Τὸ μέν ἐστι νοοῦν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ αὑτό. ὃ ἤδη φεύγει μᾶλλον τὸ δύο εἶναι. τὸ δὲ πρότερον λεχθὲν βούλεται καὶ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἧττον δύναται παρ’ αὑτῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὃ ὁρᾷ, ἕτερόν γε μὴν ἐκείνου. τὸ δὲ οὐ κεχώρισται τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ συνὸν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτό. ἄμφω οὖν γίνεται ἓν ὄν. μᾶλλον οὖν νοεῖ, ὅτι ἔχει, καὶ πρώτως νοεῖ, ὅτι τὸ νοοῦν δεῖ ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι.
One thing thinks something else; another thinks itself. The latter already escapes being two more than the former does. The former wants this too, but is less able to manage it. It has what it sees with itself, but that is different from it. The latter is not separated from its object in being; it is together with itself and sees itself. So the two become one. It thinks more, then, because it has its object, and it thinks primarily, because what thinks must be both one and two.
εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἕν, ἄλλο τὸ νοοῦν, ἄλλο τὸ νοούμενον ἔσται — οὐκ ἂν οὖν πρώτως νοοῦν εἴη, ὅτι ἄλλου τὴν νόησιν λαμβάνον οὐ τὸ πρώτως νοοῦν ἔσται, ὅτι ὃ νοεῖ οὐκ ἔχει ὡς αὑτοῦ, ὥστε οὐδ’ αὑτό· ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὡς αὑτό, ἵνα κυρίως νοῇ, τὰ δύο ἓν ἔσται· δεῖ ἄρα ἓν εἶναι ἄμφω — εἴτε ἓν μέν, μὴ δύο δὲ αὖ ἔσται, ὅ τι νοήσει οὐχ ἕξει· ὥστε οὐδὲ νοοῦν ἔσται. ἁπλοῦν ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν δεῖ εἶναι. μᾶλλον δ’ ἄν τις αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν ἕλοι ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναβαίνων· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ διαιρεῖν ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ῥᾷον ἄν τις τὸ διπλοῦν ἴδοι.
For suppose it is not one. Then what thinks will be one thing and what is thought another—and then it would not be what thinks primarily. Receiving the thinking of something else, it will not be the primary thinker, because it does not have what it thinks as its own, and so does not have itself either. Or, if it has its object as itself, so as to think in the proper sense, the two will be one: so both must be one. But suppose it is one, but not, in turn, two. Then it will not have anything to think, so it will not even be a thinker. So it must be simple and not simple. One would grasp better that it is like this by going up from soul. For here it is easy to divide, and one could more easily see the doubleness.
εἰ οὖν τις διπλοῦν φῶς ποιήσειε, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸ ἧττον, τὸ δὲ νοητὸν αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ καθαρώτερον, εἶτα ποιήσειε καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἴσον εἶναι φῶς τῷ ὁρωμένῳ, οὐκ ἔχων ἔτι χωρίζειν τῇ διαφορᾷ ἓν τὰ δύο θήσεται νοῶν μέν, ὅτι δύο ἦν, ὁρῶν δὲ ἤδη ἕν· οὕτω νοοῦν καὶ νοητὸν αἱρήσει. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ δύο ἓν πεποιήκαμεν, τὸ δ’ ἀνάπαλιν ἐξ ἑνός ἐστι δύο, ὅτι νοεῖ ποιοῦν αὑτὸ δύο, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄν, ὅτι νοεῖ, δύο, καὶ ὅτι αὑτό, ἕν
Suppose, then, someone were to make a double light: soul corresponding to the lesser light, its intelligible object to the purer. Then suppose he were to make the light that sees equal to the light that is seen. No longer able to separate them by any difference, he will set the two down as one, thinking that they were two, but now seeing one. That is how he will grasp the thinker and the thought. In our argument, then, we have made one out of two. But in fact it is the reverse: from being one it is two, because it thinks, making itself two—or rather, being two because it thinks, and one because what it thinks is itself.
εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρώτως νοοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἤδη ἄλλως νοοῦν, τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ πρώτως νοοῦντος οὐκ ἂν ἔτι νοοῖ· νοῦν γὰρ δεῖ γενέσθαι, ἵνα νοῇ, ὄντα δὲ νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἔχειν καὶ πρώτως νοοῦντα ἔχειν τὸ νοητὸν ἐν αὑτῷ. νοητὸν δὲ ὂν οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν καὶ νοοῦν ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχειν καὶ νοεῖν· ἔσται γὰρ οὐ μόνον νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοοῦν, πρῶτόν τε οὐκ ἔσται δύο ὄν.
If, then, one thing thinks primarily and another thinks in a different way, what is beyond the primary thinker will no longer think. For it must become intellect in order to think. And being intellect, it must have an intelligible object, and, as primary thinker, have the intelligible in itself. But it is not necessary for everything intelligible to have a thinker in itself as well and to think. For then it will be not only intelligible but also a thinker, and, being two, it will not be first.
ὅ τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ οὔσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὃ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητὸν ἔσται, καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν κυρίως ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ νοητὸν ἑτέρῳ ὅ τε νοῦς τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ νοήσει κενὸν ἔχει ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἑλεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ὃ νοεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ νοητοῦ. τότε οὖν τέλειον, ὅταν ἔχῃ· ἔδει δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τέλειον εἶναι παρ’ αὑτοῦ τῆς οὐσίας. ᾧ ἄρα τὸ τέλειον ὑπάρξει, πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τοῦτο ἔσται· οὐδὲν ἄρα δεῖ αὐτῷ τοῦ νοεῖν· αὔταρκες γὰρ πρὸ τούτου. οὐκ ἄρα νοήσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα οὐ νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ πρώτως νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ νοήσει δευτέρως.
And the Intellect that has the intelligible could not exist if there were no being that was purely intelligible. This will be intelligible in relation to Intellect, but in itself it will be neither a thinker nor intelligible in the proper sense. For the intelligible is intelligible for another. And Intellect’s directing of its thought is empty unless it receives and grasps the intelligible that it thinks; it does not have thinking without the intelligible. So it is complete when it has it. But there had to be something complete in its being of itself, before thinking. So that to which completeness belongs will be complete before thinking. So it does not need thinking at all, for it is self-sufficient before this. So it will not think. One thing, then, does not think; another thinks primarily; and another will think secondarily.
ἔτι εἰ νοήσει τὸ πρῶτον, ὑπάρξει τι αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερον καὶ οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἤδη καὶ πάντα ὅσα νοήσει· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον ἑαυτό, πολλὰ ἔσται.
Further, if the First thinks, something will belong to it. So it is not first but also second, and not one but already many: all the things it will think. Even if it thinks only itself, it will be many.
εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲν κωλύειν φήσουσιν, ἓν τούτοις ὑποκείμενον ἔσται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ πολλὰ μὴ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἀφ’ οὗ ἢ ἐν ᾧ, ἢ ὅλως ἑνὸς καὶ τούτου πρώτου τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμουμένου, ὃ αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ λαβεῖν μόνον. εἰ δὲ ὁμοῦ εἴη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, δεῖ τοῦτο συλλαβόντα αὐτὸ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ὄν, ἐᾶν ὡς μετ’ ἄλλων, ζητεῖν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς ἄλλοις μηκέτι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτό. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτὸ ὅμοιον μὲν ἂν εἴη τούτῳ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτὸ μόνον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὁρᾶσθαι.
But if they say that nothing prevents the same thing from being many, there will be a one underlying these many. There cannot be many unless there is a one from which or in which they are, or at least a one that is counted first, before the others. That one must be grasped by itself, alone. If it is together with the others, one must take it together with the others, yet as different from them. One must leave it as it is with the others, and seek this that underlies the others no longer with the others, but itself by itself. For what is in the others would be like this, but would not be this. It must be alone, if it is also to be seen in others.
εἰ μή τις αὐτοῦ λέγοι τὸ εἶναι σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἁπλοῦν αὐτὸ ἔσται, οὐδὲ τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ οὐ δυνάμενον ἁπλοῦν εἶναι ὑπόστασιν οὐχ ἕξει, τό τε συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἁπλοῦ οὐκ ὄντος οὐδ’ αὐτὸ ἔσται. ἑκάστου γὰρ ἁπλοῦ οὐ δυναμένου εἶναι οὐχ ὑφεστηκότος τινὸς ἑνὸς ἁπλοῦ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δυναμένου οὐδὲ παρέχειν αὑτὸ μετ’ ἄλλου εἶναι τῷ ὅλως μὴ εἶναι, πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐκ πάντων εἴη σύνθετον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γεγενημένον, οὐ τὶ μὴ ὄντων, ἀλλ’ ὅλως μὴ ὄντων; εἰ ἄρα πολλά τί ἐστι, δεῖ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἓν εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ νοοῦν τι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ εἶναι. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον.
Unless someone were to say that its being consists in having its existence with the others. Then it will not be simple, nor will what is composed of many exist. For what cannot be simple will have no existence, and what is composed of many will not exist either if the simple does not. Suppose each simple thing cannot be, because no single simple thing exists by itself. Then none of them can have existence by itself, or offer itself to be with another, since it does not exist at all. How, then, could the composite of all of them exist, made from things that are not—not things that are not something, but things that are not at all? So if there is a many, there must be a one before the many. If, then, the thinker is a multiplicity, thinking cannot be in what is not a multiplicity. But this was the First.
ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ νοῦς ἔσται.
So thinking and Intellect will be among the things that come after it.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀνενδεὲς δεῖ εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἂν τοῦ νοεῖν δέοιτο· οὗ δὲ μὴ δεῖ αὐτῷ, οὐ παρέσται αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως οὐδὲν πάρεστιν αὐτῷ. οὐκ ἄρα πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν. καὶ νοεῖ οὐδέν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἄλλο. ἔτι ἄλλο νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἀγαθοειδὴς γὰρ τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν. ἔτι ὡς ἐν τοῖς δυσὶν ὄντος ἑνὸς καὶ ἄλλου οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο τὸ μετ’ ἄλλου τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἔδει ἓν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ μετ’ ἄλλου εἶναι, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ οὐ μετ’ ἄλλου τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχον ἁπλοῦν καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν ὅσα ἐν τῷ μετ’ ἄλλων. πόθεν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο, μὴ πρότερον χωρὶς ὄντος ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ ἄλλο;
Further, if the Good must be simple and without need, it would not need thinking either. And what it does not need will not be present to it, since nothing at all is present to it. So thinking is not present to it. And it thinks nothing, because there is nothing else either. Further, Intellect is other than the Good, for it is good-like by thinking the Good. Further, take two, where there is one and another. This one that is with another cannot be the One; there had to be one by itself before the one with another. In the same way, the one that is not with another must be simple, by itself, having in itself none of the things that are in the one with others. For how could one thing be in another unless there were first, separately, that from which the other comes?
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν οὐκ ἂν παρ’ ἄλλου εἴη, ὃ δ’ ἂν πολὺ ᾖ δύο, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀνηρτῆσθαι εἰς ἄλλο. καὶ οὖν ἀπεικαστέον τὸ μὲν φωτί, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἡλίῳ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τῷ σελήνης ἄστρῳ κομιζομένῳ τὸ φῶς παρ’ ἡλίου. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐπακτὸν νοῦν ἔχει ἐπιχρωννύντα αὐτὴν νοερὰν οὖσαν, νοῦς δ’ ἐν αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον ἔχει οὐ φῶς ὢν μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὅ ἐστι πεφωτισμένον ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ παρέχον τούτῳ τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄλλο ὂν φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν παρέχον τὴν δύναμιν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ὃ ἔστι. τί ἂν οὖν αὐτὸ δέοιτό τινος; οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐν ἄλλῳ· ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὄντος.
For the simple could not come from something else, but whatever is many, two, must depend on something else. So we should compare the first to light, the next to the sun, and the third to the moon, a star that gets its light from the sun. Soul has intellect as something brought in from outside, which colors its surface when it is intellectual. Intellect has it in itself as its own: it is not light only, but what has been illuminated in its very being. And what provides it with light, not being anything else, is simple light, which gives Intellect the power to be what it is. What, then, could it need? For what is itself is not the same as what is in something else; what is in something else is different from what is itself by itself.
ἔτι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῖ ἂν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐθέλοι ἂν συννεύειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ· ὃ δ’ ἐστὶ πάντη ἕν, ποῦ χωρήσεται πρὸς αὑτό; ποῦ δ’ ἂν δέοιτο συναισθήσεως; ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συναισθήσεως καὶ πάσης κρεῖττον νοήσεως. τὸ γὰρ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον οὔτε τῷ εἶναι οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεύτερον καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ δ’ ἐκινήθη τε καὶ εἶδε. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιεμένου ἐκείνου· ἡ γὰρ ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὑτῇ· ἔφεσις γὰρ ὄψεως ὅρασις. οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο αὑτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
Further, what is many would seek itself, and would want to converge on itself and be aware of itself. But what is altogether one—where will it go to reach itself? Where would it need self-awareness? It is the same, and it is better than self-awareness and all thinking. For thinking is not first, either in being or in value. It is second, something that came to be, once the Good existed and set something moving toward itself, and that was moved and saw. This is what thinking is: a movement toward the Good on the part of what desires it. The desire generated thinking and brought it into existence along with itself; for the desire for sight is seeing. So the Good itself does not need to think at all; for the Good is not something other than itself.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτὸ νοῇ, τῷ ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι νοεῖ καὶ ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν αὑτῷ γενόμενον νοεῖ καὶ οἷον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβάνον. εἰ δ’ ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἀεὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν τῇ νοήσει αὑτοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὑτὸ νοεῖ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπον αὑτὸ νοεῖ· ἐνεργοῦν γὰρ αὖ ἑαυτὸ νοεῖ· ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν.
For even when what is other than the Good thinks itself, it does so by being good-like and having a likeness to the Good. It thinks itself as good and as desirable to itself, grasping, as it were, an imagining of the Good. If it is always so, it is always this. And again, in thinking itself it thinks itself incidentally: it thinks itself while looking toward the Good. For in being active, in turn, it thinks itself; and the activity of all things is directed toward the Good.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι χώραν νοήσεως ἡντινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἄλλο γὰρ δεῖ τῷ νοοῦντι τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀνενέργητον οὖν. καὶ τί δεῖ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν; ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμία ἐνέργεια ἔχει αὖ πάλιν ἐνέργειαν· εἰ δέ γε ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς εἰς ἄλλο ἐχούσαις ἐπανενεγκεῖν, τήν γε πρώτην ἁπασῶν, εἰς ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι ἀνήρτηνται, αὐτὸ εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο ὃ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῇ προστιθέντας. ἡ οὖν τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια οὐ νόησις· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ὃ νοήσει· αὐτὸ γὰρ πρῶτον. ἔπειτα οὐδ’ ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν. δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνεται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῇ δύο. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἴδοι ἄν τις τοῦτο, εἰ λάβοι σαφέστερον, πῶς ἐν παντὶ τῷ νοοῦντι ὑπάρχει ἡ διπλῆ φύσις αὕτη.
If this is rightly said, the Good would have no room for any thinking at all. For the good must be something other than what thinks it. So it is not active. And why should activity be active? In general, no activity has an activity of its own in turn. And even if we were to allow that to the other activities, those directed toward something else, the first of all, on which the others depend, must be just what it is, without our adding anything further to it. So such an activity is not thinking; for it has nothing to think, since it is first. And then, it is not thinking that thinks, but what has thinking. So again two come about in what thinks; but this is in no way two. One would see this still better if one grasped more clearly how this double nature is present in everything that thinks.
λέγομεν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ εἶναι οὐ μόνον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μένει ὡσαύτως τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ῥεῖ καὶ οὐ μένει, ὅσα ἐν αἰσθήσει — τάχα γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐστι τὰ μένοντα — ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ τέλειον τοῦ εἶναι παρ’ αὑτῶν ἔχει.
We say that the things that are, as things that are, each thing itself, and the things that truly are, are in the intelligible place. This is not only because some remain the same in their being, while others flow and do not remain—the things in perception (for perhaps there are things that remain in the perceptible world too). Rather, it is because they have the completeness of being from themselves.
δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πρώτως λεγομένην οὐσίαν οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι σκιάν, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν πλῆρες τὸ εἶναι. πλῆρες δέ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι, ὅταν εἶδος τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ ζῆν λάβῃ. ὁμοῦ ἄρα τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ ζῆν, τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι. εἰ ἄρα ὄν, καὶ νοῦς, καὶ εἰ νοῦς, καὶ ὄν, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι. πολλὰ ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ νοεῖν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τῷ μὴ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ τὸ νοεῖν εἶναι. καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ ἐπιοῦσιν [νόησις ἀνθρώπου καὶ] ἄνθρωπος καὶ νόησις ἵππου καὶ ἵππος καὶ δικαίου νόησις καὶ δίκαιον. διπλᾶ τοίνυν ἅπαντα καὶ τὸ ἓν δύο, καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο εἰς ἓν ἔρχεται· ὃ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων, οὐδ’ ἓν ἕκαστον οὐδὲ ἐκ πάντων τῶν δύο οὐδ’ ὅλως δύο.
For what is called being in the primary sense must not be a shadow of being, but must have being in its fullness. And being is full when it takes the form of thinking and living. So thinking, living and being are together in what is. If, then, it is being, it is also intellect; and if it is intellect, it is also being; and thinking is together with being. So thinking is many and not one. So necessarily what is not of this kind does not think either. And if we go through things one by one: [thought of man and] man, thought of horse and horse, thought of the just and the just. So all things are double, and the one is two, and again the two come together into one. But what is none of these is neither each one, nor made from all the twos, nor two at all.
ὅπως δὲ τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλ’ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ὄντι καὶ [τὸ] τοῦ νοεῖν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνο ἄτοπον, εἰ μὴ οἶδεν ἑαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει παρ’ ἑαυτῷ, ὃ μάθῃ, εἷς ὤν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι. κρεῖττον γάρ τι καὶ μεῖζον δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ [ὃ] ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐκείνου.
How the two come from the One is discussed elsewhere. But what is beyond being must also be beyond thinking. So it is not absurd either if it does not know itself. It has nothing with it to learn, being one. Nor must it know the other things. For it gives them something better and greater than its knowing them, [which] was the good of the other things—or rather, it gives them, as far as each is able, to be in the same with it by touching it.