‘Νοῦς’, φησιν, ‘ὁρᾷ ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον· εἶτα διενοήθη [δεῖν]’, φησίν, ‘ὁ δημιουργὸς ἃ ὁ νοῦς ὁρᾷ ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἔχειν.’ οὐκοῦν φησιν ἤδη εἶναι τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ, ὄντα δὲ αὐτὰ νοεῖν τὸν νοῦν; πρῶτον οὖν ἐκεῖνο, λέγω δὲ τὸ ζῷον, ζητητέον εἰ μὴ νοῦς, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον νοῦ· τὸ γὰρ θεωροῦν νοῦς· τὸ τοίνυν ζῷον αὐτὸ οὐ νοῦς, ἀλλὰ νοητὸν αὐτὸ φήσομεν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔξω φήσομεν αὑτοῦ ἃ ὁρᾷ ἔχειν εἴδωλα ἄρα καὶ οὐ τἀληθῆ ἔχει, εἰ ἐκεῖ τἀληθῆ ἐκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειάν φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, οὗ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἤ, κἂν ἕτερον ἑκάτερον, οὐ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον τῷ ἕτερα.
“Intellect,” he says, “sees the Forms present in what the living being is; then the craftsman thought,” he says, “[it must be] that this All too should have what Intellect sees in what the living being is.” Is he not saying, then, that the Forms already exist before Intellect, and that Intellect thinks them as already existing? First, then, we must ask about that, I mean the living being, whether it is not Intellect but something other than Intellect. For what contemplates is Intellect. So the living being itself is not Intellect: we will say it is an intelligible, and we will say that Intellect has what it sees outside itself. In that case it has images and not the true things, if the true things are There; for he says that truth too is There, in what is, where each thing itself is. Or rather: even if each of the two is different, they are not apart from each other, but different only in that they are other.
ἔπειτα οὐδὲν κωλύει ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἓν εἶναι ἄμφω, διαιρούμενα δὲ τῇ νοήσει, εἴπερ μόνον οὕτως ὂν τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δὲ νοοῦν· ὃ γὰρ καθορᾷ οὔ φησιν ἐν ἑτέρῳ πάντως, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχειν.
Next, as far as the statement goes, nothing prevents the two from being one, distinguished only in thought, if indeed it is only in this way that one is intelligible and the other is thinking. For he does not say that what Intellect beholds is altogether in something else, but that it has the intelligible in itself.
ἢ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ νοῦν εἶναι ἐν στάσει καὶ ἑνότητι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν τοῦ ὁρῶντος ἐκεῖνον τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐνέργειάν τινα ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ἣ ὁρᾷ ἐκεῖνον· ὁρῶντα δὲ ἐκεῖνον οἷον εἶναι νοῦν ἐκείνου, ὅτι νοεῖ ἐκεῖνον· νοοῦντα δὲ ἐκεῖνον καὶ αὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἄλλως εἶναι τῷ μεμιμῆσθαι. τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι τὸ διανοηθέν, ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ, ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ποιῆσαι (ζῴων γένη τέσσαρα). δοκεῖ γε μὴν τὸ διανοούμενον ἐπικεκρυμμένως ἕτερον ἐκείνων τῶν δύο ποιεῖν. ἄλλοις δὲ δόξει τὰ τρία ἓν εἶναι, τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ὁ νοῦς, τὸ διανοούμενον. ἢ ὥσπερ ἐν πολλοῖς προτείνων ἄλλως ὁ δὲ ἄλλως νοεῖ τρία εἶναι.
Or rather: nothing prevents the intelligible from being Intellect too, an Intellect at rest, in unity and stillness, while the nature of the Intellect that sees that Intellect within itself is a kind of activity derived from it, by which it sees it. Seeing it, it is, as it were, the intellect of that, because it thinks that; and thinking it, it too is intellect and intelligible, in another way, by imitation. This, then, is what was “thought out”: to make in this cosmos what it sees There (four kinds of living beings). Yet what thinks it out seems, in a veiled way, to make something other than those two. Others will take the three to be one: the living being itself, Intellect, and what thinks it out. Or perhaps, as in many cases, it depends on how one sets the question out: one person thinks one way, another another, that there are three.
καὶ τὰ μὲν δύο εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τί, ὃ διενοήθη τὰ ὁρώμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ κείμενα αὐτὸ ἐργάσασθαι καὶ ποιῆσαι καὶ μερίσαι; ἢ δυνατὸν τρόπον μὲν ἄλλον τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τὸν μερίσαντα, τρόπον δὲ ἕτερον τὸν μερίσαντα μὴ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ μερισθέντα, αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν μερίσαντα, ᾗ δ’ αὐτὸς ἀμέριστος μένει, τὰ δ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐστι τὰ μερισθέντα· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι ψυχαί· ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν μερίσασαν εἰς πολλὰς ψυχάς. διὸ καί φησι τοῦ τρίτου εἶναι τὸν μερισμὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ, ὅτι διενοήθη, ὃ οὐ νοῦ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μεριστὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐχούσης ἐν μεριστῇ φύσει.
Two of these have been discussed. But what is the third, which thought it out: to work, make and divide by itself the things seen by Intellect lying in the living being? Perhaps it is possible that in one way Intellect is the divider, and in another way the divider is not Intellect. Insofar as the divided things come from it, it is itself the divider; but insofar as it remains undivided itself, and what comes from it is what is divided—and these are souls—it is Soul that divides into many souls. That is why he says the division belongs to the third and is in the third: because it “thought out,” which is not the work of Intellect but of soul, which has a divided activity in a divided nature.
οἷον γὰρ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ὅλης ὁ μερισμὸς εἰς τὰ θεωρήματα τὰ καθέκαστα οὐ σκεδασθείσης οὐδὲ κατακερματισθείσης, ἔχει δὲ ἕκαστον δυνάμει τὸ ὅλον, οὗ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, καὶ οὕτω χρὴ παρασκευάζειν αὑτόν, ὡς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τέλη εἶναι καὶ ὅλα καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄριστον, ὃ γενόμενός ἐστιν ἐκεῖ· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ ἀρίστῳ αὑτοῦ, ὅταν ἔχῃ, ἅψεται ἐκείνου.
It is like the division of a single science as a whole into its particular theorems. The science is not scattered or chopped into bits; each theorem holds the whole potentially, and the same thing is its beginning and its end. So too one must prepare oneself so that the principles in oneself are also ends, and wholes, and all, directed toward the best of one’s nature; and when one has become that, one is There. For with this best part of oneself, when one has it, one will touch that.
ἡ πᾶσα ψυχὴ οὐδαμοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἦλθεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ὅπου· ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα γειτονῆσαν μετέλαβεν αὐτῆς· διὸ οὐκ ἐν τῷ σώματι οὐδ’ ὁ Πλάτων φησί που, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα εἰς αὐτήν. αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι ἔχουσιν ὅθεν· ἀπὸ γὰρ ψυχῆς· καὶ εἰς ὃ καὶ κατελθεῖν καὶ μετελθεῖν· ὅθεν καὶ ἀνελθεῖν. ἡ δ’ ἀεὶ ἄνω ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν εἶναι ψυχή· τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πᾶν, οἷον τὸ πλησίον ἢ τὸ ὑφ’ ἡλίῳ. φωτίζεται μὲν οὖν ἡ μερικὴ πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς φερομένη· ὄντι γὰρ ἐντυγχάνει· εἰς δὲ τὸ μετ’ αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν.
Soul as a whole did not come into being anywhere, nor did it come anywhere, for there was no “where.” Rather, the body, being its neighbor, came to share in it. That is why even Plato nowhere says it is in the body, but that the body is in it. The other souls do have a “whence”—they come from Soul—and something into which they come down and move from one to another, and from which they can also go back up. But Soul is always above, in that in which it is its nature to be; what comes next is the All, like what is near, or what is under the sun. The partial soul, then, is illuminated when it moves toward what is before it, for there it meets what is; but when it moves toward what comes after it, it moves toward non-being.
τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ, ὅταν πρὸς αὑτήν· πρὸς αὑτὴν γὰρ βουλομένη [εἶναι] τὸ μετ’ αὐτὴν ποιεῖ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς, τὸ μὴ ὄν, οἷον κενεμβατοῦσα καὶ ἀοριστοτέρα γινομένη· καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἴδωλον τὸ ἀόριστον πάντη σκοτεινόν· ἄλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόητον πάντη καὶ πολὺ τοῦ ὄντος ἀποστατοῦν. εἰς δὲ τὸ μεταξύ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ, πάλιν δὲ ἰδοῦσα οἷον δευτέρᾳ προσβολῇ τὸ εἴδωλον ἐμόρφωσε καὶ ἡσθεῖσα ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτό.
It does this when it turns toward itself. For wanting [to be] toward itself, it makes what comes after it, an image of itself, non-being, as if stepping into emptiness and becoming more indefinite. And this image, the indefinite, is altogether dark: it is altogether without reason and without intelligence, and stands far off from what is. When it moves to what is in between, it is in its own place; but looking again, as with a second glance, it gave the image shape and, delighted, enters into it.
πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πλῆθος; ὅτι πανταχοῦ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅπου οὔ. πάντα οὖν πληροῖ. πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα ἤδη· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν ἦν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ, γίνεται μὲν τὰ πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνο, ἕτερα δὲ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸ οὐδαμοῦ. διὰ τί οὖν αὐτὸ οὐ μόνον πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὖ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ; ὅτι δεῖ πρὸ πάντων ἓν εἶναι. πληροῦν οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ ποιεῖν πάντα, οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, ἃ ποιεῖ.
How, then, does multiplicity come from one? Because it is everywhere: there is nowhere it is not. So it fills all things. So it is many, or rather, already all things. For if it were only everywhere, it would itself be all things. But since it is also nowhere, all things come into being through it, because it is everywhere, but they are other than it, because it is nowhere. Why, then, is it not only everywhere but, in addition, also nowhere? Because there must be one before all things. So it must fill all things and make them, not be all the things it makes.
τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν εἶναι, ὁρατὸν δὲ αὐτῇ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ἀόριστον πρὶν ἰδεῖν, πεφυκυῖαν δὲ νοεῖν· ὕλην οὖν πρὸς νοῦν.
Soul itself must be like sight, and what it sees must be Intellect. It is indefinite before it sees, but its nature is to think. So it is matter in relation to Intellect.
νοοῦντες αὑτοὺς βλέπομεν δηλονότι νοοῦσαν φύσιν, ἢ ψευδοίμεθα ἂν τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ οὖν νοοῦμεν καὶ ἑαυτοὺς νοοῦμεν, νοερὰν οὖσαν φύσιν νοοῦμεν· πρὸ ἄρα τῆς νοήσεως ταύτης ἄλλη ἐστὶ νόησις οἷον ἥσυχος. καὶ οὐσίας δὲ ἡ νόησις καὶ ζωῆς νόησις· ὥστε πρὸ ταύτης τῆς ζωῆς καὶ οὐσίας ἄλλη οὐσία καὶ ζωή. ταῦτα ἄρα εἶδεν, ὅσα ἐνέργειαι. εἰ δὲ νόες αἱ ἐνέργειαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν οὕτως ἑαυτούς, τὸ νοητὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ ὄντως. ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ αὐτῶν τὴν εἰκόνα φέρει.
When we think ourselves, we are plainly looking at a thinking nature; otherwise our claim to think would be false. So if we think, and think ourselves, we are thinking a nature that is intellectual. So before this thinking there is another thinking, a still one, as it were. And thinking is thinking of being and thinking of life; so before this life and being there is another being and life. These, then, it saw, all that are activities. And if the activities that consist in thinking ourselves in this way are intellects, then we, the real we, are the intelligible; and the thinking of them carries their image.
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δύναμίς ἐστι κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως· ὥστε ἐπέκεινα τούτων· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται περὶ ἐκεῖνο· καὶ νοῦς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον· ἄλλο γὰρ ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ νόησιν οὐκ ἔχει. διπλοῦν δὲ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ αὑτὸ νοεῖ καὶ ἐλλιπές, ὅτι ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει τὸ εὖ, οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει.
The First is the power of motion and rest, so it is beyond them. The second stands still and moves around it. And the second is Intellect: being one thing, it has its thinking directed toward another, whereas the First does not have thinking. What thinks is double, even when it thinks itself, and deficient, because it has its well-being in thinking, not in its hypostasis.
τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ παντὶ τῷ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ὅ ἐστι ταὐτὸν ἀεί, ἕως ἂν ᾖ· ὥστε καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρί· ἀλλ’ οὐ δύναται ἀεὶ εἶναι, ὅτι μεθ’ ὕλης· ὃ δ’ ἂν ἀσύνθετον ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, ἀεὶ ἔστιν. ἐστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν δυνάμει κατ’ ἄλλο εἶναι.
For everything that passes from potentiality to actuality, what is in actuality is always the same, as long as it exists. So perfection belongs to bodies too, fire for instance; but fire cannot exist forever, because it is with matter. Whatever is incomposite and in actuality exists forever. But the same thing, while being in actuality, can be in potentiality in another respect.
ἀλλ’ οὐ θεοὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα ὄντες· ὁ δὲ νοῦς τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἔστι κίνησις ἐνταῦθα καὶ στάσις· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ ἀναπαυόμενα ἕστηκε καὶ κινεῖται· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἐφίεται· τίνος γὰρ τό γε ἀκρότατον; οὐ νοεῖ οὖν οὐδὲ ἑαυτό; ἢ ᾗ ἔχει ἑαυτὸ καὶ νοεῖν ὅλως λέγεται. ⟨…⟩ ἢ τῷ ἔχειν ἑαυτὸ οὐ νοεῖν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον βλέπειν. ἔστι δὲ πρώτη ἐνέργεια καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ νόησις. εἰ οὖν αὕτη πρώτη, οὐδεμίαν δεῖ προτέραν. τὸ οὖν παρέχον ταύτην ἐπέκεινα ταύτης· ὥστε δευτέρα ἡ νόησις μετ’ ἐκεῖνο. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πρώτως σεμνὸν ἡ νόησις· οὔκουν οὐδὲ πᾶσα, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα νοήσεως τἀγαθόν. ἀλλ’ οὐ παρακολουθήσει αὑτῷ.
But the gods are not the First, which is beyond. Intellect is the things that are, and here there is motion and rest. For the First itself is around nothing, while the other things, resting around it, stand still and move. For motion is aspiration, and the First aspires to nothing: what could the very summit aspire to? Does it not think, then, not even itself? Or rather: insofar as it has itself, it is said to think in a general sense. ⟨…⟩ Or rather, it is not by having itself that something is said to think, but by looking toward the First. And thinking itself is the first activity. If, then, this is first, there must be none before it. So what provides it is beyond it; and so thinking is second, after that. For thinking is not what is primarily venerable—nor is every thinking venerable, but only thinking of the Good. So the Good is beyond thinking. But then it will not be conscious of itself.
τί οὖν ἡ παρακολούθησις αὐτῷ; ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ἢ οὔ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντος, ἤδη ἐστὶ πρὸ τῆς παρακολουθήσεως τἀγαθόν· εἰ δ’ ἡ παρακολούθησις ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρὸ ταύτης τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὥστε οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἔσται μὴ οὖσα ἀγαθοῦ. τί οὖν; οὐδὲ ζῇ; ἢ ζῆν μὲν οὐ λεκτέον, εἴπερ ζωὴν δίδωσι. τὸ δὲ παρακολουθοῦν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν αὑτὸ δεύτερον· παρακολουθεῖ γάρ, ἵνα τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ταύτῃ συνῇ αὑτῷ. δεῖ οὖν, εἰ καταμανθάνει αὑτό, ἀκαταμάθητον τετυχηκέναι αὑτῷ καὶ τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει ἐλλιπὲς εἶναι, τῇ δὲ νοήσει τελειοῦσθαι. τὸ ἄρα κατανοεῖν ἐξαιρετέον· ἡ γὰρ προσθήκη ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ ἔλλειψιν ποιεῖ.
Well, what would its consciousness of itself be? Consciousness of itself as good, or not? If as good, the Good already exists before the consciousness. But if the consciousness makes it good, the Good would not exist before it; and so the consciousness itself will not exist either, since it will not be consciousness of the good. What then? Does it not even live? Or rather, we must not say that it lives, since it gives life. What is conscious of itself and thinks itself is second: it is conscious of itself in order to be together with itself by this activity. So if it comes to know itself, it must have been unknown to itself, deficient in its own nature, and perfected by thinking. Coming to know, then, must be taken away; for adding produces subtraction and deficiency.