦσι τοίνυν ἀλλήλαις καὶ αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐν νῷ ὥσπερ παραδείγματα. καὶ γὰρ ἡ νόησις ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἡ οἰκειοπραγία, τὸ δὲ οἷον ἀνδρεία ἡ ταυτότης καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ μένειν καθαρόν. ἐν ψυχῇ τοίνυν πρὸς νοῦν ἡ ὅρασις σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὴ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ τῇ καθάρσει δέ, εἴπερ πᾶσαι καθάρσεις κατὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι, ἀνάγκη πάσας ἢ οὐδὲ μία τελεία. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὰς μείζους καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυνάμει, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐλάττους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει ἐκείνας.
These virtues in the soul, then, imply one another, just as There the things in Intellect that come before virtue, the models as it were, do too. For thinking There is knowledge and wisdom; being directed toward itself is moderation; its own work is doing its own; and what is, so to speak, courage is its identity and its remaining pure by itself. In the soul, then, seeing toward Intellect is wisdom and understanding, which are its virtues; for it is not these itself, as Intellect is There. And the rest follow in the same way. With purification too, if all the virtues are purifications in the sense of having been purified, all of them must be there, or none is complete. And whoever has the greater virtues necessarily has the lesser ones potentially, but whoever has the lesser ones does not necessarily have the greater.
ὁ μὲν δὴ προηγούμενος τοῦ σπουδαίου βίος οὗτος· πότερα δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχει καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἢ τὰς μείζους ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον καθ’ ἑκάστην· οἷον φρόνησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς χρήσεται, πῶς ἔτι ἐκείνη μένει κἂν εἰ μὴ ἐνεργοῦσα; καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν φύσει τοσόνδε, ἡ δὲ τοσόνδε, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐκεῖνα μετροῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὅλως ἀναιροῦσα; ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως τῆς φρονήσεως κινηθείσης. ἢ εἰδήσει γε αὐτὰς καὶ ὅσον παρ’ αὐτῶν ἕξει· τάχα δέ ποτε περιστατικῶς ἐνεργήσει κατά τινας αὐτῶν.
This, then, is the principal life of the good person. Whether he has the lesser virtues as well as the greater in activity, or in some other way, we must examine for each one. Take understanding. If it uses other principles, how does that lower understanding still remain, even if it is not active? And what if one virtue by nature allows so much, and another so much, moderation of one kind measuring those things and the other abolishing them altogether? The same goes for the other virtues, once the question about understanding has been raised at all. Or rather, he will at least know them, and how much he will get from them. Perhaps at times, when circumstances require, he will act in accordance with some of them.
ἐπὶ μείζους δὲ ἀρχὰς ἥκων καὶ ἄλλα μέτρα κατ’ ἐκεῖνα πράξει· οἷον τὸ σωφρονεῖν οὐκ ἐν μέτρῳ ἐκείνῳ τιθείς, ἀλλ’ ὅλως κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν χωρίζων καὶ ὅλως ζῶν οὐχὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃν ἀξιοῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ [διαζῆν], ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν καταλιπών, ἕτερον δὲ ἀλλαξάμενος τὸν τῶν θεῶν· πρὸς γὰρ τούτους [αὐτῷ], οὐ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς ἡ ὁμοίωσις. ὁμοίωσις δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τούτους, ὡς εἰκὼν εἰκόνι ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑκατέρα. ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα.
But on reaching greater principles and other measures, he will act in accordance with those. For instance, he will not place moderation in that measure. He will separate himself entirely, as far as possible, and will not live at all the human life of the good man, which civic virtue thinks worth [living]. He will leave this behind and choose another in exchange, the life of the gods. For the likeness [for him] is to them, not to good human beings. Likeness to good human beings is as image is made like image, each from the same source. Likeness to the other is as to a model.