Εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστόν ἐστιν ἰδέα; ἢ εἰ ἐγὼ καὶ ἕκαστος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἑκάστου ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖ. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ Σωκράτης καὶ ψυχὴ Σωκράτους, ἔσται αὐτοσωκράτης ὡς λέγεται ἐκεῖ, καθ’ ὃ ἡ ψυχὴ καθέκαστα καὶ ἐκεῖ· εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γίνεται ὁ πρότερον Σωκράτης, οἷον Πυθαγόρας ἤ τις ἄλλος, οὐκέτι ὁ καθέκαστα οὗτος κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστου ὧν διεξέρχεται τοὺς λόγους ἔχει πάντων, πάντες αὖ ἐκεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγομεν, ὅσους ὁ κόσμος ἔχει λόγους, καὶ ἑκάστην ψυχὴν ἔχειν. εἰ οὖν ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἀνθρώπου μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν καθέκαστα ζῴων, καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ἄπειρον οὖν τὸ τῶν λόγων ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει περιόδοις, καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἀπειρία ἔσται πεπερασμένη, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ἀποδιδῶται.
Is there a Form of the individual too? Perhaps: if I and each of us can be traced back to the intelligible, the principle of each of us is There too. Or perhaps: if Socrates, the soul of Socrates, exists always, there will be a Socrates-itself, as people say, There, insofar as souls are individual There too. But if not always—if the one who was formerly Socrates becomes a different person at different times, Pythagoras for instance, or someone else—then this individual is no longer There as well. But if the soul of each has the rational principles of all the individuals it passes through, then again they are all There. For we also say that each soul has as many rational principles as the cosmos has. If, then, the cosmos has the rational principles not only of man but also of the individual animals, so does the soul. So the number of rational principles will be unlimited—unless it comes back round in periods. In this way the unlimitedness will be limited, when the same things are given back again.
εἰ οὖν ὅλως πλείω τὰ γινόμενα τοῦ παραδείγματος, τί δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ πάντων γινομένων λόγους καὶ παραδείγματα; ἀρκεῖν γὰρ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ καὶ ψυχὰς ὡρισμένας ἀνθρώπους ποιούσας ἀπείρους. ἢ τῶν διαφόρων οὐκ ἔστιν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, οὐδὲ ἀρκεῖ [εἷς] ἄνθρωπος πρὸς παράδειγμα τῶν τινων ἀνθρώπων διαφερόντων ἀλλήλων οὐ τῇ ὕλῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδικαῖς διαφοραῖς μυρίαις· οὐ γὰρ ὡς αἱ εἰκόνες Σωκράτους πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν διάφορον ποίησιν ἐκ διαφόρων λόγων [εἶναι]. ἡ δὲ πᾶσα περίοδος πάντας ἔχει τοὺς λόγους, αὖθις δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους. τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀπειρίαν οὐ δεῖ δεδιέναι· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, καὶ οἷον πρόεισιν, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ.
If, then, the things that come to be are on the whole more numerous than the model, why must there be rational principles and models of all the things that come to be in one period? One man would be enough for all men, just as a limited number of souls produce an unlimited number of men. Or rather, different individuals cannot have the same rational principle. [One] man is not enough as a model for particular men who differ from one another not only in their matter but in countless differences of form. They are not like portraits of Socrates in relation to the original: different products must come from different rational principles. The whole period contains all the rational principles, and then the same things come round again according to the same rational principles. We need not fear the unlimitedness in the intelligible. All of it is in what is without parts, and it comes forth, as it were, when it is active.
ἀλλ’ εἰ αἱ μίξεις τῶν λόγων ἄρρενος καὶ θήλεος διαφόρους ποιοῦσιν, οὐκέτι τοῦ γινομένου ἑκάστου λόγος τις ἔσται, ὅ τε ἑκάτερος γεννῶν, οἷον ὁ ἄρρην, οὐ κατὰ διαφόρους λόγους ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕνα τὸν αὑτοῦ ἢ πατρὸς ἑαυτοῦ. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κατὰ διαφόρους τῷ τοὺς πάντας ἔχειν αὐτούς, ἄλλους δὲ ἀεὶ προχείρους. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων· διάφοροι; ἢ διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἴσην ἐπικράτησιν. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οὐκ εἰ ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ὁτὲ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τὸ πλεῖστον, ὁτὲ δὲ κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ. ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον μέρος ἔδωκεν ἑκάτερος. ἀλλ’ ὅλον μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ ἔγκειται, κρατεῖ δὲ τῆς ὕλης μέρους ἑκατέρου ἢ θατέρου. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῃ χώρᾳ πῶς διάφοροι; ἆρ’ οὖν ἡ ὕλη τὸ διάφορον οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατουμένη;
But if the mixtures of the rational principles of male and female produce different individuals, there will no longer be a rational principle for each one that comes to be. And each of the two parents generating—the male, for instance—will not produce according to different rational principles, but according to one, his own or his father’s. Or rather, nothing prevents him from producing according to different ones too, since he has them all, though different ones are always ready to hand. And when children come from the same parents, why are they different? Perhaps because of unequal dominance. But note this: it does not follow that, in appearance, the child takes mostly after the male at one time and after the female at another. Did each parent, then, give an equal share? No: each gave the whole, and it lies within; but it masters the matter in part, the matter of one or of the other. And how are those born in another region different? Is it, then, the matter that makes the difference, by being mastered unequally?
πάντες ἄρα χωρὶς ἑνὸς παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τὸ διάφορον πολλαχοῦ καλόν, οὐχ ἓν τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τῷ αἴσχει μόνῳ ἀποδοτέον τὸ παρὰ [φύσιν] τὴν ὕλην κρατεῖν τῶν τελείων λόγων κεκρυμμένων μέν, δοθέντων δὲ ὅλων. ἀλλ’ ἔστωσαν διάφοροι οἱ λόγοι· τί δεῖ τοσούτους, ὅσοι οἱ γινόμενοι ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ, εἴπερ ἔνι τῶν αὐτῶν διδομένων διαφόρους ἔξωθεν φαίνεσθαι; ἢ συγκεχώρηται τῶν ὅλων διδομένων, ζητεῖται δέ, εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν κρατούντων. ἆρ’ οὖν, ὅτι τὸ ταὐτὸν πάντη ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ περιόδῳ, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ οὐδὲν πάντη ταὐτόν;
Then all but one would be contrary to nature. But if difference is often beautiful, the form is not one. No: only ugliness should be put down to matter’s prevailing [contrary to nature] over the complete rational principles, which are hidden but have been given whole. But let the rational principles be different. Why must there be as many as the individuals that come to be in one period, if it is possible for different individuals to appear outwardly when the same principles are given? Or rather, it has been granted that this happens when the principles are given whole; the question is whether it happens when the same ones prevail. Is it, then, because in the next period the same is altogether the same, while within this period nothing is altogether the same?
πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν διδύμων διαφόρους φήσομεν τοὺς λόγους; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τις ἴοι καὶ τὰ πολυτόκα μάλιστα; ἤ, ἐφ’ ὧν ἀπαράλλακτα, εἷς λόγος. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐχ, ὅσα τὰ καθέκαστα, τοσοῦτοι καὶ οἱ λόγοι. ἢ ὅσα διάφορα τὰ καθέκαστα καὶ διάφορα οὐ τῷ ἐλλείπειν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. ἢ τί κωλύει καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιάφορα; εἴπερ τινὰ ὅλως ἐστὶ πάντη ἀδιάφορα. ὡς γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης, κἂν ἀδιάφορα ποιῇ, δεῖ ὅμως τὸ ταὐτὸν διαφορᾷ λαμβάνειν λογικῇ, καθ’ ἣν ἄλλο ποιήσει προσφέρων διάφορόν τι τῷ αὐτῷ· ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει μὴ λογισμῷ γινομένου τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ λόγοις μόνον, συνεζεῦχθαι δεῖ τῷ εἴδει τὸ διάφορον· ἡμεῖς δὲ λαμβάνειν τὴν διαφορὰν ἀδυνατοῦμεν.
How, then, shall we say the rational principles are different in the case of many twins? And what if one went on to the other animals, especially those that bear many young at once? Perhaps: where they are indistinguishable, there is one rational principle. But if so, there are not as many rational principles as there are individuals. Or rather, there are as many as there are individuals that differ, and differ not by falling short in form. Or what prevents it even where they do not differ—if indeed some things are altogether without difference? Think of a craftsman. Even if he makes indistinguishable things, he must still grasp what is the same by a rational difference, according to which he will make another by bringing some difference to the same. In nature, where the other does not come about by reasoning but by rational principles alone, the difference must be yoked to the form. It is we who are unable to grasp the difference.
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ποίησις ἔχει τὸ εἰκῆ τοῦ ὁποσαοῦν, ἄλλος λόγος· εἰ δὲ μεμέτρηται, ὁπόσα τινὰ εἴη, τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον ἔσται τῇ τῶν λόγων ἁπάντων ἐξελίξει καὶ ἀναπλώσει· ὥστε, ὅταν παύσηται πάντα, ἀρχὴ ἄλλη· ὁπόσον γὰρ δεῖ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ διεξελεύσεται, κεῖται ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ ἔχοντι τοὺς λόγους. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἐφ’ ὧν πλῆθος ἐκ μιᾶς γενέσεως, τοσούτους τοὺς λόγους; ἢ οὐ φοβητέον τὸ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἄπειρον, ψυχῆς τὰ πάντα ἐχούσης. ἢ καὶ ἐν νῷ, ᾗ ἐν ψυχῇ τὸ ἄπειρον τούτων ἀνάπαλιν τῶν ἐκεῖ προχείρων.
And if the production leaves it to chance how many there are, that is another matter. But if it is measured how many there are to be, the quantity will be fixed by the unrolling and unfolding of all the rational principles. So when everything comes to an end, there is another beginning. For how large the cosmos must be, and how many things it will pass through in its life, is laid down from the beginning in what has the rational principles. Then, in the case of the other animals too, where many come from one birth, are there as many rational principles? Or rather, we need not fear the unlimited in seeds and in rational principles, since Soul holds all things. Or perhaps, in Intellect too, as in Soul, there is the unlimited of these, ready to hand in their turn There.