Categories

Things are called homonymous when only the name is common to them, but the definition (account) of the being that corresponds to the name is different. For example, both a man and a picture are “animals.” These have only the name in common, while the definition of the being that corresponds to the name is different. If someone is to say what being an animal is for each of them, he will give a distinctive definition for each. Things are called synonymous when both the name is common to them and the definition of the being that corresponds to the name is the same. For example, both a man and an ox are animals. A man and an ox are each called by a common name, “animal,” and the definition of the being is also the same. If someone gives the definition of each, saying what being an animal is for each of them, he will give the same definition.note

Of things that are said, some are said in combination, others without combination. Those in combination are like “man runs” and “man wins”; those without combination are like “man,” “ox,” “runs,” “wins.”

When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, everything said of what is predicated will also be said of the subject. For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man. So animal will also be predicated of the individual man, since the individual man is both a man and an animal.

Where genera are different and not ranked one under the other, their differentiae are also different in species. Take animal and knowledge. Footed, two-footed, winged and aquatic are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge: one knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. But where genera are ranked one under the other, nothing prevents their differentiae from being the same. The higher genera are predicated of those under them, so that all the differentiae of what is predicated will be differentiae of the subject as well.

Of the secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance. If someone is to say what the primary substance is, he will give a more informative and more appropriate answer by giving the species than by giving the genus. For example, in saying what the individual man is, he would be more informative in saying “man” than in saying “animal,” since the first is more distinctive of the individual man and the second more general. And in saying what the individual tree is, he will be more informative in saying “tree” than in saying “plant.” Further, the primary substances are called substances most of all because they underlie all the other things, and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them.

It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, the species and genera alone of all the other things should be called secondary substances, since of all the things predicated they alone reveal the primary substance. If someone is to say what the individual man is, he will answer appropriately by giving the species or the genus, and he will make it more informative by giving “man” than “animal.” But whatever else he gives, his answer will be foreign to the question, for example if he says “white” or “runs” or anything else of that kind. So it is reasonable that these alone of the other things should be called substances. Further, it is because the primary substances underlie all the other things that they are called substances 3a in the most proper sense. And just as the primary substances stand to all the other things, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest, for all the rest are predicated of them.

It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. The primary substance is neither in a subject nor said of a subject. As for the secondary substances, it is obvious in the following way too that they are not in a subject. Man is said of the individual man as subject, but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. Likewise animal is said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not in the individual man. Further, with things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but the definition cannot be.

It is a feature of substances and of differentiae that everything called after them is called synonymously. All the predications from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. From the primary substance there is no predication, since it is said of no subject. Of the secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, and the genus both of the species and of the individual. 3b Likewise the differentiae are predicated both of the species and of the individuals. And the primary substances admit the definition of their species and of their genera, and the species admits the definition of its genus; for everything said of what is predicated will also be said of the subject. Likewise the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae.note

Every substance seems to signify a “this.” With the primary substances it is indisputable and true that they signify a “this,” since what they reveal is individual and one in number. With the secondary substances, when someone says “man” or “animal,” it looks from the shape of the name as though they signify a “this” in the same way. But that is not true. Rather, each signifies something qualified, since the subject is not one, as the primary substance is: man and animal are said of many things. Yet it does not simply signify something qualified, as white does. White signifies nothing but something qualified, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualified with regard to substance: they signify a substance qualified in a certain way.note

It also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. What would be contrary to a primary substance, for example to the individual man or the individual animal? Nothing is contrary to it. Nor is anything contrary to man or to animal. This is not distinctive of substance, however; it holds of many other things too, for example of quantity. Nothing is contrary to two cubits long or three cubits long, nor to ten, nor to anything of that kind, unless someone were to say that much is contrary to little, or large to small. But of definite quantities none is contrary to any other.

Substance seems not to admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance, or less a substance, than another (we have said that it is), but that no substance is called more or less just what it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more or less a man, either than itself or than another man. One man is not more a man than another, in the way that 4a one white thing is more or less white than another, and one beautiful thing is called more or less beautiful than another. A thing is also called more or less than itself: for example, a body that is white is said to be whiter now than before, and one that is hot is called more or less hot.

Of quantity, some is discrete and some continuous. Some consists of parts that have position in relation to one another, and some of parts that do not have position. Discrete quantities are, for example, number and speech; continuous ones are line, surface, body, and besides these, time and place. The parts of a number have no common boundary at which they join. For example, if five is a part of ten, the two fives do not join at any common boundary but are separate; nor do three and seven join at any common boundary. In general, you could not find a common boundary between the parts of a number: they are always separate. So number is one of the discrete quantities.

Further, some quantities consist of parts that have position in relation to one another, and others of parts that do not have position. For example, the parts of a line have position in relation to one another: each of them lies somewhere, and you could distinguish and state where each lies in the plane and which of the other parts it joins. Likewise the parts of a plane have some position, since one could state in the same way where each lies and which parts join one another. The same goes for the parts of a solid and the parts of a place. But in the case of a number, one could not show that its parts have any position in relation to one another, or lie somewhere, or which of its parts join one another.

Only the things mentioned are called quantities in the proper sense; all the others are so called accidentally. It is with an eye 5b to these that we call the others quantities too. For example, there is said to be much white because the surface is large, an action is called long because the time taken is long, and a change, too, is called long. None of these is called a quantity in its own right. For example, if someone is to say how long an action is, he will define it by the time, saying that it lasts a year or something of the sort. And in saying how much white there is, he will define it by the surface: however large the surface is, that is how much he would say the white is. So only the things mentioned are called quantities properly and in their own right. None of the others is a quantity in its own right, but, if at all, accidentally.

Further, nothing is contrary to a quantity. In the case of definite quantities it is obvious that nothing is contrary, for example to two cubits long or three cubits long, or to a surface, or to anything of that kind. Nothing is contrary to them, unless someone were to say that much is contrary to little, or large to small. But none of these is a quantity; they are relatives. Nothing is called large or small itself by itself, but only by being referred to something else. For example, a mountain is called small and a millet seed large, because the seed is larger than others of its kind and the mountain smaller than others of its kind. So the reference is to something else; for if a thing were called small or large itself by itself, a mountain would never be called small or a millet seed large.

But it is in the case of place that there seems most of all to be a contrariety of quantity. For people treat up as contrary to down, calling the region toward the center “down,” because the distance from the center to the limits of the world is greatest. And they seem to derive their definition of the other contraries from these as well, for they define as contraries the things within the same genus that are farthest apart from one another.

Quantity does not seem to admit of a more and a less. Take two cubits long: one thing is not more two cubits long than another. Nor with number: three is no more three than five is five, nor is five more five than three is three. Nor is one time called more a time than another. In general, none of the things mentioned is called more or less. So quantity does not admit of a more and a less either.

What is most distinctive of quantity is that it is called equal and unequal. Each of the quantities mentioned is called both equal and unequal. For example, a body is called both equal and unequal, and a time both equal and unequal. It is the same with each of the other things mentioned. But the remaining things, the ones that are not quantities, would hardly seem to be called equal and unequal. For example, a condition is hardly called equal or unequal, but rather similar; and white is hardly equal or unequal, but similar. So it would be most distinctive of quantity to be called equal and unequal.

We call relatives all things that are said to be just what they are of other things, or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, the greater is said to be just what it is of something else, since it is called greater than something; and the double is said to be just what it is of something else, 6b since it is called double of something. It is the same with all other such things. The following are also relatives: state, condition, perception, knowledge, position. All of these are said to be just what they are of other things, and not something else: a state is called a state of something, knowledge knowledge of something, a position the position of something, and so on with the rest.

There is also contrariety among relatives. For example, excellence is contrary to vice, each of them being a relative, and knowledge to ignorance. But not every relative has a contrary: nothing is contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to anything of that kind.

Relatives also seem to admit of a more and a less. Similar and dissimilar are called more and less, and equal and unequal are called more and less, each of them being a relative, since the similar is called similar to something and the dissimilar dissimilar to something. But not all relatives admit of a more and a less: double is not called more or less double, nor is anything of that kind.

All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. For example, the slave is called slave of a master, and the master master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double; the greater greater than a less, and the less less than a greater. It is the same with the others, except that the wording will sometimes differ in grammatical case. For example, knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable, and the knowable knowable by knowledge; perception perception of the perceptible, and the perceptible perceptible by perception. Sometimes, though, they will not seem to reciprocate, when what they are spoken of in relation to is not given appropriately and the person giving it makes a mistake. For example, if a wing is given as a wing of a bird, it does not reciprocate: a bird is not a bird of a wing.

Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature, and in most cases this is true. Double and half are simultaneous: when there is a half there is a double, when there is a master there is a slave, and when there is a slave there is a master; and the other cases are similar to these. These also do away with each other: if there is no double there is no half, and if there is no half there is no double; and it is the same with the other such cases. But it does not seem true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. The knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge, since for the most part we acquire knowledge of things that already exist. In few cases, if any, would one see knowledge coming into being simultaneously with the knowable.

There is a problem as to whether no substance is spoken of as a relative, as is commonly thought, or whether this is possible with some secondary substances. With primary substances it is true, for neither wholes nor parts are spoken of in relation to something. The individual man is not called some individual man of something, nor is the individual ox called some individual ox of something. The same goes for parts. An individual hand is not called some individual hand of something but someone’s hand, and an individual head is not called some individual head of something but someone’s head. The same holds for secondary substances, at least for most of them. Man, for example, is not called man of something, nor ox ox of something, nor timber timber of something. It is called something’s property.

By a quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow. Quality is one of the things spoken of in several ways. Let us call one species of quality, then, states and conditions. A state differs from a condition in being much more lasting and more stable. Such are the branches of knowledge and the excellences. Knowledge seems to be one of the things that are lasting and hard to shift, even if someone has acquired it only moderately, unless some great change comes about through illness or something else of the kind. So too excellence, such as justice or moderation or anything of the kind, does not seem easy to shift or easy to change.

Another genus of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners, healthy or sickly. In general, it covers whatever is spoken of in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity. Each of these is called qualified not by being in a certain condition, but by having a natural capacity or incapacity to do something easily or to be unaffected. For example, people are called boxers or runners not by being in a certain condition, but by having a natural capacity to do something easily. They are called healthy by having a natural capacity not to be easily affected by whatever befalls them, and sickly by having a natural incapacity not to be easily affected by whatever befalls them. The hard and the soft are similar. The hard is so called by having a capacity not to be easily divided, the soft by having an incapacity for this same thing.

A third genus of quality is affective qualities and affections. Such are, for example, sweetness, bitterness and sourness and everything akin to them, as well as heat and coldness, whiteness and blackness. That these are qualities is evident, because the things that have received them are called qualified in virtue of them. Honey, for example, is called sweet by having received sweetness, and a body white by having received whiteness, and it is the same with the others. They are called affective qualities not because the things that have received the 9b qualities have themselves been affected in some way. Honey is not called sweet because it has been affected in some way, and the same is true of everything else of that kind.

A fourth genus of quality is shape and the form that belongs to each thing, together with straightness and curvedness and anything similar to these. In virtue of each of these a thing is called qualified somehow. A thing is called qualified somehow by being triangular or square, and by being straight or curved. And each thing is called qualified somehow in virtue of its form too. The rare and the dense, the rough and the smooth, might seem to signify a way of being qualified. But such things seem to be foreign to the division of quality, since each of them appears rather to indicate a certain position of the parts.

Perhaps some other mode of quality might come to light as well, but the ones most commonly spoken of are roughly these.

These, then, are qualities. Qualified things are those called paronymously after them, or in some other way from them. In most cases, practically all, they are called paronymously. From whiteness, for example, a thing is called white, from grammar grammatical, from justice just, and likewise with the others. In some cases, though, no names are established for the qualities, and so things cannot be called paronymously after them. For example, the runner or the boxer, so called in virtue of a natural capacity, is not called paronymously after any quality. 10b No names are established for the capacities in virtue of which these people are called qualified. It is otherwise with the branches of knowledge in virtue of which people are called boxers or wrestlers by condition. Boxing and wrestling are spoken of as branches of knowledge, and those in that condition are called qualified paronymously after them.

There is contrariety in the case of quality too. Justice, for example, is contrary to injustice, whiteness to blackness, and so on. The things called qualified in virtue of them are contrary as well, the unjust to the just, and the white to the black. But this is not so in every case. Nothing is contrary to tawny or pale or such colors, though they are qualified. Further, if one of two contraries is qualified, the other will be qualified too. This is clear if one runs through the other categories. For example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice is a quality too. None of the other categories will fit injustice, whether quantity or relative or where or anything of that sort at all. Only quality fits it.

Qualified things also admit of a more and a less. One thing is called more white or less white than another, and one thing more just than another. And the thing itself can increase in this respect, since something that is white can become whiter still. Not all do, however, but most. One might raise the question whether one justice is called more or less justice than another, and similarly with the other conditions. Some people dispute about such cases. They say that justice should not at all be called more or less justice than justice, nor health than health. But they say that one person has less health than another, and one person less justice than 11a another, and likewise with grammar and the other conditions.

None of the features mentioned, then, is distinctive of quality. But things are called like and unlike in virtue of qualities alone. One thing is not like another in virtue of anything except that in virtue of which it is qualified. So it would be distinctive of quality that things are called like and unlike in virtue of it.

We should not be troubled if someone says that, having set out to discuss quality, we are counting many relatives along with it, since we said that states and conditions are relatives. In practically all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular ones is. Knowledge, which is a genus, is said to be just what it is of something else, since it is called knowledge of something. But none of the particular ones is said to be just what it is of something else. Grammar, for example, is not called grammar of something, nor music music of something. If at all, these too are spoken of as relatives in virtue of their genus. Grammar is called knowledge of something, not grammar of something, and music is called knowledge of something, not music of something. So the particular ones are not relatives.

Acting and being acted on also admit of contrariety and of a more and a less. Heating is contrary to cooling, being heated to being cooled, and being pleased to being pained, so they admit of contrariety. They also admit of a more and a less, for one can heat more and less, and be heated more and less. So acting and being acted on admit of a more and a less.

This much, then, is said about these. Being in a position was also discussed in the section on relatives, where it was said to be spoken of paronymously from positions. The rest, when, where and having, are obvious, so nothing more is said about them than what was said at the beginning. There we said that having signifies having shoes on or being armed, and that where signifies, for example, “in the Lyceum.” The other things said about them there also stand.

Things opposed as relatives are said to be just what they are of their opposites, or are related to them in some other way. The double, for example, is said to be just what it is, double, of something else, for it is double of something. Knowledge too is opposed to the knowable as relatives are, and knowledge is said to be just what it is of the knowable. The knowable too is said to be just what it is in relation to its opposite, knowledge, for the knowable is said to be knowable by something, namely by knowledge.

Things opposed as relatives, then, are said to be just what they are of other things, or are in some way or other spoken of in relation to one another. Things opposed as contraries, however, are in no way said to be just what they are in relation to one another, though they are called contraries of one another. The good is not called good of the bad, but its contrary. Nor is the white called white of the black, but its contrary. So these oppositions differ from one another. Some contraries are such 12a that one or the other of them must belong to the things in which they naturally occur, or of which they are predicated, and these have nothing in between. But with those of which it is not necessary that one or the other belong, there is always something in between. For example, illness and health naturally occur in an animal’s body, and one or the other must belong to an animal’s body, either illness or health.

Privation and possession are spoken of in connection with the same thing. Sight and blindness, for example, are spoken of in connection with the eye. To put it universally, each of them is spoken of in connection with that in which the possession naturally occurs. Something capable of receiving a possession is said to be deprived of it when the possession is in no way present in that in which it naturally belongs, at the time when it is natural for the thing to have it. We do not call something toothless just because it has no teeth, or blind just because it has no sight. We use those words for what does not have them when it is natural for it to have them. Some things have neither sight nor teeth from birth, yet they are not called toothless or blind. Being deprived and having the possession are not privation and possession.

Nor is what underlies an affirmation and a denial itself an affirmation and a denial. An affirmation is an affirmative statement and a denial a negative statement, whereas none of the things underlying affirmation and denial is a statement. Yet these too are said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and denial, since with them too the mode of opposition is the same. An affirmation is opposed to a denial, as “he is sitting” is opposed to “he is not sitting.” In just the same way the thing underlying each is opposed to the other, his sitting to his not sitting.

That privation and possession are not opposed as relatives is evident, since neither is said to be just what it is of its opposite. Sight is not sight of blindness, nor is it spoken of in relation to blindness in any other way. Likewise, blindness would not be called blindness of sight. It is called privation of sight, but it is not called blindness of sight. Further, all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. So if blindness were a relative, that in relation to which it is spoken of would reciprocate with it. But it does not reciprocate, since sight is not called sight of blindness.

That things spoken of as privation and possession are not opposed as contraries either is clear from the following. With contraries that have nothing in between, one or the other must always belong to that in which they naturally occur, or of which they are predicated. For there was nothing in between in those cases where one or the other had to belong to what can receive them, as with illness and health, and odd and even. But where there is something in between, it is never necessary that one or the other belong to everything. It is not necessary that everything that can receive them be white or black, or hot or cold, because nothing prevents something in between from belonging.

Further, with contraries, a change of each into the other is possible while the thing that receives them persists, unless one of the pair belongs to something by nature, as being hot belongs to fire. What is healthy can become ill, what is white black, and what is cold hot. It is also possible to become base from worthy and worthy from base. A base man who is led into better ways of spending his time and better discussions would make at least some small progress toward being better. And once he makes even a little progress, it is evident that he would either change completely or make a very great deal of progress. He keeps becoming more easily moved toward excellence, even if he made only the slightest progress at first, so that it is likely he will make still more progress. When this keeps happening, it brings him over completely to the contrary state, unless he is prevented by lack of time.

As for things opposed as affirmation and denial, 13b it is evident that they are not opposed in any of the ways mentioned. With these alone it is always necessary that one of them be true and the other false. With contraries it is not always necessary that one be true and the other false. The same is true of relatives, and of possession and privation. For example, health and illness are contraries, and neither of them is either true or false. Likewise the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false. Nor is either of the things spoken of as privation and possession, such as sight and blindness. In general, nothing spoken of without any combination is either true or false, and all the things mentioned are spoken of without combination.

The contrary of a good is necessarily a bad. This is clear by induction from particular cases. Illness is contrary to health, 14a cowardice to courage, and similarly with the others. But the contrary of a bad is sometimes a good and sometimes a bad. Deficiency, which is a bad, has as its contrary excess, which is itself a bad. Likewise the mean, which is a good, is contrary to each of them. One would see this in few cases, though. In most, the contrary of a bad is always a good.

Further, with contraries it is not necessary, if one exists, that the other exist too. If everyone is healthy, there will be health but not illness. Likewise, if everything is white, there will be whiteness but not blackness. Further, suppose that Socrates’ being healthy is contrary to Socrates’ being ill, and that both cannot belong to the same thing at the same time. Then it would not be possible for the other contrary to exist when one of them exists. If Socrates’ being healthy exists, Socrates’ being ill would not.

It is also clear that contraries naturally occur in connection with the same thing, either in species or in genus. Illness and health naturally occur in an animal’s body, whiteness and blackness in body without qualification, and justice and injustice in a man’s soul.

All contraries must either be in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or be genera themselves. White and black are in the same genus, since color is their genus. Justice and injustice are in contrary genera, since the genus of the one is excellence and that of the other is vice. Good and bad, however, are not in a genus, but are themselves genera of certain things.

One thing is called prior to another in four ways. The first and most strict is in time. In this sense one thing is called older and more ancient than another, since it is called both older and more ancient because its time is greater. Second, a thing is prior when the implication of being does not reciprocate. One, for example, is prior to two. If there are two, it follows at once that there is one, but if there is one, it is not necessary that there be two. So from one the implication that the other exists does not reciprocate. And what seems to be prior is that from which the implication of being does not reciprocate.

Third, a thing is called prior with respect to a certain order, as with branches of knowledge and speeches. In the demonstrative branches of knowledge there is a prior and posterior in order. The elements are prior in order to the 14b diagrams, and in grammar the letters are prior to the syllables. The same holds for speeches, for the introduction is prior in order to the narration.note

Further, besides those mentioned, what is better and more valued seems to be prior by nature. Most people are in the habit of saying that those they hold in greater honor and love more are “first” with them. This is, though, pretty much the most remote of the ways.

These, then, are roughly the ways in which prior is spoken of. But there might seem to be another way of being prior besides those mentioned. Some things reciprocate as to implication of being, and the one that is in some way the cause of the other’s being might reasonably be called prior by nature. That there are some such cases is clear. There being a man reciprocates as to implication of being with the true statement about it. If there is a man, the statement by which we say that there is a man is true. And it does reciprocate, for if the statement by which we say that there is a man is true, there is a man.

Things are called simultaneous, without qualification and most strictly, when their coming to be is at the same time, since neither of them is prior or posterior. These are called simultaneous in time. Things are simultaneous by nature when they reciprocate as to implication of being but neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being. The double and the half are an example. These reciprocate, since if there is a double there is a half, and if there is a half there is a double. But neither is the cause of the other’s being.

Things divided against one another from the same genus are also called simultaneous by nature. Things are said to be divided against one another when they come from the same division, as winged is divided against footed and aquatic. These are divided against one another from the same genus, since animal is divided into these, into winged, footed and aquatic. None of them is prior or posterior. Rather, such things 15a seem to be simultaneous by nature. Each of these, footed, winged and aquatic, might in turn be divided into species. The species that come from the same genus by the same division will then also be simultaneous by nature.

So things are called simultaneous by nature when they reciprocate as to implication of being but neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being. Things divided against one another from the same genus are also simultaneous by nature. Things are simultaneous without qualification when their coming to be is at the same time.

There are six species of change: coming to be, perishing, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place.

Now it is evident that the other changes are different from one another. Coming to be is not perishing, and increase is neither decrease nor change of place, and likewise with the others. With alteration, however, there is a problem: perhaps whatever is altered must be altered by one of the other changes. But this is not true. We are altered with respect to practically all affections, or most of them, without sharing in any of the other changes. What is changed in respect of an affection need not increase or decrease, and the same holds for the rest. So alteration would be different from the other changes. If it were the same, what is altered would have to increase or decrease at once, or go through one of the other changes. But it need not.

Change without qualification has rest as its contrary, and the particular changes have the particular contraries. Coming to be has perishing, increase has decrease, and change of place has rest in place. But change toward the contrary place seems most of all to be opposed to change of place, for example upward change to downward, and downward change to upward. With the remaining one of the changes listed, it is not easy to say what its contrary is. It seems that nothing is contrary to it, unless here too one were to oppose rest in quality, or change to the contrary of the quality. That would be just as, with change of place, one opposes rest in place or change to the contrary place. For alteration is change in quality.

Having is spoken of in several ways. It may be having as a state and condition, or some other quality, since we are said to have some knowledge, or excellence. It may be having as a quantity, such as the size someone happens to have, for he is said to have a size of three cubits or of four. It may be having as with things on the body, such as a cloak or tunic, or as with something on a part, such as a ring on a hand. It may be having as a part, such as a hand or foot. It may be having as in a vessel, as the bushel has the wheat or the jar the wine. The jar is said to have wine, and the bushel wheat, so all these are said to have as in a vessel. Or it may be having as a possession, for we are said to have a house or a field.

We are also said to have a wife, and a wife to have a husband. But the way of having just mentioned seems the most remote, since by “has a wife” we signify nothing other than that he lives with her.

Perhaps some other ways of having might come to light too, but the ones customarily spoken of have practically all been enumerated.