Τὴν λεγομένη ὕλην ὑποκείμενόν τι καὶ ὑποδοχὴν εἰδῶν λέγοντες εἶναι κοινόν τινα τοῦτον λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς πάντες λέγουσιν, ὅσοι εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθον τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, καὶ μέχρι τούτου τὴν αὐτὴν φέρονται· τίς δέ ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ὑποκειμένη φύσις καὶ πῶς δεκτικὴ καὶ τίνων, τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ζητήσαντες διέστησαν. καὶ οἱ μὲν σώματα μόνον τὰ ὄντα εἶναι θέμενοι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν τούτοις μίαν τε τὴν ὕλην λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα οἷον πάθη ταύτης καί πως ἔχουσαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τολμῶσι καὶ μέχρι θεῶν αὐτὴν ἄγειν καὶ τέλος δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν [τὴν] ὕλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι. διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ ἄποιον αὐτὴν σῶμα λέγοντες καὶ μέγεθος δέ.
Those who say that what is called matter is a substrate and a receptacle of forms all give this common account of it, all who have arrived at a conception of such a nature; up to this point they travel the same road. But what this underlying nature is, how it is receptive and of what: here, as they inquire further, they part company. Some hold that only bodies are beings and that substance is in them. They say that matter is one, that it underlies the elements and is itself substance, while everything else is like affections of it, and the elements too are matter in a certain state. They even dare to bring it as far as the gods, and finally to make god himself [the] matter in a certain state. They also give it body, calling it body without quality, and magnitude too.
οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον λέγουσι καὶ ταύτην οὐ μίαν τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοί, περὶ ἧς οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν, ἑτέραν μέντοι προτέραν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὑποβεβλημένην τοῖς ἐκεῖ εἴδεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις.
Others say it is incorporeal, and some of these say it is not one. They too hold that this matter, the one the former speak of, underlies bodies; but there is another, prior one in the intelligible world, underlying the Forms there and the incorporeal substances.
διὸ πρότερον ζητητέον περὶ ταύτης εἰ ἔστι, καὶ τίς οὖσα τυγχάνει, καὶ πῶς ἔστιν. εἰ δὴ ἀόριστόν τι καὶ ἄμορφον δεῖ τὸ τῆς ὕλης εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀρίστοις οὖσιν οὐδὲν ἀόριστον οὐδὲ ἄμορφον, οὐδ’ ἂν ὕλη ἐκεῖ εἴη· καὶ εἰ ἁπλοῦν ἕκαστον, οὐδ’ ἂν δέοι ὕλης, ἵνα ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ἄλλου τὸ σύνθετον· καὶ γινομένοις μὲν ὕλης δεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἕτερα ποιουμένοις, ἐφ’ ὧν καὶ ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὕλη ἐνοήθη, μὴ γινομένοις δὲ οὔ. πόθεν δὲ ἐλήλυθε καὶ ὑπέστη; εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὑπό τινος· εἰ δὲ ἀίδιος, καὶ ἀρχαὶ πλείους καὶ κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰ πρῶτα. κἂν εἶδος δὲ προσέλθῃ, τὸ σύνθετον ἔσται σῶμα· ὥστε κἀκεῖ σῶμα.
So we must first inquire about this one: whether it exists, what it is, and how it exists. If matter must be something indefinite and shapeless, and nothing indefinite or shapeless is found among the things there, which are the best, then there would be no matter there. And if each of them is simple, there would be no need of matter to make a compound of it and something else. Things that come into being and are made out of one another need matter (it was in their case that the matter of perceptible things was conceived), but things that do not come into being do not. And where has it come from, and how did it come to exist? If it came into being, then it was produced by something; if it is eternal, there are several principles and the first things are there by chance. And if form comes to it, the compound will be body; so there will be body there too.
πρῶτον οὖν λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἀόριστον ἀτιμαστέον, οὐδὲ ὃ ἂν ἄμορφον ᾖ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπινοίᾳ, εἰ μέλλοι παρέχειν αὑτὸ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις· οἷόν τι καὶ ψυχὴ πρὸς νοῦν καὶ λόγον πέφυκε μορφουμένη παρὰ τούτων καὶ εἰς εἶδος βέλτιον ἀγομένη· ἔν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ σύνθετον ἑτέρως, οὐχ ὡς τὰ σώματα· ἐπεὶ καὶ λόγοι σύνθετοι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ σύνθετον ποιοῦσι τὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς εἶδος φύσιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο, καὶ παρ’ ἄλλου καὶ μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὕλη ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἴσχει, τῶν δὲ ἀιδίων ἡ αὐτὴ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. τάχα δ’ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ ἐνταῦθα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ παρὰ μέρος πάντα καὶ ἓν ἑκάστοτε.
First, then, we must say that the indefinite is not to be despised everywhere, nor anything that is shapeless in its own concept, if it is going to offer itself to what comes before it and to the best. Soul, for instance, is like this in relation to Intellect and rational principle: it is shaped by them and brought to a better form. And in the intelligible world the compound is of another kind, not like bodies; for rational principles too are compound, and by their activity they make compound the nature that is active toward form. And if it is active toward something else and from something else, all the more so. The matter of things that come into being always takes on one form after another; that of eternal things is the same and always has the same form. Perhaps the matter here is the reverse. For here everything is in turn, and only one at a time.
διὸ οὐδὲν ἐμμένει ἄλλου ἄλλο ἐξωθοῦντος· διὸ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, ἐκεῖ δ’ ἅμα πάντα· διὸ οὐκ ἔχει εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ, ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει πάντα. οὐδέποτ’ οὖν ἄμορφος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἡ ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τρόπον ἑκατέρα. τὸ δὲ εἴτε ἀίδιος, εἴτε γενομένη, ἐπειδὰν ὅ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ λάβωμεν, δῆλον ἔσται.
That is why nothing endures, one thing pushing out another, and why it is not always the same. There, all things are together at once; so it has nothing to change into, since it already has everything. So the matter There is never shapeless, since the matter here isn’t either; but each has shape in a different way. Whether it is eternal or came into being will be clear once we grasp what it is.
ὁ δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὑποθεμένοις τὸ νῦν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη — δέδεικται γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις — προίτω. εἰ οὖν πολλὰ τὰ εἴδη, κοινὸν μέν τι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἴδιον, ᾧ διαφέρει ἄλλο ἄλλου. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ χωρίζουσα ἡ οἰκεία ἐστὶ μορφή. εἰ δὲ μορφή, ἔστι καὶ τὸ μορφούμενον, περὶ ὃ ἡ διαφορά. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ὕλη ἡ τὴν μορφὴν δεχομένη καὶ ἀεί τι ὑποκείμενον. ἔτι εἰ κόσμος νοητὸς ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, μίμημα δὲ οὗτος ἐκείνου, οὗτος δὲ σύνθετος καὶ ἐξ ὕλης, κἀκεῖ δεῖ ὕλην εἶναι. ἢ πῶς προσερεῖς κόσμον μὴ εἰς εἶδος ἰδών; πῶς δὲ εἶδος μὴ ἐφ’ ᾧ τὸ εἶδος λαβών; ἀμερὲς μὲν γὰρ παντελῶς πάντη αὐτό, μεριστὸν δὲ ὁπωσοῦν.
Let our argument proceed, assuming for now that the Forms exist; this has been shown elsewhere. If, then, the Forms are many, there must be something common in them, and also something distinctive, by which one differs from another. This distinctive feature, the separating difference, is its own shape. And if there is shape, there is also what is shaped, with which the difference is concerned. There is, then, also matter, which receives the shape, and always some substrate. Further, if there is an intelligible world there, and this cosmos is an imitation of it, and this one is compound and made of matter, there must be matter there too. Or how will you call it a world without looking to its form? And how will you have form without grasping what the form is on? For while it is altogether partless in every respect, it is still divisible in some way.
καὶ εἰ μὲν διασπασθέντα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ μέρη, ἡ τομὴ καὶ ἡ διάσπασις ὕλης ἐστὶ πάθος· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τμηθεῖσα· εἰ δὲ πολλὰ ὂν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντα ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ μορφαὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο τὸ πολλὰ ὂν νόησον ποικίλον καὶ πολύμορφον. οὐκοῦν ἄμορφον αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ ποικίλον· εἰ γὰρ τῷ νῷ ἀφέλοις τὴν ποικιλίαν καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ νοήματα, τὸ πρὸ τούτων ἄμορφον καὶ ἀόριστον καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.
If the parts are torn apart from one another, cutting and tearing apart are an affection of matter, since it is matter that is cut. But if, being many, it is undivided, then the many, being in one, are in matter, as its shapes. For think of this one thing, which is many, as variegated and many-shaped. So before it was variegated, it was shapeless. For if with your intellect you take away the variety, the shapes, the rational principles and the thoughts, what is before these is shapeless and indefinite, and none of the things that are on it and in it.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι ἀεὶ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοῦ, ἓν ἄμφω καὶ οὐχ ὕλη ἐκεῖ, οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα ἔσται τῶν σωμάτων ὕλη, οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄνευ μορφῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὅλον σῶμα, σύνθετον μὴν ὅμως. καὶ νοῦς εὑρίσκει τὸ διττόν· οὗτος γὰρ διαιρεῖ, ἕως [ἂν] εἰς ἁπλοῦν ἥκῃ μηκέτι αὐτὸ ἀναλύεσθαι δυνάμενον· ἕως δὲ δύναται, χωρεῖ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ βάθος. τὸ δὲ βάθος ἑκάστου ἡ ὕλη· διὸ καὶ σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, ὅτι τὸ φῶς λόγος καὶ ὁ νοῦς λόγος. διὸ τὸν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου λόγον ὁρῶν τὸ κάτω ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς σκοτεινὸν ἡγεῖται, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς φωτοειδὴς ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς βαλὼν καὶ χρόας φῶτα ὄντα τὰ ὑπὸ τὰ χρώματα σκοτεινὰ καὶ ὑλικὰ εἶναι λέγει (κεκρυμμένα τοῖς χρώμασι).
But if, because it always has these and has them together, the two are one and there is no matter there, then there will be no matter of bodies here either; for it is never without shape but always a whole body, though compound all the same. And intellect finds the doubleness. It divides until it [should] reach something simple that can no longer be analyzed; and as long as it can, it advances into the thing’s depth. The depth of each thing is matter. That is why all matter is dark: because the light is rational principle, and intellect is rational principle. So intellect, seeing the rational principle in each thing, takes what is below it to be dark, as lying beneath the light, just as an eye, which is light-like, casting itself toward the light and the colors, which are lights, says that what lies beneath the colors is dark and material (hidden by the colors).
διάφορόν γε μὴν τὸ σκοτεινὸν τό τε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τό τε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχει διάφορός τε ἡ ὕλη, ὅσον καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπικείμενον ἀμφοῖν διάφορον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεία λαβοῦσα τὸ ὡρισμένον αὐτὴ ζωὴν ὡρισμένην καὶ νοερὰν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ ὡρισμένον μέν τι γίνεται, οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοοῦν, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον. καὶ ἡ μορφὴ δὲ εἴδωλον· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἴδωλον. ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡ μορφὴ ἀληθινόν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
Yet the darkness in intelligibles and that in perceptibles are different, and the matter differs as much as the form laid upon each differs. The divine matter, when it receives what defines it, has a defined and intellectual life of its own; the other becomes something defined, but not living or thinking: a decorated corpse. The shape is an image, and so the substrate is an image too. There the shape is true, and so is the substrate.
διὸ καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, εἰ περὶ ἐκείνης ἔλεγον, ὀρθῶς ἔδει ὑπολαμβάνειν λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἐκεῖ οὐσία, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ νοουμένη καὶ ὅλη οὖσα πεφωτισμένη οὐσία. πότερα δὲ ἀίδιος ἡ νοητὴ ὁμοίως ζητητέον, ὡς ἄν τις καὶ τὰς ἰδέας ζητοῖ· γεννητὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν,ἀγέννητα δέ, ὅτι μὴ χρόνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ παρ’ ἄλλου, οὐχ ὡς γινόμενα ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ [ἐνταῦθα] κόσμος, ἀλλὰ ὄντα ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐκεῖ κόσμος.
So those who say that matter is substance would have to be taken as speaking correctly if they were talking about that matter. For the substrate there is substance; or rather, conceived together with what is upon it, and as a whole illuminated, it is substance. Whether the intelligible matter is eternal must be investigated in the same way as one would investigate the Forms. They are generated, in that they have a principle, but ungenerated, because they do not have their principle in time but always from something else, not as always coming into being, like the cosmos [here], but as always being, like the cosmos there.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἐκεῖ ἀεί, ἣ τὴν ὕλην ποιεῖ· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὕλης αὕτη, ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη· διὸ καὶ αὕτη ἑτερότης ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ὁμοῦ ἐξέφυσαν κίνησις καὶ ἑτερότης· ἀόριστον δὲ καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, κἀκείνου πρὸς τὸ ὁρισθῆναι δεόμενα· ὁρίζεται δέ, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστραφῇ· πρὶν δὲ ἀόριστον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ οὔπω ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἀφώτιστον ἐκείνου. εἰ γὰρ παρ’ ἐκείνου τὸ φῶς, τὸ δεχόμενον τὸ φῶς, πρὶν δέξασθαι, φῶς οὐκ ἔχει ἀληθινόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο ὂν ἔχει, εἴπερ τὸ φῶς παρ’ ἄλλου. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὕλης πλείω τῶν προσηκόντων παραγυμνωθέντα ταύτῃ.
For otherness there is eternal too, and it is what makes matter; for this is the principle of matter, this and the first motion. That is why motion too was called otherness: because motion and otherness sprang out together. Both the motion and the otherness that come from the First are indefinite and need it in order to be defined; and they are defined when they turn back toward it. Before that, otherness too is indefinite and not yet good, but unilluminated by it. For if the light comes from it, then what receives the light has no true light before it receives it, but has it as something other, since the light comes from something else. So much for the matter in the intelligibles: more has been laid bare here than was fitting.
The matter of bodies
The transformation of elements shows a substrate, which is neither body, quality nor magnitude.
περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὑποδοχῆς ὧδε λεγέσθω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποκείμενον εἶναι ἄλλο ὂν παρ’ αὐτά, ἥ τε εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴ τῶν στοιχείων δηλοῖ. οὐ γὰρ παντελὴς τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος ἡ φθορά· ἢ ἔσται τις οὐσία εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπολλυμένη· οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ παντελῶς μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἐλήλυθεν, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν εἴδους μεταβολὴ ἐξ εἴδους ἑτέρου. μένει δὲ τὸ δεξάμενον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἀποβαλὸν θάτερον. τοῦτό τε οὖν δηλοῖ καὶ ὅλως ἡ φθορά· συνθέτου γάρ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἕκαστον.
About the receptacle of bodies, let this be said. That there must be some substrate for bodies, something other than they are, is shown by the transformation of the elements into one another. For the destruction of what changes is not total, or else some substance will perish into non-being; nor again has what comes into being come into being out of what is absolutely non-being. There is a change of form out of another form, and what has received the form of what came into being and has lost the other remains. This, then, shows it, and so does destruction in general; for destruction is of a compound. If so, each thing is made of matter and form.
ἥ τε ἐπαγωγὴ μαρτυρεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον σύνθετον δεικνῦσα· καὶ ἡ ἀνάλυσις δέ· οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη εἰς τὸν χρυσόν, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς εἰς ὕδωρ, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ δὲ φθειρόμενον τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀπαιτεῖ. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ εἶδος εἶναι ἢ ὕλην πρώτην ἢ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους. ἀλλ’ εἶδος μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ ὕλης ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ μεγέθει; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὕλη ἡ πρώτη· φθείρεται γάρ. ἐξ ὕλης ἄρα καὶ εἴδους. καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀόριστον, ὅτι μὴ εἶδος.
Induction also testifies to it, showing that what is destroyed is compound; and so does analysis. If the bowl is resolved into gold, for example, and the gold into water, then water too, when it is destroyed, requires something analogous. The elements must be either form, or prime matter, or made of matter and form. They can’t be form, for how, without matter, could they have bulk and magnitude? Nor are they prime matter, since they are destroyed. So they are made of matter and form. The form accounts for quality and shape, matter for the substrate, which is indefinite because it is not form.
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν ὕλῃ θέμενος ἀντιμαρτυροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν φθορὰν αὐτῶν. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὸ μῖγμα ὕλην ποιῶν, οὐκ ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς πάντα, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχειν λέγων ὃν εἰσάγει νοῦν ἀναιρεῖ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος διδόντα ποιῶν οὐδὲ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης ἀλλ’ ἅμα. ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ ἅμα. εἰ γὰρ μετέχει τὸ μῖγμα τοῦ εἶναι, πρότερον τὸ ὄν· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὂν κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δεήσει τρίτου. εἰ οὖν πρότερον ἀνάγκη τὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τί ἔδει τὰ εἴδη κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι, εἶτα τὸν νοῦν διὰ πραγμάτων ἀνηνύτων διακρίνειν ἐξὸν ἀποίου οὔσης τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν μορφὴν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐκτεῖναι; τό τε πᾶν ἐν παντὶ εἶναι πῶς οὐκ ἀδύνατον; ὁ δὲ τὸ ἅπειρον ὑποθεὶς τί ποτε τοῦτο λεγέτω.
Empedocles, who sets the elements in matter, has their destruction testifying against him. Anaxagoras makes the mixture matter, and says it has not a fitness for all things but all things in actuality; so he does away with the Intellect he introduces, since he doesn’t make it the giver of shape and form, nor prior to matter, but simultaneous with it. But simultaneity is impossible. For if the mixture participates in being, being is prior; and if both this and that are beings, there will be need of another, third thing over them. If, then, the craftsman must be prior, why did the forms have to be in matter in tiny pieces, and then Intellect separate them out with endless labor, when it could have extended quality and shape over the whole of matter, since it has no quality? And how is the claim that everything is in everything not impossible? As for the one who posited the unlimited, let him tell us what on earth this is.
καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἄπειρον, ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτόν τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὔτε αὐτοάπειρον οὔτε ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ φύσει ὡς συμβεβηκὸς σώματί τινι, τὸ μὲν αὐτοάπειρον, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ ὡς συμβεβηκός, ὅτι τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἂν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἄπειρον εἴη οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ ὕλη, ἐστὶ δῆλον. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ αἱ ἄτομοι τάξιν ὕλης ἕξουσιν αἱ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ οὖσαι· τμητὸν γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα κατὰ πᾶν· καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ οἷόν τε ἄνευ νοῦ ἕκαστα καὶ ψυχῆς, ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀτόμων εἶναι, ἄλλην τε φύσιν παρὰ τὰς ἀτόμους ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων δημιουργεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τε· ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδεὶς δημιουργὸς ποιήσει τι ἐξ οὐχ ὕλης συνεχοῦς.
If it is unlimited in the sense of untraversable, it is clear that there is no such thing among beings, neither the unlimited itself nor the unlimited as an accident in another nature, some body. Not the unlimited itself, because its part too would necessarily be unlimited; not as an accident, because that to which it belongs as an accident would not be unlimited in itself, nor simple, nor matter. Nor will atoms hold the position of matter, since they don’t exist at all: every body is divisible at every point. Moreover, the continuity of bodies and their fluidity are impossible without intellect and soul in each case, and soul cannot be made of atoms; nor is it possible to fashion out of atoms a nature other than the atoms. Besides, no craftsman will make anything out of a material that is not continuous.
καὶ μυρία ἂν λέγοιτο πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ εἴρηται· διὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν περιττὸν ἐν τούτοις.
Countless things could be said, and have been said, against this hypothesis; so it is superfluous to dwell on it.
τίς οὖν ἡ μία αὕτη καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ἄποιος λεγομένη; καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα, εἴπερ ἄποιος, δῆλον· ἢ ποιότητα ἕξει. λέγοντες δὲ πάντων αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ οὐ τινῶν μὲν ὕλην, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ εἶδος οὖσαν· οἷον τὸν πηλὸν ὕλην τῷ κεραμεύοντι, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐχ ὕλην· οὐ δὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα λέγοντες, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ προσάπτοιμεν, ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁρᾶται. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις ποιότησιν, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ θερμότησι καὶ ψυχρότησιν, οὐδὲ τὸ κοῦφον οὐδὲ τὸ βάρος, οὐ πυκνόν, οὐχ ἁραιόν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ σχῆμα. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος· ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ μεγέθει, ἄλλο τὸ μεμεγεθυσμένῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τὸ σχήματι, ἄλλο τὸ ἐσχηματισμένῳ.
What, then, is this matter that is called one, continuous and without quality? That it is not body, if it is without quality, is clear; otherwise it will have quality. When we say that it is the matter of all perceptible things, and not matter for some while being form in relation to others (as clay is matter for the potter, but not matter without qualification), when we say it is matter not in this way but in relation to everything, we would attach to it none of the things seen in perceptible things. If so, then besides the other qualities, such as colors, heat and cold, it has neither lightness nor weight; it is not dense, not rare; it has no shape either. Nor, then, does it have magnitude. For to be magnitude is one thing and to be something that has magnitude another; to be shape is one thing and to be something shaped another.
δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν μὴ σύνθετον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἕν τι τῇ αὑτῆς φύσει· οὕτω γὰρ πάντων ἔρημος. καὶ ὁ μορφὴν διδοὺς δώσει ἄλλην οὖσαν παρ’ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ πάντα ἐκ τῶν ὄντων οἷον προσφέρων· ἢ δουλεύσει τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῆς καὶ ποιήσει οὐχ ἡλίκον θέλει, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἡ ὕλη βούλεται· τὸ δὲ συντροχάζειν τὴν βούλησιν τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῆς πλασματῶδες. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης τὸ ποιοῦν, ταύτῃ ἔσται ἡ ὕλη πάντη, ᾗ τὸ ποιοῦν θέλει, καὶ εὐάγωγος εἰς ἅπαντα· καὶ εἰς μέγεθος τοίνυν. μέγεθος δὲ εἰ ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ σχῆμα ἔχειν· ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον δύσεργος ἔσται. ἔπεισι τοίνυν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῇ πάντα ἐπ’ αὐτῇ φέρον· τὸ δὲ εἶδος πᾶν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου.
It must not be compound, but simple and one thing by its own nature; for in this way it is bare of everything. And the one who gives it shape will give the shape as something other than it, and magnitude, and everything, bringing them, as it were, from the things that are. Or else he will be a slave to its magnitude and will make things not as large as he wants but as large as matter wants; and to have his will run in step with its magnitude is a fiction. But if the maker is prior to matter, matter will be in every respect as the maker wants, and easily led into everything, and so into magnitude too. If it had magnitude, it would necessarily also have shape, and so it would be still harder to work. So form comes upon it, bringing everything onto it; and every form has magnitude as well, and whatever size it is, it has with the rational principle and by its agency.
διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν ἑκάστων μετὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ὥρισται· ἄλλο γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἄλλο ὄρνιθος καὶ ὄρνιθος τοιουτουί. [οὐ] θαυμαστότερον [δὲ] τὸ ποσὸν τῇ ὕλῃ ἄλλο ἐπάγειν τοῦ ποιὸν αὐτῇ προστιθέναι, οὐδὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν λόγος, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ εἶδος καὶ μέτρον καὶ ἀριθμὸς ὄν.
That is why in each kind the quantity is defined together with the form: one for a human being, another for a bird, and another for this particular sort of bird. It is [not] more remarkable [, though,] to bring a different quantity onto matter than to add quality to it; nor is quality a rational principle while quantity, which is form, measure and number, is not.
πῶς οὖν τις λήψεταί τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ μὴ μέγεθος ἔχει; ἢ πᾶν ὅπερ μὴ ταὐτὸν τῷ ποσῷ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ταὐτόν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἕτερα τοῦ ποσοῦ. ὅλως δὲ πᾶσαν ἀσώματον φύσιν ἄποσον θετέον· ἀσώματος δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ποσότης αὐτὴ οὐ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετασχὸν αὐτῆς· ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου δῆλον, ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ποσότης. ὡς οὖν ἐγίνετό τι λευκὸν παρουσίᾳ λευκότητος, τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ χρώματα ποικίλα οὐκ ἦν ποικίλον χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ ποικίλος, εἰ βούλει, λόγος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ τηλικόνδε οὐ τηλικόνδε, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πηλίκον ἢ [ἡ] πηλικότης ἢ ὁ λόγος τὸ ποιοῦν. προσελθοῦσα οὖν ἡ πηλικότης ἐξελίττει εἰς μέγεθος τὴν ὕλην;
How, then, will anyone grasp something among the things that are which has no magnitude? Or rather: anything at all that is not the same as quantity, for being and quantity are certainly not the same. Many other things, too, are different from quantity. In general, every incorporeal nature must be put down as without quantity, and matter too is incorporeal. Besides, quantity itself is not a quantity; what partakes of it is. So from this too it is clear that quantity is a form. Something became white, then, by the presence of whiteness, while what produced the white color in an animal, and its other varied colors, was not a varied color but, if you like, a varied rational principle. In the same way, what produces a thing of such-and-such a size is not of such-and-such a size. It is the how-large itself, or [the] largeness, or the rational principle, that produces it. Does largeness, then, come to matter and unroll it into magnitude?
οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγῳ συνεσπείρατο· ἀλλ’ ἔδωκε μέγεθος τὸ οὐ πρότερον ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιότητα τὴν οὐ πρότερον οὖσαν.
Not at all, for matter was not rolled up small beforehand. Largeness gave it magnitude, which was not there before, just as it gave it quality, which was not there before.
τί οὖν νοήσω ἀμέγεθες ἐν ὕλῃ; τί δὲ νοήσεις ἄποιον ὁπωσοῦν; καὶ τίς ἡ νόησις καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ ἐπιβολή; ἢ ἀοριστία· εἰ γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, καὶ τῷ ἀορίστῳ τὸ ἀόριστον. λόγος μὲν οὖν γένοιτο ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀορίστου ὡρισμένος, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιβολὴ ἀόριστος. εἰ δ’ ἕκαστον λόγῳ καὶ νοήσει γινώσκεται — ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁ μὲν λόγος λέγει, ἃ δὴ λέγει περὶ αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ βουλομένη εἶναι νόησις οὐ νόησις, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἄνοια μᾶλλον — νόθον ἂν εἴη τὸ φάντασμα αὐτῆς καὶ οὐ γνήσιον, ἐκ θατέρου οὐκ ἀληθοῦς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θατέρου λόγου συγκείμενον. καὶ τάχα εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων ὁ Πλάτων νόθῳ λογισμῷ εἶπε ληπτὴν εἶναι. τίς οὖν ἡ ἀοριστία τῆς ψυχῆς; ἆρα παντελὴς ἄγνοια ὡς ἀπουσία;
What, then, am I to think of as sizeless in matter? And what will you think of as in any way without quality? What is the thinking here, and what is the approach of discursive thought? Or rather: indefiniteness. For if like is known by like, the indefinite too is known by the indefinite. An account of the indefinite might well be definite, but the approach to it is indefinite. Each thing is known by reason and thinking. Here, though, reason says what it does say about matter, while what would like to be thinking is not thinking but, as it were, a lack of thought. If so, the image we have of matter would be spurious and not genuine, put together from one component that is not true and the other, reason. And perhaps it was with this in view that Plato said matter is grasped “by a kind of illegitimate reasoning.” What, then, is this indefiniteness of the soul? Is it complete ignorance, an absence?
ἢ ἐν καταφάσει τινὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, καὶ οἷον ὀφθαλμῷ τὸ σκότος ὕλη ὂν παντὸς ἀοράτου χρώματος, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφελοῦσα ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οἷον φῶς τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκέτι ἔχουσα ὁρίσαι ὁμοιοῦται τῇ ὄψει τῇ ἐν σκότῳ ταὐτόν πως γινομένῃ τότε τῷ ὃ οἷον ὁρᾷ. ἆρ’ οὖν ὁρᾷ;
Or rather, the indefinite lies in a kind of affirmation. For the eye, darkness is the matter of every color it cannot see. In the same way the soul, when it has taken away everything that lies on sensible things like a kind of light, and has nothing left to define, becomes like sight in the dark, which then becomes in a way the same as what it, as it were, sees. Does it see, then?
ἢ οὕτως ὡς ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ ὡς ἄχροιαν καὶ ὡς ἀλαμπὲς καὶ προσέτι δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰδοποιήσει ἤδη. ὅταν οὖν μηδὲν νοῇ, οὐ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ψυχὴν πάθος; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὲν μηδὲν [νοῇ], λέγει μηδέν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσχει οὐδέν· ὅταν δὲ τὴν ὕλην, οὕτω πάσχει πάθος οἷον τύπον τοῦ ἀμόρφου· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεμορφωμένα καὶ τὰ μεμεγεθυσμένα νοῇ, ὡς σύνθετα νοεῖ· ὡς γὰρ κεχρωσμένα καὶ ὅλως πεποιωμένα. τὸ ὅλον οὖν νοεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω· καὶ ἐναργὴς μὲν ἡ νόησις ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν ἐπόντων, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τοῦ ἀμόρφου· οὐ γὰρ εἶδος.
Or rather, it sees in the way one sees shapelessness, colorlessness, something without light, and moreover something that has no magnitude; otherwise it would already be giving it form. When the soul thinks nothing, then, isn’t this the same experience? Or rather no. When it [thinks] nothing, it says nothing, or better, it experiences nothing. But when it thinks matter, it undergoes an experience that is like an impression of the shapeless. For even when it thinks things that have been shaped and given magnitude, it thinks them as composites, as colored and in general qualified. So it thinks the whole, the two together. The thinking or perception of what lies on the surface is clear; that of the substrate, the shapeless, is faint, for it is not a form.
ὃ οὖν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ συνθέτῳ λαμβάνει μετὰ τῶν ἐπόντων ἀναλύσασα ἐκεῖνα καὶ χωρίσασα, ὃ καταλείπει ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο νοεῖ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινὸν καὶ νοεῖ οὐ νοοῦσα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔμεινεν οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη ἄμορφος, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασίν ἐστι μεμορφωμένη, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εὐθέως ἐπέβαλε τὸ εἶδος τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῇ ἀλγοῦσα τῷ ἀορίστῳ, οἷον φόβῳ τοῦ ἔξω τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνεχομένη ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐπιπολὺ ἑστάναι.
So the soul grasps something in the whole, the composite, along with what lies on it. When it has analyzed those features and separated them off, it thinks what reason leaves behind: dimly, a dim thing; darkly, a dark thing; and it thinks it without thinking. And since matter itself did not stay shapeless either, but is shaped in things, the soul too immediately imposed on it the form of things. It is pained at the indefinite, as if afraid of being outside the things that are, and it cannot bear to stand for long in non-being.
καὶ ἔτι δεῖ τινος ἄλλου πρὸς σύστασιν σωμάτων μετὰ μέγεθος καὶ ποιότητας ἁπάσας; ἢ τοῦ ὑποδεξομένου πάντα. οὐκοῦν ὄγκου; εἰ δὲ ὄγκος, μέγεθος δήπου· εἰ δὲ ἀμέγεθες, οὐδ’ ὅπου δέξεται ἔχει. ἀμέγεθες δὲ ὂν τί ἂν συμβάλλοιτο, εἰ μήτε εἰς εἶδος καὶ τὸ ποιὸν μήτε εἰς τὴν διάστασιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ὃ δὴ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης δοκεῖ, ὅπου ἂν ᾖ, ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὰ σώματα; ὅλως δὲ ὥσπερ πράξεις καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ χρόνοι καὶ κινήσεις ὑποβολὴν ὕλης ἐν αὑτοῖς οὐκ ἔχοντα ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ σώματα τὰ πρῶτα ἀνάγκη ὕλην ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ὅλα ἕκαστα εἶναι ἅ ἐστι ποικιλώτερα ὄντα μίξει τῇ ἐκ πλειόνων εἰδῶν τὴν σύστασιν ἔχοντα· ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ ἀμέγεθες ὕλης ὄνομα κενὸν εἶναι.
Is something else still needed for the constitution of bodies, beyond magnitude and all the qualities? Yes: something that will receive them all. A bulk, then? But if a bulk, surely a magnitude; and if it is sizeless, it has no room in which to receive anything. And being sizeless, what would it contribute, if it contributes neither to form and quality nor to extension and magnitude, which seem to come into bodies from matter, wherever matter is? In general, actions, productions, times and motions are among the things that are without having any underlying matter in them. Just so, the primary bodies need not have matter either. Each of them is wholly what it is, and is more varied because it is constituted by a mixture of several forms. So this sizeless matter is an empty name.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὑποδεχόμενον ὁτιοῦν· ὄγκον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ μέγεθος ἤδη αὐτῷ παρῇ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα δεχομένη ὁμοῦ ἔχει πάντα· εἰ δὲ μέγεθος αὐτῇ συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, ἔσχεν ἂν ἕκαστα ἐν μεγέθει. ἡ δὲ ὕλη διὰ τοῦτο ἐν διαστήματι ἃ δέχεται λαμβάνει, ὅτι διαστήματός ἐστι δεκτική· ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ μετὰ τοῦ μεγεθύνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἀντιπαραγόμενον ἴσχει τῷ ποσῷ καὶ συστελλομένου συσταλείη ἄν.
First, then, what receives anything at all need not be a bulk, unless magnitude is already present to it. The soul, after all, receives everything and holds everything all together; if magnitude were an attribute of the soul, it would hold each thing in magnitude. Matter takes what it receives in extension precisely because it is receptive of extension. In the same way, animals and plants, as they grow larger, have their quality drawn out alongside their quantity, and when the quantity shrinks, the quality would shrink with it.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι προυπάρχει τι μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑποκείμενον τῷ μορφοῦντι, κἀκεῖ ἀπαιτεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῶς ἀλλ’ ἡ τούτου· τὴν δ’ ἁπλῶς δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παρ’ ἄλλου ἔχειν. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ὄγκον εἶναι τὸ δεξόμενον τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ’ ὁμοῦ τῷ γενέσθαι ὄγκον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποιότητα δέχεσθαι καὶ φάντασμα μὲν ἔχειν ὄγκου εἰς ἐπιτηδειότητα τούτου ὥσπερ πρώτην, κενὸν δὲ ὄγκον. ὅθεν τινὲς ταὐτὸν τῷ κενῷ τὴν ὕλην εἰρήκασι. φάντασμα δὲ ὄγκου λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα ὁρίσαι, ὅταν τῇ ὕλῃ προσομιλῇ, εἰς ἀοριστίαν χεῖ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε περιγράφουσα οὔτε εἰς σημεῖον ἰέναι δυναμένη· ἤδη γὰρ ὁρίζει.
Someone may demand a magnitude in the case of matter too, because in such cases some magnitude already exists as a substrate for what shapes it. He is wrong. For here the matter is not matter simply but the matter of this particular thing, whereas matter simply must get even this from something else. So what is to receive form need not be a bulk. Rather, at the same time as it becomes a bulk, it receives the rest of quality too. It has an image of bulk, as a sort of first aptitude for it—but an empty bulk. That is why some have said matter is the same as the void. I say “an image of bulk” because the soul too, having nothing to define when it associates with matter, pours itself out into indefiniteness, neither drawing a boundary around it nor able to come to a point; for that would already be defining.
διὸ οὔτε μέγα λεκτέον χωρὶς οὔτε σμικρὸν αὖ, ἀλλὰ μέγα καὶ σμικρόν· καὶ οὕτως ὄγκος καὶ ἀμέγεθες οὕτως, ὅτι ὕλη ὄγκου καὶ συστελλόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μέγα οἷον ὄγκον διατρέχει· καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία αὐτῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὄγκος, ὑποδοχὴ μεγέθους ἐν αὐτῇ· ἐν δὲ φαντασίᾳ ἐκείνως. καὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀμεγέθων ὅσα εἴδη ὥρισται ἕκαστον· ὥστε οὐδαμῇ ἔννοια ὄγκου· ἡ δὲ ἀόριστος οὖσα καὶ μήπω στᾶσα παρ’ αὑτῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἶδος φερομένη δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε καὶ πάντη εὐάγωγος οὖσα πολλή τε γίνεται τῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀγωγῇ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἔσχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φύσιν ὄγκου.
That is why matter should not be called large on its own, nor small either, but large-and-small. It is a bulk in this way, and sizeless in this way: because it is the matter of bulk, and, contracting from the large to the small and from the small to the large, it runs through, as it were, a bulk. Its indefiniteness is a bulk of this sort, a receptacle of magnitude in itself; in imagination it is a bulk in the other way. Of the other sizeless things, those that are forms are each defined, so that there is no notion of bulk about them at all. But matter is indefinite and not yet stable of itself; it is carried this way and that toward every form and is pliant in every direction. It becomes many through being led into all things and coming to be, and in this way it has acquired the nature of bulk.
συμβάλλεται οὖν τὰ μεγέθη τοῖς σώμασι· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν σωμάτων ἐν μεγέθεσι. περὶ δὲ μέγεθος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἢ περὶ τὸ μεμεγεθυσμένον· εἰ γὰρ περὶ μέγεθος, οὐ περὶ ὕλην, ὁμοίως ἂν ἀμεγέθη καὶ ἀνυπόστατα ἦν ἢ λόγοι μόνοι ἂν ἦσαν — οὗτοι δὲ περὶ ψυχήν — καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σώματα. δεῖ οὖν ἐνταῦθα περὶ ἕν τι τὰ πολλά· τοῦτο δὲ μεμεγεθυσμένον· τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερον τοῦ μεγέθους. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὅσα μίγνυται τῷ ὕλην ἔχειν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔρχεται καὶ οὐ δεῖται ἄλλου του περὶ ὅ, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν μιγνυμένων ἥκει φέρον τὴν αὑτοῦ ὕλην. δεῖται δ’ ὅμως καὶ ἑνός τινος τοῦ δεξομένου ἢ ἀγγείου ἢ τόπου· ὁ δὲ τόπος ὕστερος τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν δέοιτο τὰ σώματα ὕλης.
Magnitudes, then, do contribute to bodies, for the forms of bodies are in magnitudes. But these forms would not have come to be around magnitude itself, but around what has been given magnitude. If they were around magnitude and not around matter, they would equally be sizeless and without real existence, or they would be only rational principles—and these belong to soul—and there would be no bodies. So here the many must be around some one thing; this one thing has been given magnitude; and this is different from magnitude. Indeed, even now, things that are mixed come together into one by having matter, and need nothing else to be around, because each of the things mixed comes bringing its own matter. All the same, they do need some one thing to receive them, a vessel or a place. But place comes after matter and bodies, so that bodies would need matter first.
οὐδέ, ὅτι αἱ ποιήσεις καὶ αἱ πράξεις ἄυλοι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σώματα· σύνθετα γὰρ τὰ σώματα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις οὔ. καὶ τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ ὕλη ὅταν πράττωσι τὸ ὑποκείμενον δίδωσι μένουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς [δὲ] τὸ πράττειν οὐχ αὑτὴν δίδωσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ πράττοντες τοῦτο ζητοῦσι.
Nor, because productions and actions are without matter, are bodies therefore without matter too. Bodies are composite; actions are not. And when agents act, matter provides them with the substrate, remaining in them, [but] it does not give itself over into the acting; nor is that what agents are looking for.
καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἄλλη πρᾶξις εἰς ἄλλην, ἵνα ἂν ἦν καὶ αὐταῖς ὕλη, ἀλλ’ ὁ πράττων ἐπ’ ἄλλην μεταβάλλει πρᾶξιν ἐξ ἄλλης· ὥστε ὕλην αὐτὸν εἶναι ταῖς πράξεσιν. ἔστι τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τῇ ποιότητι καὶ τῷ μεγέθει· ὥστε καὶ τοῖς σώμασι· καὶ οὐ κενὸν ὄνομα, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι ὑποκείμενον κἂν ἀόρατον κἂν ἀμέγεθες ὑπάρχῃ. ἢ οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰς ποιότητας φήσομεν οὐδὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων λέγοιτο ἂν οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον λαμβανόμενον. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔστι καίπερ ἀμυδρῶς ὂν ἕκαστον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη [ἡ] ὕλη, κἂν μὴ ἐναργὴς ὑπάρχῃ αἱρετὴ οὖσα οὐ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὄμμασιν, ἄχρους γάρ· οὔτε ἀκοῇ, οὐ γὰρ ψόφος· οὐδὲ χυμοί, διὸ οὐδὲ ῥῖνες οὐδὲ γλῶσσα [αἱροῦσιν]. ἆρ’ οὖν ἁφῇ;
Nor does one action change into another, in which case actions too would have matter. It is the agent who changes from one action to another, so that he himself is the matter for his actions. Matter, then, is necessary both to quality and to magnitude, and so to bodies as well. It is not an empty name; it is a substrate, even if it is invisible and sizeless. Otherwise, by the same argument, we shall deny qualities and magnitude too, for each of these, taken by itself alone, might be said to be nothing. But if these exist, though each of them dimly, all the more would [the] matter exist, even if it is not clear, since it is not grasped by the senses. Not by the eyes, for it is colorless; not by hearing, for it is not a sound; it has no flavors, so neither nostrils nor tongue [grasp it]. By touch, then?
ἢ οὔ, ὅτι μηδὲ σῶμα· σώματος γὰρ ἡ ἁφή, ὅτι ἢ πυκνοῦ ἢ ἁραιοῦ, μαλακοῦ σκληροῦ, ὑγροῦ ξηροῦ· τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν περὶ τὴν ὕλην· ἀλλὰ λογισμῷ οὐκ ἐκ νοῦ, ἀλλὰ κενῷ· διὸ καὶ νόθος, ὡς εἴρηται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ σωματότης περὶ αὐτήν· εἰ μὲν [γὰρ] λόγος ἡ σωματότης, ἕτερος αὐτῆς· αὕτη οὖν ἄλλο· εἰ δ’ ἤδη ποιήσασα καὶ οἷον κραθεῖσα, σῶμα φανερῶς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐχ ὕλη μόνον.
No, since it is not a body either. Touch is of body, because it is of dense or rare, soft or hard, wet or dry, and none of these belongs to matter. It is grasped by a reasoning that does not come from intellect but is empty—which is why, as was said, it is spurious. Nor does corporeality belong to it. [For] if corporeality is a rational principle, it is different from matter, and matter is something else. And if it has already done its work and been, as it were, blended, the result would plainly be body and not matter alone.
εἰ δὲ ποιότης τὸ ὑποκείμενον κοινή τις οὖσα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν στοιχείων, πρῶτον μὲν τίς αὕτη λεκτέον. ἔπειτα πῶς ποιότης ὑποκείμενον ἔσται; πῶς δὲ ἐν ἀμεγέθει ποιὸν θεωρηθήσεται μὴ ἔχον ὕλην μηδὲ μέγεθος; ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν ὡρισμένη ἡ ποιότης, πῶς ὕλη; εἰ δ’ ἀόριστόν τι, οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ ζητουμένη ὕλη. τί οὖν κωλύει ἄποιον μὲν εἶναι τῷ τῶν ἄλλων μηδεμιᾶς τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει μετέχειν, αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ μηδεμιᾶς μετέχειν ποιὰν εἶναι ἰδιότητα πάντως τινὰ ἔχουσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσαν, οἷον στέρησίν τινα ἐκείνων; καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐστερημένος ποιός· οἷον ὁ τυφλός. εἰ οὖν στέρησις τούτων περὶ αὐτήν, πῶς οὐ ποιά; εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅλως στέρησις περὶ αὐτήν, ἔτι μᾶλλον, εἴ γε δὴ καὶ στέρησις ποιόν τι.
If the substrate is a quality common to each of the elements, we must first be told what this quality is. Then, how will a quality be a substrate? How will something qualified be observed in what is sizeless, when it has neither matter nor magnitude? Again, if the quality is definite, how is it matter? And if it is something indefinite, it is not a quality but the substrate, the matter we are looking for. What, then, prevents matter from being without quality, in that its own nature shares in none of the other qualities, and yet qualified by this very fact of sharing in none—having some particular character entirely its own, which distinguishes it from the others, a sort of privation of them? After all, someone deprived is qualified: a blind man, for example. If, then, a privation of these qualities belongs to matter, how is it not qualified? And if privation in general belongs to it, all the more so—if privation is indeed something qualified.
ὁ δὲ ταῦτα λέγων τί ἄλλο ἢ ποιὰ καὶ ποιότητας πάντα ποιεῖ; ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποσότης ποιότης ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ οὐσία δέ. εἰ δὲ ποιόν, πρόσεστι ποιότης. γελοῖον δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ μὴ ποιὸν ποιὸν ποιεῖν. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἕτερον, ποιόν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοετερότης, οὐδ’ ὣς ποιόν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἡ ποιότης ποιά· εἰ δ’ ἕτερον μόνον, οὐχ ἑαυτῇ, ἀλλ’ ἑτερότητι ἕτερον καὶ ταυτότητι ταὐτόν. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ στέρησις ποιότης οὐδὲ ποιόν, ἀλλ’ ἐρημία ποιότητος ἢ ἄλλου, ὡς ἡ ἀψοφία ψόφου ἢ ὁτουοῦν ἄλλου· ἄρσις γὰρ ἡ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἐν καταφάσει.
But whoever says this—what else is he doing but making everything qualified, and qualities? So quantity would be a quality, and substance too. If matter is qualified, a quality is present to it. But it is ridiculous to make what is other than the qualified, and not qualified, qualified. Suppose it is qualified because it is other. If it is otherness itself, even so it is not qualified, since quality itself is not qualified either. And if it is merely other, it is other not by itself but by otherness, just as a thing is the same by sameness. Nor, then, is privation a quality or something qualified. It is an absence of quality or of something else, as soundlessness is an absence of sound or of anything else. For privation is a removal, while the qualified lies in affirmation.
ἥ τε ἰδιότης τῆς ὕλης οὐ μορφή· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ποιὰ εἶναι μηδ’ εἶδός τι ἔχειν· ἄτοπον δή, ὅτι μὴ ποιά, ποιὰν λέγειν καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ, ὅτι ἀμέγεθες, αὐτῷ τούτῳ μέγεθος ἔχειν. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἰδιότης αὐτῆς οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ οὐ πρόσκειται ἡ ἰδιότης, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτῶν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐ μόνον ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ καί τι ἕκαστον ὡς εἶδος, αὕτη δὲ πρεπόντως ἂν λέγοιτο μόνον ἄλλο· τάχα δὲ ἄλλα, ἵνα μὴ τῷ ἄλλο ἑνικῶς ὁρίσῃς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλα τὸ ἀόριστον ἐνδείξῃ
Matter’s particular character is not a shape either, for not being qualified means not having any form. It is absurd, then, to call it qualified because it is not qualified; it is like saying it has magnitude by the very fact that it is sizeless. Its particular character, then, is nothing other than what it is. The character is not added on to it; it lies rather in its relation to other things, in its being other than they. The other things are not only other; each is also something, as a form. Matter, though, might properly be called only “other”—or perhaps “others,” so that you don’t define it with the singular “other” but indicate its indefiniteness with the plural.
Matter as privation and the unlimited
Matter is the unlimited itself, poverty and privation, and so evil.
ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον, πότερα στέρησις, ἢ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ στέρησις. ὁ τοίνυν λέγων ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἓν ἄμφω, λόγῳ δὲ δύο, δίκαιος ἦν διδάσκειν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἑκατέρου ὅντινα δεῖ ἀποδιδόναι, τῆς μὲν ὕλης ὃς ὁριεῖται αὐτὴν οὐδὲν προσαπτόμενος τῆς στερήσεως, τῆς τε αὖ στερήσεως ὡσαύτως. ἢ γὰρ οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἢ θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ μόνον ὁποτερονοῦν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερον χωρὶς καὶ οὐκ ἐπιζητεῖ οὐδέτερον, δύο ἔσται ἄμφω καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἕτερον στερήσεως, κἂν συμβεβήκῃ αὐτῇ ἡ στέρησις. δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ δυνάμει ἐνορᾶσθαι θάτερον. εἰ δ’ ὡς ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ καὶ τὸ σιμόν, καὶ οὕτω διπλοῦν ἑκάτερον καὶ δύο.
But we must investigate this: is matter privation, or does privation belong to it? Whoever says the two are one in substrate but two in account ought, in fairness, to have taught us which account must be given of each: an account of matter that defines it without bringing in privation at all, and likewise one of privation. For either neither is in the account of the other, or each is in the other’s, or only one of them, whichever it is, is in the other’s. If each is separate and neither requires the other, they will be two, and matter will be other than privation, even if privation is an attribute of it. And in the account of the one, the other must not be seen even potentially. But if they are like the snub nose and snubness, then too each is double, and they are two.
εἰ δὲ ὡς τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ θερμότης, ἐν μὲν τῷ πυρὶ τῆς θερμότητος οὔσης, ἐν δὲ τῇ θερμότητι οὐ λαμβανομένου τοῦ πυρός, καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὕτω στέρησις, ὡς τὸ πῦρ θερμόν, οἷον εἶδος αὐτῆς ἔσται ἡ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο, ὃ δεῖ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι. καὶ οὐδ’ οὕτως ἕν. ἆρα οὖν οὕτως ἓν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, δύο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, τῆς στερήσεως οὐ σημαινούσης τι παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ οἷον ἀπόφασις ἡ στέρησις τῶν ὄντων· ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι οὐκ ὄν, οὐ γὰρ προστίθησιν ἡ ἀπόφασις, ἀλλά φησιν οὐκ εἶναι· καὶ οὕτω στέρησις ὡς οὐκ ὄν;
If they are like fire and heat—heat being in the fire, while fire is not included in heat—and matter is privation in the way fire is hot, then privation will be a sort of form of matter, and the substrate, which is what matter must be, will be something else. So even in this way they are not one. Are they, then, one in substrate and two in account in this sense: that privation signifies not that something is present but that it is not, privation being a sort of negation of the things that are—as if someone said “non-being,” for the negation adds nothing but says that something is not? Is privation, then, non-being in this sense?
εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὄν, ὅτι μὴ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο ὄν τι, ἔτι δύο οἱ λόγοι, ὁ μὲν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἁπτόμενος, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα σχέσιν δηλῶν. ἢ ὁ μὲν τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὁ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως εἰ τὸ ἀόριστον αὐτῆς δηλοῖ, τάχα ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῆς ἐφάπτοιτο· πλὴν ἕν γε ἑκατέρως τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, λόγῳ δὲ δύο. εἰ μέντοι τῷ ἀορίστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀποίῳ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ταὐτόν, πῶς ἔτι δύο οἱ λόγοι;
If it is non-being in the sense that it is not being but some other being, the accounts are still two: one touches the substrate, while that of privation shows its relation to other things. Or rather, the account of matter refers to other things, and so does that of the substrate; while the account of privation, if it shows matter’s indefiniteness, might perhaps itself touch matter. Either way, though, they are one in substrate and two in account. But if, for matter, to be indefinite, to be unlimited and to be without quality are the same, how can the accounts still be two?
πάλιν οὖν ζητητέον, εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἐπ ’ ἄλλῃ φύσει καὶ πῶς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ εἰ στέρησις συμβέβηκεν. εἰ δὴ ὅσα μὲν ἀριθμοὶ καὶ λόγοι ἀπειρίας ἔξω — ὅροι γὰρ καὶ τάξεις καὶ τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρὰ τούτων, τάττει δὲ ταῦτα οὐ τὸ τεταγμένον οὐδὲ τάξις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τὸ ταττόμενον παρὰ τὸ τάττον, τάττει δὲ τὸ πέρας καὶ ὅρος καὶ λόγος — ἀνάγκη τὸ ταττόμενον καὶ ὁριζόμενον τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι. τάττεται δὲ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὅσα δὲ μὴ ὕλη τῷ μετέχειν ἢ ὕλης λόγον ἔχειν· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὴν ὕλην τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἄπειρον, ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῇ.
So we must investigate again whether the unlimited and the indefinite belong as an attribute to some other nature, how they are an attribute, and whether privation is an attribute. Now all that is number and rational principle lies outside unlimitedness. For these are limits and orders, and other things too get their ordered state from them. What they order is not what is already ordered, nor order itself; what is ordered is different from what orders, and what orders is limit, boundary and rational principle. If so, what is ordered and bounded must be the unlimited. Matter is what is ordered, and so is whatever is not matter in so far as it participates in matter or plays the role of matter. So matter must be the unlimited—not unlimited incidentally, as though the unlimited were an attribute of it.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ συμβαῖνόν τῳ δεῖ λόγον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον οὐ λόγος· ἔπειτα τίνι ὄντι τὸ ἄπειρον συμβήσεται; πέρατι καὶ πεπερασμένῳ. ἀλλ’ οὐ πεπερασμένον οὐδὲ πέρας ἡ ὕλη. καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον δὲ προσελθὸν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ ἀπολεῖ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν· οὐ τοίνυν συμβεβηκὸς τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἄπειρον· αὐτὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἄπειρον.
For, first, what is an attribute of something must be a rational principle, and the unlimited is not a rational principle. Second, to what sort of being will the unlimited be an attribute? To limit and to what is limited. But matter is neither limited nor a limit. Besides, if the unlimited came to what is limited, it would destroy its nature. So the unlimited is not an attribute of matter: matter itself is the unlimited.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ εἴη ἂν γεννηθὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπειρίας ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ ἀεί, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀπειρίας ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος. πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; ἢ διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. καὶ τί διαφέρει; ὡς ἀρχέτυπον καὶ εἴδωλον. ἐλαττόνως οὖν ἄπειρον τοῦτο; ἢ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γὰρ εἴδωλον πεφευγὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, μᾶλλον ἄπειρον. ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία ἐν τῷ ἧττον ὁρισθέντι μᾶλλον· τὸ γὰρ ἧττον ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ κακῷ. τὸ ἐκεῖ οὖν μᾶλλον ὂν εἴδωλόν πως ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἧττον [ὄν], ὅσῳ πέφευγε τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, εἰς δὲ εἰδώλου κατερρύη φύσιν, ἀληθεστέρως ἄπειρον. τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι;
Even in the intelligible world matter is the unlimited, and it would be generated from the unlimitedness, or power, or everlastingness of the One—not that there is unlimitedness in the One; it produces it. How, then, is the unlimited both there and here? Or rather, the unlimited too is twofold. And what is the difference? That of archetype and image. Is the unlimited here less unlimited, then? Or rather more: the more it is an image that has fled true being, the more unlimited it is. For unlimitedness is greater in what is less defined, since what is less in the good is more in the bad. So the unlimited there, having more being, is unlimited only in a way, as an image; while the unlimited here, having less [being], is more truly unlimited, to the extent that it has fled true being and slid down into the nature of an image. Is the unlimited, then, the same as what it is to be unlimited?
ἢ ὅπου λόγος καὶ ὕλη ἄλλο ἑκάτερον, ὅπου δὲ ὕλη μόνον ἢ ταὐτὸν λεκτέον ἢ ὅλως, ὃ καὶ βέλτιον, οὐκ εἶναι ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι· λόγος γὰρ ἔσται, ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ, ἵν’ ᾖ ἄπειρον. ἄπειρον μὲν δὴ παρ’ αὑτῆς τὴν ὕλην λεκτέον ἀντιτάξει τῇ πρὸς τὸν λόγον. καὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὤν ἐστι λόγος, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀντιτεταγμένην τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν οὐκ ἄλλο τι οὖσαν λεκτέον ἄπειρον.
Or rather, where there is a rational principle and matter, each is distinct; but where there is only matter, we must either say they are the same or—which is better—that there is no “what it is to be unlimited” here at all. For that would be a rational principle, and there is none in the unlimited, if it is to be unlimited. So matter must be called unlimited of itself, by its opposition to rational principle. Just as a rational principle is a rational principle without being anything else, so too matter, opposed to rational principle by its unlimitedness, must be called unlimited without being anything else.
ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἑτερότητι ταὐτόν; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μορίῳ ἑτερότητος ἀντιταττομένῳ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα κυρίως, ἃ δὴ λόγοι. διὸ καὶ [τὸ] μὴ ὂν οὕτως τι ὂν καὶ στερήσει ταὐτόν, εἰ ἡ στέρησις ἀντίθεσις πρὸς τὰ ἐν λόγῳ ὄντα. οὔκουν φθαρήσεται ἡ στέρησις προσελθόντος τοῦ οὗ στέρησις; οὐδαμῶς· ὑποδοχὴ γὰρ ἕξεως οὐχ ἕξις, ἀλλὰ στέρησις, καὶ πέρατος οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον οὐδὲ τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καθ’ ὅσον ἄπειρον. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀπολεῖ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν προσελθὸν τὸ πέρας καὶ ταῦτα οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος ἀπείρου;
Is it, then, the same as otherness too? Or rather no, but the same as a part of otherness, the part opposed to the things that are in the strict sense, which are rational principles. That is why [the] non-being, being something in this way, is also the same as privation, if privation is opposition to the things that exist in rational principle. Won’t privation be destroyed, then, when that of which it is the privation arrives? Not at all. What receives a state is not a state but a privation; and what receives limit is not what is limited, nor the limit, but the unlimited, in so far as it is unlimited. How, then, will the limit not destroy its nature by coming to it—especially since it is not unlimited incidentally?
ἢ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἄπειρον, ἀνῄρει [ἄν]· νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σώζει αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ εἶναι· ὃ γὰρ πέφυκεν εἰς ἐνέργειαν καὶ τελείωσιν ἄγει, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄσπαρτον, ὅταν σπείρηται· καὶ ὅταν τὸ θῆλυ [ἐκ] τοῦ ἄρρενος κυῇ, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θηλύνεται· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ ἔστι μᾶλλον γίνεται. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ κακὸν ἡ ὕλη μεταλαμβάνουσα ἀγαθοῦ; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐδεήθη· οὐ γὰρ εἶχε. καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὲν ἂν δέηταί τινος, τὸ δ’ ἔχῃ, μέσον ἂν ἴσως γίνοιτο ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, εἰ ἰσάζοι πως ἐπ’ ἄμφω· ὃ δ’ ἂν μηδὲν ἔχῃ ἅτε ἐν πενίᾳ ὄν, μᾶλλον δὲ πενία ὄν, ἀνάγκη κακὸν εἶναι.
Or rather: if it were unlimited in quantity, the limit [would] destroy it. As it is, it is not unlimited in that way; on the contrary, the limit preserves it in its being. For the limit brings what it naturally is to activity and completion, as with unsown ground when it is sown; and when the female conceives [by] the male, the female is not destroyed but rather becomes more female—that is, it becomes more what it is. Is matter, then, evil even when it has a share in good? Or rather, it is evil for this very reason, that it needed good: it did not have it. Whatever needs one thing and has another might perhaps come to be midway between good and bad, if it is somehow balanced between the two. But whatever has nothing, since it is in poverty—or rather is poverty—must be evil.
οὐ γὰρ πλούτου πενία τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἰσχύος, ἀλλὰ πενία μὲν φρονήσεως, πενία δὲ ἀρετῆς, κάλλους, μορφῆς, εἴδους, ποιοῦ. πῶς οὖν οὐ δυσειδές; πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη αἰσχρόν; πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη κακόν; ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἐκεῖ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἐπέκεινα ὄντος. ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὄν. οὐκ ὂν ἄρα αὐτὴ ἕτερον ὂν πρὸς τῷ καλῷ τοῦ ὄντος.
For this is not poverty of wealth or of strength, but poverty of understanding, poverty of virtue, of beauty, of shape, of form, of quality. How, then, can it not be ill-formed? How can it not be wholly ugly? How can it not be wholly evil? That other matter, the matter there, is being, for what comes before it is beyond being. Here, though, what comes before matter is being. So matter itself is non-being, something other, beside the beauty of being.