Ἆρά γε ἡ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ τῷ παντὶ πάρεστιν, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τοῦ παντὸς τοσόνδε, περὶ τὰ σώματα φύσιν ἔχουσα μερίζεσθαι, ἢ καὶ παρ’ αὑτῆς πανταχοῦ ἔστιν; οὐχ οὗπερ ἂν ὑπὸ σώματος προαχθῇ, ἀλλὰ σώματος εὑρίσκοντος αὐτὴν πρὸ αὑτοῦ πανταχοῦ οὖσαν· ὥστε, ὅπου ἂν τεθῇ, ἐκεῖ εὑρίσκειν ψυχὴν οὖσαν πρὶν αὐτὸ τεθῆναι ἐν μέρει τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα τεθῆναι ἐν ψυχῇ οὔσῃ. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον πρὶν τὸ τοσόνδε σῶμα ἐλθεῖν πληροῦσα τὸ διάστημα πᾶν, πῶς οὐ μέγεθος ἕξει; ἢ τίς τρόπος ἂν εἴη τοῦ εἶναι ἐν τῷ παντὶ πρὶν τὸ πᾶν γενέσθαι τοῦ παντὸς οὐκ ὄντος; τό τε ἀμερῆ λεγομένην καὶ ἀμεγέθη εἶναι πανταχοῦ εἶναι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσαν πῶς ἄν τις παραδέξαιτο;
Is Soul present everywhere to the All because the body of the All is of a certain size, Soul having a nature that is divided among bodies? Or is it everywhere of itself—not wherever body has brought it, but with body finding it already everywhere before it? In that case, wherever body is placed, it finds soul there before it was itself placed in a part of the All, and the whole body of the All was placed in a Soul that already was. But if Soul extends that far before a body of that size arrives, filling the whole extent, how will it not have magnitude? Or what way could there be of its being in the All before the All came to be, when the All did not exist? And how could one accept that something said to be without parts and without magnitude is everywhere without having magnitude?
καὶ εἰ τῷ σώματι λέγοιτο συνεκτείνεσθαι μὴ σῶμα οὖσα, οὐδ’ ὣς ἐκφεύγειν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῇ διδόναι· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ζητήσειεν εὐλόγως, ὅπως κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεγεθύνεται. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἡ ποιότης, οἷον γλυκύτης ἢ χρόα, κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ πάθη τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε πᾶν τὸ πεπονθὸς ἔχειν τὸ πάθος, καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ σώματος ὄν τι καὶ γινωσκόμενον τότε· διὸ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοσοῦτον, τό τε ἄλλου μέρους λευκὸν οὐχ ὁμοπαθὲς τῷ ἄλλου.
And if it is said to be extended along with the body without being body, even so one does not escape the puzzle by giving it magnitude incidentally; for here too one might reasonably ask how it acquires magnitude incidentally. Soul is not spread throughout the whole body the way a quality is—sweetness or color, for example. These are affections of bodies, so that the whole thing affected has the affection, and the affection is nothing by itself, being something belonging to body and known only then. That is why it is necessarily of that size, and the white of one part does not share the affection of another part.
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν εἴδει τὸ ἐπ’ ἄλλου πρὸς τὸ ἐπ’ ἄλλου μέρους, οὐ μὴν ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ ἀντιλήψεις· καὶ ὅμως ἐν μὲν ταῖς ποιότησι τὸ αὐτὸ μεμερισμένον θεωρεῖται, ἐπὶ δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μεμερισμένον, οὕτω δὲ μεμερίσθαι λεγόμενον, ὅτι πανταχοῦ. λέγωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς περὶ τούτων, εἴ τι ἡμῖν σαφὲς καὶ εὐπαράδεκτον γένοιτο, πῶς ἀσώματος καὶ ἀμεγέθης οὖσα δύναται εἰς πλεῖστον ἰέναι εἴτε πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἴτ’ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι. τάχα δέ, εἰ φανείη καὶ πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦτο δύνασθαι, ῥᾴδιον ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων παραδέξασθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον γένοιτο.
With white, what is in one part is the same in species as what is in another, but not the same in number; whereas with soul, what is in the foot and in the hand is the same in number, as our perceptions show. And yet in qualities the same thing is seen divided, while with soul the same thing is not divided, but is said to be divided in this sense, that it is everywhere. Let us, then, speak about these matters from the beginning, in case something clear and easy to accept may come to us: how, being incorporeal and without magnitude, it can reach to the greatest extent, whether before bodies or in bodies. Perhaps, if it should appear that it can do this even before bodies, it will become easy to accept the same in the case of bodies.
ἔστι δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀληθινὸν πᾶν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς μίμημα ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ ὁρατοῦ φύσις. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄντως πᾶν ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν, οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι πρὸ αὐτοῦ· ὃ δ’ ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο ᾖ, τοῦτο ἤδη ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἔσται, καὶ μάλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνου ἠρτημένον καὶ οὐ δυνάμενον ἄνευ ἐκείνου οὔτε μένειν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τις τιθεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον τὸν τόπον νοῶν ἢ πέρας σώματος τοῦ περιέχοντος καθ’ ὃ περιέχει ἢ διάστημά τι, ὃ πρότερον ἦν τῆς φύσεως τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ ἔτι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε οἷον ἐρείδεσθαι ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι πανταχοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου καὶ συνέχοντος, τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀφεὶς κατηγορίαν τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον λαμβανέτω.
There is the true All, and there is the imitation of the All, the nature of this visible world. Now what really is the All is in nothing, for there is nothing before it. But whatever comes after it must necessarily be in the All, if it is to exist at all, especially since it depends on it and can neither remain nor move without it. One might not place such a thing in it as in a place—understanding place either as the limit of the containing body insofar as it contains, or as a kind of extension that previously belonged to the nature of the void and still does—but rather by its being, as it were, propped on it and resting on it, since that is everywhere and holds it together. Even so, let him set aside what the word implies and grasp with his mind what is meant.
τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλου χάριν εἴρηται, ὅτι τὸ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὂν οὐ ζητεῖ τόπον, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἔν τινι. πᾶν δὴ τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀπολείπεται ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔστι πεπληρωκὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὂν ἴσον ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὗ τὸ πᾶν, ἐκεῖ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν αὐτό ἐστιν. ὅλως τε, εἴ τι ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἱδρύθη ἄλλο ὂν παρ’ ἐκεῖνο, μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ καὶ συντυγχάνει αὐτῷ καὶ ἰσχύει παρ’ αὐτοῦ οὐ μερίζον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ εὑρίσκον αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ αὐτὸ προσελθὸν ἐκείνῳ ἐκείνου οὐκ ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ γενομένου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τῷ ὄντι.
This has been said for the sake of something else: that that All, which is first and is being, does not seek place, nor is it in anything at all. The whole All, then, cannot possibly fall short of itself; it has filled itself and is equal to itself; and where the All is, there it is, for it is the All. And in general, if something other than it has been set in the All, it participates in it, meets it, and draws strength from it—not dividing it, but finding it in itself, having itself approached it, while that has not come outside itself. For being cannot be in non-being; rather, if anything, non-being is in being.
ὅλῳ οὖν ἐντυγχάνει τῷ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀποσπᾶσθαι αὐτὸ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸ πανταχοῦ δὲ λέγεσθαι εἶναι αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐν τῷ ὄντι· ὥστε ἐν αὑτῷ.
So it meets being whole; for being could not be torn away from itself. And its being said to be everywhere shows that it is in being; and so in itself.
καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τὸ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ· ἤδη γὰρ γίνεται τὸ πανταχοῦ ἐν ἑνί. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ὂν ἐν αἰσθητῷ θέμενοι καὶ τὸ πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖ τιθέμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἀποροῦμεν, πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ τοσούτῳ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκτείνεται· τὸ δέ ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν, ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρόν, ἐκεῖνο μέγα, εἴ γε ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τούτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὑρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτοῦ.
And it is no wonder if what is everywhere is in being and in itself; for then “everywhere” comes to be in one. But we, having placed being in the sensible, place “everywhere” there too; and thinking the sensible great, we are puzzled how that nature extends over something great and so large. But what is called great is small, and what is thought small is great, if indeed it reaches whole to every part of this—or rather, this, coming to it from every side with its parts, finds it everywhere whole and greater than itself.
ὅθεν ὡς οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐκτάσει πλέον τι ληψόμενον· ἔξω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἐγίνετο· περιθεῖν αὐτὸ ἐβουλήθη, οὔτε δὲ περιλαβεῖν δεδυνημένον οὐδ’ αὖ ἐντὸς γενέσθαι ἠγάπησε τόπον ἔχειν καὶ τάξιν οὗ σώζοιτο γειτονοῦν αὐτῷ παρόντι καὶ οὐ παρόντι αὖ· ἔστι γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκεῖνο, κἄν τι αὐτῷ ἐθέλῃ παρεῖναι· ὅπου δὴ συνιὸν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς εὑρίσκει τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἔτι δεῖσθαι τοῦ πόρρω, ἀλλὰ στρέφεσθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὡς παντὸς ὄντος τούτου οὗ κατὰ πᾶν μέρος αὑτοῦ ἀπολαύει ὅλου ἐκείνου.
So, since it would gain nothing more by extension—it would come outside the All as well—it wanted to circle round it. And since it could neither embrace it nor get inside it, it was content to have a place and a position where it might be kept safe, neighboring it, which is present and again not present; for that is by itself, even if something wants to be present to it. And there the body of the All, coming together, finds the All, so that it no longer needs what is far off, but turns in the same place, since this is the All of which it enjoys the whole in every part of itself.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ἦν ἐκεῖνο αὐτό, προσχωρεῖν τε ἔδει ἐκεῖ καὶ εὐθυπορεῖν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ μέρει αὐτοῦ ἄλλῳ μέρει ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐκείνου καὶ εἶναι τὸ πόρρω καὶ ἐγγύθεν· εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ πόρρω μήτε τὸ ἐγγύθεν, ἀνάγκη ὅλον παρεῖναι, εἴπερ πάρεστι. καὶ ὅλως πάρεστιν ἐκείνων ἑκάστῳ, οἷς μήτε πόρρωθέν (ἐστι) μήτε ἐγγύθεν, δυνατοῖς δὲ δέξασθαί ἐστιν.
If that were itself in a place, the body would have to approach it and travel straight toward it, touching different parts of it with different parts of itself, and there would be far and near. But if there is neither far nor near, it must be present whole, if it is present at all. And it is present wholly to each of those things from which it (is) neither far nor near, but which are able to receive it.
ἆρ’ οὖν αὐτὸ φήσομεν παρεῖναι, ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἰέναι ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ λέγεσθαι εἶναι; οὕτω γὰρ τὰς ψυχὰς οἷον βολὰς εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μὲν ἱδρῦσθαι ἐν αὑτῷ, τὰς δὲ ἐκπεμφθείσας κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ κατ’ ἄλλο ζῷον γίνεσθαι. ἢ ἐφ’ ὧν μὲν τὸ ἓν τῷ μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν φύσιν ἀποσώζειν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐνταῦθα δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ᾧ πάρεστι παρεῖναι, οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὣς ἐκεῖνο μὴ ὅλως παρεῖναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται ἐκεῖνο τῆς δυνάμεως αὑτοῦ, ἣν ἔδωκεν ἐκείνῳ· ἀλλ’ ὁ λαβὼν τοσοῦτον ἐδυνήθη λαβεῖν παντὸς παρόντος.
Shall we say, then, that it is itself present? Or that it is by itself, while powers go out from it to all things, and in this way it is said to be everywhere? For this is how they say souls are like beams cast out, so that it is itself settled in itself, while the souls sent forth come to be in one living being after another. Or perhaps: in the cases where the one thing, because the recipient does not preserve the whole nature that is in that one itself, is present there as a power of it to what it is present to—even so it is not that that one is not wholly present, since even then it is not cut off from its power, which it gave to that thing; rather, the recipient was able to receive only so much, though the whole was present.
οὗ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις, αὐτὸ σαφῶς πάρεστι χωριστὸν ὅμως ὄν· γενόμενον μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε εἶδος ἀπέστη ἂν τοῦ τε πᾶν εἶναι τοῦ τε εἶναι ἐν αὑτῷ πανταχοῦ, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλου. μηδενὸς δὲ ὂν τοῦ θέλοντος αὐτοῦ εἶναι ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐθέλῃ ὡς δύναται πελάζει οὐ γενόμενον ἐκείνου, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου ἐφιεμένου αὐτοῦ, οὐδ’ αὖ ἄλλου. θαυμαστὸν οὖν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι, ὅτι αὖ ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν αὐτῶν οὕτως ὡς ἐκείνων εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτω λέγειν συμπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄτοπον ἴσως, εἰ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς λέγοιτο εἶναι οὐχ ὕλης γενομένη οὐδὲ σώματος, τὸ δὲ σῶμα πᾶν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ οἱονεὶ ἐλλάμποιτο.
But where all the powers are, it is itself plainly present, though still separate. For if it had become the form of this particular thing, it would have ceased to be all and to be everywhere in itself, and would belong to anything else only incidentally. But belonging to none of the things that want it to belong to them, it draws near, as each is able, to whatever wants it, not becoming that thing’s, but with that thing longing for it—nor anyone else’s either. So it is no wonder that it is in all things in this way, because, again, it is in none of them in such a way as to belong to them. That is why it is perhaps not absurd to say that soul too shares the body’s affections incidentally, in this sense: if it were said to be by itself, not having become matter’s or body’s, while the whole body is, as it were, illuminated by it throughout.
θαυμάζειν δὲ οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι πάρεστιν· ἦν γὰρ ἂν τοὐναντίον θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον πρὸς τῷ θαυμαστῷ, εἰ τόπον καὶ αὐτὸ ἔχον οἰκεῖον παρῆν ἄλλῳ τῳ ἐν τόπῳ, ἢ ὅλως παρῆν, καὶ παρῆν οὕτως, ὥς τοι ἡμεῖς φαμεν. νῦν δέ φησιν ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι ᾧ πάρεστι τούτῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι, παντὶ δὲ παρὸν ὡς καὶ ἑκάστῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι. ἢ ἔσται αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοθι· ὥστε μεριστὸν ἔσται καὶ σῶμα ἔσται. πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ μεριεῖς; ἆρά γε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωή, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται. ἀλλὰ τὸν νοῦν, ἵν’ ὁ μὲν ᾖ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ; ἀλλ’ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν νοῦς ἔσται.
One should not wonder if it, not being in place, is present to everything that is in place. On the contrary, it would be a wonder—and impossible on top of being a wonder—if, having a place of its own, it were present to something else in place, or present at all, and present in the way we say. As it is, the argument says that, since it has been allotted no place, it must be present whole to whatever it is present to, and, being present to all, must be present whole to each. Otherwise one part of it will be here, another elsewhere, so that it will be divisible and will be body. And how in fact will you divide it? Will you divide its life? But if the whole was life, the part will not be life. Its intellect, then, so that one bit is in one thing, another in another? But neither of them will be intellect.
ἀλλὰ τὸ ὂν αὐτοῦ; ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ὂν ἔσται, εἰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ὂν ὑπῆρχε. τί οὖν, εἴ τις λέγοι καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεριζόμενον καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν σώματα ὄντα; ἢ ὁ μερισμὸς ἦν οὐ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦδε σώματος, καὶ σῶμα ἕκαστον ἐλέγετο τῷ εἴδει καθ’ ὃ σῶμα· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εἶχε τοσόνδε τι, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὁπωσοῦν τοσόνδε.
Its being, then? But the part will not be being, if the whole was being. What if someone says that body too is divided, and its parts are bodies? But the division was not of body, but of a body of a certain size, and each part was called body by the form in virtue of which it is body; and this form had no particular size—indeed, no size of any kind.
Many souls, one soul
Being and souls are many by otherness, not by place, and remain one.
πῶς οὖν τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ νοῦς πολλοὺς καὶ ψυχὰς πολλάς, εἰ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ἓν καὶ μὴ ὡς ὁμοειδὲς καὶ νοῦς εἷς καὶ ψυχὴ μία; καίτοι ἄλλην μὲν τοῦ παντός, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας. ταὐτά τε γὰρ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴ τινα ἀνάγκην, ἀλλ’ οὐ πειθώ γε ἔχει ἀπίθανον νομιζούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἓν οὕτω πανταχοῦ ταὐτὸν εἶναι. βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μερίσαντα τὸ ὅλον ὡς μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι ἀφ’ οὗ ὁ μερισμὸς γεγένηται, ἢ καὶ γεννήσαντα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα δὴ βελτίοσι χρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν, οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἐᾶσαι ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ εἶναι, τὰ δ’ οἷον μέρη γενόμενα συμπληροῦν ἤδη τὰ πάντα.
How, then, are there being and beings, and many intellects and many souls, if being is everywhere one—and not as being of one species—and Intellect is one and Soul is one? And yet there is the Soul of the All, and there are the others. These facts seem to testify against us, and what has been said, even if it has some necessity, certainly does not carry persuasion, since the soul finds it unconvincing that the one is in this way the same everywhere. Perhaps it is better to divide the whole in such a way that what the division comes from is in no way diminished—or rather, to use better words, to generate from it—and so to let it be by itself, while the things that have come to be as its parts, so to speak, now fill up all things.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐκεῖνο μένει τὸ ὂν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ὅτι παράδοξον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα ὅλον τι πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἔσται, ἐν οἷς γὰρ λέγονται σώμασιν ὅλαι ἐν ὅλοις εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσονται, ἀλλ’ ἢ μερισθήσονται ἢ μένουσαι ὅλαι ποῦ τοῦ σώματος δύναμιν αὑτῶν δώσουσιν; ἐφ’ ὧν καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπορία ἔσται, εἰ ὅλον πανταχοῦ. καὶ ἔτι τὸ μέν τι ψυχὴν ἕξει τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ δύναμιν μόνον. ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῖ πολλοὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ὄντα; καὶ δὴ καὶ προιόντα ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἀριθμοὶ ὄντα, ἀλλ’ οὐ μεγέθη, ὁμοίως ἀπορίαν παρέξουσι πῶς πληροῦσι τὸ πᾶν.
But if that being remains by itself because it seems paradoxical for something whole to be present everywhere at once, the same argument will apply to souls too. In the bodies in which they are said to be whole in wholes, they will not be so; will they not either be divided, or, remaining whole somewhere in the body, give it their power? And with the powers the same puzzle will arise, whether the whole is everywhere. Further, one part of the body will have soul, another only power. But how are there many souls and many intellects, and being and beings? And indeed, proceeding from the prior things as numbers, not magnitudes, they will likewise raise the puzzle of how they fill the All.
οὐδὲν οὖν ἡμῖν παρὰ τοῦ πλήθους οὕτω προιόντος ἐξεύρηται εἰς εὐπορίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν πολλὰ συγχωροῦμεν εἶναι ἑτερότητι, οὐ τόπῳ. ὁμοῦ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὄν, κἂν πολὺ οὕτως ᾖ· ‘ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει’ καὶ πᾶν ὁμοῦ καὶ νοῦς πολὺς ἑτερότητι, οὐ τόπῳ, ὁμοῦ δὲ πᾶς.
So we have found nothing in a multiplicity proceeding in this way that leads to a solution, since we too grant that being is many by otherness, not by place. For all being is together, even if it is many in this way: “for being draws near to being,” and all is together. And Intellect is many by otherness, not by place, but is all together.
ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ψυχαί; ἢ καὶ ψυχαί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὸν λέγεται ἀμερὲς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, τὰ δὲ σώματα μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταύτης τῆς ψυχῆς φύσεως αὐτοῖς παρούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἐκεῖ γενομένων, ὅσον ἐστὶ μεμερισμένα κατὰ πᾶν μέρος ἐκείνης ἐμφανταζομένης τῆς φύσεως περὶ τὰ σώματα οὕτως ἐνομίσθη εἶναι μεριστή. ἐπεί, ὅτι οὐ συνδιείληπται τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἀλλ’ ὅλη πανταχοῦ, φανερὸν ποιεῖ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀμέριστον ὄντως τῆς φύσεως. οὔτ’ οὖν τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὰς πολλὰς ἀναιρεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν τὰ ὄντα, οὔτε μάχεται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκεῖ τῷ ἑνί, οὔτε τῷ πλήθει συμπληροῦν δεῖ ζωῆς τὰ σώματα, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι καὶ πολλὰς καὶ μίαν.
Are souls, then, many in this way too? Yes, souls too. For what is called “divisible in bodies” is said to be undivided in its nature. Bodies have magnitude, and when this nature of soul is present to them—or rather, when the bodies come to be there—then, insofar as the bodies are divided, and since that nature shows itself in every part, it came to be thought divisible in bodies. But the fact that it is not divided along with the parts, and is whole everywhere, makes plain that its nature is one and really undivided. So its being one does not abolish the many souls, any more than being abolishes the beings. Multiplicity There does not fight with unity. Bodies do not need a multiplicity of souls to fill them with life. Nor should we think that the multiplicity of souls arises because of the size of the body: before there are bodies, souls are both many and one.
ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ αἱ πολλαὶ ἤδη οὐ δυνάμει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ ἑκάστη· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ μία ἡ ὅλη κωλύει τὰς πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, οὔτε αἱ πολλαὶ τὴν μίαν. διέστησαν γὰρ οὐ διεστῶσαι καὶ πάρεισιν ἀλλήλαις οὐκ ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαι· οὐ γὰρ πέρασίν εἰσι διωρισμέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ πολλαὶ ἐν ψυχῇ μιᾷ, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μία τοιαύτη, ὥστε ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ πάσας. οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄπειρος ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις.
For the many are already in the whole, not potentially but each one actually. The one whole soul does not prevent the many from being in it, and the many do not prevent the one. They are distinct without standing apart, and present to one another without becoming strangers. They are not marked off by boundaries, any more than the many branches of knowledge in one soul are; and the one soul is such that it holds them all in itself. That is how such a nature is unlimited.
καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτῆς οὕτω ληπτέον, οὐκ ἐν ὄγκῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ μικρόν ἐστιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἰόν, εἴ τις ἀφαιροῖ. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν, οὐδ’ εἰ ἀφαιροῖς ἐπιλείψει. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιλείψει, τί δεῖ δεδιέναι, μή τινος ἀποστατῇ; πῶς γὰρ ἀποστατεῖ οὐκ ἐπιλείπουσα, ἀλλ’ ἀέναος οὖσα φύσις οὐ ῥέουσα; ῥέουσα μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔρχεται, ἐφ’ ὅσον ῥεῖν δύναται, μὴ ῥέουσα δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὐδ’ ὅπου ῥεύσειεν ἔχοι· τὸ πᾶν κατείληφε, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτή ἐστι τὸ πᾶν καὶ μεῖζόν τι οὖσα ἢ κατὰ σώματος φύσιν. ὀλίγον γὰρ [ἂν] εἰκότως νομίζοιτο τῷ παντὶ διδόναι, ὅσον δύναται τοῦτο αὐτοῦ φέρειν.
And its greatness has to be understood in this way, not as bulk. Bulk is small: it goes to nothing if you keep taking from it. There, you cannot even take anything away; and if you did take something away, it would not run out. And if it will not run out, why fear that it might stand apart from anything? How could it stand apart, when it does not run out but is an ever-flowing nature that does not flow? If it flowed, it would go only as far as it could flow. But it does not flow—it would not even have anywhere to flow: it has taken possession of the All. Or rather, it is itself the All, since it is something greater than the nature of body allows. It would be reasonable, then, to think that it gives the All only a little: as much of itself as the All is able to bear.
δεῖ δὲ ἐκεῖνο μήτε ἔλαττον λέγειν, μηδὲ τιθέμενον ἔλαττον τῷ ὄγκῳ ἀπιστεῖν ἤδη, ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον αὐτοῦ ἰέναι τὸ ἔλαττον· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κατηγορητέον, οὐδὲ παραθετέον ὄγκον πρὸς ἄογκον ἐν μετρήσει — ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις ἰατρικὴν λέγοι ἐλάττω εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἰατροῦ — οὐδ’ αὖ οὕτω μεῖζον νομιστέον τῇ ποσοῦ μετρήσει· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ σώματος. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ μεγάλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μείζονος τοῦ ὄγκου γινομένου φθάνειν ἐπὶ πᾶν αὐτοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχήν, ἣ ἐπ’ ἐλάττονος ὄγκου ἦν. γελοῖον γὰρ πολλαχῇ, εἴ τις προσθείη καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ὄγκον.
But we must not call that “smaller,” nor, positing it as smaller in bulk, go on to disbelieve, as though the smaller could not extend over what is larger than itself. “Smaller” must not be predicated of it at all, and in measuring we must not set bulk beside what has no bulk—that would be like saying medicine is smaller than the doctor’s body. Nor, on the other hand, should it be thought larger by a measure of quantity; for not even with soul do “great” and “greater than the body” mean that. A further witness to the greatness of soul is this: when the bulk becomes larger, the same soul that was in the smaller bulk reaches over the whole of it. It would be absurd in many ways to attribute bulk to soul as well.
τί οὖν οὐκ ἐπ’ ἄλλο σῶμα ἔρχεται; ἢ ὅτι ἐκεῖνο δεῖ, εἰ δύναται, προσελθεῖν, τὸ δὲ προσεληλυθὸς καὶ δεξάμενον ἔχει. τί οὖν; τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει ἔχον καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν ἣν ἔχει ψυχήν; τί γὰρ διαφέρει; ἢ καὶ ταῖς προσθήκαις. εἶτα πῶς ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτήν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷδε τῷ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ἐν τῷδε; εἰ δὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις διάφοροι, καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ συμπίπτοντα διάφορα λεκτέον εἶναι.
Why, then, does it not go into another body? Because that body must come to it, if it can; and what has come and received it has it. What, then? Does the other body, having the soul it has, have the same soul? Where would the difference lie? Perhaps in the additions as well. And then, how is it the same soul in foot and hand, while the soul in this part of the All is not the same as the soul in that one? If the perceptions differ, we must say that the experiences that occur differ too.
ἄλλα οὖν ἐστι τὰ κρινόμενα, οὐ τὸ κρῖνον· ὁ δὲ κρίνων ὁ αὐτὸς δικαστὴς ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις πάθεσι γινόμενος, καίτοι οὐχ ὁ πάσχων αὐτός, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος φύσις· καὶ ἔστιν οἷον εἰ [ὁ] αὐτὸς ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδονὴν κρίνοι τὴν περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ἀλγηδόνα τὴν περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ συναισθάνεται ἡ ἑτέρα τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας κρίμα; ἢ ὅτι κρίσις ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάθος. εἶτα οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἡ κρίνασα κέκρικα λέγει, ἀλλ’ ἔκρινε μόνον· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἡ ὄψις τῇ ἀκοῇ λέγει, καίτοι ἔκριναν ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν· τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερον ἀμφοῖν. πολλαχῇ δὲ καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς εἶδε τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ κρίμα καὶ σύνεσιν ἔσχεν ἑτέρου πάθους. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτου καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.
So it is the things judged that are different, not what judges. The one judging is the same judge, coming to be in one experience after another—though it is not the judge that is affected, but the nature of this or that body. It is as if the same one of us were judging both a pleasure in the finger and a pain in the head. Why, then, does one soul not share awareness of the other’s judgment? Because it is a judgment, not an affection. Besides, the soul that judged does not say “I have judged”; it simply judged. Even in us, sight does not report to hearing, though both have judged; it is reasoning that presides over both, and reasoning is different from both. And often reasoning has seen the judgment made in another and has understood another’s experience. This has been discussed elsewhere too.
ἀλλὰ πάλιν λέγωμεν πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι [τῷ] πῶς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἄμοιρον τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολλαχῇ κείμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων μερίζειν εἰς τὰ πολλά, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ μεμερισμένα εἰς τὸ ἓν μᾶλλον ἀνάγειν, κἀκεῖνο οὐκ ἐληλυθέναι πρὸς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὅτι διέρριπται παρεσχηκέναι δόξαν ἡμῖν κατὰ ταῦτα κἀκεῖνο διειλῆφθαι, οἷον εἴ τις τὸ κρατοῦν καὶ συνέχον εἰς ἴσα τῷ κρατουμένῳ διαιροῖ.
But let us say again how the same thing extends over all things. This is the same as asking how each of the many perceptible things, lying in many places, is not without a share in the same thing. From what has been said, it is not right to divide that into the many. Rather, we should lead the divided many back up to the one, and say that that has not come to them; it is because these are scattered that they have given us the impression that that too is cut up to match them—as if someone were to divide what masters and holds something together into parts equal to the thing it masters.
καίτοι κρατοίη ἂν καὶ χεὶρ σῶμα ὅλον καὶ ξύλον πολύπηχυ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ κρατοῦν, οὐ διείληπται δὲ ὅμως εἰς ἴσα τῷ κρατουμένῳ ἐν τῇ χειρί, καθ’ ὅσον ἐφάπτεται εἰς τοσοῦτον περιγραφομένης, ὡς δοκεῖ, τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλ’ ὅμως τῆς χειρὸς ὁριζομένης τῷ αὑτῆς ποσῷ, οὐ τῷ τοῦ αἰωρουμένου καὶ κρατουμένου σώματος. καὶ εἰ προσθείης δὲ τῷ κρατουμένῳ σώματι μῆκος ἄλλο καὶ δύναιτο ἡ χεὶρ φέρειν, ἡ δύναμις κἀκεῖνο κρατεῖ οὐ διαληφθεῖσα εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη, ὅσα τὸ σῶμα ἔχει. τί οὖν, εἴ τις τὸν ὄγκον τὸν σωματικὸν τῆς χειρὸς ὑποθεῖτο ἀφῃρῆσθαι, καταλείποι δὲ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀνέχουσαν καὶ πρότερον αὐτόν, τὴν πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ οὖσαν; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀμέριστος οὖσα ἐν παντὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ πᾶν μέρος εἴη;
Yet a hand can master a whole body, or a log many cubits long, or something else; the mastering extends over the whole, and yet it is not cut up in the hand into parts equal to what is mastered. The power seems to be limited to the extent of what the hand touches, but still the hand is bounded by its own quantity, not by that of the body it lifts and masters. And if you added another length to the body being held, and the hand could carry it, the power masters that too, without being cut up into as many parts as the body has. What, then, if one supposed the bodily bulk of the hand taken away, but left the same power that held up the body before, the power that was previously in the hand? Would that power not be the same, undivided, in the whole alike and in every part?
εἰ δὲ δὴ φωτεινὸν μικρὸν ὄγκον οἷον κέντρον ποιησάμενος μεῖζόν τι περιθείης σφαιρικὸν σῶμα διαφανές, ὥστε τὸ φῶς τὸ ἔνδον ἐν παντὶ τῷ περιέχοντι φαίνειν, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλοθεν αὐγῆς τῷ ἔξωθεν ὄγκῳ, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔνδον φήσομεν αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν, ἀλλὰ μένον ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν ἔξωθεν ὄγκον ἐληλυθέναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖ ἐνορώμενον ἐν τῷ μικρῷ ὄγκῳ φῶς κατειληφέναι τὸ ἔξω;
Or suppose you made a small luminous mass into a kind of center and placed around it a larger, transparent spherical body, so that the light within shone throughout all that surrounds it, the outer mass getting no light from anywhere else. Won’t we say that the inner thing itself has suffered nothing, but, remaining as it is, has reached over the whole outer mass, and that the light we see in the small mass has taken possession of what lies outside?
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ παρὰ τοῦ ὄγκου τοῦ σωματικοῦ τοῦ μικροῦ ἐκείνου ἦν τὸ φῶς — οὐ γὰρ ᾗ σῶμα ἦν εἶχε τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ’ ᾗ φωτεινὸν σῶμα, ἑτέρᾳ δυνάμει, οὐ σωματικῇ οὔσῃ — φέρε, εἴ τις τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ σώματος ὑφέλοι, τηροῖ δὲ τὴν τοῦ φωτὸς δύναμιν, ἆρ’ ἂν ἔτι εἴποις που εἶναι τὸ φῶς, ἢ ἐπ’ ἴσης ἂν εἴη [ἐντὸς] καθ’ ὅλην τε τὴν ἔξω σφαῖραν;
Now since the light did not come from that small bodily mass—it did not have the light insofar as it was a body, but insofar as it was a luminous body, by another power, one that is not bodily—come: if someone took away the bulk of the body but kept the power of the light, would you still say the light was somewhere? Or would it be equally [inside] and throughout the whole outer sphere?
οὐκέτι δὴ οὐδ’ ἀπερείσῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὅπου πρότερον ἦν κείμενον, καὶ οὔτε ἔτι ἐρεῖς ὅθεν οὔτε ὅπῃ, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἄπορος ἔσῃ ἐν θαύματι ποιούμενος, ἅμα δὲ ὡδὶ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ σώματος ἀτενίσας εἰς τὸ φῶς καὶ ὡδὶ αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχεις μὲν εἰπεῖν ὅθεν τὸ φῶς ἐπιλάμπει κατὰ πάντα τὸν ἀέρα εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἡλίου βλέπων, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ὅμως ὁρᾷς φῶς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μεμερισμένον. δηλοῦσι δὲ αἱ ἀποτομαὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα ἢ ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν διδοῦσαι εἶναι οὐδὲ μερίζουσαι. καὶ δὴ τοίνυν εἰ δύναμις μόνον ὁ ἥλιος ἦν σώματος χωρὶς οὖσα καὶ φῶς παρεῖχεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐντεῦθεν ἤρξατο οὐδ’ ἂν εἶπες ὅθεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἂν τὸ φῶς πανταχοῦ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὂν οὐκ ἀρξάμενον οὐδ’ ἀρχήν ποθεν ἔχον.
You will no longer fix your thought on where it lay before, and you will no longer say where it comes from or where it goes. You will be at a loss about this and filled with wonder, as you gaze at the light here in the spherical body and here, all at once. With the sun, too, you can say where the light that shines through all the air comes from, by looking at the body of the sun; and yet you see the same light everywhere, and not divided either. Things that cut off the light show this: they do not let it be on the side opposite to where it came from, and yet they do not divide it. And so, if the sun were only a power existing apart from body and supplying light, the light would not begin from here, and you would not say where it came from. The light would be everywhere, one and the same, not having begun, with no origin anywhere.
τὸ μὲν οὖν φῶς, ἐπειδὴ σώματός ἐστιν, ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν εἰπεῖν ἔχεις ἔχων εἰπεῖν τὸ σῶμα ὅπου ἐστίν, ἄυλον δὲ εἴ τί ἐστι καὶ δεῖται οὐδὲν σώματος πρότερον ὂν τῇ φύσει παντὸς σώματος, ἱδρυμένον αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἱδρύσεως δεόμενον οὐδὲν τῆς τοιαύτης, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοιαύτην ἔχον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχον ἀρχὴν ὅθεν ὁρμηθείη οὔτε ἔκ τινος τόπου οὔτε τινὸς ὂν σώματος πῶς αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὡδὶ φήσεις, τὸ δὲ ὡδί; ἤδη γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ ὅθεν ὡρμήθη [ἔχον] ἔχοι καὶ τό τινος εἶναι. λείπεται τοίνυν εἰπεῖν ὡς, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει, τῇ τοῦ ὅλου δυνάμει μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ παντός· μηδὲν οὖν μήτ’ ἄλλο τι μήτε μεμερισμένον.
Light, then, since it belongs to a body, you can say where it has come from, since you can say where the body is. But suppose something is immaterial and needs no body, being prior in nature to every body, established in itself—or rather not needing any such establishment at all. This thing, with such a nature, having no starting point from which it set out, coming from no place and belonging to no body: how will you say that part of it is here and part there? For then it would already have a point it set out from, and would belong to something. It remains, then, to say that if anything participates in it, it participates in the whole of it, by the power of the whole. So it is in no way either something else or divided.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα ἔχοντι τὸ πάσχειν κἂν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ ταύτῃ παθητὸν ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ μεριστόν, ἐπειδὴ σώματός ἐστί τι οἷον πάθος ἢ εἶδος· ὃ δέ ἐστι μηδενὸς σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐθέλει αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τά τε ἄλλα πάθη τοῦ σώματος μηδαμῶς αὐτὸ πάσχειν μερίζεσθαί τε οὐχ οἷόν τε· σώματος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ πρώτως πάθος καὶ ᾗ σῶμα. εἰ δὴ ᾗ σῶμα τὸ μεριστόν, ᾗ μὴ σῶμα τὸ ἀμέριστον. πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριεῖς οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος; εἰ οὖν οὐκ ἔχοντος μέγεθος τὸ ἔχον τὸ μέγεθος ἀμηγέπη μεταλαμβάνει, οὐ μεριζομένου αὐτοῦ ἂν μεταλαμβάνοι ἢ μέγεθος αὖ ἕξει πάλιν.
For what has a body might be affected, even if only incidentally, and in this respect could be called subject to affection and divisible, since it is something belonging to body, like an affection or a form. But what belongs to no body—rather, body wants to belong to it—must in no way suffer the other affections of body, and it cannot be divided. For this, too, is an affection of body, primarily so, and insofar as it is body. If what is divisible is so insofar as it is body, then what is not body is indivisible. How could you divide what has no magnitude? So if what has magnitude participates in some way in what has none, it would participate in it without its being divided; otherwise it will once again have magnitude.
ὅταν οὖν ἓν [ἐν] πολλοῖς λέγῃς, οὐκ αὐτὸ πολλὰ γενόμενον λέγεις, ἀλλὰ τῶν πολλῶν τὸ πάθος περιάπτεις τῷ ἑνὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτὸ ἅμα ὁρῶν.
So when you say “one [in] many,” you are not saying that it has itself become many. You are attaching the affection of the many to that one, because you see it in many at once.
τὸ δὲ ἓν [ἐν] αὐτοῖς οὕτω ληπτέον ὡς οὐκ αὐτῶν γενόμενον ἑκάστου οὐδ’ αὖ τοῦ παντός, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μὲν αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι, αὐτὸ δὲ ὂν οὐκ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἑαυτοῦ, οὐδ’ αὖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν οὐδ’ εἴ τι μέρος τοῦ παντός· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποσόν. πῶς ἂν οὖν τοσοῦτον; σώματι μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] τοσοῦτον, τῷ δὲ μὴ σώματι, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρας ὄντι φύσεως, οὐδαμῇ δεῖ προσάπτειν [τὸ] τοσοῦτον. ὅπου δὲ μὴ τὸ τοσοῦτον, οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ποῦ· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν πολλάκις που εἴη. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ μερισμὸς τοῖς τόποις, ὅταν τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ὡδί, ὅτῳ τὸ ὡδὶ μὴ ὑπάρχει, πῶς ἂν τὸ μερίζεσθαι ἔχοι;
The one [in] them must be understood like this: it has not become each of them, nor the whole of them; that belongs to itself and is itself, and being itself it does not fall short of itself. Nor again is it as large as the whole perceptible All, or as some part of the All; it is not a quantity at all. How, then, could it be “so large”? “So large” belongs to body; to what is not body but of another nature we must in no way attach “so large.” And where there is no “so large,” there is no “where” either; and so no “here and here,” for then it would be somewhere many times over. If, then, division goes by places, when one part of a thing is here and another there, how could what has no “here” be divided?
ἀμέριστον ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ σὺν αὑτῷ εἶναι, κἂν τὰ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ ἐφιέμενα τυγχάνῃ. εἰ οὖν τὰ πολλὰ ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ, δηλονότι ὅλου ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ· ὥστε καὶ εἰ δύναται μεταλαβεῖν, ὅλου ἂν αὐτοῦ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται μεταλαμβάνοι. δεῖ οὖν τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὐ μετέλαβε, μὴ ἰδίου αὐτῶν ὄντος· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν μένοι αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὅλον καὶ ἐν οἷς ὁρᾶται ὅλον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅλον, οὐκ αὐτὸ οὐδ’ αὖ οὗ ἐφίεται ἡ μετάληψις ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου, οὗ ἡ ἔφεσις οὐκ ἦν.
So it must be undivided, together with itself, even if the many happen to aspire to it. If the many aspire to it, they clearly aspire to the whole of it; so whatever can participate would participate in the whole of it, as far as it can. Things that participate in it, then, must have it as though they had not participated, since it does not become their own. In this way it would remain whole by itself, and whole in the things in which it is seen. For if it is not whole, it will not be itself, and the participation will not be in what they aspire to but in something else, which was not the object of their aspiration.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μέρος τὸ γενόμενον ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον ἦν, καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον οἷον τὸ πρῶτον, ἀποτετμημένων ἀεὶ ἑκάστων πολλὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἕκαστον πρῶτον. εἶτα ταῦτα τὰ πολλὰ πρῶτα τί ἂν εἴη τὸ διεῖργον, ὥστε μὴ ἓν ὁμοῦ πάντα εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων οἷόν τε ἦν εἴδη αὐτὰ εἶναι, εἴπερ ὅμοια καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἀφ’ οὗ. εἰ δὲ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα μέρη τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκέτι ὅλον ἕκαστον· ἔπειτα πῶς ἦλθον ἀποτμηθεῖσαι καὶ καταλιποῦσαι; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατέλιπον, δηλονότι κατέλιπόν ποι ἰοῦσαι. εἶτα πότερα ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ γεγενημέναι ἢ οὔ;
And indeed, if the part that came to be in each thing were a whole, and each were like the first, then, since each would always be cut off, there would be many firsts and each would be first. Then what would keep these many firsts apart, so that they are not all one together? Not their bodies, surely; for they could not be forms of the bodies, if they too are like that first thing from which they come. And if the so-called parts in the many are its powers, then, first, each is no longer whole. Then, how did they come, cut off, leaving it behind? If they left it, clearly they left it to go somewhere. And then: are the powers that have come to be here in the perceptible still in it, or not?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή εἰσιν, ἄτοπον ἐλαττωθῆναι ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἀδύναμον γεγονέναι ἐστερημένον ὧν πρότερον εἶχε δυνάμεων, χωρίς τε τὰς δυνάμεις εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑαυτῶν πῶς ἂν οἷόν τε εἴη ἀποτετμημένας; εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τέ εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἢ ὅλαι ἢ μέρη αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα ἔσονται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μέρη, κἀκεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη· εἰ δὲ ὅλαι, ἤτοι αἵπερ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὐ μεμερισμέναι καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ οὐ μεμερισμένον, ἢ πολλὰ γενόμενον ὅλον ἕκαστον αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ὅμοιαι ἀλλήλαις, ὥστε καὶ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστης ἡ δύναμις ἡ μία μόνον ἔσται ἡ συνοῦσα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις μόνον. καίτοι οὐχ οἷόν τε, ὥσπερ οὐσίαν ἄνευ δυνάμεως, οὕτως οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἄνευ οὐσίας. ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ἐκεῖ ὑπόστασις καὶ οὐσία ἢ μεῖζον οὐσίας.
If they are not, it is absurd that that should have been diminished and become powerless, stripped of the powers it had before; and how could the powers exist apart from their own beings, cut off from them? If they are both in it and elsewhere, then either they will be here as wholes or parts of them will. But if parts, the remaining parts are There. If wholes, then either they are the very ones that are There, here too, undivided—and once again the same thing will be everywhere undivided—or each power has become many wholes, alike to one another. Then with each being there will be only the one power that goes with that being, and the others will be mere powers. Yet just as there cannot be being without power, so there cannot be power without being. For power There is real existence and being, or greater than being.
εἰ δ’ ἕτεραι ὡς ἐλάττους καὶ ἀμυδραὶ δυνάμεις αἱ ἐξ ἐκείνου, οἱονεὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς ἀμυδρὸν ἐκ φανοτέρου, καὶ δὴ οὐσίαι συνοῦσαι ταῖς δυνάμεσι ταύταις, ἵνα μὴ γίνηται ἄνευ οὐσίας δύναμις, πρῶτον μὲν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοειδῶν πάντως πρὸς ἀλλήλας γινομένων ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν πανταχοῦ συγχωρεῖν εἶναι, ἢ καί, εἰ μὴ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὖν πανταχῇ ἅμα τὴν αὐτὴν ὅλην, οὐ μεμερισμένην, οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ὅλῳ; εἰ δὲ μεμερίσθαι ἑκάστην εἰς ἄπειρον, οὐκέτι οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ὅλη, ἀλλὰ τῷ μερισμῷ ἔσται ἀδυναμία. ἔπειτα ἄλλη κατ’ ἄλλο οὖσα οὐ καταλείψει συναίσθησιν.
But suppose the powers that come from it are different, being lesser and dim—like a dim light from a brighter one—and there are beings accompanying these powers, so that power does not occur without being. First of all: even in the case of such powers, since they are surely all of the same kind as one another, we must concede either that it is the same power everywhere, or, if not everywhere, at any rate the same whole in every part at once, undivided, as in one and the same body. And if so, why not in the whole All? But if each is divided to infinity, it will no longer be whole itself, and the division will bring powerlessness. And then, being different in different parts, it will leave no room for self-awareness.
ἔπειτα δέ, καθάπερ τὸ ἴνδαλμά τινος, οἷον καὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστερον φῶς, ἀποτεμνόμενον τοῦ παρ’ οὗ ἐστιν οὐκέτ’ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ παρ’ ἄλλου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον ἴνδαλμα ὂν ἐκείνου οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀποτέμνοντα ἐν ὑποστάσει ποιεῖν εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἂν αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται αἱ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ἐλθοῦσαι ἀποτετμημέναι ἂν ἐκείνου εἶεν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὗ εἰσιν αὗται, κἀκεῖνο ἀφ’ οὗ ἐγένοντο ἐκεῖ ἅμα ἔσται, ὥστε πανταχοῦ ἅμα πάλιν αὐτὸ οὐ μεμερισμένον ὅλον ἔσται.
Then again, an image of something—a weaker light, for instance—would cease to exist if cut off from what it comes from. In general, everything that has its existence from another, being an image of that other, cannot be cut off from it and made to exist on its own. So neither could these powers that have come from that be cut off from it. And if so, wherever these are, that from which they came will be there at the same time; so once again it will be everywhere at once, undivided and whole.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ εἴδωλόν του συνηρτῆσθαι τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ — ἔστι γὰρ καὶ εἰκόνα εἶναι ἀπόντος τοῦ ἀρχετύπου, ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ εἰκών, καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπελθόντος τὴν θερμότητα εἶναι ἐν τῷ θερμανθέντι· πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρχετύπου καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος, εἰ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ζωγράφου εἰκόνα λέγοι τις, οὐ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον φήσομεν τὴν εἰκόνα πεποιηκέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ζωγράφον οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοῦ εἰκόνα οὐδ’ εἰ αὑτόν τις γράφοι· τὸ γὰρ γράφον ἦν οὐ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζωγράφου οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος τὸ μεμιμημένον· καὶ οὐ τὸν ζωγράφον, ἀλλὰ τὴν θέσιν τὴν οὑτωσὶ τῶν χρωμάτων λεκτέον ποιεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην εἰκόνα, οὐδὲ κυρίως ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος καὶ τοῦ ἰνδάλματος ποίησις, οἷον ἐν ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις ἢ ἐν σκιαῖς· ἐνταῦθα [γὰρ] ὑφίσταταί τε παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου κυρίως καὶ γίνεται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀποτετμημένα τὰ γεγενημένα εἶναι.
But suppose someone says that an image need not be attached to its archetype: there can be an image when the archetype it comes from is absent, and heat in what has been heated when the fire has gone away. First, about archetype and image: if one means the image a painter makes, we shall say that it was not the archetype that made the image but the painter, and it is not his own image even if he paints himself; for what painted was not the painter’s body, nor the form that was represented. And it is not even the painter who should be said to produce such an image, but this particular arrangement of the colors. Nor is this, properly speaking, the making of an image and likeness, as happens in water and mirrors or in shadows. There [for] the image properly exists from what is prior and comes to be from it, and what has come to be cannot be cut off from it.
τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἀσθενεστέρας δυνάμεις παρὰ τῶν προτέρων ἀξιώσουσι γίνεσθαι. τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς λεγόμενον οὐκ εἰκόνα τὴν θερμότητα τοῦ πυρὸς λεκτέον εἶναι, εἰ μή τις λέγοι καὶ πῦρ ἐν τῇ θερμότητι εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, χωρὶς πυρὸς ποιήσει τὴν θερμότητα. εἶτα κἂν εἰ μὴ αὐτίκα, ἀλλ’ οὖν παύεται καὶ ψύχεται τὸ σῶμα τὸ θερμανθὲν ἀποστάντος τοῦ πυρός. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις σβεννύοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν ἓν μόνον ἄφθαρτον φήσουσι, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς καὶ τὸν νοῦν φθαρτὰ ποιήσουσιν· εἶτα καὶ ἐκ ῥεούσης οὐσίας ῥέοντα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ποιήσουσι, καίτοι, εἰ μένοι ἱδρυθεὶς [ὁ] ἥλιος ὁπουοῦν, τὸ αὐτὸ φῶς ἂν παρέχοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις· εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις μὴ τὸ αὐτό, τούτῳ ἂν πιστῷτο τὸ τὸ σῶμα ῥεῖν τοῦ ἡλίου.
It is in this way that they will claim the weaker powers come to be from the prior ones. As for the example of fire: we should not call heat an image of fire, unless one were to say that fire is in the heat too; for if so, it will produce heat without fire. Besides, even if not at once, the heated body does stop and grow cold when the fire has gone away. And if these people were to extinguish these powers too, then, first, they will say that only one thing is imperishable, and they will make souls and Intellect perishable. Then they will make what comes from a flowing being flowing too. And yet, if the sun stayed fixed anywhere at all, it would give the same light to the same places; and if someone said it was not the same light, he would be using this to argue that the body of the sun flows.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν μὴ φθαρτὰ τὰ παρ’ ἐκείνου, ἀθάνατοι δὲ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται.
But that what comes from that is not perishable, and that souls and every intellect are immortal, has been argued at greater length elsewhere.
Sharing by fitness
Things receive the intelligible as far as they are fit, as many ears hear one voice.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἴπερ ὅλον πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὅλου πάντα μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ νοητοῦ; πῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ ἔτι δεύτερον καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο ἄλλα; ἢ τὸ παρὸν ἐπιτηδειότητι τοῦ δεξομένου παρεῖναι νομιστέον, καὶ εἶναι μὲν πανταχοῦ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον ἑαυτοῦ, παρεῖναι δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ δυνάμενον παρεῖναι καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται κατὰ τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ οὐ τόπῳ παρεῖναι, οἷον τῷ φωτὶ τὸ διαφανές. τῷ δὲ τεθολωμένῳ ἡ μετάληψις ἄλλως. καὶ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα τάξει καὶ δυνάμει καὶ διαφοραῖς, οὐ τόποις. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ὁμοῦ εἶναι τὰ διάφορα, οἷον ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πάσας ἐπιστήμας μείζους τε καὶ ὑφειμένας.
But why, if it is whole everywhere, do not all things participate in the whole intelligible? How is one thing first in relation to it, another second, and others after that? Perhaps we should think that what is present is present according to the fitness of what receives it. Being is everywhere in being, never falling short of itself, but what can be present to it is present to it, and to the extent that it can be—not by place—as the transparent is present to light. For what is murky, participation is different. So first, second and third are so by rank, by power and by differences, not by places. Nothing prevents different things from being together: soul and intellect, for example, and all the branches of knowledge, the higher and the lower.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς εἶδε τὸ χρῶμα, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις τὸ εὐῶδες, ἄλλη δὲ αἴσθησις ἄλλο, ὁμοῦ πάντων, ἀλλ’ οὐ χωρὶς ὄντων. οὔκουν ἐκεῖνο ποικίλον καὶ πολύ; ἢ τὸ ποικίλον ἁπλοῦν αὖ, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν. λόγος γὰρ εἷς καὶ πολύς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἕν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. καὶ τὸ ὂν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐ κεχωρισμένου, καὶ ὅπου ἂν ᾖ τὸ ὄν, πάρεστιν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἓν ὂν αὖ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ παρεῖναι χωρὶς ὄν.
Indeed, from the same thing the eye has seen the color, smell the fragrance, and each other sense something else—all of them together, not apart. Is that, then, varied and many? Or rather the varied is in turn simple, and the many one. For a rational principle is one and many, and all being is one. For the different is in it, and difference belongs to it—it certainly does not belong to non-being. And being belongs to the one, which is not separated from it; wherever being is, its one is present to it too; and the one being, in turn, is by itself. For it is possible to be present while being separate.
ἄλλως δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς πάρεστιν, ὅσα πάρεστιν αὐτῶν καὶ οἷς πάρεστιν, ἄλλως τὰ νοητὰ αὑτοῖς ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλως ψυχῇ σῶμα, ἄλλως ἐπιστήμη ψυχῇ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμῃ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἑκατέρα οὖσα· σῶμα δὲ σώματι παρὰ ταῦτα ἑτέρως.
Perceptible things are present to intelligible ones in one way—those of them that are present, and to those to which they are present—and intelligible things to one another in another way. So too body is present to soul in one way, knowledge to soul in another, and one piece of knowledge to another, both being in the same subject, in another again; and body to body differently from all of these.
ὥσπερ δὲ φωνῆς οὔσης κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα πολλάκις καὶ λόγου ἐν τῇ φωνῇ οὖς μὲν παρὸν ἐδέξατο καὶ ᾔσθετο καὶ εἰ ἕτερον θείης μεταξὺ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἦλθε καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ φωνή, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ οὖς ἦλθε πρὸς τὸν λόγον, καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδον καὶ πάντες ἐπλήσθησαν τῆς θέας καίτοι ἐν ἀφωρισμένῳ τοῦ θεάματος κειμένου, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμός, τὸ δὲ οὖς ἦν, οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον ψυχὴν ἔχειν ἕξει καὶ ἄλλο αὖ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἦν δὲ ἡ φωνὴ πανταχοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος οὐ μία μεμερισμένη, ἀλλὰ μία πανταχοῦ ὅλη, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως δέ, εἰ παθὼν ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν μορφὴν ἔχοι, ἔχει οὐ μεμερισμένην· οὗ γὰρ ἂν ὄψις τεθῇ, ἔχει ἐκεῖ τὴν μορφήν.
Think of a voice in the air, often carrying words. An ear that is present receives and perceives it; and if you placed another ear somewhere in between in the empty space, the words and the voice came to it as well—or rather, the ear came to the words. Many eyes have seen the same thing and all have been filled with the vision, though the object seen lies in a delimited place, because one is an eye and the other an ear. In just this way, what is able to have soul will have it, and another and yet another, from the same source. The voice was everywhere in the air, not one voice divided up but one whole everywhere. And as for sight: if the air, being affected, holds the shape, it holds it undivided; for wherever sight is placed, there it has the shape.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ πᾶσα δόξα συγχωρεῖ, εἰρήσθω δ’ οὖν δι’ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ μετάληψις. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἀέρι ὅλον τὸ εἶδός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἤκουσε πᾶς τὸ αὐτὸ μὴ ἑκασταχοῦ ὅλου ὄντος τοῦ φωνηθέντος λόγου καὶ ἑκάστης ἀκοῆς τὸ πᾶν ὁμοίως δεδεγμένης. εἰ δὲ μηδ’ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ὅλη φωνὴ καθ’ ὅλον τὸν ἀέρα παρατέταται, ὡς τόδε μὲν τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς τῷδε συνεζεῦχθαι τῷ μέρει, τόδε δὲ τῷδε συμμεμερίσθαι, τί δεῖ ἀπιστεῖν, εἰ ψυχὴ μὴ παρατέταται συμμεριζομένη, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ οὗ ἂν παρῇ πάρεστι καὶ ἔστὶ πανταχοῦ τοῦ παντὸς οὐ μεμερισμένη;
Not every theory grants this; but let it be said all the same, for this reason: that the participation is from one and the same thing. The case of the voice is clearer: the whole form is in all the air. Everyone would not have heard the same thing unless the spoken words were whole in every place and each act of hearing received the whole alike. And if, even here, the whole voice is not stretched out over the whole air—this part of it coupled with this part of the air, that one divided off along with that—why should we disbelieve that soul is not stretched out and divided along with the body, but is present wherever it is present, and is everywhere in the All, undivided?
καὶ γενομένη μὲν ἐν σώμασιν, οἷς ἂν γένοιτο, ἀνάλογον ἕξει τῇ ἤδη ἐν τῷ ἀέρι φωνηθείσῃ φωνῇ, πρὸ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τῷ φωνοῦντι καὶ φωνήσοντι· καίτοι καὶ γενομένη ἐν σώματι οὐδ’ ὣς ἀπέστη τοῦ κατὰ τὸν φωνοῦντα εἶναι, ὅστις φωνῶν καὶ ἔχει τὴν φωνὴν καὶ δίδωσι.
Once it has come into bodies—whichever it comes into—it will be analogous to a voice already spoken in the air; before bodies, to one who speaks and is about to speak. And yet even when it has come into a body, it has not ceased, even so, to be as it is in the speaker, who in speaking both has the voice and gives it.
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς φωνῆς ταυτότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχει τοῖς πρὸς ἃ εἴληπται, ἔχει δ’ οὖν ὁμοιότητα κατά τι· τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅτε φύσεως ὄντα τῆς ἑτέρας δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς οὐκ ὄντος αὐτῆς τοῦ μὲν ἐν σώμασι, τοῦ δὲ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὅλου ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς αὖ φανταζομένου. καὶ αὖ [εἰ] ἦλθεν ἄλλο εἰς τὸ λαβεῖν ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀφανοῦς αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω προητοίμαστο, ὥστε μέρος αὐτῆς ὡδὶ κείμενον εἰς τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἥκειν ἦν ἐν παντὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καίτοι δοκοῦν ἐνταῦθα ἐλθεῖν. πῶς γὰρ καὶ ἦλθεν;
The features of a voice are not identical with the things they are adduced to illustrate, but they do have a certain likeness. Those of soul, since it belongs to the other nature, must be understood not as though one part of it were in bodies and another by itself, but as though it were whole in itself and also appearing in many. And again, if something else has come to receive soul, it too has it out of the unseen—the same soul that was in the others. For it was not prepared beforehand so that a part of it, lying here, would come into this; rather, what is said to come was in the All, in itself, and is in itself, though it seems to have come here. For how could it have come?
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἦλθεν, ὤφθη δὲ νῦν παροῦσα, καὶ παροῦσα οὐ τῷ ἀναμεῖναι τὸ μεταληψόμενον, δηλονότι οὖσα ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς πάρεστι καὶ τούτῳ. εἰ δ’ οὖσα ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς τούτῳ πάρεστι, τοῦτο ἦλθε πρὸς αὐτήν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔξω ὂν τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ἦλθε πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ὄν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ τῆς ζωῆς κόσμῳ, ἦν δὲ ὁ κόσμος ὁ τῆς ζωῆς ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ πᾶς δὴ ἦν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οὐ διειλημμένος εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ὄγκον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὄγκος ἦν· καὶ τὸ ἐληλυθὸς δὴ οὐκ εἰς ὄγκον ἦλθε. μετέλαβεν ἄρα αὐτοῦ οὐ μέρος ὅλου. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλο ἥκῃ εἰς τὸν τοιοῦτον κόσμον, ὅλου αὐτοῦ μεταλήψεται. ὁμοίως ἄρα, εἰ λέγοιτο ἐκεῖνος ἐν τούτοις ὅλος, ἐν παντὶ ἑκάστῳ ἔσται.
If, then, it did not come, but is now seen to be present—and present not by waiting for what is to participate in it—clearly it is present to this too while remaining by itself. And if, remaining by itself, it is present to this, then this has come to it. And if this, being outside what really is, came to what really is and came to be in the world of life—and the world of life was by itself, the whole of it by itself, not divided up into its own bulk, for it was not bulk at all, and so what came did not come into bulk—then it participated not in a part of it but in the whole. And if something else comes into such a world, it will participate in the whole of it. Likewise, then, if that is said to be whole in these things, it will be whole in each and every one.
καὶ πανταχοῦ ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς εἷς ἀριθμῷ οὐ μεμερισμένος, ἀλλ’ ὅλος ἔσται.
So everywhere it will be the same, one in number, not divided but whole.
πόθεν οὖν ἡ ἔκτασις ἡ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ζῷα; ἢ οὐκ ἐξετάθη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, ᾗ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδέ φησιν οὐκ ἐκταθέντος ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκταθὲν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετειληφέναι ὄντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν τι μεταλήψεταί τινος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ αὑτοῦ μεταλήψεται· ἢ οὐ μετειληφὸς ἔσται, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἔσται. δεῖ οὖν σῶμα μεταλαμβάνον τινὸς οὐ σώματος μεταλαμβάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη. σῶμα δὴ οὐ σώματος μεταλήψεται. οὐδὲ μέγεθος τοίνυν μεγέθους μεταλήψεται· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη.
Where, then, does its extension over the whole heaven and all living things come from? Or rather, it has not been extended. Perception, which we heed when we disbelieve what is said, tells us “here and here.” But reason says that the “here and here” did not come about by its being extended here and here; rather, the whole extended thing has participated in it, while it is itself unextended. If something is to participate in something, clearly it will not participate in itself; otherwise it will not be participating, but will be that thing. So a body that participates in something must participate in something that is not body; for body it has already. Body, then, will not participate in body. Nor, then, will magnitude participate in magnitude; for that it has already.
οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ προσθήκην λάβοι, τὸ μέγεθος ἐκεῖνο, ὃ πρότερον ἦν, μεγέθους μεταλήψεται· οὐ γὰρ τὸ δίπηχυ τρίπηχυ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο ποσὸν ἔχον ἄλλο ἔσχεν· ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε αὐτὰ τὰ δύο τρία ἔσται. εἰ οὖν τὸ διειλημμένον καὶ τὸ ἐκτεταμένον εἰς τόσον ἄλλου γένους μεταλήψεται ἢ ὅλως [ἄλλο] ἄλλου, δεῖ τὸ οὗ μεταλαμβάνει μήτε διειλημμένον εἶναι μήτε ἐκτεταμένον μήτε ὅλως ποσόν τι εἶναι.
Even if it receives an addition, the magnitude that existed before will not participate in magnitude. The two-cubit length does not become three cubits; rather, the underlying thing, which had one quantity, has acquired another—otherwise two itself would become three. If, then, what is divided and extended to a certain size is to participate in another kind, or in general [one thing] in another, what it participates in must be neither divided nor extended, nor any quantity at all.
ὅλον ἄρα δεῖ τὸ παρεσόμενον αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ ἀμερὲς ὂν παρεῖναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἀμερές, ὡς μικρόν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔσται καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτῷ ἐφαρμόσει οὐδ’ αὖ αὐξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται· ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ οὕτως, ὡς σημεῖον· οὐ γὰρ ἓν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ’ ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ· ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἄπειρα σημεῖα ἔσται, εἴπερ ἔσται, καὶ οὐ συνεχές· ὥστε οὐδ’ ὣς ἐφαρμόσει. εἰ οὖν ὁ ὄγκος ὁ πᾶς ἕξει αὐτὸ ὅλον, ἕξει αὐτὸ κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ.
What is to be present, then, must be present everywhere, itself whole, being without parts. But not without parts in the sense of being small: for then it would none the less be divisible, and would not fit the whole thing, nor would it stay with the thing as it grew. Nor without parts in the way a point is: for the mass is not one point but contains infinitely many; so this too would be infinitely many points, if it is anything, and not continuous; so it would not fit that way either. If, then, the whole mass is to have it whole, it will have it throughout the whole of itself.
Who are we?
We were There before birth; another man attached himself to us and made us double.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ ἑκασταχοῦ ψυχή, πῶς ἰδία ἑκάστου; καὶ πῶς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ κακή; ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ ἑκάστῳ καὶ πάσας ψυχὰς ἔχει καὶ πάντας νοῦς. καὶ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον αὖ καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ καὶ ἕκαστον ἔχει διακεκριμένον καὶ αὖ οὐ διακριθὲν χωρίς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄπειρον; ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτο, ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα ἔχει, πᾶσαν ζωὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ἅπαντα. ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν οὐ πέρασιν ἀφώρισται· διὰ τοῦτο αὖ καὶ ἕν.
But if the same soul is everywhere, how is it each one’s own? And how is one soul good and another bad? Or rather: it suffices for each, and holds all souls and all intellects. For it is one and also unlimited; it holds all things together and each one distinct, and yet not separated apart—how else could it be unlimited? Or one might put it like this: it holds all things together, all life, all soul, every intellect; and each of them is not marked off by boundaries—which is why, again, it is also one.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ μίαν ζωὴν ἔδει αὐτὸ ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἄπειρον, καὶ αὖ μίαν καὶ τὴν μίαν οὕτω μίαν, ὅτι πάσας ὁμοῦ οὐ συμφορηθείσας εἰς ἕν, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ἑνὸς ἀρξαμένας καὶ μενούσας ὅθεν ἤρξαντο, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἤρξαντο, ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἶχον ἀεί· οὐδὲν γὰρ γινόμενον ἐκεῖ· οὐδὲ μεριζόμενον τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μερίζεσθαι τῷ λαβόντι. τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ ἔκπαλαι καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τὸ δὲ γινόμενον πελάζει καὶ συνάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξήρτηται ἐκείνου. ἡμεῖς δέ — τίνες δὲ ἡμεῖς; ἆρα ἐκεῖνο ἢ τὸ πελάζον καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ;
For it had to have not one life but an unlimited life, and yet one; and one in this way: all lives together, not heaped up into one, but beginning from one and remaining where they began—or rather they did not even begin, but were always so. Nothing comes to be There; nor, then, is anything divided; it only seems divided to what receives it. What is There is from of old and from the beginning; what comes to be draws near, seems to be joined to it, and hangs from it. But we—who are “we”? Are we that, or what draws near and comes to be in time?
ἢ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ταύτην τὴν γένεσιν γενέσθαι ἦμεν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοι ὄντες καί τινες καὶ θεοί, ψυχαὶ καθαραὶ καὶ νοῦς συνημμένος τῇ ἁπάσῃ οὐσίᾳ, μέρη ὄντες τοῦ νοητοῦ οὐκ ἀφωρισμένα οὐδ’ ἀποτετμημένα, ἀλλ’ ὄντες τοῦ ὅλου· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἀποτετμήμεθα.
Or rather: even before this coming-to-be came about, we were There, other human beings, and some of us even gods—pure souls, and intellect joined to the whole of being, parts of the intelligible, not marked off or cut off but belonging to the whole. And not even now are we cut off.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ νῦν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσελήλυθεν ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος εἶναι θέλων καὶ εὑρὼν ἡμᾶς· ἦμεν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς οὐκ ἔξω· περιέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν ἡμῖν καὶ προσέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ ὃς ἦν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τότε — οἷον εἰ φωνῆς οὔσης μιᾶς καὶ λόγου ἑνὸς ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν παραθεὶς τὸ οὖς ἀκούσειε καὶ δέξαιτο καὶ γένοιτο κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοή τις ἔχουσα τὸ ἐνεργοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν παρόν — καὶ γεγενήμεθα τὸ συνάμφω, καὶ οὐ θάτερον, ὃ πρότερον ἦμεν, καὶ θάτερόν ποτε, ὃ ὕστερον προσεθέμεθα ἀργήσαντος τοῦ προτέρου ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον οὐ παρόντος.
But now another human being has come up to that one, wanting to exist, and finding us—for we were not outside the All—he wrapped himself around us and attached himself to that human being that each of us was then. It is as if there were one voice and one speech, and someone put his ear to it from here, someone else from there, and heard and received it, and there came to be an actual hearing, with what acts on it present to it. And we have become the two together, and not the one we were before; and sometimes we become the other, the one we added later, when that former one is idle and in another sense not present.
ἀλλὰ πῶς προσελήλυθε τὸ προσεληλυθός; ἢ ἐπεὶ ἐπιτηδειότης αὐτῷ παρῆν, ἔσχε πρὸς ὃ ἦν ἐπιτήδειον. ἦν δὲ γενόμενον οὕτως, ὡς δέξασθαι ψυχήν. ὃ δὲ γίνεται ὡς μὴ δέξασθαι πᾶσαν καίτοι παροῦσαν πᾶσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὑτῷ, οἷον καὶ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ φυτά, τοσοῦτον ἔχει, ὅσον δύναται λαβεῖν· οἷον φωνῆς λόγον σημαινούσης τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῦ λόγου μετέσχε μετὰ τῆς κατὰ φωνὴν ἠχῆς, τὰ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τῆς πληγῆς μόνον.
But how has what came come? Since it had a fitness, it got that for which it was fit. It had come to be such as to receive soul. What comes to be such as not to receive all of it—though all of it is present, only not to that thing—the other animals, for example, and plants, has as much as it can take. Just so, when a voice conveys a meaning, some share in the meaning along with the sound of the voice, others only in the voice and the impact.
γενομένου δὴ ζῴου, ὃ ἔχει μὲν παροῦσαν αὑτῷ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ψυχήν, καθ’ ἣν δὴ ἀνήρτηται εἰς πᾶν τὸ· ὄν, παρόντος δὲ καὶ σώματος οὐ κενοῦ οὐδὲ ψυχῆς ἀμοίρου, ὃ ἔκειτο μὲν οὐδὲ πρότερον ἐν τῷ ἀψύχῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον οἷον ἐγγὺς γενόμενον τῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι, καὶ γενομένου οὐκ ἔτι σώματος μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶντος σώματος, καὶ τῇ οἷον γειτονείᾳ καρπωσαμένου τι ἴχνος ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐκείνης μέρους, ἀλλ’ οἷον θερμασίας τινὸς ἢ ἐλλάμψεως ἐλθούσης, γένεσις ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἀλγηδόνων ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξέφυ. ἦν δὴ οὐκ ἀλλότριον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ γεγενημένου.
So a living being has come about. It has soul present to it from being, by which it hangs from all being. A body is present too, not empty, nor without a share in soul—a body that even before was not lying in the soulless, and has come still closer, so to speak, by its fitness. It has become no longer just a body but a living body, and by this neighborliness, as it were, has reaped a kind of trace of soul—not a part of that soul, but something like a warmth or an illumination that has come to it. Then the generation of desires, pleasures and pains sprang up in it. So the body of the living being that had come to be was not foreign to it.
ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκ τοῦ θείου ψυχὴ ἥσυχος ἦν κατὰ τὸ ἦθος τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς βεβῶσα, τὸ δὲ ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας θορυβούμενον καὶ ῥέον τε αὐτὸ καὶ πληγαῖς κρουόμενον ταῖς ἔξω πρῶτον αὐτό, [εἶτα] εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ζῴου ἐφθέγγετο, καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ταραχὴν ἐδίδου τῷ ὅλῳ· οἷον [ἐν] ἐκκλησίᾳ δημογερόντων καθημένων ἐφ’ ἡσύχῳ συννοίᾳ δῆμος ἄτακτος τροφῆς δεόμενος καὶ ἄλλα ἃ δὴ πάσχει αἰτιώμενος τὴν πᾶσαν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς θόρυβον ἀσχήμονα [ἂν] ἐμβάλλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀπό του φρονοῦντος ἥκῃ εἰς αὐτοὺς λόγος, κατέστη εἰς τάξιν μετρίαν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ οὐ κεκράτηκε τὸ χεῖρον· εἰ δὲ μή, κρατεῖ τὸ χεῖρον ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος τοῦ βελτίονος, ὅτι μὴ ἠδυνήθη τὸ θορυβοῦν δέξασθαι τὸν ἄνωθεν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι πόλεως καὶ ἐκκλησίας κακία.
The soul that comes from the divine was quiet, true to its own character, standing on itself. But the other part, thrown into turmoil by weakness, itself flowing, and battered by blows from outside, first itself [then] cried out to the common life of the living being and passed on its own disturbance to the whole. It is as if, in an assembly of elders sitting in quiet deliberation, a disorderly populace, wanting food and complaining about everything else it suffers, were to throw the whole assembly into unseemly uproar. When such people calm down and words reach them from someone of understanding, the crowd settles into a moderate order, and the worse has not prevailed. Otherwise the worse prevails while the better keeps quiet, because the disorderly element could not receive the word from above; and this is the badness of a city and an assembly.
τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κακία αὖ ἔχοντος δῆμον ἐν αὑτῷ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων κρατησάντων συνδόντος ἑαυτὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου δήμῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ· ὃς δ’ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ὄχλον δουλώσηται καὶ ἀναδράμῃ εἰς ἐκεῖνον, ὅς ποτε ἦν, κατ’ ἐκεῖνόν τε ζῇ καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος διδοὺς τῷ σώματι, ὅσα δίδωσιν ὡς ἑτέρῳ ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ· ἄλλος δέ τις ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως, ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλως ζῇ, μικτός τις ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἑτέρου γεγενημένος.
This is also the badness of a human being who has within himself a populace of pleasures, desires and fears that has gained the upper hand, when such a man gives himself up to such a populace. But whoever enslaves this mob and runs back up to the man he once was lives by that man and is that man, giving the body what he gives it as to something other than himself. Someone else lives now this way, now that, a mixed being, made up of a good self and a bad other.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κακὴ καὶ οὗτος τρόπος ψυχῆς εἰς σῶμα ἰούσης καὶ παρούσης, τίς ἡ κάθοδος ἡ ἐν περιόδοις καὶ ἄνοδος αὖ καὶ αἱ δίκαι καὶ αἱ εἰς ἄλλων ζῴων σώματα εἰσκρίσεις; ταῦτα γὰρ παρὰ τῶν πάλαι περὶ ψυχῆς ἄριστα πεφιλοσοφηκότων παρειλήφαμεν, οἷς πειρᾶσθαι προσήκει σύμφωνον ἢ μὴ διάφωνόν γε ἐπιδεῖξαι τὸν νῦν προκείμενον λόγον.
But if that nature could not become bad, and this is how soul goes into body and is present to it, what are the descent in cycles and the ascent again, the judgments, and the entries into the bodies of other animals? For we have received these teachings from those who long ago philosophized best about soul, and we ought to try to show that the present argument is in harmony with them, or at least not in discord.
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως ἦν οὐ τὸ ἐλθεῖν ἐκείνην εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἀποστᾶσαν ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ τήνδε ἐν ἐκείνῃ γίνεσθαι καὶ μεταλαβεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι ὃ λέγουσιν ἐκεῖνοι ἥκειν λεκτέον εἶναι τὴν σώματος φύσιν ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ μεταλαβεῖν ζωῆς καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ὅλως οὐ τοπικῶς τὸ ἥκειν, ἀλλ’ ὅστις [ὁ] τρόπος τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας· ὥστε τὸ μὲν κατελθεῖν τό [τε] ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, ὥς φαμεν ψυχὴν ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, τὸ τούτῳ δοῦναί τι παρ’ αὑτῆς, οὐκ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἀπελθεῖν τὸ μηδαμῇ τὸ σῶμα ἐπικοινωνεῖν αὐτῆς· τάξιν δὲ εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας τοῖς τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς μέρεσι, τὴν δὲ οἷον ἐν ἐσχάτῳ τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πλεονάκις διδόναι ἑαυτῆς ἅτε πλησίον τῇ δυνάμει οὖσαν καὶ ἐν βραχυτέροις διαστήμασι φύσεως τῆς τοιαύτης νόμῳ· κακὸν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν.
Since, then, participating in that nature was not that nature’s coming to things here and departing from itself, but this nature’s coming to be in that one and participating, clearly what those thinkers call “coming” must be taken to mean that the nature of body comes to be There and participates in life and soul. In general, “coming” is not spatial; it is whatever the manner of such communion is. So “descending” means coming to be in a body, in the sense in which we say that soul comes to be in a body: giving it something of itself, not becoming its possession. And “departing” means that the body no longer shares in it in any way. There is an order of such communion for the parts of this All, while soul, which is, as it were, in the last region of the intelligible, gives of itself more often, since it is close in power, and at shorter intervals, by the law of such a nature. And such communion is bad, and release from it good.
διὰ τί; ὅτι, κἂν μὴ τοῦδε ᾖ, ἀλλ’ οὖν ψυχὴ τοῦδε λεγομένη ὁπωσοῦν μερική πως ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς γίνεται· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ ὅλον καίπερ τοῦ ὅλου οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπιστήμης ὅλης οὔσης κατά τι θεώρημα ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἐνεργοῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ ἦν οὐ κατά τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἣν ἔχει.
Why? Because even if it does not belong to this body, still, being called the soul of this body, it becomes in some way partial, falling away from the All. Its activity is no longer directed to the whole, though it belongs to the whole—as if, the knowledge being whole, the knower were active in one single theorem; yet his good lay not in some piece of his knowledge but in the whole of what he has.
καὶ τοίνυν αὕτη τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα κόσμου νοητοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος ἀποκρύπτουσα οἷον ἐξέθορεν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς εἰς μέρος, εἰς ὃ ἐνείργει ἑαυτὴν μέρος ὄν, οἷον εἰ πῦρ πᾶν καίειν δυνάμενον μικρόν τι καίειν ἀναγκάζοιτο καίτοι πᾶσαν ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς πάντη οὖσα ἑκάστη οὐχ ἑκάστη, ὅταν δὲ διακριθῇ οὐ τόπῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται τὸ καθέκαστον, μοῖρά τίς ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶσα, καίτοι καὶ ὣς πᾶσα τρόπον ἄλλον· οὐδενὶ δὲ ἐπιστατοῦσα πάντη πᾶσα, οἷον δυνάμει τότε μέρος οὖσα. τὸ δὲ εἰς ᾅδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται· εἰ δέ τινα χείρω τόπον, τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν οὗ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν καὶ ἐν ᾧ τόπῳ κἀκείνη λέγεται ἐκεῖ. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ὄντος ἔτι τοῦ σώματος;
So too this soul, belonging to the whole intelligible world and hiding its part within the whole, has, as it were, leapt out of the whole into a part, in which it shuts itself up, being a part—as if a fire able to burn everything were forced to burn some small thing, though it has all its power. For soul, when it is entirely separate, is each and not each. But when it is distinguished—not by place, but by activity—and becomes the individual, it is a portion, not all; though even so it is all, in another way. When it presides over nothing, it is entirely all, being a part then only potentially, as it were. As for going to Hades: if this means going into the unseen, it refers to its separation; if to some worse place, what is surprising in that? Even now, wherever our body is and in whatever place, the soul too is said to be there. But when the body no longer exists?
ἢ τὸ εἴδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ, οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον; εἰ δὲ παντελῶς λύσειε φιλοσοφία, κἂν ἀπέλθοι τὸ εἴδωλον εἰς τὸν χείρω τόπον μόνον, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐδενὸς ἐξῃρημένου αὐτῆς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε εἴδωλον γενόμενον οὕτως· ὅταν δ’ αὐτὴ οἷον ἐλλάμψῃ πρὸς ἑαυτήν, τῇ νεύσει τῇ ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συνέσταλται καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ οὐδ’ αὖ ἀπόλωλεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ταῦτα· πάλιν δὲ ἀναλαβόντες τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον λέγωμεν.
If the image has not been torn away, how is the soul not there where its image is? But if philosophy has released it completely, the image would go off alone to the worse place, while the soul itself is purely in the intelligible, with nothing of it taken away. That, then, is how the image that comes from such a thing comes to be. But when the soul itself, as it were, shines toward itself, by the inclination toward the other side it is drawn together into the whole, and is no longer active, yet it has not perished either. But enough on these matters; let us take up the argument again from the beginning.