Ἆρ’ ἄν τις ἕτερον εἴποι ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ἢ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ζωῆς ἐνέργειαν, καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ πολλῶν εἴη, τούτῳ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπουσαν; ψυχῆς δὴ ἐνέργεια κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ἐνεργοῖ ἀρίστη οὖσα, οὐ μόνον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη. εἰ οὖν τι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνεργοῖ ἄριστον ὂν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, δῆλον, ὡς τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, δι’ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα διχῶς ἂν ἔχοι, ὅσα οὕτω τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὡμοιῶσθαι καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖσθαι.
Could anyone say that the good for each thing is anything other than the activity of its life in accordance with nature? And if something is made of many parts, that its good is the activity of the better part in it—an activity that is its own, in accordance with nature, and lacking nothing? So for soul, its activity in accordance with nature is its good. And if, being the best, it is active toward the best, then this would be not only its own good but the good without qualification. If, then, there is something that is not active toward anything else, since it is the best of beings and beyond beings, while the others are active toward it, it is clear that this would be the Good, through which the others too can share in good. The others, those that have the good in this way, would have it in two ways: by having become like it, and by directing their activity toward it.
εἰ οὖν ἔφεσις καὶ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν, δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπον μηδ’ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου ἐν ἡσύχῳ οὖσαν πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐνεργειῶν κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦσαν οὐ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἐνεργείᾳ — ἐκεῖνα γὰρ πρὸς αὐτήν — οὐ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ [οὖν] οὐδὲ τῇ νοήσει τἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ [τῇ] μονῇ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας, ἐπέκεινα καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ νοήσεως. καὶ γὰρ αὖ τοῦτο δεῖ τἀγαθὸν τίθεσθαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα ἀνήρτηται, αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς μηδέν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀληθὲς τὸ οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται. δεῖ οὖν μένειν αὐτό, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπιστρέφειν πάντα, ὥσπερ κύκλον πρὸς κέντρον, ἀφ’ οὗ πᾶσαι γραμμαί.
If, then, desire and activity toward the best is good, the Good must not look toward anything else or desire anything else; it must be at rest, the spring and principle of activities in accordance with nature, making the others good-like, not by an activity directed toward them—for they are directed toward it. It is not by activity [then], nor by thinking, that it is the Good, but by [the] remaining itself. For since it is beyond being, it is also beyond activity, and beyond intellect and thinking. Again, we must posit as the Good that on which all things depend, while it depends on nothing; for that is how “that which all things desire” comes out true. So it must remain, and all things must turn back toward it, as a circle does toward the center from which all the radii come.
καὶ παράδειγμα ὁ ἥλιος ὥσπερ κέντρον ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἀνηρτημένον πρὸς αὐτόν· πανταχοῦ γοῦν μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, κἂν ἀποτεμεῖν ἐθελήσῃς ἐπὶ θάτερα, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιόν ἐστι τὸ φῶς.
The sun is an example: it is like a center for the light that comes from it and depends on it. At any rate the light is everywhere with it and is not cut off; even if you want to cut it off on one side, the light still belongs to the sun.
τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα πρὸς αὐτὸ πῶς; ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα πρὸς ψυχήν, ψυχὴ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ διὰ νοῦ. ἔχει δέ τι αὐτοῦ τῷ ἕν πως καὶ τῷ ὄν πως ἕκαστον εἶναι, καὶ μετέχει δὲ καὶ εἴδους. ὡς οὖν μετέχει τούτων, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. εἰδώλου ἄρα· ὧν γὰρ μετέχει, εἴδωλα ὄντος καὶ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὡσαύτως. ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ζῆν, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ τῇ μετὰ νοῦν, ἐγγυτέρω ἀληθείας, καὶ διὰ νοῦ ἀγαθοειδὲς αὕτη· ἔχοι δ’ ἂν τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον βλέποι· νοῦς δὲ μετὰ τἀγαθόν. ζωὴ τοίνυν, ὅτῳ τὸ ζῆν, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ νοῦς, ὅτῳ νοῦ μέτεστιν· ὥστε ὅτῳ ζωὴ μετὰ νοῦ, διχῶς καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτό.
And all the other things—how are they directed toward it? Lifeless things are directed toward soul, and soul toward it through Intellect. Each thing has something of it by being in a way one and in a way a being; and it also shares in form. As it shares in these, so it shares in the good too. In an image of it, then: for what it shares in are images of being and of unity, and the form likewise. For soul, the good is living—for the first Soul, the one after Intellect, a life nearer to truth, and through Intellect it is good-like; it would have the good if it looked toward that Intellect. And Intellect comes after the Good. Life, then, is the good for whatever has life, and intellect for whatever shares in intellect; so whatever has life together with intellect is directed toward it in two ways.
εἰ δ’ ἡ ζωὴ ἀγαθόν, ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ζῶντι παντί; ἢ οὔ· χωλεύει γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ τῷ φαύλῳ, ὥσπερ ὄμμα τῷ μὴ καθαρῶς ὁρῶντι· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον αὑτοῦ. εἰ δὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῖν, ᾗ μέμικται, κακὸν ἀγαθόν, πῶς οὐχ ὁ θάνατος κακόν; ἤ τίνι; τὸ γὰρ κακὸν συμβεβηκέναι δεῖ τῳ· ὃ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι ὄν, ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἐστερημένον ζωῆς, [οὐκ ἔστι δεκτικὸν κακοῦ], οὐδ’ οὕτω κακὸν τῷ λίθῳ. εἰ δ’ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον, ἤδη ἄν εἴη ἀγαθόν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὰ αὑτῆς ἄνευ σώματος. εἰ δὲ τῆς ὅλης γίνεται, τί ἂν ἐκεῖ οὔσῃ εἴη κακόν;
If life is a good, does it belong to every living thing? No: life limps in the bad person, like an eye in someone who does not see clearly; it does not do its work. If, then, our life, in which bad is mixed, is a good, how is death not a bad? Or bad for whom? For the bad must happen to something. But what no longer exists, or, if it exists, is deprived of life, [is not receptive of the bad,] is no more harmed in this way than a stone is. And if there is life and soul after death, then by that time it would be a good, all the more as it exercises its own activities without body. And if it becomes part of the whole Soul, what bad could there be for it while it is there?
καὶ ὅλως ὥσπερ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀγαθὸν μέν ἐστι, κακὸν δὲ οὐδέν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σωζούσῃ τὸ καθαρὸν αὑτῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ σώζοι, οὐχ ὁ θάνατος ἂν εἴη κακὸν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ’ ἡ ζωή. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾅδου δίκαι, πάλιν αὐτῇ ἡ ζωὴ κἀκεῖ κακόν, ὅτι μὴ ζωὴ μόνον. ἀλλ’ εἰ σύνοδος μὲν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ζωή, θάνατος δὲ διάλυσις τούτων, ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται ἀμφοτέρων δεκτική. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀγαθὴ ἡ ζωή, πῶς ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν; ἢ ἀγαθὴ μὲν ἡ ζωὴ οἷς ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν οὐ καθόσον σύνοδος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι δι’ ἀρετῆς ἀμύνεται τὸ κακόν· ὁ δὲ θάνατος μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν.
In general, just as for the gods there is good and no bad, so there is none for the soul that keeps its purity; and if it does not keep it, it would not be death that is bad for it, but life. And if there are punishments in Hades too, then once again life is bad for it, even there, because it is not life alone. But if life is the coming together of soul and body, and death their separation, the soul will be receptive of both. But if life is good, how is death not bad? Or rather: life is good for those for whom it is good—good not insofar as it is a coming together, but because through virtue it wards off the bad; and death is more of a good.
ἢ λεκτέον αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ζωὴν κακὸν μὲν παρ’ αὑτῆς, τῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ ἐν ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ ζῶσαν [κατὰ] τὸ σύνθετον, ἀλλ’ ἤδη χωρίζουσαν ἑαυτήν.
Or we should say that life in the body is in itself bad, but that through virtue the soul comes to be in the good, not living [according to] the composite, but already separating itself.