Λέγεται τὸ μὲν δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι· λέγεται δέ τι καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. σκεπτέον οὖν τί τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τί τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ εἴ τί ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ ἕτερον ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι; ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ δυνάμει, δῆλον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς, σκεπτέον, ἢ [εἰ] ἐκεῖ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει, [εἰ] δυνάμει μόνον ἀεί, κἂν ἀεί, εἰ οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι εἰς ἐνέργειαν τῷ τὸν χρόνον ἐξείργεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει πρῶτον λεκτέον, εἰ δὴ τὸ δυνάμει δεῖ μὴ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει μηδενὸς εἶναι.
Some things are said to be potentially, others actually; and something among the things that are is also said to be actuality. We must examine, then, what the potential is and what the actual is. Is actuality the same as being actual, so that whatever is actuality is also actual? Or is each different, so that what is actual need not also be actuality? That the potential exists among sensible things is clear. Whether it exists among intelligibles too must be examined, or [whether] only the actual is there; and if the potential is there, [whether] it is forever only potential, and, if forever, whether it could never come to actuality, because time is excluded there. But first we must say what the potential is—if indeed “potentially” must not be said without qualification. For nothing can be potential without being potentially something.
οἷον δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ὁ χαλκός· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μηδ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ μηδ’ ἔμελλε μηδὲν ἔσεσθαι μεθ’ ὃ ἦν μηδ’ ἐνεδέχετό [τι] γενέσθαι, ἦν ἂν ὃ ἦν μόνον. ὃ δὲ ἦν ἤδη παρῆν καὶ οὐκ ἔμελλε· τί οὖν ἠδύνατο ἄλλο μετὰ τὸ παρὸν αὐτό; οὐ τοίνυν ἦν ἂν δυνάμει.
Bronze, for example, is potentially a statue. For if nothing were to come from it or upon it, and nothing were going to be after what it was, and [anything] could not come to be from it, it would be only what it was. But what it was was already present and not still to come. What else, then, could it have been capable of, beyond what was already present? So it would not be potential.
δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ δυνάμει τι ὂν ἄλλο ἤδη τῷ τι καὶ ἄλλο μεθ’ αὑτὸ δύνασθαι, ἤτοι μένον μετὰ τοῦ ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖν ἢ παρέχον αὑτὸ ἐκείνῳ ὃ δύναται φθαρὲν αὐτό, δυνάμει λέγεσθαι· ἄλλως γὰρ δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ὁ χαλκός, ἄλλως τὸ ὕδωρ δυνάμει χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ πῦρ. τοιοῦτον δὴ ὂν τὸ δυνάμει ἆρα καὶ δύναμις λέγοιτο ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἐσόμενον, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς δύναμις τοῦ ἀνδριάντος; ἤ, εἰ μὲν ἡ δύναμις κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν λαμβάνοιτο, οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν λαμβανομένη λέγοιτο ἂν δυνάμει. εἰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν, εἴη ἂν καὶ δύναμις [τὸ] δυνάμει. βέλτιον δὲ καὶ σαφέστερον τὸ μὲν δυνάμει πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν πρὸς ἐνέργειαν λέγειν.
What is potentially, then, must already be something else, and be called potential by being able to be something more after itself—either remaining while it produces that other thing, or giving itself up to what it is capable of becoming, being itself destroyed. For bronze is potentially a statue in one way; water is potentially bronze, and air potentially fire, in another. Since this is what the potential is, might it also be called a potentiality in relation to what is to be—the bronze, say, a potentiality of the statue? Or rather, if potentiality is taken in the sense of the power to produce, not at all; for potentiality taken in the sense of producing could not be said to be potential. But if the potential is spoken of not only in relation to the actual but also in relation to actuality, then the potential [thing] would also be a potentiality. It is better and clearer, though, to relate the potential to the actual, and potentiality to actuality.
τὸ μὲν δὴ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ ὑποκείμενόν τι πάθεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ εἴδεσιν, ἃ μέλλει δέχεσθαι καὶ πέφυκεν ἢ καὶ σπεύδει ἑλεῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω καὶ λυμαντικὰ αὐτῶν, ὧν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν ἄλλο.
The potential, then, is something like a substrate for the affections, shapes and forms that it is going to receive, which it is naturally fit, or even eager, to take on—some of them for the better, others for the worse and destructive of it—and each of which is also actually something else.
περὶ δὲ τῆς ὕλης σκεπτέον, εἰ ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ πρὸς ἃ μορφοῦται, ἢ οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ὅλως καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ λέγομεν δυνάμει λαβόντα τὸ εἶδος καὶ μένοντα αὐτὰ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεται, ἢ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ κατὰ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος λεχθήσεται ἀντιτιθεμένου μόνον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ κατηγορουμένου κατ’ ἐκείνου, καθ’ οὗ τὸ δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ἐλέγετο. εἰ δὴ οὕτως, οὐ τὸ δυνάμει γίνεται ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος πρότερον ἐγένετο τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὕστερον. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐχ ἡ ὕλη· τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ. καὶ τοῦτο μέν, εἰ ἑτέρα γίγνοιτο οὐσία, οἷον ἐκ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάς.
As for matter, we must examine whether, while being actually something else, it is potentially the things it is shaped into, or whether it is actually nothing. And in general, we must examine whether the other things we call potential become actual when they receive the form and remain themselves, or whether “actual” will be said of the statue, the actual statue simply being contrasted with the potential statue, without “actual” being predicated of the very thing of which “potentially a statue” was said. If so, it is not the potential that becomes actual; rather, out of what was earlier potential there came what is later actual. For what is actual is the composite, not the matter; the form is what lies on the matter. And this is so if a different substance comes to be, as a statue from bronze.
ἄλλη γὰρ οὐσία ὡς τὸ συναμφότερον ὁ ἀνδριάς· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὅλως οὐ μενόντων φανερόν, ὡς τὸ δυνάμει παντάπασιν ἕτερον ἦν· ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὁ δυνάμει γραμματικὸς ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται, ἐνταῦθα τὸ δυνάμει πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό; ὁ γὰρ δυνάμει Σωκράτης ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ σοφός. ἆρα οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων ἐπιστήμων; δυνάμει γὰρ ἦν ἐπιστήμων.
For the statue, as the composite, is a different substance. And in the case of things that do not remain at all, it is evident that the potential was something entirely different. But when the potential grammarian becomes an actual grammarian, how is the potential here not the same as the actual? For Socrates potentially wise is the same as Socrates actually wise. Is the ignorant man, then, also a man of knowledge? He was, after all, potentially a man of knowledge.
ἢ ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀμαθὴς ἐπιστήμων; οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἀμαθὴς δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων, ἀλλὰ συμβεβήκει αὐτῷ ἀμαθεῖ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσα τὸ δυνάμει ἦν ᾗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμων. ἔτι οὖν σώζει τὸ δυνάμει καὶ [ὁ] δυνάμει γραμματικὸς ἤδη γραμματικὸς ὤν. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον· ἐκεῖ μὲν δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐχούσης τὸ εἶδος. εἰ οὖν ἐστι τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ συναμφότερον, ὁ ἀνδριάς, τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τί ἂν λέγοιτο; ἢ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καθ’ ἣν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μόνον δυνάμει, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος λέγειν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλην ἐνέργειαν τάχα κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιμεν, τὴν ἀντίθετον τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ἐπαγούσῃ ἐνέργειαν.
Or rather, it is the man who is ignorant incidentally who is a man of knowledge. For it was not as ignorant that he was potentially knowledgeable; being ignorant was incidental to him, while his soul, being in itself suitably disposed, was the potential thing, in the very respect in which he is also knowledgeable. Does he still keep the potential, then, and is [the] potential grammarian still potential when he is already a grammarian? Or rather, nothing prevents this, but in another way: there it was potential only, while here the potentiality has its form. If, then, the potential is the substrate and the actual is the composite, the statue, what should we call the form on the bronze? Or rather, it is not absurd to call the shape and the form an actuality—the actuality by which the thing is actual and not only potential—not actuality without qualification, but the actuality of this thing. For we might perhaps more properly call something else actuality: the actuality that is the counterpart of the power which brings it about.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχει παρ’ ἄλλου, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ὃ δύναται παρ’ αὐτῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια· οἷον ἕξις καὶ ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν λεγομένη ἐνέργεια, ἀνδρεία καὶ τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως.
For the potential has its actuality from something else, while for a power, what it is capable of is its own actuality, from itself: a state, for example, and the actuality said to correspond to it—courage and acting courageously. So much for that.
οὗ δ’ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προείρηται, νῦν λεκτέον, ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς πῶς ποτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται καὶ εἰ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον ἢ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕκαστον καὶ πάντα καὶ εἰ τὸ δυνάμει κἀκεῖ. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὕλη ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾗ τὸ δυνάμει, μήτε τι μέλλει τῶν ἐκεῖ, ὃ μὴ ἤδη ἔστι, μηδέ τι μεταβάλλον εἰς ἄλλο ἢ μένον ἕτερόν τι γεννᾷ ἢ ἐξιστάμενον ἑαυτοῦ ἔδωκεν ἄλλῳ ἀνθ’ αὑτοῦ εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι [πάντα ὄντως], τῶν ὄντων καὶ αἰῶνα, οὐ χρόνον ἐχόντων.
Now we must say why all this was said in advance: how “actually” is said in the intelligible world; whether each thing there, and all of them, are only actual or also actuality; and whether the potential is there too. Suppose there is no matter there, in which the potential resides; suppose nothing there is going to be what it is not already, and nothing changes into something else, or, while remaining, generates something different, or, departing from itself, lets something else be in its place. Then there would be no potential there, in the realm where [all things truly] are, among beings that have eternity, not time.
εἴ τις οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν τοὺς τιθεμένους κἀκεῖ ὕλην ἔροιτο, εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἐκεῖ — καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλ’ ἔσται ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος, τὸ δὲ συναμφότερον — τί ἐροῦσιν; ἢ καὶ τὸ ὡς ὕλη ἐκεῖ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος ὂν πρὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη ὕλη. οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ δυνάμει; ἢ οὔ· εἶδος γὰρ ἦν αὐτῆς καὶ οὐκ εἰς ὕστερον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὐ χωρίζεται δὲ ἀλλ’ ἢ λόγῳ, καὶ οὕτως ὕλην ἔχον, ὡς διπλοῦν νοούμενον, ἄμφω δὲ μία φύσις· οἷον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ τὸ πέμπτον σῶμα ἄυλον εἶναι. περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς πῶς ἐροῦμεν;
Suppose, then, someone asks those who posit matter in the intelligible world too whether there is not potentiality there as well, corresponding to the matter there. For even if matter is there in another way, still in each thing there will be one part as matter, another as form, and the composite. What will they say? Perhaps that what serves as matter there is also form, since the soul too, being a form, might be matter in relation to something else. Isn’t it potential in relation to that, then? Or rather no. The form belonged to it; the form was not something for later, and it is not separated except in thought. So it has matter in this sense: it is thought of as double, while both are one nature—just as Aristotle too says that the fifth body is immaterial. But what shall we say about soul?
δυνάμει γὰρ ζῷον, ὅταν μήπω, μέλλῃ δέ, καὶ μουσικὴ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα γίνεται οὐκ ἀεὶ οὖσα· ὥστε καὶ ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ δυνάμει.
For it is potentially a living being when it is not yet one but is going to be; it is potentially musical, and potentially all the other things it becomes without always being them. So the potential is among the intelligibles too.
ἢ οὐ δυνάμει ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ δύναμις ἡ ψυχὴ τούτων. τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ πῶς ἐκεῖ; ἆρα ὡς ὁ ἀνδριὰς τὸ συναμφότερον ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον ἀπείληφεν; ἢ ὅτι εἶδος ἕκαστον καὶ τέλειον ὃ ἔστι. νοῦς γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ οἷόν τε νοεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοεῖν — ἄλλου γὰρ ἂν προτέρου τοῦ οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως δέοιτο — ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν. τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει βούλεται ἑτέρου ἐπελθόντος εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγεσθαι, ἵνα ἐνεργείᾳ γίγνηταί τι, ὃ δ’ αὐτὸ παρ’ αὑτοῦ τὸ ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη. πάντα οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔχει γὰρ ἃ δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ παρ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀεί· καὶ ψυχὴ δὴ οὕτως ἡ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ.
Or rather, these are not potential: the soul is the potentiality for them. And how is the actual there? Is it like the statue, the composite, which is actual because each thing has taken on its form? Or rather, because each thing is a form, complete as what it is. For Intellect does not pass from potentiality, in the sense of being able to think, to the actuality of thinking—then it would need something else prior to it which did not come from potentiality—but it has everything in itself. What is potential wants something else to come to it and bring it into actuality, so that it may become something actually; but what has its everlasting state from itself, by itself, would be actual. All the first things, then, are actual, for they have what they must have, both from themselves and always. So too is soul—the soul that is not in matter but in the intelligible.
καὶ ἡ ἐν ὕλῃ δὲ ἄλλη ἐνεργείᾳ· οἷον ἡ φυτική· ἐνεργείᾳ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη ὃ ἔστιν. ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν πάντα, καὶ οὕτως ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα; ἢ πῶς; εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἄγρυπνος εἶναι καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ζωὴ ἀρίστη, αἱ κάλλισται ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ ἐνέργειαι. καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα καὶ ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωαὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐκεῖ τόπος ἐστὶ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἀληθῶς ψυχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ.
And the soul in matter is actual too, in another way—the vegetative soul, for example, for this too is actually what it is. But granted that all things are actual: are they, in the same way, all actuality? Or how? If it has rightly been said that that nature is unsleeping, and life, and the best life, then the finest actualities would be there. So all things there are both actual and actuality, all are lives, and the place there is the place of life, truly the principle and source of soul and intellect.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα δυνάμει τί ἐστιν, ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἤδη ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο δυνάμει εἶναι λέγεται· περὶ δὲ τῆς λεγομένης εἶναι ὕλης, ἣν πάντα δυνάμει λέγομεν τὰ ὄντα, πῶς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐνεργείᾳ τι τῶν ὄντων εἶναι; ἢ γὰρ οὐ πάντα τὰ ὄντα δυνάμει ἂν εἴη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων, ἀνάγκη μηδ’ ὂν αὐτὴν εἶναι. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ τι εἴη μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων οὖσα; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τούτων, ἃ γίνεται ἐπ’ αὐτῇ, ἄλλο δέ τι οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι, εἴπερ μηδὲ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ. εἰ μὲν δὴ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ, ταῦτα δὲ ὄντα, μὴ ὂν ἂν εἴη. οὐ μὲν δὴ ἀνείδεόν τι φανταζομένη εἶδος ἂν εἴη;
Everything else, then, that is potentially something also actually is something else, which, being already, is said to be potential in relation to something further. But as for what is called matter, which we say is potentially all beings, how can one say that it is actually any of the beings? If it were, it would not be potentially all beings. If, then, it is none of the beings, it must be non-being. How, then, could it be anything actually, when it is none of the beings? Well, it would be none of the beings that come to be on it, but nothing prevents it from being something else, if indeed not all beings are on matter. If, then, it is none of the things on it, and these are beings, it would be non-being. Surely, if it is imagined as something formless, it would not be a form?
οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ’ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἂν ἀριθμηθείη. μὴ ὂν ἄρα καὶ ταύτῃ ἔσται. ἐπ’ ἄμφω ἄρα μὴ ὂν οὖσα καὶ πλειόνως μὴ ὂν ἔσται. εἰ δὴ πέφευγε μὲν τὴν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων φύσιν, οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐφικέσθαι οὐδὲ τῶν ψευδῶς λεγομένων εἶναι, ὅτι μηδὲ ἴνδαλμα λόγου ἐστὶν ὡς ταῦτα, ἐν τίνι τῷ εἶναι ἂν ἁλοίη; εἰ δὲ ἐν μηδενὶ τῷ εἶναι, τί ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ εἴη;
So it could not be counted among the forms either. In this way too, then, it will be non-being. Being non-being on both counts, it will be non-being many times over. If it has fled the nature of the things that truly are, and cannot even reach the things falsely said to be, since it is not even a phantom of rational principle as they are, in what kind of being could it be caught? And if it is in no kind of being, what could it be actually?
πῶς οὖν λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς; πῶς δὲ τῶν ὄντων ὕλη; ἢ ὅτι δυνάμει. οὔκουν, ὅτι δυνάμει, ἤδη ἔστι καθὸ μέλλει, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ μόνον τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελλόμενον· οἷον τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀναβάλλεται, ὃ ἔσται. τὸ τοίνυν δυνάμει οὔ τι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει πάντα· μηδὲν δὲ ὂν καθ’ αὑτό, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἔστιν ὕλη ὄν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐχ ὕλη ἔσται· οὐ πάντη οὖν ὕλη, ἀλλὰ οἷον ὁ χαλκός.
How, then, are we to speak of it? How is it the matter of beings? Because it is potentially. Not that, being potentially, it already is what it is going to be; its being is only an announcement of what is to come. Its being is, as it were, deferred to what it will be. The potential, then, is not something; it is potentially everything. And since it is nothing in itself, but is what it is by being matter, it is not actual either. For if it is actually something, then what it actually is will not be matter; so it will not be matter through and through, but will be like the bronze.
εἴη ἂν οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ὡς ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος, οἷον κίνησις· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ ἐποχεῖται τῷ ὄντι οἷον ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ οὖσα, ἡ δέ ἐστιν οἷον ἐκριφεῖσα καὶ πάντη χωρισθεῖσα καὶ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτὴν οὐ δυναμένη, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν· μὴ ὂν δὲ ἦν· οὕτως ἀεὶ ἔχουσα. οὔτε δὲ ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνεργείᾳ τι ἀποστᾶσα πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὔτε ἐγένετο· ἃ γὰρ ὑποδῦναι ἠθέλησεν, οὐδὲ χρωσθῆναι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δεδύνηται, ἀλλὰ μένουσα πρὸς ἄλλο δυνάμει οὖσα πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, τῶν δ’ ὄντων ἤδη παυσαμένων ἐκείνων φανεῖσα ὑπό τε τῶν μετ’ αὐτὴν γενομένων καταληφθεῖσα ἔσχατον καὶ τούτων κατέστη.
It would, then, be non-being—not as something other than being, like motion. For motion rides on being, coming as it were from it and existing in it, whereas matter has been, as it were, cast out and wholly separated. It cannot change itself, but is always as it was from the beginning—and it was non-being. It was not actually anything from the beginning, standing apart as it does from all beings, nor did it become anything. It has not even been able to take color from the things it wanted to slip into. Remaining in relation to something else, potential with respect to what comes next, it appeared when those beings had already come to an end; and, caught by the things that came to be after it, it settled as the last of these too.
ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν καταληφθεῖσα ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὐδετέρων ἂν εἴη, δυνάμει δὲ μόνον ἐγκαταλέλειπται εἶναι ἀσθενές τι καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἴδωλον μορφοῦσθαι μὴ δυνάμενον. οὐκοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ εἴδωλον· οὐκοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ψεῦδος. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀληθινῶς ψεῦδος· τοῦτο δὲ ὄντως μὴ ὄν. εἰ οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ ὄν, μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὄντως ἄρα μὴ ὄν. πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐνεργείᾳ τι τῶν ὄντων εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι.
Caught by both, then, it would actually belong to neither. It has been left being only potentially, a weak and faint image, unable to take shape. So it is actually an image; so it is actually a falsehood. And this is the same as being truly a falsehood; and this is really non-being. If, then, it is actually non-being, it is more non-being, and so really non-being. It is far, then, from being actually any of the beings, since its truth lies in non-being.
εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα ἐκβεβηκὸς τοῦ ἀληθῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἔχῃ τὸ εἶναι, ἐπείπερ τοῖς ψευδῶς οὖσιν, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν, ἀφεῖλες αὐτῶν ἥντινα εἶχον οὐσίαν, καὶ τοῖς δυνάμει τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν εἰσαγαγὼν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀπολώλεκας τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἐν δυνάμει ἦν. εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ ἀνώλεθρον τὴν ὕλην τηρεῖν, ὕλην αὐτὴν δεῖ τηρεῖν· δεῖ ἄρα δυνάμει, ὡς ἔοικεν,εἶναι λέγειν μόνον, ἵνα ᾖ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἐξελεγκτέον.
If, then, it must exist, it must not be actually, so that, having stepped outside true being, it may have its being in non-being. For with things that are falsely, if you take away their falsity, you have taken away whatever being they had. And with things that have their being and their reality in potentiality, if you bring in actuality, you have destroyed the cause of their existence, since their being lay in potentiality. If, then, matter is to be kept indestructible, it must be kept as matter. So it seems we must say that it is only potential, so that it may be what it is—or else these arguments must be refuted.