Part I: Of Man
Human nature: sense, imagination, speech, reason, the passions, power, religion, the state of nature and the laws of nature.
The epistle dedicatory
Hobbes dedicates the book to Francis Godolphin in memory of his brother Sidney.
Your most worthy Brother Mr Sidney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleas’d to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth.
Your most worthy brother, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, when he was alive, was pleased to think my studies worth something, and besides that to oblige me, as you know, with real tokens of his good opinion—great in themselves, and all the greater for the worthiness of the man. For there is no virtue that disposes a man either to the service of God or to the service of his country, to civil society or to private friendship, that did not plainly appear in his dealings with others—not acquired out of necessity, or put on for the occasion, but inherent, and shining in the generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honor and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate to you this discourse of mine on the commonwealth.
I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, ’tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great.
I do not know how the world will receive it, or how it may reflect on those who seem to favor it. For on a road crowded with those who fight, on one side for too much liberty and on the other for too much authority, it is hard to pass between the points of both unwounded. And yet, it seems to me, an effort to advance the civil power ought not to be condemned by the civil power; nor should private men, by condemning it, declare that they think that power too great.
Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there,) offending none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power.
Besides, I am not speaking of the men but, in the abstract, of the seat of power—like those simple and impartial creatures in the Roman Capitol who with their noise defended those within it, not because they were who they were, but because they were there. I offend no one, I think, except those outside, or such people inside (if there are any) as favor them. What may perhaps give most offense are certain texts of Holy Scripture, which I have cited for purposes other than those for which others usually cite them. But I have done it with due submission, and also (given my subject) out of necessity; for those texts are the outworks of the enemy, from which they attack the civil power.
If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have presum’d on that, to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,
If in spite of this you find my work generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself by saying that I am a man who loves his own opinions and thinks everything he says is true; that I honored your brother, and honor you, and have presumed on that to take the title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,
SIR, Your most humble, and most obedient servant, THO. HOBBES, Paris. Aprill 15/25. 1651.
Sir, your most humble and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes. Paris, April 15/25, 1651.
Introduction
The commonwealth is an artificial man; to understand it, begin by reading mankind in yourself.
Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?
Nature (the art by which God has made and governs the world) is imitated by the art of man, in this as in many other things: that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing that life is only a motion of limbs, whose beginning is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels, as a watch does) have an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring; and the nerves but so many strings; and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, as the maker intended?
Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall;
Art goes further still, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a commonwealth, or state (in Latin, civitas), which is only an artificial man—though of greater stature and strength than the natural one, for whose protection and defense it was intended. In it, the sovereignty is an artificial soul, giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judgment and execution are artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which every joint and member, fastened to the seat of sovereignty, is moved to perform its duty) are the nerves, which do the same in the natural body;
The Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.
the wealth and riches of all the particular members are its strength; salus populi (the people’s safety) is its business; counselors, by whom everything it needs to know is suggested to it, are its memory; equity and laws are an artificial reason and will; concord is its health; sedition, its sickness; and civil war, its death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants by which the parts of this body politic were first made, put together, and united resemble that fiat, the “Let us make man,” pronounced by God at the Creation.
To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider
To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider
First, the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man. Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that preserveth and dissolveth it. Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-wealth. Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.
First, its matter and its maker, both of which are man. Second, how, and by what covenants, it is made; what the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign are; and what it is that preserves it and dissolves it. Third, what a Christian commonwealth is. Lastly, what the kingdom of darkness is.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late,. That Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much misused of late: that wisdom is acquired not by reading books but by reading men. As a result, those persons who for the most part can give no other proof of being wise take great delight in showing what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable criticism of one another behind their backs.
But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thy self: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions.
But there is another saying, not understood of late, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains: Nosce teipsum, “Read thyself.” It was not meant, as it is now used, to excuse the barbarous conduct of men in power toward their inferiors, or to encourage men of low rank to behave insolently toward their betters. It was meant to teach us that, because the thoughts and passions of one man are similar to the thoughts and passions of another, whoever looks into himself and considers what he does when he thinks, opines, reasons, hopes, fears, and so on, and on what grounds, will thereby read and know what the thoughts and passions of all other men are on similar occasions.
I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men, desire, feare, hope, not the similitude of the objects of the Passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.
I say the similarity of the passions, which are the same in all men—desire, fear, hope—not the similarity of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped for, and so on. For these vary so much with individual constitution and particular upbringing, and are so easily kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confused as they are by dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him who searches hearts.
And though by mens actions wee do discover their designe sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.
And though we sometimes discover men’s designs from their actions, to do it without comparing them with our own, and without distinguishing all the circumstances that may alter the case, is to decipher without a key, and to be deceived for the most part—by too much trust or by too much distrust, according as the reader is himself a good or an evil man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.
But however perfectly one man reads another by his actions, it serves him only with his acquaintances, who are few. He who is to govern a whole nation must read in himself not this or that particular man, but mankind. This is hard to do, harder than learning any language or science; yet once I have set down my own reading in an orderly and clear way, the only work left for anyone else will be to consider whether he does not find the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admits no other demonstration.
Chapter 1: Of sense
All thoughts begin in sense, which is motion pressed on our organs by external bodies.
Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.
Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterward in train, or in their dependence on one another. Singly, each of them is a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body outside us, which is commonly called an object. This object works on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man’s body, and by working in different ways produces different appearances.
The Originall of them all, is that which we call SENSE; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.
The origin of them all is what we call sense. For there is no conception in a man’s mind that has not first, wholly or in parts, been produced in the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that origin.
To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have else-where written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.
To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary for the business now at hand, and I have written about it at length elsewhere. Nevertheless, to fill out each part of my present method, I will briefly set it out here.
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without.
The cause of sense is the external body, or object, which presses on the organ proper to each sense—either immediately, as in taste and touch, or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling. This pressure, carried inward by means of the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body to the brain and heart, causes there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart to deliver itself. And because this endeavor is outward, it seems to be some matter outside us.
And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call Sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye, in a Light, or Colour figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill, in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; And to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming.
And this seeming, or fancy, is what men call sense. To the eye it consists in a light, or color with shape; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odor; to the tongue and palate, in a taste; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All these qualities, called sensible, are in the object that causes them nothing but so many different motions of the matter, by which it presses on our organs in different ways. Nor are they anything else in us who are pressed but various motions (for motion produces nothing but motion). But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking as dreaming.
And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the apparence, in another. And though at some certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another.
And just as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye makes us imagine a light, and pressing the ear produces a din, so the bodies we see or hear produce the same by their strong, though unobserved, action. For if those colors and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be separated from them, as we see they are by mirrors and lenses, and in echoes by reflection—where we know the thing we see is in one place, and its appearance in another. And though at a certain distance the real object itself seems clothed in the fancy it produces in us, still the object is one thing, and the image or fancy is another.
So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.
So sense in all cases is nothing but original fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure—that is, by the motion—of external things on our eyes, ears, and other organs designed for it.
But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a visible species (in English) a visible shew, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an Audible species, that is, an Audible aspect, or Audible being seen; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand.
But the schools of philosophy throughout all the universities of Christendom, relying on certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine. For the cause of vision, they say that the thing seen sends out on every side a visible species—in English, a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen—and the receiving of this into the eye is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sends out an audible species, that is, an audible aspect, or audible being seen, which entering the ear makes hearing. Indeed, for the cause of understanding too, they say that the thing understood sends out an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen, which coming into the understanding makes us understand.
I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.
I do not say this out of disapproval of the use of universities. But because I am to speak later of their role in a commonwealth, I must show you along the way, whenever the occasion arises, what things in them ought to be reformed—among which the frequency of meaningless speech is one.
Chapter 2: Of imagination
Imagination is decaying sense; memory, experience, dreams, and apparitions are explained from it.
That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth.
That when a thing lies still, it will lie still forever unless something else moves it, is a truth no one doubts. But that when a thing is in motion, it will remain in motion eternally unless something else stops it, is not so readily agreed to, even though the reason is the same (namely, that nothing can change itself). For men measure not only other men but all other things by themselves; and because they find themselves subject to pain and weariness after motion, they think everything else grows weary of motion and seeks rest of its own accord—hardly considering whether that desire for rest they find in themselves may not consist in some other motion.
From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly.
This is why the Schools say that heavy bodies fall downward out of an appetite for rest, and to preserve their nature in the place most proper to them—absurdly attributing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their preservation (which is more than man has), to inanimate things.
When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.
When a body is once in motion, it moves eternally (unless something else hinders it); and whatever hinders it cannot extinguish the motion entirely in an instant, but only over time and by degrees. And just as we see in water that, though the wind stops, the waves do not stop rolling for a long time afterward, so it is with the motion made in the internal parts of a man when he sees, dreams, and so on. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.
And this is it, the Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, aswell sleeping, as waking.
And this is what the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and they apply the same word, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which means appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense, and is found in men and many other living creatures, sleeping as well as waking.
The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs.
The decay of sense in men who are awake is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in the way that the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars—stars that exercise their power of being visible no less by day than by night. But because among the many strokes our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies only the predominant one is perceived, the light of the sun, being predominant, keeps us from being affected by the action of the stars.
And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us.
And when any object is removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remains, other objects more present succeed it and work on us, so that the imagination of the past is obscured and made weak, as a man’s voice is in the noise of the day. From this it follows that the longer the time since the sight or sense of any object, the weaker the imagination. For the continual change of a man’s body in time destroys the parts that were moved in sense; so that distance of time and distance of place have one and the same effect on us.
For as at a great distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This decaying sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination; as I said before: But when we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.
For just as at a great distance of place what we look at appears dim, without distinction of its smaller parts, and voices grow weak and inarticulate, so after a great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak: we lose (for example) many particular streets of the cities we have seen, and many particular circumstances of actions. When we want to express the thing itself—I mean the fancy itself—we call this decaying sense imagination, as I said before. But when we want to express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So imagination and memory are only one thing, which for different considerations has different names.
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience. Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure.
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagination is only of those things that have previously been perceived by sense, either all at once or in parts at several times. The first (which is imagining the whole object as it was presented to the sense) is simple imagination, as when someone imagines a man or a horse he has seen before. The other is compound, as when from the sight of a man at one time and of a horse at another we conceive in our mind a centaur.
So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind.
So when a man compounds the image of his own person with the image of another man’s actions—as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander (which often happens to those much taken with reading romances)—it is a compound imagination, and properly only a fiction of the mind.
There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense: As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.
There are also other imaginations that arise in men (even awake) from a strong impression made in sense. From gazing at the sun, for instance, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes long afterward; and from being long and intensely focused on geometrical figures, a man will in the dark (though awake) have images of lines and angles before his eyes. This kind of fancy has no particular name, being something that does not commonly come up in men’s conversation.
Dreams, apparitions, and superstition
Dreams come from inward disturbances; failing to tell them from sense feeds belief in ghosts.
The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body;
The imaginations of those who sleep are what we call dreams. And these too (like all other imaginations) have been in the senses before, either wholly or in pieces. And because in sleep the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so numbed as not to be easily moved by the action of external objects, no imagination—and therefore no dream—can occur in sleep except what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of a man’s body;
which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obseure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts.
and these inward parts, because of their connection with the brain and other organs, keep those organs in motion when they are disordered. By this means the imaginations previously made there appear as if a man were awake—except that, since the organs of sense are now numbed and there is no new object that can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must be clearer, in this silence of sense, than our waking thoughts are.
And hence it cometh to passe, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.
And this is why it is hard, and thought by many to be impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, I consider that in dreams I do not often or consistently think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that I do when awake, nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts when dreaming as at other times; and that when awake I often notice the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts. So I am well satisfied that, when I am awake, I know I am not dreaming—though when I dream, I think myself awake.
And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) And that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy.
And seeing that dreams are caused by the disorder of some of the inward parts of the body, different disorders must cause different dreams. That is why lying cold breeds dreams of fear, and raises the thought and image of some fearful object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain, being reciprocal). And just as anger causes heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep, the overheating of the same parts causes anger, and raises up in the brain the imagination of an enemy.
In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.
In the same way, just as natural affection, when we are awake, causes desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body, so too much heat in those parts while we sleep raises in the brain an imagination of some affection shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations: the motion when we are awake begins at one end, and when we dream, at the other.
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream.
It is hardest to tell a man’s dream from his waking thoughts when by some accident we do not notice that we have slept. This easily happens to a man full of fearful thoughts, whose conscience is much troubled, and who sleeps without the circumstances of going to bed or taking off his clothes, as one who nods off in a chair. For someone who takes pains and deliberately lays himself down to sleep, if any strange and extravagant fancy comes to him, can hardly think it anything other than a dream.
We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Iulius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar, hee saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream.
We read of Marcus Brutus (who owed his life to Julius Caesar, was also his favorite, and nevertheless murdered him) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful apparition, which historians commonly relate as a vision; but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge it to have been only a short dream.
For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision.
For sitting in his tent, brooding and troubled by the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, dozing in the cold, to dream of what frightened him most. And as that fear by degrees woke him, it must also have made the apparition vanish by degrees. And having no assurance that he had slept, he could have no reason to think it a dream, or anything but a vision.
And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies; and believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Church-yards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare, to passe disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.
And this is no very rare occurrence. For even those who are perfectly awake, if they are timid and superstitious, filled with frightening tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to similar fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men’s ghosts walking in churchyards—whereas it is either only their fancy, or else the trickery of persons who make use of such superstitious fear to go about disguised at night to places they would not want to be known to frequent.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can: their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams and other strong fancies from vision and sense arose the greater part of the religion of the Gentiles in times past, who worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like; and nowadays the opinion that ignorant people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. As for witches, I do not think their witchcraft is any real power; but I do think they are justly punished for the false belief they have that they can do such harm, joined with their intention to do it if they can—their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science.
And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions: But that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith.
And as for fairies and walking ghosts, the belief in them has, I think, been deliberately taught, or left unrefuted, to keep up the credit of exorcism, crosses, holy water, and other such inventions of spiritual men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that God can make unnatural apparitions. But that he does it so often that men need to fear such things more than they fear a halt or change in the course of nature—which he can also halt and change—is no point of Christian faith.
But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.
But evil men, on the pretext that God can do anything, are bold enough to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue. It is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes what they say appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostications from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things that depend on it, by which crafty, ambitious persons abuse simple people, men would be much better fitted than they are for civil obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the Schooles: but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they receive, they reach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and Evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by God, and Evill ones by the Divell.
And this ought to be the work of the Schools; but instead they nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what imagination or the senses are) they teach what they have received. Some say that imaginations arise of themselves and have no cause; others, that they arise most commonly from the will, and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God and evil thoughts by the devil; or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the devil.
Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.
Some say the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment—like handing things from one to another, with many words, making nothing understood.
The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.
The imagination that is raised in a man (or any other creature endowed with the faculty of imagining) by words or other voluntary signs is what we generally call understanding, and it is common to man and beast. For a dog will by habit understand the call or the scolding of his master, and so will many other beasts. The understanding that is peculiar to man is the understanding not only of another’s will, but of his conceptions and thoughts, through the sequence and combination of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech. And of this kind of understanding I will speak later.
Chapter 3: Of the train of imaginations
Thoughts follow one another unguided or guided by desire; prudence is foresight drawn from experience.
By Consequence, or TRAYNE of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.
By the consequence, or train, of thoughts I mean that succession of one thought after another which is called mental discourse (to distinguish it from discourse in words).
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this.
When a man thinks about anything whatever, his next thought is not quite as random as it seems. Not every thought follows every other thought indifferently. But just as we have no imagination of which we have not previously had sense, wholly or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another of which we never had the like before in our senses. The reason for this is as follows.
All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.
All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the senses. And those motions that immediately followed one another in sense continue together after sense as well—so that when the first comes again to take place and predominate, the second follows it, by the coherence of the matter moved, in the way that water on a flat table is drawn whichever way any part of it is guided by the finger.
But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.
But because in sense one and the same thing perceived is followed sometimes by one thing and sometimes by another, it comes about in time that when we imagine anything, there is no certainty what we will imagine next. Only this is certain: it will be something that followed it before, at one time or another.
This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first is Vnguided, without Designe, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thonghts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play.
This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant. In it there is no passionate thought to govern and direct the thoughts that follow toward itself, as the end and aim of some desire or other passion. In this case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem unrelated to one another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men who are not only without company but also without any concern. Even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony—like the sound a lute out of tune would make for anyone, or a lute in tune for someone who could not play.
And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough.
And yet in this wild ranging of the mind a man may often perceive its course, and the dependence of one thought on another. For in a discussion of our present civil war, what could seem more irrelevant than to ask (as someone did) what the value of a Roman penny was? Yet the connection was obvious enough to me.
For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.
For the thought of the war brought in the thought of the handing over of the King to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the handing over of Christ; and that in turn the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason. From there that malicious question followed easily—and all this in a moment of time, for thought is quick.
The second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire, and designe. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power.
The second sort is more constant, being regulated by some desire and design. For the impression made by things we desire or fear is strong and lasting, or (if it stops for a while) quick to return—so strong, sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire arises the thought of some means we have seen produce something like what we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that means; and so on continually, until we come to some beginning within our own power.
And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.
And because the end, by the strength of its impression, often comes to mind, if our thoughts begin to wander they are quickly brought back into the way. Observing this led one of the seven wise men to give men this precept, now worn out: Respice finem—that is to say, in all your actions look often at what you want to have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts on the way to attaining it.
The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger.
The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds. One is when, imagining an effect, we seek the causes or means that produce it; and this is common to man and beast. The other is when, imagining anything whatever, we seek all the possible effects it can produce—that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it once we have it. Of this I have never seen any sign except in man alone; for this is a curiosity hardly found in the nature of any living creature that has no passions but sensual ones, such as hunger, thirst, lust, and anger.
In summe, the Disconrse of the Mind, when it is governed by designe, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking.
In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins call sagacitas and solertia: a hunting out of the causes of some effect, present or past, or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man looks for what he has lost; and from the place and time where he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place and time to time to find where and when he had it—that is to say, to find some definite, limited time and place in which to begin a method of searching.
Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-conning of our former actions.
Then from there his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might have made him lose it. This we call remembrance, or calling to mind; the Latins call it reminiscentia, as it were a re-counting of our former actions.
Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime.
Sometimes a man knows a definite place within whose bounds he has to search; and then his thoughts run over all its parts, in the same way as one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or as a spaniel ranges a field until he picks up a scent, or as a man might run through the alphabet to find a rhyme.
Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious.
Sometimes a man wants to know the outcome of an action; and then he thinks of some similar past action and its consequences one after another, supposing that like outcomes will follow like actions. So a man who foresees what will become of a criminal goes over what he has seen follow similar crimes before, with this order of thoughts: the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. This kind of thought is called foresight, and prudence, or providence, and sometimes wisdom—though such conjecture, because of the difficulty of observing all the circumstances, is very fallible.
But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption.
But this is certain: the more experience of things past one man has than another, the more prudent he is, and the less often his expectations fail him. The present alone has any being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all, the future being only a fiction of the mind, applying the consequences of past actions to present ones. This is done with most certainty by the one who has the most experience—but not with certainty enough. And though it is called prudence when the outcome answers our expectation, yet in its own nature it is only presumption.
For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.
For foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him alone, and supernaturally, comes prophecy. The best prophet, naturally speaking, is the best guesser; and the best guesser is the one most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at, for he has the most signs to guess by.
A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time; and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.
A sign is the antecedent event of the consequent, and conversely the consequent of the antecedent, when similar sequences have been observed before; and the more often they have been observed, the less uncertain the sign. Therefore the one who has the most experience in any kind of business has the most signs by which to guess at the future, and is consequently the most prudent—so much more prudent than someone new to that kind of business that no advantage of natural and quick wit can equal him, though perhaps many young men think the opposite.
Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.
Nevertheless, it is not prudence that distinguishes man from beast. There are beasts that at a year old observe more, and pursue what is for their good more prudently, than a child can at ten.
As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine; upon the sight of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience.
Just as prudence is a presumption about the future drawn from experience of the past, so there is a presumption about things past taken from other things that are also (not future but) past. For someone who has seen by what courses and stages a flourishing state first fell into civil war and then into ruin will, on seeing the ruins of any other state, guess that a similar war and similar courses took place there too. But this conjecture has almost the same uncertainty as conjecture about the future, both being grounded only on experience.
There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech.
There is no other act of man’s mind that I can remember that is naturally planted in him, so as to need nothing else for its exercise but to be born a man and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties I will speak of shortly, which seem proper to man alone, are acquired and increased by study and industry—and in most men learned by instruction and discipline—and all proceed from the invention of words and speech.
For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.
For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though with the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of any thing we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him.
Whatever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, or conceive infinite speed, infinite time, infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing but only of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconceivable) but so that we may honor him.
Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoole-men.
Also, because whatever we conceive (as I said before) has first been perceived by sense, either all at once or in parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense. No man, therefore, can conceive anything without conceiving it in some place, endowed with some definite magnitude, and divisible into parts. Nor can he conceive that anything is all in this place and all in another place at the same time, or that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once. For none of these things ever have happened, or can happen, to sense; they are absurd speeches, taken on credit (without any meaning at all) from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving, Schoolmen.
Chapter 4: Of speech
Speech records and communicates thoughts through names; truth and error belong to speech, not things.
The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them.
The invention of printing, ingenious as it is, is no great matter compared with the invention of letters. But who first found the use of letters is not known. The man who first brought them into Greece, people say, was Cadmus, son of Agenor, king of Phoenicia. It was a profitable invention for preserving the memory of past time, and for connecting mankind, dispersed into so many distant regions of the earth. It was also a difficult one, proceeding from watchful observation of the various motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech, so as to make as many different characters to remember them by.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations and their connection. By it men record their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them to one another for mutual benefit and conversation. Without it there would have been among men neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, any more than among lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, who instructed Adam how to name the creatures he presented to his sight; for Scripture goes no further on this matter.
But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of.
But this was enough to lead him to add more names as experience and use of the creatures gave him occasion, and to join them together by degrees in such a way as to make himself understood. And so, over time, he might acquire as much language as he had found use for—though not as copious as an orator or philosopher needs.
For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other insignificant words of the School.
For I do not find anything in Scripture from which it can be gathered, directly or by implication, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colors, sounds, fancies, and relations—much less the names of words and speech, such as general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all of which are useful—and least of all entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other meaningless words of the Schools.
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.
But all this language, acquired and enlarged by Adam and his descendants, was lost again at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God every man was struck, for his rebellion, with forgetfulness of his former language. And being thereby forced to disperse into various parts of the world, the diversity of tongues that now exists must have proceeded from them by degrees, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in the course of time it grew everywhere more copious.
The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for.
The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal discourse, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words—and that for two advantages. One is the recording of the sequences of our thoughts, which, being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to new labor, can be recalled again by the words they were marked with. So the first use of names is to serve as marks, or notes, of remembrance. The other is, when many people use the same words, to signify to one another (by their connection and order) what they conceive or think about each matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for.
And for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.
And for this use they are called signs. The special uses of speech are these. First, to record what by thinking we find to be the cause of anything, present or past, and what we find that present or past things may produce or bring about—which, in sum, is the acquiring of arts. Second, to show others the knowledge we have attained—that is, to counsel and teach one another. Third, to make known to others our wills and purposes, so that we may have one another’s mutual help. Fourth, to please and delight ourselves and others by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.
To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.
To these uses there are also four corresponding abuses. First, when men record their thoughts wrongly, through the inconstancy of the meaning of their words—by which they record as their conceptions what they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Second, when they use words metaphorically—that is, in a sense other than the one they are designed for—and thereby deceive others. Third, when by words they declare something to be their will which is not.
Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.
Fourth, when they use them to wound one another. For seeing that nature has armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to wound an enemy, it is simply an abuse of speech to wound him with the tongue—unless it is someone we are obliged to govern; and then it is not wounding, but correcting and reforming.
The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connexion of them.
The way in which speech serves to remember the sequence of causes and effects consists in the imposing of names and the connecting of them.
Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter, Iohn, This man, this Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individuall and Singular.
Of names, some are proper, and belong singly to one thing only, such as Peter, John, this man, this tree; and some are common to many things, such as man, horse, tree. Each of these, though only one name, is nevertheless the name of various particular things; and with respect to all of them together it is called a universal—there being nothing in the world universal but names, for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.
One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: And wheras a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.
One universal name is given to many things because of their likeness in some quality or other accident. And whereas a proper name brings to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.
And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is of larger signification than the word Man, and comprehendeth it; and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely Word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee that in his actions observeth the Lawes of his Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.
Of universal names, some are of greater extent and some of lesser, the larger including the less large. And some again are of equal extent, each including the other reciprocally. For example, the name “body” has a broader meaning than the word “man,” and includes it; and the names “man” and “rational” are of equal extent, each including the other. But here we must note that a name is not always understood, as it is in grammar, to be one single word. Sometimes it is many words together, by circumlocution. For all these words, “he that in his actions observes the laws of his country,” make only one name, equivalent to this one word: “just.”
By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and [mute],) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it.
By imposing names, some of broader and some of narrower meaning, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of names. For example, a man who has no use of speech at all (such as one born and remaining completely deaf and unable to speak) may set a triangle before his eyes, and beside it two right angles (such as the corners of a square), and by thinking it over he may compare them and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to the two right angles standing beside it.
But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle;
But if he is shown another triangle, different in shape from the first, he cannot know without fresh labor whether its three angles are also equal to the same. But the man who has the use of words observes that this equality followed, not from the length of the sides, nor from any other particular feature of his triangle, but only from this: that the sides were straight and the angles three, and that this was all for which he called it a triangle.
will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, Every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as an Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.
He will then boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles holds in all triangles whatever, and record his discovery in these general terms: “Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles.” And so the consequence found in one particular case comes to be recorded and remembered as a universal rule. It frees our mental reckoning from time and place, it spares us all labor of the mind except the first, and it makes what was found true here and now to be true in all times and places.
But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbring. A [person with an intellectual disability] that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again.
But the use of words in recording our thoughts is nowhere so evident as in counting. A person with a severe intellectual disability who could never learn the order of the number words by heart, such as “one,” “two,” and “three,” may notice every stroke of the clock and nod to it, or say “one, one, one,” but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was a time when those names of number were not in use, and men were obliged to use the fingers of one or both hands for the things they wanted to keep count of. That, it seems, is why our number words now go only up to ten in every nation, and in some only to five, and then begin again.
And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to adde, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.
And someone who can count to ten, if he recites the numbers out of order, will get lost and not know when he has finished. Much less will he be able to add and subtract and perform all the other operations of arithmetic. So without words there is no possibility of reckoning numbers, much less magnitudes, speeds, forces, and other things whose reckoning is necessary to the survival or the well-being of mankind.
When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, A man is a living creature; or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature, If the later name Living creature, signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is true; otherwise false. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.
When two names are joined together into a consequence or affirmation, like this, “A man is a living creature,” or this, “If he is a man, he is a living creature,” then if the latter name, “living creature,” signifies everything the former name, “man,” signifies, the affirmation or consequence is true; otherwise it is false. For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where there is no speech, there is neither truth nor falsehood. There may be error, as when we expect what will not happen, or suspect what has not happened; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.
Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.
Seeing, then, that truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man who seeks precise truth needs to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly. Otherwise he will find himself entangled in words, like a bird in lime-twigs: the more he struggles, the more he is stuck. And therefore in geometry (which is the only science it has so far pleased God to bestow on mankind), men begin by settling the meanings of their words. These settled meanings they call definitions, and they place them at the beginning of their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours.
This shows how necessary it is for anyone who aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of earlier authors, and either to correct them where they are carelessly set down, or to make his own. For errors in definitions multiply as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities. At last they see these absurdities but cannot escape them without reckoning anew from the beginning, where the foundation of their errors lies.
From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in.
Hence those who trust in books do like those who add many little sums into a larger one without considering whether the little sums were correctly added. Finding the error plain at last, and not suspecting their first grounds, they do not know how to get themselves clear. Instead they spend their time fluttering over their books, like birds that come in by the chimney and, finding themselves shut in a room, flutter at the false light of a glass window, lacking the wit to consider which way they came in.
So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary.
So the first use of speech lies in the right definition of names, and that use is the acquisition of science. And the first abuse lies in wrong definitions, or none. From it come all false and senseless doctrines, which make those who take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own thinking, as far below the condition of ignorant men as men endowed with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance lies in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err. And as men grow rich in abundance of language, so they become either wiser or madder than ordinary.
Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.
Nor is it possible for any man without letters to become either outstandingly wise, or (unless his memory is damaged by disease or a poor constitution of his organs) outstandingly foolish. For words are wise men’s counters: they only reckon with them. But they are the money of fools, who value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatever, if he is only a man.
Kinds of names and their abuse
Names are sorted into four kinds, and meaningless or contradictory names are exposed.
Subject to Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things.
Whatever can enter into an account or be considered in one, and be added together to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder, is subject to names. The Romans called accounts of money rationes, and accounting ratiocinatio; and what we call “items” in bills or account books they called nomina, that is, “names.” And from this, it seems, they extended the word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things.
The Greeks have but one word Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called Syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.
The Greeks have only one word, logos, for both speech and reason. Not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but that there was no reasoning without speech. And they called the act of reasoning syllogism, which means summing up the consequences of one statement with another. And because the same things may enter into an account on account of different accidents, their names are variously twisted and varied to show that difference. This variety of names may be reduced to four general heads.
First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as living, sensible, rationall, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which names the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.
First, a thing may enter into an account as matter or body, as with “living,” “sensible,” “rational,” “hot,” “cold,” “moved,” “at rest.” With all these names the word “matter” or “body” is understood, since all such are names of matter.
Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for living put into the account life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like: And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called names Abstract; because severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.
Second, it may enter into an account, or be considered, for some accident or quality we conceive to be in it, such as being moved, being so long, being hot. Then, from the name of the thing itself, by a little change or twisting, we make a name for the accident we are considering: for “living” we put “life” into the account; for “moved,” “motion”; for “hot,” “heat”; for “long,” “length”; and so on. All such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter or body is distinguished from another. These are called abstract names, because they are separated (not from matter, but) from the account of matter.
Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the fancy: and when any thing is heard, wee reckon it not; but the hearing, or sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.
Third, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies by which we make such distinctions. When anything is seen by us, we do not reckon the thing itself but the sight, the color, the idea of it in the imagination. And when anything is heard, we do not reckon the thing, but only the hearing or sound, which is our imagination or conception of it by the ear. Such are names of imaginations.
Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, generall, universall, speciall, aequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other such, are names of Speeches. And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.
Fourth, we bring into account, consider, and give names to names themselves, and to speeches. For “general,” “universal,” “special,” “equivocal” are names of names. And “affirmation,” “interrogation,” “command,” “narration,” “syllogism,” “sermon,” “oration,” and many others are names of speeches. And this is the whole variety of positive names. These are used to mark something that exists in nature, or that may be invented by the mind of man: bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or, of bodies, the properties that are, or may be imagined to be; or words and speech.
There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.
There are also other names, called negative. These are signs showing that a word is not the name of the thing in question, such as the words “nothing,” “no man,” “infinite,” “unteachable,” “three minus four,” and the like. They are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting reckoning, and they call to mind our past thoughts, though they are not names of anything, because they make us refuse to accept names that are not rightly used.
All other Names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled Philosophers.
All other names are only meaningless sounds, and these are of two sorts. One is when they are new, and their meaning has not been explained by definition. Of these, a great many have been coined by the Schoolmen and by muddled philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeall body, or (which is all one) an incorporeall substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound.
The other is when men make one name out of two names whose meanings are contradictory and inconsistent, like the name “incorporeal body,” or (which is the same thing) “incorporeal substance,” and a great many more. For whenever an affirmation is false, the two names it is composed of, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it is a false affirmation to say “a quadrangle is round,” then the phrase “round quadrangle” signifies nothing; it is a mere sound.
So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words In-Powred vertue, In-blown vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a round quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senslesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.
Likewise, if it is false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, then the words “in-poured virtue” and “in-blown virtue” are as absurd and meaningless as “round quadrangle.” And so you will hardly meet a senseless, meaningless word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Savior called by the name parole, but often by the name verbe; yet verbe and parole differ in nothing except that one is Latin and the other French.
When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it: Understanding being nothing else, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.
When a man, on hearing any speech, has the thoughts that the words of that speech and their connection were designed and established to signify, then he is said to understand it, understanding being nothing but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech is peculiar to man (as, for all I know, it is), then understanding is peculiar to him too. And therefore there can be no understanding of absurd and false affirmations, if they are universal, though many think they understand them when they are only repeating the words under their breath, or conning them over in their minds.
What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.
What kinds of speech signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man’s mind, and their use and abuse, I shall discuss when I have discussed the passions.
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions.
The names of things that affect us, that is, that please and displease us, are of inconstant meaning in men’s ordinary talk, because not all men are affected alike by the same thing, nor the same man at all times. For seeing that all names are given to signify our conceptions, and all our feelings are only conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently we can hardly avoid naming them differently. For though the nature of what we conceive is the same, the differences in how we receive it, owing to different bodily constitutions and prejudices of opinion, give everything a tinge of our different passions.
And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidicy, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.
So in reasoning a man must beware of words that, besides signifying what we imagine of their nature, also signify the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker. Such are the names of virtues and vices. For one man calls wisdom what another calls fear; one calls cruelty what another calls justice; one prodigality what another magnanimity; one gravity what another stupidity, and so on. And therefore such names can never be true grounds for any reasoning. Nor can metaphors and figures of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they openly declare their inconstancy, which the others do not.
Chapter 5: Of reason and science
Reason is reckoning with names; absurdity comes from bad definitions; science is knowledge of consequences.
When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder; from Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Adding together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can.
When a man reasons, he does nothing else but conceive a total sum from the addition of parts, or conceive a remainder from the subtraction of one sum from another. If it is done in words, this is conceiving the consequence from the names of all the parts to the name of the whole, or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of the other part. And though in some things (as in numbers) men name other operations besides adding and subtracting, such as multiplying and dividing, these are the same. For multiplication is only adding together equal things, and division only subtracting one thing as often as we can.
These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficiall,) angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftnesse, force, power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences of words; adding together two Names, to make an Affirmation; and two Affirmations, to make a Syllogisme; and many Syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the summe, or Conclusion of a Syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other.
These operations do not belong to numbers only, but to all kinds of things that can be added together and taken one from another. For as arithmeticians teach how to add and subtract in numbers, so geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and plane), angles, proportions, times, degrees of speed, force, power, and the like. Logicians teach the same in consequences of words: adding together two names to make an affirmation, two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion, of a syllogism they subtract one proposition to find the other.
Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find mens duties; and Lawyers, Lawes, and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and substraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.
Writers on politics add together agreements to find men’s duties, and lawyers add laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in whatever matter there is room for addition and subtraction, there is also room for reason; and where these have no place, reason has nothing at all to do.
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.
From all this we may define (that is, determine) what is meant by the word “reason” when we count it among the faculties of the mind. For reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) the consequences of general names agreed upon for marking and signifying our thoughts. I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying when we demonstrate our reckonings to other men or prove them to their satisfaction.
And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is alwayes Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it.
And as in arithmetic unpracticed men must err, and even professors may often err and add up wrongly, so also in any other subject of reasoning the ablest, most attentive, and most practiced men may deceive themselves and draw false conclusions. Not that reason itself is not always right reason, just as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art. But no one man’s reason, nor the reason of any number of men, makes the certainty, any more than an account is correctly added up because a great many men have unanimously approved it.
And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after ttump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand.
And therefore, when there is a dispute over an account, the parties must by their own agreement set up, as right reason, the reason of some arbitrator or judge whose verdict they will both abide by; otherwise their dispute must either come to blows or remain undecided, for lack of a right reason established by nature. And so it is in all debates of whatever kind. And when men who think themselves wiser than everyone else clamor and demand right reason as judge, yet seek nothing but that things be decided by no one’s reason but their own, it is as intolerable in human society as it is in cards, after trump has been turned, to use as trump on every occasion whichever suit one has most of in one’s hand.
For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.
For those who want each of their passions, as it comes to hold sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own disputes, do nothing else. They betray their lack of right reason by the very claim they lay to it.
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred.
The use and purpose of reason is not to find the sum and truth of one or a few consequences remote from the first definitions and settled meanings of names, but to begin with these and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the final conclusion without certainty of all the affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and from which it was inferred.
As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty: so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.
Consider the head of a household who, in going over the accounts, adds up the totals of all the bills of expense into one sum, without regarding how each bill was added up by those who submitted it, or what it is he is paying for. He gains no more than if he approved the whole account in a lump, trusting to the skill and honesty of each accountant. So also in reasoning about all other things: whoever takes up conclusions on trust from authors, and does not derive them from the first items in every reckoning (which are the meanings of names settled by definitions), wastes his labor. He does not know anything; he only believes.
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senslesse Speech.
A man may reckon without the use of words, which can be done in particular things, as when, on seeing some one thing, we guess what is likely to have preceded it or is likely to follow it. If what he thought likely to follow does not follow, or what he thought likely to have preceded it did not precede it, this is called error, to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general meaning and arrive at a general inference that is false, though it is commonly called error, it is really an absurdity, or senseless speech.
For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable.
For error is only a deception in presuming that something is past or to come; though it was not past or was not to come, still no impossibility in it could be discovered. But when we make a general assertion, unless it is a true one, its possibility is inconceivable.
And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immateriall Substances; or of A free Subject; A free-will; or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.
And words by which we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call absurd, meaningless, and nonsense. And so if a man should talk to me of a “round quadrangle,” or “accidents of bread in cheese,” or “immaterial substances,” or of “a free subject,” “a free will,” or anything free except free from being hindered by opposition, I would not say he was in error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.
I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another.
I said before (in the second chapter) that man excels all other animals in this faculty: that when he conceives anything whatever, he is apt to inquire into its consequences and what effects he can produce with it. And now I add this further degree of the same excellence: that by words he can reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called theorems or aphorisms. That is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in numbers but in all other things of which one may be added to or subtracted from another.
But this privedge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
But this privilege is offset by another, namely the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject but man alone. And of men, those who profess philosophy are the most subject to it of all. For what Cicero says of them somewhere is very true: that there is nothing so absurd that it may not be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is plain. For not one of them begins his reasoning from the definitions or explanations of the names he is to use. That is a method used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, one, two, and three.
The first cause of absurd conclusions I attribute to lack of method: they do not begin their reasoning from definitions, that is, from settled meanings of their words. It is as if they could do accounts without knowing the value of the number words “one,” “two,” and “three.”
And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore
And since all bodies enter into an account under different considerations (which I mentioned in the previous chapter), and these considerations are named differently, various absurdities come from confusing their names and joining them unfittingly into assertions. And therefore:
The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of bodies, to accidents; or of accidents, to bodies; As they do, that say, Faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be powred, or breathed into any thing, but body; and that, extension is body; that phantasmes are spirits, &c.
The second cause of absurd assertions I attribute to giving names of bodies to accidents, or names of accidents to bodies. This is what they do who say that faith is infused or inspired, when nothing can be poured or breathed into anything but body; or that extension is body; or that phantasms are spirits; and so on.
The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies; as they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the ayre, &c.
The third I attribute to giving the names of the accidents of bodies outside us to the accidents of our own bodies, as they do who say that the color is in the body, the sound is in the air, and so on.
The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies, to names, or speeches; as they do that say, that there be things universall; that a living creature is Genus, or a generall thing, &c.
The fourth, to giving the names of bodies to names or speeches, as they do who say that there are universal things, that a living creature is a genus, or a general thing, and so on.
The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names and speeches; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a mans command is his will; and the like.
The fifth, to giving the names of accidents to names and speeches, as they do who say that the nature of a thing is its definition, that a man’s command is his will, and the like.
The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb sayes this or that (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.
The sixth, to using metaphors, figures of speech, and other rhetorical devices instead of proper words. For though it is legitimate in ordinary speech to say, for example, “the road goes or leads here or there,” or “the proverb says this or that” (whereas roads cannot go, nor proverbs speak), yet in reckoning and seeking the truth such expressions are not to be allowed.
The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the Schooles, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-Now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.
The seventh, to names that signify nothing but are picked up and learned by rote from the Schools, such as “hypostatical,” “transubstantiate,” “consubstantiate,” “eternal-now,” and similar jargon of the Schoolmen.
To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?
For anyone who can avoid these things, it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, except through the length of an account, in which he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid as both to make a mistake in geometry and to persist in it when someone else points out his error to him?
By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE.
This shows that reason is not, like sense and memory, born with us, nor gained by experience alone, as prudence is, but attained by industry: first in the apt imposing of names, and second by acquiring a good and orderly method of proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connecting one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connections of one assertion to another, until we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of the names belonging to the subject at hand. And that is what men call science.
And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.
And whereas sense and memory are only knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of consequences, and of the dependence of one fact on another. By it, from what we can do at present, we know how to do something else when we wish, or something similar at another time. For when we see how anything comes about, from what causes and in what manner, then when similar causes come into our power we see how to make them produce similar effects.
Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another.
Children, therefore, are not endowed with reason at all until they have acquired the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures because of the evident possibility of their having the use of reason in time to come. And most men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in counting to some degree, get little use from it in ordinary life. There they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations toward various ends, but especially according to good or bad fortune and one another’s errors.
For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.
For as for science, or certain rules for their actions, they are so far from it that they do not know what it is. Geometry they have thought to be conjuring. And as for the other sciences, those who have not been taught their beginnings and made some progress in them, so as to see how they are acquired and produced, are in this respect like children who, having no idea of how babies are conceived, are made to believe by the women that their brothers and sisters were not born but found in the garden.
But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.
Yet those who have no science are in a better and nobler condition with their natural prudence than men who, by bad reasoning, or by trusting those who reason wrongly, fall into false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes and rules does not lead men so far astray as relying on false rules, and taking as causes of what they aim at things that are not its causes, but rather causes of the contrary.
To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contentention, and sedition, or contempt.
To conclude: the light of human minds is clear words, but first trimmed and purged of ambiguity by exact definitions. Reason is the pace; the growth of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And on the other hand, metaphors and senseless and ambiguous words are like will-o’-the-wisps, and reasoning with them is wandering among countless absurdities; and their end is contention and sedition, or contempt.
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did alwayes distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible.
As much experience is prudence, so much science is sapience. For though we usually have one name, wisdom, for them both, the Romans always distinguished between prudentia and sapientia, attributing the former to experience and the latter to science. But to make the difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endowed with an excellent natural skill and dexterity in handling his weapons, and another who has added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can strike or be struck by his adversary in every possible posture or guard. The ability of the first would be to the ability of the second as prudence is to sapience: both useful, but the second infallible.
But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.
But those who trust only to the authority of books, and follow the blind blindly, are like a man who, trusting to the false rules of a fencing master, rashly takes on an adversary who either kills or disgraces him.
The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible.
Of the signs of science, some are certain and infallible, some uncertain. They are certain when someone who claims the science of anything can teach it, that is, demonstrate its truth clearly to another. They are uncertain when only some particular events bear out his claim, and on many occasions turn out as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain, because it is impossible to observe by experience, and remember, all the circumstances that may alter the outcome.
But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own naturall judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.
But in any business where a man has no infallible science to proceed by, to abandon his own natural judgment and be guided by general maxims read in authors, which are subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and is generally scorned under the name of pedantry. And even of those men who love to show off their reading in politics and history in the councils of the commonwealth, very few do so in their household affairs, where their own particular interest is concerned. They have prudence enough for their private affairs; but in public they care more for the reputation of their own wit than for the success of someone else’s business.
Chapter 6: Of the passions
Endeavor, appetite, and aversion are defined, and the simple passions are named.
There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoction, Nutrition, Excretion, to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other is Animall motion, otherwise called Voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds.
There are in animals two sorts of motion peculiar to them. One is called vital motion. It begins at conception and continues without interruption through their whole life: such are the circulation of the blood, the pulse, breathing, digestion, nutrition, and excretion. These motions need no help from the imagination. The other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion: such as walking, speaking, and moving any of our limbs in the way first imagined in our minds.
That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.
That sense is motion in the organs and inner parts of man’s body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, and so on, and that imagination is only the remains of the same motion, lingering after sense, has already been said in the first and second chapters. And because walking, speaking, and the like voluntary motions always depend on a prior thought of where, which way, and what, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion.
And although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.
And although untrained people do not think there is any motion at all where the thing moved is invisible, or where the space it moves through is too short to be sensed, that does not prevent such motions from existing. For however small a space may be, anything moved over a larger space, of which that small one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavor.
This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other, often-times restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme, and aphorme. For Nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at.
This endeavor, when it is toward something that causes it, is called appetite or desire, the latter being the general name, and the former often restricted to mean the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor is away from something, it is generally called aversion. We have these words, appetite and aversion, from the Latin, and both of them signify motions, one of approaching, the other of withdrawing. So do the Greek words for the same, hormē and aphormē. For nature itself often presses on men truths that they later stumble over when they look for something beyond nature.
For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.
For the Schools find no actual motion at all in the mere appetite to go or move. But since they must acknowledge some motion, they call it metaphorical motion, which is only an absurd expression. For though words may be called metaphorical, bodies and motions cannot.
That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE: and to HATE those things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the Object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.
What men desire they are also said to love, and they are said to hate the things for which they have aversion. So desire and love are the same thing, except that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, and by love most commonly its presence. So also by aversion we signify the absence of the object, and by hate its presence.
Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.
Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men, such as the appetite for food, and the appetite for excretion and relief (which may also, and more properly, be called aversions, from something they feel in their bodies), and a few other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites for particular things, come from experience and from trying their effects on ourselves or other men. For of things we do not know at all, or believe do not exist, we can have no further desire than to taste and try them. But we have aversion not only to things we know have hurt us, but also to things we do not know whether they will hurt us or not.
Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.
Things we neither desire nor hate we are said to contemn: contempt being nothing but an immobility or stubbornness of the heart in resisting the action of certain things. It arises either because the heart is already moved otherwise, by other, more powerful objects, or from lack of experience of them.
And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.
And because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual change, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause the same appetites and aversions in him. Much less can all men agree in desiring almost any one and the same object.
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; And of his Contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.
But whatever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire is what he for his part calls good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words, good, evil, and contemptible, are always used in relation to the person who uses them. There is nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves. The rule is taken from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth), or (in a commonwealth) from the person who represents it, or from an arbitrator or judge whom men who disagree set up by consent, making his verdict the rule.
The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth Evil. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in others Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and Evil.
The Latin language has two words whose meanings come close to those of good and evil, but are not precisely the same: pulchrum and turpe. The former signifies what promises good by some visible signs, and the latter what promises evil. But in our language we have no names so general to express them. Instead of pulchrum we say, of some things, “fair”; of others, “beautiful,” or “handsome,” or “gallant,” or “honorable,” or “comely,” or “amiable”; and for turpe, “foul,” “deformed,” “ugly,” “base,” “nauseous,” and the like, as the subject requires. All these words, in their proper places, signify nothing but the look or countenance that promises good and evil.
So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Vtile, Profitable; and as many of Evil: For Evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; Evil in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Vnpleasant, Troublesome; and Evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.
So there are three kinds of good: good in the promise, that is, pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable. And there are as many kinds of evil. For evil in the promise is what they call turpe; evil in effect and end is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means is inutile, unprofitable, harmful.
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the reall effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.
In sense, what is really within us is (as I have said before) only motion, caused by the action of external objects; but in appearance it is, to the sight, light and color; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, smell; and so on. So when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavor, which consists in appetite toward, or aversion from, the object causing the motion. But the appearance or sense of that motion is what we call either delight or trouble of mind.
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (à Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.
This motion, which is called appetite, and in its appearance delight and pleasure, seems to be a strengthening of vital motion and a help to it. And therefore things that caused delight were not improperly called jucunda (from juvando), from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering and troubling the vital motion.
Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of Evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.
Pleasure (or delight), therefore, is the appearance or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure, the appearance or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied by some delight, more or less; and all hatred and aversion by more or less displeasure and offense.
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures of Sense, (The word sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures of the Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY.
Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present, and these may be called pleasures of sense. (The word “sensual,” as it is used only by those who condemn them, has no place until there are laws.) Of this kind are all takings-in and dischargings of the body, and also everything pleasant to the sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the expectation that comes from foreseeing the end or consequence of things, whether those things please or displease the senses. And these are pleasures of the mind of the one who draws those consequences, and are generally called joy.
In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.
In the same way, some displeasures are in the sense, and are called pain; others are in the expectation of consequences, and are called grief.
These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.
These simple passions, called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, are given various names under various considerations. First, when they succeed one another, they are named differently according to men’s opinion of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Second, from the object loved or hated. Third, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourth, from the alteration or succession itself.
A catalog of the passions
Hobbes defines dozens of passions, from hope and fear to laughter, pity, and envy.
For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
For appetite with an opinion of attaining is called hope.
Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.
Aversion with an opinion of hurt from the object: fear.
The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistence, COURAGE.
The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance: courage.
Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.
Anger at great hurt done to another, when we conceive it to have been done by injury: indignation.
Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.
Desire of good to another: benevolence, goodwill, charity. If toward people generally: good nature.
Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.
Desire of riches: covetousness. The name is always used as a term of blame, because men competing for riches are displeased when others get them; yet the desire in itself deserves blame or approval according to the means by which those riches are sought.
Desire of Office; or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
Desire of office or precedence: ambition. This name, too, is used in the worse sense, for the reason just given.
Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
Desire of things that contribute only a little to our ends, and fear of things that are only a small hindrance: pusillanimity.
Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.
Contempt of small helps and hindrances: magnanimity.
Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.
Magnanimity in the face of death or wounds: valor, fortitude.
Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked, or disliked.
Pusillanimity in the same: wretchedness, miserliness, or parsimony, depending on whether it is disliked or liked.
Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.
Love of persons for the sake of their company: kindness.
Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURALL LUST.
Love of persons for pleasing the senses only: natural lust.
Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.
Love of the same, acquired by rumination, that is, by imagining past pleasure: luxury.
Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.
Love of one person in particular, with the desire to be loved by that person in particular: the passion of love. The same, with fear that the love is not returned: jealousy.
Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.
Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some deed of his own: revengefulness.
Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man: so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.
Desire to know why and how: curiosity. It is found in no living creature but man, so that man is distinguished from the other animals not only by his reason but also by this unique passion. In animals, the appetite for food and the other pleasures of sense are so dominant that they crowd out any concern for knowing causes. Curiosity is a lust of the mind which, by a persistent delight in the continual and tireless generation of knowledge, surpasses the brief intensity of any carnal pleasure.
Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.
Fear of invisible power, invented by the mind or imagined from tales publicly permitted: religion; from tales not permitted: superstition. And when the power imagined truly is as we imagine it: true religion.
Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the Fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth, there is alwayes in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.
Fear without any grasp of why or of what: panic terror, so called from the fables that make Pan its author. In truth, though, whoever feels this fear always has, at first, some grasp of the cause, while the rest run away by example, each supposing his fellow knows why. And so this passion happens to no one except in a crowd or multitude of people.
Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to Man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
Joy at grasping something new: admiration. It is proper to man, because it excites the appetite for knowing the cause.
Joy, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or onely supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well grounded Confidence begetteth Attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.
Joy arising from imagining a man’s own power and ability is the exultation of mind called glorying. If it is grounded on the experience of his own past actions, it is the same as confidence. But if it is grounded on the flattery of others, or merely supposed by himself for the delight of its consequences, it is called vainglory. The name fits, because a well-grounded confidence leads to action, whereas merely supposing one has power does not, and is therefore rightly called vain.
Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called DEIECTION of mind.
Grief arising from the belief that one lacks power is called dejection of mind.
The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is corrected oftentimes by Age, and Employment.
The vainglory that consists in imagining or supposing abilities in ourselves that we know we do not have is found most often in young men. It is nourished by histories or fictions of gallant heroes, and is often corrected by age and employment.
Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.
Sudden glory is the passion that produces those grimaces called laughter. It is caused either by some sudden act of one’s own that pleases one, or by noticing some deformity in another, by comparison with which one suddenly applauds oneself. It occurs most in those who are aware of having the fewest abilities, who are forced to keep themselves in their own good graces by noticing the imperfections of others. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity. For one of the proper works of great minds is to help others and free them from scorn, and to compare themselves only with the most able.
On the contrary, Sudden Dejection, is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: And they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are, Women, and Children. Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.
On the other hand, sudden dejection is the passion that causes weeping. It is caused by accidents that suddenly take away some strong hope or some prop of one’s power, and those most subject to it are the ones who rely chiefly on external help, such as women and children. So some weep for the loss of friends, others for their unkindness, others for the sudden halt that reconciliation puts to their thoughts of revenge. But in all cases both laughter and weeping are sudden motions, and custom takes both away. For no one laughs at old jokes, or weeps over an old calamity.
Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth it selfe in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: In old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.
Grief at the discovery of some lack of ability is shame, the passion that reveals itself in blushing. It consists in the awareness of something dishonorable. In young men it is a sign of the love of a good reputation, and is commendable. In old men it is a sign of the same, but, because it comes too late, it is not commendable.
The Contempt of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
Contempt for a good reputation is called impudence.
Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: And therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
Grief at the calamity of another is pity. It arises from imagining that a similar calamity may befall oneself, and so it is also called compassion, and, in the phrase of our own day, fellow feeling. Therefore, for a calamity that comes from great wickedness, the best people feel the least pity; and for the same calamity, those feel least pity who think themselves least exposed to it.
Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens great harmes, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.
Contempt for, or little feeling for, the calamity of others is what men call cruelty. It proceeds from confidence in the security of one’s own fortune. For I do not think it possible that any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harms without some further end of his own.
Griefe, for the successe of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equall or exceed him, is called EMULATION: But joyned with Endeavour to supplant, or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.
Grief at a competitor’s success in wealth, honor, or some other good, if joined with an endeavor to strengthen our own abilities to equal or surpass him, is called emulation. But joined with an endeavor to supplant or hinder the competitor, it is envy.
Deliberation and the will
Deliberation is alternating appetite and aversion; the will is the last appetite; felicity is continual success.
When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.
In the human mind, appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, about one and the same thing sometimes arise by turns. Various good and bad consequences of doing or not doing the thing proposed come into our thoughts one after another, so that sometimes we have an appetite for it, sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope of being able to do it, sometimes despair of it or fear of attempting it. The whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears, continuing until the thing is either done or thought impossible, is what we call deliberation.
Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.
So there is no deliberation about things past, because they manifestly cannot be changed; nor about things known or thought to be impossible, because men know or think such deliberation is pointless. But we may deliberate about impossible things that we think possible, not knowing it is pointless. And it is called deliberation because it puts an end to the liberty we had of doing or not doing according to our own appetite or aversion.
This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, is no lesse in other living Creatures then in Man: and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.
This alternating succession of appetites, aversions, hopes, and fears is found no less in other living creatures than in man, and therefore beasts deliberate too.
Every Deliberation is then sayd to End, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.
Every deliberation is said to end when the thing deliberated about is either done or thought impossible, because until then we keep the liberty of doing or not doing it according to our appetite or aversion.
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation, must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here.
In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion, immediately attached to the action or to its omission, is what we call the will: the act (not the faculty) of willing. And animals that have deliberation must necessarily have will as well. The definition of the will commonly given by the Schools, that it is a rational appetite, is not good. For if it were, there could be no voluntary act against reason, since a voluntary act is one that proceeds from the will and nothing else. But if, instead of a rational appetite, we say an appetite resulting from a preceding deliberation, then the definition is the same as the one I have given here.
Will therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites, make any action Voluntary; then by the same Reason all intervenient Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.
The will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating. It is true that in ordinary speech we say a man once had a will to do something that he nevertheless refrained from doing. But that is properly only an inclination, which makes no action voluntary, because the action does not depend on it but on the last inclination or appetite. For if the intervening appetites made an action voluntary, then by the same reasoning all the intervening aversions would make the same action involuntary, and so one and the same action would be both voluntary and involuntary.
By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from Covetousnesse, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.
From this it is clear that not only actions that begin from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites for the thing proposed, but also those that begin from aversion, or from fear of the consequences that follow from not doing it, are voluntary actions.
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which wee expresse our Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as I love, I feare, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which neverthelesse are not affirmations, unlesse it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from.
The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same as, and partly different from, those by which we express our thoughts. First, in general, all passions may be expressed indicatively, as in “I love,” “I fear,” “I rejoice,” “I deliberate,” “I will,” “I command.” But some of them have particular expressions of their own. These are nevertheless not affirmations, except when they serve to draw other inferences besides that of the passion they come from.
Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars.
Deliberation is expressed subjunctively, a form of speech proper for signifying suppositions and their consequences, as in “If this is done, then this will follow.” It does not differ from the language of reasoning, except that reasoning is in general words, while deliberation is mostly about particulars.
The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as Do this, forbeare that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbeare, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vain-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other language of the Passions I find none: For Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.
The language of desire and aversion is imperative, as in “Do this,” “Don’t do that.” When the party addressed is obliged to do or refrain, this is command; otherwise it is prayer, or else counsel. The language of vainglory, indignation, pity, and revengefulness is optative. But the desire to know has an expression of its own, called interrogative, as in “What is it?” “When will it be?” “How is it done?” and “Why so?” Other language of the passions I find none. For cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like do not signify as speech, but as the actions of a tongue grown used to them.
These formes of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aimes, which we otherwise know the man to have.
These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary signs of our passions, but they are not reliable signs, since they may be used at will, whether or not those who use them have such passions. The best signs of passions actually present are in the face, the movements of the body, actions, and the ends or aims we otherwise know the man to have.
And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end.
In deliberation, the appetites and aversions are raised by foreseeing the good and bad consequences and results of the action we are deliberating about. So whether its effect is good or bad depends on foreseeing a long chain of consequences, which very seldom anyone can see to the end.
But for so farre as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences, be greater than the Evill, the whole chaine is that which Writers call Apparent, or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the Evill exceedeth the Good, the whole is Apparent, or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himselfe; and is able when he will, to give the best counsell unto others,
But so far as a man can see, if the good in those consequences is greater than the evil, the whole chain is what writers call apparent or seeming good. And conversely, when the evil exceeds the good, the whole is apparent or seeming evil. So whoever has, by experience or reason, the widest and surest view of consequences deliberates best for himself, and is able, when he wishes, to give the best counsel to others.
Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of Schoole-men Beatificall Vision is unintelligible.
Continual success in obtaining the things a man desires from time to time, that is to say, continual prospering, is what men call felicity; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind while we live here, because life itself is nothing but motion, and can never be without desire, or without fear, any more than without sense. What kind of felicity God has ordained for those who devoutly honor him, a man will know no sooner than he enjoys it. These are joys as incomprehensible now as the Schoolmen’s phrase beatific vision is unintelligible.
The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a mans Felicity, is by the Greeks called Makarismos, for which wee have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.
The form of speech by which men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is praise. That by which they signify its power and greatness is magnifying. And that by which they signify their opinion of a man’s felicity the Greeks called makarismos, for which we have no name in our language. And this is enough to have said about the passions for the present purpose.
Chapter 7: Of the ends of discourse
Discourse ends in judgment or doubt, science or opinion; belief and faith rest on persons.
Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.
Every discourse governed by the desire for knowledge comes at last to an end, either by attaining it or by giving up. And wherever the chain of discourse is interrupted, there is an end for that time.
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil;
If the discourse is merely mental, it consists of thoughts, alternating, that the thing will be and will not be, or that it has been and has not been. So wherever you break off the chain of a man’s discourse, you leave him in a presumption that it will be or it will not be, or that it has been or has not been. All of this is opinion. And what alternating appetite is in deliberating about good and evil,
the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the Will; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Finall Sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT.
alternating opinion is in inquiring into the truth of the past and the future. And just as the last appetite in deliberation is called the will, so the last opinion in the search for the truth of past and future is called the judgment, or the resolute and final sentence of the one who is reasoning. And as the whole chain of alternating appetites on a question of good or bad is called deliberation, so the whole chain of alternating opinions on a question of true or false is called doubt.
No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
No discourse whatever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or future. For knowledge of fact is originally sense, and ever after memory. And knowledge of consequence, which I said earlier is called science, is not absolute but conditional. No one can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely; but only that if this is, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally. And even then it is not the consequence of one thing from another, but of one name of a thing from another name of the same thing.
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes; the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. But if the first ground of such Discourse, be not Definitions; or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood.
And therefore, when discourse is put into speech, beginning with definitions of words, and proceeding by connecting these into general affirmations, and these again into syllogisms, the end or final sum is called the conclusion. And the thought in the mind it signifies is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse is not definitions, or if the definitions are not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again opinion: opinion, that is, of the truth of something said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words that cannot possibly be understood.
When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Conscience: or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been alwayes hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses.
When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it to one another, which is as much as to say that they know it together. And because such men are the fittest witnesses of each other’s deeds, or of a third person’s, it was and always will be considered a very evil act for anyone to speak against his conscience, or to corrupt or force another to do so. So much so that the plea of conscience has been listened to very carefully in all ages. Later, men used the same word metaphorically for knowledge of their own secret deeds and secret thoughts; and so it is said rhetorically that conscience is a thousand witnesses.
And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.
And last of all, men passionately in love with their own new opinions (however absurd) and stubbornly bent on maintaining them gave those opinions, too, that revered name of conscience, as if they wanted it to seem unlawful to change them or speak against them. And so they claim to know they are true, when at most they know only that they think so.
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, in the man; Beleefe, both of the man, and of the truth of what he sayes. So that in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue.
When a man’s discourse does not begin from definitions, it begins either from some other reflection of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it begins from something said by another person, whose ability to know the truth and whose honesty in not deceiving he does not doubt. Then the discourse concerns not so much the thing as the person, and the resolution is called belief and faith: faith in the man; belief both of the man and of the truth of what he says. So in belief there are two opinions: one of what the man says, the other of his virtue.
To have faith in, or trust to, or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I beleeve in; as also the Latine, Credo in; and the Greek, Pisteuo Eis are never used but in the writings of Divines.
To have faith in, or trust, or believe a man all mean the same thing: an opinion of the man’s truthfulness. But to believe what is said means only an opinion of the truth of the statement. We should note, though, that the phrase I believe in, like the Latin credo in and the Greek pisteuo eis, is never used except in the writings of theologians.
In stead of them, in other writings are put, I beleeve him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him: and in Latin, Credo illi; fido illi: and in Greek, Pisteuo Anto: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastique use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.
In other writings, these are replaced by I believe him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him; in Latin, credo illi; fido illi; and in Greek, pisteuo auto. And this peculiarity in the Church’s use of the word has given rise to many disputes about the proper object of Christian faith.
But by Beleeving in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.
But believing in, as the phrase is used in the Creed, means not trust in the person, but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians but men of every kind believe in God in the sense of holding as true everything they hear him say, whether they understand it or not. That is all the faith and trust that can possibly be had in any person whatever. But they do not all believe the doctrine of the Creed.
From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.
From this we may infer that when we believe some statement, whatever it is, to be true on arguments drawn not from the thing itself or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority and good opinion we have of the one who said it, then the speaker, the person we believe in or trust and whose word we take, is the object of our faith, and the honor done in believing is done to him alone. And consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the Church, whose word we take and accept.
And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written by Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian.
And those who believe what a prophet tells them in the name of God take the prophet’s word, honor him, and trust and believe in him concerning the truth of what he reports, whether he is a true prophet or a false one. And the same holds for all other history. For if I did not believe everything historians have written of the glorious deeds of Alexander or Caesar, I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar would have any just cause to be offended, or anyone else but the historian.
If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.
If Livy says the gods once made a cow speak, and we do not believe it, it is not God we distrust in this, but Livy. So it is evident that whatever we believe for no other reason than one drawn from the authority of men and their writings alone, whether or not they are sent from God, is faith in men only.
Chapter 8: Of the intellectual virtues and their defects
Wit, fancy, judgment, and prudence are defined, and their differences traced to the passions.
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are alwayes understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a good witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.
Virtue in general, in every kind of subject, is something valued for its eminence, and it consists in comparison. For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized. And by intellectual virtues are always meant those abilities of the mind that men praise, value, and wish to have in themselves. They commonly go under the name of a good wit, though the same word wit is also used to distinguish one particular ability from the rest.
These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and steddy direction to some approved end.
These virtues are of two sorts: natural and acquired. By natural I do not mean what a man has from birth, for that is nothing but sense, in which men differ so little from one another, and from brute animals, that it is not to be counted among the virtues. I mean the wit that is gained by use and experience alone, without method, cultivation, or instruction. This natural wit consists chiefly in two things: quickness of imagining (that is, swift succession of one thought to another), and steady direction toward some approved end.
On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.
On the other hand, a slow imagination makes the defect or fault of mind commonly called dullness, stupidity, and sometimes other names that signify slowness of motion or difficulty in being moved.
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination.
This difference in quickness is caused by differences in men’s passions: some love and dislike one thing, others another. And so some men’s thoughts run one way, some another, and they hold on to and notice differently the things that pass through their imagination.
And whereas in this succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION.
Now in this succession of men’s thoughts, there is nothing to notice in the things they think about except in what ways they are like one another, or in what ways unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve that purpose. Those who notice their similarities, when these are such as others rarely notice, are said to have a good wit, which in this context means a good fancy. But those who notice their differences and dissimilarities, which is called distinguishing, discerning, and judging between one thing and another, when such discerning is not easy, are said to have good judgment. And particularly in matters of conversation and business, where times, places, and persons must be discerned, this virtue is called discretion.
The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity of their invention.
The first, fancy, is not praised as a virtue without the help of judgment; but the second, judgment and discretion, is praised for itself, without the help of fancy. Besides discretion about times, places, and persons, which a good fancy needs, it also requires frequently applying one’s thoughts to their end, that is, to some use to be made of them. When this is done, whoever has this virtue will easily be supplied with comparisons that will please, not only by illustrating his discourse and adorning it with new and apt metaphors, but also by the rarity of their invention.
But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.
But without steadiness and direction toward some end, a great fancy is a kind of madness. It is the kind found in those who, starting any discussion, are snatched from their purpose by everything that comes into their thoughts, into so many and such long digressions and parentheses that they lose themselves completely. I know no particular name for this kind of folly. But its cause is sometimes lack of experience, by which something seems new and rare to a man that does not seem so to others; sometimes pusillanimity, by which something seems great to him that others think a trifle. And whatever is new or great, and so thought worth telling, draws a man little by little away from the intended path of his discourse.
In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.
In a good poem, whether epic or dramatic, and also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required. But fancy must be the more prominent, because such works please by their extravagance, though they ought not to displease by indiscretion.
In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile.
In a good history, judgment must be prominent, because its goodness consists in its method, in its truth, and in the choice of the actions most profitable to know. Fancy has no place in it except in adorning the style.
In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant; because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.
In speeches of praise and in invectives, fancy is predominant, because the aim is not truth but to honor or dishonor, which is done by noble or by vile comparisons. Judgment merely suggests what circumstances make an action praiseworthy or blameworthy.
In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.
In exhortations and pleadings, judgment or fancy is most needed according to whether truth or disguise best serves the purpose at hand.
In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.
In demonstration, in counsel, and in every rigorous search for truth, judgment does everything, except that sometimes the understanding needs to be opened by some apt comparison, and to that extent fancy is of use. But metaphors are in this case completely excluded. For since they openly profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning would be manifest folly.
And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.
And in any discourse whatever, if a lack of discretion is apparent, then however extravagant the fancy, the whole discourse will be taken as a sign of lack of wit. But it never will be when the discretion is evident, however ordinary the fancy.
The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. And ’tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference.
The secret thoughts of a man range over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame or blame. Spoken discourse cannot do this, beyond what judgment approves with respect to time, place, and persons. An anatomist or a physician may speak or write his judgment of unclean things, because the aim is not to please but to benefit. But for another man to write his extravagant and amusing fancies about the same things is as if someone who had been tumbled in the dirt should come and present himself before good company. And it is the lack of discretion that makes the difference.
Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocall significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.
Again, when the mind is openly at leisure, and in familiar company, a man may play with the sounds and double meanings of words, often with flashes of extraordinary fancy. But in a sermon, or in public, or before strangers or those we ought to revere, any jingling of words will be counted folly; and the difference lies only in the lack of discretion. So where wit is lacking, it is not fancy that is lacking, but discretion. Judgment without fancy, therefore, is wit; but fancy without judgment is not.
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes.
When the thoughts of a man who has some design in hand run over a multitude of things and notice how they contribute to that design, or what design they might contribute to, and if his observations are of a kind that are not easy or usual, this wit of his is called prudence. It depends on much experience, and on memory of similar things and their consequences in the past. In this men do not differ as much as in their fancies and judgments, because the experience of men of equal age is not very unequal in quantity; it lies in different occasions, each man having his own private designs.
To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.
To govern a family well and to govern a kingdom well are not different degrees of prudence, but different sorts of business, just as drawing a picture in miniature, or life-size, or larger than life, are not different degrees of art. A plain farmer is more prudent in the affairs of his own house than a Privy Councillor in the affairs of another man.
To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater; as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signisies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.
If to prudence you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as fear or need usually prompts men to, you have that crooked wisdom called craft, which is a sign of pusillanimity; for magnanimity is contempt for unjust or dishonest helps. And what the Romans call versutia (translated into English as shifting) consists in putting off a present danger or inconvenience by taking on a greater one, as when a man robs one person to pay another. It is only a shorter-sighted craft, and is called versutia from versura, which means borrowing money at interest to pay the interest now due.
As for acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.
As for acquired wit (I mean acquired by method and instruction), there is none but reason, which is grounded on the right use of speech and produces the sciences. But I have already spoken of reason and science in the fifth and sixth chapters.
The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of customes, and education.
The causes of this difference in wits lie in the passions; and the difference in passions comes partly from differences in bodily constitution, and partly from differences in education. For if the difference came from the temper of the brain and the organs of sense, whether external or internal, there would be no less difference among men in their sight, hearing, or other senses than in their fancies and discretion. It comes, therefore, from the passions, which differ not only because of differences in men’s constitutions, but also because of differences in their customs and education.
The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.
The passions that most of all cause differences of wit are chiefly the greater or lesser desire for power, for riches, for knowledge, and for honor. All of these may be reduced to the first, the desire for power. For riches, knowledge, and honor are only different sorts of power.
And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence.
And so a man who has no great passion for any of these things, but is, as men say, indifferent, may be good to the extent of never giving offense, yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. For thoughts are to desires as scouts and spies, ranging abroad to find the way to the things desired; all steadiness of the mind’s motion, and all its quickness, comes from there.
Madness
Madness is excessive passion; Hobbes rejects possession by spirits and ends with the absurdities of the Schoolmen.
For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.
For as to have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is dullness; to have passions indifferently for everything is giddiness and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything than are ordinarily seen in others is what men call madness.
Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.
Of madness there are almost as many kinds as there are passions. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion comes from a bad constitution of the bodily organs, or from harm done to them; and sometimes the damage and disorder of the organs is caused by the vehemence or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature.
The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and selfe-conceipt; or great Dejection of mind.
The passion whose violence or persistence produces madness is either great vainglory, commonly called pride and self-conceit, or great dejection of mind.
Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse: The same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.
Pride subjects a man to anger, and the excess of anger is the madness called rage and fury. And so it comes about that an excessive desire for revenge, when it becomes habitual, damages the organs and becomes rage. Excessive love, with jealousy, also becomes rage. An excessive opinion of a man’s own self, as divinely inspired, or for wisdom, learning, beauty, and the like, becomes distraction and giddiness; the same, joined with envy, becomes rage. And a vehement opinion of the truth of anything, when others contradict it, becomes rage.
Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.
Dejection subjects a man to groundless fears. This is a madness commonly called melancholy, which also shows itself in various ways: in haunting lonely places and graves, in superstitious behavior, and in fearing, some one particular thing, some another. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behavior are called by the general name of madness. As for the several kinds of madness, anyone who would take the trouble could enroll a legion of them. And if the excesses are madness, there is no doubt that the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same thing.
(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their life-time before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man.
For example: in those who are possessed by the belief that they are inspired, the effect of folly is not always visible in any one person through some very extravagant action arising from that passion. But when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what greater proof of madness can there be than to shout at, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will shout at, fight against, and destroy those by whom they have been protected and kept safe from injury all their lives. And if this is madness in the multitude, it is the same in every individual.
For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, though wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough.
For in the middle of the sea, though a man hears no sound from the part of the water next to him, he is still quite sure that this part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any other part of the same quantity. In the same way, though we perceive no great unrest in one or two men, we may be quite sure that their individual passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if nothing else betrayed their madness, their very claiming such inspiration for themselves is proof enough.
If some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.
Suppose some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober conversation, and as you take your leave you ask who he is, so that you might repay his civility another time, and he tells you he is God the Father. I think you need expect no extravagant action as proof of his madness.
This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.
This belief in inspiration, commonly called the “private spirit,” very often begins with some lucky discovery of an error generally held by others. Not knowing, or not remembering, by what process of reasoning they arrived at so singular a truth (as they think it, though many times it is an untruth they have stumbled on), they at once admire themselves as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who has revealed it to them supernaturally by his Spirit.
Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of [the mentally ill]: some of them Raging, others Loving, others Laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions.
Again, that madness is nothing else but passion showing itself too much can be gathered from the effects of wine, which are the same as those of a bad disposition of the organs. For the variety of behavior in men who have drunk too much is the same as that of people who are mentally ill: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but each according to his own dominant passions. For the effect of the wine is only to remove dissimulation, and to take away their sight of how ugly their passions are.
For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.
For I believe that the most sober men, when they walk alone without any care or employment for the mind, would be unwilling to have the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time seen in public. That is a confession that passions without guidance are, for the most part, mere madness.
The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs in such strange, and uncouth manner, as [the mentally ill] use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, [mentally ill]: but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is, agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, [mentally ill]; but also Spiritati, men possest.
There have been two opinions in the world, in both ancient and later ages, about the cause of madness. Some derived it from the passions. Others derived it from demons or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in the strange and uncouth ways that people who are mentally ill tend to move. The first group therefore called such men mentally ill. But the second group called them sometimes demoniacs (that is, possessed by spirits), sometimes energumeni (that is, agitated or moved by spirits). And now in Italy they are called not only pazzi (mentally ill) but also spiritati (men possessed).
There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from the Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in another Graecian City, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves.
There was once a great gathering of people in Abdera, a city of the Greeks, for the performance of the tragedy Andromeda, on an extremely hot day. Many of the spectators fell into fevers, and from the heat and the tragedy together this befell them: they did nothing but recite iambic verses with the names of Perseus and Andromeda in them. This, together with the fever, was cured by the coming of winter. And this madness was thought to come from the passion imprinted on them by the tragedy. Likewise a fit of madness once reigned in another Greek city, which seized only the young maidens and caused many of them to hang themselves.
This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang’d themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aëreal living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits.
Most people at the time thought this was an act of the devil. But one man suspected that their contempt of life might come from some passion of the mind. Supposing that they did not also hold their honor in contempt, he advised the magistrates to strip those who hanged themselves in this way and leave them hanging naked. The story says this cured that madness. But on the other side, these same Greeks often attributed madness to the workings of the Eumenides, or Furies, and sometimes to Ceres, Phoebus, and other gods. So much did men attribute to phantasms as to think them living bodies made of air, and generally to call them spirits.
And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they called [the mentally ill] Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, [the mentally ill]; and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and [mentally ill]. But for the Gentiles, ’tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange.
And as the Romans held the same opinion as the Greeks on this, so did the Jews. For they called people who were mentally ill prophets or (according to whether they thought the spirits good or bad) demoniacs. Some of them called both prophets and demoniacs mentally ill, and some called the same man both demoniac and mentally ill. For the Gentiles this is no wonder, because with them diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural occurrences were named and worshipped as demons. So by “demon” a man was to understand sometimes a fever as well as a devil. But for the Jews to hold such an opinion is somewhat strange.
For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, Numb. 11. 25. to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse. And where it is said *Exod. 28. 3.
For neither Moses nor Abraham claimed to prophesy by being possessed by a spirit, but from the voice of God, or by a vision or dream. Nor is there anything in his Law, moral or ceremonial, that taught them there was any such enthusiasm or any possession. When God is said (Numbers 11:25) to take from the spirit that was in Moses and give it to the seventy elders, the Spirit of God (taking it as the substance of God) is not divided. By the Spirit of God in man, the Scriptures mean a man’s spirit inclined to godliness. And where it is said (Exodus 28:3),
Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron, is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen of the Lord* was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession?
“whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron,” what is meant is not a spirit put into them that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the same sense, the spirit of a man, when it produces unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and likewise with other spirits—not always, but whenever the virtue or vice so named is extraordinary and eminent. Nor did the other prophets of the Old Testament claim enthusiasm, or that God spoke in them; rather he spoke to them by voice, vision, or dream. And “the burden of the Lord” was not possession but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession?
I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe, when our Saviour Mark 3. 21.)
I can imagine no reason but the one common to all men: namely, the lack of curiosity to search out natural causes, and their placing felicity in acquiring the gross pleasures of the senses and the things that most immediately lead to them. For those who see any strange and unusual ability or defect in a man’s mind can hardly think it natural unless they also see from what cause it probably comes. And if it is not natural, they must think it supernatural—and then what can it be, but that either God or the devil is in him? And so it came about, when our Savior (Mark 3:21)
was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels; as if the greater [mentally ill man] had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some said, He hath a Divell, and is mad; whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, These are not the words of one that hath a Divell. So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt *Jehu, 2 Kings 9.
was surrounded by the multitude, that those of his household suspected he was mad and went out to restrain him; but the scribes said he had Beelzebub, and that it was by him that he cast out devils—as if the more gravely ill of two mentally ill men had overawed the lesser. And so too (John 10:20) some said, “He has a devil, and is mad,” while others, taking him for a prophet, said, “These are not the words of one who has a devil.” So in the Old Testament, the man who came to anoint Jehu (2 Kings 9:11)
11. was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, What came that [mentally ill man] for?* So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinory manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than [the mentally ill].
was a prophet, but some of the company asked Jehu, “Why did this mentally ill man come to you?” So, in sum, it is plain that whoever behaved in an extraordinary manner was thought by the Jews to be possessed by either a good or an evil spirit—except by the Sadducees, who erred so far in the other direction as not to believe there were any spirits at all (which is very near to outright atheism). And this perhaps provoked others all the more to call such men demoniacs rather than mentally ill.
But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God, and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason.
But why, then, does our Savior go about curing them as if they were possessed, and not as if they were mad? To this I can give no other kind of answer than the one given to those who urge Scripture in the same way against the opinion that the Earth moves. Scripture was written to show men the kingdom of God and to prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects, leaving the world and its philosophy to the disputation of men, for the exercise of their natural reason.
Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8. 26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever?
Whether the Earth’s motion or the Sun’s makes day and night, or whether the extravagant actions of men come from passion or from the devil (so long as we do not worship him), it is all one as far as our obedience and subjection to God Almighty are concerned—and that is the thing for which Scripture was written. As for our Savior speaking to the disease as to a person, that is the usual phrasing of all who cure by words alone, as Christ did (and as enchanters claim to do, whether they speak to a devil or not). For is not Christ also said (Matthew 8:26) to have rebuked the winds? Is he not also said (Luke 4:39) to rebuke a fever?
Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. And whereas many of those Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those [mentally ill men] confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was.
Yet this does not show that a fever is a devil. And where many of those devils are said to confess Christ, there is no need to interpret those passages otherwise than that those mentally ill men confessed him. And where our Savior (Matthew 12:43) speaks of an unclean spirit that, having gone out of a man, wanders through dry places seeking rest and finding none, and then returns into the same man with seven other spirits worse than itself—that is plainly a parable. It alludes to a man who, after a little effort to be rid of his lusts, is overcome by their strength and becomes seven times worse than he was.
So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but [the mentally ill].
So I see nothing at all in Scripture that requires us to believe that demoniacs were anything other than mentally ill.
There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy.
There is yet another fault in the discourse of some men, which may also be counted among the sorts of madness: namely, that abuse of words I spoke of earlier, in the fifth chapter, under the name of absurdity. That is when men speak words that, put together, have no meaning at all. Some fall into this by misunderstanding words they have received and repeat by rote; others from an intention to deceive by obscurity. And this happens only to those who deal in questions about incomprehensible matters, like the Schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy.
The common sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted [unlearned]. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation; Free-will, &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words.
Ordinary people seldom speak meaninglessly, and are therefore regarded as unlearned by those other distinguished persons. But to be certain that their words have nothing corresponding to them in the mind, some examples would be needed. If anyone wants them, let him take up a Schoolman and see whether he can translate any one chapter on some difficult point—the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free will, and so on—into any of the modern languages so as to make it intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as was familiar to those who lived when Latin was the common tongue. What is the meaning of these words:
The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essentiall subordination of the second causes, by Which it may help it to worke? They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so?
“The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work”? They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of the first book of Suárez, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or do they not intend to make others so?
And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the White nesse, Round nesse, Magnitude, Quality, Corruptibility, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nessles, Tudes, and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.
And in particular, in the question of transubstantiation: when they say that after certain words are spoken, the whiteness, roundness, magnitude, quality, corruptibility—all of which are incorporeal—and so on, go out of the wafer into the body of our blessed Savior, do they not make those -nesses, -tudes, and -ties into so many spirits possessing his body? For by spirits they always mean things that, though incorporeal, can nevertheless move from one place to another. So this kind of absurdity may rightly be counted among the many sorts of madness. And all the time that, guided by clear thoughts of their worldly desires, they refrain from disputing or writing in this way are nothing but lucid intervals. And that is enough about the intellectual virtues and defects.
Chapter 9: Of the several subjects of knowledge
Knowledge is of fact or of consequence, and the sciences are laid out in a table.
There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge of Fact: the other Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know, that, If the figure showne be a Circle, then any straight line through the Center shall divide it into two equall parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.
There are two kinds of knowledge. One is knowledge of fact; the other is knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation from another. The first is nothing but sense and memory, and is absolute knowledge, as when we see a fact being done, or remember it done; and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The second is called science, and is conditional, as when we know that if the figure shown is a circle, then any straight line through the center will divide it into two equal parts. And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher—that is, in anyone who claims to reason.
The Register of Knowledge of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are the Histories of Metalls, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.
The record of knowledge of fact is called history, of which there are two sorts. One is called natural history: the history of those facts, or effects of nature, that do not depend on man’s will, such as the histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like. The other is civil history: the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.
The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following Table.
The records of science are the books that contain the demonstrations of the consequences of one affirmation from another, and are commonly called books of philosophy. There are many sorts of them, according to the diversity of their subject matter, and they may be divided in the way I have divided them in the following table.
SCIENCE, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY. / Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY. / Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall; which are Quantity, and Motion. / Consequences from Quantity, and Motion indeterminate; which being the Principles, or first foundation of Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima. / PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA. / Consequences from Motion, and Quantity determined. / Consequences from Quantity, and Motion determined / By Figure, … / Mathematiques, / GEOMETRY. / ARITHMETIQUE / By Number, … / Mathematiques, / GEOMETRY.
SCIENCE, that is, knowledge of consequences, which is also called PHILOSOPHY. / Consequences from the accidents of natural bodies, which is called NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. / Consequences from the accidents common to all natural bodies, which are quantity and motion. / Consequences from quantity and motion indeterminate, which, being the principles or first foundation of philosophy, is called philosophia prima. / PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA. / Consequences from motion and quantity determined. / Consequences from quantity and motion determined / By figure … / Mathematics, / GEOMETRY. / ARITHMETIC / By number … / Mathematics, / GEOMETRY.
/ ARITHMETIQUE / Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in speciall. / Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the great parts of the World, as the Earth and Starres, / Cosmography, / ASTRONOMY. / GEOGRAPHY. / Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and Figures of Body, / Mechaniques, / Science of ENGINEERS. / ARCHITECTURE / NAVIGATION. / Doctrine of Weight, / PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities. / Consequences from the Qualities of Bodyes Transient, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish, … METEOROLOGY / Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent. / Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres. / Consequences from the Light of the Starres.
/ ARITHMETIC / Consequences from the motion and quantity of bodies in particular. / Consequences from the motion and quantity of the great parts of the world, such as the Earth and the stars, / Cosmography, / ASTRONOMY. / GEOGRAPHY. / Consequences from the motion of particular kinds and shapes of body, / Mechanics, / Science of ENGINEERS. / ARCHITECTURE / NAVIGATION. / Doctrine of weight, / PHYSICS, or consequences from qualities. / Consequences from the qualities of transient bodies, such as sometimes appear and sometimes vanish … METEOROLOGY / Consequences from the qualities of permanent bodies. / Consequences from the qualities of the stars. / Consequences from the light of the stars.
Out of this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the Science of … SCIOGRAPHY. / Consequences from the Influence of the Starres, … ASTROLOGY. / Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that fill the space between the Starres; such as are the Ayre, or substance aetheriall. / Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Terrestriall. / Consequences from the parts of the Earth, that are without Sense, / Consequences from the Qualities of Minerals, as Stones, Metalls, &c. / Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables. / Consequences from the Qualities of Animals. / Consequences from the Qualities of Animals in generall / Consequences from Vision, … OPTIQUES. / Consequences from Sounds, … MUSIQUE.
Out of this and the motion of the sun is made the science of … SCIOGRAPHY. / Consequences from the influence of the stars … ASTROLOGY. / Consequences from the qualities of the liquid bodies that fill the space between the stars, such as the air, or ethereal substance. / Consequences from the qualities of terrestrial bodies. / Consequences from the parts of the earth that are without sense, / Consequences from the qualities of minerals, such as stones, metals, etc. / Consequences from the qualities of vegetables. / Consequences from the qualities of animals. / Consequences from the qualities of animals in general / Consequences from vision … OPTICS. / Consequences from sounds … MUSIC.
/ Consequences from the rest of the Senses. / Consequences from the Qualities of Men in speciall / Consequences from the Passions of Men, … ETHIQUES. / Consequences from Speech, / In Magnifying, Vilifying, &c. POETRY. / In Perswading, . . RHETORIQUE / In Reasoning, … LOGIQUE. / In Contracting, . . The Science of JUST and UNIUST. / Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY. / 1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign. / 2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty, and Right of the Subjects.
/ Consequences from the rest of the senses. / Consequences from the qualities of men in particular / Consequences from the passions of men … ETHICS. / Consequences from speech, / In magnifying, vilifying, etc. … POETRY. / In persuading … RHETORIC / In reasoning … LOGIC. / In contracting … The science of JUST and UNJUST. / Consequences from the accidents of political bodies, which is called POLITICS, and CIVIL PHILOSOPHY. / 1. Of consequences from the institution of COMMONWEALTHS to the rights and duties of the body politic, or sovereign. / 2. Of consequences from the same to the duty and right of the subjects.
Place this Table between folio 40. and 41.
Place this table between folios 40 and 41.
Chapter 10: Of power, worth, dignity, honor, and worthiness
Power is present means to future good; a man’s worth is his price, set by others.
The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall.
The power of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain some future apparent good. And it is either original or instrumental.
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.
Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind: such as extraordinary strength, good looks, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental powers are those that, acquired by these or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: such as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God that men call good luck. For the nature of power is in this respect like fame, increasing as it goes; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, the faster they move.
The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: Or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.
The greatest of human powers is the one compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, who has the use of all their powers depending on his will—such as the power of a commonwealth; or depending on the wills of each individual—such as the power of a faction, or of several factions in league. Therefore to have servants is power; to have friends is power: for they are strengths united.
Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.
Also, riches joined with liberality are power, because they procure friends and servants. Without liberality, not so; because in that case riches do not defend men, but expose them to envy, as a prey.
Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerence of those that need protection.
A reputation for power is power, because it draws to it the adherence of those who need protection.
So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the same Reason.
So is a reputation for love of one’s country (called popularity), for the same reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.
Also, any quality that makes a man loved or feared by many, or a reputation for such a quality, is power, because it is a means of having the assistance and service of many.
Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.
Success is power, because it creates a reputation for wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him.
Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.
Affability in men already in power is an increase of power, because it gains love.
Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.
A reputation for prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power, because we entrust the government of ourselves more willingly to prudent men than to others.
Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.
Nobility is power—not everywhere, but only in those commonwealths where it has privileges; for its power consists in such privileges.
Eloquence is power; because it is seeming Prudence.
Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.
Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.
Good looks are power, because being a promise of good, they recommend men to the favor of women and strangers.
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.
The sciences are small power, because they are not eminent, and therefore not acknowledged in any man. Nor do they exist at all except in a few, and in those only concerning a few things. For science is of such a nature that none can understand that it exists except those who have attained a good measure of it.
Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power: And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.
Arts of public use, such as fortification and the making of engines and other instruments of war, are power, because they contribute to defense and victory. And though their true mother is science—namely, mathematics—yet because they are brought to light by the hand of the craftsman, they are regarded as his offspring (the midwife passing with ordinary people for the mother).
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price.
The value, or worth, of a man is, as with all other things, his price—that is, as much as would be given for the use of his power. And therefore it is not absolute, but depends on the need and judgment of another. An able leader of soldiers is of great price in time of war, present or imminent, but not so in peace. A learned and incorruptible judge is worth much in time of peace, but not so much in war. And as with other things, so with men: not the seller but the buyer determines the price.
For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
For let a man (as most men do) rate himself at the highest value he can; yet his true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
Honoring and dishonoring
Hobbes lists the ways of honoring and dishonoring, and what is honorable or dishonorable.
The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.
The manifestation of the value we set on one another is what is commonly called honoring and dishonoring. To value a man at a high rate is to honor him; at a low rate, to dishonor him. But high and low, in this case, are to be understood by comparison with the rate each man sets on himself.
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command, Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.
The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is what men commonly call dignity. And this valuation of him by the commonwealth is expressed through offices of command, judicature, and public employment, or through names and titles introduced to distinguish such value.
To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.
To pray to another for aid of any kind is to honor him, because it is a sign that we believe he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid, the greater the honor.
To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.
To obey is to honor, because no one obeys those whom they think have no power to help or hurt them. And consequently, to disobey is to dishonor.
To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because ’tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and fignifies an opinion of the need of small helps.
To give a man great gifts is to honor him, because it is buying protection and acknowledging power. To give little gifts is to dishonor, because it is only alms, and signifies a belief that he needs small help.
To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.
To be diligent in promoting another’s good, and also to flatter, is to honor, as a sign that we seek his protection or aid. To neglect is to dishonor.
To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.
To give way or yield place to another in anything of advantage is to honor, being a confession of greater power. To arrogate is to dishonor.
To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare, then he expects, is to Dishonour; for ’tis undervaluing.
To show any sign of love or fear of another is to honor, for both to love and to fear is to value. To hold in contempt, or to love or fear less than he expects, is to dishonor, for it is undervaluing.
To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to Dishonour.
To praise, extol, or call happy is to honor, because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity is to dishonor.
To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.
To speak to another with consideration, and to appear before him with decency and humility, is to honor him, as signs of fear of offending. To speak to him rashly, or to do anything before him obscenely, sloppily, or impudently, is to dishonor.
To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour,
To believe, to trust, to rely on another is to honor him, a sign of our opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust or disbelieve is to dishonor.
To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.
To listen to a man’s advice, or to his talk of any kind, is to honor, as a sign that we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or walk out, or talk meanwhile is to dishonor.
To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.
To do to another the things he takes for signs of honor, or that the law or custom makes so, is to honor, because in approving the honor done by others, one acknowledges the power that others acknowledge. To refuse to do them is to dishonor.
To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.
To agree with someone in opinion is to honor, as a sign of approving his judgment and wisdom. To dissent is to dishonor, and a reproach of error, and (if the dissent is in many things) of folly.
To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.
To imitate is to honor, for it is to approve strongly. To imitate one’s enemy is to dishonor.
To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.
To honor those whom another honors is to honor him, as a sign of approval of his judgment. To honor his enemies is to dishonor him.
To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.
To employ someone in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honor, as a sign of our opinion of his wisdom or other power. To deny employment in such cases to those who seek it is to dishonor.
All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.
All these ways of honoring are natural, and hold within commonwealths as well as outside them. But in commonwealths, where he or they who have the supreme authority can make whatever they please stand for signs of honor, there are other honors.
A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will to Honour him.
A sovereign honors a subject with whatever title, office, employment, or action he himself wants taken as a sign of his will to honor him.
The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him, proclayming, Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour. And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour.
The king of Persia honored Mordecai when he ordered that he be led through the streets in the king’s garment, on one of the king’s horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince going before him proclaiming, “Thus shall it be done to the man whom the king will honor.” And yet another king of Persia, or the same one at another time, when someone asked, in return for some great service, to wear one of the king’s robes, gave him leave to do so—but with this addition, that he should wear it as the king’s fool. And then it was dishonor.
So that of Civill Honour, the Fountain is in the person of the Common-wealth, and dependeth on the Will of the Soveraigne; and is therefore temporary, and called Civill Honour; such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.
So the fountain of civil honor is in the person of the commonwealth, and depends on the will of the sovereign. It is therefore temporary, and is called civil honor—such as magistracies, offices, titles, and in some places painted coats of arms and escutcheons. And men honor those who have them as having so many signs of favor in the commonwealth, and that favor is power.
Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power.
Honorable is whatever possession, action, or quality is a proof and sign of power.
And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.
And therefore to be honored, loved, or feared by many is honorable, as proofs of power. To be honored by few or none is dishonorable.
Dominion, and Victory is Honourable; because acquired by Power; and Servitude, for need, or feare, is Dishonourable.
Dominion and victory are honorable, because they are acquired by power; and servitude, out of need or fear, is dishonorable.
Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.
Good fortune (if lasting) is honorable, as a sign of the favor of God. Ill fortune and losses are dishonorable. Riches are honorable, for they are power. Poverty is dishonorable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, and confidence are honorable, for they come from the consciousness of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, and diffidence are dishonorable.
Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.
Timely resolution, or determining what one is to do, is honorable, as being contempt of small difficulties and dangers. And irresolution is dishonorable, as a sign of valuing little obstacles and little advantages too much. For when a man has weighed things as long as time permits and does not resolve, the difference in weight is only small; and therefore if he does not resolve, he overvalues little things, which is pusillanimity.
All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.
All actions and speeches that come, or seem to come, from much experience, science, discretion, or wit are honorable, for all these are powers. Actions or words that come from error, ignorance, or folly are dishonorable.
Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.
Gravity, so far as it seems to come from a mind occupied with something else, is honorable, because occupation is a sign of power. But if it seems to come from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonorable. For the gravity of the first is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise; but that of the second, like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand and other trash.
To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.
To be conspicuous—that is, to be known—for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good is honorable, as a sign of the power for which one is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity is dishonorable.
To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.
To be descended from conspicuous parents is honorable, because such people more easily obtain the aid and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonorable.
Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.
Actions arising from equity, joined with loss, are honorable, as signs of magnanimity; for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, and neglect of equity are dishonorable.
Covetousnesse of great Riches, and ambition of great Honours, are Honourable; as signes of power to obtain them. Covetousnesse, and ambition, of little gaines, or preferments, is Dishonourable.
Covetousness of great riches and ambition for great honors are honorable, as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness and ambition for little gains or promotions are dishonorable.
Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power.
Nor does it alter the case of honor whether an action (so long as it is great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power) is just or unjust; for honor consists only in the opinion of power.
Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolne away the Cattell of Apollo, from his Herdsmen.
Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonored the gods, but rather greatly honored them, when they brought them into their poems committing rapes, thefts, and other great but unjust or unclean acts. So much so that nothing is so celebrated in Jupiter as his adulteries, nor in Mercury as his frauds and thefts. Of Mercury’s praises in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this: that being born in the morning, he had invented music by noon, and before night had stolen away the cattle of Apollo from his herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge.
Also among men, until great commonwealths were established, it was thought no dishonor to be a pirate or a highway robber, but rather a lawful trade—not only among the Greeks, but among all other nations as well, as is plain from the histories of ancient times. And at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are, and always will be, honorable, though unlawful, until such time as honor is ordained for those who refuse the challenge, and disgrace for those who make it.
For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.
For duels are also often the effects of courage, and the ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power. Yet for the most part they are the effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of dishonor in one or both of the combatants, who, committed by their rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace.
Coats of arms and titles of honor
Heraldry and titles such as duke, count, and baron are traced to their origins.
Scutchions, and Coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them.
Escutcheons and hereditary coats of arms are honorable where they carry some eminent privileges, and otherwise not; for their power consists either in such privileges, or in riches, or in something else that is equally honored in other men. This kind of honor, commonly called gentry, has come down from the ancient Germans. No such thing was ever known where German customs were unknown, and it is nowhere in use now where Germans have not lived. The ancient Greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with whatever devices they pleased, so that an unpainted shield was a sign of poverty and of a common soldier. But they did not pass them on by inheritance.
The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.
The Romans passed on the marks of their families, but these were the images of their ancestors, not their devices. Among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and America there is not, and never was, any such thing. The Germans alone had that custom, and from them it has spread into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world.
For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent, and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets.
For Germany, like all other countries in their beginnings, was anciently divided among an infinite number of petty lords, or masters of families, who were continually at war with one another. Chiefly so that they might be recognized by their followers when they were covered in armor, and partly for ornament, those masters or lords both painted their armor, or their escutcheon or coat, with the picture of some beast or other thing, and also put some prominent and visible mark on the crest of their helmets.
And this ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military.
This ornament, both of the arms and of the crest, descended by inheritance to their children: to the eldest unaltered, and to the rest with some mark of difference, as the old master—in Dutch, the Here-alt—thought fit. But when many such families joined together to make a greater monarchy, this duty of the herald, to distinguish escutcheons, was made into a separate private office. And the descendants of these lords are the great and ancient gentry, who for the most part bear living creatures noted for courage and plunder, or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisades, and other emblems of war, since nothing was then held in honor but military virtue.
Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such antient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.
Afterward, not only kings but popular commonwealths gave various kinds of escutcheons to those who went out to war or returned from it, as encouragement or as a reward for their service. An observant reader may find all this in those ancient histories, Greek and Latin, that mention the German nation and its customs in their times.
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire.
Titles of honor, such as duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honorable, as signifying the value set on those who hold them by the sovereign power of the commonwealth. In old times these titles were titles of office and command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French. Dukes, in Latin duces, were generals in war; counts, comites, were those who kept the general company out of friendship and were left to govern and defend places that had been conquered and pacified; marquises, marchiones, were counts who governed the marches, or borders, of the empire.
Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr.
These titles of duke, count, and marquis came into the empire about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German militia. But baron seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man—such as were the king’s or prince’s men whom they employed in war about their persons. It seems to be derived from vir, to ber and bar, which meant the same in the language of the Gauls as vir in Latin; and from there to bero and baro, so that such men were called berones, and later barones, and (in Spanish) varones. But anyone who wants to know the origin of titles of honor in more detail may find it, as I have found this, in Mr.
Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.
Selden’s most excellent treatise on that subject. In the course of time, owing to troubles and for reasons of good and peaceable government, these offices of honor were turned into mere titles, serving for the most part to mark the precedence, place, and rank of subjects in the commonwealth. Men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places where they had neither possession nor command, and other titles too were devised for the same purpose.
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.
Worthiness is something different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert. It consists in a particular power or ability for that of which he is said to be worthy; and this particular ability is usually called fitness, or aptitude.
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it.
For the man most worthy to be a commander, a judge, or to hold any other charge is the one best equipped with the qualities required to carry it out well; and the man most worthy of riches is the one who has the qualities most needed to use them well. Even if any of these qualities is lacking, a man may nevertheless be a worthy man and valuable for something else. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment and yet be unable to claim any right to have it before another; and therefore he cannot be said to merit or deserve it.
For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.
For merit presupposes a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise. I shall say more about this later, when I speak of contracts.
Chapter 11: Of the difference of manners
All men restlessly desire power after power; the passions and ignorance incline them to war or peace.
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Moralls; But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand.
By manners I do not mean here decency of behavior—how one man should greet another, or how a man should rinse his mouth or pick his teeth in company, and other such points of the “small morals.” I mean those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. To that end we must consider that the felicity of this life does not consist in the repose of a mind that is satisfied. For there is no such finis ultimus (ultimate aim) or summum bonum (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man whose desires are at an end live any more than one whose senses and imaginations have come to a standstill.
Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the Object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend, not onely to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.
Felicity is a continual progress of desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still only the way to the latter. The cause of this is that the object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to secure forever the way to his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only to obtaining but also to securing a contented life. They differ only in the way—which arises partly from the diversity of passions in different men, and partly from differences in the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes that produce the effect desired.
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.
So in the first place, I put forward as a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intense delight than he has already attained, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but that he cannot secure the power and means to live well that he has now without acquiring more.
And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.
Hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their efforts to securing it at home by laws or abroad by wars. And when that is done, a new desire follows: in some, for fame from new conquest; in others, for ease and sensual pleasure; in others, for admiration, or for being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.
Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.
Competition for riches, honor, command, or other power inclines men to contention, enmity, and war, because the way for one competitor to attain his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. In particular, competition for praise inclines men to a reverence for antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead, and they ascribe more than is due to the dead so that they may obscure the glory of the living.
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power: Because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour. Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.
Desire of ease and sensual delight disposes men to obey a common power, because by such desires a man gives up the protection he might hope for from his own industry and labor. Fear of death and wounds disposes men the same way, and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy and hardy men who are not content with their present condition, and also all men who are ambitious for military command, are inclined to keep the causes of war alive and to stir up trouble and sedition. For there is no military honor except by war, and no hope of mending a bad hand like causing a new shuffle.
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.
Desire of knowledge and of the arts of peace inclines men to obey a common power. For such desire contains a desire for leisure, and consequently for protection from some power other than their own.
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.
Desire of praise disposes men to praiseworthy actions, such as please those whose judgment they value; for when we hold men in contempt, we hold their praises in contempt too. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though after death there is no sense of the praise given us on earth—those joys being either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell—yet such fame is not vain. For men take a present delight in it, from foreseeing it and the benefit that may come of it to their descendants. Though they do not see this now, they imagine it; and anything that is pleasure to the senses is also pleasure to the imagination.
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome; and unrequitable obligation, perpetuall thraldome; which is to ones equall, hatefull. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution.
To have received from someone we consider our equal greater benefits than we can hope to repay disposes us to pretended love but really to secret hatred. It puts a man in the position of a desperate debtor who, avoiding the sight of his creditor, silently wishes him somewhere he might never see him again. For benefits oblige, and obligation is bondage; and an obligation that cannot be repaid is perpetual bondage, which is hateful when owed to an equal. But to have received benefits from someone we acknowledge as our superior inclines us to love, because the obligation is no new lowering of ourselves; and cheerful acceptance (which men call gratitude) is such an honor done to the benefactor that it is generally taken as repayment.
Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.
Also, to receive benefits, even from an equal or an inferior, disposes us to love as long as there is hope of repaying them. For in the receiver’s intention the obligation is one of mutual aid and service; and from this comes a rivalry over who shall outdo the other in benefits—the most noble and profitable contest possible, in which the victor is pleased with his victory and the other is revenged by admitting it.
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.
To have done a man more harm than one can, or is willing to, make amends for inclines the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect either revenge or forgiveness, and both are hateful.
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.
Fear of oppression disposes a man to strike first, or to seek aid from others in association. For there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wife, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of Wit.
Men who distrust their own cleverness are better disposed for victory in tumult and sedition than those who think themselves wise or crafty. For the latter love to deliberate, while the former, fearing to be outmaneuvered, strike first. And in sedition, since men are always on the verge of battle, to hold together and use every advantage of force is a better stratagem than any that can come from subtlety of wit.
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.
Vainglorious men who, without any real awareness in themselves of great ability, delight in imagining themselves gallant men, are inclined only to show and not to action. For when danger or difficulty appears, they expect nothing but to have their inadequacy exposed.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.
Vainglorious men who estimate their ability by the flattery of others, or by the good fortune of some earlier action, without any sure ground of hope in a true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rush into engagements, and to retreat if they can when danger or difficulty approaches. For not seeing the way to safety, they would rather risk their honor, which can be patched up with an excuse, than their lives, for which no patch is enough.
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisedome, both to themselves and others.
Men who have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matters of government are disposed to ambition, because without public employment in council or magistracy the honor of their wisdom is lost. And therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition, for eloquence seems like wisdom, both to themselves and to others.
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, ’tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is Pusillanimity.
Pusillanimity disposes men to irresolution, and consequently to losing the occasions and best opportunities for action. For when men have deliberated until the time for action approaches, if it is not then clear what is best to do, that is a sign the motives one way and the other do not differ much. So not to decide then is to lose the occasion by weighing trifles—which is pusillanimity.
Frugality, (though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.
Frugality, though a virtue in poor men, makes a man unfit to achieve actions that require the strength of many men at once. For it weakens their effort, which must be nourished and kept vigorous by reward.
Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.
Eloquence together with flattery disposes men to trust those who have them, because the former is seeming wisdom and the latter seeming kindness. Add military reputation to them, and it disposes men to attach themselves and submit to those who have them. The first two assure them against danger from the man himself; the last assures them against danger from others.
Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.
Lack of science—that is, ignorance of causes—disposes, or rather compels, a man to rely on the advice and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns must, if they do not rely on their own opinion, rely on the opinion of someone else whom they think wiser than themselves and see no reason to suspect of deceiving them.
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.
Ignorance of the meaning of words, which is lack of understanding, disposes men to take on trust not only the truth they do not know, but also the errors—and, what is more, the nonsense—of those they trust. For neither error nor nonsense can be detected without a perfect understanding of words.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.
From the same cause it comes about that men give different names to one and the same thing according to their own differing passions. Those who approve of a private opinion call it opinion, but those who dislike it call it heresy—and yet heresy means no more than private opinion, only with a stronger tinge of anger.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.
From the same cause, too, it comes about that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men and many actions of one multitude—for example, between the one action of all the senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of senators in killing Caesar. They are therefore disposed to take for the action of the people what is really a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, perhaps led by the persuasion of one.
Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use this false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters;
Ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions. He comes to think unjust whatever it has been the custom to punish, and just whatever he can produce an example of going unpunished and approved—or, as the lawyers who use only this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent. He is like little children, who have no other rule of good and bad manners than the correction they receive from their parents and teachers,
save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust.
except that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not. For having grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason and from reason to custom as it suits them, departing from custom when their interest requires it and setting themselves against reason whenever reason is against them. This is why the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and by the sword, whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not: in that subject men do not care what the truth is, since it crosses no man’s ambition, profit, or lust.
For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle, should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.
For I do not doubt that if it had been contrary to any man’s right of dominion, or to the interest of men who have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine would have been, if not disputed, then suppressed by the burning of all books of geometry, as far as the one it concerned was able.
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.
Ignorance of remote causes disposes men to attribute all events to the immediate and instrumental causes, for these are the only causes they perceive. Hence it happens everywhere that men who are aggrieved by payments to the public vent their anger on the publicans—that is, the tax farmers, collectors, and other officers of the public revenue—and attach themselves to those who find fault with the public government. And so, once they have committed themselves beyond hope of justification, they also turn on the supreme authority, for fear of punishment or shame at receiving a pardon.
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: For such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man both to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.
Ignorance of natural causes disposes a man to credulity, so that he often believes impossible things. For such people know nothing to the contrary—for all they know, these things may be true—being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, because men love to be listened to in company, disposes them to lying. So ignorance itself, without malice, can make a man both believe lies and tell them, and sometimes also invent them.
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.
Anxiety about the future disposes men to inquire into the causes of things, because knowing them makes men better able to arrange the present to their best advantage.
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature.
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from considering the effect to seek the cause, and then the cause of that cause, until of necessity he must at last come to this thought: that there is some cause which has no prior cause, but is eternal—and this is what men call God. So it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined by it to believe there is one eternal God, though men cannot have any idea of him in their minds that corresponds to his nature.
For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.
For just as a man born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by it, may easily conceive and be sure that there is something there which men call fire and which is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like or have an idea of it in his mind such as those who see it have—so also, from the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive that there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet have no idea or image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods.
And those who make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things are still inclined—from the fear that comes from their very ignorance of what it is that has the power to do them much good or harm—to suppose and invent for themselves various kinds of invisible powers. They stand in awe of their own imaginations, call on them in times of distress, and also thank them when they expect good success, making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. By this means it has come about that, from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created innumerable sorts of gods in the world.
And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.
And this fear of invisible things is the natural seed of what each person calls religion in himself, and superstition in those who worship or fear that power differently from the way he does.
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.
This seed of religion has been noticed by many; and some of those who noticed it have been inclined by it to nourish, dress, and shape it into laws, and to add to it any opinion of their own invention about the causes of future events by which they thought they would best be able to govern others and make the greatest use of their own powers.
Chapter 12: Of religion
Religion grows from anxiety, ignorance of causes, and fear of invisible powers.
Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree therof, not to be found in other Living creatures.
Since there are no signs or fruits of religion except in man alone, there is no reason to doubt that the seed of religion is also only in man, and consists in some peculiar quality—or at least in some eminent degree of it—not to be found in other living creatures.
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune.
First, it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive about the causes of the events he sees—some more, some less, but all men enough to be curious in searching for the causes of their own good and bad fortune.
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.
Second, on seeing anything that has a beginning, to think also that it had a cause, which determined it to begin when it did rather than sooner or later.
Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.
Third, whereas beasts have no other felicity than enjoying their daily food, ease, and lusts—having little or no foresight of the time to come, for lack of observing and remembering the order, sequence, and dependence of the things they see—man observes how one event has been produced by another, and remembers in them what came before and what followed. And when he cannot be sure of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and bad fortune are for the most part invisible), he supposes causes for them—either such as his own fancy suggests, or on the authority of other men whom he thinks to be his friends and wiser than himself.
The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The prudent man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.
The first two produce anxiety. For being sure that there are causes of all things that have happened so far or will happen hereafter, a man who is continually striving to secure himself against the evil he fears and to obtain the good he desires cannot help being in perpetual concern about the time to come. So every man, especially those who are overly provident, is in a state like that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus (whose name, interpreted, means “the prudent man”) was bound to Mount Caucasus, a place with a wide view, where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured in the day as much as was restored in the night: so the man who looks too far ahead, in his care for the future, has his heart gnawed all day long by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no rest or pause from his anxiety except in sleep.
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true.
This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in its ignorance of causes, as if in the dark, must necessarily have some object. And therefore, when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to blame for their good or bad fortune except some invisible power or agent. It was perhaps in this sense that some of the old poets said that the gods were first created by human fear—which, said of the gods (that is, the many gods of the Gentiles), is very true.
But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to be fall them in time to come.
But the acknowledgment of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies and their various powers and operations than from fear of what was to befall them in the time to come.
For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.
For anyone who, from any effect he sees come about, reasons to its next and immediate cause, and from there to the cause of that cause, and plunges deep into the pursuit of causes, will at last come to this: that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers admitted) one first mover—that is, a first and eternal cause of all things, which is what men mean by the name of God. And all this without any thought of their fortune, concern for which both inclines men to fear and hinders them from searching for the causes of other things, and so gives occasion for inventing as many gods as there are men to invent them.
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed; they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aëreall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please.
As for the matter or substance of the invisible agents so imagined, men could not by natural reasoning arrive at any other notion than that it was the same as that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man was of the same substance as what appears in a dream to someone asleep, or in a mirror to someone awake. Men, not knowing that such apparitions are nothing but creatures of the fancy, think them real and external substances, and therefore call them ghosts—as the Latins called them imagines and umbrae—and thought them spirits, that is, thin airy bodies. And they thought the invisible agents they feared were like them, except that they appear and vanish when they please.
But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his Nature by Spirit Incorporeall, and then confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.
But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter any man’s mind by nature. For though men may put together words of contradictory meaning, like “spirit” and “incorporeal,” they can never have an imagination of anything corresponding to them. And therefore men who by their own meditation arrive at the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God prefer to confess that he is incomprehensible and above their understanding, rather than define his nature as “incorporeal spirit” and then confess their definition to be unintelligible. Or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with the intention of making the divine nature understood, but piously, to honor him with attributes whose meanings are as remote as possible from the grossness of visible bodies.
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; The Pompeian faction for their warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since.
Next, as to the way in which they think these invisible agents brought about their effects—that is, what immediate causes they used in bringing things to pass—men who do not know what it is that we call causing (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by than observing and remembering what they have seen precede a similar effect at some other time or times, without seeing any dependence or connection at all between the earlier and the later event. And therefore from similar things past they expect similar things to come, and superstitiously hope for good or bad luck from things that have no part at all in causing it. So the Athenians, for their war at Lepanto, demanded another Phormio; the Pompeian faction, for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done the like on various occasions since.
In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.
In the same way they attribute their fortune to a bystander, to a lucky or unlucky place, or to words spoken—especially if the name of God is among them—as in charming and conjuring (the liturgy of witches), to the point of believing that such words have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.
Third, as for the worship that men naturally offer to invisible powers, it can be nothing other than such expressions of reverence as they would use toward men: gifts, petitions, thanks, bodily submission, respectful addresses, sober behavior, premeditated words, and swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises) by invoking them. Beyond that, reason suggests nothing, but leaves them either to stop there or, for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.
Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.
Lastly, as to how these invisible powers declare to men the things that will come to pass hereafter—especially concerning their good or bad fortune in general, or good or bad success in any particular undertaking—men are by nature at a loss. Except that, being used to conjecturing about the future from the past, they are very apt not only to take chance things, after one or two occurrences, as omens of the same occurrence ever after, but also to believe similar omens from other men of whom they have once formed a good opinion.
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.
And in these four things—belief in ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion toward what men fear, and taking chance things for omens—consists the natural seed of religion. Owing to the different fancies, judgments, and passions of different men, it has grown into ceremonies so different that those used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another.
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God.
For these seeds have been cultivated by two sorts of men. One sort have nourished and ordered them according to their own invention; the other have done it by God’s commandment and direction. But both sorts have done it with the purpose of making the men who relied on them more apt for obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So the religion of the first sort is a part of human politics, and teaches part of the duty that earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the second sort is divine politics, and contains precepts for those who have given themselves up as subjects in the Kingdom of God.
Of the former sort, were all the founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.
Of the first sort were all the founders of commonwealths and the lawgivers of the Gentiles. Of the second sort were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Savior, through whom the laws of the Kingdom of God have come down to us.
The religion of the Gentiles
Pagan lawgivers shaped the seeds of religion into gods, rites, and oracles to secure obedience.
And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.
As for that part of religion which consists in opinions about the nature of invisible powers, there is almost nothing with a name that has not been regarded among the Gentiles, in one place or another, as a god or devil, or imagined by their poets to be animated, inhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.
The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.
The unformed matter of the world was a god, by the name of Chaos.
The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.
The heaven, the ocean, the planets, fire, the earth, the winds were so many gods.
Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called Daemons: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house, with its Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears.
Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek—deified. Besides this, they filled almost every place with spirits called daemons: the plains with Pan and Panises, or satyrs; the woods with fauns and nymphs; the sea with tritons and other nymphs; every river and spring with a ghost of its name and with nymphs; every house with its lares, or household spirits; every man with his genius; hell with ghosts and spiritual officers, such as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and at night, every place with larvae, lemures, ghosts of dead men, and a whole kingdom of fairies and bugbears.
They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they prayed.
They have also ascribed divinity to, and built temples to, mere accidents and qualities, such as time, night, day, peace, concord, love, strife, virtue, honor, health, rust, fever, and the like. When they prayed for or against these, they prayed to them, as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, letting fall or withholding the good or evil for or against which they prayed.
They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Divel.
They also invoked their own wit, under the name of the Muses; their own ignorance, under the name of Fortune; their own lust, under the name of Cupid; their own rage, under the name of the Furies; their own private parts, under the name of Priapus; and attributed their nocturnal emissions to incubi and succubi. So there was nothing that a poet could introduce as a person in his poem that they did not make either a god or a devil.
The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependance at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apolla; of Subtilty and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.
The same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground of religion—men’s ignorance of causes, and so their readiness to attribute their fortune to causes on which it plainly did not depend at all—took the opportunity to thrust on their ignorance, in place of second causes, a kind of second-rank, ministering gods. They ascribed the cause of fertility to Venus, the cause of the arts to Apollo, of subtlety and craft to Mercury, of tempests and storms to Aeolus, and of other effects to other gods; so that among the heathen there was almost as great a variety of gods as of occupations.
And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses;
And to the worship that men naturally thought fit to be used toward their gods—namely offerings, prayers, thanks, and the rest named before—the same lawgivers of the Gentiles added their images, both in painting and sculpture. They did this so that the more ignorant sort (that is, most people, the generality of the people), thinking that the gods these were made to represent were really contained and as it were housed within them, might stand in all the more fear of them. And they endowed them with lands, houses, officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses—
that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger.
that is, consecrated and made holy to those idols of theirs—as well as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole islands. And they attributed to them not only shapes—some of men, some of beasts, some of monsters—but also the faculties and passions of men and beasts: sense, speech, sex, lust, generation (and this not only by mating with one another to propagate the race of gods, but also by mating with men and women to beget hybrid gods who were only lodgers in heaven, such as Bacchus, Hercules, and others); and besides these, anger,
Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.
revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions that come from them, such as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken as an effect of power or a cause of pleasure—all such vices as among men are held to be against law rather than against honor.
Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the Priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own the event both wayes; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republiques Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of [the mentally ill], supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy:
Lastly, to foreknowledge of the time to come—which naturally is only conjecture based on experience of the past, and supernaturally is divine revelation—the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly on pretended experience and partly on pretended revelation, added innumerable other superstitious ways of divination. They made men believe they would find their fortunes sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous oracles—answers made ambiguous by design, so as to cover the outcome either way, or absurd from the intoxicating vapor of the place, which is very common in sulfurous caverns. Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibyls, of whose prophecies (like those, perhaps, of Nostradamus—for the fragments now surviving seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books held in repute in the time of the Roman republic. Sometimes in the meaningless utterances of people who were mentally ill, supposed to be possessed by a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm; and these kinds of foretelling events were counted theomancy, or prophecy.
Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called Portenta, and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come: Somtimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts.
Sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their birth, which was called horoscopy and considered part of judicial astrology. Sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called thumomancy, or presage. Sometimes in the predictions of witches who claimed to converse with the dead, which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft, and is nothing but trickery and conspiring fraud. Sometimes in the chance flight or feeding of birds, called augury. Sometimes in the entrails of a sacrificed beast, which was haruspicy. Sometimes in dreams. Sometimes in the croaking of ravens or the chattering of birds. Sometimes in the features of the face, which was called metoposcopy; or by palmistry in the lines of the hand; or in chance words, called omina. Sometimes in monsters or unusual occurrences—eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, floods, strange births, and the like—which they called portenta and ostenta, because they thought them to portend or foreshow some great calamity to come. Sometimes in mere lottery, such as heads or tails, counting holes in a sieve, dipping into verses of Homer and Virgil, and innumerable other such vain notions.
So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.
So easily are men drawn to believe anything from those who have gained credit with them and can, with gentleness and dexterity, take hold of their fear and ignorance.
And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the Sunne: and [Muhammad], to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.
And therefore the first founders and lawgivers of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose only aims were to keep the people in obedience and peace, have everywhere taken care, first, to imprint in their minds a belief that the precepts they gave concerning religion should not be thought to come from their own devising, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit—or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals—so that their laws might be more easily accepted. So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted among the Romans from the nymph Egeria; the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru pretended that he and his wife were children of the Sun; and Muhammad, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conversations with the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required.
Second, they have taken care to make it believed that the same things that were forbidden by the laws were displeasing to the gods. Third, they prescribed ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals by which people were to believe the anger of the gods might be appeased; and they taught that failure in war, great epidemics of sickness, earthquakes, and each man’s private misery came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from neglect of their worship, or from forgetting or mistaking some point of the required ceremonies.
And though amongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.
And though among the ancient Romans men were not forbidden to deny what the poets write about the pains and pleasures after this life—which several men of great authority and gravity in that state openly ridiculed in their speeches—yet that belief was always more encouraged than its contrary.
And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Games, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State.
By these and other such institutions they obtained what served their end (which was the peace of the commonwealth): that the common people, laying the blame for their misfortunes on neglect of or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were less apt to mutiny against their governors. And being entertained with the pomp and amusement of festivals and public games made in honor of the gods, they needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, grumbling, and agitation against the state.
And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoeuer in the City of Rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.
And therefore the Romans, who had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, had no scruple about tolerating any religion whatever in the city of Rome itself, unless it had something in it that could not be reconciled with their civil government. Nor do we read that any religion was forbidden there except that of the Jews, who (being the special Kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatever. And so you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.
But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own.
But where God himself planted religion by supernatural revelation, there he also made for himself a special kingdom, and gave laws not only of behavior toward himself but also toward one another. And so in the Kingdom of God, policy and civil laws are a part of religion, and therefore the distinction between temporal and spiritual dominion has no place there. It is true that God is King of all the earth; yet he may be King of a special, chosen nation. For there is no more inconsistency in this than in the general commander of the whole army also having a particular regiment or company of his own.
God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other place.
God is King of all the earth by his power; but of his chosen people he is King by covenant. But I have assigned another place in the following discourse to speak more fully of the Kingdom of God, both by nature and by covenant.
How religions decline
Religions fail when their priests lose the reputation of wisdom, sincerity, and love.
From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.
From the way religion is propagated, it is not hard to understand the causes of its dissolution back into its first seeds or principles. These are only a belief in a deity and in invisible and supernatural powers, which can never be so abolished from human nature that new religions cannot spring up from them again through the cultivation of men who are held in repute for that purpose.
For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Government of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of Divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.
For all formed religion is founded at first on the faith that a multitude has in some one person, whom they believe to be not only a wise man, who labors to secure their happiness, but also a holy man, to whom God himself deigns to declare his will supernaturally. It follows necessarily that when those who govern religion come to have their wisdom, their sincerity, or their love suspected, or when they are unable to show any probable sign of divine revelation, the religion they want to uphold must be suspected too—and (without the fear of the civil sword) contradicted and rejected.
That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beleife of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall reason.
What takes away the reputation of wisdom in someone who founds a religion, or adds to one already founded, is requiring belief in contradictions. Both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true, and so to require belief in them is a proof of ignorance. It exposes the author in that, and discredits him in everything else he puts forward as supernatural revelation. A man may indeed have revelation of many things above natural reason, but of nothing against it.
That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults?
What takes away the reputation of sincerity is doing or saying things that appear to be signs that what they require other men to believe, they do not believe themselves. All such doings and sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they are stumbling blocks that make men fall on the way of religion: such as injustice, cruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can believe that a man who habitually does things that spring from any of these roots believes there is any such invisible power to be feared as the one he frightens other men with for lesser faults?
That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.
What takes away the reputation of love is being found out in private aims: as when the belief they require of others leads, or seems to lead, to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure for themselves alone, or chiefly for themselves. For whatever men reap benefit from themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes, and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.
Lastly, the testimony men can give of a divine calling can be nothing but the working of miracles, or true prophecy (which is also a miracle), or extraordinary felicity. And therefore, when points are added to those points of religion received from men who did such miracles, by people who do not prove their calling by some miracle, those additions win no greater belief than the custom and laws of the places where people are brought up have instilled in them. For as in natural things men of judgment require natural signs and arguments, so in supernatural things they require supernatural signs (which are miracles) before they consent inwardly, from their hearts.
All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40. dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles fayling, Faith also failed.
All these causes of the weakening of men’s faith appear plainly in the following examples. First, we have the example of the children of Israel. When Moses, who had proved his calling to them by miracles and by leading them happily out of Egypt, was absent for only forty days, they revolted from the worship of the true God he had commended to them, set up a golden calf as their god, and relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians, from whom they had so lately been delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and the generation that had seen the great works of God in Israel were dead, another generation arose and served Baal. So when miracles failed, faith failed too.
Again, when the sons of Samuel, being constituted by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.
Again, when the sons of Samuel, whom their father had appointed judges in Beersheba, took bribes and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused to have God as their king any longer, except in the way he was king of other peoples, and cried out to Samuel to choose them a king like the other nations. So when justice failed, faith failed too—so far that they deposed their God from reigning over them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes.
And when the Christian religion was being planted, the oracles fell silent in every part of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day and in every place through the preaching of the apostles and evangelists. A great part of that success may reasonably be attributed to the contempt into which the priests of the Gentiles at that time had brought themselves by their impurity, their avarice, and their double-dealing between princes.
Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.
The religion of the Church of Rome, too, was abolished in England and many other parts of Christendom partly for the same cause—since the failing of virtue in the pastors makes faith fail in the people—and partly because the Schoolmen brought the philosophy and doctrine of Aristotle into religion. From this arose so many contradictions and absurdities that the clergy got a reputation for both ignorance and fraudulent intent, and people were inclined to revolt from them: either against the will of their own princes, as in France and Holland, or with their will, as in England.
Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry?
Lastly, among the points the Church of Rome declared necessary for salvation, there are so many plainly to the advantage of the pope, and of his spiritual subjects living in the territories of other Christian princes, that were it not for the mutual rivalry of those princes, they could exclude all foreign authority without war or trouble, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who does not see whose benefit it serves to have it believed that a king does not have his authority from Christ unless a bishop crowns him? That a king, if he is a priest, cannot marry?
That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall?
That whether a prince was born in lawful marriage or not must be judged by authority from Rome? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance if the court of Rome judges the king a heretic? That a king (like Childeric of France) may be deposed by a pope (like Pope Zachary) for no cause, and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy and the members of religious orders, in whatever country, shall be exempt from their king’s jurisdiction in criminal cases?
Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.
Or who does not see whose profit is served by the fees for private masses and the payments for purgatory, along with other signs of private interest—enough to deaden the liveliest faith, if (as I said) the civil magistrate and custom did not sustain it more than any opinion people have of the holiness, wisdom, or honesty of their teachers? So I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause: unpleasing priests—and not only among Catholics, but even in the church that has most presumed to be reformed.
Chapter 13: Of the natural condition of mankind
Equal men without a common power fall into a war of every man against every man.
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the fame danger with himselfe.
Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind that, though one man is sometimes found plainly stronger in body or quicker of mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable that one man can claim for himself any benefit that another may not claim as well as he. For as to strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret plotting or by alliance with others who are in the same danger as himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.
And as to the faculties of the mind, I find an even greater equality among men than that of strength—setting aside the arts grounded on words, and especially that skill of proceeding by general and infallible rules called science, which very few have, and they in only a few things, since it is not a native faculty we are born with, nor one acquired (like prudence) while we are attending to something else. For prudence is nothing but experience, which equal time bestows equally on all men in the things they equally apply themselves to.
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall.
What may perhaps make such equality incredible is only a vain conceit of one’s own wisdom, which almost everyone thinks he has in greater measure than the common people—that is, than everyone but himself and a few others whom he approves, whether for their fame or for agreeing with him. For such is the nature of men that, however many others they may acknowledge to be wittier, or more eloquent, or more learned, they will hardly believe that many are as wise as themselves; for they see their own wit close at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But this proves rather that men are equal on that point than unequal.
For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.
For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty.
From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in attaining our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and on the way to their end (which is chiefly their own preservation, and sometimes only their pleasure) they endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. And so it comes about that where an invader has nothing more to fear than one other man’s single power, if one man plants, sows, builds, or possesses a convenient place, others may probably be expected to come prepared with united forces to dispossess him and deprive him not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty.
And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.
And the invader in turn is in the same danger from another.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.
And from this mistrust of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation: that is, by force or cunning, to master the persons of as many men as he can, until he sees no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own preservation requires, and is generally allowed. Also, because there are some who take pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts of conquest, which they pursue further than their security requires, others, who would otherwise be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, would not be able to survive for long by standing only on the defensive, if they did not increase their power by invasion.
And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
And consequently, since such an increase of dominion over men is necessary to a man’s preservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.
Again, men take no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man expects his companion to value him at the same rate he sets on himself; and at every sign of contempt or undervaluing, he naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which, among those who have no common power to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater valuation from those who scorn him by doing them harm, and from others by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
So in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; second, diffidence; third, glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
The first makes men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles—a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervaluing, whether aimed directly at their persons or reflected on their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather.
From this it is clear that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition called war—and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a stretch of time during which the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. So the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather.
For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.
For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain, but in a tendency toward it over many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition to it during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall.
Whatever follows from a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, follows also from the time when men live without any other security than what their own strength and their own ingenuity supply them with.
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
In such a condition there is no place for industry, because its fruit is uncertain; and consequently no cultivation of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the goods that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments for moving and removing things that require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no reckoning of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, what is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience.
It may seem strange to someone who has not weighed these things well that nature should thus set men apart and make them apt to invade and destroy one another. And so, not trusting this inference drawn from the passions, he may perhaps want to have it confirmed by experience.
Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it.
Let him consider, then, that when he takes a journey he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when he goes to sleep he locks his doors; even in his own house he locks his chests—and this when he knows there are laws, and armed public officers, to avenge any injury done to him. What opinion does he have of his fellow subjects when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants when he locks his chests? Does he not accuse mankind as much by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuses man’s nature in this.
The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.
The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. Nor are the actions that proceed from those passions, until men know a law that forbids them. That they cannot know until laws are made; and no law can be made until they have agreed on the person who is to make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the [Indigenous] people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
It may perhaps be thought that there never was such a time, or such a condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over the whole world. But there are many places where people live so now. For the Indigenous peoples in many places of America have no government at all, except the government of small families, whose concord depends on natural desire; and they live at this day in that brutish manner I described above. However that may be, it can be seen what manner of life there would be where there was no common power to fear, from the manner of life into which men who have previously lived under a peaceful government tend to degenerate in a civil war.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.
But even if there had never been any time when individual men were in a condition of war against one another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousy, and in the state and posture of gladiators, with their weapons pointed and their eyes fixed on one another—that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns on the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies on their neighbors—which is a posture of war. But because by this they uphold the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it the misery that accompanies the liberty of individual men.
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude.
To this war of every man against every man, this also follows: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place there. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are not faculties of either the body or the mind. If they were, they might be in a man who was alone in the world, just as his senses and passions are. They are qualities that belong to men in society, not in solitude.
It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.
It follows also from the same condition that there is no property, no dominion, no distinct mine and yours; but only that is every man’s that he can get, and for as long as he can keep it. And so much for the miserable condition in which man is actually placed by mere nature—though with a possibility of coming out of it, which lies partly in the passions and partly in his reason.
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.
The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope of obtaining them by their industry. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, on which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are what are otherwise called the laws of nature, which I shall speak of more particularly in the next two chapters.
Chapter 14: Of the first and second laws of nature, and of contracts
The right of nature, the first two laws of nature, and how rights are laid down.
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man has to use his own power as he himself wills, for the preservation of his own nature—that is to say, of his own life—and consequently of doing anything that, in his own judgment and reason, he conceives to be the fittest means to that end.
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.
By liberty is understood, according to the proper meaning of the word, the absence of external impediments. These impediments may often take away part of a man’s power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left to him as his judgment and reason dictate.
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
A law of nature (lex naturalis) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do what is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving it, and to omit what he thinks may best preserve it. For though those who speak of this subject tend to confuse jus and lex, right and law, they ought to be distinguished. Right consists in liberty to do or to refrain, whereas law determines and binds to one of them. So law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.
And the condition of man (as was shown in the preceding chapter) is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which case everyone is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not help him in preserving his life against his enemies. It follows that in such a condition every man has a right to everything—even to one another’s body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endures, there can be no security for any man (however strong or wise he may be) of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows men to live.
And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves.
And consequently it is a precept, or general rule, of reason: that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all the helps and advantages of war. The first branch of this rule contains the first and fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace, and follow it. The second contains the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all means we can, to defend ourselves.
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe. For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre.
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far as he thinks it necessary for peace and for the defense of himself, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with as much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holds this right of doing anything he likes, so long are all men in the condition of war.
But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that Law of all men, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.
But if other men will not lay down their right as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his; for that would be to expose himself as prey (which no man is bound to do) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel: “Whatever you require that others should do to you, do that to them.” And that law of all men: Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris—“What you would not have done to you, do not do to another.”
To lay downe a mans Right to any thing, is to devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the efect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.
To lay down a man’s right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another from the benefit of his own right to the same thing. For he who renounces or passes away his right does not give any other man a right he did not have before, since there is nothing to which every man did not have a right by nature. He only stands out of the other’s way, so that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him—though not without hindrance from anyone else. So the effect that comes to one man from another man’s giving up of his right is only so much reduction of the obstacles to the use of his own original right.
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INIUSTICE, and INIURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being before renounced, or transferred.
Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another. By simply renouncing, when he does not care to whom the benefit of it goes. By transferring, when he intends the benefit of it for some particular person or persons. And when a man has abandoned or granted away his right in either way, he is said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those to whom that right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it; and he ought—it is his duty—not to make void that voluntary act of his own; and such hindrance is injustice and injury, as being sine jure, “without right,” since the right was renounced or transferred before.
So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it.
So injury or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is something like what in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is called an absurdity there to contradict what one maintained at the beginning, so in the world it is called injustice and injury voluntarily to undo what one had voluntarily done from the beginning. The way a man either simply renounces or transfers his right is by a declaration or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs, that he does so renounce or transfer it, or has so renounced or transferred it, to the one who accepts it.
And these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often) both Words, and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.
And these signs are either words only, or actions only, or (as most often happens) both words and actions. And these are the bonds by which men are bound and obliged: bonds that have their strength not from their own nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a man’s word), but from fear of some evil consequence of breaking them.
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned; or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe.
Whenever a man transfers or renounces his right, it is either in consideration of some right transferred to himself in return, or for some other good he hopes for by it. For it is a voluntary act, and of every man’s voluntary acts the object is some good to himself. And therefore there are some rights that no man can be understood, by any words or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. First, a man cannot lay down the right of resisting those who assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim by it at any good to himself.
The same may be sayd of Wounds; and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.
The same may be said of wounds, chains, and imprisonment: both because no benefit follows from such submission, as there does from the submission of allowing another to be wounded or imprisoned, and also because a man cannot tell, when he sees men proceeding against him with violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly, the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it.
And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.
And therefore if a man, by words or other signs, seems to strip himself of the very end for which those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as meaning it, or as if it were his will, but as having been ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.
Contracts, covenants, and gifts
Hobbes distinguishes contract, covenant, and free gift, and explains which covenants bind and which are void.
The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.
The mutual transferring of right is what men call contract.
There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.
There is a difference between transferring the right to a thing and transferring, or handing over—that is, delivering—the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together with the transfer of the right, as in buying and selling with ready money, or in exchanging goods or lands; or it may be delivered some time later.
Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT,, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of Faith.
Again, one of the contracting parties may deliver the thing contracted for on his side and leave the other to perform his part at some fixed time afterward, trusting him in the meantime; and then the contract on his part is called a pact, or covenant. Or both parties may contract now to perform later. In these cases, when the one who is to perform in the future is trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith, and the failure to perform (if it is voluntary) violation of faith.
When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.
When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transfers in the hope of gaining friendship or service from another or from his friends; or in the hope of gaining a reputation for charity or magnanimity; or to relieve his mind of the pain of compassion; or in the hope of reward in heaven—this is not contract, but gift, free gift, grace, words that all mean one and the same thing.
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or by Inference. Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie: And such words are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I have Given, I have Granted, I will that this be yours: Or of the future; as, I will Give, I will Grant: which words of the future, are called PROMISE.
Signs of contract are either express or by inference. Express signs are words spoken with an understanding of what they mean. Such words are either of the present or past tense—as, “I give,” “I grant,” “I have given,” “I have granted,” “I will that this be yours”—or of the future, as, “I will give,” “I will grant.” These words of the future are called promise.
Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; somtimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor.
Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes of silence, sometimes of actions, sometimes of refraining from an action. And in general a sign by inference of any contract is whatever sufficiently shows the will of the contracting party.
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to Come, as, To morrow I will Give, they are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow, then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will.
Words alone, if they are of the future and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift, and therefore not binding. For if they are of the future, as, “Tomorrow I will give,” they are a sign that I have not yet given, and consequently that my right is not transferred but remains until I transfer it by some other act. But if the words are of the present or past, as, “I have given,” or “I give, to be delivered tomorrow,” then my right for tomorrow is given away today—and that by virtue of the words, even if there were no other evidence of my will.
And there is a great difference in the signification of these words; Volo hoc tuum esse cras, and Cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine to morrow, and, I will give it thee to morrow: For the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it fignifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing.
And there is a great difference in the meaning of these words: Volo hoc tuum esse cras and Cras dabo—that is, between “I will that this be yours tomorrow” and “I will give it to you tomorrow.” For the words “I will” in the first form of speech signify a present act of the will, but in the second they signify a promise of a future act of the will. And therefore the first words, being of the present, transfer a future right; the second, being of the future, transfer nothing.
But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne.
But if there are other signs of the will to transfer a right besides words, then, even though the gift is free, the right may be understood to pass by words of the future. For example, if a man offers a prize to whoever comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words are of the future, the right passes. For if he did not want his words to be so understood, he should not have let the runners run.
In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future: because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, a Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.
In contracts, the right passes not only where the words are of the present or past, but also where they are of the future. For all contract is a mutual transfer or exchange of right; and so he who only promises, because he has already received the benefit for which he promises, is to be understood as intending the right to pass. For unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that reason, in buying and selling and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant, and therefore binding.
He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention.
He who performs first in the case of a contract is said to merit what he is to receive by the other’s performance, and he has it as due. Also, when a prize is offered to many, to be given only to the one who wins, or money is thrown among many, to be enjoyed by those who catch it, then though this is a free gift, yet so to win or so to catch is to merit, and to have it as due. For the right is transferred in the offering of the prize and in the throwing down of the money, though to whom it goes is not determined except by the outcome of the contest.
But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver: In Contract, I merit at the Contractors hand that hee should depart with his right; In this case of Gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers.
But there is this difference between these two sorts of merit. In contract, I merit by virtue of my own power and the other party’s need; but in this case of free gift, I am enabled to merit only by the kindness of the giver. In contract, I merit at the other party’s hands that he should part with his right; in this case of gift, I do not merit that the giver should part with his right, but that, once he has parted with it, it should be mine rather than another’s.
And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles, between Meritum congrui, and Meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely;
And this I take to be the meaning of the Schoolmen’s distinction between meritum congrui and meritum condigni. For God Almighty has promised Paradise to those men (blindfolded by carnal desires) who can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits he has prescribed. They say that he who walks so shall merit Paradise ex congruo. But because no man can claim a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but only by the free grace of God,
they say, no man can Merit Paradise ex condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.
they say that no man can merit Paradise ex condigno. This, I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction. But because disputers do not agree on the meaning of their own technical terms any longer than it serves their turn, I will not affirm anything about their meaning. Only this I say: when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he who wins merits it, and may claim the prize as due.
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd.
If a covenant is made in which neither party performs at once, but they trust one another, then in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man), upon any reasonable suspicion it is void. But if there is a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void.
For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therfore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.
For he who performs first has no assurance that the other will perform afterward, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions without the fear of some coercive power—which, in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and are judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he who performs first only betrays himself to his enemy, contrary to the right (which he can never abandon) of defending his life and his means of living.
But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.
But in a civil state, where there is a power set up to restrain those who would otherwise break their faith, that fear is no longer reasonable; and for that reason, he who by the covenant is to perform first is obliged to do so.
The cause of feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other signe of the Will not to performe: else it cannot make the Covenant voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.
The cause of fear that makes such a covenant invalid must always be something that arises after the covenant is made, such as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform; otherwise it cannot make the covenant void. For what could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance to performing.
He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.
He who transfers any right transfers the means of enjoying it, as far as lies in his power. So he who sells land is understood to transfer the grass and whatever grows on it; nor can he who sells a mill divert the stream that drives it. And those who give a man the right of government as sovereign are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice.
To make Covenants with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another: and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.
To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible. Since they do not understand our speech, they do not understand or accept any transfer of right, nor can they transfer any right to another; and without mutual acceptance there is no covenant.
To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name: For otherwise we know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.
To make a covenant with God is impossible, except through the mediation of those to whom God speaks, either by supernatural revelation or through his lieutenants who govern under him and in his name. For otherwise we do not know whether our covenants are accepted or not. And therefore those who vow anything contrary to any law of nature vow in vain, since it would be unjust to pay such a vow. And if the thing is commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow but the law that binds them.
The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to performe.
The matter, or subject, of a covenant is always something that falls under deliberation (for to covenant is an act of the will—that is to say, an act, and the last act, of deliberation); and so it is always understood to be something to come, and something judged possible for the one who covenants to perform.
And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no man can be obliged.
And therefore to promise what is known to be impossible is no covenant. But if something proves impossible afterward that was thought possible before, the covenant is valid and binds—not to the thing itself, but to its value; or, if that also is impossible, to the sincere endeavor of performing as much as is possible, for no man can be obliged to more.
Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and Eorgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.
Men are freed from their covenants in two ways: by performing, or by being forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation, and forgiveness the restoring of liberty, being a transferring back of the right in which the obligation consisted.
Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid.
Covenants entered into out of fear, in the condition of mere nature, are binding. For example, if I covenant to pay an enemy a ransom, or service, for my life, I am bound by it. For it is a contract in which one party receives the benefit of life and the other is to receive money or service for it; and consequently, where no other law forbids the performance (as none does in the condition of mere nature), the covenant is valid.
Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it: And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.
Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it. And if a weaker prince makes a disadvantageous peace with a stronger one out of fear, he is bound to keep it—unless (as was said before) some new and just cause of fear arises to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I am forced to buy myself free from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it until the civil law discharges me. For whatever I may lawfully do without obligation, I may lawfully covenant to do out of fear; and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.
A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.
An earlier covenant makes a later one void. For a man who has passed away his right to one man today does not have it to pass to another tomorrow; and therefore the later promise passes no right, but is null.
A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging.
A covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void. For (as I showed before) no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment—the avoiding of which is the only end of laying down any right—and therefore the promise not to resist force transfers no right in any covenant, nor is it binding.
For though a man may Covenant thus, Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot Covenant thus, Unlesse I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.
For though a man may covenant like this—“Unless I do such and such, kill me”—he cannot covenant like this: “Unless I do such and such, I will not resist you when you come to kill me.” For man by nature chooses the lesser evil, which is the danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And all men grant this to be true, in that they lead criminals to execution and to prison with armed men, even though those criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned.
A Covenant to accuse ones selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it.
A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation; and in the civil state, accusation is followed by punishment, which, being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is true of accusing those whose condemnation would bring a man into misery, such as a father, a wife, or a benefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature, and therefore is not to be accepted; and where a man’s testimony is not to be believed, he is not bound to give it.
Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.
Also, accusations made under torture are not to be counted as testimony. For torture is to be used only as a means of conjecture and a light in the further examination and search for truth; and what is confessed in that case tends to the relief of the one tortured, not to the informing of the torturers. It therefore ought not to be given the credit of sufficient testimony; for whether he frees himself by true or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life.
Oaths
Fear is what holds men to covenants; an oath adds nothing to the obligation.
The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, The Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, The Power of those men they shall therein Offend.
The force of words being (as I have noted before) too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants, there are in man’s nature only two conceivable helps to strengthen it. These are either a fear of the consequences of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. The latter is a generosity too rarely found to be relied on, especially in those who pursue wealth, command, or sensual pleasure, who are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned on is fear, which has two very general objects: one, the power of invisible spirits; the other, the power of those men they would offend by breaking faith.
Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society. The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell.
Of these two, though the former is the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is, in every man, his own religion, which has a place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter does not—at least not a place large enough to keep men to their promises—because in the condition of mere nature, inequality of power is not discerned except by the outcome of battle.
So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy.
So before the time of civil society, or when it is interrupted by war, there is nothing that can strengthen a covenant of peace, once agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, except the fear of that invisible power that each of them worships as God and fears as an avenger of their treachery.
All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing, or OATH, is a Forme of Speech, added to a Promise; by which he that promiseth, signisieth, that unlesse he performe, he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast. So is our Forme, I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God. And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater.
All that can be done, therefore, between two men not subject to civil power is for each to make the other swear by the God he fears. This swearing, or oath, is a form of speech added to a promise, by which the one who promises signifies that unless he performs, he renounces the mercy of his God, or calls on him for vengeance on himself. Such was the heathen form: “Let Jupiter kill me otherwise, as I kill this beast.” So is our form: “I shall do thus and thus, so help me God.” And this is done with the rites and ceremonies each one uses in his own religion, so that the fear of breaking faith may be the greater.
By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And that there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.
From this it appears that an oath taken in any form or rite other than the swearer’s own is in vain, and no oath at all; and that there is no swearing by anything the swearer does not think to be God. For though men have sometimes sworn by their kings, out of fear or flattery, they meant it to be understood that they attributed divine honor to them. It appears too that swearing by God unnecessarily is nothing but profaning his name; and that swearing by other things, as men do in ordinary talk, is not swearing at all, but an impious custom, picked up from too much vehemence in talking.
It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it: if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath.
It appears also that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God as much without the oath as with it. If unlawful, it does not bind at all, even though it is confirmed with an oath.
Chapter 15: Of other laws of nature
The third law, keeping covenants, is the origin of justice; further laws of nature follow.
From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, That men performe their Covenants made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.
From that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another those rights which, if retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there follows a third, which is this: that men perform their covenants made. Without this, covenants are in vain and nothing but empty words; and since the right of all men to all things remains, we are still in the condition of war.
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INIUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.
In this law of nature lies the fountain and origin of justice. For where no covenant has gone before, no right has been transferred, and every man has a right to everything; consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust. And the definition of injustice is nothing other than the nonperformance of covenant. Whatever is not unjust is just.
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be done.
But covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of nonperformance on either side, are invalid (as was said in the previous chapter). So although the origin of justice is the making of covenants, there can actually be no injustice until the cause of that fear is taken away. And while men are in the natural condition of war, that cannot be done.
Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coërcive Power, to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth.
Therefore, before the names of just and unjust can have any place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to perform their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect from breaking them; and to make good the property that men acquire by mutual contract, in recompense for the universal right they abandon. And no such power exists before a commonwealth is set up.
And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coërceive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust.
This can also be gathered from the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools. They say that “justice is the constant will to give every man his own.” Therefore, where there is no own—that is, no property—there is no injustice. And where no coercive power has been set up—that is, where there is no commonwealth—there is no property, all men having a right to all things. Therefore where there is no commonwealth, nothing is unjust.
So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.
So the nature of justice consists in keeping valid covenants. But the validity of covenants begins only with the establishment of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them; and it is then, too, that property begins.
The fool’s objection
Hobbes answers the fool who says that breaking covenants can sometimes be reasonable.
The Foole hath fayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.
The fool has said in his heart that there is no such thing as justice—and sometimes he says it with his tongue as well. He seriously argues that, since every man’s preservation and contentment are committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do whatever he thought led to them; and so also that to make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reason, when it led to one’s benefit.
He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence?
He does not deny that there are covenants, that they are sometimes broken and sometimes kept, and that breaking them may be called injustice and keeping them justice. What he questions is whether injustice—setting aside the fear of God (for the same fool has said in his heart there is no God)—may not sometimes be consistent with that reason which dictates to every man his own good. And particularly when it leads to a benefit that would put a man in a position to disregard not only the blame and abuse of other men, but also their power. The Kingdom of God is taken by violence; but what if it could be taken by unjust violence?
were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice: or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the name of Vertue: and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome.
Would it be against reason to take it that way, when it is impossible to come to any harm by it? And if it is not against reason, it is not against justice—or else justice is not to be approved as good. From reasoning like this, successful wickedness has come to be called virtue. And some who in all other things have condemned breaking faith have nevertheless allowed it when it is done to win a kingdom.
And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the Atteynder be voyd: From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends.
And the heathens, who believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, nevertheless believed that same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice. This is somewhat like a point of law in Coke’s Commentaries on Littleton, where he says that if the rightful heir to the crown is attainted of treason, the crown shall still descend to him, and eo instante (at that very instant) the attainder shall be void. From such instances a man will be very apt to infer that when the heir apparent of a kingdom kills the one in possession, even his own father, you may call it injustice or any other name you like, yet it can never be against reason. For all the voluntary actions of men aim at their own benefit, and the actions most reasonable are those that do most to achieve their ends.
This specious reasoning is neverthelesse false.
This plausible reasoning is nevertheless false.
For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against reason.
For the question is not about mutual promises where there is no security of performance on either side—as when no civil power has been set up over the parties promising—for such promises are not covenants. The question is about cases where either one of the parties has already performed, or there is a power to make him perform: is it then against reason, that is, against his benefit, for the other party to perform or not? And I say it is not against reason.
For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done.
To make this plain, we must consider, first, that when a man does something which, as far as can be foreseen and calculated, tends to his own destruction, then even if some accident he could not have expected turns it to his benefit, such events do not make it a reasonable or wise thing to have done.
Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power.
Second, in a condition of war, where every man is an enemy to every man for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, no man can hope to defend himself from destruction by his own strength or wit without the help of allies; and in such an alliance every one expects the same protection as any other. Therefore he who declares that he thinks it reasonable to deceive those who help him can reasonably expect no other means of safety than what his own single power can provide.
He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and Defence, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.
He, then, who breaks his covenant, and so declares that he thinks he may reasonably do so, cannot be received into any society that unites for peace and defense, except by the error of those who receive him. Nor, once received, can he be kept in it once they see the danger of their error. And these are errors a man cannot reasonably count on as the means of his security. So if he is left out or cast out of society, he perishes; and if he lives in society, it is by other men’s errors, which he could neither foresee nor count on—and therefore against the reason of his own preservation. And so all men who do not contribute to his destruction spare him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.
As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.
As for the example of gaining the secure and everlasting felicity of heaven by any means whatever, it is frivolous. There is only one imaginable way, and that is not breaking covenant but keeping it.
And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.
And as for the other example, attaining sovereignty by rebellion: it is plain that even if it succeeds, the attempt is against reason. For success cannot reasonably be expected—rather the contrary—and by gaining sovereignty in this way, others are taught to gain it the same way. Justice, therefore—that is, the keeping of covenant—is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature.
There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.)
Some go further. They will not have the law of nature be those rules that lead to the preservation of man’s life on earth, but rather to the attaining of eternal felicity after death—to which they think breaking covenant may lead, and so be just and reasonable. (Such are those who think it a meritorious work to kill, or depose, or rebel against the sovereign power set over them by their own consent.)
But because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.
But there is no natural knowledge of man’s state after death, still less of the reward to be given then for breaking faith—only a belief grounded on other men’s saying that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those who knew others who knew it supernaturally. So breaking faith cannot be called a precept of reason, or of nature.
Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.
Others, who accept the keeping of faith as a law of nature, nevertheless make an exception for certain persons—such as heretics, and those who are in the habit of not performing their covenants to others. This too is against reason. For if any fault in a man is enough to release us from a covenant we have made with him, the same fault should in reason have been enough to prevent our making it.
The names of Just, and Injust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same.
The names just and unjust mean one thing when they are attributed to men and another when they are attributed to actions. Attributed to men, they mean the conformity or nonconformity of their manners to reason. Attributed to actions, they mean the conformity or nonconformity to reason not of manners, or way of life, but of particular actions. A just man, therefore, is one who takes all the care he can that his actions may all be just; and an unjust man is one who neglects to. In our language such men are more often called righteous and unrighteous than just and unjust, though the meaning is the same.
Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, or forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise.
So a righteous man does not lose that title through one or a few unjust actions that come from sudden passion or from mistaking things or persons. Nor does an unrighteous man lose his character for things he does, or refrains from doing, out of fear, because his will is shaped not by justice but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. What gives human actions the flavor of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantry of courage (rarely found), by which a man scorns to owe the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise.
This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.
This justice of manners is what is meant when justice is called a virtue and injustice a vice.
But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse: and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of Guilty.
But the justice of actions makes men not just but guiltless; and the injustice of actions (which is also called injury) gives them only the name of guilty.
Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when the Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him.
Again, the injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury. It is injustice before it proceeds to action, and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action (that is, injury) supposes an individual person injured—namely, the one to whom the covenant was made. And so the injury is often received by one man while the damage falls on another. For example, when a master commands his servant to give money to a stranger, if it is not done, the injury is done to the master, whom the servant had previously covenanted to obey; but the damage falls on the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and whom he therefore could not injure.
And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.
So also in commonwealths, private men may forgive one another their debts, but not robberies or other acts of violence by which they are harmed. For withholding a debt is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signied to the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant: and so again there is no Injury done him.
Whatever is done to a man in accordance with his own will, made known to the doer, is no injury to him. For if the doer has not given away his original right to do as he pleases by some previous covenant, there is no breach of covenant, and therefore no injury done. And if he has, then the other’s will to have it done, once made known, is a release from that covenant; and so again there is no injury done him.
Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and Distributive: and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give.
Writers divide the justice of actions into commutative and distributive. The former, they say, consists in arithmetical proportion, the latter in geometrical proportion. Commutative justice they therefore place in equality of value in the things contracted for; distributive justice in the distribution of equal benefit to men of equal merit—as if it were injustice to sell for more than we buy, or to give a man more than he merits. But the value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contracting parties; and therefore the just value is whatever they are content to give.
And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.
And merit is not due by justice but is rewarded by grace alone—except merit by covenant, where performance on one side merits performance on the other, and which falls under commutative, not distributive, justice. So this distinction, in the sense in which it is usually explained, is not right. Properly speaking, commutative justice is the justice of a contractor—that is, the performance of covenant in buying and selling, hiring and letting out for hire, lending and borrowing, exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.
And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.
And distributive justice is the justice of an arbitrator—that is, the act of defining what is just. If he performs the trust placed in him by those who made him arbitrator, he is said to distribute to every man his own. This is indeed just distribution, and may be called (though improperly) distributive justice—but more properly equity, which is also a law of nature, as will be shown in due place.
The remaining laws of nature
Gratitude, accommodation, pardon, equality, equity, and the other laws of nature are set out.
As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does GRATITUDE depend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good;
As justice depends on a previous covenant, so gratitude depends on previous grace—that is, a previous free gift. It is the fourth law of nature, which may be stated in this form: that a man who receives benefit from another out of mere grace endeavor that he who gives it have no reasonable cause to regret his good will. For no man gives except with the intention of some good to himself, because a gift is voluntary, and in all voluntary acts the object for every man is his own good.
of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seck Peace. The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant,
If men see that they will be frustrated in this, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another. They will therefore remain in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature, which commands men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called ingratitude, and it has the same relation to grace that injustice has to obligation by covenant.
A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice.
A fifth law of nature is complaisance—that is, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. To understand this, we may consider that in men’s aptness for society there is a diversity of nature, arising from their diversity of affections, not unlike what we see in stones brought together to build an edifice.
For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto.
For a stone that, by the roughness and irregularity of its shape, takes more room from the others than it fills itself, and that, being hard, cannot easily be made smooth, and so hinders the building, is thrown away by the builders as useless and troublesome. So too a man who, by roughness of nature, will strive to keep things that are superfluous to himself and necessary to others, and who cannot be corrected because of the stubbornness of his passions, is to be left out or cast out of society as a burden to it.
For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth to seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.
For every man is supposed, not only by right but also by necessity of nature, to endeavor all he can to obtain what is necessary for his preservation. So he who sets himself against this for the sake of superfluous things is guilty of the war that follows from it, and therefore does what is contrary to the fundamental law of nature, which commands to seek peace. Those who observe this law may be called sociable (the Latins call them commodi); the contrary, stubborn, unsociable, perverse, intractable.
A sixth Law of Nature, is this, That upon caution of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.
A sixth law of nature is this: that on security for the future, a man ought to pardon the past offenses of those who repent and desire it. For pardon is nothing but the granting of peace. Granted to those who persist in their hostility, it is not peace but fear; yet refused to those who give security for the future, it is a sign of aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the law of nature.
A seventh is, That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future time.
A seventh is, that in revenges (that is, returning evil for evil) men look not at the greatness of the past evil, but at the greatness of the good to follow. By this we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other purpose than the correction of the offender or the direction of others. This law follows from the one before it, which commands pardon on security for the future.
Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.
Besides, revenge without regard to example and future benefit is a triumph or glorying in another’s hurt that tends to no end (for the end is always something to come). And glorying to no end is vainglory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason tends to bring on war, which is against the law of nature. It is commonly called cruelty.
And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature, set down this Precept, That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another. The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.
And because all signs of hatred or contempt provoke men to fight—so much so that most men would rather risk their lives than not be revenged—we may set down in eighth place, as a law of nature, this precept: that no man by deed, word, look, or gesture declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of this law is commonly called contumely.
The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequallity that now is, has bin introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience.
The question of who is the better man has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shown before) all men are equal. The inequality that now exists has been introduced by civil laws. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his Politics, makes it a foundation of his doctrine that by nature some men are more worthy to command—meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be on account of his philosophy—and others to serve—meaning those who had strong bodies but were not philosophers as he was. As if master and servant were introduced not by men’s consent but by difference of intelligence! This is not only against reason but also against experience.
For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged: or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of Nature, I put this, ’That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature. The breach of this Precept is Pride.
For there are very few so foolish that they would not rather govern themselves than be governed by others. Nor, when those who are wise in their own opinion contend by force with those who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost ever, win. If nature, then, has made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged. Or if nature has made men unequal, then still, because men who think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace except on equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore, as the ninth law of nature, I set down this: that every man acknowledge every other as his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride.
On this law, dependeth another, That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well.
On this law depends another: that on entering into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men who seek peace to lay down certain rights of nature—that is, not to have liberty to do all they please—so it is necessary for man’s life to retain some: such as the right to govern their own bodies, to enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place, and all other things without which a man cannot live, or cannot live well.
If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgment of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.
If in this case, when making peace, men require for themselves what they would not have granted to others, they act contrary to the preceding law, which commands the acknowledgment of natural equality, and so also against the law of nature. Those who observe this law are those we call modest, and those who break it arrogant. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia—that is, a desire for more than one’s share.
Also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the Law of Nature, that he deale Equally between them. For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.
Also, if a man is trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them. For without that, men’s controversies cannot be settled except by war. He, therefore, who is partial in judgment does all he can to deter men from using judges and arbitrators, and so (against the fundamental law of nature) is the cause of war.
The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before) distributive Justice: the violation, Acception of persons, Prosopolepsia.
The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of what in reason belongs to him, is called equity, and (as I said before) distributive justice. Its violation is called respect of persons, or prosopolepsia.
And from this followeth another law, That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right. For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.
And from this follows another law: that things which cannot be divided be enjoyed in common, if that can be done; and, if the quantity of the thing permits, without limit; otherwise in proportion to the number of those who have a right to it. For otherwise the distribution is unequal and contrary to equity.
But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot. For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.
But there are some things that can be neither divided nor enjoyed in common. Then the law of nature, which prescribes equity, requires that the entire right—or else, making the use alternate, the first possession—be decided by lot. For equal distribution is part of the law of nature, and no other means of equal distribution can be imagined.
Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the Competitors: Naturall, is either Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot; ) or First Seisure.
There are two sorts of lots, arbitrary and natural. Arbitrary is the one agreed on by the competitors. Natural is either primogeniture (which the Greeks call kleronomia, meaning given by lot) or first seizure.
And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and in some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.
Therefore things that can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided ought to be awarded to the first possessor—and in some cases to the firstborn, as acquired by lot.
It is also a Law of Nature, That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct. For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.
It is also a law of nature that all men who mediate peace be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commands peace as the end commands intercession as the means; and the means to intercession is safe conduct.
And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes, there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, That they that are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.
However willing men may be to observe these laws, questions may nevertheless arise concerning a man’s action: first, whether it was done or not; second (if done), whether it was against the law or not. The former is called a question of fact, the latter a question of right. Therefore, unless the parties to the question mutually covenant to abide by the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other, to whose sentence they submit, is called an arbitrator. And so it is a law of nature that those who are in controversy submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator.
And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.
And since every man is presumed to do everything with a view to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause. And even if he were ever so fit, equity allows each party equal benefit, so if one is admitted as judge, the other must be admitted too. And so the controversy—that is, the cause of war—remains, against the law of nature.
For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for hee hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.
For the same reason, no man ought to be accepted as arbitrator in any cause if greater profit, or honor, or pleasure evidently comes to him from the victory of one party than of the other. For he has taken a bribe—an unavoidable bribe, but a bribe—and no man can be obliged to trust him. And so, again, the controversy and the condition of war remain, contrary to the law of nature.
And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.
And in a controversy of fact, since the judge is to give no more credit to one party than to the other, he must (if there are no other proofs) give credit to a third, or to a third and fourth, or more. Otherwise the question is left undecided and left to force, contrary to the law of nature.
The laws of nature as moral philosophy
The laws are summed up in one rule, bind in conscience, and are the true moral philosophy.
These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.
These are the laws of nature that dictate peace as a means to the preservation of men in multitudes, and which concern only the doctrine of civil society. There are other things that tend to the destruction of individual men, such as drunkenness and all the other kinds of intemperance. These may therefore also be counted among the things the law of nature has forbidden; but they need not be mentioned, and are not relevant enough to this place.
And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe; which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.
This may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be noticed by all men, most of whom are too busy getting food and the rest too careless to understand. Yet, to leave all men without excuse, the laws have been summed up in one easy rule, intelligible even to the humblest capacity: “Do not do to another what you would not have done to yourself.” This shows him that all he has to do in learning the laws of nature is this: when he weighs other men’s actions against his own and they seem too heavy, he should put them in the other pan of the balance and his own in their place, so that his own passions and self-love add nothing to the weight. Then there is none of these laws of nature that will not seem to him very reasonable.
The Lawes of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that having sufficient Security, that others shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.
The laws of nature oblige in foro interno—that is, they bind us to desire that they take effect. But in foro externo—that is, to putting them into action—they do not always oblige. For a man who was modest and tractable, and performed everything he promised, at a time and place where no one else would do so, would only make himself a prey to others and bring about his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature’s preservation. And again, a man who has sufficient security that others will observe the same laws toward him, yet does not observe them himself, seeks not peace but war, and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence.
And whatsoever Lawes bind in foro interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the Law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the Law; which where the Obligation is in foro interno, is a breach.
And any laws that bind in foro interno may be broken not only by a deed contrary to the law, but also by a deed in keeping with it, if a man thinks it contrary. For though his action in this case accords with the law, his purpose was against it; and where the obligation is in foro interno, that is a breach.
The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall; For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.
The laws of nature are immutable and eternal. For injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, respect of persons, and the rest can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life and peace destroy it.
The sames Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.
These same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavor—I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavor—are easy to observe. For since they require nothing but endeavor, he who endeavors to perform them fulfills them; and he who fulfills the law is just.
And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of man-kind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life.
And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which differ in men of different temperaments, customs, and doctrines. And different men differ not only in their judgment of the senses—of what is pleasant and unpleasant to taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight—but also of what is agreeable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of ordinary life.
Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long a man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill.
Indeed, the same man at different times differs from himself: at one time he praises—that is, calls good—what at another time he disparages and calls evil. From this arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore, so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war), private appetite is the measure of good and evil. Consequently all men agree on this: that peace is good, and therefore also that the way or means of peace—which (as I have shown before) are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature—are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil.
Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.
Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy. But the writers on moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, do not see in what their goodness consists, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living. So they place them in a mean between passions—as if not the cause but the degree of daring made fortitude, or not the cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality.
These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes, but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; wheras Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.
Men are accustomed to call these dictates of reason laws, but improperly. For they are only conclusions, or theorems, concerning what leads to the preservation and defense of themselves; whereas law, properly, is the word of him who by right has command over others. Yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, who by right commands all things, then they are properly called laws.
Chapter 16: Of persons, authors, and things personated
A person is natural or artificial; actors act by the authority of authors.
A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.
A person is he whose words or actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to which they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.
When they are considered as his own, he is called a natural person. When they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, he is a feigned or artificial person.
The word Person is latine: insteed whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters.
The word person is Latin. In its place the Greeks have prosopon, which means the face, just as persona in Latin means the disguise or outward appearance of a man counterfeited on the stage—and sometimes, more particularly, the part of it that disguises the face, such as a mask or visor. From the stage it has been transferred to anyone who represents speech and action, in law courts as well as theaters.
So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, Unus sustineo tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;) and is called in diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.
So a person is the same as an actor, both on the stage and in ordinary conversation; and to personate is to act or represent oneself or another. He who acts another is said to bear his person, or to act in his name. (It is in this sense that Cicero uses it when he says, Unus sustineo tres personas: mei, adversarii, et judicis—“I bear three persons: my own, my adversary’s, and the judge’s.”) And on different occasions he is called by different names: a representer or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act: and done by Authority, done by Commssiion, or Licence from him whose right it is.
Of artificial persons, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. The person is then the actor, and he who owns his words and actions is the author; in this case the actor acts by authority. For what is called an owner when we speak of goods and possessions—in Latin dominus, in Greek kurios—is called an author when we speak of actions. And as the right of possession is called dominion, so the right of doing any action is called authority. So by authority is always understood a right of doing some act; and done by authority means done by commission or license from him whose right it is.
From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14.) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.
It follows from this that when the actor makes a covenant by authority, he binds the author by it, no less than if the author had made it himself, and subjects him no less to all its consequences. Therefore everything said earlier (chapter 14) about the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity is also true when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators who have authority from them—as far as their commission extends, but no further.
And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.
And therefore whoever makes a covenant with the actor or representer without knowing what authority he has does so at his own risk. For no man is obliged by a covenant of which he is not the author; nor, consequently, by a covenant made against or beyond the authority he gave.
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.
When the actor does something against the law of nature by command of the author, then if he is obliged by an earlier covenant to obey him, it is not he but the author who breaks the law of nature. For though the action is against the law of nature, it is not his. On the contrary, to refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbids breach of covenant.
And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.
And he who makes a covenant with the author through the mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority the actor has but only taking his word, is no longer obliged if that authority is not made plain to him on demand. For the covenant made with the author is not valid without his counter-assurance. But if the one who so covenants knew beforehand that he was to expect no other assurance than the actor’s word, then the covenant is valid, because in this case the actor makes himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident the covenant obliges the author, not the actor, so when the authority is feigned it obliges the actor only, there being no author but himself.
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.
There are few things that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, such as a church, a hospital, or a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But inanimate things cannot be authors, and so cannot give authority to their actors. Yet the actors may have authority to provide for their upkeep, given them by those who are the owners or governors of those things. And therefore such things cannot be personated before there is some state of civil government.
Likewise Children, [the intellectually disabled], and [the mentally ill] that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.
Likewise children, people with severe intellectual disabilities, and people who are mentally ill, having no use of reason, may be personated by guardians or curators. But (during that time) they can be authors of no action done by those guardians—except insofar as, when they recover the use of reason, they judge the action reasonable. Yet during the incapacity, he who has the right of governing them may give authority to the guardian. But this again has no place except in a civil state, because before such a state there is no dominion over persons.
An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated; as were the Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But Idols cannot be Authors: for an Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.
An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated, as the gods of the heathens were. They were personated by officers appointed by the state, and held possessions and other goods and rights that men from time to time dedicated and consecrated to them. But idols cannot be authors, for an idol is nothing. The authority came from the state; and therefore, before civil government was introduced, the gods of the heathens could not be personated.
The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with Hoc dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc dicit Dominus. Secondly by the Son of man, his own Son, our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.
The true God may be personated. So he was: first, by Moses, who governed the Israelites (who were not his people but God’s) not in his own name, with Hoc dicit Moses (“Thus says Moses”), but in God’s name, with Hoc dicit Dominus (“Thus says the Lord”). Second, by the Son of Man, his own Son, our blessed Savior Jesus Christ, who came to bring the Jews back and to draw all nations into his Father’s kingdom—not as of himself, but as sent by his Father. And third, by the Holy Spirit, or Comforter, speaking and working in the apostles; and this Holy Spirit was a Comforter who came not of himself, but was sent by, and proceeded from, them both.
How a multitude becomes one person
A multitude becomes one person when one representative acts with each member’s consent.
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.
A multitude of men are made one person when they are represented by one man, or one person, provided it is done with the consent of every one of that multitude individually. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that makes the person one. And it is the representer who bears the person, and only one person. Unity cannot be understood in a multitude in any other way.
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.
And because the multitude is naturally not one but many, they cannot be understood as one author but as many authors of everything their representative says or does in their name. Every man gives their common representer authority from himself individually, and owns all the actions the representer does, if they give him authority without limit. Otherwise, when they limit him in what and how far he shall represent them, none of them owns more than what they commissioned him to act.
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.
And if the representative consists of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the voice of them all. For if (for example) the smaller number pronounces in the affirmative and the greater in the negative, there will be more than enough negatives to cancel the affirmatives; and so the excess of negatives, standing uncontradicted, is the only voice the representative has.
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve: but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time: For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.
And a representative of an even number, especially when the number is not large, so that the opposing voices are often equal, is for that reason often mute and incapable of action. Yet in some cases opposing voices equal in number may decide a question. In condemning or acquitting, for instance, an equality of votes acquits by the very fact that it does not condemn; but it does not, conversely, condemn by the fact that it does not acquit. For when a case is heard, not to condemn is to acquit; but to say, on the contrary, that not acquitting is condemning, is not true. It is the same in deliberating whether to execute something at once or to postpone it to another time. For when the voices are equal, not decreeing execution is a decree of postponement.
Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.
Or if the number is odd—three or more (men or assemblies)—and each one of them has, by a negative vote, authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative votes of the rest, this number is no representative. For through the diversity of men’s opinions and interests it often becomes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, unfit for many things and in particular for governing a multitude, especially in time of war.
Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.
There are two sorts of authors. The first is simply so called; I defined him earlier as one who owns the action of another simply. The second is one who owns an action or covenant of another conditionally—that is, he undertakes to do it if the other does not do it at or before a certain time. These conditional authors are generally called sureties—in Latin fidejussores and sponsores; and in particular, for debt, praedes; and for appearance before a judge or magistrate, vades.
Part II: Of Commonwealth
How the state is made by covenant, the rights of the sovereign, liberty of subjects, law, crime and punishment, and what weakens a commonwealth.
Chapter 17: Of the causes, generation, and definition of a commonwealth
Men leave the state of war by covenanting to give all their power to one sovereign person.
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.
The final cause, end, or purpose of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in introducing that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life as a result. That is to say, it is to get themselves out of that miserable condition of war which, as has been shown, necessarily follows from the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and to tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and the observance of the laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.
For the laws of nature (such as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to), of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, which carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.
Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.
Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which everyone keeps when he has the will to keep them, when he can do so safely), if there is no power set up, or none great enough for our security, every man will—and lawfully may—rely on his own strength and skill as a safeguard against all other men.
And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry.
And in all places where men have lived in small families, robbing and plundering one another has been a trade. So far from being thought against the law of nature, the greater the plunder they gained, the greater was their honor. And in this men observed no other laws but the laws of honor: that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving men their lives and their farming tools.
And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are remembred for it in after ages with honour.
And as small families did then, so now do cities and kingdoms, which are only greater families. For their own security they enlarge their dominions on every pretext of danger, and of fear of invasion or of assistance that may be given to invaders. They try as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors, by open force and by secret arts—justly, for want of any other safeguard—and they are remembered for it with honor in later ages.
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.
Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security. For in small numbers, small additions on one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as to be enough to carry the victory, and so they encourage invasion. The multitude large enough to be trusted for our security is not fixed by any definite number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear. It is sufficient when the enemy’s advantage is not so visibly and conspicuously decisive for the outcome of a war as to move him to attempt it.
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests.
And however great a multitude there may be, if their actions are directed by their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect from it no defense or protection, either against a common enemy or against the injuries they do one another. For being divided in opinion about the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another, and by mutual opposition reduce their strength to nothing. As a result they are easily subdued, not only by a very few who agree together; but also, when there is no common enemy, they make war on each other for their particular interests.
For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.
For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to agree in observing justice and the other laws of nature without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same. And then there would be no civil government or commonwealth at all, nor any need of one, because there would be peace without subjection.
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.
Nor is it enough, for the security that men desire should last all their lives, that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time, as in one battle or one war. For though they win a victory against a foreign enemy by their united effort, afterward—when either they have no common enemy, or the one whom some hold to be an enemy is held by others to be a friend—they must, through the difference of their interests, break apart and fall again into a war among themselves.
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,
It is true that certain living creatures, such as bees and ants, live sociably with one another (and are therefore counted by Aristotle among political creatures). Yet they have no other direction than their particular judgments and appetites, nor any speech by which one of them can signify to another what he thinks useful for the common benefit. So someone may perhaps want to know why mankind cannot do the same. To this I answer:
First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not so.
First, that men are continually competing for honor and dignity, which these creatures are not. Consequently there arise among men, on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but among these creatures, not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.
Second, that among these creatures the common good does not differ from the private; and being inclined by nature to their private good, they procure the common benefit by it. But man, whose joy consists in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what stands above the rest.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.
Third, that these creatures, not having the use of reason as man does, do not see, or think they see, any fault in the management of their common business. Among men, by contrast, there are very many who think themselves wiser, and better able to govern the public than the rest. These strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that, and so bring the public into disorder and civil war.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.
Fourth, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making their desires and other feelings known to one another, lack that art of words by which some men can represent to others what is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good, and can enlarge or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil—discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure.
Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.
Fifth, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage. Therefore, as long as they are at ease, they are not offended with their fellows. Man, however, is most troublesome when he is most at ease; for it is then that he loves to show his wisdom and to control the actions of those who govern the commonwealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somwhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial. And so it is no wonder if something else is required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting: namely, a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.
The generation of the Leviathan
Each man authorizes one man or assembly to bear his person; the multitude so united is a commonwealth.
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment.
The only way to set up such a common power—one able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and so to secure them that by their own industry and the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly—is to confer all their power and strength on one man, or on one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, to one will. That is as much as to say: to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and for everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be the author of whatever he who so bears their person shall do, or cause to be done, in those things that concern the common peace and safety; and in this to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment.
This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
This is more than consent or concord. It is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such a way as if every man should say to every man: “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition: that you give up your right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.” This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth, in Latin civitas.
This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to performe the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.
This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by the terror of it he is enabled to shape the wills of them all toward peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.
And in him consists the essence of the commonwealth, which, to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with one another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end that he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defense.
And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBIECT.
And he who carries this person is called sovereign, and is said to have sovereign power; and everyone else is his subject.
The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Institution.
This sovereign power is attained in two ways. One is by natural force: as when a man makes his children submit themselves and their children to his government, since he is able to destroy them if they refuse; or when by war he subdues his enemies to his will, granting them their lives on that condition. The other is when men agree among themselves to submit voluntarily to some man, or assembly of men, trusting to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political commonwealth, or a commonwealth by institution; and the former a commonwealth by acquisition. And first I shall speak of a commonwealth by institution.
Chapter 18: Of the rights of sovereigns by institution
From the covenant that institutes a commonwealth follow the sovereign’s rights, which no subject can revoke.
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.
A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men agree and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatever man or assembly of men the majority shall give the right to present the person of them all (that is to say, to be their representative), every one—he who voted for it as well as he who voted against it—shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same way as if they were his own, in order to live peaceably among themselves and be protected against other men.
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.
From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.
First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission.
First, because they covenant, it is to be understood that they are not obliged by any earlier covenant to anything inconsistent with this one. Consequently, those who have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant among themselves to be obedient to anyone else, in anything whatever, without his permission.
And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
And therefore those who are subjects of a monarch cannot, without his leave, cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor can they transfer their person from him who bears it to another man or another assembly of men. For they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of, all that he who is already their sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done. So if any one man dissents, all the rest would break the covenant they made with that man, which is injustice. And every man has also given the sovereignty to him who bears their person; so if they depose him, they take from him what is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God.
Besides, if he who attempts to depose his sovereign is killed or punished by him for the attempt, he is the author of his own punishment, since by the institution he is author of all his sovereign shall do. And because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is on that ground also unjust. And whereas some men have pleaded, as grounds for disobeying their sovereign, a new covenant made not with men but with God, this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God except through the mediation of somebody who represents God’s person; and no one does that but God’s lieutenant, who holds the sovereignty under God.
But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.
But this pretense of a covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders’ own consciences, that it is the act not only of an unjust disposition but also of a vile and unmanly one.
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects before-hand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man.
Second, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to the one they make sovereign by a covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can be no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign. Consequently none of his subjects can be freed from his subjection on any pretense of forfeiture. That he who is made sovereign makes no covenant with his subjects beforehand is plain. For either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must make a separate covenant with every man.
With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
With the whole as one party it is impossible, because as yet they are not one person. And if he makes as many separate covenants as there are men, those covenants become void once he has the sovereignty. For whatever act any one of them can allege as a breach of them is the act both of himself and of all the rest, because it is done in the person, and by the right, of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant.
Besides, if one or more of them allege a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution, and others—or one other of his subjects, or he himself alone—maintain there was no such breach, there is in this case no judge to decide the controversy. It returns therefore to the sword again, and every man recovers the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore futile to grant sovereignty by way of a prior covenant.
The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united.
The opinion that any monarch receives his power by covenant—that is to say, on condition—comes from failing to understand this easy truth: that covenants, being but words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, except what they have from the public sword—that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men, that has the sovereignty, whose actions are vouched for by them all and performed by the strength of them all united in him.
But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the goverment of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.
But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, no one imagines that any such covenant took place at the institution. For no one is so dull as to say, for example, that the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such-and-such conditions, which, if not performed, would allow the Romans lawfully to depose the Roman people. That men do not see the reasoning to be the same in a monarchy as in a popular government comes from the ambition of some, who are kinder to the government of an assembly, in which they may hope to take part, than to monarchy, which they despair of enjoying.
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly.
Third, because the majority has by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he who dissented must now consent with the rest—that is, be content to avow all the actions the sovereign shall do—or else be justly destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered the congregation of those who were assembled, he sufficiently declared by that his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted) to abide by what the majority should ordain. And so if he refuses to abide by it, or protests against any of their decrees, he acts contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly.
And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.
And whether he is of the congregation or not, and whether his consent is asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was in before, in which he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatever.
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgments of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice.
Fourth, because every subject is by this institution the author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted, it follows that whatever the sovereign does can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be accused of injustice by any of them.
For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.
For he who does anything by authority from another does no injury by it to the one by whose authority he acts. But by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign does. Consequently, he who complains of injury from his sovereign complains of something of which he himself is the author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself—no, nor even himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that those who have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice, or injury in the proper sense.
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can iustly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.
Fifth, and following from what was said last, no man who has sovereign power can justly be put to death, or punished in any other way, by his subjects. For since every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign, he would be punishing another for actions committed by himself.
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,
And because the end of this institution is the peace and defense of them all, and whoever has a right to the end has a right to the means, it belongs by right to whatever man or assembly has the sovereignty to be judge both of the means of peace and defense and of whatever hinders and disturbs them; and to do whatever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for preserving peace and security by preventing discord at home and hostility from abroad, and, when peace and security are lost, for recovering them. And therefore,
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace.
Sixth, it belongs to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are hostile to peace and what are conducive to it; and consequently on what occasions, how far, and in what, men are to be trusted in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they are published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions, and in the good government of opinions consists the good government of men’s actions, for the sake of their peace and concord. And though in matters of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the truth, this is not inconsistent with regulating doctrine with a view to peace.
For Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive: Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only somtimes awake the Warre.
For doctrine contrary to peace can no more be true than peace and concord can be against the law of nature. It is true that in a commonwealth where, through the negligence or lack of skill of governors and teachers, false doctrines have in time come to be generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offensive. Yet the most sudden and rough bustling-in of a new truth that can be never breaks the peace, but only sometimes awakens the war.
For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace; therby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.
For men who are so loosely governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still at war. Their condition is not peace but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another, and they live, as it were, continually within the precincts of battle. It belongs therefore to him who has the sovereign power to be judge, or to appoint all judges, of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace, so as to prevent discord and civil war.
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the publique peace.
Seventh, there belongs to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules by which every man may know what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may do without being molested by any of his fellow subjects. And this is what men call propriety, or property. For before the constitution of sovereign power (as has already been shown) all men had a right to all things, which necessarily causes war. And therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, for the sake of the public peace.
These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull, and Unlawfull in the actions of Subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the Lawes of each Common-wealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civill Law.
These rules of propriety (or meum and tuum, mine and yours), and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects, are the civil laws—that is to say, the laws of each particular commonwealth. The name “civil law” is now, however, restricted to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome, which, being the head of a great part of the world, had laws that were at that time the civil law in these parts.
Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or Naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.
Eighth, there belongs to the sovereignty the right of judicature: that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies that may arise concerning law, whether civil or natural, or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another; the laws concerning meum and tuum are in vain; and every man retains, from the natural and necessary appetite for his own preservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength—which is the condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted.
Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expences thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign.
Ninth, there belongs to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and commonwealths: that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that purpose; and of levying money on the subjects to cover the expenses. For the power by which the people are to be defended consists in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union of their strength under one command. And the sovereign instituted therefore has that command, because the command of the militia, without any other institution, makes whoever has it sovereign.
And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.
And therefore, whoever is made general of an army, he who has the sovereign power is always generalissimo.
Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Counsellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in Peace, and War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.
Tenth, there belongs to the sovereignty the choosing of all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace and in war. For since the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defense, he is understood to have power to use such means as he shall think most fit for discharging it.
Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.
Eleventh, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding every subject with riches or honor, and of punishing him with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with disgrace, according to the law he has previously made; or, if no law has been made, according to what he shall judge most conducive to encouraging men to serve the commonwealth, or to deterring them from doing it disservice.
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution.
Lastly, consider what value men are naturally apt to set on themselves, what respect they look for from others, and how little they value other men—from which there continually arise among them rivalry, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destruction of one another and the weakening of their strength against a common enemy. Given this, it is necessary that there be laws of honor, and a public valuation of the worth of those men who have deserved, or are able to deserve, well of the commonwealth; and that there be force in the hands of someone or other to put those laws into execution.
But it hath already been shewn, that not onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.
But it has already been shown that not only the whole militia, or forces of the commonwealth, but also the judicature of all controversies belongs to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore it belongs also to give titles of honor; to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall hold; and to appoint what signs of respect they shall give to one another in public or private meetings.
Sovereignty cannot be divided
These rights are inseparable, and dividing them led England into civil war.
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subjects be retained.
These are the rights that make up the essence of sovereignty, and they are the marks by which a man may discern in what man or assembly of men the sovereign power is placed and resides. For these are incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of the estates and persons of infant heirs; to have first right of purchase in markets; and all other statutory prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign, and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained.
But if he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of Doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, a Kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand: For unlesse this division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen.
But if he transfers the militia, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of means to execute the laws. Or if he grants away the power of raising money, the militia is in vain. Or if he gives away the government of doctrines, men will be frightened into rebellion by the fear of spirits. And so if we consider any one of these rights, we shall at once see that holding all the rest will have no effect in preserving peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths are instituted. And this division is what is meant by the saying, a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand. For unless this division comes first, division into opposing armies can never happen.
If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto been.
If there had not first been an opinion received by the greater part of England that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people would never have been divided and fallen into this civil war—first between those who disagreed in politics, and afterward between the dissenters about liberty of religion. These have so instructed men on this point of sovereign right that there are few now in England who do not see that these rights are inseparable. And so they will be generally acknowledged at the next return of peace, and will continue to be until their miseries are forgotten—and no longer, unless the common people are better taught than they have been so far.
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.
And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it necessarily follows that in whatever words any of them may seem to be granted away, the grant is void if the sovereign power itself is not renounced in direct terms, and the name of sovereign is still given by the grantees to him who grants them. For when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably attached to it.
This great Authority being Indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis minores, of lesse power than them all together. For if by all together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then all together, and every one, signifie the same; and the speech is absurd.
This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably attached to the sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of those who say of sovereign kings that, though they are singulis majores, of greater power than each one of their subjects, they are universis minores, of less power than all of them together. For if by “all together” they do not mean the collective body as one person, then “all together” and “every one” signify the same thing, and the saying is absurd.
But if by all together, they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.
But if by “all together” they understand them as one person (which person the sovereign bears), then the power of all together is the same as the sovereign’s power, and so again the saying is absurd. They see this absurdity well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people; but in a monarch they do not see it. And yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomever it is placed.
And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun.
And as the power, so also the honor of the sovereign ought to be greater than that of any or all of the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honor. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creations. As in the presence of the master the servants are equal, and without any honor at all, so are the subjects in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine, some more and some less, when they are out of his sight, yet in his presence they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun.
But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands.
But someone may object here that the condition of subjects is very miserable, since they are exposed to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them who have so unlimited a power in their hands.
And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre;
And commonly those who live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy, and those who live under the government of a democracy or other sovereign assembly attribute all the trouble to that form of commonwealth—whereas the power in all forms, if they are complete enough to protect them, is the same. They do not consider that the condition of man can never be without some inconvenience or other, and that the greatest that can possibly befall the people in general under any form of government is scarcely felt in comparison with the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war,
or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coërcive Power to tye their lands from rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies.
or that lawless condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from plunder and revenge. Nor do they consider that the greatest pressure from sovereign governors comes not from any delight or profit they can expect from the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor their own strength and glory consists, but from the stubbornness of the subjects themselves, who, contributing unwillingly to their own defense, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, so that they may have the means, on any emergency or sudden need, to resist their enemies or take advantage of them.
For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Selfe-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.
For all men are by nature provided with notable magnifying glasses (that is, their passions and self-love), through which every little payment appears a great grievance; but they lack those telescopes (namely moral and civil science) to see from afar the miseries that hang over them, which cannot be avoided without such payments.
Chapter 19: Of the kinds of commonwealth by institution, and of succession
There are only three kinds of commonwealth: monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy.
The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part.
The difference between commonwealths consists in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man or in an assembly of more than one; and because into that assembly either every man has the right to enter, or not everyone but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is plain that there can be only three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must be one man or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or of only a part.
When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or More, or All, must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.
When the representative is one man, the commonwealth is a monarchy; when it is an assembly of all who will come together, it is a democracy, or popular commonwealth; when it is an assembly of a part only, it is called an aristocracy. There can be no other kind of commonwealth. For either one, or more, or all must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.
There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: So also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.
There are other names of government in the histories and books of politics, such as tyranny and oligarchy. But they are not the names of other forms of government; they are the names of the same forms when disliked. For those who are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny; and those who are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy. So also those who find themselves aggrieved under a democracy call it anarchy (which means lack of government). And yet I think no one believes that lack of government is some new kind of government. Nor, by the same reasoning, ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it and of another when they dislike it or are oppressed by the governors.
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to One man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people, but onely to certain particular; ends, by the Soveraign limited.
It is plain that men who are in absolute liberty may, if they please, give authority to one man to represent every one of them, just as they may give such authority to any assembly of men whatever. Consequently they may, if they think good, subject themselves to a monarch as absolutely as to any other representative. Therefore, where a sovereign power has already been set up, there can be no other representative of the same people except for certain particular purposes, limited by the sovereign.
For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy.
For that would be to set up two sovereigns, and to have every man’s person represented by two actors, who by opposing one another must necessarily divide that power which (if men will live in peace) is indivisible, and so reduce the multitude to the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore, just as it would be absurd to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting the people of its dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their advice or desires, should on that account hold those deputies, rather than itself, to be the absolute representative of the people, so it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy.
And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise.
And I do not know how so plain a truth should of late have been so little observed: that in a monarchy, he who held the sovereignty by a descent of six hundred years, who alone was called sovereign, who had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and who was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was nevertheless never considered their representative—that name passing without contradiction as the title of those men who, at his command, were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and give him their advice (if he permitted it).
Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the truth committed to them.
This may serve as a warning to those who are the true and absolute representative of a people to instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take heed how they admit any other general representation on any occasion whatever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them.
Monarchy compared with assemblies
Hobbes argues that monarchy best unites public and private interest and gives the steadiest counsel.
The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoeuer beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person.
The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth consists not in a difference of power, but in a difference of convenience, or fitness to produce the peace and security of the people, for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe, first, that whoever bears the person of the people, or is one of the assembly that bears it, also bears his own natural person.
And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects.
And though he is careful in his political person to promote the common interest, he is no less careful, or more so, to promote the private good of himself, his family, kindred, and friends. And for the most part, if the public interest happens to cross the private, he prefers the private; for the passions of men are commonly more powerful than their reason. From this it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there the public is most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same as the public. The riches, power, and honor of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects.
For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.
For no king can be rich or glorious or secure whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want or dissension to maintain a war against their enemies. Whereas in a democracy or aristocracy, public prosperity contributes less to the private fortune of someone who is corrupt or ambitious than a perfidious piece of advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war often does.
Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it.
Second, that a monarch takes counsel from whom, when, and where he pleases; and consequently he may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter he is deliberating about, of whatever rank or quality, as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he wishes. But when a sovereign assembly needs counsel, none are admitted but those who have a right to it from the beginning. For the most part these are men who have been more versed in acquiring wealth than knowledge, and who are to give their advice in long speeches, which may and commonly do excite men to action, but do not guide them in it.
For the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.
For the understanding is never enlightened by the flame of the passions, but dazzled. Nor is there any place or time in which an assembly can receive counsel in secrecy, because of its own numbers.
Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.
Third, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no inconstancy but that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there arises an inconstancy from their number. For the absence of a few who would have kept a resolution, once taken, firm (which may happen through overconfidence, negligence, or private obstacles), or the diligent attendance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a Civill Warre.
Fourth, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest; but an assembly may, and to such a pitch as may produce a civil war.
Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: For their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes.
Fifth, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience: that any subject may, by the power of one man, be deprived of all he possesses in order to enrich a favorite or flatterer. This, I confess, is a great and unavoidable inconvenience. But the same may just as well happen where the sovereign power is in an assembly. For their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to being seduced by orators, as a monarch is by flatterers; and, becoming one another’s flatterers, they serve one another’s covetousness and ambition by turns.
And whereas the Favorites of Monarchs, are few, and they have none els to advance but their owne Kindred; the Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice.
And whereas the favorites of monarchs are few, and have no one else to advance but their own kindred, the favorites of an assembly are many, and their kindred much more numerous than any monarch’s. Besides, there is no favorite of a monarch who cannot help his friends as well as hurt his enemies. But orators—that is to say, the favorites of sovereign assemblies—though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse requires less eloquence than to excuse (such is man’s nature), and condemnation looks more like justice than acquittal.
Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre.
Sixth, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or on one who cannot distinguish between good and evil. The inconvenience consists in this: that the use of his power must be in the hands of another man, or of some assembly of men, who are to govern by his right and in his name, as guardians and protectors of his person and authority. But to say there is inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign power into the hands of a man or an assembly of men is to say that all government is more inconvenient than confusion and civil war.
And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is the same.
And therefore all the danger that can be alleged must arise from the contention of those who may become competitors for an office of such great honor and profit. To show that this inconvenience does not proceed from the form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider that the preceding monarch has appointed who shall have the guardianship of his infant successor, either expressly by will, or tacitly by not overruling the custom received in that case. And then such inconvenience, if it happens, is to be attributed not to the monarchy but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects—which is the same in all kinds of government where the people are not well instructed in their duty and in the rights of sovereignty.
Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery.
Or else the preceding monarch has made no arrangement at all for such guardianship. And then the law of nature has provided this sufficient rule: that the guardianship shall be in him who has by nature the most interest in preserving the infant’s authority, and to whom the least benefit can come from his death or diminishment. For since every man by nature seeks his own benefit and advancement, to put an infant into the power of those who can advance themselves by his destruction or harm is not guardianship but treachery.
So that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child.
So, sufficient provision having been made against all just quarrels about government under a child, if any contention arises that disturbs the public peace, it is to be attributed not to the form of monarchy but to the ambition of subjects and their ignorance of their duty. On the other side, there is no great commonwealth whose sovereignty is in a great assembly that is not, with respect to consultations of peace and war and the making of laws, in the same condition as if the government were in a child.
For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad.
For as a child lacks the judgment to dissent from the counsel given him, and so is compelled to take the advice of those, or the one, to whom he is committed, so an assembly lacks the liberty to dissent from the counsel of the majority, be it good or bad.
And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes libertatis; that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.
And as a child needs a tutor or protector to preserve his person and authority, so also in great commonwealths the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, has need of custodes libertatis, guardians of liberty—that is, of dictators, or protectors of their authority, who amount to temporary monarchs, to whom they may commit for a time the entire exercise of their power. And at the end of that time such assemblies have more often been deprived of it than infant kings have been by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.
Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three; that is to say, Monarchie, where One Man has it; or Democracie, where the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together.
The kinds of sovereignty, as I have now shown, are only three: monarchy, where one man holds it; democracy, where the general assembly of subjects holds it; and aristocracy, where it lies in an assembly of certain persons nominated or otherwise distinguished from the rest. Yet anyone who considers the particular commonwealths that have existed, and exist now, in the world will perhaps not easily reduce them to three, and may be inclined to think there are other forms, arising from these mixed together.
As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands for a time; or Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments, are nevertheles by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the Soveraigne Power: Nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.
Take, for example, elective kingdoms, where kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or kingdoms in which the king has a limited power. Most writers nevertheless call these governments monarchy. Likewise, if a popular or aristocratic commonwealth conquers an enemy’s country and governs it through a president, procurator, or other magistrate, this may at first sight seem to be a democratic or aristocratic government. But it is not so. For elective kings are not sovereigns but ministers of the sovereign; limited kings are not sovereigns but ministers of those who have the sovereign power; and provinces subject to the democracy or aristocracy of another commonwealth are governed not democratically or aristocratically, but monarchically.
And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre.
First, consider an elective king whose power is limited to his lifetime, as it is in many parts of Christendom today, or to certain years or months, as the dictator’s power was among the Romans. If he has the right to appoint his successor, he is no longer elective but hereditary. But if he has no power to choose his successor, then either there is some other known man or assembly that may elect a new one after his death, or else the commonwealth dies and dissolves with him, and returns to the condition of war.
If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, it they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute,
If it is known who has the power to confer the sovereignty after his death, then it is also known that the sovereignty was in them before. For no one has the right to give what he has no right to possess and keep for himself, if he thinks fit. But if there is no one who can confer the sovereignty after the death of the man first elected, then he has the power—indeed, he is obliged by the law of nature—to provide for a successor, so as to keep those who had trusted him with the government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war. Consequently, when he was elected, he was an absolute sovereign.
Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.
Second, a king whose power is limited is not superior to the one or ones who have the power to limit it; and one who is not superior is not supreme—that is, not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore always lay in the assembly that had the right to limit him, and consequently the government was not monarchy but either democracy or aristocracy. So it was in ancient Sparta, where the kings had the privilege of leading the armies, but the sovereignty lay with the ephors.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into the which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch.
Third, the Roman people formerly governed the land of Judea (for example) through a governor. Judea was not therefore a democracy, since its people were not governed by any assembly that any of them had the right to enter; nor an aristocracy, since they were not governed by any assembly that anyone could enter by their election. They were governed by one person, which, though with respect to the people of Rome it was an assembly of the people, or democracy, was a monarch with respect to the people of Judea, who had no right at all to take part in the government.
For though where the people are governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, ’tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.
For where a people is governed by an assembly chosen by themselves from among their own number, the government is called a democracy or an aristocracy. But when they are governed by an assembly not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy—not of one man over another man, but of one people over another people.
The right of succession
Succession, the commonwealth’s artificial eternity, must be decided by the present sovereign.
Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man, assoon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.
In all these forms of government the material is mortal: not only monarchs but whole assemblies die. So for the preservation of peace among men, just as provision was made for an artificial man, provision must also be made for an artificial eternity of life. Without it, people governed by an assembly would return to the condition of war in every generation, and those governed by one man as soon as their ruler died. This artificial eternity is what men call the right of succession.
There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did Institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security,
No form of government is perfect where the disposal of the succession does not lie with the present sovereign. For if it lies with some other particular man or private assembly, it lies with a subject, and the sovereign may take it over at his pleasure; so the right is in fact his own. And if it lies with no particular man but is left to a new choice, then the commonwealth is dissolved, and the right belongs to whoever can seize it—contrary to the intention of those who instituted the commonwealth for their perpetual, not temporary, security.
In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.
In a democracy the whole assembly cannot fail unless the multitude to be governed fails. So in that form of government questions about the right of succession have no place at all.
In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as Author. And though the Soveraign Assembly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.
In an aristocracy, when any member of the assembly dies, the election of another in his place belongs to the assembly, as the sovereign, to which belongs the choice of all counselors and officers. For what the representative does as actor, every one of the subjects does as author. And although the sovereign assembly may give others the power to elect new members to fill its ranks, the election is still made by its authority, and by the same authority it may be revoked when the public good requires it.
The greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use.
The greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy. The difficulty arises because at first sight it is not obvious who is to appoint the successor, nor, often, whom he has appointed. Both cases call for more exact reasoning than most people are accustomed to use.
As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of Inheritance, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude.
As to the question of who shall appoint the successor of a monarch who holds sovereign authority—that is, who shall determine the right of inheritance (for elective kings and princes do not own the sovereign power but only have the use of it)—we must consider that either the one in possession has the right to dispose of the succession, or else that right returns to the dissolved multitude.
For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him; or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had its first Institution.
For the death of one who owns the sovereign power leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all—that is, without any representative in whom they could be united and be capable of doing any single action. They are therefore incapable of electing any new monarch. Every man has an equal right to submit himself to whoever he thinks best able to protect him, or, if he can, to protect himself with his own sword. That is a return to confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the purpose for which monarchy was first instituted.
Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.
It is evident, therefore, that by the institution of monarchy the choice of the successor is always left to the judgment and will of the present holder.
And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or by other tacite signes sufficient.
As for the question (which sometimes arises) of whom the reigning monarch has designated to succeed to and inherit his power, it is settled by his express words and testament, or by other sufficient tacit signs.
By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in life time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediatly after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.
By express words or testament, when he declares it during his lifetime, by word of mouth or in writing, as the first emperors of Rome declared who were to be their heirs. For the word “heir” does not in itself mean a man’s children or nearest relatives, but whoever a man declares in any way that he wants to succeed him in his estate. If, then, a monarch declares expressly, by word or in writing, that a certain man shall be his heir, that man is invested with the right to be monarch immediately upon his predecessor’s death.
But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female.
But where there is no testament or express words, other natural signs of his will are to be followed, one of which is custom. So where the custom is that the next of kin succeeds without qualification, the next of kin has the right to the succession; for if the will of the one in possession had been otherwise, he could easily have declared so during his lifetime. Likewise, where the custom is that the nearest male relative succeeds, the right of succession lies with the nearest male relative, for the same reason. And it would be the same if the custom were to prefer the female.
For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.
For whatever custom a man could control with a word, and does not, is a natural sign that he wants that custom to stand.
But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger.
But where neither custom nor testament has gone before, it is to be understood, first, that the monarch wills that the government remain monarchical, since he has approved that government in himself. Second, that a child of his own, male or female, be preferred to anyone else, since men are presumed to be more inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children of other men; and among their own, a male rather than a female, because men are naturally fitter than women for acts of labor and danger.
Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote; because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and ’tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.
Third, where his own line fails, a brother rather than a stranger; and so on, always the nearer in blood rather than the more remote. For it is always presumed that the nearer in kinship is the nearer in affection; and it is evident that a man always receives, by reflection, the most honor from the greatness of his nearest kin.
But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques.
But if a monarch may lawfully dispose of the succession by words of contract or by testament, some may object that there is a great inconvenience: he may sell or give his right of governing to a foreigner. Because foreigners (that is, men not used to living under the same government or speaking the same language) commonly undervalue one another, this may turn to the oppression of his subjects. That is indeed a great inconvenience. But it does not follow necessarily from being subject to a foreigner’s government; it comes from the lack of skill of rulers who are ignorant of the true rules of politics.
And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes, at this present, miserable.
That is why the Romans, when they had subdued many nations, made their government easier to swallow by removing that grievance as far as they thought necessary. They gave sometimes whole nations, and sometimes the leading men of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges but also the name of Romans, and took many of them into the Senate and into offices of responsibility, even in the city of Rome itself. This was what our most wise King James aimed at in trying to bring about the union of his two realms of England and Scotland. Had he achieved it, it would in all likelihood have prevented the civil wars that make both those kingdoms miserable at present.
It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.
It is therefore no injury to the people for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will, even though, through the fault of many princes, it has sometimes proved inconvenient. A further argument for its lawfulness is this: whatever inconvenience can come from giving a kingdom to a foreigner can also come from marrying foreigners in such a way that the right of succession may descend to them; yet everyone considers this lawful.
Chapter 20: Of paternal and despotic dominion
Sovereignty acquired by force rests on consent given out of fear and carries the same rights.
A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.
A commonwealth by acquisition is one where the sovereign power is acquired by force. It is acquired by force when men, one by one or many together by a majority of votes, for fear of death or chains, authorize all the actions of the man or assembly that has their lives and liberty in its power.
And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience.
This kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differs from sovereignty by institution in only one respect: men who choose their sovereign do so out of fear of one another, not of the one they institute; but in this case they subject themselves to the one they are afraid of. In both cases they do it out of fear. This should be noted by those who hold that all covenants arising from fear of death or violence are void. If that were true, no man in any kind of commonwealth could be obliged to obey.
It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.
It is true that in a commonwealth once instituted or acquired, promises that arise from fear of death or violence are not covenants and do not bind when the thing promised is contrary to the laws. But the reason is not that the promise was made out of fear; it is that the one who promises has no right in the thing promised. Also, when he could lawfully perform and does not, what releases him is not the invalidity of the covenant but the sentence of the sovereign. Otherwise, whenever a man lawfully promises, he unlawfully breaks his promise. But when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquits him, then he is acquitted by the one who extorted the promise, as the author of that release.
But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both. His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and Punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.
But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both. The sovereign’s power cannot be transferred to another without his consent. He cannot forfeit it. He cannot be accused of injury by any of his subjects. He cannot be punished by them. He is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines. He is the sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies, and of the times and occasions of war and peace. It belongs to him to choose magistrates, counselors, commanders, and all other officers and ministers, and to determine rewards and punishments, honor and rank. The reasons for all this are the same as those given in the previous chapter for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution.
Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters.
Dominion is acquired in two ways: by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is the one that a parent has over his children, and it is called paternal. It is not derived from generation, as if the parent had dominion over his child because he begot him, but from the child’s consent, either express or declared by other sufficient evidence. For as to generation, God has ordained a helper for man, and there are always two who are equally parents. Dominion over the child should therefore belong equally to both, and he should be equally subject to both—which is impossible, for no man can obey two masters.
And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not alwayes that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, this controversie in decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families.
Some have attributed the dominion to the man alone, as being of the more excellent sex; but they miscalculate. For there is not always such a difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman that the right can be determined without war. In commonwealths this dispute is decided by the civil law, and for the most part (but not always) the judgment is in favor of the father, because for the most part commonwealths have been founded by the fathers, not by the mothers, of families.
But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the Contract.
But the question here concerns the state of mere nature, where there are supposed to be no laws of marriage and no laws for the education of children, but only the law of nature and the natural inclination of the sexes to one another and to their children. In this condition of mere nature, either the parents settle dominion over the child between themselves by contract, or they do not settle it at all. If they settle it, the right passes according to the contract.
We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.
We find in history that the Amazons contracted with the men of neighboring countries, to whom they resorted for offspring, that the male children should be sent back but the female ones stay with them; so the dominion over the females was in the mother.
If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be delared by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers.
If there is no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no marriage laws, it cannot be known who the father is unless the mother declares it; so the right of dominion over the child depends on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, since the infant is first in the mother’s power, so that she may either nourish it or abandon it, if she nourishes it, it owes its life to the mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than anyone else; and consequently dominion over it is hers.
But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.
But if she abandons it, and someone else finds and nourishes it, the dominion is in the one who nourishes it. For it ought to obey the one by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life is the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to the one in whose power it is to save or destroy him.
If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject.
If the mother is the father’s subject, the child is in the father’s power. And if the father is the mother’s subject (as when a sovereign queen marries one of her subjects), the child is subject to the mother, because the father is also her subject.
If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.
If a man and a woman who are monarchs of two different kingdoms have a child, and make a contract about who shall have dominion over him, the right of dominion passes by the contract. If they make no contract, the dominion follows the dominion of the place where he resides. For the sovereign of each country has dominion over all who reside in it.
He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over the Children of the Child; and over their Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.
Whoever has dominion over the child also has dominion over the child’s children, and over their children’s children. For whoever has dominion over a man’s person has dominion over all that is his; without that, dominion would be only a title, without effect.
The Right of Succession to Paternall Dominion, proceedeth in the same manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.
The right of succession to paternal dominion proceeds in the same way as the right of succession to monarchy, which I have already discussed sufficiently in the previous chapter.
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure.
Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is what some writers call despotic, from the Greek despotes, which means a lord or master; it is the dominion of the master over his servant. This dominion is acquired by the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the immediate stroke of death, covenants—either in express words or by other sufficient signs of the will—that so long as his life and the liberty of his body are allowed him, the victor shall have the use of them at his pleasure.
And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.
Only after such a covenant is made is the vanquished a servant, and not before. For by the word “servant” (whether it is derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to save, which I leave to the grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive who is kept in prison or chains until the owner of the man who took him, or who bought him from the one who did, decides what to do with him. (For such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all, but may break their chains or the prison, and kill their master or carry him away captive, justly.) A servant is one who, having been taken, is allowed bodily liberty, and, on his promise not to run away or do violence to his master, is trusted by him.
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and Submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.
It is therefore not the victory that gives the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered—that is to say, beaten, and taken or put to flight—but because he comes in and submits to the victor. Nor is the victor obliged, by an enemy’s surrender without a promise of life, to spare him for thus yielding at discretion; this obliges the victor no longer than he, at his own discretion, thinks fit.
And that which men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.
What men do when they ask for “quarter,” as it is now called (which the Greeks called zogria, taking alive), is to escape the present fury of the victor by submission, and to bargain for their life with ransom or service. So the one who is given quarter does not have his life granted, but only deferred until further deliberation; for it is not a surrender on condition of life, but at discretion. Only when the victor has trusted him with his bodily liberty is his life secure and his service owed. For slaves who work in prisons or fetters do it not from duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters.
The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.
The master of the servant is also master of all that the servant has, and may demand the use of it—that is, of his goods, his labor, his servants, and his children—as often as he thinks fit. For the servant holds his life from his master by the covenant of obedience, that is, of owning and authorizing whatever the master does. And if the master, when the servant refuses, kills him, or puts him in chains, or otherwise punishes him for his disobedience, the servant is himself the author of it, and cannot accuse him of injury.
In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter.
In sum, the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotic dominion are exactly the same as those of a sovereign by institution, and for the same reasons, which are set down in the previous chapter.
So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty, For the Soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.
Suppose, then, a man is monarch of several nations, holding sovereignty over one by the institution of the people assembled, and over another by conquest—that is, by the submission of each individual to avoid death or chains. For him to demand more of one nation than of the other on the ground of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of ignorance of the rights of sovereignty. For the sovereign is absolute over both alike; otherwise there is no sovereignty at all, and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.
By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war.
From this it appears that a great family, if it is not part of some commonwealth, is in itself, as far as the rights of sovereignty go, a little monarchy—whether that family consists of a man and his children, or of a man and his servants, or of a man and his children and servants together—in which the father or master is the sovereign. But a family is still not properly a commonwealth unless it has such power, by its own numbers or by other advantages, that it cannot be subdued without the risk of war.
For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of Common-wealths, and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection.
For where a number of men are clearly too weak to defend themselves even when united, each may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life, either by flight or by submission to the enemy, as he thinks best—just as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may throw down their arms and ask for quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And this will be enough concerning what I find, by reflection and deduction, about sovereign rights from the nature, needs, and designs of men in setting up commonwealths and placing themselves under monarchs or assemblies entrusted with power enough for their protection.
What Scripture teaches on sovereign power
Passages from Moses, Samuel, Solomon, Paul, and Christ are cited for the sovereign’s absolute power.
Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To Moses, the children of Israel say thus. Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye. This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, *This shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you.
Let us now consider what Scripture teaches on the same point. The children of Israel say this to Moses: “You speak to us, and we will hear you; but do not let God speak to us, lest we die.” This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God himself, by the mouth of Samuel, says: “This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you.
He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his businesse.
He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots, and to gather in his harvest, and to make his engines of war and the instruments of his chariots; and he shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks and bakers. He shall take your fields, your vineyards, and your olive yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your grain and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber and to his other servants. He shall take your menservants and your maidservants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his business.
He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants. This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants. Againe, when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, We will be as all other nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our wars. Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of King Salomon* to God, was this.
He shall take the tithe of your flocks; and you shall be his servants.” This is absolute power, summed up in the last words, “you shall be his servants.” Again, when the people heard what power their king was to have, they still consented to it, and said: “We will be as all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars.” Here the right that sovereigns have both to the militia and to all judicature is confirmed—which contains as absolute a power as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, King Solomon’s prayer to God was this:
Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and Evill. It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and to praescribe the Rules of discerning Good and Evill: which Rules are Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, Servants obey your masters in All things; and, Children obey your Parents in All things. There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion.
“Give your servant understanding, to judge your people, and to discern between good and evil.” It belongs therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules for discerning good and evil; these rules are laws, and therefore the legislative power is in him. Saul sought David’s life; yet when it was in David’s power to kill Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbade them, saying, “God forbid I should do such an act against my lord, the anointed of God.” On the obedience of servants, St. Paul says, “Servants, obey your masters in all things,” and, “Children, obey your parents in all things.” There is simple obedience in those who are subject to paternal or despotic dominion.
Again, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre, and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do. There again is simple obedience. And St Paul, Warn them that they, subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey them. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed, where he sayes, Give to Caesar that which is Caesars; and payed such taxes himselfe.
Again: “The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat, and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do.” There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul: “Warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey them.” This obedience is also simple. Finally, our Savior himself acknowledges that men ought to pay the taxes that kings impose, when he says, “Give to Caesar that which is Caesar’s”; and he paid such taxes himself.
And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from any Subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, *Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me.
He also acknowledges that the king’s word is sufficient to take anything from any subject when there is need, and that the king is judge of that need. For he himself, as King of the Jews, commanded his disciples to take the donkey and the donkey’s colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying: “Go into the village opposite you, and you will find a she-donkey tied, and her colt with her; untie them, and bring them to me.
And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let them go.* They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.
And if anyone asks you what you mean by it, say that the Lord has need of them; and they will let them go.” They will not ask whether his need is a sufficient title, or whether he is judge of that need, but will accept the will of the Lord.
To these places may be added also that of Genesis, You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. And verse 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the Cognisance or Judicature of Good and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divel to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright.
To these passages may be added that of Genesis: “You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” And verse 11: “Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?” The knowing or judging of good and evil was forbidden under the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a test of Adam’s obedience. The Devil, to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it they would be as gods, knowing good and evil. And when they had both eaten, they did indeed take upon themselves God’s office, which is the judging of good and evil; but they acquired no new ability to distinguish rightly between them.
And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith, Hast thou eaten, &c. as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.
And where it is said that, having eaten, they saw that they were naked, no one has interpreted that passage as if they had previously been blind and could not see their own skins. The meaning is plain: it was then that they first judged their nakedness (in which it was God’s will to create them) to be indecent, and by being ashamed they tacitly passed judgment on God himself. And so God says, “Have you eaten, etc.,” as if to say: do you, who owe me obedience, take it upon yourself to judge my commandments? By this it is clearly, though allegorically, signified that the commands of those who have the right to command are not to be criticized or disputed by their subjects.
So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants, from which the Common-wealth hath its being.
So it appears plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and from Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratic commonwealths, is as great as men can possibly be imagined to make it. And though men may imagine many evil consequences of so unlimited a power, the consequences of lacking it—which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor—are much worse. The condition of man in this life will never be without inconveniences; but no great inconvenience happens in any commonwealth except what proceeds from the subjects’ disobedience and breach of those covenants from which the commonwealth has its being.
And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.
And whoever, thinking the sovereign power too great, seeks to make it less must subject himself to the power that can limit it—that is to say, to a greater one.
The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an argument from the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid.
The greatest objection is the one from practice: people ask where and when such power has been acknowledged by subjects. But one may ask them in return when or where there has been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war. In those nations whose commonwealths have been long-lived, and were not destroyed except by foreign war, the subjects never disputed the sovereign power. But in any case, an argument drawn from the practice of men who have not sifted things to the bottom, nor weighed the causes and nature of commonwealths with exact reason, and who suffer daily the miseries that come from their ignorance of these things, is invalid.
For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.
For even if men everywhere in the world laid the foundations of their houses on sand, it could not be inferred from that that this is how it ought to be done. The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consists in certain rules, as arithmetic and geometry do, not (as tennis does) in practice alone. And these are rules that poor men have not had the leisure to discover, and men who have had the leisure have so far lacked the curiosity or the method to find out.
Chapter 21: Of the liberty of subjects
Liberty properly means the absence of external impediments and is consistent with fear and necessity.
LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further.
Liberty, or freedom, means (properly) the absence of opposition—by opposition I mean external impediments to motion—and it may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational ones. For whatever is so tied or surrounded that it cannot move except within a certain space, that space being determined by the opposition of some external body, we say has not the liberty to go further.
And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.
So of all living creatures while they are imprisoned or restrained by walls or chains, and of water while it is held in by banks or vessels (which otherwise would spread out into a larger space), we usually say that they are not at liberty to move in the way they would without those external impediments. But when the impediment to motion lies in the constitution of the thing itself, we do not usually say it lacks the liberty, but the power, to move—as when a stone lies still, or a man is confined to his bed by sickness.
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, A FREE-MAN, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to. But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore, when ’tis said (for example) The way is Free, no Liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.
According to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a free man is one who, in those things he is able to do by his strength and wit, is not hindered from doing what he has a will to do. But when the words “free” and “liberty” are applied to anything but bodies, they are misused; for what is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment. So when it is said (for example) that the way is free, no liberty of the way is meant, but of those who walk along it without being stopped.
And when we say a Guift is Free, there is not meant any Liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So when we speak Freely, it is not the Liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Free-will, no Liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the Liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe.
And when we say a gift is free, no liberty of the gift is meant, but of the giver, who was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of the voice or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law has obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Finally, from the use of the phrase “free will,” no liberty of the will, desire, or inclination can be inferred, but only the liberty of the man, which consists in this: that he finds nothing to stop him in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.
Feare, and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for feare of the law, are actions, which the doers had liberty to omit.
Fear and liberty are consistent. When a man throws his goods into the sea for fear the ship will sink, he nevertheless does it very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will; it is therefore the action of one who was free. So too a man sometimes pays his debt only for fear of prison; yet because nobody prevented him from keeping the money, it was the action of a man at liberty. And in general, all the actions that men do in commonwealths for fear of the law are actions the doers had the liberty to leave undone.
Liberty, and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest.
Liberty and necessity are consistent. Water has not only the liberty but the necessity of flowing down the channel; and so it is with the actions men do voluntarily. Because they proceed from their will, they proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man’s will, and every desire and inclination, proceeds from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes), they proceed from necessity. So to anyone who could see the connection of those causes, the necessity of all men’s voluntary actions would be evident.
And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God.
And therefore God, who sees and disposes all things, sees also that man’s liberty in doing what he wills is accompanied by the necessity of doing what God wills, no more and no less. For though men may do many things that God does not command, and of which he is therefore not the author, they can have no passion or appetite for anything of which God’s will is not the cause. And if his will did not guarantee the necessity of man’s will, and consequently of everything that depends on man’s will, the liberty of men would be a contradiction of, and an impediment to, the omnipotence and liberty of God.
And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall liberty, which only is properly called liberty.
This will suffice (for the matter in hand) about that natural liberty which alone is properly called liberty.
Civil laws as artificial chains
The liberty of subjects lies only in what the laws pass over in silence.
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.
But just as men, to attain peace and thereby preserve themselves, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth, so they have also made artificial chains, called civil laws. By mutual covenants they themselves have fastened these chains at one end to the lips of the man or assembly to whom they have given the sovereign power, and at the other end to their own ears. These bonds, weak in their own nature, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty, of breaking them.
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy.
It is only in relation to these bonds that I am now to speak of the liberty of subjects. For since there is no commonwealth in the world in which enough rules have been laid down to regulate all the actions and words of men (that being impossible), it follows necessarily that in all kinds of actions the laws pass over in silence, men have the liberty to do whatever their own reason suggests as most profitable to themselves. For if we take liberty in its proper sense, as bodily liberty—that is, freedom from chains and prison—it would be quite absurd for men to clamor as they do for the liberty they so plainly enjoy.
Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution.
Again, if we take liberty to mean exemption from laws, it is no less absurd for men to demand, as they do, that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet, absurd as it is, this is what they demand—not knowing that the laws have no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to have those laws carried out.
The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.
The liberty of a subject, therefore, lies only in those things that the sovereign has passed over in regulating their actions: such as the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise make contracts with one another; to choose their own home, their own diet, their own way of life; to bring up their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature.
We are not to understand, however, that by such liberty the sovereign power of life and death is either abolished or limited. For it has already been shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on any pretext whatever, can properly be called injustice or injury, because every subject is the author of every act the sovereign does. So the sovereign never lacks the right to anything, except insofar as he himself is the subject of God, and bound by that to observe the laws of nature.
And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: As when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject.
And therefore it can, and often does, happen in commonwealths that a subject is put to death by command of the sovereign power, and yet neither does the other wrong. So it was when Jephthah caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in this and similar cases, the one who dies had the liberty to do the action for which he is nevertheless put to death without injury. And the same holds for a sovereign prince who puts an innocent subject to death.
For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself: And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature.
For though the action is against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity (as was David’s killing of Uriah), yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased had been given to David by Uriah himself; and yet to God, because David was God’s subject and forbidden all iniquity by the law of nature.
Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it.
David himself clearly confirmed this distinction when he repented of the deed, saying, “Against you only have I sinned.” In the same way, when the people of Athens banished the most powerful man in their commonwealth for ten years, they thought they committed no injustice; and yet they never asked what crime he had committed, but what harm he might do. Indeed, they ordered the banishment of they knew not whom: each citizen brought to the marketplace an oyster shell with the name written on it of the man he wanted banished, and without actually accusing him, they sometimes banished an Aristides for his reputation for justice, and sometimes a scurrilous jester like Hyperbolus, to make a joke of it.
And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.
And yet one cannot say that the sovereign people of Athens lacked the right to banish them, or that an Athenian lacked the liberty to joke, or to be just.
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same.
The liberty so often and so honorably mentioned in the histories and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and in the writings and conversation of those who have received all their political learning from them, is not the liberty of individual men but the liberty of the commonwealth. It is the same liberty that every man would have if there were no civil laws and no commonwealth at all. And its effects are the same too.
For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about.
For among men without a master there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor; no inheritance to pass on to the son or to expect from the father; no ownership of goods or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every individual man. So too among states and commonwealths that are not dependent on one another, every commonwealth (not every man) has an absolute liberty to do what it judges—that is, what the man or assembly that represents it judges—most conducive to its benefit. But along with this, they live in a condition of perpetual war, on the brink of battle, with their frontiers armed and cannons aimed at their neighbors all around.
The Athenians, and Romanes were free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.
The Athenians and Romans were free—that is, free commonwealths. Not that any individual had the liberty to resist his own representative, but that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other peoples. On the towers of the city of Lucca the word LIBERTAS is written in great letters to this day; yet no one can infer from this that an individual has more liberty, or immunity from service to the commonwealth, there than in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth is monarchical or popular, the freedom is still the same.
But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government.
But it is easy for men to be deceived by the attractive name of liberty, and, for lack of judgment to tell the difference, to mistake for their private inheritance and birthright what is the right of the public only. And when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men renowned for their writings on the subject, it is no wonder if it produces sedition and changes of government.
In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practise of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his *Politiques, (lib.
In these western parts of the world we are made to take our opinions about the institution and rights of commonwealths from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romans, who, living under popular states, did not derive those rights from the principles of nature, but copied them into their books from the practice of their own commonwealths, which were popular—just as grammarians describe the rules of language from the practice of their time, or the rules of poetry from the poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught (to keep them from wanting to change their government) that they were free men, and that all who lived under monarchy were slaves, Aristotle writes in his Politics (book
6. cap. 2. In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for ’tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome;* and afterwards by their Successors.
6, chapter 2): “In a democracy liberty is to be presupposed; for it is commonly held that no man is free under any other government.” And like Aristotle, Cicero and other writers based their civil doctrine on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate monarchy first by those who, having deposed their sovereign, shared the sovereignty of Rome among themselves, and afterward by their successors.
And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.
And from reading these Greek and Latin authors, men have from childhood acquired a habit (under a false show of liberty) of favoring tumults and of licentiously controlling the actions of their sovereigns, and then of controlling those controllers, with the shedding of so much blood that I think I may truly say nothing was ever so dearly bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.
The true liberty of subjects
Subjects keep the rights they could not give away, above all the right to defend their own lives.
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free.
To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject—that is, what are the things which, though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless refuse to do without injustice—we must consider what rights we pass away when we make a commonwealth. Or, which is the same thing, what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all the actions (without exception) of the man or assembly we make our sovereign. For both our obligation and our liberty consist in the act of our submission, and so they must be inferred by arguments taken from it. There is no obligation on any man that does not arise from some act of his own, for all men are equally free by nature.
And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, I Authorise all his Actions, or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy,
Such arguments must be drawn either from the express words, “I authorize all his actions,” or from the intention of the one who submits himself to that power (and his intention is to be understood by the end for which he submits). So the obligation and liberty of the subject must be derived either from those words (or others equivalent), or else from the end for which sovereignty was instituted: namely, the peace of the subjects among themselves, and their defense against a common enemy.
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,
First, then: sovereignty by institution comes about through the covenant of every one with every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, through the covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or of the child to the parent. It is therefore obvious that every subject has liberty in all those things the right to which cannot be transferred by covenant. I have shown before, in chapter 14, that covenants not to defend one’s own body are void. Therefore,
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.
If the sovereign commands a man (even one justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those who attack him; or to abstain from food, air, medicine, or anything else without which he cannot live—that man nevertheless has the liberty to disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.
If a man is questioned by the sovereign, or by his authority, about a crime he himself has committed, he is not bound to confess it without an assurance of pardon. For, as I showed in the same chapter, no man can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.
Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. ’Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill my selfe, or my fellow. It followeth therefore, that
Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words: “I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions.” In this there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty. For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, “Kill me, or my fellow, if you please”; another to say, “I will kill myself, or my fellow.” It follows, therefore,
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.
that no man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself or to kill any other man. Consequently, the obligation a man may sometimes have, at the sovereign’s command, to carry out some dangerous or dishonorable task depends not on the words of our submission but on the intention, which is to be understood by its end. When, therefore, our refusal to obey defeats the end for which sovereignty was ordained, there is no liberty to refuse. Otherwise there is.
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably.
On this ground, a man commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice, though his sovereign has right enough to punish his refusal with death—as when he substitutes a capable soldier in his place, for in that case he does not desert the service of the commonwealth. Allowance must also be made for natural timidity, not only in women (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected), but also in men of feminine courage. When armies fight, there is running away on one side or both; yet when men do it not out of treachery but out of fear, they are not judged to act unjustly, but dishonorably.
For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.
For the same reason, avoiding battle is not injustice but cowardice. But a man who enlists as a soldier, or takes enlistment money, takes away the excuse of a timid nature. He is obliged not only to go into battle but also not to run from it without his captain’s leave. And when the defense of the commonwealth requires the help of all who are able to bear arms at once, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they lack the resolve or the courage to preserve, was in vain.
To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the Guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent.
No man has the liberty to resist the sword of the commonwealth in defense of another man, guilty or innocent, because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us, and so destroys the very essence of government. But suppose a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expects death. Do they not then have the liberty to join together, and assist and defend one another? Certainly they have. For they are only defending their lives, which the guilty man may do as well as the innocent.
There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.
There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty. Their bearing arms afterward, even if it is to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act; and if it is only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But an offer of pardon takes away the plea of self-defense from those to whom it is offered, and makes their persisting in assisting or defending the rest unlawful.
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the Silence of the Law. In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it,) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible Entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament.
As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, the subject has the liberty to act or to refrain, at his own discretion. And so such liberty is greater in some places and less in others, greater at some times and less at others, according to what those who hold the sovereignty think most convenient. For example, there was a time when a man in England might enter his own land by force (and dispossess those who wrongfully held it). But in later times that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made (by the king) in Parliament.
And in some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.
And in some places of the world men have the liberty of many wives; in other places such liberty is not allowed.
If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law.
If a subject has a dispute with his sovereign—about a debt, or the right of possession of lands or goods, or some service required of him, or some penalty, bodily or financial, grounded on a prior law—he has the same liberty to sue for his right as if it were against a fellow subject, and before such judges as the sovereign appoints. For since the sovereign makes his demand by force of a prior law, and not by virtue of his power, he thereby declares that he requires no more than shall appear to be due by that law.
The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every Subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.
The suit, therefore, is not contrary to the will of the sovereign, and so the subject has the liberty to demand a hearing of his case, and a sentence according to that law. But if the sovereign demands or takes anything on the strength of his power, there is in that case no action at law. For everything he does by virtue of his power is done by the authority of every subject; and consequently whoever brings an action against the sovereign brings it against himself.
If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects, which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another.
If a monarch or sovereign assembly grants a liberty to all or any of his subjects, and while that grant stands he is unable to provide for their safety, the grant is void—unless he directly renounces the sovereignty or transfers it to another.
For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power: and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.
For he could have renounced or transferred it openly and in plain terms, if that had been his will, and he did not. So it must be understood that this was not his will, but that the grant came from ignorance of the conflict between such a liberty and the sovereign power. Therefore the sovereignty is still retained, and with it all the powers necessary to exercise it: the power of war and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers and counselors, of levying money, and the rest named in chapter 18.
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it.
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long as, and no longer than, the power by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when no one else can protect them, can be given up by no covenant. Sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; once it has departed from the body, the members no longer receive their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection; and wherever a man sees it, whether in his own sword or in another’s, nature applies his obedience to it, and his endeavor to maintain it.
And though Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.
And though sovereignty, in the intention of those who make it, is immortal, yet by its own nature it is not only subject to violent death by foreign war; through the ignorance and passions of men it also carries in it, from its very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by internal discord.
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country.
If a subject is taken prisoner in war, or his person or his means of living are in the hands of the enemy, and he is given his life and bodily liberty on condition of being subject to the victor, he has the liberty to accept the condition. Having accepted it, he is the subject of the one who took him, because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same if he is detained on the same terms in a foreign country.
But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.
But if a man is held in prison or in chains, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body, he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection. He may therefore, if he can, make his escape by any means whatever.
If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.
If a monarch relinquishes the sovereignty, both for himself and for his heirs, his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature. For though nature may declare who his sons are and who his nearest kin, it depends on his own will (as was said in the previous chapter) who shall be his heir. If, then, he will have no heir, there is no sovereignty and no subjection. The case is the same if he dies without known kindred and without declaring his heir. For then no heir can be known, and consequently no subjection is due.
If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is Subject to all the Laws thereof; unlesse he have a privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.
If the sovereign banishes his subject, then during the banishment he is not a subject. But one who is sent on a mission, or has leave to travel, is still a subject—though by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of subjection. For whoever enters another’s dominion is subject to all its laws, unless he has a privilege through the friendship of the sovereigns, or by special license.
If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.
If a monarch defeated in war makes himself subject to the victor, his subjects are released from their former obligation and become obliged to the victor. But if he is held prisoner, or does not have the liberty of his own body, he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty. His subjects are therefore obliged to obey the magistrates previously placed over them, who govern not in their own name but in his. For since his right remains, the only question is one of administration—that is, of magistrates and officers; and if he has no means of naming them, he is presumed to approve those he himself appointed before.
Chapter 22: Of systems subject, political and private
Hobbes classifies the lawful and unlawful groups of men within a commonwealth.
Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.
Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am next in order to speak of its parts. And first of systems, which resemble the similar parts, or muscles, of a natural body. By systems I mean any number of men joined in one interest or one business. Of these, some are regular and some irregular. Regular systems are those in which one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. All others are irregular.
Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last precedent chapters. Others are Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one, as also their Representative is Subject.
Of regular systems, some are absolute and independent, subject to none but their own representative: such are only commonwealths, of which I have already spoken in the last five chapters. Others are dependent—that is, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one of them, and their representative too, is subject.
Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private. Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons in Law,) are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique there, but Private.
Of subordinate systems, some are political and some private. Political systems (otherwise called bodies politic and persons in law) are those made by authority from the sovereign power of the commonwealth. Private systems are those constituted by subjects among themselves, or by authority from a foreigner. For no authority derived from a foreign power is public within the dominion of another; there it is private.
And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull. Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.
Of private systems, some are lawful and some unlawful. Lawful are those allowed by the commonwealth; all others are unlawful. Irregular systems are those which, having no representative, consist only in a gathering of people. If these are not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor formed with an evil design (such as crowds of people at markets or shows, or for any other harmless end), they are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number is considerable) unknown, they are unlawful.
In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited: And that which prescribeth the Limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the subjects; and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave: And to give leave to a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection.
In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited, and what sets its limits is the sovereign power. For unlimited power is absolute sovereignty. And in every commonwealth the sovereign is the absolute representative of all the subjects; therefore no one else can be representative of any part of them except so far as he gives leave. To give leave to a body politic of subjects to have an absolute representative for all intents and purposes would be to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defense. The sovereign cannot be understood to do that by any grant that does not plainly and directly release them from their subjection.
For consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckonning; to which all mankind is too prone.
For the implications of words are not signs of his will when other implications are signs of the contrary; they are rather signs of error and miscalculation, to which all mankind is too prone.
The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.
The bounds of the power given to the representative of a body politic are to be learned from two things. One is their writ, or letters from the sovereign; the other is the law of the commonwealth.
For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.
For in the institution or acquisition of an independent commonwealth no writing is needed, because the power of the representative there has no bounds other than those set by the unwritten law of nature. But in subordinate bodies so many different limitations are necessary, concerning their business, times, and places, that they could neither be remembered without letters, nor be known unless those letters are patent—so that they may be read to them—and also sealed or attested with the seals or other permanent signs of the sovereign authority.
And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must determine, what the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore
And because such limitation is not always easy, or perhaps even possible, to describe in writing, the ordinary laws common to all subjects must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the letters themselves are silent. And therefore:
In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own.
In a body politic, if the representative is one man, whatever he does in the person of the body that is not warranted by his letters or by the laws is his own act, and not the act of the body, or of any member of it besides himself. For beyond what his letters or the laws allow, he represents no one’s person but his own.
But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.
But what he does in accordance with them is the act of every one. For every one is author of the act of the sovereign, because he is their unlimited representative; and the act of one who does not depart from the sovereign’s letters is the act of the sovereign; and therefore every member of the body is its author.
But if the Representative be an Assembly; whatsoever that Assembly shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration.
But if the representative is an assembly, whatever that assembly decrees that is not warranted by their letters or the laws is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made. But it is not the act of any man who was present and voted against it, nor of any man absent, unless he voted for it by proxy.
It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters, (which is to such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are involved in their Votes.
It is the act of the assembly because it was voted by the majority. And if it is a crime, the assembly may be punished as far as it is capable of punishment: by dissolution, or by forfeiture of their letters (which, for such artificial and fictitious bodies, is capital), or (if the assembly has a common fund in which none of the innocent members has any property) by a fine. For nature has exempted all bodies politic from bodily punishment. But those who did not give their vote are innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any man in things not warranted by their letters, and so such men are not involved in the votes of the rest.
If the person of the Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives.
If the person of the body politic lies in one man, and he borrows money from an outsider—that is, from someone not of the same body (for no letters need limit borrowing, since limiting lending is left to men’s own inclinations)—the debt is the representative’s.
For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate.
For if he had authority from his letters to make the members pay what he borrows, he would by consequence have sovereignty over them. And then the grant would either be void, as proceeding from error—common to human nature—and so an insufficient sign of the grantor’s will; or, if the grantor stands by it, the representative is sovereign, and falls outside the present question, which concerns only subordinate bodies.
No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any,) or (if there be none) out of his own estate.
No member, therefore, is obliged to pay a debt so borrowed, but only the representative himself. For the lender, being a stranger to the letters and to the terms of the body, takes as his debtors only those who are bound; and since the representative can bind himself and no one else, the lender has him alone as debtor. He must therefore pay him out of the common fund (if there is one), or (if there is none) out of his own estate.
If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.
If he comes into debt by contract or by fine, the case is the same.
But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, he be discharged.
But when the representative is an assembly and the debt is owed to an outsider, all those, and only those, are responsible for the debt who voted for the borrowing, or for the contract that made it due, or for the act for which the fine was imposed. For every one of them, in voting, bound himself to payment. Whoever is author of the borrowing is obliged to pay, even the whole debt—though when it is paid by any one of them, he is discharged.
But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be payd; If he Vote if shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the Assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.
But if the debt is owed to one of the assembly, only the assembly is obliged to pay it, out of their common fund (if they have one). For he has liberty of vote: if he votes that the money shall be borrowed, he votes that it shall be repaid. If he votes that it shall not be borrowed, or is absent, then, because in lending he votes for the borrowing, he contradicts his former vote and is bound by the later one. He becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but only from the common treasury. If that fails, he has no remedy and no complaint except against himself: knowing the acts of the assembly and their means to pay, and under no compulsion, he nevertheless lent his money through his own folly.
It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the Soverign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject is the Author.
It is plain from this that in bodies politic that are subordinate and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful but expedient for a particular man to protest openly against the decrees of the representative assembly, and have his dissent registered, or take witnesses to it. Otherwise he may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be held responsible for crimes committed, by other men. But in a sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away: both because whoever protests there denies their sovereignty, and because whatever is commanded by the sovereign power is, as far as the subject is concerned (though not always in the sight of God), justified by the command. For every subject is the author of such a command.
The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite: for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by Commission.
The variety of bodies politic is almost infinite. They are distinguished not only by the different affairs for which they are constituted, in which there is an indescribable diversity, but also by times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. As for their affairs, some are ordained for government. First, the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men in which all resolutions depend on the votes of the majority; this assembly is then a body politic, and its power is limited by commission.
This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there be few examples.
The word “province” signifies a charge, or care of business, which the one whose business it is commits to another man to administer for him and under him. And so, when one commonwealth contains several countries that have laws distinct from one another, or lie far apart, and the administration of government is committed to various persons, those countries where the sovereign does not reside, but governs by commission, are called provinces. But of the government of a province by an assembly residing in the province itself there are few examples.
The Romans who had the Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour;
The Romans, who had sovereignty over many provinces, always governed them by presidents and praetors, not by assemblies, as they governed the city of Rome and the adjacent territories. In the same way, when colonies were sent from England to plant Virginia and the Somers Islands, though their government here was committed to assemblies in London, those assemblies never committed the government under them to any assembly there, but sent one governor to each plantation.
For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose rather to trust one Servant, then an Assembly either of their friends or servants.
For though every man, where he can be present, naturally desires to take part in government, yet where men cannot be present they are also naturally inclined to commit the government of their common interest to a monarchical rather than a popular form. This is evident too in men with great private estates: when they are unwilling to take the trouble of managing the business that belongs to them, they choose to trust one servant rather than an assembly of their friends or servants.
But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged.
But however it may be in fact, we may suppose the government of a province or colony committed to an assembly. And when it is, what I have to say here is this: whatever debt that assembly contracts, or whatever unlawful act it decrees, is the act only of those who assented, and not of any who dissented or were absent, for the reasons given before.
Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same.
Also, an assembly residing outside the bounds of the colony it governs cannot exercise any power over the persons or goods of anyone of the colony, to seize them for debt or other obligation, in any place outside the colony itself. It has no jurisdiction or authority elsewhere, but is left to whatever remedy the law of that place allows. And though the assembly has the right to impose a fine on any of its members who break the laws it makes, it has no right to enforce it outside the colony itself.
And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, an University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.
And what is said here of the rights of an assembly for the government of a province or colony applies also to an assembly for the government of a town, a university, a college, a church, or any other government over the persons of men.
And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member conceive himself Injuried by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.
And generally, in all bodies politic, if any particular member believes himself injured by the body itself, the hearing of his case belongs to the sovereign, and to those the sovereign has appointed as judges in such cases, or shall appoint for that particular case—not to the body itself. For in this case the whole body is his fellow subject. In a sovereign assembly it is otherwise: there, if the sovereign is not judge, even in his own cause, there can be no judge at all.
Companies of merchants and other bodies
Trading corporations, assemblies of deputies, families, leagues, and crowds are examined in turn.
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation.
In a body politic for the good ordering of foreign trade, the most suitable representative is an assembly of all the members—that is, one in which everyone who invests his money may be present at all the deliberations and resolutions of the body, if he wishes. To prove this, we must consider the end for which merchants, who may buy and sell, export and import their merchandise at their own discretion, nevertheless bind themselves together in one corporation.
It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man may either participate of the gaine; according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects.
It is true that there are few merchants who, with the goods they buy at home, can freight a ship to export them, or with what they buy abroad, bring one home. So they need to join together in one society, in which every man may either share in the profit in proportion to his investment, or take his own goods and sell what he exports or imports at whatever prices he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, since there is no common representative to bind them to any law other than that common to all other subjects.
The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad.
The end of their incorporating is to make their profit greater, which is done in two ways: by sole buying and sole selling, both at home and abroad. So to grant a company of merchants the status of a corporation, or body politic, is to grant them a double monopoly: one to be the sole buyers, the other to be the sole sellers. For when a company is incorporated for some particular foreign country, only they export the commodities saleable in that country—which is sole buying at home and sole selling abroad.
For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.
For at home there is only one buyer, and abroad only one seller; both of which profit the merchant, because in this way they buy at home at lower rates and sell abroad at higher ones. And abroad there is only one buyer of foreign merchandise, and only one seller of it at home; both of which again profit the investors.
Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people.
Of this double monopoly, one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home, by their sole exportation, they set whatever price they please on the farm produce and handiwork of the people; and by their sole importation, whatever price they please on all the foreign commodities the people need. Both are bad for the people.
On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.
On the other hand, by being the sole sellers of native commodities abroad, and the sole buyers of foreign commodities on the spot, they raise the price of the former and lower the price of the latter, to the disadvantage of the foreigner. For where only one sells, the merchandise is dearer; and where only one buys, it is cheaper. Such corporations, therefore, are nothing other than monopolies—though they would be very profitable for a commonwealth if, bound together in one body in foreign markets, they were free at home, every man to buy and sell at whatever price he could.
The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.
The end of these bodies of merchants, then, is not a common benefit to the whole body (which in this case has no common fund except what is deducted from the individual investments for building, buying, provisioning, and manning ships), but the particular profit of each investor. So it is reasonable that everyone should know how his own money is used—that is, that everyone should belong to the assembly that has power to direct it, and should know its accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly at whose consultations every member of the body may be present, if he wishes.
If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.
If a body politic of merchants contracts a debt to an outsider by the act of its representative assembly, every member is individually liable for the whole. For an outsider can take no notice of their private laws, but regards them as so many individual men, each obliged for the whole payment, until payment by one discharges all the rest. But if the debt is owed to one of the company, the creditor is debtor to himself for the whole, and therefore cannot demand his debt except from the common fund, if there is one.
If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be layd upon every Member proportionably to his particular adventure in the Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures.
If the commonwealth imposes a tax on the body, it is understood to be laid on every member in proportion to his particular investment in the company. For in this case there is no common fund other than what is made up of their particular investments.
If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.
If a fine is laid on the body for some unlawful act, only those are liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or with whose help it was carried out. For in none of the rest is there any crime other than belonging to the body; and that, if it is a crime, is not his, because the body was ordained by the authority of the commonwealth.
If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.
If one of the members is in debt to the body, he may be sued by the body. But his goods cannot be seized, nor his person imprisoned, by the authority of the body, but only by the authority of the commonwealth. For if they could do it by their own authority, they could by their own authority give judgment that the debt is due—which is as much as to be judge in their own cause.
Those Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse.
Those bodies made for the government of men, or for trade, are either perpetual or for a time prescribed in writing. But there are also bodies whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business.
For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with one Person representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique, representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved.
For example, a sovereign monarch or sovereign assembly may think fit to command the towns and other parts of their territory to send him their deputies, to inform him of the condition and needs of the subjects, or to advise with him on making good laws, or for any other reason, as with one person representing the whole country. Such deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned to them, are there and at that time a body politic representing every subject of that dominion. But this holds only for such matters as are put to them by the man or assembly that summoned them by the sovereign authority; and when it is declared that nothing more will be put before them or debated by them, the body is dissolved.
For if they were the absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.
For if they were the absolute representative of the people, it would be the sovereign assembly; and so there would be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people, which is inconsistent with their peace. And so, where there is once a sovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people except by it. As for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set out in the writing by which they were summoned. For the people cannot choose their deputies for any other purpose than is expressed in the writing directed to them from their sovereign.
Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns.
Private bodies that are regular and lawful are those constituted without letters or other written authority, apart from the laws common to all other subjects. And because they are united in one representative person, they are held to be regular. Such are all families, in which the father or master governs the whole family. For he binds his children and servants as far as the law permits, though not further, since none of them are bound to obey in actions the law has forbidden. In all other actions, while they are under domestic government, they are subject to their fathers and masters as to their immediate sovereigns.
For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.
For since the father and master were absolute sovereigns in their own families before the institution of the commonwealth, they lose afterward no more of their authority than the law of the commonwealth takes from them.
Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for the easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.
Private bodies that are regular but unlawful are those that unite themselves into one representative person without any public authority at all. Such are the organized bands of beggars, thieves, and Roma, formed the better to order their trade of begging and stealing; and the corporations of men who, by authority from some foreign person, unite themselves in another’s dominion for the easier spreading of doctrines, and to form a party against the power of the commonwealth.
Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans designe therein: And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.
Irregular systems—which are by nature only leagues, or sometimes mere gatherings of people, with no union for any particular purpose, arising not from any obligation of one to another but only from a likeness of wills and inclinations—become lawful or unlawful according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of each particular man’s purpose in them. And his purpose is to be understood from the occasion.
The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence,) are in a Common wealth (which is no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of Factions, or Conspiracies.
Leagues of subjects (because leagues are commonly made for mutual defense) are for the most part unnecessary in a commonwealth, which is nothing more than a league of all the subjects together; and they smack of unlawful designs. For that reason they are unlawful, and commonly go by the name of factions or conspiracies.
For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man, or Assembly (as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last.
For a league, being a connection of men by covenants, is valid only so long as no just cause of distrust arises, if no power is given to any one man or assembly (as in the condition of mere nature) to compel them to perform. And therefore leagues between commonwealths, over which no human power is established to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful but also profitable for as long as they last.
But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.
But leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary for maintaining peace and justice, and (if their design is evil, or unknown to the commonwealth) unlawful. For every uniting of strength by private men is unjust if for an evil purpose; and if for an unknown purpose, dangerous to the public and unjustly concealed.
If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men, part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice.
If the sovereign power lies in a large assembly, and a number of men who are part of the assembly consult apart, without authority, to contrive the guidance of the rest, this is a faction, or unlawful conspiracy, since it is a fraudulent manipulation of the assembly for their particular interest. But if someone whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the assembly makes as many friends as he can, in him it is no injustice, because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And even if he hires such friends with money, it is still not injustice (unless there is an express law against it).
For sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.
For sometimes, men’s ways being what they are, justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his own cause just until it has been heard and judged.
In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.
In every commonwealth, if a private man maintains more servants than the management of his estate and the lawful employment he has for them require, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the commonwealth, he has no need of the defense of private force. And though in nations not thoroughly civilized several large families have lived in continual hostility and attacked one another with private force, it is evident enough that either they acted unjustly or else they had no commonwealth.
And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.
And like factions of kindred, so also factions over the government of religion, such as Papists, Protestants, and so on, or over the state, such as the patricians and plebeians of old in Rome, and the aristocrats and democrats of old in Greece, are unjust. They are contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and take the sword out of the sovereign’s hand.
Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe.
A gathering of people is an irregular system, whose lawfulness or unlawfulness depends on the occasion and on the number of those assembled. If the occasion is lawful and evident, the gathering is lawful, as with the usual meeting of people at church, or at a public show, in the usual numbers. For if the numbers are extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently anyone who cannot give a particular and good account of his being among them is to be judged aware of an unlawful and riotous design.
It may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse, and bring to Justice.
It may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be delivered to a judge or magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a riotous assembly, because one or two are all that is needed for that purpose. But in cases like these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful, but a number greater than the officers on hand are able to suppress and bring to justice.
When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with one Voyce, Great is Diana of the Ephesians; which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade.
When an unusual number of men assemble against a man whom they accuse, the assembly is an unlawful riot, because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus, where Demetrius and a great number of other men brought two of Paul’s companions before the magistrate, crying out with one voice, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians”—which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people doctrine that was against their religion and their trade.
The occasion here, considering the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words, If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man; of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse of People. Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for.
The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was just; yet their assembly was judged unlawful, and the magistrate rebuked them for it in these words: “If Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any man of anything, there are courts and deputies; let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in a lawfully called assembly. For we are in danger of being accused for this day’s sedition, because there is no cause by which anyone can give any reason for this gathering of people.” There he calls an assembly for which men can give no just account a sedition, and one they could not answer for.
And this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.
And this is all I shall say about systems and assemblies of people. They may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of the human body: the lawful ones to the muscles; the unlawful ones to wens, boils, and abscesses, bred by the unnatural confluence of evil humors.
Chapter 23: Of the public ministers of sovereign power
Officials who act in the sovereign’s name are compared to the organs of a body.
In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Common-wealth: In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are Publique Ministers.
In the last chapter I spoke of the similar parts of a commonwealth; in this one I shall speak of its organic parts, which are public ministers.
A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of the Publique businesse.
A public minister is one who is employed by the sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) in any affairs, with authority to represent the person of the commonwealth in that employment. Now every man or assembly that has sovereignty represents two persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two capacities, one natural and the other political. A monarch bears the person not only of the commonwealth but also of a man; and a sovereign assembly bears the person not only of the commonwealth but also of the assembly. Those who serve them in their natural capacity are not public ministers; only those who serve them in the administration of public business are.
And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.
And so neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers who wait on the assembly for no other purpose than the convenience of the men assembled, in an aristocracy or democracy, are public ministers; nor, in a monarchy, are stewards, chamberlains, cofferers, or any other officers of the monarch’s household.
Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a generall Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power.
Of public ministers, some are entrusted with a general administration, either of the whole dominion or of a part of it. The whole administration may be entrusted, for example, to a protector or regent, to whom the predecessor of an infant king may commit the entire administration of his kingdom during the king’s minority. In that case every subject is obliged to obey, so far as the ordinances he makes and the commands he gives are in the king’s name and not inconsistent with the king’s sovereign power.
Of a part, or Province; as when either a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right. For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governors, have no other right, but what depends on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre the Sovernignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the severall limbs of a body naturall.
A part, or province, may be entrusted when either a monarch or a sovereign assembly gives the general charge of it to a governor, lieutenant, prefect, or viceroy. In this case too, everyone in that province is obliged by everything he does in the sovereign’s name that is not incompatible with the sovereign’s right. For such protectors, viceroys, and governors have no right but what depends on the sovereign’s will; and no commission that can be given them can be interpreted as a declaration of the will to transfer sovereignty, without express and clear words to that purpose. This kind of public minister resembles the nerves and tendons that move the various limbs of a natural body.
Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his. Politicall Capacity.
Others have a special administration, that is, charge of some special business, either at home or abroad. At home, first, for the economy of a commonwealth: those who have authority concerning the treasury—tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or any public revenue whatever—to collect, receive, or pay it out, or to take the accounts of it, are public ministers. They are ministers, because they serve the representative person and can do nothing against his command or without his authority; public, because they serve him in his political capacity.
Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.
Second, those who have authority concerning the militia—to have custody of arms, forts, and ports; to levy, pay, or lead soldiers; or to provide anything necessary for the use of war, either by land or sea—are public ministers. But a soldier without a command, though he fights for the commonwealth, does not for that reason represent its person, because there is no one to whom he represents it. For everyone who has a command represents it only to those whom he commands.
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign.
Those also who have authority to teach the people their duty to the sovereign power, or to enable others to teach it, and to instruct them in the knowledge of what is just and unjust, so as to make them more apt to live in godliness and in peace among themselves and to resist the public enemy, are public ministers. They are ministers, in that they do it not by their own authority but by another’s; and public, because they do it (or should do it) by no authority but the sovereign’s.
The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei gratiâ simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei gratiâ & Regis; or Dei providentiâ & voluntate Regis.
Only the monarch or the sovereign assembly has authority immediately from God to teach and instruct the people; and no one but the sovereign receives his power simply Dei gratia, that is, by the favor of no one but God. All others receive theirs by the favor and providence of God and of their sovereigns—as in a monarchy, Dei gratia et regis, or Dei providentia et voluntate regis.
They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are Judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.
Those also to whom jurisdiction is given are public ministers. For in their seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign, and their sentence is his sentence; for (as has been declared before) all judicature is essentially annexed to sovereignty, and therefore all other judges are only ministers of him or them that have the sovereign power. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of fact and of law, so are judgments, some of fact and some of law; and consequently in the same controversy there may be two judges, one of fact and another of law.
And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on.
In both of these kinds of controversy, a controversy may arise between the party judged and the judge. Since both are subjects of the sovereign, it ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by the consent of both, for no man can be judge in his own cause. But the sovereign is already agreed on as judge by both of them, and so he is either to hear the case and decide it himself, or to appoint as judge someone they both agree on.
And this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.
This agreement is understood to be made between them in various ways. First, if the defendant is allowed to object to any of his judges whose interest makes him suspect them (for as to the plaintiff, he has already chosen his own judge), then those he does not object to are judges he himself agrees on. Second, if he appeals to any other judge, he can appeal no further, for his appeal is his choice. Third, if he appeals to the sovereign himself, and the sovereign gives sentence, either in person or by delegates whom the parties agree on, that sentence is final; for the defendant is judged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself.
These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had themselves desired.
Considering these properties of just and rational judicature, I cannot refrain from remarking on the excellent constitution of the courts of justice established in England, both for common pleas and for public pleas. By common pleas I mean those in which both plaintiff and defendant are subjects; by public pleas (which are also called pleas of the Crown), those in which the plaintiff is the sovereign. For since there were two orders of men, one the Lords and the other the Commons, the Lords had this privilege: to have none but lords as judges in all capital crimes, and as many of them as chose to be present. Since this was always acknowledged as a privilege granted in their favor, their judges were none but those they had themselves desired.
And in all controversies, every Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of the Country where the matter in controvesie lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party, why the sentence should not be finall. These publique persons, with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.
And in all controversies every subject (as also the Lords, in civil controversies) had as judges men of the county where the matter in controversy lay. He might make his objections against them, until at last twelve men were agreed on to whom no objection was made, and he was judged by those twelve. So, having his own judges, the party could allege nothing why the sentence should not be final. These public persons, who have authority from the sovereign power either to instruct or to judge the people, are members of the commonwealth that may fitly be compared to the organs of the voice in a natural body.
Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For every act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the Common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.
Public ministers also include all those who have authority from the sovereign to secure the execution of judgments given; to publish the sovereign’s commands; to suppress riots; to arrest and imprison criminals; and to do other acts tending to the preservation of the peace. For every act they do by such authority is the act of the commonwealth, and their service corresponds to that of the hands in a natural body.
Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers, Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique Businesse.
Public ministers abroad are those who represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign states. Such are ambassadors, messengers, agents, and heralds, sent by public authority and on public business.
But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though the Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and belonging to him in his naturall capacity;; is a Private person.
But those who are sent by the authority only of some private party in a troubled state, even if they are received, are neither public nor private ministers of the commonwealth, because none of their actions has the commonwealth as its author. Likewise an ambassador sent from a prince to congratulate, to offer condolences, or to attend a ceremony, though the authority is public, is a private person, because the business is private and belongs to the prince in his natural capacity.
Also if a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.
Also, if a man is sent into another country to explore its counsels and strength secretly, then though both the authority and the business are public, he is only a private minister, because there is no one to take notice of any person in him but his own. Yet he is a minister of the commonwealth, and may be compared to an eye in the natural body. And those who are appointed to receive the petitions or other information of the people, and are as it were the public ear, are public ministers, and represent their sovereign in that office.
Neither a Counsellor (nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another.
Neither a counselor nor a council of state—if we consider it as having no authority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not—is a public person. For the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose person cannot be represented to him by another in his own presence.
But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.
But a body of counselors is never without some other authority, either of judicature or of direct administration. In a monarchy they represent the monarch in delivering his commands to the public ministers. In a democracy the council, or senate, proposes the result of its deliberations to the people as a council; but when it appoints judges, or hears cases, or gives audience to ambassadors, it does so in the character of a minister of the people. And in an aristocracy the council of state is the sovereign assembly itself, and gives counsel to no one but themselves.
Chapter 24: Of the nutrition and procreation of a commonwealth
The commonwealth’s goods, property, money, and colonies are compared to a body’s food, blood, and offspring.
The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the Publique use.
The nutrition of a commonwealth consists in the plenty and distribution of materials conducive to life; in concoction, or preparation; and (when concocted) in the conveyance of it, by suitable channels, to public use.
As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land, and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind.
As for plenty of matter, it is something limited by nature to those commodities which God usually either gives freely to mankind, or sells to them for labor, from land and sea, the two breasts of our common mother.
For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly on the labour and industry of men.
For the matter of this nourishment, consisting of animals, vegetables, and minerals, God has freely laid before us, in or near the face of the earth, so that nothing more is needed than the labor and industry of receiving it. So plenty depends (next to God’s favor) merely on the labor and industry of men.
This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth: Forraign, that which is imported from without. And because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not something more than necessary;
This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native and partly foreign: native, what is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth; foreign, what is imported from outside. And because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth (unless it is of very vast extent) that produces all things needed for the maintenance and motion of the whole body, and few that do not produce something more than necessary,
the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.
the surplus commodities to be had within cease to be surplus, and supply these wants at home by the importation of what may be had abroad, whether by exchange, by just war, or by labor. For a man’s labor is also a commodity exchangeable for benefit, like anything else. And there have been commonwealths that, having no more territory than served them to live on, have nevertheless not only maintained but also increased their power, partly by the labor of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling manufactures whose materials were brought in from other places.
The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His; that is to say, in one word Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power.
The distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of mine, yours, and his—that is, in one word, property. In every kind of commonwealth it belongs to the sovereign power.
For where there is no Common-wealth, there is (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety, nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, Let the Civill Law, saith he, be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children. And again;
For where there is no commonwealth there is (as has already been shown) a perpetual war of every man against his neighbor; and therefore everything belongs to whoever gets it and keeps it by force—which is neither property nor community, but uncertainty. This is so evident that even Cicero (a passionate defender of liberty), in a public pleading, attributes all property to the civil law. “Let the civil law,” he says, “be once abandoned, or only negligently guarded (not to say oppressed), and there is nothing that any man can be sure of receiving from his ancestor or leaving to his children.” And again:
Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans. Seeing therefore the Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign Power.
“Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own and what is another man’s.” Seeing, then, that the introduction of property is an effect of the commonwealth, which can do nothing except by the person that represents it, it is the act of the sovereign alone, and consists in the laws, which no one can make who does not have the sovereign power.
And this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own.
The ancients understood this well: they called what we call law nomos (that is, distribution), and defined justice as distributing to every man his own.
In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good.
In this distribution the first law is for the division of the land itself. In it the sovereign assigns every man a portion according to what he, and not any subject or any number of subjects, judges agreeable to equity and the common good.
The Children of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary.
The children of Israel were a commonwealth in the wilderness, but lacked the commodities of the earth until they were masters of the Promised Land. That land was afterward divided among them, not at their own discretion, but at the discretion of Eleazar the priest and Joshua their general. There were twelve tribes, and they made them thirteen by subdividing the tribe of Joseph; yet they made only twelve portions of the land, and ordained no land for the tribe of Levi, but assigned them a tenth part of all the produce. That division was therefore arbitrary.
And though a People comming into possession of a Land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour.
And though a people coming into possession of a land by war do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants (as the Jews did), but leave many, or most, or all of them their estates, it is plain that they hold them afterward as by the victors’ distribution—just as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conqueror.
From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch.
From this we may gather that the property a subject has in his lands consists in a right to exclude all other subjects from using them, and not to exclude their sovereign, whether an assembly or a monarch.
For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understod as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd.
For seeing that the sovereign—that is, the commonwealth, whose person he represents—is understood to do nothing except with a view to the common peace and security, this distribution of lands is to be understood as done with a view to the same. Consequently, any distribution he makes to the prejudice of that peace is contrary to the will of every subject who committed his peace and safety to the sovereign’s discretion and conscience, and therefore, by the will of every one of them, is to be considered void.
It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.
It is true that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust and of the law of nature. But this is not enough to authorize any subject either to make war on their sovereign, or even to accuse him of injustice, or to speak ill of him in any way; because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity and the law of nature is to be considered later, in another place.
In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities.
In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself may be conceived to have a portion, and to possess and improve it by its representative; and such a portion may be conceived as made large enough to sustain the whole expense required for the common peace and defense. This would be very true, if there could be any representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities.
But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land, or of any certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and War, assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in engaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly war. Common-wealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require.
But the nature of men being what it is, setting aside public land, or any fixed revenue, for the commonwealth is useless. It tends to the dissolution of government, and to the condition of mere nature and war, as soon as ever the sovereign power falls into the hands of a monarch or an assembly that is either too careless of money or too reckless in committing the public stock to a long or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no diet. For since their expense is limited not by their own appetite but by external accidents and the appetites of their neighbors, the public riches cannot be limited by any limits other than those that emergencies require.
And whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects Land, when they judged it necessary.
And whereas in England the Conqueror reserved various lands for his own use (besides forests and chases, either for his recreation or for the preservation of woods), and reserved various services on the land he gave his subjects, it seems they were reserved for his maintenance not in his public but in his natural capacity. For he and his successors nevertheless laid arbitrary taxes on all the subjects’ land when they judged it necessary.
Or if those publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late small Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative.
Or if those public lands and services were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the commonwealth, that was contrary to the purpose of the institution, since they were (as the taxes that followed showed) insufficient, and (as the recent small revenue of the Crown shows) subject to alienation and diminution. It is therefore useless to assign a portion to the commonwealth, which may sell it or give it away, and does sell it and give it away when its representative does so.
As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places, and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign Traffique.
As with the distribution of lands at home, so also it belongs to the sovereign to assign in what places, and in what commodities, the subject shall trade abroad. For if it belonged to private persons to use their own discretion in this, some of them would be drawn by gain to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth, and to hurt it themselves by importing things that please men’s appetites but are nevertheless harmful, or at least unprofitable, to them. And therefore it belongs to the commonwealth (that is, to the sovereign only) to approve or disapprove both the places and the matter of foreign trade.
Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract.
Further, it is not enough for the sustenance of a commonwealth that every man has property in a portion of land, or in a few commodities, or a natural property in some useful art; and there is no art in the world that is not necessary to the being, or at least the well-being, of almost every individual man. It is therefore necessary that men distribute what they can spare, and transfer their property in it to one another, by exchange and mutual contract.
And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.
And therefore it belongs to the commonwealth (that is to say, to the sovereign) to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects (such as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and hiring) are to be made, and by what words and signs they shall be understood as valid. And as for the matter and distribution of nourishment to the various members of the commonwealth, this much (considering the plan of the whole work) is sufficient.
By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equall value, and withall so portable, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony.
By concoction I understand the reducing of all commodities that are not consumed at once, but reserved for nourishment in time to come, to something of equal value, and at the same time so portable as not to hinder men’s movement from place to place—so that a man may have, in whatever place, such nourishment as the place affords. And this is nothing else but gold, silver, and money.
For Gold and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the Subjects of that Common-wealth.
For gold and silver, being (as it happens) highly valued in almost every country in the world, are a convenient measure of the value of all other things between nations; and money (of whatever material it is coined by the sovereign of a commonwealth) is a sufficient measure of the value of all other things between the subjects of that commonwealth.
By the means of which measures, all commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man.
By means of these measures, all commodities, movable and immovable, are made to accompany a man to every place he goes, within and outside the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passes from man to man within the commonwealth, and goes round, nourishing every part of it as it passes. So this concoction is, as it were, the sanguification of the commonwealth. For natural blood is made in the same way from the fruits of the earth, and, circulating, nourishes every member of the human body along the way.
And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self; they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may easily be enhansed, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to make Common-wealths move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with Provision.
And because silver and gold have their value from the material itself, they have, first, this privilege: that their value cannot be altered by the power of one commonwealth, or of a few, since they are a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base money may easily be raised or lowered in value. Second, they have the privilege of making commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms when need be into foreign countries, and supply with provisions not only private subjects who travel but whole armies.
But that Coyne, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.
But coinage that is valued not for its material but for the stamp of the place, being unable to endure a change of air, has its effect at home only; and there it is also subject to changes in the laws, and so to having its value diminished, often to the harm of those who hold it.
The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use, are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other, that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall Parts of of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.
The channels and ways by which it is conveyed to public use are of two sorts: one that conveys it to the public coffers, the other that pays it out again for public payments. Of the first sort are collectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second, the treasurers again, and the officers appointed to pay the various public or private ministers. And in this too the artificial man keeps its resemblance to the natural man, whose veins receive the blood from the various parts of the body and carry it to the heart, where it is made vital, and the heart sends it out again through the arteries to enliven all the members and enable them to move.
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre.
The procreation, or children, of a commonwealth are what we call plantations, or colonies: numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth under a leader or governor to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly empty of inhabitants or emptied of them then by war.
And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth from which they went, was called their Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them.
And when a colony is settled, either they are a commonwealth of their own, discharged from subjection to the sovereign that sent them (as has been done by many commonwealths of ancient times)—in which case the commonwealth from which they went was called their metropolis, or mother, and requires no more of them than fathers require of the children whom they emancipate and free from their household government, which is honor and friendship—or else they remain united to their metropolis, as the colonies of the people of Rome were, and then they are not commonwealths themselves, but provinces and parts of the commonwealth that sent them.
So that the Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised them to Plant.
So the right of colonies (apart from honor and alliance with their metropolis) depends wholly on the license, or letters, by which their sovereign authorized them to plant.
Chapter 25: Of counsel
Counsel is distinguished from command and exhortation, and the marks of a good counselor are set out.
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words Doe this, are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occcasion.
How misleading it is to judge the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appears in nothing more than in the confusion of counsels and commands, which arises from the imperative manner of speaking in both, and on many other occasions besides. For the words “Do this” are the words not only of one who commands, but also of one who gives counsel, and of one who exhorts. And yet there are few who do not see that these are very different things, or who cannot distinguish between them when they perceive who is speaking, to whom the speech is directed, and on what occasion.
But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that Command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.
But finding those phrases in men’s writings, and being unable or unwilling to consider the circumstances, they sometimes mistake the precepts of counselors for the precepts of those who command, and sometimes the reverse, according as it best agrees with the conclusions they want to draw or the actions they approve. To avoid these mistakes, and to give the terms commanding, counseling, and exhorting their proper and distinct meanings, I define them as follows.
Command is, where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe not this, without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.
Command is where a man says “Do this” or “Do not do this,” without expecting any other reason than the will of the one who says it. From this it plainly follows that one who commands claims thereby his own benefit. For the reason for his command is his own will only, and the proper object of every man’s will is some good to himself.
COUNSELL, is where a man saith, Doe, or Doe not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it.
Counsel is where a man says “Do this” or “Do not do this,” and deduces his reasons from the benefit that comes by it to the one he says it to. And from this it is evident that one who gives counsel claims only (whatever he intends) the good of the one to whom he gives it.
Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command.
Therefore one great difference between counsel and command is that command is directed to a man’s own benefit, and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this arises another difference: a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded, as when he has covenanted to obey; but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counseled, because the harm of not following it is his own. Or if he should covenant to follow it, then the counsel is turned into the nature of a command.
A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe: but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper object.
A third difference between them is that no man can claim a right to be another man’s counselor, because he is not supposed to claim any benefit by it to himself. To demand a right to counsel another shows a will to learn his designs, or to gain some other good for oneself—which (as I said before) is the proper object of every man’s will.
This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate.
This also belongs to the nature of counsel: whatever it is, one who asks for it cannot in equity accuse or punish it. For to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel as he thinks best. Consequently one who gives counsel to his sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) when it asks for it cannot in equity be punished for it, whether it agrees with the opinion of the majority or not, so long as it is to the proposition under debate.
For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.
For if the sense of the assembly can be known before the debate is ended, they should neither ask for nor take any further counsel; for the sense of the assembly is the resolution of the debate and the end of all deliberation. And in general, one who asks for counsel is its author, and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot do, no one else can. But if one subject gives counsel to another to do anything contrary to the laws, whether that counsel comes from evil intention or only from ignorance, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because ignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.
EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, Counsell vehemently pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; bnt encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.
Exhortation and dehortation are counsel accompanied by signs, in the one who gives it, of a vehement desire to have it followed; or, to put it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed. For one who exhorts does not deduce the consequences of what he advises and bind himself to the rigor of true reasoning, but encourages the one he counsels to action, just as one who dehorts deters him from it. And therefore in deducing their reasons they have regard in their speeches to the common passions and opinions of men, and make use of similes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to persuade their hearers of the usefulness, honor, or justice of following their advice.
From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificiall giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.
From this it may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation are directed to the good of the one who gives the counsel, not of the one who asks for it, which is contrary to the duty of a counselor, who (by the definition of counsel) ought to regard not his own benefit but that of the one he advises. And that he directs his counsel to his own benefit is plain enough from the long and vehement urging, or from the artful giving of it; which, since it was not required of him and so proceeds from his own motives, is directed principally to his own benefit, and only incidentally, or not at all, to the good of the one counseled.
Secondly; that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.
Second, that exhortation and dehortation have a use only where a man is to speak to a multitude. For when speech is addressed to one person, he can interrupt the speaker and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude, who are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with a speaker addressing them all alike at once.
Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a Just Judge.
Third, that those who exhort and dehort where they are asked to give counsel are corrupt counselors, bribed as it were by their own interest. For however good the counsel they give, the one who gives it is no more a good counselor than one who gives a just sentence for a reward is a just judge.
But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.
But where a man may lawfully command, as a father in his family or a leader in an army, his exhortations and dehortations are not only lawful but also necessary and praiseworthy. But then they are no longer counsels but commands. And when commands are for carrying out hard labor, sometimes necessity, and always humanity, requires that they be sweetened in the delivery by encouragement, and in the tone and phrasing of counsel rather than in the harsher language of command.
Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale not, &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey.
We may take examples of the difference between command and counsel from the forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture. “Have no other gods but me; make yourself no graven image; do not take God’s name in vain; keep the Sabbath holy; honor your parents; do not kill; do not steal,” and so on, are commands, because the reason for which we are to obey them is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey.
But these words, Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me, are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have Treasure in heaven. These words, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me, are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus, are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.
But these words, “Sell all you have, give it to the poor, and follow me,” are counsel, because the reason for which we are to do so is drawn from our own benefit, which is this: that we shall have “treasure in heaven.” These words, “Go into the village opposite you, and you will find a donkey tied, and her colt; untie her and bring her to me,” are a command, for the reason for their doing it is drawn from the will of their Master. But these words, “Repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus,” are counsel, because the reason why we should do so tends not to any benefit of God Almighty, who will still be King in whatever way we rebel, but to our own, who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept Counsellours be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse.
As the difference between counsel and command has now been deduced from the nature of counsel, which consists in deducing the benefit or harm that may come to the one counseled from the necessary or probable consequences of the action proposed, so the differences between apt and inept counselors may be derived from the same. For experience is only the memory of the consequences of similar actions observed before, and counsel only the speech by which that experience is made known to another; so the virtues and defects of counsel are the same as the intellectual virtues and defects. And to the person of a commonwealth, his counselors serve in the place of memory and mental discourse.
But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That his Ends, and Interest, be not inconsistent with the Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth.
But joined with this resemblance of the commonwealth to a natural man there is one dissimilarity of great importance. A natural man receives his experience from the natural objects of sense, which work on him without passion or interest of their own; whereas those who give counsel to the representative person of a commonwealth may have, and often have, their own particular ends and passions, which make their counsels always suspect, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down as the first condition of a good counselor: “That his ends and interest be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of the one he counsels.”
Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash, and unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion.)
Second, because the office of a counselor, when an action comes under deliberation, is to make its consequences plain, in such a way that the one counseled may be truly and clearly informed, he ought to propose his advice in such a form of speech as may make the truth most clearly appear—that is, with reasoning as firm, language as meaningful and proper, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore “rash and unevident inferences” (such as are drawn only from examples or the authority of books, and are not arguments about what is good or evil, but witnesses of fact or of opinion),
obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring up of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellour.
“obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, and also all metaphorical speeches tending to stir up passion” (because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive, or to lead the one we counsel toward ends other than his own), “are repugnant to the office of a counselor.”
Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary to be known, No man is presumed to be a good Counsellour, but in such Businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered. For seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people in Peace at home, and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that may any way annoy them.
Third, because the ability to counsel comes from experience and long study, and no man is presumed to have experience in all the things that must be known for the administration of a great commonwealth, “no man is presumed to be a good counselor except in such business as he has not only been much versed in, but has also much meditated on and considered.” For seeing that the business of a commonwealth is to preserve the people in peace at home and defend them against foreign invasion, we shall find that it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity, law, justice, and honor, which cannot be attained without study; and of the strength, resources, and places both of their own country and of their neighbors; as well as of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may in any way trouble them.
And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before (Chap. 8.) is Judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule.
And this is not attained without much experience. Of these things, not only the whole sum but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a mature man, and more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel, as I have said before (chapter 8), is judgment. And the differences between men in that respect come from different education, some to one kind of study or business and others to another. When there are infallible rules for doing something (as the rules of geometry for machines and buildings), all the experience in the world cannot equal the counsel of one who has learned or discovered the rule.
And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.
And when there is no such rule, the one who has the most experience in that particular kind of business has the best judgment in it, and is the best counselor.
Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It is necessary to be acquainted with the Intelligences, and Letters that come from thence, and with all the records of Treaties, and other transactions of State between them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.
Fourth, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth in business that concerns another commonwealth, “it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligence reports and letters” that come from there, “and with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state” between them; which no one can be, except those whom the representative thinks fit. From this we may see that those who are not called to counsel can have no good counsel to thrust forward in such cases.
Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly many of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion.
Fifth, supposing the number of counselors equal, a man is better counseled by hearing them separately than in an assembly, and that for many reasons. First, in hearing them separately you have the advice of every man; but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with “Aye” or “No,” or with their hands or feet, moved not by their own sense but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing, by contradiction, some who have spoken or the whole assembly, or for fear of appearing slower of understanding than those who have applauded the contrary opinion.
Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it.
Second, in an assembly of many there cannot help but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and their interests make them passionate, and passion makes them eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men, which separately are moderate, like the heat of one firebrand, are in an assembly like many brands that set one another alight (especially when they fan one another with speeches), to the point of setting the commonwealth on fire, under pretense of counseling it.
Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take.
Third, in hearing every man separately, one may examine (when there is need) the truth or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions and objections. This cannot be done in an assembly, where (on every difficult question) a man is more stunned and dazzled by the variety of talk about it than informed of the course he ought to take.
Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided.
Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many called together for advice in which there are not some who have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and learned in politics too, and who give their advice with care not for the business proposed but for the applause of their motley speeches, made of the diverse colored threads, or scraps, of authors. This is an impertinence at least, which takes up the time of serious consultation, and is easily avoided in the private way of counseling separately.
Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.
Fourth, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret (of which there are many occasions in public business), the counsels of many, especially in assemblies, are dangerous. And therefore great assemblies are forced to commit such affairs to smaller numbers, and to those persons who are most experienced and in whose loyalty they have most confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all.
To conclude: who is there that so far approves of taking counsel from a great assembly of counselors that he would wish for, or accept, their pains when it is a question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate—especially if there are among them some who do not wish him to prosper? A man who does his business with the help of many prudent counselors, each consulted separately in his own field, does it best, like one who uses able partners at tennis, placed in their proper positions. The next best is one who uses his own judgment only, like one who has no partner at all.
But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose.
But one who is carried to and fro about his business by a formal council, which cannot move except by a majority of concurring opinions, and whose execution is commonly delayed (out of envy or interest) by the dissenting part, does it worst of all. He is like one who is carried to the ball, though by good players, in a wheelbarrow or some other frame, heavy in itself and slowed down further by the discordant judgments and efforts of those who push it—and all the more so, the more there are who set their hands to it, and most of all when there are one or more among them who want him to lose.
And though it be true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly.
And though it is true that many eyes see more than one, this is not to be understood of many counselors, but only when the final resolution lies in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing from different angles, and are apt to look askance toward their private benefit, those who do not want to miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, still never aim with more than one. And therefore no great popular commonwealth was ever kept up except by a foreign enemy that united them, or by the reputation of some one eminent man among them, or by the secret counsel of a few, or by the mutual fear of equal factions—and not by the open consultations of the assembly.
And as for very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.
And as for very small commonwealths, whether popular or monarchical, no human wisdom can uphold them longer than the jealousy of their powerful neighbors lasts.
Chapter 26: Of civil laws
Civil law is defined as the sovereign’s command to subjects distinguishing right and wrong.
By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall. to any man. The antient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth: And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes.
By civil laws I understand the laws that men are bound to observe because they are members, not of this or that commonwealth in particular, but of a commonwealth. For knowledge of particular laws belongs to those who make a profession of studying the laws of their various countries; but knowledge of civil law in general belongs to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their civil law, from the word civitas, which means a commonwealth. And those countries that were once under the Roman Empire and governed by that law, and still retain such part of it as they think fit, call that part the civil law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws.
But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law.
But that is not what I intend to speak of here, my purpose being to show not what is law here and there, but what law is—as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and various others have done without professing the study of law.
And first it is manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.
And first, it is plain that law in general is not counsel but command; and not a command of any man to any man, but only of one whose command is addressed to someone already obliged to obey him. And as for civil law, it adds only the name of the person commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the commonwealth.
Which considered, I define Civill Law in this manner. CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.
Having considered this, I define civil law in this manner. Civil law is, to every subject, those rules which the commonwealth has commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of its will, to make use of for distinguishing right and wrong; that is to say, what is contrary to the rule and what is not contrary to it.
In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations; and some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also, that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them.
In this definition there is nothing that is not evident at first sight. For everyone sees that some laws are addressed to all subjects in general, some to particular provinces, some to particular occupations, and some to particular men; and are therefore laws to each of those to whom the command is directed, and to no one else. Also, that laws are the rules of just and unjust, nothing being considered unjust that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, that no one can make laws but the commonwealth, because our subjection is to the commonwealth only. And that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs, because otherwise a man does not know how to obey them.
And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.
And therefore whatever can be deduced from this definition by necessary consequence ought to be acknowledged as true. Now I deduce from it what follows.
1 The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign, be he one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy, or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Soveraign is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.
1. The legislator in all commonwealths is only the sovereign, whether one man, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy or aristocracy. For the legislator is the one who makes the law. And only the commonwealth prescribes and commands the observance of those rules which we call law; therefore the commonwealth is the legislator. But the commonwealth is no person, and has no capacity to do anything except by its representative (that is, the sovereign); and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, no one can repeal a law once made but the sovereign; because a law is not repealed except by another law that forbids it to be put into execution.
2 The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man, is not Subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.
2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, whether an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. Since he has power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleases, free himself from that subjection by repealing the laws that trouble him and making new ones; and consequently he was free before. For he is free who can be free when he will. Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, because he who can bind can release; and therefore he who is bound to himself only is not bound.
3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Soveraign shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any mancan remember.
3. When long use obtains the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that gives the authority, but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence (for silence is sometimes an argument of consent); and it is law no longer than the sovereign remains silent about it. And therefore if the sovereign has a question of right grounded not on his present will but on laws formerly made, the length of time does his right no harm; the question is to be judged by equity. For many unjust actions and unjust sentences go unchecked for longer than any man can remember.
And our Lawyers account no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes are to be abolished: But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.
And our lawyers count no customs as law except those that are reasonable, and hold that evil customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongs to the one who makes the law, which is the sovereign assembly or monarch.
4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and are of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these depending, in the condition of meer Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes: For it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them.
4. The law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and the other moral virtues that depend on these, are in the condition of mere nature (as I said before at the end of chapter 15) not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience. Once a commonwealth is settled, they are actually laws, and not before, since they are then the commands of the commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws; for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them.
For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordaine d for such as shall break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature.
For in the disputes of private men, to declare what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and of punishments ordained for those who break them; and these ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature, then, is a part of the civil law in every commonwealth in the world. Reciprocally, the civil law is also a part of the dictates of nature. For justice—that is, the performance of covenants, and giving every man his own—is a dictate of the law of nature.
But every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature. Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall.
But every subject in a commonwealth has covenanted to obey the civil law: either with one another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one, when, subdued by the sword, they promise obedience in order to receive their lives. And therefore obedience to the civil law is also part of the law of nature. Civil and natural law are not different kinds of law, but different parts of law: the written part is called civil, the unwritten part natural.
But the Right of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.
But the right of nature—that is, the natural liberty of man—may be abridged and restrained by the civil law. Indeed, the end of making laws is nothing but such restraint, without which there cannot possibly be any peace. And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men in such a way that they might not hurt but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy.
5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a People that have lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern them by the same Lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the Civill Lawes of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth. For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes.
5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth subdues a people who have lived under other written laws, and afterward governs them by the same laws by which they were governed before, those laws are nevertheless the civil laws of the victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator is not the one by whose authority the laws were first made, but the one by whose authority they now continue to be laws.
And therefore where there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which commonly are called the Customes of each severall Province, we are not to understand that such Customes have their force, onely from Length of Time; but that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions, and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by vertue of the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present Soveraigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that Law can be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.
And therefore where there are various provinces within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those provinces a diversity of laws, commonly called the customs of each province, we are not to understand that these customs have their force only from length of time. Rather, they were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, as the constitutions and statutes of their sovereigns; and they are laws now, not by virtue of prescription of time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an unwritten law is generally observed in all the provinces of a dominion, and no iniquity appears in its use, that law can be nothing but a law of nature, equally binding on all mankind.
6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Authority, and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in severall Common-wealths, directly, or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate Judges. As for example, That the Common Law, hath no Controuler but the Parlament; which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion.
6. Seeing, then, that all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth—that is, from the will of the representative, which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other commonwealths the sovereign assembly—one may wonder where such opinions come from as are found in the books of eminent lawyers in various commonwealths, which directly or by consequence make the legislative power depend on private men or subordinate judges. For example, “that the common law has no controller but Parliament.” This is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and cannot be assembled or dissolved except at its own discretion.
For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their controulings. And if there be no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes is not Parlamentum, but Rex in Parlamento. And were a Parlament is Soveraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a Legislative Power.
For if anyone else has a right to dissolve them, he also has a right to control them, and consequently to control their controlling. And if there is no such right, then the controller of laws is not Parlamentum but Rex in Parlamento. And where a parliament is sovereign, if it should assemble ever so many or ever so wise men from the countries subject to it, for whatever cause, no one will believe that such an assembly has thereby acquired a legislative power.
Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are Force, and Justice; the first whereof is in the King; the other deposited in the hands of the Parlament. As if a Common-wealth could consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not the Authority to command and govern.
Also, “that the two arms of a commonwealth are force and justice, the first of which is in the King, the other deposited in the hands of Parliament.” As if a commonwealth could exist in which the force was in any hand that justice did not have the authority to command and govern.
7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and that not the Letter, (that is, every construction of it,) but that which is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not meant of any private Reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; nor yet, (as Sr. Ed. Coke makes it,) an Artificiall perfection of Reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, (as his was.)
7. That law can never be against reason, our lawyers agree; and that the law is not the letter (that is, every construction of it) but what accords with the intention of the legislator. And this is true. But the question is whose reason it is that shall be received as law. It is not meant of any private reason, for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the Schools; nor yet (as Sir Edward Coke makes it) “an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience” (as his was).
For it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine: and of those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away.
For it is possible that long study may increase and confirm erroneous judgments; and where men build on false foundations, the more they build, the greater the ruin. And the reasonings and conclusions of those who study and observe with equal time and diligence are, and must remain, at odds. Therefore it is not that juris prudentia, or wisdom of subordinate judges, but the reason of this our artificial man, the commonwealth, and his command, that makes law. And since the commonwealth is in its representative but one person, contradiction cannot easily arise in the laws; and when it does, the same reason is able to remove it by interpretation or alteration.
In all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.
In all courts of justice, the sovereign (who is the person of the commonwealth) is the one who judges. The subordinate judge ought to have regard to the reason that moved his sovereign to make the law, so that his sentence may accord with it; it is then his sovereign’s sentence. Otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.
How laws are made known
Laws bind only those who can know them, and must bear sufficient signs of the sovereign’s authority.
8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the Command of the Common-wealth, is Law onely to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over [the intellectually disabled], children, or [the mentally ill] there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth.
8. From the fact that the law is a command, and that a command consists in the declaration or manifestation of the will of the one who commands, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient evidence of it, we may understand that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those who have the means to take notice of it. Over people with severe intellectual disabilities, children, or people who are mentally ill there is no law, any more than over brute beasts; nor can they be called just or unjust, because they never had the power to make any covenant or to understand its consequences, and consequently never took it upon themselves to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as those must do who make a commonwealth for themselves.
And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him. It is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signes be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say, what is the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other formes of government.
And just as those from whom nature or accident has taken away the knowledge of all laws in general are excused, so also is every man from whom some accident, not arising from his own fault, has taken away the means of knowing any particular law: he is excused if he does not observe it, and, properly speaking, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary to consider at this point what evidence and signs are sufficient for knowing what the law is—that is, what the will of the sovereign is, in monarchies as well as in other forms of government.
And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe.
First, if it is a law that obliges all the subjects without exception, and it is not written or otherwise published in places where they may take notice of it, it is a law of nature. For whatever men are to recognize as law, not on other men’s word but each from his own reason, must be such as agrees with the reason of all men; and no law can be that except the law of nature. The laws of nature therefore need no publishing or proclamation, since they are contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world: “Do not do to another what you think unreasonable to be done by another to yourself.”
Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects. For whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill, but Naturall.
Second, if it is a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and it is not written or published by word, then it too is a law of nature, and is known by the same evidence and signs that distinguish those in that condition from other subjects. For any law that is not written, or in some way published by the one who makes it law, can be known in no way but by the reason of the one who is to obey it; and it is therefore a law not only civil but natural.
For Example, if the Soveraign employ a Publique Minister, without written Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be according to the reason of his Soveraign, which being alwaies understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador, he is (in all things not conteined in his written Instructions) to take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Soveraignty, publique and private.
For example, if the sovereign employs a public minister without written instructions on what to do, the minister is obliged to take the dictates of reason as his instructions. If the sovereign makes a judge, the judge is to recognize that his sentence ought to accord with the reason of his sovereign, which is always understood to be equity, and he is bound to it by the law of nature. If he makes an ambassador, the ambassador is (in everything not contained in his written instructions) to take as his instruction whatever reason dictates as most conducive to his sovereign’s interest. And so with all other ministers of the sovereignty, public and private.
All which Instructions of naturall Reason may be comprehended under one name of Fidelity; which is a branch of naturall Justice.
All these instructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one name, fidelity, which is a branch of natural justice.
The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other Lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the Soveraign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason. And in antient time, before letters were in common use, the Lawes were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily reteine them in memory.
The law of nature excepted, it belongs to the essence of all other laws that they be made known to every man who is to be obliged to obey them, by word, or writing, or some other act known to come from the sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood except by his own word or act, or by conjecture drawn from his aims and purpose; and in the person of the commonwealth these are always to be supposed consistent with equity and reason. And in ancient times, before letters were in common use, the laws were often put into verse, so that the unlearned people, taking pleasure in singing or reciting them, might more easily keep them in memory.
And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandements upon his ten fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the Covenant, * he biddeth them to teach it their Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores of their houses; and to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to heare it read.
For the same reason Solomon advises a man to bind the Ten Commandments on his ten fingers. And of the law that Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the covenant, he tells them to teach it to their children by talking of it both at home and on the road, when going to bed and when rising from bed; to write it on the posts and doors of their houses; and to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.
Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign. For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for Lawes what they please, without, or against the Legislative Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signes of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Soveraign, who having been Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known.
Nor is it enough that the law be written and published; there must also be manifest signs that it comes from the will of the sovereign. For private men, when they have, or think they have, force enough to secure their unjust designs and carry them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish as laws whatever they please, without or against the legislative authority. What is required, therefore, is not only a declaration of the law but also sufficient signs of its author and authority. The author, or legislator, is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident, because he is the sovereign, who, having been constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed to be sufficiently known by every one.
And though the ignorance, and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the Soveraignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others.
Men are for the most part so ignorant and careless that, once the memory of the first constitution of their commonwealth has worn away, they do not consider by whose power they are defended against their enemies, have their industry protected, and are given redress when injury is done them. Yet because no man who does consider it can doubt it, no excuse can be drawn from ignorance of where the sovereignty lies. And it is a dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man ought to weaken that power whose protection he has himself demanded, or knowingly received, against others.
Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the publique Registers, publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and publique Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently verified; Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Testimony and Record; not the Authority of the Law; which consisteth in the Command of the Soveraign only.
Therefore no man can doubt who is sovereign, except by his own fault (whatever evil men may suggest). The difficulty lies in the evidence of the authority derived from him. That difficulty is removed by knowledge of the public registers, public councils, public ministers, and public seals, by which all laws are sufficiently verified—verified, I say, not authorized. For the verification is only the testimony and record, not the authority of the law, which consists in the command of the sovereign alone.
If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the Law of Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that by Commission hath Authority to take cogninisance of such causes, is a sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature in that individuall case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be usefull for the avoyding of contention; yet it is but advice: tis the Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.
If, therefore, a man has a question of injury depending on the law of nature—that is, on common equity—the sentence of the judge who by commission has authority to hear such cases is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one who professes the study of the law is useful for avoiding contention, it is still only advice. It is the judge who must tell men what the law is, after hearing the controversy.
But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law; every man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: For when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull.
But when the question is of an injury or crime under a written law, every man may, if he will, be sufficiently informed—by consulting the registers himself or through others—whether it is an injury or not, before he does the injury or commits the crime. Indeed, he ought to do so. For when a man doubts whether the act he is about to do is just or unjust, and may inform himself if he will, the doing of it is unlawful.
In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.
In the same way, a man who supposes himself injured in a case settled by the written law, which he may see and consider himself or through others, acts unjustly if he complains before he consults the law, and betrays a disposition to vex other men rather than to claim his own right.
If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen his Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to informe himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne his own future actions.
If the question is of obedience to a public officer, to have seen his commission with the public seal and heard it read, or to have had the means of being informed of it had one wished, is a sufficient verification of his authority. For every man is obliged to do his best to inform himself of all the written laws that may concern his own future actions.
The interpretation of laws
Laws need authorized interpreters, and judges must apply equity rather than follow precedent blindly.
The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by the light of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Soveraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint.
The legislator being known, and the laws sufficiently published, either in writing or by the light of nature, one more very material circumstance is still needed to make them binding. For the nature of the law consists not in the letter but in the intent or meaning—that is, in the authentic interpretation of the law, which is the sense of the legislator. And therefore the interpretation of all laws depends on the sovereign authority, and the interpreters can be none but those whom the sovereign (to whom alone the subject owes obedience) appoints.
For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law may be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.
For otherwise, by the craft of an interpreter, the law may be made to bear a sense contrary to the sovereign’s, and in this way the interpreter becomes the legislator.
All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation. The unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality, and passion, make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the violaters thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters.
All laws, written and unwritten, need interpretation. The unwritten law of nature is easy for those who use their natural reason without partiality and passion, and it therefore leaves those who violate it without excuse. Yet since there are very few, perhaps none, who are not in some cases blinded by self-love or some other passion, it has now become of all laws the most obscure, and consequently has the greatest need of able interpreters.
The written Laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the Legislator. To him therefore there can not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can doe.
Written laws, if they are short, are easily misinterpreted because a word or two can have various meanings; if long, they are more obscure because many words can have various meanings. So no written law, whether expressed in few or many words, can be well understood without a perfect understanding of the final causes for which the law was made; and the knowledge of those final causes lies with the legislator. For him, therefore, there can be no knot in the law that cannot be untied: either by finding out the ends and undoing it by them, or else by making whatever ends he will by the legislative power (as Alexander did with his sword to the Gordian knot), which no other interpreter can do.
The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common-wealth, dependeth not on the books of Morall Philosophy. The Authority of writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their opinions Law, be they never so true.
The interpretation of the laws of nature in a commonwealth does not depend on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without the authority of the commonwealth, does not make their opinions law, however true they may be.
That which I have written in this Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth, is not therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world, it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.
What I have written in this treatise about the moral virtues, and about their necessity for procuring and maintaining peace, though it is evident truth, is not for that reason immediately law. It is law because in all commonwealths in the world it is part of the civil law. For though it is naturally reasonable, it is by the sovereign power that it is law. Otherwise it would be a great error to call the laws of nature unwritten law, when we see so many volumes published about them, and in them so many contradictions of one another and of themselves.
The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the Judge constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the Law to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentique; not because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.
The interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the judge appointed by the sovereign authority to hear and determine the controversies that depend on it, and it consists in applying the law to the present case. For in the act of judging, the judge does no more than consider whether the demand of the party is consistent with natural reason and equity; and the sentence he gives is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature. That interpretation is authentic, not because it is his private sentence, but because he gives it by the authority of the sovereign, by which it becomes the sovereign’s sentence, which is law for that time to the parties pleading.
But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to doe it. No mans error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it.
But because there is no judge, subordinate or sovereign, who may not err in a judgment of equity, if afterward, in another similar case, he finds it more consistent with equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do so. No man’s error becomes his own law, or obliges him to persist in it. Nor, for the same reason, does it become a law to other judges, even though they are sworn to follow it.
For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign, if he know and allow it, in such Lawes as are mutable, be a constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in Lawes immutable, such as are the Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one Iudge passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one title of the Law of Nature shall passe; for it is the Eternall Law of God.
For though a wrong sentence given by the authority of the sovereign, if he knows and allows it, constitutes a new law in the case of mutable laws, for cases in which every little circumstance is the same, yet in immutable laws, such as the laws of nature, such sentences are no laws to the same or other judges in similar cases ever after. Princes succeed one another; one judge passes and another comes; indeed, heaven and earth shall pass, but not one tittle of the law of nature shall pass, for it is the eternal law of God.
Therefore all the Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his own naturall reason. For example sake, ’Tis against the Law of Nature, To punish the Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth himselfe Judicially, and is acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge.
Therefore all the sentences of previous judges that have ever been cannot together make a law contrary to natural equity. Nor can any examples of former judges warrant an unreasonable sentence, or relieve the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity (in the case he is to judge) from the principles of his own natural reason. For example, it is against the law of nature “to punish the innocent”; and the innocent is he who clears himself in court and is acknowledged as innocent by the judge.
Put the case now, that a man is accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runneth away for feare of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legall triall, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same.
Now suppose a man is accused of a capital crime and, seeing the power and malice of some enemy and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges, runs away for fear of the outcome; afterward he is caught and brought to a legal trial, makes it sufficiently clear that he was not guilty of the crime, and is acquitted of it, yet is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods. This is a manifest condemnation of the innocent. I say, therefore, that there is no place in the world where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of previous judges who had done the same.
For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of *England.
For he who judged it first judged unjustly, and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment for succeeding judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to flee, and they may be punished for fleeing. But that fleeing for fear of injury should be taken as a presumption of guilt, after a man has already been acquitted of the crime in court, is contrary to the nature of a presumption, which has no place once judgment has been given. Yet this is set down by a great lawyer as the common law of England:
If a man (saith he) that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattells, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight. Here you see, An Innocent man, Judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, upon a Presumption in Law,* condemned to lose all the goods he hath.
“If a man,” he says, “that is innocent be accused of felony, and for fear flees for the same, although he judicially acquits himself of the felony, yet if it be found that he fled for the felony, he shall, notwithstanding his innocence, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the presumption in law grounded upon his flight.” Here you see an innocent man, judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocence (when no written law forbade him to flee), after his acquittal, upon a presumption in law, condemned to lose all the goods he has.
If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was Capitall,) the Sentence ought to have been Capitall: if the Presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law.
If the law grounded on his flight a presumption of the fact (which was capital), the sentence ought to have been capital. If the presumption was not of the fact, then for what ought he to lose his goods? This, therefore, is no law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded on a presumption of law, but on the presumption of the judges. It is also against law to say that no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law.
For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.
For all judges, sovereign and subordinate, who refuse to hear proof refuse to do justice. Even if the sentence is just, the judges who condemn without hearing the proofs offered are unjust judges, and their presumption is only prejudice, which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of justice, whatever previous judgments or examples he claims to follow. There are other things of this kind in which men’s judgments have been perverted by trusting to precedents; but this is enough to show that though the sentence of the judge is a law to the party pleading, it is no law to any judge who succeeds him in that office.
In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation. And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the same manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements.
In the same way, when the question is the meaning of written laws, the interpreter of them is not the one who writes a commentary on them. For commentaries are commonly more open to quibbling than the text, and therefore need other commentaries, and so there will be no end to such interpretation. And therefore, unless there is an interpreter authorized by the sovereign from whom the subordinate judges are not to depart, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, just as in cases of the unwritten law. Their sentences are to be taken as laws in that particular case by those who plead, but not as binding other judges to give like judgments in like cases.
For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the Soveraigne.
For a judge may err in interpreting even written laws; but no error of a subordinate judge can change the law, which is the general sentence of the sovereign.
In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter, and the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, ’tis well distinguished. For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that, which the Legislator intended, should by the letter of the Law be signified.
In written laws, men commonly distinguish between the letter and the sentence of the law. If by the letter is meant whatever can be gathered from the bare words, the distinction is well made. For the meanings of almost all words, either in themselves or in their metaphorical use, are ambiguous, and may be drawn in argument to make many senses; but there is only one sense of the law. But if by the letter is meant the literal sense, then the letter and the sentence, or intention, of the law are one and the same. For the literal sense is what the legislator intended to be signified by the letter of the law.
Now the Intention of the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne. He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to respit Judgement till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall Law ordained.
Now the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity, for it would be a great insult for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He ought therefore, if the words of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it from the law of nature; or, if the case is difficult, to suspend judgment until he has received fuller authority. For example, a written law ordains that a man who is thrust out of his house by force shall be restored by force. It happens that a man through negligence leaves his house empty and on returning is kept out by force, a case for which no special law has been made.
It is evident, that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact, which the Judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himself Witnesse.
It is evident that this case is contained in the same law, for otherwise he has no remedy at all, which must be supposed to be against the intention of the legislator. Again, the words of the law command the judge to judge according to the evidence. A man is falsely accused of an act that the judge himself saw done by another, and not by the accused. In this case the letter of the law is not to be followed to the condemnation of the innocent; nor is the judge to give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses, because the letter of the law is to the contrary. Instead, he is to get the sovereign to make someone else judge, and himself a witness.
So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.
So the inconvenience that follows from the bare words of a written law may lead him to the intention of the law, and so help him interpret it better; though no inconvenience can warrant a sentence against the law. For every judge of right and wrong is not a judge of what is convenient or inconvenient to the commonwealth.
The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is to say, in a good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the study of the Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact, from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the Law, from nothing but the Satutes, and Constitutions of the Soveraign, alledged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the Soveraign Power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and by authority interpret it upon the place.
The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law—that is, in a good judge—are not the same as those of an advocate, namely the study of the laws. For just as a judge ought to take notice of the facts from no one but the witnesses, so he ought to take notice of the law from nothing but the statutes and constitutions of the sovereign, cited in the pleading or declared to him by those who have authority from the sovereign power to declare them. He need not worry beforehand about what he shall judge, for what he is to say concerning the facts will be given him by the witnesses, and what he is to say on points of law by those who show it in their pleadings and interpret it with authority on the spot.
The Lords of Parlament in England were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the Lawes, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving Sentence.
The Lords of Parliament in England were judges, and the most difficult cases have been heard and decided by them; yet few of them were deeply versed in the study of the laws, and fewer had made it their profession. And though they consulted lawyers who were appointed to be present for that purpose, they alone had the authority to give sentence.
In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of Right, Twelve men of the common People, are the Judges, and give Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to say, are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like, which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to know the Law of themselves, there is one that hath Authority to enforme them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of.
In the same way, in ordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people are the judges, and give sentence not only on the fact but on the right. They pronounce simply for the plaintiff or for the defendant—that is, they are judges not only of the fact but also of the right. And in a question of crime they determine not only whether it was done or not, but also whether it is murder, homicide, felony, assault, and the like, which are determinations of law. But because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves, there is one who has authority to inform them of it in the particular case they are to judge.
But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.
Yet if they do not judge according to what he tells them, they are not thereby subject to any penalty, unless it is shown that they did it against their consciences or had been corrupted by bribes.
The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes, are, first, A right understanding of that principall Law of Nature called Equity; which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt of unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To be able in judgement to devest himselfe of all feare, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to heare; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard.
The things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the laws, are these. First, a right understanding of that principal law of nature called equity, which depends not on reading other men’s writings but on the goodness of a man’s own natural reason and meditation, and is therefore presumed to be found most in those who have had the most leisure and the most inclination to meditate on it. Second, contempt of unnecessary riches and preferments. Third, to be able in judgment to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. Fourth and last, patience to hear, diligent attention in hearing, and memory to retain, digest, and apply what he has heard.
The kinds of law
Hobbes surveys the divisions of law: Roman sources, natural and positive, human and divine, fundamental.
The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of Civill Lawes. 1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles of the Prince, that is, of the Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.
The distinction and division of the laws has been made in various ways, according to the different methods of those who have written about them. For it is a thing that depends not on nature but on the aim of the writer, and serves each man’s own method. In the Institutes of Justinian we find seven sorts of civil laws. 1. The edicts, constitutions, and epistles of the prince, that is, of the emperor, because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these are the proclamations of the kings of England.
2. The Decrees of the whole people of Rome (comprehending the Senate,) when they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were Lawes, at first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people; and such of them as by the Emperours were not abrogated, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. For all Lawes that bind, are understood to be Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them. Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in England.
2. The decrees of the whole people of Rome (including the Senate), when they were put to the question by the Senate. These were laws at first by virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and those of them the emperors did not repeal remained laws by imperial authority. For all laws that bind are understood to be laws by the authority of the one who has power to repeal them. Somewhat like these laws are the Acts of Parliament in England.
3. The Decrees of the Common people (excluding the Senate,) when they were put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in England.
3. The decrees of the common people (excluding the Senate), when they were put to the question by the tribune of the people. Those of them the emperors did not repeal remained laws by imperial authority. Like these were the orders of the House of Commons in England.
4. Senatûs consulta, the Orders of the Senate; because when the people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult the Senate, in stead of the people: And these have some resemblance with the Acts of Counsell.
4. Senatus consulta, the orders of the Senate: because when the people of Rome grew so numerous that it was inconvenient to assemble them, the emperor thought it fit that men should consult the Senate instead of the people. These bear some resemblance to the acts of the Council.
5. The Edicts of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.
5. The edicts of praetors, and (in some cases) of the aediles, such as the chief justices in the courts of England.
6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret the Law, and to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice; which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the Constitutions of the Emperour to observe: And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of England bound to observe them. For the Judges of the Common Law of England, are not properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask advice.
6. Responsa prudentum: the sentences and opinions of those lawyers to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law and to answer those who sought their advice on points of law. The judges were obliged by the emperor’s constitutions to observe these answers in giving judgment. They would be like the reports of cases judged, if other judges were bound by the law of England to observe them. For the judges of the common law of England are not properly judges but juris consulti, legal advisers, whose advice on points of law the judges—who are either the Lords or twelve men of the country—are to ask.
7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are an imitation of Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour, in case they be not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Lawes.
7. Also unwritten customs (which in their own nature are an imitation of law), by the tacit consent of the emperor, are true laws, provided they are not contrary to the law of nature.
Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive. Naturall are those which have been Lawes from all Eternity; and are called not onely Naturall, but also Morall Lawes; consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.
Another division of laws is into natural and positive. Natural laws are those that have been laws from all eternity, and are called not only natural but also moral laws. They consist in the moral virtues, such as justice, equity, and all habits of mind that conduce to peace and charity, of which I have already spoken in chapters 14 and 15.
Positive, are those which have not been from Eternity; but have been made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the Will of their Legislator.
Positive laws are those that have not been laws from eternity, but have been made laws by the will of those who have had sovereign power over others; and they are either written, or made known to men by some other evidence of the will of their legislator.
Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine: And of Humane positive lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal. Distributive are those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the Subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution.
Again, of positive laws some are human, some divine; and of human positive laws some are distributive, some penal. Distributive laws are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man what it is by which he acquires and holds property in lands or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all the subjects. Penal laws are those that declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those who violate the law; and these speak to the ministers and officers appointed to carry them out.
For though every one ought to be informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; neverthelesse the Command is not addressed to the Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique Ministers appointed to see the Penalty executed. And these Penal Lawes are for the most part written together with the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For all Lawes are generall Judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator; as also every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.
For though everyone ought to be informed beforehand of the punishments ordained for transgressing, the command is nevertheless not addressed to the offender (who cannot be supposed to punish himself faithfully) but to the public ministers appointed to see the penalty carried out. And these penal laws are for the most part written together with the distributive laws, and are sometimes called judgments. For all laws are general judgments, or sentences, of the legislator; just as every particular judgment is a law to him whose case is judged.
Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall, and Universall, are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandements of God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are declared for such, by those whom God hath authorised to declare them. But this Authority of man to declare what be these Positive Lawes of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver Lawes to other men.
Divine positive laws (for natural laws, being eternal and universal, are all divine) are those which, being commandments of God—not from all eternity, nor addressed universally to all men, but only to a certain people or to certain persons—are declared to be such by those whom God has authorized to declare them. But this authority of a man to declare what these positive laws of God are—how can it be known? God may command a man in a supernatural way to deliver laws to other men.
But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, How can a man without supernaturall Revelation be assured of the Revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? For the first question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible: For though a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of God extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidences of speciall Revelation.
But because it is of the essence of law that the one who is to be obliged be assured of the authority of the one who declares it, and we cannot naturally know that this authority comes from God, the questions are: How can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the one who declares it? and How can he be bound to obey those laws? As to the first question—how a man can be assured of another’s revelation without a revelation made particularly to himself—it is evidently impossible. For though a man may be induced to believe in such a revelation by the miracles he sees the other do, or by seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or the extraordinary wisdom or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all of which are marks of God’s extraordinary favor, still they are not certain evidence of a special revelation.
Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by Naturall, and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason, that another has had a supernaturall revelation of Gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear greater; or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.
Miracles are marvelous works; but what is marvelous to one may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that another has had a supernatural revelation of God’s will; he can only have a belief—each person a firmer or a weaker belief, as the signs of it appear greater or lesser.
But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary.
But the second question, how he can be bound to obey them, is not so hard. For if the law declared is not against the law of nature (which is undoubtedly God’s law), and he undertakes to obey it, he is bound by his own act—bound, I say, to obey it, but not bound to believe it. For men’s belief and inward thoughts are not subject to commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary or extraordinary.
Faith of Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a breach of any of his Lawes; but a rejection of them all, except the Laws Naturall. But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer, by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The Covenant God made with Abraham (in a Supernaturall manner) was thus, *This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee.
Faith in supernatural law is not a fulfilling of it, but only an assenting to it; and it is not a duty that we render to God, but a gift that God freely gives to whom he pleases. Likewise, unbelief is not a breach of any of his laws, but a rejection of them all, except the natural laws. But what I say will be made still clearer by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham (in a supernatural manner) was this: “This is the covenant which you shall keep, between me and you and your offspring after you.”
Abrahams Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for Gods Law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham*) have Soveraign power over their children, and servants.
Abraham’s offspring did not have this revelation, nor were they yet in existence; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey whatever Abraham should declare to them as God’s law. They could not be so except by virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents, who (if they are subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have sovereign power over their children and servants.
Againe, where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe Righteousnesse and Judgement, it is manifest, the obedience of his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their Soveraign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law.
Again, where God says to Abraham, “In you shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; for I know you will command your children and your household after you to keep the way of the Lord, and to do righteousness and judgment,” it is plain that the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their prior obligation to obey their sovereign. At Mount Sinai, Moses alone went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet they were bound to obey all that Moses declared to them as God’s law.
Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured Revelation particularly to himself concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the Command of the Common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the Commandements of the Common-wealth.
On what ground, except this submission of their own: “You speak to us, and we will hear you; but do not let God speak to us, lest we die”? By these two passages it sufficiently appears that in a commonwealth, a subject who has no certain and assured revelation made particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey the command of the commonwealth as such. For if men were at liberty to take as God’s commandments their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men, scarcely two men would agree on what God’s commandment is; and yet, in deference to those, every man would despise the commandments of the commonwealth.
I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. Which also is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not, against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the name of them that have the Soveraign power; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other Commandements of God, than are declared for such by the Common-wealth.
I conclude, therefore, that in all things not contrary to the moral law (that is, to the law of nature), all subjects are bound to obey as divine law whatever is declared to be so by the laws of the commonwealth. This is also evident to any man’s reason. For whatever is not against the law of nature may be made law in the name of those who have the sovereign power; and there is no reason why men should be less obliged by it when it is put forward in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to claim other commandments of God than those declared to be such by the commonwealth.
Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any Religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.
Christian states punish those who revolt from the Christian religion, and all other states punish those who set up any religion they forbid. For in whatever is not regulated by the commonwealth, it is equity (which is the law of nature, and therefore an eternal law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.
There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall, and not Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall Law signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish Laws in that manner.
There is also another distinction of laws, into fundamental and not fundamental; but I could never find in any author what a fundamental law means. Nevertheless, one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that way.
For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being taken away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamentall Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Soveraign, whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the Common-wealth cannot stand; such as is the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Publique good. Not Fundamentall is that, the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes concerning Controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of Lawes.
For a fundamental law in every commonwealth is one which, if it is taken away, the commonwealth fails and is utterly dissolved, like a building whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is one by which subjects are bound to uphold whatever power is given to the sovereign, whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly, without which the commonwealth cannot stand: such as the power of war and peace, of judicature, of the choice of officers, and of doing whatever he thinks necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is a law whose repeal does not bring with it the dissolution of the commonwealth, such as the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject. So much for the division of laws.
I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law and Right Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For Right is Liberty, namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civill Law is an Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himselfe by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention: but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases where the protection of the Law may be safely stayd for.
I find the words lex civilis and jus civile—that is, civil law and civil right—used indiscriminately for the same thing, even in the most learned authors; yet this ought not to be so. For right is liberty, namely the liberty that the civil law leaves us; but civil law is an obligation, and takes from us the liberty that the law of nature gave us. Nature gave every man a right to secure himself by his own strength, and to attack a suspected neighbor by way of prevention; but the civil law takes away that liberty in all cases where the protection of the law can safely be waited for.
Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.
So lex and jus are as different as obligation and liberty.
Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command, and Enjoyn: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I have Given, I have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One part of the people.
Likewise laws and charters are taken indiscriminately for the same thing. Yet charters are gifts of the sovereign, and not laws but exemptions from law. The phrasing of a law is jubeo, injungo: “I command” and “I enjoin.” The phrasing of a charter is dedi, concessi: “I have given,” “I have granted.” But what is given or granted to a man is not forced on him by a law. A law may be made to bind all the subjects of a commonwealth; a liberty, or charter, is only to one man, or to some one part of the people.
For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.
For to say that all the people of a commonwealth have liberty in any case whatever is to say that in that case no law has been made, or else that, having been made, it is now repealed.
Chapter 27: Of crimes, excuses, and extenuations
A crime is a sin against the civil law, committed by deed or word.
A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt of the Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once. And therefore may consist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact, or in the Speaking of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the Omission of what the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention, or purpose to transgresse. For the purpose to breake the Law, is some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed.
A sin is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator; for such contempt is a breach of all his laws at once. And therefore it may consist not only in the commission of an act, or in speaking words the laws forbid, or in the omission of what the law commands, but also in the intention, or purpose, to transgress. For the purpose to break the law is some degree of contempt of the one whose office it is to see it carried out.
To be delighted in the Imagination onely, of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no breach of the Law, that sayth, Thou shalt not covet: nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and displeasure, a Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto.
To be delighted merely in imagining oneself possessed of another man’s goods, servants, or wife, without any intention of taking them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of the law that says, “You shall not covet.” Nor is the pleasure a man may take in imagining or dreaming of the death of someone from whose life he expects nothing but harm and displeasure a sin; the sin is resolving to put into execution some act that tends toward it.
For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were reall, is a Passion so adhaerent to the Nature both of man, and every other living creature, as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes. But I confesse it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other.
For to be pleased by the fiction of something that would please a man if it were real is a passion so inherent in the nature both of man and of every other living creature that to make it a sin would be to make it a sin to be a man. Considering this has made me think those too severe, both to themselves and to others, who maintain that the first motions of the mind (even when checked by the fear of God) are sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that side than on the other.
A CRIME, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime.
A crime is a sin consisting in committing (by deed or word) what the law forbids, or in omitting what it has commanded. So every crime is a sin, but not every sin is a crime.
To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a humane Judge, it hath not the name of Crime: which distinction the Greeks observed, in the word amartema, and egklema, or aitia; wherof the former, (which is translated Sinne,) signifieth any swarving from the Law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated Crime,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for humane accusation.
To intend to steal or kill is a sin, even if it never appears in word or deed, for God, who sees the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge. But until it appears by something done or said, from which a human judge can infer the intention, it does not bear the name of crime. The Greeks observed this distinction in the words hamartēma and enklēma or aitia. The first (translated “sin”) signifies any swerving whatever from the law; but the other two (translated “crime”) signify only the sin of which one man may accuse another. But of intentions that never appear by any outward act, there is no room for human accusation.
In like manner the Latines by Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from the Law; but by Crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes, as may be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.
In the same way the Latins, by peccatum, which is “sin,” signify every kind of deviation from the law; but by crimen (a word they derive from cerno, which means “to perceive”) they mean only such sins as can be made to appear before a judge, and which are therefore not mere intentions.
From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill Law, may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth. But because the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of Covenants, Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can never cease to be Sinne. Secondly, that the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. When therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise, his fact is Sinne; but not Crime.
From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, we may infer, first, that where law ceases, sin ceases. But because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all acts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be sin. Second, that when the civil law ceases, crimes cease. For when no law remains but that of nature, there is no place for accusation: every man is his own judge, accused only by his own conscience and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention. So when his intention is right, his act is no sin; if otherwise, his act is a sin, but not a crime.
Thirdly, That when the Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power, there is no protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.
Third, that when the sovereign power ceases, crime also ceases. For where there is no such power, there is no protection to be had from the law, and so everyone may protect himself by his own power. No man, in instituting sovereign power, can be supposed to have given away the right of preserving his own body, for whose safety all sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood only of those who have not themselves contributed to taking away the power that protected them; for that was a crime from the beginning.
The sources of crime
Crimes arise from ignorance, false reasoning, and passions such as vainglory, anger, hatred, and fear.
The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding; or some errour in Reasoning; or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in the Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again, Ignorance is of three sorts; of the Law, and of the Soveraign, and of the Penalty. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that Law, it is a Crime.
The source of every crime is some defect of the understanding, some error in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the understanding is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion. Ignorance, in turn, is of three sorts: of the law, of the sovereign, and of the penalty. Ignorance of the law of nature excuses no man, because everyone who has attained the use of reason is supposed to know that he ought not to do to another what he would not have done to himself. Therefore, wherever a man may come, if he does anything contrary to that law, it is a crime.
If a man come from the Indies hither, and perswade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there. But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.
If a man comes here from the Indies and persuades people here to take up a new religion, or teaches them anything that tends to disobedience of the laws of this country, then however firmly he is persuaded of the truth of what he teaches, he commits a crime and may justly be punished for it. This is not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does what he would not approve in another—namely, that someone going from here should try to alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law will excuse a man in a foreign country until it is declared to him, because until then no civil law is binding.
In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases Ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.
In the same way, if the civil law of a man’s own country is not declared clearly enough that he could know it if he wished, and the action is not against the law of nature, ignorance is a good excuse. In other cases ignorance of the civil law does not excuse.
Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary residence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath been protected there.
Ignorance of the sovereign power in the place where a man ordinarily lives does not excuse him, because he ought to take notice of the power by which he has been protected there.
Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man: For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment.
Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuses no man. A law without the fear of a penalty to follow would not be a law but empty words; so in breaking the law he undergoes the penalty even though he does not know what it is. For whoever voluntarily does any action accepts all its known consequences, and punishment is a known consequence of violating the laws in every commonwealth. If the punishment is already fixed by the law, he is subject to that; if not, he is subject to arbitrary punishment.
For it is reason, that he which does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will whose Law is thereby violated.
For it is reasonable that he who does injury with no limit but his own will should suffer punishment with no limit but the will of the one whose law is thereby violated.
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is Excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same Crime; it is the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.
But when a penalty is either attached to the crime in the law itself, or has usually been inflicted in similar cases, the offender is excused from any greater penalty. For a punishment known in advance, if it is not great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitation to it. When men compare the benefit of their injustice with the harm of their punishment, they choose, by necessity of nature, what appears best for themselves. So when they are punished more than the law had previously set, or more than others were punished for the same crime, it is the law that tempted and deceived them.
No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if the Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example, for the reason immediatly before alledged.
No law made after an act is done can make that act a crime. For if the act is against the law of nature, the law existed before the act; and a positive law cannot be known before it is made, and therefore cannot be binding. But when the law forbidding an act is made before the act is done, the one who does it is liable to the penalty ordained afterward, provided no lesser penalty was made known beforehand, either in writing or by example—for the reason given just above.
From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone to violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles: as when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their Reasoning, *That Justice is but a vain word:
From defect in reasoning (that is, from error), men are prone to break the laws in three ways. First, by assuming false principles. Men have observed how, in all places and in all ages, unjust actions have been authorized by the force and victories of those who committed them; and how, while powerful men break through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those who have failed in their enterprises, have been regarded as the only criminals. On that basis they have taken as principles and grounds of their reasoning “that justice is only an empty word;
That whatsoever a man can get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust: That Examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again; and many more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar* (the same Lawes standing) turn again into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.
that whatever a man can get by his own industry and risk is his own; that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust; that examples from former times are good arguments for doing the same again”—and many more of that kind. Grant these, and no act in itself can be a crime; it must be made one (not by the law, but) by the success of those who commit it, and the same act will be virtuous or vicious as fortune pleases. What Marius makes a crime, Sulla will make meritorious, and Caesar (the same laws still standing) will turn into a crime again, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the commonwealth.
Secondly, by falsé Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of their own, or Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.
Second, by false teachers, who either misinterpret the law of nature, making it conflict with the civil law, or teach as laws doctrines of their own, or traditions from former times, that are inconsistent with the duty of a subject.
Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but onely common experience, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study.
Third, by erroneous inferences from true principles. This commonly happens to men who are hasty and rash in drawing conclusions and deciding what to do: men who have a high opinion of their own understanding and believe that matters of this kind need not time and study, but only ordinary experience and good natural wit—which no man thinks himself short of. Yet the knowledge of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, no one will claim without great and long study.
And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their Excuse.
And none of these defects in reasoning can excuse a crime (though some may extenuate it) in any man who claims to manage his own private business—much less in those who undertake a public office. For they lay claim to the very reason whose absence they would make the ground of their excuse.
Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one, is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the Vulgar.
Of the passions that most often cause crime, one is vainglory, a foolish overrating of one’s own worth—as if differences of worth were an effect of wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural quality, and did not depend on the will of those who hold sovereign authority. From this comes a presumption that the punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them with the same rigor as on poor, obscure, and simple people, included under the name of “the common people.”
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony, or other rewards.
So it commonly happens that those who value themselves by the greatness of their wealth venture on crimes in the hope of escaping punishment by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon for money or other rewards.
And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men, that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.
And that those who have many powerful kin, and popular men who have gained a reputation among the multitude, take courage to break the laws from a hope of overpowering those whose office it is to enforce them.
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own Wisdome.
And that those who have a high and false opinion of their own wisdom take it upon themselves to criticize the actions, and call in question the authority, of those who govern, and so to unsettle the laws by their public talk that nothing shall be a crime except what their own designs require to be one. The same men also tend to be prone to all crimes that consist in cunning and in deceiving their neighbors, because they think their designs too subtle to be detected. These, I say, are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdom.
For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.
For of those who first set in motion the disturbance of a commonwealth (which can never happen without a civil war), very few live long enough to see their new designs established. The benefit of their crimes goes to posterity, and to those who would least have wished it—which shows they were not as wise as they thought. And those who deceive in the hope of not being observed commonly deceive themselves (the darkness in which they believe they lie hidden being nothing but their own blindness), and are no wiser than children who think everything is hidden when they cover their own eyes.
And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,) are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.
And in general all vainglorious men (unless they are also timid) are subject to anger, being more prone than others to take the ordinary freedom of conversation for contempt. And there are few crimes that anger cannot produce.
As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: The former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law.
As for the passions of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, the crimes they are apt to produce are so obvious to every man’s experience and understanding that nothing need be said of them—except that they are weaknesses so bound up with the nature both of man and of all other living creatures that their effects cannot be prevented except by an extraordinary use of reason, or by constant severity in punishing them. For in the things men hate they find a continual and unavoidable vexation, so that either a man’s patience must be everlasting, or he must find relief by removing the power of what vexes him. The first is difficult; the second is often impossible without some violation of the law.
Ambition, and Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments.
Ambition and covetousness are also passions that press on us perpetually, whereas reason is not perpetually present to resist them; and so whenever the hope of impunity appears, their effects follow. As for lust, what it lacks in duration it has in intensity, which is enough to outweigh the fear of any light or uncertain punishment.
Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,) that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed through Feare.
Of all the passions, the one that inclines men least to break the laws is fear. Indeed (setting aside some generous natures), it is the only thing that makes men keep them when there is a prospect of profit or pleasure in breaking them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed through fear.
For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely of corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance.
For not every fear justifies the action it produces—only the fear of physical harm, which we call bodily fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered except by that action. A man is assaulted and fears present death, from which he sees no escape except by wounding his attacker. If he wounds him fatally, this is no crime, because no man is supposed, at the making of a commonwealth, to have given up the defense of his life or limbs where the law cannot arrive in time to help him.
But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge.
But to kill a man because I may infer from his actions or threats that he will kill me when he can (seeing I have time and means to ask the sovereign power for protection) is a crime. Again, a man receives insulting words, or some small injuries (for which the lawmakers assigned no punishment, nor thought them worth the notice of a man who has the use of reason), and is afraid that unless he takes revenge he will fall into contempt and consequently be exposed to similar injuries from others. To avoid this he breaks the law, and protects himself for the future by the terror of his private revenge.
This is a Crime: For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of.
This is a crime. For the hurt is not bodily but imaginary, and (though in this corner of the world it has been made keenly felt by a custom begun not many years ago among young and vain men) so slight that a gallant man, one who is sure of his own courage, cannot take notice of it.
Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange, Dreams and Visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime.
Also, a man may fear spirits, either through his own superstition or through giving too much credit to others who tell him of strange dreams and visions, and so be made to believe that they will hurt him for doing or not doing various things which it is nonetheless against the laws to do or leave undone. What is done or left undone in this way is not excused by this fear, but is a crime.
For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.
For (as I showed earlier, in the second chapter) dreams are naturally nothing but the images that remain in sleep from the impressions our senses received while we were awake; and when men are for any reason not sure that they have slept, these seem to be real visions. So he who presumes to break the law on the strength of his own or another’s dream or supposed vision, or of any other fancy about the power of invisible spirits than the commonwealth permits, abandons the law of nature—which is a sure offense—and follows the imaginings of his own or another private man’s brain. He can never know whether they mean anything or nothing, nor whether the one who tells his dream is telling the truth or lying. If every private man were allowed to do this (as all must be by the law of nature, if any one is), no law could be made to hold, and every commonwealth would be dissolved.
Excuses and degrees of crime
Some circumstances excuse a crime entirely; others lessen or aggravate it.
From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse.
From these different sources of crimes it is already clear that all crimes are not (as the Stoics of ancient times maintained) of the same alloy. There is room not only for excuse, by which what seemed a crime is shown to be none at all, but also for extenuation, by which a crime that seemed great is made less.
For though all Crimes doe equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing, held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.
For though all crimes equally deserve the name of injustice—just as every deviation from a straight line is equally crookedness, as the Stoics rightly observed—it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust, any more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked. The Stoics, not observing this, held it as great a crime to kill a hen against the law as to kill one’s father.
That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.
What totally excuses an act, and takes from it the nature of a crime, can only be something that at the same time takes away the obligation of the law. For an act once committed against the law, if the one who committed it is bound by the law, can be nothing other than a crime.
The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and [the mentally ill] are Excused from offences against the Law Naturall.
Lack of means to know the law totally excuses, for a law that a man has no means of learning is not binding. But lack of diligence in inquiring shall not be counted as lack of means. Nor shall any man who claims reason enough to govern his own affairs be supposed to lack means of knowing the laws of nature, since they are known by the very reason he claims. Only children and people who are mentally ill are excused from offenses against the natural law.
Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.
When a man is a captive or in the power of the enemy (and he is in the enemy’s power when his person, or his means of living, is), if it is through no fault of his own, the obligation of the law ceases. For he must obey the enemy or die, and so such obedience is no crime; no man is obliged (when the protection of the law fails) not to protect himself by the best means he can.
If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, If I doe it not, I die presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained; Nature therefore compells him to the fact.
If a man is compelled by the terror of present death to do an act against the law, he is totally excused, because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And even supposing such a law were binding, a man would reason thus: “If I don’t do it, I die now; if I do it, I die later; so by doing it I gain time to live.” Nature therefore compels him to the act.
When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine for mony, nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason next before alledged.
When a man is without food or some other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way than by some act against the law—as if in a great famine he takes by force or by stealth food that he cannot obtain for money or by charity, or in defense of his life snatches away another man’s sword—he is totally excused, for the reason just given.
Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another; are by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the Law, both the Author, and Actor are Criminalls. From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other.
Again, acts done against the law by the authority of another are, by that authority, excused as against the author, because no man ought to accuse his own act in another who is only his instrument. But the act is not thereby excused as against a third person who is injured by it, because in the violation of the law both the author and the actor are criminals. From this it follows that when the man or assembly that has the sovereign power commands a man to do something contrary to a former law, doing it is totally excused. For the sovereign ought not to condemn it himself, since he is the author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the sovereign cannot justly be punished by anyone else.
Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.
Besides, when the sovereign commands something to be done against his own former law, the command, as regards that particular act, is a repeal of the law.
If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evill consequence thereof.
If the man or assembly that has the sovereign power renounces any right essential to sovereignty, so that the subject acquires some liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power—that is, with the very being of a commonwealth—then if the subject refuses to obey a command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this is nonetheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of a subject. For he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with sovereignty, since it was set up by his own consent and for his own defense, and to understand that any liberty inconsistent with it was granted through ignorance of its harmful consequences.
But if he not onely disobey, but also resist a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,) upon complaint.
But if he not only disobeys, but also resists a public officer in carrying the command out, then it is a crime, because he could have had redress (without any breach of the peace) by making a complaint.
The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.
The degrees of crime are taken on several scales. They are measured, first, by the malignity of the source or cause; second, by the contagion of the example; third, by the harm of the effect; and fourth, by the concurrence of times, places, and persons.
The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient for the future.
The same act against the law, if it proceeds from a presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist those who are to enforce the law, is a greater crime than if it proceeds from the hope of not being discovered, or of escaping by flight. For a presumption of impunity by force is a root from which springs, at all times and under all temptations, contempt of all laws; whereas in the second case, the apprehension of danger that makes a man flee renders him more obedient in the future.
A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the Law.
A crime committed knowing it to be one is greater than the same crime arising from a mistaken belief that it is lawful. For he who commits it against his own conscience relies on his force, or some other power, which encourages him to commit it again; but he who does it by error conforms to the law once the error is shown to him.
Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law, till the same Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to stand, or fall.
He whose error comes from the authority of a teacher or an interpreter of the law publicly authorized is not so much at fault as he whose error comes from stubbornly following his own principles and reasoning. For what is taught by one who teaches by public authority, the commonwealth teaches; it has the look of law until the same authority overrules it. And in all crimes that do not involve a denial of the sovereign power, and are not against an evident law, it excuses totally. Whereas he who bases his actions on his private judgment ought to stand or fall according to its rightness or error.
The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a greater Crime, than if there have been many precedent Examples of impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity, given by the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.
The same act, if it has been consistently punished in other men, is a greater crime than if there have been many previous examples of impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity given by the sovereign himself. And because he who gives a man such a hope and presumption of mercy as encourages him to offend has his share in the offense, he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole of it.
A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite.
A crime arising from sudden passion is not as great as one arising from long premeditation. In the first case there is room for extenuation in the common weakness of human nature; but he who acts with premeditation has taken care and cast his eye on the law, on the punishment, and on the consequences to human society—all of which, in committing the crime, he has despised and put after his own appetite.
But there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.
But no suddenness of passion is enough for a total excuse. For all the time between first knowing the law and committing the act shall be counted as time for deliberation, because he ought, by reflecting on the law, to correct the irregularity of his passions.
Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are left without such instrustion, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by priuate men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former, there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Sovetaign Power.
Where the law is publicly and diligently read and interpreted before all the people, an act done against it is a greater crime than where men are left without such instruction, to inquire into it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their work, and to be informed by private men. For in this case part of the fault is put down to common weakness; but in the former there is evident negligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power.
Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Law-maker. For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent.
Acts that the law expressly condemns, but the lawmaker tacitly approves by other clear signs of his will, are lesser crimes than the same acts condemned both by the law and by the lawmaker. For since the will of the lawmaker is a law, in this case there appear to be two contradictory laws. This would totally excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the sovereign’s approval by other indications than those expressed by his command. But because punishments follow not only from transgressing his law but also from observing it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and so cannot reasonably impute the whole crime to the offender.
For example, the Law condemneth Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary part, he that refuseth Duell, is subject to contempt and scorne, without remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid.
For example, the law condemns duels, and the punishment is made capital. On the other hand, he who refuses a duel is subject to contempt and scorn without remedy, and is sometimes thought by the sovereign himself unworthy of any command or promotion in war. If on that account he accepts a duel, then, considering that all men lawfully try to win the good opinion of those who have the sovereign power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished, since part of the fault may be laid on the punisher. I say this not from any wish for freedom of private revenge, or any other kind of disobedience, but out of concern that governors should not indirectly countenance anything they directly forbid.
The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And thought it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.
The examples of princes, to those who see them, are and always have been more powerful in governing their actions than the laws themselves. And though it is our duty to do not what they do but what they say, that duty will never be performed until it pleases God to give men an extraordinary and supernatural grace to follow that precept.
Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First, the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever.
Again, if we compare crimes by the harm of their effects: first, the same act, when it damages many, is greater than when it hurts few. And so, when an act hurts not only in the present but also (by example) in the future, it is a greater crime than if it hurt only in the present; for the former is a fertile crime that multiplies to the hurt of many, while the latter is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the commonwealth is a greater fault in an authorized preacher than in a private person. So also is living profanely or unchastely, or doing any irreligious act whatever.
Likewise in a Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakning of the Soveraign Power, is a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men.
Likewise, for a professor of the law to maintain any point, or do any act, that tends to weaken the sovereign power is a greater crime than for another man. And in a man with such a reputation for wisdom that his counsels are followed or his actions imitated by many, an act against the law is a greater crime than the same act in another. For such men not only commit crime but teach it as law to everyone else.
And generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becomming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.
And in general all crimes are made greater by the scandal they give—that is, by becoming stumbling blocks to the weak, who look not so much at the path they are on as at the light that other men carry before them.
Also Facts of hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth, are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men: For the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy; also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a Monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina laesae Majestatis, and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.
Also, acts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth are greater crimes than the same acts done to private men, for the damage extends to everyone. Such are betraying the strongholds or revealing the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy; also all attempts against the representative of the commonwealth, whether a monarch or an assembly; and all efforts, by word or deed, to diminish its authority, either at present or in the succession. The Latins understand these crimes by crimina laesae majestatis, and they consist in a design or act contrary to a fundamental law.
Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.
Likewise, crimes that make judgments ineffective are greater than injuries done to one or a few persons. To take money to give a false judgment or false testimony is a greater crime than to cheat a man of the same or a greater sum in some other way. For not only is the man who loses by such judgments wronged; all judgments are made useless, and occasion is given for force and private revenge.
Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues, is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man; because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.
Also, robbery and embezzlement of the public treasury or revenues is a greater crime than robbing or defrauding a private man, because to rob the public is to rob many at once.
Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the Counterfeiting of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the dammage of many.
Also, counterfeiting a public office, or counterfeiting public seals or the public coinage, is a greater crime than impersonating a private man or counterfeiting his seal, because the fraud extends to the damage of many.
Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And therefore
Of acts against the law done to private men, the greater crime is the one where the damage, in the common opinion of men, is most keenly felt. And therefore
To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, than any other injury, life preserved.
to kill against the law is a greater crime than any other injury that leaves life intact;
And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.
and to kill with torture, greater than simply to kill;
And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his goods.
and mutilation of a limb, greater than despoiling a man of his goods;
And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.
and despoiling a man of his goods by terror of death or wounds, greater than by stealing them secretly;
And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.
and by stealing them secretly, greater than by consent obtained through fraud;
And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.
and the violation of chastity by force, greater than by seduction;
And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.
and of a married woman, greater than of an unmarried woman.
For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.
For all these things are commonly valued so, though some men feel the same offense more and some less. But the law regards not the particular but the general inclination of mankind.
And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks, Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths; supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own vertue,) but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.
And so the offense men take at insults in words or gestures, when these produce no harm other than the present hurt of the one reproached, has been disregarded in the laws of the Greeks, the Romans, and other commonwealths both ancient and modern. They supposed that the true cause of such hurt lies not in the insult (which takes no hold on men conscious of their own virtue) but in the faintheartedness of the one who is offended by it.
Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign, (though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had it originally by Nature. And to Robbe a poore man, is a greater Crime, than to robbe a rich man; because ’tis to the poore a more sensible dammage.
Also, a crime against a private man is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. To kill one’s parent is a greater crime than to kill another, for a parent ought to have the honor of a sovereign (though he has surrendered his power to the civil law), because he had it originally by nature. And to rob a poor man is a greater crime than to rob a rich man, because to the poor it is a more keenly felt loss.
And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the Law.
And a crime committed at a time or in a place set apart for worship is greater than if committed at another time or place, for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law.
Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other Crime proposed.
Many other cases of aggravation and extenuation might be added. But from those I have set down, anyone can see how to take the measure of any other crime put before him.
Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely to some Private men, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when the accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth, is called Publique Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the Pleas according thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.
Lastly, because in almost all crimes an injury is done not only to some private men but also to the commonwealth, the same crime is called a public crime when the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, and a private crime when it is in the name of a private man. The corresponding pleas are called public (judicia publica, pleas of the Crown) or private pleas. So in an accusation of murder, if the accuser is a private man, the plea is a private plea; if the accuser is the sovereign, the plea is a public plea.
Chapter 28: Of punishments and rewards
Punishment is harm inflicted by public authority to make men more willing to obey.
A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.
A punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority on one who has done or omitted what that same authority judges to be a transgression of the law, to the end that men’s wills may thereby be better disposed to obedience.
Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himselfe not.
Before I infer anything from this definition, there is a question of great importance to be answered: by what door did the right or authority to punish, in any case, come in? For by what has been said before, no man is supposed to be bound by covenant not to resist violence, and consequently it cannot be supposed that he gave anyone a right to lay violent hands on his person. In making a commonwealth, every man gives away the right of defending another, but not of defending himself. He also binds himself to assist the sovereign in punishing another, but not in punishing himself.
But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every Common-wealth.
But to covenant to assist the sovereign in doing hurt to another, unless the one who so covenants has a right to do it himself, is not to give the sovereign a right to punish. It is clear, therefore, that the right the commonwealth (that is, he or they who represent it) has to punish is not grounded on any concession or gift of the subjects. But I have also shown earlier that before the institution of a commonwealth every man had a right to everything, and to do whatever he thought necessary for his own preservation—subduing, hurting, or killing any man to that end. And this is the foundation of the right of punishing that is exercised in every commonwealth.
For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour.
For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right. They only, in laying down their own rights, strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit for the preservation of them all. So it was not given to him but left to him, and to him alone; and (apart from the limits set him by natural law) as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of everyone against his neighbor.
From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.
From the definition of punishment I infer, first, that neither private revenge nor injuries done by private men can properly be called punishment, because they do not proceed from public authority.
Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour, is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.
Second, that to be neglected and passed over for public favor is not a punishment, because no new evil is thereby inflicted on anyone; he is only left in the condition he was in before.
Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.
Third, that evil inflicted by public authority without a prior public condemnation is not to be called punishment but a hostile act, because the act for which a man is punished ought first to be judged by public authority to be a transgression of the law.
Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.
Fourth, that evil inflicted by usurped power, and by judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment but an act of hostility, because the acts of usurped power do not have the condemned person as their author, and so are not acts of public authority.
Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.
Fifth, that all evil inflicted without the intention or possibility of disposing the offender, or (by his example) other men, to obey the laws is not punishment but an act of hostility, because without such an end no hurt done falls under that name.
Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.
Sixth, certain actions have various harmful consequences attached to them by nature—as when a man attacking another is himself killed or wounded, or falls sick by doing some unlawful act. Such hurt, though with respect to God, who is the author of nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and so to be a divine punishment, is not included in the name of punishment with respect to men, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man.
Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse than the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.
Seventh, if the harm inflicted is less than the benefit or satisfaction that naturally follows the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition. It is rather the price, or the ransom, of a crime than its punishment. For it is the nature of punishment to have as its end the disposing of men to obey the law; and if the harm is less than the benefit of the transgression, it does not attain that end, but works the contrary effect.
Eighthly, If a Punishment bè determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.
Eighth, if a punishment is fixed and prescribed in the law itself, and after the crime is committed a greater punishment is inflicted, the excess is not punishment but an act of hostility. For since the aim of punishment is not revenge but terror, and the terror of a great unknown punishment is taken away by the declaration of a lesser one, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But where no punishment at all is fixed by the law, whatever is inflicted has the nature of punishment. For he who sets about violating a law in which no penalty is fixed expects an indeterminate—that is, an arbitrary—punishment.
Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.
Ninth, harm inflicted for an act done before there was a law forbidding it is not punishment but an act of hostility. For before the law there is no transgression of the law; but punishment presupposes an act judged to have been a transgression of the law. Therefore harm inflicted before the law was made is not punishment but an act of hostility.
Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority only of the Representative it self.
Tenth, hurt inflicted on the representative of the commonwealth is not punishment but an act of hostility, because it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority of the representative alone.
Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull.
Lastly, harm inflicted on a declared enemy does not fall under the name of punishment. Such people were either never subject to the law, and so cannot transgress it; or, having been subject to it and declaring that they are so no longer, they by consequence deny that they can transgress it. So all the harms that can be done to them must be taken as acts of hostility. And in declared hostility, all infliction of evil is lawful.
From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.
From this it follows that if a subject, by deed or word, knowingly and deliberately denies the authority of the representative of the commonwealth, he may lawfully be made to suffer whatever the representative wills, whatever penalty has previously been ordained for treason. For in denying subjection he denies the punishment the law has ordained, and therefore suffers as an enemy of the commonwealth—that is, according to the will of the representative. For the punishments set down in the law are for subjects, not for enemies; and such enemies are those who, having become subjects by their own act, deliberately revolt and deny the sovereign power.
The kinds of punishment and reward
Punishment may be corporal, pecuniary, ignominy, imprisonment, or exile; reward is gift or wages.
The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter.
The first and most general division of punishments is into divine and human. Of the former I shall have occasion to speak hereafter, in a more convenient place.
Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.
Human punishments are those inflicted by the command of man. They are either corporal, or pecuniary, or ignominy, or imprisonment, or exile, or a mixture of these.
Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed.
Corporal punishment is punishment inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of the one who inflicts it: such as lashes, or wounds, or deprivation of bodily pleasures that were lawfully enjoyed before.
And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death follow not in the intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not to bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.
Of these, some are capital, some less than capital. Capital punishment is the infliction of death, either simply or with torment. Less than capital are lashes, wounds, chains, and any other bodily pain not mortal in its own nature. For if death does not follow the infliction of a punishment by the intention of the one who inflicts it, the punishment is not to be counted capital, even though the harm proves mortal by some accident that could not be foreseen. In that case death is not inflicted, but hastened.
Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it.
Pecuniary punishment consists not only in being deprived of a sum of money, but also of lands, or any other goods that are usually bought and sold for money. If the law that ordains such a punishment is made with the design of gathering money from those who transgress it, it is not properly a punishment. It is the price of a privilege, and of exemption from the law—a law that does not absolutely forbid the act, but forbids it only to those who are not able to pay the money. The exception is where the law is natural, or part of religion. In that case the payment is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of it.
As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.
Thus where a law exacts a fine from those who take the name of God in vain, paying the fine is not the price of a dispensation to swear, but the punishment for transgressing a law that admits no dispensation. In the same way, if the law imposes a sum of money to be paid to the person who has been injured, this is only compensation for the hurt done him. It extinguishes the injured party’s accusation, not the offender’s crime.
Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable; or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage, Magnamity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour. The former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law; and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment.
Ignominy is the infliction of an evil that the commonwealth has made dishonorable, or the deprivation of a good that the commonwealth has made honorable. For some things are honorable by nature, such as the effects of courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind. Others are made honorable by the commonwealth, such as badges, titles, offices, or any other special mark of the sovereign’s favor. The former (though they may fail through nature or accident) cannot be taken away by a law, and therefore losing them is not a punishment.
But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come.
But the latter may be taken away by the public authority that made them honorable, and such losses are properly punishments: for example, stripping condemned men of their badges, titles, and offices, or declaring them incapable of holding such things in future.
Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the later is Punishment, because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law.
Imprisonment is when a man is deprived of liberty by public authority. It may serve two different ends: one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the infliction of pain on a man condemned. The former is not punishment, because no man is supposed to be punished before he has had a judicial hearing and been declared guilty. And therefore any hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds or restraint before his case is heard, over and above what is necessary to secure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the latter is punishment, because it is an evil, inflicted by public authority, for something that the same authority has judged a transgression of the law.
Under this word Imprisoment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the general name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.
Under this word “imprisonment” I include all restraint of motion caused by an external obstacle. It may be a house, which is called by the general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to be confined to one; or a place where men are set to work, as in ancient times men were condemned to the quarries, and in these times to the galleys; or it may be a chain, or any other such impediment.
Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger.
Exile (banishment) is when a man is condemned for a crime to leave the dominion of the commonwealth, or some part of it, and not to return, either for a fixed time or forever. In its own nature, without other circumstances, it does not seem to be a punishment, but rather an escape, or a public command to avoid punishment by flight. And Cicero says that no such punishment was ever ordained in the city of Rome, but calls it a refuge for men in danger.
For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no Punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.
For if a banished man is nevertheless allowed to enjoy his goods and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punishment. Nor does it serve the benefit of the commonwealth for which all punishments are ordained (that is, forming men’s wills to observe the law); often it does the commonwealth harm. For a banished man is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth that banished him, since he is no longer a member of it. But if he is also deprived of his lands or goods, then the punishment lies not in the exile; it is to be counted among pecuniary punishments.
All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the Law of Nature: For Punishment is only for Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good.
All punishments of innocent subjects, whether great or small, are against the law of nature. For punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a violation, first, of the law of nature that forbids all men, in their revenges, to look at anything but some future good: for no good can come to the commonwealth from punishing the innocent. Second, it violates the law that forbids ingratitude. For since all sovereign power was originally given by the consent of each of the subjects, so that they would be protected by it as long as they are obedient, punishing the innocent is returning evil for good.
And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.
And third, it violates the law that commands equity, that is to say, an equal distribution of justice, which is not observed in punishing the innocent.
But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent, and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his own People.
But inflicting any evil whatever on an innocent man who is not a subject, if it is for the benefit of the commonwealth and violates no prior covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men who are not subjects are either enemies, or else have ceased to be enemies by some previous covenants. And against enemies whom the commonwealth judges capable of doing it harm, it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war. In war the sword does not judge, nor does the victor distinguish guilty from innocent as to the time past, nor show mercy except insofar as it serves the good of his own people.
And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.
It is on this ground, too, that in the case of subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the established commonwealth, vengeance is lawfully extended not only to the fathers but also to the third and fourth generation, not yet in existence and consequently innocent of the act for which they are afflicted. For the nature of this offense consists in renouncing subjection, which is a relapse into the condition of war, commonly called rebellion. Those who offend in this way suffer not as subjects but as enemies. For rebellion is only war renewed.
REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Soveraign of a Common wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall.
Reward is either by gift or by contract. When it is by contract, it is called salary and wages, which is a benefit due for service performed or promised. When it is by gift, it is a benefit proceeding from the grace of those who bestow it, to encourage or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth appoints a salary to some public office, the person who receives it is bound in justice to perform his office. Otherwise, he is bound only in honor, to gratitude and to an effort to repay.
For though men have no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the Institution of the Common-wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a debt.
For though men have no lawful remedy when they are commanded to leave their private business to serve the public without reward or salary, they are not bound to do so by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the commonwealth, unless the service cannot be done any other way. For it is supposed that the sovereign may make use of all their means, so that even the most common soldier may demand the wages of his service in war as a debt.
The benefit which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.
The benefits a sovereign bestows on a subject out of fear of some power and ability he has to hurt the commonwealth are not properly rewards. They are not salaries, because in this case no contract is supposed, every man being already obliged not to do the commonwealth a disservice. Nor are they graces, because they are extorted by fear, which ought not to affect the sovereign power. They are rather sacrifices, which the sovereign (considered in his natural person, and not in the person of the commonwealth) makes to appease the discontent of someone he thinks more powerful than himself. And they encourage not obedience, but on the contrary the continuance and increase of further extortion.
And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later is in some cases hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can.
Some salaries are fixed, and come from the public treasury; others are uncertain and incidental, arising from the exercise of the office for which the salary is ordained. The latter is in some cases harmful to the commonwealth, as in the case of the courts. For where the profit of the judges and officers of a court of justice arises from the number of cases brought before them, two inconveniences must follow. One is the fostering of lawsuits, for the more suits, the greater the profit. The other depends on that: contention about jurisdiction, with each court drawing to itself as many cases as it can.
But in offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.
But in executive offices these inconveniences do not arise, because their business cannot be increased by any effort of their own. And this much will suffice on the nature of punishment and reward, which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth.
Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud. There is nothing, saith he, *on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid.
So far I have set forth the nature of man (whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government), together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan. I took that comparison from the last two verses of the forty-first chapter of Job, where God, having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calls him the king of the proud. “There is nothing on earth,” he says, “to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid.
Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride.* But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.
He sees every high thing below him, and is king of all the children of pride.” But because he is mortal and subject to decay, like all other earthly creatures, and because there is something in heaven (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey, I shall speak in the chapters that follow of his diseases and the causes of his mortality, and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey.
Chapter 29: Of those things that weaken or tend to dissolve a commonwealth
Commonwealths die from internal diseases: defective institution and seditious doctrines.
Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them.
Though nothing that mortals make can be immortal, yet if men had the use of the reason they claim to have, their commonwealths might at least be secured from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence but by internal disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the matter of commonwealths, but as they are their makers and orderers.
For men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Lawes, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.
For men at last grow weary of irregular jostling and hacking at one another, and desire with all their hearts to fit themselves together into one firm and lasting edifice. But they lack both the art of making fit laws to square their actions by, and the humility and patience to let the rough and cumbersome points of their present greatness be taken off. So without the help of a very able architect they cannot be put together into anything but a flimsy, rickety building—one that will hardly last out their own time, and must surely fall upon the heads of their posterity.
Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.
Among the infirmities of a commonwealth, therefore, I will count first those that arise from an imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body that proceed from a defective conception.
Of which, this is one, That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required. From whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs.
One of these is this: that a man, to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes content with less power than the peace and defense of the commonwealth necessarily require. As a result, when the exercise of the power he laid aside has to be resumed for the public safety, it looks like an unjust act. This disposes great numbers of men (when occasion offers) to rebel—in the same way as the bodies of children begotten by diseased parents are liable either to an early death, or to purge the ill quality derived from their faulty conception by breaking out in boils and scabs.
And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their Neighbours.
And when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what the office they undertake requires. Often it is in the hope of recovering it again when they please. In this they reason badly, because those who would hold them to their promises will be supported against them by foreign commonwealths, which, for the good of their own subjects, let few opportunities slip to weaken the state of their neighbors.
So was Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conquerour at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French.
So Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, was supported by the Pope against Henry II, the subjection of churchmen to the commonwealth having been waived by William the Conqueror at his accession, when he took an oath not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so the barons—whose power had been increased by William Rufus, to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, in order to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself—were supported by the French in their rebellion against King John.
Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.
Nor does this happen only in monarchy. For the title of the ancient Roman commonwealth was The Senate and People of Rome, and neither the Senate nor the people claimed the whole power. This first caused the seditions of Tiberius Gracchus, Gaius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterward the wars between the Senate and the people under Marius and Sulla, and again under Pompey and Caesar, until their democracy was extinguished and monarchy set up.
The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a [mentally ill man], and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.
The people of Athens bound themselves from only one action: that no man, on pain of death, should propose renewing the war for the island of Salamis. And yet if Solon had not had it given out that he was mad, and then, with the gestures and dress of someone out of his mind, proposed it in verse to the people who flocked around him, they would have had an enemy perpetually at the ready, even at the gates of their city. Such damage, or such shifts, are all commonwealths driven to whose power is limited even a little.
The diseases of seditious doctrine
Private judgment of good and evil, divided sovereignty, and similar opinions poison the commonwealth.
In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions. This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of the Common-wealth.
In the second place, I note the diseases of a commonwealth that come from the poison of seditious doctrines. One of these is that every private man is judge of good and evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws, and also under civil government in cases the law has not determined. But otherwise it is plain that the measure of good and evil actions is the civil law, and the judge is the legislator, who is always the representative of the commonwealth.
From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.
From this false doctrine men are disposed to debate with themselves and dispute the commands of the commonwealth, and then to obey or disobey them as they think fit in their private judgments. By this the commonwealth is distracted and weakened.
Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, thought he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.
Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatever a man does against his conscience is sin. It depends on the presumption of making oneself judge of good and evil. For a man’s conscience and his judgment are the same thing, and like the judgment, the conscience may be mistaken. Therefore, though someone who is subject to no civil law sins in everything he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason, it is not so with someone who lives in a commonwealth. For the law is the public conscience, by which he has already undertaken to be guided.
Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.
Otherwise, given the diversity of private consciences, which are only private opinions, the commonwealth must be distracted, and no man would dare obey the sovereign power any further than seemed good in his own eyes.
It hath been also commonly taught, That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion. which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civill Government.
It has also been commonly taught that faith and holiness are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion. Grant this, and I do not see why any man should give a reason for his faith; or why every Christian should not also be a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own inspiration, as the rule of his action. And so we fall again into the fault of taking it upon ourselves to judge of good and evil, or of making judges of it those private men who claim to be supernaturally inspired—to the dissolution of all civil government.
Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that concurre to every effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, at such time as he thinketh fit.
Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents that bring us into the presence of those who speak to us. These accidents are all contrived by God Almighty, and yet they are not supernatural; they are only unobservable, because of the great number of them that combine in every effect. Faith and holiness are indeed not very common. But they are not miracles. They are brought about by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God works them in his elect, at such time as he thinks fit.
And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.
And these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world come chiefly from the tongues and pens of unlearned divines, who, joining the words of Holy Scripture together otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do all they can to make men think that holiness and natural reason cannot stand together.
A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes. It is true, that Soveraigns are all subject to the Lawes of Nature; because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Lawes.
A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this: that he who has the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws are divine and cannot be abrogated by any man or commonwealth. But to the laws that the sovereign himself—that is, the commonwealth—makes, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself; and that is not subjection, but freedom from the laws.
Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.
Because this error sets the laws above the sovereign, it also sets a judge above him, and a power to punish him. That is to make a new sovereign; and again, for the same reason, a third to punish the second; and so on continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth.
A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth, is, That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign. Every man has indeed a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.
A fifth doctrine that tends to the dissolution of a commonwealth is that every private man has an absolute property in his goods, such as excludes the right of the sovereign. Every man does indeed have a property that excludes the right of every other subject. And he has it only from the sovereign power; without its protection every other man would have an equal right to the same thing. But if the right of the sovereign is also excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him in, which is to defend them both from foreign enemies and from the injuries of one another. And consequently there is no longer a commonwealth.
And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.
And if the property of subjects does not exclude the sovereign representative’s right to their goods, much less does it exclude his right to their offices of judicature or execution, in which they represent the sovereign himself.
There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and ’tis this, That the Soveraign Power may be divided. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.
There is a sixth doctrine, plainly and directly against the essence of a commonwealth, and it is this: that the sovereign power may be divided. For what is dividing the power of a commonwealth but dissolving it? Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines men are chiefly indebted to some of those who, making the law their profession, try to make it depend on their own learning, and not on the legislative power.
And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of the Nations: So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians.
And as false doctrine does, so also the example of a different government in a neighboring nation often disposes men to alter the form already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to reject God, and to call on the prophet Samuel for a king like the other nations. So too the lesser cities of Greece were continually disturbed by the seditions of aristocratic and democratic factions, one part of almost every commonwealth wanting to imitate the Spartans, the other the Athenians.
And I doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme of their Government.
And I have no doubt that many men were glad to see the late troubles in England out of imitation of the Low Countries, supposing that nothing more was needed to grow rich than to change the form of their government, as the Dutch had done.
For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.
For man’s nature is in its constitution inclined of itself to desire novelty. So when men are provoked to it by having neighbors who have grown rich by it too, it is almost impossible for them not to welcome those who urge them to change, and to love the first beginnings, though they are grieved by the continuing disorder—like hot-blooded people who, having caught the itch, tear themselves with their own nails until they can bear the smart no longer.
And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of their popular forme of government: Not considering the frequent Seditions, and Civill warres, produced by the imperfection of their Policy.
As for rebellion against monarchy in particular, one of its most frequent causes is the reading of the books of politics and histories of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Young men, and all others unprovided with the antidote of solid reason, receive from them a strong and delightful impression of the great exploits of war achieved by the commanders of their armies, and with it a pleasing idea of everything else they did. They imagine that their great prosperity came not from the rivalry of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government—not considering the frequent seditions and civil wars produced by the imperfection of their constitution.
From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves.
From reading such books, I say, men have undertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books and discourses on politics, make it lawful and praiseworthy for any man to do so, provided that before he does it he calls the king a tyrant. For they do not say that regicide, that is, killing a king, is lawful, but tyrannicide, that is, killing a tyrant. From the same books, those who live under a monarch form the opinion that the subjects in a popular commonwealth enjoy liberty, but that in a monarchy they are all slaves.
I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter. In summe, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime:
I say that those who live under a monarchy form this opinion—not those who live under a popular government, for they find no such thing. In sum, I cannot imagine how anything could be more damaging to a monarchy than allowing such books to be publicly read without at once applying such correctives from discreet teachers as are fit to take away their venom.
Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or fear of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre.
This venom I do not hesitate to compare to the bite of a rabid dog, which produces a disease the physicians call hydrophobia, or fear of water. For the one who is bitten has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhors water, and is in a state as if the poison were trying to turn him into a dog. So when a monarchy has once been bitten to the quick by those democratic writers who continually snarl at that form of state, it needs nothing more than a strong monarch; and yet, when they have one, out of a certain tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, they abhor him.
As there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Soveraignty, Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark.
As there have been doctors who hold that there are three souls in a man, so there are also those who think there may be more souls (that is, more sovereigns) than one in a commonwealth. They set up a supremacy against the sovereignty, canons against laws, and a spiritual authority against the civil. They work on men’s minds with words and distinctions that in themselves signify nothing, but betray by their obscurity that there walks in the dark (invisibly, as some think) another kingdom—a kingdom of fairies, as it were.
Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making (anons, and granting Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and every Subject is subject to two Masters.
Now it is plain that the civil power and the power of the commonwealth are the same thing, and that supremacy, and the power of making canons and granting licenses, imply a commonwealth. It follows that where one is sovereign and another supreme, where one can make laws and another make canons, there must be two commonwealths of one and the same subjects—which is a kingdom divided against itself, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the meaningless distinction between temporal and spiritual, they are still two kingdoms, and every subject is subject to two masters.
For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is Sinne, it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters, who both will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is impossible.
For since the spiritual power claims the right to declare what is sin, it claims by consequence to declare what is law (sin being nothing but the transgression of the law). And the civil power also claims to declare what is law. So every subject must obey two masters, who both want their commands observed as law—which is impossible.
Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill, which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the Ghostly, and then there is no Soveraignty but the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall, and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution.
Or if it is only one kingdom, then either the civil power, which is the power of the commonwealth, must be subordinate to the spiritual, and then there is no sovereignty but the spiritual; or the spiritual must be subordinate to the temporal, and then there is no supremacy but the temporal. When these two powers oppose one another, therefore, the commonwealth cannot help being in great danger of civil war and dissolution.
For the Civill Authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the Body Naturall.
For the civil authority, being more visible and standing in the clearer light of natural reason, cannot fail at all times to draw to itself a very considerable part of the people. And the spiritual, though it stands in the darkness of scholastic distinctions and hard words, yet because the fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears, cannot lack a party large enough to trouble, and sometimes to destroy, a commonwealth. And this is a disease that may not unfitly be compared to epilepsy, or the falling sickness (which the Jews took to be a kind of possession by spirits), in the natural body.
For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses;
For in this disease there is an unnatural spirit, or wind, in the head that obstructs the roots of the nerves and, moving them violently, takes away the motion they should naturally have from the power of the soul in the brain. It thereby causes violent and irregular motions (which men call convulsions) in the parts, so that someone seized with it falls down, sometimes into water and sometimes into fire, like a man deprived of his senses;
so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby Distract the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre.
so also in the body politic, when the spiritual power moves the members of a commonwealth by the terror of punishments and hope of rewards (which are its nerves) otherwise than they ought to be moved by the civil power (which is the soul of the commonwealth), and suffocates their understanding with strange and hard words, it must thereby distract the people, and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression or cast it into the fire of a civil war.
Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion.
Sometimes, too, in a purely civil government there is more than one soul. For example, the power of levying money (which is the nutritive faculty) has depended on a general assembly; the power of conduct and command (which is the motive faculty) on one man; and the power of making laws (which is the rational faculty) on the chance consent not only of those two, but also of a third. This endangers the commonwealth, sometimes for lack of consent to good laws, but most often for lack of the nourishment necessary to life and motion.
For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so.
For although few perceive that such a government is not government but the division of the commonwealth into three factions, and they call it mixed monarchy, the truth is that it is not one independent commonwealth but three independent factions, and not one representative person but three. In the Kingdom of God there may be three independent persons without breach of unity in the God who reigns. But where men reign, who are subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so.
And therefore if the King bear the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another Assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.
And therefore if the king bears the person of the people, and the general assembly also bears the person of the people, and another assembly bears the person of a part of the people, they are not one person nor one sovereign, but three persons and three sovereigns.
To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast; and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.
To what disease in the natural body of man I may exactly compare this irregularity of a commonwealth, I do not know. But I have seen a man who had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, chest, and stomach of his own. If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.
Lesser diseases of the commonwealth
Shortage of money, monopolies, popular subjects, and overgrown towns are compared to bodily ailments.
Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same.
So far I have named the diseases of a commonwealth that carry the greatest and most immediate danger. There are others, not so great, which are nevertheless worth noting. First, the difficulty of raising money for the necessary uses of the commonwealth, especially when war is approaching. This difficulty arises from the opinion every subject has of a property in his lands and goods that excludes the sovereign’s right to use them.
From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by stratagems of Law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Common-wealth must perish.
As a result, the sovereign power, which foresees the necessities and dangers of the commonwealth, finds the flow of money to the public treasury obstructed by the tenacity of the people. Where it ought to extend itself to meet and prevent such dangers at their beginnings, it contracts itself as long as it can. When it can do so no longer, it struggles with the people by legal stratagems to obtain small sums. These not being enough, the sovereign is forced at last either to open the way violently for immediate supply, or to perish. And being often driven to these extremities, he at last brings the people to their proper temper, or else the commonwealth must perish.
Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole for a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.
So we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague. In an ague the fleshy parts are congealed or obstructed by venomous matter, and the veins, which by their natural course empty themselves into the heart, are not supplied from the arteries as they ought to be. From this there follows first a cold contraction and trembling of the limbs; and afterward a hot and strong effort of the heart to force a passage for the blood. Before it can do that, it contents itself with the small refreshment of things that cool it for a time, until (if nature is strong enough) it at last breaks the resistance of the obstructed parts and dissipates the venom into sweat—or (if nature is too weak) the patient dies.
Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.
Again, there is sometimes in a commonwealth a disease resembling pleurisy. That is when the treasure of the commonwealth, flowing out of its proper course, is gathered together in too great abundance in one or a few private men, by monopolies or by farming out the public revenues—in the same way as the blood in a pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the chest, breeds an inflammation there, accompanied by fever and painful stitches.
Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy, because an Army is of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe, they are the People.
Also, the popularity of a powerful subject (unless the commonwealth has very good security for his loyalty) is a dangerous disease. For the people, who should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign, are drawn away by the flattery and reputation of an ambitious man from their obedience to the laws, to follow a man whose virtues and designs they know nothing of. And this is commonly more dangerous in a popular government than in a monarchy, because an army is of such great force and numbers that it may easily be made to believe that it is the people.
By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.
It was by this means that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the people against the Senate, having won the affections of his army for himself, made himself master of both Senate and people. And this proceeding of popular and ambitious men is plain rebellion, and may be likened to the effects of witchcraft.
Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man. To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call Ascarides.
Another infirmity of a commonwealth is the immoderate size of a town, when it is able to supply from within its own bounds the numbers and expense of a great army. So too the great number of corporations, which are like many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater one, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To these may be added the liberty of disputing against absolute power by those who claim political wisdom. Though they are bred for the most part in the dregs of the people, yet, animated by false doctrines, they are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to the annoyance of the commonwealth—like the little worms that physicians call ascarides.
We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.
We may further add the insatiable appetite, or bulimia, for enlarging dominion, with the incurable wounds often received from the enemy as a result; and the wens of ununited conquests, which are often a burden, and are lost with less danger than they are kept; as also the lethargy of ease, and the consumption of riot and vain expense.
Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies get a finall Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyaly; then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortall) Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may.
Lastly, when in a war (foreign or internal) the enemy wins a final victory, so that the forces of the commonwealth no longer keep the field and there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty, then the commonwealth is dissolved, and every man is at liberty to protect himself by whatever courses his own discretion suggests to him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the commonwealth. When it expires, the members are governed by it no more than the corpse of a man is governed by his departed (though immortal) soul. For though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another, the obligation of the members can.
For he that wants protection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.
For he who lacks protection may seek it anywhere; and when he has it, he is obliged (without fraudulent pretense of having submitted out of fear) to protect his protection as long as he is able. But when the power of an assembly is once suppressed, its right perishes utterly, because the assembly itself is extinct; and consequently there is no possibility for the sovereignty to re-enter.
Chapter 30: Of the office of the sovereign representative
The sovereign’s duty is the safety of the people, secured by teaching and good laws.
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.
The office of the sovereign (whether a monarch or an assembly) consists in the end for which he was entrusted with the sovereign power, namely securing the safety of the people. To this he is obliged by the law of nature, and he must render an account of it to God, the author of that law, and to no one but him. But by safety here is meant not bare preservation, but also all the other contentments of life that every man shall acquire for himself by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth.
And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.
And this is meant to be done not by care applied to individuals, beyond protecting them from injuries when they complain, but by a general providence, consisting in public instruction, both of doctrine and of example, and in the making and executing of good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases.
And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them.
If the essential rights of sovereignty (specified before in chapter 18) are taken away, the commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returns into the condition and calamity of a war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life. Therefore it is the office of the sovereign to maintain those rights entire. And consequently it is against his duty, first, to transfer any of them to another, or to lay any of them aside.
For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people.
For whoever abandons the means abandons the ends. And a sovereign abandons the means when he acknowledges himself subject to the civil laws; or renounces the power of supreme judicature; or of making war or peace by his own authority; or of judging the necessities of the commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers when, and as much as, he in his own conscience judges necessary; or of appointing officers and ministers both of war and of peace; or of appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines agree with, or are contrary to, the defense, peace, and good of the people.
Secondly, it is against his Duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-informed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.
Second, it is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of those essential rights of his. For then men are easily seduced and drawn to resist him when the commonwealth requires their use and exercise.
And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legall punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.
And the grounds of these rights need all the more to be taught diligently and truly, because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that forbids rebellion (and all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty is rebellion) is not, as a civil law, any obligation. It binds only by virtue of the law of nature that forbids breaking faith. If men do not know that natural obligation, they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign makes. And as for the punishment, they take it only for an act of hostility, which, when they think they have strength enough, they will try to avoid by acts of hostility.
As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged.
I have heard some say that justice is only a word, without substance, and that whatever a man can acquire for himself by force or cunning (not only in the condition of war, but also in a commonwealth) is his own, which I have already shown to be false. So too there are those who maintain that there are no grounds or principles of reason to sustain the essential rights that make sovereignty absolute. For if there were, they say, they would have been found out in some place or other; whereas we see that there has not yet been any commonwealth where those rights have been acknowledged or claimed.
Wherein they argue as ill, as if the [Indigenous] people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge.
In this they argue as badly as if the Indigenous peoples of America were to deny that there are any grounds or principles of reason for building a house to last as long as its materials, because they had never yet seen one so well built. Time and industry produce new knowledge every day.
And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by externall violence) everlasting And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: Which whether they come not into the fight of those that have Power to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little.
And the art of building well is derived from principles of reason observed by industrious men who had long studied the nature of materials and the various effects of shape and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build. In the same way, long after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, principles of reason may be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution everlasting (except against external violence). And such are the principles I have set forth in this discourse. Whether they come to the sight of those who have power to make use of them or not, or are neglected by them or not, concerns my own particular interest very little at this day.
But supposing that these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.
But supposing these principles of mine are not such principles of reason, I am still sure that they are principles drawn from the authority of Scripture, as I shall make clear when I come to speak of the Kingdom of God (administered by Moses) over the Jews, his peculiar people by covenant.
But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn.
But they say again that, though the principles are right, common people do not have the capacity to be made to understand them. I should be glad if the rich and powerful subjects of a kingdom, or those who are reckoned the most learned, were no more incapable than they. But all men know that the obstacles to this kind of doctrine come not so much from the difficulty of the matter as from the interest of those who are to learn it.
Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men, any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them.
Powerful men can hardly digest anything that sets up a power to bridle their passions; and learned men, anything that exposes their errors and so lessens their authority. Whereas the minds of the common people, unless they are tainted by dependence on the powerful, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatever public authority shall imprint on them.
Shall whole Nations be brought to acquiescé in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it?
Shall whole nations be brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are above reason, and millions of men be made to believe that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is against reason; and shall men not be able, by their teaching and preaching, protected by the law, to make generally accepted something so agreeable to reason that any unprejudiced man needs only to hear it to learn it?
I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.
I conclude, therefore, that in instructing the people in the essential rights of sovereignty (which are the natural and fundamental laws), there is no difficulty (while a sovereign has his power entire) except what comes from his own fault, or the fault of those he trusts in the administration of the commonwealth. And consequently it is his duty to have them so instructed—and not only his duty, but also his benefit and his security against the danger that may come to himself, in his natural person, from rebellion.
What the people are to be taught
Their duties to the sovereign are to be taught, following the pattern of the Ten Commandments.
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own; nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects: nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him.
And (to come down to particulars) the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in neighboring nations more than with their own, nor to desire change, whatever present prosperity they see in nations governed differently from them. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocratic or democratic assembly comes not from aristocracy or from democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects. Nor do the people flourish in a monarchy because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him.
Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man.
Take away the obedience (and consequently the concord) of the people in any kind of state, and they will not only fail to flourish but in a short time be dissolved. And those who set out, by disobedience, to do no more than reform the commonwealth will find that they destroy it by doing so—like the foolish daughters of Peleus in the fable, who, wanting to renew the youth of their decrepit father, on the advice of Medea cut him in pieces and boiled him together with strange herbs, but did not make a new man of him.
This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God sayes, Non habebis Does alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.
This desire for change is like breaking the first of God’s commandments. For there God says, Non habebis deos alienos: you shall not have the gods of other nations. And in another place he says of kings that they are gods.
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority.
Second, they are to be taught that they ought not to be carried away by admiration for the virtue of any of their fellow subjects, however high he stands or however conspicuously he shines in the commonwealth, nor of any assembly (except the sovereign assembly), so as to give them any obedience or honor that belongs to the sovereign alone, whom they represent in their particular stations. Nor are they to receive any influence from them except what is conveyed through them from the sovereign authority.
For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them in facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.
For a sovereign cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought if he is not jealous of them, but allows them to be seduced from their loyalty by the flattery of popular men—as they often have been, not only secretly but openly, to the point of proclaiming marriage with them in facie Ecclesiae by preachers, and by publishing it in the open streets. This may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the Ten Commandments.
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great a fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.
Third, following from this, they ought to be told how great a fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign representative (whether one man or an assembly of men), or to argue and dispute his power, or to use his name irreverently in any way, by which he may be brought into contempt with his people and their obedience—in which the safety of the commonwealth consists—slackened. The third commandment points to this doctrine by analogy.
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when ’tis taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh them Lawes.
Fourth, people cannot be taught this, nor remember it once taught, nor after a single generation so much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed, unless some fixed times are set apart from their ordinary labor in which they may attend those appointed to instruct them. It is therefore necessary that such times be set, in which they may assemble together and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Sovereign of sovereigns) hear their duties told them, hear the positive laws that generally concern them all read and explained, and be reminded of the authority that makes them laws.
To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in six dayes, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation.
To this end the Jews had a Sabbath every seventh day, on which the Law was read and explained. In its solemn observance they were reminded that their King was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested on the seventh; and, by their resting on it from their labor, that their King was the God who redeemed them from their servile and painful labor in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves through lawful recreation.
So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all, in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have Soveraign Power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.
So the first table of the Commandments is spent entirely in setting down the sum of God’s absolute power—not only as God, but as King of the Jews in particular, by covenant. It may therefore give light to those on whom sovereign power has been conferred by the consent of men, so that they see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.
And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education.
And because the first instruction of children depends on the care of their parents, it is necessary that children be obedient to them while they are under their tutelage; and not only that, but also that afterward (as gratitude requires) they acknowledge the benefit of their upbringing by outward signs of honor. To this end they are to be taught that originally every man’s father was also his sovereign lord, with power of life and death over him; and that when fathers of families resigned that absolute power by instituting a commonwealth, it was never intended that they should lose the honor due to them for bringing up their children.
For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.
For giving up that right was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power. Nor would there be any reason why a man should want to have children, or take the trouble to feed and instruct them, if he were afterward to have no more benefit from them than from other men. And this agrees with the fifth commandment.
Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which (consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much asto say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbours, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, in most men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods.
Again, every sovereign ought to have justice taught. Since justice consists in taking from no man what is his, this is as much as to say that he ought to have men taught not to deprive their neighbors, by violence or fraud, of anything that is theirs by the sovereign authority. Of the things a man owns, those dearest to him are his own life and limbs; next, in most men, those that concern married love; and after them, riches and the means of living. Therefore the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to one another’s persons by private revenge, from violating the honor of marriage, and from forcible robbery and fraudulent theft of one another’s goods.
For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.
For the same purpose it is also necessary that they be shown the evil consequences of false judgment through the corruption of either judges or witnesses, by which the distinction of property is taken away and justice becomes of no effect. All these things are implied in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of the second Table; which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe: as the summe of the first Table is reduced to the love of God; whom they had then newly received as their King.
Lastly, they are to be taught that not only unjust deeds, but the designs and intentions to do them (even if accidentally prevented), are injustice, which consists in the depravity of the will as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth commandment and the sum of the second table, which is all reduced to this one commandment of mutual charity: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself”—just as the sum of the first table is reduced to the love of God, whom they had then newly received as their King.
As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so many Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them.
As for the means and channels by which the people may receive this instruction, we must look into how so many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind, resting on weak and false principles, have nevertheless been so deeply rooted in them.
I mean those, which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own Consciences; that is to say, by their own private Judgements: That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means.
I mean those I specified in the preceding chapter: that men are to judge what is lawful and unlawful not by the law itself but by their own consciences, that is, by their own private judgments; that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the commonwealth unless they have first judged them lawful themselves; that their property in their riches is such as to exclude the dominion the commonwealth has over it; that it is lawful for subjects to kill those they call tyrants; that the sovereign power may be divided; and the like. These come to be instilled into the people in the following way.
They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves.
Those whom necessity or greed keeps intent on their trades and labor, and, on the other side, those whom abundance or laziness carries off after their sensual pleasures (these two sorts of men make up the greater part of mankind), are diverted from the deep reflection that learning the truth necessarily requires—not only in matters of natural justice but in all other sciences. So they receive their notions of their duty chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from those of their neighbors or acquaintances who, having a ready and plausible way of talking, seem wiser and better learned in cases of law and conscience than themselves.
And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been published. It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some man say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions.
And the divines, and others who make a show of learning, get their knowledge from the universities and the schools of law, or from books published by men eminent in those schools and universities. It is therefore evident that the instruction of the people depends wholly on the right teaching of young men in the universities. But (someone may say) are the universities of England not learned enough already to do that? Or are you going to undertake to teach the universities? Hard questions.
Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry the eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true.
Yet to the first I do not hesitate to answer that until toward the end of the reign of Henry VIII, the power of the Pope was always upheld against the power of the commonwealth, principally by the universities; and that the doctrines maintained against the sovereign power of the King by so many preachers, and by so many lawyers and others who were educated there, are sufficient evidence that, though the universities were not the authors of those false doctrines, they did not know how to plant the true ones.
For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and ’tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.
For amid such a contradiction of opinions, it is quite certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and it is no wonder if they still retain a taste of that subtle liquor, hostile to the civil authority, with which they were first seasoned. But as to the second question, it is neither fitting nor necessary for me to say yes or no. For anyone who sees what I am doing can easily perceive what I think.
Equal justice and equal taxes
Justice and taxes must fall equally on rich and poor, and the helpless must be provided for.
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People.
The safety of the people further requires, from the one or ones who hold the sovereign power, that justice be administered equally to all ranks of people: that is, that the rich and mighty as well as poor and obscure persons may have redress for the injuries done to them, so that the great may have no greater hope of impunity when they do violence, dishonor, or any injury to those of lower rank than when one of these does the like to one of them. For in this consists equity, to which, as a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject as the lowest of his people.
All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe, according to his own diseretion. But an offence against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.
All breaches of the law are offenses against the commonwealth, but some are also against private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth alone may be pardoned without breach of equity, for every man may pardon what is done against himself, at his own discretion. But an offense against a private man cannot in equity be pardoned without the consent of the injured party, or reasonable compensation.
The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner.
The inequality of subjects proceeds from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign—that is, in a court of justice—than the inequality between kings and their subjects has in the presence of the King of kings. The honor of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence and the help they give to men of lower rank, or not at all. And the violence, oppression, and injuries they commit are not lessened but aggravated by the greatness of their persons, because they have the least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality toward the great proceed in this way.
Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the ruine of the Common wealth.
Impunity breeds insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavor to pull down all oppressive and contemptuous greatness, even at the cost of ruining the commonwealth.
To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes; the Equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them.
To equal justice belongs also the equal imposition of taxes. Their equality depends not on equality of wealth but on the equality of the debt every man owes to the commonwealth for his defense. It is not enough for a man to labor to maintain his life; he must also fight, if need be, to secure his labor. People must either do as the Jews did when they rebuilt the Temple after their return from captivity—build with one hand and hold the sword in the other—or else hire others to fight for them.
For the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons, but for many more.
For the taxes laid on the people by the sovereign power are nothing but the wages due to those who hold the public sword, to defend private men in the exercise of their various trades and callings. Since, then, the benefit everyone receives from it is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich, the debt a poor man owes those who defend his life is the same as a rich man owes for the defense of his—except that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons but for many more.
Which considered, the Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reasonis there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious waste of private men.
This considered, equality of taxation consists in the equality of what is consumed rather than of the riches of those who consume it. For what reason is there that someone who labors much and, saving the fruits of his labor, consumes little, should be charged more than someone who, living idly, earns little and spends all he gets—since the one has no more protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when taxes are laid on the things men consume, every man pays equally for what he uses; nor is the commonwealth defrauded by the extravagant waste of private men.
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require, by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.
And since many men, through unavoidable accident, become unable to support themselves by their labor, they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons, but to be provided for by the laws of the commonwealth, as far as the necessities of nature require. For as it is uncharitable in any man to neglect the helpless, so it is in the sovereign of a commonwealth to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity.
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season.
But for those who have strong bodies, the case is different: they are to be made to work. And to remove the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be laws that encourage every kind of skill, such as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and every kind of manufacture that requires labor. If the multitude of poor yet strong people keeps increasing, they are to be moved into countries not sufficiently inhabited. There, however, they are not to exterminate those they find, but to make them live closer together and not roam over a great deal of ground to snatch what they find, but to tend each little plot with skill and labor, so that it gives them their sustenance in due season.
And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death.
And when all the world is overburdened with inhabitants, the last remedy of all is war, which provides for every man, by victory or death.
Good laws, punishments, and counselors
Good laws are needful and clear; punishments, rewards, and counsel must serve the public good.
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a. Just Law: for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law is that, which is Needfull, for the Good of the People, and withall Perspicuous.
To the care of the sovereign belongs the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law I do not mean a just law, for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such power is warranted and owned by every one of the people; and what every man wills to be so, no man can say is unjust. It is with the laws of a commonwealth as with the rules of a game: whatever the players all agree on is injustice to none of them. A good law is one that is needful for the good of the people, and at the same time perspicuous, that is, clear.
For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated.
For the use of laws (which are only authorized rules) is not to restrain the people from all voluntary actions, but to direct them and keep them in such a course as not to hurt themselves by their own headlong desires, rashness, or indiscretion—just as hedges are set not to stop travelers but to keep them on the road. And therefore a law that is not needful, lacking the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be thought good when it is for the benefit of the sovereign even though it is not necessary for the people, but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and of the people cannot be separated.
It is a weak Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the People.
It is a weak sovereign who has weak subjects, and a weak people whose sovereign lacks power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws but traps for money. Where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, they are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, they are insufficient to defend the people.
The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator; and the meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes.
Perspicuity consists not so much in the words of the law itself as in a declaration of the causes and motives for which it was made. That is what shows us the meaning of the legislator; and once the meaning of the legislator is known, the law is more easily understood in few words than in many. For all words are subject to ambiguity, and so multiplying words in the body of the law multiplies ambiguity. Besides, it seems to imply (through too much diligence) that whoever can evade the words is outside the reach of the law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary lawsuits.
For when I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.
For when I consider how short the laws of ancient times were, and how they grew gradually longer and longer, I seem to see a contest between those who draft the law and those who plead it—the former trying to hem in the latter, and the latter trying to slip out of their restrictions—and the pleaders have won. It therefore belongs to the office of a legislator (who in every commonwealth is the supreme representative, whether one man or an assembly) to make clear the reason why the law was made, and to make the body of the law itself as short as possible, but in terms as proper and meaningful as possible.
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved.
It also belongs to the office of the sovereign to apply punishments and rewards rightly. And since the end of punishment is not revenge and the venting of anger, but correction—either of the offender or of others by his example—the severest punishments are to be inflicted for the crimes that are most dangerous to the public: such as those that proceed from malice toward the established government; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that provoke indignation in the multitude; and those that, left unpunished, seem authorized, as when they are committed by the sons, servants, or favorites of men in authority. For indignation carries men not only against the actors and authors of injustice, but against all power that is likely to protect them—as in the case of Tarquin, when for the insolent act of one of his sons he was driven out of Rome and the monarchy itself was dissolved.
But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People, when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example. To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.
But for crimes of infirmity—such as those that proceed from great provocation, great fear, great need, or from ignorance of whether the deed is a great crime or not—there is often room for leniency without harm to the commonwealth; and leniency, where there is room for it, is required by the law of nature. It is the punishment of the leaders and teachers in a disturbance, not of the poor misled people, that can profit the commonwealth by its example. To be severe to the people is to punish an ignorance that may in large part be charged to the sovereign, whose fault it was that they were not better instructed.
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better.
In the same way, it belongs to the office and duty of the sovereign always to apply his rewards so that benefit to the commonwealth may arise from them. In this lies their use and end, and it is achieved when those who have served the commonwealth well are rewarded, at as little expense to the common treasury as possible, so well that others are encouraged by it both to serve it as faithfully as they can and to study the skills by which they may be able to do it better.
To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three.
To buy off a popular, ambitious subject with money or promotion, so that he will keep quiet and stop making bad impressions on the minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained not for disservice but for service past). Nor is it a sign of gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit but to the damage of the public. It is a struggle with ambition like that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which had many heads, and for every one that was cut off, three grew back.
For in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all forts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.
For in the same way, when the stubbornness of one popular man is overcome with a reward, many more arise (by the example) who do the same mischief in hope of the same benefit; and like every kind of manufacture, malice too increases by being salable. And though a civil war may sometimes be put off by such means, the danger keeps growing, and the public ruin becomes more certain. It is therefore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those who aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, rather than to oppose the beginnings of such men at a little danger than later, after a longer time, at a greater one.
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, is of a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled.
Another business of the sovereign is to choose good counselors—I mean those whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth. For this word counsel, consilium, corrupted from considium, has a broad meaning, and includes all assemblies of men who sit together, not only to deliberate what is to be done in the future, but also to judge of past facts and of the law for the present. I take it here only in the first sense. And in this sense there is no choice of counsel either in a democracy or an aristocracy, because the persons counseling are members of the person counseled.
The choyce of Counsellours therefore is proper to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth.
The choice of counselors is therefore proper to monarchy. In it, the sovereign who does not try to choose those who are most able in every kind does not perform his office as he ought. The most able counselors are those who have the least hope of benefit from giving bad counsel, and the most knowledge of the things that lead to the peace and defense of the commonwealth.
It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse.
It is a hard matter to know who expects benefit from public troubles. But the signs that lead to a just suspicion are the soothing of the people in their unreasonable or irremediable grievances by men whose estates are not sufficient to meet their accustomed expenses—and these can easily be observed by anyone whom it concerns to know it. But to know who has the most knowledge of public affairs is harder still; and those who know them need them a great deal less.
For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it.
For to know who knows the rules of almost any art is to have a large part of the knowledge of that art, because no man can be sure of the truth of another’s rules unless he has first been taught to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art are long practice in it and constant good results from it.
Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two.
Good counsel does not come by lot or by inheritance. There is therefore no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matters of state than in laying out the dimensions of a fortress—unless we think that the study of politics needs no method (as the study of geometry does), but only watching from the sidelines; which is not so. For politics is the harder study of the two.
Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the Posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, then adhaereth naturally to their abilities.
In these parts of Europe it has been taken to be the right of certain persons to have a place in the highest council of state by inheritance. This derives from the conquests of the ancient Germans, in which many absolute lords joined together to conquer other nations and would not enter the confederacy without such privileges as might in time to come be marks of difference between their descendants and the descendants of their subjects. These privileges, being inconsistent with the sovereign power, they may seem to keep by the favor of the sovereign; but if they contend for them as their right, they must gradually let them go, and have at last no more honor than naturally attaches to their abilities.
And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.
And however able the counselors in any business may be, the benefit of their counsel is greater when each gives his advice and his reasons for it separately than when they do so in an assembly by way of speeches, and when they have thought beforehand than when they speak on the spur of the moment. This is both because they have more time to survey the consequences of action, and because they are less likely to be carried into contradiction through envy, rivalry, or other passions arising from difference of opinion.
The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.
The best counsel in things that concern not other nations, but only the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy through laws that look only inward, is to be taken from the general reports and complaints of the people of each province. They are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore to be diligently attended to when they demand nothing that detracts from the essential rights of sovereignty. For without those essential rights (as I have often said before), the commonwealth cannot subsist at all.
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent Souldiers.
A commander in chief of an army, if he is not popular, will not be loved or feared by his army as he ought to be, and consequently cannot perform that office successfully. He must therefore be industrious, brave, affable, generous, and fortunate, so that he may win a reputation both for competence and for loving his soldiers. This is popularity. It breeds in the soldiers both the desire and the courage to recommend themselves to his favor, and it protects the general’s severity in punishing (when need is) mutinous or negligent soldiers.
But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when it it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull Subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.
But this love of soldiers, unless there is some security for the commander’s loyalty, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power—especially when that power is in the hands of an assembly that is not popular. It therefore concerns the safety of the people that those to whom the sovereign commits his armies be both good commanders and faithful subjects.
But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular; that is, reverenced and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving them.
But when the sovereign himself is popular—that is, revered and loved by his people—there is no danger at all from the popularity of a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust as to side with their captain against their sovereign, even though they love him, when they love not only the sovereign’s person but also his cause. And therefore those who have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign by violence have always been put to the trouble of devising titles for themselves before they could settle in his place, to save the people from the shame of accepting them.
To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.
To have a known right to sovereign power is so popular a quality that the one who has it needs nothing more, on his own part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, than that they see him able to govern his own household absolutely; nor, on the part of his enemies, anything more than the disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most active part of mankind has never yet been well content with the present.
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.
Concerning the duties of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in the law commonly called the law of nations, I need say nothing here, because the law of nations and the law of nature are the same thing. And every sovereign has the same right in procuring the safety of his people that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body.
And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.
And the same law that dictates to men who have no civil government what they ought to do and what to avoid in regard to one another dictates the same to commonwealths—that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies. For there is no court of natural justice except in the conscience alone, where not man but God reigns. His laws (those of them that oblige all mankind) are natural with respect to God as the Author of nature, and laws with respect to the same God as King of kings. But of the Kingdom of God, as King of kings and also as King of a particular people, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.
Chapter 31: Of the Kingdom of God by nature
To know what the laws of God are, Hobbes considers God’s natural kingdom.
That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill duty, to know what are those Lawes of God.
That the condition of mere nature—that is, of absolute liberty, such as belongs to those who are neither sovereigns nor subjects—is anarchy and the condition of war; that the precepts by which men are guided to avoid that condition are the laws of nature; that a commonwealth without sovereign power is only a word without substance, and cannot stand; that subjects owe sovereigns simple obedience in all things in which their obedience is not contrary to the laws of God—all this I have sufficiently proved in what I have already written. All that is lacking for a complete knowledge of civil duty is to know what those laws of God are.
For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare of offending God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.
For without that, a man does not know, when the civil power commands him to do anything, whether it is contrary to the law of God or not. And so he either offends the Divine Majesty by too much civil obedience, or, through fear of offending God, transgresses the commandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know what the divine laws are. And since the knowledge of all law depends on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say something in what follows of the Kingdom of God.
God is King, let the Earth rejoyce, saith the Psalmist. And again, God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved. Whether men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of the word.
“The Lord is King; let the earth rejoice,” says the Psalmist. And again: “The Lord is King, though the nations be angry; he sits between the cherubim, though the earth be moved.” Whether men will or not, they must always be subject to the divine power. By denying the existence or the providence of God, men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke. But to call this power of God, which extends not only to man but also to beasts, plants, and inanimate bodies, by the name of kingdom is only a metaphorical use of the word.
For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings.
For only he is properly said to reign who governs his subjects by his word, by promising rewards to those who obey it, and by threatening punishment to those who do not. The subjects in the Kingdom of God, therefore, are not inanimate bodies or irrational creatures, because they understand no precepts as his. Nor are they atheists, or those who do not believe that God has any care for the actions of mankind, because they acknowledge no word as his, nor have hope of his rewards or fear of his threats.
They therefore that believe there is a God that goeverneth the world, and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.
Those, therefore, who believe there is a God who governs the world and has given precepts and set forth rewards and punishments for mankind are God’s subjects; all the rest are to be understood as enemies.
To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known; for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man. But God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, by Revelation, and by the Voyce of some man, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest.
To rule by words requires that such words be clearly made known; otherwise they are no laws. For a sufficient and clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance, belongs to the nature of laws. In human laws this is of only one kind: proclamation, or promulgation by the voice of man. But God declares his laws in three ways: by the dictates of natural reason, by revelation, and by the voice of some man to whom, by the working of miracles, he procures credit with the rest.
From hence there ariseth a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith. As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things.
From this arises a threefold word of God—rational, sensible, and prophetic—to which corresponds a threefold hearing: right reason, supernatural sense, and faith. As for supernatural sense, which consists in revelation or inspiration, no universal laws have been given in that way, because God speaks in that manner only to particular persons, and to different men different things.
From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word, Rationall, and Prophetique, there may be attributed to God, a twofold Kingdome, Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to speak in this Chapter.
From the difference between the other two kinds of God’s word, rational and prophetic, a twofold kingdom may be attributed to God, natural and prophetic. In the natural kingdom he governs as many of mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the natural dictates of right reason. In the prophetic kingdom, having chosen one particular nation (the Jews) for his subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not only by natural reason but by positive laws, which he gave them through the mouths of his holy prophets. I intend to speak of the natural Kingdom of God in this chapter.
The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign Right ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every one to reigne over all the rest.
The right of nature by which God reigns over men, and punishes those who break his laws, is to be derived not from his creating them—as if he required obedience as gratitude for his benefits—but from his irresistible power. I have shown earlier how sovereign right arises from covenant. To show how the same right may arise from nature requires no more than showing in what case it is never taken away. Since all men by nature had a right to all things, each of them had a right to reign over all the rest.
But because this Right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men (with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent.
But because this right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of everyone to lay that right aside and set up men (with sovereign authority) by common consent to rule and defend them. Whereas if there had been any man of irresistible power, there would have been no reason why he should not by that power have ruled and defended both himself and them at his own discretion. To those whose power is irresistible, therefore, dominion over all men belongs naturally, by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongs naturally to God Almighty—not as Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent.
And though Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.
And though punishment is due only for sin, because that word means affliction for sin, yet the right of afflicting is not always derived from men’s sin, but from God’s power.
This question, Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer Adversity, has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same with this of ours, by what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and Adversities of this life; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence.
This question, why evil men often prosper and good men suffer adversity, was much disputed by the ancients, and is the same as ours: by what right God dispenses the prosperities and adversities of this life. It is so difficult that it has shaken the faith in divine providence not only of ordinary people but of philosophers and, what is more, of the saints.
How Good (saith David) is the God of Israel to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity. And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the case of Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job’s Sinne, but his own Power.
“How good,” says David, “is the God of Israel to those who are upright in heart; and yet my feet had almost gone, my steps had well-nigh slipped; for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly in such prosperity.” And Job—how earnestly he remonstrates with God over the many afflictions he suffered despite his righteousness! In Job’s case, this question is decided by God himself, not by arguments drawn from Job’s sin, but from his own power.
For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by the conscience of his Innocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter, and having justified the Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power, such as this, Where wast thou when I layd the foundations of the earth, and the like, both approved Job’s Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous doctrine of his friends.
For whereas Job’s friends argued from his affliction to his sin, and he defended himself by the consciousness of his innocence, God himself takes up the matter. Having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from his power, such as “Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?” and the like, he both approved Job’s innocence and rebuked the erroneous doctrine of his friends.
Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made manifest in him. And though it be said, That Death entred into the world by sinne, (by which is meant that if Adam had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule from his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.
In agreement with this doctrine is the saying of our Savior about the man who was born blind, in these words: “Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him.” And though it is said that “death entered into the world by sin” (meaning that if Adam had never sinned he would never have died—that is, never have suffered any separation of his soul from his body), it does not follow that God could not justly have afflicted him even if he had not sinned, just as he afflicts other living creatures that cannot sin.
Natural worship of God
Reason teaches which attributes and acts of worship honor God.
Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded onely on Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one man to another, or the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign. The first are the same Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the 14. and 15. Chapters of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues. It remaineth therefore that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching the Honour and Worship of the Divine Majesty.
Having spoken of the right of God’s sovereignty as grounded on nature alone, we must next consider what the divine laws, or dictates of natural reason, are. These laws concern either the natural duties of one man to another, or the honor naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The first are the same laws of nature I have already discussed in chapters 14 and 15 of this treatise: namely, equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remains, therefore, to consider what precepts are dictated to men by their natural reason alone, without any other word of God, concerning the honor and worship of the Divine Majesty.
Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it.
Honor consists in the inward thought and opinion of another’s power and goodness; and therefore to honor God is to think as highly of his power and goodness as is possible. And the outward signs of that opinion appearing in men’s words and actions are called worship, which is one part of what the Latins understand by the word cultus. For cultus properly and consistently means the labor a man bestows on anything with the aim of getting benefit from it.
Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, according to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit.
Now the things we get benefit from are either subject to us, so that the profit they yield follows the labor we bestow on them as a natural effect; or else they are not subject to us, but respond to our labor according to their own wills. In the first sense, the labor bestowed on the earth is called culture, and the education of children a culture of their minds. In the second sense, where men’s wills are to be worked to our purpose not by force but by pleasing them, it means the same as courting—that is, winning favor by good offices: by praise, by acknowledging their power, and by whatever is pleasing to those from whom we look for any benefit.
And this is properly Worship: in which sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People; and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.
And this is properly worship: in which sense Publicola is understood to mean a worshipper of the people, and cultus Dei the worship of God.
From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodnesse, arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse; and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are signified both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The opinion of the Happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words.
From inward honor, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness, arise three passions: love, which has reference to goodness, and hope and fear, which relate to power. And there are three parts of outward worship: praise, magnifying, and blessing. The subject of praise is goodness; the subject of magnifying and blessing is power, and its effect, felicity. Praise and magnifying are signified by both words and actions: by words, when we say a man is good or great; by actions, when we thank him for his bounty and obey his power. The opinion of another’s happiness can be expressed only by words.
There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall, and the like; and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary Worship.
Some signs of honor (both in attributes and in actions) are so by nature: among attributes, good, just, generous, and the like; and among actions, prayers, thanks, and obedience. Others are so by the institution or custom of men, and at some times and places are honorable, at others dishonorable, at others indifferent—such as the gestures used in greeting, prayer, and thanksgiving, which differ in different times and places. The former is natural worship, the latter arbitrary worship.
And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gesture, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are no Worship; because no signes of Honour; and no signes of Honour; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.
Arbitrary worship has two varieties, for sometimes it is commanded and sometimes voluntary worship. It is commanded when it is such as the one worshipped requires; free, when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, the worship consists not in the words or gestures but in the obedience. But when it is free, the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders. For if the words or actions by which we intend honor seem ridiculous to them and tend toward insult, they are no worship, because they are no signs of honor; and they are no signs of honor because a sign is not a sign to the one who gives it, but to the one to whom it is made—that is, to the spectator.
Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.
Again, there is public and private worship. Public worship is what a commonwealth performs as one person. Private worship is what a private person displays. Public worship, with respect to the whole commonwealth, is free; but with respect to particular men it is not. Private worship is free in secret; but in the sight of the multitude it is never without some restraint, either from the laws or from men’s opinion, which is contrary to the nature of liberty.
The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them.
The end of worship among men is power. For when a man sees another worshipped, he supposes him powerful and is the readier to obey him, which makes his power greater. But God has no ends. The worship we give him proceeds from our duty, and is directed, according to our capacity, by those rules of honor that reason dictates the weak should observe toward more powerful men, in hope of benefit, for fear of harm, or in thankfulness for good already received from them.
That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.
So that we may know what worship of God the light of nature teaches us, I will begin with his attributes. Here, first, it is evident that we ought to attribute existence to him. For no man can have the will to honor what he thinks has no being.
Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.
Second, those philosophers who said the world, or the soul of the world, was God spoke unworthily of him and denied his existence. For by God is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is God is to say it has no cause—that is, that there is no God.
Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.
Third, to say the world was not created but eternal (since what is eternal has no cause) is to deny there is a God.
Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from him the care of Man-kind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.
Fourth, those who, attributing ease to God (as they think), take from him the care of mankind, take from him his honor. For that takes away men’s love and fear of him, which is the root of honor.
Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more.
Fifth, in things that signify greatness and power, to say he is finite is not to honor him. For it is not a sign of the will to honor God to attribute less to him than we can; and finite is less than we can, because to what is finite it is easy to add more.
Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is Finite:
Therefore to attribute figure, or shape, to him is not honor, for all figure is finite;
Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:
nor to say that we conceive or imagine him, or have an idea of him in our mind, for whatever we conceive is finite;
Nor to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes onely of things Finite:
nor to attribute to him parts or totality, which are attributes only of finite things;
Nor to say he is in this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded, and Finite:
nor to say he is in this or that place, for whatever is in a place is bounded and finite;
Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to him Place:
nor that he is moved or rests, for both these attributes ascribe place to him;
Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all Finite: for there cannot be more than one Infinite:
nor that there are more gods than one, because that implies they are all finite, for there cannot be more than one infinite;
Nor to ascribe to him (unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect) Passions that partake of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger Mercy: or of Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty: For Passion, is Power limited by somewhat else.
nor to ascribe to him (except metaphorically, meaning not the passion but the effect) passions that partake of grief, such as repentance, anger, mercy; or of want, such as appetite, hope, desire; or any passive faculty. For passion is power limited by something else.
And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood, as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he effecteth every thing.
And therefore when we ascribe a will to God, it is not to be understood like that of man, as a rational appetite, but as the power by which he brings about everything.
Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him.
Likewise when we attribute to him sight and other acts of sense, and also knowledge and understanding—which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press on the organic parts of a man’s body. For there is no such thing in God; and since these things depend on natural causes, they cannot be attributed to him.
Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by naturall Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infinite, Eternall, Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, most Great, and the like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can: For there is but one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.
Whoever will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must use either negative attributes, such as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or superlatives, such as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite ones, such as good, just, holy, creator. And he must use them in such a sense as not to declare what God is (for that would be to confine him within the limits of our imagination), but how much we admire him and how ready we would be to obey him. That is a sign of humility, and of a will to honor him as much as we can. For there is only one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that is I AM; and only one name for his relation to us, and that is God, in which are contained Father, King, and Lord.
Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall Precept of Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God; such as are, First, Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were thought to make them Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.
Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept of reason that they be signs of the intention to honor God. Such are, first, prayers. For it was not the carvers, when they made images, who were thought to make them gods, but the people who prayed to them.
Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship, no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the benefit; the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God, for Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.
Second, thanksgiving, which differs from prayer in divine worship only in that prayers come before the benefit and thanks come after it. The aim of both is to acknowledge God as the author of all benefits, past as well as future.
Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations, (if they be of the best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.
Third, gifts—that is to say, sacrifices and offerings (if they are of the best)—are signs of honor, for they are thanksgivings.
Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Honour: for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengeance on the perjured.
Fourth, not to swear by anyone but God is naturally a sign of honor. For it is a confession that God alone knows the heart, and that no man’s wit or strength can protect a man against God’s vengeance on the perjured.
Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately of God; for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his Power. Hence followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain: And it is to no purpose, unlesse it be by way of Oath, and by order of the Common-wealth, to make Judgements certain; or between Common-wealths, to avoyd Warre.
Fifth, it is a part of rational worship to speak of God with consideration, for it argues a fear of him, and fear is a confession of his power. From this it follows that the name of God is not to be used rashly and to no purpose, for that is the same as using it in vain. And it is to no purpose unless it is by way of an oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make judgments certain; or between commonwealths, to avoid war.
And that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to his Honour: For it is supposed, that in this naturall Kingdome of God, there is no other way to know any thing, but by naturall Reason; that is, from the Principles of naturall Science; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living.
It follows also that disputing about God’s nature is contrary to his honor. For it is supposed that in this natural Kingdom of God there is no other way to know anything but by natural reason—that is, from the principles of natural science. And these are so far from teaching us anything about God’s nature that they cannot teach us our own nature, or the nature of the smallest living creature.
And therefore, when men out of the Principlès of naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God, they but dishonour him: For in the Attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of Philosophicall Truth; but the signification of Pious Intention, to do him the greatest Honour we are able. From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the Nature of God, that tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his Sacred Name.
And therefore, when men dispute about the attributes of God from the principles of natural reason, they only dishonor him. For in the attributes we give to God we are not to consider the signification of philosophical truth, but the signification of a pious intention to do him the greatest honor we are able. From the lack of this consideration have come the volumes of disputation about the nature of God that tend not to his honor but to the honor of our own wits and learning, and are nothing but thoughtless and vain abuses of his sacred name.
Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgiving, Offerings and Sacrifices, it is a Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and most significant of Honour. As for example, that Prayers, and Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor Plebeian; but beautifull, and well composed; For else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the Heathens did absurdly, to worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse, and with Musick, both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable.
Sixth, in prayers, thanksgivings, offerings, and sacrifices, it is a dictate of natural reason that each be the best of its kind and the most expressive of honor. For example, prayers and thanksgivings should be made in words and phrases that are not hasty, nor frivolous, nor vulgar, but beautiful and well composed; otherwise we do not do God as much honor as we can. And so the heathens acted absurdly in worshiping images as gods; but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voices and of instruments, was reasonable.
Also that the Beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their actions in Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.
Also, that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, the gifts they offered, and their actions in worship were full of submission and commemorated benefits received—this was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honor him.
Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without that, (that which in honour is most acceptable) the procuring others to honour him, is lost.
Seventh, reason directs us to worship God not only in secret but also, and especially, in public and in the sight of men. For without that, what is most acceptable in honoring—the bringing of others to honor him—is lost.
Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes of Nature,) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is more acceptable to God than Sacrifice; so also to set light by his Commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall Reason dictateth to private men.
Lastly, obedience to his laws (that is, in this case, to the laws of nature) is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice, so also to make light of his commandments is the greatest of all insults. And these are the laws of that divine worship which natural reason dictates to private men.
But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.
But since a commonwealth is only one person, it ought also to offer God only one worship. It does this when it commands that worship to be offered publicly by private men. And this is public worship, whose property is to be uniform; for actions done differently by different men cannot be said to be a public worship. And therefore, where many kinds of worship are allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private men, it cannot be said that there is any public worship, or that the commonwealth is of any religion at all.
And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have their signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those Attributes are to be held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no Law but Reason, may be done by the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes Civill. And because a Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power; it followeth, that those Attributes which the Soveraign ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.
Words (and consequently the attributes of God) have their signification by the agreement and institution of men. So those attributes are to be held signs of honor that men intend shall be so; and whatever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the will of the commonwealth through civil laws. And since a commonwealth has no will, and makes no laws, except those made by the will of him or them that have the sovereign power, it follows that the attributes which the sovereign ordains as signs of honor in the worship of God ought to be taken and used as such by private men in their public worship.
But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some are Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later (which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence) cannot be made by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of Gods Worship, are to be taken and used for such by the Subjects.
But not all actions are signs by institution. Some are naturally signs of honor, and others of insult. The latter (those which men are ashamed to do in the sight of those they revere) cannot be made a part of divine worship by human power; nor can the former (such as decent, modest, humble behavior) ever be separated from it. But there are an infinite number of actions and gestures of an indifferent nature; and whichever of them the commonwealth ordains to be used publicly and universally as signs of honor, and as part of God’s worship, are to be taken and used as such by the subjects.
And that which is said in the Scripture, It is better to obey God than men, hath place in the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.
And what is said in Scripture, “It is better to obey God than men,” has its place in the Kingdom of God by covenant, not by nature.
Natural punishments
Hobbes ends with natural punishments and his hope that a sovereign will read this book.
Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his Naturall Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more Harme than Good.
Having thus spoken briefly of the natural Kingdom of God and his natural laws, I will add to this chapter only a short account of his natural punishments. There is no action of man in this life that is not the beginning of so long a chain of consequences that no human foresight is high enough to give a man a view of its end. And in this chain both pleasing and unpleasing events are linked together, in such a way that he who will do anything for his pleasure must bind himself to suffer all the pains attached to it. And these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good.
And hereby it comes to passe, that Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.
And so it comes about that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mishaps; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppression; negligent government by princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter. For since punishments follow on the breach of laws, natural punishments must follow naturally on the breach of the laws of nature, and therefore follow them as their natural, not arbitrary, effects.
And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the Principles of Naturall Reason. And now, considering how different this Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world, especially of these Western parts, that have received their Morall learning from Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy is required, in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, as the Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers.
So much, then, concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this doctrine is from the practice of the greater part of the world—especially of these western parts, which have received their moral learning from Rome and Athens—and how much depth of moral philosophy is required in those who administer the sovereign power, I am close to believing this labor of mine as useless as Plato’s Republic. For he too is of the opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of states, and changes of government by civil war, ever to be removed until sovereigns are philosophers.
But when I consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interessed, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.
But when I consider again that the science of natural justice is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; that they need not be burdened with the mathematical sciences (as Plato burdens them) beyond encouraging men to study them by good laws; and that neither Plato nor any other philosopher up to now has set in order, and sufficiently or even probably proved, all the theorems of moral doctrine, from which men may learn both how to govern and how to obey—then I recover some hope that at one time or another this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself (for it is short, and I think clear), without the help of any interested or envious interpreter; and who, by the exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting the public teaching of it, will convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice.
Part III: Of a Christian Commonwealth
How Scripture, prophecy, the kingdom of God and church power fit within civil sovereignty.
Chapter 32: Of the principles of Christian politics
Hobbes turns from natural reason to prophecy, and asks how anyone can know that God has spoken.
I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of Subjects hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as Experience has found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is to say, from the nature of Men, known to us by Experience, and from Definitions (of such words as are Essentiall to all Politicall reasoning) universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the Nature and Rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH, whereof there dependeth much upon Supernaturall Revelations of the Will of God; the ground of my Discourse must be, not only the Naturall Word of God, but also the Propheticall.
Up to this point I have derived the rights of sovereign power and the duty of subjects from the principles of nature only—such as experience has found true, or consent (concerning the use of words) has made so. That is to say, I have derived them from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions, universally agreed on, of such words as are essential to all political reasoning. But in what I am to handle next, which is the nature and rights of a Christian commonwealth, much depends on supernatural revelations of the will of God. The ground of my discourse must therefore be not only the natural word of God but also the prophetic.
Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an Implicite aith, but employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion. For though there be many things in Gods Word above Reason; that it is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination.
Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses and experience, nor (what is the undoubted word of God) our natural reason. For they are the talents he has put into our hands to trade with until the coming again of our blessed Savior; and therefore they are not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there are many things in God’s word above reason—that is to say, which cannot be either demonstrated or refuted by natural reason—yet there is nothing contrary to it. When it seems so, the fault lies either in our unskillful interpretation or in erroneous reasoning.
Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words; and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of naturall science. For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.
Therefore, when anything written there is too hard for us to examine, we are told to make our understanding captive to the words, and not to labor at sifting out a philosophical truth by logic from mysteries that are not comprehensible and do not fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick: swallowed whole, they have the power to cure; but chewed, they are for the most part thrown up again without effect.
But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission of the Intellectuall faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the Will to Obedience, where obedience is due. For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them.
But by the captivity of our understanding is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man, but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change. They are always, and necessarily, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest to us; and therefore they are not effects of our will, but our will is an effect of them.
We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the words spoken.
We make our understanding and reason captive, then, when we refrain from contradiction; when we speak as we are commanded (by lawful authority); and when we live accordingly. In sum, this is trust and faith placed in the one who speaks, even though the mind is incapable of forming any notion at all from the words spoken.
When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it.
When God speaks to man, it must be either immediately or through the mediation of another man, to whom he had previously spoken immediately himself. How God speaks to a man immediately may be understood well enough by those to whom he has so spoken; but how another should understand it is hard, if not impossible, to know. For if a man claims to me that God has spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I doubt it, I cannot easily see what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it.
It is true, that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then my reason perswades me. But if one that hath not such authority over me, shall pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or obedience.
It is true that if he is my sovereign, he may oblige me to obedience, so that I do not declare by act or word that I do not believe him; but not to think otherwise than my reason persuades me. But if someone who has no such authority over me makes the same claim, there is nothing that requires either belief or obedience.
For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men.
For to say that God has spoken to him in Holy Scripture is not to say that God has spoken to him immediately, but through the mediation of the prophets, or the apostles, or the Church, in the same way as he speaks to all other Christians.
To say he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more then to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man, that knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation.
To say that God has spoken to him in a dream is no more than to say that he dreamed God spoke to him. That has no force to win belief from any man who knows that dreams are for the most part natural and may proceed from earlier thoughts—and dreams like that one from self-conceit, foolish arrogance, and a false opinion of one’s own godliness or other virtue, by which a man thinks he has deserved the favor of extraordinary revelation.
To say he hath seen a Vision, or heard a Voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which hee can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions, Voice, and Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath so done to him that pretends it; who (being a man) may erre, and (which is more) may lie.
To say he has seen a vision or heard a voice is to say that he has dreamed between sleeping and waking; for in that way a man often naturally takes his dream for a vision, not having noticed that he was dozing. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration is to say that he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can give no natural and sufficient reason. So that although God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration, yet he obliges no man to believe that he has done so to someone who claims it—who, being a man, may err, and (what is more) may lie.
How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey his Word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet? Of 400 Prophets, of whom the K. of Israel asked counsel, concerning the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one. The Prophet that was sent to prophecy against the Altar set up by Ieroboam, though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him.
How then can someone to whom God has never revealed his will immediately (except by way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey, God’s word as delivered by one who says he is a prophet? Of the four hundred prophets whom the king of Israel asked for counsel about the war he made against Ramoth-gilead, only Micaiah was a true one. The prophet who was sent to prophesy against the altar set up by Jeroboam—though a true prophet, and shown by two miracles done in his presence to be a prophet sent from God—was nevertheless deceived by another, old prophet, who persuaded him, as if from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him.
Two marks of a true prophet
A true prophet must both work miracles and teach only the established religion; since miracles have ceased, Scripture suffices.
If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of Reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion than that which is already established. Asunder (I say) neither of these is sufficient. *If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a Dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of amiracle, and the miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c.
If one prophet deceives another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God by any other way than that of reason? To this I answer from Holy Scripture that there are two marks by which, together and not separately, a true prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is not teaching any religion other than the one already established. Separately, I say, neither of these is sufficient. “If a prophet rise among you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall claim to do a miracle, and the miracle comes to pass; if he says, Let us follow strange gods, which you have not known, you shall not listen to him, etc.
But that Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because be hath spoken to you to Revolt from the Lord your God. In which words two things are to be observed; First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the Prophets calling; but (as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses,* yet were great miracles.
But that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he has spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God.” In these words two things are to be observed. First, that God will not have miracles alone serve as arguments to approve a prophet’s calling, but (as it says in the third verse) as a test of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian sorcerers, though not as great as those of Moses, were still great miracles.
Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the King, or him that governeth by the Kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their allegiance. For these words, revolt from the Lord your God, are in this place equivalent to revolt from your King. For they had made God their King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods Commandements to the people.
Second, that however great the miracle may be, if it tends to stir up revolt against the king, or against him who governs by the king’s authority, then the one who does the miracle is to be considered only as sent to make trial of their allegiance. For these words, revolt from the Lord your God, are in this place equivalent to revolt from your king. For they had made God their king by covenant at the foot of Mount Sinai; and he ruled them only through Moses, for Moses alone spoke with God and from time to time declared God’s commandments to the people.
In like manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah, (that is to say, for Gods anointed, whom the nation of the Iews daily expected for their King, but refused when he came,) he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. There shall arise (saith he) false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very Elect. By which it appears, that false Prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are wee not to take their doctrin for Gods Word. St.
In the same way, after our Savior Christ had made his disciples acknowledge him as the Messiah (that is to say, as God’s anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected as their king, but refused when he came), he did not fail to warn them of the danger of miracles. “There shall arise,” he says, “false Christs, and false prophets, and shall do great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very elect.” From this it appears that false prophets may have the power of miracles; yet we are not to take their doctrine for God’s word.
Paul says further to the Galatians, that if himself, or an Angell from heaven preach another Gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed.. That Gospel was, that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the King received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already received Iesus for the Christ, that is to say, for King of the Iews.
St. Paul says further to the Galatians that if he himself, or an angel from heaven, preach another gospel to them than the one he had preached, let him be accursed. That gospel was that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the king they had received is, by the consequence of these words, accursed by St. Paul. For his speech is addressed to those who by his preaching had already received Jesus as the Christ, that is to say, as King of the Jews.
And as Miracles, without preaching that Doctrine which God hath established; so preaching the true Doctrine, without the doing of miracles is an unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation. For if a man that teacheth not false Doctrine, should pretend to bee a Prophet without shewing any Miracle, he is never the more to bee regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deut. 18. v. 21, 22. If thou say in thy heart, How shall we know that the Word (of the Prophet) *is not that which the Lord hath spoken.
And as miracles without the preaching of the doctrine God has established, so the preaching of true doctrine without the doing of miracles is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a man who does not teach false doctrine should claim to be a prophet without showing any miracle, he is not to be regarded any the more for his claim, as is evident from Deuteronomy 18:21–22: “If you say in your heart, How shall we know that the word” (of the prophet) “is not the one the Lord has spoken?
When the Prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to passe, that’s the word which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear him not.* But a man may here again ask, When the Prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know whether it will come to passe or not?
When the prophet has spoken in the name of the Lord something that does not come to pass, that is the word which the Lord has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart; do not fear him.” But here a man may ask again: when the prophet has foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it will come to pass or not?
For he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer then the time of mans life; or indefinitely, that it will come to passe one time or other: in which case this mark of a Prophet is unusefull; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a Prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferr’d event.
For he may foretell it as something to happen after a certain long time, longer than a man’s lifetime; or indefinitely, that it will come to pass at some time or other. In that case this mark of a prophet is useless; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to believe a prophet ought to be confirmed by an immediate event, or one not long delayed.
So that it is manifest, that the teaching of the Religion which God hath established, and the shewing of a present Miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true Prophet, that is to say, immediate Revelation to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith.
So it is plain that the teaching of the religion God has established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks by which Scripture would have a true prophet—that is to say, immediate revelation—acknowledged; neither of them alone being sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he says.
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour, supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want of all other Prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and carefull ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without Enthusiasme, or supernaturall Inspiration, may easily be deduced.
Since miracles have now ceased, therefore, we have no sign left by which to acknowledge the claimed revelations or inspirations of any private man; nor any obligation to listen to any doctrine further than it conforms to the Holy Scriptures. Since the time of our Savior these take the place of all other prophecy and sufficiently make up for its lack; and from them, by wise and learned interpretation and careful reasoning, all the rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and to man may easily be deduced, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration.
And this Scripture is it, out of which I am to take the Principles of my Discourse, concerning the Rights of those that are the Supream Governors on earth, of Christian Common-wealths; and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their Soveraigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next Chapter, of the Books, Writers, Scope and Authority of the Bible.
And it is this Scripture from which I am to take the principles of my discourse concerning the rights of those who are the supreme governors on earth of Christian commonwealths, and the duty of Christian subjects toward their sovereigns. To that end, I shall speak in the next chapter of the books, writers, scope, and authority of the Bible.
Chapter 33: Of the books of Scripture
Only books established by the sovereign are canonical; Hobbes examines who wrote the Old Testament books and when.
By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be the Canon, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life. And because all Rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are Laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question of what is Law throughout all Christendome, both Naturall, and Civill. For though it be not determined in Scripture, what Laws every Christian King shall constitute in his own Dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that Soveraigns in their own Dominions are the sole Legislators; those Books only are Canonicall, that is, Law, in every nation, which are established for such by the Soveraign Authority.
By the books of Holy Scripture are understood those which ought to be the canon, that is to say, the rules of Christian life. And because all rules of life which men are bound in conscience to observe are laws, the question of Scripture is the question of what is law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil. For though Scripture does not determine what laws every Christian king shall make in his own dominions, it does determine what laws he shall not make. Since, therefore, I have already proved that sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators, only those books are canonical—that is, law—in every nation which are established as such by the sovereign authority.
It is true, that God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly Potentate command to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of when, and what God hath said; which to Subjects that have no supernaturall revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason, which guided them, for the obtaining of Peace and Justice, to obey the authority of their severall Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull Soveraigns.
It is true that God is the sovereign of all sovereigns, and therefore when he speaks to any subject he ought to be obeyed, whatever any earthly potentate commands to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of when God has spoken, and what he has said. To subjects who have no supernatural revelation, this cannot be known except by that natural reason which guided them, for the sake of obtaining peace and justice, to obey the authority of their several commonwealths—that is to say, of their lawful sovereigns.
According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other Books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the Authority of the Church of England. What Books these are, is sufficiently known, without a Catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by St. Ierome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdome of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Iudith, Tobias, the first and the second of Maccabees, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew) and the third and fourth of Esdras, for Apocrypha. Of the Canonicall, Iosephus a learned Iew, that wrote in the time of the Emperour Domitian, reckoneth twenty two, making the number agree with the Hebrew Alphabet. St.
According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no books of the Old Testament to be Holy Scripture except those which the authority of the Church of England has commanded to be acknowledged as such. What books these are is well enough known without a list of them here. They are the same ones acknowledged by St. Jerome, who holds the rest—namely, the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobit, the first and second of Maccabees (though he had seen the first in Hebrew), and the third and fourth of Esdras—to be Apocrypha. Of the canonical books, Josephus, a learned Jew who wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian, counts twenty-two, making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet.
Ierome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. For Iosephus numbers five Books of Moses, thirteen of Prophets, that writ the History of their own times (which how it agrees with the Prophets writings contained in the Bible wee shall see hereafter), and four of Hymnes and Morall Precepts. But St. Ierome reckons five Books of Moses, eight of Prophets, and nine of other Holy writ, which he calls of Hagiographa. The Septuagint, who were 70.
St. Jerome does the same, though they count them in a different way. For Josephus numbers five books of Moses, thirteen of prophets who wrote the history of their own times (how this agrees with the prophets’ writings contained in the Bible we shall see later), and four of hymns and moral precepts. But St. Jerome counts five books of Moses, eight of prophets, and nine of other holy writings, which he calls Hagiographa. The Septuagint—who were seventy
learned men of the Iews, sent for by Ptoiemy King of Egypt, to translate the Iewish law, out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are received in the Church of England.
learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the Jewish law from Hebrew into Greek—have left us no other books as Holy Scripture in the Greek tongue than the same ones that are received in the Church of England.
As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all Sects of Christians, that admit any Books at all for Canonicall.
As for the books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged as canon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians that admit any books at all as canonical.
Who were the originall writers of the severall Books of Holy Scripture, has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History, (which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments of naturall Reason: for Reason serves only to convince the truth (not of fact, but) of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this question, must be that which is held out unto us from the Bookes themselves: And this light, though it shew us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unusefull to give us knowledge of the time, wherein they were written.
Who the original writers of the several books of Holy Scripture were has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history (which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can it be by any arguments of natural reason, for reason serves only to establish the truth not of fact but of consequence. The light that must guide us in this question, therefore, must be the one held out to us by the books themselves. And this light, though it does not show us the writer of every book, is still useful for giving us knowledge of the time in which they were written.
And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses; no more than these titles, The Book of Ioshua, the Book of Iudges, the Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by Ioshua, by the Iudges, by Ruth, and by the Kings. For in titles of Books, the subject is marked, as often as the writer. The History of Livy, denotes the Writer; but the History of Scanderbeg, is denominated from the subject. We read in the last Chapter of *Deuteronomie, ver.
And first, as for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses that they are called the five books of Moses; any more than these titles—the Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, the Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings—are sufficient arguments to prove that they were written by Joshua, by the judges, by Ruth, and by the kings. For in the titles of books the subject is indicated as often as the writer. The History of Livy denotes the writer; but The History of Scanderbeg is named from its subject. We read in the last chapter of Deuteronomy, verse
6. concerning the sepulcher of Moses, that no man knoweth of his sepulcher to this day, that is, to the day wherein those words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were written after his interrement. For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophesie), that it was not found to that day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alledged, that the last Chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other man, but the rest not: Let us therefore consider that which we find in the Book of Genesis, chap. 12. ver. 6.
6, concerning the tomb of Moses, that no man knows of his tomb to this day—that is, to the day on which those words were written. It is therefore plain that those words were written after his burial. For it would be a strange interpretation to say that Moses spoke of his own tomb (even by prophecy) as not found to that day, when he was still living. But it may perhaps be argued that only the last chapter, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other man, and the rest not. Let us therefore consider what we find in the Book of Genesis, chapter 12, verse 6:
And Abraham passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was then in the land; which must needs bee the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of Moses, who dyed before he came into it. Likewise Numbers 21. ver. 14. the Writer citeth another more ancient Book, Entituled, The Book of the Warres of the Lord, wherein were registred the Acts of Moses, at the Red-sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five Books of Moses* were written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest.
And Abraham passed through the land to the place of Shechem, to the plain of Moreh; and the Canaanite was then in the land. These must be the words of someone who wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land, and consequently not of Moses, who died before he came into it. Likewise, in Numbers 21:14 the writer cites another, more ancient book, entitled The Book of the Wars of the Lord, in which were recorded the acts of Moses at the Red Sea and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident that the five books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after is not so plain.
But though Moses did not compile those Books entirely, and in the form we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written: as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seemeth, in the 11 of Deuteronomie, and the following Chapters to the 27. which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan. And this also did Moses himself write, and delivered to the Priests and Elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of Tabernacles.
But though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form we have them, yet he wrote everything he is said there to have written. For example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seems, in the eleventh chapter of Deuteronomy and the following chapters to the twenty-seventh, and which was also commanded to be written on stones at their entry into the land of Canaan. This too Moses himself wrote, and delivered to the priests and elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel at their assembling for the Feast of Tabernacles.
And this is that Law which God commanded, that their Kings (when they should have established that form of Government) should take a copy of from the Priests and Levites; and which Moses commanded the Priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Arke; and the same which having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to King Iosias, who causing it to be read to the People, renewed the Covenant between God and them.
And this is the law of which God commanded that their kings (once they had established that form of government) should take a copy from the priests and Levites; and which Moses commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the ark; and the same which, having been lost, was found again a long time afterward by Hilkiah and sent to King Josiah, who had it read to the people and renewed the covenant between God and them.
That the Book of Ioshua was also written long after the time of Ioshua, may be gathered out of many places of the Book it self. Ioshua had set up twelve stones in the middest of Iordan, for a monument of their passage; of which the Writer saith thus, They are there unto this day; for unto this day, is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord, that he had rolled off from the people the Reproach of Egypt, the Writer saith, The place is called Gilgal unto this day; which to have said in the time of Ioshua had been improper.
That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua may be gathered from many places in the book itself. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the middle of the Jordan as a monument of their crossing, and of them the writer says, They are there to this day; for to this day is a phrase that signifies a time past, beyond the memory of man. In the same way, on the Lord’s saying that he had rolled away from the people the reproach of Egypt, the writer says, The place is called Gilgal to this day—which would have been improper to say in the time of Joshua.
So also the name of the Valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the Camp, the Writer saith, remaineth unto this day; which must needs bee therefore long after the time of Ioshua. Arguments of this kind there be many other; as Iosh. 8. 29. 13. 13. 14. 14. 15. 63.
So also the name of the Valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the camp, the writer says remains to this day; which must therefore have been written long after the time of Joshua. There are many other arguments of this kind, such as Joshua 8:29; 13:13; 14:14; 15:63.
The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Iudges, chap. 1. 21, 26. 6. 24. 10. 4. 15. 19. 17. 6. and Ruth 1. 1. but especially Iudg. 18. 30. where it is said, that Jonathan and his sonnes were Priests to the Tribe of Dan, untill the day of the captivity of the land.
The same is plain from similar arguments in the Book of Judges, 1:21, 26; 6:24; 10:4; 15:19; 17:6, and Ruth 1:1; but especially Judges 18:30, where it is said that Jonathan and his sons were priests to the tribe of Dan until the day of the captivity of the land.
That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are the like arguments, 1 Sam. 5. 5. 7. 13, 15. 27. 6. & 30. 25. where, after David had adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded the Ammunition, with them that fought, the Writer saith, He made it a Statute and an Ordinance to Israel to this day. Again, when David (displeased, that the Lord had slain VZZah, for putting out his hand to sustain the Ark,) called the place PereZ-VZZah, the Writer faith, it is called so to this day: the time therefore of the writing of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is, long after the time of David.
That the books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are similar arguments: 1 Samuel 5:5; 7:13, 15; 27:6; and 30:25, where, after David had judged that those who guarded the supplies should have an equal share of the spoils with those who fought, the writer says, He made it a statute and an ordinance to Israel to this day. Again, when David (displeased that the Lord had struck down Uzzah for putting out his hand to steady the ark) called the place Perez-uzzah, the writer says it is called so to this day. The time of the writing of that book must therefore be long after the time of the event—that is, long after the time of David.
As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two Books of the Chronicles, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith, remained till his own days; such as are 1 Kings 9. 13. 9. 21. 10. 12. 12. 19. 2 Kings 2. 22. 8. 22. 10. 27. 14. 7. 16. 6. 17. 23. 17. 34. 17. 41. 1 Chron. 4. 41. 5. 26. It is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon, that the History of them is continued till that time.
As for the two books of Kings and the two books of Chronicles, there are the places that mention monuments which, the writer says, remained until his own day, such as 1 Kings 9:13; 9:21; 10:12; 12:19; 2 Kings 2:22; 8:22; 10:27; 14:7; 16:6; 17:23; 17:34; 17:41; 1 Chronicles 4:41; 5:26. But besides these, it is sufficient argument that they were written after the captivity in Babylon that their history is continued up to that time.
For the Facts Registred are alwaies more ancient than the Register; and much more ancient than such Books as make mention of, and quote the Register; as these Books doe in divers places, referring the Reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of Iuda, to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the Books of the Prophet Samuel, of the Prophet Nathan, of the Prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of Iehdo, to the Books of the Prophet Serveiah, and of the Prophet Addo.
For the facts recorded are always older than the record, and much older than books that mention and cite the record, as these books do in various places, referring the reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah, the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, the books of the prophet Samuel, of the prophet Nathan, and of the prophet Ahijah; to the vision of Iddo; and to the books of the prophet Shemaiah and of the prophet Iddo.
The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses of Ierusalem, the renovation of the Covenant, and ordination of their policy are therein contained.
The books of Ezra and Nehemiah were certainly written after their return from captivity, because they contain their return, the rebuilding of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renewal of the covenant, and the ordering of their polity.
The History of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity; and therefore the Writer must have been of the same time, or after it.
The history of Queen Esther is of the time of the captivity; and therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or later.
The Book of Iob hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written: and though it appear sufficiently (Ezektel 14. 14. and Iames 5. 11.) that he was no fained person; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be a History, but a Treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted; and it is the more probable, because from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of Iob beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St.
The Book of Job has no mark in it of the time in which it was written. And though it appears sufficiently (Ezekiel 14:14 and James 5:11) that Job was not a fictitious person, yet the book itself seems to be not a history but a treatise on a question much disputed in ancient times: why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted. And this is the more probable because from the beginning to the third verse of the third chapter, where Job’s complaint begins, the Hebrew is (as St.
Jerome testifies) in prose; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in Hexameter Verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, but as a Preface in the beginning, and an Epilogue in the end But Verse is no usuall stile of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as come to comfort them, as his friends; but in Philosophy, especially morall Philosophy, in ancient time frequent.
Jerome testifies) in prose; from there to the sixth verse of the last chapter it is in hexameter verse; and the rest of that chapter is prose again. So the dispute is all in verse, and the prose is added only as a preface at the beginning and an epilogue at the end. But verse is not the usual style of those who are themselves in great pain, like Job, or of those who come to comfort them, like his friends; it was, however, frequent in ancient times in philosophy, especially moral philosophy.
The Psalmes were written the most part by David, for the use of the Quire. To these are added some Songs of Moses, and other holy men; and some of them after the return from the Captivity, as the 137. and the 126. whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.
The Psalms were written for the most part by David, for the use of the choir. To these are added some songs of Moses and of other holy men, and some from after the return from the captivity, such as the 137th and the 126th. From this it is plain that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now has, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.
The Proverbs, being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings, partly of Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh, and partly of the Mother of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by Solomon, rather then by Agur, or the Mother of Lemuel; and that, though the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this one Book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them all.
The Proverbs, being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh, and partly of the mother of King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by Solomon rather than by Agur or the mother of Lemuel. And though the sayings are theirs, the collecting or compiling of them into this one book was the work of some other godly man who lived after them all.
The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not Solomons, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions. For The Words of the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem; and, The Song of Songs, which is Solomon’s, seem to have been made for distinctions sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the Law; to the end, that not the Doctrine only, but the Authors also might be extant.
The books of Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs have nothing that was not Solomon’s, except perhaps the titles or inscriptions. For The words of the Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem, and The Song of Songs, which is Solomon’s, seem to have been added for the sake of distinction at the time when the books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the law, so that not only the doctrine but also the authors might be preserved.
Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are Sophoniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Michaiah, who lived in the time of Amaziah, and Azariah, otherwise Ozias, Kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonas is not properly a Register of his Prophecy, (for that is contained in these few words, Fourty dayes and Ninivy shall be destroyed,) but a History or Narration of his frowardnesse and disputing Gods commandements; so that there is small probability he should be the Author, seeing he is the subject of it. But the Book of Amos is his Prophecy.
Of the prophets, the most ancient are Zephaniah, Jonah, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, who lived in the time of Amaziah and Azariah (also called Uzziah), kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonah is not properly a record of his prophecy (which is contained in these few words, Forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed), but a history or narrative of his stubbornness and his disputing of God’s commandments; so there is little probability that he was its author, since he is its subject. But the Book of Amos is his prophecy.
Jeremiah, Abdias, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecyed in the time of Josiah.
Jeremiah, Obadiah, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophesied in the time of Josiah.
Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus, and Zacharias, in the Captivity.
Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, and Zechariah prophesied during the captivity.
When Ioel and Malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings. But considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books, it is manifest enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in the form we have it, after the return of the Iews from their Captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, that caused it to bee translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of Iudea for that purpose.
When Joel and Malachi prophesied is not evident from their writings. But considering the inscriptions, or titles, of their books, it is plain enough that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament was set out in the form we have it after the return of the Jews from their captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, who had it translated into Greek by seventy men sent to him from Judea for that purpose.
And if the Books of Apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the Church, though not for Canonicall, yet for profitable Books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the Scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in, by Esdras; as may appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14. verse 21, 22, &c. where speaking to God, he saith thus, *Thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the works that are to begin.
And if the books of the Apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the Church, not as canonical but as profitable books for our instruction) may be believed on this point, the Scripture was set out in the form we have it by Esdras, as may appear from what he himself says in the second book, chapter 14, verses 21, 22, etc., where, speaking to God, he says: *Your law is burned; therefore no man knows the things which you have done, or the works that are to begin.
But if I have found Grace before thee, send down the holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy Law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the later days, may live. And verse 45. And it came to passe when the forty dayes were fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people.* And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the Bookes of the Old Testament.
But if I have found grace before you, send down the Holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that has been done in the world since the beginning, which were written in your law, that men may find your path, and that those who will live in the latter days may live. And verse 45: And it came to pass, when the forty days were fulfilled, that the Highest spoke, saying, The first that you have written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that you may deliver them only to such as are wise among the people.* And so much concerning the time of the writing of the books of the Old Testament.
The New Testament and the canon
The New Testament writers were early, but the Church's collection of their books came later.
The Writers of the New Testament lived all in lesse then an age after Christs Ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his Disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time wherein the Books of the New Testament were received, and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing, is not altogether so ancient.
The writers of the New Testament all lived within less than a generation after Christ’s ascension, and all of them had seen our Savior or been his disciples, except St. Paul and St. Luke; and consequently whatever was written by them is as ancient as the time of the apostles. But the time at which the books of the New Testament were received and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing is not quite so ancient.
For, as the Bookes of the Old Testament are derived to us, from no other time then that of Esdras, who by the direction of Gods Spirit retrived them, when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, of which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans hand, cannot bee derived from a higher time, than that wherein the Governours of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the writings of those Apostles and Disciples, under whose names they go. The first enumeration of all the Bookes, both of the Old, and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement the first (after St.
For just as the books of the Old Testament come down to us from no earlier time than that of Ezra, who by the direction of God’s Spirit recovered them when they were lost, so those of the New Testament—of which the copies were not many, nor could all easily be in any one private man’s hands—cannot be traced to an earlier time than the one in which the governors of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us as the writings of those apostles and disciples under whose names they go. The first list of all the books, both of the Old and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to have been collected by Clement, the first (after St.
Peter) Bishop of Rome. But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Councell of Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then Christian Churches, for the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles: and this Councell was held in the 364. yeer after Christ.
Peter) bishop of Rome. But because that is only supposed, and questioned by many, the Council of Laodicea is the first we know of that recommended the Bible to the Christian churches of that time as the writings of the prophets and apostles; and this council was held in the year 364 after Christ.
At which time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great Doctors of the Church, as no more to esteem Emperours, though Christian, for the Shepherds of the people, but for Sheep; and Emperours not Christian, for Wolves; and endeavoured to passe their Doctrine, not for Counsell, and Information, as Preachers; but for Laws, as absolute Governours; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian Doctrine, to be pious; yet I am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the Scriptures, though the copies of the Books of the New Testament, were in the hands only of the Ecclesiasticks; because if they had had an intention so to doe, they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over Christian Princes, and Civill Soveraignty, than they are.
At that time ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the Church that they no longer regarded emperors, even Christian ones, as the shepherds of the people, but as sheep, and emperors who were not Christian as wolves. They tried to pass off their doctrine not as counsel and information, as preachers, but as laws, as absolute governors; and they thought such frauds as tended to make the people more obedient to Christian doctrine to be pious. Yet I am persuaded that they did not on that account falsify the Scriptures, though the copies of the books of the New Testament were in the hands of the clergy only. For if they had intended to do so, they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over Christian princes and civil sovereignty than they are.
I see not therefore any reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true Registers of those things, which were done and said by the Prophets, and Apostles. And so perhaps are some of those Books which are called Apocrypha, and left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were not perfect in the Greek tongue.
I see no reason, therefore, to doubt that the Old and New Testaments as we have them now are the true records of those things which were done and said by the prophets and apostles. And so perhaps are some of those books which are called Apocrypha, and left out of the canon not for any disagreement of doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews who were not perfect in the Greek tongue.
For the seventy Interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the Writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a Book Canonicall.
For the seventy interpreters who turned the Bible into Greek were all Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the writer but the authority of the Church that makes a book canonical.
And although these Books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the Rights of the Kingdome of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the Book of Genesis, deriveth the Genealogy of Gods people, from the creation of the World, to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of Moses, contain the Election of God for their King, and the Laws which hee prescribed for their Government: The Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of Gods people, till the time they cast off Gods yoke, and called for a King, after the manner of their neighbour nations:
And although these books were written by different men, it is plain that the writers were all endowed with one and the same Spirit, in that they work together toward one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the rights of the Kingdom of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For the Book of Genesis traces the genealogy of God’s people from the creation of the world to the going into Egypt. The other four books of Moses contain the election of God as their king, and the laws he prescribed for their government. The books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of God’s people until the time they cast off God’s yoke and called for a king, after the manner of their neighboring nations.
The rest of the History of the Old Testament, derives the succession of the line of David, to the Captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the Kingdome of God, even our blessed Saviour God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the Bookes of the Prophets, after whom the Evangelists write his life, and actions, and his claim to the Kingdome, whilst he lived on earth: and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of the Apostles, declare the coming of God, the Holy Ghost, and the Authority he left with them, and their successors, for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles.
The rest of the history of the Old Testament traces the succession of the line of David to the captivity; out of this line was to spring the restorer of the Kingdom of God, our blessed Savior, God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of the prophets. After him the evangelists write his life and actions, and his claim to the kingdom while he lived on earth. And lastly the Acts and Epistles of the apostles declare the coming of God the Holy Spirit, and the authority he left with them and their successors, for the direction of the Jews and for the invitation of the Gentiles.
In summe, the Histories and the Prophecies of the old Testament, and the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God; 1. in Moses, and the Priests; 2. in the man Christ; and 3. in the Apostles and the successors to Apostolicall power. For these three at several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this day.
In sum, the histories and prophecies of the Old Testament, and the gospels and epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same aim: to convert men to the obedience of God—first, in Moses and the priests; second, in the man Christ; and third, in the apostles and the successors to apostolic power. For these three at different times represented the person of God: Moses and his successors, the high priests and kings of Judah, in the Old Testament; Christ himself, in the time he lived on earth; and the apostles and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Spirit descended on them) to this day.
By what authority Scripture is law
The real question is not how we know Scripture is God's word but who makes it law.
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian Religion, From whence the Scriptures derive their Authority; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How wee know them to be the Word of God, or, Why we beleeve them to be so: And the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self is couched. For it is beleeved on all hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God; and consequently the question disputed, is not that.
It is a question much disputed among the various sects of the Christian religion, From where do the Scriptures derive their authority? The question is also sometimes put in other terms, such as, How do we know them to be the word of God? or, Why do we believe them to be so? And the difficulty of resolving it arises chiefly from the impropriety of the words in which the question itself is framed. For it is believed on all sides that the first and original author of them is God; and consequently that is not the question in dispute.
Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our Know edge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our Beleefe; because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one generall answer for them all. The question truly stated is, By what Authority they are made Law.
Again, it is plain that no one can know they are God’s word (though all true Christians believe it) except those to whom God himself has revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly raised about our knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is put about our belief, then because some are moved to believe for one reason and others for other reasons, no one general answer can be given for them all. The question truly stated is, By what authority are they made law?
As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt, but they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is no other Authority, then that of all other Morall Doctrine consonant to Reason; the Dictates whereof are Laws, not made, but Eternall.
Insofar as they do not differ from the laws of nature, there is no doubt that they are the law of God, and carry their authority with them, legible to all men who have the use of natural reason. But this is no authority other than that of all other moral doctrine consonant with reason, whose dictates are laws not made but eternal.
If they be made Law by God himselfe, they are of the nature of written Law, which are Laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he knew not they were his.
If they are made law by God himself, they are of the nature of written law, which is law only to those to whom God has published it so sufficiently that no man can excuse himself by saying he did not know it was his.
He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then that of the Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign, who only has the Legislative power. Again, if it be not the Legislative Authority of the Common-wealth, that giveth them the force of Laws, it must bee some other Authority derived from God, either private, or publique: if private, it obliges onely him, to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveale it.
He to whom God has not supernaturally revealed that they are his, or that those who published them were sent by him, is therefore not obliged to obey them by any authority except that of him whose commands already have the force of laws—that is to say, by no authority other than that of the commonwealth, residing in the sovereign, who alone has the legislative power. Again, if it is not the legislative authority of the commonwealth that gives them the force of laws, it must be some other authority derived from God, either private or public. If private, it obliges only the one to whom in particular God has been pleased to reveal it.
For if every man should be obliged, to take for Gods Law, what particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration, or Revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance, take their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods Spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences,) it were impossible that any Divine Law should be acknowledged.
For if every man were obliged to take as God’s law whatever particular men, on the pretext of private inspiration or revelation, might force on him—among so many men who, out of pride and ignorance, take their own dreams, extravagant fancies, and madness for testimonies of God’s Spirit, or who out of ambition claim such divine testimonies falsely and against their own consciences—it would be impossible for any divine law to be acknowledged.
If publique, it is the Authority of the Common-wealth, or of the Church. But the Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a Common-wealth of Christians; called a Common-wealth, because it consisteth of men united in one person, their Soveraign; and a Church, because it consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian Soveraign. But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any Will, Reason, nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall.
If public, it is the authority of the commonwealth or of the Church. But the Church, if it is one person, is the same thing as a commonwealth of Christians: called a commonwealth because it consists of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a Church because it consists of Christian men united in one Christian sovereign. But if the Church is not one person, then it has no authority at all. It can neither command nor perform any action at all; it is not capable of having any power or right to anything; and it has no will, reason, or voice, for all these qualities are personal.
Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws, by the Universall Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all Christian Monarchs, and States are private persons, and subject to bee judged, deposed, and punished by an Universall Soveraigne of all Christendome.
Now if the whole number of Christians is not contained in one commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there a universal Church that has any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made laws by the universal Church. Or if it is one commonwealth, then all Christian monarchs and states are private persons, liable to be judged, deposed, and punished by a universal sovereign of all Christendom.
So that the question of the Authority of the Scriptures, is reduced to this, Whether Christian Kings, and the Soveraigne Assemblies in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute in their own Territories, immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ, constituted of the Vniversall Church; to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good.
So the question of the authority of the Scriptures comes down to this: whether Christian kings, and the sovereign assemblies in Christian commonwealths, are absolute in their own territories, immediately under God; or subject to one vicar of Christ, constituted by the universal Church, to be judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death as he shall think expedient or necessary for the common good.
Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular consideration of the Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are to judge of the Authority of Interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a lawfull power over any Writing, to make it Law, hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.
This question cannot be resolved without a more particular consideration of the Kingdom of God. From that consideration we must also judge of the authority to interpret Scripture. For whoever has a lawful power over any writing, to make it law, also has the power to approve or disapprove the interpretation of it.
Chapter 34: Of spirit, angel, and inspiration
Hobbes defines body and spirit and argues that 'incorporeal substance' is a contradiction in terms.
Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant Signification of words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not (as in naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; It is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will begin with the words BODY, and SPIRIT, which in the language of the Schools are termed, Substances, Corporeall, and Incorporeall.
The foundation of all true reasoning is the constant signification of words. In the doctrine that follows, that signification depends not (as in natural science) on the will of the writer, nor (as in common conversation) on ordinary usage, but on the sense words carry in Scripture. Before I go any further, then, I must determine from the Bible the meaning of those words whose ambiguity might make what I am to infer from them obscure or disputable. I will begin with the words body and spirit, which in the language of the Schools are called substances, corporeal and incorporeal.
The Word Body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call the Vniverse. For the Vniverse, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Vniverse. The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, Subject, to various accidents; as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still; and to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smel, Tast, or Sound, somtimes of another.
The word body, in its most general sense, signifies that which fills or occupies some certain room or imagined place. It does not depend on the imagination, but is a real part of what we call the universe. For since the universe is the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part of it that is not also body, and nothing is properly a body that is not also part of the universe, that aggregate of all bodies. Because bodies are subject to change—that is, to a variety of appearances to the senses of living creatures—the same thing is also called substance, that is, subject to various accidents: sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one color, smell, taste, or sound, sometimes of another.
And this diversity of Seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies, on the organs of our sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, & call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this acceptation of the word, Substance and Body, signifie the same thing; and therefore Substance incorporeall are words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeall Body.
This diversity of seeming (produced by the diversity in the way bodies act on the organs of our senses) we attribute to alterations in the bodies that act on us, and we call these alterations the accidents of those bodies. In this sense of the word, substance and body signify the same thing. So “incorporeal substance” consists of words that destroy each other when they are joined together, as if a man should say “an incorporeal body.”
But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling, to resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them from a farther prospect.
But in the sense of common people, not the whole universe is called body, but only those parts of it they can detect by the sense of touch, as resisting their force, or by the sense of sight, as blocking their view of what lies beyond.
Therefore in the common language of men, Aire, and aeriall substances, use not to be taken for Bodies, but (as often as men are sensible of their effects) are called Wind, or Breath, or (because the same are called in the Latine Spiritus) Spirits; as when they call that aeriall substance, which in the body of any living creature, gives it life and motion, Vitall and Animall spirits. But for those Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us, where they are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a Distempered brain waking, they are (as the Apostle saith generally of all Idols) nothing; Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense.
So in the common language of men, air and airy substances are not usually taken for bodies. Instead, whenever men feel their effects, they are called wind, or breath, or (because the Latin word for these is spiritus) spirits—as when people call that airy substance which gives life and motion to the body of any living creature its vital and animal spirits. But as for those idols of the brain which represent bodies to us where there are none, as in a mirror, in a dream, or to a disordered brain awake, they are (as the Apostle says of all idols in general) nothing. Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to be; and in the brain itself nothing but a tumult, arising either from the action of objects or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our senses.
And men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their causes, know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers: So that the proper signification of Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination.
Men who are occupied with other things than searching into their causes do not know by themselves what to call these images. So they may easily be persuaded by those whose knowledge they greatly revere—some to call them bodies, and think them made of air compacted by a supernatural power, because the eye judges them to be corporeal; and some to call them spirits, because the sense of touch finds nothing in the place where they appear to resist their fingers. So the proper signification of spirit in common speech is either a subtle, fluid, invisible body, or a ghost, or some other idol or phantasm of the imagination.
But for metaphoricall significations, there be many: for sometimes it is taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as when for the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say, a spirit of contradiction; For a disposition to uncleannesse, an unclean spirit; for perversenesse, a froward spirit; for sullennesse, a [mute] spirit, and for inclination to godlinesse, and Gods service, the Spirit of God: sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when great wisdome is called the spirit of wisdome; and [the mentally ill] are said to be possessed with a spirit.
But there are many metaphorical meanings. Sometimes the word is taken for a disposition or inclination of the mind: as when we call a disposition to contradict what other people say “a spirit of contradiction”; a disposition to uncleanness, “an unclean spirit”; perverseness, “a contrary spirit”; sullenness, “a mute spirit”; and an inclination to godliness and God’s service, “the Spirit of God.” Sometimes it is taken for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind: as when great wisdom is called “the spirit of wisdom,” and people with mental illness are said to be “possessed by a spirit.”
Other signification of Spirit I find no where any; and where none of these can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not under humane Understanding; and our Faith therein consisteth not in our Opinion, but in our Submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God, is meant God himselfe.
I find no other meaning of spirit anywhere. Where none of these can satisfy the sense of the word in Scripture, the passage lies beyond human understanding, and our faith in it consists not in our opinion but in our submission—as in all the places where God is said to be a Spirit, or where by “the Spirit of God” is meant God himself.
For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is; and therefore the Attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, what he is, nor to signifie our opinion of his Nature, but our desire to honor him with such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves.
For the nature of God is incomprehensible: that is, we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is. So the attributes we give him are not meant to tell one another what he is, nor to signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honor him with the names we conceive to be most honorable among ourselves.
Gen. 1. 2. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters. Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is Motion attributed to God, and consequently Place, which are intelligible only of Bodies, and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is Body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, Gen. 8. 1.
Genesis 1:2: “The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” If by “the Spirit of God” is meant God himself here, then motion is attributed to God, and consequently place—which are intelligible only of bodies, not of incorporeal substances. The passage is then above our understanding, which can conceive nothing moved that does not change place or that has no dimension; and whatever has dimension is body. But the meaning of those words is best understood from the similar passage in Genesis 8:1.
Where, when the earth was covered with Waters, as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth the like words, I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall be diminished: in which place by Spirit is understood a Wind, (that is an Aire or Spirit moved,) which might be called (as in the former place) the Spirit of God, because it was Gods work.
There, when the earth was covered with waters, as in the beginning, God, intending to abate them and uncover the dry land again, uses similar words: “I will bring my Spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished.” In this passage spirit means a wind (that is, air or spirit in motion), which might be called the Spirit of God, as in the earlier passage, because it was God’s work.
Gen. 41. 38. Pharaoh calleth the Wisdome of Joseph, the Spirit of God. For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, Can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God? And Exod. 28. 3. Thou shalt speak (saith God) to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the Spirit of Wisdome, to make Aaron Garments, to consecrate him. Where extraordinary Understanding, though but in making Garments, as being the Gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod. 31. 3, 4, 5, 6. and 35. 31. And Isaiah 11. 2, 3.
In Genesis 41:38, Pharaoh calls the wisdom of Joseph “the Spirit of God.” For after Joseph had advised him to look for a wise and discreet man and set him over the land of Egypt, he says: “Can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?” And in Exodus 28:3: “You shall speak” (says God) “to all that are wise-hearted, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate him.” Here extraordinary understanding, even though only in making garments, is called the Spirit of God, because it is the gift of God. The same is found again in Exodus 31:3–6 and 35:31, and in Isaiah 11:2–3,
where the Prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the Spirit of wisdome and understanding, the Spirit of counsell, and fortitude; and the Spirit of the fear of the Lord. Where manifestly is meant, not so many Ghosts, but so many eminent graces that God would give him.
where the prophet, speaking of the Messiah, says, “The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Here what is plainly meant is not so many ghosts, but so many eminent graces that God would give him.
In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the the defence of Gods people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited Othoniel, Gideon, Jephtha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude, Judg. 3. 10. 6. 34. 11. 29. 13. 25. 14. 6, 19. And of Saul, upon the newes of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabesh Gilead, it is said (1 Sam. 11. 6.) that The Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his Anger (or, as it is in the Latine, his Fury) was kindled greatly. Where it is not probable was meant a Ghost, but an extraordinary Zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites.
In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the defense of God’s people is called the Spirit of God: as when it stirred Othniel, Gideon, Jephthah, and Samson to deliver them from servitude (Judges 3:10; 6:34; 11:29; 13:25; 14:6, 19). And of Saul, when he heard of the insolence of the Ammonites toward the men of Jabesh-gilead, it is said (1 Samuel 11:6) that “the Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his anger” (or, as the Latin has it, his fury) “was kindled greatly.” It is not probable that a ghost is meant here, but an extraordinary zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites.
In like manner by the Spirit of God, that came upon Saul, when hee was amongst the Prophets that praised God in Songs, and Musick (1 Sam. 19. 20.) is to be understood, not a Ghost, but an unexpected and sudden Zeal to join with them in their devotion.
In the same way, the Spirit of God that came upon Saul when he was among the prophets who praised God in songs and music (1 Samuel 19:20) is to be understood not as a ghost, but as an unexpected and sudden zeal to join them in their devotion.
The false Prophet Zedekiah, saith to Micaiah (1 Kings 22. 24.) Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee? Which cannot be understood of a Ghost; for Micaiah declared before the Kings of Israel and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a Vision, and not as from a Spirit, speaking in him.
The false prophet Zedekiah says to Micaiah (1 Kings 22:24), “Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to you?” This cannot be understood of a ghost. For Micaiah had declared the outcome of the battle before the kings of Israel and Judah as from a vision, not as from a spirit speaking in him.
In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets, that though they spake by the Spirit of God, that is to say, by a speciall grace of Prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a Ghost within them, but by some supernaturall Dream or Vision.
In the same way it appears in the books of the Prophets that, though they spoke by the Spirit of God—that is, by a special grace of prediction—their knowledge of the future came not from a ghost within them, but from some supernatural dream or vision.
Gen. 2. 7. It is said, God made man of the dust of the Earth, and breathed into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul. There the breath of life inspired by God, signifies no more, but that God gave him life; And (Job 27. 3.) as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils; is no more then to say, as long as I live. So in Ezek. 1. 20. the Spirit of life was in the wheels, is equivalent to, the wheels were alive. And (Ezek. 2. 30.)
Genesis 2:7 says, “God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul.” There the breath of life breathed in by God signifies no more than that God gave him life. And “as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils” (Job 27:3) is no more than to say “as long as I live.” So in Ezekiel 1:20, “the spirit of life was in the wheels” is equivalent to “the wheels were alive.” And in Ezekiel 2:2,
the Spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet, that is, I recovered my vitall strength; not that any Ghost, or incorporeall substance entred into, and possessed his body.
“the spirit entered into me, and set me on my feet” means “I recovered my vital strength,” not that any ghost or incorporeal substance entered into and possessed his body.
In the 11 chap. of Numbers. verse 17. I will take (saith God) of the Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burthen of the people with thee; that is, upon the seventy Elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe; of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which Moses would not doe. Whereby it appears; that Joshua knew not they had received authority so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a Spirit, or Authority subordinate to his own.
In Numbers 11:17, God says: “I will take of the spirit which is upon you, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burden of the people with you”—that is, upon the seventy elders. Two of the seventy are then said to have prophesied in the camp. Some complained of them, and Joshua wanted Moses to forbid them, which Moses would not do. From this it appears that Joshua did not know they had received authority to do so, and that they prophesied according to the mind of Moses—that is, by a spirit, or authority, subordinate to his own.
In the like sense we read (Deut. 34. 9.) that Joshua was full of the Spirit of wisdome, because Moses had laid his hands upon him: that is, because he was ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun, (namely, the bringing of Gods people into the promised land), but prevented by death, could not finish.
In the same sense we read (Deuteronomy 34:9) that “Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him”: that is, because he was ordained by Moses to carry on the work Moses himself had begun (namely, bringing God’s people into the promised land) but, prevented by death, could not finish.
In the like sense it is said, (Rom. 8. 9.) If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his: not meaning thereby the Ghost of Christ, but a submission to his Doctrine. As also (1 John 4. 2.) Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God; Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; by which is meant the Spirit of unfained Christianity, or submission to that main Article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ; which cannot be interpreted of a Ghost.
In the same sense it is said (Romans 8:9), “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his”—meaning not the ghost of Christ, but a submission to his doctrine. Likewise (1 John 4:2): “Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God.” What is meant is the spirit of sincere Christianity, or submission to that main article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ, which cannot be interpreted as a ghost.
Likewise these words (Luke 4. 1.) And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost (that is, as it is exprest, Mat. 4. 1. and Mar. 1. 12. of the Holy Spirit,) may be understood, for Zeal to doe the work for which hee was sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a Ghost, is to say, that God himselfe (for so our Saviour was,) was filled with God; which is very unproper, and unsignificant.
Likewise these words (Luke 4:1), “And Jesus, full of the Holy Ghost” (expressed in Matthew 4:1 and Mark 1:12 as “of the Holy Spirit”), may be understood as zeal to do the work for which he was sent by God the Father. But to interpret it as a ghost is to say that God himself (for so our Savior was) was filled with God—which is very improper and meaningless.
How we came to translate Spirits, by the word Ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not: but this I say, the word Spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a reall substance, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary ability or affection of the Mind, or of the Body.
How we came to translate spirits by the word ghosts, which signifies nothing either in heaven or on earth but the imaginary inhabitants of man’s brain, I do not examine. But this I say: the word spirit in the text signifies no such thing, but either, properly, a real substance, or, metaphorically, some extraordinary ability or affection of the mind or of the body.
The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Mat. 14. 26. and Marke 6. 49.) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an Aeriall Body, and not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to many at once, as visible Bodies are; but singular, because of the differences of Fancies), but of Bodies only. In like manner, where he was taken for a Spirit, by the same Apostles (Luke 24. 3, 7.); so also (Acts 12. 15. when St.
When the disciples of Christ saw him walking on the sea (Matthew 14:26 and Mark 6:49), they supposed him to be a spirit, meaning an airy body, and not a phantasm. For it is said that they all saw him, which cannot be understood of delusions of the brain (which are not common to many at once, as visible bodies are, but singular, because fancies differ), but only of bodies. The same holds where he was taken for a spirit by the same apostles (Luke 24:37); and also (Acts 12:15) when St.
Peter was delivered out of Prison, it would not be beleeved; but when the Maid said he was at the dore, they said it was his Angel; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must say, the Disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall; and such as needed not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the Jews called Spirits, and Angels, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the same by the name of Daemons. And some such apparitions may be reall, and substantiall; that is to say, subtile Bodies, which God can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of Ministers, and Messengers (that is to say, Angels) to declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and supernaturall manner.
Peter was delivered out of prison, and it would not be believed. When the maid said he was at the door, they said it was his angel. By this must be meant a corporeal substance; or else we must say that the disciples themselves followed the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not imaginary but real, and did not need the fancy of man for their existence. These the Jews called spirits and angels, good or bad, as the Greeks called the same things daemons. And some such apparitions may be real and substantial—that is, subtle bodies, which God can form by the same power by which he formed all things, and use as ministers and messengers (that is, angels) to declare his will and carry it out, when he pleases, in an extraordinary and supernatural way.
But when hee hath so formed them they are Substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore are not Ghosts incorporeall, that is to say, Ghosts that are in no place; that is to say, that are no where; that is to say, that seeming to be somewhat, are nothing. But if Corporeall be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such Substances as are perceptible by our externall Senses; then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not Imaginary, but Reall; namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser Bodies.
But when he has formed them in this way, they are substances endowed with dimensions. They take up room and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies. So they are not incorporeal ghosts—that is, ghosts that are in no place, that is, that are nowhere, that is, that seem to be something and are nothing. But if “corporeal” is taken in the most popular way, for such substances as are perceptible by our external senses, then an incorporeal substance is not imaginary but real: namely, a thin, invisible substance which nevertheless has the same dimensions as grosser bodies.
Angels
In Scripture angels are messengers or supernatural images signifying God's presence, not incorporeal substances.
By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a Messenger; and most often, a Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any thing that makes known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a Dream, or Vision.
The name angel signifies, in general, a messenger, and most often a messenger of God. And by a messenger of God is signified anything that makes known his extraordinary presence—that is, the extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a dream or vision.
Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures. That they are Spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of Spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and Gentiles, sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits Vitall, and Animall, of living creatures; and sometimes the Images that rise in the fancy in Dreams, and Visions; which are not reall Substances, nor last any longer then the Dream, or Vision they appear in; which Apparitions, though no reall Substances, but Accidents of the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they are not unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is to say, his Angels.
Concerning the creation of angels, nothing is delivered in the Scriptures. That they are spirits is often repeated. But by the name of spirit is signified, both in Scripture and in common speech, among both Jews and Gentiles, sometimes thin bodies, such as the air, the wind, and the vital and animal spirits of living creatures; and sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams and visions. These are not real substances, and last no longer than the dream or vision they appear in. Yet such apparitions, though they are not real substances but accidents of the brain, are not improperly called God’s messengers—that is, his angels—when God raises them supernaturally to signify his will.
And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of Daemons, Good and Evill; which because they seemed to subsist really, they called Substances; and because they could not feel them with their hands, Incorporeall: so also the Jews upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadduces,) that those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancie of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his Angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God;
The Gentiles commonly took the imagery of the brain for things really subsisting outside them and not dependent on the fancy, and out of these they framed their opinions of daemons, good and evil—which, because they seemed to subsist really, they called substances, and because they could not feel them with their hands, incorporeal. In the same way, and on the same grounds, the Jews (except the sect of the Sadducees), without anything in the Old Testament that compelled them to it, generally held the opinion that those apparitions (which God was pleased at times to produce in the fancy of men for his own service, and therefore called his angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God.
whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the Angels of God, and those they thought would hurt them, they called Evill Angels, or Evill Spirits; such as was the Spirit of Python, and the Spirits of [the mentally ill], of [the mentally disturbed], and Epileptiques: For they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, Daemoniaques.
Those they thought were good to them, they regarded as the angels of God; and those they thought would hurt them, they called evil angels, or evil spirits—such as the spirit of Python, and the spirits of people who were mentally ill or mentally disturbed, and of people with epilepsy. For they regarded those troubled with such diseases as demoniacs.
But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word Angel, but some image raised (supernaturally) in the fancy, to signifie the presence of God in the execution of some supernaturall work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not exprest, it may be understood in the same manner.
But if we consider the places in the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find that in most of them nothing else can be understood by the word angel but some image raised (supernaturally) in the fancy, to signify the presence of God in the execution of some supernatural work. So in the rest, where their nature is not stated, it may be understood in the same way.
For we read Gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an Angel, but God; where that which (verse 7.) is called the Angel of the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, I will multiply thy seed exceedingly; that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this apparition a Fancy figured, but a Voice. By which it is manifest, that Angel signifieth there, nothing but God himself, that caused Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from heaven; or rather, nothing else but a Voice supernaturall, testifying Gods speciall presence there. Why therefore may not the Angels that appeared to Lot, and are called Gen. 19. 13. Men; and to whom, though they were two, Lot speaketh (ver. 18.)
For we read in Genesis 16 that the same apparition is called not only an angel but God. What is called the angel of the Lord in verse 7 says to Hagar in verse 10, “I will multiply your seed exceedingly”—that is, it speaks in the person of God. Nor was this apparition a figure in the fancy, but a voice. From this it is plain that angel there signifies nothing but God himself, who caused Hagar supernaturally to perceive a voice from heaven—or rather, nothing but a supernatural voice testifying to God’s special presence there. Why then may not the angels that appeared to Lot—who are called men in Genesis 19:13, and to whom Lot, though they were two, speaks (verse 18)
as but to one, and that one, as God, (for the words are, Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord) be understood of images of men, supernaturally formed in the Fancy; as well as before by Angel was understood a fancyed Voice? When the Angel called to Abraham out of heaven, to stay his hand (Gen. 22. 11.) from slaying Isaac, there was no Apparition, but a Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly enough a Messenger, or Angel of God, because it declared Gods will supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent Ghosts. The Angels which Jacob saw on the Ladder of Heaven (Gen. 28. 12.)
as if to only one, and to that one as God (for the words are, “Lot said unto them, Oh not so, my Lord”)—be understood as images of men supernaturally formed in the fancy, just as before “angel” was understood as an imagined voice? When the angel called to Abraham out of heaven to stay his hand from slaying Isaac (Genesis 22:11), there was no apparition, but a voice. It was nevertheless called, properly enough, a messenger or angel of God, because it declared God’s will supernaturally; and this spares us the labor of supposing any permanent ghosts. The angels that Jacob saw on the ladder of heaven (Genesis 28:12)
were a Vision of his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a Dream; yet being supernaturall, and signs of Gods speciall presence, those apparitions are not improperly called Angels. The same is to be understood (Gen. 31. 11.) where Jacob saith thus, The Angel of the Lord appeared to mee in my sleep. For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men call a Dreame, whether such Dreame be naturall, or supernaturall: and that which there Jacob calleth an Angel, was God himselfe; for the same Angel saith (verse 13.) I am the God of Bethel.
were a vision in his sleep—therefore only fancy and a dream. Yet being supernatural, and signs of God’s special presence, those apparitions are not improperly called angels. The same is to be understood in Genesis 31:11, where Jacob says, “The angel of the Lord appeared to me in my sleep.” For an apparition made to a man in his sleep is what everyone calls a dream, whether the dream is natural or supernatural. And what Jacob there calls an angel was God himself, for the same angel says (verse 13), “I am the God of Bethel.”
Alfo (Exod. 14. 9.) the Angel that went before the Army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the Lord himself; and he appeared not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day) of a pillar of cloud, and (by night) in form of a pillar of fire; and yet this Pillar was all the apparition, and Angel promised to Moses, Exod. 14. 9.) for the Armies guide: For this cloudy pillar, is said, to have descended, and stood at the dore of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.
Also (Exodus 14:9) the angel that went before the army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19) the Lord himself. He appeared not in the form of a beautiful man, but by day in the form of a pillar of cloud, and by night in the form of a pillar of fire. And yet this pillar was the whole apparition and angel promised to Moses (Exodus 14:9) as the army’s guide. For this pillar of cloud is said to have come down and stood at the door of the tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.
There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed to Angels, attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign of Gods presence; and was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had the form of a Man, or Child of never so great beauty; or Wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the shape; but their use, that makes them Angels. But their use is to be significations of Gods presence in supernaturall operations; As when Moses (Exod. 33. 14.)
There you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to angels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of God’s presence. It was no less an angel than if it had had the form of a man, or of a child of the greatest beauty, or had wings, as angels are usually painted, to the false instruction of common people. For it is not their shape but their use that makes them angels; and their use is to signify God’s presence in supernatural operations. As when Moses (Exodus 33:14)
had desired God to goe along with the Campe, (as he had done alwaies before the making of the Golden Calfe,) God did not answer, I will goe, nor I will send an Angell in my stead; but thus, my presence shall goe with thee.
had asked God to go along with the camp (as he had always done before the making of the golden calf), God did not answer “I will go,” nor “I will send an angel in my place,” but “My presence shall go with you.”
To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the Church of England holdeth for Canonicall; from which we can conclude, there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of Spirit or Angel,) that hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts;
To mention all the places in the Old Testament where the name of angel is found would take too long. So, to take them all in at once, I say this: there is no text in that part of the Old Testament which the Church of England holds to be canonical from which we can conclude that there is, or has been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of spirit or angel) that has no quantity, and that cannot be divided by the understanding—that is, considered in parts,
so as one part may bee in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in summe, which is not (taking Body for that, which is some what, or some where) Corporeall; but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of Angel, for Messenger; as John Baptist is called an Angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same Analogy) the Dove, and the Fiery Tongues, in that they were signes of Gods speciall presence, might also be called Angels.
so that one part may be in one place and the next part in the place next to it—in short, anything that is not corporeal (taking body for that which is something, or somewhere). But in every place the sense will bear the interpretation of angel as messenger: as John the Baptist is called an angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (by the same analogy) the dove and the tongues of fire, in that they were signs of God’s special presence, might also be called angels.
Though we find in Daniel two names of Angels, Gabriel, and Michael; yet it is cleer out of the text it selfe, (Dan. 12. 1.) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an Angel, but as a Prince: and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two Saints being in talke, one of them said to the other, Gabriel, let us make this man understand his Vision: For God needeth not, to distinguish his Celestiall servants by names, which are usefull onely to the short memories of Mortalls.
Though we find the names of two angels in Daniel, Gabriel and Michael, it is clear from the text itself (Daniel 12:1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel but as a prince. And Gabriel (like the similar apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernatural phantasm, by which it seemed to Daniel in his dream that two saints were talking, and one of them said to the other, “Gabriel, make this man understand the vision.” For God does not need to distinguish his celestial servants by names, which are useful only to the short memories of mortals.
Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that Angels (except when they are put for such men, as God hath made the Messengers, and Ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent, and withall incorporeall. That they are permanent, may bee gathered from the words of our Saviour himselfe, (Mat. 25. 41.)
Nor is there any place in the New Testament from which it can be proved that angels (except where the word stands for men whom God has made the messengers and ministers of his word or works) are things permanent and also incorporeal. That they are permanent may be gathered from the words of our Savior himself (Matthew 25:41),
where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels: which place is manifest for the permanence of Evill Angels, (unlesse wee might think the name of Devill and his Angels may be understood of the Churches Adversaries and their Ministers;) but then it is repugnant to their Immateriality; because Everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things Incorporeall. Angels therefore are not thence proved to be Incorporeall. In like manner where St. Paul sayes (1 Cor. 6. 3.) Know ye not that wee shall judge the Angels? And 2 Pet. 2. 4.
where he says it shall be said to the wicked on the last day, “Go, you cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels.” This passage clearly establishes the permanence of evil angels (unless we may think that the Devil and his angels can be understood as the Church’s adversaries and their ministers). But then it contradicts their immateriality, because everlasting fire is no punishment to substances that cannot suffer, as all incorporeal things are. So angels are not proved by it to be incorporeal. In the same way, where St. Paul says (1 Corinthians 6:3), “Know you not that we shall judge the angels?” and 2 Peter 2:4,
(For if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down into hell. And (Iude 1, 6.) And the Angels that kept not their first estate, but left their owne habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto the Iudgment of the last day; though it prove the Permanence of Angelicall nature, it confirmeth also their Materiality. And (Mat. 22. 30.) In the resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven: but in the resurrection men shall be Permanent, and not Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels.
“For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down into hell,” and Jude 6, “And the angels that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he has reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the last day”—though these prove the permanence of the angelic nature, they also confirm its materiality. And Matthew 22:30: “In the resurrection men neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven.” But in the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal; so, therefore, are the angels.
There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words, Substance, and Incorporeall; as Incorporeall is taken not for subtile body, but for not Body, they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an Angel, or Spirit is (in that sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is to say in effect, there is no Angel nor Spirit at all.
There are various other places from which the same conclusion may be drawn. To men who understand the meaning of the words substance and incorporeal—taking incorporeal not for a subtle body but for not body—they imply a contradiction. So to say that an angel or spirit is (in that sense) an incorporeal substance is in effect to say that there is no angel or spirit at all.
Considering therefore the signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of Nature; I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing but supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and commandements known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble Reason, an acknowledgment, and beleef, that there be also Angels substantiall, and permanent.
Considering, then, the meaning of the word angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of the dreams and visions that come to men in the ordinary course of nature, I was inclined to the opinion that angels were nothing but supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised by the special and extraordinary operation of God to make his presence and commandments known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Savior’s own words, in texts where there is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have wrung from my feeble reason an acknowledgment and belief that there are also angels that are substantial and permanent.
But to beleeve they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they (though indirectly) say, that will have them Incorporeall, cannot by Scripture bee evinced.
But to believe that they are in no place—that is, nowhere, that is, nothing—as those who would have them incorporeal say (though indirectly), cannot be proved from Scripture.
Inspiration
Inspiration in Scripture is a metaphor for God's gifts, not spirits poured into men.
On the signification of the word Spirit, dependeth that of the word INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if Spirits be not corporeall, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible; for Phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat. That word therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically onely: As (Gen. 2. 7.)
On the meaning of the word spirit depends that of the word inspiration. It must either be taken properly, and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man of some thin, subtle air or wind, as a man fills a bladder with his breath; or, if spirits are not corporeal but exist only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasm—which is improper to say, and impossible, for phantasms are not something, but only seem to be. The word is therefore used in Scripture only metaphorically. As in Genesis 2:7,
where it is said, that God inspired into man the breath of life, no more is meant, then that God gave unto him vitall motion. For we are not to think that God made first a living breath, and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath were reall, or seeming; but only as it is (Acts 17. 25.) that he gave him life, and breath; that is, made him a living creature. And where it is said (2 Tim. 3. 16.)
where it is said that God inspired into man the breath of life, no more is meant than that God gave him vital motion. For we are not to think that God first made a living breath and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath was real or only seeming; but only, as it is said in Acts 17:25, that “he gave him life and breath”—that is, made him a living creature. And where it is said (2 Timothy 3:16)
all Scripture is given by Inspiration from God, speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie, that God enclined the spirit or mind of those Writers, to write that which should be usefull, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter (2 Pet. 1. 21.)
“All Scripture is given by inspiration of God”—speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament—it is an easy metaphor, signifying that God inclined the spirit or mind of those writers to write what would be useful in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter (2 Peter 1:21)
saith, that Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit, by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or Vision supernaturall, which is not Inspiration: Nor when our Saviour breathing on his Disciples, said, Receive the Holy Spirit, was that Breath the Spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them.
says that “prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,” by the Holy Spirit is meant the voice of God in a supernatural dream or vision, which is not inspiration. Nor, when our Savior breathed on his disciples and said, “Receive the Holy Spirit,” was that breath the Spirit; it was a sign of the spiritual graces he gave them.
And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit; yet that Fulnesse is not to be understood for Infusion of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God sayes (Joel 2. 28.)
And though it is said of many, and of our Savior himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit, that fullness is not to be understood as an infusion of the substance of God, but as an accumulation of his gifts, such as the gift of holiness of life, of tongues, and the like—whether attained supernaturally or by study and industry, for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God says (Joel 2:28),
I will powre out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons and your Daughters shall prophecy, your Old men shall dream Dreams, and your Young men shall see Visions, wee are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion, or infusion; but as if God had promised to give them Propheticall Dreams, and Vision. For the proper use of the word infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are Vertues, not Bodies to be carryed hither and thither, and to be powred into men, as into barrels.
“I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions,” we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion or infusion, but as if God had promised to give them prophetic dreams and visions. For to use the word infused in its proper sense when speaking of the graces of God is an abuse of it. Those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried here and there and poured into men as into barrels.
In the same manner, to take Inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that Good Spirits entred into men to make them prophecy, or Evill Spirits into those that became Phrenetique, [mentally ill], or Epileptique, is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also (Acts 2. 2.)
In the same way, to take inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entered into men to make them prophesy, or evil spirits into those who became frenzied, mentally ill, or epileptic, is not to take the word in the sense of Scripture. For spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes unknown to us. So too (Acts 2:2)
the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity it self; but for an Externall sign of Gods speciall working on their hearts, to effect in them the internall graces, and holy vertues hee thought requisite for the performance of their Apostleship.
the wind that is said there to fill the house where the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost is not to be understood as the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity itself, but as an external sign of God’s special working on their hearts, to produce in them the inward graces and holy virtues he thought necessary for carrying out their apostleship.
Chapter 35: Of the Kingdom of God, holy, sacred, and sacrament
The Kingdom of God is a real civil kingdom, founded by covenant with Abraham and renewed at Sinai.
The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines, and specially in Sermons, and Treatises of Devotion, is taken most commonly for Eternall Felicity, after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call the Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) Sanctification, which they terme the Kingdome of Grace; but never for the Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign Power of God over any Subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of Kingdome.
In the writings of divines, and especially in sermons and devotional treatises, the Kingdom of God is most commonly taken for eternal felicity after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the Kingdom of Glory; and sometimes for sanctification (the pledge of that felicity), which they call the Kingdom of Grace. But it is never taken for the monarchy—that is, the sovereign power of God over subjects acquired by their own consent—which is the proper meaning of kingdom.
To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most places of Scripture, a Kingdome properly so named, constituted by the Votes of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for Dominion over sinne; (and only in the New Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject shall have in the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.
On the contrary, I find that the Kingdom of God signifies, in most places of Scripture, a kingdom properly so called, established in a special way by the votes of the people of Israel, in which they chose God for their king by a covenant made with him, upon God’s promising them possession of the land of Canaan. Only seldom is it used metaphorically, and then it is taken for dominion over sin (and only in the New Testament), because every subject shall have such a dominion in the Kingdom of God, without prejudice to the sovereign.
From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men naturally by his might; but also had peculiar Subjects, whom he commanded by a Voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he reigned over Adam, and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between Good and Evill, not by his Creators commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had at first created him: And afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universall deluge; And in these eight did consist the then Kingdom of God.
From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men naturally, by his might, but also had special subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man speaks to another. In this way he reigned over Adam and commanded him to abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. When Adam did not obey, but tasted of it, and took it upon himself to be as God, judging between good and evil not by his Creator’s command but by his own sense, his punishment was to be deprived of the state of eternal life in which God had first created him. And afterward God punished Adam’s descendants for their vices with a universal flood—all but eight persons. In these eight consisted the Kingdom of God at that time.
After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17. 7, 8.) to make a Covenant with him in these words, I will establish my Covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this Covenant Abraham promiseth for himselfe and his posterity to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him: and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And for a memoriall, and a token of this Covenant, he ordaineth (verse II.)
After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham and (Genesis 17:7–8) to make a covenant with him in these words: “I will establish my covenant between me and you and your seed after you in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to you and to your seed after you. And I will give to you, and to your seed after you, the land in which you are a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession.” In this covenant Abraham promises, for himself and his descendants, to obey as God the Lord who spoke to him; and God on his part promises Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And as a memorial and token of this covenant, he ordains (verse 11)
the Sacrament of Circumcision. This is it which is called the Old Covenant, or Testament; and containeth a Contract between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to Gods positive Law; for to the Law Morall he was obliged before, as by an Oath of Allegiance.
the sacrament of circumcision. This is what is called the Old Covenant, or Testament. It contains a contract between God and Abraham, by which Abraham obliges himself and his descendants in a special way to be subject to God’s positive law; for he was already obliged to the moral law, as by an oath of allegiance.
And though the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of Kingdome to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an Institution by pact, of Gods peculiar Soveraignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same Covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressely called a peculiar Kingdome of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4. 11.) that he is the Father of the Faithfull; that is, of those that are loyall, and doe not violate their Allegiance sworn to God, then by Circumcision, and afterwards in the New Covenant by Baptisme.
And though the name of king is not yet given to God, nor of kingdom to Abraham and his seed, the thing is the same: namely, an institution by agreement of God’s special sovereignty over the seed of Abraham. When this same covenant was renewed by Moses at Mount Sinai, it is expressly called a special Kingdom of God over the Jews. And it is of Abraham (not of Moses) that St. Paul says (Romans 4:11) that he is “the father of the faithful”—that is, of those who are loyal and do not violate the allegiance sworn to God, at first by circumcision and later, in the New Covenant, by baptism.
This Covenant, at the Foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (Exod. 19. 5.) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, then yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the Earth is mine; And yee shall be unto me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation. For a Peculiar people, the vulgar Latine hath, Peculium de cunctis populis: the English Translation made in the beginning of the Reign of King James, hath, a Peculiar treasure unto me above all Nations; and the Geneva French, the most precious Iewel of all Nations. But the truest Translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St.
This covenant was renewed by Moses at the foot of Mount Sinai (Exodus 19:5), where the Lord commands Moses to speak to the people in this way: “If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then you shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and you shall be to me a priestly kingdom, and a holy nation.” For “a peculiar people” the Vulgate has peculium de cunctis populis; the English translation made at the beginning of the reign of King James has “a peculiar treasure unto me above all nations”; and the Geneva French has “the most precious jewel of all nations.” But the truest translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St.
Paul himself (Tit. 2. 14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour gave himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a peculiar (that is, an extraordinary) people: for the word is in the Greek periousios, which is opposed commonly to the word epiousios:
Paul himself (Titus 2:14), where he says, alluding to that passage, that our blessed Savior “gave himself for us, that he might purify us to himself, a peculiar” (that is, an extraordinary) “people.” For the word in the Greek is periousios, which is commonly contrasted with the word epiousios.
and as this signifieth ordinary, quotidian, or (as in the Lords Prayer) of daily use; so the other signifieth that which is overplus, and stored up, and enjoyed in a speciall manner; which the Latines call Peculium: and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, For all the Earth is mine, as if he should say, All the Nations of the world are mine; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a speciall manner: For they are all mine, by reason of my Power; but you shall be mine, by your own Consent, and Covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.
And as the latter signifies ordinary, everyday, or (as in the Lord’s Prayer) of daily use, so the former signifies what is surplus, stored up, and enjoyed in a special way, which the Latins call peculium. This meaning of the passage is confirmed by the reason God gives for it, which follows immediately when he adds, “For all the earth is mine”—as if he should say, “All the nations of the world are mine; but you are not mine in that way, but in a special way. For they are all mine by reason of my power; but you shall be mine by your own consent and covenant.” This is an addition to his ordinary title over all nations.
The same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same text, Yee shall be to me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation. The Vulgar Latine hath it, Regnum Sacerdotale, to which agreeth the Translation of that place (1 Pet. 2. 9.) Sacerdotium Regale, a Regal Priesthood; as also the Institution it self, by which no man might enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum, that is to say, no man might enquire Gods will immediately of God himselfe, but onely the High Priest. The English Translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, a Kingdom of Priests; which is either meant of the succession of one High Priest after another, or else it accordeth not with St.
The same is confirmed again in express words in the same text: “You shall be to me a priestly kingdom, and a holy nation.” The Vulgate has Regnum sacerdotale, with which agrees the translation of that passage in 1 Peter 2:9, Sacerdotium regale, “a royal priesthood.” So does the institution itself, by which no one might enter the Sanctum Sanctorum—that is, no one might inquire God’s will directly of God himself—except the high priest alone. The English translation mentioned before, following the Geneva Bible, has “a kingdom of priests.” This either means the succession of one high priest after another, or else it does not agree with St.
Peter, nor with the exercise of the High priesthood: For there was never any but the High priest onely, that was to informe the People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation of Priests ever allowed to enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum.
Peter, nor with the exercise of the high priesthood. For there was never anyone but the high priest alone who was to inform the people of God’s will, nor was any convocation of priests ever allowed to enter the Sanctum Sanctorum.
Again, the title of a Holy Nation confirmes the same: For Holy signifies, that which is Gods by speciall, not by generall Right. All the Earth (as is said in the text) is Gods; but all the Earth is not called Holy, but that onely which is set apart for his especiall service, as was the Nation of the Jews.
Again, the title of a holy nation confirms the same. For holy signifies what is God’s by special, not by general, right. All the earth (as the text says) is God’s; but not all the earth is called holy—only what is set apart for his special service, as the nation of the Jews was.
It is therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the Kingdome of God, is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other Nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a Kingdome, wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant.
It is therefore plain enough from this one passage that by the Kingdom of God is properly meant a commonwealth, instituted (by the consent of those who were to be subject to it) for their civil government and the regulation of their behavior—not only toward God their king, but also toward one another in matters of justice, and toward other nations in both peace and war. This was properly a kingdom, in which God was king, and the high priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole viceroy, or lieutenant.
But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1 Sam. 8. 7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with the corruption of the Sons of Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed unto the Lord; and the Lord answering said unto him, Hearken unto the voice of the People, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. Out of which it is evident, that God himself was then their King; and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time to time appointed him.
But there are many other places that clearly prove the same. First, in 1 Samuel 8:7, when the elders of Israel (aggrieved at the corruption of Samuel’s sons) demanded a king, Samuel was displeased and prayed to the Lord; and the Lord answered him, “Listen to the voice of the people, for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them.” From this it is evident that God himself was then their king, and that Samuel did not command the people, but only passed on to them what God from time to time appointed him to.
Again, (1 Sam. 12. 12.) where Samuel saith to the People, When yee saw that Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your King: It is manifest that God was their King, and governed the Civill State of their Common-wealth.
Again, in 1 Samuel 12:12, Samuel says to the people, “When you saw that Nahash, king of the children of Ammon, came against you, you said to me, ‘No, but a king shall reign over us,’ when the Lord your God was your king.” It is plain that God was their king, and governed the civil state of their commonwealth.
And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did foretell his restitution; as (Isaiah 24. 23.) Then the Moon shall be confounded, and the Sun ashamed, when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Ierusalem; where he speaketh expressely of his Reign in Zion, and Jerusalem; that is, on Earth. And (Micah 4. 7.) And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion: This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the Earth. And (Ezek. 20. 33.) As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, I wil rule over you; and (verse 37.)
And after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets foretold his restoration. So Isaiah 24:23: “Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem”—where he speaks expressly of his reign in Zion and Jerusalem, that is, on earth. And Micah 4:7: “And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion.” This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem, on earth. And Ezekiel 20:33: “As I live, says the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out, I will rule over you”; and (verse 37)
I will cause you to passe under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the Covenant; that is, I will reign over you, and make you to stand to that Covenant which you made with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another King.
“I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant”—that is, I will reign over you, and make you keep that covenant which you made with me by Moses, and broke in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another king.
And in the New Testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke 1. 32, 33.) He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his Father David; and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his Kingdome there shall be no end. This is also a Kingdome upon Earth; for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death; the title of his crosse, was, Iesus of Nazareth, King of the Iews; hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of Thornes; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples (Acts 17. 7.)
And in the New Testament the angel Gabriel says of our Savior (Luke 1:32–33), “He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his father David; and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end.” This too is a kingdom on earth. For claiming it he was put to death as an enemy of Caesar; the title on his cross was “Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews”; he was crowned in mockery with a crown of thorns; and for proclaiming him it is said of the disciples (Acts 17:7)
That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King, one Iesus. The Kingdome therefore of God, is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and so taken, not onely in the Old Testament, but the New; when we say, For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory, it is to be understood of Gods Kingdome, by force of our Covenant, not by the Right of Gods Power; for such a Kingdome God alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, Thy Kingdome come, unlesse it be meant of the Restauration of that Kingdome of God by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul.
“that they all acted contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another king, one Jesus.” The Kingdom of God, therefore, is a real, not a metaphorical, kingdom, and is taken so not only in the Old Testament but in the New. When we say, “For yours is the kingdom, the power, and the glory,” it is to be understood of God’s kingdom by virtue of our covenant, not by the right of God’s power; for that kind of kingdom God always has. So it would be superfluous to say in our prayer “Your kingdom come,” unless it meant the restoration by Christ of that Kingdom of God which had been interrupted by the revolt of the Israelites in the election of Saul.
Nor had it been proper to say, The Kingdome of Heaven is at hand; ot to pray, Thy Kingdome come, if it had still continued.
Nor would it have been proper to say, “The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand,” or to pray, “Your kingdom come,” if it had still continued.
There be so-many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too much light to Christian Kings to see their right of Ecclesiasticall Government. This they have observed, that in stead of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, translate, a Kingdome of Priests: for, they may as well translate a Royall Priesthood, (as it is in St. Peter) into a Priesthood of Kings. And whereas, for a peculiar people, they put a pretious jewel, or treasure, a man might as well call the speciall Regiment, or Company of a Generall, the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his Treasure.
There are so many other places that confirm this interpretation that it would be a wonder it is not more widely noticed—except that it gives Christian kings too much light to see their right of ecclesiastical government. This has been noticed: so instead of “a priestly kingdom” they translate “a kingdom of priests.” They might as well translate “a royal priesthood” (as it is in St. Peter) as “a priesthood of kings.” And where, for “a peculiar people,” they put “a precious jewel” or “treasure,” one might as well call a general’s own special regiment or company the general’s precious jewel, or his treasure.
In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; which consisted, first in the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws, which Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the High Priest for the time being, should deliver to them from before the Cherubins in the Sanctum Sanctorum; and which Kingdome having been cast off, in the election of Saul, the Prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and the Restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the Lords Prayer, Thy Kingdome come; and the Right whereof we acknowledge, when we adde, For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory, for ever and ever, Amen; and the Proclaiming whereof, was the Preaching of the Apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the Teachers of the Gospel;
In short, the Kingdom of God is a civil kingdom. It consisted, first, in the obligation of the people of Israel to the laws which Moses was to bring them from Mount Sinai, and which afterward the high priest for the time being was to deliver to them from before the cherubim in the Sanctum Sanctorum. This kingdom, having been cast off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold would be restored by Christ. Its restoration we pray for daily when we say in the Lord’s Prayer, “Your kingdom come”; its right we acknowledge when we add, “For yours is the kingdom, the power, and the glory, for ever and ever, Amen”; its proclaiming was the preaching of the apostles; and men are prepared for it by the teachers of the Gospel.
to embrace which Gospel, (that is to say, to promise obedience to Gods government) is, to bee in the Kingdome of Grace, because God hath gratis given to such the power to bee the Subjects (that is, Children) of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people, which is called the Kingdome of Glory. If the Kingdome of God (called also the Kingdome of Heaven, from the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of that throne) were not a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenants, or Vicars, who deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise on Earth; there would not have been so much contention, and warre, about who it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would many Priests have troubled themselves with Spirituall Jurisdiction, nor any King have denied it them.
To embrace that Gospel (that is, to promise obedience to God’s government) is to be in the Kingdom of Grace, because God has gratis (freely) given to such people the power to be the subjects (that is, the children) of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in majesty to judge the world and actually govern his own people—which is called the Kingdom of Glory. If the Kingdom of God (also called the Kingdom of Heaven, from the gloriousness and wonderful height of that throne) were not a kingdom which God exercised on earth by his lieutenants, or vicars, who deliver his commandments to the people, there would not have been so much contention and war over who it is by whom God speaks to us. Nor would many priests have troubled themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it to them.
Holy, sacred, and sacrament
'Holy' means God's by special right, like 'public' in human kingdoms; sacraments are oaths of allegiance.
Out of this literall interpretation of the Kingdome of God, ariseth also the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in Gods Kingdome answereth to that, which men in their Kingdomes use to call Publique, or the Kings.
From this literal interpretation of the Kingdom of God arises also the true interpretation of the word holy. For it is a word which in God’s kingdom answers to what men in their kingdoms usually call public, or the king’s.
The King of any Countrey is the Publique Person, or Representative of all his own Subjects. And God the King of Israel was the Holy one of Israel. The Nation which is subject to one earthly Soveraign, is the Nation of that Soveraign, that is, of the Publique Person. So the Jews, who were Gods Nation, were called (Exod. 19. 6.) a Holy Nation. For by Holy, is alwaies understood, either God himselfe, or that which is Gods in propriety; as by Publique, is alwaies meant, either the Person of the Common-wealth it self, or something that is so the Common-wealths, as no private person can claim any propriety therein.
The king of any country is the public person, or representative, of all his own subjects. And God, the King of Israel, was the Holy One of Israel. The nation that is subject to one earthly sovereign is the nation of that sovereign—that is, of the public person. So the Jews, who were God’s nation, were called (Exodus 19:6) “a holy nation.” For by holy is always understood either God himself or what is God’s as his property; just as by public is always meant either the person of the commonwealth itself, or something so belonging to the commonwealth that no private person can claim any property in it.
Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a Holy day; the Temple, (Gods house) a Holy house; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings (Gods tribute) Holy duties; Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings, under Christ (Gods Ministers) Holy men; the Coelestiall ministring Spirits (Gods Messengers) Holy Angels; and the like: and wheresoever the word Holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of Propriety, gotten by consent. In saying Hallowed be thy name, we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandement, of having no other Gods but him. Mankind is Gods Nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a Holy Nation. Why, but because they became his Propriety by covenant?
Therefore the Sabbath (God’s day) is a holy day; the Temple (God’s house), a holy house; sacrifices, tithes, and offerings (God’s tribute), holy duties; priests, prophets, and anointed kings under Christ (God’s ministers), holy men; the heavenly ministering spirits (God’s messengers), holy angels; and so on. And wherever the word holy is taken properly, something is always signified of property acquired by consent. In saying “Hallowed be your name,” we only pray to God for grace to keep the first commandment, to “have no other gods but him.” Mankind is God’s nation as his property; but only the Jews were a holy nation. Why, except that they became his property by covenant?
And the word Profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with Common; and consequently their contraries, Holy, and Proper, in the Kingdome of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also are called Holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted, and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is made Holy by Gods appropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be sanctified by God, as the Seventh day in the fourth Commandement; and as the Elect in the New Testament were said to bee sanctified, when they were endued with the Spirit of godlinesse.
And the word profane is usually taken in Scripture as the same as common; consequently their opposites, holy and proper, must also be the same in the Kingdom of God. But figuratively, those men also are called holy who lived such godly lives that it was as if they had forsaken all worldly designs and wholly devoted and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, what is made holy by God’s appropriating or setting it apart for his own use is said to be sanctified by God, as the seventh day is in the fourth commandment; and as the elect in the New Testament were said to be sanctified when they were endowed with the spirit of godliness.
And that which is made Holy by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used onely in his publique service, is called aso SACRED, and said to be consecrated, as Temples, and other Houses of Publique Prayer, and their Utensils, Priests, and Ministers, Victimes, Offerings, and the externall matter of Sacraments.
And what is made holy by the dedication of men and given to God, to be used only in his public service, is also called sacred, and is said to be consecrated: such as temples and other houses of public prayer and their utensils, priests and ministers, sacrificial victims, offerings, and the external matter of sacraments.
Of Holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of God, there may bee some set apart again, for a neerer and more especial service. The whole Nation of the Israelites were a people Holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a Holy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the Priests were yet more Holy; and amongst the Priests, the High Priest was the most Holy. So the Land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped, was more Holy; and again, the Temple more Holy than the City; and the Sanctum Sanctorum more Holy than the rest of the Temple.
There are degrees of holiness. For of the things set apart for the service of God, some may be set apart again for a nearer and more special service. The whole nation of the Israelites was a people holy to God; yet among the Israelites the tribe of Levi was a holy tribe; among the Levites the priests were holier still; and among the priests the high priest was the most holy. So the land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy City, where God was to be worshipped, was holier; and again, the Temple holier than the city, and the Sanctum Sanctorum holier than the rest of the Temple.
A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and a consecration of it to Gods service, for a sign, either of our admission into the Kingdome of God, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for a Commemoration of the same.
A sacrament is a separation of some visible thing from common use, and its consecration to God’s service, as a sign either of our admission into the Kingdom of God, to be of the number of his special people, or of a commemoration of that admission.
In the Old Testament, the sign of Admission was Circumcision; in the New Testament, Baptisme. The Commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the Eating (at a certaine time, which was Anniversary) of the Paschall Lamb; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the Lords Supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance from the bondage of sin, by our Blessed Saviours death upon the crosse.
In the Old Testament the sign of admission was circumcision; in the New Testament, baptism. The commemoration of it in the Old Testament was the eating of the Passover lamb (at a certain time each year), by which they were reminded of the night on which they were delivered from their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebration of the Lord’s Supper, by which we are reminded of our deliverance from the bondage of sin by our blessed Savior’s death on the cross.
The Sacraments of Admission, are but once to be used, because there needs but one Admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance, and of our Alleagance, the Sacraments of Commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principall Sacraments, and as it were the solemne oathes we make of our Alleageance. There be also other Consecrations, that may be called Sacraments, as the word implyeth onely Consecration to Gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of Alleageance to God, there were no other in the Old Testament, but Circumcision, and the Passeover; nor are there any other in the New Testament, but Baptisme, and the Lords Supper.
The sacraments of admission are to be used only once, because only one admission is needed. But because we need to be often reminded of our deliverance and of our allegiance, the sacraments of commemoration need to be repeated. These are the principal sacraments, and are, as it were, the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance. There are also other consecrations that may be called sacraments, insofar as the word implies only consecration to God’s service. But insofar as it implies an oath or promise of allegiance to God, there were no others in the Old Testament but circumcision and the Passover, and there are no others in the New Testament but baptism and the Lord’s Supper.
Chapter 36: Of the word of God, and of prophets
Hobbes distinguishes the senses in which Scripture speaks of the Word of God.
When there is mention of the Word of God, or of Man, it doth not signifie a part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a Nown, or a Verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it significative; but a perfect Speech or Discourse, whereby the speaker affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, promiseth, threatneth, wisheth, or interrogateth. In which sense it is not Vocabulum, that signifies a Word; but Sermo, (in Greek Logos) that is, some Speech, Discourse, or Saying.
When the Word of God, or of man, is mentioned, it does not signify a part of speech, such as grammarians call a noun or a verb, or any simple sound without a context of other words to give it meaning. It signifies a complete speech or discourse, by which the speaker affirms, denies, commands, promises, threatens, wishes, or asks. In this sense it is not vocabulum, which signifies a word, but sermo (in Greek logos): that is, some speech, discourse, or saying.
Again, if we say the Word of God, or of Man, it may bee understood sometimes of the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken, or that a Man hath spoken: In which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew, we understand St.
Again, when we say the Word of God, or of man, it may sometimes be understood of the speaker, as the words that God has spoken, or that a man has spoken. In this sense, when we say “the Gospel of St.
Matthew to be the Writer of it: and sometimes of the Subject: In which sense, when we read in the Bible, The words of the days of the Kings of Israel, or Iudah, ’tis meant, that the acts that were done in those days, were the Subject of those Words; And in the Greek, which (in the Scripture) retaineth many Hebraismes, by the Word of God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God, and his government; that is to say, the Doctrine of Religion: Insomuch, as it is all one, to say Logos Theou, and Theologia; which is, that Doctrine which wee usually call Divinity, as is manifest by the places following [Acts 13.
Matthew,” we understand St. Matthew to be its writer. And sometimes it is understood of the subject. In this sense, when we read in the Bible, “The words of the days of the kings of Israel,” or “of Judah,” it means that the acts done in those days were the subject of those words. And in the Greek of Scripture, which keeps many Hebraisms, “the Word of God” often means not what is spoken by God, but what is spoken concerning God and his government: that is to say, the doctrine of religion. So it is all one to say logos theou and theologia—that is, the doctrine we usually call divinity. This is clear from the following passages.
46.] Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everiasting life, loe, we turn to the Gentiles. That which is here called the Word of God, was the Doctrine of Christian Religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before. And [Acts 5.
Acts 13:46: “Then Paul and Barnabas grew bold, and said, It was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you; but seeing you put it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles.” What is here called the Word of God was the doctrine of the Christian religion, as is evident from what comes before. And
20.] where it is said to the Apostles by an Angel, Go stand and speak in the Temple, all the Words of this life; by the Words of this life, is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same Chap. Daily in the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Iesus: In which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the subject of this Word of life; or (which is all one) the subject of the Words of this life eternall, that our Saviour offered them. So [Acts 15.
in Acts 5:20, where an angel says to the apostles, “Go, stand and speak in the Temple all the words of this life,” “the words of this life” means the doctrine of the Gospel. This is evident from what they did in the Temple, as described in the last verse of the same chapter: “Daily in the Temple, and in every house, they did not cease to teach and preach Jesus Christ.” In this place it is plain that Jesus Christ was the subject of this “word of life”—or, what is the same thing, the subject of the “words of this life eternal” that our Savior offered them. So in
7.] the Word of God, is called the Word of the Gospel, because it containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ; and the same Word [Rom. 10. 8, 9.] is called the Word of Faith; that is, as is there expressed, the Doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also [Mat. 13. 19.] When any one heareth the Word of the Kingdome; that is, the Doctrine of the Kingdome taught by Christ. Again, the same Word, is said [Acts 12. 24.] to grow and to be multiplyed; which to understand of the Evangelicall Doctrine is easie, but of the Voice, or Speech of God, hard and strange.
Acts 15:7 the Word of God is called “the word of the Gospel,” because it contains the doctrine of the kingdom of Christ. And the same Word (Romans 10:8–9) is called “the word of faith”: that is, as is there expressed, the doctrine of Christ come and raised from the dead. Also Matthew 13:19: “When anyone hears the word of the kingdom”—that is, the doctrine of the kingdom taught by Christ. Again, the same Word is said (Acts 12:24) “to grow and multiply.” This is easy to understand of the doctrine of the Gospel, but hard and strange to understand of the voice or speech of God.
In the same sense the Doctrine of Devils, signifieth not the Words of any Devill, but the Doctrine of Heathen men concerning Daemons, and those Phantasms which they worshipped as Gods.
In the same sense, the “doctrine of devils” does not signify the words of any devil, but the doctrine of the heathen concerning demons, and those phantasms they worshipped as gods.
Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is taken in Scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is taken for the Doctrine of Christian Religion,) that the whole Scripture is the Word of God: but in the former sense not so. For example, though these words, I am the Lord thy God, &c. to the end of the Ten Commandements, were spoken by God to Moses; yet the Preface, God spake these words and said, is to be understood for the Words of him that wrote the holy History. The Word of God, as it is taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood sometimes Properly, sometimes *Metaphorically.
Considering these two meanings of the Word of God as it is taken in Scripture, it is plain that in the latter sense (where it is taken for the doctrine of the Christian religion) the whole of Scripture is the Word of God, but not in the former sense. For example, though the words “I am the Lord your God,” and so on to the end of the Ten Commandments, were spoken by God to Moses, the preface “God spoke these words and said” is to be understood as the words of the one who wrote the sacred history. The Word of God, taken for what he has spoken, is understood sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically.
Properly, as the words, he hath spoken to his Prophets: Metaphorically, for his Wisdome, Power, and eternall Decree, in making the world; in which sense, those Fiats, Let their be light, Let there be a firmament, Let us make man, &c. [Gen. 1.] are the Word of God. And in the same sense it is said [Iohn 1. 3.] All things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made: And [Heb. 1. 3.] He upholdeth all things by the Word of his Power; that is, by the Power of his Word; that is, by his Power: and [Heb.* 11. 3.
Properly, as the words he has spoken to his prophets. Metaphorically, for his wisdom, power, and eternal decree in making the world. In this sense those fiats—“Let there be light,” “Let there be a firmament,” “Let us make man,” and so on (Genesis 1)—are the Word of God. And in the same sense it is said (John 1:3), “All things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made”; and (Hebrews 1:3), “He upholds all things by the word of his power”—that is, by the power of his Word; that is, by his power. And (Hebrews 11:3)
The worlds were framed by the Word of God; and many other places to the same sense: As also amongst the Latines, the name of Fate, which signifieth properly The word spoken, is taken in the same sense.
“The worlds were framed by the word of God”; and many other places to the same effect. So also among the Latins, the name fate (fatum), which properly signifies “the word spoken,” is taken in the same sense.
Secondly, for the effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing it self, which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, Threatned, or Promised; as [Psalm 105. 19.] where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, till his Word was come; that is, till that was come to passe which he had [Gen. 40. 13.] foretold to Pharaohs Butler, concerning his being restored to his office: for there by his word was come, is meant, the thing it self was come to passe. So also [1 King. 18. 36.] Elijah saith to God, I have done all these thy Words, in stead of I have done all these things at thy Word, or commandement: and [Ier. 17.
Secondly, it is taken for the effect of his Word: that is to say, for the thing itself that is affirmed, commanded, threatened, or promised by his Word. So in Psalm 105:19, Joseph is said to have been kept in prison “until his word came”—that is, until what he had foretold to Pharaoh’s butler (Genesis 40:13) about his being restored to his office had come to pass. For there “his word came” means that the thing itself had come to pass. So also (1 Kings 18:36) Elijah says to God, “I have done all these your words,” instead of “I have done all these things at your word,” or command. And in Jeremiah
15.] Where is the Word of the Lord, is put for, Where is the Evill he threatned: And [Ezek. 12. 28.] There shall none of my Words be prolonged any more: by words are understood those things, which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament [Mat. 24. 35.] heaven and earth shal pass away, but my Words shal not pass away; that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold, that shall not come to passe. And in this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John onely calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh the Word of God [as Ioh. 1.
17:15, “Where is the word of the Lord?” is put for “Where is the evil he threatened?” And in Ezekiel 12:28, “None of my words shall be delayed any longer”: by words are meant those things which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament (Matthew 24:35), “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away”: that is, there is nothing I have promised or foretold that shall not come to pass. And it is in this sense that St. John the Evangelist—and, I think, St. John only—calls our Savior himself, as in the flesh, “the Word of God,” as in John 1:14:
14.] the Word was made Flesh; that is to say, the Word, or Promise that Christ should come into the world; who in the beginning was with God; that is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of Eternall life; but it was not till then put in execution, and actually incarnate; So that our Saviour is there called the Word, not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. They that taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call him the Verbe of God, do but render the text more obscure.
“The Word was made flesh”; that is to say, the word or promise that Christ would come into the world, “who in the beginning was with God.” That is to say, it was in the purpose of God the Father to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of eternal life; but this was not put into execution, and actually made flesh, until then. So our Savior is there called “the Word” not because he was the promise, but because he was the thing promised. Those who take occasion from this place to call him commonly the Verb of God only make the text more obscure.
They might as well term him the Nown of God: for as by Nown, so also by Verbe, men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall; and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or Man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this Word which St.
They might as well call him the Noun of God. For by verb, as by noun, men understand nothing but a part of speech—a sound, a noise—that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promises, nor is any substance, bodily or spiritual. So it cannot be said to be either God or man, whereas our Savior is both. And this Word, which St.
Iohn in his Gospel saith was with God, is [in his 1 Epistle, verse 1.] called the Word of life; and [verse 2.] the Eternall life, which was with the Father: so that he can be in no other sense called the Word, then in that, wherein he is called Eternall life; that is, he that hath procured us Eternall life, by his comming in the flesh. So also [Apocalypse 19.
John in his Gospel says was with God, is called in his First Epistle (verse 1) “the Word of life,” and (verse 2) “the eternal life, which was with the Father.” So he can be called the Word in no other sense than the one in which he is called eternal life: that is, “he who has procured eternal life for us” by his coming in the flesh. So also in Revelation
13.] the Apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a garment dipt in bloud, saith; his name is the Word of God; which is to be understood, as if he had said his name had been, He that was come according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his Word and promises delivered by the Prophets. So that there is nothing here of the Incarnation of a Word, but of the Incarnation of God the Son, therefore called the Word, because his Incarnation was the Performance of the Promise; In like manner as the Holy Ghost is called the Promise.
19:13, the apostle, speaking of Christ clothed in a garment dipped in blood, says his name is “the Word of God.” This is to be understood as if he had said his name was “He who came according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his word and promises delivered by the prophets.” So there is nothing here of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of God the Son, who is therefore called “the Word” because his incarnation was the fulfillment of the promise—in the same way that the Holy Spirit is called “the Promise.”
There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the Word of God, is signified such Words as are consonant to reason, and equity, though spoken sometimes neither by Prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was an Idolater; yet his Words to the good King Josiah, in which he advised him by Messengers, not to oppose him in his march against Carchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah not hearkning to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 Chron. 35. vers. 21, 22, 23.
There are also places in Scripture where the Word of God signifies words that agree with reason and equity, though sometimes spoken by someone who was neither a prophet nor a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was an idolater; yet his words to the good King Josiah—advising him by messengers not to oppose him on his march against Carchemish—are said to have come from the mouth of God; and Josiah, not heeding them, was killed in the battle. This can be read in 2 Chronicles 35:21–23.
It is true, that as the same History is related in the first Book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But wee are to give credit to the Canonicall Scripture, whatsoever be written in the Apocrypha.
It is true that as the same history is told in the First Book of Esdras, it was not Pharaoh but Jeremiah who spoke these words to Josiah from the mouth of the Lord. But we are to give credit to the canonical Scripture, whatever is written in the Apocrypha.
The Word of God, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of reason, and equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to bee written in mans heart; as Psalm 36. 31. Ierem. 31. 33. Deut. 30. 11, 14. and many other like places.
The Word of God is also to be taken for the dictates of reason and equity when Scripture says it is written in man’s heart, as in Psalm 36:31, Jeremiah 31:33, Deuteronomy 30:11 and 14, and many other similar places.
What a prophet is
A prophet may be God's spokesman, a foreteller, or a speaker of incoherent words; God spoke through dreams and visions.
The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor; that is, he that speaketh from God to Man, or from man to God: And sometimes Praedictor, or a foreteller of things to come: And sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from God to the People. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Ieremiah, and others were Prophets. And in this sense the High Priest was a Prophet, for he only went into the Sanctum Sanctorum, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to the people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man should die for the people, St. John saith [chap. 11.
The name prophet in Scripture signifies sometimes prolocutor—that is, one who speaks from God to man, or from man to God—and sometimes predictor, a foreteller of things to come; and sometimes one who speaks incoherently, as people do when their minds are disordered. It is most often used in the sense of speaking from God to the people. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were prophets. And in this sense the high priest was a prophet, for he alone went into the Sanctum Sanctorum to inquire of God, and was to declare his answer to the people. So when Caiaphas said it was expedient that one man should die for the people, St. John says (chapter 11,
51.] that He spake not this of himselfe, but being High Priest that year, he prophesied that one man should dye for the nation. Also they that in Christian Congregations taught the people [1 Cor. 14. 3.] are said to Prophecy. In the like sense it is, that God saith to Moses [Exod. 4. 16.] concerning Aaron, He shall be thy Spokes-man to the People; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God: that which here is Spokes-man, is [chap. 7.
verse 51), “He did not say this of himself, but being high priest that year, he prophesied that one man should die for the nation.” Also those who taught the people in Christian congregations are said to prophesy (1 Corinthians 14:3). It is in a similar sense that God says to Moses concerning Aaron (Exodus 4:16), “He shall be your spokesman to the people; and he shall be to you as a mouth, and you shall be to him as God.” What is here “spokesman” is (in chapter 7,
1.] interpreted Prophet; See (saith God) I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet. In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called a Prophet [Genes. 20. 7.] where God in a Dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a Prophet, and shall pray for thee; whereby may be also gathered, that the name of Prophet may be given, not unproperly to them that in Christian Churches, have a Calling to say publique prayers for the Congregation.
verse 1) rendered “prophet”: “See,” says God, “I have made you a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron your brother shall be your prophet.” In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called a prophet (Genesis 20:7), where God speaks to Abimelech in a dream in this way: “Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a prophet, and shall pray for you.” From this we may also gather that the name of prophet may, not improperly, be given to those in Christian churches who are called to say public prayers for the congregation.
In the same sense, the Prophets that came down from the High place (or Hill of God) with a Psaltery, and a Tabret, and a Pipe, and a Harp [1 Sam. 10. 5, 6. and [vers. 10.] Saul amongst them, are said to Prophecy, in that they praised God, in that manner publiquely. In the like sense, is Miriam [Exod. 15. 20.] called a Prophetesse. So is it also to be taken [1 Cor. 11. 4, 5.] where St. Paul saith, *Every man that prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered, &c.
In the same sense, the prophets who came down from the high place (or hill of God) with a psaltery, a tambourine, a pipe, and a harp (1 Samuel 10:5–6 and verse 10), with Saul among them, are said to prophesy, in that they praised God publicly in that way. In a similar sense Miriam is called a prophetess (Exodus 15:20). So also it is to be taken in 1 Corinthians 11:4–5, where St. Paul says, “Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered,” and so on,
and every woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered: For Prophecy in that place, signifieth no more, but praising God in Psalmes, and Holy Songs; which women might doe in the Church, though it were not lawfull for them to speak to the Congregation. And in this signification it is, that the Poets of the Heathen, that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems in the honor of their Gods, were called Vates (Prophets) as is well enough known by all that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles, and as is evident [Tit.* 1. 12.] where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a Prophet of their owne said, they were Liars; not that St.
“and every woman who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered.” For prophecy in that place signifies no more than praising God in psalms and holy songs, which women might do in the church, though it was not lawful for them to speak to the congregation. And it is in this sense that the heathen poets who composed hymns and other kinds of poems in honor of their gods were called vates (prophets). This is well enough known to everyone versed in the books of the Gentiles, and is evident from Titus 1:12, where St. Paul says of the Cretans that a prophet of their own said they were liars. Not that St.
Paul held their Poets for Prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word Prophet was commonly used to signifie them that celebrated the honour of God in Verse.
Paul took their poets for prophets; but he acknowledges that the word “prophet” was commonly used to mean those who celebrated the honor of God in verse.
When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future Contigents; not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokesmen, and foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but also all those Impostors, that pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to foretell the like events in time to come: of which (as I have declared already in the 12. chapter of this Discourse) there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation of Prophecy, by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings.
When prophecy means prediction, or foretelling future contingencies, then not only were those prophets who were God’s spokesmen and foretold to others the things God had foretold to them, but so were all those impostors who claim, with the help of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination from past events and false causes, to foretell similar events in time to come. Of these (as I have already shown in Chapter 12 of this book) there are many kinds. With the common sort of men they gain a greater reputation for prophecy by one chance event that can be twisted to their purpose than they can lose again by any number of failures.
Prophecy is not an Art, nor (when it is taken for Praediction) a constant Vocation; but an extraordinary, and temporary Employment from God, most often of Good men, but sometimes also of the Wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a Prophetesse; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise such a Phantasme; nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a means of Sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the discomfiture, by which he fell.
Prophecy is not an art, nor (when it is taken for prediction) a permanent vocation, but an extraordinary and temporary employment from God, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit and by it to have raised a phantasm of Samuel and foretold Saul’s death, was not for that reason a prophetess. For she had no knowledge by which she could raise such a phantasm; nor does it appear that God commanded it to be raised. He only guided that imposture to be a means of Saul’s terror and discouragement, and consequently of the defeat in which he fell.
And for Incoherent Speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one sort of Prophecy, because the Prophets of their Oracles, intoxicated with a spirit, or vapor from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like [the mentally ill]; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made of Materia prima. In the Scripture I find it also so taken [1 Sam. 18. 10.] in these words, And the Evill spirit came upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the midst of the house.
As for incoherent speech, among the Gentiles it was taken for one kind of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated by a spirit or vapor from the cave of the Pythian oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spoke like people who are mentally ill. A sense could be made of their loose words to fit any event, in the same way that all bodies are said to be made of materia prima. In Scripture I find it taken this way too (1 Samuel 18:10), in these words: “And the evil spirit came upon Saul, and he prophesied in the midst of the house.”
And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word Prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom God speaketh immediately, that which the Prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some say) be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The Prophet David argueth thus, *Shall he that made the eye, not see?
And although the word prophet has so many meanings in Scripture, the most frequent is the one in which it is taken for someone to whom God speaks directly what the prophet is to say from him to some other man, or to the people. And here a question may be asked: in what manner does God speak to such a prophet? Can it properly be said (some may ask) that God has voice and language, when it cannot properly be said that he has a tongue or other organs, as a man has? The prophet David argues thus: “Shall he who made the eye not see?
or he that made the ear, not hear? But this may be spoken, not (as usually) to signifie Gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him. For to see, and hear,* are Honorable Attributes, and may be given to God, to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive) his Almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the strict; and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other parts of mans body, that he had also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him.
or he who made the ear not hear?” But this may be said not (as usual) to signify God’s nature, but to signify our intention to honor him. For to see and to hear are honorable attributes, and may be given to God to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive it) his almighty power. But if it were taken in the strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making all the other parts of man’s body that he also had the same use of them that we have. Many of these would be so unseemly that it would be the greatest insult in the world to ascribe them to him.
Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God makes them understand his will: And the wayes whereby he doth this, are many; and to be sought onely in the Holy Scripture: where though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many places, that deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge his presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood, how he spake to many of the rest.
Therefore we are to interpret God’s speaking to men directly as whatever way it is by which God makes them understand his will. And the ways he does this are many, and are to be sought only in Holy Scripture. There, though it is often said that God spoke to this or that person without declaring in what manner, there are also many places that give the signs by which they were to recognize his presence and command; and by these we may understand how he spoke to many of the rest.
In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own countrey to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then [Gen. 12. 7.] God is said to have appeared to him. So there is one way, whereby God made his presence manifest; that is, by an Apparition, or Vision. And again, [Gen. 15. 1.] The Word of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods Messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham [Gen. 18.
In what manner God spoke to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah is not stated; nor how he spoke to Abraham, until he came out of his own country to Shechem in the land of Canaan. Then (Genesis 12:7) God is said to have appeared to him. So there is one way in which God made his presence manifest: by an apparition, or vision. And again (Genesis 15:1), the word of the Lord came to Abraham in a vision; that is to say, something appeared as a sign of God’s presence, as God’s messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Genesis 18:1)
1.] by an apparition of three Angels; and to Abimelech [Gen. 20. 3.] in a dream: To Lot [Gen. 19. 1.] by an apparition of two Angels: And to Hagar [Gen. 21. 17.] by the apparition of one Angel: And to Abraham again [Gen. 22. 11.] by the apparition of a voice from heaven: And [Gen. 26. 24.] to Isaac in the night; (that is, in his sleep, or by dream): And to Jacob [Gen. 18. 12.] in a dream; that is to say (as are the words of the text) Iacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c. And [Gen. 32. 1.] in a Vision of Angels: And to Moses [Exod. 3.
by an apparition of three angels; and to Abimelech in a dream (Genesis 20:3); to Lot by an apparition of two angels (Genesis 19:1); and to Hagar by the apparition of one angel (Genesis 21:17); and to Abraham again by the apparition of a voice from heaven (Genesis 22:11); and to Isaac in the night, that is, in his sleep or by a dream (Genesis 26:24); and to Jacob in a dream (Genesis 18:12)—that is to say, in the words of the text, “Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder,” and so on—and in a vision of angels (Genesis 32:1). And to Moses (Exodus 3:2)
2.] in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: And after the time of Moses, (where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament, is expressed) hee spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the Prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Ioseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. Iohn the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.
in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush. And after the time of Moses, wherever the Old Testament states how God spoke directly to man, he always spoke by a vision or a dream—as to Gideon, Samuel, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets. And so he often did in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Revelation.
Onely to Moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai, and in the Tabernaele; and to the High Priest in the Tabernacle, and in the Sanctum Sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the High Priests were Prophets of a more eminent place, and degree in Gods favour; And God himself in express words declareth, that to other Prophets hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these [Numb. 12. 6, 7, 8.] *If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my self known to him in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream.
Only to Moses did he speak in a more extraordinary manner, on Mount Sinai and in the Tabernacle; and to the high priest in the Tabernacle and in the Sanctum Sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the high priests, were prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God’s favor. And God himself declares in express words that to other prophets he spoke in dreams and visions, but to his servant Moses in the way a man speaks to his friend. The words are these (Numbers 12:6–8): “If there is a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known to him in a vision, and will speak to him in a dream.
My servant Moses is not so, who is faithfull in all my house; with him I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold. And [Exod. 33. 11.] The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend. And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of an Angel, or Angels, as appears expressely, Acts 7. ver. 35. and 53. and Gal. 3. 19. and was therefore a Vision, though a more cleer Vision than was given to other Prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God saith (Deut.* 13. 1.)
My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all my house. With him I will speak mouth to mouth, plainly, and not in dark speeches; and he shall behold the likeness of the Lord.” And (Exodus 33:11), “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.” And yet this speaking of God to Moses was through the mediation of an angel or angels, as appears expressly in Acts 7:35 and 53, and Galatians 3:19. It was therefore a vision, though a clearer vision than was given to other prophets. And in agreement with this, where God says (Deuteronomy 13:1),
If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer of Dreams, the later word is but the interpretation of the former. And [Ioel 2. 28.] Your sons and your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men shall dream Dreams, and your young men shall see Visions: where again, the word Prophecy is expounded by Dream, and Vision. And in the same manner it was, that God spake to Solomon, promising him Wisdome, Riches, and Honor; for the text saith, [1 Kings 3.
“If there arises among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams,” the latter phrase is only an interpretation of the former. And (Joel 2:28), “Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions”: where again the word prophesy is explained by dream and vision. And it was in the same way that God spoke to Solomon, promising him wisdom, riches, and honor; for the text says (1 Kings 3:15),
15.] And Solomon awoak, and behold it was a Dream: So that generally the Prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of the Word of God no otherwise, than from their Dreams, or Visions; that is to say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an Extasie: which imaginations in every true Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either naturall, or feigned.
“And Solomon awoke, and behold, it was a dream.” So in general the extraordinary prophets of the Old Testament took notice of the Word of God in no other way than from their dreams or visions: that is to say, from the imaginations they had in their sleep or in an ecstasy. In every true prophet these imaginations were supernatural; but in false prophets they were either natural or feigned.
The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit; as [Zach. 7. 12.] where the Prophet speaking of the Jewes, saith, They made their hearts hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former Prophets. By which it is manifest, that speaking by the Spirit, or Inspiration, was not a particular manner of Gods speaking, different from Vision, when they, that were said to speak by the Spirit, were extraordinary Prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a particular Commission, or (which is all one) a new Dream, or Vision.
These same prophets were nevertheless said to speak by the Spirit, as in Zechariah 7:12, where the prophet, speaking of the Jews, says, “They made their hearts as hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of hosts has sent in his Spirit by the former prophets.” From this it is plain that speaking by the Spirit, or by inspiration, was not a particular manner of God’s speaking, different from vision. For those who were said to speak by the Spirit were extraordinary prophets, who for every new message had to have a particular commission—or, what is the same thing, a new dream or vision.
Of Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old Testament, some were supreme, and some subordinate: Supreme were first Moses; and after him the High Priests, every one for his time, as long as the Priesthood was Royall; and after the people of the Jews, had rejected God, that he should no more reign over them, those Kings which submitted themselves to Gods government, were also his chief Prophets; and the High Priests office became Ministeriall. And when God was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as the King commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the King thought fit. For King Saul [1 Sam. 13.
Of the prophets in the Old Testament who were prophets by a perpetual calling, some were supreme and some subordinate. The supreme were, first, Moses; and after him the high priests, each for his time, as long as the priesthood was royal. And after the people of the Jews had rejected God, so that he should no longer reign over them, those kings who submitted themselves to God’s government were also his chief prophets, and the high priest’s office became ministerial. When God was to be consulted, the priests put on the holy vestments and inquired of the Lord as the king commanded them, and they were deprived of their office when the king thought fit. For King Saul (1 Samuel 13:9)
9.] commanded the burnt offering to be brought, and [1 Sam. 14. 18.] he commands the Priest to bring the Ark neer him; and [ver. 19.] again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage upon his enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsell of God. In like manner King David, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the Kingdome, is said to enquire of the Lord [1 Sam. 23. 2.] whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and [verse 10.] David commandeth the Priest to bring him the Ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah, or not. And King Solomon [1 Kings 2.
commanded the burnt offering to be brought; and (1 Samuel 14:18) he commands the priest to bring the ark near him, and (verse 19) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage over his enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asks counsel of God. Likewise King David, after his anointing, though before he had possession of the kingdom, is said to “inquire of the Lord” (1 Samuel 23:2) whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 10) David commands the priest to bring him the ephod, to inquire whether he should stay in Keilah or not. And King Solomon (1 Kings 2:27)
27.] took the Priesthood from Abiathar, and gave it [verse 35.] to Zadoc. Therefore Moses, and the High Priests, and the pious Kings, who enquired of God on all extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all Soveraign Prophets. But in what manner God spake unto them, is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount Sinai, it was a Dream, or Vision, such as other Prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses, and other Prophets, Numb. 12. 6, 7, 8. To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility, Incomprehensibility.
took the priesthood from Abiathar and gave it (verse 35) to Zadok. Therefore Moses, and the high priests, and the pious kings, who inquired of God on all extraordinary occasions how they were to conduct themselves or what outcome they would have, were all sovereign prophets. But in what manner God spoke to them is not clear. To say that when Moses went up to God on Mount Sinai it was a dream or vision, such as other prophets had, contradicts the distinction God made between Moses and other prophets (Numbers 12:6–8). To say God spoke or appeared as he is in his own nature is to deny his infinity, invisibility, and incomprehensibility.
To say he spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equall with Christ, in whom onely the Godhead [as St. Paul speaketh Col. 2. 9.] dwelleth, bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernaturall. For God disposeth men to Piety, Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and all manner of Vertue, both Morall, and Intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and by severall occasions, naturall, and ordinary.
To say he spoke by inspiration, or infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifies the Deity, is to make Moses equal with Christ, in whom alone the Godhead dwells bodily (as St. Paul says, Colossians 2:9). And lastly, to say he spoke by the Holy Spirit, as that signifies the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing supernatural to him. For God disposes men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and every kind of virtue, both moral and intellectual, by teaching, by example, and by various natural and ordinary occasions.
And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses, at Mouut Sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his speaking to the High Priests, from the Mercy-Seat. Therefore in what manner God spake to those Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament, there was no Soveraign Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both God that spake, and the Prophet to whom he spake.
And just as these ways cannot be applied to God in his speaking to Moses on Mount Sinai, so they cannot be applied to him in his speaking to the high priests from the mercy seat. Therefore the manner in which God spoke to those sovereign prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to inquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament there was no sovereign prophet but our Savior, who was both God who spoke and the prophet to whom he spoke.
To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any place that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in such manner, as naturally he inclineth men to Piety, to Beleef, to Righteousnesse, and to other vertues all other Christian men. Which way, though it consist in Constitution, Instruction, Education, and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian vertues; yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, (which we in our language call the Holy Ghost): For there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not alwaies supernaturall.
As for subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find no place that proves God spoke to them supernaturally, but only in the way he naturally inclines all other Christian men to piety, to belief, to righteousness, and to other virtues. And this way, though it consists in temperament, instruction, education, and the occasions and inducements men have to Christian virtues, is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit (which in our language we call the Holy Ghost). For there is no good inclination that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not always supernatural.
When therefore a Prophet is said to speak in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks according to Gods will, declared by the supreme Prophet. For the most common acceptation of the word Spirit, is in the signification of a mans intention, mind, or disposition.
When a prophet is said to speak in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God, therefore, we are to understand no more than that he speaks according to God’s will, as declared by the supreme prophet. For the most common meaning of the word spirit is a man’s intention, mind, or disposition.
In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that Prophecyed in the Campe of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to them, is declared in the 11 of Numbers, verse 25. *The Lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the Spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy Elders.
In the time of Moses there were seventy men besides himself who prophesied in the camp of the Israelites. In what manner God spoke to them is declared in Numbers 11:25: “The Lord came down in a cloud and spoke to Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy elders.
And it came to passe, when the Spirit rested upon them, they Prophecyed, and did not cease.* By which it is manifest, first, that their Prophecying to the people, was subservient, and subordinate to the Prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the Spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed as Moses would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at all. For there was [verse 27.] a complaint made against them to Moses; and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but said to Joshua, Bee not jealous in my behalf.
And it came to pass that when the spirit rested upon them, they prophesied, and did not cease.” From this it is plain, first, that their prophesying to the people was subservient and subordinate to the prophesying of Moses. For God took of the spirit of Moses to put upon them, so that they prophesied as Moses wanted them to; otherwise they would not have been allowed to prophesy at all. For (verse 27) a complaint was made against them to Moses, and Joshua wanted Moses to forbid them. He did not, but said to Joshua, “Do not be jealous on my behalf.”
Secondly, that the Spirit of God in that place, signifieth nothing but the Mind and Disposition to obey, and assist, Moses in the administration of the Government. For if it were meant they had the substantiall Spirit of God; that is, the Divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no lesse manner then Christ himself, in whom onely the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the Gift and Grace of God, that guided them to co-operate with Moses; from whom their Spirit was derived.
Secondly, it is plain that the Spirit of God in that place signifies nothing but the mind and disposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the government. For if it meant that they had the substantial Spirit of God—that is, the divine nature—breathed into them, then they had it in no less a manner than Christ himself, in whom alone the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant, therefore, of the gift and grace of God that guided them to cooperate with Moses, from whom their spirit was derived.
And it appeareth [verse 16.] that, they were such as Moses himself should appoint for Elders and Officers of the People: For the words are, Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be Elders and Officers of the people: where, thou knowest, is the same with thou appointest, or hast appointed to be such. For we are told before [Exod. 18.] that Moses following the counsell of Jethro his Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers over the people, such as feared God; and of these, were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon them Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the Kingdome: and in this sense the Spirit of God is said [1 Sam. 16.
And it appears (verse 16) that they were men whom Moses himself was to appoint as elders and officers of the people. For the words are, “Gather to me seventy men, whom you know to be elders and officers of the people,” where “you know” is the same as “you appoint,” or “have appointed to be such.” For we are told earlier (Exodus 18) that Moses, following the advice of Jethro his father-in-law, appointed judges and officers over the people, such as feared God. And of these were those seventy whom God, by putting Moses’ spirit upon them, inclined to help Moses in the administration of the kingdom. And in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Samuel 16:13–14)
13, 14.] presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from him, he rejected. So that by the Spirit is meant Inclination to Gods service; and not any supernaturall Revelation.
to have come upon David immediately upon his anointing, and to have left Saul—God giving his graces to the one he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from the one he rejected. So by the Spirit is meant inclination to God’s service, and not any supernatural revelation.
God spake also many times by the event of Lots; which were ordered by such as he had put in Authority over his people. So wee read that God manifested by the Lots which Saul caused to be drawn [1 Sam. 14. 43.] the fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the oath taken by the people. And [Iosh. 18. 10.] God divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelite, by the lots that Ioshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh. In the same manner it seemeth to be, that God discovered [Ioshua 7. 16, &c.] the crime of Achan. And these are the wayes whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament.
God also spoke many times by the outcome of lots, which were ordered by those he had put in authority over his people. So we read that by the lots Saul caused to be drawn (1 Samuel 14:43), God made known the fault Jonathan had committed in eating a honeycomb, contrary to the oath the people had taken. And (Joshua 18:10) God divided the land of Canaan among the Israelites by “the lots that Joshua cast before the Lord in Shiloh.” It seems to have been in the same way that God uncovered the crime of Achan (Joshua 7:16 and following). And these are the ways in which God declared his will in the Old Testament.
All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by a Vision of an Angel: To Ioseph in a Dream: again to Paul in the way to Damascus in a Vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the Vision of a sheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean, and unclean beasts; and in prison, by Vision of an Angel: And to all the Apostles, and Writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his Spirit; and to the Apostles again (at the choosing of Matthias in the place of Judas Iscariot) by lot.
He used all these ways in the New Testament as well. To the Virgin Mary, by a vision of an angel; to Joseph, in a dream; to Paul, on the road to Damascus, in a vision of our Savior; and to Peter, in the vision of a sheet let down from heaven with various sorts of flesh, of clean and unclean animals, and in prison by a vision of an angel; and to all the apostles and writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his Spirit; and to the apostles again, at the choosing of Matthias in place of Judas Iscariot, by lot.
Judging prophets
False prophets outnumber true ones, so every man must use reason, and the sovereign is the chief prophet.
Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, (which two, when they be naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of God, so rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; And seeing as well such gifts, as the most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may proceed from God, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of Reason and Judgment to discern between naturall, and supernaturall Gifts, and between naturall, and supernaturall Visions, or Dreams.
All prophecy, then, presupposes a vision or dream (which two, when they are natural, are the same), or some special gift of God so rarely observed in mankind as to be marveled at where it is observed. And such gifts, as well as the most extraordinary dreams and visions, may proceed from God not only by his supernatural and direct operation, but also by his natural operation and through secondary causes. So there is need of reason and judgment to discern between natural and supernatural gifts, and between natural and supernatural visions or dreams.
And consequently men had need to be very circumspect, aud wary, in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse.
And consequently men need to be very circumspect and wary in obeying the voice of a man who claims to be a prophet and requires us to obey God in the way that he, in God’s name, tells us is the way to happiness.
For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience; unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a Common-wealth; as when the Prophet is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized.
For he who claims to teach men the way to so great a felicity claims to govern them: that is to say, to rule and reign over them. This is something all men naturally desire, and it therefore deserves to be suspected of ambition and imposture. Consequently it ought to be examined and tested by every man before he yields them obedience—unless he has already yielded it to them in the institution of a commonwealth, as when the prophet is the civil sovereign, or is authorized by the civil sovereign.
And if this examination of Prophets, and Spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks, by which every man might be able, to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out [Deut. 13. 1, &c.] to know a Prophet by; and [1 Iohn 4. 1. &c.] to know a Spirit by: and seeing there is so much Prophecying in the Old Testament; and so much Preaching in the New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false Prophets, then of true; every one is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own perill.
And if this examination of prophets and spirits were not allowed to every one of the people, there would have been no point in setting out the marks by which every man might distinguish between those they ought to follow and those they ought not. Such marks are set out, therefore (Deuteronomy 13:1 and following), to know a prophet by, and (1 John 4:1 and following) to know a spirit by. And seeing there is so much prophesying in the Old Testament, and so much preaching in the New Testament against prophets, and ordinarily so much greater a number of false prophets than true ones, everyone is to beware of obeying their directions at his own peril.
And first, that there were many more false then true Prophets, appears by this, that when Ahab [1 Kings 12.] consulted four hundred Prophets, they were all false Impostors, but onely one Michaiah. And a little before the time of the Captivity, the Prophets were generally lyars. The Prophets (saith the Lord by Ieremy, cha. 14. verse 14.) prophecy Lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a false Vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their heart. In so much as God commanded the People by the mouth of the Prophet Ieremiah [chap. 23. 16.] not to obey them.
And first, that there were many more false prophets than true ones appears from this: when Ahab consulted four hundred prophets (1 Kings 12), they were all false impostors except one, Micaiah. And a little before the time of the Captivity, the prophets were generally liars. “The prophets,” says the Lord through Jeremiah (chapter 14, verse 14), “prophesy lies in my name. I did not send them, nor have I commanded them, nor spoken to them. They prophesy to you a false vision, a thing of nothing, and the deceit of their heart.” So much so that God commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet Jeremiah (23:16) not to obey them:
Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the Prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a Vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.
“Thus says the Lord of hosts: Do not listen to the words of the prophets who prophesy to you. They make you vain; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.”
Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrells amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another, and asking, When departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Michaiah, and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the Lye to one another, (as in Ierem. 14. 14.] and such controversies in the New Testament at this day, amongst the Spirituall Prophets: Every man then was, and now is bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those Rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from the false.
In the time of the Old Testament, then, there were such quarrels among the visionary prophets—one contending with another and asking, “When did the Spirit leave me, to go to you?”, as between Micaiah and the rest of the four hundred—and such giving each other the lie (as in Jeremiah 14:14); and there are such controversies in the New Testament today among the spiritual prophets. Every man therefore was then, and is now, bound to make use of his natural reason, to apply to all prophecy those rules which God has given us to discern the true from the false.
Of which Rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that which Moses the Soveraign Prophet had taught them; and the other the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to passe, as I have already shewn out of Deut. 13. 1. &c. And in the New Testament there was but one onely mark; and that was the preaching of this Doctrine, That Iesus is the Christ, that is, the King of the Jews, promised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denyed that Article, he was a false Prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a true Prophet. For St. Iohn [1 Epist. 4.
Of these rules in the Old Testament, one was a doctrine conforming to what Moses, the sovereign prophet, had taught them; and the other was the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to pass, as I have already shown from Deuteronomy 13:1 and following. And in the New Testament there was only one mark, and that was the preaching of this doctrine: that Jesus is the Christ—that is, the King of the Jews promised in the Old Testament. Whoever denied that article was a false prophet, whatever miracles he might seem to work; and whoever taught it was a true prophet. For St. John (First Epistle, 4:2
2, &c.] speaking expressely of the means to examine Spirits, whether they be of God, or not; after he had told them that there would arise false Prophets, saith thus, Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every Spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; that is, is approved and allowed as a Prophet of God: not that he is a godly man, or one of the Elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a Prophet avowed.
and following), speaking expressly of the means of examining spirits, whether they are of God or not, after telling them that false prophets would arise, says this: “By this you know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God.” That is, he is approved and allowed as a prophet of God—not that he is a godly man, or one of the elect, because he confesses, professes, or preaches Jesus to be the Christ, but because he is an acknowledged prophet.
For God sometimes speaketh by Prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam; and as he foretold Saul of his death, by the Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, Every Spirit that confesseth not that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of Christ. And this is the Spirit of Antichrist. So that the Rule is perfect on both sides; that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come, and looketh for him in some future Impostor, that shall take upon him that honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist.
For God sometimes speaks through prophets whose persons he has not accepted, as he did through Balaam, and as he foretold Saul’s death to him through the witch of Endor. Again, in the next verse: “Every spirit that does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is not of Christ; and this is the spirit of Antichrist.” So the rule is complete on both sides: he is a true prophet who preaches that the Messiah has already come in the person of Jesus; and he is a false one who denies that he has come and looks for him in some future impostor who will falsely take that honor upon himself—the one the apostle there properly calls Antichrist.
Every man therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to say, who it is, that is Gods Vicegerent on Earth; and hath next under God, the Authority of Governing Christian men; and to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the name of God, hee hath commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracle, or without, shall at any time advance:
Every man therefore ought to consider who is the sovereign prophet: that is to say, who is God’s vicegerent on earth, and has, next under God, the authority of governing Christian men. He ought to observe as a rule the doctrine which that sovereign, in the name of God, has commanded to be taught, and by it to examine and test the truth of the doctrines that pretended prophets, with miracles or without, shall at any time put forward.
and if they find it contrary to that Rule, to doe as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some that Propecyed in the Campe, whose Authority so to doe they doubted of; and leave to the Soveraign, as they did to Moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should see cause; and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the Spirit of their Soveraigne.
And if they find a doctrine contrary to that rule, they should do as those did who came to Moses and complained that some were prophesying in the camp whose authority to do so they doubted: leave it to the sovereign, as they left it to Moses, to uphold or forbid them as he sees cause. If he disavows them, they should no longer obey their voice; if he approves them, they should obey them as men to whom God has given a part of the spirit of their sovereign.
For when Christian men, take not their Christian Soveraign, for Gods Prophet; they must either take their owne Dreames, for the Prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead by some strange Prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can bewitch them, by slaunder of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling, then sometimes an extraordinary successe, and Impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both divine, and humane, reduce all Order, Government, and Society, to the first Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre.
For when Christian men do not take their Christian sovereign for God’s prophet, they must either take their own dreams for the prophecy they mean to be governed by, and the swelling of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must let themselves be led by some foreign prince, or by some of their fellow subjects who can bewitch them into rebellion by slandering the government, with no other miracle to confirm their calling than, sometimes, an extraordinary success and impunity. And by this means, destroying all laws, both divine and human, they reduce all order, government, and society to the original chaos of violence and civil war.
Chapter 37: Of miracles and their use
A miracle is a work of God, beyond nature, done to show his elect that a messenger is sent.
By Miracles are signified the Admirable works of God: & therefore they are also called Wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private naturall reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly in Holy Scripture, called Signes, in the same sense, as they are called by the Latines, Ostenta, and Portenta, from shewing, and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to passe.
By miracles are signified the marvelous works of God; and so they are also called wonders. And because they are for the most part done to signify his command on occasions when, without them, men are apt to doubt (following their own private natural reasoning) what he has commanded and what not, they are commonly called in Holy Scripture signs—in the same sense in which the Latins call them ostenta and portenta, from showing and signifying beforehand what the Almighty is about to bring to pass.
To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable. And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been produced: The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall means, but onely by the immediate hand of God.
To understand what a miracle is, therefore, we must first understand what works men wonder at and call marvelous. There are only two things that make men wonder at any event. One is if it is strange: that is, such that its like has never, or very rarely, been produced. The other is if, when it has been produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the direct hand of God.
But when wee see some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.
But when we see some possible natural cause of it, however rarely the like has been done; or if the like has often been done, however impossible it is to imagine a natural means for it, we no longer wonder at it or consider it a miracle.
Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle; because both the thing is strange, & the naturall cause difficult to imagin: So also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other; yet because ’tis usuall, it is no Miracle.
Therefore, if a horse or a cow were to speak, it would be a miracle, because the thing is strange and its natural cause hard to imagine. So also would it be to see a strange deviation of nature in the production of some new shape of living creature. But when a man or other animal begets its like, though we know no more how this is done than how the other would be, still, because it is usual, it is no miracle.
In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a Miracle; because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed; because we see it often, it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of God, the one is brought to passe, than the other.
In the same way, if a man is transformed into a stone or into a pillar, it is a miracle, because it is strange. But if a piece of wood is changed in that way, it is no miracle, because we see it often. And yet we know no more by what operation of God the one is brought to pass than the other.
The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more an universall destruction of the world by Water. But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not Miracles, neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works produced by the Art of man: yet when we know they are done; because thereby wee know also the means how they are done, we count them not for Miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but of humane Industry.
The first rainbow ever seen in the world was a miracle, because it was the first, and consequently strange; and it served as a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people that there would be no more universal destruction of the world by water. But today, because rainbows are frequent, they are not miracles, either to those who know their natural causes or to those who do not. Again, there are many rare works produced by human art; yet when we know they are done, since we thereby also know the means by which they are done, we do not count them miracles, because they are wrought not by the direct hand of God but by human industry.
Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not to another.
Furthermore, since admiration and wonder follow from the knowledge and experience men are endowed with, some more, some less, it follows that the same thing may be a miracle to one person and not to another.
And thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious men make great Wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God,) admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon have been taken for supernaturall works, by the common people; when neverthelesse, there were others, could from their naturall causes, have foretold the very hour they should arrive: Or, as when a man, by confederacy, and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man, and thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it seems to him a Miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such Miracles as those, cannot easily be done.
And hence it is that ignorant and superstitious men make great wonders of works which other men, knowing they proceed from nature (which is not the direct but the ordinary work of God), do not marvel at at all. So eclipses of the sun and moon have been taken for supernatural works by the common people, when there were nevertheless others who could have foretold, from their natural causes, the very hour they would arrive. Or when a man, through collusion and secret information, learns of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man and then tells him what he has done in the past, it seems to him a miraculous thing. But among wise and cautious men such miracles cannot easily be done.
Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets, that thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universall deluge, were admirable works; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any Prophet, or other Minister of God, they use not to be called Miracles.
Again, it belongs to the nature of a miracle that it is wrought to procure credit for God’s messengers, ministers, and prophets, so that men may know they are called, sent, and employed by God, and may thereby be better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universal Flood, were marvelous works, they are not usually called miracles, because they were not done to procure credit for any prophet or other minister of God.
For how admirable soever any work be, the Admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because men naturally beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at the Prayer, or Word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of Moses, were properly Miracles; because they were done with intention to make the people of Israel beleeve, that Moses came unto them, not out of any design of his owne interest, but as sent from God.
For however marvelous any work may be, the wonder lies not in the fact that it could be done—since men naturally believe the Almighty can do all things—but in the fact that he does it at the prayer or word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt by the hand of Moses were properly miracles, because they were done with the intention of making the people of Israel believe that Moses came to them not out of any design of his own interest, but as sent from God.
Therefore after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage, when he said They will not beleeve me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me, God gave him power, to turn the Rod he had in his hand into a Serpent, and again to return it into a Rod; and by putting his hand into his bosome, to make it leprous; and again by putting it out to make it whole, to make the Children of Israel beleeve (as it is verse 5.) that the God of their Fathers had appeared unto him: And if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into bloud.
Therefore, after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from Egyptian bondage, and he said, “They will not believe me, but will say, The Lord has not appeared to you,” God gave him power to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and back again into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosom to make it leprous, and by taking it out again to make it whole—to make the children of Israel believe (as verse 5 says) that the God of their fathers had appeared to him. And if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into blood.
And when hee had done these Miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41.) that they beleeved him. Neverthelesse, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him. Therefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh, and the Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites beleeve in Moses, and were properly Miracles. In like manner if we consider all the Miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the Prophets, till the Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his Apostles afterward; we shall find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirme beleefe, that they came not of their own motion, but were sent by God.
And when he had done these miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41) that “they believed him.” Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh, they did not yet dare to obey him. Therefore the other works done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians all tended to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and were properly miracles. In the same way, if we consider all the miracles done by the hand of Moses and all the rest of the prophets until the Captivity, and those of our Savior and his apostles afterward, we shall find that their purpose was always to create or confirm the belief that they came not of their own motion but were sent by God.
Wee may further observe in Scripture, that the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is to say, in such as God had determined should become his Subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for end, the conversion of Pharaoh; For God had told Moses before, that he would harden the heart of Pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: And when he let them goe at last, not the Miracles perswaded him, but the plagues forced him to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written, (Mat. 13. 58.)
We may further observe in Scripture that the purpose of miracles was to create belief not universally in all men, elect and reprobate, but in the elect only: that is to say, in those God had determined should become his subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt did not have as their purpose the conversion of Pharaoh. God had told Moses beforehand that he would harden Pharaoh’s heart so that he would not let the people go; and when at last he did let them go, it was not the miracles that persuaded him, but the plagues that forced him to it. So also it is written of our Savior (Matthew 13:58)
that he wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and (in Marke 6. 5.) in stead of, he wrought not many, it is, he could work none. It was not because he wanted power; which to say, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of Miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the Miracles of Moses, of the Prophets, of our Saviour, and of his Apostles was to adde men to the Church; but it was, because the end of their Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but) such as should be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected.
that he did not work many miracles in his own country, because of their unbelief; and in Mark 6:5, instead of “he did not work many,” it says “he could work none.” This was not because he lacked the power—to say that would be blasphemy against God. Nor was it because the purpose of miracles was not to convert unbelieving men to Christ—for the purpose of all the miracles of Moses, of the prophets, of our Savior, and of his apostles was to add men to the Church. It was because the purpose of their miracles was to add to the Church not all men, but those who were to be saved: that is to say, those whom God had elected.
Seeing therefore our Saviour was sent from his Father, hee could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected. They that expounding this place of St. Marke, say, that this word, Hee could not, is put for, He would not, do it without example in the Greek tongue, (where Would not, is put sometimes for Could not, in things inanimate, that have no will; but Could not, for Would not, never,) and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians; as if Christ could doe no Miracles, but amongst the credulous.
Since our Savior was sent from his Father, therefore, he could not use his power in the conversion of those whom his Father had rejected. Those who, expounding this place in St. Mark, say that the words “he could not” are put for “he would not,” do so without any precedent in the Greek language. (In Greek “would not” is sometimes put for “could not,” in inanimate things that have no will; but “could not” for “would not,” never.) And they thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians, as if Christ could do no miracles except among the credulous.
From that which I have here set down, of thenature, and use of a Miracle, we may define it thus, A MIRACLE, is a work of God, (besides his operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary Minister for their salvation.
From what I have set down here about the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus: A miracle is a work of God (other than his operation by way of nature, ordained in the Creation), done to make manifest to his elect the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation.
And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that in all Miracles, the work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say, God hath done it, without using the Prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.
And from this definition we may infer, first, that in all miracles the work done is not the effect of any power in the prophet, because it is the effect of the direct hand of God. That is to say, God has done it without using the prophet in it as a subordinate cause.
Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or other created Spirit, can do a Miracle. For it must either be by vertue of some naturall science, or by Incantation, that is, vertue of words. For if the Inchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God; which all men deny: and if they doe it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but naturall, and consequently no Miracle.
Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit can do a miracle. For it must be done either by virtue of some natural knowledge, or by incantation, that is, by virtue of words. If the enchanters do it by their own independent power, there is some power that does not proceed from God, which all men deny. And if they do it by power given to them, then the work is not from the direct hand of God, but natural, and consequently no miracle.
Enchantment and imposture
Apparent wonders by enchantment are deceptions of the spectator; the sovereign judges whether a miracle is real.
There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought by God himself,) to certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation. As for example, when we read that after the Rod of Moses being east on the ground became a Serpent, the Magicians of Egypt did the like by their Enchantments; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds, and Pooles of water into blood, the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise, with their Enchantments; and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land, the Magicians also did so with their Enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt; will not a man be apt to attribute Miracles to Enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of Words; and think the same very well proved out of this, and other such places?
There are some texts of Scripture that seem to attribute the power of working wonders (equal to some of the direct miracles wrought by God himself) to certain arts of magic and incantation. For example, we read that after the rod of Moses, cast on the ground, became a serpent, “the magicians of Egypt did the same with their enchantments”; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the Egyptian streams, rivers, ponds, and pools into blood, “the magicians of Egypt did so likewise with their enchantments”; and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land, “the magicians also did so with their enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt.” Will a man not be apt to attribute miracles to enchantments—that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of words—and think this very well proved from these and other such places?
and yet there is no place of Scripture, that telleth us what an Enchantment is. If therefore Enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells, and words; but Imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from supernaturall, as the Impostors need not the study so much as of naturall causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of Magick, Witcheraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight they seem to bear.
And yet there is no place in Scripture that tells us what an enchantment is. If, therefore, enchantment is not, as many think, a working of strange effects by spells and words, but imposture and delusion wrought by ordinary means—so far from supernatural that the impostors need not so much as the study of natural causes to do it, but only the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind—then those texts that seem to support the power of magic, witchcraft, and enchantment must necessarily have another sense than the one they seem to bear at first sight.
For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a Rod seemeth a Serpent, or the Waters Bloud, or any other Miracle seemeth done by Enchantment; if it be not to the edification of Gods people, not the Rod, nor the Water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the Words, but the Spectator. So that all the Miracle consisteth in this, that the Enchanter has deceived a man; which is no Miracle, but a very easie matter to doe.
For it is evident enough that words have no effect except on those who understand them; and then they have no other effect than to signify the intentions or passions of those who speak, and thereby produce hope, fear, or other passions or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore, when a rod seems to be a serpent, or water blood, or any other miracle seems to be done by enchantment, then, if it is not for the edification of God’s people, it is not the rod, nor the water, nor anything else that is enchanted—that is to say, worked upon by the words—but the spectator. So the whole miracle consists in this: that the enchanter has deceived a man. And that is no miracle, but a very easy thing to do.
For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and of the nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a Science of the course of the Stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, This hour, or day the Sun should be darkned? A Juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the Devil.
For such is the ignorance and proneness to error of all men generally, but especially of those who have little knowledge of natural causes and of the nature and interests of men, that they can be deceived by innumerable easy tricks. What reputation for miraculous power might a man have gained, before it was known that there was a science of the course of the stars, if he had told the people, “At this hour, or on this day, the sun shall be darkened”? A juggler, by handling his cups and other trinkets, would, if it were not now commonly practiced, be thought to do his wonders at least by the power of the Devil.
A man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in antient time were called Ventriloqui,) and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of Speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that, obtain the reputation of being Conjurers.
A man who has practiced speaking by drawing in his breath (men of this kind were called in ancient times ventriloqui), and so making the weakness of his voice seem to come not from the weak impulse of the organs of speech but from a distance, is able to make a great many people believe it is a voice from heaven, whatever he pleases to tell them. And for a crafty man who has looked into the secrets and intimate confessions that one man ordinarily makes to another about his past actions and adventures, it is no hard matter to tell them back to him; and yet there are many who by such means obtain the reputation of being conjurors.
But it is too long a businesse, to reckon up the severall sorts of those men, which the Greeks called Thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by Confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to bee beleeved. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witnesse; will deceive many more.
But it would be too long a business to list the various sorts of men whom the Greeks called thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of wonderful things; and yet these do everything they do by their own individual dexterity. But if we look at the impostures wrought by collusion, there is nothing so impossible to be done that it is impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring—one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm—will deceive many; but many conspiring—one to seem lame, another to cure him in this way, and all the rest to bear witness—will deceive many more.
In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended Miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, then that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said before in the precedent chapter,) in the beginning of the 13. and end of the 18. of Deuteronomy; That wee take not any for Prophets, that teach any other Religion, then that which Gods Lieutenant, (which at that time was Moses,) hath established; nor any, (though he teach the same Religion,) whose Praediction we doe not see come to passe.
Given this tendency of mankind to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better caution—nor, I think, any other—than the one God prescribed, first through Moses (as I said in the preceding chapter), at the beginning of chapter 13 and the end of chapter 18 of Deuteronomy: that we take no one for a prophet who teaches any religion other than the one established by God’s lieutenant (who at that time was Moses), nor anyone (even if he teaches the same religion) whose prediction we do not see come to pass.
Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron, and his successors in their times, and the Soveraign Governour of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say, the Head of the Church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he hath established, before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle, or Prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a Miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God.
So before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet, we must consult Moses in his time, Aaron and his successors in theirs, and in all times the sovereign governor of God’s people, next under God himself—that is, the head of the Church—as to what doctrine he has established. And when that is done, as for the thing they claim to be a miracle, we must both see it done and use every possible means to consider whether it is really done; and not only that, but whether it is such that no man could do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God.
And in this also we must have recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases, wee have submitted our private judgments. For example; if a man pretend, that after certain words spoken over a peece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a God, or a man, or both, and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done; nor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his Vicar, or Lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say not, then followeth that which Moses saith, (Deut. 18. 22.)
In this too we must have recourse to God’s lieutenant, to whom we have submitted our private judgments in all doubtful cases. For example, suppose a man claims that after certain words are spoken over a piece of bread, God has at once made it not bread but a god, or a man, or both—and yet it still looks as much like bread as it ever did. There is no reason for anyone to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him, until he inquires of God, through his vicar or lieutenant, whether it is done or not. If the lieutenant says no, then what Moses says follows (Deuteronomy 18:22):
he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him. If he say ’tis done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if wee see not, but onely hear tell of a Miracle, we are to consult the Lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful Head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian Soveraigns.
“He has spoken it presumptuously; you shall not fear him.” If he says it is done, then the man is not to contradict it. So also, if we do not see a miracle but only hear it reported, we are to consult the lawful Church—that is, its lawful head—as to how far we are to give credit to those who report it. And this is chiefly the case of men who in these days live under Christian sovereigns.
For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall: and the question is no more, whether what wee see done, be a Miracle; whether the Miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work, and not the Act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye.
For in these times I do not know a single man who ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm or at the word or prayer of a man, that someone endowed with even a moderate degree of reason would think supernatural. And the question is no longer whether what we see done is a miracle, or whether the miracle we hear or read of was a real work and not the act of a tongue or a pen, but in plain terms whether the report is true or a lie.
In which question we are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the Publique Reason, that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we have made him Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies.
In this question none of us is to make our own private reason or conscience the judge, but the public reason—that is, the reason of God’s supreme lieutenant. And indeed we have already made him judge, if we have given him a sovereign power to do all that is necessary for our peace and defense. A private man always has the liberty (because thought is free) to believe or not believe in his heart the acts that have been given out as miracles, according as he sees what benefit may come, through men’s belief, to those who claim or support them, and so to conjecture whether they are miracles or lies.
But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.
But when it comes to the confession of that faith, private reason must submit to public reason—that is to say, to God’s lieutenant. But who this lieutenant of God and head of the Church is will be considered in its proper place hereafter.
Chapter 38: Of eternal life, hell, salvation, and redemption
Rewards and punishments beyond death matter for civil peace; eternal life will be on earth after the resurrection.
The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on the power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments, residing in them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments, then Death.
The maintenance of civil society depends on justice, and justice on the power of life and death, and on other lesser rewards and punishments, residing in those who hold the sovereignty of the commonwealth. So a commonwealth cannot possibly stand where anyone other than the sovereign has the power of giving greater rewards than life and of inflicting greater punishments than death.
Now seeing Eternall life is a greater reward, than the life present; and Eternall torment a greater punishment than the death of Nature; It is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, what is meant in holy Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall; and for what offences, and against whom committed, men are to be Eternally tormented; and for what actions, they are to obtain Eternall life.
Now, since eternal life is a greater reward than the present life, and eternal torment a greater punishment than natural death, it is well worth the careful consideration of all men who wish (by obeying authority) to avoid the calamities of confusion and civil war: what is meant in Holy Scripture by eternal life and eternal torment; for what offenses, and against whom committed, men are to be eternally tormented; and for what actions they are to obtain eternal life.
And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden Everlastingly. For there was the Tree of life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill; which was not allowed him.
First, we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life that, had he not broken God’s commandment, he would have enjoyed it everlastingly in the Paradise of Eden. For the tree of life was there, and he was allowed to eat of it for as long as he refrained from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was not allowed him.
And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever. By which it seemeth to me, (with submission neverthelesse both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am,) that Adam if he had not sinned, had had an Eternall Life on Earth: and that Mortality entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin.
And therefore, as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, “lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live forever.” From this it seems to me that Adam, if he had not sinned, would have had eternal life on earth, and that mortality entered upon him and his posterity by his first sin. (In this, as in all questions whose determination depends on the Scriptures, I nevertheless submit to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the commonwealth whose subject I am.)
Not that actuall Death then entred; for Adam then could never have had children; whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed. But where it it is said, In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die, it must needs bee meant of his Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then Eternall life was lost by Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that Life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this sense it is, that the comparison of St.
Not that actual death entered then, for then Adam could never have had children; whereas he lived long afterward and saw a numerous posterity before he died. But where it is said, “In the day that you eat of it, you shall surely die,” it must be meant of his mortality and the certainty of his death. Since, then, eternal life was lost by Adam’s forfeit in committing sin, whoever was to cancel that forfeit was thereby to recover that life again. Now Jesus Christ has made satisfaction for the sins of all who believe in him, and has therefore recovered for all believers that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. And it is in this sense that the comparison of St.
Paul holdeth (Rom. 5. 18, 19.) As by the offence of one, Iudgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousnesse of one, the free gift came upon all men to Iustification of Life. Which is again (1 Cor. 15. 21, 22.) more perspicuously delivered in these words, For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.
Paul holds (Romans 5:18–19): “As by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life.” This is delivered again, more plainly, in these words (1 Corinthians 15:21–22): “For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.”
Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life, which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to make it on Earth. For if as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall Life on Earth, even so in Christ all shall bee made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, (Psal. 133. 3.) Vpon Zion God commanded the blessing, even Life for evermore: for Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth: as also that of S. Joh. (Rev. 2. 7.)
As to the place where men are to enjoy the eternal life that Christ has obtained for them, the texts just cited seem to put it on earth. For if, as in Adam all die—that is, have forfeited Paradise and eternal life on earth—even so in Christ all shall be made alive, then all men shall be made to live on earth; otherwise the comparison would not be apt. With this the Psalmist seems to agree (Psalm 133:3): “Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even life for evermore”; for Zion is in Jerusalem, on earth. So too does St. John (Revelation 2:7):
To him that overcommeth I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God. This was the tree of Adams Eternall life; but his life was to have been on Earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. Joh. (Rev. 21. 2.) where he saith, I Iohn saw the Holy City, New Ierusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a Bride adorned for her husband: and again v. 10. to the same effect: As if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ, should come down to Gods people from Heaven, and not they goe up to it from Earth.
“To him that overcomes I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God.” This was the tree of Adam’s eternal life; but his life was to have been on earth. The same seems to be confirmed again by St. John (Revelation 21:2), where he says, “I John saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband”; and again in verse 10, to the same effect. It is as if he said that the New Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, would at the second coming of Christ come down from heaven to God’s people, and not that they would go up to it from earth.
And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white clothing (that is, the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were looking upon Christ ascending (Acts 1. 11.) This same Iesus, who is taken up from you into Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into Heaven. Which soundeth as if they had said, he should come down to govern them under his Father, Eternally here; and not take them up to govern them in Heaven; and is conformable to the Restauration of the Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses; which was a Political government of the Jews on Earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (Mat. 22. 30.)
And this differs in nothing from what the two men in white clothing (that is, the two angels) said to the apostles who were watching Christ ascend (Acts 1:11): “This same Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come as you have seen him go up into heaven.” That sounds as if they had said he would come down to govern them, under his Father, eternally here, and not take them up to govern them in heaven. It is consistent with the restoration of the Kingdom of God instituted under Moses, which was a political government of the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Savior (Matthew 22:30),
that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven, is a description of an Eternall Life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of Marriage. For seeing Adam, and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on Earth Eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not continually have procreated their kind. For if Immortals should have generated, as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a small time, would not have been able to afford them place to stand on.
“that in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven,” is a description of an eternal life resembling, in the point of marriage, the one we lost in Adam. For since Adam and Eve, if they had not sinned, would have lived on earth eternally in their own individual persons, it is evident that they would not have gone on procreating their kind continually. For if immortals had reproduced as mankind does now, in a short time the earth would not have been able to give them room to stand on.
The Jews that asked our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many brothers, should be, in the resurrection, knew not what were the consequences of Life Eternall: and therefore our Saviour puts them in mind of this consequence of Immortality; that there shal be no Generation, and consequently no marriage, no more then there is marriage, or generation among the Angels.
The Jews who asked our Savior whose wife the woman who had married many brothers would be in the resurrection did not know what the consequences of eternal life were. And therefore our Savior reminds them of this consequence of immortality: that there will be no generation, and consequently no marriage, any more than there is marriage or generation among the angels.
The comparison between that Eternall life which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his Victory over death hath recovered; holdeth also in this, that as Adam lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time; so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal Life by Christs passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time; namely, till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned from the Condemnation of Adam, not from the Execution; so Life is reckoned from the Absolution, not from the Resurrection of them that are elected in Christ.
The comparison between the eternal life that Adam lost and the one our Savior has recovered by his victory over death also holds in this: just as Adam lost eternal life by his sin and yet lived for a time afterward, so the faithful Christian has recovered eternal life by Christ’s passion, though he dies a natural death and remains dead for a time—namely, until the resurrection. For as death is reckoned from Adam’s condemnation, not from its execution, so life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the resurrection, of those who are elected in Christ.
That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the Resurrection, is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts of the world, which are the most remote from Earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in another Higher Heaven, called Coelum Empyreum, (whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from any text that I can find.
That the place where men are to live eternally after the resurrection is the heavens—meaning by heaven those parts of the world most remote from the earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars in another, higher heaven called the Coelum Empyreum (of which there is no mention in Scripture and no ground in reason)—is not easily drawn from any text that I can find.
By the Kingdome of Heaven, is meant the Kingdom of the King that dwelleth in Heaven and his Kingdome was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets his Lieutenants, first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the Soveraign Priests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their King, after the manner of other Nations.
By the Kingdom of Heaven is meant the kingdom of the King who dwells in heaven; and his kingdom was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the prophets, his lieutenants—first Moses, and after him Eleazar and the sovereign priests—until in the days of Samuel they rebelled and wanted a mortal man for their king, in the manner of other nations.
And when our Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his Ministers, shall have perswaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new Kingdom of Heaven; because our King shall then be God, whose throne is Heaven; without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happinesse any higher than Gods footstool the Earth. On the contrary, we find written (Ioh. 3. 13.) that no man hath ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man, that is in Heaven. Where I observe by the way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our Saviour, but of St.
And when our Savior Christ, by the preaching of his ministers, has persuaded the Jews to return and called the Gentiles to his obedience, then there will be a new Kingdom of Heaven, because our King will then be God, whose throne is heaven—without any necessity evident in Scripture that man shall ascend to his happiness any higher than God’s footstool, the earth. On the contrary, we find it written (John 3:13) that “no man has ascended into heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man, who is in heaven.” Here I observe in passing that these words are not, like those that go just before them, the words of our Savior, but of St.
John himself; for Christ was then not in Heaven, but upon the Earth. The like is said of David (Acts 2. 34.) where St. Peter, to prove the Ascension of Christ, using the words of the Psalmist, (Psal. 16. 10.)
John himself; for Christ was then not in heaven but on earth. The like is said of David (Acts 2:34), where St. Peter, to prove the ascension of Christ, uses the words of the Psalmist (Psalm 16:10),
Thou wilt not leave my soule in Hell, not suffer thine Holy one to see corruption, saith, they were spoken (not of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this Reason, For David is not ascended into Heaven. But to this a man may easily answer, and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall day of Judgment, yet their souls were in Heaven as soon as they were departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our Saviour (Luke 20. 37, 38.)
“You will not leave my soul in hell, nor allow your Holy One to see corruption,” and says they were spoken not of David but of Christ; and to prove it he adds this reason: “For David has not ascended into heaven.” But to this a man may easily answer that, though their bodies were not to ascend until the general Day of Judgment, their souls were in heaven as soon as they had departed from their bodies. This also seems to be confirmed by the words of our Savior (Luke 20:37–38),
who proving the Resurrection out of the words of Moses, saith thus, That the dead are raised, even Moses shewed, at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Iacob. For he is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living; for they all live to him. But if these words be to be understood only of the Immortality of the Soul, they prove not at all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the Resurrection of the Body, that is to say, the Immortality of the Man.
who, proving the resurrection from the words of Moses, says: “That the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush, when he calls the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live to him.” But if these words are to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they do not prove at all what our Savior meant to prove, which was the resurrection of the body—that is to say, the immortality of the man.
Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that those Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind; but by the will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow Eternall life upon the faithfull. And though at that time the Patriarchs and many other faithfull men were dead, yet as it is in the text, they lived to God; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to Life eternall at the Resurrection.
Therefore our Savior means that those patriarchs were immortal, not by a property following from the essence and nature of mankind, but by the will of God, who was pleased of his mere grace to bestow eternal life on the faithful. And though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithful men were dead, yet, as the text says, they lived to God; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with those who were absolved of their sins and ordained to eternal life at the resurrection.
That the Soul of man is in its own nature Eternall, and a living Creature inpedendent on the body; or that any meer man is Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day, (except Enos and Elias,) is a doctrine nor apparent in Scripture. The whole 14. Chapter of Iob, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himselfe, is a complaint of this Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of the Immortality at the Resurrection. There is hope of a tree (saith hee verse 7.)
That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a living creature independent of the body, or that any mere man is immortal otherwise than by the resurrection on the last day (except Enoch and Elijah), is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole fourteenth chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends but of Job himself, is a complaint of this mortality of nature, and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. “There is hope of a tree,” he says (verse 7),
if it be cast down, Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it senteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughes like a Plant. But man dyeth, and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the Ghost, and where is he? and (verse 12.) man lyeth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more. But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us, that it is at the generall Resurrection. For in his 2. Epistle, 3.
“if it is cast down, though its root grows old and its stock dies in the ground, yet when it scents water it will bud and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dies and wastes away; yes, man gives up the ghost, and where is he?” And (verse 12): “Man lies down and does not rise, till the heavens are no more.” But when is it that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us that it is at the general resurrection. For in his Second Epistle, chapter 3,
Chapter, and 7 verse, he saith, that the Heavens and the Earth that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of Iudgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and (verse 12.) *looking for, and hasting to the comming of God, wherein the Heavens shall be on fire, and shall be dissolved, and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat.
verse 7, he says that “the heavens and the earth that are now are reserved for fire against the Day of Judgment and the perdition of ungodly men”; and (verse 12) “looking for and hastening to the coming of God, when the heavens shall be on fire and shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat.
Neverthelesse, we according to the promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse. Therefore where Job saith, man riseth not till the Heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had said, the Immortall Life (and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do usually signifie the same thing) beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection, and day of Judgement; and hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and generation; but the Promise. For St. Peter saies not, Wee look for new heavens, and a new earth, (from Nature,) but from Promise.*
Nevertheless we, according to the promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, in which righteousness dwells.” Therefore, where Job says man does not rise till the heavens are no more, it is the same as if he had said that immortal life (and in Scripture soul and life usually signify the same thing) does not begin in man until the resurrection and the Day of Judgment, and has for its cause not his specific nature and generation, but the promise. For St. Peter does not say, “We look for new heavens and a new earth” from nature, but from promise.
Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of Scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a Civil Common-wealth, where God himself is Soveraign, by vertue first of the Old, and since of the New Covenant, wherein he reigneth by his Vicar, or Lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after the comming again of our Saviour in his Majesty, and glory, to reign actually, and Eternally; the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth.
Lastly, it has already been proved from various evident passages of Scripture, in chapter 35 of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a civil commonwealth, where God himself is sovereign by virtue first of the old covenant and since of the new, in which he reigns by his vicar or lieutenant. The same passages therefore also prove that after our Savior comes again in his majesty and glory to reign actually and eternally, the Kingdom of God is to be on earth.
But because this doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to be protected by their Laws, be obeyed.
But because this doctrine (though proved from passages of Scripture neither few nor obscure) will appear a novelty to most men, I only propose it. I maintain nothing in this or in any other paradox of religion, but await the end of that dispute of the sword, not yet decided among my countrymen, concerning the authority by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved or rejected—the authority whose commands, both spoken and written (whatever the opinions of private men), must be obeyed by all who mean to be protected by its laws.
For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdome God, have so great influence on the Kingdome of Man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God have the Soveraign Power.
For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdom of God have so great an influence on the kingdom of man that they are not to be determined except by those who, under God, have the sovereign power.
Hell and its torments
Scripture's places of damnation are metaphors; the wicked suffer a second death rather than eternal life in torment.
As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies, and their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their place on Earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the Resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up of the Earth, is usually called in Scripture, by words that signifie under ground; which the Latines read generally Infernus, and Inferi, and the Greeks Hades; that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the Grave, as any other deeper place.
Like the Kingdom of God and eternal life, God’s enemies too, and their torments after judgment, appear from Scripture to have their place on earth. The place where all men who were either buried or swallowed up by the earth remain until the resurrection is usually called in Scripture by words that signify underground. The Latins generally render these Infernus and Inferi, and the Greeks Hades—that is, a place where men cannot see. It includes the grave as well as any other deeper place.
But for the place of the damned after the Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor New Testament, by any note of situation; but onely by the company: as that it shall bee, where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary, and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the Earth: As for example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomelesse pit; because Corah, Dathan, and Abirom, were swallowed up alive into the earth.
But the place of the damned after the resurrection is not fixed in either the Old or the New Testament by any mark of location, but only by the company: namely, that it shall be where such wicked men were as God in former times destroyed from the face of the earth in an extraordinary and miraculous manner. For example, they are said to be in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomless pit, because Korah, Dathan, and Abiram were swallowed up alive into the earth.
Not that the Writers of the Scripture would have us beleeve, there could be in the globe of the Earth, which is not only finite, but also (compared to the height of the Stars) of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a bottome; that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their Daemonologie (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning Daemons,) and after them the Romans called Tartarus; of which Virgill sayes,
Not that the writers of Scripture would have us believe that there could be, in the globe of the earth—which is not only finite but also (compared with the height of the stars) of no considerable size—a pit without a bottom, that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their demonology (that is, their doctrine concerning demons), and the Romans after them, called Tartarus. Of it Virgil says:
Bis patet in praeceps, tantum tenditque sub umbras, / Quantus ad æthereum coeli suspectus Olympum:
“Twice as far it gapes, sheer down, and stretches under the shades, / as the upward gaze to the heavenly Olympus of the sky”—
for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear: but that wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on whom God inflicted that Exemplary punnishment.
for that is something the proportion of the earth to the heavens cannot allow. But they would have us believe the damned are there, indefinitely: wherever those men are on whom God inflicted that exemplary punishment.
Again, hecause those mighty men of the Earth, that lived in the time of Noah, before the floud, (which the Greeks called Heroes, and the Scripture Giants, and both say, were begotten, by copulation of the children of God, with the children of men,) were for their wicked life destroyed by the generall deluge; the place of the Damned, is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased Giants; as Proverbs 21. 16. The man that wandreth out of the way of understanding, shall remain in the congregation of the Giants, and Job 26. 5. Behold the Giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them. Here the place of the Damned, is under the water. And *Isaiah 14. 9.
Again, the mighty men of the earth who lived in the time of Noah, before the flood (whom the Greeks called heroes and Scripture giants, and whom both say were begotten by the union of the children of God with the children of men), were destroyed for their wicked lives by the general deluge. So the place of the damned is also sometimes marked out by the company of those dead giants, as in Proverbs 21:16: “The man that wanders out of the way of understanding shall remain in the congregation of the giants”; and Job 26:5: “Behold, the giants groan under water, and those that dwell with them.” Here the place of the damned is under the water. And Isaiah 14:9:
Hell is troubled how to meet thee, (that is, the King of Babylon) and will displace the Giants for thee:* and here again the place of the Damned, (if the sense be literall,) is to be under water.
“Hell is troubled how to meet you” (that is, the king of Babylon) “and will displace the giants for you.” And here again the place of the damned (if the sense is literal) is to be under water.
Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their wickednesse with Fire and Brimstone, and together with them the countrey about made a stinking bituminous Lake: the place of the Damned is sometimes expressed by Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the Apocalypse ch. 21. 8.
Third, because the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were consumed with fire and brimstone for their wickedness by the extraordinary wrath of God, and the country around them was made, along with them, into a stinking lake of pitch, the place of the damned is sometimes expressed by fire and a fiery lake, as in Revelation 21:8:
But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and Murderers, and Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolaters, and all Lyars, shall have their part in the Lake that burnetb with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the second Death. So that it is manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here expressed by Metaphor, from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain kind, or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for Destruction, as it is in the 20. Chapter, at the 14.
“But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and fornicators, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.” So it is evident that hellfire, which is expressed here by a metaphor taken from the real fire of Sodom, does not signify any definite kind or place of torment, but is to be taken indefinitely, for destruction—as it is in chapter 20, at the fourteenth
verse; where it is said, that Death and Hell were cast into the Lake of Fire; that is to say, were abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of Judgment, there shall be no more Dying, nor no more going into Hell; that is, no more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,) which is the same with no more Dying.
verse, where it is said that “Death and Hell were cast into the lake of fire”: that is, were abolished and destroyed—as if after the Day of Judgment there shall be no more dying, and no more going into hell; that is, no more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word hell is derived), which is the same as no more dying.
Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written (Exod. 10. 23.) They saw not one another, neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all the Children of Israel had light in their dwellings; the place of the wicked after Judgment, is called Vtter Darknesse, or (as it is in the originall) Darknesse without. And so it is expressed (Mat. 22. 13.)
Fourth, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written (Exodus 10:23), “They saw not one another, neither did any man rise from his place for three days; but all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings,” the place of the wicked after judgment is called utter darkness, or (as it is in the original) darkness outside. So it is expressed in Matthew 22:13,
where the King commandeth his Servants, to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his Wedding garment, and to cast him out, Eis To Skotos To Exoteron, Externall darknesse, or Darknesse without: which though translated Vtter darknesse, does not signifie how great, but where that darknesse is to be; namely, without the habitation of Gods Elect.
where the king commands his servants “to bind hand and foot the man who did not have on a wedding garment, and to cast him out,” eis to skotos to exōteron—into external darkness, or darkness outside. Though this is translated utter darkness, it signifies not how great that darkness is to be, but where: namely, outside the dwelling of God’s elect.
Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the Valley of the Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet, the Jews had committed most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their children to the Idol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments; and wherein Josias had burnt the Priests of Moloch upon their own Altars, as appeareth at large in the 2 of Kings chap. 23. the place served afterwards, to receive the filth, and garbage which was carried thither, ont of the City; and there used to be fires made, from time to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of Carrion.
Lastly, there was a place near Jerusalem called the Valley of the Children of Hinnom. In one part of it, called Tophet, the Jews had committed the most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the idol Moloch. There also God had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments, and there Josiah had burned the priests of Moloch on their own altars, as appears at length in 2 Kings 23. The place afterward served to receive the filth and garbage carried there out of the city, and fires used to be made there from time to time to purify the air and take away the stench of carrion.
From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place of the Damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon. And this Gehenna, is that word, which is usually now translated HELL; and from the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of Everlasting, and Vnquenchable Fire.
From this abominable place the Jews ever afterward used to call the place of the damned by the name of Gehenna, or the Valley of Hinnom. And this Gehenna is the word now usually translated hell; and from the fires burning there from time to time we have the notion of everlasting and unquenchable fire.
Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after the day of Judgment, the wicked are all Eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after under ground, or under water; or that after the Resurrection, they shall no more see one another; nor stir from one place to another; it followeth, me thinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning Hell Fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to bee enquired after, (for of all Metaphors there is some reall ground, that may be expressed in proper words) both of the Place of Hell, and the nature of Hellish Torments, and Tormenters.
Now, since no one interprets Scripture to mean that after the Day of Judgment the wicked are all to be eternally punished in the Valley of Hinnom; or that they shall rise again so as to be forever after under ground or under water; or that after the resurrection they shall no longer see one another or stir from one place to another—it follows, it seems to me, quite necessarily, that what is said in this way about hellfire is spoken metaphorically. There is therefore a proper sense to be inquired after (for every metaphor has some real ground that may be expressed in proper words), both of the place of hell and of the nature of hellish torments and tormentors.
And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties, exactly and properly delivered by the names of, The Enemy, or Satan; The Accuser, or Diabolus; The Destroyer, or Abaddon. Which significant names, Satan, Devill, Abaddon, set not forth to us any Individuall person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality; and are therefore Appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles; because thereby they seem to be the proper names of Daemons; and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that time was the Religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ.
First, as for the tormentors, their nature and properties are exactly and properly conveyed by their names: the Enemy, or Satan; the Accuser, or Diabolus; the Destroyer, or Abaddon. These meaningful names—Satan, Devil, Abaddon—do not set before us any individual person, as proper names do, but only an office or quality. They are therefore appellatives (common nouns), which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are in the Latin and modern Bibles; for that makes them seem to be the proper names of demons, and men are the more easily seduced into believing the doctrine of devils, which at that time was the religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses and of Christ.
And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant, the Enemy of them that shall be in the Kingdome of God; therefore if the Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, (as in the former Chapter I have shewn by Scripture it seems to be,) The Enemy, and his Kingdome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.
And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and the Destroyer is meant the enemy of those who will be in the Kingdom of God, it follows that if the Kingdom of God after the resurrection is on earth (as I have shown from Scripture in the preceding chapter that it seems to be), the Enemy and his kingdom must be on earth also. For so it was also in the time before the Jews had deposed God. God’s kingdom was in Palestine, and the nations round about were the kingdoms of the Enemy; and consequently by Satan is meant any earthly enemy of the Church.
The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by weeping, and gnashing of teeth, as Mat. 8. 12. Sometimes, by the worm of Conscience; as Isa. 66. 24. and Mark 9. 44, 46, 48: sometimes, by Fire, as in the place now quoted, where the worm dyeth not, and the fire is not quenched, and many places beside: sometimes by shame, and contempt, as Dan. 12. 2. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the Earth, shall awake; some to Everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt. All which places design metaphorically a grief, and discontent of mind, from the sight of that Eternall felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost.
The torments of hell are expressed sometimes by weeping and gnashing of teeth, as in Matthew 8:12; sometimes by the worm of conscience, as in Isaiah 66:24 and Mark 9:44, 46, 48; sometimes by fire, as in the passage just cited, “where the worm does not die, and the fire is not quenched,” and in many other places; sometimes by shame and contempt, as in Daniel 12:2: “And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.” All these passages metaphorically designate a grief and discontent of mind at the sight of that eternal felicity in others which they themselves have lost through their own unbelief and disobedience.
And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actuall miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily paines, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not onely live under evill and cruell Governours, but have also for Enemy, the Eternall King of the Saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily paines, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second Death. For though the Scripture bee clear for an universall Resurrection; yet wee do not read, that to any of the Reprobate is promised an Eternall life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15. 42, 43.)
And because such felicity in others is not felt except by comparison with their own actual miseries, it follows that they are to suffer such bodily pains and calamities as befall those who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but also have as their enemy the eternal King of the saints, God Almighty. And among these bodily pains is also to be reckoned, for every one of the wicked, a second death. For though Scripture is clear for a universal resurrection, we do not read that eternal life is promised to any of the reprobate. For St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15:42–43),
to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weaknesse, it is raised in power; Glory and Power cannot be applyed to the bodies of the wicked: Nor can the name of Second Death, bee applyed to those that can never die but once: And although in Metaphoricall speech, a Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee called an Everasting Death yet it cannot well be understood of a Second Death. The fire prepared for the wicked, is an Everlasting Fire:
answering the question of what bodies men shall rise again with, says that “the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power.” Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of the wicked. Nor can the name of second death be applied to those who can never die more than once. And although in metaphorical speech a calamitous everlasting life may be called an everlasting death, it cannot well be understood as a second death. The fire prepared for the wicked is an everlasting fire:
that is to say, the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the Resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the Fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments Everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred, that hee who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure, and resist them so, as to be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die.
that is to say, the state in which no one can be without torture, both of body and of mind, after the resurrection, shall endure forever; and in that sense the fire shall be unquenchable and the torments everlasting. But it cannot be inferred from this that whoever is cast into that fire, or tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them in such a way as to be eternally burned and tortured, and yet never be destroyed or die.
And though there be many places that affirm Everlasting Fire, and Torments (into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever;) yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an Eternall Life therein of any individuall person; but to the contrary, an Everlasting Death, which is the Second Death: *For after Death, and the Grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged according to his works; Death and the Grave shall also be cast into the Lake of Fire.
And though there are many passages that affirm everlasting fire and torments (into which men may be cast one after another, in succession, forever), I find none that affirms there shall be an eternal life in them for any individual person—but on the contrary, an everlasting death, which is the second death: “For after Death and the Grave have delivered up the dead who were in them, and every man is judged according to his works, Death and the Grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire.
This is the Second Death.* Whereby it is evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee shall die no more.
This is the second death.” By this it is evident that there is to be a second death of everyone who is condemned on the Day of Judgment, after which he shall die no more.
Salvation, the world to come, and redemption
Salvation will be on earth at Jerusalem; redemption is the ransom God chose to accept, not an equivalent payment.
The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of SALVATION, or being saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely, against all Evill, comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self. And because man was created in a condition Immortall, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happinesse by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be saved from Sin, is to be saved from all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath brought upon us.
The joys of eternal life are all comprehended in Scripture under the name of salvation, or being saved. To be saved is to be made secure, either relatively, against particular evils, or absolutely, against all evil, including want, sickness, and death itself. And because man was created in an immortal condition, not subject to corruption, and consequently not subject to anything that tends to the dissolution of his nature, and fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam, it follows that to be saved from sin is to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin has brought upon us.
And therefore in the Holy Scripture, Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man sick of the Palsey, by saying, (Mat. 9. 2.) Son be of good cheer, thy Sins be forgiven thee; and knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive Sins, asked them (v. 5.)
And therefore in Holy Scripture remission of sin and salvation from death and misery are the same thing. This appears from the words of our Savior, who, having cured a man sick of the palsy by saying (Matthew 9:2), “Son, be of good cheer; your sins are forgiven you,” and knowing that the scribes took it for blasphemy that a man should claim to forgive sins, asked them (verse 5)
whether it were easier to say, Thy Sinnes be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk; signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, Thy Sins are forgiven, and Arise and walk; and that he used that form of speech, onely to shew he had power to forgive Sins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since Death and Misery, were the punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a discharge of Death and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.
“whether it was easier to say, Your sins are forgiven you, or, Arise and walk.” He signified by this that, as to saving the sick man, it was all one to say “Your sins are forgiven” and “Arise and walk,” and that he used that form of speech only to show that he had power to forgive sins. And it is evident to reason besides that, since death and misery were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also be a discharge from death and misery: that is to say, absolute salvation, such as the faithful are to enjoy after the Day of Judgment by the power and favor of Jesus Christ, who for that reason is called our Savior.
Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 Sam. 14. 39. as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel, that is, from their temporary enemies, and 2 Sam. 22. 4. Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from violence; and 2 Kings 13. 5. God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians, and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.
Concerning particular salvations—such as are meant in 1 Samuel 14:39, “as the Lord lives, who saves Israel,” that is, from their enemies of the time; and 2 Samuel 22:4, “You are my savior; you save me from violence”; and 2 Kings 13:5, “God gave the Israelites a savior, and so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians”; and the like—I need say nothing, since there is neither difficulty nor interest to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.
But concerning the Generall Salvation, hecause it must be in the Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place. On one side, by Kingdome (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this Salvation should be on Earth. For by Salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a safety by Escape: and therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look also for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for Battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven. But how good soever this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture.
But concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the Kingdom of Heaven, there is great difficulty about the place. On one side, from the word kingdom (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetual security against enemies and want), it seems that this salvation should be on earth. For salvation sets before us a glorious reign of our King by conquest, not a safety by escape. And therefore where we look for salvation we must look also for triumph; and before triumph, for victory; and before victory, for battle—which can hardly be supposed to take place in heaven. But however good this reason may be, I will not rely on it without very evident passages of Scripture.
The state of Salvation is described at large, Isaiah 33. ver. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.
The state of salvation is described at length in Isaiah 33:20–24:
Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities; [thine eyes shall see Ierusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken.
“Look upon Zion, the city of our solemn feasts; your eyes shall see Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of its stakes shall ever be removed, nor shall any of its cords be broken.
But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall gallant ship passe thereby.
But there the glorious Lord will be to us a place of broad rivers and streams, on which no galley with oars shall go, nor shall any gallant ship pass by.
For the Lord is our Iudge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King, he will save us.
For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king; he will save us.
Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey.
Your tackle is loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail. Then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey.
And the Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity.
And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people who dwell in it shall be forgiven their iniquity.”
In which words wee have the place from whence Salvation is to proceed, Ierusalem, a quiet habitation; the Eternity of it, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down, &c. The Saviour of it, the Lord, their Iudge, their Lawgiver, their King, he will save us; the Salvation, the Lord shall be to them as abroad mote of swift waters, &c. the condition of their Enemies, their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame shal take the spoil of them. The condition of the Saved, The Inhabitant shal not say, I am sick: And lastly, all this is comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin, The people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity. By which it is evident, that Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God shall reign, (at the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem;
In these words we have the place from which salvation is to proceed, “Jerusalem, a quiet habitation”; its eternity, “a tabernacle that shall not be taken down,” etc.; its Savior, “the Lord, their judge, their lawgiver, their king; he will save us”; the salvation, “the Lord shall be to them as a broad moat of swift waters,” etc.; the condition of their enemies, “their tackle is loose, their masts weak; the lame shall take the spoil of them”; the condition of the saved, “The inhabitant shall not say, I am sick”; and lastly, all this is comprehended in forgiveness of sin, “The people who dwell in it shall be forgiven their iniquity.” By this it is evident that salvation shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign in Jerusalem (at the second coming of Christ);
and from Jerusalem shall proceed the Salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into Gods Kingdome: as is also more expressely declared by the same Prophet, Chap.
and that from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the Gentiles who shall be received into God’s kingdom—as is also declared more expressly by the same prophet, chapter
65. 20, 21. And they (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) *shall bring all your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in charets, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Ierusalem, saith the Lord, as the Children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into the House of the Lord.
65, verses 20–21: “And they” (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) “shall bring all your brethren for an offering to the Lord out of all nations, on horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and on mules, and on swift beasts, to my holy mountain Jerusalem, says the Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord.
And I will also take of them for Priests and for Levites, saith the Lord: Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of Gods Kingdome (which is the Place, from whence the Salvation of us that were Gentiles, shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem: And the same is also confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place of Gods worship; to whom he saith, Iohn* 4. 22.
And I will also take of them for priests and for Levites, says the Lord.” By this it is evident that the chief seat of God’s kingdom (which is the place from which the salvation of us who were Gentiles shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem. The same is also confirmed by our Savior in his conversation with the woman of Samaria about the place of God’s worship, to whom he says (John 4:22)
that the Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worship what they knew, For Salvation is of the Iews (ex Iudae is, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he wil save you, as we doe, that know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah, a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not impertinently answered him again, We know the Messias shall come. So that which out Saviour saith, Salvation is from the Iews, is the same that Paul sayes (Rom. 1. 16, 17.)
that the Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worship what they know: “For salvation is of the Jews” (ex Iudaeis, that is, begins with the Jews). It is as if he said: you worship God, but do not know by whom he will save you, as we do, who know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah—a Jew, not a Samaritan. And so the woman answered him, not irrelevantly, “We know that the Messiah shall come.” So what our Savior says, “Salvation is from the Jews,” is the same as what Paul says (Romans 1:16–17):
The Gospel is the power of God to Salvation to every one that beleeveth: To the Iew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousnesse of God revealed from faith to faith; from the faith of the Jew, to the faith of the Gentile. In the like sense the Prophet Ioel describing the day of Judgment, (chap. 2. 30, 31.) that God would shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, bloud, and fire, and pillars os smoak. The Sun should be turned to darknesse, and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come, he addeth verse 32. *and it shall come to passe, that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved.
“The gospel is the power of God to salvation for everyone who believes: to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith”—from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile. In the same sense the prophet Joel, describing the Day of Judgment (Joel 2:30–31)—that God would “show wonders in heaven and in earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke; the sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord comes”—adds in verse 32, “And it shall come to pass that whoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved.
For in Mount Zion, and in Ierusalem shall be Salvation. And Obadiah verse 17. saith the same, Vpon Mount Zion shall be Deliverance; and there shall be holinesse, and the house of Iacob shall possesse their possessions, that is, the possessions of the Heathen, which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the mount of Esau, the Land of the Philistines, the fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the Cities of the South, and concludes with these words, the Kingdom shall be the Lords.* All these places are for Salvation, and the Kingdome of God (after the day of Judgement) upon Earth.
For in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be salvation.” And Obadiah, verse 17, says the same: “Upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance, and there shall be holiness, and the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions”—that is, the possessions of the heathen, which he describes more particularly in the following verses as the mount of Esau, the land of the Philistines, the fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the cities of the south; and he concludes with these words: “The kingdom shall be the Lord’s.” All these passages argue for salvation, and the Kingdom of God (after the Day of Judgment), being on earth.
On the other side, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any Ascension of the Saints into Heaven; that is to say, into any Coelum Empyreum, or other aetheriall Region; saving that it is called the Kingdome of Heaven: which name it may have, because God, that was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by Angels from Heaven; and after their revolt, sent his Son from Heaven, to reduce them to their obedience; and shall send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull men, from the day of Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the Throne of this our Great King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth is but his Footstoole.
On the other side, I have not found any text from which any ascension of the saints into heaven can probably be drawn—that is, into any Coelum Empyreum or other ethereal region—except that it is called the Kingdom of Heaven. It may have that name because God, who was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by angels from heaven; and after their revolt sent his Son from heaven to bring them back to their obedience; and will send him from there again to rule both them and all other faithful men from the Day of Judgment everlastingly. Or it may be because the throne of this our great King is in heaven, whereas the earth is only his footstool.
But that the Subjects of God should have any place as high as his Throne, or higher than his Footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a King, nor can I find any evident text for it in holy Scripture.
But that God’s subjects should have any place as high as his throne, or higher than his footstool, does not seem suited to the dignity of a king; nor can I find any evident text for it in Holy Scripture.
From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation, it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the Old World, the Present World, and the World to come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, If God spared not the Old World, but saved Noah the eighth person, a Preacher of righteousnesse, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly, &c. So the first World, was from Adam to the generall Flood. Of the present World, our Saviour speaks (Iohn 18. 36.)
From what has been said of the Kingdom of God and of salvation, it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the world to come. Three worlds are mentioned in Scripture: the old world, the present world, and the world to come. Of the first St. Peter speaks: “If God spared not the old world, but saved Noah the eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly,” etc. So the first world was from Adam to the general flood. Of the present world our Savior speaks (John 18:36):
My Kingdome is not of this World. For he came onely to teach men the way of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine. Of the World to come, St. Peter speaks, Neverthelesse we according to his promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth. This is that WORLD, wherein Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power, and glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth, and thence forth reign over them, (under his Father) Everlastingly.
“My kingdom is not of this world.” For he came only to teach men the way of salvation, and to renew the kingdom of his Father by his doctrine. Of the world to come St. Peter speaks: “Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth.” This is the world in which Christ, coming down from heaven in the clouds with great power and glory, shall send his angels and gather together his elect from the four winds and from the uttermost parts of the earth, and from then on reign over them (under his Father) everlastingly.
Salvation of a sinner, suppposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that is once guilty of Sin, is obnoxious to the Penalty of the same; and must pay (or some other for him) such Ransome, as he that is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is Almighty God, in whose power are all things; such Ransome is to be paid before Salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require.
The salvation of a sinner presupposes a prior redemption. For whoever is once guilty of sin is liable to its penalty, and must pay (or someone else for him) whatever ransom the one who is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. And since the person offended is Almighty God, in whose power all things are, such ransom as God has been pleased to require is to be paid before salvation can be obtained.
By this Ransome, is not intended a satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to the Offence; which no sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another: The dammage a man does to another, he may make amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be taken away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible. But sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either gratis, or upon such penalty, as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in the Old Testament, was some Sacrifice, or Oblation. To forgive sin is not an act of Injustice, though the punishment have been threatned.
By this ransom is not meant a satisfaction for sin equivalent to the offense, which no sinner can ever make for himself, nor any righteous man for another. A man may make amends for the damage he does to another by restitution or compensation, but sin cannot be taken away by compensation, for that would make the liberty to sin a thing for sale. But sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either gratis or upon such penalty as God is pleased to accept. What God usually accepted in the Old Testament was some sacrifice or offering. To forgive sin is not an act of injustice, even though the punishment has been threatened.
Even amongst men, though the promise of Good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises of Evill, bind them not; much lesse shall they bind God, who is infinitely more mercifull then men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to Redeem us, did not in that sense satisfie for the Sins of men, as that his Death, of its own vertue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with Eternall death; but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to require, for the Salvation at his second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent, and beleeve in him.
Even among men, though a promise of good binds the one who promises, threats—that is, promises of evil—do not bind them; much less shall they bind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Savior Christ, therefore, in order to redeem us, did not make satisfaction for the sins of men in the sense that his death, by its own virtue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with eternal death. Rather, at his first coming he made that sacrifice and offering of himself which God was pleased to require for the salvation, at his second coming, of those who in the meantime should repent and believe in him.
And though this act of our Redemption, be not alwaies in Scripture called a Sacrifice, and Oblation, but sometimes a Price; yet by Price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father; but that Price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.
And though this act of our redemption is not always called in Scripture a sacrifice and offering, but sometimes a price, yet by price we are not to understand anything by whose value he could claim a right to a pardon for us from his offended Father, but the price that God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.
Chapter 39: Of the word 'church'
A church that can act is a company of Christians united in one sovereign, the same as a Christian commonwealth.
The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture divers things. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for Gods House, that is to say, for a Temple, wherein Christians assemble to perform holy duties publiquely; as, 1 Cor. 14. ver. 34. Let your women keep silence in the Churches: but this is Metaphorically put, for the Congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the Edifice it self, to distinguish between the Temples of Christians, and Idolaters.
The word church (ecclesia) signifies various things in the books of Holy Scripture. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for God’s house, that is, a temple in which Christians assemble to perform holy duties publicly, as in 1 Corinthians 14:34: “Let your women keep silent in the churches.” But this is put metaphorically for the congregation assembled there, and it has since been used for the building itself, to distinguish the temples of Christians from those of idolaters.
The Temple of Jerusalem was Gods house, and the House of Prayer; and so is any Edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, Christs house: and therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake, The Lords house; and thence, in our language it came to be called Kyrke, and Church.
The Temple of Jerusalem was God’s house and the house of prayer; and so any building dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ is Christ’s house. That is why the Greek Fathers call it Kyriakē, the Lord’s house; and from this, in our language, it came to be called kirk and church.
Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that Ecclesia signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation, or an Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate speak unto them; and which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called Concio, as he that spake was called Ecclesiastes, and Concionator. And when they were called forth by lawfull Authority, it was Ecclesia legitima, a Lawfull Church, Ennomos Ecclesia. But when they were excited by tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then it was a confused Church, Ecclesia Sugkechumene.
Church (when not taken for a house) signifies the same as ecclesia signified in the Greek commonwealths: a congregation, or assembly of citizens, called out to hear the magistrate speak to them. In the Roman commonwealth this was called a concio, and the one who spoke was called ecclesiastes and concionator. When they were called out by lawful authority, it was ecclesia legitima, a lawful church, ennomos ecclesia. But when they were stirred up by tumultuous and seditious clamor, it was a confused church, ecclesia synkechymenē.
It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the Congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say, for the whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as (Act. 8. 3.) where it is said, that Saul made havock of the Church: And in this sense is Christ said to be Head of the Church. And sometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (Col. 4. 15. Salute the Church that is in his house. Sometimes also for the Elect onely; as (Ephes. 5. 27.)
It is also sometimes taken for the men who have the right to be of the congregation, though not actually assembled—that is, for the whole multitude of Christians, however widely dispersed—as in Acts 8:3, where it is said that “Saul made havoc of the church.” And in this sense Christ is said to be head of the Church. Sometimes it is taken for a certain part of Christians, as in Colossians 4:15: “Salute the church that is in his house.” Sometimes also for the elect only, as in Ephesians 5:27:
A Glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish; which is meant of the Church triumphant, or, Church to come. Sometimes, for a Congregation assembled, of professors of Christianity, whether their profession be true, or counterfeit, as it is understood, Mat. 18. 17. where it is said, Tell it to the Church, and if hee neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or Publican.
“a glorious church, without spot or wrinkle, holy and without blemish,” which is meant of the Church triumphant, or Church to come. Sometimes it is taken for an assembled congregation of those who profess Christianity, whether their profession is true or counterfeit, as it is understood in Matthew 18:17, where it is said, “Tell it to the church; and if he neglects to hear the church, let him be to you as a Gentile or a publican.”
And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one Person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other action whatsoever; For without authority from a lawfull Congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not the act of them all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse the act of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing it should be done.
And it is in this last sense only that the Church can be taken for one person: that is, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other action whatever. For without authority from a lawful congregation, whatever act is done in a gathering of people is the particular act of each of those who were present and gave their help in performing it, and not the act of them all together, as of one body—much less the act of those who were absent, or who, though present, did not want it done.
According to this sense, I define a CHURCH to be, A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. And because in all Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the Civil Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawfull Assembly.
In this sense I define a church to be a company of men professing the Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. And because in all commonwealths an assembly without warrant from the civil sovereign is unlawful, a church assembled in any commonwealth that has forbidden it to assemble is also an unlawful assembly.
It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church, as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on Earth, to which all other Common-wealths are subject: There are Christians, in the Dominions of severall Princes and States; but every one of them is subject to that Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other Person.
It follows also that there is on earth no such universal Church as all Christians are bound to obey, because there is no power on earth to which all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians in the dominions of various princes and states, but every one of them is subject to the commonwealth of which he is himself a member, and consequently cannot be subject to the commands of any other person.
And therefore a Church, such a one as is capable to Command, to Judge, Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a Civil Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a Civill State, for that the subjects of it are Men; and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithfull, after the Resurrection, shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall: but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible.
And therefore a Church, of the kind that is capable of commanding, judging, absolving, condemning, or doing any other act, is the same thing as a civil commonwealth consisting of Christian men. It is called a civil state because its subjects are men, and a Church because its subjects are Christians. Temporal and spiritual government are only two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is true that the bodies of the faithful, after the Resurrection, will be not only spiritual but eternal; but in this life they are gross and corruptible.
There is therefore no other Government in this life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governour both of the State, and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, between the Church and State; between Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between the Sword of Iustice, and the Shield of Faith; and (which is more) in every Christian mans own brest, between the Christian, and the Man. The Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; so also are Civill Soveraignes: But if Pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may bee one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary Doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be false.
There is therefore no other government in this life, either of state or of religion, but temporal; nor is the teaching of any doctrine lawful for any subject when the governor of both the state and the religion forbids it to be taught. And that governor must be one; otherwise there must follow faction and civil war in the commonwealth, between the Church and the State, between spiritualists and temporalists, between the sword of justice and the shield of faith, and (what is more) in every Christian man’s own breast, between the Christian and the man. The doctors of the Church are called pastors; so also are civil sovereigns. But if pastors are not subordinate one to another, so that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines, of which both may be false, and one must be.
Who that one chief Pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign: And to whom the Scripture hath assigned that Office, we shall see in the Chapters following.
Who that one chief pastor is according to the law of nature has already been shown: namely, the civil sovereign. And to whom the Scripture has assigned that office we shall see in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 40: Of the Kingdom of God in Abraham, Moses, the high priests, and the kings of Judah
From Abraham onward, whoever was sovereign among God's people also held supreme authority in religion.
The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God by Covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the Covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God; not onely such, as he could take notice of, (as Morall Laws,) by the light of Nature; but also such, as God should in speciall manner deliver to him by Dreams, and Visions. For as to the Morall law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withall, by promise of the Land of Canaan.
The father of the faithful, and the first in the Kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For it was with him that the covenant was first made. In it he obliged himself, and his descendants after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God: not only those he could discern by the light of nature (such as moral laws), but also those that God should deliver to him in a special manner, by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and did not need to be contracted with by the promise of the land of Canaan.
Nor was there any Contract, that could adde to, or strengthen the Obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: And therefore the Covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the Commandement of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a Dream, or Vifion; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.
Nor was there any contract that could add to or strengthen the obligation by which they, and all other men, were naturally bound to obey God Almighty. And therefore the covenant Abraham made with God was to take as the commandment of God whatever was commanded him in the name of God in a dream or vision, and to deliver it to his family and make them observe it.
In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe three points of important consequence in the government of Gods people. First, that at the making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham; and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills (which make the essence of all Covenants) were before the Contract involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. According whereunto (Gen. 18. 18, 19.)
In this contract of God with Abraham we may observe three points of important consequence for the government of God’s people. First, that at the making of this covenant God spoke only to Abraham, and therefore did not contract with any of his family or descendants, except insofar as their wills (which make the essence of all covenants) were, before the contract, included in the will of Abraham. Abraham was therefore supposed to have had a lawful power to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. In accordance with this (Genesis 18:18–19)
God saith, All the Nations of the Earth shall be blessed in him, For I know him that he will command his children and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord. From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive commandements of God, from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign. And consequently in every Common-wealth, they who have no supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own Soveraign, in the externall acts and profession of Religion.
God says, “All the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him, for I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord.” From this may be concluded the first point: that those to whom God has not spoken directly are to receive the positive commandments of God from their sovereign, as the family and descendants of Abraham did from Abraham, their father, their lord, and their civil sovereign. And consequently, in every commonwealth, those who have no supernatural revelation to the contrary ought to obey the laws of their own sovereign in the external acts and profession of religion.
As for the inward thought, and beleef of men, which humane Governours can take no notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.
As for the inward thought and belief of men, which human governors can take no notice of (for God alone knows the heart), these are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will and the power of God; and consequently they do not fall under obligation.
From whence proceedeth another point; that it was not unlawfull for Abraham, when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision, or Spirit, or other Revelation from God, for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed, or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his Private Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath the same place in the Common-wealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.
From this follows another point: that it was not unlawful for Abraham to punish any of his subjects who claimed a private vision, or spirit, or other revelation from God in support of a doctrine Abraham had forbidden, or who followed or adhered to any such pretender. And consequently it is lawful now for the sovereign to punish any man who sets his private spirit against the laws. For the sovereign holds the same place in the commonwealth that Abraham held in his own family.
There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but Abraham in his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian Common-wealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the Word of God. For God spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: And therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a Common-wealth, are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken.
From the same covenant there arises a third point: that as no one but Abraham in his family, so no one but the sovereign in a Christian commonwealth, can take notice of what is or is not the Word of God. For God spoke only to Abraham, and he alone was able to know what God said and to interpret it to his family. And therefore those who hold the place of Abraham in a commonwealth are the only interpreters of what God has spoken.
The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians, and arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses (as I have said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward the Peculiar Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was Moses, for his owne time: and the succession to that office was setled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to bee to God a Sacerdotall Kingdome for ever.
The same covenant was renewed with Isaac, and afterward with Jacob, but then no more until the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai. There it was renewed by Moses (as I said before, in chapter 35) in such a way that from that time forward they became the peculiar Kingdom of God. Moses was God’s lieutenant for his own lifetime, and the succession to that office was settled on Aaron and his heirs after him, to be to God a priestly kingdom forever.
By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for Gods Lieutenant, longer than they beleeved that God spake unto him. And therefore his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity, and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity of his Miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them in Gods name.
By this constitution a kingdom is acquired for God. But since Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites as a successor to the right of Abraham (he could not claim it by inheritance), it does not yet appear that the people were obliged to take him for God’s lieutenant any longer than they believed that God spoke to him. And therefore his authority (despite the covenant they made with God) still depended merely on the opinion they had of his holiness, of the reality of his conferences with God, and of the truth of his miracles. If that opinion changed, they were no longer obliged to take anything as the law of God that he put before them in God’s name.
We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandement of God that could oblige them; because God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses himself: And our Saviour saith of himself, If I bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true; much lesse if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as the authority of all other Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him. And so it was: For the people (Exod. 20. 18.)
We must therefore consider what other ground there was for their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandment of God that obliged them, because God did not speak to them directly, but through the mediation of Moses himself. And our Savior says of himself, “If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true”; much less, if Moses bears witness of himself (especially in a claim of kingly power over God’s people), ought his testimony to be accepted. His authority, therefore, like the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of the people and their promise to obey him. And so it was. For “the people (Exodus 20:18–19),
when they saw the Thunderings, and the Lightnings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, and the monntaine smoaking, removed, and stood a far off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die. Here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the Commandement of God.
when they saw the thunderings and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking, moved back and stood far off. And they said to Moses, ‘You speak with us, and we will hear; but do not let God speak with us, lest we die.’” Here was their promise of obedience; and by this they obliged themselves to obey whatever he should deliver to them as the commandment of God.
And notwithstanding the Covenant constituteth a Sacerdotall Kingdome, that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession, after Moses should bee dead. For whosoever ordereth, and establisheth the Policy, as first founder of a Common-wealth (be it Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy) must needs have Soveraign Power over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text last before cited, because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron but to him. Secondly, (Exod. 24. 1, 2.)
And although the covenant constitutes a priestly kingdom, that is to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron, this is to be understood of the succession after Moses was dead. For whoever orders and establishes the polity, as first founder of a commonwealth (whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy), must necessarily have sovereign power over the people all the while he is doing it. And that Moses had that power throughout his own time is plainly affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text just cited, because the people promised obedience not to Aaron but to him. Secondly (Exodus 24:1–2),
And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come neer the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him. By which it is plain, that Moses who was alone called up to God, (and not Aaron, nor the other Priests, nor the Seventy Elders, nor the People who were forbidden to come up) was alone he, that represented to the Israelites the Person of God; that is to say, was their sole Soveraign under God. And though afterwards it be said (verse 9.)
“And God said to Moses, ‘Come up to the Lord, you and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come near the Lord, but they shall not come near, nor shall the people go up with him.’” From this it is plain that Moses, who alone was called up to God (and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the people, who were forbidden to come up), was the only one who represented to the Israelites the person of God; that is to say, he was their sole sovereign under God. And though it is said afterward (verse 9),
Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a saphire stone. &c. yet this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the people the words which God had said to him. He onely went for the bnsinesse of the people; the others, as the Nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to the people; which was, as in the verse after appeareth) to see God and live.
“Then Moses went up, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and under his feet there was as it were a paved work of sapphire stone,” and so on, yet this was not until after Moses had been with God before and had brought to the people the words God had spoken to him. He alone went on the people’s business. The others, as the nobles of his retinue, were admitted, for honor, to that special grace which was not allowed to the people: namely (as appears in the verse after), to see God and live.
God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God, and did eat and drink (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from him to the people. Again, it is every where said, The Lord spake unto Moses, as in all other occasions of Government; so also in the ordering of the Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 Chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus: to Aaron seldome. The Calfe that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of the Authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriams mutiny agaiust Moses, was (Numbers 12.) judged by God himself for Moses.
“God did not lay his hand on them; they saw God, and ate and drank” (that is, they lived); but they did not carry any commandment from him to the people. Again, it is said everywhere, “The Lord spoke to Moses,” on all other occasions of government and also in the ordering of the ceremonies of religion, contained in chapters 25 through 31 of Exodus and throughout Leviticus; to Aaron seldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of Aaron’s authority, raised by his and Miriam’s mutiny against Moses, was judged by God himself in Moses’ favor (Numbers 12).
So also in the question between Moses, and the People, who had the Right of Governing the People, when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty Princes of the Assembly gathered themselves together (Numb. 16. 3.) against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are Holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the Lord? God caused the Earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram with their wives and children alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty Princes with fire.
So also in the question between Moses and the people as to who had the right of governing the people. When Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly “gathered themselves together” (Numbers 16:3) “against Moses and against Aaron, and said to them, ‘You take too much upon yourselves, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among them; why do you lift yourselves up above the congregation of the Lord?’”, God caused the earth to swallow Korah, Dathan, and Abiram alive, with their wives and children, and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire.
Therefore neither Aaron, nor the People, nor any Aristocracy of the chief Princes of the People, but Moses alone had next under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that not onely in causes of Civill Policy, but also of Religion: For Moses onely spake with God, and therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the Mountain where God talked with Moses. Thou shalt set bounds (saith the Lord, Exod. 19. 12.)
Therefore neither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people, but Moses alone had, next under God, the sovereignty over the Israelites; and that not only in matters of civil polity but also of religion. For Moses alone spoke with God, and therefore he alone could tell the people what God required of them. No man, on pain of death, might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where God talked with Moses. “You shall set bounds,” says the Lord (Exodus 19:12),
to the people round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death. And again (verse 21.) Goe down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze. Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandements. And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set by their severall Soveraigns.
“for the people all around, and say, ‘Take heed to yourselves that you do not go up into the mountain or touch its border; whoever touches the mountain shall surely be put to death.’” And again (verse 21): “Go down, warn the people, lest they break through to the Lord to gaze.” From this we may conclude that whoever holds the place of Moses in a Christian commonwealth is the sole messenger of God and interpreter of his commandments. And accordingly, no one ought, in interpreting the Scripture, to go further than the bounds set by their respective sovereigns.
For the Scriptures since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof are the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on Earth. To look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear him is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into what God saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgresse the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.
For the Scriptures, since God now speaks in them, are the Mount Sinai, and its bounds are the laws of those who represent God’s person on earth. To look upon them, and in them to behold the wondrous works of God and learn to fear him, is allowed. But to interpret them—that is, to pry into what God says to the one he appoints to govern under him, and to make themselves judges of whether he governs as God commands him or not—is to transgress the bounds God has set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.
There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized. For there were in his time but Seventy men, that are said to Prophecy by the Spirit of God, and these were of all Moses his election; concerning whom God said to Moses (Numb. 11. 16.) Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the Elders of the People. To these God imparted his Spirit; but it was not a different Spirit from that of Moses; for it is said (verse 25.)
There was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor anyone claiming the Spirit of God, except those whom Moses had approved and authorized. For in his time there were only seventy men who are said to have prophesied by the Spirit of God, and these were all of Moses’ choosing. Concerning them God said to Moses (Numbers 11:16), “Gather to me seventy of the elders of Israel, whom you know to be the elders of the people.” To these God imparted his Spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of Moses, for it is said (verse 25),
God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the Seventy Elders. But as I have shewn before (chap. 36.) by Spirit, is understood the Mind; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God endued them with a mind conformable, and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might Prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in Gods name, in such manner, as to set forward (as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine.
“God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders.” But as I have shown before (chapter 36), by spirit is understood the mind; so the sense of the passage is simply this: that God endowed them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses, so that they might prophesy—that is to say, speak to the people in God’s name in such a way as to advance (as ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as agreed with Moses’ doctrine.
For they were but Ministers; and when two of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought a new and unlawfull thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of the same Chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his Spirit that they Prophecyed. By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought to pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.
For they were only ministers. And when two of them prophesied in the camp, it was thought a new and unlawful thing; and, as it says in verses 27 and 28 of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, not knowing that it was by Moses’ spirit that they prophesied. By this it is evident that no subject ought to lay claim to prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by the one whom God has set in the place of Moses.
The high priests, the judges, and the kings
Sovereignty passed from Moses to the high priest and then to the kings, who governed religion too.
Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the Kingdome, as being a Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant, to Aarons Son, Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him (next under himself) for Soveraign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the Generall of their Army. For thus God saith expressely (Numb. 27. 21.) concerning Joshua; He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall ask counsell for him, before the Lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the Children of Israel with him: Therefore the Supreme Power of making War and Peace, was in the Priest.
When Aaron was dead, and after him Moses too, the kingdom, being a priestly kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant to Aaron’s son, Eleazar the high priest. And God declared him (next under himself) sovereign at the same time that he appointed Joshua general of their army. For God says expressly concerning Joshua (Numbers 27:21), “He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him before the Lord; at his word they shall go out, and at his word they shall come in, both he and all the children of Israel with him.” Therefore the supreme power of making war and peace was in the priest.
The Supreme Power of Judicature belonged also to the High Priest: For the Book of the Law was in their keeping; and the Priests and Levites onely, were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill, as appears in Deut. 17. 8, 9, 10. And for the manner of Gods worship, there was never doubt made, but that the High Priest till the time of Saul, had the Supreme Authority. Therefore the Civill and Ecclesiasticall Power were both joined together in one and the same person, the High Priest; and ought to bee so, in whosoever governeth by Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate from God.
The supreme power of judicature also belonged to the high priest. For the Book of the Law was in their keeping, and the priests and Levites alone were the subordinate judges in civil cases, as appears in Deuteronomy 17:8–10. And as for the manner of God’s worship, there was never any doubt that the high priest, until the time of Saul, had the supreme authority. Therefore the civil and ecclesiastical power were both joined together in one and the same person, the high priest; and they ought to be so in whoever governs by divine right, that is, by authority directly from God.
After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is noted frequently in the Book of Judges, that there was in those dayes no King in Israel; and sometimes with this addition, that every man did that which was right in his own eyes. By which is to bee understood, that where it is said, there was no King, is meant, there was no Soveraign Power in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the Act, and Exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua, & Eleazar, there arose another generation (Judges 2. 10.)
After the death of Joshua, until the time of Saul, the Book of Judges frequently notes of the period between that “in those days there was no king in Israel,” and sometimes adds that “every man did what was right in his own eyes.” By this we are to understand that where it says “there was no king,” it means “there was no sovereign power” in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar, “there arose another generation” (Judges 2:10–11)
that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim. And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, to look for a sign, not onely before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Whereas Signs, and Miracles had for End to procure Faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they have once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of Nature. But if we consider not the Exercise, but the Right of Governing, the Soveraign power was still in the High Priest.
“that did not know the Lord, nor the works he had done for Israel, but did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served the Baals.” And the Jews had the quality St. Paul notes, of “looking for a sign,” not only before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Yet signs and miracles had as their end to produce faith, not to keep men from violating it once they have given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature. But if we consider not the exercise but the right of governing, the sovereign power was still in the high priest.
Therefore whatsoever obedience was yeelded to any of the Judges (who were men chosen by God extraordinarily, to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the Right the High Priest had to the Soveraign Power, in all matters, both of Policy and Religion. And neither the Judges, nor Samuel himselfe had an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the Government; and were obeyed by the Israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with God, appearing in their wisdome, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore the Right of Regulating both the Policy, and the Religion, were inseparable.
Therefore whatever obedience was given to any of the judges (who were men chosen by God in an extraordinary way to save his rebellious subjects from the hands of the enemy), it cannot be turned into an argument against the right the high priest had to the sovereign power in all matters, both of polity and of religion. Neither the judges nor Samuel himself had an ordinary calling to the government, but an extraordinary one; and they were obeyed by the Israelites not out of duty, but out of reverence for their favor with God, which appeared in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Up to this point, therefore, the right of regulating both polity and religion was inseparable.
To the Judges, succeeded Kings: And whereas before, all authority, both in Religion, and Policy, was in the High Priest; so now it was all in the King. For the Soveraignty over the people, which was before, not onely by vertue of the Divine Power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites in God, and next under him, in the High Priest, as his Vicegerent on earth, was cast off by the People, with the consent of God himselfe. For when they said to Samuel (1 Sam. 8. 5.)
The judges were succeeded by kings. And whereas before all authority, both in religion and in polity, was in the high priest, now it was all in the king. For the sovereignty over the people—which had belonged before to God, not only by virtue of his divine power but also by a particular pact of the Israelites, and next under him to the high priest as his vicegerent on earth—was cast off by the people, with the consent of God himself. For when they said to Samuel (1 Samuel 8:5),
make us a King to judge us, like all the Nations, they signified that they would no more bee governed by the commands that should bee laid upon them by the Priest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commandcd; and consequently in deposing the High Priest of Royall authority, they deposed that peculiar Government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse 7.)
“Make us a king to judge us, like all the nations,” they signified that they would no longer be governed by the commands laid on them by the priest in the name of God, but by one who would command them in the same manner as all other nations were commanded. And consequently, in stripping the high priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse 7),
Hearken unto the voice of the People, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee, that I should not reign over them. Having therefore rejected God, in whose Right the Priests governed, there was no authority left to the Priests, but such as the King was pleased to allow them; which was more, or lesse, according as the Kings were good, or evill. And for the Government of Civill affaires, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the King. For in the same Chapter, verse 20.
“Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them.” Having therefore rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, the priests had no authority left except what the king was pleased to allow them, which was more or less according as the kings were good or evil. And as for the government of civil affairs, it is evident that it was all in the hands of the king. For in the same chapter, verse 20,
They say they will be like all the Nations; that their King shall be their Judge, and goe before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in Peace and War. In which is contained also the ordering of Religion: for there was no other Word of God in that time, by which to regulate Religion, but the Law of Moses, which was their Civill Law. Besides, we read (1 Kings 2. 27.) that Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being Priest before the Lord: He had therefore authority over the High Priest, as over any other Subject; which is a great mark of Supremacy in Religion. And we read also (1 Kings 8.)
they say they will be like all the nations: that their king shall be their judge, and go before them, and fight their battles; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in peace and in war. In this is contained also the ordering of religion. For there was no other Word of God at that time by which to regulate religion but the Law of Moses, which was their civil law. Besides, we read (1 Kings 2:27) that Solomon “thrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord.” He therefore had authority over the high priest, as over any other subject, which is a great mark of supremacy in religion. And we also read (1 Kings 8)
that hee dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the People; and that he himselfe in person made that excellent prayer, used in the Consecrations of all Churches, and houses of Prayer; which is another great mark of Supremacy in Religion. Again, we read (2 Kings 22.) that when there was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not decided by the High Priest but Josiah sent both him, and others to enquire concerning it, of Hulda, the Prophetesse; which is another mark of the Supremacy in Religion. Lastly, wee read (1 Chron. 26. 30.)
that he dedicated the Temple, that he blessed the people, and that he himself in person made that excellent prayer used in the consecration of all churches and houses of prayer; which is another great mark of supremacy in religion. Again, we read (2 Kings 22) that when there was a question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, it was not decided by the high priest; instead Josiah sent both him and others to inquire about it of Huldah the prophetess; which is another mark of supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read (1 Chronicles 26:30)
that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, Officers of Israel among them Westward, in all businesse of the Lord, and in the service of the King. Likewise (verse 32.) that hee made other Hebronites, rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the halfe tribe of Manasseh (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan) for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the King. Is not this full Power, both temporall and spirituall, as they call it, that would divide it?
that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, officers of Israel on the west side, “in all the business of the Lord, and in the service of the king.” Likewise (verse 32) that he made other Hebronites “rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh” (these were the rest of Israel, who lived beyond the Jordan) “for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king.” Is this not full power, both temporal and spiritual, as those who would divide it call them?
To conclude; from the first institution of Gods Kingdome, to the Captivity, the Supremacy of Religion, was in the same hand with that of the Civill Soveraignty; and the Priests office after the election of Saul, was not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall.
To conclude: from the first institution of God’s Kingdom until the Captivity, the supremacy in religion was in the same hand as the civil sovereignty; and the priest’s office, after the election of Saul, was not magisterial but ministerial.
Notwithstanding the government both in Policy and Religion, were joined, first in the High Priests, and afterwards in the Kings, so far forth as concerned the Right; yet it appeareth by the same Holy History, that the people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or (which is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises of their Governours, gave sufficient credit, either to the fame of Moses, or to the Colloquies between God and the Priests; they took occasion as oft as their Governours displeased them, by blaming sometimes the Policy, sometimes the Religion, to change the Government, or revolt from their Obedience at their pleasure: And from thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles, divisions, and calamities of the Nation.
Although government in both polity and religion was joined, first in the high priests and afterward in the kings, as far as the right was concerned, yet it appears from the same sacred history that the people did not understand it. There was among them a great part, and probably the greatest part, who gave sufficient credit to the fame of Moses, or to the conversations between God and the priests, only so long as they saw great miracles, or (what is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities or great felicity in the enterprises of their governors. They took occasion, as often as their governors displeased them, to change the government or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure, blaming sometimes the polity, sometimes the religion. And from this came, from time to time, the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation.
As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the Covenant of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, regarded no more the Commandement of the Priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed in Civill affairs, such men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour Nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God (as they ought to doc,) but with such men, or women, as they guessed to bee Prophets by their Praedictions of things to come; and though they had an Idol in their Chappel, yet if they had a Levite for their Chaplain, they made account they worshipped the God of Israel.
For example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation, which had not seen the wonders of God but was left to its own weak reason, not knowing itself obliged by the covenant of a priestly kingdom, paid no more regard to the commandment of the priest, or to any law of Moses, but every man did what was right in his own eyes. In civil affairs they obeyed such men as they thought, from time to time, able to deliver them from the neighboring nations that oppressed them. And they consulted not with God (as they ought to have done) but with such men or women as they guessed to be prophets by their predictions of things to come. And though they had an idol in their chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain, they reckoned they were worshipping the God of Israel.
And afterwards when they demanded a King, after the manner of the nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God their King; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they would have a King to judg them in Civill actions; but not that they would allow their King to change the Religion which they thought was recommended to them by Moses. So that they alwaies kept in store a pretext, either of Justice, or Religion, to discharge them selves of their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevaile.
And afterward, when they demanded a king after the manner of the nations, it was still not with any design to depart from the worship of God their King. Rather, despairing of the justice of Samuel’s sons, they wanted a king to judge them in civil actions—but not so that they would allow their king to change the religion they thought had been commended to them by Moses. So they always kept in reserve a pretext, either of justice or of religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience whenever they had hope of prevailing.
Samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired a King, (for God was their King already, and Samuel had but an authority under him); yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsell, in destroying Agag as God had commanded, anoint another King, namely, David, to take the succession from his heirs. Rehoboam was no Idolater; but when the people thought him an Oppressor; that Civil pretence carried from him ten Tribes to Jeroboam an Idolater.
Samuel was displeased with the people for desiring a king (for God was already their King, and Samuel had only an authority under him). Yet when Saul did not follow his counsel in destroying Agag as God had commanded, Samuel anointed another king, namely David, to take the succession from Saul’s heirs. Rehoboam was no idolater; but when the people thought him an oppressor, that civil pretext carried ten tribes away from him to Jeroboam, an idolater.
And generally through the whole History of the Kings, as well of Judah, as of Israel, there were Prophets that alwaies controlled the Kings, for transgressing the Religion; and sometimes also for Errours of State; as Jehosaphat was reproved by the Prophet Jehu, for aiding the King of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for shewing his treasures to the Ambassadors of Babylon. By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of State and Religion were in the Kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it, but such as were gracious for their own naturall abilities, or felicities.
And generally, through the whole history of the kings, of Judah as well as of Israel, there were prophets who continually checked the kings for transgressing the religion, and sometimes also for errors of state. Jehoshaphat, for instance, was reproved by the prophet Jehu for aiding the king of Israel against the Syrians, and Hezekiah by Isaiah for showing his treasures to the ambassadors of Babylon. From all this it appears that, though the power both of state and of religion was in the kings, none of them was unchecked in the use of it, except those who were in favor because of their own natural abilities or felicities.
So that from the practise of those times, there can no argument be drawn, that the Right of Supremacy in Religion was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the Prophets; and conclude, that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the Cherubins, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the Prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church; or because Iosiah consulted Hulda the Prophetesse, concerning the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the High Priest, but Hulda the Prophetesse had the Supreme authority in matter of Religion; which I thinke is not the opinion of any Doctor.
So no argument can be drawn from the practice of those times that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings—unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude that because Hezekiah, praying to the Lord before the cherubim, was not answered from there or then, but afterward by the prophet Isaiah, Isaiah was therefore supreme head of the Church; or that because Josiah consulted Huldah the prophetess about the Book of the Law, therefore neither he nor the high priest, but Huldah the prophetess, had the supreme authority in matters of religion. Which I think is not the opinion of any doctor.
During the Captivity, the Iews had no Common-wealth at all: And after their return, though they renewed their Covenant with God, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other: And presently after they became subjects to the Greeks (from whose Customes, and Daemonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their Religion became much corrupted): In such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in State and Religion, concerning the Supremacy in either.
During the Captivity the Jews had no commonwealth at all. And after their return, though they renewed their covenant with God, no promise of obedience was made either to Ezra or to anyone else. And soon afterward they became subjects of the Greeks, from whose customs and demonology, and from the doctrine of the Kabbalists, their religion became much corrupted. So nothing can be gathered from their confusion, in both state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either.
And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude, that whosoever had the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented Gods Person; that is the person of God the Father; though he were not called by the name of Father, till such time as he sent into the world his Son Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his Everlasting Kingdome, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the Chapter following.
And therefore, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, we may conclude that whoever had the sovereignty of the commonwealth among the Jews also had the supreme authority in matters of God’s external worship, and represented God’s person—that is, the person of God the Father, though he was not called by the name of Father until he sent into the world his Son Jesus Christ to redeem mankind from their sins and bring them into his everlasting Kingdom, to be saved forevermore. Of this we are to speak in the following chapter.
Chapter 41: Of the office of our blessed Savior
Christ's office has three parts: redeemer, teacher, and king in the world to come.
We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the Office of the Messiah: The first of a Redeemer, or Saviour: The second of a Pastor, Counsellor, or Teacher, that is, of a Prophet sent from God, to convert such as God hath elected to Salvation: The third of a King, an eternall King, but under his Father, as Moses and the High Priests were in their severall times. And to these three parts are correspondent three times.
We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah. The first is that of a Redeemer, or Savior. The second is that of a pastor, counselor, or teacher—that is, of a prophet sent from God to convert those whom God has elected to salvation. The third is that of a king, an eternal king, but under his Father, as Moses and the high priests were in their respective times. And to these three parts correspond three times.
For our Redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the Sacrifice, wherein he offered up himself for our sinnes upon the Crosse: our Conversion he wrought partly then in his own Person; and partly worketh now by his Ministers; and will continue to work till his coming again. And after his coming again, shall begin that his glorious Reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.
For our redemption he worked at his first coming, by the sacrifice in which he offered himself up for our sins upon the cross. Our conversion he worked partly then, in his own person, and partly works now by his ministers, and will continue to work until his coming again. And after his coming again will begin his glorious reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.
To the Office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the Ransome of Sin, (which Ransome is Death,) it appertaineth, that he was Sacrificed, and thereby bare upon his own head, and carryed away from us our iniquities, in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though without sinne, can satisfie for the offences of all men, in the rigour of Justice, but in the Mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the Old Law (as we may read, Leviticus the 16.)
To the office of a Redeemer—that is, of one who pays the ransom of sin (which ransom is death)—it belongs that he was sacrificed, and thereby bore upon his own head, and carried away from us, our iniquities, in the manner God had required. Not that the death of one man, even one without sin, can satisfy for the offenses of all men in the rigor of justice; but it can in the mercy of God, who ordained such sacrifices for sin as he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the Old Law (as we may read in Leviticus 16)
the Lord required, that there should every year once, bee made an Atonement for the Sins of all Israel, both Priests, and others; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the Priests a young Bullock; and for the rest of the people, he was to receive from them two young Goates, of which he was to sacrifice one; but as for the other, which was the Scape Goat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to cause the Goat to be led into the wildernesse, and there to escape, and carry away with him the iniquities of the people.
the Lord required that once every year an atonement be made for the sins of all Israel, both priests and others. To do this, Aaron alone was to sacrifice a young bull for himself and the priests; and for the rest of the people he was to receive from them two young goats, one of which he was to sacrifice. As for the other, which was the scapegoat, he was to lay his hands on its head and, by a confession of the iniquities of the people, lay them all on that head; and then, by some suitable man, have the goat led into the wilderness, there to escape and carry away with it the iniquities of the people.
As the Sacrifice of the one Goat was a sufficient (because an acceptable) price for the Ransome of all Israel; so the death of the Messiah, is a sufficient price, for the Sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. Our Saviour Christs sufferings seem to be here figured, as cleerly; as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament: He was both the sacrificed Goat, and the Scape Goat; Hee was oppressed, and he was afflicted (Esay 53. 7.); he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumbe before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth: Here he is the *sacrificed Goat.
As the sacrifice of the one goat was a sufficient (because an acceptable) price for the ransom of all Israel, so the death of the Messiah is a sufficient price for the sins of all mankind, because nothing more was required. Our Savior Christ’s sufferings seem to be prefigured here as clearly as in the offering of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament. He was both the sacrificed goat and the scapegoat. “He was oppressed, and he was afflicted” (Isaiah 53:7); “he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before its shearers is silent, so he opened not his mouth.” Here he is the sacrificed goat.
He hath born our Griefs, (ver. 4.) and carried our sorrows: And again, (ver. 6.) the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all: And so he is the Scape Goat. He was cut off from the land of the living (ver. 8.) for the transgression of my People: There again he is the sacrificed Goat. And again, (ver. 11.) he shall bear their sins: Hee is the Scape Goat.* Thus is the Lamb of God equivalent to both those Goates; sacrificed, in that he dyed; and escaping, in his Resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from the habitation of men in his Ascension.
“He has borne our griefs” (verse 4) “and carried our sorrows”; and again (verse 6), “the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all.” And so he is the scapegoat. “He was cut off from the land of the living” (verse 8) “for the transgression of my people”: there again he is the sacrificed goat. And again (verse 11), “he shall bear their sins”: he is the scapegoat. Thus the Lamb of God is equivalent to both those goats: sacrificed, in that he died; and escaping, in his resurrection, being raised at the appointed time by his Father and removed from the dwelling place of men in his ascension.
For as much therefore, as he that redeemeth, hath no title to the thing redeemed, before the Redemption, and Ransome paid; and this Ransome was the Death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour (as man) was not King of those that he Redeemed, before hee suffered death; that is, during that time hee conversed bodily on the Earth. I say, he was not then King in present, by vertue of the Pact, which the faithfull make with him in Baptisme: Neverthelesse, by the renewing of their Pact with God in tisme, they were obliged to obey him for King, (under his Father) whensoever he should be pleased to take the Kingdome upon him. According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressely saith, (Iohn 18.
Since, therefore, he who redeems has no title to the thing redeemed before the redemption and ransom are paid, and this ransom was the death of the Redeemer, it is evident that our Savior (as man) was not king of those he redeemed before he suffered death—that is, during the time he lived bodily on the earth. I say he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact the faithful make with him in baptism. Nevertheless, by renewing their pact with God in baptism, they were obliged to obey him as king (under his Father) whenever he should be pleased to take the kingdom upon him. In accordance with this, our Savior himself says expressly (John 18:36),
36. My Kingdome is not of this world. Now seeing the Scripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day of Judgment, (which is therefore also called, the last day;) and that which shall bee after the day of Judgement, when there shall bee a new Heaven, and a new Earth; the Kingdome of Christ is not to begin till the generall Resurrection. And that is it which our Saviour saith, (Mat. 16. 27.)
“My kingdom is not of this world.” Now, since the Scripture mentions only two worlds—this one that exists now and will remain until the Day of Judgment (which is therefore also called the last day), and the one that will be after the Day of Judgment, when there will be a new heaven and a new earth—the kingdom of Christ is not to begin until the general resurrection. And that is what our Savior says (Matthew 16:27):
The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works. To reward every man according to his works, is to execute the Office of a King; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his Father, with his Angells. When our Saviour saith, (Mat. 23. 2.) The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses seat; All therefore whatsoever they bid you doe, that observe and doe; hee declareth plainly, that hee ascribeth Kingly Power, for that time, not to himselfe, but to them. And so hee doth also, where he saith, (Luke 12. 14.)
“The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works.” To reward every man according to his works is to execute the office of a king; and this is not to happen until he comes in the glory of his Father with his angels. When our Savior says (Matthew 23:2–3), “The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat; therefore whatever they bid you do, observe and do,” he declares plainly that he ascribes kingly power, for that time, not to himself but to them. And so he does also where he says (Luke 12:14),
Who made mee a Iudge, or Divider over you? And (Iohn 12. 47.) I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. And yet our Saviour came into this world that hee might bee a King, and a Judge in the world to come: For hee was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the Anointed Priest, and the Soveraign Prophet of God; that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the Prophet, in the High Priests that succeeded Moses, and in the Kings that succeeded the Priests. And St. Iohn saies expressely (chap. 5. ver. 22.)
“Who made me a judge or divider over you?” And (John 12:47), “I came not to judge the world, but to save the world.” And yet our Savior came into this world so that he might be a king and a judge in the world to come. For he was the Messiah—that is, the Christ, the anointed priest and the sovereign prophet of God—that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the high priests who succeeded Moses, and in the kings who succeeded the priests. And St. John says expressly (chapter 5, verse 22),
The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son. And this is not repugnant to that other place, I came not to judge the world: for this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, that at the second coming of Christ, (Mat. 19. 28.) Yee that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his Glory, yee shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.
“The Father judges no man, but has committed all judgment to the Son.” And this does not conflict with that other passage, “I came not to judge the world”: for the one is spoken of the present world, the other of the world to come. So also where it is said of the second coming of Christ (Matthew 19:28), “You who have followed me, in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory, you also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.”
If then Christ whilest hee was on Earth, had no Kingdome in this world, to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new Covenant, the Kingdom, which being his by the Old Covenant, had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to doe, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that is, the King promised to them by the Prophets; and to offer himselfe in sacrifice for the sinnes of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should beleeve in him amongst the Gentiles.
If, then, Christ while he was on earth had no kingdom in this world, what was the purpose of his first coming? It was to restore to God, by a new covenant, the kingdom that had been his by the old covenant and had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. To do this, he was to preach to them that he was the Messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets; to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of those who by faith should submit themselves to it; and, in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience those among the Gentiles who should believe in him.
So that there are two parts of our Saviours Office during his aboad upon the Earth: One to Proclaim himself the Christ; and another by Teaching, and by working of Miracles, to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty, to take possession of his Fathers Kingdome.
So there are two parts of our Savior’s office during his time on earth: one, to proclaim himself the Christ; the other, by teaching and by working miracles, to persuade and prepare men to live in such a way as to be worthy of the immortality believers were to enjoy when he should come in majesty to take possession of his Father’s kingdom.
And therefore it is, that the time of his preaching, is often by himself called the Regeneration; which is not properly a Kingdome, and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the Magistrates that then were, (for hee commanded to obey those that sate then in Moses chaire, and to pay tribute to Caesar; but onely an earnest of the Kingdome of God that was to come, to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to beleeve in him; For which cause the Godly are said to bee already in the Kingdome of Grace, as naturalized in that heavenly Kingdome.
And that is why he himself often calls the time of his preaching the regeneration. This is not properly a kingdom, and so not a warrant to deny obedience to the magistrates of that time (for he commanded obedience to those who then sat in Moses’ chair, and the paying of tribute to Caesar); it is only a pledge of the Kingdom of God that was to come, given to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples and to believe in him. For this reason the godly are said to be already in the Kingdom of Grace, as naturalized citizens of that heavenly kingdom.
Hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by Christ, that tendeth to the diminution of the Civill Right of the Jewes, or of Caesar. For as touching the Common-wealth which then was amongst the Jews, both they that bare rule amongst them, and they that were governed, did all expect the Messiah, and Kingdome of God; which they could not have done if their Laws had forbidden him (when he came) to manifest, and declare himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by Preaching, and Miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that Messiah, hee did therein nothing against their laws.
Up to this point, therefore, nothing was done or taught by Christ that tended to diminish the civil right of the Jews or of Caesar. For as regards the commonwealth that then existed among the Jews, both those who ruled among them and those who were governed all expected the Messiah and the Kingdom of God; which they could not have done if their laws had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare himself. Since, therefore, he did nothing but try by preaching and miracles to prove himself that Messiah, he did nothing in this against their laws.
The Kingdome hee claimed was to bee in another world: He taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sate in Moses seat: He allowed them to give Caesar his tribute, and refused to take upon himselfe to be a Judg. How then could his words, or actions bee seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then Civill Government? But God having determined his sacrifice, for the reduction of his elect to their former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to effect, made use of their malice, and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar.
The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world. He taught all men in the meantime to obey those who sat in Moses’ seat; he allowed them to give Caesar his tribute; and he refused to take upon himself the role of judge. How then could his words or actions be seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their civil government as it then was? But God, having determined on his sacrifice for bringing his elect back to their former covenanted obedience, made use of their malice and ingratitude as the means by which he would bring it about. Nor was it contrary to the laws of Caesar.
For though Pilate himself (to gratifie the Jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him: And put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required, that he pretended to bee King; bnt simply, That hee was King of the Iews; and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it; saying, What I have written, I have written.
For though Pilate himself (to gratify the Jews) delivered him to be crucified, before he did so he pronounced openly that he found no fault in him. And as the title of his condemnation he put, not what the Jews demanded, “that he claimed to be King,” but simply “that he was King of the Jews”; and despite their clamor he refused to change it, saying, “What I have written, I have written.”
Christ as king
Christ's kingdom begins at the resurrection and is exercised under his Father, like Moses; hence the persons of God.
As for the third part of his Office, which was to be King,, I have already shewn that his Kingdome was not to begin till the Resurrection. But then he shall be King, not onely as God, in which sense he is King already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in their Baptisme. And therefore it is, that our Saviour saith (Mat. 19. 28.)
As for the third part of his office, which was to be king, I have already shown that his kingdom was not to begin until the Resurrection. But then he will be king, not only as God—in which sense he is king already, and always will be, of all the earth, by virtue of his omnipotence—but also, in a special way, of his own elect, by virtue of the pact they make with him in their baptism. And that is why our Savior says (Matthew 19:28)
that his Apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, When the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory: whereby he signified that he should reign then in his humane nature; and (Mat. 16. 27.) The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works. The same we may read, Marke 13. 26. and 14. 62. and more expressely for the time, Luke 22. 29, 30.
that his apostles shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, “when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory”; by which he signified that he would reign then in his human nature. And (Matthew 16:27): “The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works.” We may read the same in Mark 13:26 and 14:62, and, more expressly as to the time, in Luke 22:29–30:
I appoint unto you a Kingdome, as my Father hath appointed to mee, that you may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdome, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. By which it is manifest, that the Kingdome of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be before the Son of Man shall come in Glory, and make his Apostles Judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the Kingdome of Heaven, whether men shall then eat, and drink; what eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour (Iohn 6. 27.)
“I appoint to you a kingdom, as my Father has appointed to me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” By this it is evident that the kingdom of Christ appointed to him by his Father is not to be before the Son of Man comes in glory and makes his apostles judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But someone may ask here: since there is no marriage in the Kingdom of Heaven, will men then eat and drink? What eating, then, is meant in this place? This is explained by our Savior (John 6:27)
where he saith, Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give you. So that by eating at Christs table, is meant the eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoying of Immortality, in the Kingdome of the Son of Man. By which places, and many more, it is evident, that our Saviours Kingdome is to bee exercised by him in his humane nature.
where he says, “Labor not for the food that perishes, but for the food that endures to everlasting life, which the Son of Man shall give you.” So by eating at Christ’s table is meant eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoyment of immortality in the Kingdom of the Son of Man. By these passages, and many more, it is evident that our Savior’s kingdom is to be exercised by him in his human nature.
Again, he is to be King then, no otherwise than as subordinate, or Vicegerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse; and as the High Priests were before the reign of Saul: and as the Kings were after it. For it is one of the Prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be like (in Office) to Moses: I will raise them up a Prophet (saith the Lord, Deut. 18. 18.) from amongst their Brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth, and this similitude with Moses, is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilest he was conversant on Earth.
Again, he is to be king then only as subordinate to God the Father, or as his vicegerent, as Moses was in the wilderness, and as the high priests were before the reign of Saul, and as the kings were after it. For it is one of the prophecies concerning Christ that he should be like Moses in office: “I will raise up for them a prophet,” says the Lord (Deuteronomy 18:18), “from among their brethren, like you, and will put my words in his mouth.” And this likeness to Moses is also apparent in the actions of our Savior himself while he lived on earth.
For as Moses chose twelve Princes of the tribes, to govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel: And as Moses authorized Seventy Elders, to receive the Spirit of God, and to Prophecy to the people, that is, (as I have said before,) to speak unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy Disciples, to preach his Kingdome, and Salvation to all Nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses, against those of the Seventy that prophecyed in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as being subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St.
For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes to govern under him, so our Savior chose twelve apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. And as Moses authorized seventy elders to receive the Spirit of God and to prophesy to the people—that is (as I have said before), to speak to them in the name of God—so our Savior also ordained seventy disciples to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as, when a complaint was made to Moses against those of the seventy who prophesied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it as being subservient in this to his government, so also our Savior, when St.
John complained to him of a certain man that cast out Devills in his name, justified him therein, saying, (Luke 9. 50.) Forbid him not, for hee that is not against us, is on our part.
John complained to him of a certain man who cast out devils in his name, justified him in it, saying (Luke 9:50), “Do not forbid him; for he who is not against us is for us.”
Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of Sacraments, both of Admission into the Kingdome of God, and of Commemoration of his deliverance of his Elect from their miserable condition. As the Children of Israel had for Sacrament of their Reception into the Kingdome of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of Circumcision, which rite having been omitted in the Wildernesse, was again restored as soon as they came into the land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite of Baptizing, that is, of washing with water all those that being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite St.
Again, our Savior resembled Moses in the institution of sacraments, both of admission into the Kingdom of God and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. The children of Israel had as the sacrament of their reception into the Kingdom of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of circumcision; this rite, having been omitted in the wilderness, was restored as soon as they came into the Promised Land. So also the Jews, before the coming of our Savior, had a rite of baptizing, that is, of washing with water all those Gentiles who embraced the God of Israel. This rite St.
John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the Christ, whom hee preached to bee already come into the world; and our Saviour instituted the same for a Sacrament to be taken by all that beleeved in him. From what cause the rite of Baptisme first proceeded, is not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning Leprousie; wherein the Leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the Priest to be clean, hee was admitted into the campe after a solemne Washing.
John the Baptist used in receiving all who gave their names to the Christ, whom he preached as already come into the world; and our Savior instituted the same as a sacrament to be taken by all who believed in him. From what cause the rite of baptism first arose is not formally stated in the Scripture. But it may probably be thought an imitation of the law of Moses concerning leprosy, in which a person with leprosy was ordered to be kept out of the camp of Israel for a certain time; after which, being judged clean by the priest, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn washing.
And this may therefore bee a type of the Washing in Baptisme; wherein such men as are cleansed of the Leprousie of Sin by Faith, are received into the Church with the solemnity of Baptisme. There is another conjecture drawn from the Ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens; and that is, when a man that was thought dead, chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would doe to converse with a Ghost, unlesse hee were received again into the number of men, by Washing, as Children new born were washed from the uncleannesse of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth.
And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism, in which men who are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith are received into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another conjecture, drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles in a certain case that rarely happens. When a man who was thought dead happened to recover, other men had scruples about associating with him, as they would about associating with a ghost, unless he was received again into the number of men by washing—as newborn children were washed from the uncleanness of their birth, which was a kind of new birth.
This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judaea was under the Dominion of Alexander, and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept into the Religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a Heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from the Legall Ceremony of Washing after Leprosie.
This ceremony of the Greeks may quite probably have crept into the religion of the Jews at the time when Judea was under the dominion of Alexander and the Greeks who succeeded him. But since it is not likely that our Savior would countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely that baptism came from the legal ceremony of washing after leprosy.
And for the other Sacrament, of eating the Paschall Lambe, it is manifestly imitated in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; in which the Breaking of the Bread, and the pouring out of the Wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the Misery of Sin, by Christs Passion, as the eating of the Paschall Lambe, kept in memory the deliverance of the Jewes out of the Bondage of Egypt. Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and hee but a Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father.
And as for the other sacrament, eating the Passover lamb, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, in which the breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin by Christ’s Passion, as the eating of the Passover lamb kept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of bondage in Egypt. Since, therefore, the authority of Moses was only subordinate, and he only a lieutenant to God, it follows that Christ, whose authority as man was to be like that of Moses, was no more than subordinate to the authority of his Father.
The same is more expressely signified, by that that hee teacheth us to pray, Our Father, Let thy Kingdome come; and, For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and the Glory; and by that it is said, that Hee shall come in the Glory of his Father; and by that which St. Paul saith, (1 Cor. 15. 24.) then commeth the end, when hee shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God, even the Father; and by many other most expresse places.
The same is signified more expressly by his teaching us to pray, “Our Father … your kingdom come,” and “For yours is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory”; and by its being said that “he shall come in the glory of his Father”; and by what St. Paul says (1 Corinthians 15:24), “then comes the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father”; and by many other very express passages.
Our Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth (as Moses did) the Person of God; which God from that time forward, but not before, is called the Father; aud being still one and the same substance, is one Person as represented by Moses, and another Person as represented by his Sonne the Christ. For Person being a relative to a Representer, it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that there bee a plurality of Persons, though of one and the same Substance.
Our Savior, therefore, both in teaching and in reigning, represents (as Moses did) the person of God; and God, from that time forward but not before, is called the Father. And being still one and the same substance, he is one person as represented by Moses, and another person as represented by his Son the Christ. For since person is relative to a representer, it follows that where there is a plurality of representers there is a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance.
Chapter 42: Of ecclesiastical power
Before kings were converted, church power lay with the apostles and those they ordained by laying on of hands.
For the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL, what, and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our Saviour, into two parts; one before the Conversion of Kings, and men endued with Soveraign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion. For it was long after the Ascension, before any King, or Civill Soveraign embraced, and publiquely allowed the teaching of Christian Religion.
To understand ecclesiastical power—what it is, and in whom it lies—we must divide the time since the Ascension of our Savior into two parts: one before the conversion of kings and of men endowed with sovereign civil power, the other after their conversion. For it was long after the Ascension before any king or civil sovereign embraced and publicly permitted the teaching of the Christian religion.
And for the time between, it is manifest, that the Power Ecclesiasticall, was in the Apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained to Preach the Gospell, and to convert men to Christianity, and to direct them that were converted in the way of Salvation; and after these the Power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by Imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained Ministers of God, to advance his Kingdome.
And for the time in between, it is evident that ecclesiastical power was in the apostles; and after them in those whom they ordained to preach the Gospel, to convert men to Christianity, and to direct the converted in the way of salvation; and after these the power was handed on again to others ordained by them. This was done by the laying on of hands on those who were ordained, which signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those they ordained ministers of God to advance his kingdom.
So that Imposition of hands, was nothing else but the Seal of their Commission to Preach Christ, and teach his Doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of Imposition of hands, was an imitation of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his Minister Joshua, as wee read Deuteronomy 34. ver. 9. And Ioshua the Son of Nun was full of the Spirit of Wisdome; for Moses had laid his hands upon him. Our Saviour therefore between his Resurrection, and Ascension, gave his Spirit to the Apostles; first, by Breathing on them, and saying, (Iohn 20. 22.) Receive yee the Holy Spirit; and after his Ascension (Acts 2. 2, 3.)
So the laying on of hands was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach Christ and teach his doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Spirit by that ceremony of the laying on of hands was an imitation of what Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony with his minister Joshua, as we read in Deuteronomy 34:9: “And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands on him.” Our Savior therefore, between his Resurrection and Ascension, gave his Spirit to the apostles: first by “breathing on them, and saying” (John 20:22), “Receive the Holy Spirit”; and after his Ascension (Acts 2:2–3)
by sending down upon them, a mighty wind, and Cloven tongues of fire; and not by Imposition of hands; as neither did God lay his hands on Moses: and his Apostles afterward, transmitted the same Spirit by Imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest hereby, in whom the Power Ecclesiasticall continually remained, in those first times, where there was not any Christian Common-wealth; namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles, by successive laying on of hands.
by sending down on them “a mighty wind, and cloven tongues of fire,” and not by the laying on of hands—just as God did not lay his hands on Moses either. And his apostles afterward transmitted the same Spirit by the laying on of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So it is evident from this in whom ecclesiastical power continually remained in those first times, when there was no Christian commonwealth: namely, in those who received it from the apostles by the successive laying on of hands.
Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time. For as Moses, and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament; and our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth: So the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors, in the Office of Preaching, and Teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have Represented him ever since. But a Person, (as I have shewn before, chapt. 13.) is he that is Represented, as often as hee is Represented; and therefore God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons; though neither the word Person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. St.
Here we have the person of God borne now for the third time. For as Moses and the high priests were God’s representative in the Old Testament, and our Savior himself as man during his time on earth, so the Holy Spirit—that is to say, the apostles and their successors in the office of preaching and teaching, who had received the Holy Spirit—have represented him ever since. But a person (as I have shown before, in chapter 13) is he who is represented, as often as he is represented. And therefore God, who has been represented (that is, personated) three times, may properly enough be said to be three persons—though neither the word person nor Trinity is ascribed to him in the Bible. St.
Iohn indeed (1 Epist. 5. 7.) saith, There be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are One: But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three Persons in the proper signification of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another. For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person; and as Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bare witnesse. St.
John indeed says (1 John 5:7), “There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one.” But this does not disagree with, and indeed fits well with, three persons in the proper meaning of person, which is that which is represented by another. For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one person; as represented by his Son, another person; and as represented by the apostles, and by the doctors who taught by authority derived from them, a third person; and yet every person here is the person of one and the same God. But someone may ask here what it was that these three bore witness to. St.
Iohn therefore tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse, that God hath given us eternall life in his Son. Again, if it should bee asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his Apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times Represented the Person of God; and either prophecyed, or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the character of the Apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear Witnesse of his Resurrection; as appeareth expressely (Acts 1. ver. 21, 22. where St.
John therefore tells us (verse 11) that they bear witness that “God has given us eternal life in his Son.” Again, if it is asked where that testimony appears, the answer is easy. For he has testified it by the miracles he worked: first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his apostles, who had received the Holy Spirit. All of these, in their times, represented the person of God, and either prophesied or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the apostles, it was the mark of apostleship, in the twelve first and great apostles, to bear witness to his Resurrection, as appears expressly in Acts 1:21–22, where St.
Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at the Baptisme of Iohn, unto that same day that hee was taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection: which words interpret the bearing of Witnesse, mentioned by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of Witnesses in Earth. For (ver. 8.)
Peter, when a new apostle was to be chosen in place of Judas Iscariot, uses these words: “Of these men who have accompanied us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day he was taken up from us, one must be ordained to be a witness with us of his Resurrection.” These words interpret the bearing of witness mentioned by St. John. In the same place another trinity of witnesses, on earth, is mentioned. For (verse 8)
he saith, there are three that bear Witnesse in Earth, the Spirit, and the Water, and the Bloud; and these three agree in one: that is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the two Sacraments, Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, which all agree in one Testimony, to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternall life; of which Testimony he saith (verse 10.)
he says, “There are three that bear witness on earth, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood; and these three agree in one”: that is to say, the graces of God’s Spirit and the two sacraments, baptism and the Lord’s Supper, which all agree in one testimony, to assure the consciences of believers of eternal life. Of this testimony he says (verse 10),
He that beleeveth on the Son of man hath the Witnesse in himself. In this Trinity on Earth, the Unity is not of the thing; for the Spirit, the Water, and the Bloud, are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony: But in the Trinity of Heaven, the Persons are the persons of one and the same God, though Represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this; that the God who is alwaies One and the same, was the Person Represented by Moses; the Person Represented by his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by the Apostles.
“He who believes in the Son of Man has the witness in himself.” In this trinity on earth, the unity is not of the thing: for the Spirit, the water, and the blood are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony. But in the Trinity of heaven, the persons are the persons of one and the same God, though represented at three different times and on three different occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this: that God, who is always one and the same, was the person represented by Moses, the person represented by his Son incarnate, and the person represented by the apostles.
As Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake, is God; As Represented by his Son that was God and Man), the Son is that God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: From whence we may gather the reason why those names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament: For they are Persons, that is, they have their names from Representing; which could not be, till divers men had Represented Gods Person in ruling, or in directing under him.
As represented by the apostles, the Holy Spirit by whom they spoke is God. As represented by his Son (who was God and man), the Son is that God. As represented by Moses and the high priests, the Father—that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—is that God. From this we may gather the reason why the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in the sense of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament. For they are persons; that is, they take their names from representing, which could not happen until various men had represented God’s person in ruling, or in directing, under him.
Thus wee see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour to the Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called sometime in the New Testament Paracletus which signifieth an Assister, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated a Comforter. Let us now consider the Power it selfe, what it was, and over whom.
Thus we see how ecclesiastical power was left by our Savior to the apostles, and how, so that they might exercise that power better, they were endowed with the Holy Spirit—which is therefore sometimes called in the New Testament Paracletus, meaning an assister, or one called on for help, though it is commonly translated Comforter. Let us now consider the power itself: what it was, and over whom.
A power to persuade, not command
Christ left his ministers no coercive power; they are schoolmasters, and must obey the civil sovereign.
Cardinall Bellarmine in his third generall Controversie, hath handled a great many questions concerning the Ecclesiasticall Power of the Pope of Rome; and begins with this, Whether it ought to be Monarchicall, Aristocraticall, or Democraticall. All which sorts of Power, are Soveraign, and Coercive.
Cardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, has handled a great many questions concerning the ecclesiastical power of the Pope of Rome. He begins with this one: whether it ought to be monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical. All these sorts of power are sovereign and coercive.
If now it should appear, that there is no Coercive Power left them by our Saviour; but onely a Power to proclaim the Kingdom of Christ, and to perswade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by precepts and good counsell, to teach them that have submitted, what they are to do, that they may be received into the Kingdom of God when it comes; and that the Apostles, and other Ministers of the Gospel, are our Schoolemasters, and not our Commanders, and their Precepts not Laws, but wholesome Counsells; then were all that dispute in vain.
Now if it should appear that our Savior left them no coercive power, but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of Christ and to persuade men to submit to it; and, by precepts and good counsel, to teach those who have submitted what they must do to be received into the Kingdom of God when it comes; and that the apostles and other ministers of the Gospel are our schoolmasters and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws but wholesome counsels—then that whole dispute would be in vain.
I have shewn already (in the last Chapter,) that the Kingdome of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his Ministers (unlesse they be Kings,) require obedience in his name. For if the Supreme King, have not his Regall Power in this world; by what authority can obedience be required to his Officers? As my Father sent me, (so saith our Saviour) I send you. But our Saviour was sent to perswade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles, to receive the Kingdome of his Father, and not to reign in Majesty, no not, as his Fathers Lieutenant, till the day of Judgment.
I have already shown (in the last chapter) that the kingdom of Christ is not of this world. Therefore his ministers, unless they are kings, cannot require obedience in his name either. For if the supreme King does not have his regal power in this world, by what authority can obedience be required to his officers? “As my Father sent me,” says our Savior, “so I send you.” But our Savior was sent to persuade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of his Father—not to reign in majesty, not even as his Father’s lieutenant, until the Day of Judgment.
The time between the Ascension, and the generall Resurrection, is called, not a Reigning, but a Regeneration; that is, a Preparatiof men for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of Judgment; as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, Mat. 19. 28. You that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve Thrones; And of St. Paul (Ephes. 6. 15.) Having your feet shod with the Preparation of the Gospell of Peace.
The time between the Ascension and the general resurrection is called not a reigning but a regeneration—that is, a preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ at the Day of Judgment. This appears from the words of our Savior (Matthew 19:28): “You who have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones”; and of St. Paul (Ephesians 6:15): “Having your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace.”
And is compared by our Saviour, to Fishing; that is, to winning men to obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by Perswasion: and therefore he said not to his Apostles, hee would make them so many Nimrods, Hunters of men; but Fishers of men. It is compared also to Leaven; to Sowing of Seed, and to the Multiplication of a grain of Mustard-seed; by all which Compulsion is excluded; and consequently there can in that time be no actual Reigning. The work of Christs Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of Christ, and a preparation for his second comming; as the Evangelization of John Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.
And our Savior compares it to fishing—that is, to winning men to obedience not by coercion and punishment, but by persuasion. That is why he did not tell his apostles he would make them so many Nimrods, “hunters of men,” but “fishers of men.” It is compared also to leaven, to the sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of mustard seed. All of these exclude compulsion, and consequently there can be no actual reigning in that time. The work of Christ’s ministers is evangelization—that is, a proclamation of Christ and a preparation for his second coming, as the evangelization of John the Baptist was a preparation for his first coming.
Again, the Office of Christs Ministers in this world, is to make men Beleeve, and have Faith in Christ: But Faith hath no relation to, nor dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement; but onely upon certainty, or probability of Arguments drawn from Reason, or from something men beleeve already. Therefore the Ministers of Christ in this world, have no Power by that title, to Punish any man for not Beleeving, or for Contradicting what they say; they have I say no Power by that title of Christs Ministers, to Punish such: but if they have Soveraign Civill Power, by politick institution, then they may indeed lawfully Punish any Contradiction to their laws whatsoever: And St.
Again, the office of Christ’s ministers in this world is to make men believe and have faith in Christ. But faith has no relation to, and no dependence at all on, compulsion or command, but only on the certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from something men already believe. Therefore the ministers of Christ in this world have no power, by that title, to punish any man for not believing or for contradicting what they say. They have, I say, no power by that title of Christ’s ministers to punish such people; but if they have sovereign civil power by political institution, then they may indeed lawfully punish any contradiction of their laws whatsoever. And St.
Paul, of himselfe and other the then Preachers of the Gospell, saith in expresse words, Wee have no Dominion over your Faith, but are Helpers of your Ioy.
Paul says in express words, of himself and the other preachers of the Gospel at that time, “We have no dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy.”
Another Argument, that the Ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of Commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull Authority which Christ hath left to all Princes; as well Christians, as Infidels. St. Paul saith (Col. 3. 20.) Children obey your Parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord. And ver. 22. Servants obey in all things your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, as fearing the Lord: This is spoken to them whose Masters were Infidells; and yet they are bidden to obey them in all things. And again, concerning obedience to Princes. (Rom. 13. the first 6.
Another argument that the ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of commanding may be drawn from the lawful authority that Christ has left to all princes, Christians and unbelievers alike. St. Paul says (Colossians 3:20), “Children, obey your parents in all things, for this is well pleasing to the Lord”; and in verse 22, “Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, as fearing the Lord.” This is spoken to those whose masters were unbelievers, and yet they are told to obey them “in all things.” And again, concerning obedience to princes,
verses (exhorting to be subject to the Higher Powers, he saith, that all Power is ordained of God; and that we ought to be subject to them, not onely for fear of incurring their wrath, but also for conscience sake. And St. Peter, (1 Epist. chap. 2. ver. 13, 14, 15.) Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man, for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King, as Supreme, or unto Governours, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers, and for the praise of them that doe well; for so is the will of God. And again St. Paul (*Tit. 3. 1.)
exhorting us (Romans 13:1–6) “to be subject to the higher powers,” he says “that all power is ordained of God,” and “that we ought to be subject to them, not only for” fear of incurring their “wrath, but also for conscience’ sake.” And St. Peter (1 Peter 2:13–15): “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king, as supreme, or to governors, as to those that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those that do well; for so is the will of God.” And again St. Paul:
Put men in mind to be subject to Principalities, and Powers, and to obey Magistrates.* These Princes, and Powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak, were all Infidels: much more therefore we are to observe those Christians, whom God hath ordained to have Soveraign Power over us. How then can wee be obliged to obey any Minister of Christ, if he should command us to doe any thing contrary the Command of the King, or other Soveraign Representant of the Common-wealth, whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued with Civill Authority, any authority to Command other men.
(Titus 3:1) “Put men in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, and to obey magistrates.” These princes and powers of whom St. Peter and St. Paul speak here were all unbelievers. Much more, therefore, are we to obey those Christians whom God has ordained to have sovereign power over us. How then can we be obliged to obey any minister of Christ if he should command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king, or of another sovereign representative of the commonwealth of which we are members and by which we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest that Christ has not left his ministers in this world any authority to command other men, unless they are also endowed with civil authority.
Profession under compulsion, and martyrs
An outward act commanded by the sovereign is his, not the subject's; true martyrs are witnesses of the resurrection.
But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other Soveraign Person forbid us to beleeve in Christ? To this I answer, that such forbidding is of no effect; because Beleef, and Unbeleef never follow mens Commands. Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be further asked, What if wee bee commanded by our lawfull Prince, to say with our tongue, wee beleeve not; must we obey such command?
But what (someone may object) if a king, or a senate, or another sovereign person forbids us to believe in Christ? To this I answer that such forbidding has no effect, because belief and unbelief never follow men’s commands. Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards or threats of torture. And if it is further asked, “What if we are commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue that we do not believe—must we obey such a command?”
Profession with the tongue is but an externall thing, and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding firmely in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel; For hee saith (2 *Kings 5. 17.) Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto other Gods but unto the Lord.
Profession with the tongue is only an external thing, and no more than any other gesture by which we signify our obedience. In it a Christian who holds the faith of Christ firmly in his heart has the same liberty that the prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel, for he says (2 Kings 5:17–18), “Your servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice to other gods, but to the Lord.”
In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon; when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing. This the Prophet approved, and bid him Goe in peace.* Here Naaman beleeved in his heart; but by bowing before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips.
“In this thing may the Lord pardon your servant: that when my master goes into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leans on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of Rimmon—when I bow myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon your servant in this thing.” The prophet approved this, and told him, “Go in peace.” Here Naaman believed in his heart; but by bowing before the idol Rimmon he denied the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips.
But then what shall we answer to our Saviours saying, Whosoever denyeth me before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in Heaven? This we may say, that whatsoever a Subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns; nor is it he that in this case denyeth Christ before men, but his Governour, and the law of his countrey.
But then what shall we answer to our Savior’s saying, “Whoever denies me before men, I will deny him before my Father who is in heaven”? This we may say: whatever a subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to do in obedience to his sovereign, and does not do in accordance with his own mind but in accordance with the laws of his country, that action is not his but his sovereign’s. Nor is it he who in this case denies Christ before men, but his governor and the law of his country.
If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true, and unfegined Christianity; I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any Christian Common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of the [Muslim] Religion, whether if his Soveraign command him to bee present at the divine service of the Christian Church, and that on pain of death, he think that [Muslim] obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawfull Prince.
If anyone accuses this doctrine of being repugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity, I ask him this. Suppose there were a subject in some Christian commonwealth who was inwardly, in his heart, of the Muslim religion, and his sovereign commanded him, on pain of death, to be present at the divine service of the Christian Church. Does he think that Muslim is obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than obey that command of his lawful prince?
If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their Religion, true, or false: if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour, Whatsoever you would that men should doe unto you, that doe yee unto them; and contrary to the Law of Nature, (which is the indubitable everlasting Law of God) Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee.
If he says the man ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizes all private men to disobey their princes in maintenance of their religion, true or false. If he says the man ought to be obedient, then he allows himself what he denies to another—contrary to the words of our Savior, “Whatever you would have men do to you, do that to them,” and contrary to the law of nature (which is the unquestionable, everlasting law of God), “Do not do to another what you would not have him do to you.”
But what then shall we say of all those Martyrs we read of in the History of the Church, that they have needlessely cast away their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for that cause put to death; whereof some have received a Calling to preach, and professe the Kingdome of Christ openly; others have had no such Calling, nor more has been required of them than their owne faith.
But what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the Church—that they needlessly threw away their lives? To answer this, we must distinguish among the persons who have been put to death for that cause. Some of them had received a calling to preach and profess the kingdom of Christ openly; others had no such calling, and nothing more was required of them than their own faith.
The former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witnesse to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true Martyrs; For a Martyr is, (to give the true definition of the word) a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: For a Witnesse must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such, can properly be called Martyrs of Christ, is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, Act. 1. 21, 22.
The former sort, if they were put to death for bearing witness to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs. For a martyr is (to give the true definition of the word) a witness of the resurrection of Jesus the Messiah—which no one can be except those who conversed with him on earth and saw him after he had risen. For a witness must have seen what he testifies to, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of Christ is manifest from the words of St. Peter:
Wherefore of these men which have companyed with us all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the Baptisme of Iohn unto that same day hee was taken up from us, must one one be ordained to be a Martyr (that is a Witnesse) with us of his Resurrection: Where we may observe, that he which is to bee a Witnesse of the truth of the Resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamentall article of Christian Religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some Disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before, and after his Resurrection; and consequently must be one of his originall Disciples: whereas they which were not so, can Witnesse no more, but that their antecessors said it, and are therefore but Witnesses of other mens testimony; and are but second Martyrs, or Martyrs of Christs Witnesses.
(Acts 1:21–22) “Of these men who have accompanied us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day that he was taken up from us, one must be ordained to be a martyr” (that is, a witness) “with us of his resurrection.” Here we may observe that he who is to be a witness of the truth of the resurrection of Christ—that is to say, of the truth of this fundamental article of the Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ—must be some disciple who conversed with him and saw him before and after his resurrection, and consequently must be one of his original disciples. Those who were not can witness no more than that their predecessors said it. They are therefore only witnesses of other men’s testimony, and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ’s witnesses.
He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the History our Saviours of life, and of the Acts, or Epistles of the Apostles; or which he beleeveth upon the authority of a private man, wil oppose the Laws and Authority of the Civill State, is very far from being a Martyr of Christ, or a Martyr of his Martyrs. ’Tis one Article onely, which to die for, meriteth so honorable a name; and that Article is this, that Iesus is the Christ; that is to say, He that hath redeemed us, aud shall come again to give us salvation, and eternall life in his glorious Kingdome.
He who, to maintain every doctrine that he himself draws out of the history of our Savior’s life and of the Acts or Epistles of the apostles, or that he believes on the authority of a private man, will oppose the laws and authority of the civil state, is very far from being a martyr of Christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. There is only one article for which to die merits so honorable a name, and that article is this: that “Jesus is the Christ”—that is to say, he who has redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation and eternal life in his glorious kingdom.
To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not required; nor is it the Death of the Witnesse, but the Testimony it self that makes the Martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth Witnesse, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.
To die for every tenet that serves the ambition or profit of the clergy is not required. Nor is it the death of the witness but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the word signifies nothing else but the man who bears witness, whether he is put to death for his testimony or not.
Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be a Witnesse, and consequently a Martyr, either primary of Christ, or secundary of his Apostles, Disciples, or their Successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, tis not required at his hands; nor ought hee to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. None therefore can be a Martyr, neither of the first, nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but such as are sent to the conversion of Infidels.
Also, he who is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but takes it on himself by his own private authority, is not obliged to suffer death for that cause, even though he is a witness, and consequently a martyr—either a primary martyr of Christ, or a secondary one of his apostles, disciples, or their successors. For since he was not called to it, it is not required at his hands; nor ought he to complain if he loses the reward he expects from those who never set him to work. No one therefore can be a martyr, of either the first or the second degree, who does not have a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh—that is to say, no one but those who are sent to convert unbelievers.
For no man is a Witnesse to him that already beleeveth, and therefore needs no Witnesse; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his Apostles, and his Seventy Disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all that beleeved: And he sent them to unbeleevers; I send you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves; not as sheep to other sheep.
For no man is a witness to someone who already believes and therefore needs no witness, but only to those who deny, or doubt, or have not heard. Christ sent his apostles and his seventy disciples with authority to preach; he did not send all who believed. And he sent them to unbelievers: “I send you,” he says, “as sheep among wolves”—not as sheep to other sheep.
The apostles' commission
The apostles were sent to proclaim, teach, baptize, and forgive sins, but not to rule.
Lastly, the points of their Commission, as they are expressely set down in the Gospel, contain none of them any authority over the Congregation.
Lastly, none of the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down in the Gospel, contains any authority over the congregation.
We have first (Mat. 10.) that the twelve Apostles were sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, and commanded to Preach, that the Kingdome of God was at hand. Now Preaching in the originall, is that act, which a Crier, Herald, or other Officer useth to doe publiquely in Proclaiming of a King. But a Crier hath not right to Command any man. And (Luke 10. 2.) the seventy Disciples are sent out, as Labourers, not as Lords of the Harvest; and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, The Kingdome of God is come nigh unto you; and by Kingdom here is meant, not the Kingdome of Grace, but the Kingdome of Glory; for they are bidden to denounce it (ver. 11.)
We have, first (Matthew 10), that the twelve apostles were sent “to the lost sheep of the house of Israel,” and commanded to preach “that the Kingdom of God was at hand.” Now preaching, in the original, is the act that a crier, herald, or other officer performs publicly in proclaiming a king. But a crier has no right to command anyone. And (Luke 10:2) the seventy disciples are sent out as “laborers,” not as lords “of the harvest,” and are told (verse 9) to say, “The Kingdom of God has come near to you.” By kingdom here is meant not the Kingdom of Grace but the Kingdom of Glory, for they are told to proclaim it (verse 11)
to those Cities which shall not receive them, as a threatning, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodome, than for such a City. And (Mat. 20. 28.) our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that sought Priority of place, their Office was to minister, even as the Son of man came, not to be ministred unto, but to minister. Preachers therefore have not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall power: Bee not called Masters, (saith our Saviour, Mat. 23. 10.) for one is your Master, even Christ.
to those cities that will not receive them, as a threat that it will be more tolerable on that day for Sodom than for such a city. And (Matthew 20:28) our Savior tells his disciples, who were seeking priority of place, that their office was to minister, even as the Son of man came not to be ministered to, but to minister. Preachers therefore have not magisterial but ministerial power. “Be not called masters,” says our Savior (Matthew 23:10), “for one is your Master, even Christ.”
Another point of their Commission, is, to Teach all nations; as it is in Mat. 28. 19. or as in St. Mark 16. 15. Goe into all the world, and Preach the Gospel to every creature. Teaching therefore, and Preaching is the same thing. For they that Proclaim the comming of a King, must withall make known by what right he commeth, if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him: As St.
Another point of their commission is to “teach all nations,” as in Matthew 28:19, or, as in St. Mark 16:15, “Go into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature.” Teaching and preaching, therefore, are the same thing. For those who proclaim the coming of a king must also make known by what right he comes, if they mean men to submit to him—as St.
Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when three Sabbath dayes he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening, and alledging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Iesus is Christ. But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, (that is to say, King,) and risen from the dead, is not to say, that men are bound after they beleeve it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws, and commands of their Soveraigns; but that they shall doe wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in Patience, and Faith, with Obedience to their present Magistrates.
Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when “for three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ.” But to teach from the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ (that is to say, King) and risen from the dead is not to say that men, after they believe it, are bound to obey those who tell them so, against the laws and commands of their sovereigns. It is to say that they will act wisely to await the coming of Christ hereafter in patience and faith, with obedience to their present magistrates.
Another point of their Commission, is to Baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. What is Baptisme? Dipping into water. But what is it to Dip a man into the water in the name of any thing? The meaning of these words of Baptisme is this.
Another point of their commission is to “baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.” What is baptism? Dipping into water. But what is it to dip a man into water in the name of anything? The meaning of these words of baptism is this.
He that is Baptized, is Dipped or Washed, as a sign of becomming a new man, and a loyall subject to that God, whose Person was represented in old time by Moses, and the High Priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, his Sonne, God, and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his humane nature Represent his Fathers Person in his eternall Kingdome after the Resurrection; and to acknowledge the Doctrine of the Apostles, who assisted by the Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, were left for guides to bring us into that Kingdome, to be the onely, and assured way thereunto.
He who is baptized is dipped or washed as a sign of becoming a new man and a loyal subject to that God whose person was represented in old times by Moses and the high priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, his Son, God and man, who has redeemed us and shall in his human nature represent his Father’s person in his eternal kingdom after the resurrection; and as a sign of acknowledging the doctrine of the apostles—who, assisted by the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, were left as guides to bring us into that kingdom—to be the only and sure way to it.
This, being our promise in Baptisme; and the Authority of Earthly Soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of Judgment; (for that is expressely affirmed by S. Paul 1 Cor. 15. 22, 23, 24, where he saith, *As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive.
This is our promise in baptism. And the authority of earthly sovereigns is not to be put down until the Day of Judgment, as St. Paul expressly affirms (1 Corinthians 15:22–24), where he says, “As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.”
But every man in his owne order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christs, at his comming; Then commeth the end, when he shall have delivered up the Kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all Rule, and all Authority and Power*) it is manifest, that we do not in Baptisme constitute over us another authority, by which our externall actions are to bee governed in this life; but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction in the way to life eternall.
“But every man in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; afterward they that are Christ’s, at his coming. Then comes the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power.” It is manifest, then, that in baptism we do not set up over ourselves another authority by which our external actions are to be governed in this life, but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles as our direction on the way to eternal life.
The power of the keys and excommunication
Forgiving sins follows from baptizing; excommunication without civil power is only shunning, and cannot touch sovereigns.
The Power of Remission, and Retention of Sinnes, called also the Power of Loosing, and Binding, and sometimes the Keyes of the Kingdome of Heaven, is a consequence of the Authority to Baptize, or refuse to Baptize. For Baptisme is the Sacrament of Allegeance, of them that are to be received into the Kingdome of God; that is to say, into Eternall life; that is to say, to Remission of Sin: For as Eternall life was lost by the Committing, so it is recovered by the Remitting of mens Sins. The end of Baptisme is Remission of Sins: and therefore St.
The power of remission and retention of sins, also called the power of loosing and binding, and sometimes the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, is a consequence of the authority to baptize or to refuse baptism. For baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of those who are to be received into the Kingdom of God—that is to say, into eternal life; that is to say, to remission of sin. For as eternal life was lost by the committing of men’s sins, so it is recovered by the remitting of them. The end of baptism is remission of sins; and therefore St.
Peter, when they that were converted by his Sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked what they were to doe, advised them to repent, and be Baptized in the name of Iesus, for the Remission of Sins. And therefore seeing to Baptize is to declare the Reception of men into Gods Kingdome; and to refuse to Baptize is to declare their Exclusion; it followeth, that the Power to declare them Cast out, or Retained in it, was given to the same Apostles, and their Substitutes, and Successors. And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them, saying, (*Iohn 20. 22.)
Peter, when those who were converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost asked what they were to do, advised them to “repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus, for the remission of sins.” And therefore, since to baptize is to declare the reception of men into God’s kingdom, and to refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion, it follows that the power to declare them cast out of it, or retained in it, was given to the same apostles and to their substitutes and successors. And therefore, after our Savior had breathed on them, saying
Receive the Holy Ghost, hee addeth in the next verse, Whose soever Sins ye Remit, they are Remitted unto them; and whose soever Sins ye Retain, they are Retained.* By which words, is not granted an Authority to Forgive, or Retain Sins, simply and absolutely, as God Forgiveth or Retaineth them, who knoweth the Heart of man, and truth of his Penitence and Conversion; but conditionally, to the Penitent: And this Forgivenesse, or Absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned Repentance, is thereby without other act, or sentence of the Absolvent, made void, and hath no effect at all to Salvation, but on the contrary, to the Aggravation of his Sin.
(John 20:22), “Receive the Holy Spirit,” he adds in the next verse, “Whosesoever sins you remit, they are remitted to them; and whosesoever sins you retain, they are retained.” By these words is granted an authority to forgive or retain sins not simply and absolutely, as God forgives or retains them, who knows the heart of man and the truth of his penitence and conversion, but conditionally, to the penitent. And if the person absolved has only a feigned repentance, this forgiveness or absolution is thereby made void, without any other act or sentence of the one who absolves, and has no effect at all toward salvation, but on the contrary aggravates his sin.
Therefore the Apostles, and their Successors, are to follow but the outward marks of Repentance; which appearing, they have no Authority to deny Absolution; and if they appeare not, they have no authority to Absolve. The same also is to be observed in Baptisme: for to a converted Jew, or Gentile, the Apostles had not the Power to deny Baptisme; nor to grant it to the Un-penitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another mans Repentance, further than by externall marks, taken from his words, and actions, which are subject to hypocrisie; another question will arise, Who it is that is constituted Judge of those marks.
Therefore the apostles and their successors are to go only by the outward marks of repentance. If these appear, they have no authority to deny absolution; if they do not appear, they have no authority to absolve. The same is to be observed in baptism as well: for the apostles had no power to deny baptism to a converted Jew or Gentile, nor to grant it to the unrepentant. But since no man can discern the truth of another man’s repentance any further than by external marks taken from his words and actions, which are subject to hypocrisy, another question will arise: who is appointed judge of those marks?
And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; If thy Brother (saith he) *shal trespasse against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee, and him alone; if shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy Brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one, or two more.
And this question is decided by our Savior himself: “If your brother,” he says, “shall trespass against you, go and tell him his fault between you and him alone; if he shall hear you, you have gained your brother. But if he will not hear you, then take with you one or two more.”
And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican.* By which it is manifest, that the Judgment concerning the truth of Repentance, belonged not to any one Man, but to the Church, that is, to the Assembly of the Faithull, or to them that have authority to bee their Representant.
“And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it to the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican.” From this it is manifest that the judgment concerning the truth of repentance belonged not to any one man but to the Church—that is, to the assembly of the faithful, or to those who have authority to be their representative.
But besides the Judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of Sentence: And this belonged alwaies to the Apostle, or some Pastor of the Church, as Prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18 verse, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven. And conformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul (*1 Cor. 5.
But besides the judgment, the pronouncing of sentence is also necessary. This always belonged to the apostle, or some pastor of the Church, as spokesman; and our Savior speaks of this in verse 18: “Whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” And the practice of St. Paul was in keeping with this
3, 4, & 5.) where he saith, For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed; In the name of our Lord Iesus Christ when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Iesus Christ, To deliver such a one to Satan;* that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose Sins are not Forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the Sentence; but the Assembly was first to hear the Cause, (for St. Paul was absent;) and by consequence to condemn him. But in the same chapter (ver. 11, 12.)
(1 Corinthians 5:3–5), where he says, “For I verily, as absent in body but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that has so done this deed: in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when you are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one to Satan”—that is to say, to cast him out of the Church as a man whose sins are not forgiven. Paul here pronounces the sentence; but the assembly was first to hear the case (for St. Paul was absent), and consequently to condemn him. But in the same chapter
the Judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to the Assembly: *But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a Brother be a Fornicator, &c. with such a one no not to eat. For what have I to do to judg them that are without?
(1 Corinthians 5:11–12) the judgment in such a case is attributed more expressly to the assembly: “But now I have written to you not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, etc.—with such a one, no, not to eat. For what have I to do to judge them that are outside?”
Do not ye judg them that are within?* The Sentence therefore by which a man was put out of Church, was pronounced by the Apostle, or Pastor; but the Judgment concerning the merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, (as the times were before the conversion of Kings, and men that had Soveraign Authority in the Common-wealth,) the Assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same City; as in Corinth, in the Assembly of the Christians of Corinth.
“Do not you judge them that are within?” The sentence by which a man was put out of the Church, therefore, was pronounced by the apostle or pastor; but the judgment concerning the merit of the case lay with the Church—that is to say (as things stood before the conversion of kings and of men who had sovereign authority in the commonwealth), the assembly of the Christians living in the same city: as in Corinth, the assembly of the Christians of Corinth.
This part of the Power of the Keyes, by which men were thrust out from the Kingdom of God, is that which is called Excommunication; and to excommunicate, is in the Originall, Aposunagogon Poiein, to cast out of the Synagogue; that is, out of the place of Divine service; a word drawn from the custome of the Jews, to cast out of their Synagogues, such as they thought in manners, or doctrine, contagious, as Lepers were by the Law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such time as they should be by the Priest pronounced clean.
This part of the power of the keys, by which men were thrust out of the Kingdom of God, is what is called excommunication. To excommunicate is, in the original, aposunagogon poiein, “to cast out of the synagogue”—that is, out of the place of divine service. The word is drawn from the custom of the Jews of casting out of their synagogues those whom they thought contagious in manners or doctrine, as people with leprosy were separated by the law of Moses from the congregation of Israel until the priest pronounced them clean.
The Use and Effect of Excommunication, whilest it was not yet strengthened with the Civill Power, was no more, than that they, who were not Excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was not enough to repute them as Heathen, that never had been Christians; for with such they might eate, and drink; which with Excommunicate persons they might not do; as appeareth by the words of St. Paul, (1 Cor. 5. ver.
The use and effect of excommunication, while it was not yet strengthened by the civil power, was no more than this: those who were not excommunicated were to avoid the company of those who were. It was not enough to regard them as heathens who had never been Christians; for with such people they might eat and drink, which with excommunicated persons they might not do. This appears from the words of St. Paul
9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to company with Fornicators; but (because that could not bee without going out of the world,) he restraineth it to such Fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons, as were of the brethren; with such a one (he saith) they ought not to keep company, no not to eat. And this is no more than our Saviour saith (Mat. 18. 17.)
(1 Corinthians 5:9–10 and following), where he tells them he had formerly forbidden them “to keep company with fornicators”; but (because that could not be done without going out of the world) he restricts it to such fornicators and otherwise vicious persons as were of the brethren. “With such a one,” he says, they ought not to keep company, “no, not to eat.” And this is no more than what our Savior says:
Let him be to thee as a Heathen, and as a Publican. For Publicans (which signifieth Farmers, and Receivers of the revenue of the Common-wealth) were so hated, and detested by the Jews that were to pay it, as that Publican and Sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing: Insomuch, as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus a Publican; though it were to Convert him, yet it was ohjected to him as a Crime. And therefore, when our Saviour, to Heathen, added Publican, he did forbid them to eat with a man Excommunicate.
(Matthew 18:17) “Let him be to you as a heathen and as a publican.” For publicans (the word signifies tax farmers and collectors of the revenue of the commonwealth) were so hated and detested by the Jews who had to pay it that among them “publican” and “sinner” were taken for the same thing. So much so that when our Savior accepted the invitation of Zacchaeus, a publican, it was held against him as a crime, even though it was in order to convert him. And therefore, when our Savior added “publican” to “heathen,” he forbade them to eat with an excommunicated man.
As for keeping them out of their Synagogues, or places of Assembly, they had no Power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he were Christian, or Heathen. And because all places are by right, in the Dominion of the Common-wealth; as well hee that was Excommunicated, as hee that never was Baptized, might enter inter into them by Commission from the Civill Magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entred into their Synagogues at Damascus, to apprehend Christians, men and women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by Commission from the High Priest.
As for keeping them out of their synagogues or places of assembly, they had no power to do that except the power of the owner of the place, whether he was Christian or heathen. And because all places are by right in the dominion of the commonwealth, the excommunicated man, as well as the man who was never baptized, might enter them by commission from the civil magistrate—as Paul before his conversion entered their synagogues at Damascus to arrest Christians, men and women, and carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission from the high priest.
By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute, or not assist the Church, the effect of Excommunication had nothiug in it, neither of dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour, because of their unbeleef; nor of dammage, because they are returned thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come, were to be in no worse estate, then they which never had beleeved. The dammage redounded rather to the Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer execution of their malice.
From this it appears that for a Christian who became an apostate, in a place where the civil power persecuted the Church or did not assist it, excommunication carried in it neither damage in this world nor terror. Not terror, because of their unbelief; nor damage, because by it they returned into the favor of the world, and in the world to come would be in no worse condition than those who had never believed. The damage fell rather on the Church, by provoking those it cast out to vent their malice more freely.
Excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those, that beleeved that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory, to reign over, and to judge both the quick, and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his Kingdom, to those whose Sins were Retained; that is, to those that were Excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is that St. Paul calleth Excommunication, a delivery of the Excommunicate person to Satan. For without the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after Judgment, are comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan. This is it that the faithfull stood in fear of, as long as they stood Excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not Forgiven.
Excommunication therefore had its effect only on those who believed that Jesus Christ was to come again in glory to reign over and to judge both the living and the dead, and would therefore refuse entrance into his kingdom to those whose sins were retained—that is, to those excommunicated by the Church. And that is why St. Paul calls excommunication a delivery of the excommunicated person to Satan. For outside the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms after the Judgment are comprehended in the kingdom of Satan. This is what the faithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicated—that is to say, in a state in which their sins were not forgiven.
Whereby wee may understand, that Excommunication in the time that Christian Religion was not authorized by the Civill Power, was used onely for a correction of manners, not of errours in opinion: for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such as beleeved, and expected the coming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so beleeved, needed no other opinion, but onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved.
From this we may understand that excommunication, in the time when the Christian religion was not authorized by the civil power, was used only for the correction of manners, not of errors in opinion. For it is a punishment that no one could feel except those who believed in and expected the coming again of our Savior to judge the world; and those who so believed needed no other opinion, but only uprightness of life, to be saved.
There lyeth Excommunication for Injustice; as (Mat. 18.) If thy Brother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with Witnesses; lastly, tell the Church; and then if he obey not, Let him be to thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican. And there lieth Excommunication for a Scandalous Life, as (1 Cor. 5. 11.)
There lies excommunication for injustice, as in Matthew 18: if your brother offends you, tell him privately; then with witnesses; lastly, tell the Church; and then if he does not obey, “Let him be to you as a heathen and a publican.” And there lies excommunication for a scandalous life, as in
If any man that is called a Brother, be a Fornicator, or Covetous, or an Idolater, or a Drunkard, or an Extortioner, with such a one yee are not to eat. But to Excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that Iesus was the Christ, for difference of opinion in other points, by which that Foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (Titus 3. 10.) a text that seemeth to be to the contrary.
(1 Corinthians 5:11): “If any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one you are not to eat.” But to excommunicate a man who held this foundation, that Jesus was the Christ, for difference of opinion on other points by which that foundation was not destroyed—for that there appears no authority in the Scripture, and no example among the apostles. There is indeed a text in St. Paul (Titus 3:10) that seems to say the contrary.
A man that is an Haeretique, after the first and second admonition, reject. For an Haeretiqne, is he, that being a member of the Church, teacheth neverthelesse some private opinion, which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, S. Paul adviseth Titus, after the first, and second admonition, to Reject. But to Reject (in this place) is not to Excommunicate the Man; But to give over admonishing him, to let him alone, to set by disputing with him, as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe. The same Apostle saith (2 Tim. 2. 23.)
“A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject.” For a heretic is one who, being a member of the Church, nevertheless teaches some private opinion that the Church has forbidden; and St. Paul advises Titus to “reject” such a one after the first and second admonition. But to “reject,” in this place, is not to excommunicate the man, but to give up admonishing him, to let him alone, to stop disputing with him, as one who is to be convinced only by himself. The same apostle says
Foolish and unlearned questions avoid: The word Avoid in this place, and Reject in the former, is the same in the Originall, paraitou: but Foolish questions may bee set by without Excommunication. And again, (Tit. 3. 9.) Avoid Foolish questions, where the Originall periistaso, (set themby) is equivalent to the former word Reject. There is no other place that can so much as colourably be drawn, to countenance the Casting out of the Church faithfull men, such as beleeved the foundation, onely for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good & pious conscience.
(2 Timothy 2:23), “Foolish and unlearned questions avoid.” The word “avoid” in this place and “reject” in the former are the same in the original, paraitou; but foolish questions may be set aside without excommunication. And again (Titus 3:9), “Avoid foolish questions,” where the original periistaso (“set them aside”) is equivalent to the former word “reject.” There is no other passage that can even plausibly be drawn on to support casting faithful men, who believed the foundation, out of the Church only for some particular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good and pious conscience.
But on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a Lesson to Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new Articles of Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which Lesson the Apostles themselves observed well. S. Peter, and S. Paul, though their controversie were great, (as we may read in Gal. 2. 11.) yet they did not cast one another out of the Church. Neverthelesse, during the Apostles times, there were other Pastors that observed it not; As Diotrephes (3 Iohn 9. &c.) who cast out of the Church, such as S.
On the contrary, all such passages as command avoiding such disputes are written as a lesson to pastors (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new articles of faith by settling every small controversy, which obliges men to a needless burden of conscience, or provokes them to break the union of the Church. The apostles themselves observed this lesson well. St. Peter and St. Paul, though their controversy was great (as we may read in Galatians 2:11), did not cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, even in the apostles’ times there were other pastors who did not observe it—such as Diotrephes (3 John 9 and following), who cast out of the Church those whom St.
John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in Praeeminence; so early it was, that Vain-glory, and Ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.
John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of the pride he took in preeminence. So early had vainglory and ambition found their way into the Church of Christ.
That a man be liable to Excommunication, there be many conditions requisite; as First, that he be a member of some Commonalty, that is to say, of some lawfull Assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church, that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to bee Excommunicated. For where there is no Community, there can bee no Excommunication; nor where there is no power to Judge, can there bee any power to give Sentence.
For a man to be liable to excommunication, many conditions are required. First, he must be a member of some community—that is to say, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church—that has power to judge the cause for which he is to be excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can be no excommunication; and where there is no power to judge, there can be no power to give sentence.
From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be Excommunicated by another: For either they have equall power to Excommunicate each other, in which case Excommunication is not Discipline, nor an act of Authority, but Schisme, and Dissolution of charity; or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both have but one voice, and then they be but one Church; and the part Excommunicated, is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of individuall persons.
From this it follows that one Church cannot be excommunicated by another. For either they have equal power to excommunicate each other—in which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of authority, but schism and the dissolution of charity—or one is so subordinate to the other that they both have but one voice, and then they are but one Church, and the part excommunicated is no longer a Church but a loose number of individual persons.
And because the sentence of Excommunication, importeth an advice, not to keep company, nor so much as to eat with him that is Excommunicate, if a Soveraign Prince, or Assembly bee Excommunicate, the sentence is of no effect. For all Subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own Soveraign (when he requireth it) by the law of Nature; nor can they lawfully either expell him from any place of his own Dominion, whether profane or holy; nor go out of his Dominion, without his leave; much lesse (if he call them to that honour,) refuse to eat with him.
And because the sentence of excommunication carries an instruction not to keep company with, or even eat with, the person excommunicated, if a sovereign prince or assembly is excommunicated, the sentence has no effect. For all subjects are bound by the law of nature to be in the company and presence of their own sovereign when he requires it. Nor can they lawfully expel him from any place in his own dominion, whether profane or holy, nor go out of his dominion without his leave—much less refuse to eat with him, if he calls them to that honor.
And as to other Princes and States, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping companywith the State Excommunicate: for the very Institution, as it uniteth many men into one Community; so it dissociateth one Community from another: so that Excommunication is not needfull for keeping Kings and States asunder; nor has any further effect then is in the nature of Policy it selfe; unlesse it be to instigate Princes to warre upon one another.
And as for other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need no other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the excommunicated state. For the very institution, as it unites many men into one community, so it separates one community from another. So excommunication is not needed for keeping kings and states apart, and it has no further effect than is in the nature of policy itself—unless it is to incite princes to make war on one another.
Nor is the Excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the laws of his own Soveraign, whether Christian, or Heathen, of any effect. For if he beleeve that Iesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God, (1 Joh. 4. 1.) and God dwelleth in him, and he in God, (1 Joh. 4. 15.) But hee that hath the Spirit of God; hee that dwelleth in God; hee in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the Excommunication of men. Therefore, he that beleeveth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all the dangers threatned to persons Excommunicate. He that beleveeth it not, is no Christian.
Nor is the excommunication of a Christian subject who obeys the laws of his own sovereign, whether Christian or heathen, of any effect. For if he believes that Jesus is the Christ, “he has the Spirit of God” (1 John 4:1), “and God dwells in him, and he in God” (1 John 4:15). But he who has the Spirit of God, he who dwells in God, he in whom God dwells, can receive no harm from the excommunication of men. Therefore he who believes Jesus to be the Christ is free from all the dangers threatened to excommunicated persons. He who does not believe it is no Christian.
Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to Excommunication: Nor he also that is a professed Christian, till his Hypocrisy appear in his Manners, that is, till his behaviour bee contrary to the law of his Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners, and which Christ and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church cannot judge of Manners but by externall Actions, which Actions can never bee unlawfull, but when they are against the Law of the Common-wealth.
Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to excommunication; nor is a professed Christian either, until his hypocrisy appears in his manners—that is, until his behavior is contrary to the law of his sovereign, which is the rule of manners, and to which Christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject. For the Church cannot judge of manners except by external actions, and those actions can never be unlawful except when they are against the law of the commonwealth.
If a mans Father, or Mother, or Master bee Excommunicate, yet are not the Children forbidden to keep them Company, nor to Eat with them; for that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all, for want of means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey,their Parents, and Masters, contrary to the Precept of the Apostles.
If a man’s father, or mother, or master is excommunicated, the children are still not forbidden to keep them company or to eat with them. For that would (for the most part) oblige them not to eat at all, for lack of means to get food, and would authorize them to disobey their parents and masters, contrary to the precept of the apostles.
In summe, the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church have their Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by Command and Coaction, but by Teaching and Direction of men in the way of Salvation in the world to come.
In sum, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than the end for which the apostles and pastors of the Church have their commission from our Savior—which is not to rule by command and coercion, but by teaching and directing men in the way of salvation in the world to come.
And as a Master in any Science, may abandon his Scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but not accuse him of Injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his Disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they doe him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him: For to a Teacher that shall so complain, may be applyed the Answer of God to Samuel in the like place, They have not rejected thee, but mee. Excommunication therefore when it wanteth the assistance of the Civill Power, as it doth, when a Christian State, or Prince is Excommunicate by a forain Authority, is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terrour.
And as a master in any science may abandon his student when he obstinately neglects the practice of his rules, but may not accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him, so a teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his disciples who obstinately continue in an unchristian life, but he cannot say they do him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him. For to a teacher who complains in this way may be applied God’s answer to Samuel in a similar case: “They have not rejected you, but me.” Excommunication, therefore, when it lacks the assistance of the civil power—as it does when a Christian state or prince is excommunicated by a foreign authority—is without effect, and consequently ought to be without terror.
The name of Fulmen Excommunicationis (that is, the Thunderbolt of Excommunication) proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was King of Kings, as the Heathen made Jupiter King of the Gods; and assigned him in their Poems, and Pictures, a Thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the Giants, that should dare to deny his power: Which imagination was grounded on two errours; one, that the Kingdome of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviours owne words, My Kingdome is not of this world; the other, that hee is Christs Vicar, not onely over his owne Subjects, but over all the Christians of the World; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall bee proved in its due place.
The name Fulmen Excommunicationis (that is, “the thunderbolt of excommunication”) came from a fancy of the Bishop of Rome, who first used it, that he was King of Kings—as the heathen made Jupiter king of the gods, and gave him in their poems and pictures a thunderbolt with which to subdue and punish the giants who dared to deny his power. This fancy was grounded on two errors. One is that the kingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Savior’s own words, “My kingdom is not of this world.” The other is that he is Christ’s vicar not only over his own subjects but over all the Christians of the world—for which there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall be proved in its due place.
Who interprets Scripture
In the apostles' time every convert judged the Scriptures for himself, since no one had authority to command.
St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews, (Acts 17. 2, 3.) As his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this Iesus whom he preached was the Christ. The Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament. The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again from the dead, were also Jews, and did beleeve already, that they were the Word of God. Hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them beleeved, and (as it is in the 5.
St. Paul, coming to Thessalonica, where there was a synagogue of the Jews (Acts 17:2–3), “as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ.” The Scriptures mentioned here were the Scriptures of the Jews—that is, the Old Testament. The men to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ and risen again from the dead were also Jews, and already believed that those Scriptures were the word of God. Upon this (as it says in verse 4) some of them believed, and
ver. some beleeved not. What was the reason, when they all beleeved the Scripture, that they did not all beleeve alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the Interpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one Interpreted them to himself? It was this; S. Paul came to them without any Legall Commission, and in the manner of one that would not Command, but Perswade; which he must needs do, either by Miracles, as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his Authority in Gods works; or by Reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in Gods Word.
(as it says in verse 5) some did not believe. What was the reason why, when they all believed the Scripture, they did not all believe alike, but some approved and others disapproved the interpretation of St. Paul who cited it, and each interpreted it for himself? It was this: St. Paul came to them without any legal commission, in the manner of one who would not command but persuade. That he must necessarily do either by miracles, as Moses did with the Israelites in Egypt, so that they might see his authority in God’s works; or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, so that they might see the truth of his doctrine in God’s word.
But whosoever perswadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom hee speaketh Judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the Judge of what S. Paul alledged out of Scripture? If S. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ.
But whoever persuades by reasoning from written principles makes the one he speaks to the judge both of the meaning of those principles and of the force of his inferences from them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the judge of what St. Paul alleged out of Scripture? If St. Paul, what need had he to quote any passages to prove his doctrine? It would have been enough to say, “I find it so in Scripture—that is to say, in your laws, of which I am the interpreter, as sent by Christ.”
The Interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose Interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might beleeve, or not beleeve, according as the Allegations seemed to himselfe to be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged. And generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe, maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by expresse words (Deut. 17.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from the Priests and Judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to bee understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.
There could therefore be no interpreter of the Scripture to whose interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to abide. Everyone might believe or not believe, according as the allegations seemed to him agreeable or not agreeable to the meaning of the passages alleged. And generally, in all cases in the world, he who offers any proof makes the one to whom he addresses his speech the judge of his proof. As for the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words (Deuteronomy 17) to receive the determination of all hard questions from the priests and judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to be understood of the Jews who were not yet converted.
For the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alledging the Scriptures, which they beleeved not. The Apostles therefore laboured by Reason to confute their Idolatry; and that done, to perswade them to the faith of Christ, by their testimony of his Life, and Resurrection. So that there could not yet bee any controversie concerning the authority to Interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity, to follow any mans Interpretation of any Scripture, except his Soveraigns Interpretation of the Laws of his countrey.
For the conversion of the Gentiles there was no use in alleging the Scriptures, which they did not believe. The apostles therefore labored by reason to refute their idolatry, and, that done, to persuade them to the faith of Christ by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So there could not yet be any controversy about the authority to interpret Scripture, since no man was obliged, while he remained an unbeliever, to follow any man’s interpretation of any Scripture except his sovereign’s interpretation of the laws of his country.
Let us now consider the Conversion it self, and see what there was therein, that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to no other thing then to the Beleef of that which the Apostles preached: And the Apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the King that was to save them, and reign over them eternally in the world to come; and consequently that hee was not dead, but risen again from the dead, and gone up into Heaven, and should come again one day to judg the world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and reward every man according to his works.
Let us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was in it that could be the cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to nothing other than belief in what the apostles preached. And the apostles preached nothing but that Jesus was the Christ—that is to say, the King who was to save them and reign over them eternally in the world to come—and consequently that he was not dead but risen again from the dead, and gone up into heaven, and would come again one day to judge the world (which would also rise again to be judged) and reward every man according to his works.
None of them preached that himselfe, or any other Apostle was such an Interpreter of the Scripture, as all that became Christians, ought to take their Interpretation for Law. For to Interpret the Laws, is part of the Administration of a present Kingdome; which the Apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other Pastors ever since, Let thy Kingdome come; and exhorted their Converts to obey their then Ethnique Princes. The New Testament was not yet published in one Body. Every of the Evangelists was Interpreter of his own Gospel; and every Apostle of his own Epistle; And of the Old Testament, our Saviour himselfe saith to the Jews (Iohn 5. 39.)
None of them preached that he himself, or any other apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture that all who became Christians ought to take his interpretation for law. For to interpret the laws is part of the administration of a present kingdom, which the apostles did not have. They prayed then, as all other pastors have ever since, “Your kingdom come,” and exhorted their converts to obey their princes, who were then heathens. The New Testament was not yet published in one body. Each of the evangelists was the interpreter of his own Gospel, and each apostle of his own epistle. And of the Old Testament, our Savior himself says to the Jews
Search the Scriptures; for in them yee thinke to have eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me. If hee had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the Priests.
(John 5:39), “Search the Scriptures; for in them you think you have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me.” If he had not meant them to interpret the Scriptures, he would not have told them to take from there the proof of his being the Christ. He would either have interpreted them himself, or referred them to the interpretation of the priests.
When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and Elders of the Church assembled themselves together, and determined what should bee preached, and taught, and how they should Interpret the Scriptures to the People; but took not from the People the liberty to read, and Interpret them to themselves. The Apostles sent divers. Letters to the Churches, and other Writings for their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them to Interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was in the Apostles time, it must be till such time as there should be Pastors, that could authorise an Interpreter, whose Interpretation should generally be stood to: But that could not be till Kings were Pastors, or Pastors Kings.
When a difficulty arose, the apostles and elders of the Church assembled together and determined what should be preached and taught, and how they should interpret the Scriptures to the people; but they did not take from the people the liberty to read and interpret them for themselves. The apostles sent various letters to the churches, and other writings for their instruction, which would have been in vain if they had not allowed them to interpret—that is, to consider the meaning of—them. And as it was in the apostles’ time, so it must be until there should be pastors who could authorize an interpreter whose interpretation would generally be abided by. But that could not be until kings were pastors, or pastors kings.
How Scripture became law
Scripture has been law only where the civil sovereign made it so, from Moses to Christian kings.
There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be Canonicall; for Canon, signifieth a Rule; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man is guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. Such Precepts, though given by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Counsellor to his friend, without power to Compell him to observe them, are neverthelesse Canons; because they are Rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those Canons, not onely Rules, but Laws: The question therefore here, is of the Power to make the Scriptures (which are the Rules of Christian Faith) Laws.
There are two senses in which a writing may be said to be canonical. For canon signifies a rule; and a rule is a precept by which a man is guided and directed in any action whatever. Such precepts, even when given by a teacher to his disciple, or a counselor to his friend, without power to compel him to observe them, are nevertheless canons, because they are rules. But when they are given by one whom the receiver is bound to obey, then those canons are not only rules but laws. The question here, therefore, is about the power to make the Scriptures (which are the rules of Christian faith) laws.
That part of the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten Commandements, written in two Tables of Stone, and delivered by God himselfe to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people. Before that time there was no written Law of God, who as yet having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar Kingdome, had given no Law to men, but the Law of Nature, that is to say, the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in every mans own heart. Of these two Tables, the first containeth the law of Soveraignty; 1.
The part of Scripture that was law first was the Ten Commandments, written on two tables of stone, delivered by God himself to Moses, and made known by Moses to the people. Before that time there was no written law of God. Not yet having chosen any people to be his peculiar kingdom, he had given men no law but the law of nature—that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in every man’s own heart. Of these two tables, the first contains the law of sovereignty: 1.
That they should not obey, nor honour the Gods of other Nations, in these words, Non-habebis Deos alienos coram me, that is, Thou shalt not have for Gods, the Gods that other Nations worship; but onely me: whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honor, as their King and Governour, any other God, than him that spake unto them then by Moses, and afterwards by the High Priest. 2. That they should not make any Image to represent him; that is to say, they were not to choose to themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any Representative of their own fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office. 3.
That they should not obey or honor the gods of other nations, in these words: Non habebis Deos alienos coram me—that is, “You shall not have for gods the gods that other nations worship, but only me.” By this they were forbidden to obey or honor as their king and governor any other God than him who spoke to them then by Moses, and afterward by the high priest. 2. That they “should not make any image to represent him”—that is to say, they were not to choose for themselves, either in heaven or on earth, any representative of their own fancying, but to obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office. 3.
That they should not take the Name of God in vain; that is, they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his Right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his Lieutenants. 4. That they should every Seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour, and employ that time in doing him Publique Honor. The second Table containeth the Duty of one man towards another, as To honor Parents; Not to kill; Not to Commit Adultery; Not to steale; Not to corrupt Iudgment by false witnesse; and finally, Not so much as to designe in their heart the doing of any injury one to another. The question now is, Who it was that gave to these written Tables the obligatory force of Lawes.
That “they should not take the name of God in vain”—that is, they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his lieutenants. 4. That “they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labor,” and spend that time in doing him public honor. The second table contains the duty of one man toward another, as “to honor parents; not to kill; not to commit adultery; not to steal; not to corrupt judgment by false witness”; and finally, “not so much as to plan in their heart the doing of any injury to one another.” The question now is: who was it that gave these written tables the binding force of laws?
There is no doubt but they were made Laws by God himselfe: But because a Law obliges not, nor is Law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the Soveraign; how could the people of Israel that were forbidden to approach the Mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them?
There is no doubt that they were made laws by God himself. But a law does not oblige, and is not law, to anyone except those who acknowledge it to be the act of the sovereign. How then could the people of Israel, who were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obey all those laws that Moses put before them?
Some of them were indeed the Laws of Nature, as all the Second Table; and therefore to be acknowledged for Gods Laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people: But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first Table, the question remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of them, to obey Moses, in these words (Exod. 20. 19.)
Some of them were indeed laws of nature, as the whole second table was, and were therefore to be acknowledged as God’s laws not by the Israelites alone but by all people. But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, such as those of the first table, the question remains—except that they had bound themselves, immediately after these laws were put before them, to obey Moses, in these words
Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye. It was therefore onely Moses then, and after him the High Priest, whom (by Moses) God declared should administer this his peculiar Kingdome, that had on Earth, the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to bee Law in the Common-wealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns. Therefore hitherto, the Canonizing, or making of the Scripture Law, belonged to the Civill Soveraigne.
(Exodus 20:19): “Speak to us yourself, and we will hear you; but let not God speak to us, lest we die.” It was therefore only Moses then, and after him the high priest, whom God declared (through Moses) should administer this his peculiar kingdom, who had on earth the power to make this short scripture of the Decalogue law in the commonwealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding high priests were the civil sovereigns. So far, therefore, the canonizing or making of Scripture into law belonged to the civil sovereign.
The Judiciall Law, that is to say, the Laws that God prescribed to the Magistrates of Israel, for the rule of their administration of Justice, and of the Sentences, or Judgments they should pronounce, in Pleas between man and man; and the Leviticall Law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed touching the Rites and Ceremonies of the Priests and Levites, were all delivered to them by Moses onely; and therefore also became Lawes, by vertue of the same promise of obedience to Moses.
The judicial law—that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the magistrates of Israel as the rule for their administration of justice, and for the sentences or judgments they should pronounce in pleas between man and man—and the Levitical law—that is to say, the rule that God prescribed concerning the rites and ceremonies of the priests and Levites—were all delivered to them by Moses only. Therefore they too became laws by virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses.
Whether these laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the People by Moses (after his forty dayes being with God in the Mount) by word of mouth, is not expressed in the Text; but they were all positive Laws, and equivalent to holy Scripture, and made Canonicall by Moses the Civill Soveraign.
Whether these laws were then written, or not written but dictated to the people by Moses by word of mouth (after his forty days with God on the mountain), is not stated in the text. But they were all positive laws, equivalent to Holy Scripture, and made canonical by Moses, the civil sovereign.
After the Israelites were come into the Plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of Promise, Moses to the former Laws added divers others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy; that is, Second Laws. And are (as it is written, Deut. 29. 1.) The words of a Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the Children of Israel, besides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb. For having explained those former Laws, in the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the 12. Cha. and continue to the end of the 26. of the same Book. This Law (Deut. 27. 1.)
After the Israelites had come into the plains of Moab opposite Jericho, ready to enter the land of promise, Moses added various other laws to the former ones. These are therefore called Deuteronomy, that is, second laws. And they are (as it is written in Deuteronomy 29:1) “the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb.” For having explained those former laws at the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy, he adds others, which begin at chapter 12 and continue to the end of chapter 26 of the same book. This law
they were commanded to write upon great stones playstered over, at their passing over Jordan: This Law also was written by Moses himself in a Book; and delivered into the hands of the Priests, and to the Elders of Israel. (Deut. 31. 9.) and commanded (ve. 26.) to be put in the side of the Arke; for in the Ark it selfe was nothing but the Ten Commandements. This was the Law, which Moses (Deuteronomy 17. 18.) commanded the Kings of Israel should keep a copie of: And this is the Law, which having been long time lost, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received for the Law of God.
(Deuteronomy 27:1) they were commanded to write on great stones plastered over, when they crossed the Jordan. This law was also written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of “the priests, and the elders of Israel” (Deuteronomy 31:9), and commanded (verse 26) “to be put in the side of the ark”—for in the ark itself there was nothing but the Ten Commandments. This was the law of which Moses (Deuteronomy 17:18) commanded the kings of Israel to keep a copy. And this is the law which, having been lost for a long time, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received as the law of God.
But both Moses at the writing, and Josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them the Civill Soveraignty. Hitherto therefore the Power of making Scripture Canonicall, was in the Civill Soveraign.
But Moses at its writing, and Josiah at its recovery, both had the civil sovereignty. So far, therefore, the power of making Scripture canonical was in the civil sovereign.
Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other Book, from the time of Moses, till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the Law of God. For the Prophets (except a few) lived in the time of the Captivity it selfe; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from having their Prophecies generally received for Laws, as that their persons were persecuted, partly by false Prophets, and partly by the Kings which were seduced by them.
Apart from this Book of the Law, no other book was received among the Jews as the law of God from the time of Moses until after the Captivity. For the prophets (except a few) lived during the Captivity itself, and the rest lived only a little before it. And their prophecies were so far from being generally received as laws that the prophets themselves were persecuted, partly by false prophets and partly by the kings whom those false prophets had led astray.
And this Book it self, which was confirmed by Josiah for the Law of God, and with it all the History of the Works of God, was lost in the Captivity, and sack of the City of Jerusalem, as appears by that of 2 Esdras 14. 21.
And this very book, which Josiah confirmed as the law of God, was lost in the Captivity and the sack of the city of Jerusalem, together with all the history of the works of God, as appears from this passage
Thy Law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, or the works that shall begin. And before the Captivity, between the time when the Law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when Shishak King of Egypt took the spoile of the Temple,) and the time of Josiah, when it was found againe, they had no written Word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such, as each of them esteemed Prophets.
(2 Esdras 14:21): “Your law is burned; therefore no one knows the things that are done by you, or the works that shall begin.” And before the Captivity, between the time when the Law was lost and the time of Josiah, when it was found again, they had no written word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of those whom each of them considered prophets. (When it was lost is not mentioned in the Scripture, but it may probably be thought to have been in the time of Rehoboam, when Shishak king of Egypt plundered the Temple.)
From hence we may inferre, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which we have at this day, were not Canonicall, nor a Law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their Covenant with God at their return from the Captivity, and restauration of their Common-wealth under Esdras. But from that time forward they were accounted the Law of the Jews, and for such translated into Greek by Seventy Elders of Judaea, and put into the Library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the Word of God. Now seeing Esdras was the High Priest, and the High Priest was their Civill Soveraigne, it is manifest, that the Scriptures were never made Laws, but by the Soveraign Civill Power.
From this we may infer that the Scriptures of the Old Testament which we have today were not canonical, nor a law to the Jews, until the renewal of their covenant with God at their return from the Captivity, and the restoration of their commonwealth under Ezra. But from that time on they were accounted the law of the Jews, and as such were translated into Greek by seventy elders of Judea, placed in the library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved as the word of God. Now since Ezra was the high priest, and the high priest was their civil sovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws except by the sovereign civil power.
By the Writings of the Fathers that lived in the time before that Christian Religion was received, and authorised by Constantine the Emperour, we may find, that the Books wee now have of the New Testament, were held by the Christians of that time (except a few, in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholique Church, and others Haeretiques) for the dictates of the Holy Ghost; and consequently for the Canon, or Rule of Faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of their Teachers; as generally the reverence that the Disciples bear to their first Masters, in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. Therefore there is no doubt, but when S.
From the writings of the Fathers who lived before the Christian religion was received and authorized by the Emperor Constantine, we may find that the books we now have of the New Testament were held by the Christians of that time to be the dictates of the Holy Spirit, and consequently the canon, or rule of faith. (A few held otherwise; in respect of their small number, the rest were called the Catholic Church, and the others heretics.) Such was the reverence and esteem they had for their teachers—as in general the reverence that disciples bear their first masters, in every kind of doctrine they receive from them, is not small. There is therefore no doubt that when St.
Paul wrote to the Churches he had converted; or any other Apostle, or Disciple of Christ, to those which had then embraced Christ, they received those their Writings for the true Christian Doctrine. But in that time, when not the Power and Authority of the Teacher, but the Faith of the Hearer caused them to receive it, it was not the Apostles that made their own Writings Canonicall, but every Convert made them so to himself.
Paul wrote to the churches he had converted, or any other apostle or disciple of Christ wrote to those who had then embraced Christ, they received those writings as the true Christian doctrine. But in that time, when it was not the power and authority of the teacher but the faith of the hearer that caused them to receive it, it was not the apostles who made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so for himself.
But the question here, is not what any Christian made a Law, or Canon to himself, (which he might again reject, by the same right he received it;) but what was so made a Canon to them, as without injustice they could not doe any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this sense be Canonicall, that is to say, a Law in any place where the Law of the Common-wealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a Law.
But the question here is not what any Christian made a law or canon for himself (which he might reject again by the same right by which he received it), but what was made a canon for them in such a way that they could not, without injustice, do anything contrary to it. That the New Testament should be canonical in this sense—that is to say, a law—in any place where the law of the commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a law.
For a Law, (as hath been already shewn) is the Commandement of that Man, or Assembly, to whom we have given Soveraign Authority, to make such Rules for the direction of our actions, as hee shall think fit; and to punish us, when we doe any thing contrary to the same. When therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other Rules, which the Soveraign Ruler hath not prescribed, they are but Counsell, and Advice; which, whether good, or bad, hee that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to observe; and when contrary to the Laws already established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be.
For a law (as has already been shown) is the command of that man or assembly to whom we have given sovereign authority to make such rules for the direction of our actions as he thinks fit, and to punish us when we do anything contrary to them. When, therefore, any other man offers us other rules, which the sovereign ruler has not prescribed, they are only counsel and advice. Whether that advice is good or bad, the one who is counseled may refuse to follow it without injustice; and when it is contrary to laws already established, he cannot follow it without injustice, however good he thinks it to be.
I say, he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his dicourse with other men; though he may without blame beleeve his private Teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice; and that it were publiquely received for Law. For internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions that proceeed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, are injustice both before God and Man.
I say he cannot follow it in this case in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men—though he may without blame believe his private teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practice their advice, and that it were publicly received as law. For inward faith is by its own nature invisible, and consequently exempt from all human jurisdiction; whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, when they are breaches of our civil obedience, are injustice before both God and man.
Seeing then our Saviour hath denyed his Kingdome to be in this world, seeing he had said, he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other Laws than those of the Common-wealth; that is, the Jews to the Law of Moses, (which he saith (Mat. 5.) he came not to destroy, but to fulfill,) and other Nations to the Laws of their severall Soveraigns, and all men to the Laws of Nature; the observing whereof, both he himselfe, and his Apostles have in their teaching recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternall Kingdome, wherein shall be Protection, and Life everlasting.
Since, then, our Savior has denied that his kingdom is of this world, and has said that he came not to judge the world but to save it, he has not subjected us to any laws other than those of the commonwealth. That is, he has subjected the Jews to the law of Moses (which he says, in Matthew 5:17, he came not to destroy but to fulfill), other nations to the laws of their several sovereigns, and all men to the laws of nature. Both he himself and his apostles have in their teaching recommended the keeping of these laws to us as a necessary condition of being admitted by him, on the last day, into his eternal kingdom, in which there will be protection and everlasting life.
Seeing then our Saviour, and his Apostles, left not new Laws to oblige us in this world, but new Doctrine to prepare us for the next; the Books of the New Testament, which containe that Doctrine, untill obedience to them was commanded, by them that God had given power to on earth to be Legislators, were not obligatory Canons, that is, Laws, but onely good, and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take, and refuse at his owne perill, without injustice.
Since, then, our Savior and his apostles left us not new laws to bind us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for the next, the books of the New Testament, which contain that doctrine, were not binding canons—that is, laws—until obedience to them was commanded by those to whom God had given power on earth to be legislators. Until then they were only good and safe advice for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take or refuse at his own peril, without injustice.
Again, our Saviour Christs Commission to his Apostles, and Disciples, was to Proclaim his Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and to Teach all Nations; and to Baptize them that should beleeve; and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them; and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compell them to obedience by the Sword. In all which there is nothing of Power, but of Perswasion. He sent them out as Sheep unto Wolves, not as Kings to their Subjects.
Again, the commission our Savior Christ gave his apostles and disciples was to proclaim his kingdom (not present, but) to come; to teach all nations; to baptize those who believed; to enter the houses of those who received them, and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them—but not to call down fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to obedience by the sword. In all this there is nothing of power, but only of persuasion. He sent them out as sheep among wolves, not as kings to their subjects.
They had not in Commission to make Laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to Laws made; and consequently they could not make their Writings obligatory Canons, without the help of the Soveraign Civill Power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only Law, where the lawfull Civill Power hath made it so. And there also the King, or Soveraign, maketh it a Law to himself; by which he subjecteth himselfe, not to the Doctor, or Apostle that converted him, but to God himself, and his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the Apostles themselves.
They had no commission to make laws, but to obey laws already made and to teach obedience to them. Consequently they could not make their writings binding canons without the help of the sovereign civil power. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is law only where the lawful civil power has made it so. And there, too, the king or sovereign makes it a law to himself, by which he subjects himself not to the doctor or apostle who converted him, but to God himself and his Son Jesus Christ, as directly as the apostles themselves did.
That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those that have embraced Christian Doctrine, the force of Laws, in the times, and places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their Synods. For we read (Acts 15. 28.) the stile of the Councell of the Apostles, the Elders, and the whole Church, in this manner, It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things, &c. which is a stile that signifieth a Power to lay a burthen on them that had received their Doctrine.
What may seem to give the New Testament the force of law, for those who had embraced Christian doctrine in times and places of persecution, is the decrees they made among themselves in their synods. For we read (Acts 15:28) the style in which the council of the apostles, the elders, and the whole Church spoke: “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things,” and so on. This is a style that signifies a power to lay a burden on those who had received their doctrine.
Now to lay a burden on another, seemeth the same that to oblige; and therefore the Acts of that Councell were Laws to the then Christians. Neverthelesse, they were no more Laws than are these other Precepts, Repent; Be Baptized; Keep the Commandements; Beleeve the Gospel; Come unto me; Sell all that thou hast; Give it to the poor; and, Follow me; which are not Commands, but Invitations, and Callings of men to Christianity, like that of Esay 55. 1.
Now to lay a burden on another seems the same as to oblige; and therefore the acts of that council were laws to the Christians of that time. Nevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts: “Repent”; “Be baptized”; “Keep the commandments”; “Believe the gospel”; “Come unto me”; “Sell all that you have”; “Give it to the poor”; and “Follow me.” These are not commands but invitations, callings of men to Christianity, like the one in
Ho, every man that thirsteth, come yee to the waters, come, and buy wine and milke without money. For first, the Apostles power was no other than that of our Saviour, to invite men to embrace the Kingdome of God; which they themselves acknowledged for a Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and they that have no Kingdome, can make no Laws. And secondly, if their Acts of Councell, were Laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we read not any where, that they who received not the Doctrine of Christ, did therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their sins against the Laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned.
Isaiah 55:1: “Ho, everyone who thirsts, come to the waters; come, and buy wine and milk without money.” For first, the apostles’ power was no other than our Savior’s: to invite men to embrace the Kingdom of God, which they themselves acknowledged to be a kingdom (not present, but) to come; and those who have no kingdom can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts of council were laws, they could not be disobeyed without sin. But we nowhere read that those who did not receive the doctrine of Christ sinned in that; only that they died in their sins—that is, that their sins against the laws to which they owed obedience were not pardoned.
And those Laws were the Laws of Nature, and the Civill Laws of the State, whereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore by the Burthen, which the Apostles might lay on such as they had converted, are not to be understood Laws, but Conditions, proposed to those that sought Salvation; which they might accept, or refuse at their own perill, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being condemned, and excluded out of the Kingdome of God for their sins past. And therefore of Infidels, S.
And those laws were the laws of nature and the civil laws of the state, to which every Christian had submitted himself by pact. And therefore by the burden the apostles might lay on those they had converted, we are to understand not laws, but conditions offered to those who sought salvation. These they might accept or refuse at their own peril, without committing a new sin—though not without the danger of being condemned and shut out of the Kingdom of God for their past sins. And therefore St.
John saith not, the wrath of God shall come upon them, but the wrath of God remaineth upon them; and not that they shall be condemned; but that they are condemned already. Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit of Faith, is Remission of sins, unlesse we conceive withall, that the dammage of Infidelity, is the Retention of the same sins.
John does not say of unbelievers that the wrath of God shall come upon them, but that “the wrath of God remains upon them”; and not that they shall be condemned, but that “they are condemned already.” Nor can it be conceived that the benefit of faith is the remission of sins, unless we conceive at the same time that the harm of unbelief is the retention of those same sins.
But to what end is it (may some man aske), that the Apostles, and other Pastors of the Church, after their time, should meet together, to agree upon what Doctrine should be taught, both for Faith and Manners, if no man were obliged to observe their Decrees? To this may be answered, that the Apostles, and Elders of that Councell, were obliged even by their entrance into it, to teach the Doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught, so far forth, as no precedent Law, to which they were obliged to yeeld obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other Christians should be obliged to observe, what they taught.
But (someone may ask) what purpose was there in the apostles, and the other pastors of the Church after their time, meeting together to agree on what doctrine should be taught, both of faith and of morals, if no one was obliged to observe their decrees? The answer may be that the apostles and elders of that council were obliged, by their very entrance into it, to teach the doctrine concluded there and decreed to be taught, so far as no previous law to which they owed obedience was to the contrary—but not that all other Christians were obliged to observe what they taught.
For though they might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their Assembly had had a Legislative Power; which none could have but Civil Soveraigns. For though God be the Soveraign of all the world, we are not bound to take for his Law, whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name; nor any thing contrary to the Civill Law, which God hath expressely commanded us to obey.
For though they might deliberate about what each of them should teach, they could not deliberate about what others should do, unless their assembly had had a legislative power, which no one could have except civil sovereigns. For though God is the sovereign of all the world, we are not bound to take as his law whatever every man proposes in his name; nor anything contrary to the civil law, which God has expressly commanded us to obey.
Seeing then the Acts of Councell of the Apostles, were then no Laws, but Counsells; much lesse are Laws the Acts of any other Doctors, or Councells since, if assembled without the Authority of the Civill Soveraign. And consequently, the Books of the New Testament, though most perfect Rules of Christian Doctrine, could not be made Laws by any other authority then that of Kings, or Soveraign Assemblies.
Since, then, the acts of the council of the apostles were not laws at that time but counsels, still less are the acts of any other doctors or councils since then laws, if they assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And consequently the books of the New Testament, though they are the most perfect rules of Christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any authority other than that of kings or sovereign assemblies.
The first Councell, that made of the Scriptures we now have, Canon, is not extant: For that Collection of the Canons of the Apostles, attributed to Clemens, the first Bishop of Rome after S. Peter, is subject to question: For though the Canonicall books bee there reckoned up; yet these words, Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libri venerandi, &c. containe a distinction of Clergy, and Laity, that was not in use so neer St. Peters time. The first Councell for setling the Canonicall Scripture, that is extant, is that of Laodicea, Can. 59.
The first council that made the Scriptures we now have into a canon is not extant. For the collection of the Canons of the Apostles attributed to Clement, the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter, is open to question. Though the canonical books are listed there, the words Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libri venerandi, &c. (“Let these be venerable books for all of you, clergy and laity”) contain a distinction between clergy and laity that was not in use so near to St. Peter’s time. The first council for settling the canonical Scripture that is extant is that of Laodicea, whose fifty-ninth canon
which forbids the reading of other Books then those in the Churches; which is a Mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those onely that had authority to read any thing publiquely in the Church; that is, to Ecclesiastiques onely.
forbids the reading of any books other than these in the churches. This is a mandate addressed not to every Christian, but only to those who had authority to read anything publicly in the church—that is, to clergy only.
Offices in the early Church
Apostles, elders, and deacons were chosen by congregations, not appointed by any bishop.
Of Ecclesiasticall Officers in the time of the Apostles, some were Magisteriall, some Ministeriall. Magisteriall were the Offices of preaching of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to Infidels; of administaing the Sacraments, and Divine Service; and of teaching the Rules of Faith and Manners to those that were converted. Ministeriall was the Office of Deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the Church, at such time as they lived upon a common stock of mony, raised out of the voluntary contributions of the faithfull.
Of the ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles, some were magisterial and some ministerial. The magisterial offices were preaching the gospel of the Kingdom of God to unbelievers, administering the sacraments and divine service, and teaching the rules of faith and morals to those who were converted. The ministerial office was that of deacons—that is, of those appointed to administer the worldly necessities of the Church at the time when they lived on a common fund of money, raised from the voluntary contributions of the faithful.
Amongst the Officers Magisteriall, the first, and principall were the Apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by our Saviour himselfe; and their Office was not onely to Preach, Teach, and Baptize, but also to be Martyrs, (Witnesses of our Saviours Resurrection.) This Testimony, was the specificall, and essentiall mark; whereby the Apostleship was distinguished from other Magistracy Ecclesiasticall; as being necessary for an Apostle, either to have seen our Saviour after his Resurrection, or to have conversed with him before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his Divinity, whereby they might be taken for sufficient Witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new Apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, S.
Among the magisterial officers, the first and chief were the apostles. At first there were only twelve of them, chosen and appointed by our Savior himself. Their office was not only to preach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs—witnesses of our Savior’s Resurrection. This testimony was the specific and essential mark by which apostleship was distinguished from other ecclesiastical office. For an apostle had to have either seen our Savior after his Resurrection, or conversed with him before it and seen his works and the other proofs of his divinity, by which they might be taken as sufficient witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new apostle in place of Judas Iscariot, St.
Peter saith (Acts 1. 21, 22.) Of these men that have companyed with us, all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptisme of Iohn unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection: where, by this word must, is implyed a necessary property of an Apostle, to have companyed with the first and prime Apostles in the time that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.
Peter says (Acts 1:21–22), “Of these men who have accompanied us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John until the day that he was taken up from us, one must be ordained to be a witness with us of his Resurrection.” By this word must is implied a necessary property of an apostle: to have accompanied the first and principal apostles in the time when our Savior showed himself in the flesh.
The first Apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ in the time he was upon the Earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner: There were assembled together in Jerusalem about 120 Christians (Acts 1. 15.) These appointed two, Ioseph the Iust, and Matthias (ver. 23.) and caused lots to be drawn; and (ver. 26.) the Lot fell on Matthias, and he was numbred with the Apostles. So that here we see the ordination of this Apostle, was the act of the Congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven, otherwise then as Members of the Assembly.
The first apostle not appointed by Christ during his time on earth was Matthias, who was chosen in this way. About 120 Christians were gathered together in Jerusalem (Acts 1:15). They put forward two, Joseph called Justus, and Matthias (verse 23), and had lots drawn; “and (verse 26) the lot fell on Matthias, and he was numbered with the apostles.” So here we see that the ordination of this apostle was the act of the congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven, except as members of the assembly.
After him there was never any other Apostle ordained, but Paul and Barnabas; which was done (as we read (Acts 13. 1, 2, 3.) in this manner. There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certaine Prophets, and Teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministred unto the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate mee Barnabas, and Saul for the worke whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away.
After him no other apostle was ever ordained except Paul and Barnabas, which was done in this way, as we read in Acts 13:1–3: “There were in the church at Antioch certain prophets and teachers: Barnabas, and Simeon called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen, who had been brought up with Herod the tetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered to the Lord and fasted, the Holy Spirit said, ‘Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul for the work to which I have called them.’ And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away.”
By which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost, their Calling was declared unto them, and their Mission authorized by the particular Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the Apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (Acts 14. 14.) Apostles: And that it was by vertue of this act of the Church of Antioch, that they were Apostles, S. Paul declareth plainly (Rom. 1. 1.)
From this it is manifest that though they were called by the Holy Spirit, their calling was declared to them, and their mission authorized, by the particular church of Antioch. That this calling of theirs was to the apostleship is apparent from the fact that both of them are called apostles (Acts 14:14). And that they were apostles by virtue of this act of the church of Antioch, St. Paul declares plainly
in that hee useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling: For hee stileth himself, An Apostle separated unto the Gospel of God; alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, Separate me Barnabas and saul, &c. But seeing the work of an Apostle, was to be a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Christ, a man may here aske, how S. Paul, that conversed not with our Saviour before his passion, could know he was risen.
(Romans 1:1) by using the word the Holy Spirit used at his calling. For he styles himself “an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God,” alluding to the words of the Holy Spirit, “Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul,” and so on. But since the work of an apostle was to be a witness of the Resurrection of Christ, someone may ask here how St. Paul, who did not converse with our Savior before his Passion, could know that he had risen.
To which is easily answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him in the way to Damascus, from Heaven, after his Ascension; and chose him for a vessell to bear his name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and Children of Israel; and consequently (having seen the Lord after his passion) was a competent Witnesse of his Resurrection: And as for Barnabas, he was a Disciple before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul, and Barnabas were Apostles; and yet chosen, and authorized (not by the first Apostles alone, but) by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias was chosen, and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.
The answer is easy: our Savior himself appeared to him from heaven, on the road to Damascus, after his Ascension, “and chose him as a vessel to bear his name before the Gentiles, and kings, and the children of Israel.” Consequently, having seen the Lord after his Passion, he was a competent witness of his Resurrection. And as for Barnabas, he was a disciple before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul and Barnabas were apostles, and yet were chosen and authorized not by the first apostles alone, but by the church of Antioch—just as Matthias was chosen and authorized by the church of Jerusalem.
Bishop, a word formed in our language, out of the Greek Episcopus, signifieth an Overseer, or Superintendent of any businesse, and particularly a Pastor, or Shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not only amongst the Jews that were originally Shepherds, but also amongst the Heathen, to signifie the Office of a King, or any other Ruler, or Guide of People, whether he ruled by Laws, or Doctrine. And so the Apostles were the first Christian Bishops, instituted by Christ himselfe: in which sense the Apostleship of Judas is called (Acts 1. 20.) his Bishoprick. And afterwards, when there were constituted Elders in the Christian Churches, with charge to guide Christs flock by their doctrine, and advice; these Elders were also called Bishops.
Bishop, a word formed in our language from the Greek episkopos, signifies an overseer or superintendent of any business, and particularly a pastor or shepherd. From there it was taken by metaphor—not only among the Jews, who were originally shepherds, but also among the heathen—to signify the office of a king, or of any other ruler or guide of people, whether he ruled by laws or by doctrine. And so the apostles were the first Christian bishops, instituted by Christ himself; in this sense the apostleship of Judas is called “his bishopric” (Acts 1:20). And afterward, when elders were appointed in the Christian churches with the charge of guiding Christ’s flock by their doctrine and advice, these elders were also called bishops.
Timothy was an Elder (which word Elder, in the New Testament is a name of Office, as well as of Age;) yet he was also a Bishop. And Bishops were then content with the Title of Elders. Nay S. John himselfe, the Apostle beloved of our Lord, beginneth his Second Epistle with these words, The Elder to the Elect Lady. By which it is evident, that Bishop, Pastor, Elder, Doctor, that is to say, Teacher, were but so many divers names of the same Office in the time of the Apostles. For there was then no government by Coercion, but only by Doctrine, and Perswading.
Timothy was an elder (the word elder in the New Testament is a name of office as well as of age), yet he was also a bishop. And bishops were then content with the title of elders. Indeed, St. John himself, the apostle whom our Lord loved, begins his Second Epistle with these words: “The elder to the elect lady.” From this it is evident that bishop, pastor, elder, and doctor—that is to say, teacher—were only so many different names for the same office in the time of the apostles. For there was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuasion.
The Kingdome of God was yet to come, in a new world; so that there could be no authority to compell in any Church, till the Common-wealth had embraced the Christian Faith; and consequently no diversity of Authority, though there were diversity of Employments.
The Kingdom of God was yet to come, in a new world. So there could be no authority to compel in any church until the commonwealth had embraced the Christian faith; and consequently there was no difference of authority, though there was a difference of employments.
Besides these Magisteriall employments in the Church; namely, Apostles, Bishops, Elders, Pastors, and Doctors, whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews, and Infidels, and to direct, and teach those that beleeved we read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names of Evangelists and Prophets, is not signified any Office, but severall Gifts, by which severall men were profitable to the Church: as Evangelists, by writing the life and acts of our Saviour; such as were S. Matthew and S. Iohn Apostles, and S. Marke and S. Luke Disciples, and whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as S. Thomas, and S.
Besides these magisterial employments in the Church—namely apostles, bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews and to unbelievers, and to direct and teach those who believed—we read of no others in the New Testament. For the names evangelists and prophets do not signify any office, but various gifts by which various men were useful to the Church. Evangelists were useful by writing the life and acts of our Savior: such were the apostles St. Matthew and St. John, the disciples St. Mark and St. Luke, and whoever else wrote on that subject (as St. Thomas and St.
Barnabas are said to have done, though the Church have not received the Books that have gone under their names:) and as Prophets, by the gift of interpreting the Old Testament; and sometimes by declaring their speciall Revelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of Languages, nor the gift of Casting out Devils, or of Curing other diseases, nor any thing else did make an Officer in the Church, save onely the due calling and election to the charge of Teaching.
Barnabas are said to have done, though the Church has not received the books that have gone under their names). Prophets were useful by the gift of interpreting the Old Testament, and sometimes by declaring their special revelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gift of tongues, nor the gift of casting out devils or of curing other diseases, nor anything else made a man an officer in the Church, except only a due calling and election to the charge of teaching.
As the Apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the Assembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and Paul, and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the Presbyters, and Pastors in other Cities, elected by the Churches of those Cities. For proof whereof, let us consider, first, how S. Paul proceeded in the Ordination of Presbyters, in the Cities where he had converted men to the Christian Faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their Apostleship. We read (Acts 4. 23.)
The apostles Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas were not made by our Savior himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the assembly of Christians—Matthias by the church of Jerusalem, and Paul and Barnabas by the church of Antioch. In the same way the presbyters and pastors in other cities were elected by the churches of those cities. As proof of this, let us first consider how St. Paul proceeded in the ordination of presbyters in the cities where he had converted men to the Christian faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their apostleship. We read
that they ordained Elders in every Church; which at first sight may be taken for an Argument, that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority: But if we confider the Originall text, it will be manifest, that they were authorized, and chosen by the Assembly of the Christians of each City.
(Acts 14:23) that “they ordained elders in every church.” At first sight this may be taken as an argument that they themselves chose the elders and gave them their authority. But if we consider the original text, it will be manifest that the elders were authorized and chosen by the assembly of the Christians of each city.
For the words there are, cheirotonesantes autois presbuterous kat ekklesian, that is, When they had Ordained them Elders by the Holding up of Hands in every Congregation. Now it is well enough known, that in all those Cities, the manner of choosing Magistrates, and Officers, was by plurality of suffrages; and (because the ordinary way of distinguishing the Affirmative Votes from the Negatives, was by Holding up of Hands) to ordain an Officer in any of the Cities, was no more but to bring the people together, to elect them by plurality of Votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a vessell marked for the Affirmative, or Negative; for divers Cities had divers customes in that point.
For the words there are cheirotonēsantes autois presbyterous kat’ ekklēsian, that is, “when they had ordained them elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation.” Now it is well enough known that in all those cities the manner of choosing magistrates and officers was by a majority of votes. And because the ordinary way of distinguishing affirmative votes from negative ones was by the holding up of hands, to ordain an officer in any of those cities was nothing more than to bring the people together to elect him by a majority of votes—whether by a majority of raised hands, or of voices, or of balls, beans, or small stones, of which every man cast one into a vessel marked for the affirmative or the negative. For different cities had different customs on that point.
It was therefore the Assembly that elected their own Elders: the Apostles were onely Presidents of the Assembly to call them together for such Election, and to pronounce them Elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is called Consecration. And for this cause they that were Presidents of the Assemblies, as (in the absence of the Apostles) the Elders were, were called proestotes, and in Latin Antistites; which words signifie the Principall Person of the Assembly, whose office was to number the Votes, and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the Votes were equall, to decide the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the Office of a President in Councell.
It was therefore the assembly that elected its own elders. The apostles were only presidents of the assembly: they called it together for the election, pronounced the men elected, and gave them the benediction that is now called consecration. And for this reason those who presided over the assemblies—as the elders did in the absence of the apostles—were called proestōtes, and in Latin antistites. These words signify the principal person of the assembly, whose office was to count the votes and declare from them who was chosen, and, where the votes were equal, to decide the matter in question by adding his own. This is the office of a president in a council.
And (because all the Churches had their Presbyters ordained in the same manner,) where the word is Constitute, (as Titus 1. 5.) ina katasteses kata polin presbuterous, For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute Elders in every City, we are to understand the same thing; namely, that hee should call the faithfull together, and ordain them Presbyters by plurality of suffrages.
And since all the churches had their presbyters ordained in the same way, where the word is constitute—as in Titus 1:5, hina katastēsēs kata polin presbyterous, “For this reason I left you in Crete, that you should constitute elders in every city”—we are to understand the same thing: namely, that he should call the faithful together and ordain them presbyters by a majority of votes.
It had been a strange thing, if in a Town, where men perhaps had never seen any Magistrate otherwise chosen then by an Assembly, those of the Town becomming Christians, should so much as have thought on any other way of Election of their Teachers, and Guides, that is to say, of their Presbyters, (otherwise called Bishops,) then this of plurality of suffrages, intimated by S. Paul (Acts 14. 23.) in the word Cheirotonesantes: Nor was there ever any choosing of Bishops, (before the Emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them,) but by the Assemblies of the Christians in every severall Town.
It would have been strange if, in a town where men had perhaps never seen a magistrate chosen in any other way than by an assembly, the townspeople, on becoming Christians, should even have thought of any other way of electing their teachers and guides—that is to say, their presbyters (otherwise called bishops)—than this one by majority vote, which St. Paul indicates (Acts 14:23) in the word cheirotonēsantes. Nor was there ever any choosing of bishops, before the emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to keep the peace among them, except by the assemblies of the Christians in each town.
The same is also confirmed by the continuall practise even to this day, in the Election of the Bishops of Rome. For if the Bishop of any place, had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the Pastorall Office, in any City, at such time as he went from thence, to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the Right, to appoint his successour in that place, in which he last resided and dyed: And we find not, that ever any Bishop of Rome appointed his successor.
The same is also confirmed by the continual practice, even to this day, in the election of the bishops of Rome. For if the bishop of any place had had the right to choose another to succeed him in the pastoral office in some city when he left it to plant the same office elsewhere, he would much more have had the right to appoint his successor in the place where he last resided and died. And we do not find that any bishop of Rome ever appointed his successor.
For they were a long time chosen by the People, as we may see by the sedition raised about the Election, between Damasus, and Vrsicinus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so great, that Iuventius the Praefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to goe out of the City; and that there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the Church it self. And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole Clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the Cardinalls; yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor.
For they were chosen by the people for a long time, as we may see from the sedition raised over the election between Damasus and Ursinus. Ammianus Marcellinus says it was so great that Juventius the prefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to leave the city, and that more than a hundred men were found dead on that occasion in the church itself. And though the bishops of Rome were afterward chosen first by the whole clergy of Rome, and later by the cardinals, none was ever appointed to the succession by his predecessor.
If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may reasonably conclude, they had no right to appoint the successors of other Bishops, without receiving some new power; which none could take from the Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawfull authority, not onely to Teach, but to Command the Church; which none could doe, but the Civill Soveraign.
If, then, they claimed no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may reasonably conclude that they had no right to appoint the successors of other bishops without receiving some new power. And no one could take that power from the Church to bestow on them except someone who had lawful authority not only to teach the Church but to command it—which no one could do but the civil sovereign.
The word Minister in the Originall Diakonos, signifieth one that voluntarily doth the businesse of another man; and differeth from a Servant onely in this, that Servants are obliged by their condition, to what is commanded them; whereas Ministers are obliged onely by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have undertaken: So that both they that teach the Word of God, and they that administer the secular affairs of the Church, are both Ministers, but they are Ministers of different Persons. For the Pastors of the Church, called (Acts 6. 4.) The Ministers of the Word, are Ministers of Christ, whose Word it is: But the Ministery of a Deacon, which is called (verse 2.
The word minister, in the original diakonos, signifies one who voluntarily does another man’s business. He differs from a servant only in this: servants are bound by their condition to do what they are commanded, whereas ministers are bound only by their undertaking, and therefore to no more than they have undertaken. So both those who teach the word of God and those who administer the worldly affairs of the Church are ministers—but they are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church, called “the ministers of the word” (Acts 6:4), are ministers of Christ, whose word it is. But the ministry of a deacon, which is called
of the same Chapter) Serving of Tables, is a service done to the Church, or Congregation: So that neither any one man, nor the whole Church, could ever of their Pastor say, he was their Minister; but of a Deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or distribute maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each City on a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the House of Prayer, or of the Revenue, or other worldly businesse of the Church, the whole Congregation might properly call him their Minister.
(Acts 6:2) “serving tables,” is a service done to the church or congregation. So neither any one man nor the whole church could ever say of their pastor that he was their minister. But of a deacon the whole congregation might properly say that he was their minister—whether the charge he undertook was to serve tables, or to distribute maintenance to the Christians when they lived in each city on a common fund or on collections, as in the first times, or to take care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or of other worldly business of the Church.
For their employment, as Deacons, was to serve the Congregation; though upon occasion they omitted not to Preach the Gospel, and maintain the Doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as S. Steven did; and both to Preach, and Baptize, as Philip, did: For that Philip, which (Act. 8. 5.) Preached the Gospell at Samaria, and (verse 38.) Baptized the Eunuch, was Philip the Deacon, not Philip the Apostle. For it is manifest (verse 1.) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at Jerusalem, and (verse 14.) when they heard that Samaria had received the Word of God, sent Peter and Iohn to them; by imposition of whose hands, they that were Baptized, (verse 15.)
For their employment as deacons was to serve the congregation, though on occasion they did not fail to preach the gospel and uphold the doctrine of Christ, each according to his gifts, as St. Stephen did—and both to preach and to baptize, as Philip did. For the Philip who preached the gospel in Samaria (Acts 8:5) and baptized the eunuch (verse 38) was Philip the deacon, not Philip the apostle. For it is manifest (verse 1) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the apostles were in Jerusalem, and (verse 14) “when they heard that Samaria had received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them.” By the laying on of their hands, those who had been baptized
received (which before by the Baptisme of Philip they had not received) the Holy Ghost. For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost, that their Baptisme should be administred, or confirmed by a Minister of the Word, not by a Minister of the Church. And therefore to confirm the Baptisme of those that Philip the Deacon had Baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter, and John; who conferred on them that before were but Baptized, those graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true Beleevers; which what they were may be understood by that which S. Marke saith (chap. 16. 17.)
(Acts 8:15–17) received the Holy Spirit, which they had not received before by Philip’s baptism. For in order to confer the Holy Spirit it was necessary that their baptism be administered, or confirmed, by a minister of the word, not by a minister of the church. And therefore, to confirm the baptism of those whom Philip the deacon had baptized, the apostles sent Peter and John from their own number, from Jerusalem to Samaria. These conferred on those who before had only been baptized the graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time accompanied all true believers. What those signs were may be understood from what St. Mark says
These signes follow them that beleeve in my Name; they shall cast out Devills, they shall speak with new tongues; They shall take up Serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; They shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover. This to doe, was it that Philip could not give; but the Apostles could, and (as appears by this place) effectually did to every man that truly beleeved, and was by a Minister of Christ himself Baptized: which power either Christs Ministers in this age cannot conferre, or else there are very few true Beleevers, or Christ hath very few Ministérs.
(Mark 16:17–18): “These signs shall follow those who believe in my name: they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover.” This Philip could not give; but the apostles could, and (as appears from this passage) actually did, to every man who truly believed and was baptized by a minister of Christ himself. Either Christ’s ministers in this age cannot confer that power, or else there are very few true believers, or Christ has very few ministers.
That the first Deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by a Congregation of the Disciples; that is, of Christian men of all sorts, is manifest out of Acts 6. where we read that the Twelve, after the number of Disciples was multiplyed, called them together, and having told them, that it was not fit that the Apostles should leave the Word of God, and serve tables, said unto them (verse 3.)
That the first deacons were chosen not by the apostles but by a congregation of the disciples—that is, of Christian men of all sorts—is manifest from Acts 6. There we read that after the number of disciples had multiplied, the Twelve called them together and, having told them that it was not fit for the apostles to leave the word of God and serve tables, said to them
Brethren looke you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdome, whom we may appoint over this businesse. Here it is manifest, that though the Apostles declared them elected; yet the Congregation chose them; which also, (verse the fift) is more expressely said, where it is written, that the saying pleased the multitude, and they chose seven, &c.
(Acts 6:3): “Brothers, look out from among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Spirit and of wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business.” Here it is manifest that though the apostles declared them elected, the congregation chose them. This is said still more expressly in verse 5, where it is written that “the saying pleased the whole multitude, and they chose seven,” and so on.
The maintenance of the clergy
Tithes were a civil revenue under Moses; early Christian pastors lived on voluntary gifts.
Under the Old Testament, the Tribe of Levi were onely capable of the Priesthood, and other inferiour Offices of the Church. The land was divided amongst the other Tribes (Levi excepted,) which by the subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph, into Ephraim and Manasses, were still twelve. To the Tribe of Levi were assigned certain Cities for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattell: but for their portion, they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their Brethren. Again, the Priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the oblations, and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron (*Numb. 18. 20.)
Under the Old Testament, only the tribe of Levi was eligible for the priesthood and the other lower offices of the Church. The land was divided among the other tribes (Levi excepted), which, by the subdivision of the tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh, were still twelve. Certain cities were assigned to the tribe of Levi to live in, with the surrounding pastures for their cattle; but for their portion they were to have the tenth of the produce of their brothers’ land. Again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the offerings and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron
Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them, I am thy part, and thine inheritance amongst the Children of Israel.* For God being then King, and having constituted the Tribe of Levi to be his Publique Ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance, the Publique revenue, that is to say, the part that God had reserved to himself; which were Tythes, and Offerings: and that is it which is meant, where God saith, I am thine inheritance.
(Numbers 18:20): “You shall have no inheritance in their land, nor shall you have any portion among them; I am your portion and your inheritance among the children of Israel.” For since God was then king, and had appointed the tribe of Levi to be his public ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance the public revenue—that is to say, the part God had reserved to himself, which was tithes and offerings. And that is what is meant where God says, “I am your inheritance.”
And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of Clergy from Kleros, which signifieth Lot, or Inheritance; not that they were heirs of the Kingdome of God, more than other; but that Gods inheritance, was their maintenance. Now seeing in this time God himself was their King, and Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were his Lieutenants; it is manifest, that the Right of Tythes, and Offerings was constituted by the Civill Power.
And therefore the name clergy, from klēros, which signifies lot or inheritance, might not unfittingly be given to the Levites—not because they were heirs of the Kingdom of God more than others, but because God’s inheritance was their maintenance. Now since in this time God himself was their king, and Moses, Aaron, and the high priests who followed were his lieutenants, it is manifest that the right of tithes and offerings was established by the civil power.
After their rejection of God in the demanding of a King, they enjoyed still the same revenue; but the Right thereof was derived from that, that the Kings did never take it from them: for the Publique Revenue was at the disposing of him that was the Publique Person; and that (till the Captivity) was the King. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their Tythes as before to the Priest. Hitherto therefore Church Livings were determined by the Civill Soveraign.
After they rejected God by demanding a king, they still enjoyed the same revenue; but their right to it derived from the fact that the kings never took it from them. For the public revenue was at the disposal of the one who was the public person, and that (until the Captivity) was the king. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their tithes to the priest as before. Up to this point, therefore, Church revenues were determined by the civil sovereign.
Of the maintenance of our Saviour, and his Apostles, we read onely they had a Purse, (which was carried by Judas Iscariot;) and, that of the Apostles, such as were Fisher-men, did sometimes use their trade; and that when our Saviour sent the Twelve Apostles to Preach, he forbad them to carry Gold, and Silver, and Brasse in their purses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire: By which it is probable, their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment was (ver. 8.) freely to give, because they had freely received; and their maintenance was the free gift of those that beleeved the good tyding they carryed about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour.
Of the maintenance of our Savior and his apostles, we read only that they had a purse (which was carried by Judas Iscariot); that those apostles who were fishermen sometimes practiced their trade; and that when our Savior sent the twelve apostles to preach, he forbade them “to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their purses, for the workman is worthy of his hire.” From this it is probable that their ordinary maintenance was not unsuited to their employment. For their employment (verse 8) was “freely to give, because they had freely received”; and their maintenance was the free gift of those who believed the good tidings they carried about, of the coming of the Messiah their Savior.
To which we may adde, that which was contributed out of gratitude; by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned Certain women (Luke 8. 2, 3.) which had been healed of evill spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven Devills; and Ioanna the wife of Chuza, Herods Steward; and Susanna, and many others, which ministred unto him of their substance.
To this we may add what was contributed out of gratitude by those whom our Savior had healed of diseases. Among these are mentioned (Luke 8:2–3) “certain women who had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities: Mary Magdalene, out of whom went seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod’s steward; and Susanna, and many others, who ministered to him from their substance.”
After our Saviours Ascension, the Christians of every City lived in Common, upon the mony which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the Apostles, of good will, not of duty; for whilest the Land remained (saith S. Peter to Ananias (Acts 5. 4.) was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power? which sheweth he needed not have saved his land, nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute any thing at all, unlesse he had pleased.
After our Savior’s Ascension, the Christians of every city lived in common on the money made from the sale of their lands and possessions, which they laid at the feet of the apostles out of goodwill, not out of duty. For St. Peter says to Ananias (Acts 5:4), “While the land remained, was it not yours? And after it was sold, was it not in your power?” This shows that Ananias did not need to have saved his land or his money by lying, since he was not bound to contribute anything at all unless he pleased.
And as in the time of the Apostles, so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we shall find, that the maintenance of the Bishops, and Pastors of the Christian Church, was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their Doctrine. There was yet no mention of Tythes: but such was in the time of Constantine, and his Sons, the affection of Christians to their Pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith (describing the sedition of Damasus and Vrsicinus about the Bishopricke,) that it was worth their contention, in that the Bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock, and especially of Matrons, lived splendidly, were carryed in Coaches, and were sumptuous in their fare and apparell.
And as in the time of the apostles, so all the time afterward, until after Constantine the Great, we shall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the Christian Church was nothing but the voluntary contribution of those who had embraced their doctrine. There was as yet no mention of tithes. But such was the affection of Christians for their pastors in the time of Constantine and his sons that, as Ammianus Marcellinus says (describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursinus over the bishopric), it was worth their contending for: for the bishops of those times, through the liberality of their flock, and especially of wealthy matrons, lived splendidly, were carried in coaches, and were sumptuous in their food and dress.
But here may some ask, whether the Pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, as upon almes, For who (saith S. Paul 1 Cor. 9. 7.) goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milke of the flock? And again, Doe ye not know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things of the Temple; and they which wait at the Altar, partake with the Altar; that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the Altar for their maintenance?
But here someone may ask whether the pastor was then bound to live on voluntary contributions, as on alms. For St. Paul says (1 Corinthians 9:7), “Who goes to war at his own expense? Or who tends a flock and does not eat of the milk of the flock?” And again (verse 13), “Do you not know that those who minister about holy things live off the things of the Temple, and those who serve at the altar share with the altar?”—that is to say, have part of what is offered at the altar for their maintenance?
And then he concludeth, Even so hath the Lord appointed, that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel. From which place may be inferred indeed, that the Pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the Pastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own allowance, and be (as it were) their own Carvers. Their allowance must needs therefore be determined, either by the gratitude, and liberality of every particular man of their flock, or by the whole Congregation.
And then he concludes (verse 14), “Even so the Lord has appointed that those who preach the gospel should live by the gospel.” From this passage it may indeed be inferred that the pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the pastors were to determine either the amount or the kind of their own allowance, and be (as it were) their own carvers. Their allowance must therefore have been determined either by the gratitude and liberality of each particular member of their flock, or by the whole congregation.
By the whole Congregation it could not be, because their Acts were then no Laws: Therefore the maintenance of Pastors before Emperours and Civill Soveraigns had made Laws to settle it, was nothing but Benevolence. They that served at the Altar lived on what was offered. So may the Pastors also take what is offered them by their flock; but not exact what is not offered. In what Court should they sue for it, who had no Tribunalls? Or if they had Arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their Judgments, when they had no power to arme their Officers?
It could not be by the whole congregation, because its acts were not then laws. Therefore the maintenance of pastors, before emperors and civil sovereigns had made laws to settle it, was nothing but benevolence. Those who served at the altar lived on what was offered. So the pastors too may take what their flock offers them, but not exact what is not offered. In what court should they sue for it, when they had no tribunals? Or if they had arbitrators among themselves, who would carry out their judgments, when they had no power to arm their officers?
It remaineth therefore, that there could be no certaire maintenance assigned to any Pastors of the Church, but by the whole Congregation; and then onely, when their Decrees should have the force (not onely of Canons, but also) of Laws; which Laws could not be made, but by Emperours, Kings, or other Civill Soveraignes. The Right of Tythes in Moses Law, could not be applyed to the then Ministers of the Gospell; because Moses and the High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns of the people under God, whose Kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdome of God by Christ is yet to come.
It follows, therefore, that no fixed maintenance could be assigned to any pastors of the Church except by the whole congregation, and then only when its decrees had the force not only of canons but also of laws—and such laws could be made only by emperors, kings, or other civil sovereigns. The right of tithes in the law of Moses could not be applied to the ministers of the gospel of that time, because Moses and the high priests were the civil sovereigns of the people under God, whose kingdom among the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdom of God through Christ is yet to come.
Hitherto hath been shewn what the Pastors of the Church are; what are the points of their Commission (as that they were to Preach, to Teach, to Baptize, to be Presidents in their severall Congregations;) what is Ecclesiasticall Censure, viz. Excommunication, that is to say, in those places where Christanity was forbidden by the Civill Laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the Excommunicate, and where Christianity was by the Civill Law commanded, a putting the, Excommunicate out of the Congregations of Christians; who elected the Pastors and Ministers of the Church, (that it was, the Congregation); who consecrated and blessed them, (that it was the Pastor); what was their due revenue, (that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of devout and gratefull Christians).
So far it has been shown: what the pastors of the Church are; what the points of their commission are (namely, that they were to preach, to teach, to baptize, and to preside in their several congregations); what ecclesiastical censure is—namely, excommunication, which, in places where Christianity was forbidden by the civil laws, meant Christians putting themselves out of the company of the excommunicated, and where Christianity was commanded by the civil law, meant putting the excommunicated out of the congregations of Christians; who elected the pastors and ministers of the Church (the congregation); who consecrated and blessed them (the pastor); and what their due revenue was (nothing but their own possessions, their own labor, and the voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians).
The Christian sovereign as supreme pastor
Christian sovereigns are supreme pastors, and all other pastors teach and consecrate by their authority.
We are to consider now, what Office in the Church those persons have, who being Civill Soveraignes, have embraced also the Christian Faith.
We are now to consider what office in the Church belongs to those persons who, being civil sovereigns, have also embraced the Christian faith.
And first, we are to remember, that the Right of Judging what Doctrines are fit for Peace, and to be taught the Subjects, is in all Common-wealths inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved cha. 18.) to the Soveraign Power Civill, whether it be in one Man, or in one Assembly of men.
And first, we must remember that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and fit to be taught to the subjects, is in every commonwealth inseparably attached to the sovereign civil power, whether that power is in one man or in one assembly of men (as has already been proved in chapter 18).
For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that mens actions are derived from the opinions they have of the Good, or Evill, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the Soveraign Power, will bee more hurtfull to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the Laws, and thereby overthrow the Common-wealth, and introduce confusion, and Civill war; for the avoiding whereof, all Civill Government was ordained. And therefore in all Common-wealths of the Heathen, the Soveraigns have had the name of Pastors of the People, because there was no Subject that could lawfully Teach the people, but by their permission and authority.
For it is evident to the dullest understanding that men’s actions derive from the opinions they have of the good or evil that will come back to them from those actions. Consequently, men who have once taken up the opinion that their obedience to the sovereign power will hurt them more than their disobedience will disobey the laws, and so overthrow the commonwealth and bring in confusion and civil war—for the avoiding of which all civil government was ordained. And therefore in all the commonwealths of the heathen the sovereigns have had the name of shepherds of the people, because no subject could lawfully teach the people except by their permission and authority.
This Right of the Heathen Kings, cannot bee thought taken from them by their conversion to the Faith of Christ; who never ordained, that Kings for beleeving in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, or (which is all one) be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of Peace amongst their Subjects, and for their defence against foraign Enemies. And therefore Christian Kings are still the Supreme Pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what Pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the People committed to their charge.
This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought to have been taken from them by their conversion to the faith of Christ. He never ordained that kings, for believing in him, should be deposed—that is, subjected to anyone but himself—or (what amounts to the same thing) be deprived of the power necessary for keeping peace among their subjects and for defending them against foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain whatever pastors they please to teach the Church—that is, to teach the people committed to their charge.
Again, let the right of choosing them be (as before the conversion of Kings) in the Church, for so it was in the time of the Apostles themselves (as hath been shewn already in this chapter); even so also the Right will be in the Civill Soveraign, Christian. For in that he is a Christian, he allowes the Teaching; and in that he is the Soveraign (which is as much as to say, the Church by Representation,) the Teachers hee elects, are elected by the Church.
Again, suppose the right of choosing pastors lies (as it did before the conversion of kings) in the Church, for so it was in the time of the apostles themselves, as has already been shown in this chapter. Even so, the right will be in the civil sovereign who is a Christian. For insofar as he is a Christian, he allows the teaching; and insofar as he is the sovereign (which is as much as to say, the Church by representation), the teachers he elects are elected by the Church.
And when an Assembly of Christians choose their Pastor in a Christian Common-wealth, it is the Soveraign that electeth him, because tis done by his Authority; In the same manner, as when a Town choose their Maior, it is the act of him that hath the Soveraign Power: For every act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of History, concerning the Election of Pastors, by the People, or by the Clergy, they are no arguments against the Right of any Civill Soveraign, because they that elected them did it by his Authority.
And when an assembly of Christians chooses its pastor in a Christian commonwealth, it is the sovereign who elects him, because it is done by his authority—in the same way that, when a town chooses its mayor, it is the act of the one who has the sovereign power. For every act done is the act of the one without whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatever examples may be drawn from history of the election of pastors by the people or by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civil sovereign, because those who elected them did it by his authority.
Seeing then in every Christian Common-wealth, the Civill Soveraign is the Supreme Pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his Subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority, that all other Pastors are made, and have power to teach, and performe all other Pastorall offices; it followeth also, that it is from the Civill Soveraign, that all other Pastors derive their right of Teaching, Preaching, and other functions pertaining to that Office; and that they are but his Ministers; in the same manner as the Magistrates of Towns, Judges in Courts of Justice, and Commanders of Armies, are all but Ministers of him that is the Magistrate of the whole Common-wealth, Judge of all Causes, and Commander of the whole Militia, which is alwaies the Civill Soveraign.
Since, then, in every Christian commonwealth the civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently all other pastors are made, and have power to teach and to perform all other pastoral offices, by his authority, it follows also that all other pastors derive from the civil sovereign their right of teaching, preaching, and the other functions belonging to that office, and that they are only his ministers. In the same way the magistrates of towns, the judges in courts of justice, and the commanders of armies are all only ministers of the one who is magistrate of the whole commonwealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia—which is always the civil sovereign.
And the reason hereof, is not because they that Teach, but because they that are to Learn, are his Subjects. For let it be supposed, that a Christian King commit the Authority of Ordaining Pastors in his Dominions to another King, (as divers Christian Kings allow that power to the Pope;) he doth not thereby constitute a Pastor over himself, nor a Soveraign Pastor over his People; for that were to deprive himself of the Civill Power; which depending on the opinion men have of their Duty to him, and the fear they have of Punishment in another world, would depend also on the skill, and loyalty of Doctors, who are no lesse subject, not only to Ambition, but also to Ignorance, than any other sort of men.
And the reason for this is not that those who teach, but that those who are to learn, are his subjects. For suppose that a Christian king commits the authority of ordaining pastors in his dominions to another king (as various Christian kings allow that power to the Pope). He does not thereby set up a pastor over himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people. For that would be to deprive himself of the civil power, which depends on men’s opinion of their duty to him and on their fear of punishment in another world, and so would also depend on the skill and loyalty of doctors—who are no less subject than any other sort of men, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance.
So that where a stranger hath authority to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the Soveraign in whose Dominions he teacheth. Christian Doctors are our Schoolmasters to Christianity; But Kings are Fathers of Families, and may receive Schoolmasters for their Subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the Publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall Right of the Soveraignty.
So where a foreigner has authority to appoint teachers, it is given to him by the sovereign in whose dominions he teaches. Christian doctors are our schoolmasters in Christianity; but kings are fathers of families, and may accept schoolmasters for their subjects on the recommendation of a foreigner, but not on his command—especially when bad teaching by those schoolmasters will bring great and manifest profit to the one who recommends them. Nor can kings be obliged to keep them longer than serves the public good, the care of which remains their charge as long as they retain any other essential right of sovereignty.
If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, in the execution of his Office, as the chief Priests and Elders of the people (Mat. 21. 23.) asked our Saviour, By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority: he can make no other just Answer, but that he doth it by the Authority of the Common-wealth, given him by the King, or Assembly that representeth it.
If, therefore, someone should ask a pastor, in the exercise of his office, what the chief priests and elders of the people asked our Savior (Matthew 21:23), “By what authority do you do these things, and who gave you this authority?”, he can give no other just answer than that he does it by the authority of the commonwealth, given him by the king or assembly that represents it.
All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is, Iure Civili. But the King, and every other Soveraign, executeth his Office of Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, in Gods Right, or Iure Divino. And therefore none but Kings can put into their Titles (a mark of their submission to God onely) Dei gratiâ Rex, &c. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their Mandates, By the favour of the Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocesse; or as Civill Ministers, In his Majesties Name. For in saying, Divinâ providentiâ, which is the same with Dei gratiâ, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the Civill State; and sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.
All pastors except the supreme one carry out their charges by right of—that is, by the authority of—the civil sovereign: that is, jure civili. But the king, and every other sovereign, carries out his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God: that is to say, in God’s right, or jure divino. And therefore no one but kings can put into their titles, as a mark of their submission to God alone, Dei gratia Rex, etc. (“King by the grace of God”). Bishops ought to say at the beginning of their mandates, “By the favor of the King’s Majesty, Bishop of such a diocese,” or, as civil ministers, “In His Majesty’s name.” For in saying Divina providentia (“by divine providence”), which is the same as Dei gratia, though disguised, they deny having received their authority from the civil state, and slyly slip off the collar of their civil subjection, contrary to the unity and defense of the commonwealth.
But if every Christian Soveraign be the Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the Authority, not only to Preach (which perhaps no man will deny;) but also to Baptize, and to Administer the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; and to Consecrate both Temples, and Pastors to Gods service; which most men deny; partly because they use not to do it; and partly because the Administration of Sacraments, and Consecration of Persons, and Places to holy uses, requireth the Imposition of such mens hands, as by the like Imposition successively from the time of the Apostles have been ordained to the like Ministery.
But if every Christian sovereign is the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seems that he also has the authority not only to preach (which perhaps no one will deny), but also to baptize, to administer the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, and to consecrate both temples and pastors to God’s service. This most men deny: partly because sovereigns do not usually do it, and partly because the administration of sacraments and the consecration of persons and places to holy uses requires the laying on of the hands of such men as have been ordained to the same ministry by the same laying on of hands, in succession from the time of the apostles.
For proof therefore that Christian Kings have power to Baptize, and to Consecrate, I am to render a reason, both why they use not to doe it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of Imposition of hands, they are made capable of doing it, when they will.
As proof, then, that Christian kings have power to baptize and to consecrate, I must give a reason both why they do not usually do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of the laying on of hands, they are made capable of doing it when they wish.
There is no doubt but any King, in case he were skilfull in the Sciences, might by the same Right of his Office, read Lectures of them himself, by which he authorizeth others to read them in the Universities. Neverthelesse, because the care of the summe of the businesse of the Common-wealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to apply himself in Person to that particular.
There is no doubt that any king, if he were skilled in the sciences, might by the same right of his office lecture on them himself, by which he authorizes others to lecture on them in the universities. Nevertheless, because the care of the whole business of the commonwealth takes up all his time, it would not be convenient for him to apply himself in person to that particular task.
A King may also if he please, sit in Judgment, to hear and determine all manner of Causes, as well as give others authority to doe it in his name; but that the charge that lyeth upon him of Command and Government, constrain him to bee continually at the Helm, and to commit the Ministeriall Offices to others under him. In the like manner our Saviour (who surely had power to Baptize) Baptized none himselfe, but sent his Apostles and Disciples to Baptize. So also S. Paul, by the necessity of Preaching in divers and far distant places, Baptized few: Amongst all the Corinthians he Baptized only Crispus, Cajus, and Stephanus; and the reason was, because his principall Charge was to Preach.
A king may also, if he pleases, sit in judgment to hear and determine all kinds of cases, as well as give others authority to do it in his name. But the charge that lies on him of command and government obliges him to be continually at the helm, and to commit the ministerial offices to others under him. In the same way our Savior (who surely had power to baptize) baptized no one himself, but sent his apostles and disciples to baptize. So also St. Paul, because he had to preach in many widely separated places, baptized few: among all the Corinthians he baptized only Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas; and the reason was that his principal charge was to preach.
Whereby it is manifest, that the greater Charge, (such as is the Government of the Church,) is a dispensation for the lesse. The reason therefore why Christian Kings use not to Baptize, is evident, and the same, for which at this day there are few Baptized by Bishops, and by the Pope fewer.
From this it is manifest that the greater charge (such as the government of the Church) excuses one from the lesser. The reason why Christian kings do not usually baptize is therefore evident; and it is the same reason why at this day few are baptized by bishops, and fewer by the Pope.
And as concerning Imposition of Hands, whether it be needfull, for the authorizing of a King to Baptize, and Consecrate, we may consider thus.
And as to the laying on of hands, whether it is needed to authorize a king to baptize and consecrate, we may consider it this way.
Imposition of Hands, was a most ancient publique ceremony amongst the Jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other thing intended in a mans prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration, condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob in blessing the children of Joseph (Gen. 48. 14.) Laid his right Hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left Hand on Manasseh the first born; and this he did wittingly (though they were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms acrosse) to design to whom he intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrificing of the Burnt offering, Aaron is commanded [Exod. 29.
The laying on of hands was a most ancient public ceremony among the Jews, by which the person or other thing intended in a man’s prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration, condemnation, or other speech was designated and made certain. So Jacob, in blessing the children of Joseph (Genesis 48:14), “laid his right hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left hand on Manasseh the firstborn.” And he did this deliberately (though they were presented to him by Joseph in such a way that he was forced to cross his arms to do it), to designate the one for whom he intended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrifice of the burnt offering, Aaron is commanded
10.] to Lay his Hands on the head of the bullock; and [ver. 15.] to Lay his Hand on the head of the ramme. The same is also said again, Levit. 1. 4. & 8. 14. Likewise Moses when he ordained Joshua to be Captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to Gods service, [Numb. 27. 23.] Laid his Hands upon him, and gave him his Charge, designing, and rendring certain, who it was they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites [Numb. 8. 10.] God commanded that the Children of Israel should Put their Hands upon the Levites. And in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the Lord [Levit. 24. 14.)
(Exodus 29:10) “to lay his hands on the head of the bullock,” and (verse 15) “to lay his hand on the head of the ram.” The same is said again in Leviticus 1:4 and 8:14. Likewise Moses, when he ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites—that is, consecrated him to God’s service—“laid his hands upon him, and gave him his charge” (Numbers 27:23), designating and making certain whom they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites (Numbers 8:10), God commanded that “the children of Israel should put their hands upon the Levites.” And in the condemnation of the man who had blasphemed the Lord
God commanded that all that heard him should Lay their Hands on his head, and that all the Congregation should stone him. And why should they only that heard him, Lay their Hands upon him, and not rather a Priest, Levite, or other Minister of Justice, but that none else were able to design, and demonstrate to the eyes of the Congregation, who it was that had blasphemed, and ought to die? And to design a man, or any other thing, by the Hand to the Eye, is lesse subject to mistake, than when it is done to the Eare by a Name.
(Leviticus 24:14), God commanded that “all who heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the congregation should stone him.” And why should only those who heard him lay their hands on him, rather than a priest, a Levite, or some other minister of justice, unless it was that no one else could designate and show to the eyes of the congregation who it was that had blasphemed and ought to die? And to designate a man, or any other thing, by the hand to the eye is less subject to mistake than to do it to the ear by a name.
And so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole Congregation at once, which cannot be done by Laying on of Hands, yet Aaron [Levit. 9. 22.] did lift up his Hand towards the people when he blessed them. And we read also of the like ceremony of Consecration of Temples amongst the Heathen, as that the Priest laid his Hands on some post of the Temple, all the while he was uttering the words of Consecration. So naturall it is to design any individuall thing, rather by the Hand, to assure the Eyes, than by Words to inform the Eare in matters of Gods Publique service.
And this ceremony was so carefully observed that in blessing the whole congregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, “Aaron nevertheless lifted up his hand toward the people when he blessed them” (Leviticus 9:22). We also read of a similar ceremony in the consecration of temples among the heathen: the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple the whole time he was uttering the words of consecration. So natural is it, in matters of God’s public service, to designate any individual thing by the hand, to assure the eyes, rather than by words, to inform the ear.
This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviours time. For Jairus [Mark 5. 23.] whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour (not to heal her, but) to ay h is Hands upon her, that shee might bee healed. And [Matth. 19. 13.] they brought unto him little children, that hee should Put his Hands on them, and Pray.
This ceremony was therefore not new in our Savior’s time. For Jairus, whose daughter was sick (Mark 5:23), begged our Savior (not to heal her, but) “to lay his hands on her, that she might be healed.” And (Matthew 19:13) “they brought to him little children, that he should put his hands on them and pray.”
According to this ancient Rite, the Apostles, and Presbyters, and the Presbytery it self, Laid Hands on them whom they ordained Pastors, and withall prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that not only once, but sometimes oftner, when a new occasion was presented: but the end was still the same, namely a punctuall, and religious designation of the person, ordained either to the Pastorall Charge in general, or to a particular Mission: so [Act. 6. 6.] The Apostles Prayed, and Laid their Hands on the seven Deacons; which was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before they were chosen, as appeareth imdiately before, verse 3.)
According to this ancient rite, the apostles and presbyters, and the presbytery itself, laid hands on those whom they ordained pastors, and at the same time prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Spirit. And they did this not only once, but sometimes more often, when a new occasion arose. But the purpose was always the same: namely, an exact and religious designation of the person ordained, either to the pastoral charge in general or to a particular mission. So (Acts 6:6) “the apostles prayed, and laid their hands” on the seven deacons. This was done not to give them the Holy Spirit (for they were full of the Holy Spirit before they were chosen, as appears just before, in verse 3),
but to design them to that Office. And after Philip the Deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down [Act 8. 17.] and Laid their Hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost. And not only an Apostle, but a Presbyter had this power: For S. Paul adviseth Timothy [1 Tim. 5. 22.] Lay Hands suddenly on no man; that is, designe no man rashly to the Office of a Pastor. The whole Presbytery Laid their Hands on Timothy, as we read 1 Tim. 4. 14. but this is to be understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the Presbytery, and most likely their Proestos, or Prolocutor, which it may be was St. Paul himself.
but to designate them for that office. And after Philip the deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down (Acts 8:17) “and laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Spirit.” And not only an apostle but a presbyter had this power. For St. Paul advises Timothy (1 Timothy 5:22), “Lay hands suddenly on no man”—that is, designate no man rashly for the office of a pastor. We read in 1 Timothy 4:14 that the whole presbytery laid their hands on Timothy; but this is to be understood to mean that some did it by appointment of the presbytery—most likely their proestōs, or presiding officer, who may have been St. Paul himself.
For in his 2 Epist. to Tim. ver. 6. he saith to him, Stirre up the gift of God which is in thee, by the Laying on of my Hands: where note by the way, that by the Holy Ghost, is not meant the third Person in the Trinity, but the Gifts necessary to the Pastorall Office. We read also, that St. Paul had Imposition of Hands twice; once from Ananias at Damascus [Acts 9. 17, 18.] at the time of his Baptisme; and again [Acts 13. 3.] at Antioch, when he was first sent out to Preach. The use then of this ceremony considered in the Ordination of Pastors, was to design the Person to whom they gave such Power.
For in his Second Epistle to Timothy (2 Timothy 1:6) he says to him, “Stir up the gift of God which is in you by the laying on of my hands.” Note here, by the way, that by the Holy Spirit is meant not the third person of the Trinity, but the gifts necessary to the pastoral office. We read also that St. Paul had hands laid on him twice: once by Ananias at Damascus (Acts 9:17–18), at the time of his baptism, and again at Antioch (Acts 13:3), when he was first sent out to preach. The use of this ceremony in the ordination of pastors, then, was to designate the person to whom they gave such power.
But if there had been then any Christian, that had had the Power of Teaching before; the Baptizing of him, that is, the making him a Christian, had given him no new Power, but had onely caused him to preach true Doctrine, that is, to use his Power aright; and therefore the Imposition of Hands had been unnecessary; Baptisme it selfe had been sufficient.
But if there had then been any Christian who already had the power of teaching, baptizing him—that is, making him a Christian—would have given him no new power, but would only have caused him to preach true doctrine, that is, to use his power rightly. In that case the laying on of hands would have been unnecessary; baptism itself would have been sufficient.
But every Soveraign, before Christianity, had the power of Teaching, and Ordaining Teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them no new Right, but only directed them in the way of teaching Truth; and consequently they needed no Imposition of Hands (besides that which is done in Baptisme) to authorize them to exercise any part of the Pastorall Function, as namely, to Baptize, and Consecrate.
But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of teaching and of ordaining teachers. Christianity therefore gave them no new right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth. Consequently they needed no laying on of hands (besides what is done in baptism) to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral function—as, namely, to baptize and to consecrate.
And in the Old Testament, though the Priest only had right to Consecrate, during the time that the Soveraignty was in the High Priest; yet it was not so when the Soveraignty was in the King: For we read [1 Kings 8.] That Solomon Blessed the People, Consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that Publique Prayer, which is the pattern now for Consecration of all Christian Churches, and Chappels: whereby it appears, he had not only the right of Ecclesiasticall Government; but also of exercising Ecclesiasticall Functions.
And in the Old Testament, though only the priest had the right to consecrate during the time when the sovereignty was in the high priest, it was not so when the sovereignty was in the king. For we read (1 Kings 8) that Solomon blessed the people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that public prayer which is now the pattern for the consecration of all Christian churches and chapels. From this it appears that he had not only the right of ecclesiastical government, but also the right of exercising ecclesiastical functions.
From this consolidation of the Right Politique, and Ecclesiastique in Christian Soveraigns, it is evident, they have all manner of Power over their Subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of mens externall actions, both in Policy, and Religion; and may make such Laws, as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own Subjects, both as they are the Common-wealth, and as they are the Church: for both State, and Church are the same men.
From this consolidation of political and ecclesiastical right in Christian sovereigns, it is evident that they have every kind of power over their subjects that can be given to man for the government of men’s external actions, both in policy and in religion. They may make such laws as they themselves judge fittest for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the commonwealth and as they are the Church: for State and Church are the same men.
If they please therefore, they may (as many Christian Kings now doe) commit the government of their Subjects in matters of Religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point Subordinate to them, and exerciseth that Charge in anothers Dominion Iure Civili, in the Right of the Civill Soveraign; not Iure Divino, in Gods Right; and may therefore be discharged of that Office, when the Soveraign for the good of his Subjects shall think it necessary.
If they please, therefore, they may (as many Christian kings now do) commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope. But then the Pope is, on that point, subordinate to them, and exercises that charge in another’s dominion jure civili, by the right of the civil sovereign, not jure divino, by God’s right. He may therefore be discharged of that office whenever the sovereign, for the good of his subjects, thinks it necessary.
They may also if they please, commit the care of Religion to one Supreme Pastor, or to an Assembly of Pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor, as of Bishops, Archbishops, Priests, or Presbyters, they will; and make such Laws for their maintenance, either by Tithes, or otherwise, as they please, so they doe it out of a sincere conscience, of which God onely is the Judge. It is the Civill Soveraign, that is to appoint Judges, and Interpreters of the Canonicall Scriptures; for it is he that maketh them Laws.
They may also, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pastors, and give them whatever power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient, and whatever titles of honor they wish, such as bishops, archbishops, priests, or presbyters. And they may make such laws for their maintenance, by tithes or otherwise, as they please—provided they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God alone is the judge. It is the civil sovereign who is to appoint judges and interpreters of the canonical Scriptures, for it is he who makes them laws.
It is he also that giveth strength to Excommunications; which but for such Laws and Punishments, as may humble obstinate Libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would bee contemned. In summe, he hath the Supreme Power in all causes, as well Ecclesiasticall, as Civill, as far as concerneth actions, and words, for those onely are known, and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no Judg at all, but God, that knoweth the heart. And these Rights are incident to all Soveraigns, whether Monarchs, or Assemblies: for they that are the Representants of a Christian People, are Representants of the Church: for a Church, and a Common-wealth of Christian People, are the same thing.
It is he also who gives force to excommunications, which would be held in contempt without such laws and punishments as may humble obstinate libertines and bring them back into union with the rest of the Church. In sum, he has the supreme power in all causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil, so far as concerns actions and words; for only these are known and can be accused, and of what cannot be accused there is no judge at all but God, who knows the heart. And these rights belong to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies. For those who are the representatives of a Christian people are representatives of the Church, since a Church and a commonwealth of Christian people are the same thing.
Bellarmine answered: Peter and the papacy
Hobbes answers Bellarmine's first three books on the Pope, Peter's primacy, and Antichrist.
Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this Book, seem cleer enough for the asserting of the Supreme Ecclesiasticall Power to Christian Soveraigns; yet because the Pope of Romes challenge to that Power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think as strongly as is possible, by Cardinall Bellarmine, in his Controversie De Summo Pontifice; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the grounds, and strength of his Discourse.
What I have said here and in other places of this book seems clear enough to establish the supreme ecclesiastical power of Christian sovereigns. Yet the Pope of Rome’s claim to that power universally has been maintained chiefly, and I think as strongly as is possible, by Cardinal Bellarmine in his controversy De Summo Pontifice. I have therefore thought it necessary to examine, as briefly as I can, the grounds and strength of his discourse.
Of five Books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three Questions: One, Which is simply the best government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for a government mixt of all three: Another, which of these is the best Government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixt, but which should most participate of Monarchy: The third, whether in this mixt Monarchy, St. Peter had the place of Monarch. Concerning his first Conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all Governments, which men are bound to obey, are Simple, and Absolute.
Of the five books he has written on this subject, the first contains three questions. The first is which is simply the best government—monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy—and he concludes for none of them, but for a government mixed of all three. The second is which of these is the best government of the Church, and he concludes for the mixed, but one that partakes most of monarchy. The third is whether, in this mixed monarchy, St. Peter held the place of monarch. Concerning his first conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (in chapter 18) that all governments that men are bound to obey are simple and absolute.
In Monarchy there is but One Man Supreme; and all other men that have any kind of Power in the State, have it by his Commission, during his pleasure; and execute it in his name: And in Aristocracy, and Democracy, but One Supreme Assembly, with the same Power that in Monarchy belongeth to the Monarch, which is not a Mixt, but an Absolute Soveraignty. And of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the Law of Nature, and the Divine positive Law, to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof.
In monarchy there is only one man supreme, and all other men who have any kind of power in the state have it by his commission, during his pleasure, and exercise it in his name. In aristocracy and democracy there is only one supreme assembly, with the same power that in monarchy belongs to the monarch; and this is not a mixed but an absolute sovereignty. And which of the three sorts is best is not to be disputed where any one of them is already established. The present one ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best, because it is against both the law of nature and the divine positive law to do anything tending to its subversion.
Besides, it maketh nothing to the Power of any Pastor, (unlesse he have the Civill Soveraignty,) what kind of Government is the best; because their Calling is not to govern men by Commandement, but to teach them, and perswade them by Arguments, and leave it to them to consider, whether they shall embrace, or reject the Doctrine taught. For Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of Soveraigns, not of Pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of Masters of Families, not three sorts of Schoolmasters for their children.
Besides, it makes no difference to the power of any pastor (unless he has the civil sovereignty) what kind of government is best. For their calling is not to govern men by command, but to teach them and persuade them by arguments, and to leave it to them to consider whether they will embrace or reject the doctrine taught. Monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy mark out for us three sorts of sovereigns, not of pastors—or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of families, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children.
And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form of Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Popes Power without his own Dominions: For in all other Common-wealths his Power (if hee have any at all) is that of the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the Master of the Family.
And therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of government of the Church, has nothing to do with the question of the Pope’s power outside his own dominions. For in all other commonwealths his power (if he has any at all) is only that of the schoolmaster, and not that of the master of the family.
For the third Conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was Monarch of the Church, he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place of S. Matth. (chap. 16. 18, 19.) *Thou art Peter, And upon this rock I will build my Church, &c.
For the third conclusion, that St. Peter was monarch of the Church, he brings as his chief argument the passage in St. Matthew (16:18–19): “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,” etc.
And I will give thee the keyes of Heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven. Which place well considered, proveth no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one onely Article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all the Apostles professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited; which that wee may cleerly understand, we are to consider, that our Saviour preached by himself, by John Baptist, and by his Apostles, nothing but this Article of Faith, that he was the Christ; all other Articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that. John began first, (Mat.* 3.
“And I will give you the keys of heaven; whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” Rightly considered, this passage proves no more than that the Church of Christ has for its foundation one single article: namely, the one that Peter professed in the name of all the apostles, which gave our Savior occasion to speak the words cited here. To understand this clearly, we must consider that our Savior preached—by himself, by John the Baptist, and by his apostles—nothing but this article of faith, that he was the Christ; all other articles require faith only insofar as they are founded on that one. John began first
2. preaching only this, The Kingdome of God is at hand. Then our Saviour himself (Mat. 4. 17.) preached the same: And to his Twelve Apostles, when he gave them their Commission (Mat. 10. 7.) there is no mention of preaching any other Article but that. This was the fundamentall Article, that is the Foundation of the Churches Faith. Afterwards the Apostles being returned to him, he asketh them all, (Mat. 16. 13.) not Peter onely, Who men said he was; and they answered, that some said he was Iohn the Baptist, some Elias, and others Ieremias, or one of the Prophets: Then (ver. 15.) he asked them all again, (not Peter onely) Whom say yee that I am? Therefore S.
(Matthew 3:2), preaching only this: “The Kingdom of God is at hand.” Then our Savior himself (Matthew 4:17) preached the same. And when he gave his twelve apostles their commission (Matthew 10:7), there is no mention of preaching any article but that. This was the fundamental article, the foundation of the Church’s faith. Afterward, when the apostles had returned to him, he asked them all (Matthew 16:13), not Peter only, who men said he was; and they answered that “some said he was John the Baptist, some Elijah, and others Jeremiah, or one of the prophets.” Then (verse 15) he asked them all again (not Peter only), “But who do you say that I am?” Therefore St.
Peter answered (for them all) Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God; which I said is the Foundation of the Faith of the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying, Vpon this stone I will build my Church: By which it is manifest, that by the Foundation-Stone of the Church, was meant the Fundamentall Article of the Churches Faith. But why then (will some object) doth our Saviour interpose these words, Thou art Peter? If the originall of this text had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared: We are therefore to consider, that the Apostle Simon, was surnamed Stone, (which is the signification of the Syriacke word Cephas, and of the Greek word Petrus).
Peter answered (for them all), “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.” This, as I said, is the foundation of the faith of the whole Church, and from it our Savior takes occasion to say, “Upon this stone I will build my Church.” By this it is manifest that by the foundation stone of the Church was meant the fundamental article of the Church’s faith. But why then (some will object) does our Savior insert the words “You are Peter”? If the original of this text had been strictly translated, the reason would easily have appeared. We must therefore consider that the apostle Simon was surnamed Stone (which is the meaning of the Syriac word Cephas and of the Greek word Petrus).
Our Saviour therefore after the confession of that Fundamentall Article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus, Thou art Stone, and upon this Stone I will build my Church: which is as much as to say, this Article, that I am the Christ, is the Foundation of all the Faith I require in those that are to bee members of my Church: Neither is this allusion to a name, an unusuall thing in common speech: But it had been a strange, and obscure speech, if our Saviour intending to build his Church on the Person of S.
Our Savior, therefore, after the confession of that fundamental article, alluding to his name, said (as it would be in English): You are Stone, and upon this stone I will build my Church. That is as much as to say: this article, that I am the Christ, is the foundation of all the faith I require in those who are to be members of my Church. Nor is such an allusion to a name anything unusual in common speech. But it would have been a strange and obscure way of speaking if our Savior, intending to build his Church on the person of St.
Peter, had said, thou art a Stone, and upon this Stone I will build my Church, when it was so obvious without ambiguity to have said, I will build my Church on thee; and yet there had been still the same allusion to his name.
Peter, had said, “You are a stone, and upon this stone I will build my Church,” when it would have been so obvious, and free of ambiguity, to say, “I will build my Church on you”—and there would still have been the same allusion to his name.
And for the following words, I will give thee the Keyes of Heaven, &c. it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his Disciples [Matth. 18. 18.] Whatsoever yee shall bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven. And whatsoever ye shall loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven. But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the Power here granted belongs to all Supreme Pastors; such as are all Christian Civill Soveraignes in their own Dominions. In so much, as if St.
As for the words that follow, “I will give you the keys of heaven,” etc., this is no more than what our Savior also gave to all the rest of his disciples (Matthew 18:18): “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” But however this is interpreted, there is no doubt that the power granted here belongs to all supreme pastors, as all Christian civil sovereigns are in their own dominions. So much so that if St.
Peter, or our Saviour himself had converted any of them to beleeve him, and to acknowledge his Kingdome; yet because his Kingdome is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him; or else hee must have deprived him of the Soveraignty, to which the Right of Teaching is inseparably annexed. And thus much in refutation of his first Book, wherein hee would prove St. Peter to have been the Monarch Universall of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.
Peter, or our Savior himself, had converted any of them to believe in him and acknowledge his kingdom, then, since his kingdom is not of this world, he would have left the supreme care of converting his subjects to that sovereign alone; or else he must have deprived him of the sovereignty, to which the right of teaching is inseparably attached. So much in refutation of his first book, in which he would prove St. Peter to have been the universal monarch of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.
The second Book hath two Conclusions: One, that S. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and there dyed: The other, that the Popes of Rome are his Successors. Both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them true; yet if by Bishop of Rome, bee understood either the Monarch of the Church, or the Supreme Pastor of it; not Silvester, but Constantine (who was the first Christian Emperour) was that Bishop; and as Constantine, so all other Christian Emperors were of Right supreme Bishops of the Roman Empire; I say of the Roman Empire, not of all Christendome: For other Christian Soveraigns had the same Right in their severall Territories, as to an Office essentially adhaerent to their Soveraignty.
The second book has two conclusions: one, that St. Peter was bishop of Rome and died there; the other, that the popes of Rome are his successors. Both have been disputed by others. But supposing them true, still, if by “bishop of Rome” is meant either the monarch of the Church or its supreme pastor, then not Silvester but Constantine (who was the first Christian emperor) was that bishop. And like Constantine, all other Christian emperors were by right supreme bishops of the Roman Empire—I say of the Roman Empire, not of all Christendom. For other Christian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as an office essentially inherent in their sovereignty.
Which shall serve for answer to his second Book.
This will serve as an answer to his second book.
In the third Book, he handleth the question whether the Pope be Antichrist. For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that sense the Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from the quality of Antichrist, to contradict the Authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised in the Dominions of any other Prince, or State.
In the third book he deals with the question whether the Pope is Antichrist. For my part, I see no argument that proves he is, in the sense in which Scripture uses the name. Nor will I take any argument from the character of Antichrist to contradict the authority he exercises, or has formerly exercised, in the dominions of any other prince or state.
It is evident that the Prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the time of Samuel, when they required a King after the manner of other Nations. This expectation of theirs, made them obnoxious to the Imposture of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the Kingdome, and the art to deceive the People by counterfeit miracles, by hypocriticall life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour therefore, and his Apostles forewarned men of False Prophets, and of False Christs.
It is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected, a Messiah, that is, a Christ, who would re-establish among them the Kingdom of God, which they had rejected in the time of Samuel when they demanded a king in the manner of other nations. This expectation of theirs made them vulnerable to the imposture of all who had both the ambition to try to gain the kingdom and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by a hypocritical life, or by plausible speeches and doctrine. Our Savior and his apostles therefore warned men beforehand of false prophets and false Christs.
False Christs, are such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not, and are called properly Antichrists, in such sense, as when there happeneth a Schisme in the Church by the election of two Popes, the one calleth the other Antipapa, or the false Pope. And therefore Antichrist in the proper signification hath two essentiall marks; One, that he denyeth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth himselfe to bee Christ. The first Mark is set down by S. Iohn in his 1 Epist. 4. ch. 3. ver.
False Christs are those who claim to be the Christ but are not. They are properly called Antichrists, in the same sense in which, when a schism happens in the Church through the election of two popes, each calls the other Antipapa, or the false pope. And therefore Antichrist, in the proper meaning of the word, has two essential marks: one, that he denies Jesus to be the Christ; the other, that he professes himself to be the Christ. The first mark is set down by St. John in his first epistle:
Every Spirit that confesseth not that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; And this is the Spirit of Antichrist. The other Mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour, (Mat. 24. 5.) Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and again, If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ, there is Christ, beleeve it not. And therefore Antichrist must be a False Christ, that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ.
(1 John 4:3) “Every spirit that does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist.” The other mark is expressed in the words of our Savior (Matthew 24:5), “Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ,” and again, “If any man shall say to you, Look, here is Christ, there is Christ, do not believe it.” And therefore Antichrist must be a false Christ, that is, one of those who shall claim to be Christ.
And out of these two Marks, to deny Iesus to be the Christ, and to affirm himselfe to be the Christ, it followeth, that he must also be an Adversary of Iesus the true Christ, which is another usuall signification of the word Antichrist.
And from these two marks, to deny Jesus to be the Christ and to affirm himself to be the Christ, it follows that he must also be an adversary of Jesus, the true Christ, which is another usual meaning of the word Antichrist.
But of these many Antichrists, there is one speciall one, O Antichristos, The Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one certaine person; not indefinitely an Antichrist. Now seeing the Pope of Rome, neither pretendeth himself, nor denyeth Jesus to bee the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to be His Lieutenant, or Vicar generall, but to be Hee. There is also some Mark of the time of this speciall Antichrist, as (Mat. 24. 15.)
But of these many Antichrists there is one special one, ho Antichristos, the Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one certain person—not indefinitely an Antichrist. Now since the Pope of Rome neither claims to be the Christ himself nor denies Jesus to be the Christ, I do not see how he can be called Antichrist. For by that word is meant not one who falsely claims to be His lieutenant or vicar general, but one who claims to be He. There is also a mark given of the time of this special Antichrist, as
when that abominable Destroyer, spoken of by Daniel, shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, (ver. 22.) no flesh could be saved; but for the elects sake those days shall be shortened (made fewer). But that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the Sun and Moon, a falling of the Stars, a concussion of the Heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour in the cloudes. And therefore The Antichrist is not yet come; whereas, many Popes are both come and gone.
(Matthew 24:15) when that abominable destroyer spoken of by Daniel shall stand in the holy place, and there shall be such tribulation as there has not been since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again—so great that if it were to last long (verse 22), “no flesh could be saved; but for the elect’s sake those days shall be shortened” (made fewer). But that tribulation has not yet come. For it is to be followed immediately (verse 29) by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a shaking of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Savior in the clouds. And therefore the Antichrist has not yet come, whereas many popes have both come and gone.
It is true, the Pope in taking upon him to give Laws to all Christian Kings, and Nations, usurpeth a Kingdome in this world, which Christ took not on him: but he doth it not as Christ, but as for Christ, wherein there is nothing of The Antichrist.
It is true that the Pope, in taking it upon himself to give laws to all Christian kings and nations, usurps a kingdom in this world, which Christ did not take upon himself. But he does it not as Christ but for Christ, and in that there is nothing of the Antichrist.
Bellarmine answered: infallibility and papal law
The texts Bellarmine cites give the Pope neither infallibility nor power to make laws outside his dominions.
In the fourth Book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme Judg in all questions of Faith and Manners, (which is as much as to be the absolute Monarch of all Christians in the world,) he bringeth three Propositions: The first, that his Judgments are Infallible: The second, that he can make very Laws, and punish those that observe them not: The third, that our Saviour conferred all Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall on the Pope of Rome.
In the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all questions of faith and morals (which is as much as to be the absolute monarch of all Christians in the world), he brings three propositions. The first, that his judgments are infallible. The second, that he can make real laws and punish those who do not observe them. The third, that our Savior conferred all ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the Pope of Rome.
For the Infallibility of his Judgments, he alledgeth the Scriptures: and first, that of Luke 22. 31. Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you that hee may sist you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith faile not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy thy Brethren. This, according to Bellarmines exposition, is, that Christ gave here to Simon Peter two priviledges: one, that neither his Faith should fail, nor the Faith of any of his successors: the other, that neither he, nor any of his successors should ever define any point concerning Faith, or Manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope: Which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation.
For the infallibility of his judgments he cites the Scriptures, and first Luke 22:31–32: “Simon, Simon, Satan has desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for you, that your faith fail not; and when you are converted, strengthen your brethren.” According to Bellarmine’s exposition, Christ here gave Simon Peter two privileges: one, that neither his faith nor the faith of any of his successors should fail; the other, that neither he nor any of his successors should ever define any point of faith or morals erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former pope. This is a strange and very much strained interpretation.
But he that with attention readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the whole Scripture, that maketh more against the Popes Authority, than this very place. The Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passeover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the Passeover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same with his Apostles, which he said, till the Kingdome of God was come hee would doe no more; and withall told them, that one of them was to betray him: Hereupon they questioned, which of them it should be; and withall (seeing the next Passeover their Master would celebrate should be when he was King) entred into a contention, who should then be the greatest man.
But whoever reads that chapter attentively will find that there is no place in all of Scripture that tells more against the Pope’s authority than this very passage. The priests and scribes were seeking to kill our Savior at the Passover, and Judas was resolved to betray him. When the day of killing the Passover lamb had come, our Savior celebrated it with his apostles, saying he would do so no more until the Kingdom of God had come, and at the same time told them that one of them was to betray him. At this they asked one another which of them it would be; and at the same time (seeing that the next Passover their master celebrated would be when he was king) they fell into a dispute over who should then be the greatest.
Our Saviour therefore told them, that the Kings of the Nations had Dominion over their Subjects, and are called by a name (in Hebrew) that signifies Bountifull; but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to serve one another; I ordain you a Kingdome, but it is such as my Father hath ordained mee; a Kingdome that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possesse till my second coming; then yee shall eat and drink at my Table, and sit on Thrones, judging the twelve Tribes of Israel: And then addressing himself to St.
Our Savior therefore told them that the kings of the nations have dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name that (in Hebrew) signifies “bountiful”; but I cannot be so to you—you must strive to serve one another. I ordain you a kingdom, but it is such as my Father has ordained me: a kingdom that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possess until my second coming. Then you shall eat and drink at my table and sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And then, addressing himself to St.
Peter, he saith, Simon, Simon, Satan seeks by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; Thou therefore (Note this,) being converted, and understanding my Kingdome as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy Brethren: To which S. Peter answered (as one that no more expected any authority in this world) Lord I am ready to goe with thee, not onely to Prison, but to Death. Whereby it is manifest, S. Peter had not onely no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach all the other Apostles, that they also should have none. And for the Infallibility of St.
Peter, he says: “Simon, Simon,” Satan seeks, by suggesting a present dominion, to weaken your faith in the future one; but I have prayed for you, that your faith shall not fail. You therefore (note this), being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another world, confirm the same faith in your brethren. To this St. Peter answered (as one who no longer expected any authority in this world), “Lord, I am ready to go with you, not only to prison, but to death.” From this it is manifest that St. Peter not only was given no jurisdiction in this world, but was charged to teach all the other apostles that they too should have none. And as for the infallibility of St.
Peters sentence definitive in matter of Faith, there is no more to be attributed to it out of this Text, than that Peter should continue in the beleef of this point, namely, that Christ should come again, and possesse the Kingdome at the day of Judgement; which was not given by this Text to all his Successors; for wee see they claime it in the World that now is.
Peter’s final judgment in matters of faith, no more can be attributed to it from this text than that Peter should continue to believe this point: namely, that Christ would come again and possess the kingdom at the Day of Judgment. And this was not given by this text to all his successors, for we see that they claim the kingdom in the world that now is.
The second place is that of Matth. 16. Thou art Peter, and upon this rocke I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. By which (as I have already shewn in this chapter) is proved no more, than that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely this, that Iesus is Christ the Sonne of God.
The second passage is Matthew 16: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” By this (as I have already shown in this chapter) nothing more is proved than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter that gave occasion to that speech—namely, that “Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.”
The third Text is Iohn 21. ver. 16, 17. Feed my sheep; which contains no more but a Commission of Teaching: And if we grant the rest of the Apostles to be contained in that name of Sheep; then it is the supreme Power of Teaching: but it was onely for the time that there were no Christian Soveraigns already possessed of that Supremacy. But I have already proved, that Christian Soveraignes are in their owne Dominions the supreme Pastors, and instituted thereto, by vertue of their being Baptized, though without other Imposition of Hands.
The third text is John 21:16–17, “Feed my sheep,” which contains nothing more than a commission to teach. And if we grant that the rest of the apostles are included under the name sheep, then it is the supreme power of teaching. But it was only for the time when there were no Christian sovereigns already possessed of that supremacy. And I have already proved that Christian sovereigns are the supreme pastors in their own dominions, instituted to that office by virtue of their baptism, even without any other laying on of hands.
For such Imposition being a Ceremony of designing the person, is needlesse, when hee is already designed to the Power of Teaching what Doctrine he will, by his institution to an Absolute Power over his Subjects. For as I have proved before, Soveraigns are supreme Teachers (in generall) by their Office; and therefore oblige themselves (by their Baptisme) to teach the Doctrine of Christ: And when they suffer others to teach their people, they doe it at the perill of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the Heads of Families that God will require the account of the instruction of his Children and Servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that God saith (Gen. 18. 19.)
For such laying on of hands, being a ceremony for designating the person, is needless when he is already designated to the power of teaching whatever doctrine he will by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects. For, as I have proved before, sovereigns are supreme teachers (in general) by their office, and therefore oblige themselves (by their baptism) to teach the doctrine of Christ. And when they allow others to teach their people, they do it at the peril of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the heads of families that God will require an account of the instruction of his children and servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hired hand, that God says
I know him that he will command his Children, and his houshold after him, that they keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgement.
(Genesis 18:19) “I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgment.”
The fourth place is that of Exod. 28. 30. Thou shalt put in the Breastplate of Iudgment, the Vrim and the Thummin: which hee saith is interpreted by the Septuagint delosin kai aletheian, that is, Evidence and Truth: And thence concludeth, God had given Evidence, and Truth, (which is almost Infallibility,) to the High Priest.
The fourth passage is Exodus 28:30: “You shall put in the breastplate of judgment the Urim and the Thummim.” This, he says, is rendered by the Septuagint as dēlōsin kai alētheian, that is, evidence and truth. And from this he concludes that God had given evidence and truth (which is almost infallibility) to the high priest.
But be it Evidence and Truth it selfe that was given; or be it but Admonition to the Priest to endeavour to inform himself cleerly, and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was given to the High Priest, it was given to the Civill Soveraign: For such next under God was the High Priest in the the Common-wealth of Israel; and is an argument for Evidence and Truth, that is, for the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy of Civill Soveraigns over their own Subjects, against the pretended Power of the Pope. These are all the Texts hee bringeth for the Infallibility of the Judgement of the Pope, in point of Faith.
But whether it was evidence and truth itself that was given, or only an admonition to the priest to strive to inform himself clearly and give judgment uprightly, still, in being given to the high priest, it was given to the civil sovereign. For that is what the high priest was, next under God, in the commonwealth of Israel. So this is an argument for evidence and truth—that is, for the ecclesiastical supremacy of civil sovereigns over their own subjects—against the pretended power of the Pope. These are all the texts he brings for the infallibility of the Pope’s judgment in matters of faith.
For the Infallibility of his Judgment concerning Manners, hee bringeth one Text, which is that of Iohn 16. 13. When the Spirit of truth is come, hee will lead you into all truth: where (saith he) by all truth, is meant, at least, all truth necessary to salvation. But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more Infallibility to the Pope, than to any man that professeth Christianity, and is not to be damned: For if any man erre in any point, wherein not to erre is necessary to Salvation, it is impossible he should be saved; for that onely is necessary to Salvation, without which to be saved is impossible. What points these are, I shall declare out of the Scripture in the Chapter following.
For the infallibility of his judgment concerning morals he brings one text, John 16:13: “When the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth.” Here (he says) all truth means at least all truth necessary to salvation. But with this qualification he attributes no more infallibility to the Pope than to any man who professes Christianity and is not to be damned. For if any man errs on any point where not erring is necessary to salvation, it is impossible for him to be saved, since only that is necessary to salvation without which it is impossible to be saved. What these points are I shall set out from Scripture in the following chapter.
In this place I say no more, but that though it were granted, the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him to any Jurisdiction in the Dominions of another Prince, unlesse we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another.
Here I say no more than this: even if it were granted that the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all, that would not entitle him to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince—unless we are also to say that a man is obliged in conscience to employ the best workman on every occasion, even when he has previously promised his work to another.
Besides the Text, he argueth from Reason, thus. If the Pope could erre in necessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Churches Salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the Popes directions. But this Reason is invalid, unlesse he shew when, and where Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope: Nay granting whatsoever was given to S. Peter, was given to the Pope: yet seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St. Peter, no man can bee just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are contrary to those of his lawfull Soveraign.
Besides the texts, he argues from reason, thus: if the Pope could err in necessary matters, then Christ has not sufficiently provided for the Church’s salvation, since he has commanded her to follow the Pope’s directions. But this reasoning is invalid unless he shows when and where Christ commanded that, or took any notice of a pope at all. Indeed, even granting that whatever was given to St. Peter was given to the Pope, still, since there is no command in Scripture to any man to obey St. Peter, no man who obeys him can be just when his commands are contrary to those of his lawful sovereign.
Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himselfe, that he is the Civill Soveraign of all the Christians in the world; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his Jurisdiction in point of Manners. For the Civill Soveraignty, and supreme Judicature in controversies of Manners, are the same thing: And the Makers of Civill Laws, are not onely Declarers, but also Makers of the justice, and injustice of actions; there being nothing in mens Manners that makes them righteous, or unrighteous, but their conformity with the Law of the Soveraign.
Lastly, it has not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himself, that he is the civil sovereign of all the Christians in the world; and therefore not all Christians are bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in matters of morals. For civil sovereignty and supreme judicature in controversies of morals are the same thing. And the makers of civil laws are not only declarers but also makers of the justice and injustice of actions, since there is nothing in men’s conduct that makes it righteous or unrighteous except its conformity with the law of the sovereign.
And therefore when the Pope challengeth Supremacy in controversies of Manners, hee teacheth men to disobey the Civill Soveraign; which is an erroneous Doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our Saviour and his Apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.
And therefore, when the Pope claims supremacy in controversies of morals, he teaches men to disobey the civil sovereign. This is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our Savior and his apostles delivered to us in Scripture.
To prove the Pope has Power to make Laws, he alledgeth many places; as first, Deut. 17. 12. The man that will doe presumptuously, and will not he arken unto the Priest, (that standeth to Minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the Iudge,) even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evill from Israel. For answer whereunto, we are to remember that the High Priest (next and immediately under God) was the Civill Soveraign; and all Judges were to be constituted by him. The words alledged sound therefore thus.
To prove that the Pope has power to make laws, he cites many passages. First, Deuteronomy 17:12: “The man that will act presumptuously, and will not listen to the priest (who stands to minister there before the Lord your God) or to the judge, that man shall die, and you shall put away the evil from Israel.” In answer to this we must remember that the high priest (next and immediately under God) was the civil sovereign, and that all judges were to be appointed by him. The words cited therefore amount to this:
The man that will presume to disobey the Civill Soveraign for the time being, or any of his Officers in the execution of their places, that man shall die, &c. which is cleerly for the Civill Soveraignty, against the Universall power of the Pope.
“The man that will presume to disobey the civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers in the execution of their duties, that man shall die,” etc. This is clearly for the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of the Pope.
Secondly, he alledgeth that of Matth. 16. Whatsoever yee shall bind, &c. and interpreteth it for such binding as is attributed (Matth. 23. 4.) to the Scribes and Pharisees, They bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be born, and lay them on mens shoulders; by which is meant (he sayes) Making of Laws; and concludes thence, that the Pope can make Laws. But this also maketh onely for the Legislative power of Civill Soveraigns: For the Scribes, and Pharisees sat in Moses Chaire, but Moses next under God was Soveraign of the People of Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded them to doe all that they should say, but not all that they should do.
Second, he cites Matthew 16, “Whatever you shall bind,” etc., and interprets it as the kind of binding attributed (Matthew 23:4) to the scribes and Pharisees: “They bind heavy burdens, grievous to be borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders.” By this, he says, is meant the making of laws, and he concludes from it that the Pope can make laws. But this too tells only for the legislative power of civil sovereigns. For the scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses’ seat, and Moses, next under God, was sovereign of the people of Israel. And therefore our Savior commanded the people to do all that they should say, but not all that they should do.
That is, to obey their Laws, but not follow their Example.
That is, to obey their laws, but not to follow their example.
The third place, is Iohn 21. 16. Feed my sheep; which is not a Power to make Laws, but a command to Teach. Making Laws belongs to the Lord of the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain, as also a Schoolmaster to Teach his children.
The third passage is John 21:16, “Feed my sheep,” which is not a power to make laws but a command to teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of the family, who at his own discretion chooses his chaplain, as he also chooses a schoolmaster to teach his children.
The fourth place Iohn 20. 21. is against him. The words are, As my Father sent me, so send I you. But our Saviour was sent to Redeeem (by his Death) such as should Beleeve; and by his own, and his Apostles preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his Kingdome; which he himself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter, though hee refused (Acts 1. 6, 7.) to tell his Apostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve Apostles shall sit on twelve Thrones (every one perhaps as high as that of St. Peter) to judge the twelve tribes of Israel.
The fourth passage, John 20:21, is against him. The words are, “As my Father has sent me, so I send you.” But our Savior was sent to redeem (by his death) those who would believe, and by his own preaching and that of his apostles to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom. That kingdom, he himself says, is not of this world; and he has taught us to pray for its coming hereafter, though he refused (Acts 1:6–7) to tell his apostles when it would come. And in it, when it comes, the twelve apostles shall sit on twelve thrones (each perhaps as high as St. Peter’s) to judge the twelve tribes of Israel.
Seeing then God the Father sent not our Saviour to make Laws in this present world, wee may conclude from the Text, that neither did our Saviour send S. Peter to make Laws here, but to perswade men to expect his second comming with a stedfast faith; and in the mean time, if Subjects, to obey their Princes; and if Princes, both to beleeve it themselves, and to do their best to make their Subjects doe the same; which is the Office of a Bishop. Therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy to the Civill Soveraignty, contrary to that which Cardinall Bellarmine alledgeth it for.
Since, then, God the Father did not send our Savior to make laws in this present world, we may conclude from the text that neither did our Savior send St. Peter to make laws here, but to persuade men to expect his second coming with steadfast faith; and in the meantime, if they are subjects, to obey their princes; and if they are princes, both to believe it themselves and to do their best to make their subjects do the same—which is the office of a bishop. Therefore this passage tells most strongly for joining the ecclesiastical supremacy to the civil sovereignty, contrary to what Cardinal Bellarmine cites it for.
The fift place is Acts 15. 28. It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden, than these necessary things, that yee abstain from meats offered to Idoles, and from bloud, and from things strangled, and from fornication. Here hee notes the word Laying of burdens for the Legislative Power. But who is there, that reading this Text, can say, this stile of the Apostles may not as properly be used in giving Counsell, as in making Laws?
The fifth passage is Acts 15:28: “It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things: that you abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.” Here he takes the phrase laying of burdens to mean legislative power. But who is there that, reading this text, can say that this language of the apostles may not as properly be used in giving counsel as in making laws?
The stile of a Law is, We command: But, We think good, is the ordinary stile of them, that but give Advice; and they lay a Burthen that give Advice, though it bee conditionall, that is, if they to whom they give it, will attain their ends: And such is the Burthen, of abstaining from things strangled, and from bloud; not absolute, but in case they will not erre. I have shewn before (chap. 25.) that Law, is distinguished from Counsell, in this, that the reason of a Law, is taken from the designe, and benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a Counsell, from the designe, and benefit of him, to whom the Counsell is given.
The language of a law is “We command”; but “We think good” is the ordinary language of those who only give advice. And those who give advice do lay a burden, though a conditional one—that is, if those to whom they give it wish to attain their ends. Such is the burden of abstaining from things strangled and from blood: not absolute, but in case they wish not to err. I have shown before (chapter 25) that law is distinguished from counsel in this: the reason of a law is taken from the design and benefit of the one who prescribes it, but the reason of a counsel from the design and benefit of the one to whom the counsel is given.
But here, the Apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely their Salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed, or not. And therefore the Acts of this Councell, were not Laws, but Counsells.
But here the apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely their salvation, not at their own benefit; for having done their part, they will have their reward whether they are obeyed or not. And therefore the acts of this council were not laws but counsels.
The sixt place is that of Rom. 13. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God; which is meant, he saith not onely of Secular, but also of Ecclesiasticall Princes. To which I answer, first, that there are no Ecclesiasticall Princes but those that are also Civill Soveraignes; and their Principalities exceed not the compasse of their Civill Soveraignty; without those bounds though they may be received for Doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for Princes.
The sixth passage is Romans 13: “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God.” This is meant, he says, not only of secular but also of ecclesiastical princes. To this I answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes except those who are also civil sovereigns, and their principalities do not exceed the bounds of their civil sovereignty. Beyond those bounds, though they may be received as doctors, they cannot be acknowledged as princes.
For if the Apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own Princes, and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which Christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely, to serve two Masters. And though the Apostle say in another place, I write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpnesse, according to the Power which the Lord hath given me; it is not, that he challenged a Power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are Punishments; but onely to Excommunicate, which (without the Civill Power) is no more but a leaving of their company, and having no more to doe with them, than with a Heathen man, or a Publican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the Excommunicant, than to the Excommunicate.
For if the apostle had meant that we should be subject both to our own princes and also to the Pope, he would have taught us a doctrine that Christ himself has told us is impossible, namely, “to serve two masters.” And though the apostle says in another place, “I write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness, according to the power which the Lord has given me,” this does not mean that he claimed a power to put any of them to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine them, which are punishments. He claimed only the power to excommunicate, which (without the civil power) is nothing more than leaving their company and having no more to do with them than with a heathen or a publican. On many occasions this might be a greater pain to the one who excommunicates than to the one excommunicated.
The seventh place is 1 Cor. 4. 21. Shall I come unto you with a Rod, or in love, and the spirit of lenity? But here again, it is not the Power of a Magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a Rod; but onely the Power of Excommunication, which is not in its owne nature a Punishment, but onely a Denouncing of punishment, that Christ shall inflict, when he shall be in possession of his Kingdome, at the day of Judgment.
The seventh passage is 1 Corinthians 4:21: “Shall I come to you with a rod, or in love and the spirit of gentleness?” But here again it is not the power of a magistrate to punish offenders that is meant by a rod, but only the power of excommunication. This is not in its own nature a punishment, but only a denouncing of the punishment that Christ will inflict when he is in possession of his kingdom, at the Day of Judgment.
Nor then also shall it bee properly a Punishment, as upon a Subject that hath broken the Law; but a Revenge, as upon an Enemy, or Revolter, that denyeth the Right of our Saviour to the Kingdome: And therefore this proveth not the Legislative Power of any Bishop, that has not also the Civill Power.
Nor even then will it properly be a punishment, as on a subject who has broken the law, but a revenge, as on an enemy or a rebel who denies our Savior’s right to the kingdom. And therefore this does not prove the legislative power of any bishop who does not also have the civil power.
The eighth place is, Timothy 3. 2. A Bishop must be the husband but of one wife, vigilant, sober, &c. which he saith was a Law. I thought that none could make a Law in the Church, but the Monarch of the the Church, St. Peter. But suppose this Precept made by the authority of St. Peter; yet I see no reason why to call it a Law, rather than an Advice, seeing Timothy was not a Subject, but a Disciple of S.
The eighth passage is 1 Timothy 3:2: “A bishop must be the husband of one wife, vigilant, sober,” etc., which he says was a law. I thought that no one could make a law in the Church but the monarch of the Church, St. Peter. But suppose this precept was made by the authority of St. Peter; still I see no reason to call it a law rather than advice, since Timothy was not a subject but a disciple of St.
Paul; nor the flock under the charge of Timothy, his Subjects in the Kingdome, but his Scholars in the Schoole of Christ: If all the Precepts he giveth Timothy, be Laws, why is not this also a Law, Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy healths sake? And why are not also the Precepts of good Physitians, so many Laws? but that it is not the Imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute Subjection to a Person, that maketh his Precepts Laws.
Paul, and the flock under Timothy’s charge were not his subjects in a kingdom but his scholars in the school of Christ. If all the precepts he gives Timothy are laws, why is this not also a law: “Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for your health’s sake”? And why are not the precepts of good physicians so many laws? It is not the imperative manner of speaking, but absolute subjection to a person, that makes his precepts laws.
In like manner, the ninth place, 1 Tim. 5. 19. Against an Elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three Witnesses, is a wise Precept, but not a Law.
In the same way, the ninth passage, 1 Timothy 5:19, “Against an elder receive not an accusation, except before two or three witnesses,” is a wise precept, but not a law.
The tenth place is, Luke 10. 16. He that heareth you, heareth mee; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me. And there is no doubt, but he that despiseth the Counsell of those that are sent by Christ, despiseth the Counsell of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by Christ, but such as are ordained Pastors by lawfull Authority? and who are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the Soveraign Pastor? and who is ordained by the Soveraign Pastor in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not ordained by the authority of the Soveraign thereof?
The tenth passage is Luke 10:16: “He that hears you hears me; and he that despises you despises me.” And there is no doubt that whoever despises the counsel of those sent by Christ despises the counsel of Christ himself. But who are those now sent by Christ, if not those ordained pastors by lawful authority? And who are lawfully ordained, if not those ordained by the sovereign pastor? And who is ordained by the sovereign pastor in a Christian commonwealth, if not by the authority of its sovereign?
Out of this place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his Soveraign being a Christian, heareth Christ; and hee that despiseth the Doctrine which his King being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the Doctrine of Christ (which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary). But all this is nothing to a Law. Nay more, a Christian King, as a Pastor, and Teacher of his Subjects, makes not thereby his Doctrines Laws.
It follows from this passage, therefore, that whoever hears his sovereign, being a Christian, hears Christ; and whoever despises the doctrine that his king, being a Christian, authorizes, despises the doctrine of Christ (which is not what Bellarmine intends to prove here, but the contrary). But all this has nothing to do with law. Indeed, a Christian king, as pastor and teacher of his subjects, does not thereby make his doctrines laws.
He cannot oblige men to beleeve; though as a Civill Soveraign he may make Laws suitable to his Doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are Laws; and the externall actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the Soveraign, and not of the Subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his owne at all; because God hath commanded to obey them.
He cannot oblige men to believe. As a civil sovereign, though, he may make laws suited to his doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions—sometimes to actions they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command. Yet when they are commanded, they are laws; and the external actions done in obedience to them, without inward approval, are the actions of the sovereign and not of the subject, who in that case is only an instrument, without any motion of his own at all—because God has commanded that they be obeyed.
The eleventh, is every place, where the Apostle for Counsell, putteth some word, by which men use to signifie Command; or calleth the following of his Counsell, by the name of Obedience. And therefore they are alledged out of 1 Cor. 11. 2. I commend you for keeping my Precepts as I delivered them to you. The Greek is, I commend you for keeping those things I delivered to you, as I delivered them. Which is far from signifying that they were Laws, or any thing else, but good Counsell. And that of 1. *Thess. 4. 2.
The eleventh is every passage where the apostle, giving counsel, uses some word by which men usually signify command, or calls the following of his counsel by the name of obedience. So they cite 1 Corinthians 11:2: “I commend you for keeping my precepts as I delivered them to you.” The Greek is, “I commend you for keeping the things I delivered to you, as I delivered them.” This is far from signifying that they were laws, or anything but good counsel. And so with
You know what commandements we gave you: where the Greek word is paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to paredokamen, what wee delivered to you, as in the place next before alledged, which does not prove the Traditions of the Apostles, to be any more than Counsells; though as is said in the 8 verse, he that despiseth them, despiseth not man, but God:* For our Saviour himself came not to Judge, that is, to be King in this world; but to Sacrifice himself for Sinners, and leave Doctors in his Church, to lead, not to drive men to Christ, who never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the Law produceth;) but the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of Laws, but of Counsell, and Doctrine.
1 Thessalonians 4:2, “You know what commandments we gave you,” where the Greek words are paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to paredokamen, “what we delivered to you,” as in the passage cited just before. This does not prove the traditions of the apostles to be anything more than counsels, even though, as is said in verse 8, “he that despises them despises not man but God.” For our Savior himself came not to judge, that is, to be king in this world, but to sacrifice himself for sinners and to leave doctors in his Church to lead men to Christ, not to drive them. He never accepts forced actions (which is all that law produces), but the inward conversion of the heart, which is the work not of laws but of counsel and doctrine.
And that of 2 Thess. 3. 14. If any man Obey not our word by this Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may bee ashamed: where from the word Obey, he would inferre, that this Epistle was a Law to the Thessalonians. The Epistles of the Emperours were indeed Laws. If therefore the Epistle of S. Paul were also a Law, they were to obey two Masters. But the word Obey, as it is in the Greek upakouei, signifieth hearkning to, or putting in practice, not onley that which is Commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is delivered in a way of Counsell for our good; and therefore St.
And so with 2 Thessalonians 3:14: “If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed.” From the word obey he would infer that this epistle was a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed laws. If, therefore, the epistle of St. Paul was also a law, they had to obey two masters. But the word obey, as it is in the Greek, hypakouei, signifies listening to or putting into practice not only what is commanded by one who has the right to punish, but also what is delivered by way of counsel for our good. And therefore St.
Paul does not bid kill him that disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him, which Legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may bee ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the Empire of an Apostle, but his Reputation amongst the Faithfull, which the Christians stood in awe of.
Paul does not bid them kill the one who disobeys, nor beat, imprison, or fine him, all of which legislators may do, but avoid his company, that he may be ashamed. From this it is evident that it was not the authority of an apostle but his reputation among the faithful that the Christians stood in awe of.
The last place is that of Heb. 13. 17. Obey your Leaders, and submit your selves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account: And here also is intended by Obedience, a following of their Counsell: For the reason of our Obedience, is not drawn from the will and command of our Pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the Salvation of our Souls they watch for, and not for the Exaltation of their own Power, and Authority. If it were meant here, that all they teach were Laws, then not onely the Pope, but every Pastor in his Parish should have Legislative Power.
The last passage is Hebrews 13:17: “Obey your leaders, and submit yourselves to them, for they watch over your souls, as those who must give account.” Here too obedience means following their counsel. For the reason for our obedience is drawn not from the will and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, since it is the salvation of our souls they watch for, and not the exaltation of their own power and authority. If it were meant here that all they teach were laws, then not only the Pope but every pastor in his parish would have legislative power.
Again, they that are bound to obey, their Pastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall wee say to St. Iohn who bids us (1 Epist. chap. 4. ver. 1.) Not to beleeve every Spirit, but to try the Spirits whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world? It is therefore manifest, that wee may dispute the Doctrine of our Pastors; but no man can dispute a Law. The Commands of Civill Soveraigns are on all sides granted to be Laws: if any else can make a Law besides himselfe, all Common-wealth, and consequently all Peace, and Justice must cease; which is contrary to all Laws, both Divine and Humane.
Again, those who are bound to obey their pastors have no power to examine their commands. What then shall we say to St. John, who bids us (1 John 4:1) “not to believe every spirit, but to test the spirits, whether they are of God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world”? It is therefore manifest that we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors, but no man can dispute a law. The commands of civil sovereigns are granted on all sides to be laws. If anyone besides the sovereign can make a law, all commonwealth, and consequently all peace and justice, must cease—which is contrary to all laws, both divine and human.
Nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places of Scripture, to prove the Decrees of the Pope, where he has not also the Civill Soveraignty, to be Laws.
Nothing, therefore, can be drawn from these or any other passages of Scripture to prove that the decrees of the Pope are laws where he does not also have the civil sovereignty.
The last point hee would prove, is this, That our Saviour Christ has committed Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope. Wherein he handleth not the Question of Supremacy between the Pope and Christian Kings, but between the Pope and other Bishops. And first, he sayes it is agreed, that the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is at least in the generall de Iure Divino, that is, in the Right of God; for which he alledges S. Paul, Ephes. 4. 11.
The last point he would prove is this: “that our Savior Christ has committed ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope.” Here he deals not with the question of supremacy between the Pope and Christian kings, but between the Pope and other bishops. And first, he says it is agreed that the jurisdiction of bishops is, at least in general, de jure divino, that is, by the right of God. For this he cites St. Paul
where hee sayes, that Christ after his Ascension into heaven, gave gifts to men, some Apostles, some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors, and some Teachers And thence inferres, they have indeed their Jurisdiction in Gods Right; but will not grant they have it immediately from God, but derived through the Pope.
(Ephesians 4:11), where he says that Christ, after his ascension into heaven, “gave gifts to men: some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers.” And from this he infers that they do indeed have their jurisdiction by God’s right, but he will not grant that they have it immediately from God; rather, it is derived through the Pope.
But if a man may be said to have his Jurisdiction de Jure Divino, and yet not immediately; what lawfull Jurisdiction, though but Civill, is there in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not also de Jure Divino? For Christian Kings have their Civill Power from God immediately; and the Magistrates under him exercise their severall charges in vertue of his Commission; wherein that which they doe, is no lesse de Jure Divino mediato, than that which the Bishops doe, in vertue of the Popes Ordination.
But if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction de jure divino, and yet not immediately, what lawful jurisdiction, even merely civil, is there in a Christian commonwealth that is not also de jure divino? For Christian kings have their civil power immediately from God, and the magistrates under them exercise their several charges by virtue of the king’s commission. So what they do is no less de jure divino mediato than what the bishops do by virtue of the Pope’s ordination.
All lawfull Power is of God, immediately in the Supreme Governour, and mediately in those that have Authority under him: So that either hee must grant every Constable in the State, to hold his Office in the Right of God; or he must not hold that any Bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himselfe.
All lawful power is from God: immediately in the supreme governor, and mediately in those who have authority under him. So either he must grant that every constable in the state holds his office by the right of God, or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so, apart from the Pope himself.
But this whole Dispute, whether Christ left the Jurisdiction to the Pope onely, or to other Bishops also, if considered out of those places where the Pope has the Civill Soveraignty, is a contention de lana Caprina: For none of them (where they are not Soveraigns) has any Jurisdiction at all. For Jurisdiction is the Power of hearing and determining Causes between man and man; and can belong to none, but him that hath the Power to prescribe the Rules of Right and Wrong; that is, to make Laws; and with the Sword of Justice to compell men to obey his Decisions, pronounced either by himself, or by the Judges he ordaineth thereunto; which none can lawfully do, but the Civill Soveraign.
But this whole dispute—whether Christ left jurisdiction to the Pope only, or to other bishops also—if considered outside those places where the Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a quarrel de lana caprina, about goat’s wool. For none of them (where they are not sovereigns) has any jurisdiction at all. Jurisdiction is the power of hearing and deciding cases between man and man. It can belong to no one but him who has the power to prescribe the rules of right and wrong, that is, to make laws, and with the sword of justice to compel men to obey his decisions, pronounced either by himself or by the judges he appoints for the purpose. And this no one can lawfully do but the civil sovereign.
Therefore when he alledgeth out of the 6 of Luke, that our Saviour called his Disciples together, and chose twelve of them which he named Apostles, he proveth that he Elected them (all, except Matthias, Paul and Barnabas,) and gave them Power and Command to Preach, but not to Judge of Causes between man and man: for that is a Power which he refused to take upon himselfe, saying, Who made me a Iudge, or a Divider, amongst you? and in another place, My Kingdome is not of this world. But hee that hath not the Power to hear, and determine Causes between man and man, cannot be said to have any Jurisdiction at all.
Therefore, when he cites the sixth chapter of Luke, that our Savior called his disciples together and chose twelve of them whom he named apostles, he proves that Christ chose them (all except Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas) and gave them power and command to preach, but not to judge cases between man and man. For that is a power he refused to take upon himself, saying, “Who made me a judge or a divider over you?” and in another place, “My kingdom is not of this world.” But whoever does not have the power to hear and decide cases between man and man cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all.
And yet this hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them Power to Preach and Baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawfull Soveraign forbidden: For to our own Soveraigns Christ himself, and his Apostles, have in sundry places expressely commanded us in all things to be obedient.
And yet this does not prevent our Savior from having given them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world, provided they were not forbidden by their own lawful sovereign. For Christ himself and his apostles have, in various places, expressly commanded us to be obedient in all things to our own sovereigns.
The arguments by which he would prove, that Bishops receive their Jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the Dominions of other Princes hath no Jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all Bishops receive Jurisdiction when they have it from their Civill Soveraigns, I will not omit the recitall of them.
The arguments by which he would prove that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the Pope are all in vain, since the Pope himself has no jurisdiction in the dominions of other princes. Yet because they prove, on the contrary, that all bishops receive their jurisdiction, when they have it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not omit reciting them.
The first, is from Numbers 11. where Moses not being able alone to undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs of the People of Israel, God commanded him to choose Seventy Elders, and took part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those Seventy Elders: by which is understood, not that God weakned the spirit of Moses, for that had not eased him at all, but that they had all of them their authority from him; wherein he doth truly, and ingenuously interpret that place.
The first is from Numbers 11. Moses, being unable to bear alone the whole burden of administering the affairs of the people of Israel, was commanded by God to choose seventy elders, and God took part of the spirit of Moses to put it upon those seventy elders. By this is understood not that God weakened the spirit of Moses, for that would not have eased him at all, but that they all had their authority from him. In this he interprets the passage truly and fairly.
But seeing Moses had the entire Soveraignty in the Common-wealth of the Jews, it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their Authority from the Civill Soveraign: and therefore that place proveth, that Bishops in every Christian Common-wealth have their Authority from the Civill Soveraign; and from the Pope in his own Territories only, and not in the Territories of any other State.
But since Moses had the entire sovereignty in the commonwealth of the Jews, it is manifest that what is signified is that they had their authority from the civil sovereign. And therefore that passage proves that bishops in every Christian commonwealth have their authority from the civil sovereign—and from the Pope only in his own territories, not in the territories of any other state.
The second argument, is from the nature of Monarchy; wherein all Authority is in one Man, and in others by derivation from him: But the Government of the Church, he says, is Monarchicall. This also makes for Christian Monarchs. For they are really Monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people;) whereas the Power of the Pope, though hee were S. Peter, is neither Monarchy, nor hath any thing of Archicall, nor Craticall, but onely of Didacticall; For God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience.
The second argument is from the nature of monarchy, in which all authority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him; and the government of the Church, he says, is monarchical. This too tells for Christian monarchs. For they are really monarchs of their own people, that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing as a Christian people); whereas the power of the Pope, even if he were St. Peter, is not monarchy, nor has it anything archical or cratical about it, but only didactical. For God accepts not a forced but a willing obedience.
The third, is, from that the Sea of S. Peter is called by S. Cyprian, the Head, the Source, the Roote, the Sun, from whence the Authority of Bishops is derived. But by the Law of Nature (which is a better Principle of Right and Wrong, than the word of any Doctor that is but a man) the Civill Soveraign in every Common-wealth, is the Head, the Source, the Root, and the Sun, from which all Jurisdiction is derived. And therefore the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is derived from the Civill Soveraign.
The third is that the see of St. Peter is called by St. Cyprian the head, the source, the root, the sun, from which the authority of bishops is derived. But by the law of nature (which is a better principle of right and wrong than the word of any doctor who is only a man), the civil sovereign in every commonwealth is the head, the source, the root, and the sun from which all jurisdiction is derived. And therefore the jurisdiction of bishops is derived from the civil sovereign.
The fourth, is taken from the Inequality of their Jurisdictions: For if God (saith he) had given it them immediately, he had given aswell Equality of Jurisdiction, as of Order: But wee see, some are Bishops but of own Town, some of a hundred Towns, and some of many whole Provinces; which differences were not determined by the command of God; their Jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of Man; and one has a greater, another a lesse, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument, if he had proved before, that the Pope had had an Universall Jurisdiction over all Christians, had been for his purpose.
The fourth is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions. For if God (he says) had given it to them immediately, he would have given equality of jurisdiction as well as of order. But we see that some are bishops of only one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces; and these differences were not determined by the command of God. Their jurisdiction, therefore, is not from God but from man, and one has a greater, another a lesser, as it pleases the prince of the Church. This argument would have served his purpose if he had first proved that the Pope had a universal jurisdiction over all Christians.
But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large Jurisdiction of the Pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the Emperours of Rome, (for the Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being Bishop of the Capitall City of the Empire, and Seat of the Emperour, claimed to be equall to him,) it followeth, that all other Bishops have their Jurisdiction from the Soveraigns of the place wherein they exercise the same: And as for that cause they have not their Authority de Iure Divino; so neither hath the Pope his de Iure Divino, except onely where hee is also the Civill Soveraign.
But that has not been proved; and it is notoriously known that the Pope’s large jurisdiction was given him by those who had it, that is, by the emperors of Rome (for the patriarch of Constantinople, on the same title—namely, being bishop of the capital city of the empire and seat of the emperor—claimed to be his equal). It follows that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place where they exercise it. And as for that reason they do not have their authority de jure divino, so neither does the Pope have his de jure divino, except only where he is also the civil sovereign.
His fift argument is this, If Bishops have their Iurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can doe nothing contrary to Gods ordination; And this consequence is good, and well proved. But (saith he) the Pope can do this, and has done it. This also is granted, so he doe it in his own Dominions, or in the Dominions of any other Prince that hath given him that Power; but not universally, in Right of the Popedome: For that power belongeth to every Christian Soveraign, within the bounds of his owne Empire, and is inseparable from the Soveraignty.
His fifth argument is this: “If bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can do nothing contrary to God’s ordinance.” This inference is good and well proved. “But” (he says) “the Pope can do this, and has done it.” This also is granted, provided he does it in his own dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince who has given him that power—but not universally, by right of the papacy. For that power belongs to every Christian sovereign within the bounds of his own empire, and is inseparable from the sovereignty.
Before the People of Israel had (by the commandment of God to Samuel) set over themselves a King, after the manner of other Nations, the High Priest had the Civill Government; and none but he could make, nor depose an inferiour Priest: But that Power was afterwards in the King, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine; For if the Priest (be he the High Priest or any other) had his Jurisdiction immediately from God, then the King could not take it from him; for he could doe nothing contrary to Gods ordinance: But it is certain, that King Solomon (1 Kings 2. 26.) deprived Abiathar the High Priest of his Office, and placed Zadok (verse 35.) in his room.
Before the people of Israel had (by God’s commandment to Samuel) set a king over themselves in the manner of other nations, the high priest had the civil government, and no one but he could appoint or depose a lesser priest. But that power was afterward in the king, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine. For if the priest (whether the high priest or any other) had his jurisdiction immediately from God, then the king could not take it from him, “for he could do nothing contrary to God’s ordinance.” But it is certain that King Solomon (1 Kings 2:26) deprived Abiathar the high priest of his office, and put Zadok (verse 35) in his place.
Kings therefore may in the like manner Ordaine, and Deprive Bishops, as they shall thinke fit, for the well governing of their Subjects.
Kings therefore may in like manner ordain and deprive bishops as they think fit, for the good government of their subjects.
His sixth argument is this, If Bishops have their Jurisdiction de Iure Divino (that is, immediately from God,) they that maintaine it, should bring some Word of God to prove it: But they can bring none. The argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no lesse good, to prove the Pope himself to have no Jurisdiction in the Dominion of any other Prince.
His sixth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction de jure divino (that is, immediately from God), those who maintain it should bring some word of God to prove it; but they can bring none. The argument is good, and so I have nothing to say against it. But it is no less good an argument to prove that the Pope himself has no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.
Lastly, hee bringeth for argument, the testimony of two Popes, Innocent, and Leo; and I doubt not but hee might have alledged, with as good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost since S. Peter: For considering the love of Power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Neverthelesse, they should therein but doe, as Innocent, and Leo did, bear witnesse of themselves, and therefore their witnesse should not be good.
Lastly, he brings as an argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent and Leo. And I do not doubt that he might, with as good reason, have cited the testimonies of almost all the popes since St. Peter. For considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whoever was made pope would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, in doing so they would only do as Innocent and Leo did: bear witness of themselves. And therefore their witness would not be good.
Bellarmine answered: the Pope's indirect power
The Pope's claimed indirect power over princes is real power, and Bellarmine's arguments for it fail.
In the fift Book he hath four Conclusions. The first is, That the Pope is not Lord of all the world: The second, That the Pope is not Lord of all the Christian world: The third, That the Pope (without his owne Territory) has not any Temporall Jurisdiction DIRECTLY: These three Conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, That the Pope has (in the Dominions of other Princes) the Supreme Temporall Power INDIRECTLY: which is denyed; unlesse hee mean by Indirectly, that he has gotten it by Indirect means, then is that also granted.
In the fifth book he has four conclusions. The first is, “That the Pope is not lord of all the world.” The second, “That the Pope is not lord of all the Christian world.” The third, “That the Pope (outside his own territory) has no temporal jurisdiction directly.” These three conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, “That the Pope has (in the dominions of other princes) the supreme temporal power indirectly.” This is denied—unless by “indirectly” he means that he has gotten it by indirect means, in which case that too is granted.
But I understand, that when he saith: he hath it Indirectly, he means, that such Temporall Jurisdiction belongeth to him of Right, but that this Right is but a Consequence of his Pastorall Authority, the which he could not exercise, unlesse he have the other with it: And therefore to the Pastorall Power (which he calls Spirituall) the Supreme Power Civill is necessarily annexed; and that thereby hee hath a Right to change Kingdomes, giving them to one, and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the Salvation of Souls.
But I understand that when he says he has it “indirectly,” he means that such temporal jurisdiction belongs to him by right, but that this right is only a consequence of his pastoral authority, which he could not exercise unless he had the other along with it. And therefore the supreme civil power is necessarily annexed to the pastoral power (which he calls spiritual), and by this he has a right to change kingdoms, giving them to one and taking them from another, whenever he thinks it conduces to the salvation of souls.
Before I come to consider the Arguments by which hee would prove this Doctrine, it will not bee amisse to lay open the Consequences of it; that Princes, and States, that have the Civill Soveraignty in their severall Common-wealths, may bethink themselves, whether it bee convenient for them, and conducing to the good of their Subjects, of whom they are to give an account at the day of Judgment, to admit the same.
Before I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this doctrine, it will not be amiss to lay open its consequences, so that princes and states that hold the civil sovereignty in their several commonwealths may consider whether it is convenient for them, and conducive to the good of their subjects (for whom they are to give an account on the Day of Judgment), to admit it.
When it is said, the Pope hath not (in the Territories of other States) the Supreme Civill Power Directly; we are to understand, he doth not challenge it, as other Civill Soveraigns doe, from the originall submission thereto of those that are to be governed.
When it is said that the Pope does not have the supreme civil power directly in the territories of other states, we are to understand that he does not claim it as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission to it of those who are to be governed.
For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this Treatise demonstrated, that the Right of all Soveraigns, is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to bee governed; whether they that choose him, doe it for their common defence against an Enemy, as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a Man, or an Assembly of men to protect them; or whether they doe it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering Enemy.
For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently demonstrated in this treatise, that the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of those who are to be governed—whether those who choose him do so for their common defense against an enemy, as when they agree among themselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them, or whether they do it to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy.
The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the Supreme Civill Power over other States Directly, denyeth no more, but that his Right cometh to him by that way; He ceaseth not for all that, to claime it another way; and that is, (without the consent of them that are to be governed) by a Right given him by God, (which hee calleth indirectly,) in his Assumption to the Papacy.
Therefore, when the Pope disclaims the supreme civil power over other states directly, he denies no more than that his right comes to him by that way. He does not for all that cease to claim it another way: that is, without the consent of those who are to be governed, by a right given him by God (which he calls indirectly) at his assumption to the papacy.
But by what way soever he pretend, the Power is the same; and he may (if it bee granted to be his Right) depose Princes and States, as often as it is for the Salvation of Soules, that is, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the Sole Power to Judge, whether it be to the Salvation of mens Souls, or not. And this is the Doctrine, not onely that Bellarmine here, and many other Doctors teach in their Sermons and Books, but also that some Councells have decreed, and the Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in practise. For the fourth Councell of Lateran held under Pope Innocent the third, (in the third Chap.
But by whatever way he claims it, the power is the same. And (if it is granted to be his right) he may depose princes and states as often as it is for the salvation of souls—that is, as often as he pleases, for he also claims the sole power to judge whether it is for the salvation of men’s souls or not. And this is the doctrine not only that Bellarmine here, and many other doctors, teach in their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed, and that the popes, when the occasion has served them, have put into practice accordingly. For the Fourth Lateran Council, held under Pope Innocent III, (in the third chapter,
De Haereticis,) hath this Canon. If a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeretiques, and being Excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a yeer, his Subjects are absolved of their Obedience. And the practise hereof hath been seen on divers occasions; as in the Deposing of Chilperique, King of France; in the Translation of the Roman Empire to Charlemaine; in the Oppression of Iohn King of England; in Transferring the Kingdome of Navarre; and of late years, in the League against Henry the third of France, and in many more occurrences. I think there be few Princes that consider not this as Injust, and Inconvenient; but I wish they would all resolve to be Kings, or Subjects.
De haereticis) has this canon: “If a king, at the Pope’s admonition, does not purge his kingdom of heretics, and, being excommunicated for this, does not make satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience.” And the practice of it has been seen on various occasions: as in the deposing of Chilperic, King of France; in the transfer of the Roman Empire to Charlemagne; in the oppression of John, King of England; in transferring the kingdom of Navarre; and in recent years, in the League against Henry III of France; and in many more instances. I think there are few princes who do not consider this unjust and inconvenient. But I wish they would all resolve to be either kings or subjects.
Men cannot serve two Masters: They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the Reins of Government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another Indirect Power, as with a Direct one. But to come now to his Arguments.
No man can serve two masters. They ought therefore to ease their subjects, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands, or by delivering them wholly into the hands of the Pope, so that men who are willing to be obedient may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal and spiritual power is nothing but words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously for all purposes, by sharing it with another indirect power as with a direct one. But now to come to his arguments.
The first is this, The Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall: Therefore he that hath the Supreme Power Spirituall, hath right to command Temporall Princes, and dispose of their Temporalls in order to the Spirituall. As for the dictinction of Temporall, and Spirituall, let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the Temporall, or Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall. There be but two ways that those words can be made sense. For when wee say, one Power is subject to another Power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is subject to him that hath the other; or that the one Power is to the other, as the means to the end.
The first is this: “The civil power is subject to the spiritual. Therefore he who has the supreme spiritual power has the right to command temporal princes, and to dispose of their temporal affairs in order to the spiritual.” As for the distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us consider in what sense it may intelligibly be said that the temporal or civil power is subject to the spiritual. There are only two ways in which those words can be made to make sense. For when we say that one power is subject to another power, the meaning is either that he who has the one is subject to him who has the other, or that the one power is to the other as the means to the end.
For wee cannot understand, that one Power hath Power over another Power; or that one Power can have Right or Command over another: For Subjection, Command, Right, and Power are accidents, not of Powers, but of Persons: One Power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a Sadler, to the art of a Rider. If then it bee granted, that the Civill Government be ordained as a means to bring us to a Spirituall felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a King have the Civill Power, and the Pope the Spirituall, that therefore the King is bound to obey the Pope, more then every Sadler is bound to obey every Rider.
For we cannot understand one power to have power over another power, or one power to have right or command over another. For subjection, command, right, and power are accidents not of powers but of persons. One power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a saddler is to the art of a rider. If, then, it is granted that civil government is ordained as a means to bring us to a spiritual felicity, it still does not follow that if a king has the civil power and the Pope the spiritual, the king is therefore bound to obey the Pope—any more than every saddler is bound to obey every rider.
Therefore as from Subordination of an Art, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Professor; so from the Subordination of a Government, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Governor. When therefore he saith, the Civill Power is Subject to the Spirituall, his meaning is, that the Civill Soveraign, is Subject to the Spirituall Soveraign. And the Argument stands thus, The Civil Soveraign, is subject to the Spirituall; Therefore the Spirituall Prince may command Temporall Princes. Where the Conclusion is the same, with the Antecedent he should have proved.
Therefore, as the subjection of the practitioner cannot be inferred from the subordination of an art, so the subjection of the governor cannot be inferred from the subordination of a government. When, therefore, he says that the civil power is subject to the spiritual, his meaning is that the civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual sovereign. And the argument stands thus: “The civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual; therefore the spiritual prince may command temporal princes.” Here the conclusion is the same as the premise he should have proved.
But to prove it, he alledgeth first, this reason, Kings and Popes, Clergy and Laity make but one Common-wealth; that is to say, but one Church: And in all Bodies the Members depend one upon another: But things Spirituall depend not of things Temporall: Therefore Temporall depend on Spirituall. And therefore are Subject to them. In which Argumentation there be two grosse errours: one is, that all Christian Kings, Popes, Clergy, and all other Christian men, make but one Common-wealth: For it is evident that France is one Common-wealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c.
But to prove it he first brings this reason: “Kings and popes, clergy and laity, make up only one commonwealth, that is to say, only one Church. And in all bodies the members depend on one another. But spiritual things do not depend on temporal things. Therefore temporal things depend on spiritual ones, and are therefore subject to them.” In this argument there are two gross errors. One is that all Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all other Christian men make up only one commonwealth. For it is evident that France is one commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, and so on.
And these consist of Christians; and therefore also are severall Bodies of Christians; that is to say, severall Churches: And their severall Soveraigns Represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a naturall man; which no Generall or Universall Church is, till it have a Representant; which it hath not on Earth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that all Christendome were one Common-wealth, whose Soveraign were that Representant, both in things Spirituall and Temporall: And the Pope, to make himself this Representant, wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to Command, and to Iudge, and to Punish, otherwise than (by Excommunication) to run from those that will not Learn of him: For though the Pope were Christs onely Vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government, till our Saviours second coming: And then also it is not the Pope, but St.
And these consist of Christians, and so they are also several bodies of Christians, that is to say, several churches. And their several sovereigns represent them, by which they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man is. No general or universal Church is so capable until it has a representative, which it does not have on earth. For if it had one, there is no doubt that all Christendom would be one commonwealth, whose sovereign would be that representative, in things both spiritual and temporal. And to make himself this representative, the Pope lacks three things that our Savior has not given him: to command, to judge, and to punish, other than (by excommunication) to shun those who will not learn from him. For even if the Pope were Christ’s only vicar, he still cannot exercise his government until our Savior’s second coming. And then, too, it is not the Pope but St.
Peter himselfe, with the other Apostles, that are to be Judges of the world.
Peter himself, with the other apostles, who are to be judges of the world.
The other errour in this his first Argument is, that he sayes, the Members of every Common-wealth, as of a naturall Body, depend one of another: It is true, they cohaere together; but they depend onely on the Soveraign, which is the Soul of the Common-wealth; which failing, the Common-wealth is dissolved into a Civill war, no one man so much as cohaering to another, for want of a common Dependance on a known Soveraign; Just as the Members of the naturall Body dissolve into Earth, for want of a Soul to hold them together.
The other error in this first argument of his is his saying that the members of every commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend on one another. It is true they cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign, who is the soul of the commonwealth. When the sovereign fails, the commonwealth is dissolved into civil war, no one man so much as cohering to another for want of a common dependence on a known sovereign—just as the members of the natural body dissolve into earth for want of a soul to hold them together.
Therefore there is nothing in this similitude, from whence to inferre a dependance of the Laity on the Clergy, or of the Temporall Officers on the Spirituall; but of both on the Civill Soveraign; which ought indeed to direct his Civill commands to the Salvation of Souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himselfe. And thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first Argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not between the Subordination of Actions in the way to the End; and the Subjection of Persons one to another in the administration of the Means.
Therefore there is nothing in this comparison from which to infer a dependence of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporal officers on the spiritual, but only of both on the civil sovereign—who ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of souls, but is not therefore subject to anyone but God himself. And so you see the labored fallacy of the first argument, meant to deceive such men as do not distinguish between the subordination of actions in the way to the end and the subjection of persons to one another in the administration of the means.
For to every End, the Means are determined by Nature, or by God himselfe supernaturally: but the Power to make men use the Means, is in every nation resigned (by the Law of Nature, which forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given) to the Civill Soveraign.
For to every end, the means are determined by nature, or supernaturally by God himself. But the power to make men use the means is in every nation resigned to the civil sovereign (by the law of nature, which forbids men to violate the faith they have given).
His second Argument is this, Every Common-wealth, (because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in it self,) may command any other Common-wealth, not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of the Government; nay depose the Prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend it selfe against the injuries he goes about to doe them: much more may a Spirituall Common-wealth command a Temporall one to change the administration of their Government, and may depose Princes, and institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the Spirituall Good.
His second argument is this: “Every commonwealth (because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in itself) may command any other commonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of its government—indeed, depose its prince and set another in his place—if it cannot otherwise defend itself against the injuries he is setting out to do it. Much more may a spiritual commonwealth command a temporal one to change the administration of its government, and depose princes and institute others, when it cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good.”
That a Common-wealth, to defend it selfe against injuries, may lawfully doe all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also true, that there is now in this world a Spirituall Common-wealth, distinct from a Civill Common-wealth, then might the Prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come, repaire, and secure himself by Warre; which is in summe, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of Hostility.
That a commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do all that he has said here is very true, and has already been sufficiently demonstrated in what has gone before. And if it were also true that there is now in this world a spiritual commonwealth distinct from a civil commonwealth, then its prince might, upon injury done him, or for want of assurance that injury will not be done him in time to come, repair and secure himself by war—which, in sum, is deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility.
But by the same reason, it would be no lesse lawfull for a Civill Soveraign, upon the like injuries done, or feared, to make warre upon the Spirituall Soveraign; which I beleeve is more than Cardinall Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.
But by the same reason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon like injuries done or feared, to make war on the spiritual sovereign—which I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.
But Spirituall Common-wealth there is none in this world: for it is the same thing with the Kingdome of Christ; which he himselfe saith, is not of this world; but shall be in the next world, at the Resurrection, when they that have lived justly, and beleeved that he was the Christ, shall (though they died Naturall bodies) rise Spirituall bodies; and then it is, that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his Adversaries, and make a Spirituall Common-wealth.
But there is no spiritual commonwealth in this world. For it is the same thing as the kingdom of Christ, which he himself says is not of this world, but shall be in the next world, at the resurrection, when those who have lived justly and believed that he was the Christ shall (though they died natural bodies) rise spiritual bodies. And it is then that our Savior shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries, and make a spiritual commonwealth.
In the mean time, seeing there are no men on earth, whose bodies are Spirituall; there can be no Spirituall Common-wealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unlesse wee call Preachers, that have Commission to Teach, and prepare men for their reception into the Kingdome of Christ at the Resurrection, a Common-wealth; which I have proved already to bee none.
In the meantime, since there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual commonwealth among men who are still in the flesh—unless we call preachers, who have a commission to teach and to prepare men for their reception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a commonwealth, which I have already proved it is not.
The third Argument is this; It is not lawfull for Christians to tolerate an Infidel, or Haereticall King, in case he endeavour to draw them to his Haeresie, or Infidelity. But to judge whether a King draw his subjects to Haeresie, or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope Right, to determine whether the Prince be to be deposed, or not deposed.
The third argument is this: “It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate an unbelieving or heretical king, if he tries to draw them to his heresy or unbelief. But to judge whether a king draws his subjects to heresy or not belongs to the Pope. Therefore the Pope has the right to determine whether the prince is to be deposed or not.”
To this I answer, that both these assertions are false. For Christians, (or men of what Religion soever,) if they tolerate not their King, whatsoever law hee maketh, though it bee concerning Religion, doe violate their faith, contrary to the Divine Law, both Naturall and Positive: Nor is there any Judge of Haeresie amongst Subjects, but their owne Civill Soveraign: For Haeresie is nothing else, but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion which the Publique Person (that is to say, the Representant of the Common-wealth) hath commanded to bee taught. By which it is manifest, that an opinion publiquely appointed to bee taught, cannot be Haeresie; nor the Soveraign Princes that authorize them, Haeretiques.
To this I answer that both these assertions are false. For Christians (or men of whatever religion), if they do not tolerate their king, whatever law he makes, even one concerning religion, violate their faith, contrary to the divine law, both natural and positive. Nor is there any judge of heresy among subjects but their own civil sovereign. For heresy is nothing else but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary to the opinion that the public person (that is to say, the representative of the commonwealth) has commanded to be taught. By this it is evident that an opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy, nor can the sovereign princes who authorize such opinions be heretics.
For Haeretiques are none but private men, that stubbornly defend some Doctrine, prohibited by their lawfull Soveraigns.
For heretics are none but private men who stubbornly defend some doctrine prohibited by their lawful sovereigns.
But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate Infidell, or Haereticall Kings, he alledgeth a place in Deut. 17. where God forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a King over themselves, to choose a stranger: And from thence inferreth, that it is unlawfull for a Christian, to choose a King, that is not a Christian. And ’tis true, that he that is a Christian, that is, hee that hath already obliged himself to receive our Saviour when he shall come, for his King, shal tempt God too much in choosing for King in this world, one that hee knoweth will endeavour, both by terrour, and perswasion to make him violate his faith.
But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate unbelieving or heretical kings, he cites a passage in Deuteronomy 17, where God forbids the Jews, when they set a king over themselves, to choose a foreigner; and from this he infers that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose a king who is not a Christian. And it is true that he who is a Christian—that is, he who has already obliged himself to receive our Savior as his king when he comes—will tempt God too much in choosing for king in this world one whom he knows will try, both by terror and by persuasion, to make him violate his faith.
But, it is (saith hee) the same danger, to choose one that is not a Christian, for King, and not to depose him, when hee is chosen. To this I say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the Justice of deposing him. To choose him, may in some cases bee unjust; but to depose him, when he is chosen, is in no case Just. For it is alwaies violation of faith, and consequently against the Law of Nature, which is the eternall Law of God. Nor doe wee read, that any such Doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the Apostles; nor in the time of the Romane Emperours, till the Popes had the Civill Soveraignty of Rome.
But, he says, it is the same danger to choose one who is not a Christian for king as not to depose him once he is chosen. To this I say that the question is not about the danger of not deposing him, but about the justice of deposing him. To choose him may in some cases be unjust; but to depose him once he is chosen is in no case just. For it is always a violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal law of God. Nor do we read that any such doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the apostles, nor in the time of the Roman emperors, until the popes had the civil sovereignty of Rome.
But to this he hath replyed, that the Christians of old, deposed not Nero, nor Dioclesian, nor Iulian, nor Valens an Arrian, for this cause onely, that they wanted Temporall forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for calling for, might have had twelve Legions of immortall, invulnerable Angels to assist him, want forces to depose Caesar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to bee crucified?
But to this he has replied that the Christians of old did not depose Nero, or Diocletian, or Julian, or Valens the Arian, only because they lacked temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Savior—who for the asking might have had twelve legions of immortal, invulnerable angels to assist him—lack forces to depose Caesar, or at least Pilate, who unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to be crucified?
Or if the Apostles wanted Temporall forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them in their Epistles to the new made Christians, to teach them (as they did) to obey the Powers constituted over them, (whereof Nero in that time was one,) and that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience sake? Shall we say they did not onely obey, but also teach what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their Heathen Princes, or Princes (for I cannot call any one whose Doctrine is the Publique Doctrine, an Haeretique) that authorize the teaching of an Errour.
Or if the apostles lacked temporal forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them, in their epistles to the newly made Christians, to teach them (as they did) to obey the powers set over them (of which Nero at that time was one), and that they ought to obey them not for fear of their wrath but for conscience’ sake? Shall we say that they not only obeyed but also taught what they did not mean, for want of strength? It is not, therefore, for want of strength, but for conscience’ sake, that Christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes who authorize the teaching of an error (for I cannot call anyone a heretic whose doctrine is the public doctrine).
And whereas for the Temporall Power of the Pope, he alledgeth further, that St. Paul (1 Cor. 6.) appointed Judges under the Heathen Princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those Princes; it is not true. For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their Brethren to compound their differences, as Arbitrators, rather than to goe to law one with another before the Heathen Judges; which is a wholsome Precept, and full of Charity, fit to bee practised also in the best Christian Common-wealths.
And whereas, in support of the Pope’s temporal power, he further alleges that St. Paul (1 Corinthians 6) appointed judges under the heathen princes of those times, judges not ordained by those princes, this is not true. For St. Paul only advises them to take some of their brethren as arbitrators to settle their differences, rather than to go to law with one another before the heathen judges. That is a wholesome precept, full of charity, and fit to be practiced even in the best Christian commonwealths.
And for the danger that may arise to Religion, by the Subjects tolerating of an Heathen, or an Erring Prince, it is a point, of which a Subject is no competent Judge; or if hee bee, the Popes Temporall Subjects may judge also of the Popes Doctrine. For every Christian Prince, as I have formerly proyed, is no lesse Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects, than the Pope of his.
And as for the danger that may arise to religion from subjects tolerating a heathen or an erring prince, it is a point of which a subject is no competent judge. Or if he is, the Pope’s temporal subjects may also judge of the Pope’s doctrine. For every Christian prince, as I have proved before, is no less the supreme pastor of his own subjects than the Pope is of his.
The fourth Argument, is taken from the Baptisme of Kings; wherein, that they may be made Christians they submit their Scepters to Christ; and promise to keep, and defend the Christian Faith. This is true; for Christian Kings are no more but Christs Subjects: but they may, for all that, bee the Popes Fellowes; for they are Supreme Pastors of their own Subjects; and the Pope is no more but King, and Pastor, even in Rome it selfe.
The fourth argument is taken from the baptism of kings, in which, in order to be made Christians, they submit their scepters to Christ and promise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true; for Christian kings are no more than Christ’s subjects. But for all that, they may be the Pope’s fellows; for they are supreme pastors of their own subjects, and the Pope is no more than king and pastor, even in Rome itself.
The fifth Argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, Feed my sheep; by which was given all Power necessary for a Pastor; as the Power to chase away Wolves, such as are Haeretiques; the Power to shut up Rammes, if they be mad, or push at the other Sheep with their Hornes, such as are Evill (though Christian) Kings; and Power to give the Flock convenient food: From whence hee inferreth, that St. Peter had these three Powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of these Powers, is no more than the Power, or rather Command to Teach. For the first, which is to chase away Wolves, that is, Haeretiques, the place hee quoteth is (Matth. 7.
The fifth argument is drawn from the words our Savior spoke, “Feed my sheep,” by which, he says, all the power necessary for a pastor was given: such as the power to chase away wolves, which are heretics; the power to shut up rams if they are mad or butt the other sheep with their horns, which are evil (though Christian) kings; and the power to give the flock suitable food. From this he infers that St. Peter was given these three powers by Christ. To this I answer that the last of these powers is no more than the power, or rather the command, to teach. As for the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the passage he quotes is
15. Beware of false Prophets which come to you in Sheeps clothing, but inwardly are ravening Wolves. But neither are Haeretiques false Prophets, or at all Prophets: nor (admitting Haeretiques for the Wolves there meant,) were the Apostles commanded to kill them, or if they were Kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and avoid them: nor was it to St.
Matthew 7:15: “Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves.” But heretics are not false prophets, or prophets at all. Nor (granting that heretics are the wolves meant there) were the apostles commanded to kill them, or, if they were kings, to depose them, but to beware of them, flee, and avoid them. Nor was it to St.
Peter, nor to any of the Apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that hee gave this Counsell, to Beware of false Prophets: which therefore if it conferre a Power of chasing away Kings, was given, not onely to private men; but to men that were not at all Christians.
Peter, nor to any of the apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews who followed him onto the mountain—men for the most part not yet converted—that he gave this counsel, to beware of false prophets. If, therefore, it confers a power of chasing away kings, it was given not only to private men but to men who were not Christians at all.
And as to the Power of Separating, and Shutting up of furious Rammes, (by which hee meaneth Christian Kings that refuse to submit themselves to the Roman Pastor,) our Saviour refused to take upon him that Power in this world himself, but advised to let the Corn and Tares grow up together till the day of Judgment: much lesse did hee give it to St. Peter, or can S. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and all other Pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the Church, that is, (that disobey the Christian Soveraigne) as Heathen men, and as Publicans.
And as to the power of separating and shutting up furious rams (by which he means Christian kings who refuse to submit themselves to the Roman pastor), our Savior himself refused to take that power upon him in this world, but advised letting the wheat and the tares grow up together until the Day of Judgment. Much less did he give it to St. Peter, or can St. Peter give it to the popes. St. Peter and all other pastors are bidden to regard those Christians who disobey the Church—that is, who disobey the Christian sovereign—as heathens and publicans.
Seeing then men challenge to the Pope no authority over Heathen Princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are to bee esteemed as Heathen.
Since, then, men claim for the Pope no authority over heathen princes, they ought to claim none over those who are to be regarded as heathens.
But from the Power to Teach onely, hee inferreth also a Coercive Power in the Pope, over Kings. The Pastor (saith he) must give his flock convenient food: Therefore the Pope may, and ought to compell Kings to doe their duty. Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as Pastor of Christian men, is King of Kings: which all Christian Kings ought indeed either to Confesse, or else they ought to take upon themselves the Supreme Pastorall Charge, every one in his own Dominion.
But from the power to teach alone, he also infers a coercive power in the Pope over kings. The pastor, he says, must give his flock suitable food; therefore the Pope may, and ought to, compel kings to do their duty. From this it follows that the Pope, as pastor of Christian men, is King of Kings—which all Christian kings ought indeed either to confess, or else they ought to take upon themselves the supreme pastoral charge, every one in his own dominion.
His sixth, and last Argument, is from Examples. To which I answer, first, that Examples prove nothing: Secondly, that the Examples he alledgeth make not so much as a probability of Right. The fact of Jehoiada, in Killing Athaliah (2 Kings 11.) was either by the Authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible Crime in the High Priest which (ever after the election of King Saul) was a mere Subject. The fact of St. Ambrose, in Excommunicating Theodosius the Emperour, (if it were true hee did so,) was a Capitall Crime. And for the Popes, Gregory 1. Greg. 2. Zachary, and Leo 3.
His sixth and last argument is from examples. To this I answer, first, that examples prove nothing; and second, that the examples he cites do not make so much as a probability of right. The act of Jehoiada in killing Athaliah (2 Kings 11) was either by the authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible crime in the high priest, who (ever after the election of King Saul) was a mere subject. The act of St. Ambrose in excommunicating the Emperor Theodosius (if it is true that he did so) was a capital crime. And as for the popes Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary, and Leo III,
their Judgments are void, as given in their own Cause; and the Acts done by them conformably to this Doctrine, are the greatest Crimes (especially that of Zachary) that are incident to Humane Nature. And thus much of Power Ecclesiasticall; wherein I had been more briefe, forbearing to examine these Arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his, as a Private man, and not as the Champion of the Papacy, against all other Christian Princes, and States.
their judgments are void, as given in their own cause; and the acts they did in conformity with this doctrine are the greatest crimes (especially that of Zachary) that human nature is capable of. And so much for ecclesiastical power. I would have been briefer on it, and forborne to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his as a private man, and not as the champion of the papacy against all other Christian princes and states.
Chapter 43: Of what is necessary for entry into the Kingdom of Heaven
Obedience to God and to the sovereign conflict only if we misjudge what salvation requires.
The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandements are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull Soveraign (whether a Monarch, or or a soveraign Assembly,) or the command of his Father.
The most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war in Christian commonwealths has for a long time come from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying both God and man at once when their commandments are contrary to each other. It is evident enough that when a man receives two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is God’s, he ought to obey that one and not the other, even if the other is the command of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly) or the command of his father.
The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men when they are commanded in the name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some private ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews, many false Prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned Dreams, and Visions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false Teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by phantasticall and false Doctrines; and by such reputation (as is the nature of Ambition,) to govern them for their private benefit.
The difficulty therefore consists in this: that men, when they are commanded in the name of God, do not know in various cases whether the command is from God, or whether the one who commands is only abusing God’s name for some private ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews many false prophets who sought reputation with the people by feigned dreams and visions, so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ false teachers who seek reputation with the people by fantastical and false doctrines, and by such reputation (as is the nature of ambition) to govern them for their private benefit.
But this difficulty of obeying both God, and the Civill Soveraign on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is Necessary, and what is not Necessary for their Reception into the Kingdome of God, is of no moment.
But this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on earth is of no importance to those who can distinguish between what is necessary and what is not necessary for their reception into the Kingdom of God.
For if the command of the Civill Soveraign bee such, as that it may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life Eternall; not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the Apostle takes place; Servants obey your Masters in all things; and, Children obey your Parents in all things; and the precept of our Saviour, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Chaire, All therefore they shall say, that observe, and doe. But if the command be such, as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to Eternall Death, then it were madnesse to obey it, and the Counsell of our Saviour takes place, (Mat. 10. 28.)
For if the command of the civil sovereign is such that it may be obeyed without the forfeiture of eternal life, then not to obey it is unjust, and the precept of the apostle applies: “Servants, obey your masters in all things,” and, “Children, obey your parents in all things”; and the precept of our Savior: “The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat; therefore all that they tell you, observe and do.” But if the command is such that it cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death, then it would be madness to obey it, and the counsel of our Savior applies:
Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule. All men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for disobedience to their earthly Soveraign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not Necessary to Eternall Salvation.
“Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul” (Matthew 10:28). All men, therefore, who would avoid both the punishments to be inflicted in this world for disobedience to their earthly sovereign and those to be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, need to be taught to distinguish well between what is and what is not necessary to eternal salvation.
All that is NECESSARY to Salvatian, is contained in two Vertues, Faith in Christ, and Obedience to Laws. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. But because wee are all guilty of disobedience to Gods Law, not onely originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not onely Obedience for the rest of our time, but also a Remission of sins for the time past; which Remission is the reward of our Faith in Christ.
All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith in Christ and obedience to laws. The latter, if it were perfect, would be enough for us. But because we are all guilty of disobedience to God’s law—not only originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions—what is now required of us is not only obedience for the rest of our time, but also a remission of sins for the time past. And that remission is the reward of our faith in Christ.
That nothing else is Necessarily required to Salvation, is manifest from this, that the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to none but to Sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the Law; nor to them, in case they Repent, and Beleeve all the Articles of Christian Faith, Necessary to Salvation.
That nothing else is necessarily required for salvation is evident from this: that the Kingdom of Heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the law; and not even to them, if they repent and believe all the articles of Christian faith necessary to salvation.
The Obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our actions the Will for the Deed, is a serious Endeavour to Obey him; and is called also by all such names as signifie that Endeavour.
The obedience God requires of us—God, who in all our actions accepts the will for the deed—is a serious effort to obey him; and it is also called by all such names as signify that effort.
And therefore Obedience, is sometimes called by the names of Charity, and Love, because they imply a Will to Obey; and our Saviour himself maketh our Love to God, and to one another, a Fulfilling of the whole Law: and sometimes by the name of Righteousnesse; for Righteousnesse is but the will to give to every one his owne, that is to say, the will to obey the Laws: and sometimes by the name of Repentance; because to Repent, implyeth a turning away from finne, which is the same, with the return of the will to Obedience.
And so obedience is sometimes called by the names charity and love, because they imply a will to obey; and our Savior himself makes our love of God, and of one another, a fulfilling of the whole law. Sometimes it is called by the name of righteousness, for righteousness is only the will to give to everyone his own, that is to say, the will to obey the laws. And sometimes by the name of repentance, because to repent implies a turning away from sin, which is the same as the return of the will to obedience.
Whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfill the Commandements of God, or repenteth him truely of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, hath all the Obedience Necessary to his Reception into the Kingdom of God: For if God should require perfect Innocence, there could no flesh be saved.
Whoever, therefore, sincerely desires to fulfill the commandments of God, or truly repents of his transgressions, or loves God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself, has all the obedience necessary for his reception into the Kingdom of God. For if God were to require perfect innocence, no flesh could be saved.
But what Commandements are those that God hath given us? Are all those Laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses, the Commandements of God? If they bee, why are not Christians taught to Obey them? If they be not, what others are so, besides the Law of Nature? For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new Laws, but Counsell to observe those wee are subject to; that is to say, the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of our severall Soveraigns: Nor did he make any new Law to the Jews in his Sermon on the Mouut, but onely expounded the Laws of Moses, to which they were subject before.
But what commandments are those that God has given us? Are all those laws that were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses the commandments of God? If they are, why are Christians not taught to obey them? If they are not, what others are, besides the law of nature? For our Savior Christ has not given us new laws, but counsel to observe those we are subject to, that is to say, the laws of nature and the laws of our several sovereigns. Nor did he make any new law for the Jews in his Sermon on the Mount, but only expounded the laws of Moses, to which they were already subject.
The Laws of God therefore are none but the Laws of Nature, whereof the principall is, that we should not violate our Faith, that is, a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns, which wee constituted over us, by mutuall pact one with another. And this Law of God, that commandeth Obedience to the Law Civill, commandeth by consequence Obedience to all the Precepts of the Bible; which (as I have proved in the precedent Chapter) is there onely Law, where the Civill Soveraign hath made it so; and in other places but Counsell; which a man at his own perill, may without injustice refuse to obey.
The laws of God, therefore, are none but the laws of nature, of which the principal one is that we should not violate our faith—that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, whom we set up over us by mutual pact with one another. And this law of God, which commands obedience to the civil law, commands by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the Bible. The Bible (as I proved in the preceding chapter) is law only where the civil sovereign has made it so, and in other places only counsel, which a man may, at his own peril, refuse to obey without injustice.
Faith: whom we believe, and why
Christians believe the Scripture because their lawful teachers tell them so; faith is God's gift through hearing.
Knowing now what is the Obedience Necessary to Salvation, and to whom it is due; we are to consider next concerning Faith, whom, and why we beleeve; and what are the Articles, or Points necessarily to be beleeved by them that shall be saved. And first, for the Person whom we beleeve, because it is impossible to beleeve any Person, before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that wee have heard speak. The Person therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and the Prophets beleeved, was God himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: And the Person, whom the Apostles and Disciples that conversed with Christ beleeved, was our Saviour himself.
Knowing now what obedience is necessary to salvation, and to whom it is due, we are next to consider, concerning faith, whom we believe and why, and what the articles or points are that must necessarily be believed by those who shall be saved. And first, as for the person whom we believe: because it is impossible to believe any person before we know what he says, he must be one whom we have heard speak. The person, therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets believed was God himself, who spoke to them supernaturally; and the person whom the apostles and disciples who conversed with Christ believed was our Savior himself.
But of them, to whom neither God the Father, nor our Saviour ever spake, it cannot be said, that the Person whom they beleeved, was God. They beleeved the Apostles, and after them the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that recommended to their faith the History of the Old and New Testament: so that the Faith of Christians ever since our Saviours time, hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their Pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the Rule of Faith; which none could do but Christian Soveraignes; who are therefore the Supreme Pastors, and the onely Persons, whom Christians now hear speak from God; except such as God speaketh to, in these days supernaturally.
But of those to whom neither God the Father nor our Savior ever spoke, it cannot be said that the person they believed was God. They believed the apostles, and after them the pastors and doctors of the Church, who recommended to their faith the history of the Old and New Testaments. So the faith of Christians ever since our Savior’s time has had for its foundation, first, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward the authority of those who caused the Old and New Testaments to be received as the rule of faith—which none could do but Christian sovereigns. They are therefore the supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God, except those to whom God speaks supernaturally in these days.
But because there be many false Prophets gone out into the world, other men are to examine such Spirits (as St. Iohn adviseth us; 1 Epistle, Chap. 4. ver. 1.) whether they be of God, or not. And therefore, seeing the Examination of Doctrines belongeth to the Supreme Pastor, the Person which all they that have no speciall revelation are to beleeve, is (in every Common-wealth) the Supreme Pastor, that is to say, the Civill Soveraigne.
But because there are many false prophets “gone out into the world,” other men are to test such spirits, as St. John advises us (1 John 4:1), “whether they are of God or not.” And therefore, since the examination of doctrines belongs to the supreme pastor, the person whom all those who have no special revelation are to believe is (in every commonwealth) the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil sovereign.
The causes why men beleeve any Christian Doctrine, are various: For Faith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each severall man, by such wayes, as it seemeth good unto himself. The most ordinary immediate cause of our beleef; concerning any point of Christian Faith, is, that wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God. But why wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs bee, that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, Why we Beleeve it, but, How wee Know it; as if Beleeving and Knowing were all one.
The causes why men believe any Christian doctrine are various. For faith is the gift of God, and he works it in each individual man by such ways as seem good to him. The most ordinary immediate cause of our belief concerning any point of Christian faith is that we believe the Bible to be the Word of God. But why we believe the Bible to be the Word of God is much disputed, as all questions must be that are not well stated. For they do not make the question “Why do we believe it?” but “How do we know it?”—as if believing and knowing were all one.
And thence while one side ground their Knowledge upon the Infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the Testimony of the Private Spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall a man know the Infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the Infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own Private spirit to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and Arguments of his Teachers; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts? Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the Infallibility of the Church; much lesse, of any particular Church; and least of all, the Infallibility of any particular man.
And so, while one side grounds its knowledge on the infallibility of the Church, and the other on the testimony of the private spirit, neither side proves what it claims. For how shall a man know the infallibility of the Church except by first knowing the infallibility of Scripture? Or how shall a man know that his own private spirit is anything other than a belief grounded on the authority and arguments of his teachers, or on a presumption of his own gifts? Besides, there is nothing in Scripture from which the infallibility of the Church can be inferred—much less that of any particular church, and least of all the infallibility of any particular man.
It is manifest therefore, that Christian men doe not know, but onely beleeve the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the means of making them beleeve which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of Nature, that is to say, from their Teachers. It is the Doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian Faith in generall, (Rom. 10. 17.) Faith cometh by Hearing, that is, by Hearing our lawfull Pastors. He saith also (ver. 14, 15. of the same Chapter) *How shall they beleeve in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a Preacher?
It is evident, therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only believe, the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the means of making them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. It is the doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian faith in general: “Faith comes by hearing” (Romans 10:17)—that is, by hearing our lawful pastors. He also says in the same chapter (Romans 10:14–15), “How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?
and how shall they Preach, except they be sent?* Whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of beleeving that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is the same with the cause of the beleeving of all other Articles of our Faith, namely, the Hearing of those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach us, as our Parents in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches: Which also is made more manifest by experience.
And how shall they preach, unless they are sent?” From this it is evident that the ordinary cause of believing that the Scriptures are the Word of God is the same as the cause of believing all the other articles of our faith: namely, the hearing of those who are allowed and appointed by the law to teach us, as our parents in their houses and our pastors in the churches. This is also made more evident by experience.
For what other cause can there bee assigned, why in Christian Common-wealths all men either beleeve, or at least professe the Scripture to bee the Word of God, and in other Common-wealths scarce any; but that in Christian Common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught otherwise?
For what other cause can be assigned why, in Christian commonwealths, all men either believe, or at least profess, the Scripture to be the Word of God, and in other commonwealths scarcely anyone does, except that in Christian commonwealths they are taught it from their infancy, and in other places they are taught otherwise?
But if Teaching be the cause of Faith, why doe not all beleeve? It is certain therefore that Faith is the gift of God, and hee giveth it to whom he will. Neverthelesse, because to them to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by the means of Teachers, the immediate cause of Faith is Hearing. In a School, where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit, is the Master; yet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God.
But if teaching is the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is certain, therefore, that faith is the gift of God, and he gives it to whom he will. Nevertheless, because he gives it to those to whom he gives it by means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is hearing. In a school where many are taught, and some profit and others do not, the cause of learning in those who profit is the master; yet it cannot be inferred from this that learning is not the gift of God.
All good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them, say they are Inspired; for that implies a gift supernaturall, and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a Prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.
All good things proceed from God; yet not all who have them can say they are inspired. For that implies a supernatural gift and the immediate hand of God; and he who claims that claims to be a prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.
But whether men Know, or Beleeve, or Grant the Scriptures to be the Word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, I shall shew what Articles of Faith are necessary, and onely necessary for Salvation, those men must needs Know, Beleeve, or Grant the same.
But whether men know, or believe, or grant the Scriptures to be the Word of God, if I show from those passages of them that are free of obscurity what articles of faith are necessary, and alone necessary, for salvation, those men must necessarily know, believe, or grant the same.
The one necessary article
The only article necessary to salvation is that Jesus is the Christ; Hobbes gives five proofs.
The (Vnum Necessarium) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh simply Necessary to Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. By the name of Christ, is understood the King, which God had before promised by the Prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him) under himself eternally; and to give them that eternall life, which was lost by the sin of Adam. Which when I have proved out of Scripture, I will further shew when, and in what sense some other Articles may bee also called Necessary.
The only article of faith (the unum necessarium) that Scripture makes simply necessary to salvation is this: that Jesus is the Christ. By the name Christ is understood the King whom God had promised beforehand, by the prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign under himself eternally (over the Jews and over those of other nations who should believe in him), and to give them that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. When I have proved this from Scripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some other articles may also be called necessary.
For Proof that the Beleef of this Article, Iesus is the Christ, is all the Faith required to Salvation, my first Argument shall bee from the Scope of the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of our Saviour, to establish that one Article, Iesus is the Christ. The summe of St.
As proof that belief in this article, “Jesus is the Christ,” is all the faith required for salvation, my first argument shall be from the purpose of the evangelists, which was, by describing the life of our Savior, to establish that one article, “Jesus is the Christ.” The sum of St.
Matthews Gospell is this, That Jesus was of the stock of David; Born of a Virgin; which are the Marks of the true Christ: That the Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews: That Herod for the same cause sought to kill him: That John Baptist proclaimed him: That he preached by himselfe, and his Apostles that he was that King: That he taught the Law, not as a Scribe, but as a man of Authority: That he cured diseases by his Word onely, and did many other Miracles, which were foretold the Christ should doe: That he was saluted King when hee entred into Jerusalem: That he fore-warned them to beware of all others that should pretend to be Christ: That he was taken, accused, and put to death, for saying, hee was King: That the cause of his condemnation written on the Crosse, was JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWES.
Matthew’s Gospel is this: that Jesus was of the line of David, and born of a virgin, which are the marks of the true Christ; that the Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews; that Herod for the same reason sought to kill him; that John the Baptist proclaimed him; that he preached, himself and through his apostles, that he was that King; that he taught the law not as a scribe but as a man of authority; that he cured diseases by his word alone, and did many other miracles that the Christ had been foretold to do; that he was hailed as king when he entered Jerusalem; that he warned them to beware of all others who should claim to be Christ; that he was taken, accused, and put to death for saying he was king; and that the charge for which he was condemned, written on the cross, was “Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews.”
All which tend to no other end than this, that men should beleeve, that Iesus is the Christ. Such therefore was the Scope of St. Matthews Gospel. But the Scope of all the Evangelists (as may appear by reading them) was the same. Therefore the Scope of the whole Gospell, was the establishing of that onely Article. And St. John expressely makes it his conclusion, Iohn 20. 31. These things are written, that you may know that Iesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.
All of this tends to no other end than this: that men should believe that Jesus is the Christ. Such, therefore, was the purpose of St. Matthew’s Gospel. But the purpose of all the evangelists (as may be seen by reading them) was the same. Therefore the purpose of the whole Gospel was the establishing of that one article. And St. John expressly makes it his conclusion (John 20:31): “These things are written that you may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.”
My second Argument is taken from the Subject of the Sermons of the Apostles, both whilest our Saviour lived on earth, aud after his Ascension. The Apostles in our Saviours time were sent, Luke 9. 2. to Preach the Kingdome of God: For neither there, nor Mat. 10. 7. giveth he any Commission to them, other than this, As ye go, Preach, saying, the Kingdome of Heaven is at hand; that is, that Iesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King which was to come. That their Preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of Acts 17. 6. They drew (saith St.
My second argument is taken from the subject of the sermons of the apostles, both while our Savior lived on earth and after his ascension. The apostles, in our Savior’s time, were sent (Luke 9:2) to preach the Kingdom of God. For neither there nor in Matthew 10:7 does he give them any commission other than this: “As you go, preach, saying, The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand”—that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ, the King who was to come. That their preaching after his ascension was also the same is evident from what St.
Luke) Iason and certain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Iason hath received. And these all do contrary to the Decrees of Caesar, saying, that there is another King, one Iesus: And out of the 2. & 3. verses of the same Chapter, where it is said, that St. Paul as his manner was, went in unto them; and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures; opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen againe from the dead, and that this Iesus (whom hee preached) is Christ.
Luke says in Acts 17:6: “They dragged Jason and certain brethren before the rulers of the city, crying, These men who have turned the world upside down have come here too, and Jason has received them. And they all act contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another king, one Jesus.” And it is evident from the second and third verses of the same chapter (Acts 17:2–3), where it is said that St. Paul, “as his custom was, went in to them, and on three Sabbath days reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and demonstrating that the Christ had to suffer and rise again from the dead, and that this Jesus, whom I preach to you, is the Christ.”
The third Argument is, from those places of Scripture, by which all the Faith required to Salvation is declared to be Easie. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the Doctrines concerning Christian Faith now taught, (whereof the greatest part are disputed,) were necessary to Salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard, as to be a Christian. The Thief upon the Crosse though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, Lord remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome; by which he testified no beleefe of any other Article, but this, That Iesus was the King. Nor could it bee said (as it is Mat. 11. 30.)
The third argument is from those passages of Scripture by which all the faith required for salvation is declared to be easy. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning Christian faith now taught (most of which are disputed) were necessary to salvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard as to be a Christian. The thief on the cross, though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, “Lord, remember me when you come into your kingdom,” by which he testified belief in no other article but this: that Jesus was the King. Nor could it be said
that Christs yoke is Easy, and his burthen Light: Nor that Little Children beleeve in him, as it is Matth. 18. 6. Nor could St. Paul have said (1 Cor. 1. 21.) It pleased God by the Foolishnesse of preaching, to save them that beleeve: Nor could St. Paul himself have been saved, much lesse have been so great a Doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of Transubstantiation, nor Purgatory, nor many other Articles now obtruded.
(as it is in Matthew 11:30) that “Christ’s yoke is easy, and his burden light”; nor that “little children believe in him,” as it is in Matthew 18:6. Nor could St. Paul have said (1 Corinthians 1:21), “It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe.” Nor could St. Paul himself have been saved—much less have become so great a doctor of the Church so suddenly—who never perhaps thought of transubstantiation, or purgatory, or many other articles now forced upon us.
The fourth Argument is taken from places expresse, and such as receive no controversie of Interpretation; as first, Iohn 5. 39. Search the Scriptures, for in them yee thinke yee have eternall life; and they are they that testifie of mee. Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures onely of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old Testament hath nothing of Christ, but the Markes by which men might know him when hee came; as that he should descend from David; be born at Bethlem, and of a Virgin; doe great Miracles, and the like.
The fourth argument is taken from passages that are explicit and admit of no controversy of interpretation. First, John 5:39: “Search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life; and they are what testify of me.” Our Savior here speaks only of the Scriptures of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which had not been written. But the Old Testament contains nothing of Christ except the marks by which men might know him when he came: such as that he should descend from David, be born at Bethlehem and of a virgin, do great miracles, and the like.
Therefore to beleeve that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternall life: but more than sufficient is not Necessary; and consequently no other Article is required. Again, (Iohn 11. 26.) Whosoever liveth and beleeveth in mee, shall not die eternally, Therefore to beleeve in Christ, is faith sufficient to eternall life; and consequently no more faith than that is Necessary, But to beleeve in Jesus, and to beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following. For when our Saviour (verse 26.) had said to Martha, Beleevest thou this? she answereth (verse 27.)
Therefore to believe that this Jesus was he was sufficient for eternal life; but what is more than sufficient is not necessary, and consequently no other article is required. Again, John 11:26: “Whoever lives and believes in me shall not die eternally.” Therefore to believe in Christ is faith sufficient for eternal life, and consequently no more faith than that is necessary. But to believe in Jesus and to believe that Jesus is the Christ are all one, as appears in the verses immediately following. For when our Savior (verse 26) had said to Martha, “Do you believe this?” she answers
Yea Lord, I beleeve that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world: Therefore this Article alone is faith sufficient to life eternall; and more than sufficient is not Necessary. Thirdly, Iohn 20. 31. These things are written that yee might beleeve, that Iesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that beleeving yee might have life through his name. There, to beleeve that Iesus is the Christ, is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other Article is Necessary. Fourthly, 1 Iohn 4. 2. Every spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. And 1 *Ioh. 5. 1.
(John 11:27), “Yes, Lord, I believe that you are the Christ, the Son of God, who was to come into the world.” Therefore this article alone is faith sufficient for eternal life, and what is more than sufficient is not necessary. Third, John 20:31: “These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life through his name.” There, to believe that Jesus is the Christ is faith sufficient to obtain life, and therefore no other article is necessary. Fourth, 1 John 4:2: “Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God.” And
Whosoever beleeveth that Iesus is the Christ, is born of God. And verse 5. Who is hee that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that Iesus is the Son of God? Fiftly, Act. 8. ver. 36, 37. See (saith the Eunuch) here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou beleevest with all thy heart thou mayst. And hee answered and said, I beleeve that Iesus Christ is the Son of God. Therefore this Article beleeved, Iesus is the Christ,* is sufficient to Baptisme, that is to say, to our Reception into the Kingdome of God, and by consequence, onely Necessary.
1 John 5:1: “Whoever believes that Jesus is the Christ is born of God.” And verse 5: “Who is he who overcomes the world, but he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God?” Fifth, Acts 8:36–37: “See,” says the eunuch, “here is water; what hinders me from being baptized? And Philip said, If you believe with all your heart, you may. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.” Therefore belief in this article, “Jesus is the Christ,” is sufficient for baptism, that is to say, for our reception into the Kingdom of God, and consequently is the only thing necessary.
And generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, Thy faith hath saved thee, the cause he saith it, is some Confession, which directly, or by consequence, implyeth a beleef, that Jesus is the Christ.
And generally, in all places where our Savior says to anyone, “Your faith has saved you,” the reason he says it is some confession that, directly or by consequence, implies a belief that Jesus is the Christ.
The last Argument is from the places, where this Article is made the Foundation of Faith: For he that holdeth the Foundation shall bee saved. Which places are first, Mat. 24. 23. If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ, or there, beleeve it not, for there shall arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes and wonders, &c. Here wee see, this Article Jesus is the Christ, must bee held, though hee that shall teach the contrary should doe great miracles. The second place is, *Gal. 1. 8.
The last argument is from the passages where this article is made the foundation of faith; for he who holds to the foundation shall be saved. These passages are, first, Matthew 24:23: “If anyone says to you, Look, here is the Christ, or there, do not believe it. For false christs and false prophets will arise, and will show great signs and wonders,” and so on. Here we see that this article, “Jesus is the Christ,” must be held even if someone who teaches the contrary should do great miracles. The second passage is
Though we, or an Angell from Heaven preach any other Gospell unto you, than that wee have preached unto you, let him bee accursed. But the Gospell which Paul, and the other Apostles, preached, was onely this Article, that Jesus is the Christ: Therefore for the Beleef of this Article, we are to reject the Authority of an Angell from heaven; much more of any mortall man, if he teach the contrary. This is therefore the Fundamentall Article of Christian Faith. A third place is, 1 Joh. 4. 1. Beloved, beleeve not every spirit.
Galatians 1:8: “Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel to you than the one we have preached to you, let him be accursed.” But the gospel that Paul and the other apostles preached was only this article, that Jesus is the Christ. Therefore, for the sake of belief in this article, we are to reject the authority of an angel from heaven—much more that of any mortal man, if he teaches the contrary. This, therefore, is the fundamental article of Christian faith. A third passage is 1 John 4:1–2: “Beloved, do not believe every spirit.
Hereby yee shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. By which it is evident, that this Article, is the measure, and rule, by which to estimate, and examine all other Articles; and is therefore onely Fundamentall. A fourth is, Matt. 16. 18. where after St. Peter had professed this Article, saying to our Saviour, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God, Our Saviour answered, Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church: from whence I inferre, that this Article is that, on which all other Doctrines of the Church are built, as on their Foundation. A fift is (1 Cor.* 3. ver. 11, 12, &c.)
By this you shall know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God.” From this it is evident that this article is the measure and rule by which to evaluate and examine all other articles, and is therefore the only fundamental one. A fourth is Matthew 16:18, where, after St. Peter had professed this article, saying to our Savior, “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God,” our Savior answered, “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church.” From this I infer that this article is the one on which all the other doctrines of the Church are built, as on their foundation. A fifth is
*Other Foundation can no man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build upon this Foundation, Gold, Silver, pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble; Every mans work shall be made manifest; For the Day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every mans work, of what sort it is.
1 Corinthians 3:11–15: “No one can lay any other foundation than the one that is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if anyone builds on this foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, each one’s work will be made evident; for the Day will declare it, because it will be revealed by fire, and the fire will test each one’s work, of what sort it is.
If any mans work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward: If any mans work shall bee burnt, he shall suffer losse; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. Which words, being partly plain and easie to understand, and partly allegoricall and difficult; out of that which is plain, may be inferred, that Pastors that teach this Foundation, that Jesus is the Christ,* though they draw from it false consequences, (which all men are sometimes subject to,) they may neverthelesse bee saved; much more that they may bee saved, who being no Pastors, but Hearers, beleeve that which is by their lawfull Pastors taught them.
If anyone’s work that he has built on it endures, he will receive a reward. If anyone’s work is burned, he will suffer loss; but he himself will be saved, yet so as by fire.” These words are partly plain and easy to understand, and partly allegorical and difficult. From what is plain, it may be inferred that pastors who teach this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, may nevertheless be saved, even though they draw false consequences from it (which all men are sometimes liable to do); and much more, that those may be saved who, being not pastors but hearers, believe what their lawful pastors teach them.
Therefore the beleef of this Article is sufficient; and by consequence, there is no other Article of Faith Necessarily required to Salvation.
Therefore belief in this article is sufficient; and consequently there is no other article of faith necessarily required for salvation.
Now for the part which is Allegoricall, as That the fire shall try every mans work, and that They shall be saved, but so as by fire, or through fire, (for the originall is dia puros,) it maketh nothing against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that are plain. Neverthelesse, because upon this place there hath been an argument taken, to prove the fire of Purgatory, I will also here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this triall of Doctrines, and saving of men as by Fire. The Apostle here seemeth to allude to the words of the Prophet Zachary, Ch. 13. 8; 9.
Now as for the part that is allegorical, such as “the fire shall test each one’s work,” and “they shall be saved, but so as by fire” or “through fire” (for the original is dia puros), it makes nothing against the conclusion I have drawn from the other words, which are plain. Nevertheless, because an argument has been taken from this passage to prove the fire of purgatory, I will also offer you here my conjecture concerning the meaning of this testing of doctrines, and saving of men as by fire. The apostle here seems to allude to the words of the prophet Zechariah,
who speaking of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God, saith thus, Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; And I will bring the third part through the Fire, and will refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them. The day of Judgment, is the day of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God; and at that day it is, that St.
who, speaking of the restoration of the Kingdom of God, says this (Zechariah 13:8–9): “Two parts in it shall be cut off and die, but the third shall be left in it. And I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will test them as gold is tested; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them.” The Day of Judgment is the day of the restoration of the Kingdom of God; and it is on that day that St.
Peter tells us * shall be the Conflagration of the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God will save, shall passe through that Fire, unhurt, and be therein (as Silver and Gold are refined by the fire from their drosse) tryed, and refined from their Idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the true God. Alluding whereto St.
Peter tells us there will be the conflagration of the world, in which the wicked shall perish; but the remnant whom God will save shall pass through that fire unhurt, and be tested in it and refined from their idolatry (as silver and gold are refined from their dross by the fire), and be made to call on the name of the true God. Alluding to this, St.
Paul here saith, That the Day (that is, the Day of Judgment, the Great Day of our Saviours comming to restore the Kingdome of God in Israel) shall try every mans doctrine, by Judging, which are Gold, Silver, Pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble; And then they that have built false Consequences on the true Foundation, shall see their Doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved, and passe unhurt through this universall Fire, and live eternally, to call upon the name of the true and onely God. In which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of Purgatory.
Paul here says that “the Day” (that is, the Day of Judgment, the great day of our Savior’s coming to restore the Kingdom of God in Israel) shall test every man’s doctrine, by judging which are gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble. And then those who have built false consequences on the true foundation shall see their doctrines condemned; nevertheless they themselves shall be saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live eternally, to call on the name of the true and only God. In this sense there is nothing that does not agree with the rest of Holy Scripture, nor any glimpse of the fire of purgatory.
But a man may here aske, whether it bee not as necessary to Salvation, to beleeve, that God is Omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day; as to beleeve, that Jesus is the Christ. To which I answer, they are; and so are many more Articles: but they are such, as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more, or lesse difficulty.
But someone may ask here whether it is not as necessary to salvation to believe that God is omnipotent and the creator of the world, that Jesus Christ is risen, and that all other men will rise again from the dead at the last day, as it is to believe that “Jesus is the Christ.” I answer that it is; and so are many more articles. But they are such as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it with more or less difficulty.
For who is there that does not see, that they who beleeve Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, doe therein also beleeve, that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man beleeve, that Jesus is the King that shall reign eternally, unlesse hee beleeve him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the Office of a King. In summe, he that holdeth this Foundation, Jesus is the Christ, holdeth Expressely all that hee seeth rightly deduced from it, and Implicitely all that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence.
For who does not see that those who believe Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for their God the omnipotent creator of all things, thereby also believe that God is the omnipotent creator of all things? Or how can a man believe that Jesus is the King who will reign eternally unless he also believes him risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king. In sum, whoever holds this foundation, “Jesus is the Christ,” holds expressly everything he sees rightly deduced from it, and implicitly everything that follows from it, even if he lacks the skill to discern the consequence.
And therefore it holdeth still good, that the beleef of this one Article is sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the Penitent, and consequently to bring them into the Kingdome of Heaven.
And therefore it still holds good that belief in this one article is sufficient faith to obtain remission of sins for the penitent, and consequently to bring them into the Kingdom of Heaven.
Faith and obedience together
Repentance and belief that Jesus is the Christ suffice, so obeying a Christian or unbelieving sovereign never endangers salvation.
Now that I have shewn, that all the Obedience required to Salvation, consisteth in the will to obey the Law of God, that is to say, in Repentance; and all the Faith required to the same, is comprehended in the beleef of this Article Jesus is the Christ; I will further alledge those places of the Gospell, that prove, that all that is Necessary to Salvation is contained in both these joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the Ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the Apostles, saying, (Act. 2. 37.) Men and Brethren what shall we doe? To whom St.
Now that I have shown that all the obedience required to salvation consists in the will to obey the law of God, that is, in repentance, and that all the faith required to it is comprehended in the belief of this article, “Jesus is the Christ,” I will further cite those places of the Gospel which prove that everything necessary to salvation is contained in these two joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, just after our Savior’s Ascension, asked him and the rest of the apostles, “Brothers, what shall we do?” (Acts 2:37). To them St.
Peter answered (in the next verse) Repent, and be Baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Repentance, and Baptisme, that is, beleeving that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is Necessary to Salvation. Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain Ruler, (Luke 18. 18.) What shall I doe to inherite eternall life? Answered (verse 20.)
Peter answered (in the next verse), “Repent, and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit.” Therefore repentance and baptism—that is, believing that “Jesus is the Christ”—is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, when our Savior was asked by a certain ruler, “What shall I do to inherit eternal life?” (Luke 18:18), he answered
Thou knowest the Commandements, Doe not commit Adultery, Doe not Kill, Doe not Steal, Doe not bear false witnesse, Honor thy Father, and thy Mother: which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, Sell all thou hast, give it to the Poor, and come and follow me: which was as much as to say, Relye on me that am the King: Therefore to fulfill the Law, and to beleeve that Jesus is the King, is all that is required to bring a man to eternall life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (Rom. 1. 17.)
(Luke 18:20), “You know the commandments: Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Honor your father and your mother.” When the ruler said he had kept them, our Savior added, “Sell all you have, give it to the poor, and come and follow me.” This was as much as to say, “Rely on me, who am the King.” Therefore to fulfill the law, and to believe that Jesus is the King, is all that is required to bring a man to eternal life. Thirdly, St. Paul says
The Just shall live by Faith; not every one, but the Just; therefore Faith and Justice (that is, the will to be Just, or Repentance) are all that is Necessary to life eternall. And (Mark 1. 15.) our Saviour preached, saying, The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand, Repent and Beleeve the Evangile, that is, the Good news that the Christ was come. Therefore to Repent, and to Beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to Salvation.
(Romans 1:17), “The just shall live by faith”—not everyone, but the just. Therefore faith and justice (that is, the will to be just, or repentance) are all that is necessary to eternal life. And our Savior preached, saying, “The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent, and believe the gospel” (Mark 1:15)—that is, the good news that the Christ had come. Therefore to repent, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to salvation.
Seeing then it is Necessary that Faith, and Obedience (implyed in the word Repentance) do both concurre to our Salvation; the question by which of the two we are Justified, is impertinently disputed. Neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be Justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by Righteousnesse be understood the Justice of the Works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the Law of God.
Since, then, it is necessary that faith and obedience (implied in the word repentance) both concur in our salvation, the question of which of the two we are justified by is pointlessly disputed. Nevertheless it will not be pointless to make plain in what way each of them contributes to it, and in what sense it is said that we are justified by the one and by the other. First, if by righteousness is understood the justice of the works themselves, no man can be saved; for there is no one who has not transgressed the law of God.
And therefore when wee are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be understood of the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. And in this sense onely it is, that a man is callod Iust, or Vnjust; and that his Justice Justifies him, that is, gives him the title; in Gods acceptation, of Just; and renders him capable of living by his Faith, which before he was not. So that Justice Justifies in that sense, in which to Justifie, is the same that to Denominate a man Iust; and not in the signification of discharging the Law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.
And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will, which God always accepts for the work itself, in good men as well as in evil. It is in this sense only that a man is called just or unjust, and that his justice justifies him—that is, gives him the title of just in God’s acceptance, and makes him capable of living by his faith, which before he was not. So justice justifies in the sense in which to justify is the same as to call a man just, and not in the sense of fully satisfying the law, whereby punishment of his sins would be unjust.
But a man is then also said to be Justified, when his Plea, though in it selfe unsufficient, is accepted; as when we Plead our Will, our Endeavour to fulfill the Law, and Repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for the Performance it selfe: And because God accepteth not the Will for the Deed, but onely in the Faithfull; it is therefore Faith that makes good our Plea; and in this sense it is, that Faith onely Justifies: So that Faith and Obedience are both Necessary to Salvation; yet in severall senses each of them is said to Justifie.
But a man is also said to be justified when his plea, though insufficient in itself, is accepted: as when we plead our will, our effort to fulfill the law, and our repentance for our failings, and God accepts this for the performance itself. And because God accepts the will for the deed only in the faithful, it is faith that makes good our plea; and in this sense faith alone justifies. So faith and obedience are both necessary to salvation, yet each of them is said to justify in a different sense.
Having thus shewn what is Necessary to Salvation; it is not hard to reconcile our Obedience to God, with our Obedience to the Civill Soveraign; who is either Christian, or Infidel. If he bee a Christian, he alloweth the beleefe of this Article, that Iesus is the Christ; and of all the Articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence deduced from it: which is all the Faith Necessary to Salvation.
Having thus shown what is necessary to salvation, it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to God with our obedience to the civil sovereign, who is either Christian or an unbeliever. If he is a Christian, he allows belief in this article, “Jesus is the Christ,” and in all the articles contained in it or deduced from it by evident consequence—which is all the faith necessary to salvation.
And because he is a Soveraign, he requireth Obedience to all his owne, that is, to all the Civill Laws; in which also are contained all the Laws of Nature, that is, all the Laws of God: for besides the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of the Church, which are part of the Civill Law, (for the Church that can make Laws is the Common-wealth,) there bee no other Laws Divine. Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian Soveraign, is not thereby hindred, neither from beleeving, nor from obeying God.
And because he is a sovereign, he requires obedience to all his own laws, that is, to all the civil laws, in which all the laws of nature, that is, all the laws of God, are also contained. For besides the laws of nature and the laws of the Church, which are part of the civil law (for the church that can make laws is the commonwealth), there are no other divine laws. Whoever obeys his Christian sovereign, therefore, is not thereby hindered either from believing or from obeying God.
But suppose that a Christian King should from this Foundation Iesus is the Christ, draw some false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of Hay, or Stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St. Paul says, he shal be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but onely beleeves his lawfull Teacher. And in case a Subject be forbidden by the Civill Soveraign to professe some of those his opinions, upon what just ground can he disobey? Christian Kings may erre in deducing a Consequence, but who shall Judge? Shall a private man Judge, when the question is of his own obedience?
But suppose a Christian king should draw some false consequences from this foundation, “Jesus is the Christ”—that is, build on it some superstructures of hay or stubble—and command that they be taught. Yet since St. Paul says that he shall be saved, much more shall the one be saved who teaches them at his command, and still more the one who does not teach but only believes his lawful teacher. And if a subject is forbidden by the civil sovereign to profess some of those opinions of his, on what just ground can he disobey? Christian kings may err in deducing a consequence; but who shall judge? Shall a private man judge, when the question concerns his own obedience?
or shall any man Judg but he that is appointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the Civill Soveraign that representeth it? or if the Pope, or an Apostle Judge, may he not erre in deducing of a consequence? did not one of the two, St. Peter, or St. Paul erre in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the Laws of a Christian Common-wealth.
Or shall anyone judge but the one appointed to it by the Church, that is, by the civil sovereign who represents it? Or if the Pope or an apostle judges, may he not err in deducing a consequence? Did not one of the two, St. Peter or St. Paul, err in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God and the laws of a Christian commonwealth.
And when the Civill Soveraign is an Infidel, every one of his own Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God (for such as are the Laws of Nature,) and rejecteth the counsell of the Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes, and all Children and Servants to obey their Parents, and Masters, in all things. And for their Faith, it is internall, and invisible; They have the licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in Heaven, and not complain of their Lawfull Soveraign; much lesse make warre upon him.
And when the civil sovereign is an unbeliever, every one of his own subjects who resists him sins against the laws of God (for such are the laws of nature), and rejects the counsel of the apostles, which admonishes all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey their parents and masters in all things. As for their faith, it is internal and invisible. They have the license that Naaman had, and need not put themselves in danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawful sovereign, much less make war on him.
For he that is not glad of any just occasion of Martyrdome, has not the faith he professeth, but pretends it onely, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But what Infidel King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject, that waiteth for the second comming of Christ, after the present world shall bee burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of beleeving that Iesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the Laws of that Infidel King, (which all Christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death, or to persecute such a Subject?
For anyone who is not glad of any just occasion of martyrdom does not have the faith he professes, but only pretends to it, to give some color to his own defiance. But what unbelieving king is so unreasonable that, knowing he has a subject who waits for the second coming of Christ after the present world has been burned, and intends then to obey him (which is what believing that Jesus is the Christ means), and who in the meantime thinks himself bound to obey the laws of that unbelieving king (as all Christians are obliged in conscience to do)—would put such a subject to death, or persecute him?
And thus much shall suffice, concerning the Kingdome of God, and Policy Ecclesiasticall. Wherein I pretend not to advance any Position of my own, but onely to shew what are the Consequences that seem to me deducible from the Principles of Christian Politiques, (which are the holy Scriptures,) in confirmation of the Power of Civill Soveraigns, and the Duty of their Subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure, or controverted Interpretation; and to alledge none, but in such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible; which was written for the re-establishment of the Kingdome of God in Christ.
And this much will suffice concerning the Kingdom of God and ecclesiastical policy. In it I claim to advance no position of my own, but only to show what consequences seem to me deducible from the principles of Christian politics (which are the Holy Scriptures), in confirmation of the power of civil sovereigns and the duty of their subjects. In citing Scripture I have tried to avoid texts of obscure or disputed interpretation, and to cite none except in the sense that is most plain and agreeable to the harmony and purpose of the whole Bible, which was written for the re-establishment of the Kingdom of God in Christ.
For it is not the bare Words, but the Scope of the writer that giveth the true light, by which any writing is to bee interpreted; and they that insist upon single Texts, without considering the main Designe, can derive no thing from them cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of Scripture, as dust before mens eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage.
For it is not the bare words but the purpose of the writer that gives the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted. Those who insist on single texts without considering the main design can derive nothing clearly from them; rather, by throwing atoms of Scripture like dust before men’s eyes, they make everything more obscure than it is—an ordinary trick of those who seek not the truth but their own advantage.
Part IV: Of the Kingdom of Darkness
Errors of misread Scripture, demonology, vain philosophy and fabulous traditions, who profits from them, and a review and conclusion.
Chapter 44: Of spiritual darkness from misinterpretation of Scripture
Hobbes defines the kingdom of darkness as a confederacy of deceivers and names its four sources.
Besides these Soveraign Powers, Divine, and Humane, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another Power, namely, that of the Rulers of the Darknesse of this world, the Kingdome of Satan, and the Princpality of Beelzebub over Daemons, that is to say, over Phantasmes that appear in the Air: For which cause Satan is also called the Prince of the Power of the Air; and (because he ruleth in the darknesse of this world) The Prince of this world: And in consequence hereunto, they who are under his Dominion, in opposition to the faithfull (who are the Children of the Light) are called the Children of Darknesse. For seeing Beelzebub is Prince of Phantasmes, Inhabitants of his Dominion of Air and Darknesse, the Children of Darknesse, and these Daemons, Phantasmes, or Spirits of Illusion, signifie allegorically the same thing.
Besides these sovereign powers, divine and human, which I have discussed so far, Scripture mentions another power: that of “the rulers of the darkness of this world,” “the kingdom of Satan,” and “the principality of Beelzebub over demons”—that is, over phantasms that appear in the air. For this reason Satan is also called “the prince of the power of the air,” and (because he rules in the darkness of this world) “the prince of this world.” Accordingly, those under his dominion, as opposed to the faithful (who are “the children of light”), are called “the children of darkness.” For since Beelzebub is prince of phantasms, the inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness, the children of darkness and these demons, phantasms, or spirits of illusion signify allegorically the same thing.
This considered, the Kingdome of Darknesse, as it is set forth in these, and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneons Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light, both of Nature, and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare them for the Kingdome of God to come.
This considered, the kingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of Scripture, is nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers who, to obtain dominion over men in this present world, try by dark and erroneous doctrines to extinguish in them the light both of nature and of the Gospel, and so to unfit them for the Kingdom of God to come.
As men that are utterly deprived from their Nativity, of the light of the bodily Eye, have no Idea at all, of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some time, or other, perceived by his outward Senses: so also is it of the light of the Gospel, and of the light of the Understanding, that no man can conceive there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto.
Men who have been wholly deprived from birth of the light of the bodily eye have no idea at all of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light than he has at some time perceived by his outward senses. So it is also with the light of the Gospel and the light of the understanding: no man can conceive that there is any greater degree of it than what he has already attained.
And from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means to acknowledge their owne Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the un-foreseen mischances, that befall them in their ways; The Darkest part of the Kingdom of Satan, is that which is without the Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that beleeve not in Jesus Christ. But we cannot say, that therefore the Church enjoyeth (as the land of Goshen) all the light, which to the performance of the work enjoined us by God, is necessary. Whence comes it, that in Christendome there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out of their places, both by forraign, and Civill war?
And so it happens that men have no other means of recognizing their own darkness except by reasoning from the unforeseen mishaps that befall them along their way. The darkest part of the kingdom of Satan is what lies outside the Church of God, that is, among those who do not believe in Jesus Christ. But we cannot therefore say that the Church enjoys (like the land of Goshen) all the light necessary for performing the work God has enjoined on us. Otherwise, where does it come from that in Christendom there has been, almost from the time of the apostles, such jostling of one another out of their places, by both foreign and civil war?
such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men? and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, Felicity, if it be not Night amongst us, or at least a Mist? wee are therefore yet in the Dark.
Such stumbling at every little roughness in their own fortune, and at every little eminence in that of other men? And such diversity of ways in running to the same goal, felicity—if it is not night among us, or at least a mist? We are therefore still in the dark.
The Enemy has been here in the Night of our naturall Ignorance, and sown the tares of Spirituall Errors; and that, First, by abusing, and putting out the light of the Scriptures: For we erre, not knowing the Scriptures. Secondly, by introducing the Daemonology of the Heathen Poets, that is to say, their fabulous Doctrine concerning Daemons, which are but Idols, or Phantasms of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy; such as are dead mens Ghosts, and Fairies, and other matter of old Wives tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers reliques of the Religion, and much of the vain and erroneous Philosophy of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle.
The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown the tares of spiritual errors. He has done this, first, by abusing and putting out the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures. Secondly, by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are only idols or phantasms of the brain, with no real nature of their own distinct from human fancy—such as dead men’s ghosts, and fairies, and other matter of old wives’ tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture various relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy, of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle.
Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false, or uncertain Traditions, and fained, or uncertain History. And so we come to erre, by giving heed to seducing Spirits, and the Daemonology of such as speak lies in Hypocrisie, (or as it is in the Originall, 1 Tim. 4. 1, 2. of those that play the part of lyars) with a seared conscience, that is, contrary to their own knowledge. Concerning the first of these, which is the Seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this Chapter.
Fourthly, by mingling with both of these false or uncertain traditions, and invented or uncertain history. And so we come to err, “giving heed to seducing spirits,” and to the demonology of those “who speak lies in hypocrisy” (or, as it is in the original, “of those who play the part of liars”) “with a seared conscience,” that is, contrary to their own knowledge (1 Timothy 4:1–2). Concerning the first of these, the seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter.
Mistaking the Church for the Kingdom of God
The claim that the present Church is God's kingdom supports papal power, clergy, tithes and canon law.
The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the Kingdome of God was first instituted by the Ministery of Moses, over the Jews onely; who were therefore called his Peculiar People; and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more, and demanded a King after the manner of the nations; which God himself consented unto, as I have more at large proved before, in the 35.
The greatest and chief abuse of Scripture, to which almost all the rest are either consequent or subservient, is the twisting of it to prove that the Kingdom of God, mentioned so often in Scripture, is the present Church, or the multitude of Christians now living, or who, being dead, are to rise again at the last day. Yet the Kingdom of God was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only, who were therefore called his peculiar people; and it ceased afterward, at the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more and demanded a king after the manner of the nations—to which God himself consented, as I have proved more at length before, in Chapter 35.
Chapter. After that time, there was no other Kingdome of God in the world, by any Pact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be King, of all men, and of all creatures, as governing according to his Will, by his infinite Power.
After that time there was no other Kingdom of God in the world, by any pact or otherwise, than that he ever was, is, and shall be King of all men and all creatures, as governing according to his will by his infinite power.
Neverthelesse, he promised by his Prophets to restore this his Government to them again, when the time he hath in his secret counsell appointed for it shall bee fully come, and when they shall turn unto him by repentance, and amendment of life: and not onely so, but he invited also the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happinesse of his Reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance;
Nevertheless, he promised by his prophets to restore this government of his to them again, when the time he has appointed for it in his secret counsel is fully come, and when they turn to him by repentance and amendment of life. And not only that: he also invited the Gentiles to come in and enjoy the happiness of his reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance;
and hee promised also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his Doctrine, to receive him at his second coming: Which second coming not yet being, the Kingdome of God is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other Kings by Pact, but our Civill Soveraigns; saving onely, that Christian men are already in the Kingdome of Grace, in as much as they have already the Promise of being received at his comming againe.
and he promised also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine to receive him at his second coming. Since that second coming has not yet happened, the Kingdom of God has not yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact but our civil sovereigns—except only that Christians are already in the kingdom of grace, inasmuch as they already have the promise of being received at his coming again.
Consequent to this Errour, that the present Church is Christs Kingdome, there ought to be some one Man, or Assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour (now in heaven) speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his Person to all Christians, or divers Men, or divers Assemblies that doe the same to divers parts of Christendome. This power Regal under Christ, being challenged, universally by the Pope, and in particular Common-wealths by Assemblies of the Pastors of the place, (when the Scripture gives it to none but to Civill Soveraigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the Light of Nature, and causeth so great a Darknesse in mens understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience.
Following from this error, that the present Church is Christ’s kingdom, there would have to be some one man or assembly through whose mouth our Savior (now in heaven) speaks and gives law, and which represents his person to all Christians—or various men or various assemblies that do the same for various parts of Christendom. This regal power under Christ is claimed universally by the Pope, and in particular commonwealths by assemblies of the local pastors (whereas Scripture gives it to none but civil sovereigns). It has come to be so passionately disputed that it puts out the light of nature, and causes so great a darkness in men’s understanding that they do not see to whom they have pledged their obedience.
Consequent to this claim of the Pope to Vicar Generall of Christ in the present Church, (supposed to be that Kingdom of his, to which we are addressed in the Gospel,) is the Doctrine, that it is necessary for a Christian King, to receive his Crown by a Bishop; as if it were from that Ceremony, that he derives the clause of Dei gratiâ in his title; and that then onely he is made King by the favour of God, when he is crowned by the authority of Gods universall Vicegerent on earth; and that every Bishop whosoever be his Soveraign, taketh at his Consecration an oath of absolute Obedience to the Pope.
Following from this claim of the Pope to be Vicar General of Christ in the present Church (which is supposed to be that kingdom of his to which we are directed in the Gospel) is the doctrine that a Christian king must receive his crown from a bishop—as if it were from that ceremony that he derives the clause Dei gratia (“by the grace of God”) in his title, and as if he were made king by the favor of God only when crowned by the authority of God’s universal vicegerent on earth. So too the doctrine that every bishop, whoever his sovereign may be, takes at his consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the Pope.
Consequent to the same, is the Doctrine of the fourth Councell of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the third, (Chap. 3. de Haereticis.) That if a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeresies, and being excommunicate for the same, doe not give satisfaction within a year, his Subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience. Where, by Haeresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained.
Following from the same is the doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council, held under Pope Innocent III (chapter 3, De haereticis): that if a king, at the Pope’s admonition, does not purge his kingdom of heresies, and, being excommunicated for this, does not give satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved from the bond of their obedience. Here by heresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome has forbidden to be maintained.
And by this means, as often as there is any repugnancy between the Politicall designes of the Pope, and other Christian Princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a Mist amongst their Subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawfull Prince, from him whom they had themselves placed there; and in this Darknesse of mind, are made to fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends, under the conduct of another mans ambition.
And by this means, whenever there is any conflict between the political designs of the Pope and those of other Christian princes—as there very often is—such a mist arises among their subjects that they cannot tell a stranger who thrusts himself into the throne of their lawful prince from the one they had themselves placed there. In this darkness of mind they are made to fight one another, without distinguishing their enemies from their friends, under the leadership of another man’s ambition.
From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdome of God, it proceeds that Pastours, Deacons, and all other Ministers of the Church, take the name to themselves of the Clergy; giving to other Christians the name of Laity, that is, simply People. For Clergy signifies those, whose maintenance is that Revenue, which God having reserved to himselfe during his Reigne over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi (who were to be his publique Ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance.
From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdom of God, it follows that pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church take to themselves the name of clergy, giving other Christians the name of laity, that is, simply people. For clergy signifies those whose maintenance is that revenue which God, having reserved it to himself during his reign over the Israelites, assigned as an inheritance to the tribe of Levi (who were to be his public ministers, and had no portion of land set out for them to live on, as their brethren had).
The Pope therefore, (pretending the present Church to be, as the Realme of Israel, the Kingdome of God) challenging to himselfe and his subordinate Ministers, the like revenue, as the Inheritance of God, the name of Clergy was sutable to that claime. And thence it is, that Tithes, and other tributes paid to the Levites, as Gods Right, amongst the Israelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken of Christians, by Ecclesiastiques, Iure divino, that is, in Gods Right.
The Pope, therefore (pretending that the present Church is, like the realm of Israel, the Kingdom of God), claiming for himself and his subordinate ministers the like revenue as the inheritance of God, found the name of clergy suitable to that claim. Hence it is that tithes and other tributes paid to the Levites as God’s right among the Israelites have long been demanded and taken from Christians by churchmen jure divino, that is, by divine right.
By which meanes, the people every where were obliged to a double tribute; one to the State, another to the Clergy; whereof, that to the Clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a King of Athens (and esteemed a Tyrant) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all publique charges: For he demanded no more but the twentieth part; and yet abundantly maintained therewith the Commonwealth. And in the Kingdome of the Iewes, during the Sacerdotall Reigne of God, the Tithes and Offerings were the whole Publique Revenue.
By this means the people everywhere were bound to a double tribute, one to the state and another to the clergy. The one to the clergy, being a tenth of their revenue, is double what a king of Athens (and one counted a tyrant) exacted of his subjects to defray all public charges; for he demanded no more than the twentieth part, and yet amply maintained the commonwealth with it. And in the kingdom of the Jews, during the priestly reign of God, the tithes and offerings were the whole public revenue.
From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of God, came in the distinction betweene the Civill and the Canon Laws: The Civil Law being the Acts of Soveraigns in their own Dominions, and the Canon Law being the Acts of the Pope in the same Dominions. Which Canons, though they were but Canons, that is, Rules Propounded, and but voluntarily received by Christian Princes, till the translation of the Empire to Charlemain; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope encreased, became Rules Commanded, and the Emperours themselves (to avoyd greater mischiefes, which the people blinded might be led into) were forced to let them passe for Laws.
From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of God came the distinction between the civil and the canon laws: the civil law being the acts of sovereigns in their own dominions, and the canon law the acts of the Pope in those same dominions. These canons were at first only canons, that is, rules proposed, and were only voluntarily received by Christian princes until the transfer of the Empire to Charlemagne. But afterward, as the power of the Pope increased, they became rules commanded, and the emperors themselves (to avoid greater mischiefs into which the blinded people might be led) were forced to let them pass for laws.
From hence it is, that in all Dominions, where the Popes Ecclesiasticall power is entirely received, Jewes, Turkes, and Gentiles, are in the Roman Church tolerated in their Religion, as farre forth, as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against the civill power: whereas in a Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman Religion, is Capitall; because the Pope pretendeth that all Christians are his Subjects. For otherwise it were as much against the law of Nations, to persecute a Christian stranger, for professing the Religion of his owne country, as an Infidell; or rather more, in as much as they that are not against Christ, are with him.
Hence it is that in all dominions where the Pope’s ecclesiastical power is fully received, Jews, Muslims, and pagans are tolerated in their religion by the Roman Church, so far as they do not offend against the civil power in the practice and profession of it; whereas for a Christian, even a foreigner, not to be of the Roman religion is a capital crime, because the Pope claims that all Christians are his subjects. For otherwise it would be as much against the law of nations to persecute a Christian foreigner for professing the religion of his own country as to persecute an unbeliever—or rather more so, inasmuch as those who are not against Christ are with him.
From the same it is that in every Christian State there are certaine men, that are exempt, by Ecclesiasticall liberty, from the tributes, and from the tribunals of the Civil State; for so are the secular Clergy, besides Monks and Friars, which in many places, bear so great a proportion to the common people, as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone, an Army, sufficient for any warre the Church militant should imploy them in, against their owne, or other Princes.
From the same it comes that in every Christian state there are certain men who are exempt, by ecclesiastical liberty, from the taxes and from the courts of the civil state. Such are the secular clergy, besides the monks and friars, who in many places are so large a proportion of the common people that, if need were, an army could be raised out of them alone, sufficient for any war the Church militant might employ them in, against their own or other princes.
Consecration turned into conjuration
The Mass and baptism are said to use charms and exorcisms instead of true consecration.
A second generall abuse of Scripture, is the turning of Consecration into Conjuration, or Enchantment. To Consecrate, is in Scripture, to Offer, Give, or Dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a man, or any other thing to God, by separating of it from common use; that is to say, to Sanctifie, or make it Gods, and to be used only by those, whom God hath appointed to be his Publike Ministers, (as I have already proved at large in the 35. Chapter;) and thereby to change, not the thing Consecrated, but onely the use of it, from being Profane and common, to be Holy, and peculiar to Gods service.
A second general abuse of Scripture is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment. To consecrate, in Scripture, is to offer, give, or dedicate a man or any other thing to God, in pious and decent language and gesture, by separating it from common use—that is, to sanctify it, or make it God’s, to be used only by those whom God has appointed to be his public ministers (as I have already proved at length in Chapter 35). It thereby changes not the thing consecrated, but only its use, from being profane and common to being holy and set apart for God’s service.
But when by such words, the nature or qualitie of the thing it selfe, is pretended to be changed, it is not Consecration, but either an extraordinary worke of God, or a vaine and impious Conjuration. But seeing (for the frequency of pretending the change of Nature in their Consecrations,) it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a Conjuration or Incantation, whereby they would have men to beleeve an alteration of Nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of mans Sight, and of all the rest of his Senses.
But when by such words the nature or quality of the thing itself is claimed to be changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work of God or a vain and impious conjuration. And since (given how often a change of nature is claimed in their consecrations) it cannot be regarded as an extraordinary work, it is nothing other than a conjuration or incantation, by which they would have men believe in an alteration of nature that does not exist, contrary to the testimony of their sight and of all the rest of their senses.
As for example, when the Priest, in stead of Consecrating Bread and Wine to Gods peculiar service in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, (which is but a separation of it from the common use, to signifie, that is, to put men in mind of their Redemption, by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the Crosse for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words of our Saviour, This is my Body, and This is my Blood, the nature of Bread is no more there, but his very Body; notwithstanding there appeareth not to the Sight, or other Sense of the Receiver, any thing that appeared not before the Consecration.
For example, when the priest, instead of consecrating bread and wine to God’s special service in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper (which is only a separation of it from common use, to signify—that is, to remind men of—their redemption by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken and blood shed upon the cross for our transgressions), claims that by saying our Savior’s words, “This is my body” and “This is my blood,” the nature of bread is no longer there, but his very body—even though nothing appears to the sight or other senses of the receiver that did not appear before the consecration.
The Egyptian Conjurers, that are said to have turned their Rods to Serpents, and the Water into Bloud, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the Spectators by a false shew of things, yet are esteemed Enchanters: But what should wee have thought of them, if there had appeared in their Rods nothing like a Serpent, and in the Water enchanted, nothing like Bloud, nor like any thing else but Water, but that they had faced down the King, that they were Serpents that looked like Rods, and that it was Bloud that seemed Water? That had been both Enchantment, and Lying.
The Egyptian conjurers who are said to have turned their rods into serpents and the water into blood are thought only to have deluded the senses of the spectators by a false show of things, yet they are regarded as enchanters. But what should we have thought of them if nothing like a serpent had appeared in their rods, and nothing like blood, nor like anything but water, in the enchanted water, and they had nonetheless insisted to the king’s face that these were serpents that looked like rods, and blood that seemed to be water? That would have been both enchantment and lying.
And yet in this daily act of the Priest, they doe the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a Charme, which produceth nothing new to the Sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the Bread into a Man; nay more, into a God; and require men to worship it, as if it were our Saviour himself present God and Man, and thereby to commit most grosse Idolatry.
And yet in this daily act of the priest they do the very same thing: they turn the holy words into a kind of charm, which produces nothing new to the senses; yet they insist to our faces that it has turned the bread into a man—no, more, into a God—and require men to worship it as if it were our Savior himself present, God and man, and thereby to commit most gross idolatry.
For if it bee enough to excuse it of Idolatry, to say it is no more Bread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they had the faces to say, the Leeks, and Onyons they worshipped, were not very Leeks, and Onyons, but a Divinity under their species, or likenesse. The words, This is my Body, are aequivalent to these, This signifies, or represents my Body; and it is an ordinary figure of Speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken, can it extend any further, than to the Bread which Christ himself with his own hands Consecrated.
For if it is enough to excuse it from idolatry to say that it is no longer bread but God, why should the same excuse not serve the Egyptians, if they had had the face to say that the leeks and onions they worshipped were not really leeks and onions, but a divinity under their species, or likeness? The words “This is my body” are equivalent to “This signifies, or represents, my body,” and it is an ordinary figure of speech. To take it literally is an abuse; and even taken so, it cannot extend any further than to the bread which Christ himself consecrated with his own hands.
For hee never said, that of what Bread soever, any Priest whatsoever, should say, This is my Body, or, This is Christs Body, the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish this Transubstantiation, till the time of Innocent the third; which was not above 500.
For he never said that whatever bread any priest whatever should say “This is my body,” or “This is Christ’s body” over, would at once be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome establish this transubstantiation until the time of Innocent III, which was not more than five hundred
years agoe, when the Power of Popes was at the Highest, and the Darknesse of the time grown so great, as men discerned not the Bread that was given them to eat, especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the Crosse, as if they would have men beleeve it were Transubstantiated, not onely into the Body of Christ, but also into the Wood of his Crosse, and that they did eat both together in the Sacrament.
years ago, when the power of the popes was at its height, and the darkness of the time had grown so great that men did not discern the bread that was given them to eat—especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they would have men believe it was transubstantiated not only into the body of Christ but also into the wood of his cross, and that they ate both together in the sacrament.
The like Incantation, in stead of Consecration, is used also in the Sacrament of Baptisme: Where the abuse of Gods name in each severall Person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the Crosse at each name, maketh up the Charm: As first, when they make the Holy water, the Priest saith, I Conjure thee, thou Creature of Water, in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Iesus Christ his onely Son our Lord, and in vertue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become Conjured water, to drive away all the Powers of the Enemy, and to eradicate, and supplant the Enemy, &c. And the same in the Benediction of the Salt to be mingled with it; *That thou become Conjured Salt, that all Phantasmes, and Knavery of the Devills fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled;
The like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the sacrament of baptism. There the abuse of God’s name in each separate Person and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each name, makes up the charm. First, when they make the holy water, the priest says, “I conjure you, creature of water, in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, and in the power of the Holy Spirit, that you become conjured water, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to root out and supplant the enemy,” and so on. And the same in the blessing of the salt to be mixed with it: “That you become conjured salt, that all phantasms and knavery of the devil’s fraud may fly and depart from the place where you are sprinkled,
and every unclean Spirit bee Conjured by Him that shall come to judg the quicke and the dead. The same in the Benediction of the Oyle, That all the Power of the Enemy, all the Host of the Devill, all Assaults and Phantasmes of Satan, may be driven away by this Creature of Oyle. And for the Infant that is to be Baptized, he is subject to many Charms: First, at the Church dore the Priest blows thrice in the Childs face, and sayes, Goe out of him unclean Spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the Comforter. As if all Children, till blown on by the Priest were Daemoniaques: Again, before his entrance into the Church, he saith as before, I Conjure thee, &c.
and every unclean spirit be conjured by him who shall come to judge the living and the dead.” The same in the blessing of the oil: “That all the power of the enemy, all the host of the devil, all assaults and phantasms of Satan, may be driven away by this creature of oil.” And the infant who is to be baptized is subjected to many charms. First, at the church door the priest blows three times in the child’s face and says, “Go out of him, unclean spirit, and give place to the Holy Spirit the Comforter”—as if all children, until blown on by the priest, were possessed by demons. Again, before the child enters the church, he says as before, “I conjure you, etc.,
to goe out, and depart from this Servant of God:* And again the same Exorcisme is repeated once more before he be Baptized. These, and some other Incantations, are those that are used in stead of Benedictions, and Consecrations, in administration of the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the Lords Supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy uses (except the unhallowed Spittle of the Priest) hath some set form of Exorcisme.
to go out and depart from this servant of God.” And the same exorcism is repeated once more before the child is baptized. These and some other incantations are what are used instead of blessings and consecrations in administering the sacraments of baptism and the Lord’s Supper; and in them everything that serves those holy uses (except the unhallowed spittle of the priest) has some set form of exorcism.
Nor are the other rites, as of Marriage, of Extreme Unction, of Visitation of the Sick, of Consecrating Churches, and Church-yards, and the like, exempt from Charms; in as much as there is in them the use of Enchanted Oyle, and Water, with the abuse of the Crosse, and of the holy word of David, Asperges me Domine Hyssopo, as things of efficacy to drive away Phantasmes, and Imaginary Spirits.
Nor are the other rites—of marriage, of extreme unction, of visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches and churchyards, and the like—free of charms, inasmuch as they use enchanted oil and water, with the abuse of the cross and of the holy words of David, Asperges me, Domine, hyssopo (“Sprinkle me, Lord, with hyssop”), as things effective to drive away phantasms and imaginary spirits.
Eternal life and everlasting death
Belief in a naturally immortal soul opens the way to eternal torment, purgatory and ghosts.
Another generall Error, is from the Misinterpretation of the words Eternall Life, Everlasting Death, and the Second Death. For though we read plainly in holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of Living for Ever, which was conditionall, that is to say, if he disobeyed not his Commandement; which was not essentiall to Humane Nature, but consequent to the vertue of the Tree of Life; whereof hee had liberty to eat, as long as hee had not sinned; and that hee was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest hee should eate thereof, and live for ever; and that Christs Passion is a Discharge of sin to all that beleeve on him;
Another general error comes from the misinterpretation of the words eternal life, everlasting death, and the second death. We read plainly in Holy Scripture that God created Adam in a state of living forever, which was conditional—that is, if he did not disobey his commandment—and was not essential to human nature but a consequence of the virtue of the Tree of Life, of which he was free to eat as long as he had not sinned; that he was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest he should eat of it and live forever; and that Christ’s Passion is a discharge from sin for all who believe in him;
and by consequence, a restitution of Eternall Life, to all the Faithfull, and to them onely: yet the Doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath Eternity of Life by Nature, in as much as his Soul is Immortall: So that the flaming Sword at the entrance of Paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the Tree of Life, hinders him not from the Immortality which God took from him for his Sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the recovering of the same; and consequently, not onely the faithfull and righteous, but also the wicked, and the Heathen, shall enjoy Eternall Life, without any Death at all; much lesse a Second, and Everlasting Death.
and consequently a restoration of eternal life to all the faithful, and to them only. Yet the doctrine now is, and has long been, quite otherwise: namely, that every man has eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal. So the flaming sword at the entrance of Paradise, though it keeps a man from coming to the Tree of Life, does not keep him from the immortality which God took from him for his sin, nor makes him need the sacrifice of Christ to recover it. Consequently not only the faithful and righteous, but also the wicked and the heathen, shall enjoy eternal life without any death at all—much less a second and everlasting death.
To salve this, it is said, that by Second, and Everlasting Death, is meant a Second, and Everlasting Life, but in Torments; a Figure never used, but in this very Case.
To remedy this, it is said that by second and everlasting death is meant a second and everlasting life, but in torments—a figure of speech never used except in this very case.
All which Doctrine is founded onely on some of the obscurer places of the New Testament; which neverthelesse, the whole scope of the Scripture considered, are cleer enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to the Christian Faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but his carkasse; cannot God that raised inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by his Word, as easily raise a dead carkasse to life again, and continue him alive for Ever, or make him die again, by another Word?
All this doctrine is founded only on some of the more obscure places of the New Testament; which nevertheless, considering the whole purpose of Scripture, are clear enough in a different sense, and are unnecessary to the Christian faith. For suppose that when a man dies nothing remains of him but his carcass: cannot God, who by his word raised lifeless dust and clay into a living creature, just as easily raise a dead carcass to life again and keep him alive forever, or make him die again, by another word?
The Soule in Scripture, signifieth alwaies, either the Life, or the Living Creature; and the Body and Soule jointly, the Body alive. In the fift day of the Creation, God said, Let the waters produce Reptile animae viventis, the creeping thing that hath in it a Living Soule; the English translate it, that hath Life: And again, God created Whales, & omnem animam viventem; which in the English is, every Living Creature: And likewise of Man, God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of Life, & factus est Homo in animam viventem, that is, and Man was made a Living Creature: And after Noah came out of the Arke, God saith, hee will no more smite omnem animam viventem, that is, every Living Creature: And Deut.
The soul in Scripture always signifies either the life or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly, the living body. On the fifth day of the Creation, God said, Let the waters bring forth reptile animae viventis, the creeping thing that has in it a living soul; the English translates it “that has life.” And again, God created whales, et omnem animam viventem, which in the English is “every living creature.” And likewise of man: God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, et factus est homo in animam viventem, that is, “and man became a living creature.” And after Noah came out of the ark, God says he will no more smite omnem animam viventem, that is, “every living creature.” And
12. 23. Eate not the Bloud, for the Bloud is the Soule; that is, the Life. From which places, if by Soule were meant a Substance Incorporeall, with an existence separated from the Body, it might as well be inferred of any other living Creature, as of Man. But that the Souls of the Faithfull, are not of theirown Nature, but by Gods speciall Grace, to remaine in their Bodies, from the Resurrection to all Eternity, I have already I think sufficiently proved out of the Scriptures, in the 38. Chapter.
Deuteronomy 12:23: “Do not eat the blood, for the blood is the soul,” that is, “the life.” From these places, if by soul were meant an incorporeal substance with an existence separate from the body, the same might as well be inferred of any other living creature as of man. But that the souls of the faithful remain in their bodies from the Resurrection to all eternity, not by their own nature but by God’s special grace, I have already, I think, sufficiently proved from the Scriptures in Chapter 38.
And for the places of the New Testament, where it is said that any man shall be cast Body and Soul into Hell fire, it is no more than Body and Life; that is to say, they shall be cast alive into the perpetuall fire of Gehenna.
And as for the places in the New Testament where it is said that someone shall be cast body and soul into hellfire, this means no more than body and life—that is, they shall be cast alive into the perpetual fire of Gehenna.
This window it is, that gives entrance to the Dark Doctrine, first, of Eternall Torments; and afterwards of Purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad, especially in places Consecrated, Solitary, or Dark, of the Ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of Exorcisme and Conjuration of Phantasmes; as also of Invocation of men dead; and to the Doctrine of Indulgences; that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for ever, from the fire of Purgatory, wherein these Incorporeall Substances are pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for Heaven.
This is the window that lets in the dark doctrine, first, of eternal torments; and afterward of purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad of the ghosts of the dead, especially in places that are consecrated, solitary, or dark; and so to the pretenses of exorcism and conjuring of phantasms; as also to the invocation of the dead; and to the doctrine of indulgences, that is, of exemption for a time or forever from the fire of purgatory, in which these incorporeal substances are claimed to be cleansed by burning and made fit for heaven.
For men being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by contagion of the Daemonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the Souls of men were substances distinct from their Bodies, and therefore that when the Body was dead, the Soule of every man, whether godly, or wicked, must subsist somewhere by vertue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any supernaturall gift of Gods; the Doctors of the Church doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be re-united to their Bodies in the Resurrection; supposing for a while, they lay under the Altars: but afterward the Church of Rome found it more profitable, to build for them this place of Purgatory; which by some other Churches in this later age, has been demolished.
For before the time of our Savior, men were generally possessed, by contagion from the demonology of the Greeks, with the opinion that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies; and therefore that when the body was dead, the soul of every man, godly or wicked, must subsist somewhere by virtue of its own nature, without acknowledging in this any supernatural gift of God. So the Doctors of the Church doubted for a long time what place the souls were to stay in until they should be reunited with their bodies at the Resurrection. For a while they supposed they lay under the altars; but afterward the Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place of purgatory—which in this later age has been demolished by some other churches.
Answering the texts for a present kingdom
Texts cited for a Kingdom of God already on earth, and for exorcised consecrations, are examined.
Let us now consider, what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three generall Errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinall Bellarmine hath alledged, for the present Kingdome of God administred by the Pope, (than which there are none that make a better shew of proof,) I have already answered them; and made it evident, that the Kingdome of God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul: After which time the Priest of his own authority never deposed any King.
Let us now consider which texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three general errors I have touched on here. As for those which Cardinal Bellarmine has cited for the present Kingdom of God administered by the Pope (and none make a better show of proof), I have already answered them, and made it evident that the Kingdom of God instituted by Moses ended with the election of Saul; after which time the priest never deposed any king by his own authority.
That which the High Priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his owne right, but in the right of the young King Joash her Son: But Solomon in his own right deposed the High Priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The most difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought, to prove the Kingdome of God by Christ is already in this world, is alledged, not by Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but by Beza; that will have it to begin from the Resurrection of Christ.
What the high priest did to Athaliah was not done in his own right, but in the right of the young king Joash, her son. But Solomon in his own right deposed the high priest Abiathar and set up another in his place. The most difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought to prove that the Kingdom of God by Christ is already in this world, is cited not by Bellarmine, nor by any other of the Church of Rome, but by Beza, who will have it begin from the Resurrection of Christ.
But whether hee intend thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the Supreme Power Ecclesiasticall in the Common-wealth of Geneva, (and consequently to every Presbytery in every other Common-wealth,) or to Princes, and other Civill Soveraigns, I doe not know. For the Presbytery hath challenged the power to Excomunicate their owne Kings, and to bee the Supreme Moderators in Religion, in the places where they have that form of Church government, no lesse then the Pope callengeth it universally.
But whether he means by this to entitle the presbytery to the supreme ecclesiastical power in the commonwealth of Geneva (and consequently every presbytery in every other commonwealth), or princes and other civil sovereigns, I do not know. For the presbytery has claimed the power to excommunicate their own kings, and to be the supreme moderators in religion wherever they have that form of church government, no less than the Pope claims it universally.
The words are (Marke 9. 1.) Verily I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not tast of death, till they have seene the Kingdome of God come with power. Which words, if taken grammatically, make it certaine, that either some of those men that stood by Christ at that time, are yet alive; or else, that the Kingdome of God must be now in this present world. And then there is another place more difficult: For when the Apostles after our Saviours Resurrection, and immediately before his Ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (Acts 1. 6.)
The words are, “Truly I say to you, there are some of those standing here who shall not taste death until they have seen the Kingdom of God come with power” (Mark 9:1). These words, if taken grammatically, make it certain either that some of the men who stood by Christ at that time are still alive, or else that the Kingdom of God must now be in this present world. And then there is another place, more difficult. For when the apostles, after our Savior’s Resurrection and immediately before his Ascension, asked our Savior,
Wilt thou at this time restore again the Kingdome to Israel, he answered them, It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power; But ye shall receive power by the comming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and yee shall be my (Martyrs) witnesses both in Ierusalem, & in all Iudaea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the Earth: Which is as much as to say, My Kingdome is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come;
“Will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?” (Acts 1:6), he answered them, “It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father has put in his own power. But you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you, and you shall be my witnesses (martyrs) both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and to the uttermost part of the earth.” This is as much as to say, “My kingdom has not yet come, nor shall you know beforehand when it will come;
for it shall come as a theefe in the night; But I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to beare witnesse to all the world (by your preaching) of my Resurrection, and the workes I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may beleeve in me, and expect eternall life, at my comming againe: How does this agree with the comming of Christs Kingdome at the Resurrection?
for it shall come like a thief in the night. But I will send you the Holy Spirit, and by him you shall have power to bear witness to all the world (by your preaching) of my Resurrection, and the works I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, so that they may believe in me and expect eternal life at my coming again.” How does this agree with the coming of Christ’s kingdom at the Resurrection?
And that which St. Paul saies (1 Thessal. 1. 9, 10.) That they turned from Idols, to serve the living and true God, and to waite for his Sonne from Heaven; Where to waite for his Sonne from Heaven, is to wait for his comming to be King in power; which were not necessary, if his Kingdome had beene then present. Againe, if the Kingdome of God began (as Beza on that place (Mark 9. 1.) would have it) at the Resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since the Resurrection to say in their prayers, Let thy Kingdome Come? It is therefore manifest, that the words of St. Mark are not so to be interpreted.
And St. Paul says, “They turned from idols to serve the living and true God, and to wait for his Son from heaven” (1 Thessalonians 1:9–10). To wait for his Son from heaven is to wait for his coming to be King in power, which would not have been necessary if his kingdom had then been present. Again, if the Kingdom of God began at the Resurrection (as Beza would have it in his comment on that place, Mark 9:1), what reason is there for Christians ever since the Resurrection to say in their prayers, “Thy kingdom come”? It is therefore evident that the words of St. Mark are not to be interpreted so.
There be some of them that stand here (saith our Saviour) that shall not tast of death till they have seen the Kingdome of God come in power. If then this Kingdome were to come at the Resurrection of Christ, why is it said, some of them, rather than all? For they all lived till after Christ was risen.
“There are some of those standing here,” says our Savior, “who shall not taste death until they have seen the Kingdom of God come in power.” If, then, this kingdom was to come at the Resurrection of Christ, why is it said some of them rather than all? For they all lived until after Christ was risen.
But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like words of our Saviour to St. Peter concerning St. John, (chap. 21. 22.) If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? upon which was grounded a report that hee should not dye: Neverthelesse the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a saying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Marke. And if it be lawfull to conjecture at their meaning, by that which immediately followes, both here, and in St.
But let those who require an exact interpretation of this text first interpret the similar words of our Savior to St. Peter concerning St. John: “If I will that he remain until I come, what is that to you?” (John 21:22). On these words was grounded a report that he would not die. Yet the truth of that report was neither confirmed as well grounded nor refuted as ill grounded on those words, but left as a saying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place in St. Mark. And if it is lawful to guess at their meaning from what immediately follows, both here and in St.
Luke, where the same is againe repeated, it is not unprobable, to say they have relation to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following; where it is said, that After six dayes Iesus taketh with him Peter, and Iames, and Iohn (not all, but some of his Disciples) *and leadeth them up into an high mountaine apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them. And his rayment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no Fuller on earth can white them.
Luke, where the same is repeated, it is not improbable to say that they refer to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following, where it is said that “after six days Jesus takes with him Peter, and James, and John” (not all, but some of his disciples) “and leads them up into a high mountain apart by themselves, and he was transfigured before them. And his clothing became shining, exceedingly white as snow, such as no fuller on earth can whiten them.
And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Iesus, &c. So that they saw Christ in Glory and Majestie, as he is to come; insomuch as They were sore afraid. And thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of Vision:* For it was a Vision, as may probably bee inferred out of St. Luke, that reciteth the same story (ch. 9. ve. 28.) and saith, that Peter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep: But most certainly out of Matth. 17. 9.
And there appeared to them Elijah with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus,” etc. (Mark 9:2–4). So they saw Christ in glory and majesty, as he is to come—so that “they were very much afraid.” And thus our Savior’s promise was fulfilled by way of vision. For that it was a vision may probably be inferred from St. Luke, who recounts the same story and says that Peter and those with him were heavy with sleep (Luke 9:28, 32); but most certainly from
(where the same is again related;) for our Saviour charged them, saying, Tell no man the Vision untill the Son of man be Risen from the dead. Howsoever it be, yet there can from thence be taken no argument, to prove that the Kingdome of God taketh beginning till the day of Judgement.
Matthew 17:9, where the same is related again; for our Savior charged them, saying, “Tell no one the vision until the Son of Man is risen from the dead.” However it may be, no argument can be drawn from it to prove that the Kingdom of God begins before the Day of Judgment.
As for some other texts, to prove the Popes Power over civill Soveraignes (besides those of Bellarmine;) as that the two Swords that Christ and his Apostles had amongst them, were the Spirituall and the Temporall Sword, which they say St.
As for some other texts used to prove the Pope’s power over civil sovereigns (besides those of Bellarmine): for instance, that the two swords which Christ and his apostles had among them were the spiritual and the temporal sword, which they say St.
Peter had given him by Christ: And, that of the two Luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the lesser the King; One might as well inferre out of the first verse of the Bible, that by Heaven is meant the Pope, and by Earth the King: Which is not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over Princes, that came in fashion after the time the Popes were growne so secure of their greatnesse, as to contemne all Christian Kings; and Treading on the necks of Emperours, to mocke both them, and the Scripture, in the words of the 91. Psalm, Thou shalt Tread upon the Lion and the Adder, the young Lion and the Dragon thou shalt Trample under thy feet.
Peter was given by Christ; and that of the two great lights, the greater signifies the Pope and the lesser the king. One might as well infer from the first verse of the Bible that by heaven is meant the Pope and by earth the king. This is not arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting of princes, which came into fashion after the popes had grown so secure in their greatness as to despise all Christian kings—treading on the necks of emperors, and mocking both them and the Scripture in the words of the ninety-first Psalm: “You shall tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion and the dragon you shall trample under your feet.”
As for the rites of Consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the discretion and judgement of the governors of the Church, and not upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction, as the nature of the action it selfe requireth; as that the ceremonies, words, and gestures, be both decent, and significant, or at least conformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the Tabernacle, the Altar, and the Vessels belonging to them, (Exod. 40.) he anointed them with the Oyle which God had commanded to bee made for that purpose; and they were holy: There was nothing Exorcized, to drive away Phantasmes.
As for the rites of consecration, though they depend for the most part on the discretion and judgment of the governors of the Church, and not on the Scriptures, those governors are still bound to such direction as the nature of the action itself requires: that the ceremonies, words, and gestures be both decent and meaningful, or at least suited to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels belonging to them (Exodus 40), he anointed them with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose, and they were holy. Nothing was exorcised to drive away phantasms.
The same Moses (the civill Soveraigne of Israel) when he consecrated Aaron (the High Priest,) and his Sons, did wash them with Water, (not Exorcized water,) put their Garments upon them, and anointed them with Oyle; and they were sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the Priests office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and adorning them, before hee presented them to God, to be his servants. When King Solomon, (the civill Soveraigne of Israel) consecrated the Temple hee had built, (2 Kings 8.)
The same Moses (the civil sovereign of Israel), when he consecrated Aaron (the high priest) and his sons, washed them with water (not exorcised water), put their garments on them, and anointed them with oil; and they were sanctified to minister to the Lord in the priest’s office. This was a simple and decent cleansing and adorning of them before he presented them to God to be his servants. When King Solomon (the civil sovereign of Israel) consecrated the Temple he had built,
he stood before all the Congregation of Israel; and having blessed them, he gave thankes to God, for putting into the heart of his father, to build it; and for giving to himselfe the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that House, though it were not sutable to his infinite Greatnesse; and to hear the prayers of his Servants that should pray therein, or (if they were absent,) towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of Peace-offering, and the House was dedicated.
he stood before all the congregation of Israel (1 Kings 8); and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God for putting it into his father’s heart to build it, and for giving himself the grace to accomplish it. Then he prayed to him, first, to accept that house, though it was not suited to his infinite greatness, and to hear the prayers of his servants who should pray in it, or (if they were absent) toward it. And lastly he offered a sacrifice of peace offerings, and the house was dedicated.
Here was no Procession; the King stood still in his first place; no Exorcised Water; no Asperges me, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion; but a decent, and rationall speech, and such as in making to God a present of his new built House, was most conformable to the occasion.
Here there was no procession—the king stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no Asperges me, nor any other irrelevant application of words spoken on another occasion; but a decent and rational speech, and such as was most suited to the occasion of making God a present of his newly built house.
We read not that St. John did Exorcize the Water of Jordan; nor Philip the Water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch; nor that any Pastor in the time of the Apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to the nose of the person to be Baptized, and say, In odorem suavitatis, that is, for a sweet savour unto the Lord; wherein neither the Ceremony of Spittle, for the uncleannesse; nor the application of that Scripture for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified.
We do not read that St. John exorcised the water of the Jordan, nor Philip the water of the river in which he baptized the eunuch, nor that any pastor in the time of the apostles took his spittle, put it to the nose of the person to be baptized, and said In odorem suavitatis, that is, “for a sweet savor to the Lord.” In this, neither the ceremony of spittle, for its uncleanness, nor the application of that Scripture, for its levity, can be justified by any human authority.
Texts for the soul's natural immortality
Passages seeming to prove that souls, including the wicked's, live forever are read otherwise.
To prove that the Soule separated from the Body, liveth eternally, not onely the Soules of the Elect, by especiall grace, and restauration of the Eternall Life which Adam lost by Sinne, and our Saviour restored by the Sacrifice of himself, to the Faithfull; but also the Soules of Reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without other grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind; there are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn: but such, as when I compare them with that which I have before (Chapter 38.)
To prove that the soul separated from the body lives eternally—not only the souls of the elect, by special grace and by the restoration of the eternal life which Adam lost by sin and our Savior restored to the faithful by the sacrifice of himself, but also the souls of the reprobate, as a property naturally consequent on the essence of mankind, without any other grace of God than what is given universally to all mankind—there are various places which at first sight seem to serve the purpose well enough. But when I compare them with what I cited earlier (Chapter 38)
alledged out of the 14 of Iob, seem to mee much more subject to a divers interpretation, than the words of Iob.
from the fourteenth chapter of Job, they seem to me much more open to a different interpretation than the words of Job.
And first there are the words of Solomon (Ecclesiastes 12. 7.) Then shall the Dust return to Dust, as it was, and the Spirit shall return to God that gave it. Which may bear well enough (if there be no other text directly against it) this interpretation, that God onely knows, (but Man not,) what becomes of a mans spirit, when he expireth; and the same Solomon, in the same Book, (Chap. 3. ver. 20, 21.)
First, there are the words of Solomon, “Then shall the dust return to the dust as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it” (Ecclesiastes 12:7). This may well enough bear (if there is no other text directly against it) this interpretation: that God only knows, and man does not, what becomes of a man’s spirit when he dies. And the same Solomon, in the same book,
delivereth the same sentence in the sense I have given it: His words are, All goe (man and beast) to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of Man goeth upward, and that the spirit of the Beast goeth downward to the earth? That is, none knows but God; Nor is it an unusuall phrase to say of things we understand not, God Knows what, and God Knows where. That of Gen. 5. 24. Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him; which is expounded Heb. 13. 5. *He was translated, that he should not die; and was not found, because God had translated him.
delivers the same judgment in the sense I have given it (Ecclesiastes 3:20–21). His words are, “All go” (man and beast) “to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knows that the spirit of man goes upward, and that the spirit of the beast goes downward to the earth?” That is, no one knows but God. Nor is it an unusual phrase to say of things we do not understand, “God knows what,” and “God knows where.” The text in Genesis 5:24, “Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him,” is expounded in Hebrews 11:5: “He was taken up, so that he should not die, and was not found, because God had taken him up.
For before his Translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God, making as much for the Immortality of the Body, as of the Soule, proveth, that this his translation was peculiar to them that please God; not common to them with the wicked; and depending on Grace, not on Nature. But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give, besides the literall sense of the words of Solomon (Eccles. 3.
For before he was taken up, he had this testimony, that he pleased God.” This, making as much for the immortality of the body as of the soul, proves that this taking up was peculiar to those who please God, not common to them with the wicked, and depended on grace, not on nature. But on the other hand, what interpretation shall we give, other than the literal sense, of the words of Solomon,
19.) That which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dyeth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one breath (one spirit;) so that a Man hath no praeeminence above a Beast, for all is vanity.* By the literall sense, here is no Naturall Immortality of the Soule; nor yet any repugnancy with the Life Eternall, which the Elect shall enjoy by Grace. And (chap. 4. ver. 3.)
“That which befalls the sons of men befalls beasts; even one thing befalls them: as the one dies, so does the other; yes, they all have one breath” (one spirit), “so that a man has no preeminence above a beast; for all is vanity” (Ecclesiastes 3:19)? In the literal sense, there is here no natural immortality of the soul—nor yet any conflict with the eternal life which the elect shall enjoy by grace. And
Better is he that hath not yet been, than both they; that is, than they that live, or have lived; which, if the Soule of all them that have lived, were Immortall, were a hard saying; for then to have an Immortall Soule, were worse than to have no Soule at all. And againe, (Chapt. 9. 5.) The living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing; that is, Naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.
(Ecclesiastes 4:3): “Better is he who has not yet been than both of them,” that is, than those who live or have lived. If the souls of all who have lived were immortal, this would be a hard saying; for then to have an immortal soul would be worse than to have no soul at all. And again (Ecclesiastes 9:5), “The living know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing”—that is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.
Another place which seems to make for a Naturall Immortality of the Soule, is that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to rise again, not of a Life then actuall; and in the same sense that God said to Adam, that on the day hee should eate of the forbidden fruit, he should certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ spake; but are not actually till the Resurrection.
Another place which seems to support a natural immortality of the soul is where our Savior says that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living. But this is spoken of the promise of God and of their certainty of rising again, not of a life then actual. It is in the same sense that God said to Adam that on the day he ate of the forbidden fruit he would certainly die: from that time on he was a dead man by sentence, but not by execution until almost a thousand years later. So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise when Christ spoke, but will not be actually alive until the Resurrection.
And the History of Dives and Lazarus, make nothing against this, if wee take it (as it is) for a Parable.
And the story of Dives and Lazarus makes nothing against this, if we take it (as it is) for a parable.
But there be other places of the New Testament, where an Immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident, that they shall all rise to Judgement. And it is said besides in many places, that they shall goe into Everlasting fire, Everlasting torments, Everlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dyeth; and all this is comprehended in the word Everlasting Death, which is ordinarily interpreted Everlasting Life in torments: And yet I can find no where that any man shall live in torments Everlastingly.
But there are other places in the New Testament where immortality seems to be attributed directly to the wicked. For it is evident that they will all rise to judgment. And it is said besides, in many places, that they will go into “everlasting fire,” “everlasting torments,” “everlasting punishments,” and that “the worm of conscience never dies.” All this is comprehended in the phrase “everlasting death,” which is ordinarily interpreted as “everlasting life in torments.” And yet I can find nowhere that any man will live in torments everlastingly.
Also, it seemeth hard, to say, that God who is the Father of Mercies, that doth in Heaven and Earth all that hee will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to doe, and to will; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evill, should punish mens transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of Everlasting Fire, and other the like phrases of Scripture.
Also, it seems hard to say that God—who is the Father of mercies; who does in heaven and earth all that he will; who has the hearts of all men at his disposal; who works in men both to do and to will; and without whose free gift a man has neither inclination to good nor repentance of evil—should punish men’s transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can imagine, and more. We must therefore consider what is meant by “everlasting fire” and other similar phrases of Scripture.
I have shewed already, that the Kingdome of God by Christ beginneth at the day of Judgment: That in that day, the Faithfull shall rise again, with glorious, and spirituall Bodies, and bee his Subjects in that his Kingdome, which shall be Eternall: That they shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, nor eate and drink, as they did in their naturall bodies; but live for ever in their individuall persons, without the specificall eternity of generation: And that the Reprobates also shall rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: As also, that those of the Elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spirituall, and Immortall.
I have already shown that the Kingdom of God by Christ begins at the day of judgment, and that on that day the faithful will rise again with glorious and spiritual bodies and be his subjects in that kingdom of his, which will be eternal. They will neither marry nor be given in marriage, nor eat and drink as they did in their natural bodies, but will live forever in their individual persons, without the eternity of the species that comes by generation. The reprobate also will rise again, to receive punishment for their sins. And those of the elect who are alive in their earthly bodies on that day will have their bodies suddenly changed and made spiritual and immortal.
But that the bodies of the Reprobate, who make the Kingdome of Satan, shall also be glorious, or spirituall bodies, or that they shall bee as the Angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendring; or that their life shall be Eternall in their individuall persons, as the life of every faithfull man is, or as the life of Adam had been if hee had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save onely these places concerning Eternall Torments; which may otherwise be interpreted.
But there is no passage of Scripture to prove that the bodies of the reprobate, who make up the kingdom of Satan, will also be glorious or spiritual bodies; or that they will be like the angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor begetting; or that their life will be eternal in their individual persons, as the life of every faithful man is, or as the life of Adam would have been if he had not sinned—except only these passages concerning eternal torments, which may be interpreted otherwise.
From whence may be inferred, that as the Elect after the Resurrection shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so the Reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam, and his posterity were in after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam, and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not to them that should die in their sins, as do the Reprobate.
From this it may be inferred that, as the elect after the resurrection will be restored to the state Adam was in before he sinned, so the reprobate will be in the state that Adam and his posterity were in after the sin was committed—except that God promised a Redeemer to Adam, and to those of his seed who would trust in him and repent, but not to those who would die in their sins, as the reprobate do.
These things considered, the texts that mention Eternall Fire, Eternall Torments, or the Worm that never dieth, contradict not the Doctrine of a Second, and Everlasting Death, in the proper and naturall sense of the word Death. The Fire, or Torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any one Eternally.
These things considered, the texts that mention “eternal fire,” “eternal torments,” or “the worm that never dies” do not contradict the doctrine of a second and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the word death. The fire or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or wherever it may be, may continue forever, and there may never be a lack of wicked men to be tormented in them—though not every one, nor any one, eternally.
For the wicked being left in the estate they were in after Adams sin, may at the Resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have grosse and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the Resurrection, as they did before: For there is no place of Scripture to the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the Resurrection (1 Cor. 15.) understandeth it onely of the Resurrection to Life Eternall; and not the Resurrection to Punishment.
For the wicked, being left in the state they were in after Adam’s sin, may at the resurrection live as they did before: marry and give in marriage, and have gross and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now have. Consequently they may beget children perpetually after the resurrection, as they did before; for there is no passage of Scripture to the contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15), understands it only of the resurrection to eternal life, and not of the resurrection to punishment.
And of the first, he saith that the Body is Sown in Corruption, raised in Incorruption; sown in Dishonour, raised in Honour; sown in Weaknesse, raised in Power; sown a Naturall body, raised a Spirituall body: There is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them that rise to Punishment. So also our Saviour, when hee speaketh of the Nature of Man after the Resurrection, meaneth, the Resurrection to Life Eternall, not to Punishment. The text is Luke 20. verses 34. 35, 36. a fertile text.
And of the first he says that the body is “sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonor, raised in honor; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body.” No such thing can be said of the bodies of those who rise to punishment. So also our Savior, when he speaks of the nature of man after the resurrection, means the resurrection to eternal life, not to punishment. The text is Luke 20:34–36, a fertile text:
The Children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtaine that world, and the Resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage: Neither can they die any more; for they are equall to the Angells, and are the Children of God, being the Children of the Resurrection: The Children of this world, that are in the estate which Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is, corrupt, and generate successively; which is an Immortality of the Kind, but not of the Persons of men: They are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute Resurrection from the dead; but onely a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the end onely to receive condign punishment for their contumacy.
“The children of this world marry and are given in marriage; but those who will be counted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage. Nor can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.” The children of this world, who are in the state Adam left them in, will marry and be given in marriage; that is, they will decay and beget successors, which is an immortality of the species but not of the persons of men. They are not worthy to be counted among those who will obtain the next world and an absolute resurrection from the dead. They are given only a short time there, as lodgers in that world, and only so as to receive the punishment they deserve for their obstinacy.
The Elect are the onely children of the Resurrection; that is to say, the sole heirs of Eternall Life: they only can die no more: it is they that are equall to the Angels, and that are the children of God; and not the Reprobate. To the Reprobate there remaineth after the Resurrection, a Second, and Eternall Death: between which Resurrection, and their Second, and Eternall death, is but a time of Punishment and Torment; and to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of Man by propagation shall endure; which is Eternally.
The elect are the only children of the resurrection; that is to say, the sole heirs of eternal life. They alone can die no more. It is they who are equal to the angels and who are the children of God, and not the reprobate. For the reprobate there remains, after the resurrection, a second and eternal death. Between that resurrection and their second and eternal death there is only a time of punishment and torment; and it will last, by a succession of sinners into it, as long as the human species endures by propagation—which is eternally.
Bellarmine's texts for purgatory
Hobbes answers, one by one, the Scripture passages Bellarmine alleges for purgatory.
Upon this Doctrine of the Naturall Eternity of separated Soules, is founded (as I said) the Doctrine of Purgatory. For supposing Eternall Life by Grace onely, there is no Life, but the Life of the Body; and no Immortality till the Resurrection. The texts for Purgatory alledged by Bellarmine out of the Canonicall Scripture of the old Testament, are first, the Fasting of David for Saul and Ionathan, mentioned (2 Kings, 1. 12.); and againe, (2 Sam. 3. 35.)
Upon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls is founded (as I said) the doctrine of purgatory. For if we suppose eternal life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body, and no immortality until the resurrection. The texts for purgatory that Bellarmine alleges out of the canonical Scripture of the Old Testament are, first, the fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned in 2 Samuel 1:12; and again,
for the death of Abner. This Fasting of David, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at Gods hands, after their death; because after he had Fasted to procure the recovery of his owne child, assoone as he knew it was dead, he called for meate. Seeing then the Soule hath an existence separate from the Body, and nothing can be obtained by mens Fasting for the Soules that are already either in Heaven, or Hell, it followeth that there be some Soules of dead men, that are neither in Heaven, nor in Hell; and therefore they must bee in some third place, which must be Purgatory.
for the death of Abner (2 Samuel 3:35). This fasting of David, he says, was to obtain something for them at God’s hands after their death; because after David had fasted to procure the recovery of his own child, as soon as he knew it was dead he called for food. Since, then, the soul has an existence separate from the body, and nothing can be obtained by men’s fasting for souls that are already either in heaven or in hell, it follows that there are some souls of dead men that are neither in heaven nor in hell. And therefore they must be in some third place, which must be purgatory.
And thus with hard straining, hee has wrested those places to the proofe of a Purgatory: whereas it is manifest, that the ceremonies of Mourning, and Fasting, when they are used for the death of men, whose life was not profitable to the Mourners, they are used for honours sake to their persons; and when tis done for the death of them by whose life the Mourners had benefit, it proceeds from their particular dammage: And so David honoured Saul, and Abner, with his Fasting; and in the death of his owne child, recomforted himselfe, by receiving his ordinary food.
And so, with hard straining, he has wrested those passages into a proof of purgatory. Yet it is manifest that when the ceremonies of mourning and fasting are used for the death of men whose life was of no profit to the mourners, they are used to honor those persons; and when they are used for the death of those whose life benefited the mourners, they proceed from the mourners’ own particular loss. And so David honored Saul and Abner with his fasting, and at the death of his own child comforted himself again by taking his ordinary food.
In the other places, which he alledgeth out of the old Testament, there is not so much as any shew, or colour of proofe. He brings in every text wherein there is the word Anger, or Fire, or Burning, or Purging, or Clensing, in case any of the Fathers have but in a Sermon rhetorically applied it to the Doctrine of Purgatory, already beleeved. The first verse of Psalme, 37. O Lord rebuke me not in thy wrath; nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure: What were this to Purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the Wrath to the fire of Hell, and the Displeasure to that of Purgatory? And what is it to Purgatory, that of Psalme, 66. 12.
In the other passages he alleges from the Old Testament there is not so much as any show or color of proof. He brings in every text containing the word “anger,” or “fire,” or “burning,” or “purging,” or “cleansing,” if any of the Fathers has merely applied it rhetorically in a sermon to the doctrine of purgatory, already believed. Take the first verse of Psalm 38: “O Lord, rebuke me not in your wrath, nor chasten me in your hot displeasure.” What would this have to do with purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the “wrath” to the fire of hell and the “displeasure” to that of purgatory? And what has purgatory to do with that verse of Psalm 66,
Wee went through fire and water, and thou broughtest us to a moist place; and other the like texts, (with which the Doctors of those times entended to adorne, or extend their Sermons, or Commentaries) haled to their purposes by force of wit?
“We went through fire and water, and you brought us out into a moist place” (Psalm 66:12), and other similar texts—with which the doctors of those times meant to adorn or extend their sermons or commentaries—dragged to their purposes by force of wit?
But he alledgeth other places of the New Testament, that are not so easie to be answered: And first that of Matth. 12. 32. Whosoever speaketh a word against the Sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not bee forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the world to come: Where he will have Purgatory to be the World to come, wherein some sinnes may be forgiven, which in this World were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are but three Worlds;
But he alleges other passages of the New Testament that are not so easy to answer. First, Matthew 12:32: “Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven him; but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the world to come.” Here he would have purgatory be the world to come, in which some sins may be forgiven that were not forgiven in this world—notwithstanding that it is manifest there are only three worlds:
one from the Creation to the Flood, which was destroyed by Water, and is called in Scripture the Old World; another from the Flood, to the day of Judgement, which is the Present World, and shall bee destroyed by Fire; and the third, which shall bee from the day of Judgement forward, everlasting, which is called the World to come; and in which it is agreed by all, there shall be no Purgatory: And therefore the World to come, and Purgatory, are inconsistent.
one from the Creation to the Flood, which was destroyed by water and is called in Scripture “the old world”; another from the Flood to the day of judgment, which is “the present world” and will be destroyed by fire; and the third, which will last from the day of judgment forward, everlasting, and is called “the world to come,” and in which, all agree, there will be no purgatory. And therefore the world to come and purgatory are inconsistent.
But what then can bee the meaning of those our Saviours words? I confesse they are very hardly to bee reconciled with all the Doctrines now unanimously received: Nor is it any shame, to confesse the profoundnesse of the Scripture, to bee too great to be sounded by the shortnesse of humane understanding. Neverthelesse, I may propound such things to the consideration of more learned Divines, as the text it selfe suggesteth.
What, then, can be the meaning of those words of our Savior? I confess they are very hard to reconcile with all the doctrines now unanimously received. Nor is it any shame to confess that the depth of the Scripture is too great to be sounded by the shortness of human understanding. Nevertheless, I may propose to the consideration of more learned divines such things as the text itself suggests.
And first, seeing to speake against the Holy Ghost, as being the third Person of the Trinity, is to speake against the Church, in which the Holy Ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made, betweene the Easinesse of our Saviour, in bearing with offences done to him while hee himselfe taught the world, that is, when he was on earth, and the Severity of the Pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority, which was from the Holy Ghost: As if he should say, You that deny my Power; nay you that shall crucifie me, shall be pardoned by mee, as often as you turne unto mee by Repentance:
And first, since to speak against the Holy Spirit, as the third Person of the Trinity, is to speak against the Church, in which the Holy Spirit resides, it seems that the comparison is made between the leniency of our Savior in bearing with offenses done to him while he himself taught the world—that is, when he was on earth—and the severity of the pastors after him against those who would deny their authority, which was from the Holy Spirit. It is as if he said: You who deny my power—indeed, you who will crucify me—will be pardoned by me as often as you turn to me in repentance;
But if you deny the Power of them that teach you hereafter, by vertue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this World, and leave you without absolution, (though you turn to me, unlesse you turn also to them,) to the punishments (as much as lies in them) of the World to come: And so the words may be taken as a Prophecy, or Praediction concerning the times, as they have along been in the Christian Church: Or if this be not the meaning, (for I am not peremptory in such difficult places,) perhaps there may be place left after the Resurrection for the Repentance of some sinners: And there is also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith.
but if you deny the power of those who will teach you hereafter by virtue of the Holy Spirit, they will be inexorable and will not forgive you, but will persecute you in this world and leave you without absolution (even though you turn to me, unless you turn also to them) to the punishments, as far as lies in them, of the world to come. And so the words may be taken as a prophecy or prediction concerning the times, as they have long been in the Christian Church. Or, if this is not the meaning (for I am not dogmatic in such difficult passages), perhaps there may be room left after the resurrection for the repentance of some sinners. And there is also another passage that seems to agree with this.
For considering the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. 15. 29.) What shall they doe which are Baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why also are they Baptized for the dead? a man may probably inferre, as some have done, that in St. Pauls time, there was a custome by receiving Baptisme for the dead, (as men that now beleeve, are Sureties and Undertakers for the Faith of Infants, that are not capable of beleeving,) to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey, and receive our Saviour for their King, at his his coming again; and then the forgivenesse of sins in the world to come, has no need of a Purgatory.
For consider the words of St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15:29): “What shall they do who are baptized for the dead, if the dead do not rise at all? Why then are they baptized for the dead?” From these a man may probably infer, as some have done, that in St. Paul’s time there was a custom of receiving baptism for the dead (as men who now believe act as sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants, who are not capable of believing), in order to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends that they would be ready to obey and receive our Savior as their King at his coming again. And then the forgiveness of sins in the world to come has no need of a purgatory.
But in both these interpretations, there is so much of paradox, that I trust not to them; but propound them to those that are throughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. Onely of thus much, I see evident Scripture, to perswade me, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of Purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the Soule without the Body; neither for the Soule of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the Soules of them which the Romane Church pretend to be tormented now in Purgatory.
But in both these interpretations there is so much paradox that I do not trust them; I propose them to those who are thoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire whether there is not some clearer passage that contradicts them. Only of this much do I see evident Scripture to persuade me: that there is neither the word nor the thing of purgatory, in this or any other text; nor anything that can prove the necessity of a place for the soul without the body—neither for the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead, nor for the souls of those whom the Roman Church claims are now tormented in purgatory.
For God, that could give a life to a peece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten Carkasse, into a glorious, spirituall, and immortall Body.
For God, who could give life to a piece of clay, has the same power to give life again to a dead man, and to renew his lifeless and rotten carcass into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.
Another place is that of 1 Cor. 3. where it is said, that they which built Stubble, Hay, &c. on the true Foundation, their work shall perish; but they themselves shall be saved; but as through Fire: This Fire, he will have to be the Fire of Purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zach. 13. 9.
Another passage is 1 Corinthians 3, where it is said that those who built stubble, hay, and so on, upon the true foundation will see their work perish, but “they themselves will be saved, yet as through fire.” This fire he would have be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zechariah,
where he saith, I will bring the third part through the Fire, and refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed: Which is spoken of the comming of the Messiah in Power and Glory; that is, at the day of Judgment, and Conflagration of the present world; wherein the Elect shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose their erroneous Doctrines, and Traditions, and have them as it were sindged of; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true God.
where he says (Zechariah 13:9), “I will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined, and will test them as gold is tested.” This is spoken of the coming of the Messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of judgment and the conflagration of the present world, in which the elect will not be consumed but refined. That is, they will lay aside their erroneous doctrines and traditions, having them, as it were, singed off, and will afterward call upon the name of the true God.
In like manner, the Apostle saith of them, that holding this Foundation Iesus is the Christ, shall build thereon some other Doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall passe through it to Salvation; but so, as to see, and relinquish their former Errours. The Builders, are the Pastors; the Foundation, that Iesus is the Christ; the Stubble and Hay, False Consequences drawn from it through Ignorance, or Frailty; the Gold, Silver, and pretious Stones, are their True Doctrines; and their Refining or Purging, the Relinquishing of their Errors. In all which there is no colour at all for the burning of Incorporeall, that is to say, Impatible Souls.
In the same way the Apostle says of those who hold this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, and build upon it some other doctrines that are erroneous, that they will not be consumed in the fire that renews the world, but will pass through it to salvation—but in such a way as to see and give up their former errors. The builders are the pastors; the foundation, that Jesus is the Christ; the stubble and hay, false consequences drawn from it through ignorance or frailty; the gold, silver, and precious stones, their true doctrines; and their refining or purging, the giving up of their errors. In all this there is no color at all for the burning of incorporeal souls—that is to say, souls incapable of suffering.
A third place is that of 1 Cor. 15. before mentioned, concerning Baptisme for the Dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that Prayers for the Dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a Fire of Purgatory: But neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the word Baptisme, he approveth this in the first place, that by Baptisme is meant (metaphorically) a Baptisme of Penance; and that men are in this sense Baptized, when they Fast, and Pray, and give Almes: And so Baptisme for the Dead, and Prayer for the Dead, is the same thing.
A third passage is the one in 1 Corinthians 15, mentioned before, concerning baptism for the dead. From it he concludes, first, that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable, and from that, that there is a fire of purgatory; but neither conclusion rightly. For of the many interpretations of the word “baptism,” he approves this one first: that by baptism is meant (metaphorically) a baptism of penance, and that men are baptized in this sense when they fast, and pray, and give alms. And so baptism for the dead and prayer for the dead are the same thing.
But this is a Metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture, nor in any other use of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony, and scope of the Scripture. The word Baptisme is used (Mar. 10. 38. & Luk. 12. 50.) for being Dipped in ones own bloud, as Christ was upon the Cross, and as most of the Apostles were, for giving testimony of him. But it is hard to say, that Prayer, Fasting, and Almes, have any similitude with Dipping. The same is used also Mat. 3. 11. (which seemeth to make somewhat for Purgatory) for a Purging with Fire.
But this is a metaphor of which there is no example, either in the Scripture or in any other use of language; and it is also out of harmony with the tenor and scope of the Scripture. The word “baptism” is used (Mark 10:38 and Luke 12:50) for being dipped in one’s own blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the apostles were, for bearing witness to him. But it is hard to say that prayer, fasting, and alms have any likeness to dipping. The same word is used also in Matthew 3:11 (which seems to tell somewhat in favor of purgatory) for a purging with fire.
But it is evident the Fire and Purging here mentioned, is the same whereof the Prophet Zachary speaketh (chap. 13. v. 9.) I will bring the third part through the Fire, and will Refine them, &c. And St. Peter after him (1 Epist. 1. 7.) That the triall of your Faith, which is much more precious than of Gold that perisheth, though it be tryed with Fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the Appearing of Iesus Christ; And St. Paul (1 Cor. 3. 13.) The Fire shall trie every mans work of what sort it is. But St. Peter, and St.
But it is evident that the fire and purging mentioned there are the same that the prophet Zechariah speaks of (Zechariah 13:9): “I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them,” and so on. And St. Peter after him (1 Peter 1:7): “That the trial of your faith, which is much more precious than that of gold that perishes, though it is tested with fire, might be found to praise and honor and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ.” And St. Paul (1 Corinthians 3:13): “The fire will test every man’s work, of what sort it is.” But St. Peter and St.
Paul speak of the Fire that shall be at the Second Appearing of Christ; and the Prophet Zachary of the Day of Judgment: And therefore this place of S. Mat. may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity of the Fire of Purgatory.
Paul speak of the fire that will come at the second appearing of Christ, and the prophet Zechariah of the day of judgment. And therefore this passage of St. Matthew may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity for the fire of purgatory.
Another interpretation of Baptisme for the Dead, is that which I have before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of probability: And thence also he inferreth the utility of Prayer for the Dead. For if after the Resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ, or not beleeved in him, may be received into Christs Kingdome; it is not in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them, till they should be risen.
Another interpretation of baptism for the dead is the one I mentioned before, which he ranks second in probability. And from it also he infers the usefulness of prayer for the dead. For if after the resurrection those who have not heard of Christ, or have not believed in him, may be received into Christ’s kingdom, it is not in vain for their friends to pray for them after their death, until they have risen.
But granting that God, at the prayers of the faithfull, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of men in that point, cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for Purgatory, because to rise from Death to Life, is one thing; to rise from Purgatory to Life is another; as being a rising from Life to Life, from a Life in torments to a Life in joy.
But grant that God, at the prayers of the faithful, may convert to himself some of those who have not heard Christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ; and grant that men’s charity on that point cannot be blamed. Still this concludes nothing for purgatory. For to rise from death to life is one thing; to rise from purgatory to life is another, since that is a rising from life to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.
A fourth place is that of Mat. 5. 25. *Agree with thine Adversary quickly, whilest thou art in the way with him, left at any time the Adversary deliver thee to the Iudge, and the Iudge deliver thee to the Officer, and thou be cast into prison.
A fourth passage is Matthew 5:25–26: “Agree with your adversary quickly, while you are on the way with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you to the officer, and you be thrown into prison.
Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing. In which Allegory, the Offender is the Sinner; both the Adversary and the Judge is God; the Way is this Life; the Prison is the Grave; the Officer, Death;* from which, the sinner shall not rise again to life eternall, but to a second Death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his Passion, which is a full Ransome for all manner of sin, as well lesser sins, as greater crimes; both being made by the passion of Christ equally veniall.
Truly I say to you, you will by no means come out of there until you have paid the last penny.” In this allegory the offender is the sinner; both the adversary and the judge are God; the way is this life; the prison is the grave; the officer, death. From it the sinner will not rise again to eternal life, but to a second death, until he has paid the last penny, or Christ pays it for him by his Passion—which is a full ransom for every kind of sin, lesser sins as well as greater crimes, both being made equally pardonable by the Passion of Christ.
The fift place, is that of Matth. 5. 22. Whosoever is angry with his Brother without a cause, shall be guilty in Iudgment. And whosoever shall say to his Brother, RACHA, shall be guilty in the Councel. But whosoever shall say, Thou Foole, shall be guilty to hell fire. From which words he inferreth three sorts of Sins, and three sorts of Punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and consequently, that after this life, there is punishment of lesser sins in Purgatory.
The fifth passage is Matthew 5:22: “Whoever is angry with his brother without a cause will be liable to judgment. And whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca,’ will be liable to the council. But whoever says, ‘You fool,’ will be liable to hell fire.” From these words he infers three sorts of sins and three sorts of punishments; and that none of those sins but the last will be punished with hell fire; and consequently that after this life there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory.
Of which inference, there is no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them: Shall there be a distinction after this life of Courts of Justice, as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviours time, to hear, and determine divers sorts of Crimes; as the Judges, and the Councell? Shall not all Judicature appertain to Christ, and his Apostles? To undersand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this Chapter interpreteth the Law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the Grammaticall sense thereof, howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the Legislator.
For this inference there is no color in any interpretation of these words yet given. Will there be, after this life, a distinction of courts of justice, as there was among the Jews in our Savior’s time, to hear and determine different sorts of crimes—such as the judges and the council? Will not all judicature belong to Christ and his apostles? To understand this text, therefore, we must not consider it by itself, but together with the words before and after it. In this chapter our Savior interprets the law of Moses, which the Jews thought was fulfilled so long as they had not transgressed its grammatical sense, however much they had transgressed against the intent or meaning of the legislator.
Therefore whereas they thought the Sixth Commandement was not broken, but by Killing a man; nor the Seventh, but when a man lay with a woman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them, the inward Anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is Homicide: You have heard (saith hee) the Law of Moses, Thou shalt not Kill, and that Whosoever shall Kill, shall bee condemned before the Iudges, or before the Session of the Seventy: But I say unto you, to be Angry with ones Brother without cause; or to say unto him Racha, or Foole, is Homicide, and shall be punished at the day of Judgment, and Session of Christ, and his Apostles, with Hell fire:
So whereas they thought the sixth commandment was not broken except by killing a man, nor the seventh except when a man lay with a woman not his wife, our Savior tells them that a man’s inward anger against his brother, if it is without just cause, is homicide. You have heard (he says) the law of Moses, “You shall not kill,” and that “Whoever kills will be condemned before the judges,” or before the session of the Seventy. But I say to you, to be angry with one’s brother without cause, or to say to him “Raca” or “fool,” is homicide, and will be punished with hell fire at the day of judgment and the session of Christ and his apostles;
so that those words were not used to distinguish between divers Crimes, and divers Courts of Justice, and divers Punishments; but to taxe the distinction between sin, and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the Will in Obeying God, but from the difference of their Temporall Courts of Justice; and to shew them that he that had the Will to hurt his Brother, though the effect appear but in Reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by the Judges, and by the Session, which shall be the same, not different Courts at the day of Judgment.
so that those words were not used to distinguish between different crimes, different courts of justice, and different punishments. They were used to censure the distinction between sin and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying God, but from the difference of their temporal courts of justice; and to show them that he who had the will to hurt his brother, even though the effect appears only in reviling, or not at all, will be cast into hell fire by the judges and by the session—which at the day of judgment will be the same court, not different ones.
This considered, what can be drawn from this text, to maintain Purgatory, I cannot imagine.
This considered, I cannot imagine what can be drawn from this text to maintain purgatory.
The sixth place is Luke 16. 9. Make yee friends of the unrighteous Mammon, that when yee faile, they may receive you into Everlasting Tabernacles. This he alledges to prove Invocation of Saints departed. But the sense is plain, That we should make friends with our Riches, of the Poore; and thereby obtain their Prayers whilest they live. He that giveth to the Poore, lendeth to the Lord.
The sixth passage is Luke 16:9: “Make friends for yourselves by means of the unrighteous mammon, so that when you fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings.” This he alleges to prove the invocation of departed saints. But the sense is plain: that with our riches we should make friends of the poor, and so obtain their prayers while they live. “He who gives to the poor lends to the Lord.”
The seventh is Luke 23. 42. Lord remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome: Therefore, saith hee, there is Remission of sins after this life. But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave him; and at his comming againe in Glory, will remember to raise him againe to Life Eternall.
The seventh is Luke 23:42: “Lord, remember me when you come into your kingdom.” Therefore, he says, there is remission of sins after this life. But the inference is not good. Our Savior forgave him then, and at his coming again in glory he will remember to raise him again to eternal life.
The Eight is Acts 2. 24. where St. Peter saith of Christ, that God had raised him up, and loosed the Paines of Death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it: Which hee interprets to bee a descent of Christ into Purgatory, to loose some Soules there from their torments: whereas it is manifest, that it was Christ that was loosed; it was hee that could not bee holden of Death, or the Grave; and not the Souls in Purgatory.
The eighth is Acts 2:24, where St. Peter says of Christ “that God had raised him up, and loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible that he should be held by it.” This he interprets as a descent of Christ into purgatory, to release some souls there from their torments. Yet it is manifest that it was Christ who was loosed. It was he who could not be held by death or the grave, and not the souls in purgatory.
But if that which Beza sayes in his notes on this place be well observed, there is none that will not see, that in stead of Paynes, it should be Bands; and then there is no further cause to seek for Purgatory in this Text.
But if what Beza says in his notes on this passage is well observed, there is no one who will not see that instead of “pains” it should be “bonds”; and then there is no further reason to look for purgatory in this text.
Chapter 45: Of demonology and other relics of the religion of the Gentiles
Mistaking the images of sight and dreams for real beings produced the pagan doctrine of daemons.
The impression made on the organs of Sight, by lucide Bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from Opaque, or refracted in the passage through Diaphanous Bodies, produceth in living Creatures, in whom God hath placed such Organs, an Imagination of the Object, from whence the Impression proceedeth; which Imagination is called Sight; and seemeth not to bee a meer Imagination, but the Body it selfe without us; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but himselfe; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but onely a motion in the interiour organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so.
The impression made on the organs of sight by luminous bodies—either in one direct line, or in many lines reflected from opaque bodies or refracted in passing through transparent ones—produces, in living creatures in whom God has placed such organs, an imagination of the object from which the impression proceeds. This imagination is called sight, and it seems to be not a mere imagination but the body itself outside us. It is the same as when a man presses his eye violently: a light appears to him outside and in front of him, which no one perceives but himself, because there is in fact no such thing outside him, but only a motion in the interior organs, pressing outward by resistance, that makes him think so.
And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call Imagination, and Memory, and (in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by Sicknesse, or Violence) a Dream: of which things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third Chapters.
And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object that caused it is removed, is what we call imagination and memory, and (in sleep, and sometimes in a great disorder of the organs through sickness or violence) a dream. Of these things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third chapters.
This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Naturall Knowledge; much lesse by those that consider not things so remote (as that Kowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really without us: Which some (because they vanish away, they know not whither, nor how,) will have to be absolutely Incorporeall, that is to say Immateriall, or Formes without Matter; Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured Body; and that they can put on Aiery bodies (as a garment) to make them Visible when they will to our bodily Eyes; and others say, are Bodies, and living Creatures, but made of Air, or other more subtile and aethereall Matter, which is, then, when they will be seen, condensed.
This nature of sight was never discovered by the ancient claimants to natural knowledge, much less by those who do not consider things so remote from their present use as that knowledge is. So it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense otherwise than as things really outside us. Some—because these images vanish away, they know not where or how—will have them be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say immaterial: forms without matter, color and shape without any colored or shaped body; and they say these can put on airy bodies, like a garment, to make themselves visible to our bodily eyes when they wish. Others say they are bodies and living creatures, but made of air or some other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is condensed when they wish to be seen.
But Both of them agree on one generall appellation of them, DAEMONS. As if the Dead of whom they Dreamed, were not Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven, or Hell; not Phantasmes, but Ghosts; with just as much reason, as if one should say, he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-Glasse, or the Ghosts of the Stars in a River; or call the ordinary apparition of the Sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the Daemon, or Ghost of that great Sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world:
But both agree on one general name for them: daemons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were inhabitants not of their own brain but of the air, or of heaven, or hell; not phantasms, but ghosts. There is just as much reason in this as if one should say he saw his own ghost in a mirror, or the ghosts of the stars in a river; or should call the ordinary appearance of the sun, about a foot across, the daemon or ghost of that great sun that illuminates the whole visible world.
And by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to doe them good, or harme; and consequently, given occasion to the Governours of the Heathen Common-wealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that DAEMONOLOGY (in which the Poets, as Principall Priests of the Heathen Religion, were specially employed, or reverenced) to the Publique Peace, and to the Obedience of Subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them Good Daemons, and others Evill; the one as a Spurre to the Observance, the other, as Reines to withhold them from Violation of the Laws.
And by that means they have feared them, as things of an unknown—that is, an unlimited—power to do them good or harm. This in turn gave the governors of the heathen commonwealths occasion to regulate this fear of theirs by establishing that demonology (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were especially employed or revered), for the sake of the public peace and the obedience of subjects necessary to it; and to make some of the daemons good and others evil—the one as a spur to observance of the laws, the other as reins to hold men back from violating them.
What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of Daemons, appeareth partly in the Genealogie of their Gods, written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient Poets of the Graecians; and partly in other Histories; of which I have observed some few before, in the 12. Chapter of this discourse.
What kind of things they were to which they gave the name of daemons appears partly in the genealogy of their gods written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Greeks, and partly in other histories, a few of which I noted earlier, in chapter 12 of this discourse.
The Graecians, by their Colonies and Conquests, communicated their Language and Writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by necessary consequence their Daemonology, or (as St. Paul calles it) their Doctrines of Devils: And by that meanes, the contagion was derived also to the Jewes, both of Iudaea, and Alexandria, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of Daemon they did not (as the Graecians) attribute to Spirits both Good, and Evill; but to the Evill onely: And to the Good Daemons they gave the name of the Spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entred to be Prophets.
The Greeks, by their colonies and conquests, spread their language and writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy, and with them, by necessary consequence, their demonology, or (as St. Paul calls it) their “doctrines of devils.” And by that means the contagion passed also to the Jews, both of Judea and of Alexandria and the other places into which they were dispersed. But the Jews did not, as the Greeks did, give the name daemon to spirits both good and evil, but to the evil only. To the good daemons they gave the name of the Spirit of God, and they regarded those whose bodies these entered as prophets.
In summe, all singularity if Good, they attributed to the Spirit of God; and if Evill, to some Daemon, but a kakodaimen, an Evill Daemon, that is, a Devill. And therefore, they called Daemoniaques, that is, possessed by the Devill, such as we call [mentally ill or mentally disturbed]; or such as had the Falling Sicknesse; or that spoke any thing, which they for want of understanding, thought absurd: As also of an Unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an Unclean Spirit; of a Dumbe man, that he had a Dumbe Devill; and of Iohn Baptist (Math. 11. 18.)
In sum, every singularity, if good, they attributed to the Spirit of God; and if evil, to some daemon—but a kakodaimon, an evil daemon, that is, a devil. And therefore they called “demoniacs,” that is, “possessed by the devil,” those we call mentally ill or mentally disturbed, or those who had epilepsy, or who said anything that they, for want of understanding, thought absurd. So also of a person unclean to a notorious degree they used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a man who could not speak, that he had a mute devil; and of John the Baptist,
for the singularity of his fasting, that he had a Devill; and of our Saviour, because he said, hee that keepeth his sayings should not see Death in aeternum, Now we know thou hast a Devill; Abraham is dead, and the Prophets are dead: And again, because he said (Iohn 7. 20.) They went about to kill him, the people answered, Thou hast a Devill, who goeth about to kill thee? Whereby it is manifest, that the Jewes had the same opinions concerning Phantasmes, namely, that they were not Phantasmes that is, Idols of the braine, but things reall, and independent on the Fancy.
because of the singularity of his fasting, that he had a devil (Matthew 11:18); and of our Savior, because he said that whoever keeps his sayings should not see death in aeternum, forever: “Now we know that you have a devil; Abraham is dead, and the prophets are dead.” And again, because he said (John 7:20) that they were seeking to kill him, the people answered, “You have a devil; who is seeking to kill you?” By this it is manifest that the Jews had the same opinions concerning phantasms: namely, that they were not phantasms—that is, idols of the brain—but real things, independent of the fancy.
Why Christ did not deny possession
Hobbes explains Scripture's language of devils and possession without incorporeal spirits.
Which doctrine if it be not true, why (may some say; did not our Saviour contradict it, and teach the contrary? nay why does he use on diverse occasions, such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I answer, that first, where Christ saith, A spirit hath not flesh and bone, though hee shew that there be Spirits, yet hee denies not that they are Bodies: And where St. Paul saies, We shall rise spirituall Bodies, he acknowledgeth the nature of Spirits, but that they are Bodily Spirits; which is not difficult to understand. For Air and many other things are Bodies, though not Flesh and Bone, or any other grosse body, to bee discerned by the eye.
If this doctrine is not true, why (some may say) did our Savior not contradict it and teach the contrary? Indeed, why does he on various occasions use forms of speech that seem to confirm it? To this I answer, first, that where Christ says, “A spirit does not have flesh and bones,” though he shows that there are spirits, he does not deny that they are bodies. And where St. Paul says, “We shall rise spiritual bodies,” he acknowledges the nature of spirits, but as bodily spirits—which is not difficult to understand. For air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or any other gross body that can be discerned by the eye.
But when our Saviour speaketh to the Devill, and commandeth him to go out of a man, if by the Devill, be meant a Disease as Phrenesy, or Lunacy, or a corporeal Spirit, is not the speech improper? can Diseases heare? or can there be a corporeall Spirit in a Body of Flesh and Bone, full already of vitall and animall Spirits? Are there not therefore Spirits, that neither have Bodies, nor are meer Imaginations?
But when our Savior speaks to the devil and commands him to go out of a man, if by the devil is meant a disease, such as frenzy or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit, is not the speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a corporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone that is already full of vital and animal spirits? Are there not, therefore, spirits that neither have bodies nor are mere imaginations?
To the first I answer, that the addressing of our Saviours command to the Madnesse, or Lunacy he cureth, is no more improper, than was his rebuking of the Fever, or of the Wind, and Sea; for neither do these hear: Or than was the command of God, to the Light, to the Firmament, to the Sunne, and Starres, when he commanded them to bee: for they could not heare before they had a beeing. But those speeches are not improper, because they signifie the power of Gods Word: no more therefore is it improper, to command Madnesse, or Lunacy (under the appellation of Devils, by which they were then commonly understood,) to depart out of a mans body.
To the first I answer that addressing our Savior’s command to the madness or lunacy he cures is no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind and sea, for these do not hear either; or than was the command of God to the light, to the firmament, to the sun and stars, when he commanded them to be, for they could not hear before they had any being. But those speeches are not improper, because they signify the power of God’s word. No more, therefore, is it improper to command madness or lunacy (under the name of devils, by which they were then commonly understood) to depart out of a man’s body.
To the second, concerning their being Incorporeall, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture, from whence it can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other Corporeall Spirit, but that of his owne, by which his body is naturally moved.
To the second, concerning their being incorporeal, I have not yet noticed any passage of Scripture from which it can be gathered that any man was ever possessed by any corporeal spirit other than his own, by which his body is naturally moved.
Our Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the form of a Dove, is said by St. Matthew (Chapt. 4. 1.) to have been led up by the Spirit into the Wildernesse; and the same is recited (Luke 4. 1.) in these words, Iesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit into the Wildernesse: Whereby it is evident, that by Spirit there, is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for a Possession: For Christ, and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same substance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another.
Our Savior, immediately after the Holy Spirit descended upon him in the form of a dove, is said by St. Matthew (Matthew 4:1) to have been “led up by the Spirit into the wilderness”; and the same is told in Luke 4:1 in these words: “Jesus, being full of the Holy Spirit, was led in the Spirit into the wilderness.” By this it is evident that by “Spirit” there is meant the Holy Spirit. This cannot be interpreted as a possession; for Christ and the Holy Spirit are one and the same substance, and that is no possession of one substance or body by another.
And whereas in the verses following, he is said to have been taken up by the Devill into the Holy City, and set upon a pinnacle of the Temple, shall we conclude thence that hee was possessed of the Devill, or carryed thither by violence? And again, carryed thence by the Devill into an exceeding high mountain, who shewed him thence all the Kingdomes of the world: Wherein, wee are not to beleeve he was either possessed, or forced by the Devill; nor that any Mountaine is high enough, (according to the literall sense,) to shew him one whole Hemisphere.
And whereas in the verses following he is said “to have been taken up by the devil into the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the Temple,” shall we conclude from this that he was possessed by the devil, or carried there by force? And again, he was “carried from there by the devil into an exceedingly high mountain, who showed him from there all the kingdoms of the world.” Here we are not to believe that he was either possessed or forced by the devil, nor that any mountain is high enough (in the literal sense) to show him one whole hemisphere.
What then can be the meaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the Wildernesse; and that this carrying of him up and down, from the Wildernesse to the City, and from thence into a Mountain, was a Vision? Conformable whereunto, is also the phrase of St. Luke, that hee was led into the Wildernesse, not by, but in the Spirit: whereas concerning His being Taken up into the Mountaine, and unto the Pinnacle of the Temple, hee speaketh as St. Matthew doth. Which suiteth with the nature of a Vision.
What, then, can be the meaning of this passage, other than that he went into the wilderness of his own accord, and that this carrying of him up and down, from the wilderness to the city and from there to a mountain, was a vision? In keeping with this is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he was led into the wilderness not by but in the Spirit; whereas concerning his being taken up to the mountain and to the pinnacle of the Temple, he speaks as St. Matthew does. This suits the nature of a vision.
Again, where St. Luke sayes of Judas Iscariot, that Satan entred into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the Chief Priests, and Captaines, how he might betray Christ unto them: it may be answered, that by the Entring of Satan (that is the Enemy) into him, is meant, the hostile and traiterours intention of selling his Lord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture understood, the Graces and good Inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so by the Entring of Satan, may bee understood the wicked Cogitations, and Designes of the Adversaries of Christ, and his Disciples.
Again, where St. Luke says of Judas Iscariot that “Satan entered into him, and thereupon he went and conferred with the chief priests and captains how he might betray Christ to them,” it may be answered that by the entering of Satan (that is, the Enemy) into him is meant the hostile and traitorous intention of selling his Lord and Master. For just as by the Holy Spirit Scripture frequently means the graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Spirit, so by the entering of Satan may be understood the wicked thoughts and designs of the adversaries of Christ and his disciples.
For as it is hard to say, that the Devill was entred into Judas, before he had any such hostile designe; so it is impertinent to say, he was first Christs Enemy in his heart, and that the Devill entred into him afterwards. Therefore the Entring of Satan, and his Wicked Purpose, was one and the same thing.
For as it is hard to say that the devil had entered into Judas before he had any such hostile design, so it is beside the point to say that he was first Christ’s enemy in his heart and that the devil entered into him afterward. Therefore the entering of Satan and his wicked purpose were one and the same thing.
But if there be no Immateriall Spirit, nor any Possession of mens bodies by any Spirit Corporeall, it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his Apostles did not teach the People so; and in such cleer words, as they might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are more curious, than necessary for a Christian mans Salvation.
But if there is no immaterial spirit, nor any possession of men’s bodies by any corporeal spirit, it may again be asked why our Savior and his apostles did not teach the people so, and in such clear words that they could no longer doubt it. But questions such as these are more curious than necessary for a Christian’s salvation.
Men may as well aske, why Christ that could have given to all men Faith, Piety, and all manner of morall Vertues, gave it to some onely, and not to all: and why he left the search of naturall Causes, and Sciences, to the naturall Reason and Industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally; and many other such questions: Of which neverthelesse there may be alledged probable and pious reasons.
Men may as well ask why Christ, who could have given all men faith, piety, and every kind of moral virtue, gave it to some only and not to all; and why he left the search for natural causes and sciences to the natural reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it supernaturally to all, or to any; and many other such questions. For these, nevertheless, probable and pious reasons may be alleged.
For as God, when he brought the Israelites into the Land of Promise, did not secure them therein, by subduing all the Nations round about them; but left many of them, as thornes in their sides, to awaken from time to time their Piety and Industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly Kingdome, did not destroy all the difficulties of Naturall Questions; but left them to exercise our Industry, and Reason;
For just as God, when he brought the Israelites into the Promised Land, did not secure them there by subduing all the nations around them, but left many of them as thorns in their sides, to awaken their piety and industry from time to time, so our Savior, in leading us toward his heavenly kingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of natural questions, but left them to exercise our industry and reason;
the Scope of his preaching, being onely to shew us this plain and direct way to Salvation, namely, the beleef of this Article, that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himselfe for our Sins, and at his comming again, gloriously to reign over his Elect, and to save them from their Enemies eternally: To which, the opinion of Possession by Spirits, or Phantasmes, are no impediment in the way; though it be to some an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own Inventions.
the scope of his preaching being only to show us this plain and direct way to salvation, namely, belief in this article: “that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himself for our sins, and at his coming again to reign gloriously over his elect and to save them from their enemies eternally.” To this, the opinion of possession by spirits or phantasms is no impediment on the way, though to some it is an occasion of going out of the way and following their own inventions.
If wee require of the Scripture an account of all questions, which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of Gods commands; we may as well complaine of Moses for not having set downe the time of the creation of such Spirits, as well as of the Creation of the Earth, and Sea, and of Men, and Beasts.
If we require of the Scripture an account of every question that may be raised to trouble us in performing God’s commands, we may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and sea, and of men and beasts.
To conclude, I find in Scripture that there be Angels, and Spirits, good and evill; but not that they are Incorporeall, as are the Apparitions men see in the Dark, or in a Dream, or Vision; which the Latines call Spectra, and took for Daemons. And I find that there are Spirits Corporeall, (though subtile and Invisible;) but not that any mans body was possessed, or inhabited by them; And that the Bodies of the Saints shall be such, namely, Spirituall Bodies, as St. Paul calls them.
To conclude: I find in Scripture that there are angels and spirits, good and evil; but not that they are incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream or vision, which the Latins call spectra and took for daemons. And I find that there are corporeal spirits (though subtle and invisible); but not that any man’s body was possessed or inhabited by them. And I find that the bodies of the saints will be such—namely, spiritual bodies, as St. Paul calls them.
Neverthelesse, the contrary Doctrine, namely, that there be Incorporeall Spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church, that the use of Exorcisme, (that is to say, of ejection of Devills by Conjuration) is thereupon built; and (,though rarely and faintly practised) is not yet totally given over. That there were many Daemoniaques in the Primitive Church, and few [mentally ill], and other such singular diseases; whereas in these times we hear of, and see many [mentally ill], and few Daemoniaques, proceeds not from the change of Nature; but of Names.
Nevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely that there are incorporeal spirits, has so far prevailed in the Church that the use of exorcism (that is to say, the ejection of devils by conjuration) is built upon it; and though rarely and faintly practiced, it is not yet entirely given up. That in the early Church there were many demoniacs and few people who were mentally ill, or who had other such singular diseases, whereas in these times we hear of and see many who are mentally ill and few demoniacs, proceeds from a change not of nature but of names.
But how it comes to passe, that whereas heretofore the Apostles, and after them for a time, the Pastors of the Church, did cure those singular Diseases, which now they are not seen to doe; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true Beleever now, to doe all that the Faithfull did then, that is to say, as we read (Mark 16. 17.) In Christs name to cast out Devills, to speak with new Tongues, to take up Serpents, to drink deadly Poison without harm taking, and to cure the Sick by the laying on of their hands, and all this without other words, but in the Name of Iesus, is another question.
But how it comes about that the apostles formerly, and after them for a time the pastors of the Church, cured those singular diseases, which they are not now seen to do; and likewise why it is not now in the power of every true believer to do all that the faithful did then—that is to say, as we read in Mark 16:17–18, “in Christ’s name to cast out devils, to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison without taking harm, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their hands,” and all this with no other words than “in the name of Jesus”—is another question.
And it is probable, that those extraordinary gifts were given to the Church, for no longer a time, than men trusted wholly to Christ, and looked for their felicity onely in his Kingdome to come; and consequently, that when they sought Authority, and Riches, and trusted to their own Subtilty for a Kingdome of this world, these supernaturall gifts of God were again taken from them.
And it is probable that those extraordinary gifts were given to the Church for no longer than men trusted wholly in Christ and looked for their felicity only in his kingdom to come; and consequently that when they sought authority and riches, and trusted to their own cunning for a kingdom of this world, these supernatural gifts of God were taken from them again.
Worship and images
Hobbes defines worship, civil and divine, and what an image or idol is.
Another relique of Gentilisme, is the Worship of Images, neither instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament; nor yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them, after they had given their names to Christ.
Another relic of the religion of the Gentiles is the worship of images, which was neither instituted by Moses in the Old Testament nor by Christ in the New, nor yet brought in from the Gentiles, but left among them after they had given their names to Christ.
Before our Saviour preached, it was the generall Religion of the Gentiles, to worship for Gods, those Apparences that remain in the Brain from the impression of externall Bodies upon the organs of their Senses, which are commonly called Ideas, Idols, Phantasmes, Conceits, as being Representations of those externall Bodies, which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a Dream: And this is the reason why St.
Before our Savior preached, it was the general religion of the Gentiles to worship as gods those appearances that remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of their senses. These are commonly called ideas, idols, phantasms, conceits, as being representations of the external bodies that cause them; and they have no more reality in them than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream. And this is the reason why St.
Paul says, Wee know that an Idol is Nothing: Not that he thought that an Image of Metall, Stone, or Wood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honored, or feared in the Image, and held for a God, was a meer Figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the Brain. And the worship of these with Divine Honour, is that which is in the Scripture called Idolatry, and Rebellion against God.
Paul says, “We know that an idol is nothing”: not that he thought that an image of metal, stone, or wood was nothing, but that the thing they honored or feared in the image, and held for a god, was a mere figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence except in the motions of the brain. And the worship of these with divine honor is what the Scripture calls idolatry and rebellion against God.
For God being King of the Jews, and his Lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the High Priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to Images, (which are Representations of their own Fancies,) they had had no farther dependence on the true God, of whom their can be no similitude; nor on his prime Ministers, Moses, and the High Priests; but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the Common-wealth, and their own destruction for want of Union.
For God was King of the Jews, and his lieutenant was first Moses and afterward the high priest. If the people had been permitted to worship and pray to images (which are representations of their own fancies), they would have had no further dependence on the true God, of whom there can be no likeness, nor on his chief ministers, Moses and the high priests. Instead every man would have governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter overthrow of the commonwealth and their own destruction for want of union.
And therefore the first Law of God was, They should not take for Gods, ALIENOS DEOS, that is, the Gods of other nations, but that onely true God, who vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give them laws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their enemies. And the second was, that they should not make to themselves any Image to Worship, of their own Invention. For it is the same deposing of a King, to submit to another King, whether he be set up by a neighbour nation, or by our selves.
And therefore the first law of God was that “they should not take as gods alienos deos, that is, the gods of other nations, but only that true God who deigned to speak with Moses, and by him to give them laws and directions for their peace and for their salvation from their enemies.” And the second was that “they should not make for themselves any image of their own invention to worship.” For it is the same deposing of a king to submit to another king, whether he is set up by a neighboring nation or by ourselves.
The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of Images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where God is worshipped, are First, two Examples; one of the Cherubins over the Ark of God; the other of the Brazen Serpent: Secondly, some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain Creatures for their relation to God; as to worship his Footstool: And lastly, some other texts, by which is authorized, a religious honoring of Holy things. But before I examine the force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, I must first explain what is to be understood by Worshipping, and what by Images, and Idols.
The passages of Scripture alleged to countenance setting up images in order to worship them, or setting them up at all in the places where God is worshiped, are these. First, two examples: one of the cherubim over the Ark of God, the other of the bronze serpent. Second, some texts in which we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation to God, as to worship his footstool. And last, some other texts that authorize a religious honoring of holy things. But before I examine the force of those passages to prove what is claimed, I must first explain what is to be understood by worshiping, and what by images and idols.
I have already shewn in the 20 Chapter of this Discourse, that to Honor, is to value highly the Power of any person: and that such value is measured, by our comparing him with others. But because there is nothing to be compared with God in Power; we Honor him not but Dishonour him by any Value lesse than Infinite. And thus Honor is properly of its own nature, secret, and internall in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men, which appeare outwardly in their words and actions, are the signes of our Honoring, and these goe by the name of WORSHIP, in Latine CULTUS.
I have already shown in chapter 20 of this discourse that to honor is to value highly the power of any person, and that such value is measured by comparing him with others. But because there is nothing to be compared with God in power, we do not honor him but dishonor him by any value less than infinite. And thus honor is properly, by its own nature, secret and internal, in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions, are the signs of our honoring, and these go by the name of worship, in Latin cultus.
Therefore, to Pray to, to Swear by, to Obey, to bee Diligent, and Officious in Serving: in summe, all words and actions that betoken Fear to Offend, or Desire to Please, is Worship, whether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: and because they appear as signes of Honoring, are ordinarily also called Honor.
Therefore to pray to, to swear by, to obey, to be diligent and dutiful in serving—in sum, all words and actions that betoken fear of offending or desire to please—is worship, whether those words and actions are sincere or feigned. And because they appear as signs of honoring, they are ordinarily also called honor.
The Worship we exhibite to those we esteem to be but men, as to Kings, and men in Authority, is Civill Worship: But the worship we exhibite to that which we think to bee God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions be, is Divine Worship. To fall prostrate before a King, in him that thinks him but a Man, is but Civill Worship: And he that but putteth off his hat in the Church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the House of God, worshippeth with Divine Worship. They that seek the distinction of Divine and Civill Worship, not in the intention of the Worshipper, but in the Words douleia, and latreia, deceive themselves.
The worship we show to those we consider to be only men, such as kings and men in authority, is civil worship. But the worship we show to that which we think to be God, whatever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions may be, is divine worship. To fall prostrate before a king, in one who thinks him only a man, is only civil worship; and he who merely takes off his hat in church, because he thinks it the house of God, worships with divine worship. Those who seek the distinction between divine and civil worship not in the intention of the worshiper but in the words douleia and latreia deceive themselves.
For whereas there be two sorts of Servants; that sort, which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their Masters, as Slaves taken in war, and their Issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on the Will of their Masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience,) and that are bought and sold as Beasts, were called Douloi, that is properly, Slaves, and their Service Douleia: The other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their Masters) voluntarily; are called Thetes; that is, Domestique Servants; to whose service the Masters have no further right, than is contained in the Covenants made betwixt them.
For there are two sorts of servants. One sort is those who are absolutely in the power of their masters, such as slaves taken in war and their offspring, whose bodies are not in their own power (their lives depending on the will of their masters, so that they forfeit them at the least disobedience), and who are bought and sold like beasts. These were called douloi, that is, properly, slaves, and their service douleia. The other sort is those who serve voluntarily (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters); these are called thetes, that is, domestic servants, to whose service the masters have no further right than is contained in the covenants made between them.
These two kinds of Servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another: And the word Latris, is the generall name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: So that Latreia signifieth generally all Service; but Douleia the service of Bondmen onely, and the condition of Slavery: And both are used in Scripture (to signifie our Service of God) promiscuously. Douleia, because we are Gods Slaves; Latreia, because wee Serve him: and in all kinds of Service is contained, not onely Obedience, but also Worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signifie Honor.
These two kinds of servants have this much in common: their labor is assigned to them by another. And the word latris is the general name for both, signifying one who works for another, whether as a slave or as a voluntary servant. So latreia signifies all service generally, but douleia the service of bondmen only, and the condition of slavery. And both are used in Scripture interchangeably to signify our service of God: douleia because we are God’s slaves, latreia because we serve him. And in every kind of service is contained not only obedience but also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words as signify honor.
An IMAGE (in the most strict signification of the word) is the Resemblance of some thing visible: In which sense the Phantasticall Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of visible Bodies to the Sight, are onely Images; such as are the Shew of a man, or other thing in the Water, by Reflexion, or Refraction; or of the Sun, or Stars by Direct Vision in the Air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of Sight, or by glasses; and are present oftentimes in our Imagination, and in our Dreams, when the object is absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend onely upon the Fancy.
An image (in the strictest sense of the word) is the resemblance of something visible. In this sense the fantastic forms, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to the sight are the only images: such as the appearance of a man or other thing in water, by reflection or refraction, or of the sun or stars by direct vision in the air. These are nothing real in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to be; nor are their sizes and shapes the same as those of the object, but changeable by variations in the organs of sight, or by lenses. And they are often present in our imagination and in our dreams when the object is absent, or changed into other colors and shapes, as things that depend only on the fancy.
And these are the Images which are originally and most properly called Ideas, and IDOLS, and derived from the language of the Graecians, with whom the word Eido signifieth to See. They are also called PHANTASMES, which is in the same language, Apparitions. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of mans Nature, is called the Imagination. And from hence it is manifest, that there neither is, nor can bee any Image made of a thing Invisible.
And these are the images that are originally and most properly called ideas and idols, from the language of the Greeks, in which the word eido signifies “to see.” They are also called phantasms, which in the same language means “apparitions.” And it is from these images that one of the faculties of man’s nature is called the imagination. From this it is manifest that there neither is nor can be any image made of a thing invisible.
It is also evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for all the Images, and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression of things visible, are figured: but Figure is a quantity every way determined: And therefore there can bee no Image of God; nor of the Soule of Man; nor of Spirits; but onely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enligtened.
It is also evident that there can be no image of a thing infinite. For all the images and phantasms that are made by the impression of visible things have shape, and shape is a quantity determined in every direction. And therefore there can be no image of God, nor of the soul of man, nor of spirits, but only of visible bodies: that is, bodies that have light in themselves, or are lit by such bodies.
And whereas a man can fancy Shapes he never saw; making up a Figure out of the parts of divers creatures; as the Poets make their Centaures, Chimaeras, and other Monsters never seen: So can he also give Matter to those Shapes, and make them in Wood, Clay or Metall. And these are also called Images, not for the resemblance, of any corporeall thing, but for the resemblance of some Phantasticall Inhabitants of the Brain of the Maker.
And whereas a man can imagine shapes he never saw, making up a figure out of the parts of different creatures, as the poets make their centaurs, chimeras, and other monsters never seen, so he can also give matter to those shapes and make them in wood, clay, or metal. And these are also called images, not for their resemblance to any corporeal thing, but for their resemblance to some fantastic inhabitants of the maker’s brain.
But in these Idols, as they are originally in the Brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the Materiall Body made by Art, may be said to be the Image of the Phantasticall Idoll made by Nature.
But between these idols as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, molded, or cast in matter, there is a likeness of the one to the other, for which the material body made by art may be said to be the image of the fantastic idol made by nature.
But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also, any Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an earthly Soveraign. And many times in the Idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their Materiall Idol to the Idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the Image of it. For a Stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their Gods.
But in a broader use of the word, image also includes any representation of one thing by another. So an earthly sovereign may be called the image of God, and an inferior magistrate the image of an earthly sovereign. And often in the idolatry of the Gentiles little regard was paid to the likeness of their material idol to the idol in their fancy, and yet it was called its image. For an unhewn stone has been set up for Neptune, and various other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their gods.
And at this day we see many Images of the Virgin Mary, and other Saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one mans Fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the Names onely, to represent the Persons mentioned in the History; to which every man applyeth a Mentall Image of his owne making, or none at all. And thus an Image in the largest sense, is either the Resemblance, or the Representation of some thing Visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the most part.
And at this day we see many images of the Virgin Mary and other saints, unlike one another and corresponding to no one man’s fancy; and yet they serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for, which was no more than to represent, by the names only, the persons mentioned in the history, to whom every man applies a mental image of his own making, or none at all. And thus an image in the broadest sense is either the resemblance or the representation of some visible thing, or both together, as happens for the most part.
But the name of Idoll is extended yet further in Scripture, to signifie also the Sunne, or a Starre, or any other Creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for Gods.
But in Scripture the name idol is extended still further, to signify also the sun, or a star, or any other creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped as gods.
What idolatry is
Which outward acts toward images, places and persons are idolatry, and which are scandalous worship.
Having shewn what is Worship, and what an Image; I will now put them together, and examine what that IDOLATRY is, which is forbidden in the Second Commandement, and other places of the Scripture.
Having shown what worship is, and what an image is, I will now put them together and examine what that idolatry is which is forbidden in the Second Commandment and in other places of Scripture.
To worship an Image, is voluntarily to doe those externall acts, which are signes of honoring either the matter of the Image, which is Wood, Stone, Metall, or some other visible creature; or the Phantasme of the brain, for the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed and figured; or both together, as one animate Body, composed of the Matter and the Phantasme, as of a Body and Soule.
To worship an image is voluntarily to perform those external acts which are signs of honoring either the matter of the image (wood, stone, metal, or some other visible creature), or the phantasm of the brain which the matter was formed and shaped to resemble or represent, or both together, as one animate body composed of the matter and the phantasm, like a body and soul.
To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should suppose the Soule of the Prince to be in the Stool, or should present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine Worship, and Idolatry.
To uncover one’s head before a man of power and authority, or before the throne of a prince, or in such other places as he appoints for that purpose in his absence, is to worship that man or prince with civil worship. It is a sign of honoring not the chair or the place but the person, and it is not idolatry. But if the one who does it were to suppose that the soul of the prince was in the chair, or were to present a petition to the chair, it would be divine worship, and idolatry.
To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: But voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God onely can doe for us, is Divine Worship, and Idolatry.
To pray to a king for things he is able to do for us, even if we prostrate ourselves before him, is only civil worship, because we acknowledge no power in him but human power. But voluntarily to pray to him for fair weather, or for anything that only God can do for us, is divine worship, and idolatry.
On the other side if a King compell a man to it by the terrour of Death, or other great corporall punishment, it is not Idolatry: For the Worship which the Soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internall honor, is no Worship; and therefore no Idolatry.
On the other hand, if a king compels a man to it by the terror of death or some other great bodily punishment, it is not idolatry. For the worship which the sovereign commands to be done to himself by the terror of his laws is not a sign that the one who obeys him inwardly honors him as a god, but that he wants to save himself from death or from a miserable life. And what is not a sign of inward honor is no worship, and therefore no idolatry.
Neither can it bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block before his Brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of his Soveraign.
Nor can it be said that the one who does it gives scandal, or lays any stumbling block before his brother. For however wise or learned the man who worships in that manner may be, another man cannot argue from it that he approves of it, but only that he does it out of fear, and that it is not his act but the act of his sovereign.
To worship God, in some peculiar Place, or turning a mans face towards an Image, or determinate Place, is not to worship, or honor the Place, or Image; but to acknowledge it Holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the Image, or the Place to be set apart from common use: for that is the meaning of the word Holy; which implies no new quality in the Place, or Image; but onely a new Relation by Appropriation to God; and therefore is not Idolatry; no more than it was Idolatry to worship God before the Brazen Serpent;
To worship God in some particular place, or turning one’s face toward an image or a definite place, is not to worship or honor the place or image. It is to acknowledge it holy—that is, to acknowledge the image or the place to be set apart from common use. For that is the meaning of the word holy: it implies no new quality in the place or image, but only a new relation, by being appropriated to God. It is therefore not idolatry, any more than it was idolatry to worship God before the bronze serpent;
or for the Jews when they were out of their owne countrey, to turn their faces (when they prayed) toward the Temple of Jerusalem; or for Moses to put off his Shoes when he was before the Flaming Bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai; which place God had chosen to appear in, and to give his Laws to the People of Israel, and was therefore Holy ground, not by inhaerent sanctity, but by separation to Gods use; or for Christians to worship in the Churches, which are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose, by the Authority of the King, or other true Representant of the Church.
or for the Jews, when they were out of their own country, to turn their faces toward the Temple of Jerusalem when they prayed; or for Moses to take off his shoes when he was before the burning bush, on ground belonging to Mount Sinai, a place God had chosen to appear in and to give his laws to the people of Israel, and which was therefore holy ground, not by any inherent sanctity but by being set apart for God’s use; or for Christians to worship in churches, which have been solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose by the authority of the king or other true representative of the Church.
But to worship God, as inanimating, or inhabiting, such Image, or place; that is to say, an infinite substance in a finite place, is Idolatry: for such finite Gods, are but Idols of the brain, nothing reall; and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of Vanity, and Lyes, and Nothing. Also to worship God, not as inanimating, or present in the place, or Image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some works of his, in case the Place, or Image be dedicated, or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our Soveraign Pastors, is Idolatry.
But to worship God as animating or inhabiting such an image or place—that is, an infinite substance in a finite place—is idolatry. For such finite gods are only idols of the brain, nothing real, and in Scripture they are commonly called by the names of vanity, lies, and nothing. Likewise, to worship God, not as animating or present in the place or image, but in order to be reminded of him or of some of his works, is idolatry if the place or image is dedicated or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of those who are our sovereign pastors.
For the Commandement is, Thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven Image. God commanded Moses to set up the Brazen Serpent; hee did not make it to himselfe; it was not therefore against the Commandement. But the making of the Golden Calfe by Aaron, and the People, as being done without authority from God, was Idolatry; not onely because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a Religious use, without warrant either from God their Soveraign, or from Moses, that was his Lieutenant.
For the commandment is, “You shall not make for yourself any graven image.” God commanded Moses to set up the bronze serpent; Moses did not make it for himself, so it was not against the commandment. But the making of the golden calf by Aaron and the people was idolatry, being done without authority from God. It was idolatry not only because they took it for God, but also because they made it for a religious use without warrant either from God their sovereign or from Moses, who was his lieutenant.
The Gentiles worshipped for Gods, Jupiter, and others; that living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious Acts; and for the Children of God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an Immortall Deity, and a mortall man. This was Idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternall Law of Reason, nor in his positive and revealed Will. But though our Saviour was a man, whom wee also beleeve to bee God Immortall, and the Son of God; yet this is no Idolatry; because wee build not that beleef upon our own fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures.
The Gentiles worshipped as gods Jupiter and others who, when living, were perhaps men who had done great and glorious deeds; and as children of God they worshipped various men and women whom they supposed to have been begotten between an immortal deity and a mortal. This was idolatry, because they made them gods for themselves, with no authority from God, either in his eternal law of reason or in his positive and revealed will. But though our Savior was a man whom we also believe to be God immortal and the Son of God, this is no idolatry, because we do not build that belief on our own fancy or judgment, but on the word of God revealed in the Scriptures.
And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, This is my Body, signifie, that he himselfe, and the seeming bread in his hand; and not onely so, but that all the seeming morsells of bread that have ever since been, and any time hereafter shall bee consecrated by Priests; bee so many Christs bodies, and yet all of them but one body, then is that no Idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that text doe not signifie that, (for there is no other that can be alledged for it,) then, because it is a worship of humane institution, it is Idolatry.
As for the adoration of the Eucharist: if Christ’s words “This is my body” signify “that he himself and the seeming bread in his hand—and not only that, but all the seeming morsels of bread that have ever since been, or at any time hereafter shall be, consecrated by priests—are so many bodies of Christ, and yet all of them only one body,” then it is no idolatry, because it is authorized by our Savior. But if that text does not signify this (and there is no other that can be cited for it), then, being a worship of human institution, it is idolatry.
For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the Bread into Christs Body: For the Gentiles also held God to be Omnipotent; and might upon that ground no lesse excuse their Idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, a transubstantiation of their Wood, and Stone into God Almighty.
For it is not enough to say that God can transubstantiate the bread into Christ’s body. The Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and on that ground could just as well excuse their idolatry, by claiming, as others do, a transubstantiation of their wood and stone into God Almighty.
Whereas there be, that pretend Divine Inspiration, to be a supernaturall entring of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of Gods graces, by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous Dilemma. For if they worship not the men whom they beleeve to be so inspired, they fall into Impiety; as not adoring Gods supernaturall Presence. And again, if they worship him, they commit Idolatry; for the Apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped.
There are some who claim that divine inspiration is a supernatural entering of the Holy Spirit into a man, and not an acquiring of God’s graces by teaching and study. I think they are caught in a very dangerous dilemma. For if they do not worship the men whom they believe to be so inspired, they fall into impiety, by not adoring God’s supernatural presence. And if they do worship them, they commit idolatry, for the apostles would never allow themselves to be worshipped in that way.
Therefore the safest way is to beleeve, that by the Descending of the Dove upon the Apostles; and by Christs Breathing on them, when hee gave them the Holy Ghost; and by the giving of it by Imposition of Hands, are understood the signes which God hath been pleased to use, or ordain to bee used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to Preach his Kingdome, and in their Conversation, that it might not be Scandalous, but Edifying to others.
The safest course, therefore, is to believe that by the descent of the dove upon the apostles, by Christ’s breathing on them when he gave them the Holy Spirit, and by the giving of it through the laying on of hands, we are to understand the signs which God has been pleased to use, or to ordain to be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach his kingdom, and in their conduct, so that it might not be scandalous but edifying to others.
Besides the Idolatrous Worship of Images, there is also a Scandalous Worship of them; which is also a sin; but not Idolatry. For Idolatry is to worship by signes of an internall, and reall honour: but Scandalous Worship, is but Seeming Worship; and may sometimes bee joined with an inward, and hearty detestation, both of the Image, and of the Phantasticall Daemon, or Idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed onely from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is neverthelesse a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of Religion: Whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently are no causes of our falling.
Besides the idolatrous worship of images there is also a scandalous worship of them, which is also a sin, but not idolatry. For idolatry is worship by signs of an inward and real honor, whereas scandalous worship is only seeming worship. It may sometimes be joined with an inward and heartfelt detestation both of the image and of the fantastical demon or idol to which it is dedicated, and may proceed only from fear of death or other grievous punishment. It is nevertheless a sin in those who worship in this way, if they are men whose actions others look to as lights to guide them by; because those who follow their ways cannot help stumbling and falling in the way of religion. The example of those we pay no regard to, by contrast, does not work on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution, and so is no cause of our falling.
If therefore a Pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, doe externall honor to an Idol for fear; unlesse he make his feare, and unwillingnesse to it, as evident as the worship; he Scandalizeth his Brother, by seeming to approve Idolatry. For his Brother arguing from the action of his teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to bee lawfull in it selfe.
If, therefore, a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or anyone else whose knowledge is highly thought of, does outward honor to an idol out of fear, then unless he makes his fear and unwillingness as evident as the worship, he gives scandal to his brother by seeming to approve of idolatry. For his brother, reasoning from the action of his teacher, or of the man whose knowledge he greatly esteems, concludes that it is lawful in itself.
And this Scandall, is Sin, and a Scandall given. But if one being no Pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in Christian Doctrine, doe the same, and another follow him; this is no Scandall given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a pretence of Scandall which hee taketh of himselfe for an excuse before men: For an unlearned man, that is in the power of an Idolatrous King, or State, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an Idoll, hee detesteth the Idoll in his heart, hee doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should doe better.
And this scandal is a sin, and a scandal given. But if someone who is no pastor, and has no eminent reputation for knowledge of Christian doctrine, does the same, and another follows him, this is no scandal given, for the other had no reason to follow such an example. It is rather a pretense of scandal, which he takes up on his own account as an excuse before men. For if an unlearned man in the power of an idolatrous king or state is commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, and he detests the idol in his heart, he does well—though if he had the fortitude to suffer death rather than worship it, he would do better.
But if a Pastor, who as Christs Messenger, has undertaken to teach Christs Doctrine to all nations, should doe the same, it were not onely a sinfull Scandall, in respect of other Christian mens consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge.
But if a pastor, who as Christ’s messenger has undertaken to teach Christ’s doctrine to all nations, were to do the same, it would be not only a sinful scandal with respect to other Christians’ consciences, but a treacherous desertion of his charge.
The summe of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the Worship of Images, is this, that he that worshippeth in an Image, or any Creature, either the Matter thereof, or any Fancy of his own, which he thinketh to dwell in it; or both together; or beleeveth that such things hear his Prayers, or see his Devotions, without Ears, or Eyes, committeth Idolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such Worship for fear of punishment, if he bee a man whose example hath power amongst his Brethren, committeth a sin: But he that worshippeth the Creator of the world before such an Image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or chosen of himselfe, but taken from the commandement of Gods Word, as the Jewes did in worshipping God before the Cherubins, and before the Brazen Serpent for a time, and in, or towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time, committeth not Idolatry.
The sum of what I have said so far about the worship of images is this. Whoever worships in an image, or in any creature, either its matter, or some fancy of his own which he thinks dwells in it, or both together, or believes that such things hear his prayers or see his devotions without ears or eyes, commits idolatry. Whoever counterfeits such worship for fear of punishment commits a sin, if he is a man whose example has power among his brethren. But whoever worships the Creator of the world before such an image, or in such a place, as he has not made or chosen for himself but taken from the commandment of God’s word, does not commit idolatry—as the Jews did not in worshipping God before the cherubim, and before the bronze serpent for a time, and in or toward the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also only for a time.
Pagan relics in the Church of Rome
Image worship, canonization, the title of pontifex, processions and holy water are traced to paganism.
Now for the Worship of Saints, and Images, and Reliques, and other things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed by the Word of God, nor brought into the Church of Rome, from the Doctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the Bishops of Rome.
Now as for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things practiced today in the Church of Rome, I say they are not permitted by the word of God, nor were they brought into the Church of Rome from the doctrine taught there. They were partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles, and afterward countenanced, confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of Rome.
As for the proofs alledged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of Images appointed by God to bee set up; They were not set up for the people, or any man to worship; but that they should worship God himselfe before them; as before the Cherubins over the Ark, and the Brazen Serpent. For we read not, that the Priest, or any other did worship the Cherubins; but contrarily wee read (2 Kings 18.4.) that Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent which Moses had set up, because the People burnt incense to it.
As for the proofs cited from Scripture—namely, those examples of images that God appointed to be set up—they were not set up for the people or anyone to worship, but so that they would worship God himself before them, as before the cherubim over the Ark, and the bronze serpent. For we do not read that the priest or anyone else worshipped the cherubim. On the contrary, we read (2 Kings 18:4) that Hezekiah broke in pieces the bronze serpent that Moses had set up, because the people burned incense to it.
Besides, those examples are not put for our Imitation, that we also should set up Images, under pretence of worshipping God before them; because the words of the second Commandement, Thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven Image, &c. distinguish between the Images that God commanded to be set up, and those which wee set up to our selves. And therefore from the Cherubins, or Brazen Serpent, to the Images of mans devising; and from the Worship commanded by God, to the Will-Worship of men, the argument is not good.
Besides, those examples are not given for us to imitate, so that we too should set up images under pretense of worshipping God before them. For the words of the Second Commandment, “You shall not make for yourself any graven image,” etc., distinguish between the images God commanded to be set up and those we set up for ourselves. And therefore the argument from the cherubim or the bronze serpent to images of man’s devising, and from worship commanded by God to the self-chosen worship of men, is not good.
This also is to bee considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should doe so no more; so also Christian Soveraigns ought to break down the Images which their Subjects have been accustomed to worship; that there be no more occasion of such Idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant People, where Images are worshipped, doe really beleeve there is a Divine Power in the Images; and are told by their Pastors, that some of them have spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as done by the Saint, which they think either is the Image it self, or in it.
This also must be considered: just as Hezekiah broke the bronze serpent in pieces because the Jews worshipped it, so that they would do so no more, so Christian sovereigns ought to break down the images their subjects have been accustomed to worship, so that there may be no further occasion for such idolatry. For today, where images are worshipped, the ignorant people really do believe there is a divine power in the images. They are told by their pastors that some of them have spoken, and have bled, and that miracles have been done by them; and they take these as done by the saint, whom they think either is the image itself or is in it.
The Israelites, when they worshipped the Calfe, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt; and yet it was Idolatry, because they thought the Calfe either was that God, or had him in his belly. And though some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the Image to be God, or a Saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where when the Golden Calfe was made, the people said, These are thy Gods O Israel; and where the Images of Laban are called his Gods.
When the Israelites worshipped the calf, they thought they were worshipping the God who brought them out of Egypt; and yet it was idolatry, because they thought the calf either was that God or had him in its belly. Some may think it impossible for people to be so stupid as to think the image is God, or a saint, or to worship it on that understanding. But Scripture makes the contrary plain: when the golden calf was made, the people said, “These are your gods, O Israel,” and the images of Laban are called his gods.
And wee see daily by experience in all sorts of People, that such men as study nothing but their food and ease, are content to beleeve any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entaile unalienable, except by an expresse and new Law.
And we see by daily experience in all sorts of people that men who care about nothing but their food and ease are content to believe any absurdity rather than trouble themselves to examine it, holding their faith as if by an entail that cannot be alienated except by an express new law.
But they inferre from some other places, that it is lawfull to paint Angels, and also God himselfe: as from Gods walking in the Garden; from Jacobs seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other Visions, and Dreams. But Visions, and Dreams, whether naturall, or snpernaturall, are but Phantasmes: and he that painteth an Image of any of them, maketh not an Image of God, but of his own Phantasm, which is, making of an Idol. I say not, that to draw a Picture after a fancy, is a Sin; but when it is drawn, to hold it for a Representation of God, is against the second Commandement; and can be of no use, but to worship.
But they infer from certain other passages that it is lawful to paint angels, and even God himself: from God’s walking in the garden, from Jacob’s seeing God at the top of the ladder, and from other visions and dreams. But visions and dreams, whether natural or supernatural, are only phantasms; and whoever paints an image of any of them makes an image not of God but of his own phantasm, which is making an idol. I do not say that drawing a picture from one’s fancy is a sin. But once it is drawn, to hold it to be a representation of God is against the Second Commandment, and it can be of no use except for worship.
And the same may be said of the Images of Angels, and of men dead; unlesse as Monuments of friends, or of men worthy remembrance: For such use of an Image, is not Worship of the Image; but a civill honoring of the Person, not that is, but that was: But when it is done to the Image which we make of a Saint, for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is pleased with the honour wee doe him, when dead, and without sense, wee attribute to him more than humane power; and therefore it is Idolatry.
And the same may be said of images of angels and of dead men, except as monuments of friends or of men worthy of remembrance. For such a use of an image is not worship of the image, but civil honoring of the person—not one who is, but one who was. But when it is done to the image we make of a saint, for no other reason than that we think he hears our prayers and is pleased with the honor we do him, though he is dead and without sense, we attribute to him more than human power, and therefore it is idolatry.
Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the Law of Moses, nor in the Gospel, for the religious Worship of Images, or other Representations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the Worship of the Image of any Creature in Heaven, or Earth, or under the Earth: And whereas Christian Kings, who are living Representants of God, are not to be worshipped by their Subjects, by any act, that signifieth a greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortall man is capable of; It cannot be imagined, that the Religious Worship now in use, was brought into the Church, by misunderstanding of the Scripture.
There is, then, no authority, either in the law of Moses or in the Gospel, for the religious worship of images or other representations of God which men set up for themselves, or for the worship of the image of any creature in heaven, or on earth, or under the earth. And Christian kings, who are living representatives of God, are not to be worshipped by their subjects by any act that signifies a greater esteem of their power than the nature of mortal man is capable of. So it cannot be supposed that the religious worship now in use was brought into the Church by misunderstanding of the Scripture.
It resteth therefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the Images themselves, in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.
It remains, therefore, that it was left in the Church by failing to destroy the images themselves at the conversion of the Gentiles who worshipped them.
The cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the workmanship of them, which made the owners (though converted, from worshipping them as they had done Religiously for Daemons) to retain them still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honor of Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles, and other the Pastors of the Primitive Church; as being easie, by giving them new names, to make that an Image of the Virgin Mary, and of her Sonne our Saviour, which before perhaps was called the Image of Venus, and Cupid; and so of a Iupiter to make a Barnabas, and of Mercury a Paul, and the like.
The cause of this was the immoderate esteem and high prices set on their workmanship. This made their owners, though converted from worshipping them religiously as demons, as they had done, keep them still in their houses, on the pretense of doing it in honor of Christ, the Virgin Mary, the apostles, and other pastors of the primitive Church. For it was easy, by giving them new names, to make an image of the Virgin Mary and her Son, our Savior, out of what had perhaps before been called an image of Venus and Cupid; and in the same way to make a Barnabas out of a Jupiter, a Paul out of a Mercury, and the like.
And as worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the Pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the new made Christians; and also to a liking of this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the Images of Christ and his Apostles, grew more and more Idolatrous; save that somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers Emperors, and Bishops, and generall Councells observed, and opposed the unlawfulnesse thereof; but too late, or too weakly.
And as worldly ambition crept by degrees into the pastors, it drew them to try to please the newly made Christians, and also to like this kind of honor, which they too might hope for after their death, as well as those who had already gained it. So the worship of the images of Christ and his apostles grew more and more idolatrous—except that some time after Constantine, various emperors, bishops, and general councils noticed its unlawfulness and opposed it, but too late, or too weakly.
The Canonizing of Saints, is another Relique of Gentilisme: It is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church, but a custome as ancient as the Common-wealth of Rome it self. The first that ever was canonized at Rome, was Romulus, and that upon the narration of Iulius Proculus, that swore before the Senate, he spake with him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in Heaven, and was there called Quirinus, and would be propitious to the State of their new City: And thereupon the Senate gave publique testimony of his Sanctity.
The canonizing of saints is another relic of paganism. It is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture nor a new invention of the Roman Church, but a custom as old as the commonwealth of Rome itself. The first person ever canonized at Rome was Romulus, on the report of Julius Proculus, who swore before the Senate that he had spoken with him after his death, and had been assured by him that he dwelt in heaven, was called Quirinus there, and would look with favor on the state of their new city. Thereupon the Senate gave public testimony of his sanctity.
Iulius Caesar, and other Emperors after him, had the like testimony; that is, were Canonized for Saints; for by such testimony is CANONIZATION, now defined; and is the same with the Apotheosis of the Heathen.
Julius Caesar, and other emperors after him, had the like testimony; that is, they were canonized as saints. For canonization is now defined by such testimony, and it is the same as the apotheosis of the heathen.
It is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the name, and power of PONTIFEX MAXIMUS. This was the name of him that in the ancient Common-wealth of Rome, had the Supreme Authority under the Senate and People, of regulating all Ceremonies, and Doctrines concerning their Religion: And when Augustus Caesar changed the State into a Monarchy, he took to himselfe no more but this office, and that of Tribune of the People, (that is to say, the Supreme Power both in State, and Religion;) and the succeeding Emperors enjoyed the same.
It is also from the Roman heathen that the popes have received the name and power of pontifex maximus. This was the title of the man who, in the ancient commonwealth of Rome, had the supreme authority under the Senate and people to regulate all ceremonies and doctrines concerning their religion. When Augustus Caesar changed the state into a monarchy, he took for himself no more than this office and that of tribune of the people—that is to say, the supreme power in both state and religion—and the emperors who succeeded him enjoyed the same.
But when the Emperour Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized Christian Religion, it was consonant to his profession, to cause Religion to be regulated (under his authority) by the Bishop of Rome: Though it doe not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but rather, that the succeeding Bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the Bishops of the Roman Provinces. For it is not any Priviledge of St.
But in the time of the emperor Constantine, who was the first to profess and authorize the Christian religion, it was consistent with his profession to have religion regulated, under his authority, by the bishop of Rome. It does not appear, though, that they had the title of pontifex so soon; rather, later bishops seem to have taken it on themselves, to lend countenance to the power they exercised over the bishops of the Roman provinces. For it was not any privilege of St.
Peter, but the Priviledge of the City of Rome, which the Emperors were alwaies willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other Bishops; as may be evidently seen by that, that the Bishop of Constantinople, when the Emperour made that City the Seat of the Empire, pretended to bee equall to the Bishop of Rome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carryed it, and became the Pontifex Maximus; but in right onely of the Emperour; and not without the bounds of the Empire; nor any where, after the Emperour had lost his power in Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his power from him.
Peter, but the privilege of the city of Rome, which the emperors were always willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other bishops. This can be plainly seen from the fact that the bishop of Constantinople, when the emperor made that city the seat of the empire, claimed to be equal to the bishop of Rome—though in the end, not without contention, the Pope prevailed and became the pontifex maximus. But he was so only by right of the emperor, and not beyond the bounds of the empire, nor anywhere after the emperor had lost his power in Rome—even though it was the Pope himself who took his power from him.
From whence wee may by the way observe, that there is no place for the superiority of the Pope over other Bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the Civill Soveraign; and where the Emperour having Soveraign Power Civill, hath expressely chosen the Pope for the chief Pastor under himselfe, of his Christian Subjects.
From this we may observe in passing that there is no room for the superiority of the Pope over other bishops, except in the territories where he is himself the civil sovereign, and where the emperor, having sovereign civil power, has expressly chosen the Pope as the chief pastor, under himself, of his Christian subjects.
The carrying about of Images in Procession; is another Relique of the Religion of the Greeks, and Romans: For they also carried their Idols from place to place, in a kind of Chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the Latines called Thensa, and Vehiculum Deorum; and the Image was placed in a frame, or Shrine, which they called Ferculum: And that which they called Pompa, is the same that now is named Procession: According whereunto, amongst the Divine Honors which were given to Iulius Caesar by the Senate, this was one, that in the Pompe (or Procession) at the Circaean games, he should have Thensam & Ferculum, a sacred Chariot, and a Shrine; which was as much, as to be carried up and down as a God: Just as at this day the Popes are carried by Switzers under a Canopie.
The carrying of images about in procession is another relic of the religion of the Greeks and Romans. For they too carried their idols from place to place in a kind of chariot specially dedicated to that use, which the Latins called thensa and vehiculum deorum; and the image was placed in a frame or shrine which they called ferculum. What they called pompa is the same as what is now called procession. Accordingly, among the divine honors the Senate gave to Julius Caesar, one was that in the pomp (or procession) at the Circus games he should have thensam et ferculum, a sacred chariot and a shrine—which amounted to being carried up and down like a god. Just so, today, the popes are carried under a canopy by Swiss Guards.
To these Processions also belonged the bearing of burning Torches, and Candles, before the Images of the Gods, both amongst the Greeks, and Romans. For afterwards the Emperors of Rome received the same honor; as we read of Caligula, that at his reception to the Empire, he was carried from Misenum to Rome, in the midst of a throng of People, the wayes beset with Altars, and Beasts for Sacrifice, and burning Torches: And of Caracalla that was received into Alexandria with Incense, and with casting of Flowers, and Dadouchiais, that is, with Torches; for Dadochoi were they that amongst the Greeks carried Torches lighted in the Processions of their Gods: And in processe of time, the devout, but ignorant People, did many times honor their Bishops with the like pompe of Wax Candles, and the Images of our Saviour, and the Saints, constantly, in the Church it self.
To these processions also belonged the carrying of burning torches and candles before the images of the gods, among both Greeks and Romans. For later the emperors of Rome received the same honor. We read of Caligula that on his accession to the empire he was carried from Misenum to Rome through a throng of people, the roads lined with altars, beasts for sacrifice, and burning torches; and of Caracalla, that he was received into Alexandria with incense, strewing of flowers, and dadouchiai, that is, torches—for the dadouchoi were those among the Greeks who carried lighted torches in the processions of their gods. And in the course of time the devout but ignorant people many times honored their bishops with the same pomp of wax candles, and constantly honored the images of our Savior and the saints in the same way, in the church itself.
And thus came in the use of Wax Candles; and was also established by some of the ancient Councells.
And that is how the use of wax candles came in; it was also established by some of the ancient councils.
The Heathens had also their Aqua Lustralis; that is to say, Holy Water. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their Holy Dayes. They had their Bacchanalia; and we have our Wakes, answering to them: They their Saturnalia, and we our Carnevalls, and Shrove-tuesdays liberty of Servants: They their Procession of Priapus; wee our fetching in, erection, and dancing about May-poles; and Dancing is one kind of Worship: They had their Procession called Ambarvalia; and we our Procession about the fields in the Rogation week. Nor do I think that these are all the Ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of the Gentiles:
The heathen also had their aqua lustralis, that is to say, holy water. The Church of Rome also imitates them in its holy days. They had their Bacchanalia, and we have our wakes corresponding to them; they their Saturnalia, and we our carnivals and the Shrove Tuesday liberty of servants; they their procession of Priapus, we our fetching in, setting up, and dancing around maypoles—and dancing is one kind of worship; they had their procession called Ambarvalia, and we our procession about the fields in Rogation week. Nor do I think these are all the ceremonies left in the Church from the first conversion of the Gentiles;
but they are all that I can for the present call to mind; and if a man would wel observe that which is delivered in the Histories, concerning the Religious Rites of the Greeks and Romanes, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty Bottles of Gentilisme, which the Doctors of the Romance Church, either by Negligence, or Ambition, have filled up again with the new Wine of Christianity, that will not faile in time to break them.
but they are all I can call to mind at present. And if anyone were to look carefully at what the histories report about the religious rites of the Greeks and Romans, I do not doubt he could find many more of these old empty bottles of paganism, which the doctors of the Roman Church, through negligence or ambition, have filled again with the new wine of Christianity—which will not fail in time to break them.
Chapter 46: Of darkness from vain philosophy and fabulous traditions
Hobbes defines philosophy and excludes experience, error, revelation and book learning from it.
By PHILOLOSPHY, is understood the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the Generation of any thing, to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force permit, such Effects, as humane life requireth. So the Geometrician, from the Construction of Figures, findeth out many Properties thereof; and from the Properties, new Ways of their Construction, by Reasoning; to the end to be able to measure Land, and Water; and for infinite other uses.
By philosophy is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning from the manner of the generation of anything to its properties, or from the properties to some possible way of its generation, in order to be able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as human life requires. So the geometer, from the construction of figures, discovers many of their properties by reasoning, and from the properties new ways of constructing them, in order to be able to measure land and water, and for countless other uses.
So the Astronomer, from the Rising, Setting, and Moving of the Sun, and Starres, in divers parts of the Heavens, findeth out the Causes of Day, and Night, and of the different Seasons of the Year; whereby he keepeth an account of Time: And the like of other Sciences.
So the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and motion of the sun and stars in different parts of the heavens, discovers the causes of day and night and of the different seasons of the year, by which he keeps an account of time. And the same holds for other sciences.
By which Definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part thereof, that originall knowledge called Experience, in which consisteth Prudence: Because it is not attained by Reasoning, but found as well in Brute Beasts, as in Man; and is but a Memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most Prudent: whereas nothing is produced by Reasoning aright, but generall, eternall, and immutable Truth.
By this definition it is evident that we are not to count as any part of philosophy that original knowledge called experience, in which prudence consists. For it is not attained by reasoning, but is found in brute beasts as well as in man. It is only a memory of sequences of events in times past, in which the omission of any little circumstance that alters the effect frustrates the expectation of even the most prudent. Whereas nothing is produced by right reasoning but general, eternal, and immutable truth.
Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false Conclusions: For he that Reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an Error:
Nor, therefore, are we to give that name to any false conclusions. For whoever reasons rightly in words he understands can never conclude an error.
Nor to that which any man knows by supernaturall Revelation; because it is not acquired by Reasoning:
Nor to what anyone knows by supernatural revelation, because it is not acquired by reasoning.
Nor that which is gotten by Reasoning from the Authority of Books; because it is not by Reasoning from the Cause to the Effect, nor from the Effect to the Cause; and is not Knowledg, but Faith.
Nor to what is gained by reasoning from the authority of books, because that is not reasoning from the cause to the effect, or from the effect to the cause; and it is not knowledge, but faith.
The origins of philosophy and the schools
Philosophy grew from leisure in great commonwealths; the Greek and Jewish schools taught little of use.
The faculty of Reasoning being consequent to the use of Speech, it was not possible, but that there should have been some generall Truthes found out by Reasoning, as ancient almost as Language it selfe. The [Indigenous peoples] of America, are not without some good Morall Sentences; also they have a little Arithmetick, to adde, and divide in Numbers not too great: but they are not therefore Philosophers.
Since the faculty of reasoning follows from the use of speech, it was impossible that there should not have been some general truths discovered by reasoning almost as old as language itself. The Indigenous peoples of America are not without some good moral maxims; they also have a little arithmetic, to add and divide numbers that are not too large. But they are not therefore philosophers.
For as there were Plants of Corn and Wine in small quantity dispersed in the Fields and Woods, before men knew their vertue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them apart in Fields, and Vineyards; in which time they fed on Akorns, and drank Water: so also there have been divers true, generall, and profitable Speculations from the beginning; as being the naturall plants of humane Reason: But they were at first but few in number; men lived upon grosse Experience; there was no Method; that is to say, no Sowing, nor Planting of Knowledge by it self, apart from the Weeds, and common Plants of Errour and Conjecture: And the cause of it being the want of leasure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbors, it was impossible, till the erecting of great Common-wealths, it should be otherwise.
For just as there were plants of grain and grapes, in small quantities, scattered in the fields and woods before men knew their value, or used them for food, or planted them separately in fields and vineyards—during which time men fed on acorns and drank water—so too there have been various true, general, and profitable speculations from the beginning, as the natural plants of human reason. But at first they were few in number. Men lived on crude experience. There was no method—that is to say, no sowing or planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds and common plants of error and conjecture. And since the cause of this was the lack of leisure from procuring the necessities of life and defending themselves against their neighbors, it could not be otherwise until great commonwealths were set up.
Leasure is the mother of Philosophy; and Common-wealth, the mother of Peace, and Leasure. Where first were great and flourishing Cities, there was first the study of Philosophy. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of Chaldaea and Egypt, are counted the most ancient Philosophers; and those Countreys were the most ancient of Kingdomes. Philosophy was not risen to the Graecians, and other people of the West, whose Common-wealths (no greater perhaps then Lucca, or Geneva) had never Peace, but when their fears of one another were equall; nor the Leasure to observe any thing but one another.
Leisure is the mother of philosophy, and commonwealth the mother of peace and leisure. Where great and flourishing cities first arose, there the study of philosophy first arose. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the priests of Chaldea and Egypt are counted the most ancient philosophers, and those countries were the most ancient of kingdoms. Philosophy had not arisen among the Greeks and other peoples of the West, whose commonwealths (perhaps no greater than Lucca or Geneva) never had peace except when their fears of one another were equal, nor the leisure to observe anything but one another.
At length, when Warre had united many of these Graecian lesser Cities, into fewer, and greater; then began Seven men, of severall parts of Greece, to get the reputation of being Wise; some of them for Morall and Politique Sentences; and others for the learning of the Chaldaeans and Egyptians, which was Astronomy, and Geometry. But we hear not yet of any Schools of Philosophy.
At length, when war had united many of these lesser Greek cities into fewer and larger ones, seven men from various parts of Greece began to gain the reputation of being wise—some for moral and political maxims, and others for the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, which was astronomy and geometry. But we do not yet hear of any schools of philosophy.
After the Athenians by the overthrow of the Persian Armies, had gotten the Dominion of the Sea; and thereby, of all the Islands, and Maritime Cities of the Archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home, nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says, Acts 17. 21. in telling and hearing news, or in discoursing of Philosophy publiquely to the youth of the City. Every Master took some place for that purpose.
After the Athenians, by defeating the Persian armies, had gained command of the sea, and with it of all the islands and coastal cities of the Archipelago, in Asia as well as Europe, and had grown wealthy, those who had no employment either at home or abroad had little else to occupy themselves with but either (as St. Luke says, Acts 17:21) “telling and hearing news,” or discoursing publicly on philosophy to the youth of the city. Every master took some place for that purpose.
Plato in certain publique Walks called Academia, from one Academus: Aristotle in the Walk of the Temple of Pan, called Lycaeum: others in the Stoa, or covered Walk, wherein the Merchants Goods were brought to land: others in other places; where they spent the time of their Leasure, in teaching or in disputing of their Opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of the City together to hear them talk. And this was it which Carneades also did at Rome, when he was Ambassadour: which caused Cato to advise the Senate to dispatch him quickly, for feare of corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak (as they thought) fine things.
Plato took certain public walks called the Academia, after one Academus; Aristotle the walk of the temple of Pan, called the Lyceum; others the Stoa, or covered walk, where merchants’ goods were landed; others other places, where they spent their leisure teaching or disputing their opinions; and some any place at all where they could gather the youth of the city to hear them talk. This is also what Carneades did at Rome when he was ambassador there, which led Cato to advise the Senate to send him away quickly, for fear of corrupting the manners of the young men who delighted to hear him say (as they thought) fine things.
From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed, was called Schola, which in their Tongue signifieth Leasure; and their Disputations, Diatribae, that is to say, Passing of the time. Also the Philosophers themselves had the name of their Sects, some of them from these their Schools: For they that followed Plato’s Doctrine, were called Academiques; The followers of Aristotle, Peripatetiques, from the Walk hee taught in; and those that Zeno taught, Stoiques, from the Stoa: as if we should denominate men from More-fields, from Pauls-Church, and from the Exchange, because they meet there often, to prate and loyter.
This is why the place where any of them taught and disputed was called schola, which in their language means leisure, and their disputations diatribae, that is to say, passing the time. The philosophers themselves also took the names of their sects, some of them from these schools. For those who followed Plato’s doctrine were called Academics; the followers of Aristotle Peripatetics, from the walk he taught in; and those Zeno taught Stoics, from the Stoa—as if we were to name men after Moorfields, St. Paul’s, and the Exchange, because they often meet there to chatter and loiter.
Neverthelesse, men were so much taken with this custome, that in time it spread it selfe over all Europe, and the best part of Afrique; so as there were Schools publiquely erected, and maintained for Lectures, and Disputations, almost in every Common-wealth.
Nevertheless, men were so taken with this custom that in time it spread over all Europe and most of Africa, so that there were schools publicly established and maintained for lectures and disputations in almost every commonwealth.
There were also Schools, anciently, both before, and after the time of our Saviour, amongst the Iews: but they were Schools of their Law. For though they were called Synagogues, that is to say, Congregations of the People; yet in as much as the Law was every Sabbath day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name onely from Publique Schools; and were not onely in Jerusalem, but in every City of the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a Schoole at Damascus, whereinto Paul entred, to persecute.
There were also schools in ancient times, both before and after the time of our Savior, among the Jews; but they were schools of their law. For though they were called synagogues, that is to say, congregations of the people, yet since the law was read, expounded, and disputed in them every Sabbath day, they differed from public schools in name only, not in nature. They existed not only in Jerusalem but in every city of the Gentiles where Jews lived. There was such a school at Damascus, which Paul entered in order to persecute.
There were others at Antioch, Iconium and Thessalonica, whereinto he entred, to dispute: And such was the Synagogue of the Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians, and those of Asia; that is to say, the Schoole of Libertines, and of Iewes, that were strangers in Ierusalem: And of this Schoole they were that disputed (Act. 6. 9.) with Saint Steven.
There were others at Antioch, Iconium, and Thessalonica, which he entered in order to dispute. Such too was the synagogue of the Freedmen, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians, and those of Asia—that is to say, the school of the Freedmen and of Jews who were foreigners in Jerusalem. And it was of this school that those were who disputed with St. Stephen (Acts 6:9).
But what has been the Utility of those Schools? what Science is there at this day acquired by their Readings and Disputings? That wee have of Geometry, which is the Mother of all Naturall Science, wee are not indebted for it to the Schools. Plato that was the best Philosopher of the Greeks, forbad entrance into his Schoole, to all that were not already in some measure Geometricians. There were many that studied that Science to the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their Schools; nor was there any Sect of Geometricians; nor did they then passe under the name of Philosophers.
But what has been the usefulness of those schools? What science is there today that has been acquired by their readings and disputings? What we have of geometry, which is the mother of all natural science, we do not owe to the schools. Plato, the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbade entrance to his school to all who were not already geometers to some degree. There were many who studied that science to the great advantage of mankind; but there is no mention of their schools, nor was there any sect of geometers, nor did they then go under the name of philosophers.
The naturall Philosophy of those Schools, was rather a Dream than Science, and set forth in senselesse and insignificant Language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach Philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in Geometry: For Nature worketh by Motion; the Wayes, and Degrees whereof cannot be known, without the knowledge of the Proportions and Properties of Lines, and Figures. Their Morall Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions.
The natural philosophy of those schools was more a dream than a science, and was set out in senseless and meaningless language. This cannot be avoided by those who try to teach philosophy without first having attained great knowledge of geometry. For nature works by motion, whose ways and degrees cannot be known without knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines and figures. Their moral philosophy is only a description of their own passions.
For the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature; and in it, the Law Civill; that determineth what is Honest, and Dishonest; what is Iust, and Vnjust; and generally what is Good, and Evill: whereas they make the Rules of Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and Disliking: By which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his owne eyes, to the subversion of Common-wealth. Their Loigque which should bee the Method of Reasoning, is nothing else but Captions of Words, and Inventions how to puzzle such as should goe about to pose them.
For the rule of manners, outside civil government, is the law of nature; and within it, the civil law, which determines what is honest and dishonest, what is just and unjust, and in general what is good and evil. They, by contrast, make the rules of good and bad by their own liking and disliking. By this means, amid so great a diversity of tastes, nothing is generally agreed on, but everyone does (as far as he dares) whatever seems good in his own eyes, to the subversion of the commonwealth. Their logic, which ought to be the method of reasoning, is nothing but verbal quibbles, and contrivances for puzzling anyone who tries to test them.
To conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old Philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of them maintained. And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotles Metaphysiques; nor more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques.
In short, there is nothing so absurd that some of the old philosophers have not maintained it, as Cicero says, who was one of them. And I believe that scarcely anything can be said more absurdly in natural philosophy than what is now called Aristotle’s Metaphysics; nor anything more contrary to government than much of what he said in his Politics; nor anything more ignorant than a great part of his Ethics.
The Schoole of the Jews, was originally a Schoole of the Law of Moses; who commanded (Deut. 31. 10.) that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear, and learn it: Therefore the reading of the Law (which was in use after the Captivity) every Sabbath day, ought to have had no other end, but the acquainting of the people with the Commandements which they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the Prophets.
The school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses, who commanded (Deuteronomy 31:10) that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, so that they might hear and learn it. Therefore the reading of the law every Sabbath day (which was the practice after the Captivity) ought to have had no other purpose than to acquaint the people with the commandments they were to obey, and to expound to them the writings of the prophets.
But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they corrupted the Text of the Law with their false Commentaries, and vain Traditions; and so little understood the Prophets, that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the works he did; of which the Prophets prophecyed. So that by their Lectures and Disputations in their Synagogues, they turned the Doctrine of their Law into a Phantasticall kind of Philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of God, and of Spirits; which they compounded of the Vain Philosophy and Theology of the Graecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most easily bee wrested to their purpose; and from the Fabulous Traditions of their Ancestors.
But it is plain from our Savior’s many rebukes of them that they corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries and vain traditions, and understood the prophets so little that they acknowledged neither Christ nor the works he did, which the prophets had prophesied. So by their lectures and disputations in their synagogues they turned the doctrine of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy about the incomprehensible nature of God and of spirits. They compounded it out of the vain philosophy and theology of the Greeks, mixed with their own fancies drawn from the more obscure passages of Scripture, those most easily twisted to their purpose, and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors.
The universities and separated essences
Aristotle's metaphysics in the universities produced the doctrine of essences separated from bodies.
That which is now called an Vniversity, is a Joyning together, and an Incorporation under one Government of many Publique Schools, in one and the same Town or City. In which, the principall Schools were ordained for the three Professions, that is to say, of the Romane Religion, of the Romane Law, and of the Art of Medicine. And for the study of Philosophy it hath no otherwise place, then as a handmaid to the Romane Religion: And since the Authority of Aristotle is onely current there, that study is not properly Philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on Authors,) but Aristotelity. And for Geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigide Truth.
What is now called a university is a joining together and incorporation, under one government, of many public schools in one and the same town or city. In it the principal schools were established for the three professions: Roman religion, Roman law, and the art of medicine. The study of philosophy has no place there except as a handmaid to the Roman religion. And since only the authority of Aristotle has currency there, that study is not properly philosophy (whose nature does not depend on authors) but Aristotelity. As for geometry, until very recently it had no place there at all, since it serves nothing but rigorous truth.
And if any man by the ingenuity of his owne nature, had attained to any degree of perfection therein, hee was commonly thought a Magician, and his Art Diabolicall.
And if any man had, by the ingenuity of his own nature, attained any degree of perfection in it, he was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolical.
Now to descend to the particular Tenets of Vain Philosophy, derived to the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from Blindnesse of understanding; I shall first consider their Principles. There is a certain Philosophia prima, on which all other Philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right limiting of the significations of such Appellations, or Names, as are of all others the most Universall: Which Limitations serve to avoid ambiguity, and aequivocation in Reasoning; and are commonly called Definitions; such as are the Definitions of Body, Time, Place, Matter, Forme, Essence, Subject, Substance, Accident, Power, Act, Finite, Infinite, Quantity, Quality, Motion, Action, Passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of a mans Conceptions concerning the Nature and Generation of Bodies.
Now, to come down to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, which came into the universities and from there into the Church, partly from Aristotle and partly from blindness of understanding, I will first consider their principles. There is a certain philosophia prima on which all other philosophy ought to depend. It consists chiefly in rightly limiting the meanings of those appellations, or names, that are the most universal of all. These limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning, and are commonly called definitions—such as the definitions of body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and various others necessary for explaining a man’s conceptions of the nature and generation of bodies.
The Explication (that is, the setling of the meaning) of which, and the like Terms, is commonly in the Schools called Metaphysiques; as being a part of the Philosophy of Aristotle, which hath that for title: but it is in another sense; for there it signifieth as much, as Books written, or placed after his naturall Philosophy: But the Schools take them for Books of supernaturall Philosophy: for the word Metaphysiques will bear both these senses. And indeed that which is there written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to naturall Reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to bee understood by it, must needs think it supernaturall.
The explication (that is, the settling of the meaning) of these and similar terms is commonly called metaphysics in the Schools, as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle that bears that title. But there it is in another sense: there it means books written or placed after his natural philosophy, while the Schools take them for books of supernatural philosophy; for the word metaphysics will bear both senses. And indeed what is written there is for the most part so far from being possible to understand, and so contrary to natural reason, that anyone who thinks there is anything to be understood by it must think it supernatural.
From these Metaphysiques, which are mingled with the Scripture to make Schoole Divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certaine Essences separated from Bodies, which they call Abstract Essences, and Substantiall Formes: For the Interpreting of which Iargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of Discourse, for applying my selfe to those that are.
From these metaphysics, mixed with Scripture to make School divinity, we are told that there are in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call abstract essences and substantial forms. To interpret this jargon requires somewhat more than ordinary attention here. I also ask pardon of those who are not used to this kind of discourse for addressing myself to those who are.
The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the Lovers of it Worldly men, but the Vniverse, that is, the whole masse of all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body; and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe:
The world (I mean not only the earth, which gives those who love it the name of worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body, and has the dimensions of magnitude, namely length, breadth, and depth. Every part of body is likewise body and has the same dimensions. Consequently every part of the universe is body, and what is not body is no part of the universe.
And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently no where. Nor does it follow from hence, that Spirits are nothing; for they have dimensions, and are therefore really Bodies; though that name in common Speech be given to such Bodies onely, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some degree of Opacity: But for Spirits, they call them Incorporeall; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety bee attributed to God himselfe; in whom wee consider not what Attribute expresseth best his Nature, which is Incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him.
And because the universe is all, what is no part of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere. It does not follow from this that spirits are nothing. For they have dimensions, and are therefore really bodies—though in common speech that name is given only to bodies that are visible or tangible, that is, that have some degree of opacity. Spirits, however, they call incorporeal, which is a more honorable name, and may therefore more piously be attributed to God himself. In him we consider not which attribute best expresses his nature, which is incomprehensible, but which best expresses our desire to honor him.
To know now upon what grounds they say there be Essences Abstract, or Substantiall Formes, wee are to consider what those words do properly signifie. The use of Words, is to register to our selves, and make manifest to others the Thoughts and Conceptions of our Minds.
Now, to know on what grounds they say there are abstract essences or substantial forms, we must consider what those words properly signify. The use of words is to register for ourselves, and to make manifest to others, the thoughts and conceptions of our minds.
Of which Words, some are the names of the Things conceived; as the names of all sorts of Bodies, that work upon the Senses, and leave an Impression in the Imagination: Others are the names of the Imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those Ideas, or mentall Images we have of all things wee see, or remember: And others againe are names of Names; or of different sorts of Speech: As Vniversall, Plurall, Singular, are the names of Names; and Definition, Affirmation, Negation, True, False, Syllogisme, Interrogation, Promise, Covenant, are the names of certain Forms of Speech.
Of these words, some are names of the things conceived, such as the names of all sorts of bodies that work on the senses and leave an impression in the imagination. Others are names of the imaginations themselves, that is to say, of the ideas or mental images we have of all the things we see or remember. And others again are names of names, or of different sorts of speech: thus universal, plural, singular are names of names; and definition, affirmation, negation, true, false, syllogism, interrogation, promise, covenant are names of certain forms of speech.
Others serve to shew the Consequence, or Repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, A Man is a Body, hee intendeth that the name of Body is necessarily consequent to the name of Man; as being but severall names of the same thing, Man; which Consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word Is. And as wee use the Verbe Is; so the Latines use their Verbe Est, and the Greeks their Esti through all its Declinations.
Others serve to show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another. When someone says, “A man is a body,” he means that the name body necessarily follows from the name man, as being only different names of the same thing, man; and this consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word is. And as we use the verb is, so the Latins use their verb est, and the Greeks their esti, through all its inflections.
Whether all other Nations of the world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need of it: For the placing of two names in order may serve to signifie their Consequence, if it were the custome, (for Custome is it, that give words their force,) as well as the words Is, or Bee, or Are, and the like.
Whether all the other nations of the world have a word in their various languages that corresponds to it or not, I cannot tell. But I am sure they have no need of it. For placing two names in order could serve to signify their consequence, if that were the custom (for it is custom that gives words their force), just as well as the words is, or be, or are, and the like.
And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb answerable to Est, or Is, or Bee; yet the men that used it would bee not a jot the lesse capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of Reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latines. But what then would become of these Terms, of Entity, Essence, Essentiall, Essentiality, that are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed as most commonly they are?
And if there were a language without any verb corresponding to est, or is, or be, the men who used it would be not a bit less capable of inferring, concluding, and every kind of reasoning than the Greeks and Latins were. But what then would become of these terms entity, essence, essential, essentiality, which are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applied as they most commonly are?
They are therefore no Names of Things; but Signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Consequence of one name or Attribute to another: as when we say, a Man, is, a living Body, wee mean not that the Man is one thing, the Living Body another, and the Is, or Beeing a third: but that the Man, and the Living Body, is the same thing; because the Consequence, If hee bee a Man, hee is a living Body, is a true Consequence, signified by that word Is.
They are therefore not names of things, but signs by which we make known that we conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another. When we say, “A man is a living body,” we do not mean that the man is one thing, the living body another, and the is, or being, a third; but that the man and the living body are the same thing. For the consequence “If he is a man, he is a living body” is a true consequence, signified by that word is.
Therefore, to bee a Body, to Walke, to bee Speaking, to Live, to See, and the like Infinitives; also Corporeity, Walking, Speaking, Life, Sight, and the like, that signifie just the same, are the names of Nothing; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.
Therefore to be a body, to walk, to be speaking, to live, to see, and similar infinitives, and also corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight, and the like, which signify just the same, are the names of nothing, as I have explained more fully elsewhere.
But to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of Separated Essences, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.
But what is the point (someone may say) of such subtlety in a work of this kind, where I aim at nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience? The point is this: that men may no longer let themselves be deceived by those who, with this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy of Aristotle, would frighten them from obeying the laws of their country with empty names—as men frighten birds from the grain with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.
For it is upon this ground, that when a Man is dead and buried, they say his Soule (that is his Life) can walk separated from his Body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say, that the Figure, and Colour, and Tast of a peece of Bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no Bread: And upon the same ground they say, that Faith, and Wisdome, and other Vertues are sometimes powred into a man, sometimes blown into him from Heaven; as if the Vertuous, and their Vertues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of Subjects on the Soveraign Power of their Countrey.
For it is on this ground that they say that when a man is dead and buried, his soul (that is, his life) can walk separated from his body, and is seen at night among the graves. On the same ground they say that the shape, color, and taste of a piece of bread have a being there, where they say there is no bread. And on the same ground they say that faith, wisdom, and other virtues are sometimes poured into a man and sometimes blown into him from heaven—as if the virtuous and their virtues could be separated—and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country.
For who will endeavour to obey the Laws, if he expect Obedience to be Powred or Blown into him? Or who will not obey a Priest, that can make God, rather than his Soveraign; nay than God himselfe? Or who, that is in fear of Ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the Holy Water, that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the Errors, which are brought into the Church, from the Entities, and Essences of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false Philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their Religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.
For who will make any effort to obey the laws if he expects obedience to be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest who can make God, rather than his sovereign—indeed, rather than God himself? Or who that is afraid of ghosts will not show great respect to those who can make the holy water that drives them away from him? And this will suffice as an example of the errors brought into the Church from the entities and essences of Aristotle—which perhaps he knew to be false philosophy, but wrote as something consistent with and supporting their religion, fearing the fate of Socrates.
Being once fallen into this Error of Separated Essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Forms to be reall, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them Incorporeall, without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is Corporeall; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where Circumscriptivè, but Definitivè: Which Terms being meer Words, and in this occasion insignificant, passe onely in Latine, that the vanity of them may bee concealed.
Having once fallen into this error of separated essences, they are necessarily entangled in many other absurdities that follow from it. For since they will have these forms be real, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them to be incorporeal, without any dimension of quantity, and everyone knows that place is dimension and can be filled only by what is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction: that they are not indeed anywhere circumscriptive but definitive. These terms, being mere words and in this case meaningless, pass only in Latin, so that their emptiness may be concealed.
For the Circumscription of a thing, is nothing else but the Determination, or Defining of its Place; and so both the Terms of the Distinction are the same. And in particular, of the Essence of a Man, which (they say) is his Soule, they affirm it, to be All of it in his little Finger, and All of it in every other Part (how small soever) of his Body; and yet no more Soule in the Whole Body, than in any one of those Parts. Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to beleeve, to those that will beleeve the Existence of an Incorporeall Soule, Separated from the Body.
For the circumscription of a thing is nothing but the determination, or defining, of its place; so both terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of the essence of a man, which (they say) is his soul, they affirm that all of it is in his little finger, and all of it in every other part of his body, however small; and yet that there is no more soul in the whole body than in any one of those parts. Can anyone think that God is served by such absurdities? And yet all this must be believed by those who will believe in the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated from the body.
And when they come to give account, how an Incorporeall Substance can be capable of Pain, and be tormented in the fire of Hell, or Purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can burn Soules.
And when they come to explain how an incorporeal substance can be capable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer except that it cannot be known how fire can burn souls.
Again, whereas Motion is change of Place, and Incorporeall Substances are not capable of Place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a Soule can goe hence, without the Body to Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory; and how the Ghosts of men (and I may adde of their clothes which they appear in) can walk by night in Churches, Church-yards, and other places of Sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unlesse they will say, they walke definitivè, not circumscriptivè, or spiritually, not temporally: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever.
Again, since motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they are hard put to make it seem possible how a soul can go from here, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and how the ghosts of men (and, I may add, of the clothes they appear in) can walk at night in churches, churchyards, and other burial places. I do not know what they can answer to this, unless they say they walk definitive, not circumscriptive, or spiritually, not temporally; for such egregious distinctions apply equally well to any difficulty whatever.
For the meaning of Eternity, they will not have it to be an Endlesse Succession of Time; for then they should not be able to render a reason how Gods Will, and Praeordaining of things to come, should not be before his Praescience of the same, as the Efficient Cause before the Effect, or Agent before the Action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the Incomprehensible Nature of God. But they will teach us, that Eternity is the Standing still of the Present Time, a Nunc-stans (as the Schools call it;) which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a Hic-stans for an Infinite greatnesse of Place.
As for the meaning of eternity, they will not have it be an endless succession of time. For then they could not give a reason why God’s will and preordaining of things to come should not come before his foreknowledge of them, as the efficient cause comes before the effect, or the agent before the action—nor for many other of their bold opinions about the incomprehensible nature of God. Instead they will teach us that eternity is the standing still of the present time, a nunc-stans (as the Schools call it), which neither they nor anyone else understands, any more than they would a hic-stans for an infinite greatness of place.
And whereas men divide a Body in their thought, by numbring parts of it, and in numbring those parts, number also the parts of the Place it filled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, wee make also many places of those parts; whereby there cannot bee conceived in the mind of any man, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have us beleeve, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place; as if it were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power, to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been.
Again: when men divide a body in thought by numbering its parts, in numbering those parts they also number the parts of the place it filled. So in making many parts we must also make many places for those parts, and no one can conceive in his mind more or fewer parts than there are places for them. Yet they would have us believe that, by the almighty power of God, one body may be in many places at one and the same time, and many bodies in one place at one and the same time—as if it were an acknowledgment of the divine power to say that what is, is not, or that what has been, has not been.
And these are but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing Philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine and Incomprehensible Nature; whose Attributes cannot signifie what he is, but ought to signifie our desire to honour him, with the best Appellations we can think on.
And these are only a small part of the incongruities they are driven to by disputing philosophically, instead of admiring and adoring the divine and incomprehensible nature. God’s attributes cannot signify what he is; they ought to signify our desire to honor him with the best names we can think of.
But they that venture to reason of his Nature, from these Attributes of Honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one Inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man ignorant of the Ceremonies of Court, comming into the presence of a greater Person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himselfe from falling, lets slip his Cloake; to recover his Cloake, lets fall his Hat; and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity.
But those who venture to reason about his nature from these attributes of honor lose their understanding in the very first attempt, and fall from one difficulty into another, without end and without number. It is like a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court who comes into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speaking to: he stumbles as he enters, and to save himself from falling lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak he lets fall his hat; and with one blunder after another he betrays his bewilderment and his rustic manners.
Errors of Scholastic physics
The Schools explain gravity, sense, will and other effects with empty words.
Then for Physiques, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate, and secundary causes of naturall events; they render none at all, but empty words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the Earth, and others goe naturally from it; The Schools will tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards, are Heavy; and that this Heavinesse is it that causes them to descend: But if you ask what they mean by Heavinesse, they will define it to bee an endeavour to goe to the center of the Earth: so that the cause why things sink downward, is an Endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because they doe.
Then for physics—that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events—they give no causes at all, only empty words. If you want to know why some kinds of bodies naturally sink down toward the earth and others naturally move away from it, the Schools will tell you, out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink are heavy, and that it is this heaviness that makes them descend. But if you ask what they mean by heaviness, they will define it as an endeavor to go to the center of the earth. So the cause why things sink downward is an endeavor to be below—which is as much as to say that bodies descend or ascend because they do.
Or they will tell you the center of the Earth is the place of Rest, and Conservation for Heavy things; and therefore they endeavour to be there: As if Stones, and Metalls had a desire, or could discern the place they would bee at, as Man does; or loved Rest, as Man does not; or that a peece of Glasse were lesse safe in the Window, than falling into the Street.
Or they will tell you that the center of the earth is the place of rest and preservation for heavy things, and therefore they endeavor to be there. As if stones and metals had a desire, or could discern the place they would like to be, as man does; or loved rest, as man does not; or as if a piece of glass were less safe in the window than falling into the street.
If we would know why the same Body seems greater (without adding to it) one time, than another; they say, when it seems lesse, it is Condensed; when greater, Rarefied. What is that Condensed, and Rarefied? Condensed, is when there is in the very same Matter, lesse Quantity than before; and Rarefied, when more. As if there could be Matter, that had not some determined Quantity; when Quantity is nothing else but the Determination of Matter; that is to say of Body, by which we say one Body is greater, or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much.
If we want to know why the same body seems larger at one time than at another, without anything added to it, they say that when it seems smaller it is condensed, and when larger, rarefied. What are condensed and rarefied? Condensed is when there is less quantity in the very same matter than before; rarefied, when there is more. As if there could be matter that did not have some determinate quantity—when quantity is nothing else but the determination of matter, that is to say, of body, by which we say one body is greater or smaller than another by so much or so much.
Or as if a Body were made without any Quantity at all, and that afterwards more, or lesse were put into it, according as it is intended the Body should be more, or lesse Dense.
Or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and more or less were afterward put into it, according as the body was meant to be more or less dense.
For the cause of the Soule of Man, they say, Creatur Infundendo, and Creando Infunditur: that is, It is Created by Powring it in, and Powred in by Creation.
For the cause of the soul of man, they say Creatur infundendo and Creando infunditur: that is, “It is created by being poured in,” and “It is poured in by being created.”
For the Cause of Sense, an ubiquity of Species; that is, of the Shews or Apparitions of objects; which when they be Apparitions to the Eye, is Sight; when to the Eare, Hearing; to the Palate, Tast; to the Nostrill, Smelling; and to the rest of the Body, Feeling.
For the cause of sense, they give an omnipresence of species, that is, of the shows or appearances of objects. When these are appearances to the eye, they are sight; to the ear, hearing; to the palate, taste; to the nostril, smell; and to the rest of the body, feeling.
For cause of the Will, to doe any particular action, which is called Volitio, they assign the Faculty, that is to say, the Capacity in generall, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called Voluntas; making the Power the cause of the Act: As if one should assign for cause of the good or evill Acts of men, their Ability to doe them.
For the cause of the will to do any particular action, which is called volitio, they assign the faculty—that is, the general capacity men have to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another—which is called voluntas. They make the power the cause of the act: as if one were to assign as the cause of men’s good or evil acts their ability to do them.
And in many occasions they put for cause of Naturall events, their own Ignorance; but disguised in other words: As when they say, Fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: And as when they attribute many Effects to occult qualities; that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also (as they thinke) to no Man else. And to Sympathy, Antipathy, Antiperistasis, Specificall Qualities, and other like Termes, which signifie neither the Agent that produceth them, nor the Operation by which they are produced.
And on many occasions they give their own ignorance, disguised in other words, as the cause of natural events. So when they say that fortune is the cause of contingent things—that is, of things they know no cause for. And so when they attribute many effects to occult qualities—that is, qualities not known to them, and therefore (as they think) to no one else—and to sympathy, antipathy, antiperistasis, specific qualities, and other such terms, which signify neither the agent that produces the effects nor the operation by which they are produced.
If such Metaphysiques, and Physiques as this, be not Vain Philosophy, there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.
If such metaphysics and physics as this are not vain philosophy, there never was any, and St. Paul had no need to warn us to avoid it.
Errors of moral and civil philosophy
Private measures of good, clerical celibacy, the hatred of tyranny and inquisition into consciences are attacked.
And for their Morall, and Civill Philosophy, it hath the same, or greater absurdities. If a man doe an action of Injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the Law, God they say is the prime cause of the Law, and also the prime cause of that, and all other Actions; but no cause at all of the Injustice; which is the Inconformity of the Action to the Law. This is Vain Philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man maketh both a streight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their Incongruity.
And their moral and civil philosophy has the same absurdities, or greater. If a man does an unjust action, that is, an action contrary to the law, God, they say, is the first cause of the law, and also the first cause of that action and of all other actions; but no cause at all of the injustice, which is the nonconformity of the action to the law. This is vain philosophy. One might as well say that one man makes both a straight line and a crooked one, and another man makes their disagreement.
And such is the Philosophy of all men that resolve of their Conclusions, before they know their Premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is Incomprehensible; and of Attributes of Honour to make Attributes of Nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the Doctrine of Free-Will, that is, of a Will of man, not subject to the Will of God.
And such is the philosophy of all men who settle on their conclusions before they know their premises, pretending to comprehend what is incomprehensible, and turning attributes of honor into attributes of nature. This distinction was made to uphold the doctrine of free will—that is, of a will of man not subject to the will of God.
Aristotle, and other Heathen Philosophers define Good, and Evill, by the Appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own Law: For in the condition of men that have no other Law but their own Appetites, there can be no generall Rule of Good, and Evill Actions. But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure.
Aristotle and other pagan philosophers define good and evil by the appetite of men. That is well enough so long as we consider men as each governed by his own law. For in the condition of men who have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good and evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false. The measure is not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state.
And yet is this Doctrine still practised; and men judge the Goodnesse, or Wickednesse of their own, and of other mens actions, and of the actions of the Common-wealth it selfe, by their own Passions; and no man calleth Good or Evill, but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the Publique Laws; except onely Monks, and Friers, that are bound by Vow to that simple obedience to their Superiour, to which every Subject ought to think himself bound by the Law of Nature to the Civill Soveraign. And this private measure of Good, is a Doctrine, not onely Vain, but also Pernicious to the Publique State.
And yet this doctrine is still practiced. Men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own actions, of other men’s, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own passions. No one calls anything good or evil except what is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws—except only monks and friars, who are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superior to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of good is a doctrine not only vain but also pernicious to the public state.
It is also Vain and false Philosophy, to say the work of Marriage is repugnant to Chastity, or Continence, and by consequence to make them Morall Vices; as they doe, that pretend Chastity, and Continence, for the ground of denying Marriage to the Clergy. For they confesse it is no more, but a Constitution of the Church, that requireth in those holy Orders that continually attend the Altar, and administration of the Eucharist, a continuall Abstinence from women, under the name of continuall Chastity, Continence, and Purity. Therefore they call the lawfull use of Wives, want of Chastity, and Continence; and so make Marriage a Sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render a man unfit for the Altar.
It is also vain and false philosophy to say that the act of marriage is contrary to chastity or continence, and so to make marriage a moral vice—as they do who allege chastity and continence as the ground for denying marriage to the clergy. For they admit it is no more than an ordinance of the Church, which requires of those in holy orders who continually attend the altar and administer the Eucharist a continual abstinence from women, under the name of continual chastity, continence, and purity. So they call the lawful use of wives a want of chastity and continence, and thus make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure and unclean as to make a man unfit for the altar.
If the Law were made because the use of Wives is Incontinence, and contrary to Chastity, then all Marriage is vice: If because it is a thing too impure, and unclean for a man consecrated to God; much more should other naturall, necessary, and daily works which all men doe, render men unworthy to bee, Priests, because they are more unclean.
If the law was made because the use of wives is incontinence and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice. If it was made because it is a thing too impure and unclean for a man consecrated to God, then much more should the other natural, necessary, daily functions that all men perform make men unworthy to be priests, because they are more unclean.
But the secret foundation of this prohibition of Marriage of Priests, is not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errours in Morall Philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of Matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdome of St.
But the secret foundation of this prohibition of the marriage of priests is not likely to have been laid so lightly as on such errors in moral philosophy; nor yet on the preference of the single life to the state of matrimony, which came from the wisdom of St.
Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of persecution were Preachers of the Gospel, and forced to fly from one countrey to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children; but upon the designe of the Popes, and Priests of after times, to make themselves the Clergy, that is to say, sole Heirs of the Kingdome of God in this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of Marriage, because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his Kingdome the Children of God shall neither Marry, nor bee given in Marriage, but shall bee as the Angels in heaven; that is to say, Spirituall.
Paul, who saw how inconvenient it was for those who, in those times of persecution, were preachers of the Gospel and forced to flee from one country to another, to be burdened with the care of wife and children. It was laid rather on the design of the popes and priests of later times to make themselves the clergy—that is to say, the sole heirs of the Kingdom of God in this world. For this it was necessary to take from them the use of marriage, because our Savior says that at the coming of his kingdom the children of God “shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven”—that is to say, spiritual.
Seeing then they had taken on them the name of Spirituall, to have allowed themselves (when there was no need) the propriety of Wives, had been an Incongruity.
Since, then, they had taken on themselves the name of spiritual, it would have been an inconsistency to allow themselves (when there was no need) the possession of wives.
From Aristotles Civill Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Common-wealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens,) Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants; and the Aristocracy of the thirty Governours set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued them, the thirty Tyrants: As also to call the condition of the people under the Democracy, Liberty. A Tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a Monarch: But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signifie, not onely the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the Popular States bare towards it: As also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the Kings in Rome, as being a thing naturall to all men, to conceive some great Fault to be signified in any Attribute, that is given in despight, and to a great Enemy.
From Aristotle’s civil philosophy they have learned to call every kind of commonwealth except the popular one (such as the state of Athens was at that time) tyranny. The Athenians called all kings tyrants, and they called the aristocracy of the thirty governors set up there by the Spartans who conquered them “the Thirty Tyrants.” They have learned too to call the condition of the people under democracy liberty. A tyrant originally signified simply a monarch, and nothing more. But afterward, when that kind of government had been abolished in most parts of Greece, the name began to signify not only what it had before, but along with it the hatred that the popular states bore toward it—just as the name of king became odious in Rome after the kings were deposed. For it is natural to all men to conceive some great fault to be signified in any name that is given in spite, and to a great enemy.
And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the Democracy, or Aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgracefull names to expresse their anger in; but call readily the one Anarchy, and the other, Oligarchy, or the Tyranny of a Few. And that which offendeth the People, is no other thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would himselfe, but as the Publique Representant, be it one Man, or an Assembly of men thinks fit; that is, by an Arbitrary government: for which they give evill names to their Superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a Civill warre) that without such Arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall; and that it is Men, and Arms, not Words, and Promises, that make the Force and Power of the Laws.
And when the same men are displeased with those who administer a democracy or an aristocracy, they need not look far for insulting names to express their anger in; they readily call the one anarchy and the other oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few. And what offends the people is nothing else than that they are governed, not as each of them would himself wish, but as the public representative—be it one man or an assembly of men—thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government. For this they give their superiors evil names, never knowing (until perhaps a little after a civil war) that without such arbitrary government such war must be perpetual, and that it is men and arms, not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws.
And therefore this is another Errour of Aristotles Politiques, that in a wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men should govern, but the Laws. What man, that has his naturall Senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and beleeves can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? or that beleeves the Law can hurt him; that is, Words, and Paper, without the Hands, and Swords of men?
And therefore this is another error of Aristotle’s Politics: that in a well-ordered commonwealth not men should govern, but the laws. What man with his natural senses, even if he can neither read nor write, does not find himself governed by those he fears and believes can kill or hurt him if he does not obey? Or who believes the law can hurt him—that is, words and paper, without the hands and swords of men?
And this is of the number of pernicious Errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their Governours, to adhaere to those that call them Tyrants, and to think it lawfull to raise warre against them: And yet they are many times cherished from the Pulpit, by the Clergy.
And this is one of the pernicious errors. For such errors lead men, as often as they dislike their governors, to side with those who call them tyrants, and to think it lawful to make war against them. And yet they are often fostered from the pulpit by the clergy.
There is another Errour in their Civill Philosophy (which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the Heathen,) to extend the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of what they Hold, notwithstanding the Conformity of their Speech and Actions: By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment.
There is another error in their civil philosophy (which they never learned from Aristotle, or Cicero, or any other of the pagans): extending the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination and inquisition into what they hold, even though their speech and actions conform. By this men are either punished for answering truthfully what they think, or forced to answer an untruth for fear of punishment.
It is true, that the Civill Magistrate, intending to employ a Minister in the charge of Teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to Preach such, and such Doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the employment: But to force him to accuse himselfe of Opinions, when his Actions are not by Law forbidden, is against the Law of Nature; and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith.
It is true that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may ask him whether he is content to preach such and such doctrines, and if he refuses, may deny him the employment. But to force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions are not forbidden by law, is against the law of nature—and especially so for those who teach that a man shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments if he dies in a false opinion concerning an article of the Christian faith.
For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the naturall care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?
For who is there who, knowing there is so great a danger in an error, is not compelled by the natural care of himself to risk his soul on his own judgment, rather than on that of any other man who is unconcerned in his damnation?
For a Private man, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, that is to say, without permission from the Representant thereof, to Interpret the Law by his own Spirit, is another Error in the Politiques; but not drawn from Aristotle, nor from any other of the Heathen Philosophers. For none of them deny, but that in the Power of making Laws, is comprehended also the Power of Explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are Law, made Law by the Authority of the Common-wealth, and consequently, a part of the Civill Law?
That a private man, without the authority of the commonwealth—that is to say, without permission from its representative—may interpret the law by his own spirit is another error in politics, but not one drawn from Aristotle or any other of the pagan philosophers. For none of them denies that the power of making laws includes also the power of explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority of the commonwealth, and consequently a part of the civil law?
Of the same kind it is also, when any but the Soveraign restraineth in any man that power which the Common-wealth hath not restrained; as they do, that impropriate the Preaching of the Gospell to one certain Order of men, where the Laws have left it free. If the State give me leave to preach, or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If I find my selfe amongst the Idolaters of America, shall I that am a Christian, though not in Orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received Orders from Rome?
Of the same kind is it when anyone but the sovereign restrains in any man a power that the commonwealth has not restrained—as those do who reserve the preaching of the Gospel to one particular order of men, where the laws have left it free. If the state gives me leave to preach or teach—that is, if it does not forbid me—no one can forbid me. If I find myself among the idol-worshipping peoples of America, shall I, a Christian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ until I have received orders from Rome?
or when I have preached, shall not I answer their doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is, shall I not Teach? But for this may some say, as also for administring to them the Sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient Mission; which is true: But this is true also, that for whatsoever, a dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation, when there is no Law that forbids it. Therefore to deny these Functions to those, to whom the Civill Soveraigne hath not denyed them, is a taking away of a lawfull Liberty, which is contrary to the Doctrine of Civill Government.
Or when I have preached, shall I not answer their doubts and expound the Scriptures to them—that is, shall I not teach? Someone may say that for this, as also for administering the sacraments to them, the necessity will be counted a sufficient commission. That is true. But this is true also: whatever a dispensation is due for on account of necessity, for that same thing no dispensation is needed when there is no law forbidding it. Therefore to deny these functions to those to whom the civil sovereign has not denied them is to take away a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the doctrine of civil government.
More examples of Vain Philosophy, brought into Religion by the Doctors of Schoole-Divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. I shall onely adde this, that the Writings of Schoole-Divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant Traines of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, then in the common use of the Latine tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and Varro, and all the Grammarians of ancient Rome.
More examples of vain philosophy brought into religion by the doctors of school divinity might be given, but others may, if they please, observe them for themselves. I shall only add this: that the writings of the school divines are for the most part nothing but meaningless strings of strange and barbarous words, or of words used otherwise than in the common use of the Latin tongue—such as would baffle Cicero, and Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome.
Which if any man would see proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he can translate any Schoole-Divine into any of the Modern tongues, as French, English, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of these be made Intelligible, is not Intelligible in the Latine. Which Insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false Philosophy; yet it hath a quality, not onely to hide the Truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.
If anyone wants to see this proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he can translate any school divine into any of the modern languages, such as French, English, or any other rich language. For what cannot be made intelligible in most of these is not intelligible in the Latin. This meaninglessness of language, though I cannot mark it down as false philosophy, has nevertheless the property not only of hiding the truth, but also of making men think they have it, so that they give up further search.
False history and suppressed truth
Legends of miracles and ghosts are dismissed, and churchmen's punishment of true philosophy is condemned.
Lastly, for the Errors brought in from false, or uncertain History, what is all the Legend of fictitious Miracles, in the lives of the Saints; and all the Histories of Apparitions, and Ghosts, alledged by the Doctors of the Romane Church, to make good their Doctrines of Hell, and Purgatory, the power of Exorcisme, and other Doctrines which have no warrant, neither in Reason, nor Scripture; as also all those Traditions which they call the unwritten Word of God; but old Wives Fables?
Lastly, as for the errors brought in from false or uncertain history: what is all the legend of fictitious miracles in the lives of the saints, and all the histories of apparitions and ghosts cited by the doctors of the Roman Church to support their doctrines of hell and purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines that have no warrant in either reason or Scripture—as also all those traditions they call the unwritten Word of God—but old wives’ tales?
Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the Writings of the ancient Fathers; yet those Fathers were men, that might too easily beleeve false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they beleeved, hath no other force with them that (according to the Counsell of St. Iohn 1 Epist. chap. 4. verse 1.)
Some of these, indeed, they find scattered in the writings of the ancient Fathers. But those Fathers were men who might too easily believe false reports. And producing their opinions as testimony for the truth of what they believed has no other force with those who, following the counsel of St. John,
examine Spirits, than in all things that concern the power of the Romane Church, (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it,) to discredit their testimony, in respect of too rash beleef of reports; which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of naturall causes, (such as the Fathers were) are commonly the most subject to: For naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope, and S. Bernard have somewhat of Apparitions of Ghosts, that said they were in Purgatory; and so has our Beda: but no where, I beleeve, but by report from others.
(1 John 4:1) test the spirits, than—in everything that concerns the power of the Roman Church (whose abuse the Fathers either did not suspect or profited from)—to discredit their testimony, on account of their too hasty belief of reports. The most sincere men, without great knowledge of natural causes (as the Fathers were), are commonly the most subject to that. For naturally the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Pope Gregory and St. Bernard have something about apparitions of ghosts who said they were in purgatory, and so has our Bede—but nowhere, I believe, except by report from others.
But if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own Infirmity, or Fraud.
But if they, or anyone else, relate such stories from their own knowledge, they will not thereby confirm such vain reports the more, but only reveal their own weakness, or fraud.
With the Introduction of False, we may joyn also the suppression of True Philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawfull authority, nor sufficient study, are competent Judges of the truth. Our own Navigations make manifest, and all men learned in humane Sciences, now acknowledge there are Antipodes: And every day it appeareth more and more, that Years, and Dayes are determined by Motions of the Earth. Neverthelesse, men that have in their Writings but supposed such Doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by, Authority Ecclesiasticall. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true Religion? that cannot be, if they be true.
Together with the introduction of false philosophy we may also consider the suppression of true philosophy, by men who are competent judges of the truth neither by lawful authority nor by sufficient study. Our own voyages make it plain, and all men learned in human sciences now acknowledge, that there are antipodes. And every day it appears more and more that years and days are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men who in their writings have merely supposed such a doctrine, as an occasion to set out the reasons for and against it, have been punished for it by ecclesiastical authority. But what reason is there for that? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they are true.
Let therefore the truth be first examined by competent Judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they be contrary to the Religion established? Let them be silenced by the Laws of those, to whom the Teachers of them are subject; that is, by the Laws Civill: For disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that against the Laws teach even true Philosophy. Is it because they tend to disorder in Government, as countenancing Rebellion, or Sedition? then let them be silenced, and the Teachers punished by vertue of his Power to whom the care of the Publique quiet is committed; which is the Authority Civill.
Then let the truth first be examined by competent judges, or refuted by those who claim to know the contrary. Is it because they are contrary to the established religion? Then let them be silenced by the laws of those to whom their teachers are subject—that is, by the civil laws. For disobedience may lawfully be punished in those who teach even true philosophy against the laws. Is it because they tend to disorder in government, by encouraging rebellion or sedition? Then let them be silenced, and their teachers punished, by virtue of the power of him to whom the care of public peace is committed, which is the civil authority.
For whatsoever Power Ecclesiastiques take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the State,) in their own Right, though they call it Gods Right, is but Usurpation.
For whatever power churchmen take upon themselves in their own right (in any place where they are subject to the state), though they call it God’s right, is nothing but usurpation.
Chapter 47: Of the benefit that proceeds from such darkness, and to whom it accrues
Asking cui bono, Hobbes finds the papacy and Presbyterian clergy profit from these doctrines.
Cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe Judge amongst the Romans, for a custome he had, in Criminall causes, (when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient,) to ask the Accusers, Cuibono; that is to say, what Profit, Honor, or other Contentment, the accused obtained, or expected by the Fact. For amongst Praesumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the Author, as doth the BENEFIT of the Action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine, who they may be, that have possessed the People so long in this part of Christendome, with these Doctrines, contrary to the Peaceable Societies of Mankind.
Cicero makes honorable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge among the Romans, for a custom he had in criminal cases, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, of asking the accusers cui bono—that is to say, what profit, honor, or other satisfaction the accused had obtained or expected from the deed. For among presumptions there is none that so plainly reveals the author as the benefit of the action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine who they may be who have for so long possessed the people in this part of Christendom with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind.
And first, to this Error, that the present Church now Militant on Earth, is the Kingdome of God, (that is, the Kingdome of Glory, or the Land of Promise; not the Kingdome of Grace, which is but a Promise of the Land,) are annexed these worldly Benefits; First, that the Pastors, and Teachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as Gods Publique Ministers, to a Right of Governing the Church; and consequently (because the Church, and Common-wealth are the same Persons) to be Rectors, and Governours of the Common-wealth.
And first, to this error—that the present Church now militant on earth is the Kingdom of God (that is, the Kingdom of Glory, or the Land of Promise; not the Kingdom of Grace, which is only a promise of the land)—these worldly benefits are attached. First, that the pastors and teachers of the Church are entitled by it, as God’s public ministers, to a right of governing the Church; and consequently (because the Church and the commonwealth are the same persons) to be rulers and governors of the commonwealth.
By this title it is, that the Pope prevailed with the subjects of all Christian Princes, to beleeve, that to disobey him, was to disobey Christ himselfe; and in all differences between him and other Princes, (charmed with the word Power Spirituall,) to abandon their lawfull Soveraigns; which is in effect an universall Monarchy over all Christendome.
It is by this title that the Pope prevailed on the subjects of all Christian princes to believe that to disobey him was to disobey Christ himself, and, in all disputes between him and other princes, to abandon their lawful sovereigns, bewitched by the words spiritual power—which is in effect a universal monarchy over all Christendom.
For though they were first invested in the right of being Supreme Teachers of Christian Doctrine, by, and under Christian Emperors, within the limits of the Romane Empire (as is acknowledged by themselves) by the title of Pontifex Maximus, who was an Officer subject to the Civill State; yet after the Empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to them, another Title, namely, the Right of St. Peter; not onely to save entire their pretended Power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian Provinces, though no more united in the Empire of Rome.
For although the popes were first invested with the right of being supreme teachers of Christian doctrine by and under Christian emperors, within the limits of the Roman Empire (as they themselves acknowledge), under the title of pontifex maximus, who was an officer subject to the civil state, yet after the empire was divided and dissolved it was not hard to impose on the people already subject to them another title, namely the right of St. Peter. They did so not only to keep their pretended power whole, but also to extend it over the same Christian provinces, though these were no longer united in the empire of Rome.
This Benefit of an Universall Monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear Rule) is a sufficient Presumption, that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the Authors of the Doctrine, by which it was obtained; namely, that the Church now on Earth, is the Kingdome of Christ. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some Lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his Commandements.
This benefit of a universal monarchy (considering men’s desire to rule) is sufficient presumption that the popes who laid claim to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine by which it was obtained: namely, that the Church now on earth is the Kingdom of Christ. For once that is granted, it must be understood that Christ has some lieutenant among us, by whom we are to be told what his commandments are.
After that certain Churches had renounced this universall Power of the Pope, one would expect in reason, that the Civill Soveraigns in all those Churches, should have recovered so much of it, as (before they had unadvisedly let it goe) was their own Right, and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the Kings administred the Government of Religion, by maintaining their imployment to be in Gods Right, seemed to usurp, if not a Supremacy, yet an Independency on the Civill Power: and they but seemed to usurpe it, in as much as they acknowledged a Right in the King, to deprive them of the Exercise of their Functions at his pleasure.
After certain churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one would reasonably expect the civil sovereigns in all those churches to have recovered as much of it as had been their own right and in their own hands before they unwisely let it go. And in England this was in effect the case—except that those through whom the kings administered the government of religion, by maintaining that their office was held by God’s right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, at least an independence of the civil power. And they only seemed to usurp it, inasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king to deprive them of the exercise of their functions at his pleasure.
But in those places where the Presbytery took that Office, though many other Doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet this Doctrine, that the Kingdome of Christ is already come, and that it began at the Resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But cui bono? What Profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes expected: to have a Soveraign Power over the People. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful King, but to keep him from all places of Gods publique Service in his own Kingdom? and with force to resist him, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them?
But in those places where the Presbytery took over that office, though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught, this doctrine was still kept: that the Kingdom of Christ has already come, and that it began at the resurrection of our Savior. But cui bono? What profit did they expect from it? The same that the popes expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from every place of God’s public worship in his own kingdom, and to resist him by force when he by force tries to correct them?
Or what is it, without Authority from the Civill Soveraign, to excommunicate any person, but to take from him his Lawfull Liberty, that is, to usurpe an unlawfull Power over their Brethren? The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy.
Or what is it to excommunicate any person without authority from the civil sovereign, but to take from him his lawful liberty—that is, to usurp an unlawful power over their brethren? The authors, therefore, of this darkness in religion are the Roman and the Presbyterian clergy.
To this head, I referre also all those Doctrines, that serve them to keep the possession of this spirituall Soveraignty after it is gotten. As first, that the Pope in his publique capacity cannot erre. For who is there, that beleeving this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatsoever he commands?
Under this head I also place all the doctrines that serve them to keep possession of this spiritual sovereignty once it is gained. First, that the Pope in his public capacity cannot err. For who is there that, believing this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatever he commands?
Secondly, that all other Bishops, in what Common-wealth soever, have not their Right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their Civill Soveraigns, but from the Pope, is a Doctrine, by which there comes to be in every Christian Common-wealth many potent men, (for so are Bishops,) that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to him, though he be a forraign Prince; by which means he is able, (as he hath done many times) to raise a Civill War against the State that submits not it self to be governed according to his pleasure and Interest.
Second, that all other bishops, in whatever commonwealth, have their right neither immediately from God nor mediately from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope. By this doctrine there come to be in every Christian commonwealth many powerful men (for bishops are such) who depend on the Pope and owe him obedience, though he is a foreign prince. By this means he is able (as he has done many times) to stir up a civil war against any state that does not submit to being governed according to his pleasure and interest.
Thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other Priests, and of all Monkes, and Fryers, from the Power of the Civill Laws. For by this means, there is a great part of every Common-wealth, that enjoy the benefit of the Laws, and are protected by the Power of the Civill State, which neverthelesse pay no part of the Publique expence; nor are lyable to the penalties, as other Subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently, stand not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him onely, to uphold his universall Monarchy.
Third, the exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all monks and friars, from the power of the civil laws. For by this means there is a great part of every commonwealth that enjoys the benefit of the laws and is protected by the power of the civil state, yet pays no part of the public expense, and is not liable, as other subjects are, to the penalties due to its crimes. Consequently they stand in fear of no one but the Pope, and adhere to him alone, to uphold his universal monarchy.
Fourthly, the giving to their Priests (which is no more in the New Testament but Presbyters, that is, Elders) the name of Sacerdotes, that is, Sacrificers, which was the title of the Civill Soveraign, and his publique Ministers, amongst the Jews, whilest God was their King. Also, the making the Lords Supper a Sacrifice, serveth to make the People beleeve the Pope hath the same power over all Christians, that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews; that is to say, all Power, both Civill and Ecclesiasticall, as the High Priest then had.
Fourth, giving their priests (who in the New Testament are no more than presbyters, that is, elders) the name of sacerdotes, that is, sacrificers—which was the title of the civil sovereign and his public ministers among the Jews while God was their king. Also, making the Lord’s Supper a sacrifice serves to make the people believe that the Pope has the same power over all Christians that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews—that is to say, all power, both civil and ecclesiastical, as the high priest then had.
Fiftly, the teaching that Matrimony is a Sacrament, giveth to the Clergy the Judging of the lawfulnesse of Marriages; and thereby, of what Children are Legitimate; and consequently, of the Right of Succession to haereditary Kingdomes.
Fifth, teaching that matrimony is a sacrament gives the clergy the judging of the lawfulness of marriages, and thereby of which children are legitimate, and consequently of the right of succession to hereditary kingdoms.
Sixtly, the Deniall of Marriage to Priests, serveth to assure this Power of the Pope over Kings. For if a King be a Priest, he cannot Marry, and transmit his Kingdome to his Posterity; If he be not a Priest then the Pope pretendeth this Authority Ecclesiasticall over him, and over his people.
Sixth, the denial of marriage to priests serves to secure this power of the Pope over kings. For if a king is a priest, he cannot marry and pass his kingdom on to his descendants; if he is not a priest, then the Pope claims this ecclesiastical authority over him and over his people.
Seventhly, from Auricular Confession, they obtain, for the assurance of their Power, better intelligence of the designs of Princes, and great persons in the Civill State, than these can have of the designs of the State Ecclesiasticall.
Seventh, from auricular confession they obtain, for the security of their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes and great persons in the civil state than these can have of the designs of the ecclesiastical state.
Eighthly, by the Canonization of Saints, and declaring who are Martyrs, they assure their Power, in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the Laws and Commands of their Civill Soveraigns even to death, if by the Popes excommunication, they be declared Heretiques or Enemies to the Church; that is, (as they interpret it,) to the Pope.
Eighth, by the canonization of saints and the declaring of who are martyrs, they secure their power: for they lead simple men into obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns, even to death, if by the Pope’s excommunication those sovereigns are declared heretics or enemies to the Church—that is (as they interpret it), to the Pope.
Ninthly, they assure the same, by the Power they ascribe to every Priest, of making Christ; and by the Power of ordaining Pennance; and of Remitting, and Retaining of sins.
Ninth, they secure the same by the power they ascribe to every priest of making Christ, and by the power of ordaining penance, and of remitting and retaining sins.
Tenthly, by the Doctrine of Purgatory, of Justification by externall works, and of Indulgences, the Clergy is enriched.
Tenth, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external works, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched.
Eleventhly, by their Daemonology, and the use of Exorcisme, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep (or thinke they keep) the People more in awe of their Power.
Eleventh, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other things belonging to it, they keep (or think they keep) the people more in awe of their power.
Lastly, the Metaphysiques, Ethiques, and Politiques of Aristotle, the frivolous Distinctions, barbarous Terms, and obscure Language of the Schoolmen, taught in the Universities, (which have been all erected and regulated by the Popes Authority,) serve them to keep these Errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the Ignis fatuus of Vain Philosophy, for the Light of the Gospell.
Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, and the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the Schoolmen, taught in the universities (which have all been founded and regulated by the Pope’s authority), serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the ignis fatuus of vain philosophy for the light of the Gospel.
To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark Doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up of an unlawfull Power over the lawfull Soveraigns of Christian People; or for the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly Riches, Honour, and Authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule, of Cui bono, we may justly pronounce for the Authors of all this Spirituall Darknesse, the Pope, and Roman Clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the mindes of men this erroneous Doctrine, that the Church now on Earth, is that Kingdome of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament.
To these, if they were not enough, might be added others of their dark doctrines, whose profit plainly goes toward setting up an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people, or toward sustaining it once it is set up, or toward the worldly riches, honor, and authority of those who sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule of cui bono, we may justly declare the authors of all this spiritual darkness to be the Pope and the Roman clergy, and besides them all those who try to settle in men’s minds this erroneous doctrine: that the Church now on earth is that Kingdom of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament.
But the Emperours, and other Christian Soveraigns, under whose Government these Errours, and the like encroachments of Ecclesiastiques upon their Office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and of the tranquillity of their Subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the Sequel, and of insight into the designs of their Teachers, may neverthelesse bee esteemed accessaries to their own, and the Publique dammage: For without their Authority there could at first no seditious Doctrine have been publiquely preached.
But the emperors and other Christian sovereigns under whose government these errors, and similar encroachments of churchmen on their office, first crept in—to the disturbance of their possessions and of the tranquility of their subjects—though they suffered it for want of foresight of what would follow and of insight into the designs of their teachers, may nevertheless be counted accessories to their own injury and the public harm. For without their authority no seditious doctrine could at first have been publicly preached.
I say they might have hindred the same in the beginning: But when the people were once possessed by those spirituall men, there was no humane remedy to be applyed, that any man could invent: And for the remedies that God should provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the Machinations of men against the Truth, wee are to attend his good pleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence thereof openeth the eyes, which the warinesse of their predecessours had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let goe all, as Peters net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of Fishes; whereas the Impatience of those, that strive to resist such encroachment, before their Subjects eyes were opened, did but encrease the power they resisted.
I say they might have prevented it at the beginning. But once the people were possessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy that anyone could devise. And as for the remedies that God should provide—who never fails in his own good time to destroy all the schemes of men against the truth—we must wait on his good pleasure. He often allows the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height that its very violence opens the eyes which the caution of their predecessors had sealed up before, and makes men let go of everything by grasping too much—as Peter’s net was broken by the struggling of too great a multitude of fish. Whereas the impatience of those who try to resist such encroachment before their subjects’ eyes are opened only increases the power they resist.
I doe not therefore blame the Emperour Frederick for holding the stirrop to our countryman Pope Adrian; for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if hee had not done it, hee was not likely to have succeeded in the Empire: But I blame those, that in the beginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such Doctrines to be forged in the Universities of their own Dominions, have holden the Stirrop to all the succeeding Popes, whilest they mounted into the Thrones of all Christian Soveraigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and their people, at their pleasure.
I do not therefore blame the Emperor Frederick for holding the stirrup for our countryman Pope Adrian. For such was the disposition of his subjects then that, if he had not done it, he was not likely to have succeeded to the empire. But I blame those who in the beginning, when their power was whole, by allowing such doctrines to be forged in the universities of their own dominions, have held the stirrup for all the succeeding popes, while they mounted into the thrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride and tire out both them and their people at their pleasure.
The knots of ecclesiastical power untied
Church power was tied in three knots and has been untied in England in reverse order.
But as the Inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the order is inverted: The web begins at the first Elements of Power, which are Wisdom, Humility, Sincerity, and other vertues of the Apostles, whom the people converted, obeyed, out of Reverence, not by Obligation: Their Consciences were free, and their Words and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power.
But as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they unraveled: the way is the same, but the order is reversed. The web begins at the first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and the other virtues of the apostles, whom the people they converted obeyed out of reverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their words and actions were subject to no one but the civil power.
Afterwards the Presbyters (as the Flocks of Christ encreased) assembling to consider what they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing against the Decrees of their Assemblies, made it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their Doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called Excommunication,) not as being Infidels, but as being disobedient: And this was the first knot upon their Liberty. And the number of Presbyters encreasing, the Presbyters of the chief City or Province, got themselves an authority over the Parochiall Presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of Bishops: And this was a second knot on Christian Liberty.
Afterward, as the flocks of Christ increased, the presbyters assembled to consider what they should teach, and so bound themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of their assemblies. They made it thought that the people were thereby bound to follow their doctrine; and when the people refused, they refused to keep company with them (this was then called excommunication), not as unbelievers but as disobedient. And this was the first knot upon their liberty. And as the number of presbyters increased, the presbyters of the chief city or province got themselves an authority over the parish presbyters, and took for themselves the name of bishops. And this was a second knot on Christian liberty.
Lastly, the Bishop of Rome, in regard of the Imperiall City, took upon him an Authority (partly by the wills of the Emperours themselves, and by the title of Pontifex Maximus, and at last when the Emperours were grown weak, by the priviledges of St. Peter) over all other Bishops of the Empire: Which was the third and last knot, and the whole Synthesis and Construction of the Pontificiall Power.
Lastly, the Bishop of Rome, on account of the imperial city, took on himself an authority over all the other bishops of the empire—partly by the will of the emperors themselves and by the title of pontifex maximus, and at last, when the emperors had grown weak, by the privileges of St. Peter. This was the third and last knot, and the whole synthesis and construction of the papal power.
And therefore the Analysis, or Resolution is by the same way; but beginneth with the knot that was last tyed; as wee may see in the dissolution of the praeterpoliticall Church Government in England. First, the Power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth; and the Bishops, who before exercised their Functions in Right of the Pope, did afterwards exercise the same in Right of the Queen and her Successours; though by retaining the phrase of Iure Divino, they were thought to demand it by immediate Right from God: And so was untyed the first knot.
And therefore the analysis, or resolution, goes the same way, but begins with the knot that was tied last, as we may see in the dissolution of the extra-political church government in England. First, the power of the popes was dissolved entirely by Queen Elizabeth; and the bishops, who before had exercised their functions by right of the Pope, afterward exercised them by right of the queen and her successors—though by keeping the phrase jure divino they were thought to claim them by immediate right from God. And so the first knot was untied.
After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting down of Episcopacy: And so was the second knot dissolved: And almost at the same time, the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians: And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best:
After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the abolition of episcopacy; and so the second knot was undone. And almost at the same time the power was taken from the Presbyterians as well. And so we are brought back to the independency of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he likes best. Which, if it is without contention, and without measuring the doctrine of Christ by our affection for the person of his minister (the fault the Apostle rebuked in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best:
First, because there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it selfe, working Faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase: and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile.
first, because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men but that of the Word itself, working faith in each one, not always according to the purpose of those who plant and water, but of God himself, who gives the increase; and second, because it is unreasonable for those who teach that there is such danger in every little error to require a man endowed with reason of his own to follow the reason of any other man, or the majority vote of many other men. That is little better than staking his salvation on the toss of a coin.
Nor ought those Teachers to be displeased with this losse of their antient Authority: For there is none should know better then they, that power is preserved by the same Vertues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by Wisdome, Humility, Clearnesse of Doctrine, and sincerity of Conversation; and not by suppression of the Naturall Sciences, and of the Morality of Naturall Reason; nor by obscure Language; nor by Arrogating to themselves more Knowledge than they make appear; nor by Pious Frauds; nor by such other faults, as in the Pastors of Gods Church are not only Faults, but also scandalls, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their Authority.
Nor ought those teachers to be displeased at this loss of their ancient authority. For no one should know better than they that power is preserved by the same virtues by which it is acquired—that is to say, by wisdom, humility, clarity of doctrine, and sincerity of conduct; and not by suppressing the natural sciences and the morality of natural reason; nor by obscure language; nor by claiming more knowledge than they show; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other faults as in the pastors of God’s Church are not only faults but also scandals, apt to make men stumble one time or another into the suppression of their authority.
The papacy and the kingdom of fairies
The papacy is compared point by point to the fairies of English folk tales.
But after this Doctrine, that the Church now Militant, is the Kingdome of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament, was received in the World; the ambition, and canvasing for the Offices that belong thereunto, and especially for that great Office of being Christs Lieutenant, and the Pompe of them that obtained therein the principall Publique Charges, became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward Reverence due to the Pastorall Function: in so much as the Wisest men, of them that had any power in the Civill State, needed nothing but the authority of their Princes, to deny them any further Obedience.
But after this doctrine—that the Church now militant is the Kingdom of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament—was received in the world, the ambition and canvassing for the offices belonging to it, and especially for that great office of being Christ’s lieutenant, and the pomp of those who obtained the principal public posts in it, became by degrees so evident that the clergy lost the inward reverence due to the pastoral office. So much so that the wisest of those who had any power in the civil state needed nothing but the authority of their princes to refuse them any further obedience.
For, from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for Bishop Universall, by pretence of Succession to St. Peter, their whole Hierarchy, or Kingdome of Darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the Kingdome of Fairies; that is, to the old wives Fables in England, concerning Ghosts and Spirits, and the feats they play in the night. And if a man consider the originall of this great Ecclesiasticall Dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy, is no other, than the Ghost of the deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: For so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power.
For from the time that the Bishop of Rome had got himself acknowledged as universal bishop, on the pretense of succession to St. Peter, their whole hierarchy, or kingdom of darkness, may not unfitly be compared to the kingdom of fairies—that is, to the old wives’ tales in England about ghosts and spirits and the tricks they play in the night. And if a man considers the origin of this great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily see that the papacy is nothing other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof. For so did the papacy start up suddenly out of the ruins of that pagan power.
The Language also, which they use, both in the Churches, and in their Publique Acts, being Latine, which is not commonly used by any Nation now in the world, what is it but the Ghost of the Old Romane Language?
The language, too, which they use both in the churches and in their public acts, is Latin, which is not commonly used by any nation now in the world. What is it but the ghost of the old Roman language?
The Fairies in what Nation soever they converse, have but one Universall King, which some Poets of ours call King Oberon; but the Scripture calls Beelzebub, Prince of Daemons. The Ecclesiastiques likewise, in whose Dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one Universall King, the Pope.
The fairies, in whatever nation they live, have only one universal king, whom some of our poets call King Oberon; but Scripture calls him Beelzebub, prince of demons. The churchmen likewise, in whosever dominions they are found, acknowledge only one universal king, the Pope.
The Ecclesiastiques are Spirituall men, and Ghostly Fathers. The Fairies are Spirits, and Ghosts. Fairies and Ghosts inhabite Darknesse, Solitudes, and Graves. The Ecclesiastiques walke in Obscurity of Doctrine, in Monasteries, Churches, and Church-yards.
The churchmen are spiritual men and ghostly fathers. The fairies are spirits and ghosts. Fairies and ghosts inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves. The churchmen walk in obscurity of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and churchyards.
The Ecclesiastiques have their Cathedrall Churches; which, in what Towne soever they be erected, by vertue of Holy Water, and certain Charmes called Exorcismes, have the power to make those Townes, Cities, that is to say, Seats of Empire. The Fairies also have their enchanted Castles, and certain Gigantique Ghosts, that domineer over the Regions round about them.
The churchmen have their cathedral churches, which, in whatever town they are built, have the power, by virtue of holy water and certain charms called exorcisms, to make those towns cities, that is to say, seats of empire. The fairies also have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantic ghosts that lord it over the regions round about them.
The Fairies are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the hurt they do. So also the Ecclesiastiques vanish away from the Tribunals of Civill Justice.
The fairies cannot be seized and brought to answer for the harm they do. So too the churchmen vanish away from the tribunals of civil justice.
The Ecclesiastiques take from young men, the use of Reason, by certain Charms compounded of Metaphysiques, and Miracles, and Traditions, and Abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute what they command them. The Fairies likewise are said to take young Children out of their Cradles, and to change them into [intellectually disabled children], which Common people do therefore call Elves, and are apt to mischief.
The churchmen take from young men the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions, and abused Scripture, so that they are good for nothing but to carry out what they are commanded. The fairies likewise are said to take young children out of their cradles and change them into children with intellectual disabilities, whom common people therefore call elves, and who are apt to mischief.
In what Shop, or Operatory the Fairies make their Enchantment, the old Wives have not determined. But the Operatories of the Clergy, are well enough known to be the Universities, that received their Discipline from Authority Pontificiall.
In what shop or workshop the fairies make their enchantment, the old wives have not determined. But the workshops of the clergy are well enough known to be the universities, which received their discipline from papal authority.
When the Fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send their Elves, to pinch them. The Ecclesiastiques, when they are displeased with any Civill State, make also their Elves, that is, Superstitious, Enchanted Subjects, to pinch their Princes, by preaching Sedition; or one Prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.
When the fairies are displeased with anyone, they are said to send their elves to pinch them. The churchmen, when they are displeased with any civil state, likewise make their elves—that is, superstitious, enchanted subjects—pinch their princes by preaching sedition; or make one prince, enchanted with promises, pinch another.
The Fairies marry not; but there be amongst them Incubi, that have copulation with flesh and bloud. The Priests also marry not.
The fairies do not marry; but there are among them incubi, who have intercourse with flesh and blood. The priests also do not marry.
The Ecclesiastiques take the Cream of the Land, by Donations of ignorant men, that stand in aw of them, and by Tythes: So also it is in the Fable of Fairies, that they enter into the Dairies, and Feast upon the Cream, which they skim from the Milk.
The churchmen take the cream of the land, by donations from ignorant men who stand in awe of them, and by tithes. So too in the tale of the fairies, they get into the dairies and feast on the cream, which they skim from the milk.
What kind of Money is currant in the Kingdome of Fairies, is not recorded in the Story. But the Ecclesiastiques in their Receipts accept of the same Money that we doe; though when they are to make any Payment, it is in Canonizations, Indulgences, and Masses.
What kind of money is current in the kingdom of the fairies is not recorded in the story. But the churchmen accept the same money we do in their receipts, though when they have to make any payment, it is in canonizations, indulgences, and Masses.
To this, and such like resemblances between the Papacy, and the Kingdome of Fairies, may be added this, that as the Fairies have no existence, but in the Fancies of ignorant people, rising from the Traditions of old Wives, or old Poets: so the Spirituall Power of the Pope (without the bounds of his own Civill Dominion) consisteth onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, of their Excommunications; upon hearing of false Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of the Scripture.
To this and similar resemblances between the papacy and the kingdom of fairies may be added this: that as the fairies have no existence except in the fancies of ignorant people, arising from the traditions of old wives or old poets, so the spiritual power of the Pope (outside the bounds of his own civil dominion) consists only in the fear that deluded people have of his excommunications, on hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of Scripture.
It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry 8. by his Exorcisme; nor for Qu. Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this Spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by Missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yeeld him little fruit, may not return, or rather an Assembly of Spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabite this clean swept house, and make the End thereof worse than the Beginning? For it is not the Romane Clergy onely, that pretends the Kingdome of God to be of this World, and thereby to have a Power therein, distinct from that of the Civill State.
It was not, therefore, a very difficult matter for Henry VIII by his exorcism, nor for Queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out and walking by missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, which yield him little fruit, may not return—or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he enter in and inhabit this clean-swept house, and make the end of it worse than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only that claims the Kingdom of God to be of this world, and thereby to have a power in it distinct from that of the civil state.
And this is all I had a designe to say, concerning the Doctrine of the POLITIQUES. Which when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my Countrey.
And this is all I intended to say concerning the doctrine of politics. When I have reviewed it, I shall willingly submit it to the judgment of my country.
A Review and Conclusion
Hobbes answers the objection that the faculties needed for civil duty cannot coexist in one person.
From the contrariety of some of the Naturall Faculties of the Mind, one to another, as also of one Passion to another, and from their reference to Conversation, there has been an argument taken, to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of Civill duty. The Severity of Judgment, they say, makes men Censorious, and unapt to pardon the Errours and Infirmities of other men: and on the other side, Celerity of Fancy, makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is necessary, to discern exactly between Right and Wrong.
From the conflict of some of the natural faculties of the mind with one another, as also of one passion with another, and from their bearing on social life, an argument has been drawn to infer that it is impossible for any one man to be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. Severity of judgment, they say, makes men censorious and unready to pardon the errors and weaknesses of other men; and on the other side, quickness of fancy makes the thoughts less steady than is necessary to discern exactly between right and wrong.
Again, in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which procureth attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little. But these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of Truth; the other upon Opinions already received, true, or false; and upon the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and mutable.
Again, in all deliberations and in all pleadings the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary, for without it men’s resolutions are rash and their sentences unjust. And yet if there is not powerful eloquence, which wins attention and consent, the effect of reason will be small. But these are contrary faculties: the former is grounded on principles of truth; the other on opinions already received, whether true or false, and on the passions and interests of men, which are various and changeable.
And amongst the Passions, Courage, (by which I mean the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death) enclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace: And Timorousnesse, many times disposeth to the desertion of the Publique Defence. Both these they say cannot stand together in the same person.
And among the passions, courage (by which I mean the contempt of wounds and violent death) inclines men to private revenge, and sometimes to try to unsettle the public peace; while timidity often disposes them to desert the public defense. Both of these, they say, cannot exist together in the same person.
And to consider the contrariety of mens Opinions, and Manners in generall, It is they say, impossible to entertain a constant Civill Amity with all those, with whom the Businesse of the world constrains us to converse: Which Businesse, consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall contention for Honor, Riches, and Authority.
And considering how contrary men’s opinions and manners are in general, it is, they say, impossible to maintain a constant civil friendship with all those with whom the business of the world compels us to deal—business that consists almost entirely in a perpetual contention for honor, riches, and authority.
To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not Impossibilities: For by Education, and Discipline, they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment, and Fancy may have place in the same man; but by turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making Bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather Straw: So also may the Judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain Consideration, and the Fancy at another time wandring about the world. So also Reason, and Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall) may stand very well together.
To this I answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities. For by education and discipline they may be reconciled, and sometimes are. Judgment and fancy may both have a place in the same man, but by turns, as the end he aims at requires. Just as the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes tied to their labor of making bricks, and at other times ranged abroad to gather straw, so the judgment may sometimes be fixed on one particular consideration, and the fancy at another time go wandering about the world. So too reason and eloquence (though perhaps not in the natural sciences, yet in the moral) may stand very well together.
For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of Truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the Laws, and not fearing a publique Enemy; nor between abstaining from Injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such Inconsistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think. I have known cleernesse of Judgment, and largenesse of Fancy; strength of Reason, and gracefull Elocution; a Courage for the Warre, and a Fear for the Laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored friend Mr.
For wherever there is room to adorn and advance error, there is much more room to adorn and advance truth, if men have it to adorn. Nor is there any conflict between fearing the laws and not fearing a public enemy, nor between abstaining from injury and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistency between human nature and civil duties as some think. I have known clearness of judgment and breadth of fancy, strength of reason and graceful speech, courage for war and fear of the laws, all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored friend Mr.
Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civill warre, in the Publique quarrell, by an undiscerned, and an undiscerning hand.
Sidney Godolphin, who, hating no one and hated by no one, was unfortunately killed at the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an unseen and undiscerning hand.
Conquest and the duty to the protector
A new law of nature, and when a subject may submit to a conqueror.
To the Laws of Nature, declared in the 15. Chapter, I would have this added, That every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time of Peace. For he that pretendeth a Right of Nature to preserve his owne body, cannot pretend a Right of Nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved: It is a manifest contradiction of himselfe. And though this Law may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned; yet the Times require to have it inculcated, and remembred.
To the laws of nature set out in Chapter 15, I would have this one added: “That every man is bound by nature, as far as he is able, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.” For he who claims a right of nature to preserve his own body cannot claim a right of nature to destroy the one by whose strength he is preserved; that is a plain contradiction of himself. And though this law may be derived by consequence from some of those already mentioned there, the times require that it be driven home and remembered.
And because I find by divers English Books lately printed, that the Civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws: Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject to a Conquerour, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his Subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have shewed before in the end of the 21.
I find from various English books lately printed that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men at what point in time a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror, or what conquest is, or how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws. For their further satisfaction on these matters, therefore, I say that the point in time at which a man becomes subject to a conqueror is the point at which, having liberty to submit to him, he consents, either by express words or by some other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When a man has the liberty to submit, I have shown before, at the end of Chapter
Chapter; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former Soveraign but that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer Protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his Contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, (notwithstanding it be an assistance to the Enemy,) esteemed lawfull; a totall Submission, which is but an assistance to the Enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful.
21: namely, that for one who has no obligation to his former sovereign other than that of an ordinary subject, it is when the means of his life lie within the guards and garrisons of the enemy. For it is then that he no longer has protection from his sovereign, but is protected by the opposing party in return for his contribution. Since such contribution is everywhere considered lawful, as something unavoidable (even though it is an assistance to the enemy), a total submission, which is only an assistance to the enemy, cannot be considered unlawful.
Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the Enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the Enemy.
Besides, if one considers that those who submit assist the enemy with only part of their estates, whereas those who refuse assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission or settlement an assistance; it is rather a detriment to the enemy.
But if a man, besides the obligation of a Subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a Souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new Power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his Armies, or Garrisons: for in this case, he cannot complain of want of Protection, and means to live as a Souldier: But when that also failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new Master. And so much for the Time when he may do it lawfully, if hee will.
But if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, has taken on himself the new obligation of a soldier, then he does not have the liberty to submit to a new power as long as the old one keeps the field and gives him the means of subsistence, either in its armies or its garrisons. For in this case he cannot complain of lacking protection and the means to live as a soldier. But when that too fails, a soldier also may seek protection wherever he has the most hope of finding it, and may lawfully submit himself to his new master. So much for the time when he may lawfully do it, if he will.
If therefore he doe it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true Subject: For a Contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.
If, then, he does it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject. For a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to be Conquered; and in what the nature of Conquest, and the Right of a Conquerour consisteth: For this Submission is it implyeth them all. Conquest, is not the Victory it self; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is Overcome, but not Conquered: He that is taken, and put into prison, or chaines, is not Conquered, though Overcome; for he is still an Enemy, and may save himself if hee can: But he that upon promise of Obedience, hath his Life and Liberty allowed him, is then Conquered, and a Subject; and not before.
From this a man may also understand when men may be said to be conquered, and in what the nature of conquest and the right of a conqueror consist; for this submission implies them all. Conquest is not the victory itself, but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. So he who is killed is overcome, but not conquered. He who is captured and put in prison or chains is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy, and may save himself if he can. But he who, on a promise of obedience, is granted his life and liberty is then conquered and a subject—and not before.
The Romanes used to say, that their Generall had Pacified such a Province, that is to say, in English, Conquerea it; and that the Countrey was Pacified by Victory, when the people of it had promised Imperata facere, that is, To doe what the Romane People commanded them: this was to be Conquered. But this promise may be either expresse, or tacite: Expresse, by Promise: Tacite, by other signes.
The Romans used to say that their general had pacified such-and-such a province, which is to say in English, conquered it; and that a country was pacified by victory when its people had promised imperata facere, that is, “to do what the Roman people commanded them.” This was to be conquered. But this promise may be either express or tacit: express, by promise; tacit, by other signs.
As for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an expresse Promise, (because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable;) yet if he live under their Protection openly, hee is understood to submit himselfe to the Government: But if he live there secretly, he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a Spie, and Enemy of the State. I say not, hee does any Injustice, (for acts of open Hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death.
For example, a man who has not been called on to make such an express promise (perhaps because his power is not significant) is nevertheless understood to submit himself to the government if he lives openly under its protection. But if he lives there secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the state. I do not say he commits any injustice (for acts of open hostility do not bear that name), but that he may justly be put to death.
Likewise, if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government, he is bound to obey it. So that Conquest (to define it) is the Acquiring of the Right of Soveraignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the peoples Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty.
Likewise, if a man is outside his country when it is conquered, he is not conquered, nor a subject; but if on his return he submits to the government, he is bound to obey it. So conquest (to define it) is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory. That right is acquired through the people’s submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising obedience in exchange for life and liberty.
In the 29. Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the Dissolutions of Common-wealths, their Imperfect Generation, consisting in the want of an Absolute and Arbitrary Legislative Power; for want whereof, the Civill Soveraign is fain to handle the Sword of Justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: One reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession.
In Chapter 29 I set down, as one of the causes of the dissolution of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, which consists in the lack of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power. For want of it, the civil sovereign is forced to handle the sword of justice inconstantly, as if it were too hot for him to hold. One reason for this (which I did not mention there) is that they will all justify the war by which their power was first gained, and on which (as they think) their right depends, rather than on possession.
As if, for example, the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of William the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie all the successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their Successors.
As if, for example, the right of the kings of England depended on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and on their lineal and most direct descent from him—by which reasoning there would perhaps be no bond of subjects’ obedience to their sovereign anywhere in the world today. In needlessly trying to justify themselves this way, they justify every successful rebellion that ambition may at any time raise against them and their successors.
Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerors require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.
Therefore I set down, as one of the most effective seeds of the death of any state, that conquerors require not only the submission of men’s future actions to them, but also approval of all their past actions—when there is scarcely a commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.
And because the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of Soveraignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to bee angry with them they call Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Common-wealth in generall, and another evill seed, not differing much from the former. For to the Justification of the Cause of a Conqueror, the Reproach of the Cause of the Conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the Obligation of the Conquered.
And since the name “tyranny” signifies nothing more nor less than the name “sovereignty,” whether it is in one man or many, except that those who use the former word are understood to be angry with those they call tyrants, I think that tolerating a professed hatred of tyranny is tolerating hatred of commonwealth in general—another evil seed, not much different from the former. For to justify the cause of a conqueror, it is for the most part necessary to disparage the cause of the conquered; but neither is necessary for the obligation of the conquered.
And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the Review of the first and second part of this Discourse.
So much I have thought fit to say on reviewing the first and second parts of this discourse.
Executions and the right of zeal
Hobbes shows that capital punishment among the Israelites never rested on private zeal.
In the 35. Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture, that in the Common-wealth of the Jewes, God himselfe was made the Soveraign, by Pact with the People; who were therefore called his Peculiar People, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their Consent, but by his own Power: And that in this Kingdome Moses was Gods Lieutenant on Earth; and that it was he that told them what Laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have omitted to set down who were the Officers appointed to doe Execution; especially in Capitall Punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration, as I find it since.
In Chapter 35 I showed sufficiently from Scripture that in the commonwealth of the Jews, God himself was made the sovereign by a pact with the people, who were therefore called his peculiar people, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their consent but by his own power. I showed too that in this kingdom Moses was God’s lieutenant on earth, and that it was he who told them by what laws God had appointed them to be ruled. But I omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to carry out sentences, especially capital punishments, not thinking it then a matter needing as much consideration as I have since found it does.
Wee know that generally in all Common-wealths, the Execution of Corporeall Punishments, was either put upon the Guards, or other Souldiers of the Soveraign Power; or given to those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardnesse of heart, concurred, to make them sue for such an Office. But amongst the Israelites it was a Positive Law of God their Soveraign, that he that was convicted of a capitall Crime, should be stoned to death by the People; and that the Witnesses should cast the first Stone, and after the Witnesses, then the rest of the People.
We know that generally, in all commonwealths, the execution of corporal punishments was either assigned to the guards or other soldiers of the sovereign power, or given to those in whom poverty, contempt of honor, and hardness of heart combined to make them seek such an office. But among the Israelites it was a positive law of God their sovereign that whoever was convicted of a capital crime should be stoned to death by the people, and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses the rest of the people.
This was a Law that designed who were to be the Executioners; but not that any one should throw a Stone at him before Conviction and Sentence, where the Congregation was Judge. The Witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to Execution, unlesse the Fact were committed in the presence of the Congregation it self, or in sight of the lawfull Judges; for then there needed no other Witnesses but the Judges themselves.
This was a law that designated who were to be the executioners, but not that anyone should throw a stone at the man before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was the judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unless the deed was committed in the presence of the congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then no witnesses were needed other than the judges themselves.
Neverthelesse, this manner of proceeding being not throughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some cases, by a Right of Zeal; as if the Executions done upon Offenders in the Kingdome of God in old time, proceeded not from the Soveraign Command, but from the Authority of Private Zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.
Nevertheless, this manner of proceeding, not being thoroughly understood, has given rise to a dangerous opinion: that any man may, in some cases, kill another by a right of zeal—as if the executions carried out on offenders in the Kingdom of God in ancient times proceeded not from the sovereign’s command but from the authority of private zeal. If we consider the texts that seem to favor it, the truth is quite the contrary.
First, where the Levites fell upon the People, that had made and worshipped the Golden Calfe, and slew three thousand of them; it was by the Commandement of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, Exod. 32. 27. And when the Son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give Sentence against him; as appears, Levit. 25. 11, 12. Again, (Numbers 25. 6, 7.)
First, where the Levites fell upon the people who had made and worshipped the golden calf, and killed three thousand of them, it was by the command of Moses, from the mouth of God, as is plain from Exodus 32:27. And when the son of an Israelite woman had blasphemed God, those who heard it did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him in custody until God should pass sentence on him, as appears from Leviticus 24:11–12. Again,
when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of Private Zeale: Their Crime was committed in the sight of the Assembly; there needed no Witnesse; the Law was known, and he the heir apparent to the Soveraignty; and which is the principall point, the Lawfulnesse of his Act depended wholly upon a subsequent Ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt.
(Numbers 25:6–7) when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cozbi, it was not by right of private zeal. Their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; no witness was needed; the law was known; and he was the heir apparent to the sovereignty. And, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended entirely on a subsequent ratification by Moses, which he had no reason to doubt.
And this Presumption of a future Ratification, is sometimes necessary to the safety a Common-wealth; as in a sudden Rebellion, any man that can suppresse it by his own Power in the Countrey where it begins, without expresse Law or Commission, may lawfully doe it, and provide to have it Ratified, or Pardoned, whilest it is in doing, or after it is done. Also Numb. 35. 30. it is expressely said, Whosoever shall kill the Murtherer, shall kill him upon the word of Witnesses: but Witnesses suppose a formall Judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence of Ius Zelotarum. The Law of Moses concerning him that enticeth to Idolatry, (that is to say, in the Kingdome of God to a renouncing of his Allegiance (Deut. 13.
And this presumption of a future ratification is sometimes necessary to the safety of a commonwealth. In a sudden rebellion, for instance, any man who can suppress it by his own power in the region where it begins may lawfully do so without express law or commission, and see to having it ratified or pardoned while it is being done or after it is done. Also, in Numbers 35:30 it is expressly said, “Whoever kills the murderer shall kill him on the word of witnesses.” But witnesses presuppose a formal court of justice, and so condemn that claim of jus zelotarum, the right of zealots. The law of Moses concerning one who entices others to idolatry (that is, in the Kingdom of God, to a renouncing of their allegiance)
8. forbids to conceal him, and commands the Accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be Condemned. And (Deut. 17. ver. 4, 5, 6.) the Processe against Idolatry is exactly set down: For God there speaketh to the People, as Judge, and commandeth them, when a man is Accused of Idolatry, to Enquire diligently of the Fact, and finding it true, then to Stone him; but still the hand of the Witnesse throweth the first stone. This is not Private Zeale, but Publique Condemnation. In like manner when a Father hath a rebellious Son, the Law is (Deut. 21. 18.)
(Deuteronomy 13:8) forbids concealing him, and commands the accuser to have him put to death and to cast the first stone at him—but not to kill him before he is condemned. And in Deuteronomy 17:4–6 the process against idolatry is set down exactly. For God there speaks to the people as judge, and commands them, when a man is accused of idolatry, to inquire diligently into the deed and, finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the witness throws the first stone. This is not private zeal, but public condemnation. In the same way, when a father has a rebellious son, the law is
that he shall bring him before the Judges of the Town, and all the people of the Town shall Stone him. Lastly, by pretence of these Laws it was, that St. Steven was Stoned, and not by pretence of Private Zeal: for before hee was carried away to Execution, he had Pleaded his Cause before the High Priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance Executions by Private Zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of Ignorance and Passion, is against both the Justice and Peace of a Common-wealth.
(Deuteronomy 21:18–21) that he shall bring him before the judges of the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. Lastly, it was on the pretext of these laws that St. Stephen was stoned, and not on a pretext of private zeal; for before he was carried off to execution, he had pleaded his cause before the high priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by private zeal—which, being often only a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is contrary to both the justice and the peace of a commonwealth.
In the 36. Chapter I have said, that it is not declared in what manner God spake supernaturally to Moses: Not that he spake not to him sometimes by Dreams and Visions, and by a supernaturall Voice, as to other Prophets: For the manner how he spake unto him from the Mercy-Seat, is expressely set down Numbers 7. 89.
In Chapter 36 I said that it is not declared in what manner God spoke supernaturally to Moses. Not that he did not speak to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice, as to other prophets. For the manner in which he spoke to him from the mercy seat is expressly set down
in these words, From that time forward, when Moses entred into the Tabernacle of the Congregation to speak with God, he heard a Voice which spake unto him from over the Mercy-Seate, which is over the Arke of the Testimony, from between the Cherubins he spake unto him. But it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other Prophets, as to Samuel, and to Abraham, to whom he also spake by a Voice, (that is, by Vision) Unlesse the difference consist in the cleernesse of the Vision. For Face to Face, and Mouth to Mouth, cannot be literally understood of the Infinitenesse, and Incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.
(Numbers 7:89) in these words: “From that time forward, when Moses entered into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with God, he heard a voice that spoke to him from above the mercy seat, which is over the ark of the testimony; from between the cherubim he spoke to him.” But it is not declared in what the preeminence of God’s manner of speaking to Moses consisted, over his speaking to other prophets—such as Samuel and Abraham, to whom he also spoke by a voice (that is, by vision)—unless the difference lies in the clearness of the vision. For “face to face” and “mouth to mouth” cannot be understood literally of the infinity and incomprehensibility of the divine nature.
Defense of the whole doctrine
Hobbes defends his principles, his new doctrines and his refusal to quote the ancients.
And as to the whole Doctrine, I see not yet, but the Principles of it are true and proper; and the Ratiocination solid. For I ground the Civill Right of Soveraigns, and both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known naturall Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of Nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the Power Ecclesiasticall of the same Soveraigns, I ground it on such Texts, as are both evident in themselves, and consonant to the Scope of the whole Scripture. And therefore am perswaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to be informed, shall be informed by it.
As to the whole doctrine, I do not yet see but that its principles are true and proper, and its reasoning solid. For I ground the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and the liberty of subjects, on the known natural inclinations of mankind and on the articles of the law of nature, of which no man who claims even enough reason to govern his own household ought to be ignorant. And as for the ecclesiastical power of those same sovereigns, I ground it on texts that are both evident in themselves and consistent with the scope of the whole Scripture. I am therefore persuaded that whoever reads it with the sole purpose of being informed will be informed by it.
But for those that by Writing, or Publique Discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not bee so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is naturall for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before: Of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that Doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot choose but be very many.
But those who, by writing, or public speech, or their prominent actions, have already committed themselves to maintaining contrary opinions will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases it is natural for men, at one and the same time, to go on reading and to lose their attention in searching for objections to what they read before. And in a time when men’s interests have changed, there cannot fail to be very many such objections, since much of the doctrine that serves to establish a new government must necessarily be contrary to what contributed to the dissolution of the old.
In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are some new Doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this time, that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask, that both may be preserved together.
In the part that treats of a Christian commonwealth there are some new doctrines which, in a state where the contrary had already been fully settled, it might be a fault for a subject to publish without leave, as a usurpation of the place of a teacher. But at this time, when men call not only for peace but also for truth, to offer such doctrines as I think true, and as plainly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those who are still deliberating is no more than offering new wine to be put into new casks, so that both may be preserved together.
And I suppose, that then, when Novelty can breed no trouble, nor disorder in a State, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of Antiquity, as to preferre Ancient Errors, before New and well proved Truth.
And I suppose that at such a time, when novelty can breed no trouble or disorder in a state, men are not generally so much inclined to revere antiquity as to prefer ancient errors to new and well-proven truth.
There is nothing I distrust more than my Elocution; which neverthelesse I am confident (excepting the Mischances of the Presse) is not obscure. That I have neglected the Ornament of quoting ancient Poets, Orators, and Philosophers, contrary to the custome of late time, (whether I have done well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon Reason, or upon Scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any Writer.
There is nothing I distrust more than my style of expression—which nevertheless, apart from the misprints of the press, I am confident is not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custom of recent times (whether I have done well or ill in it), proceeds from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. First, all truth of doctrine depends either on reason or on Scripture, both of which lend credit to many writers but never receive it from any.
Secondly, the matters in question are not of Fact, but of Right, wherein there is no place for Witnesses. There is scarce any of those old Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such Opinions as are taken onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not intrinsecally the Judgment of those that cite them, but Words that passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth. Fiftly, it is many times with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their corrupt Doctrine with the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that the Ancients they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote before them.
Secondly, the matters in question are not of fact but of right, where there is no place for witnesses. There is scarcely any of those old writers who does not sometimes contradict both himself and others, which makes their testimony insufficient. Fourthly, opinions taken solely on the credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgment of those who cite them, but words that pass (like yawning) from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, men often, with a fraudulent design, stud their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other men’s wit. Sixthly, I do not find that the ancients they cite thought it an ornament to do the same with those who wrote before them.
Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion; when Greek and Latine Sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due: For if we will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest.
Seventhly, it is a sign of indigestion when Greek and Latin sentences come up again unchewed and, as they usually do, unchanged. Lastly, though I revere those men of ancient times who either wrote the truth clearly or set us on a better way to find it out for ourselves, yet to antiquity itself I think nothing is due. For if we are to revere age, the present is the oldest.
If the Antiquity of the Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honor is given, were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that am Writing: But if it bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the Dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the Living.
If it is the antiquity of the writer we revere, I am not sure that those to whom such honor is generally given were older when they wrote than I am who am writing. But if it is well considered, the praise of ancient authors proceeds not from reverence for the dead, but from the competition and mutual envy of the living.
To conclude, there is nothing in this whole Discourse, nor in that I writ before of the same Subject in Latine, as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of God, or to good Manners; or to the disturbance of the Publique Tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth.
To conclude: there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in what I wrote before on the same subject in Latin, so far as I can see, contrary either to the word of God or to good morals, or tending to the disturbance of the public tranquility. I therefore think it may profitably be printed, and more profitably taught in the universities, if those to whom the judgment of such things belongs think so too.
For seeing the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) upon the People, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving Spirits.
For since the universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from which the preachers and the gentry draw such water as they find there and sprinkle it (both from the pulpit and in their conversation) upon the people, great care certainly ought to be taken to keep it pure, both from the venom of heathen political writers and from the incantations of deceiving spirits.
And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the lesse grieved with the Contributions necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themselves have the lesse cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of forraign Enemies.
By that means most men, knowing their duties, will be less liable to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons in their designs against the state, and less aggrieved by the contributions necessary for their peace and defense; and the governors themselves will have less cause to maintain, at the common expense, any larger army than is necessary to secure the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies.
And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, and the Laws Divine, (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation.
And so I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, written without partiality, without application to particular persons, and with no other design than to set before men’s eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience, which the condition of human nature and the divine laws (both natural and positive) require to be inviolably observed.
And though in the revolution of States, there can be no very good Constellation for Truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new;;) yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to finish it,) I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend.
And though, in the revolution of states, there can be no very favorable constellation for truths of this nature to be born under (since they meet an angry look from those who dissolve an old government, and see only the backs of those who erect a new one), yet I cannot think this will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine or by anyone who desires the continuance of public peace. In this hope I return to my interrupted speculation on natural bodies, in which (if God gives me health to finish it) I hope the novelty will please as much as, in the doctrine of this artificial body, it usually offends.
For such Truth, as opposeth no mans profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.
For such truth as opposes no man’s profit or pleasure is welcome to all men.