Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰσθήσει πρὸ νοῦ χρησάμενοι καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσβαλόντες πρώτοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἱ μὲν ἐνταυθοῖ καταμείναντες διέζησαν ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ ἔσχατα νομίσαντες, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαβόντες ἀρκεῖν ἐνόμισαν, εἰ τὸ μὲν διώκοντες, τὸ δ’ ἀποικονομούμενοι διεγένοντο. καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην οἵ γε λόγου μεταποιούμενοι αὐτῶν ἔθεντο, οἷα οἱ βαρεῖς τῶν ὀρνίθων, οἲ πολλὰ ἐκ γῆς λαβόντες καὶ βαρυνθέντες ὑψοῦ πτῆναι ἀδυνατοῦσι καίπερ πτερὰ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαβόντες. οἱ δὲ ἤρθησαν μὲν ὀλίγον ἐκ τῶν κάτω κινοῦντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡδέος τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονος.
All human beings, from the start, use perception before intellect, and of necessity encounter perceptible things first. Some stay down here and live out their lives thinking these things are first and last. Taking what is painful in them to be bad and what is pleasant to be good, they thought it enough to spend their lives pursuing the one and arranging to get away from the other. Those of them who lay claim to reason have made this their wisdom, like heavy birds that have taken in much from the earth and are weighed down, and cannot fly high, though nature gave them wings. Others have been lifted a little from what is below, because the better part of the soul moves them from the pleasant toward what is more beautiful.
ἀδυνατήσαντες δὲ ἰδεῖν τὸ ἄνω, ὡς οὐκ ἔχοντες ἄλλο, ὅπου στήσονται, κατηνέχθησαν σὺν τῷ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ πράξεις καὶ ἐκλογὰς τῶν κάτω, ἀφ’ ὧν ἐπεχείρησαν τὸ πρῶτον αἴρεσθαι. τρίτον δὲ γένος θείων ἀνθρώπων δυνάμει τε κρείττονι καὶ ὀξύτητι ὀμμάτων εἶδέ τε ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ὀξυδορκίας τὴν ἄνω αἴγλην, καὶ ἤρθη τε ἐκεῖ οἷον ὑπὲρ νεφῶν καὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀχλύος, καὶ ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖ τὰ τῇδε ὑπεριδὸν πάντα ἡσθὲν τῷ τόπῳ ἀληθινῷ καὶ οἰκείῳ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς τινος πλάνης εἰς πατρίδα εὔνομον ἀφικόμενος ἄνθρωπος.
But, unable to see what is above, and having nowhere else to stand, they were carried back down, together with the name of virtue, to actions and choices among the things below, from which they had tried at first to rise. A third kind, of godlike men, by greater power and sharpness of eye, saw the radiance above, as if by keen sight, and rose There, as if above the clouds and the mist down here; and they stayed There, looking down on everything here, delighted with the place, which is true and their own—like a man who has come home after long wandering to a well-governed fatherland.
τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ τόπος; καὶ πῶς ἄν τις εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφίκοιτο; ἀφίκοιτο μὲν ἂν ὁ φύσει ἐρωτικὸς καὶ ὄντως τὴν διάθεσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φιλόσοφος, ὠδίνων μέν, ἅτε ἐρωτικός, περὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος δὲ τοῦ ἐν σώματι κάλλους, ἀλλ’ ἔνθεν ἀναφυγὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλη, ἀρετὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμας καὶ [καλὰ] ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμους, πάλιν αὖ ἐπαναβαίνει ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ καλῶν αἰτίαν, καὶ εἴ τι πάλιν αὖ πρὸ τούτου, ἕως ἐπ’ ἔσχατον ἥκῃ τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καλόν. ἔνθα καὶ ἐλθὼν ὠδῖνος παύσεται, πρότερον δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀναβήσεται; καὶ πόθεν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ, καὶ τίς λόγος τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα παιδαγωγήσεται;
What, then, is this place? And how could one get there? One would get there who is by nature a lover, and from the outset truly a philosopher in disposition. In labor, as a lover is, with beauty, but not content with the beauty in body, he flees from there up to the beauties of soul—virtues, branches of knowledge, [fine] practices and laws—and then climbs again to the cause of the beauties in soul, and to whatever there may be before that again, until he reaches the last, which is the first, beautiful of itself. When he arrives there he will be free of his labor, but not before. But how will he climb? Where does his power come from, and what reasoning will guide this love?
ἢ ὅδε· τοῦτο τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπακτόν ἐστι τοῖς σώμασι μορφαὶ γὰρ αὗται σωμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ ὕλῃ αὐτοῖς. μεταβάλλει γοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν γίνεται. μεθέξει ἄρα, φησὶν ὁ λόγος. τί οὖν τὸ ποιῆσαν σῶμα καλόν; ἄλλως μὲν κάλλους παρουσία, ἄλλως δὲ ψυχή, ἣ ἔπλασέ τε καὶ μορφὴν τοιάνδε ἐνῆκε. τί οὖν; ψυχὴ παρ’ αὑτῆς καλόν; ἢ οὔ. οὐ γὰρ [ἂν] ἡ μὲν ἦν φρόνιμός τε καὶ καλή, ἡ δὲ ἄφρων καὶ αἰσχρά. φρονήσει ἄρα τὸ καλὸν περὶ ψυχήν. καὶ τίς οὖν ὁ φρόνησιν δοὺς ψυχῇ; ἢ νοῦς ἐξ ἀνάγκης. νοῦς δὲ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν νοῦς, ποτὲ δὲ ἄνους, ὅ γε ἀληθινός. παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἄρα καλός. καὶ πότερον δὲ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ στῆναι, ὡς πρῶτον, ἢ καὶ νοῦ ἐπέκεινα δεῖ ἰέναι;
Like this. The beauty on bodies is brought to them from outside, for these are shapes of bodies, as on matter. At any rate, the substrate changes and goes from beautiful to ugly. So it is by participation, the argument says. What, then, made the body beautiful? In one sense the presence of beauty; in another, soul, which shaped it and put such a shape into it. What then? Is soul beautiful of itself? No. Otherwise one soul would not have understanding and be beautiful, another be senseless and ugly. So beauty in soul comes by understanding. And who gave soul understanding? Intellect, necessarily—and an intellect that is not intellect at one time and mindless at another: the true one. So it is beautiful of itself. And must we stop here, as at the first, or must we go even beyond Intellect?
νοῦς δὲ προέστηκε μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἐν προθύροις τἀγαθοῦ ἀπαγγέλλων ἐν αὑτῷ τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ [δὲ] ἐκείνου τύπος μᾶλλον ἐν πλήθει ἐκείνου πάντη μένοντος ἐν ἑνί.
Intellect stands before the first principle, as far as we are concerned, as if in the forecourt of the Good, announcing everything in itself, being rather, as it were, an impress of the Good in multiplicity, while the Good remains wholly in unity.
Why there must be Intellect
Analyzing composite things leads up through Soul to Intellect as their maker.
ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ ταύτην τὴν νοῦ φύσιν, ἣν ἐπαγγέλλεται ὁ λόγος εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὄντως καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ οὐσίαν, πρότερον βεβαιωσαμένους κατ’ ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἰόντας, ὅτι δεῖ εἶναί τινα τοιαύτην. ἴσως μὲν οὖν γελοῖον ζητεῖν, εἰ νοῦς ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τάχα δ’ ἄν τινες καὶ περὶ τούτου διαμφισβητοῖεν. μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ τοιοῦτος, οἷόν φαμεν, καὶ εἰ χωριστός τις, καὶ εἰ οὗτος τὰ ὄντα, καὶ εἰ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν φύσις ἐνταῦθα, περὶ οὗ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰπεῖν πρόκειται. ὁρῶμεν δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι πάντα σύνθετα καὶ ἁπλοῦν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἕν, ἅ τε τέχνη ἐργάζεται ἑκάστη, ἅ τε συνέστηκε φύσει.
But we must examine this nature of Intellect, which the argument promises is what really is and true being, after first establishing, by going another road, that there must be some such nature. Perhaps it is ridiculous to ask whether there is intellect among the things that are; but some people might even dispute this. Rather, whether it is such as we say, and whether it is something separate, and whether it is the things that are, and whether the nature of the Forms is there—this is what we now propose to discuss. We see, then, that all the things said to be are composite, and not one of them is simple—both what each art produces and what is constituted by nature.
τά τε γὰρ τεχνητὰ ἔχει χαλκὸν ἢ ξύλον ἢ λίθον καὶ παρὰ τούτων οὔπω τετέλεσται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ τέχνη ἑκάστη ἡ μὲν ἀνδριάντα, ἡ δὲ κλίνην, ἡ δὲ οἰκίαν ἐργάσηται εἴδους τοῦ παρ’ αὑτῆς ἐνθέσει. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ φύσει συνεστῶτα τὰ μὲν πολυσύνθετα αὐτῶν καὶ συγκρίματα καλούμενα ἀναλύσεις εἰς [ὕλην καὶ] τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκριθεῖσιν εἶδος· οἷον ἄνθρωπον εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὰ τέσσαρα. ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων σύνθετον εὑρὼν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ τοῦ μορφοῦντος — ὕλη γὰρ παρ’ αὑτῆς ἡ τῶν στοιχείων ἄμορφος — ζητήσεις τὸ εἶδος ὅθεν τῇ ὕλῃ.
Products of art have bronze or wood or stone, and are not yet complete from these until each art produces, one a statue, another a bed, another a house, by putting in the form that comes from it. And as for the things constituted by nature, those that are highly composite and called compounds you will analyze into [matter and] the form over all the things compounded: a human being, for example, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. Finding each of these composed of matter and what shapes it—for the matter of the elements is shapeless of itself—you will look for where the form comes to the matter from.
ζητήσεις δ’ αὖ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πότερα τῶν ἁπλῶν ἤδη, ἢ ἔνι τι ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ, ὁ μὲν ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ χαλκῷ μορφή, ὁ δὲ οἷος ὁ τὴν μορφὴν ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ποιήσας.
You will also ask about soul, whether it is already one of the simple things, or whether there is something in it like matter and something like form, the intellect in it: one intellect like the shape on the bronze, the other like the one who made the shape in the bronze.
τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς μεταφέρων τις ἀναβήσεται καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ νοῦν ποιητὴν ὄντως καὶ δημιουργὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ φήσει τὸ ὑποκείμενον δεξάμενον μορφὰς τὸ μὲν πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, τὰς δὲ μορφὰς ταύτας παρ’ ἄλλου ἥκειν· τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ψυχήν· ψυχὴν δ’ αὖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τὴν κόσμου μορφὴν δοῦναι ταύτῃ δὲ νοῦν χορηγὸν τῶν λόγων γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς τῶν τεχνιτῶν ψυχαῖς παρὰ τῶν τεχνῶν τοὺς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν λόγους· νοῦν δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ κατὰ τὴν μορφήν, τὸν δὲ τὴν μορφὴν παρέχοντα ὡς τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ᾧ πάντα ἐνυπάρχει, ἃ δίδωσιν. ἐγγὺς μὲν ἀληθείας, ἃ δίδωσι ψυχῇ· ἃ δὲ τὸ σῶμα δέχεται, εἴδωλα ἤδη καὶ μιμήματα.
Carrying these same points over to the All, one will climb up here too to Intellect, positing it as truly maker and craftsman. One will say that the substrate received shapes and became, in one part fire, in another water, in another air and earth, and that these shapes came from something else, and that this is Soul; that Soul in turn gave the four elements the shape of the cosmos; and that Intellect became for it the supplier of the rational principles—just as the souls of craftsmen get from their arts the rational principles for their activity. Of Intellect, one is like the form of soul, the one that corresponds to the shape; the other, which provides the shape, is like the maker of the statue, in whom everything he gives is present. What it gives to soul is close to truth; what the body receives are already images and imitations.
διὰ τί οὖν δεῖ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ ἀνιέναι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὴν εἶναι τίθεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν νοῦς ψυχῆς ἕτερον καὶ κρεῖττον· τὸ δὲ κρεῖττον φύσει πρῶτον. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὡς οἴονται, ψυχὴ νοῦν τελειωθεῖσα γεννᾷ· πόθεν γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται, μὴ τοῦ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγοντος αἰτίου ὄντος; εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τύχην, ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν. διὸ δεῖ τὰ πρῶτα ἐνεργείᾳ τίθεσθαι καὶ ἀπροσδεᾶ καὶ τέλεια· τὰ δὲ ἀτελῆ ὕστερα ἐκείνων, τελειούμενα δὲ παρ’ αὐτῶν τῶν γεγεννηκότων δίκην πατέρων τελειούντων, ἃ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἀτελῆ ἐγέννησαν καὶ εἶναι μὲν ὕλην πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαν τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτ’ αὐτὴν ἔμμορφον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐμπαθὴς ψυχή, δεῖ δέ τι [καὶ] ἀπαθὲς εἶναι — ἢ πάντα τῷ χρόνῳ ἀπολεῖται — δεῖ τι πρὸ ψυχῆς εἶναι.
Why, then, must we go up beyond Soul, instead of positing it as the first? First, Intellect is other than Soul and better, and the better is first by nature. For it is not, as they think, that Soul generates Intellect once it is perfected. How would what is potential become actual unless there were a cause to bring it to actuality? If it were by chance, it might never come to actuality. That is why we must posit the first things as actual, needing nothing, and perfect; the imperfect come after them, and are perfected by the very things that generated them, like fathers bringing to perfection what they at first begot imperfect: it is first like matter in relation to what made it, and then is itself brought to completion, with shape. And if Soul is subject to affection, and there must be something impassive—or everything will perish in time—there must be something before Soul.
καὶ εἰ ἐν κόσμῳ ψυχή, ἐκτὸς δὲ δεῖ τι κόσμου εἶναι, καὶ ταύτῃ πρὸ ψυχῆς δεῖ τι εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ τὸ ἐν σώματι καὶ ὕλῃ, οὐδὲν ταὐτὸν μένει· ὥστε ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντες λόγοι οὐκ ἀίδιοι οὐδὲ οἱ αὐτοί. καὶ ὅτι μὲν νοῦν πρὸ ψυχῆς εἶναι δεῖ, ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἄν τις θεωρήσειε.
And if Soul is in the cosmos, and there must be something outside the cosmos, in this way too there must be something before Soul. For if what is in the cosmos is what is in body and matter, nothing remains the same; so that man, and all the rational principles, would not be eternal or the same. That Intellect must be before Soul, then, one may see from these and many other considerations.
Intellect is the beings
Intellect does not think things outside itself; it is the Forms it thinks.
δεῖ δὲ νοῦν λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ ἐπαληθεύσομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ τὸν δυνάμει μηδὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης εἰς νοῦν ἐλθόντα — εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον πάλιν αὖ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ζητήσομεν — ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἀεὶ νοῦν ὄντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπακτὸν τὸ φρονεῖν ἔχει, εἴ τι νοεῖ, παρ’ αὑτοῦ νοεῖ, καὶ εἴ τι ἔχει, παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ νοεῖ, αὐτός ἐστιν ἃ νοεῖ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἄλλη, ἃ δὲ νοεῖ ἕτερα αὐτοῦ, αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἀνόητος ἔσται· καὶ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ αὖ. οὐ χωριστέον οὖν οὐδέτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου. ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν κἀκεῖνα ταῖς ἐπινοίαις χωρίζειν. τί οὖν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ τί νοεῖ, ἵνα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸν ἃ νοεῖ θώμεθα;
We must take Intellect, if we are to be true to the name, not as intellect in potentiality, nor as having come from folly to intellect—otherwise we shall have to look for yet another before it—but as actual and always intellect. And if its understanding is not brought in from outside, then if it thinks anything, it thinks it from itself, and if it has anything, it has it from itself. And if it thinks from itself and out of itself, it is itself what it thinks. For if its being were one thing, and what it thinks were other than it, its very being would be unthinking—and, again, potential, not actual. So neither must be separated from the other. It is our habit, starting from things among us, to separate even those in our conceptions. What, then, is its activity, and what does it think, so that we may posit it as being what it thinks?
ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι νοῦς ὢν ὄντως νοεῖ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφίστησιν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ ὄντα. ἢ γὰρ ἑτέρωθι ὄντα αὐτὰ νοήσει, ἢ ἐν αὑτῷ ὡς αὐτὸν ὄντα. ἑτέρωθι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον· ποῦ γάρ; αὑτὸν ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ὥσπερ οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἕκαστον οὐ τὸ αἰσθητόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶδος ἐπὶ ὕλῃ εἴδωλον ὄντος, πᾶν τε εἶδος ἐν ἄλλῳ παρ’ ἄλλου εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἔρχεται καὶ ἔστιν εἰκὼν ἐκείνου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ποιητὴν δεῖ εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, οὐ τὰ ἐν τῷ μήπω ὄντι οὗτος νοήσει, ἵνα αὐτὸ ποιῇ. πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα, οὐ τύπους ἀφ’ ἑτέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ πρῶτα καὶ νοῦ οὐσίαν.
Clearly, being truly Intellect, it thinks the things that are and gives them existence. So it is the things that are. For either it will think them as being elsewhere, or in itself as being itself. Elsewhere is impossible: where could that be? So it thinks itself, and in itself. Not, surely, in perceptible things, as they think. For the first of each thing is not the perceptible one: the form in them, on matter, is an image of what is, and every form in something else comes into it from something else and is an image of that. And if there must also be a maker of this All, he will not think the things in what does not yet exist in order to make it. So those things must be before the cosmos—not impressions from other things, but archetypes, primary, and the being of Intellect.
εἰ δὲ λόγους φήσουσιν ἀρκεῖν, ἀιδίους δῆλον· εἰ δὲ ἀιδίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς, ἐν νῷ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοιούτῳ καὶ προτέρῳ ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς· δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα. ὁ νοῦς ἄρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοθι νοῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὔτε μετ’ αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ οἷον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι. ὀρθῶς ἄρα ‘τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι’, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν τῷ πράγματι, καὶ τὸ ‘ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιζησάμην’ ὡς ἓν τῶν ὄντων· καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις δέ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ’ ἐν τόπῳ, μένει δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς μεταβολὴν οὐδὲ φθορὰν δεχόμενα· διὸ καὶ ὄντως ὄντα.
If they say that rational principles are enough, these are clearly eternal; and if eternal and impassive, they must be in an intellect—an intellect of this kind, prior to state, nature and soul, for these are potential. Intellect, then, is the things that really are, not thinking them as they are elsewhere; for they are neither before it nor after it. It is like a first lawgiver—or rather, it is itself the law of being. So it is rightly said that “thinking and being are the same,” and that the knowledge of things without matter is the same as the thing; and “I searched myself,” as one of the things that are; and the recollections too. For none of the things that are is outside, or in place; they remain always in themselves, admitting neither change nor destruction. That is why they really are.
ἢ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἐπακτῷ χρήσεται τῷ ὄντι, καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὂν ἔσται. τὰ μὲν δὴ αἰσθητὰ μεθέξει ἐστὶν ἃ λέγεται τῆς ὑποκειμένης φύσεως μορφὴν ἰσχούσης ἄλλοθεν· οἷον χαλκὸς παρὰ ἀνδριαντοποιικῆς καὶ ξύλον παρὰ τεκτονικῆς διὰ εἰδώλου τῆς τέχνης εἰς αὐτὰ ἰούσης, τῆς δὲ τέχνης αὐτῆς ἔξω ὕλης ἐν ταυτότητι μενούσης καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ ἀνδριάντα καὶ κλίνην ἐχούσης. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων. καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἰνδαλμάτων μετέχον ἕτερα αὐτῶν δείκνυσι τὰ ὄντα, ἄτρεπτα μὲν ὄντα ἐκεῖνα, αὐτὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα, ἱδρυμένα τε ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν, οὐ τόπου δεόμενα· οὐ γὰρ μεγέθη· νοερὰν δὲ καὶ αὐτάρκη ἑαυτοῖς ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα. σωμάτων γὰρ φύσις σώζεσθαι παρ’ ἄλλου θέλει, νοῦς δὲ ἀνέχων θαυμαστῇ φύσει τὰ παρ’ αὑτῶν πίπτοντα ὅπου ἱδρυθῇ αὐτὸς οὐ ζητεῖ.
Otherwise, coming to be and passing away, they will make use of being brought in from outside, and it will no longer be they that are, but that being. Perceptible things are what they are said to be by participation, the underlying nature taking its shape from elsewhere—as bronze from the sculptor’s art and wood from the carpenter’s, the art entering them through an image of itself, while the art itself remains outside matter, in its identity, and holds the true statue and the true bed. So it is with bodies too. And this All, sharing in reflections, shows that the things that are are other than it: they are unchanging, while it changes; they are set firm on themselves and do not need place, for they are not magnitudes; and they have an intellectual and self-sufficient hypostasis. For the nature of bodies needs to be preserved by something else, while Intellect, holding up by its wonderful nature things that would fall of themselves, does not look for a place where it is itself to be set.
νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὡς αὑτὸν ἔχων καὶ ἓν ὢν αὐτοῖς. πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον διακεκριμένα. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲν ἔχει συγκεχυμένον καὶ ἑκάστη πράττει τὸ αὑτῆς, ὅταν δέῃ, οὐ συνεφέλκουσα τὰς ἄλλας, νόημα δὲ ἕκαστον καθαρὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἔνδον αὖ νοημάτων κειμένων. οὕτως οὖν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ αὖ οὐχ ὁμοῦ, ὅτι ἕκαστον δύναμις ἰδία· ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς περιέχει [πάντα] ὥσπερ γένος εἴδη καὶ ὥσπερ ὅλον μέρη.
Let Intellect, then, be the things that are. It holds them all within itself, not as in a place, but as holding itself, and it is one with them. All things are together There, and they are none the less distinct. For a soul, too, holds many branches of knowledge together within itself, and none of them is confused with the others. Each does its own work when it is needed, without dragging the others along, and each brings into activity a pure thought out of the thoughts lying stored within. In this way, then, and much more so, Intellect is all things together and yet again not together, because each is a power of its own. And the whole Intellect encompasses [all] as a genus encompasses its species and as a whole encompasses its parts.
καὶ αἱ τῶν σπερμάτων δὲ δυνάμεις εἰκόνα φέρουσι τοῦ λεγομένου· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ ἀδιάκριτα πάντα, καὶ οἱ λόγοι ὥσπερ ἐν ἑνὶ κέντρῳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἄλλος ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἄλλος δὲ χειρῶν λόγος (τὸ) ἕτερος εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ γενομένου ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γνωσθείς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι δυνάμεις ἑκάστη αὐτῶν λόγος εἷς ὅλος μετὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐμπεριεχομένων μερῶν, [ὧν] τὸ μὲν σωματικὸν ὕλην ἔχει, οἷον ὅσον ὑγρόν, αὐτὸς δὲ εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψυχῆς εἴδει τῷ γεννῶντι, ἥ ἐστιν ἴνδαλμα ψυχῆς ἄλλης κρείττονος.
The powers in seeds also give an image of what we are saying. In the whole seed all things are undistinguished, and the rational principles are as though at a single center. Yet the principle of the eye is one thing and that of the hands another, and (the fact) that it is different is recognized from the perceptible thing it produces. So the powers in seeds: each of them is one whole rational principle together with the parts encompassed in it. [Of these] the bodily part has matter, such as whatever is moist, while the principle itself is form, the whole of it, and is the same rational principle as the generating form of soul, and this soul is an image of another, superior soul.
φύσιν δέ τινες λέγουσιν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασιν, ἣ ἐκεῖθεν ὁρμηθεῖσα ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρὸς φῶς, ἔτρεψέ τε καὶ ἐμόρφωσε τὴν ὕλην οὐκ ὠθοῦσα οὐδὲ ταῖς πολυθρυλήτοις μοχλείαις χρωμένη, δοῦσα δὲ τῶν λόγων.
Some people call this thing in the seeds “nature.” Setting out from There, from what is prior to it, like light from fire, it turned and shaped matter—not by pushing, nor by using the levers people talk so much about, but by giving it a share of the rational principles.
αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ οὖσαι αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν — εἰ δεῖ ἐπιστήμας τούτων λέγειν, πρέπει δὲ αὐταῖς τὸ τῆς δόξης ὄνομα — ὕστεραι τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσαι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τούτων· αἱ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν, αἳ δὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστῆμαι, παρὰ νοῦ εἰς λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθοῦσαι αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὐδὲν νοοῦσι· καθόσον δέ εἰσιν ἐπιστῆμαι, εἰσὶν αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἃ νοοῦσι, καὶ ἔνδοθεν τό τε νοητὸν τήν τε νόησιν ἔχουσιν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἔνδον, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα, συνὼν αὑτῷ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια ὑπάρχων καὶ οὐκ ἐπιβάλλων ὡς οὐκ ἔχων ἢ ἐπικτώμενος ἢ διεξοδεύων οὐ προκεχειρισμένα· ψυχῆς γὰρ ταῦτα πάθη· ἀλλ’ ἕστηκεν ἐν αὑτῷ ὁμοῦ πάντα ὤν, οὐ νοήσας, ἵν’ ὑποστήσῃ ἕκαστα. οὐ γάρ, ὅτε ἐνόησε θεόν, θεὸς ἐγένετο, οὐδέ, ὅτε ἐνόησε κίνησιν, κίνησις ἐγένετο.
As for the branches of knowledge in the rational soul: those concerned with perceptible things—if one should call these knowledge at all; the name “opinion” suits them better—come after their objects and are images of them. But those concerned with intelligible things, which really are knowledge, come from Intellect into the rational soul and think nothing perceptible. Insofar as they are knowledge, they are each of the very things they think, and they have both the object of thought and the thinking within, because Intellect is within. Intellect is the first things themselves. It is always together with itself and exists as activity. It does not reach out to things as if it did not have them, or acquire them, or run through them as though they were not already at hand—these are experiences of soul. No: it stands still in itself, being all things at once, and it did not think each thing in order to bring it into existence. It was not when it thought god that god came to be, nor when it thought motion that motion came to be.
ὅθεν καὶ τὸ λέγειν νοήσεις τὰ εἴδη, εἰ οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνόησε, τότε ἐγένετο ἢ ἔστι τόδε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ταύτης γὰρ τῆς νοήσεως πρότερον δεῖ τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι. ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔλθοι ἐπὶ τὸ νοεῖν αὐτό; οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν οὐδὲ ἐπέβαλεν εἰκῇ.
So it is not right to say that the Forms are thoughts, if this is meant to imply that this or that came to be, or exists, at the moment Intellect thought it. What is thought must be prior to this thinking. Otherwise, how would Intellect come to think it? Certainly not by chance, nor did it light on it at random.
εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις ἐνόντος, ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνὸν καὶ ἡ ἰδέα αὕτη. τί οὖν τοῦτο; νοῦς καὶ νοερὰ οὐσία, οὐχ ἑτέρα τοῦ νοῦ ἑκάστη ἰδέα, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη νοῦς. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς τὰ πάντα εἴδη, ἕκαστον δὲ εἶδος νοῦς ἕκαστος, ὡς ἡ ὅλη ἐπιστήμη τὰ πάντα θεωρήματα, ἕκαστον δὲ μέρος τῆς ὅλης οὐχ ὡς διακεκριμένον τόπῳ, ἔχον δὲ δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ἔχων ἑαυτὸν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ κόρος ἀεί.
If, then, thinking is of something within, that inner thing is the form within, and this is the Form. What, then, is it? Intellect, and intellectual being. No Form is other than Intellect; each is intellect. Intellect as a whole is all the Forms, and each Form is an individual intellect, just as a science as a whole is all its theorems, and each theorem is a part of the whole—not separated from it in place, but each having its power within the whole. This Intellect, then, is in itself, and possessing itself in stillness it is forever fullness.
εἰ μὲν οὖν προεπενοεῖτο ὁ νοῦς πρότερος τοῦ ὄντος, ἔδει τὸν νοῦν λέγειν ἐνεργήσαντα καὶ νοήσαντα ἀποτελέσαι καὶ γεννῆσαι τὰ ὄντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν τοῦ νοῦ προεπινοεῖν ἀνάγκη, ἐγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι τὰ ὄντα, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πυρὶ ἤδη τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐνέργειαν, ἵν’ ἓν ὄντα τὸν νοῦν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἔχῃ ἐνέργειαν αὑτῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν ἐνέργεια· μία οὖν ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἄμφω ἕν. μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τό τε ὂν ὅ τε νοῦς· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνέργεια καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ τοιοῦτος· καὶ αἱ οὕτω νοήσεις τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια.
Now if Intellect were conceived as prior to being, we would have to say that Intellect, by its activity and its thinking, completed and generated the things that are. But since being must be conceived as prior to Intellect, we must posit that the things that are lie within what thinks, and that the activity and the thinking rest upon the things that are, as the activity of fire already rests upon fire. In this way, being one, they have Intellect upon themselves as their own activity. But being, too, is activity. So there is one activity of both—or rather, the two are one. Being and Intellect, then, are one nature. That is why the things that are, and the activity of being, and Intellect of this kind are one; and thoughts of this kind are the form, the shape and the activity of being.
ἐπινοεῖταί γε μὴν μεριζομένων ὑφ’ ἡμῶν θάτερα πρὸ τῶν ἑτέρων. ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ μερίζων νοῦς, ὁ δὲ ἀμέριστος καὶ μὴ μερίζων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ πάντα.
Yet when we divide them, we conceive one before the other. For the intellect that divides is a different one; the other is undivided, and does not divide being and all things.
τίνα οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἐν ἑνὶ νῷ, ἃ νοοῦντες μερίζομεν ἡμεῖς; δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἠρεμοῦντα προφέρειν, οἷον ἐξ ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἑνὶ οὔσης ἐπιθεωρεῖν τὰ ἐνόντα. κόσμου δὴ τοῦδε ὄντος ζῴου περιεκτικοῦ ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ παρ’ ἄλλου ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιῷδε εἶναι, παρ’ οὗ δέ ἐστιν εἰς νοῦν ἀναγομένου, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν νῷ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πᾶν εἶναι, καὶ κόσμον νοητὸν τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ὅν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Τιμαίῳ ὃ ἔστι ζῷον. ὡς γὰρ ὄντος λόγου ζῴου τινός, οὔσης δὲ καὶ ὕλης τῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν σπερματικὸν δεξαμένης, ἀνάγκη ζῷον γενέσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φύσεως νοερᾶς καὶ παντοδυνάμου οὔσης καὶ οὐδενὸς διείργοντος, μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι δυναμένου, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν κοσμηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κοσμῆσαι.
What, then, are the things in the one Intellect that we divide when we think them? We must bring them out while they stay at rest, as though we were surveying the contents of a knowledge that exists as a unity. This cosmos is a living being that encompasses all living beings; it has its being, and its being such as it is, from another; and that from which it comes is traced back to Intellect. So the archetype too must be wholly in Intellect, and this Intellect must be an intelligible cosmos—what Plato in the Timaeus calls “what Living Being is.” Just as, when there is the rational principle of some living being, and also matter that has received the seminal rational principle, a living being must come to be, so in the same way, when there is a nature that is intellectual and all-powerful, with nothing hindering it and nothing between it and what is able to receive, the one must be ordered and the other must order.
καὶ τὸ μὲν κοσμηθὲν ἔχει τὸ εἶδος μεμερισμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιον· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα.
What has been ordered has the form divided: man in one place, sun in another. But the other has all things in one.
What has a Form There
Plotinus asks which things have Forms: natural kinds, the arts, individuals, soul itself.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς εἴδη ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐστι, ταῦτα ἐκεῖθεν· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ. διὸ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ τέχνην ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι χωλεία. ποδῶν δὲ χωλεία [ἡ μὲν] ἤδη ἐν τῇ γενέσει οὐ κρατήσαντος λόγου, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τύχης λύμη τοῦ εἴδους. καὶ ποιότητες δὴ σύμφωνοι καὶ ποσότητες, ἀριθμοί τε καὶ μεγέθη, γενέσεις τε καὶ σχέσεις, ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις αἱ κατὰ φύσιν, κινήσεις τε καὶ στάσεις καθόλου τε καὶ ἐν μέρει τῶν ἐκεῖ· ἀντὶ δὲ χρόνου αἰών· ὁ δὲ τόπος ἐκεῖ νοερῶς τὸ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ.
Whatever exists as form in the perceptible world, then, comes from There; whatever does not, does not. That is why nothing contrary to nature is There, just as nothing contrary to art is in the arts, and lameness is not in the seeds. Lameness of the feet is [in one case] already there at birth, when the rational principle failed to prevail, or else it is damage to the form by chance. So harmonious qualities and quantities, numbers and magnitudes, comings-to-be and relations, actings and being-acted-upon that accord with nature, motions and rests, both universal and particular, are among the things There. Instead of time there is eternity; and place, There, is in an intellectual way one thing being in another.
ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων ὅ τι ἂν λάβῃς αὐτῶν οὐσία νοερὰ καὶ ζωῆς ἕκαστον μετέχον, καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον, καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἑστώς, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιόν, καὶ πάντα οὐσίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐ δυνάμει, τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον· ὥστε οὐ κεχώρισται τὸ ποιὸν ἑκάστης οὐσίας. ἆρ’ οὖν μόνα τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω; ἀλλὰ πρότερον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην σκεπτέον. [περὶ] κακοῦ γὰρ οὐδενός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν ἐνταῦθα ἐξ ἐνδείας καὶ στερήσεως καὶ ἐλλείψεως, καὶ ὕλης ἀτυχούσης πάθος καὶ τοῦ ὕλῃ ὡμοιωμένου.
There, then, since all things are together, whatever you take of them is intellectual being, and each shares in life. It is same and other, motion and rest, moving and at rest, being and quality—and all is being. For each thing there is what it is actually, not potentially, so that the quality is not separated from each being. Are only the things in the perceptible world There, then, or more besides? But first we must consider the products of art. For [as regards] evil, there is none There: evil here comes from lack, privation and deficiency, and is an affection of matter that has fared badly and of what has been made like matter.
τῶν δὴ τεχνῶν ὅσαι μιμητικαί, γραφικὴ μὲν καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία, ὄρχησίς τε καὶ χειρονομία, ἐνταῦθά που τὴν σύστασιν λαβοῦσαι καὶ αἰσθητῷ προσχρώμεναι παραδείγματι καὶ μιμούμεναι εἴδη τε καὶ κινήσεις τάς τε συμμετρίας ἃς ὁρῶσι μετατιθεῖσαι οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐκεῖ ἀνάγοιντο, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ. εἰ δέ τις ἕξις ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα συμμετρίας ὅλων ζῴων ἐπισκοποῖτο, μόριον ἂν εἴη δυνάμεως τῆς κἀκεῖ ἐπισκοπούσης καὶ θεωρούσης τὴν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ περὶ πάντα συμμετρίαν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μουσικὴ πᾶσα περὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχουσα καὶ ῥυθμὸν τὰ νοήματα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν νοητὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχουσα.
Of the arts, then, take the imitative ones—painting and sculpture, dancing and pantomime. They get their composition somewhere here, make use of a perceptible model, imitate shapes and movements, and transpose the proportions they see; so they could not reasonably be traced back There, except through the rational principle of man. But if some disposition, starting from the proportion in living things, were to study the proportion of whole living things, it would be a part of the power that, There too, studies and contemplates the proportion that runs through all things in the intelligible world. And indeed all music, since its thoughts concern harmony and rhythm, would stand in the same way, as does the music concerned with intelligible rhythm.
ὅσαι δὲ ποιητικαὶ αἰσθητῶν τῶν κατὰ τέχνην, οἷον οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ τεκτονική, καθ’ ὅσον συμμετρίαις προσχρῶνται, ἀρχὰς ἂν ἐκεῖθεν ἔχοιεν καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ φρονήσεων· τῷ δὲ αἰσθητῷ ταῦτα συγκερασάμεναι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γεωργία συλλαμβάνουσα αἰσθητῷ φυτῷ, ἰατρική τε τὴν ἐνταῦθα ὑγίειαν θεωροῦσα ἥ τε περὶ ἰσχὺν τὴν τῇδε καὶ εὐεξίαν· ἄλλη γὰρ ἐκεῖ δύναμις καὶ ὑγίεια, καθ’ ἣν ἀτρεμῆ πάντα καὶ ἱκανὰ ὅσα ζῷα. ῥητορεία δὲ καὶ στρατηγία, οἰκονομία τε καὶ βασιλική, εἵ τινες αὐτῶν τὸ καλὸν κοινοῦσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, εἰ ἐκεῖνο θεωροῖεν, μοῖραν ἐκεῖθεν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἔχουσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ἐκεῖ. γεωμετρία δὲ τῶν νοητῶν οὖσα τακτέα ἐκεῖ, σοφία τε ἀνωτάτω περὶ τὸ ὂν οὖσα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνας ταῦτα.
As for the arts that produce perceptible objects of art, such as architecture and carpentry: insofar as they make use of proportions, they would have their principles from There and from the kinds of understanding There. But since they mix these with the perceptible, they would not be There as a whole, except in man. Nor indeed would agriculture, which assists the perceptible plant, nor medicine, which studies health here, nor the art concerned with strength and fitness here. For there is another power and another health There, by which all living beings there are untroubled and sufficient. Rhetoric and generalship, household management and kingship—if any of them shares the beautiful with actions, if they contemplate that, they have a portion from There for their knowledge, from the knowledge There. Geometry, since it is about intelligibles, must be ranked There, and so must wisdom, which is highest and concerned with being. So much for the arts and the things produced by art.
εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἐκεῖ, καὶ λογικοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ τεχνικοῦ, καὶ αἱ τέχναι νοῦ γεννήματα οὖσαι. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν καθόλου λέγειν τὰ εἴδη εἶναι, οὐ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπου. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ ὁ καθέκαστα· τὸ δὲ καθέκαστον, ὅτι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· οἷον ὅτι ὁ μὲν σιμός, ὁ δὲ γρυπός. γρυπότητα μὲν [οὖν] καὶ σιμότητα διαφορὰς ἐν εἴδει θετέον ἀνθρώπου, ὥσπερ ζῴου διαφοραί εἰσιν· ἥκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τὸν μὲν τοιάνδε γρυπότητα, τὸν δὲ τοιάνδε [ἔχειν]· καὶ χρωμάτων διαφορὰς τὰς μὲν ἐν λόγῳ οὔσας, τὰς δὲ καὶ ὕλην καὶ τόπον διάφορον ὄντα ποιεῖν.
If man is There, rational man is There too, and man the craftsman, and so are the arts, which are offspring of Intellect. We must also say that the Forms are of universals: not of Socrates, but of man. But we must inquire about man whether the individual man is There too. Individuality comes about because the same thing is not in one as in another—for instance, one man is snub-nosed and another hook-nosed. [So] hook-nosedness and snubness must be posited as differences within the form of man, just as there are differences of animal; but that one man [has] this sort of hook nose, and another that sort, comes from matter. And of differences of color, some are in the rational principle, while others are produced by matter and differing place.
λοιπὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ μόνα τὰ ἐν αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἢ καί, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος ἕτερος, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοψυχὴ ἑτέρα ἐκεῖ καὶ νοῦ αὐτονοῦς. λεκτέον δὴ πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δεῖ, ὅσα ἐνταῦθα, εἴδωλα νομίζειν ἀρχετύπων, οὐδὲ ψυχὴν εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοψυχῆς, τιμιότητι δὲ ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρειν καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ἴσως δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐνταῦθα, αὐτοψυχήν. εἶναι δὲ ψυχῆς ὄντως οὔσης ἑκάστης καὶ δικαιοσύνην δή τινα καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ψυχαῖς ἐπιστήμην ἀληθινήν, οὐκ εἴδωλα οὐδὲ εἰκόνας ἐκείνων ὡς ἐν αἰσθητῷ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντα ἐνταῦθα· οὐ γὰρ ἔν τινι τόπῳ ἀφωρισμένα ἐκεῖνα· ὥστε, ὅπου ψυχὴ σώματος ἐξανέδυ, ἐκεῖ κἀκεῖνα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος μοναχοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοητὸς πανταχοῦ.
It remains to say whether only the things in the perceptible world are There, or whether, just as man-itself is different from man, so soul-itself, different from soul, is There too, and intellect-itself, different from intellect. First we must say that we should not think that everything here is an image of an archetype, nor that soul is an image of soul-itself. One soul differs from another in rank, and soul-itself is here too, though perhaps not in the way it is here. Each soul that really is soul has a kind of justice and moderation, and in our souls there is true knowledge—not images or likenesses of those things, as in the perceptible world, but those very things, existing here in another way. For they are not marked off in some place, so that wherever a soul has emerged from a body, there they are too. The perceptible world is in one place only; the intelligible world is everywhere.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνταῦθα, ταῦτα ἐκεῖ· ὥστε, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις λαμβάνοιτο, οὐ μόνον τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείω· εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ λέγοιτο συμπεριλαμβανομένων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, πάντα ἐνταῦθα, ὅσα κἀκεῖ.
Whatever such a soul has here, then, is There. So if “the things in the perceptible world” were taken to mean the things among visible objects, then not only the things in the perceptible world are There, but more besides. But if it meant the things in the cosmos, including soul and what is in soul, then everything that is there is also here.
τὴν οὖν τὰ πάντα περιλαβοῦσαν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ φύσιν ταύτην ἀρχὴν θετέον. καὶ πῶς, τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς ὄντως ἑνὸς καὶ ἁπλοῦ πάντη οὔσης, πλήθους δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντος; πῶς [δὲ] παρὰ τὸ ἓν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ πῶς τὰ πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ τί νοῦς ταῦτα καὶ πόθεν, λεκτέον ἀπ’ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἀρχομένοις. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ σήψεως καὶ τῶν χαλεπῶν, εἰ κἀκεῖ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ ῥύπου καὶ πηλοῦ, λεκτέον, ὡς, ὅσα κομίζεται νοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, πάντα ἄριστα· ἐν οἷς οὐ ταῦτα· οὐδ’ ἐκ τούτων νοῦς, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴ παρὰ νοῦ, λαβοῦσα παρὰ ὕλης ἄλλα, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα. περὶ δὲ τούτων σαφέστερον λεχθήσεται ἐπανελθοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς πλῆθος.
This nature, then, which has encompassed all things in the intelligible world, must be posited as a principle. And how, when the principle is truly one and simple in every way, while there is multiplicity among the things that are? How multiplicity comes from the One, how these are all things, why Intellect is these, and from where—this must be discussed starting from another starting point. As for things that come from putrefaction, and noxious things—whether there is a Form of these too, and whether of dirt and mud—we must say that whatever Intellect receives from the First is all of the best, and these things are not among them. Nor does Intellect come from them. It is soul, which comes from Intellect and has taken other things from matter, among which these are found. But we will speak about these more clearly when we return to the problem of how multiplicity comes from one.
ὅτι δὲ τὰ σύνθετα εἰκῇ ὄντα, οὐ νῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν αἰσθητὰ συνελθόντα, οὐκ ἐν εἴδεσι, τά τε ἐκ σήψεως ψυχῆς ἄλλο τι ἴσως ἀδυνατούσης· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐποίησεν ἄν τι τῶν φύσει· ποιεῖ γοῦν ὅπου δύναται· περὶ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτοανθρώπῳ περιέχονται ὅσαι τέχναι ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ· πρότερον δὲ [εἶναι] ἄλλην καθόλου, καὶ τῆς καθόλου αὐτοψυχήν, ἤτοι τὴν ζωὴν τὴν ἐν νῷ πρὶν γενέσθαι ψυχήν, ἵνα καὶ γένηται αὐτοψυχὴν ἐκείνην λέγειν.
As for composite things that come about at random—not by Intellect, but perceptible things coming together on their own—they are not among the Forms. Things that come from putrefaction arise because soul is perhaps incapable of anything else; otherwise it would have made one of the things that accord with nature. It does, at any rate, make these wherever it can. As for the arts: all the arts that relate to what is natural to man are contained in man-itself. And prior to this [there is] another, universal soul, and prior to the universal soul, soul-itself—or rather the life in Intellect before it became soul—so that it can also be called that soul-itself.