Εἴ τι ἔστι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἐκείνου εἶναι ἢ εὐθύς, ἢ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ ἔχειν, καὶ τάξιν εἶναι δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων, τοῦ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀναγομένου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον.
If there is anything after the First, it must come from it, either directly or by tracing its ascent back to it through intermediaries; and there must be an order of second and third things, the second going back to the First, the third to the second.
δεῖ μὲν γάρ τι πρὸ πάντων εἶναι ἁπλοῦν τοῦτο καὶ πάντων ἕτερον τῶν μετ’ αὐτό, ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὄν, οὐ μεμιγμένον τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις παρεῖναι δυνάμενον, ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἶτα ἕν, καθ’ οὗ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, οὗ μὴ λόγος μηδὲ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπέκεινα λέγεται εἶναι οὐσίας — εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἁπλοῦν ἔσται συμβάσεως ἔξω πάσης καὶ συνθέσεως καὶ ὄντως ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ἀρχὴ εἴη — αὐταρκέστατόν τε τῷ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον ἁπάντων· τὸ γὰρ μὴ πρῶτον ἐνδεὲς τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τό τε μὴ ἁπλοῦν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἁπλῶν δεόμενον, ἵν’ ᾖ ἐξ ἐκείνων. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἓν μόνον δεῖ εἶναι· ἄλλο γὰρ εἰ εἴη τοιοῦτον, [οὐχ] ἓν ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄμφω.
For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things that come after it. It is by itself, not mixed with what comes from it, and yet able to be present to the others in a different way. It is really one, not something else that is then one; even to say of it that it is one is false; there is no account or knowledge of it; it is indeed said to be beyond being. For if it is not simple, outside all coming-together and composition, and really one, it would not be a principle. And it is most self-sufficient, because it is simple and first of all. For what is not first needs what is before it, and what is not simple needs the simple things in it, so as to be made up of them. Such a thing, then, must be one alone; for if there were another such, the two would be one.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώματα λέγομεν δύο, ἢ τὸ ἓν πρῶτον σῶμα. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν σῶμα, γινόμενόν τε τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀρχή· ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀγέννητος· μὴ σωματικὴ δὲ οὖσα, ἀλλ’ ὄντως μία, ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη τὸ πρῶτον. εἰ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον εἴη, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἁπλοῦν εἴη· ἓν ἄρα πολλὰ ἔσται. πόθεν οὖν τοῦτο; ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου· εἰ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἔτι ἐκεῖνο πάντων ἀρχή.
For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or saying that the One is the first body. For no body is simple, and body comes into being and is not a principle, whereas the principle is ungenerated. And being not bodily but really one, it would be that First. If, then, there were something else after the First, it would no longer be simple; it will therefore be one-many. Where, then, does this come from? From the First; for if it came by chance, that would no longer be the principle of all things.
πῶς οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου; [ἢ] εἰ τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάντων τελειότατον καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο. ὅ τι δ’ ἂν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τελείωσιν ἴῃ, ὁρῶμεν γεννῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεχόμενον ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μένειν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον ποιοῦν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι ἂν προαίρεσιν ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα φύει ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὲ μεταδιδόντα ἑαυτῶν καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται· οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει, καὶ ψύχει ἡ χιών, καὶ τὰ φάρμακα δὲ εἰς ἄλλο ἐργάζεται, οἷον αὖ τὰ πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀπομιμούμενα εἰς ἀιδιότητά τε καὶ ἀγαθότητα. πῶς [ἂν] οὖν τὸ τελειότατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὑτῷ σταίη ὥσπερ φθονῆσαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀδυνατῆσαν, ἡ πάντων δύναμις;
How, then, from the First? [Or rather:] if the First is perfect, the most perfect of all, and the first power, it must be the most powerful of all beings, and the other powers must imitate it as far as they can. Now whatever else comes to perfection, we see generating and not content to remain by itself, but making something else—not only whatever has choice, but also whatever produces by nature without choice; and even lifeless things give of themselves as far as they can. Fire heats, snow chills, drugs act on something else—all things imitating the principle as far as they can, toward eternity and goodness. How then could the most perfect, the first Good, stand still within itself, as if begrudging itself, or powerless—it, the power of all things?
πῶς δ’ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ εἴη; δεῖ δή τι καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, εἴπερ ἔσται τι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παρ’ αὐτοῦ γε ὑποστάντων· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τιμιώτατον εἶναι τὸ γεννῶν, τὸ [δὲ] γεννώμενον καὶ δεύτερον ἐκείνου τῶν ἄλλων ἄμεινον εἶναι.
And how would it still be a principle? Something must, then, come into being from it too, if there are going to be other things that came into existence from it; for that they come from it is necessary. And what generates must be most honorable, while what is generated, second after it, must be better than all the rest.
εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτονοῦς ἦν τὸ γεννῶν, [τὸ ἐφεξῆς] νοῦ ἐνδεέστερον, προσεχέστερον δὲ νῷ καὶ ὅμοιον ἔδει εἶναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τὸ γεννῶν, νοῦν εἶναι ἀνάγκη. διὰ τί δὲ οὐ νοῦς; ὅτι νοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι νόησις· νόησις δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὁρῶσα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιστραφεῖσα καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου οἷον ἀποτελειουμένη ἀόριστος μὲν αὐτὴ ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὁριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ. διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς. διὸ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλά, σύνθεσίν τε ἐμφαίνων, νοητὴν μέντοι, καὶ πολλὰ ὁρῶν ἤδη. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῶν· διὸ δύο ἤδη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μετ’ αὐτὸ νοητόν. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ [τούτου] τοῦ νοητοῦ ὁ νοῦς;
If what generates were Intellect itself, [what comes next] would have to be more deficient than Intellect, but closer to Intellect and like it. But since what generates is beyond Intellect, what is generated must be Intellect. And why is the generator not Intellect? Because the activity of Intellect is thinking; and thinking, which sees the intelligible, turns toward it and is, as it were, completed by it, is in itself indefinite, like sight, but is defined by the intelligible. That is why it has been said that the Forms and the numbers come from the indefinite dyad and the One; for this is Intellect. That is why it is not simple but many, displaying a composition—an intelligible one, to be sure—and already seeing many things. It is itself an intelligible, but also thinking: that is why it is already two. And there is also the other intelligible, the one after which it comes. But how does Intellect come from [this] intelligible?
οὕτως· τὸ νοητὸν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μένον καὶ οὐκ ὂν ἐνδεές, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ νοοῦν — ἐνδεὲς δὲ λέγω τὸ νοοῦν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο — οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον ἀναίσθητον, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ζωὴ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ οἱονεὶ συναισθήσει οὖσα ἐν στάσει ἀιδίῳ καὶ νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν. εἴ τι οὖν μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν αὑτῷ γίνεται, ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο γίνεται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο μάλιστα ᾖ ὃ ἔστι. μένοντος οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἤθει ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται, μένοντος δὲ γίνεται.
Like this. The intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient as what sees and thinks is—I call what thinks deficient in relation to that. But it is not, as it were, without awareness: everything that belongs to it is in it and with it; it is wholly able to discern itself; life is in it and all things are in it; and its comprehension of itself is itself, by a kind of self-awareness, in eternal rest and in a thinking different from the thinking of Intellect. If, then, something comes into being while it remains in itself, it comes into being from it when it is most of all what it is. So while it remains in its own character, what comes into being comes into being from it—but comes into being while it remains.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκεῖνο μένει νοητόν, τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται νόησις· νόησις δὲ οὖσα καὶ νοοῦσα ἀφ’ οὗ ἐγένετο — ἄλλο γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει — νοῦς γίγνεται, ἄλλο οἷον νοητὸν καὶ οἷον ἐκεῖνο καὶ μίμημα καὶ εἴδωλον ἐκείνου.
Since that remains intelligible, then, what comes into being comes into being as thinking; and being thinking, and thinking that from which it came—for it has nothing else—it becomes Intellect: another intelligible, as it were, like that, an imitation and image of that.
ἀλλὰ πῶς μένοντος ἐκείνου γίνεται ἐνέργεια; [ἢ] ἡ μέν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ δ’ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστου· καὶ ἡ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτό ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης, ἣν δεῖ παντὶ ἕπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέραν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι συμπληροῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ἤδη γινομένη ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου τὴν σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ [ἐνέργειαν] ἐν τῷ μένειν πῦρ. οὕτω δὴ κἀκεῖ· καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκεῖ μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἤθει ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ συνούσης ἐνεργείας ἡ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσα, ἅτε ἐκ μεγάλης δυνάμεως, μεγίστης μὲν οὖν ἁπασῶν, εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἦλθεν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἦν. καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν δύναμις πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πάντα.
But how, while that remains, does activity come into being? [Or rather:] in each thing there is an activity of the substance and an activity from the substance. The activity of the substance is each thing itself in activity; the activity from it must necessarily follow every thing, being other than it. So with fire: there is the heat that makes up its substance, and the heat that already comes from that, as the fire exercises the [activity] natural to its substance, by remaining fire. So it is There too—and much more so There. While it remains in its own character, out of the perfection within it and the activity that accompanies it, the generated activity took on existence, since it came from a great power—the greatest of all, in fact—and came to being and substance; for that was beyond being. And that is the power of all things, while this is already all things.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὰ πάντα, ἐκεῖνο ἐπέκεινα τῶν πάντων· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα οὐσίας· καὶ εἰ τὰ πάντα, πρὸ δὲ πάντων τὸ ἓν οὐ τὸ ἴσον ἔχον τοῖς πᾶσι, καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νοῦ· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τι νοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐ νεκρὸν οὐδὲ οὐ ζωὴ οὐδὲ οὐ νοοῦν· νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὂν ταὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς, ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν προόντων, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς [ὁ] νοῦς τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ μὴ εἴδη αὐτῶν κομίζεται. πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἕν· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ ὅλη τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα.
If this is all things, that is beyond all things, and so beyond being. And if this is all things, and the One is before all things, not having equal standing with all things, in this way too it must be beyond being. And this means beyond Intellect too: so there is something beyond Intellect. For being is not dead, nor is it not life, nor not thinking: Intellect and being are the same. For Intellect is not of things in the way that perception is of sense objects that exist before it; Intellect itself is the things, if indeed it does not take in forms of them. For where would it get them from? No: here it is with the things, and the same as them, and one with them. And knowledge of what is without matter is, as a whole, the things themselves.