Περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα καὶ τίνα ἐζήτησαν μὲν καὶ οἱ πάνυ παλαιοὶ [οἱ μὲν] ἕν, οἱ δὲ ὡρισμένα, οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα εἰπόντες, καὶ τούτων ἕκαστοι οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο εἰπόντες τὸ ἕν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πεπερασμένα καὶ αὐτὰ ἄπειρα εἰπόντες· καὶ τοῖς μετ’ αὐτοὺς ἐξετασθεῖσαι αὗται αἱ δόξαι ἱκανῶς ἀφετέαι ἡμῖν. ὅσα δὲ ἐξετάσαντες τὰ ἐκείνων ἔθεντο ἐν γένεσιν ὡρισμένοις καὶ αὐτοί, περὶ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον, οἳ οὔτε ἓν θέμενοι, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἑώρων, οὔτε ἄπειρα, ὅτι μήτε οἷόν τε, μήτ’ ἐπιστήμη ἂν γένοιτο, τά τε πεπερασμένα εἰς ἀριθμόν, ὅτι τὰ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἷον στοιχεῖα, γένη τινὰ αὐτῶν εἰρήκασιν, οἱ μὲν δέκα, οἱ δὲ ἐλάττω· εἶεν δ’ ἄν τινες οἱ πλείω τούτων.
How many the things that are, and what they are—this was investigated even by the very ancient thinkers. [Some] said one, others a definite number, others an unlimited number; and within each of these groups, some said the one was one thing and others another, and likewise with the limited and the unlimited numbers themselves. Since these opinions have been adequately examined by their successors, we may leave them aside. But those who examined their views and themselves posited definite kinds—these we must consider. They posited neither one, since they saw that there are many things even among the intelligibles, nor an unlimited number, since that is impossible and there could be no knowledge of it; nor a limited number in the sense of elements, since the underlying things are not rightly treated as elements. Instead they named certain kinds of the things that are—some ten, others fewer; and there may be some who say more.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφορά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ γένη ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα τῷ γένει τοσαῦτα. πρῶτον τοίνυν τὴν διαιρουμένην εἰς δέκα τὰ ὄντα ληπτέον ἀνασκοποῦντας, πότερα δέκα γένη δεῖ νομίζειν αὐτοὺς λέγειν κοινοῦ ὀνόματος τυχόντα τοῦ ὄντος, ἢ κατηγορίας δέκα. ὅτι γὰρ οὐ συνώνυμον τὸ ὂν ἐν ἅπασι, λέγουσι καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐρωτητέον, πότερα ὁμοίως ἕν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς ἕν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ δέκα, ἢ ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἅπαντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς τὰ μὲν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀνάπαλιν. οὗ δὴ ἐξεταστέον, τίνα κἀκεῖ τῶν δέκα, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὄντα ὑφ’ ἓν γένος ὑπακτέον τοῖς ἐνταῦθα, ἢ ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ἐκεῖ οὐσία ἥ τε ἐνταῦθα.
There is also a difference about the kinds. Some take the kinds to be principles; others hold that the things that are are just so many in kind. First, then, we must take up the division of the things that are into ten and examine it: must we think they mean ten kinds that share the common name “being,” or ten categories? For they say—and rightly—that being is not synonymous in all cases. But rather, this must be asked first: are the ten found alike in the intelligibles and the perceptibles, or are all of them in the perceptibles, while in the intelligibles some are and some are not? Certainly not the reverse. Here we must examine which of the ten are also There, and whether the things that are There should be brought under one kind with those here, or whether substance There and substance here are so called homonymously.
ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, πλείω τὰ γένη· εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἄτοπον τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπί τε τῶν πρώτως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων οὐκ ὄντος γένους κοινοῦ, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν οὐ λέγουσιν· οὐ πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὄντα διαιρεῖσθαι ἐβουλήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα παραλελοίπασιν.
But if homonymously, there are more kinds than ten. And if synonymously, it is absurd that “substance” should mean the same for the things that are primarily and for those that come after, since there is no common genus for things among which there is prior and posterior. But they say nothing about the intelligibles in their division. So they did not intend to divide all the things that are; they have left out the things that most truly are.
πάλιν οὖν ἆρα γένη νομιστέον εἶναι; καὶ πῶς ἓν γένος ἡ οὐσία; ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης πάντως ἀρκτέον. ὅτι μὲν [οὖν] ἓν ἐπί τε τῆς νοητῆς ἐπί τε τῆς αἰσθητῆς κοινὸν εἶναι ἀδύνατον τὸ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴρηται. καὶ προσέτι ἄλλο τι ἔσται πρό τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρὸ τῆς αἰσθητῆς, ἄλλο τι ὂν κατηγορούμενον κατ’ ἀμφοῖν, ὃ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη· ἔσται γὰρ ἢ τὸ σῶμα ἀσώματον, ἢ τὸ ἀσώματον σῶμα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν τῇδε οὐσιῶν ζητητέον, τί κοινὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐσίας λέγουσιν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἴσον εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχειν, ὅταν μᾶλλον λέγηται τὸ εἶδος οὐσία ἢ ἡ ὕλη· καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἱ δ’ ἂν εἴποιεν τὴν ὕλην μᾶλλον.
Once more, then: should we think they are kinds? And how is substance one kind? For we must certainly start with it. That “substance” cannot be one thing common to the intelligible and the perceptible has been said. Moreover, there would be something else prior to both intelligible and perceptible substance, something else predicated of both, which would be neither body nor bodiless; otherwise body would be bodiless, or the bodiless body. Nevertheless, in the case of the substances here themselves, we must ask what is common to matter, form, and what is composed of both. For they say all these are substances, but that they do not have an equal claim to substance, since form is said to be substance more than matter—and rightly. Others, though, would say matter is more so.
αἱ δὲ πρῶται λεγόμεναι οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰς δευτέρας τί ἂν ἔχοιεν κοινόν; ὁπότε παρὰ τῶν προτέρων ἔχουσιν αἱ δεύτεραι τὸ οὐσίαι λέγεσθαι ὅλως δὲ τί ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἴδιόν τις ἀποδοίη, ἤδη ἔχει τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπὶ πάντων ἁρμόσει.
And what would the so-called primary substances have in common with the secondary ones, when the secondary get from the prior the very fact of being called substances? In general, it is not possible to say what substance is. Even if one gave its distinctive property, one would not yet have what it is; and perhaps not even “what is one and the same in number and receptive of contraries” will fit all cases.
ἀλλ’ ἆρα μίαν τινὰ κατηγορίαν λεκτέον ὁμοῦ συλλαβοῦσι τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; οἷον εἴ τις τὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος ἕν τι λέγοι, οὐχ ὡς κοινὸν κατὰ πάντων, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀφ’ ἑνός· πρώτως γὰρ καὶ οὐσία ἐκείνη, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ ἧττον τὰ ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει μίαν κατηγορίαν τὰ πάντα εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι. ἢ ἐκεῖνα μὲν πάθη, αἱ δ’ οὐσίαι ἐφεξῆς ἄλλως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ οὕτως οὔπω ἔχομεν ἐπερείσασθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ, οὐδὲ τὸ κυριώτατον λαβεῖν, ἵν’ ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. συγγενεῖς μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔστωσαν πᾶσαι αἱ λεγόμεναι οὐσίαι ἔχουσαί τι παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα γένη.
Should we, then, speak of a single category, taking together intelligible substance, matter, form, and the composite of both? As if someone called the family of the Heraclids one thing—not as something common to all, but as coming from one source. For that substance is substance primarily, and the others secondarily and less. But what prevents everything from being one category? All the other things that are said to be come from substance. Or rather, those are affections, whereas substances follow one another in a different way. But even so, we do not yet have anything to rest on in substance, nor have we grasped its most proper sense, so as to derive the others from it. So let all the things called substances be akin in this way, having something beyond the other kinds.
τί ἄρα γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ τὶ καὶ τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ μὴ ἐπικείμενον μηδ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μηδ’ ὅ ἐστιν ἄλλου ὄν, οἷον λευκὸν ποιότης σώματος καὶ ποσὸν οὐσίας, καὶ χρόνος κινήσεώς τι καὶ κίνησις τοῦ κινουμένου; ἀλλ’ ἡ δευτέρα οὐσία κατ’ ἄλλου. ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ κατ’ ἄλλου ἐνταῦθα, ὡς γένος ἐνυπάρχον (καὶ ἐνυπάρχον ὡς μέρος) καὶ τὸ τὶ ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν κατ’ ἄλλου, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴδια ἄν τις λέγοι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἓν οὕτω συνάγοι καὶ οὐσίας λέγοι, ἓν δέ τι γένος οὐκ ἂν λέγοι, οὐδὲ δηλοῖ πω τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω· ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ποσοῦ ἴωμεν φύσιν.
What, then, is this very “something,” the “this,” the underlying subject, which does not lie upon another, is not in another as in a subject, and is not what it is as belonging to another—as white is a quality of body, and quantity of substance, and time something of motion, and motion of what is moved? But secondary substance is predicated of another. Or rather, “of another” is meant here in a different way: as a genus inhering in it (and inhering as a part), and as its “what”; whereas white is predicated of another because it is in another. One might call these distinctive features in relation to the other kinds, and on that account gather them into one and call them substances; but one would not call them one kind, and they do not yet show the concept and nature of substance. Let this stand here; let us go on to the nature of quantity.
Quantity
Only number is quantity in the strict sense; magnitudes, time and speech are quantities secondarily.
ἀριθμὸν δὴ πρῶτον ποσὸν λέγουσι καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἅπαν μέγεθος καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα εἰς ταῦτα ἀναφέρουσιν, ὅσα ποσὰ λέγουσι, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ποσὸν τῷ τὸν χρόνον, καίτοι ἴσως ἀνάπαλιν τοῦ χρόνου τὸ συνεχὲς παρὰ τῆς κινήσεως λαβόντος. εἰ μὲν δὴ τὸ συνεχὲς ᾗ συνεχὲς ποσὸν φήσουσιν εἶναι, τὸ διωρισμένον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποσόν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ συνεχές, τί κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἔσται τὸ ποσοῖς εἶναι;
They say, then, that number is primarily quantity, and all continuous magnitude, place and time; the other things they call quantities they refer to these. Motion they call quantity because time is—though perhaps it is the reverse, time getting its continuity from motion. Now if they say that the continuous is a quantity insofar as it is continuous, the discrete would not be a quantity; but if the continuous is a quantity incidentally, what will be common to both that makes them quantities?
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ποσοῖς εἶναι ὑπαρχέτω· καίτοι τοῦτο τὸ λέγεσθαι ποσοῖς ὑπάρχει, οὔπω δέ, τίς ἡ φύσις καθ’ ὃ λέγεται, δηλοῦται· ἀλλὰ γραμμή γε καὶ ἐπίπεδον καὶ σῶμα οὐδὲ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μεγέθη μὲν λέγεται, ποσὰ δὲ οὐ λέγεται, εἴπερ τότε προσλαμβάνει τὸ ποσὸν λέγεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἀχθῇ [οἷον] δίπηχυ ἢ τρίπηχυ· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυσικὸν μετρηθὲν γίνεται ποσόν τι, καὶ ὁ τόπος κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ᾗ τόπος. δεῖ δὲ μὴ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ’ αὑτό, οἷον ποσότητα· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς τρεῖς βοῦς ποσόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀριθμόν· βόες γὰρ τρεῖς δύο κατηγορίαι ἤδη.
Let it be granted that numbers are quantities—though this only gives them the name “quantities”; it does not yet show what nature it is in virtue of which they are so called. But line, surface and body are not even called quantities: they are called magnitudes, not quantities, if indeed they take on the name “quantity” only when they are brought to number, [as] two cubits or three. Even natural body becomes a quantity when it is measured, and place is a quantity incidentally, not insofar as it is place. We must not take quantity incidentally, but quantity in itself, such as quantitativeness. For not even the three oxen are a quantity, but the number on them: “three oxen” is already two categories.
οὕτως οὖν καὶ γραμμὴ τοσήδε δύο κατηγορίαι, καὶ ἐπιφάνεια τοσήδε δύο, καὶ ἡ ποσότης μὲν αὐτῆς ποσόν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια διὰ τί ποσόν; περατωθεῖσα γοῦν οἷον τρισὶ γραμμαῖς ἢ τέσσαρσι λέγεται εἶναι ποσόν. τί οὖν; μόνον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς φήσομεν ποσόν; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τοὺς καθ’ αὑτοὺς ἀριθμούς, οὐσίαι λέγονται οὗτοι καὶ μάλιστα τῷ καθ’ αὑτοὺς εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν, καθ’ οὓς ἀριθμοῦμεν, οὐ μονάδας, ἀλλὰ ἵππους δέκα καὶ βοῦς δέκα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον δόξει εἶναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι οὐσίαι, μὴ καὶ τούτους· ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ μετροῦντες τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔξω ὄντες ὥσπερ οἱ κανόνες καὶ τὰ μέτρα μετροῦσιν.
In the same way, then, “a line of such a length” is two categories, and “a surface of such a size” two. And its quantitativeness is a quantity, but why is the surface itself a quantity? At any rate, it is when it is bounded, say by three lines or four, that it is said to be a quantity. What then? Shall we say only numbers are quantity? But if we mean numbers in themselves, these are called substances, and especially because they exist in themselves. And if we mean the numbers in the things that participate in them, by which we count—not units, but ten horses and ten oxen—first, it will seem absurd that, if those numbers are substances, these are not; and then, that they measure the underlying things while being present in them, and not from outside, the way rulers and measures measure.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν ὄντες λαμβάνονται εἰς τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὔτε ἐκεῖνα ποσὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ μετέχοντα ποσότητος, αὐτοί τε διὰ τί ποσόν; μέτρα γάρ· τὰ δὲ μέτρα διὰ τί ποσὰ ἢ ποσότης; ἢ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντες, εἰ μηδεμιᾷ τῶν ἄλλων ἁρμόττουσι, τοῦτο, ὃ λέγονται, ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ ποσότητι κείσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς αὐτῶν ὁρίζει ἕν, εἶτ’ ἔπεισι καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλο, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσα μηνύει, καὶ μετρεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἡ ψυχὴ προσχρωμένη. μετροῦσα οὖν οὐ τὸ τί ἐστι μετρεῖ· ἓν γὰρ λέγει καὶ δύο, κἂν ὁποιαοῦν καὶ ἐναντία ᾖ· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἥντινα διάθεσιν ἔχει, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ καλόν, ἀλλ’ ὅσα. τοῦ ποσοῦ ἄρα, εἴτε καθ’ αὑτό, εἴτ’ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσι θεωροῖτο, αὐτός, οὐ τὰ μετέχοντα.
But if they are taken as existing by themselves for the purpose of measuring, and not in the underlying things, then those underlying things are not quantities, since they do not participate in quantitativeness. And why are the numbers themselves a quantity? Because they are measures. But why are measures quantities, or quantitativeness? Perhaps because, since they are among the things that are, if they fit none of the other categories, they will be what they are called and will be placed in what is called quantitativeness. Their unit marks off one, then passes on to another, and number indicates how many, and the soul makes use of it to measure the multitude. In measuring, then, it does not measure what the thing is—it says “one” and “two” whatever sort of things they are, even contraries—nor what disposition it has, such as hot or beautiful, but how many. So it is number itself that belongs to quantity, whether it is considered by itself or in the things that participate in it—not the participants.
οὐ τὸ τρίπηχυ τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τρία. διὰ τί οὖν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη; ἆρα, ὅτι ἐγγὺς τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγγίνηται, ποσὰ αὐτὰ λέγομεν, οὐ τῷ κυρίως ποσῷ, ἀλλὰ μέγα λέγομεν, ὥσπερ πολλοῦ μετέχον ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ μικρόν, ὅτι ὀλίγου; ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν οὐκ ἀξιοῦται ποσὰ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πρός τι· ἀλλ’ ὅμως πρός τι λέγουσι, καθ’ ὅσον ποσὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι. σκεπτέον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον. ἔσται τοίνυν οὐχ ἕν τι γένος, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀριθμὸς μόνος, τὰ δὲ δευτέρως. οὐ κυρίως τοίνυν ἓν γένος, ἀλλὰ κατηγορία μία συνάγουσα καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς πρὸς τὰ πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως.
So it is not “three cubits long” that is a quantity, but “three.” Why, then, magnitudes too? Is it because they are close to quantity, and we call the things in which quantity comes to be quantities themselves—not by quantity in the strict sense—but we call a thing great as participating in much number, and small as participating in little? But the great itself and the small are not held to be quantities, but relatives; still, they call them relatives insofar as they seem to be quantities. This must be examined more precisely. So it will not be one kind: number alone is quantity, the others secondarily. So it is not strictly one kind, but one category that brings together the things close to quantity with what is quantity primarily, and secondarily.
ἡμῖν δὲ ζητητέον, πῶς οἱ καθ’ αὑτοὺς ἀριθμοὶ οὐσίαι ἢ καὶ αὐτοὶ ποσόν τι· ὁποτέρως δ’ ἂν ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ἂν κοινόν τι ἔχοιεν πρὸς τούτους ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὄνομα μόνον.
We, for our part, must inquire how numbers in themselves are substances, or whether they too are a sort of quantity. Whichever is the case, those numbers would have nothing in common with these, except the name alone.
ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις πῶς; πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγου, εἰ βούλει. μετρεῖται μὲν γάρ· ἀλλὰ λόγος [φωνὴ] ὢν τοσόσδε ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ λόγος, οὐ ποσόν· σημαντικὸν γάρ, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα. ὕλη δ’ αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀήρ, ὥσπερ καὶ τούτων· καὶ γὰρ σύγκειται ἐξ αὐτῶν· ἡ δὲ πληγὴ μᾶλλον λόγος, καὶ οὐχ ἡ πληγὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ἡ τύπωσις ἡ γιγνομένη, ὥσπερ μορφοῦσα· μᾶλλον οὖν ποίησις καὶ ποίησις σημαντική. τὴν δὲ κίνησιν ταύτην καὶ τὴν πληγὴν ποίησιν μᾶλλον ἂν εὐλόγως τις θεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀντικειμένως πάθος, ἢ ἑκάστην ἄλλου μὲν ποίησιν, ἄλλου δὲ πάθος, ἢ ποίησιν εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, πάθημα δ’ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ.
What about speech, time and motion? First about speech, if you like. It is measured, yes; but it is of such a size insofar as it is [sound], whereas insofar as it is speech it is not a quantity. For it signifies, as do the noun and the verb. Its matter is air, as is theirs, for it is composed of them. The impact is more truly speech—and not the impact simply, but the impression produced, which as it were gives shape. So it is rather an action, and an action that signifies. One could reasonably regard this motion and impact as action, and the opposite as affection; or each as the action of one thing and the affection of another; or as action upon the subject and affection in the subject.
εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν ἡ φωνή, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα, δύο ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ μία ἡ κατηγορία ἐκ τῆς σημαντικῆς εἰς συσσημαντικὸν ἐκείνης τῆς κατηγορίας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνοιτο, τί ποτε τὸ μετροῦν ληπτέον· ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἢ τὸ νῦν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετρούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοσόσδε εἶναι, οἷον ἐνιαύσιος, ἔστω ποσόν, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ χρόνος εἶναι φύσις τις ἄλλη· τὸ γὰρ τοσόνδε ἄλλο ὂν τοσόνδε ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποσότης ὁ χρόνος· ἡ δὲ ποσότης οὐκ ἐφαπτομένη ἄλλου αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ κυρίως ποσόν. εἰ δὲ τὰ μετέχοντα πάντα τοῦ ποσοῦ ποσὰ θεῖτο, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ποσόν.
But if vocal sound is classed not by the impact but by the air, there would be two categories and not one, the signifying element coming in as something that co-signifies alongside that category. As for time, if it is taken as what measures, we must ask what the measuring thing is to be taken as: either soul or the now. If it is taken as what is measured, then insofar as it is of such a size—say, a year long—let it be a quantity; but insofar as it is time it is some other nature. For what is of such a size is of such a size by being something else. Time, surely, is not quantitativeness; and quantitativeness not attached to anything else would be this very thing, quantity in the strict sense. And if all the things that participate in quantity are to be counted quantities, substance too will be the same thing as quantity.
τὸ δὲ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, οὐ τῶν μετεχόντων, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα, ὥσπερ ὁ τρίπηχυς ποσός, συνῃρημένος καὶ οὗτος οὐκ εἰς γένος ἕν, ἀλλ’ ὑφ’ ἓν καὶ μίαν κατηγορίαν.
That “equal” and “unequal” are distinctive of quantity must be taken of quantity itself, not of the things that participate in it—except incidentally, not insofar as they are what they are—as “three cubits long” is a quantity, this too being gathered not into one kind, but under one heading and one category.
Relation
Plotinus asks whether relations are real or only our comparisons, and what reality they have.
τὸ δὲ πρός τι οὕτως ἐπισκεπτέον, εἴ τις κοινότης γενικὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰς ἓν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τούτου, εἰ ὑπόστασίς τις ἡ σχέσις ἐστὶν αὕτη, ὥσπερ ὁ δεξιὸς καὶ ὁ ἀριστερὸς καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕστερον λεχθέντος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρότερον λεχθέντος οὐδεμία, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ τοῦτο. τί δὴ ἐπὶ διπλασίου καὶ ἡμίσεος καὶ ὅλως ὑπερέχοντος καὶ ὑπερεχομένου, καὶ αὖ ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως, ἀνακλίσεως, καθίσεως, στάσεως, καὶ αὖ πατρός, υἱέος, δεσπότου, δούλου, καὶ πάλιν ὁμοίου, ἀνομοίου, ἴσου, ἀνίσου, ποιητικοῦ τε αὖ καὶ παθητικοῦ, καὶ μέτρου καὶ μετρουμένου; καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αἰσθητόν.
As for the relative, we should examine it like this: whether there is some generic commonness in it, or it is one in some other way; and especially, in its case, whether this relation is some sort of reality—as with right and left, double and half—or whether it is a reality in some cases, as in the last mentioned, but not at all in the first mentioned, or nowhere. What, then, of double and half, and in general of the exceeding and the exceeded; and again of state and disposition, reclining, sitting, standing; and again of father, son, master, slave; and again of like, unlike, equal, unequal; and of the active and the passive, and measure and measured? And knowledge and perception: the one relative to the knowable, the other to the perceptible.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἔχοι ἂν πρὸς ἐπιστητὸν μίαν τινὰ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις πρὸς αἰσθητὸν ὡσαύτως, τό τε ποιητικὸν πρὸς τὸ παθητικόν, κἂν ἔργον ἓν ἀπεργάσαιτο, καὶ τὸ μέτρον πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον. ὅμοιον δὲ πρὸς ὅμοιον τί ἂν ἔχοι ἀπογεννώμενον; ἢ οὐκ ἀπογεννώμενον, ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχον, τὴν ταυτότητα τὴν ἐν τῷ ποιῷ.
Knowledge might have, in relation to the knowable, a single reality consisting in activity, relative to the form of the knowable; and perception likewise relative to the perceptible; and the active relative to the passive, even if it produced a single work; and the measure relative to the measured. But what might the like have, relative to the like, that is generated from them? Or rather, nothing generated, but something already there: sameness in quality.
ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ποιόν οὐδέν. οὐδὲ τὰ ἴσα· τὸ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ποσῷ προυπάρχει πρὸ τῆς σχέσεως· ἡ δὲ σχέσις τί ἄλλο ἢ ἡμετέρα κρίσις παραβαλλόντων τὰ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν ὄντα ἃ ἔστι καὶ λεγόντων ‘τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιότητα’ καὶ ‘οὗτος πεποίηκε τοῦτον καὶ οὗτος κρατεῖ τούτου’; κάθισίς τε καὶ στάσις παρὰ τὸ καθήμενον καὶ ἑστηκὸς τί ἂν εἴη; ἡ δὲ ἕξις, ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἔχον λεγομένη, ἔχειν ἂν μᾶλλον σημαίνοι, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐχόμενον, ποιὸν ἂν εἴη· καὶ ἐπὶ διαθέσεως ὡσαύτως. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη παρὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ ἡμῶν τὴν παράθεσιν νοούντων;
But beyond the quality in each, there is nothing. Nor with equals: sameness in quantity exists prior to the relation. And what is the relation other than our judgment, when we compare things that exist by themselves as what they are and say “this and this have the same size and the same quality,” and “this man has made this one,” and “this one rules that one”? And what would sitting and standing be beyond the one sitting and the one standing? As for state, when it is spoken of with reference to the one who has, it would rather signify having; when with reference to what is had, it would be a quality; and likewise with disposition. What, then, would there be beyond these terms related to one another, other than our thinking of them side by side?
τὸ δ’ ὑπερέχον τὸ μὲν τοσόνδε μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε· ἄλλο δὲ τόδε, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ἡ δὲ παραβολὴ παρ’ ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς. ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς πρὸς ἀριστερὸν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν μᾶλλον ἂν ἴσως ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι· ὁ μὲν ὡδί, ὁ δὲ ὡδί· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἐνοήσαμεν, ἐν δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐδέν. τό τε πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον χρόνοι δύο· τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἡμεῖς ὡσαύτως.
As for the exceeding: one thing is of such a magnitude, the other of such; this is one thing, that is another. The comparison comes from us; it is not in them. Right relative to left, and in front and behind, perhaps lie rather in position: one is here, the other there. It is we who have conceived right and left; in the things themselves there is nothing of the sort. Before and after are two times; but the “before” and the “after”—that, likewise, is us.
εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ λέγοντες ψευδόμεθα, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη τούτων, ἀλλὰ κενὸν ἡ σχέσις· εἰ δ’ ἀληθεύομεν λέγοντες ‘πρότερος ὅδε τοῦδε καὶ ὕστερος’ χρόνους δύο παραβάλλοντες, ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα αὐτῶν λέγοντες τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀριστεροῦ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῶν τὴν σχέσιν, καθὸ τὸ μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, τὸ δ’ ὑπερβάλλεται;
If, then, we are saying nothing, and lie when we speak, none of these would exist, and relation would be empty. But what if we speak truly when we say “this one is before that one, and that one after,” comparing two times, and mean that the “before” is something other than the things underlying them? And likewise with right and left; and with magnitudes, that the relation is something beyond their quantity, in that one exceeds and the other is exceeded?
εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ λεγόντων ἡμῶν μηδὲ νοούντων ἔστιν οὕτως, ὥστε διπλάσιον εἶναι τόδε τοῦδε, καὶ ἔχει, τὸ δ’ ἔχεται, καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἐπιστῆσαι, καὶ ἴσα πρὸ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιὰ εἶναι ἔστιν ἐν ταυτότητι τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ὧν λέγομεν πρός τι μετὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἔστι πρὸς ἄλληλα ἡ σχέσις, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖσαν θεωροῦμεν καὶ ἡ γνῶσις πρὸς τὸ γινωσκόμενον — οὗ δὴ καὶ φανερώτερον τὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὸ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως — παυστέον μὲν τὸ ζητεῖν, εἰ ἔστι σχέσις·
And suppose that, even when we neither say nor think it, things are so—so that this is double that, and one has while the other is had, even before we notice; and equal things, prior to us, stand in relation to each other, and in the case of being qualified are in sameness with one another; and in all the things we call relative the relation to one another exists in addition to the underlying things, and we contemplate it as something that is; and knowledge stands relative to what is known—where the reality that comes from the relation is even plainer. Then we must stop asking whether relation exists.
ἐπισημηναμένους δέ, ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν, ἕως μένει τὰ ὑποκείμενα ὅπως εἶχε, κἂν χωρὶς γένηται, ὑπάρχει ἡ σχέσις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν, ὅταν συνέλθῃ, γίγνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καὶ μενόντων παύεται ἡ σχέσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἄλλη γίγνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ καὶ πλησίον, ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα ἡ ὑπόνοια τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· τοῦτ’ οὖν ἐπισημηναμένους χρὴ ζητεῖν τί ταὐτὸν ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ εἰ ὡς γένος, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμβεβηκός· εἶτα εὑρεθὲν τὸ ταὐτὸν ποίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει.
But we should note that among such things, in some cases the relation exists as long as the underlying things remain as they were, even if they come to be apart; in others it comes into being when they come together; and in others, even while they remain, the relation ceases altogether or becomes a different one—as with right and near. It is mostly from these that the suspicion arises that there is nothing in such cases. Having noted this, we must ask what is the same in all of them, and whether it is so as a genus and not as an accident; and then, once this sameness is found, what kind of reality it has.
λεκτέον δὴ τὸ πρὸς τι οὐκ εἴ τι ἁπλῶς ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἕξις ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, οὐδ’ ὅτι ψυχὴ τοῦδε ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἡ ὑπόστασις οὐδαμόθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως παραγίνεται· ὑπόστασις δὲ οὐχ ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ἀλλ’ ἣ πρός τι λέγεται· οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον πρὸς ἥμισυ τὴν ὑπόστασιν δίδωσιν οὔτε τῷ διπήχει ἢ ὅλως δυσίν, οὔτε τῷ πηχυαίῳ ἢ ὅλως ἑνί, ἀλλὰ τούτων ὄντων κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τῷ δύο, τὸ δὲ ἓν εἶναι, ἔσχε τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον λέγεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἥμισυ ἔσχεν αὐτό.
We must say, then, that the relative is not whatever is simply said to be of another—like a state of soul or of body—nor is it so because a soul is this person’s or is in something else. It is those things whose reality comes from nowhere but the relation; and the reality meant is not that of the underlying things, but the one that is called relative. For example, double relative to half gives its reality neither to the two-cubit length, or to two in general, nor to the one-cubit length, or to one in general. But when these exist, by virtue of their relation—in addition to the one being two and the other one—the one came to be called and to be double, and the one itself came to be half.
συνεγέννησεν οὖν ἄμφω ἐξ αὑτῶν ἄλλο εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ ἥμισυ, ἃ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐγεννήθη καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τῷ μὲν διπλασίῳ παρὰ τοῦ ὑπερέχειν τὸ ἥμισυ, τῷ δὲ ἡμίσει παρὰ τοῦ ὑπερέχεσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ’ ἅμα ὑφίσταται. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἅμα μένει; ἢ ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων πατρὸς ἀπελθόντος υἱός ἐστι, καὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἀδελφός· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ‘ὅμοιος οὗτος τῷ τεθνηκότι’ λέγομεν.
So the two together generated out of themselves something else, being double and half. These were generated relative to each other, and their being is nothing other than being for each other: for the double it comes from exceeding the half, for the half from being exceeded. So neither of them is prior and the other posterior; they come into existence together. But do they also remain together? Or rather, with father and son and the like, when the father has gone the son is still a son, and a brother still a brother; for we also say “this man is like the dead man.”
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρεξέβημεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ζητητέον τὸ διὰ τί ἐπὶ τούτων οὐχ ὁμοίως; ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ παρ’ ἀλλήλων τίνα ἔχει κοινὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰπάτωσαν. σῶμα μὲν οὖν τι τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη. λείπεται δή, εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἀσώματον καὶ ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις, συνώνυμος, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ’ ἄλλη ἄλλων, ὁμώνυμος· οὐ γὰρ δή, ὅτι σχέσις λέγεται, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν ἔχοι.
But this has been a digression. Back where we were, we must ask why it is not the same with these cases. But let them tell us what common reality this being-from-one-another has. This common thing would not be a body. It remains, then, if it exists, that it is bodiless, and either in the things or outside them. And if the relation is the same, it is synonymous; if not, but different for different things, homonymous. For surely it would not have the same substance just because it is called relation.
ἆρ’ οὖν τὰς σχέσεις ταύτῃ διαιρετέον, ᾗ τὰ μὲν ἔχει ἀργὸν τὴν σχέσιν, οἷον κειμένην θεωρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα πάντη ἡ ὑπόστασις, τὰ δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἔργου ἢ ἀεί πως τὴν σχέσιν καὶ εἶχε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὴν ἑτοιμότητα, ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόδῳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπέστη, ἢ καὶ ὅλως τὰ μὲν πεποίηκε, τὰ δ’ ὑπέστη, καὶ τὸ ὑποστὰν ὄνομα μόνον παρέσχε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱός· καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ἔχει τινὰ οἷον ζωὴν καὶ ἐνέργειαν.
Should we, then, divide relations in this way? Some things have the relation inert, lying there, as it were, to be contemplated, and their reality is wholly simultaneous. Others have it with power and work: either they always had the relation in a way, and even before had the readiness, but came into reality in their meeting and activity; or, more generally, some have made while others have come into existence, and what has come into existence supplied only a name to the other, while the other supplied the reality. Father and son are of this sort; and the active and the passive have a kind of life, as it were, and activity.
ἆρ’ οὖν ταύτῃ διαιρετέον τὴν σχέσιν, καὶ διαιρετέον οὐχ ὡς ταὐτόν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἐν διαφοραῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅλως ὡς ἑτέραν φύσιν τὴν σχέσιν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ λεκτέον ὁμώνυμον τὴν μὲν ποιοῦσαν ποίησιν καὶ πάθησιν, ὡς μίαν ἄμφω, τὴν δὲ οὐ ποιοῦσαν, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ποιοῦν ἄλλο; οἷον ἰσότητα τὴν τὰ ἴσα· ἰσότητι γὰρ ἴσα καὶ ὅλως ταυτότητί τινι ταὐτά· τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ μὲν μεγέθους παρουσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ μικρότητος. ὅταν δὲ τὸ μὲν μεῖζον, τὸ δὲ μικρότερον, οἱ μὲν μεταλαβόντες ὁ μὲν μείζων ἐνεργείᾳ φανέντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μεγέθους, ὁ δὲ μικρὸς τῆς σμικρότητος.
Should we, then, divide relation in this way—and divide it not as something the same and common within differences, but as relation being a wholly different nature in each case? Should we call homonymous, on the one side, the relation that produces action and affection, both as one, and on the other the relation that does not produce, but where something else produces it in both? For instance, equality, which makes things equal: things are equal by equality, and in general the same by some sameness; and the great and the small are so, the one by the presence of greatness, the other of smallness. And when one is greater and the other smaller, the ones who have partaken are so—the one greater because the greatness in him has become manifest in activity, the other small because of the smallness.
χρὴ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρόσθεν εἰρημένων, οἷον ποιοῦντος, ἐπιστήμης, ἐνεργῆ τὴν σχέσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ λόγον τίθεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδους καὶ λόγου μετάληψιν εἶναι. καὶ γάρ, εἰ μὲν σώματα ἔδει τὰ ὄντα εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἔδει λέγειν εἶναι ταύτας τὰς τοῦ πρός τι λεγομένας σχέσεις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀσωμάτοις δίδομεν τὴν κυρίαν χώραν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, λόγους λέγοντες τὰς σχέσεις καὶ εἰδῶν μεταλήψεις αἰτίας· τοῦ γὰρ διπλάσιον εἶναι τὸ διπλάσιον αὐτὸ αἴτιον, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ· καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις εἶναι ἃ λέγεται· ἅμα οὖν τῷδε μὲν προσῆλθε τὸ διπλάσιον, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ, καὶ τῷδε μὲν τὸ μέγεθος, τῷδε δὲ ἡ σμικρότης, ἢ ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ, καὶ ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης καὶ ὅλως ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον· διὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον.
So in the cases mentioned earlier—such as the agent and knowledge—we must posit the relation as active, and the activity, and the rational principle in the activity; in the others, participation in form and rational principle. For if the things that are had to be bodies, there would be no need to say that these so-called relations of the relative exist. But if we give the chief place also to bodiless things and rational principles, calling the relations rational principles and participations in forms causes—for of being double the double itself is the cause, and for the other the half—then some things are what they are said to be by the same form, others by opposite forms. So at the same moment the double came to this one and the half to another, and to this one greatness, to that one smallness; or both are in each, and likeness and unlikeness, and in general sameness and otherness. That is why the same thing is like and unlike, same and other.
τί οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν αἰσχρός, ὁ δὲ αἰσχίων εἴδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετουσίᾳ; ἤ, εἰ μὲν παντάπασιν αἰσχροί, ἴσοι εἴδους ἀπουσίᾳ· εἰ δ’ ἐν τῷ μὲν τὸ μᾶλλον, [ἐν] τῷ δὲ τὸ ἧττον, μεταλήψει εἴδους τοῦ οὐ κρατοῦντος ὁ ἧττον αἰσχρός, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι μᾶλλον οὐ κρατοῦντος· ἢ τῇ στερήσει, εἴ τις βούλοιτο τὴν παραβολὴν ἔχειν, οἷον εἴδους αὐτοῖς ὄντος.
What, then, if one man is ugly and another uglier by participation in the same form? Or rather, if they are completely ugly, they are equal through the absence of form. But if there is more in one and less in the other, the less ugly is so by participation in a form that does not prevail, and the more ugly by one that prevails still less—or by privation, if one wanted to make the comparison, as though it were a form in them.
αἴσθησις δὲ εἶδός τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ γνῶσις ὡσαύτως ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τι εἶδος· ἡ δὲ ἕξις πρὸς τὸ ἐχόμενον ἐνέργειά τις οἷον συνέχουσα, ὥσπερ ποίησίς τις· ἡ δὲ μέτρησις τοῦ μετροῦντος ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον λόγος τις. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἶδος γενικῶς τὴν τοῦ πρός τι σχέσιν ὡς ἕν τις θήσεται, γένος ἓν καὶ ὑπόστασις ὡς λόγος τις πανταχοῦ· εἰ δὲ οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἀντικείμενοι καὶ διαφορὰς ἔχοντες τὰς εἰρημένας, τάχα οὐκ ἂν ἓν γένος εἴη, ἀλλ’ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τινα πάντα ἀνάγεται καὶ κατηγορίαν μίαν. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ εἰς ἓν δύναιτο ἀνάγεσθαι τὰ εἰρημένα, ἀλλ’ εἰς γένος ἓν ἀδύνατον τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν κατηγορίαν αὐτοῖς τεθέντα.
Perception is a form arising from both, and knowledge likewise a form from both. State, relative to what is had, is a kind of activity, holding together as it were, like a kind of action. Measuring, the activity of the measurer relative to the measured, is a kind of rational principle. If, then, someone posits the relation of the relative generically, as a form, as one thing, it is one kind and a reality, as a kind of rational principle everywhere. But if the rational principles are opposed and have the differences mentioned, perhaps it would not be one kind; rather, all are brought back to some likeness and to one category. But even if the things mentioned could be brought back to one, the things they put under the same category cannot be brought back to one kind.
καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτῶν εἰς ἓν ἀνάγουσι, καὶ τὰ παρονομαζόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, οἷον [διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον] καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ διπλασμός. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὑφ’ ἓν γένος αὐτό τι καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον, καὶ πρός τι καὶ οὐ πρός τι; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζῷόν τις γένος θεὶς καὶ τὸ οὐ ζῷον ἐκεῖ τιθείη. καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ διπλασμὸς ὥσπερ ἡ λευκότης καὶ ὁ λευκός, οὐχ ὥσπερ ταὐτόν.
For they bring back to one also their negations, and the things named derivatively from them, such as [double and not double] the double and doubling. How, then, could something and its negation—double and not double, relative and not relative—fall under one kind? It would be as if someone posited animal as a kind and put not-animal there too. And the double and doubling are like whiteness and the white man, not like one and the same thing.
Quality
No common power or shape unites the different kinds of quality Aristotle lists.
τὴν δὲ ποιότητα, ἀφ’ ἧς ὁ λεγόμενος ποιός, δεῖ λαμβάνειν πρῶτον τίς οὖσα τοὺς λεγομένους ποιοὺς παρέχεται, καὶ εἰ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὰ εἴδη παρέχεται· ἤ, εἰ πολλαχῶς αἱ ποιότητες, οὐχ ἓν ἂν εἴη γένος. τί οὖν τὸ κοινὸν ἐπί τε ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ παθητικῆς ποιότητος καὶ σχήματος καὶ μορφῆς; καὶ λεπτόν, παχύ, ἰσχνόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν δύναμιν ἐροῦμεν, ἣ ἐφαρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς διαθέσεσι καὶ ταῖς φυσικαῖς δυνάμεσιν, ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ ἔχον δύναται ἃ δύναται, οὐκέτι αἱ ἀδυναμίαι ἁρμόσουσιν. ἔπειτα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον πῶς δύναμις;
As for quality, from which the qualified gets its name, we must first grasp what it is that makes things what they are called, qualified; and whether, being one and the same in what is common, it supplies the species through differences; or whether, if qualities are spoken of in many senses, it would not be one kind. What, then, is common to state and disposition, affective quality, figure and shape? And to thin, thick, lean? If we say the common thing is power—which fits states, dispositions and natural powers, and by which the possessor can do what it can—incapacities will no longer fit. And then, how are the figure and the shape of each thing a power?
εἶτα καὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν δύναμιν οὐδεμίαν ἕξει, ἀλλ’ ὅταν αὐτῷ προσέλθῃ τὸ ποιόν, αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι τῶν οὐσιῶν, ὅσαι μάλιστά εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τοῦ ποιοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὰς ἐνεργοῦσαι καὶ τῶν οἰκείων δυνάμεων ὅ εἰσιν. ἀλλ’ ἆρα κατὰ τὰς μετ’ αὐτὰς οὐσίας δυνάμεις; οἷον ἡ πυκτικὴ δύναμις οὐ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικόν· ὥστε οὐ ποιότης τὸ οὕτω λογικόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὃ ἐξ ἀρετῆς κτήσαιτο ἄν τις· ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ λογικόν· ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἡ ποιότης δύναμις προστιθεῖσα ταῖς οὐσίαις μεθ’ ἑαυτὰς τὸ ποιαῖς εἶναι. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ αἱ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς οὐσίας διιστᾶσαι ὁμωνύμως ποιότητες, ἐνέργειαι οὖσαι μᾶλλον καὶ λόγοι ἢ μέρη λόγων, τὸ τὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον δηλοῦσαι, κἂν δοκῶσι τὴν ποιὰν οὐσίαν λέγειν.
Then, too, being as being will have no power, but only when quality comes to it; and the activities of substances—those that are activities in the fullest sense—will belong to quality, even though they act of themselves and are what their own powers are. But perhaps they are powers that come after the substances? For instance, the power of boxing does not belong to man as man; but the rational does. So “rational” in this sense is not a quality, but rather what one might acquire from virtue; so “rational” is homonymous. Quality, then, would be a power that adds to substances, after they are, their being qualified. The differences that distinguish substances from one another are qualities only homonymously: they are rather activities and rational principles, or parts of rational principles, and they show the “what” no less, even if they seem to speak of a qualified substance.
αἱ δὲ ποιότητες αἱ κυρίως, καθ’ ἃς ποιοί, ἃς δὴ λέγομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι, [κατὰ] τὸ κοινὸν εἶεν ἂν λόγοι τινὲς καὶ οἷον μορφαί, περί τε ψυχὴν κάλλη καὶ αἴσχη καὶ περὶ σῶμα ὡσαύτως.
But the qualities in the strict sense, by which things are qualified, and which we say are powers, would be, [in] what they have in common, rational principles of a sort, and shapes, as it were: beauties and uglinesses in the soul, and likewise in the body.
ἀλλὰ πῶς δυνάμεις πᾶσαι; κάλλος μὲν γὰρ ἔστω καὶ ὑγίεια ἑκατέρα, αἶσχος δὲ καὶ νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ ἀδυναμία ὅλως [πῶς]; ἢ ὅτι καὶ κατὰ ταύτας ποιοὶ λέγονται. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει λεγομένους ποιοὺς ὁμωνύμως λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ καθ’ ἕνα λόγον, καὶ μὴ μόνον τετραχῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν τεττάρων τοὐλάχιστον διχῶς; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ κατὰ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν ἡ ποιότης, ὥστε ἄλλως μὲν τὸ δυνάμενον ποιεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ πάσχον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ποιὸν καὶ τὴν νόσον ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκέτι κοινὸν ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν ζητεῖν· οὐδ’ αὖ λόγους πάσας· πῶς γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἡ ἐν ἕξει λόγος;
But how are they all powers? Let beauty and health, of both soul and body, be so; but ugliness and disease and weakness and incapacity in general—[how]? Or is it because things are called qualified by these too? But what prevents the things called qualified from being so called homonymously and not according to one account—and not only in four ways, but in each of the four in at least two? Or rather, first, quality does not concern acting or being acted upon, so that what can act is qualified in one way and what is acted upon in another. Things are qualified by health, by disposition and by state, and likewise by disease, by strength and by weakness. But if so, power is no longer the common element, and we must look for something else as common. Nor, again, are they all rational principles: how is disease that has become a settled state a rational principle?
ἀλλ’ ἆρα τὰς μὲν ἐν εἴδεσι καὶ δυνάμεσι ποιότητας, ταύτας δὲ στερήσεις; ὥστε μὴ ἓν γένος, ἀλλὰ εἰς ἓν ὡς μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶδος καὶ δύναμιν, ἀνεπιστημοσύνην δὲ στέρησιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν. ἢ μορφή τις καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ ἡ νόσος, καὶ δύναται δὲ καὶ ποιεῖ πολλά, ἀλλὰ φαύλως, καὶ ἡ νόσος καὶ ἡ κακία. ἢ ἔκπτωσις τοῦ σκοποῦ οὖσα πῶς δύναμις;
Are those, then, that consist in forms and powers qualities, while these are privations? Then it is not one kind, but they are brought to one as a single category—knowledge, for example, being form and power, ignorance privation and incapacity. Or rather, incapacity and disease are a kind of shape too; and disease and vice alike can do and make many things, though badly. But how can what is a missing of the mark be a power?
ἢ τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη πράττει οὐ πρὸς τὸ ὀρθὸν βλέπουσα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐποίησέ τι, ὃ μὴ δύναται. καὶ τὸ κάλλος δὲ δύναμιν ἔχει τινός. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ἢ ὅλως οὐδὲ πρὸς δύναμιν δεῖ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ὃ διάκειται· ὥστε κατὰ τὰς οἷον μορφὰς καὶ χαρακτῆρας, καὶ κοινὸν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλλὰ πάλιν πῶς αἱ δυνάμεις; ἢ καὶ ὁ φύσει πυκτικὸς τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἔχει τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ ἀδύνατος πρός τι, καὶ ὅλως χαρακτήρ τις ἡ ποιότης οὐκ οὐσιώδης.
Perhaps each does its own work without looking to what is right; for it would not have done anything it is unable to do. Beauty too has a power for something. The triangle too, then? Or rather, we should not look to power at all, but rather to how a thing is disposed. Then quality is according to shapes and characters, so to speak, and what is common is the shape and form that comes upon the substance, after the substance. But again, what about the powers? Perhaps the natural boxer too has this by being disposed in a certain way, and so does the one incapable of something; and in general quality is a character that is not of the substance.
ὃ δ’ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ δοκῇ καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ εἰς μὴ οὐσίαν, οἷον θερμότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ ὅλως χρόα, τὸ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλο, οἷον ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅμοιον. ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τὴν μόρφωσιν καὶ χαρακτῆρα καὶ λόγον, πῶς τὰ κατὰ ἀδυναμίαν καὶ αἴσχη; ἢ λόγους ἀτελεῖς λεκτέον, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰσχρῷ. καὶ ἐν τῇ νόσῳ πῶς ὁ λόγος; ἢ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λόγον κινούμενον τὸν τῆς ὑγιείας. ἢ οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ πάντα, ἀλλὰ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κοινὸν παρὰ τό πως διακεῖσθαι εἶναι ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότης τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον ποιότης τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τρίγωνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ καθ’ ὅσον ἐμόρφωσεν.
Whenever the same thing seems to contribute both to substance and to what is not substance—like heat and whiteness and color in general—the one that belongs to the substance is one thing, an activity of it, as it were, while the other is secondary, derived from that, one thing in another, an image of it and like it. But if quality consists in shaping and character and rational principle, what about the things that go with incapacity, and uglinesses? Perhaps they must be called incomplete rational principles, as in the ugly. And in disease, how is there a rational principle? Here too, perhaps, we should speak of the rational principle of health being disturbed. Or rather, not everything is in a rational principle; it is enough that what is common, besides being disposed in a certain way, is being outside the substance, and that what supervenes after the substance is a quality of the underlying thing. The triangle is a quality of the thing it is in—not triangle simply, but the triangle in this thing, insofar as it has shaped it.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐμόρφωσεν ἢ οὐσίωσεν.
But humanity too has shaped it—or rather, made it a substance.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως, διὰ τί πλείω εἴδη ποιότητος, καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἄλλο; οὐ γὰρ διαφορὰ ποιότητος τὸ μόνιμον καὶ τὸ μή, ἀλλ’ ἀρκεῖ ἡ διάθεσις ὁπωσοῦν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὸ παρασχέσθαι ποιόν· προσθήκη δ’ ἔξωθεν τὸ μένειν· εἰ μή τις λέγοι τὰς μὲν διαθέσεις μόνον ἀτελεῖς οἷον μορφάς, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις τελείας. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀτελεῖς, οὔπω ποιότητες· εἰ δ’ ἤδη ποιότητες, προσθήκη τὸ μόνιμον. αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις πῶς ἕτερον εἶδος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότητες, οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει πάσαις τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ τῷ διακεῖσθαι τὸν φύσει πυκτικὸν ποιὸν λέγομεν, οὐδὲν ἡ δύναμις προστεθεῖσα ποιεῖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσι δύναμις. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν τοῦ κατὰ ἐπιστήμην διοίσει;
But if this is so, why are there several species of quality, and why are states and dispositions different? Permanence and impermanence are not a difference of quality: the disposition, however it is, suffices to make a thing qualified, and remaining is an addition from outside—unless someone says that dispositions are only incomplete shapes, as it were, and states complete ones. But if they are incomplete, they are not yet qualities; and if they are already qualities, permanence is an addition. And how are natural powers another species? If things are qualities by virtue of powers, the notion of power does not fit them all, as has been said. But if we call the natural boxer qualified by his being disposed in a certain way, adding power does nothing, since there is power in states too. Then, why will the one who is so by power differ from the one who is so by knowledge?
ἤ, εἰ ποιοί, οὐδὲ διαφοραὶ ποιότητος αὗται, εἰ ὁ μὲν μελετήσας ἔχοι, ὁ δὲ φύσει, ἀλλ’ ἔξωθεν ἡ διαφορά· κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς πυκτικῆς πῶς; καὶ εἰ αἱ μὲν ἐκ πάθους, αἱ δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πόθεν ἡ ποιότης· λέγω δὲ ποιότητος παραλλαγαῖς καὶ διαφοραῖς.
Or rather, if they are qualified, these are not differences of quality either—if one has it by practice and the other by nature; the difference is external. But in the form of boxing itself, how do they differ? And if some come from affection and others not: where a quality comes from makes no difference—I mean, to the variations and differences of quality.
ἔχοι δ’ ἂν ζήτησιν καί, εἰ ἐκ πάθους αἵδε, αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν, πῶς ἐν εἴδει τῷ αὐτῷ· καὶ εἰ αἱ μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, ὁμωνύμως ἂν εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον μορφή; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ ὃ εἶδός ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οὐ ποιόν· εἰ δὲ καθ’ ὃ καλὸν μετὰ τὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου εἶδος ἢ αἰσχρόν, λόγον ἂν ἔχοι. τὸ δὲ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ποιά· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐγγὺς τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τραχύτης, καὶ οὐ πανταχοῦ ἐξ ἀνωμαλίας θέσεως καὶ ὁμαλότητος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ὡς ποιὰ εἶναι.
There would also be a question whether, if these come from affection—some in this way, others not from the same things—they are in the same species; and if some are so by having come to be, others by producing, they would be so homonymously. And what about the shape of each thing? If it is that by which each thing is a form, it is not a quality; but if it is that by which a thing is beautiful or ugly, after the form of the underlying thing, that would make sense. And would rough and smooth, rare and dense, not rightly be called qualities? For rare and dense and roughness surely do not consist in the distances of parts from one another and their nearness, and they do not always come from unevenness and evenness of position; and even if they did come from these, nothing prevents them from being qualities as well.
τὸ δὲ κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ γνωσθὲν δηλώσει, ὅπου δεῖ αὐτὰ θεῖναι. εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁμωνυμία περὶ τὸ κοῦφον, εἰ μὴ τῷ σταθμῷ λέγοιτο τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἰσχνὸν καὶ τὸ λεπτόν, ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἴδει παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα.
Light and heavy, once understood, will show where they should be placed. There might also be homonymy about “light,” unless it is said by weight, of more and less—in which case lean and thin belong there too, which is in another species besides the four.
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ οὕτω τις ἀξιώσειε τὸ ποιὸν διαιρεῖν, τίνι ἂν διέλοι; ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν, εἰ δεῖ τὰς μὲν σώματος λέγοντα, τὰς δὲ ψυχῆς, τοῦ δὲ σώματος μερίζειν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰς μὲν ὄψει λέγοντα, τὰς δ’ ἀκοῇ ἢ γεύσει, ἄλλας ὀσφρήσει ἢ ἁφῇ. τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς; ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, θυμοειδοῦς, λογιστικοῦ. ἢ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, αἳ γίνονται κατ’ αὐτάς, ὅτι γεννητικαὶ αὗται τούτων. ἢ τῷ ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ· καὶ πάλιν διαιρετέον τὰς ὠφελείας καὶ τὰς βλάβας. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματικῶν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορα τῷ ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ· οἰκεῖαι γὰρ διαφοραὶ ποιότητος. ἢ γὰρ δοκεῖ ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ τὸ βλάβος ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος καὶ ποιοῦ ἢ ζητητέον τρόπον ἄλλον.
But if one did not see fit to divide quality in this way, how would one divide it? We must consider whether one should speak of some qualities as of the body and others as of the soul, and divide those of the body according to the senses, calling some qualities of sight, others of hearing or taste, others of smell or touch. And those of the soul—how? Qualities of the desiring, the spirited, the reasoning part. Or by the differences of the activities that come about in accordance with them, since they generate these. Or by the beneficial and the harmful; and then the benefits and harms must in turn be divided. The same goes for bodily qualities: they differ in their action by being beneficial or harmful, for these are proper differences of quality. For either benefit and harm seem to come from quality and the qualified, or another way must be sought.
ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, πῶς καὶ ὁ ποιὸς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἓν γένος ἀμφοῖν· καὶ εἰ ὁ πυκτικὸς ἐν ποιότητι, πῶς οὐ καὶ ὁ ποιητικός; καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν· ὥστε οὐδὲν δεῖ εἰς τὸ πρός τι τὸ ποιητικὸν οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ παθητικόν, εἰ ὁ παθητικὸς ποιός. καὶ ἴσως βέλτιον ἐνταῦθα ὁ ποιητικός, εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν λέγεται· ἡ δὲ δύναμις ποιότης· εἰ δὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἡ δύναμις, ᾗ δύναμις, οὐδ’ οὕτω πρός τι οὐδὲ ποιὸν ἔτι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς τὸ μεῖζον τὸ ποιητικόν· τὸ γὰρ μεῖζον τὴν ὑπόστασιν, καθ’ ὃ μεῖζον, πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τὸ δὲ ποιητικὸν τῷ τοιόνδε εἶναι ἤδη.
We must also consider how the qualified, which is so by quality, will be in the same category; for surely there is not one kind for both. And if the boxer is in quality, why not also the man who is able to act? And if so, the active too; so there is no need to put the active in the relative, nor again the passive, if the man who can be acted upon is qualified. And perhaps the one able to act is better placed here, if he is so called by power, and power is a quality. But if the power belongs to substance as power, even so it is not relative, nor any longer qualified. For the active is not like the greater: the greater has its reality, insofar as it is greater, relative to the smaller, while the active is active already by being of a certain kind.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε ποιόν, ᾗ δὲ δύναται εἰς ἄλλο ποιητικὸν λεγόμενον πρός τι. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ πυκτικὸς πρός τι, καὶ ἡ πυκτικὴ αὐτή; πρὸς ἄλλο γὰρ ὅλως ἡ πυκτική· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς θεώρημα, ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ τεχνῶν ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἐπισκεπτέον καὶ λεκτέον ἴσως· ᾗ μὲν διατιθεῖσι τὴν ψυχήν, ποιότητες, ᾗ δὲ ποιοῦσι, ποιητικαὶ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ πρός τι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον πρός τι, καθ’ ὃ ἕξεις λέγονται. ἆρ’ οὖν ἄλλη τις ὑπόστασις κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ὄντος ἢ καθ’ ὅσον ποιόν;
But perhaps it is a quality insofar as it is of such a kind, and a relative insofar as it is able to act on something else and is called “active.” Why, then, isn’t the boxer a relative too, and boxing itself? For boxing is directed entirely toward another: none of its principles is not related to another. And about the other arts too, or most of them, we should look into this and perhaps say: insofar as they dispose the soul, they are qualities; insofar as they act, they are active, and in this respect directed toward something else, and relatives. For they are relatives in another way too, insofar as they are called states. Is there, then, any other reality corresponding to the “active” in what is active, when it is nothing other than what it is insofar as it is qualified?
τάχα μὲν γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν προαίρεσιν ἐχόντων τῷ νενευκέναι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων δυνάμεων, ἃς ποιότητας εἴπομεν, τί τὸ ποιητικόν; ἢ ὅταν συντύχῃ αὐτῷ ἄλλο, ἀπέλαυσε καὶ μετέλαβε παρ’ ἐκείνου οὗ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ποιεῖ εἰς ἄλλο καὶ πάσχει, πῶς ἔτι τὸ ποιητικόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μεῖζον τρίπηχυ ὂν καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ἐν τῇ συντυχίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλο. ἀλλ’ ἐρεῖ τις τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον μεταλήψει μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο μεταλήψει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ. ζητητέον δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ εἰ αἱ τῇδε ποιότητες καὶ αἱ ἐκεῖ ὑφ’ ἕν· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τιθεμένους κἀκεῖ.
Perhaps someone might say that in living things, and still more in those that have choice, there is a reality corresponding to the “active” as well, by their having inclined toward acting. But in the case of soulless powers, which we called qualities, what is “the active”? Or rather: when something else meets it, that other thing enjoys and receives a share of what it has. But if the same thing both acts on another and is affected, how is it still “the active”? For the larger, too, though it is three cubits by itself, is both larger and smaller in its encounter with something else. But someone will say that larger and smaller come by participation in largeness and smallness. Then this too comes by participation in the active and the passive. And here too we must ask whether the qualities here and those There fall under one genus. This is addressed to those who posit qualities There as well.
ἢ κἂν μὴ εἴδη τις διδῷ, ἀλλὰ νοῦν λέγων εἰ ἕξιν λέγοι, εἰ κοινόν τι ἐπ’ ἐκείνης καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως. καὶ σοφία δὲ συγχωρεῖται. ἢ εἰ ὁμώνυμος πρὸς τὴν ἐνταῦθα, οὐκ ἠρίθμηται δηλονότι ἐν τούτοις· εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἔσται τὸ ποιὸν κοινὸν ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖ, εἰ μή τις τὰ ἐκεῖ λέγοι πάντα οὐσίας· καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τοίνυν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, εἰ τὸ διττὸν ὧδε κἀκεῖ, ἢ ὑφ’ ἓν ἄμφω.
Or even if one does not grant Forms, but speaks of Intellect and calls it a state, we must ask whether there is anything common to that state and this one. And wisdom too is granted to be There. Or rather: if that state is homonymous with the state here, it is clearly not counted among these; but if synonymous, quality will be common to here and There—unless someone says that everything There is substance. And thinking too, then. But this question applies to the other categories as well: whether there is a double set, here and There, or both fall under one.
When and where
Yesterday, last year and places add nothing that time, place and relation do not cover.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτὲ ὧδε ἐπισκεπτέον· εἰ τὸ χθὲς καὶ αὔριον καὶ πέρυσι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη χρόνου, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται καὶ ταῦτα, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἔσται, εἴδη ὄντα χρόνου, δίκαιον δήπου ἐν ᾧ ὁ χρόνος τετάχθαι. λέγεται δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ χρόνος· ὥστε τί δεῖ κατηγορίας ἄλλης;
On “when,” we should look at it this way. If yesterday, tomorrow, last year and the like are parts of time, why won’t they be in the same category as time itself? Since “was,” “is” and “will be” are species of time, it is surely right that they be placed where time is. And time is said to belong to quantity. So what need is there of another category?
εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, ὡς οὐ μόνον χρόνος τὸ ἦν καὶ ἔσται, καὶ τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι, τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ ἦν — ὑποβεβλῆσθαι γὰρ δεῖ ταῦτα τῷ ἦν — ἀλλ’ οὐ νῦν μόνον χρόνος, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ χρόνος, πρῶτον μὲν ἔσται, εἰ τὸ ποτὲ χρόνος, χρόνος· ἔπειτα, εἰ χρόνος παρεληλυθὼς τὸ χθές, σύνθετόν τι ἔσται, εἰ ἕτερον τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος· δύο οὖν κατηγορίαι καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ φήσουσι τὸ ποτὲ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ χρόνον, τοῦτο τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσιν, οἷον Σωκράτης ὅτι πέρυσιν ἦν, ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης ἔξωθεν ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐχ ἕν τι λέγουσιν.
Suppose they say that not only are “was” and “will be” time, and yesterday and last year, which fall under “was”—for these must be subordinate to “was”—but that here it is not just time but time-when. First, if “when” is time, it will be time. Next, if yesterday is past time, it will be something composite, if the past is one thing and time another: so two categories, and not something simple. And if they say that “when” is what is in time, not time, then if by this “in time” they mean the thing—Socrates, for example, in that he was there last year—Socrates would be outside it, and they are not saying one thing.
ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐν μέρει τοῦ χρόνου; εἰ δ’ ὅτι μέρος χρόνου λέγουσι, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι μέρος ἀξιοῦσι μὴ χρόνον ἁπλῶς τι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μέρος χρόνου παρεληλυθός, πλείω ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ᾗ μέρος πρός τι ὂν προσλαμβάνουσι καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἐγκείμενόν τι αὐτοῖς ἔσται ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἦν, ὃ ἦν εἶδος χρόνου. ἀλλ’ εἰ τῷ ἀόριστον μὲν εἶναι τὸ ἦν, τὸ δὲ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσιν ὡρίσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἦν που τάξομεν· ἔπειτα τὸ χθὲς ἔσται ἦν ὡρισμένον· ὥστε ἔσται ὡρισμένος χρόνος τὸ χθές. τοῦτο δὲ ποσός τις χρόνος· ὥστε, εἰ χρόνος ποσόν, ποσὸν ὡρισμένον ἕκαστον τούτων ἔσται.
But what could “Socrates, or his action, is in this time” be, other than “in a part of time”? And if they say it is because it is a part of time, and insofar as it is a part they claim to be saying not simply time but a past part of time, they are making it several things: they take in the part, which as a part is a relative, and the “past” will be something added on for them—or else the same as “was,” which was a species of time. But if it is because “was” is indefinite, while yesterday and last year are determinate, first, where shall we place “was”? Then yesterday will be a determinate “was,” so yesterday will be a determinate time. And this is a certain quantity of time; so, if time is a quantity, each of these will be a determinate quantity.
εἰ δέ, ὅταν λέγωσι χθές, τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ παρεληλυθότι ὡρισμένῳ γέγονε τόδε, ἔτι πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον λέγουσιν· ἔπειτα, εἰ δεῖ ἐπεισάγειν ἄλλας κατηγορίας τῷ ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἄλλας πολλὰς ἀνευρήσομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. λεχθήσεται δὲ σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποῦ.
And if, when they say “yesterday,” they mean that this thing happened in a determinate past time, they are saying still more things, and more so. Next, if we must bring in other categories because one thing is put in another, as here with “in time,” we shall find many others from putting one thing in another. This will be said more clearly in what follows, on “where.”
‘τὸ δὲ ποῦ [οἷον] ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ.’ ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαδημία καὶ τὸ Λύκειον πάντως τόποι καὶ μέρη τόπου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ ὡδὶ εἴδη ἢ μέρη· διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἀφωρισμένως μᾶλλον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ μέσον τόποι, οἷον Δελφοὶ τὸ μέσον, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ μέσον, οἷον Ἀθῆναι καὶ Λύκειον δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τί δεῖ ἔτι παρὰ τὸν τόπον ζητεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντας τόπον ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τούτων σημαίνειν; εἰ δὲ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ λέγομεν, οὐχ ἓν λέγομεν οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν λέγομεν.
“Where, [for example,] in the Lyceum and in the Academy.” Now the Academy and the Lyceum are, in any case, places and parts of place, just as “above,” “below” and “here” are species or parts of it. The difference is that they are more sharply marked off. If, then, above, below and the middle are places—Delphi, for example, is the middle—and so is what is beside the middle, like Athens, and the Lyceum of course, and the rest, why should we look for anything beyond place, when we ourselves say that in each of these cases place is meant? And if we say one thing is in another, we are not saying one thing, nor a simple one.
ἔπειτα, εἰ τοῦτον ἐνταῦθα λέγομεν, σχέσιν τινὰ γεννῶμεν τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε καὶ τοῦ δεξαμένου πρὸς ὃ ἐδέξατο· διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πρός τι, εἰ ἐκ τῆς ἑκατέρου πρὸς ἑκάτερον σχέσεως ἀπεγεννήθη τι; εἶτα [τί] διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε τοῦ Ἀθήνησιν; ἀλλὰ τὸ ὧδε τὸ δεικτικὸν τόπον φήσουσι σημαίνειν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ Ἀθήνησιν· ὥστε τοῦ τόπου τὸ Ἀθήνησιν. εἶτα, εἰ τὸ Ἀθήνησι τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐστί, πρὸς τῷ τόπῳ καὶ τὸ ἔστι προσκατηγορεῖται· δεῖ δὲ οὔ· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ποιότης ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιότης μόνον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ ἄλλο παρὰ χρόνον καὶ τόπον, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιήσει;
Next, if we say this man is here, we generate a relation, of this in that, of what receives to what it has received. So why isn’t it a relative, if something has been generated from the relation of each to the other? Then, how does “here” differ from “at Athens”? They will say that “here,” the demonstrative, signifies place. So does “at Athens,” then; so “at Athens” belongs to place. Then, if “at Athens” means “is in Athens,” “is” is predicated in addition to the place; but it shouldn’t be—just as we don’t say “quality is,” but only “quality.” Besides, if “in time” must be something other than time, and “in place” something other than place, why won’t “in a vessel” make yet another category,
καὶ τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν μέρεσι, καὶ γένος ἐν εἴδεσι καὶ εἶδος ἐν γένει; καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν πλείους αἱ κατηγορίαι ἔσονται.
and “in matter” another, and “in a subject” another, and a part in a whole, and the whole in its parts, and a genus in its species, and a species in its genus? And so we shall have more categories.
Acting and being affected
Acting and being affected are both motion, and motion itself deserves to be a genus.
ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν λεγομένῳ τάδ’ ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο. λέγεται γάρ, ὡς, ἐπεὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἦν ποσότης καὶ ἀριθμός, τὸ ποσὸν γένος ἕτερον ἦν καὶ ποιότητος οὔσης περὶ αὐτὴν ἄλλο γένος τὸ ποιόν, οὕτω καὶ ποιήσεως οὔσης ἄλλο γένος τὸ ποιεῖν. ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ ἡ ποίησις, ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιότης, ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ ποιόν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ποίησις, ποιεῖν, ποιῶν εἰς ἓν ληπτέα. ἐμφαίνει δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα, ἡ δὲ ποίησις οὔ· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐν ποιήσει εἶναί τινι· τοῦτο δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ· ὥστε ἐνέργειαν μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν κατηγορίαν, ἣ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεται θεωρεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐκεῖ ποιότης, καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὥσπερ κίνησις, καὶ ἓν γένος ἡ κίνησις τῶν ὄντων.
In what is called acting, one might consider the following. It is said that, since after substance the things about substance were quantity and number, quantity was another genus; and since there is quality about it, quality is another genus; so too, since there is action, acting is another genus. Is it, then, acting, or action, from which acting comes—just as quality, from which the qualified comes? Or rather, here action, acting and agent should be taken together as one. “Acting” brings out the agent more, while “action” does not; and acting is being in some action, that is, in activity. So the category is rather activity, which is said to be observed about substance, as quality was in the other case; and activity too is about substance, as motion is. And motion is one genus of beings.
διὰ τί γὰρ ποιότης μὲν ἕν τι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ποσότης ἕν τι, καὶ πρός τι διὰ τήν σχέσιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο, κινήσεως δὲ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔσης οὐκ ἔσται τι καὶ κίνησις ἓν γένος;
For why should quality be one thing about substance, and quantity one thing, and relation one thing because of the relation of one thing to another, while motion, though it too is about substance, will not be something—motion as one genus?
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν ἀτελῆ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐκώλυε τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν προτάττειν, εἶδος δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὡς ἀτελῆ οὖσαν ὑποβάλλειν, κατηγοροῦντά γε αὐτῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, προστιθέντα δὲ τὸ ἀτελές. τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς λέγεται περὶ αὐτῆς, οὐχ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντως, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλιν· καὶ τὸ πάλιν, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίκηται εἰς ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη· ἀλλ’ ἵνα ἐργάσηταί τι, ὃ ἕτερόν ἐστι μετ’ αὐτήν· καὶ οὐκ αὐτὴ τελειοῦται τότε, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐστοχάζετο· οἷον βάδισις ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάδισις ἦν.
If someone says that motion is incomplete activity, nothing would prevent placing activity first and subordinating motion to it as a species, as being incomplete—predicating activity of it, and adding “incomplete.” For “incomplete” is said of it not because it is not activity at all: it is activity, entirely, but it also has the “again and again.” And the “again” is not so that it may arrive at activity—it is that already—but so that it may produce something that is other than it and comes after it. And then it is not motion itself that is completed, but the thing it was aiming at. Walking, for example, was walking from the start.
εἰ δὲ ἔδει στάδιον διανύσαι, οὔπω δὲ ἦν διανύσας, τὸ ἐλλεῖπον οὐ τῆς βαδίσεως οὐδὲ τῆς κινήσεως ἦν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ποσῆς βαδίσεως· βάδισις δὲ ἦν καὶ ὁποσηοῦν καὶ κίνησις ἤδη· ὁ γοῦν κινούμενος ἤδη κεκίνηται, καὶ ὁ τέμνων ἤδη ἔτεμε. καὶ ὡς ἡ λεγομένη ἐνέργεια οὐ δεῖται χρόνου, οὕτως οὐδ’ ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ’ ἡ εἰς τοσοῦτον κίνησις· καὶ εἰ ἐν ἀχρόνῳ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἡ ὅλως κίνησις.
If one had to cover a stade and had not yet covered it, what was lacking belonged not to walking, nor to motion, but to walking of a certain amount. It was walking, however much of it there was, and already motion. At any rate, someone moving has already moved, and someone cutting has already cut. And just as what is called activity does not need time, neither does motion; what needs time is motion to a certain extent. And if activity is in no time, so is motion—motion as such.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι τὸ συνεχὲς προσλαβοῦσα πάντως ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ ἡ ὅρασις μὴ διαλείπουσα τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐν συνεχείᾳ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ λέγουσα ἀεὶ οἷόν τε εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἡστινοσοῦν κινήσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι μήτε τοῦ χρόνου ἀρχὴν ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ ἤρξατο μήτε αὐτῆς ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλ’ εἶναι αὐτὴν διαιρεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω· ὥστε ἐξ ἀπείρου συμβαίνοι ἂν τοῦ χρόνου κεκινῆσθαι τὴν ἄρτι ἀρξαμένην καὶ αὐτὴν ἄπειρον εἰς τὸ ἀρξάμενον εἶναι.
But if it is because, having taken on continuity, it is certainly in time, then seeing too, which does not interrupt its seeing, would be in continuity and in time. Evidence for this is also the argument from proportion, which says that one can always take a portion of any motion whatever, and that there is no beginning either of the time in which and from which it started, or of the motion itself, but that it can be divided backward. So it would turn out that the motion which has just begun has been moving from an unlimited time, and is itself unlimited toward its beginning.
τοῦτο γὰρ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ χωρίζειν ἐνέργειαν κινήσεως καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν ἀχρόνῳ φάσκειν γενέσθαι, τὴν δὲ χρόνου δεῖσθαι λέγειν μὴ τὴν ποσὴν μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὅλως τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποσὴν λέγειν καίτοι ὁμολογοῦντας καὶ αὐτοὺς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῇ παρεῖναι, εἰ ἡμερησία εἴη ἢ ὁποσουοῦν χρόνου. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐνέργεια ἐν ἀχρόνῳ, οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κίνησιν ἦρχθαι ἐν ἀχρόνῳ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος τῷ τοσήνδε γεγονέναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ μεταβολαὶ ἐν ἀχρόνῳ ὁμολογοῦνται γίγνεσθαι ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι ‘ὥσπερ οὐ καὶ ἀθρόας γινομένης μεταβολῆς’. εἰ οὖν μεταβολή, διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ κίνησις; εἴληπται δὲ μεταβολὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεταβεβληκέναι· οὐ γὰρ τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταβεβληκέναι ἐδεῖτο.
This follows from separating activity from motion, and claiming that the one occurs in no time while saying that the other needs time—and being forced to call not just motion of a certain amount but its very nature quantitative, even though they themselves agree that quantity belongs to it incidentally, if it lasts a day or any amount of time. So just as activity is in no time, nothing prevents motion too from having begun in no time, while time comes in through its having gone on for so long. For changes too are agreed to occur in no time, when it is said: “as if change did not also occur all at once.” If, then, change, why not motion too? And change was not meant here as having changed: what it needed was not the change that consists in having changed.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μήτε τὴν ἐνέργειαν μήτε τὴν κίνησιν γένους δεῖσθαι καθ’ αὑτά, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ πρός τι ἀνάγειν τῷ τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν [τοῦ] δυνάμει εἶναι ἐνεργητικοῦ, τὴν δὲ [κίνησιν] τοῦ δυνάμει κινητικοῦ, λεκτέον, ὡς τὰ μὲν πρός τι αὐτὴ ἡ σχέσις ἐγέννα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον μόνον λέγεσθαι· ὅταν δὲ ᾖ τις ὑπόστασις, κἂν ἑτέρου ᾖ κἂν πρὸς ἕτερον, τήν γε πρὸ τοῦ πρός τι εἴληχε φύσιν.
If someone says that neither activity nor motion needs a genus of its own, but refers them to relation, on the grounds that activity belongs to [the] potentially active and [motion] to what is potentially a mover, we must answer that relatives are generated by the relation itself, not by merely being spoken of with reference to another. But when there is some reality, even if it belongs to another or is directed toward another, it has been allotted its nature prior to the relation.
αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις δὲ ἑτέρου οὖσα οὐκ ἀφῄρηται τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ πρός τι εἶναί τε καὶ νοεῖσθαι καθ’ αὑτά· ἢ οὕτω πάντα ἔσται πρός τι· πάντως γὰρ ἔχει ὁτιοῦν σχέσιν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· αὐτή τε ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν διὰ τί εἰς τὸ πρός τι οὐκ ἀναχθήσεται; ἢ γὰρ κίνησις ἢ ἐνέργεια πάντως ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν ποίησιν εἰς τὸ πρός τι ἀνάξουσι, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἓν γένος θήσονται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν μὲν κίνησιν εἰς τὸ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἕν τι γένος θήσονται, καὶ διαιρήσονται τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὡς ἓν διχῇ ἐν εἴδεσι τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς νῦν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν λέγουσι, τὸ δέ πάσχειν;
So this activity and motion, and state too, though they belong to another, are not deprived of being, and being thought of, by themselves, prior to the relation. Otherwise everything will be relative, for anything whatever has some relation to anything whatever, as happens with the soul too. And why won’t action itself and acting be referred to relation? For they will in any case be either motion or activity. And if they refer action to relation but posit acting as one genus, why won’t they also refer motion to relation and posit being moved as one genus, and divide being moved, as one thing, in two, into the species of acting and being affected, instead of calling acting one genus and being affected another, as they do now?
ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας φήσουσι, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας λέγοντες εἶναι τὰς ἀθρόας, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, οἷον τὸ τέμνειν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τὸ τέμνειν· ἢ πάσας κινήσεις ἢ μετὰ κινήσεως, καὶ εἰ πάσας πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν τὰς ποιήσεις ἤ τινας καὶ ἀπολύτους, οἷον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ λέγειν, καὶ εἰ τὰς [μὲν] πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν πάσας κινήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἀπολύτους ἐνεργείας, ἢ ἐν ἑκατέροις ἑκάτερον. τὸ γοῦν βαδίζειν ἀπολελυμένον ὂν κίνησιν ἂν εἴποιεν, τὸ δὲ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔχον τὸ πάσχον καὶ αὐτὸ ἐνέργειαν, οἶμαι· ἢ οὐδὲ ποιεῖν φατέον τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, ποῦ λεκτέον.
We must also look into whether, within acting, they will say that some are activities and others motions, calling activities those that are all at once and motions the others, like cutting—for cutting takes time; or whether all are motions or involve motion; and whether all actions are related to being affected, or some are also absolute, like walking and speaking; and whether those related to being affected are all motions and the absolute ones activities, or each kind occurs in both. Walking, at any rate, though it is absolute, they would call motion; and thinking, which has nothing that is affected, they would call activity too, I think. Or else we must say that neither thinking nor walking is acting at all. But if they are not under acting, we must say where they belong.
τάχα δὲ τὸ νοεῖν πρὸς τὸ νοητόν, ὥσπερ τὴν νόησιν· καὶ γὰρ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν. ἀλλ’ εἰ κἀκεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν, διὰ τί αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν; καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν μὲν ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δέ τι παρὰ τὴν σχέσιν, τὸ ἢ ἐνέργεια ἢ πάθος εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ πάθος παρὰ τό τινος εἶναι καὶ ὑπό τινος, ἔστι τι ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἡ δὲ δὴ βάδισις ἔχουσα καὶ αὐτὴ τό τινος εἶναι (καὶ ποδῶν εἶναι) καὶ ὑπό τινος ἔχει τὸ κίνησις εἶναι. ἔχοι ἂν οὖν καὶ ἡ νόησις παρὰ τὸ πρός τι τὸ ἢ κίνησις εἶναι ἢ ἐνέργεια.
Perhaps thinking is related to the intelligible, as thought is; for perception, too, is related to the perceptible. But if in that case too perception is related to the perceptible, why isn’t perceiving itself related to the perceptible as well? And perception, which is directed to another, does have a relation to that, but it also has something besides the relation: being either an activity or an affection. If, then, an affection is something else besides belonging to something and being caused by something, so too is an activity. And walking, which itself has belonging to something (it belongs to feet) and being caused by something, has its being a motion. So thinking too would have, besides being relative, its being either a motion or an activity.
ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ καί τινες ἐνέργειαι δόξουσιν ἀτελεῖς εἶναι μὴ προσλαβοῦσαι χρόνον, ὥστε εἰς ταὐτὸν ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἐλθεῖν, οἷον τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἡ ζωή. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τελείῳ τὸ ζῆν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, ἀλλὰ οἷον ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι· ὥστε κινήσεις ἄμφω λεκτέον καὶ ἕν τι τὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένος ἕν, θεωροῦντας παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ κίνησιν οὖσαν περὶ αὐτήν· καί, εἰ βούλει, τὰς μὲν σωματικάς, τὰς δὲ ψυχικάς, ἢ τὰς μὲν παρ’ αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπ’ ἄλλων εἰς αὐτά, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιήσεις εἴτε εἰς ἄλλα εἴτε ἀπολελυμένας, τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων πείσεις.
We must also look into whether some activities too will seem incomplete unless they take on time, so that they come to the same thing as motions—living, for example, and life. For each one’s living takes a complete time, and happiness is an activity not in something partless but of the sort they claim motion to be. So both must be called motions, and motion something one, a single genus, observing besides the quantity and quality in substance the motion that is about it too. And, if you like, some motions are bodily and others belong to soul; or some come from the things themselves and others come into them from other things; or some originate from themselves and others from others—and those from themselves are actions, whether directed toward others or absolute, while those from others are affections.
καίτοι καὶ αἱ εἰς ἄλλα κινήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ ταῖς ἐξ ἄλλων· ἡ γὰρ τμῆσις, ἥ τε παρὰ τοῦ τέμνοντος ἥ τε ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ, μία, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέμνειν ἕτερον καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ μία ἡ τμῆσις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέμνοντος καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὸ τέμνειν τὸ ἐκ τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἐνεργείας καὶ κινήσεως ἑτέραν ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ διάδοχον κίνησιν γίγνεσθαι. ἢ ἴσως οὐ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τέμνεσθαι τὸ διάφορον, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλο τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον κίνημα, οἷον τὸ ἀλγεῖν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχειν ἐν τούτῳ.
And yet the motions directed toward others are the same as those coming from others. For the cutting, both the one from the cutter and the one in what is being cut, is one; but cutting and being cut are different. But perhaps the cutting from the cutter and the one in what is cut are not even one; perhaps cutting is this: that from such an activity and motion another, successive motion arises in what is being cut. Or perhaps the difference lies not in being cut itself but in another motion that supervenes, like feeling pain; for being affected lies in this.
τί οὖν, εἰ μή τι ἀλγεῖ; τί ἄλλο ἢ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐν τῷδε οὖσα; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον ποιεῖν, καὶ διττὸν οὕτως εἶναι τὸ ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ συνιστάμενον· καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκε δύο νομίζειν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· οἷον καὶ τὸ γράφειν, καίτοι ὂν ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ πάσχειν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο τι ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ ποιεῖ παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ γράφοντος οἷον τὸ ἀλγεῖν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι γεγράφθαι, οὐ τὸ πάσχειν λέγει. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βαδίζειν, καίτοι οὔσης γῆς ἐφ’ ἧς, οὐ προσποιεῖται τὸ πεπονθέναι.
What, then, if nothing feels pain? What is there other than the activity of the agent, present in this thing? For that is how what is called acting in this way is too; and so acting is twofold, one kind not taking place in another, the other taking place in another. And it is no longer that one is acting and the other being affected; rather, acting in another has made people think there are two, acting and being affected. Writing, for example, though it is in another, does not call for being affected, because it produces nothing in the writing tablet besides the writer’s activity, nothing like pain. And if someone says the tablet has been written on, he is not speaking of being affected. And with walking, though there is earth on which one walks, nobody adds that it has been affected.
ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἐπὶ σώματος ζῴου βαίνῃ, τὸ πάσχειν ἐπινοεῖ, ὃ ἐπιγίγνεται, ἄλγημα συλλογιζόμενος, οὐ τὸ βαδίζειν· ἢ ἐπενόησεν ἂν καὶ πρότερον. οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποιεῖν ἓν λεκτέον μετὰ τοῦ λεγομένου πάσχειν, τοῦ ἀντιθέτου. ὃ δὲ πάσχειν λέγεται, τὸ γενόμενον ὕστερον, οὐ τὸ ἀντίθετον, οἷον τῷ καίειν τὸ καίεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ καίειν καὶ καίεσθαι ἑνὸς ὄντος, τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἄλγημα ἤ τι ἄλλο, οἷον μαραίνεσθαι. τί οὖν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐργάζοιτο, ὥστε λυπεῖν, οὐχ ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, καὶ ἐκ μιᾶς ἐνεργείας τὰ δύο; ἢ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκέτι τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ λυπεῖν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ τι ἕτερον, δι’ οὗ λυπεῖ, ὃ ἐν τῷ λυπησομένῳ γενόμενον ἓν ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ἄλλο, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι.
But when someone steps on an animal’s body, one thinks of being affected—reckoning in the pain, which supervenes—not of the walking; otherwise one would have thought of it before too. So in every case, as far as acting goes, we must speak of one thing, together with what is called being affected, its opposite. And what is called being affected is what comes about afterward, not the opposite—as being burned is to burning—but, burning and being burned being one, it is what arises on top of it: pain, or something else, like withering. What, then, if someone produced this very thing, so as to cause pain? Doesn’t one act and the other is affected, and the two come from one activity? Or rather, in the activity there is no longer the element of willing to cause pain; he produces something else, by which he causes pain, and this, arising in the one who is going to be pained, being one and the same, has produced something else: being pained.
τί οὖν; αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν γενόμενον, πρὶν καὶ λύπην ποιῆσαι, ἢ ὅλως λύπην οὐκ ἐμποιοῦν, οὐ πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰς ὅν, οἷον τὸ ἀκοῦσαι; ἢ οὐ πάθος τὸ ἀκοῦσαι οὐδ’ ὅλως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηθῆναί ἐστι γενέσθαι ἐν πάθει, ὃ μὴ ἀντίθετον τῷ ποιῆσαι.
What, then? Isn’t that single thing that has come about, before it even produces pain, or if it produces no pain at all, an affection of the one it enters—hearing, for example? Or rather, hearing is not an affection, nor is perceiving at all; but to be pained is to come into an affection, and this is not the opposite of acting.
ἀλλ’ ἔστω μὴ ἀντίθετον· ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον ὂν τοῦ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῇ ποιήσει. ἤ, εἰ κίνησις ἄμφω, ἔν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀλλοίωσις κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. ἆρ’ οὖν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦ ἴῃ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ποίησις καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἀπαθοῦς αὐτοῦ ὄντος; ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ἀπαθὴς ᾖ, ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ ἐνεργοῦν εἰς ἄλλο, οἷον τύπτον, καὶ πάσχῃ, οὐκέτι ποιεῖ. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ποιοῦντα καὶ πάσχειν. εἰ οὖν κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πάσχειν, οἷον τὸ τρίβειν, διὰ τί ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχειν; ἤ, ὅτι ἀντιτρίβεται, καὶ πάσχει. ἆρ’ οὖν, ὅτι ἀντικινεῖται, καὶ δύο κινήσεις φήσομεν περὶ αὐτόν; καὶ πῶς δύο; ἀλλὰ μία. καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ποίησις καὶ πεῖσις;
But grant that it is not the opposite; still, since it is other than acting, it is not in the same genus as action. Or rather, if both are motion, they are in the same genus, as alteration is motion with respect to quality. Then, when alteration proceeds from the qualified thing, is it action and acting, the thing itself being unaffected? Or rather, if it is unaffected, it will be under acting, but if, acting on another—striking, for example—it is also affected, it no longer acts? Or rather, nothing prevents something that acts from also being affected. If, then, it is with respect to the being affected itself, as with rubbing, why is it acting rather than being affected? Or rather, because it is rubbed in return, it is also affected. Shall we say, then, that because it is moved in return there are two motions about it? And how two? It is one. And how is the same motion both action and affection?
ἢ οὕτω μὲν ποίησις τῷ ἀπ’ ἄλλου, [τῷ] εἰς ἄλλον δὲ πεῖσις ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα. ἀλλὰ ἄλλην φήσομεν; καὶ πῶς ἄλλο τι διατίθησι τὸν πάσχοντα ἀλλοιοῦσα καὶ ὁ ποιῶν ἀπαθὴς ἐκείνου; πῶς γὰρ ἂν πάθοι ὃ ποιεῖ ἐν ἄλλῳ; ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ποιεῖ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ ἦν οὐ πάσχειν κατὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα; ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ μὲν λευκαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ κύκνου, ὁ δὲ λευκαίνεται ὁ γιγνόμενος κύκνος, πάσχειν φήσομεν ἰόντα εἰς οὐσίαν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερον λευκαίνοιτο γενόμενος, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν αὔξοι, τὸ δὲ αὔξοιτο, τὸ αὐξανόμενον πάσχειν; ἢ μόνον ἐν τῷ ποιῷ τὴν πεῖσιν; ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ποιοῖ, τὸ δὲ καλλύνοιτο, τὸ καλλυνόμενον πάσχειν;
Or rather, it is action in this way, by being from one thing, and affection by being into another, while being the same. But shall we say it is different? And how does it dispose what is affected in a different way by altering it, while the agent is unaffected by that? For how could the agent be affected by what it produces in another? Is it, then, the motion’s being in another that makes it being affected, when in the agent it was not being affected? But if the rational principle of the swan whitens, and the swan that is coming to be is whitened, shall we say it is affected as it proceeds to substance? And if it were whitened later too, once it had come to be? And if one thing caused growth and the other grew, is what grows affected? Or is affection only in quality? But if one thing made beautiful and the other were beautified, is what is beautified affected?
εἰ οὖν τὸ καλλῦνον χεῖρον γίγνοιτο ἢ καὶ ἀφανίζοιτο, οἷον ὁ καττίτερος, τὸ δὲ βέλτιον γίγνοιτο, ὁ χαλκός, πάσχειν τὸν χαλκὸν φήσομεν, τὸν δὲ ποιεῖν; τὸν δὲ μανθάνοντα πῶς πάσχειν τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐνεργείας εἰς αὐτὸν ἰούσης; ἢ πάθησις πῶς ἂν εἴη μία γε οὖσα; ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ μὲν οὐ πάθησις, ὁ δὲ ἔχων πάσχων ἔσται, τοῦ πάσχειν τινὸς λαμβανομένου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἐνηργηκέναι αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν, ὥσπερ τὸ πληγῆναι, ἐν ἀντιλήψει ὂν καὶ γνωρίσει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν.
If, then, what does the beautifying became worse or even disappeared, like tin, while the other became better—the copper—shall we say that the copper is affected and the tin acts? And how is the learner affected, when the agent’s activity enters him? Or how could it be an affection, being one and the same activity? Rather, the activity itself is not an affection, but the one who has it will be affected, taking “being affected” in some sense—and not because he has not been active himself. For learning, which lies in apprehension and recognition, is not like being struck, any more than seeing is.
τίνι οὖν γνωριοῦμεν τὸ πάσχειν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τῇ παρ’ ἄλλου, εἰ ὁ τὴν ἐνέργειαν παραδεξάμενος αὑτοῦ ἐποιήσατο διαδεξάμενος. ἀλλ’ ἆρα ὅπου μὴ ἐνέργεια, πεῖσις δὲ μόνον; τί οὖν, εἰ κάλλιον γίγνοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ χεῖρον ἔχοι; ἢ εἰ κατὰ κακίαν ἐνεργοῖ τις καὶ ἄρχοι εἰς ἄλλον ἀκολάστως; ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φαύλην καὶ πεῖσιν καλήν. τίνι οὖν διοριοῦμεν; ἆρα τῷ τὸ μὲν εἰς ἄλλον παρ’ αὑτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀφ’ ἑτέρου ἐν ἄλλῳ; τί οὖν, εἰ ἐξ αὑτοῦ μέν, μὴ εἰς ἄλλον δέ, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δοξάζειν; τὸ δὲ θερμανθῆναι παρ’ αὑτοῦ διανοηθέντος ἢ θυμωθέντος ἐκ δόξης μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος. ἢ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, εἴτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἴτε εἰς ἄλλο τι ὄν, κίνημα ἐξ αὑτοῦ.
How, then, shall we recognize being affected? Not by the activity coming from another, if the one who received the activity took it over and made it his own. Is it, then, where there is no activity, but only affection? What, then, if the thing affected became finer, while the activity had the worse part? Or if someone acted viciously and took the initiative against another without restraint? Or rather, nothing prevents an activity from being base and an affection fine. How, then, shall we distinguish them? Is it that the one goes from itself into another, while the other is from something else in another? What, then, if it is from oneself but not into another, like thinking or forming opinions? And what of being heated from oneself, having thought something or having become angry from an opinion, with nothing coming in from outside? Or rather, acting, whether it is in itself or directed into something else, is a motion from itself.
ἡ οὖν ἐπιθυμία τί καὶ πᾶσα ὄρεξις; ἢ ἡ ὄρεξις κινεῖται ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ, εἰ μή τις μὴ προσποιοῖ τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ κεκίνηται, ὅτι δὲ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο ἐγήγερται. τί οὖν διαφέρει τοῦ πεπλῆχθαι ἢ ὠσθέντα κατενεχθῆναι; ἀλλ’ ἆρα διαιρετέον τὰς ὀρέξεις λέγοντα τὰς μὲν ποιήσεις, ὅσαι νῷ ἑπόμεναι, τὰς δὲ ὁλκὰς οὔσας πείσεις, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν οὐ τῷ παρ’ ἑτέρου ἢ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ — ἀπείη γὰρ ἄν τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ — ἀλλ’ ὅταν μηδὲν συμβαλλόμενον αὐτὸ ὑπομείνῃ ἀλλοίωσιν τὴν μὴ εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγουσαν, ἥτις ἐξίστησι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, τὴν τοιαύτην ἀλλοίωσιν πεῖσιν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἔχειν; ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι θερμότητά ἐστιν ἴσχειν, εἴη δὲ τῷ μὲν εἰς οὐσίαν συντελοῦν, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν καὶ οὐ πάσχειν ἔσται.
What, then, is desire, and every appetite? Or rather, appetite is moved by its object, unless one leaves out what it was moved by and attends only to its having been aroused after it. Then how does it differ from having been struck, or pushed and knocked down? Should we, then, divide appetites, calling those that follow intellect actions and those that are pulls affections, and define being affected not by its coming from another or from oneself—for something might waste away within itself—but say that whenever a thing, contributing nothing itself, undergoes an alteration that does not lead to substance, one that displaces it toward the worse or not toward the better, such an alteration is affection and involves being affected? But if being heated is acquiring heat, and in one case this contributes to substance and in another does not, the same thing will be both being affected and not being affected.
καὶ πῶς οὐ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι διττόν; ἢ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς οὐσίαν συντελῇ, καὶ τότε ἄλλου πάσχοντος εἰς οὐσίαν συντελέσει, οἷον θερμαινομένου τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ὁ ἀνδριάς, ὃς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐθερμαίνετο, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ οὖν καλλίων ὁ χαλκὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ κατὰ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύει πάσχειν λέγειν· διττὸν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πάσχειν, τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ χεῖρον γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ βέλτιον, ἢ οὐδέτερον.
And how is being heated not twofold? Or rather, being heated, when it contributes to substance, will even then contribute to substance while something else is affected. The bronze, for example, is heated and affected, but the substance is the statue, which was not itself heated, except incidentally. If, then, the bronze is finer from being heated, or in being heated, nothing prevents us from saying it is affected; for being affected is twofold, one kind in becoming worse, the other in becoming better—or neither.
οὐκοῦν γίγνεται τὸ πάσχειν τῷ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῷ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὁπωσοῦν· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν οὖν ἢ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῷ κίνησιν τὴν ἀπόλυτον παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἢ τὴν τελευτῶσαν εἰς ἄλλο ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ὁρμωμένην ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένου ποιεῖν. καὶ κίνησις μὲν ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἡ διαιροῦσα τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, καθ’ ὅσον ποιεῖν, ἀπαθὲς τηροῦσα, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ διατίθεσθαι ἑτέρως ἢ πρότερον εἶχε, τῆς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὐσίας οὐδὲν εἰς οὐσίαν προσλαμβανούσης, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ πάσχοντος, ὅταν τις οὐσία γίνηται. γίνεται τοίνυν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν σχέσει τινὶ ποιεῖν, ἐν ἄλλῃ δὲ πάσχειν.
So being affected comes about by having in oneself the motion of being altered in any way whatever; and acting, then, is either having in oneself the absolute motion that comes from oneself, or the motion that sets out from what is called the agent and ends in another. There is motion in both cases, but the difference that divides acting from being affected keeps acting, insofar as it is acting, unaffected, while being affected consists in being disposed otherwise than before, the substance of what is affected gaining nothing toward substance; rather, when some substance comes to be, it is something else that is affected. So the same thing turns out to be acting in one relation and being affected in another.
παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷδε θεωρούμενον ποιεῖν ἔσται, κίνησις οὖσα ἡ αὐτή, παρὰ δὲ τῷδε πάσχειν, ὅτι τάδε οὕτως διατίθεται, ὥστε κινδυνεύειν ἄμφω πρός τι εἶναι, ὅσα τοῦ ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν, (εἰ μὲν παρὰ τούτῳ, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ παρὰ τῷδε, πάσχειν), καὶ θεωρούμενον ἑκάτερον οὐ καθ’ αὑτό, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος ‘οὗτος κινεῖ καὶ οὗτος κινεῖται’ καὶ δύο κατηγορίαι ἑκάτερον· καὶ ‘οὗτος δίδωσι τῷδε κίνησιν, οὗτος δὲ λαμβάνει’, ὥστε λῆψις καὶ δόσις καὶ πρός τι.
For considered in relation to this thing it will be acting, being the same motion, and in relation to that thing, being affected, because those things are disposed in this way. So it looks as if both are relatives, insofar as acting is related to being affected (if in relation to this one, the same thing is acting; if in relation to that one, being affected), and each is considered not by itself but together with the agent and the patient: “this one moves and that one is moved,” and each is two categories. And “this one gives motion to that one, and that one receives it,” so that there is receiving and giving, and relation.
ἢ εἰ ἔχοι ὁ λαβών, ὥσπερ λέγεται ἔχειν χρῶμα, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ἔχει κίνησιν; καὶ ἡ ἀπόλυτος κίνησις, οἷον ἡ τοῦ βαδίζειν, ἔχει βάδισιν καὶ ἔχει δὲ νόησιν. ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ τὸ προνοεῖν ποιεῖν, εἰ καὶ τὸ προνοίας τυγχάνειν πάσχειν· εἰς ἄλλο γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἡ πρόνοια. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ προνοεῖν ποιεῖν, καὶ εἰ περὶ ἄλλου τὸ νοεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο πάσχειν. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ ποίησις ὅλως οὐδὲ δεῖ πάσας ἐνεργείας ποιήσεις λέγειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν τι· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἡ ποίησις. τί οὖν; εἰ βαδίζων ἴχνη εἰργάσατο, οὐ λέγομεν πεποιηκέναι; ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἄλλο τι.
Or, if the receiver has it, as one is said to have a color, why doesn’t he also have motion? And with absolute motion, like walking: one has walking, and one has thinking too. We must also look into whether exercising providence is acting, if receiving providence is being affected; for providence is directed toward another and concerns another. Or rather, exercising providence is not acting either, even if the thinking concerns another, nor is the other thing being affected. Or rather, thinking is not acting either; for it does not go into the object of thought, but concerns it. Nor is it action at all; and we need not call all activities actions, nor say that they do something: action is incidental. What, then? If someone walking made footprints, don’t we say he has made them? Yes—but from his being something else.
ἢ ποιεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο ἑώρα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ποιεῖν λέγομεν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνειν καὶ ‘ἐνήργησε τὸ φάρμακον’. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις.
Or rather, he acts incidentally, and the activity is incidental, because he was not looking to that. For we speak of acting in the case of soulless things too—fire heats, for example, and “the drug has taken effect.” But enough about these matters.
Having and position
These categories apply to few things and reduce to the other categories.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν, εἰ τὸ ἔχειν πολλαχῶς, διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ τρόποι τοῦ ἔχειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀναχθήσονται; ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ὅτι ἔχει μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ὅτι ἔχει χρῶμα, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἔχει [υἱόν, καὶ ὁ υἱός, ὅτι ἔχει] πατέρα, καὶ ὅλως κτήματα. εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν ἐκείναις, ὅπλα δὲ καὶ ὑποδήματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, πρῶτον μὲν ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, διὰ τί, καὶ διὰ τί ἔχων μὲν αὐτὰ μίαν ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιεῖ, καίων δὲ ἢ τέμνων ἢ κατορύττων ἢ ἀποβάλλων οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ ἄλλας; εἰ δ’ ὅτι περίκειται, κἂν ἱμάτιον κέηται ἐπὶ κλίνης, ἄλλη κατηγορία ἔσται, κἂν κεκαλυμμένος ᾖ τις.
As for having: if having is said in many ways, why won’t all the ways of having be referred to this category? Then quantity too, because it has magnitude, and quality, because it has color, and the father and the like, because he has [a son, and the son, because he has] a father, and in general possessions. But if the other kinds go under those other categories, while arms and shoes and what is on the body go here, one might first ask why. And why does having them make one further category, while burning them or cutting them or burying them or throwing them away does not make another, or others? If it is because they are placed around the body, then a cloak lying on a bed will be another category, and so will someone being covered.
εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν κάθεξιν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν, δηλονότι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα [τὰ] κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν λεγόμενα καὶ εἰς ἕξιν αὐτά, ὅπου ποτὲ ἡ ἕξις, ἀνακτέον· οὐ γὰρ διοίσει κατὰ τὸ ἐχόμενον. εἰ μέντοι ποιότητα ἔχειν οὐ δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι ἤδη ποιότης εἴρηται, οὐδὲ ποσότητα ἔχειν, ὅτι ποσότης, οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχειν, ὅτι οὐσία εἴρηται· διὰ τί δὲ ὅπλα ἔχειν εἰρημένης οὐσίας, ἐν ᾗ ταῦτα; οὐσία γὰρ ὑπόδημα καὶ ὅπλα. πῶς δ’ ὅλως ἁπλοῦν καὶ μιᾶς κατηγορίας ‘ὅδε ὅπλα ἔχει;’ τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ὡπλίσθαι. ἔπειτα πότερον ἐπὶ ζῶντος μόνον ἢ κἂν ἀνδριὰς ᾖ, ὅτῳ ταῦτα; ἄλλως γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ ἴσως ὁμωνύμως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἕστηκεν ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν οὐ ταὐτόν. ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγοις πῶς εὔλογον ἔχειν κατηγορίαν γενικὴν ἄλλην;
But if it is according to the holding itself and the having, then clearly all the other [things] said in terms of having must also be referred to having, wherever having belongs; for it will make no difference what is had. If, however, we must not speak of having a quality, because quality has already been mentioned, nor of having a quantity, because quantity has been, nor of having parts, because substance has been, why speak of having arms, when substance, to which these belong, has been mentioned? For a shoe and arms are substance. And how is “this man has arms” simple at all, and of a single category? For it signifies being armed. Then, is it only of a living being, or also if it is a statue that has them? For each seems to have them in a different way, and perhaps homonymously; for “stands,” too, is not the same in both cases. And further, how is it reasonable for what occurs in few cases to have a separate generic category?
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κεῖσθαι, ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ αὐτὸ ὄν ⟨…⟩ ἀνακεῖσθαι, καθῆσθαι· καίτοι οὐ κεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς λεγομένων. ἀλλὰ ‘πὼς κεῖνται’ καὶ ‘κεῖται ἐν σχήματι τοιῷδε’. καὶ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἄλλο· τοῦ δὲ κεῖσθαι τί ἄλλο σημαίνοντος ἢ ‘ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν’, εἰρημένου τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ τόπου, τί δεῖ εἰς ἓν δύο κατηγορίας συνάπτειν; ἔπειτα, εἰ μὲν τὸ κάθηται ἐνέργειαν σημαίνει, ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τακτέον, εἰ δὲ πάθος, ἐν τῷ πεπονθέναι ἢ πάσχειν. τὸ δὲ ἀνάκειται τί ἄλλο ἢ ἄνω κεῖται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάτω κεῖται ἢ μεταξὺ κεῖται. διὰ τί δὲ ἀνακλάσεως οὔσης ἐν τῷ πρός τι οὐχὶ καὶ ὁ ἀνακείμενος ἐκεῖ; ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὄντος ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἀριστερός. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων.
As for position, this too occurs in few cases ⟨…⟩ reclining, sitting. And yet these are not spoken of as “lying” without qualification, but “they lie in a certain way” and “it lies in such-and-such a posture.” And posture is something else. And since “lies” signifies nothing other than “is in a place,” and posture and place have already been mentioned, why combine two categories into one? Next, if “sits” signifies an activity, it must be placed among activities; if an affection, under having been affected or being affected. And what is “reclines” but “lies up,” just as there is “lies down” or “lies in between”? And since reclining position is among relatives, why isn’t the one reclining there too? For since “right” is there, so are the one on the right and the one on the left. So much on these.
Against the Stoic categories
The Stoics’ one genus “something” and their placing of matter first are absurd.
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τέτταρας τιθέντας καὶ τετραχῶς διαιροῦντας εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα, καὶ κοινόν τι ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τιθέντας καὶ ἑνὶ γένει περιλαμβάνοντας τὰ πάντα, ὅτι μὲν κοινόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι, πολλὰ ἄν τις λέγοι. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀσύνετον αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλογον τὸ τὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόττον ἀσωμάτοις καὶ σώμασι· καὶ διαφορὰς οὐ καταλελοίπασιν, αἷς τὸ τὶ διαιρήσουσι· καὶ τὸ τὶ τοῦτο ἢ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὄν, ἕν τι τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἔστι τὸ ὂν μὴ ὄν — καὶ μυρία ἕτερα. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐατέον, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπισκεπτέον.
Against those who posit four genera and divide fourfold, into substrates, qualified things, things in a certain state, and things in a certain state relative to something, and who posit something common over them and embrace everything in one genus, a great deal could be said about their taking something common, one genus, over all. For this “something” of theirs is unintelligible and irrational, and does not fit both bodiless things and bodies; and they have left no differences by which to divide the “something.” And this “something” is either being or not-being. If being, it is one of the species; if not-being, being is not-being—and countless other objections. These we must leave for now, and examine the division itself.
ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες τὴν πρώτην αὐτοῖς δοκοῦσαν ἀρχὴν συντάττουσι τοῖς μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὑστέροις εἰς ἓν ἄγουσιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε ὂν ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι.
For in ranking substrates first, and here placing matter before the rest, they set what they take to be the first principle in the same rank as the things that come after their principle. And first of all, they bring the prior together with the posterior into one, though it is impossible for one thing to be prior and another posterior in the same genus.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου λαμβάνει τὸ εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ ἴσον εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἕκαστον ἔχει παρὰ τοῦ γένους, εἴπερ τοῦτο δεῖ γένος εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορούμενον· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ φήσουσι παρὰ τῆς ὕλης, οἶμαι, τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἓν ἀριθμοῦντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἐξαριθμοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦσι· διαφέρει δὲ ἀρχὰς λέγειν καὶ αὐτά. εἰ δὲ ὂν μὲν μόνον τὴν ὕλην φήσουσι, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάθη τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ ἐχρῆν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕν τι γένος προτάττειν· μᾶλλον δ’ ἂν βέλτιον αὐτοῖς ἐλέγετο, εἰ τὸ μὲν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάθη, καὶ διῃροῦντο ταῦτα.
For where there is prior and posterior, the posterior receives its being from the prior; but among things under the same genus, each has an equal share of being from the genus, if indeed a genus must be what is predicated in the what-it-is of its species. And they themselves, I think, will say that the others get their being from matter. Next, in counting the substrate as one, they are not enumerating the beings but looking for principles of the beings; and it is one thing to speak of principles, another to speak of the things themselves. And if they say that matter alone is being and the others are affections of matter, they ought not to have placed one genus before being and the others. Rather, it would have been better for them to say that the one is substance and the others affections, and to divide these.
τὸ δὲ καὶ λέγειν τὰ μὲν ὑποκείμενα, τὰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαφορὰν οὐκ ἔχοντος, ἀλλ’ ἢ τῷ μεμερίσθαι, ὥσπερ ὄγκον εἰς μέρη — καίτοι οὐδὲ μεμερίσθαι τῷ συνεχῆ λέγειν τὴν οὐσίαν βέλτιον λέγειν ἦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
And as for speaking of some things as substrates and of the others as the remaining kinds, when the substrate is one and has no difference except by being divided, as a mass is into parts—and yet it is not even divided, since they call substance continuous—it would have been better to say “the substrate.”
ὅλως δὲ τὸ προτάττειν ἁπάντων, ὃ δυνάμει ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐνέργειαν πρὸ δυνάμεως τάττειν, παντάπασιν ἀτοπώτατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν ποτε τάξεως ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τοῦ δυνάμει· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἄξει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἢ πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἀρχή, ἤ, εἰ ἅμα λέγοιεν, ἐν τύχαις θήσονται τὰς ἀρχάς. ἔπειτα, εἰ ἅμα, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐκεῖνο προτάττουσι; καὶ διὰ τί τοῦτο μᾶλλον ὄν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; εἰ δὲ ὕστερον ἐκεῖνο, πῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶδος γεννᾷ, ἡ ἄποιος τὸ ποιόν, οὐδ’ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ἐνέργεια· ἐνυπῆρχε γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι. καὶ ὁ θεὸς δεύτερος αὐτοῖς τῆς ὕλης· καὶ γὰρ σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης ὂν καὶ εἴδους.
In general, to place first of all what is potential, instead of placing actuality before potentiality, is utterly absurd. For the potential can never come to actuality if the potential holds the first rank among beings. It will not bring itself; either the actual must be prior to it, and then this is no longer a principle, or, if they say the two are simultaneous, they will leave the principles to chance. Next, if they are simultaneous, why don’t they rank the actual first? And why is this more being, and not that? And if the actual is later, how? For matter does not generate form, nor does what is without quality generate the qualified, nor does actuality come from the potential; for then the actual would have been in it already, and it would no longer be simple. And their god is second to matter; for he is a body, made of matter and form.
καὶ πόθεν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὕλην ἔχειν, ἀρχοειδὴς ὢν καὶ λόγος ἀσώματος ἂν εἴη ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σύνθετος, ἅτε σῶμα ὤν, ἄλλην ὕλην τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσάξουσιν. ἔπειτα πῶς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλη σῶμα οὖσα; οὐ γὰρ ἔστι σῶμα μὴ οὐ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος.
And where does he get his form? But if he has it even without having matter, then, being principle-like and a rational principle, god would be bodiless, and the active principle bodiless. But if even without matter he is composite in his substance, being a body, they will bring in another matter, god’s. Next, how is matter a principle, if it is body? For there is no body that is not many; and every body is made of matter and quality.
εἰ δὲ ἄλλως τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ὁμωνύμως λέγουσι σῶμα τὴν ὕλην. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπὶ σώματος τὸ τριχῇ διάστατον, μαθηματικὸν λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας τὸ τριχῇ, οὐχ ἓν λέγουσιν. ἔπειτα ἡ ἀντιτυπία ποιὸν ἢ παρὰ ποιότητος. καὶ πόθεν ἡ ἀντιτυπία; πόθεν δὲ τὸ τριχῇ διάστατον, ἢ τίς διέστησεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ τριχῇ διαστάτου ἡ ὕλη, οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τριχῇ διάστατον. μετασχοῦσα τοίνυν μεγέθους οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἁπλοῦν εἴη. ἔπειτα πόθεν ἡ ἕνωσις; οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸ ἕνωσις, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ ἑνότητος.
And if this body is body in some other sense, they are calling matter body homonymously. If what is common to body is extension in three dimensions, they mean mathematical body; if three-dimensionality with resistance, they are not saying one thing. Next, resistance is a quality, or comes from quality. And where does resistance come from? Where does extension in three dimensions come from, or who extended it? For matter is not in the definition of the three-dimensionally extended, nor three-dimensional extension in that of matter. So, having taken part in magnitude, matter would no longer be simple. Next, where does its unification come from? For it is not itself unity, but unified by participation in oneness.
ἐχρῆν δὴ λογίσασθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν προτάττειν ἁπάντων ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄογκον καὶ τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξαμένους εἰς τὰ πολλὰ τελευτᾶν καὶ ἐξ ἀμεγέθους εἰς μεγέθη, εἴ γε οὐκ ἔστι πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ἑνὸς ὄντος, οὐδὲ μέγεθος μὴ ἀμεγέθους· εἴ γε τὸ μέγεθος ἓν οὐ τῷ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἓν καὶ κατὰ σύμβασιν. δεῖ τοίνυν εἶναι τὸ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως πρὸ τοῦ κατὰ σύμβασιν· ἢ πῶς ἡ σύμβασις; καὶ ζητεῖν, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς συμβάσεως· τάχα γὰρ ἂν εὗρον τὸ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτῳ μὴ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἄλλου.
They ought to have reasoned that it is impossible to place mass first of all; what comes first is what is without mass, the One. They should have begun from the One and ended in the many, and gone from what is without magnitude to magnitudes—since there cannot be many if there is not one, nor magnitude if there is not what is without magnitude, given that magnitude is one not by being one itself, but by participating in the one, and by combination. So what is one primarily and in the strict sense must exist before what is one by combination; otherwise how is there combination? And they should have asked what the manner of the combination is; perhaps they would have found what is one not incidentally. By “incidentally” I mean what is not one of itself, but from another.
ἐχρῆν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τηροῦντας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ἐν τῷ τιμίῳ μὴ τὸ ἄμορφον μηδὲ τὸ παθητὸν μηδὲ τὸ ζωῆς ἄμοιρον καὶ ἀνόητον καὶ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον τίθεσθαι ἀρχήν, καὶ τούτῳ ἀναφέρειν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς αὐτοῖς εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκεν ἐπεισάγεται παρά τε τῆς ὕλης ἔχων τὸ εἶναι καὶ σύνθετος καὶ ὕστερος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. ἔπειτα εἰ ὑποκείμενον, ἀνάγκη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ ποιοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν ἔξω ὂν αὐτῆς παρέχει αὐτὴν ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς παρ’ αὐτοῦ πεμπομένοις εἰς αὐτήν. εἰ δ’ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ αὐτὸς εἴη ὑποκείμενος καὶ αὐτὸς σὺν αὐτῇ γενόμενος, οὐκέτι ὑποκείμενον τὴν ὕλην παρέξεται οὐδὲ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης αὐτὸς ὑποκείμενον· τίνι γὰρ ὑποκείμενα ἔσται οὐκέτι ὄντος τοῦ παρέξοντος ὑποκείμενα αὐτὰ ἁπάντων καταναλωθέντων εἰς τὸ λεγόμενον ὑποκείμενον;
They ought also, in any case, to have kept the principle of all things in its place of honor, and not to have made the shapeless, the passive, what has no share in life, what is mindless and dark and indefinite, the principle, and to have referred substance to it as well. For their god is brought in for the sake of appearances: he has his being from matter, is composite and posterior—or rather, he is matter in a certain state. Next, if matter is a substrate, there must be something else which, acting on it from outside, makes it a substrate for what it sends into it. But if god too were in matter, being himself a substrate and having come to be together with it, he will no longer make matter a substrate, nor will he himself, together with matter, be a substrate. For to what will they be substrates, when there is no longer anything to make them substrates, everything having been used up in what is called the substrate?
πρός τι γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν εἰς αὐτὸ κείμενον. καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὑπόκειται πρὸς τὸ οὐχ ὑποκείμενον· εἰ [δὲ] τοῦτο, πρὸς τὸ ἔξω· ὥστε παραλελειμμένον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν δέονται ἄλλου ἔξωθεν, αὐτὸ δὲ πάντα δύναται γίνεσθαι σχηματιζόμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ τῇ ὀρχήσει πάντα αὑτὸν ποιῶν, οὐκέτ’ ἂν ὑποκείμενον εἴη, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὰ πάντα. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ὀρχηστὴς οὐχ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς σχήμασιν — ἐνέργεια γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα — οὕτως οὐδὲ ἣν λέγουσιν ὕλην ἔσται τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑποκείμενον, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα παρ’ αὐτῆς εἴη· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα ὅλως ἔσται, εἴ γέ πως ἔχουσα ὕλη τὰ ἄλλα, ὥς πως ἔχων ὁ ὀρχούμενος τὰ σχήματα.
For the substrate is relative, not to what is in it, but to what acts on it as it lies there. And the substrate lies under in relation to what is not a substrate; [and] if so, in relation to what is outside; so this would have been left out. But if they need nothing else from outside, and the substrate can itself become all things by taking on shapes, like the dancer who makes himself everything in his dance, it would no longer be a substrate, but itself all things. For just as the dancer is not a substrate for his figures—the rest is his activity—so neither will what they call matter be a substrate for all things, if the rest comes from it. Or rather, the rest will not exist at all, if the rest is matter in a certain state, as the figures are the dancer in a certain state.
εἰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὅλως ὑποκείμενον αὕτη οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ ὕλη μόνον οὖσα τούτῳ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ὕλη· πρός τι γὰρ ἡ ὕλη. τὸ γὰρ πρός τι πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, οἷον διπλάσιον πρὸς ἥμισυ, οὐκ οὐσία πρὸς διπλάσιον· ὂν δὲ πρὸς μὴ ὂν πῶς πρός τι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός; τὸ δὲ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ ὕλη ὂν πρὸς ὄν. εἰ γὰρ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὃ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μὴ οὐσία, οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὴ οὐσία· ὥστε συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτιωμένοις τοὺς ἐκ μὴ οὐσιῶν οὐσίας ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν ἐξ οὐσίας μὴ οὐσίαν· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος καθ’ ὅσον κόσμος οὐκ οὐσία.
And if the rest will not exist, neither will this matter be a substrate at all, nor matter of beings; being matter only, by that very fact it is not even matter. For matter is a relative. And a relative is related to another, and to something of the same genus: double to half, for example, not substance to double. But how is being related to not-being, except incidentally? And what is by itself, matter included, is being related to being. For if it is potentiality, for what is going to be, and that is not substance, it would not be substance itself either. So it turns out that these people, who blame those who make substances out of non-substances, themselves make non-substance out of substance; for the cosmos, insofar as it is the cosmos, is not substance.
ἄτοπον δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ σώματα μὴ μᾶλλον οὐσίας, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον μὴ τὸν κόσμον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον, καθ’ ὅσον μόριον αὐτοῦ, οὐσίαν· καὶ τὸ ζῷον μὴ παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχειν τὴν οὐσίαν, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ὕλης μόνον, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάθημα ὕλης καὶ ὕστερον. παρὰ τίνος οὖν ἔσχεν ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἐψυχῶσθαι, καὶ ὅλως τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ὑπόστασις; πῶς δὲ ἡ ὕλη ὁτὲ μὲν σώματα γίνεται, ἄλλο δὲ αὐτῆς ψυχή; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλοθεν προσίοι τὸ εἶδος, οὐδαμῇ ψυχὴ ἂν γένοιτο ποιότητος προσελθούσης τῇ ὕλῃ, ἀλλὰ σώματα ἄψυχα. εἰ δέ τι αὐτὴν πλάττοι καὶ ψυχὴν ποιοῖ, πρὸ τῆς γινομένης ψυχῆς ἔσται ἡ ποιοῦσα ψυχή.
It is absurd that matter, the substrate, should be substance, while bodies are not more substance; and, still more than these, that the cosmos should not be substance, except only in respect of a part of it; and that the living being should get its substance not from soul but from matter alone, soul being an affection of matter and posterior to it. From what, then, did matter get its ensoulment, and in general where does soul’s existence come from? And how does matter sometimes become bodies, while another part of it becomes soul? For even if form came to it from elsewhere, soul would never come about when quality came to matter, only soulless bodies. And if something shapes it and makes soul, the soul that makes will be prior to the soul that comes to be.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ταύτην τούτων μὲν παυστέον, μὴ καὶ ἄτοπον ᾖ τὸ πρὸς οὕτω φανερὰν ἀτοπίαν φιλονεικεῖν, δεικνύντα, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς τὸ μάλιστα ὂν προτάττουσι καὶ τὸ ὕστατον πρῶτον. αἴτιον δὲ ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτοῖς ἡγεμὼν γενομένη καὶ πιστὴ εἰς ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θέσιν· τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίσαντες εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, εἶτα αὐτῶν τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλληλα φοβηθέντες τὸ μένον ὑπ’ αὐτὰ τοῦτο ᾠήθησαν τὸ ὂν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μᾶλλον τὸν τόπον ἢ τὰ σώματα νομίσειεν εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὅτι οὐ φθείρεται ὁ τόπος, νομίσας. καίτοι καὶ οὗτος αὐτοῖς μένει, ἔδει δὲ οὐ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μένον νομίσαι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἰδεῖν πρότερον, τίνα δεῖ προσεῖναι τῷ ἀληθῶς ὄντι, οἷς οὖσιν ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν.
But since there is much to be said against this hypothesis, let us stop here, lest it be absurd in itself to contend against so obvious an absurdity, showing that they rank not-being first, as if it were being in the highest degree, and the last first. The cause is that perception became their guide, and was trusted for positing principles and everything else. For having thought that bodies are the beings, and then, alarmed at their changing into one another, they took what remains beneath them to be being—as if someone were to think that place, rather than bodies, is being, because he thought place does not perish. And yet place too remains, on their view. But they ought not to have taken what remains in any way whatever as being; they should first have seen what must belong to what truly is—the characteristics whose presence also brings it permanence forever.
οὐδὲ γὰρ, εἰ σκιὰ ἀεὶ μένοι παρακολουθοῦσα ἀλλοιουμένῳ ἄλλῳ, μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκεῖνο· τό τε αἰσθητὸν μετ’ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τῷ πλήθει μᾶλλον ἂν τὸ ὅλον ὂν εἴη, ἢ ἕν τι τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον, ὑποβάθρα ἐκεῖνο μὴ ὂν πῶς ἂν ἐκεῖνο; πάντων τε θαυμαστότατον τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει πιστουμένους ἕκαστα τὸ μὴ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἁλωτὸν τίθεσθαι ὄν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀντιτυπὲς αὐτῇ διδόασι· ποιότης γὰρ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ τῷ νῷ λέγουσι λαβεῖν, ἄτοπος ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ τὴν ὕλην αὑτοῦ προτάξας καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτῇ δεδωκώς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὑτῷ. οὐκ ὢν οὖν ὁ νοῦς αὐτοῖς πῶς ἂν πιστὸς εἴη περὶ τῶν κυριωτέρων αὑτοῦ λέγων καὶ οὐδαμῇ αὐτοῖς συγγενὴς ὤν;
For even if a shadow always remained, accompanying something else that alters, it would have no more being than that thing. And the perceptible thing, made of matter together with many other things, would by its multitude be being as a whole more than any one of the things in it. And if the whole is being, how could that underlay, which is not being, be being? Most astonishing of all is that people who trust perception for everything should posit as being what cannot be grasped by perception. For they are not right to assign resistance to matter; that is a quality. And if they say they grasp it by intellect, it is a strange intellect that ranks matter before itself and gives being to matter, not to itself. Since, then, on their view intellect has no being, how could it be trustworthy when it speaks about things more sovereign than itself, and in no way akin to them?
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.
But enough has been said about this nature, and about substrates, elsewhere as well.
τὰ δὲ ποιὰ αὐτοῖς ἕτερα μὲν δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ λέγουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ δεύτερα κατηρίθμουν. εἰ τοίνυν ἕτερα, δεῖ αὐτὰ καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἶναι· εἰ τοῦτο, μὴ σύνθετα· εἰ τοῦτο, μηδ’ ὕλην ἔχειν, ᾗ ποιά· εἰ τοῦτο, ἀσώματα εἶναι καὶ δραστήρια· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν αὐτοῖς ὑπόκειται. εἰ δὲ σύνθετα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις ἀπλᾶ καὶ σύνθετα ἀντιδιαστέλλουσα καὶ ταῦτα ὑφ’ ἓν γένος, ἔπειτα ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἴ] τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι.
Their qualified things must be different from the substrates, and they say so; otherwise they would not have counted them second. If, then, they are different, they must also be simple; if so, not composite; if so, they must not have matter, insofar as they are qualified; if so, they must be bodiless and active, since for them matter underlies in order to be affected. But if they are composite, first the division is absurd, setting simple and composite against each other under one genus, and then placing one of them within the other species—as if someone dividing knowledge were to call one kind grammar, and the other grammar plus something else.
εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι, σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ συνθέτου ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἔσονται· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ λόγοι. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν μηδὲν εἶναι τοὺς λόγους ἢ ὕλην πως ἔχουσαν, τὰ ποιὰ δηλονότι πως ἔχοντα ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ γένει τακτέον. εἰ δὲ ἥδε ἡ σχέσις ἄλλη, τίς ἡ διαφορά; ἢ δηλονότι τό πως ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα ὑπόστασις μᾶλλον· καίτοι εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖ ὑπόστασις, τί καταριθμοῦσιν ὡς ἓν γένος ἢ εἶδος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ὂν δύναται εἶναι.
And if they say that qualified things are qualified matter, first, their rational principles, being enmattered but not coming to be in matter, will make something composite; yet they will exist before the composite that they make out of matter and form. So they are not themselves forms or rational principles. And if they say that the rational principles are nothing but matter in a certain state, they will clearly be saying that qualified things are things in a certain state, and these must be placed in the fourth genus. If this state is a different one, what is the difference? Or clearly the “in a certain state” is more of a reality here. And yet, if it is not a reality in that case too, why do they count it as one genus or species? For being and not-being cannot fall under the same.
ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ πως ἔχον; ἢ γὰρ ὂν ἢ οὐκ ὄν. καὶ εἰ ὄν, πάντως ἀσώματον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ὄν, μάτην λέγεται, καὶ ὕλη μόνον, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὐδέν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τό πως ἔχον· ἔτι γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐκ ὄν. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον λεχθὲν καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον. μόνον ὂν ἄρα ὕλη. τίς οὖν τοῦτό φησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη· εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτή, πὼς γὰρ ἔχουσα ὁ νοῦς — καίτοι τό πως ἔχουσα προσθήκη κενή — ἡ ὕλη ἄρα λέγει ταῦτα καὶ καταλαμβάνει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔλεγεν ἔμφρονα, θαῦμα ἂν ἦν, πῶς καὶ νοεῖ καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργα ποιεῖ οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε ψυχὴν ἔχουσα· εἰ δ’ ἀφρόνως λέγοι αὑτὴν τιθεῖσα ὃ μή ἐστι μηδὲ δύναται, τίνι ταύτην δεῖ ἀνατιθέναι τὴν ἀφροσύνην;
But what is this “in a certain state” that is attached to matter? It is either being or not being. If being, it is certainly bodiless; if not being, it is said in vain, and there is only matter, and the qualified is nothing. Nor is the “in a certain state” anything; it is still more not-being. And what was called the fourth, much more so. So the only being is matter. Who, then, says this? Surely not matter itself. Unless it is matter after all—for intellect is matter in a certain state—though “in a certain state” is an empty addition. So it is matter that says these things and grasps them. And if what it said were sensible, it would be a wonder how it thinks and does the work of soul while having neither intellect nor soul. But if it spoke senselessly, positing itself as what it is not and cannot be, to whom should this senselessness be attributed?
ἤ, εἰ ἔλεγεν αὐτή· νῦν δὲ οὔτε λέγει ἐκείνη, ὅ τε λέγων πολὺ τὸ παρ’ ἐκείνης ἔχων λέγει, ὅλος μὲν ὢν ἐκείνης, εἰ καὶ μόνον ψυχὴν ἔχοι, ἀγνοίᾳ δὲ αὑτοῦ καὶ δυνάμεως τῆς λέγειν τἀληθῆ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυναμένης.
To matter, if it were matter that spoke. But as it is, matter does not speak. The one who speaks, speaks with much that comes from matter: he belongs wholly to it—though he does at least have a soul—in ignorance of himself and of the power that is able to speak the truth about such things.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς πως ἔχουσιν ἄτοπον μὲν ἴσως τά πως ἔχοντα τρίτα τίθεσθαι ἢ ὁπωσοῦν τάξεως ἔχει, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα πάντα. ἀλλὰ διαφορὰν τῶν πως ἐχόντων φήσουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν τὴν ὕλην ὡδὶ καὶ οὕτως, ἄλλως δὲ ἐν τοῖς πως ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὲν ποιὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δέ πως ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιά. ἀλλὰ τῶν ποιῶν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἢ ὕλης πως ἐχούσης ὄντων πάλιν τά πως ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῖς ἀνατρέχει καὶ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἔσται. πῶς δὲ ἓν τό πως ἔχον πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης; πῶς γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἕν, τοῦ μὲν ποσοῦ, τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ;
As for things in a certain state, it is perhaps absurd to place them third, or in any rank at all, since everything is in a certain state with respect to matter. But they will say there is a difference among things in a certain state: matter is in a certain state in one way here, this way and that, and in another way in the things in a certain state; and further, the qualified things are in a certain state with respect to matter, while the things properly in a certain state are so with respect to the qualified. But since the qualified things themselves are nothing but matter in a certain state, on their view the things in a certain state run back again to matter and will be about matter. And how is “in a certain state” one thing, when there is so much difference within it? For how do three cubits and white come together into one, when one belongs to quantity and the other to quality? And how do “when” and “where”?
πῶς δὲ ὅλως πως ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πως ἔχων; οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς οὔτε τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ χρόνῳ, οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὔτε ὁ τόπος.
And how at all are yesterday and last year, and in the Lyceum and in the Academy, things in a certain state? And in general, how is time in a certain state? Neither time itself is, nor what is in time, nor what is in place, nor place.
τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πως ἔχον; ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ὁ ποιῶν πως ἔχων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλόν πως ποιῶν ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλὰ ποιῶν μόνον· καὶ ὁ πάσχων οὔ πως ἔχων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλόν πως πάσχων ἢ ὅλως πάσχων οὕτως. ἴσως δ’ ἂν μόνον ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι τό πως ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ πὼς ἔχον, ἀλλὰ ἔχον. τὸ δὲ πρός τι εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑφ’ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐτίθεσαν, ἕτερος λόγος ἦν ἂν ζητούντων, εἴ τινα διδόασιν ὑπόστασιν ταῖς τοιαύταις σχέσεσι, πολλαχοῦ οὐ διδόντων. ἔτι δ’ ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπιγενόμενον πρᾶγμα τοῖς ἤδη οὖσιν ἄτοπον συντάττειν εἰς ταὐτὸν γένος τοῖς πρότερον οὖσι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι, ἴνα καὶ ἥμισυ καὶ διπλάσιον.
And how is acting “in a certain state”? The agent is not in a certain state either; rather, he is acting in a certain way—or not being at all, but only acting. And what is affected is not in a certain state, but rather affected in a certain way, or simply affected thus. Perhaps “in a certain state” (literally “having in a certain way”) would fit only position and having—and with having, not “having in a certain way” but just “having.” As for relation, if they had not placed it under one genus with the others, there would be another discussion, asking whether they grant any reality to such relations, since in many places they do not. Further, it is absurd to rank a thing that supervenes on things already existing in the same genus as the things that existed before; for one and two must exist first, for there to be half and double.
περὶ δὲ τῶν ὅσοι ἄλλως τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἔθεντο, εἴτε ἄπειρα εἴτε πεπερασμένα, εἴτε σώματα εἴτε ἀσώματα, ἢ καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον, χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστων ἔξεστι ζητεῖν λαμβάνουσι καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων πρὸς τὰς δόξας αὐτῶν εἰρημένα.
As for all those who have posited the beings, or the principles of the beings, in other ways—unlimited or limited in number, bodies or bodiless, or both together—one may investigate each of them separately, taking into account also what the ancients said against their opinions.