Τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι κοινὴ μέν τις ἔννοιά φησιν, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν θεὸν ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ εἴ τις αὐτοὺς τὸν τρόπον μὴ ἀπαιτοῖ, μηδὲ λόγῳ ἐξετάζειν τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἐθέλοι, οὕτως ἂν καὶ θεῖντο καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦτο οὕτως ἀναπαύοιντο εἰς ἕν πως συνερείδοντες καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὐδ’ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ταύτης τῆς ἑνότητος ἀποσχίζεσθαι. καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται, ἡ [οὐκ] ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα συγκεφαλαιωθεῖσα, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστα πάντων προελθοῦσα καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνης τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα ὀρέγεσθαι τιθεμένης τε καὶ λεγούσης. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὕτη ἀληθὴς εἴη, εἰ τὰ πάντα εἰς ἓν σπεύδοι, καὶ ἓν εἴη, καὶ τούτου ἡ ὄρεξις εἴη.
That what is one and the same in number is everywhere at once as a whole is asserted by a common notion, when all people, moved by nature, speak of the god in each of us as one and the same. If one did not demand of them how, and had no wish to examine their opinion by argument, they would set it down just so; and with their thought active in this way, they would come to rest, leaning together, in a way, on what is one and the same, and they would not want to be split off from this unity. And this is the most secure principle of all, one our souls, as it were, cry out: [not] summed up from particulars, but coming before all particulars, and before that principle which posits and declares that all things desire the good. For that would be true in this way: if all things hasten toward one, and it is one, and this is what they desire.
τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο προιὸν μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα, ἐφ’ ὅσον προελθεῖν αὐτῷ οἷόν τε, πολλὰ ἂν φανείη τε καί πως καὶ εἴη, ἡ δ’ ἀρχαία φύσις καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἓν ὄντως ἄγει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεύδει πᾶσα φύσις, ἐφ’ ἑαυτήν. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ μιᾷ ταύτῃ φύσει τὸ εἶναι αὑτῆς καὶ εἶναι αὑτήν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μίαν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο οἰκεῖον· διὸ οὐδὲ ἔξω ζητεῖν αὐτὸ δεῖ. ποῦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος περιπεπτωκός; ἢ πῶς ἄν τις ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐξεύροι αὐτό; ἀλλὰ δηλονότι ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ὂν αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δὲ ὂν καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη ἑκάστῳ.
For this one, proceeding outward as far as it can proceed, would appear many, and in a way would be many. But the ancient nature, and the desire for the good—which is itself—leads back to what is really one, and every nature hastens toward this: toward itself. For the good for this one nature is to be its own and to be itself; and that is to be one. In this sense the good may rightly be called one’s own, which is why we must not seek it outside. Where could it be, fallen outside being? Or how could anyone find it in non-being? Clearly it is in being, since it is not itself non-being. And if it is being and in being, it would be in itself, for each.
οὐκ ἀπέστημεν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ’ ἐσμὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδ’ αὖ ἐκεῖνο ἡμῶν· ἓν ἄρα πάντα τὰ ὄντα.
So we have not departed from being but are in it, nor has it departed from us. All beings, then, are one.
λόγος δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἐξέτασιν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ λεγομένου οὐχ ἕν τι ὤν, ἀλλά τι μεμερισμένον, παραλαμβάνων τε εἰς τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τὰς ἀρχὰς λαμβάνων ἐμέρισέ τε τὴν οὐσίαν τοιαύτην εἶναι νομίσας, καὶ τῇ ἑνότητι ἠπίστησεν αὐτῆς ἅτε μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῶν τῶν οἰκείων τὴν ὁρμὴν τῆς ζητήσεως πεποιημένος. ἡμῖν δὲ ληπτέον εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ πάντη ὄντος λόγον οἰκείας εἰς πίστιν ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ νοητὰς νοητῶν καὶ τῆς ἀληθινῆς οὐσίας ἐχομένας.
Reasoning, setting out to examine this claim, is not something one but something divided. It brought the nature of bodies into the inquiry and took its principles from there; so it divided being, thinking being was like that, and disbelieved in its unity, because it did not launch its inquiry from the appropriate principles. We, for our account of what is one and is everywhere, must take principles appropriate to producing conviction: that is, intelligible principles for intelligible things, principles that hold fast to true being.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ μέν ἐστι πεφορημένον καὶ παντοίας δεχόμενον μεταβολὰς καὶ εἰς πάντα τόπον διειλημμένον, ὃ δὴ γένεσιν ἂν προσήκοι ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ ὂν ἀεί, [οὐ] διειλημμένον, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, οὔτε γινόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον οὐδέ τινα χώραν οὐδὲ τόπον οὐδέ τινα ἕδραν ἔχον οὐδ’ ἐξιόν ποθεν οὐδ’ αὖ εἰσιὸν εἰς ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένον, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνων λέγων ἄν τις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀξιουμένων συλλογίζοιτο ἂν εἰκότως δι’ εἰκότων εἰκότας καὶ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ποιούμενος.
There is, on the one hand, what is carried about, undergoes all sorts of changes and is spread out into every place, which it would be proper to call becoming rather than being. On the other hand, there is what always is, [not] divided, always the same in the same respects, neither coming to be nor perishing, having no region, no place, no seat, neither going out from anywhere nor entering into anything, but remaining in itself. Someone speaking about the former would reason from that nature and from what is held to be true of it, and would quite properly draw likely conclusions from likely premises, with likely arguments.
ὅταν δ’ αὖ τοὺς περὶ τὼν νοητῶν λόγους τις ποιῆται, λαμβάνων τὴν τῆς οὐσίας φύσιν περὶ ἧς πραγματεύεται τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων δικαίως ἂν ποιοῖτο μὴ παρεκβαίνων ὥσπερ ἐπιλελησμένος ἐπ’ ἄλλην φύσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐκείνης περὶ αὐτῆς τὴν κατανόησιν ποιούμενος, ἐπειδὴ πανταχοῦ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀρχή, καὶ τοῖς καλῶς ὁρισαμένοις λέγεται καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ πολλὰ γινώσκεσθαι, οἷς δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις ἔχεσθαι δεῖ τούτου, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο πάντα ἀνενεκτέον.
But when one gives accounts of intelligible things, one would rightly take the nature of the being one is dealing with and make it the starting point of the account, not straying off to another nature as if one had forgotten, but considering that being from itself. For everywhere the “what it is” is the starting point; and it is said that those who define well also come to know most of the accidental attributes. And in cases where everything is contained in the “what it is,” one must hold to it all the more, look to it, and refer everything back to it.
εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν ὄντως τοῦτο καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταται αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ γένεσις περὶ αὐτὸ οὐδεμία οὐδ’ ἐν τόπῳ ἐλέγετο εἶναι, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ οὕτως ἔχον ἀεί τε σὺν αὑτῷ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διεστάναι ἀφ’ αὑτοῦ μηδὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ὡδὶ εἶναι, μηδὲ προιέναι τι ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ εἴη, καὶ ὅλως ἔν τινι εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οὐδ’ ἀπαθές· πάθοι γὰρ ἄν, εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ· εἰ δ’ ἐν ἀπαθεῖ ἔσται, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
If, then, what really is is this, and is always the same and does not stand outside itself, and there is no becoming about it, and it was said not to be in place, then, being like this, it must always be with itself, and not stand apart from itself, nor have one part of it here and another there, nor have anything proceed from it. For then it would be in one thing after another, and in general in something, and not by itself, nor unaffected; it would be affected if it were in another. And if it is to remain in what is unaffected, it will not be in another.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἀποστὰν ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ μερισθὲν μηδὲ μεταβάλλον αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα εἴη ἓν ὅλον ἅμα ἑαυτῷ ὄν, τὸ αὐτὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς εἶναι ἂν ἔχοι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὂν μὴ αὖ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι. λείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν οὐδενὶ εἶναι, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἐκείνου μεταλαμβάνειν, ὅσα δύναται αὐτῷ παρεῖναι, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι.
If, then, without departing from itself, without being divided, without itself undergoing any change at all, it were in many things at once, being one whole together with itself, then it would have its being in many by being the same with itself everywhere—that is, by being by itself and yet again not being by itself. It remains, then, to say that it is itself in nothing, while the other things participate in it: those that can be present to it, and to the extent that they can be present to it.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἢ τὰς ὑποθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκείνας ἀναιρεῖν μηδεμίαν εἶναι τοιαύτην φύσιν λέγοντας ἤ, εἰ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιαύτη φύσις καὶ οὐσία, παραδέχεσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ μὴ μεμερισμένον, ἀλλὰ ὅλον ὄν, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρ’ αὐτὸ μηδενὸς ἀποστατεῖν οὐδὲν τοῦ χεῖσθαι δεηθὲν οὐδὲ τῷ μοίρας τινὰς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν μηδ’ αὖ τῷ αὐτὸ μὲν μεῖναι ἐν αὑτῷ ὅλον, ἄλλο δέ τι ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγονὸς καταλελοιπὸς αὐτὸ ἥκειν εἰς τὰ ἄλλα πολλαχῇ. ἔσται τε γὰρ οὕτως τὸ μὲν ἄλλοθι, τὸ δ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἄλλοθι, καὶ τόπον ἕξει διεστηκὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.
So we must either abolish those hypotheses and principles, saying there is no such nature, or, if that is impossible and there necessarily is such a nature and being, accept the original thesis: that what is one and the same in number, not divided but whole, stands apart from none of the things beside it. It needs no pouring out to do so; nor does it happen by portions of it going out, nor again by its remaining whole in itself while something else that has come from it leaves it behind and reaches the other things in many places. For in that way it would be in one place and what comes from it in another, and it would have a place separate from the things that come from it.
καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων αὖ εἰ ἕκαστον ὅλον ἢ μέρος· καὶ εἰ μὲν μέρος, οὐ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἀποσώσει φύσιν, ὅπερ δὴ εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ ὅλον ἕκαστον, ἢ ἕκαστον μεριοῦμεν ἴσα μέρη τῷ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἢ ταὐτὸν ὅλον πανταχοῦ συγχωρήσομεν δύνασθαι εἶναι. οὗτος δὴ ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἑλκύσας.
And again, with those things, there is the question whether each is a whole or a part. If a part, it will not preserve the nature of the whole, as has already been said. If each is a whole, either we shall divide each into parts equal to the thing it is in, or we shall grant that the same thing can be whole everywhere. This argument, then, is drawn from the thing itself and its being, bringing in nothing foreign, nothing from the other nature.
The god everywhere
Many lines from one center and Man in many men show the intelligible whole everywhere.
ἰδὲ δέ, εἰ βούλει, καὶ τόνδε τὸν θεόν· οὐ πῇ μὲν εἶναι, πῇ δ’ οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀξιούμενόν τε παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἔννοιαν ἔχουσι θεῶν οὐ μόνον περὶ ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πάντων λέγειν θεῶν, ὡς πανταχοῦ πάρεισι, καὶ ὁ λόγος δέ φησι δεῖν οὕτω τίθεσθαι. εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ, οὐχ οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος τὸ μὲν ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ὡδὶ ἔσται αὐτός τε οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθείη τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλά, ἀπολλύμενόν τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα οὐκέτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα ἔσται.
Consider, if you like, this god as well. We do not say he is in one place and not in another. It is held by all who have any notion of gods to say, not only about him but about all gods, that they are present everywhere; and reason says that this is how it must be posited. If, then, he is everywhere, he cannot be divided. Otherwise it would no longer be he himself who is everywhere; each part of him would be, one here, one there, and he would no longer be one. It would be as if a magnitude were cut into many pieces: it would be destroyed, and all the parts together would no longer be that whole. On top of that, he would be a body.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν αὖ ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον ἐν πάσῃ φύσει ἀνθρώπου ὁμοῦ τῷ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι. πάλιν δέ, εἰ ἄπειρον λέγομεν ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεπερασμένην· τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη, ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιλείψει; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιλείψει, ὅτι πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναται παρεῖναι, ἐπιλείψει τε καὶ ἔσται ὅπου οὔ. καὶ γὰρ εἰ λέγοιμεν ἄλλο μετ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὁμοῦ αὖ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ μετ’ αὐτὸ περὶ ἐκεῖνο καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο καὶ αὐτοῦ οἷον γέννημα συναφὲς ἐκείνῳ, ὥστε τὸ μετέχον τοῦ μετ’ αὐτὸ κἀκείνου μετειληφέναι.
If these things are impossible, then once again what was disbelieved has come to light, present in every human nature along with belief in god: that the same thing is everywhere at once as a whole. And again, if we call that nature unlimited—for it is certainly not limited—what else could this mean than that it will not run out? And if it will not run out, that it is present to each thing. For if it cannot be present, it will run out, and there will be somewhere it is not. Indeed, even if we were to say that there is something else after the One, what comes after it is together with it, around it and directed toward it, a kind of offspring joined to it; so that what participates in what comes after it has participated in that too.
πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, πρώτων τε καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων, καὶ οἷον σφαίρας μιᾶς εἰς ἓν κέντρον ἀνημμένων, οὐ διαστήμασι διειλημμένων, ἀλλ’ ὄντων ὁμοῦ αὑτοῖς ἁπάντων, ὅπου ἂν παρῇ τὰ τρίτα, καὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τὰ πρῶτα πάρεστι.
For the things in the intelligible are many, first and second and third, attached, as it were, to the one center of a single sphere, not divided by intervals but all together with one another; so wherever the third are present, the second and the first are present too.
καὶ σαφηνείας μὲν ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος πολλάκις οἷον ἐκ κέντρου ἑνὸς πολλὰς γραμμὰς ποιήσας εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ γενομένου ἐθέλει ἄγειν. δεῖ δὲ τηροῦντας ὁμοῦ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα πολλὰ γεγονέναι λέγειν, ὡς κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου οὐκ οὔσας γραμμὰς ἀφωρισμένας ἔστι λαμβάνειν· ἐπίπεδον γὰρ ἕν. οὗ δὲ οὐδὲ κατ’ ἐπίπεδον ἓν διάστημά τι, ἀλλ’ ἀδιάστατοι δυνάμεις καὶ οὐσίαι, πάντα ἂν εἰκότως κατὰ κέντρα λέγοιτο ἐν ἑνὶ ὁμοῦ κέντρῳ ἡνωμένα, οἷον ἀφέντα τὰς γραμμὰς τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν τὰ πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ κείμενα, ὅτε δὴ καὶ ἕν ἐστι πάντα.
For the sake of clarity, the argument often draws, as it were, many lines from one center, wanting to lead us to a conception of the multiplicity that has come about. But we must keep in mind that all the things said to have become many are together. Even there, in the circle, one cannot take the lines as marked off from each other: the plane is one. And where there is not even the one extension a plane has, but powers and beings without extension, all things could reasonably be said to be united, center by center, in one center together—as if the ends of the lines, lying at the center, had let the lines go; and then indeed all are one.
πάλιν δέ, εἰ προσθείης τὰς γραμμάς, αἱ μὲν ἐξάψονται τῶν κέντρων αὑτῶν ἃ κατέλιπον ἑκάστη, ἔσται γε μὴν οὐδὲν ἧττον κέντρον ἕκαστον οὐκ ἀποτετμημένον τοῦ ἑνὸς πρώτου κέντρου, ἀλλ’ ὁμοῦ ὄντα ἐκείνῳ ἕκαστον αὖ ἔσται καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσαι αἱ γραμμαὶ αἷς ἔδοσαν αὑτὰ πέρατα εἶναι ἐκείνων, ὥστε ὅσων μὲν ἐφάπτεται γραμμῶν τοσαῦτα φανῆναι, ἓν δὲ ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι. εἰ δ’ οὖν κέντροις πολλοῖς ἀπεικάσαμεν πάντα τὰ νοητὰ εἰς ἓν κέντρον ἀναφερομένοις καὶ ἑνουμένοις, πολλὰ δὲ φανεῖσι διὰ τὰς γραμμὰς οὐ τῶν γραμμῶν γεννησασῶν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ δειξασῶν, αἱ γραμμαὶ παρεχέτωσαν ἡμῖν χρείαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀνάλογον εἶναι ὧν ἐφαπτομένη ἡ νοητὴ φύσις πολλὰ καὶ πολλαχοῦ φαίνεται παρεῖναι.
Again, if you added the lines, they will each attach to their own centers, which they had left. Yet each center will none the less not be cut off from the one first center, but each will be together with it; and they will be as many as the lines to which they gave themselves as ends. So they appear as many as the lines they touch, yet all of them together are one. If, then, we have likened all the intelligibles to many centers referred back to one center and united in it, but appearing many because of the lines—the lines not generating them but revealing them—let the lines serve us for now as an analogy for the things touching which the intelligible nature appears to be many and present in many places.
πολλὰ γὰρ ὄντα τὰ νοητὰ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ ἓν ὄντα τῇ ἀπείρῳ φύσει πολλά ἐστι, καὶ πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ μέρος αὖ μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου. δέχεται δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰς αὑτὸ τὸ ὡς μέρους πρῶτον ἐνέργημα, ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τὸ ὅλον· οἷον εἰ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐλθὼν εἰς τόν τινα ἄνθρωπον τὶς ἄνθρωπος γίνοιτο ὢν αὖ ἄνθρωπος. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἀφ’ ἑνὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν πολλοὺς ἐποίησε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν πολλοῖς οὕτως, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν τι οἷον ἐνσφραγιζόμενον ἐν πολλοῖς.
For the intelligibles, being many, are one, and being one, they are many by their unlimited nature: many in one and one over many, and all together. It acts toward the whole with the whole, and toward the part, again, with the whole. The part receives into itself the activity first as the activity of a part, but the whole follows. It is as if Man, coming into a particular man, were to become a particular man while still being Man. The man in matter, then, has made from the one Man of the Form many men who are the same, and the same one thing is in many in this sense: there is one thing stamped, as it were, on many.
αὐτὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ ὅλον τὸ πᾶν οὐχ οὕτως ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτό. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ λευκὸν πανταχοῦ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστου ἐν παντὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος ἦ αὐτή· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ.
But Man itself, and each thing itself, and the whole All, are not in many in that way; rather, the many are in it, or better, around it. For white is everywhere in one way, and the soul of each is the same in every part of the body in another; and it is in this latter way that being too is everywhere.
We are all one
Turning inward, we find ourselves in being and one with all; matter’s participation explains this.
ἀνάγεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἀναβαίνομέν τε εἰς ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, καὶ νοοῦμεν ἐκεῖνα οὐκ εἴδωλα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τύπους ἔχοντες. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ὄντες ἐκεῖνα. εἰ οὖν ἀληθινῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχομεν, ἐκεῖνα ἐσμὲν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄντες. ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μόνον ἡμῶν, ἐκεῖνα, πάντες ἐσμὲν ἐκεῖνα. ὁμοῦ ἄρα ὄντες μετὰ πάντων ἐσμὲν ἐκεῖνα· πάντα ἄρα ἐσμὲν ἕν. ἔξω μὲν οὖν ὁρῶντες ἢ ὅθεν ἐξήμμεθα ἀγνοοῦμεν ἓν ὄντες, οἷον πρόσωπα πολλὰ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κορυφὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ εἴσω μίαν.
For what is ours, and we ourselves, are led back up to being; we ascend to it and to what comes first from it, and we think those things, not by having images or impressions of them. And if not that way, then by being them. If we participate in true knowledge, we are those things—not by taking them into ourselves, but by being ourselves in them. And since others too, not only we, are those things, we all are those things. So being together with all, we are those things; so we are all one. When we look outside, then, rather than to that from which we hang, we do not know that we are one—like many faces turned outward, with a single crown of the head turned inward.
εἰ δέ τις ἐπιστραφῆναι δύναιτο ἢ παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἢ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς αὐτῆς εὐτυχήσας τῆς ἕλξεως, θεόν τε καὶ αὑτὸν καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ὄψεται· ὄψεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οὐχ ὡς τὸ πᾶν, εἶτ’ οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ αὑτὸν στήσας ὁριεῖται, μέχρι τίνος αὐτός ἐστιν, ἀφεὶς περιγράφειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἅπαντος αὑτὸν εἰς ἅπαν τὸ πᾶν ἥξει προελθὼν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ μείνας, οὗ ἵδρυται τὸ πᾶν.
But if someone could turn around—either by himself, or with the good luck of being pulled by Athena herself—he will see god, and himself, and the All. At first he will not see as the All. But then, having nowhere to set himself and fix how far he himself extends, he will give up marking himself off from all being and will come into the whole All, without going forward anywhere, but remaining right there where the All is established.
οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ εἴ τις ἐπισκέψαιτο τὴν τῆς ὕλης τῶν εἰδῶν μετάληψιν, μᾶλλον ἂν εἰς πίστιν ἐλθεῖν τοῦ λεγομένου καὶ μὴ ἂν ἔτι ὡς ἀδυνάτῳ ἀπιστεῖν ἢ αὖ ἀπορεῖν. εὔλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, οἶμαι, μὴ κειμένων τῶν εἰδῶν χωρὶς καὶ αὖ τῆς ὕλης πόρρωθεν ἄνωθέν ποθεν τὴν ἔλλαμψιν εἰς αὐτὴν γεγονέναι· μὴ γὰρ ᾖ κενὸν τοῦτο λεγόμενον. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ πόρρω ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ χωρίς; καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ δύσφραστον καὶ τὸ ἀπορώτατον ἦν τὸ τῆς μεταλήψεως λεγόμενον, ἀλλ’ εἴρητο ἂν προχειρότατα γνώριμον ὂν τοῖς παραδείγμασιν.
I think, too, that if someone examined how matter participates in the Forms, he would come more readily to believe what is being said, and would no longer disbelieve it as impossible or be at a loss about it. For it is reasonable and necessary, I think, that it is not the case that the Forms lie apart, and matter again far off, and the illumination reaches it from somewhere above—I suspect that is empty talk. For what would “far” and “apart” mean among these? And participation would not have been called hard to express and most puzzling; it would have been stated very readily, being familiar from examples.
ἀλλὰ κἂν ἔλλαμψιν λέγωμέν ποτε, οὐχ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν λέγομεν εἰς αἰσθητὸν τὰς ἐλλάμψεις· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ εἴδωλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ἀρχετύπων δὲ τάξιν ἔχει τὰ εἴδη, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐλλάμψεως τοιοῦτον οἷον χωρὶς ἔχειν τὸ ἐλλαμπόμενον, οὕτω λέγομεν. δεῖ δὲ νῦν ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντας μὴ οὕτω τίθεσθαι ὡς χωρὶς ὄντος τόπῳ τοῦ εἴδους εἰθ’ ὥσπερ ἐν ὕδατι ἐνορᾶσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὴν ἰδέαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην πανταχόθεν οἷον ἐφαπτομένην καὶ αὖ οὐκ ἐφαπτομένην τῆς ἰδέας κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτῆς ἴσχειν παρὰ τοῦ εἴδους τῷ πλησιασμῷ ὅσον δύναται λαβεῖν οὐδενὸς μεταξὺ ὄντος, οὐ τῆς ἰδέας διὰ πάσης διεξελθούσης καὶ ἐπιδραμούσης, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὑτῇ μενούσης.
Even if we sometimes speak of illumination, we shall not mean it as we speak, among perceptible things, of illuminations of one perceptible thing by another. We speak this way because the things in matter are images, while the Forms hold the rank of archetypes, and illumination is the kind of thing in which what is illuminated stands apart. But now, speaking more precisely, we must not suppose that the Form is apart in place and is then seen reflected in matter, as in water. Rather, matter, touching the Form from every side, as it were, and yet again not touching it, holds throughout the whole of itself, by its nearness to the Form, as much as it can receive, with nothing in between—the Form not passing through the whole of it and running over it, but remaining in itself.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστὶν οἷον πυρὸς ἡ ἰδέα — τὴν δὲ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑποβεβλημένην ὁ λόγος λαμβανέτω — αὐτὸ δὴ πῦρ οὐκ ἐγγενόμενον αὐτὸ τῇ ὕλῃ μορφὴν πυρὸς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν πυρωθεῖσαν ὕλην παρέξεται. ὄγκος δὲ πολὺς πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον ἔνυλον ὑποκείσθω γενόμενον. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων ἁρμόσει.
For if the Form of fire, for example, is not in matter—let the argument take the matter that underlies the elements—then Fire itself, without itself coming to be in the matter, will supply the shape of fire throughout all the matter that has been set on fire. Let us suppose that a great mass has come to be, the first fire in matter. The same argument will fit the other so-called elements too.
εἰ οὖν τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο πῦρ ἐν πᾶσι θεωρεῖται παρέχον εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ [οὐ] τόπῳ χωρὶς ὄν, οὐ παρέξει ὡς ἡ ἔλλαμψις ἡ ὁρωμένη· ἤδη γὰρ [ἂν] εἴη που πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἐν αἰσθήσει, εἰ πᾶν αὐτὸ πολλὰ εἴη ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς μενούσης ἐν ἀτόπῳ αὐτὸ τόπους γεννῆσαν ἐξ αὑτοῦ· ἐπείπερ ἔδει τὸ αὐτὸ πολὺ γενόμενον φυγεῖν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἵν’ ᾖ πολὺ οὕτως καὶ πολλάκις μεταλάβῃ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκε μὲν ἑαυτῆς οὐδὲν τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ ἰδέα ἀσκέδαστος οὖσα, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατος γέγονεν ἓν οὖσα τὸ μὴ ἓν τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτῆς μορφῶσαι καὶ παντὶ αὐτοῦ οὕτω τοι παρεῖναι, ὡς [μὴ] ἄλλῳ μὲν μέρει αὑτῆς τόδε, ἄλλῳ δὲ ἄλλο μορφῶσαι, ἀλλὰ παντὶ ἕκαστον καὶ πᾶν.
If, then, that one fire is contemplated in all things, providing an image of itself, and [not] being separate in place, it will not provide that image the way the visible illumination does. For [in that case] all this fire that is in perception would already be somewhere, if the whole of it were a plurality of itself while the Form itself remained in what has no place, having generated places out of itself. For the same thing, in becoming many, would have had to flee from itself, so as to be many in this way and to participate many times in the same thing. And the Form, being unscattered, gave nothing of itself to matter. Yet, being one, it has not been made incapable of shaping what is not one by its own oneness, and of being present to the whole of it in such a way as [not] to shape this with one part of itself and that with another, but each thing and the whole with the whole of itself.
γελοῖον γὰρ πολλὰς ἰδέας πυρὸς ἐπεισφέρειν, ἵν’ ἕκαστον πῦρ ὑφ’ ἑκάστης ἄλλης, τὸ δὲ ἄλλης, μορφοῖτο· ἄπειροι γὰρ οὕτως ἔσονται αἱ ἰδέαι. εἶτα πῶς καὶ μεριεῖς τὰ γινόμενα συνεχοῦς πυρὸς ἑνὸς ὄντος; καὶ εἰ προσθείημεν τῇ ὕλῃ ταύτῃ ἄλλο πῦρ μεῖζον ποιήσαντες αὐτό, καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ μέρος τῆς ὕλης φατέον τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν τὰ αὐτὰ εἰργάσθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄλλην.
It would be absurd to bring in many Forms of fire, so that each fire is shaped by a different one, this by one and that by another; in that way the Forms would be unlimited in number. Then too, how will you even divide up what comes to be, when the fire is one and continuous? And if we added more fire to this matter and made it bigger, we would have to say that in that part of matter too the same Form produced the same effects; certainly not a different one.
καὶ τοίνυν εἰ πάντα γενόμενα ἤδη τὰ στοιχεῖα τῷ λόγῳ τις εἰς ἓν σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα ἄγοι, οὐ πολλοὺς φατέον τὴν σφαῖραν ποιεῖν κατὰ μέρη ἄλλον ἄλλῃ ἀποτεμνόμενον αὑτῷ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν μέρος, ἀλλ’ ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ποιήσεως ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ ποιοῦν οὐ μέρους αὐτοῦ ἄλλου ἄλλο ποιοῦντος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν πολλοὶ εἶεν, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἓν ἀμερὲς ἀναφέροις τὴν ποίησιν, μᾶλλον δ’ εἰ [μὴ] ἓν ἀμερὲς τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν σφαῖραν εἴη οὐκ αὐτοῦ χυθέντος εἰς τὴν σφαῖραν τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφαίρας ὅλης εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν ἀνηρτημένης.
Further, suppose someone brought all the elements, once they had come to be, together in thought into a single spherical shape. We must not say that the sphere is made by many makers, part by part, each cutting off a different part for himself to make. Rather, the cause of the making is one, making with the whole of itself, not with one part of it making one thing and another another. For in that way there would again be many makers—unless you referred the making to one partless thing, or rather, unless what makes the sphere were [not] one partless thing, the maker not being poured out into the sphere, but the whole sphere hanging from the maker.
καὶ ζωὴ τοίνυν μία τὴν σφαῖραν ἔχει ἡ αὐτὴ τῆς σφαίρας αὖ τεθείσης ἐν ζωῇ μιᾷ· καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοίνυν πάντα εἰς μίαν ζωήν· καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ τοίνυν μία, οὕτω δὲ μία, ὡς ἄπειρος αὖ. διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἔλεγον, οἱ δὲ αὑτὸν αὔξοντα τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς, φαντασθέντες ταύτῃ ἴσως, ὡς οὐδενὶ ἐπιλείπει, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ὃ ἔστι μένουσα, καὶ εἰ πλείων ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπέλιπεν ἡ δύναμις μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα αὖ ἐλθεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτον ἐν πάσῃ αὐτῇ εἶναι.
So one life, the same life, holds the sphere, and the sphere in turn is set within one life. So too all the things in the sphere go back to one life; and so all souls are one—one in such a way as also to be unlimited. That is why some called its nature a number, and others something that increases itself. Perhaps they imagined it in this way: that it fails nothing, but reaches to all things while remaining what it is; and that if the cosmos were larger, its power would not fail to reach to all of it again—or rather, the cosmos would be in the whole of it.
δεῖ δῆτα λαβεῖν τὸ αὖξον οὐχ ὡς τῷ ῥήματι λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιλείπει εἰς τὸ πανταχοῦ ἓν οὖσα· τοιοῦτον γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ ἓν ὡς μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον μεμετρῆσθαι ὅσον· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσεως ἄλλης τῆς τὸ ἓν ψευδομένης καὶ μεταλήψει ἓν φανταζομένης.
The “increasing,” then, must be taken not in the word’s ordinary sense, but as meaning that soul never falls short of being one everywhere. For its oneness is of such a kind that it is not the sort of thing measured as a quantity. That belongs to another nature, one that only pretends to oneness and appears one by participation.
τὸ δ’ ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον ἓν οἷον μήτε συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ πολλῶν, ἵνα [μὴ] ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπολωλὸς ᾖ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον ἕν, μήτε διειλῆφθαι πέρασιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐναρμοζομένων αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἐλαττοῖτο αὐτῶν μειζόνων ὄντων ἢ διασπῷτο βουλόμενον ἐπὶ πάντα ἰέναι, παρῇ τε οὐχ ὅλον πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ μέρεσιν αὑτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐκείνων, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἀγνοῇ ὅπου γῆς ἐστιν εἰς μίαν τινὰ συντέλειαν οὐ δυνάμενον ἰέναι ἅτε διεσπασμένον ἑαυτοῦ.
What is truly one, by contrast, is such as neither to be composed of many things—so that, if something were taken away from it, that whole one would [not] be destroyed—nor to be marked off by limits. Otherwise, when the other things were fitted to it, it would either be diminished, because they are bigger, or be torn apart in its wish to reach all of them; it would be present not as a whole to all things but by parts of itself to parts of them; and, as the saying goes, it would not know where on earth it is, unable to come together into any single whole, torn away from itself as it would be.
εἴπερ οὖν ἀληθεύσει τὸ ἓν τοῦτο, καθ’ οὗ δὴ καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἔστιν ὡς οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν, δεῖ αὐτὸ φανῆναι τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αὐτῷ φύσιν ἔχον τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἔξωθεν αὖ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦτο ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ, τούτῳ ἓν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι ἄπειρόν τε καὶ πλῆθος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὂν πανταχοῦ ὅλον φαίνεσθαι ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ἑαυτὸν περιέχοντα καὶ τὸν περιέχοντα αὐτὸν εἶναι οὐδαμοῦ αὑτοῦ ἀποστατοῦντα, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὑτῷ πανταχοῦ ὄντα. οὐ δή ἐστιν αὐτὸ οὕτως ἄλλου τόπῳ διειλημμένον· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἁπάντων ἦν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐδεῖτο αὐτὸ τούτων, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνου, ἵνα ἱδρυθῇ.
If, then, this one is to be truly one—the one of which “one” can actually be predicated as its very being—it must be shown to possess, in a way, the nature opposite to it, that of multiplicity, in its power. And by having this multiplicity not from outside but from itself and out of itself, it must by that very fact be really one, and have its being unlimited and multiple within its oneness. Being such, it must appear everywhere as a whole, as a single rational principle that contains itself and is itself what contains it, nowhere standing apart from itself, but everywhere in itself. So it is not divided off from something else by place. For it existed before all the things in place and needed none of them; they needed it, in order to be set firmly in place.
ἱδρυθέντα δὲ οὐκ ἀπέστησεν ἐκεῖνο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐν αὑτῷ ἕδρας· κινηθείσης γὰρ ἐκείνης ἀπώλετο ἂν αὐτὰ ἀπολομένης αὐτῶν τῆς βάσεως καὶ τοῦ στηρίζοντος αὐτά, οὐδ’ αὖ ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἀνόητον ἦν, ὥστε ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ διασπασθῆναι καὶ σωζόμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀπίστῳ δοῦναι ἑαυτὸ τόπῳ τῷ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι δεομένῳ.
But once they were settled, it did not move from its own seat within itself. For if that seat were moved, they would perish, since their base and what supports them would have perished. Nor was it so foolish as to part from itself and be torn apart, and, though safe in itself, to hand itself over to an untrustworthy place, a place that needs it in order to be kept safe.
μένει οὖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σωφρονοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ γένοιτο· ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἀνήρτηται εἰς αὐτὸ ὥσπερ οὗ ἐστι πόθῳ ἐξευρόντα, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θυραυλῶν Ἔρως παρὼν ἔξωθεν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐφιέμενος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαπῶν ἀεὶ οὕτως ὡς δύναται μετασχεῖν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ ἐνταῦθα ἐραστὴς οὐ δεχόμενος τὸ κάλλος, ἀλλὰ παρακείμενος οὕτως ἔχει. τὸ δὲ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μένει, καὶ οἱ [τοῦ] ἑνὸς ἐρασταὶ πολλοὶ ὅλου ἐρῶντες ὅλον ἔχουσιν οὕτως, ὅταν ἔχωσι· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ἦν τὸ ἐρώμενον. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἂν πᾶσιν ἀρκοῖ μένον; ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀρκεῖ, ὅτι μένει, καὶ καλόν, ὅτι πᾶσιν ὅλον.
So it remains in itself, in its right mind, and could not come to be in something else. Those other things hang from it, as if by longing they had found out where it is. And this is the Love who lingers at the door, always present outside, longing for the beautiful and content always to share in it as far as he can. For the lover here too is in this condition: he does not take beauty into himself, but lies beside it. But it remains by itself; and the many lovers of the one, loving it whole, possess it whole in this way, when they do possess it, since it was the whole that was loved. How then could it fail to suffice for all while it remains? Indeed it suffices precisely because it remains, and is beautiful because it is whole for all.
καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν πᾶσιν ὅλον· διὸ καὶ ξυνὸν τὸ φρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ μὲν ὧδε, τὸ δὲ ὡδὶ ὄν· γελοῖον γάρ, [εἰ] καὶ τόπου δεόμενον τὸ φρονεῖν ἔσται. καὶ οὐχ οὕτω τὸ φρονεῖν, ὡς τὸ λευκόν· οὐ γὰρ σώματος τὸ φρονεῖν· ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ὄντως μετέχομεν τοῦ φρονεῖν, ἓν δεῖ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι. [καὶ] οὕτως ἐκεῖθεν, οὐ μοίρας αὐτοῦ λαβόντες, οὐδὲ ὅλον ἐγώ, ὅλον δὲ καὶ σύ, ἀποσπασθὲν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου. μιμοῦνται δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαι καὶ πᾶσα σύνοδος ὡς εἰς ἓν τῷ φρονεῖν ἰόντων· καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστος εἰς τὸ φρονεῖν ἀσθενής, συμβάλλων δὲ εἰς ἓν πᾶς ἐν· τῇ συνόδῳ καὶ τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς συνέσει τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγέννησε καὶ εὗρε.
For understanding, too, is whole for all. That is why understanding is “common,” not partly here and partly there; it would be absurd for understanding to need a place. Understanding is not like white, since understanding does not belong to body. If we really do participate in understanding, it must be one thing, the whole of it together with itself in the same place. [And] so we have it from There, not by taking portions of it, nor with me having a whole and you a whole, each torn away from the other. Assemblies, too, and every gathering imitate this, as people coming into one in their understanding. Each of them separately is weak at understanding, but when they all join into one, in their coming together and in true comprehension they have generated understanding and found it.
τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ διείρξει, ὡς μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι νοῦν ἀπ’ ἄλλου [καὶ ἄλλου];
What, after all, will wall them off, so that one intellect is not in the same place as another [and another]?
ἀλλ’ ὁμοῦ ὄντες ἡμῖν οὐχ ὁμοῦ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· οἷον εἴ τις πολλοῖς τοῖς δακτύλοις ἐφαπτόμενος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου ἐφάπτεσθαι νομίζοι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν χορδὴν μὴ ὁρῶν κρούοι. καίτοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐφαπτόμεθα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐχρῆν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου μὲν ἐγώ, ἄλλου δὲ σὺ ἐφάπτῃ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέν, προσελθόντος δ’ ἐμοὶ ῥεύματος ἐκεῖθεν ἄλλου, σοὶ δὲ ἄλλου, ὥστε τὸ μὲν εἶναί που ἄνω, τὰ δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐνταῦθα· καὶ [δίδωσι] τὸ διδὸν τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα ὄντως λαμβάνωσι, καὶ δίδωσι τὸ διδὸν οὐ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ.
But though they are together, they don’t seem to us to be together—as if someone touching the same thing with many fingers thought he was touching different things, or struck the same string without seeing it. And yet we ought to have reflected on how we touch the Good with our souls. It isn’t that I touch one thing and you another; it is the same thing. Nor is it the same thing while one stream from There reaches me and a different one reaches you, so that it is somewhere up above and what comes from it is here. [It gives:] the giver gives to those who receive, so that they really receive; and the giver gives not to strangers but to its own.
ἐπεὶ οὐ πόμπιος ἡ νοερὰ δόσις· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διεστηκόσιν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς τόποις σώμασιν ἡ δόσις ἄλλου τῇ ἄλλου συγγενὴς καὶ εἰς [τὸ] αὐτὸ ἡ δόσις καὶ ἡ ποίησις, καὶ τό γε σωματικὸν τοῦ παντὸς δρᾷ καὶ πάσχει ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν εἰς αὐτό. εἰ δὴ ἐπὶ σώματος οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἐκ φύσεως οἷον φεύγοντος ἑαυτό, ἐπὶ πράγματος ἀδιαστάτου πῶς τὸ ἔξωθεν; ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄρα ὄντες καὶ ὁρῶμεν τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφαπτόμεθα αὐτοῦ ὁμοῦ ὄντες τοῖς ἡμετέροις νοητοῖς. καὶ κόσμος εἷς πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ· ἢ δύο κόσμοι αἰσθητοὶ ἔσονται ὅμοια μεμερισμένοι, καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ νοητή, εἰ οὕτως ἕν, ὡς αὕτη, οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἢ γελοιοτέρα ἔσται, εἴπερ τῇ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄγκος εὔλογος, ἡ δὲ μηδὲν δεομένη ἐκτενεῖ ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐκστήσεται.
For intellectual giving is not something sent along by escort. Even among bodies separated from one another in place, what one gives to another comes from their kinship, and the giving and the making are directed into the same whole; and the bodily part of the All acts and is acted on within itself, and nothing comes to it from outside. If, then, in the case of body, which by its nature flees, as it were, from itself, nothing comes from outside, how can there be an outside in the case of something without extension? So it is by being in the same place that we both see the Good and touch it, being together with our own intelligibles. And there is one cosmos There, far more so than here. Otherwise there will be two perceptible cosmoses, divided in the same way; and the intelligible sphere, if it is one in the way this one is, will be no different from it—or rather it will be more absurd, since this one has bulk by necessity and for good reason, whereas that one, needing nothing, will stretch itself out and stand outside itself.
τί δὲ καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ εἰς ἕν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἕτερον ἀπωθεῖ θάτερον τόπον οὐ παρέχον, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ὁρῶντες πᾶν μάθημα καὶ θεώρημα καὶ ὅλως ἐπιστήμας πάσας ἐπὶ ψυχῆς οὐ στενοχωρουμένας. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ οὐσιῶν φήσει τις οὐ δυνατόν. ἀλλ’ οὐ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄν, εἴπερ ὄγκοι ἦσαν αἱ ἀληθιναὶ οὐσίαι.
And what is there to prevent them from being in one? One does not push the other out by leaving it no room—just as we see that every piece of learning and every theorem, and all branches of knowledge generally, are not cramped for space in the soul. “But with beings,” someone will say, “it is not possible.” It would not be possible—if true beings were bulks.
ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀδιάστατον παρήκει παρὰ πᾶν σῶμα μέγεθος τοσοῦτον ἔχον; καὶ πῶς οὐ διασπᾶται ἓν ὂν καὶ ταὐτόν; ὃ πολλάκις ἠπόρηται παύειν τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἄπορον τῆς διανοίας περὶ [ταῦτα] τῇ προθυμίᾳ βουλομένου. ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ἤδη πολλαχῇ, ὅτι οὕτως· δεῖ δέ τινων καὶ παραμυθιῶν, καίτοι οὐκ ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλὰ μέγιστον εἰς πειθὼ ἦν ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις οἵα ἐστὶ διδαχθεῖσα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οἵα λίθος, οἷον κύβος τις μέγας κείμενος οὗ κεῖται τοσοῦτον ἐπέχων, ὅσος ἐστίν, ἐκβαίνειν οὐκ ἔχων τοὺς αὑτοῦ ὅρους μετρηθεὶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ καὶ τῇ συμπεριγραφείσῃ ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λίθου δυνάμει· ἀλλὰ οὖσα πρώτη φύσις καὶ οὐ μετρηθεῖσα οὐδὲ ὁρισθεῖσα ὁπόσον δεῖ εἶναι· ταύτῃ γὰρ αὖ ἑτέρα μετρηθήσεται· πᾶσά ἐστι δύναμις οὐδαμοῦ τοσήδε.
But how does what is without extension stretch across every body, when body has so great a size? And how is it not torn apart, being one and the same? This puzzle has been raised many times, as the argument in its eagerness tries to put an end to discursive thought’s perplexity about [these matters]. It has already been demonstrated in many ways that it is so; but some encouragement is needed as well. And yet not the least but the greatest help toward persuasion would be to be taught what that nature is like: that it is not like a stone, like some big cube lying where it lies, taking up as much space as its size, unable to step beyond its own boundaries, measured to just so much both in its bulk and in the stone’s power, which is circumscribed along with it. Rather, being a primary nature, not measured or defined as to how much it must be—for in that way it would in turn be measured by another—it is all power, nowhere of such and such a size.
διὸ οὐδ’ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς χρόνου ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνου σκιδναμένου ἀεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦ δ’ αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει ἀιδίῳ τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἰέναι χρόνου, οἱονεὶ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι δοκούσης εἰς σημεῖον ἀνηρτημένης καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεούσης πανταχῇ οὗ ἂν δράμῃ τοῦ σημείου αὐτῇ ἐμφανταζομένου αὐτοῦ οὐ θέοντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκείνης κυκλουμένης.
That is why it is not in time either, but outside all time. Time is always scattering into extension, while eternity remains in the same and is master, and by its everlasting power is greater than time, which seems to go on to many things. It is as it were a line that seems to go on to infinity, but hangs from a point and runs around it; wherever the line runs, the point appears in it, though the point does not run, but the line circles around it.
εἰ τοίνυν χρόνος πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένον ἐν οὐσίᾳ ἔχει τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἔστι δὲ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις οὐ μόνον τῷ ἀεὶ ἄπειρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, χρὴ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῆς δυνάμεως ἀντιπαραθέουσαν ἀποδοῦναι φύσιν ἀνταιωρουμένην καὶ ἐξηρτημένην ἐκείνης· ταύτης τὰ ἴσα πως τῷ χρόνῳ θεούσης πρὸς μένουσαν δύναμιν πλείω οὖσαν τῷ ποιεῖν ἐκείνη ἐστὶν ὅσον παρετάθη. τίς οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα ταύτης τῆς φύσεως καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε αὐτῇ μεταλαβεῖν, πάσης μὲν παρούσης, οὐ παντὶ δὲ πάσης ἐνορωμένης ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου; πάρεστι δὲ ταὐτὸν πάντη οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἔνυλον τρίγωνον ἐν πολλοῖς πλείω ὂν ἀριθμῷ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ ἄυλον αὐτό, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕλῃ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ τρίγωνον ἔνυλον, εἴπερ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἄυλον;
If, then, time is analogous to what remains in the same in being, and that nature is unlimited not only by being “always” but also in power, then alongside this unlimitedness of power we must posit a nature that runs beside it in turn, poised opposite it and dependent on it. As this nature runs a course in a way equal to time, over against a power that remains and is greater by its making, it is as much as it has been stretched out. What, then, is this nature that participates in that one as far as it is able to participate, while the whole of that one is present, though the whole is not seen in everything because of the incapacity of the substrate? It is present everywhere as the same, not as the triangle in matter is the same while being numerically many in many things, but as the immaterial triangle itself, from which the triangles in matter also derive. Why then is there not a material triangle everywhere, if the immaterial one is everywhere?
ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα μετέσχεν ὕλη, ἀλλὰ [ἄλλη] ἄλλο τι ἔχει, καὶ οὐ πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἡ πρώτη πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν, εἶτ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄλλα· παρῆν μέντοι παντί.
Because not all matter participated; [different] matter has something different, and not all matter is suited to everything. Not even the first matter is all suited to everything; it is suited to the first of the kinds, and then other things come on top of these. Still, it was present to all of it.
πάρεστιν οὖν πῶς; ὡς ζωὴ μία· οὐ γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς ἐν ζῴῳ ἡ ζωή, εἶτ’ οὐ δύναται εἰς ἅπαν φθάσαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ. εἰ δέ τις ζητεῖ πάλιν πῶς, ἀναμνησθήτω τῆς δυνάμεως. ὅτι μὴ ποσή, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρῶν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀεὶ ἔχει δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν βυσσόθεν ἄπειρον· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει ὕλην, ἵνα τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ ὄγκου συνεπιλείπῃ εἰς μικρὸν ἐλθοῦσα.
How, then, is it present? As one life. For life in a living thing does not reach up to a certain point and then prove unable to extend to the whole; it is everywhere. If someone asks again how, let him remember the power: that it is not a quantity, but that, dividing it to infinity in thought, one always holds the same power, unlimited from its depths. For it has no matter in it, such that it would give out along with the size of the bulk as it came down to something small.
ἐὰν οὖν λάβῃς ἀέναον ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπειρίαν, φύσιν ἀκάματον καὶ ἄτρυτον καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἐλλείπουσαν, ἐν αὑτῇ οἷον ὑπερζέουσαν ζωῇ, ἤ που ἐπιβαλὼν ἢ πρός τι ἀτενίσας οὐχ εὑρήσεις ἐκεῖ, τοὐναντίον δ’ ἄν σοι γένοιτο· οὐ γὰρ σύ γε ὑπερβήσῃ παρελθὼν οὐδὲ αὖ στήσῃ εἰς μικρὸν ὡς οὐκέτι ἐχούσης διδόναι τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπιλιπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἢ συνθεῖν δυνηθείς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἔτι ζητήσεις, ἢ ἀπειπὼν παρεκβήσῃ εἰς ἄλλο καὶ πεσῇ παρὸν οὐκ ἰδὼν τῷ εἰς ἄλλο βλέπειν. ἀλλ’ εἰ οὐδὲν ἔτι ζητήσεις, πῶς ποτε τοῦτο πείσῃ;
If, then, you grasp an ever-flowing unlimitedness in it—a nature unwearying and untiring, nowhere falling short, boiling over, as it were, with life within itself—then whether you fix your attention on some spot or gaze intently at something, you will not find it there; the opposite will happen to you. For you will not get past it and leave it behind, nor again will you come to a halt at something small, as though it had nothing left to give because it gave out little by little. Rather, either you will be able to run along with it—or rather, having come to be in the whole, you will seek nothing further—or else you will give up and turn aside to something else and fall, not seeing what is present because you are looking at something else. But if you seek nothing further, how will you ever experience this?
ἢ ὅτι παντὶ προσῆλθες καὶ οὐκ ἔμεινας ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ οὐδ’ εἶπας οὐδὲ σύ ‘τοσοῦτός εἰμι’, ἀφεὶς δὲ [τὸ] τοσοῦτον γέγονας πᾶς, καίτοι καὶ πρότερον ἦσθα πᾶς· ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ ἄλλο τι προσῆν σοι μετὰ τὸ πᾶν, ἐλάττων ἐγίνου τῇ προσθήκῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἦν ἡ προσθήκη — οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ προσθήσεις — ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. γενόμενος δέ τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὅταν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀφῇ. αὔξεις τοίνυν σεαυτὸν ἀφεὶς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάρεστί σοι τὸ πᾶν ἀφέντι, μετὰ δὲ ἄλλων ὄντι οὐ φαίνεται, οὐδ’ ἦλθεν, ἵνα παρῇ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἀπῆλθες (ὅτε οὐ πάρεστιν). εἰ δ’ ἀπῆλθες, οὐκ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ — αὐτὸ γὰρ πάρεστιν — οὐδέ ποι ἀπῆλθες, ἀλλὰ παρὼν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐστράφης.
Or rather: because you have come to the whole and did not stay in a part of it, and did not say, you too, “I am this much”; letting go of the “this much,” you have become whole—though you were whole before as well. But because something else was added to you besides the whole, you became less by the addition; for the addition did not come from being—you will add nothing to that—but from non-being. And someone who has come to be also out of non-being is not whole, except when he lets non-being go. So you increase yourself by letting the other things go, and once you have let them go the whole is present to you; but while you are with other things it does not appear. Nor did it come in order to be present; it was you who went away (when it is not present). And if you went away, it was not away from it—for it is present—nor did you go anywhere: you were present, and turned toward the opposite.
οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ πολλῶν παρόντων ἑνὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις, ὅτι ὁ εἷς ἐκεῖνος μόνος δύναται βλέπειν. ἀλλ’ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ θεοί, ὅτι παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, εἰς ἐκεῖνον δὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐπιστρέφονται καὶ πᾶσα γῆ καὶ πᾶς οὐρανός, πανταχοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μένοντα καὶ ἔχοντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὄντα μέχρι ψυχῆς καὶ ζωῆς ἀνηρτημένα καὶ εἰς ἓν ἰόντα ἀμεγέθει τῷ ἀπείρῳ.
That is how the other gods, too, though present to many, often appear to one, because only that one is able to see them. But these gods, “in all kinds of shapes, roam the cities”; whereas toward him the cities turn, and all the earth and all the heaven, everywhere resting on him and in him and having their being from him; and the things that truly are, down to soul and life, hang from him and go into one, by virtue of his unlimitedness, which has no magnitude.