C’EST vn vsage de nostre iustice, d’en condamner aucuns, pour l’aduertissement des autres. De les condamner, par ce qu’ils ont failly, ce seroit bestise, comme dit Platon. Car ce qui est faict, ne se peut deffaire: mais c’est afin qu’ils ne faillent plus de mesmes, ou qu’on fuye l’exemple de leur faute. On ne corrige pas celuy qu’on pend, on corrige les autres par luy. Ie fais de mesmes. Mes erreurs sont tantost naturelles et incorrigibles et irremediables. Mais ce que les honnestes hommes profitent au public en se faisant imiter, ie le profiteray à l’auanture à me faire euiter. *Nónne vides Albi vt malè viuat filius, vtque / Barrus inops?
It is a practice of our justice to condemn some people as a warning to others. To condemn them because they have done wrong would be stupidity, as Plato says, for what is done cannot be undone. It is done so that they will not do wrong in the same way again, or so that others will shun the example of their fault. We do not correct the man we hang; we correct others through him. I do the same. My errors are by now natural, incorrigible and irremediable. But the good that decent men do the public by getting themselves imitated, I shall perhaps do by getting myself avoided. *Do you not see how badly Albius’ son lives, and how / Barrus is in want?
magnum documentum, ne patriam rem / Perdere quis velit.* Publiant et accusant mes imperfections, quelqu’vn apprendra de les craindre. Les parties que i’estime le plus en moy, tirent plus d’honneur de m’accuser, que de me recommander. Voylà pourquoy i’y retombe, et m’y arreste plus souuent. Mais quand tout est compté, on ne parle iamais de soy, sans perte. Les propres condemnations sont tousiours accreuës, les louanges mescruës. Il en peut estre aucuns de ma complexion, qui m’instruis mieux par contrarieté que par similitude: et par fuite que par suite. A cette sorte de discipline regardoit le vieux Caton, quand il dict, que les sages ont plus à apprendre des fols, que les fols des sages.
A great lesson to anyone tempted to squander / his inheritance.* By my publishing and accusing my imperfections, someone will learn to fear them. The qualities I most esteem in myself gain more honor from accusing me than from commending me. That is why I fall back on accusation and dwell on it more often. But when all is reckoned, one never speaks of oneself without loss. Self-condemnation is always believed, and then some; self-praise is disbelieved. There may be some people of my temperament who, like me, learn better by contrast than by likeness, by shunning than by following. This is the kind of discipline the elder Cato had in mind when he said that the wise have more to learn from fools than fools from the wise.
Et cet ancien ioueur de lyre, que Pausanias recite, auoir accoustumé contraindre ses disciples d’aller ouyr vn mauuais sonneur, qui logeoit vis à vis de luy: où ils apprinssent à hayr ses desaccords et fauces mesures. L’horreur de la cruauté me reiecte plus auant en la clemence, qu’aucun patron de clemence ne me sçauroit attirer. Vn bon escuyer ne redresse pas tant mon assiete, comme fait vn procureur, ou vn Venitien à cheual. Et vne mauuaise façon de langage, reforme mieux la mienne, que ne fait la bonne. Tous les iours la sotte contenance d’vn autre, m’aduertit et m’aduise. Ce qui poincte, touche et esueille mieux, que ce qui plaist.
So too that ancient lyre player who, as Pausanias relates, used to make his pupils go and hear a bad player who lived opposite him, so that they would learn to hate his discords and false rhythms. The horror of cruelty throws me further into clemency than any model of clemency could draw me. A good riding master does not straighten my seat as much as an attorney or a Venetian on horseback does. And a bad way of speaking reforms mine better than a good one. Every day someone else’s foolish bearing warns and advises me. What stings touches and rouses us better than what pleases.
Ce temps est propre à nous amender à reculons, par disconuenance plus que par conuenance; par difference, que par accord. Estant peu apprins par les bons exemples, ie me sers des mauuais: desquels la leçon est ordinaire. Ie me suis efforcé de me rendre autant aggreable comme i’en voyoy de fascheux: aussi ferme, que i’en voyoy de mols: aussi doux, que i’en voyoy d’aspres: aussi bon, que i’en voyoy de meschants. Mais ie me proposoy des mesures inuincibles.
Our age is fit to mend us backward: by disagreement more than by agreement, by difference rather than by accord. Being little taught by good examples, I make use of bad ones, whose lesson is everywhere. I have striven to make myself as agreeable as I saw others disagreeable, as firm as I saw others weak, as gentle as I saw others harsh, as good as I saw others wicked. But I set myself unbeatable standards.
Conversation, the best exercise
Montaigne prizes vigorous argument with strong minds above the study of books.
Le plus fructueux et naturel exercice de nostre esprit, c’est à mon gré la conference. I’en trouue l’vsage plus doux, que d’aucune autre action de nostre vie. Et c’est la raison pourquoy, si i’estois à cette heure forcé de choisir, ie consentirois plustost, ce crois-ie, de perdre la veuë, que l’ouyr ou le parler. Les Atheniens, et encore les Romains, conseruoient en grand honneur cet exercice en leurs Academies. De nostre temps, les Italiens en retiennent quelques vestiges, à leur grand profit: comme il se voit par la comparaison de nos entendemens aux leurs. L’estude des liures, c’est vn mouuement languissant et foible qui n’eschauffe point: là où la conference, apprend et exerce en vn coup.
The most fruitful and natural exercise of our mind is, in my opinion, conversation. I find its practice sweeter than that of any other action of our life. That is why, if I were now forced to choose, I would sooner consent, I think, to lose my sight than my hearing or my speech. The Athenians, and the Romans too, held this exercise in great honor in their Academies. In our time the Italians retain some vestiges of it, to their great profit, as can be seen by comparing our minds with theirs. The study of books is a languid, feeble activity that gives off no heat; whereas conversation teaches and exercises us at one stroke.
Si ie confere auec vne ame forte, et vn roide iousteur, il me presse les flancs, me picque à gauche et à dextre: ses imaginations eslancent les miennes. La ialousie, la gloire, la contention, me poussent et rehaussent au dessus de moy-mesmes. Et l’vnisson, est qualité du tout ennuyeuse en la conference. Mais comme nostre esprit se fortifie par la communication des esprits vigoureux et reglez, il ne se peut dire, combien il perd, et s’abastardit, par le continuel commerce, et frequentation, que nous auons auec les esprits bas et maladifs. Il n’est contagion qui s’espande comme celle-là. Ie sçay par assez d’experience, combien en vaut l’aune. I’ayme à contester, et à discourir, mais c’est auec peu d’hommes, et pour moy.
If I converse with a strong mind and a tough jouster, he presses on my flanks and pricks me left and right; his ideas launch mine. Rivalry, glory and contention drive me on and lift me above myself. And unison is an altogether tiresome quality in conversation. But just as our mind is strengthened by contact with vigorous and well-ordered minds, it is impossible to say how much it loses and degenerates through continual dealings and association with low and sickly minds. No contagion spreads like that one. I know from enough experience exactly what it costs. I love to argue and discuss, but with few men, and for my own sake.
Car de seruir de spectacle aux grands, et faire à l’enuy parade de son esprit, et de son caquet, ie trouue que c’est vn mestier tres-messeant à vn homme d’honneur.
For to serve as a spectacle for the great, and to show off one’s wit and one’s chatter in competition with others, I find a most unbecoming trade for a man of honor.
La sottise est vne mauuaise qualité, mais de ne la pouuoir supporter, et s’en despiter et ronger, comme il m’aduient, c’est vne autre sorte de maladie, qui ne doit guere à la sottise, en importunité. Et est ce qu’à present ie veux accuser du mien. I’entre en conference et en dispute, auec grande liberté et facilité: d’autant que l’opinion trouue en moy le terrein mal propre à y penetrer, et y pousser de hautes racines. Nulles propositions m’estonnent, nulle creance me blesse, quelque contrarieté qu’elle aye à la mienne. Il n’est si friuole et si extrauagante fantasie, qui ne me semble bien sortable à la production de l’esprit humain.
Stupidity is a bad quality. But to be unable to bear it, to be vexed and eaten up by it, as happens to me, is another sort of disease, hardly less of a nuisance than stupidity. And that is what I now want to accuse in myself. I enter into conversation and dispute with great freedom and ease, inasmuch as opinion finds me poor soil to penetrate and put down deep roots in. No propositions stun me, no belief wounds me, however contrary it may be to mine. There is no notion so frivolous and so extravagant that it does not seem to me quite a fitting product of the human mind.
Nous autres, qui priuons nostre iugement du droict de faire des arrests, regardons mollement les opinions diuerses: et si nous n’y prestons le iugement, nous y prestons aysement l’oreille. Où l’vn plat est vuide du tout en la balance, ie laisse vaciller l’autre, sous les songes d’vne vieille. Et me semble estre excusable, si i’accepte plustost le nombre impair: le ieudy au prix du vendredy: si ie m’aime mieux douziesme ou quatorziesme, que treiziesme à table: si ie vois plus volontiers vn liéure costoyant, que trauersant mon chemin, quand ie voyage: et donne plustost le pied gauche, que le droict, à chausser. Toutes telles reuasseries, qui sont en credit autour de nous, meritent aumoins qu’on les escoute.
We who deny our judgment the right to hand down rulings look mildly on differing opinions; if we do not lend them our judgment, we readily lend them our ear. Where one pan of the scales is completely empty, I let the other waver under an old woman’s dreams. And I think I may be excused if I prefer an odd number; Thursday over Friday; if I would rather be twelfth or fourteenth at table than thirteenth; if, when I travel, I would rather see a hare running alongside my path than crossing it; and if I offer my left foot to be shod before my right. All such fancies, which are in credit around us, deserve at least a hearing.
Pour moy, elles emportent seulement l’inanité, mais elles l’emportent. Encores sont en poids, les opinions vulgaires et casuelles, autre chose, que rien, en nature. Et qui ne s’y laisse aller iusques là, tombe à l’auanture au vice de l’opiniastreté, pour euiter celuy de la superstition.
For me, they outweigh only emptiness; but they do outweigh it. Even so, common and chance opinions have some weight; in nature they are something other than nothing. And whoever will not let himself go that far may well fall into the vice of obstinacy while avoiding that of superstition.
Les contradictions donc des iugemens, ne m’offencent, ny m’alterent: elles m’esueillent seulement et m’exercent. Nous fuyons la correction, il s’y faudroit presenter et produire notamment quand elle vient par forme de conference, non de regence. A chasque opposition, on ne regarde pas si elle est iuste, mais, à tort, ou à droit, comme on s’en deffera. Au lieu d’y tendre les bras, nous y tendons les griffes. Ie souffrirois estre rudement heurté par mes amis: Tu és vn sot, tu resues. I’ayme entre les galans hommes, qu’on s’exprime courageusement: que les mots aillent où va la pensee. Il nous faut fortifier l’ouye, et la durcir, contre cette tendreur du son ceremonieux des parolles.
Contradictory judgments, then, neither offend me nor upset me; they only rouse and exercise me. We flee correction; we ought to come forward and offer ourselves to it, especially when it comes in the form of conversation, not of schoolmastering. At each objection we do not consider whether it is just, but how, rightly or wrongly, we can get rid of it. Instead of opening our arms to it, we put out our claws. I would put up with being roughly jostled by my friends: “You are a fool, you are dreaming.” Among gentlemen I like people to speak out boldly, and words to go where the thought goes. We must toughen our hearing and harden it against this tenderness for the ceremonious sound of words.
I’ayme vne societé, et familiarité forte, et virile: vne amitié, qui se flatte en l’aspreté et vigueur de son commerce: comme l’amour, és morsures et esgratigneures sanglantes. Elle n’est pas assez vigoureuse et genereuse, si elle n’est querelleuse: si elle est ciuilisee et artiste: si elle craint le heurt, et a ses allures contreintes. Neque enim disputari sine reprehensione potest. Quand on me contrarie, on esueille mon attention, non pas ma cholere: ie m’auance vers celuy qui me contredit, qui m’instruit. La cause de la verité, deuroit estre la cause commune à l’vn et à l’autre. Que respondra-il? la passion du courroux luy a desia frappé le iugement: le trouble s’en est saisi, auant la raison.
I like a strong, manly fellowship and familiarity, a friendship that delights in the sharpness and vigor of its dealings, as love does in bites and bloody scratches. It is not vigorous and generous enough if it is not quarrelsome, if it is civilized and artful, if it fears clashes and moves with a constrained gait. For there can be no discussion without contradiction. When I am contradicted, it rouses my attention, not my anger. I go toward the man who contradicts me: he is instructing me. The cause of truth ought to be the common cause of both sides. What will he answer? The passion of anger has already struck down his judgment; turmoil has seized it before reason could.
Il seroit vtile, qu’on passast par gageure, la decision de nos disputes: qu’il y eust vne marque materielle de nos pertes: affin que nous en tinssions estat, et que mon valet me peust dire: Il vous cousta l’annee passee cent escus, à vingt fois, d’auoir esté ignorant et opiniastre. Ie festoye et caresse la verité en quelque main que ie la trouue, et m’y rends alaigrement, et luy tends mes armes vaincues, de loing que ie la vois approcher. Et pourueu qu’on n’y procede d’vne troigne trop imperieusement magistrale, ie prens plaisir à estre reprins. Et m’accommode aux accusateurs, souuent plus, par raison de ciuilité, que par raison d’amendement: aymant à gratifier et à nourrir la liberté de m’aduertir, par la facilité de ceder.
It would be useful to settle our disputes by wager, so that there would be a material mark of our losses, and we would keep account of them, and my valet could tell me: “Last year, on twenty occasions, being ignorant and stubborn cost you a hundred crowns.” I welcome and embrace truth in whatever hands I find it. I surrender to it cheerfully and hold out my vanquished arms to it as soon as I see it approaching in the distance. And provided it is not done with too imperiously schoolmasterly a face, I enjoy being reproved. I often accommodate myself to my accusers more for the sake of civility than for the sake of amendment, because I like to gratify and foster people’s freedom to admonish me by yielding readily.
Toutesfois il est malaisé d’y attirer les hommes de mon temps. Ils n’ont pas le courage de corriger, par ce qu’ils n’ont pas le courage de souffrir à l’estre. Et parlent tousiours auec dissimulation, en presence les vns des autres. Ie prens si grand plaisir d’estre iugé et cogneu, qu’il m’est comme indifferent, en quelle des deux formes ie le soys. Mon imagination se contredit elle mesme si souuent, et condamne, que ce m’est tout vn, qu’vn autre le face: veu principalement que ie ne donne à sa reprehension, que l’authorité que ie veux.
Yet it is hard to draw the men of my time into this. They lack the courage to correct, because they lack the courage to endure being corrected. And they always speak with dissimulation in one another’s presence. I take such great pleasure in being judged and known that it is almost indifferent to me in which of the two ways it is done. My own imagination so often contradicts and condemns itself that it is all one to me if someone else does so, especially since I give his reproof only the authority I choose.
Mais ie romps paille auec celuy, qui se tient si haut à la main: comme i’en cognoy quelqu’vn, qui plaint son aduertissement, s’il n’en est creu: et prend à iniure, si on estriue à le suiure. Ce que Socrates recueilloit tousiours riant, les contradictions, qu’on opposoit à son discours, on pourroit dire, que sa force en estoit cause: et que l’auantage ayant à tomber certainement de son costé, il les acceptoit, comme matiere de nouuelle victoire. Toutesfois nous voyons au rebours, qu’il n’est rien, qui nous y rende le sentiment si delicat, que l’opinion de la préeminence, et desdaing de l’aduersaire. Et que par raison, c’est au foible plustost, d’accepter de bon gré les oppositions qui le redressent et rabillent.
But I break off with a man who carries himself so high-handedly, like one I know who regrets having given his advice if it is not believed, and takes it as an insult if anyone balks at following it. As for Socrates, who always welcomed with a smile the objections raised against his arguments, one could say that his strength was the cause of it: since the advantage was sure to fall to his side, he accepted them as material for a fresh victory. Yet we see, on the contrary, that nothing makes us so touchy here as a belief in our own superiority and contempt for our opponent. And by rights it is rather for the weak to accept with good grace the objections that set him straight and mend him.
Ie cherche à la verité plus la frequentation de ceux qui me gourment, que de ceux qui me craignent. C’est vn plaisir fade et nuisible, d’auoir affaire à gens qui nous admirent et facent place. Antisthenes commanda à ses enfans, de ne sçauoir iamais gré ny grace, à homme qui les louast. Ie me sens bien plus fier, de la victoire que ie gaigne sur moy, quand en l’ardeur mesme du combat, ie me faits plier soubs la force de la raison de mon aduersaire: que ie ne me sens gré, de la victoire que ie gaigne sur luy, par sa foiblesse.
In truth I seek out the company of those who handle me roughly more than of those who fear me. It is an insipid and harmful pleasure to deal with people who admire us and make way for us. Antisthenes commanded his children never to be grateful or obliged to any man who praised them. I feel much prouder of the victory I win over myself when, in the very heat of combat, I make myself bow beneath the force of my opponent’s reasoning, than I feel pleased with a victory I win over him through his weakness.
En fin, ie reçois et aduoue toute sorte d’atteinctes qui sont de droict fil, pour foibles qu’elles soient: mais ie suis par trop impatient, de celles qui se donnent sans forme.
In short, I accept and acknowledge every kind of thrust that comes straight, however weak; but I am far too impatient of those delivered without form.
Order in debate
He cares less who wins than that a dispute keeps order; muddled wrangling makes him rude.
Il me chaut peu de la matiere, et me sont les opinions vnes, et la victoire du subiect à peu pres indifferente. Tout vn iour ie contesteray paisiblement, si la conduicte du debat se suit auec ordre. Ce n’est pas tant la force et la subtilité, que ie demande, comme l’ordre. L’ordre qui se voit tous les iours, aux altercations des bergers et des enfants de boutique: iamais entre nous. S’ils se detraquent, c’est en inciuilité: si faisons nous bien. Mais leur tumulte et impatience, ne les deuoye pas de leur theme. Leur propos suit son cours. S’ils preuiennent l’vn l’autre, s’ils ne s’attendent pas, aumoins ils s’entendent. On respond tousiours trop bien pour moy, si on respond à ce que ie dits.
I care little about the subject matter. Opinions are all one to me, and which side wins on the point at issue is nearly indifferent. I will argue peaceably for a whole day if the debate is conducted in an orderly way. It is not so much force and subtlety that I ask for as order: the order seen every day in the squabbles of shepherds and shop boys, never among us. If they go off the rails, it is into rudeness; and so do we, indeed. But their tumult and impatience do not turn them away from their theme; their talk follows its course. If they jump in ahead of one another, if they do not wait for one another, at least they understand one another. Anyone answers me only too well if he answers what I say.
Mais quand la dispute est trouble et des-reglee, ie quitte la chose, et m’attache à la forme, auec despit et indiscretion: et me iette à vne façon de debattre, testue, malicieuse, et imperieuse, dequoy i’ay à rougir apres. Il est impossible de traitter de bonne foy auec vn sot. Mon iugement ne se corrompt pas seulement à la main d’vn maistre si impetueux: mais aussi ma conscience.
But when the dispute is muddled and disorderly, I abandon the matter and fasten on the form, with vexation and lack of restraint. I fall into a stubborn, spiteful and imperious way of arguing that I have to blush for afterward. It is impossible to deal in good faith with a fool. At the hands of so impetuous a master, it is not only my judgment that is corrupted, but my conscience too.
Noz disputes deuroient estre defendues et punies, comme d’autres crimes verbaux. Quel vice n’esueillent elles et n’amoncellent, tousiours regies et commandees par la cholere? Nous entrons en inimitié, premierement contre les raisons, et puis contre les hommes. Nous n’apprenons à disputer que pour contredire: et chascun contredisant et estant contredict, il en aduient que le fruit du disputer, c’est perdre et aneantir la verité. Ainsi Platon en sa republique, prohibe cet exercice aux esprits ineptes et mal nays. A quoy faire vous mettez vous en voye de quester ce qui est, auec celuy qui n’a ny pas, ny alleure qui vaille? On ne fait point tort au subiect, quand on le quicte, pour voir du moyen de le traicter.
Our disputes ought to be forbidden and punished like other verbal crimes. What vice do they not rouse and heap up, ruled and commanded as they always are by anger? We become hostile first to the reasons and then to the men. We learn to dispute only in order to contradict; and with everyone contradicting and being contradicted, the result is that the fruit of disputing is to lose and annihilate the truth. Thus Plato, in his Republic, forbids this exercise to inept and ill-endowed minds. Why set out in quest of what is with someone whose pace and gait are worth nothing? We do the subject no wrong when we leave it to see about the right means of treating it.
Ie ne dis pas moyen scholastique et artiste, ie dis moyen naturel, d’vn sain entendement. Que sera-ce en fin? l’vn va en Orient, l’autre en Occident. Ils perdent le principal, et l’escartent dans la presse des incidens. Au bout d’vne heure de tempeste, ils ne sçauent ce qu’ils cherchent: l’vn est bas, l’autre haut, l’autre costier. Qui se prend à vn mot et vne similitude. Qui ne sent plus ce qu’on luy oppose, tant il est engagé en sa course, et pense à se suiure, non pas à vous.
I do not mean a scholastic, artful means; I mean the natural means of a sound understanding. What will it come to in the end? One goes east, the other west. They lose the main point and scatter it in the throng of side issues. After an hour of storm they do not know what they are looking for: one is low, another high, another off to the side. One fastens on a word and a comparison. Another no longer even feels the objections made to him, so caught up is he in his own course; he is thinking of following himself, not you.
Qui se trouuant foible de reins, craint tout, refuse tout, mesle dez l’entree, et confond le propos: ou sur l’effort du debat, se mutine à se taire tout plat: par vne ignorance despite, affectant vn orgueilleux mesprix: ou vne sottement modeste fuitte de contention. Pourueu que cettuy-cy frappe, il ne luy chaut combien il se descouure. L’autre compte ses mots, et les poise pour raisons. Celuy-là n’y employe que l’auantage de sa voix, et de ses poulmons. En voyla vn qui conclud contre soy-mesme: et cettuy-cy qui vous assourdit de prefaces et digressions inutiles. Cet autre s’arme de pures iniures, et cherche vne querelle d’Alemaigne, pour se deffaire de la societé et conference d’vn esprit, qui presse le sien.
Another, finding himself weak in the loins, fears everything, refuses everything, muddles and confuses the issue from the start. Or else, at the height of the debate, he mutinies and falls flatly silent, out of spiteful ignorance, affecting a proud contempt, or out of a foolishly modest avoidance of contention. This one, provided he strikes, does not care how much he exposes himself. That one counts his words and weighs them as if they were reasons. Another relies only on the power of his voice and his lungs. Here is one who reaches a conclusion against himself, and here another who deafens you with useless prefaces and digressions. Yet another arms himself with sheer insults and picks a quarrel over nothing, to escape the company and conversation of a mind that presses his own too hard.
Ce dernier ne voit rien en la raison, mais il vous tient assiegé sur la closture dialectique de ses clauses, et sur les formules de son art.
This last one sees nothing in reason, but he keeps you besieged within the dialectical enclosure of his clauses and the formulas of his art.
Learning without judgment
Logic and learning make no one wiser; in a weak soul knowledge is a fool’s bauble.
Or qui n’entre en deffiance des sciences, et n’est en doubte, s’il s’en peut tirer quelque solide fruict, au besoin de la vie: à considerer l’vsage que nous en auons? Nihil sanantibus litteris. Qui a pris de l’entendement en la logique? où sont ses belles promesses? Nec ad melius viuendum, nec ad commodius disserendum. Voit-on plus de barbouillage au caquet des harengeres, qu’aux disputes publiques des hommes de cette profession? I’aymeroy mieux, que mon fils apprint aux tauernes à parler, qu’aux escholes de la parlerie.
Now who does not grow distrustful of learning, and doubt whether any solid fruit can be drawn from it for the needs of life, considering the use we make of it? Letters that cure nothing. Who has gained understanding from logic? Where are its fine promises? Neither for living better nor for reasoning more aptly. Is there more muddle in the chatter of fishwives than in the public disputations of the men of this profession? I would rather my son learned to talk in taverns than in the schools of talkery.
Ayez vn maistre és arts, conferez auec luy, que ne nous fait-il sentir cette excellence artificiele, et ne rauit les femmes, et les ignorans comme nous sommes, par l’admiration de la fermeté de ses raisons, de la beauté de son ordre? que ne nous domine-il et persuade comme il veut? Vn homme si auantageux en matiere, et en conduicte, pourquoy mesle-il à son escrime les iniures, l’indiscretion et la rage? Qu’il oste son chapperon, sa robbe, et son Latin, qu’il ne batte pas nos aureilles d’Aristote tout pur et tout creu, vous le prendrez pour l’vn d’entre nous, ou pis.
Take a master of arts and converse with him. Why does he not make us feel that artful excellence of his, and ravish women and ignorant people like us with admiration for the firmness of his reasons and the beauty of his order? Why does he not dominate us and persuade us as he wishes? A man with such an advantage in matter and method, why does he mix insults, indiscretion and rage into his fencing? Let him take off his hood, his gown and his Latin; let him stop battering our ears with Aristotle pure and raw: you will take him for one of us, or worse.
Il me semble de cette implication et entrelasseure du langage, par où ils nous pressent, qu’il en va comme des ioueurs de passe-passe: leur souplesse combat et force nos sens, mais elle n’esbranle aucunement nostre creance: hors ce bastelage, ils ne font rien qui ne soit commun et vil. Pour estre plus sçauans, ils n’en sont pas moins ineptes. I’ayme et honore le sçauoir, autant que ceux qui l’ont. Et en son vray vsage, c’est le plus noble et puissant acquest des hommes.
This intricacy and interlacing of language with which they press us seems to me like the work of conjurers: their sleight of hand fights and overpowers our senses, but it does not shake our belief in the least. Apart from this juggling, they do nothing that is not common and mean. Being more learned does not make them any less inept. I love and honor knowledge as much as those who have it. And in its true use it is the noblest and most powerful acquisition of mankind.
Mais en ceux-là, et il en est vn nombre infiny de ce genre, qui en establissent leur fondamentale suffisance et valeur: qui se rapportent de leur entendement à leur memoire, sub aliena vmbra latentes: et ne peuuent rien que par liure: ie le hay, si ie l’ose dire, vn peu plus que la bestise. En mon pays, et de mon temps, la doctrine amande assez les bourses, nullement les ames. Si elle les rencontre mousses, elle les aggraue et suffoque: masse crue et indigeste: si desliees, elle les purifie volontiers, clarifie et subtilise iusques à l’exinanition. C’est chose de qualité à peu pres indifferente: tres-vtile accessoire, à vne ame bien nee, pernicieux à vne autre ame et dommageable.
But there are those, and there are countless people of this kind, who base their fundamental ability and worth on it; who refer from their understanding to their memory, hiding in another’s shadow, and can do nothing except out of a book. In them I hate it, if I dare say so, a little more than stupidity. In my country and in my time, learning improves purses well enough, but souls not at all. If it meets dull souls, it weighs them down and smothers them, a raw and undigested mass; if keen ones, it readily purifies, clarifies and refines them to the point of emptiness. It is a thing of nearly indifferent quality: a very useful accessory to a well-born soul, pernicious and harmful to another.
Ou plustost, chose de tres-precieux vsage, qui ne se laisse pas posseder à vil prix: en quelque main c’est vn sceptre, en quelque autre, vne marotte.
Or rather, it is a thing of very precious use, which does not let itself be possessed at a low price. In one hand it is a scepter; in another, a fool’s bauble.
Mais suyuons. Quelle plus grande victoire attendez vous, que d’apprendre à vostre ennemy qu’il ne vous peut combattre? Quand vous gaignez l’auantage de vostre proposition, c’est la verité qui gaigne: quand vous gaignez l’auantage de l’ordre, et de la conduitte, c’est vous qui gaignez. Il m’est aduis qu’en Platon et Xenophon Socrates dispute plus, en faueur des disputants qu’en faueur de la dispute: et pour instruire Euthydemus et Protagoras de la cognoissance de leur impertinence, plus que de l’impertinence de leur art. Il empoigne la premiere matiere, comme celuy qui a vne fin plus vtile que de l’esclaircir, assauoir esclaircir les esprits, qu’il prend à manier et exercer.
But let us go on. What greater victory can you expect than to teach your enemy that he cannot fight you? When you gain the advantage for your proposition, it is truth that wins; when you gain the advantage through order and method, it is you who win. It seems to me that in Plato and Xenophon, Socrates argues more for the sake of the arguers than for the sake of the argument, and more to teach Euthydemus and Protagoras their own ineptitude than the ineptitude of their art. He seizes on the first subject that comes along, like a man with a more useful aim than clarifying it: namely, to clarify the minds he takes in hand to work on and exercise.
L’agitation et la chasse est proprement de nostre gibier, nous ne sommes pas excusables de la conduire mal et impertinemment: de faillir à la prise, c’est autre chose. Car nous sommes nais à quester la verité, il appartient de la posseder à vne plus grande puissance. Elle n’est pas, comme disoit Democritus, cachee dans le fonds des abysmes: mais plustost esleuee en hauteur infinie en la cognoissance diuine. Le monde n’est qu’vne escole d’inquisition. Ce n’est pas à qui mettra dedans, mais à qui fera les plus belles courses. Autant peut faire le sot, celuy qui dit vray, que celuy qui dit faux: car nous sommes sur la maniere, non sur la matiere du dire.
Stirring up and chasing the game are properly our business. We are not excusable if we conduct the chase badly and ineptly; missing the catch is another matter. For we are born to seek the truth; to possess it belongs to a greater power. It is not, as Democritus said, hidden in the depths of the abyss, but rather raised to an infinite height in divine knowledge. The world is nothing but a school of inquiry. The question is not who will spear the ring, but who will run the finest courses. The man who speaks the truth can play the fool as well as the man who speaks falsely, for we are concerned with the manner of speaking, not the matter.
Mon humeur est de regarder autant à la forme, qu’à la substance: autant à l’aduocat qu’à la cause, comme Alcibiades ordonnoit qu’on fist. Et tous les iours m’amuse à lire en des autheurs, sans soing de leur science: y cherchant leur façon, non leur subiect. Tout ainsi que ie poursuy la communication de quelque esprit fameux, non affin qu’il m’enseigne, mais affin que ie le cognoisse, et que le cognoissant, s’il le vaut, ie l’imite. Tout homme peut dire veritablement, mais dire ordonnement, prudemment, et suffisamment, peu d’hommes le peuuent. Par ainsi la fauceté qui vient d’ignorance, ne m’offence point: c’est l’ineptie. I’ay rompu plusieurs marchez qui m’estoient vtiles, par l’impertinence de la contestation de ceux, auec qui ie marchandois.
My temperament is to look at the form as much as at the substance, at the advocate as much as at the cause, as Alcibiades directed people to do. And every day I amuse myself reading authors without caring about their learning, looking for their manner, not their subject. In the same way I seek the company of some famous mind, not so that he may teach me, but so that I may know him, and, knowing him, imitate him if he is worth it. Any man can speak truly; but to speak with order, prudence and competence, few men can. So falsehood that comes from ignorance does not offend me; ineptitude does. I have broken off several bargains that would have been useful to me because of the senseless wrangling of those I was bargaining with.
Ie ne m’esmeus pas vne fois l’an, des fautes de ceux sur lesquels i’ay puissance: mais sur le poinct de la bestise et opiniastreté de leurs allegations, excuses et defences, asnieres et brutales, nous sommes tous les iours à nous en prendre à la gorge. Ils n’entendent ny ce qui se dit, ny pourquoy, et respondent de mesme: c’est pour desesperer. Ie ne sens heurter rudement ma teste, que par vne autre teste. Et entre plustost en composition auec le vice de mes gens, qu’auec leur temerité, importunité et leur sottise. Qu’ils facent moins, pourueu qu’ils soient capables de faire. Vous viuez en esperance d’eschauffer leur volonté. Mais d’vne souche, il n’y a ny qu’esperer, ny que iouyr qui vaille.
I am not upset once a year by the faults of those over whom I have authority. But over the stupidity and obstinacy of their assertions, excuses and defenses, asinine and brutish as they are, we are at each other’s throats every day. They understand neither what is said nor why, and they answer accordingly: it is enough to drive one to despair. My head is never roughly jarred except by another head. And I come to terms with my people’s vices sooner than with their rashness, their importunity and their stupidity. Let them do less, provided they are capable of doing. You live in hope of firing their will. But from a block of wood there is nothing worth hoping for or enjoying.
Against my own impatience
Irritation at others’ folly is itself folly, and our reproaches usually turn back on ourselves.
Or quoy, si ie prends les choses autrement qu’elles ne sont? Il peut estre. Et pourtant i’accuse mon impatience. Et tiens, premierement, qu’elle est esgallement vitieuse en celuy qui a droit, comme en celuy qui a tort. Car c’est tousiours vn’aigreur tyrannique, de ne pouuoir souffrir vne forme diuerse à la sienne. Et puis, qu’il n’est à la verité point de plus grande fadese, et plus constante, que de s’esmouuoir et piquer des fadeses du monde, ny plus heteroclite. Car elle nous formalise principallement contre nous: et ce philosophe du temps passé n’eust iamais eu faute d’occasion à ses pleurs, tant qu’il se fust consideré.
But what if I take things otherwise than they are? That may be. And so I blame my impatience. First, I hold that it is just as faulty in the one who is right as in the one who is wrong. For it is always a tyrannical sourness to be unable to endure a way different from one’s own. Second, there is truly no greater folly, nor any more persistent, than to be stirred and stung by the follies of the world, nor any more bizarre. For it sets us chiefly against ourselves; and that philosopher of old would never have lacked occasion for his tears so long as he considered himself.
Mison l’vn des sept sages, d’vne humeur Timoniene et Democritiene interrogé, dequoy il rioit seul: De ce que ie ris seul: respondit-il. Combien de sottises dis-ie, et respons-ie tous les iours, selon moy: et volontiers donq combien plus frequentes, selon autruy? Si ie m’en mors les leures, qu’en doiuent faire les autres? Somme, il faut viure entre les viuants, et laisser la riuiere courre sous le pont, sans nostre soing: ou à tout le moins, sans nostre alteration. De vray, pourquoy sans nous esmouuoir, rencontrons nous quelqu’vn qui ayt le corps tortu et mal basty, et ne pouuons souffrir le rencontre d’vn esprit mal rengé, sans nous mettre en cholere? Cette vitieuse aspreté tient plus au iuge, qu’à la faute.
Myson, one of the Seven Sages, whose temperament was like Timon’s and Democritus’s, was asked what he was laughing at all alone. “At the fact that I am laughing alone,” he answered. How many foolish things do I say and answer every day, by my own reckoning; and so, very likely, how many more by other people’s? If I bite my lips over them, what must others do? In short, we must live among the living and let the river flow under the bridge without our concern, or at least without our getting upset. Indeed, why is it that we meet someone with a crooked, ill-made body without being disturbed, yet cannot bear to meet a disordered mind without flying into a rage? This faulty harshness has more to do with the judge than with the fault.
Ayons tousiours en la bouche ce mot de Platon: Ce que ie treuue mal sain, n’est-ce pas pour estre moy-mesmes mal sain? Ne suis-ie pas moy-mesmes en coulpe? mon aduertissement se peut-il pas renuerser contre moy? Sage et diuin refrein, qui fouete la plus vniuerselle, et commune erreur des hommes. Non seulement les reproches, que nous faisons les vns aux autres, mais noz raisons aussi, et noz arguments et matieres controuerses, sont ordinairement retorquables à nous: et nous enferrons de noz armes. Dequoy l’ancienneté m’a laissé assez de graues exemples. Ce fut ingenieusement dit et bien à propos, par celuy qui l’inuenta: Stercus cuique suum bene olet. Noz yeux ne voyent rien en derriere.
Let us always have on our lips this saying of Plato: “If I find something unsound, is it not because I myself am unsound? Am I not myself at fault? Can my rebuke not be turned back against me?” A wise and divine refrain, which lashes the most universal and common error of mankind. Not only the reproaches we make to one another, but also our reasons, our arguments and the matters we dispute can usually be turned back against us; and we run ourselves through with our own weapons. Antiquity has left me plenty of weighty examples of this. It was cleverly and aptly said by whoever invented it: Everyone’s own dung smells sweet. Our eyes see nothing behind us.
Cent fois le iour, nous nous moquons de nous sur le subiect de nostre voysin, et detestons en d’autres, les defauts qui sont en nous plus clairement: et les admirons d’vne merueilleuse impudence et inaduertence. Encores hier ie fus à mesmes, de veoir vn homme d’entendement se moquant autant plaisamment que iustement, de l’inepte façon d’vn autre, qui rompt la teste à tout le monde du registre de ses genealogies et alliances, plus de moitié fauces (ceux-là se iettent plus volontiers sur tels sots propos, qui ont leurs qualitez plus doubteuses et moins seures) et luy s’il eust reculé sur soy, se fust trouué non guere moins intemperant et ennuyeux à semer et faire valoir la prerogatiue de la race de sa femme.
A hundred times a day we mock ourselves in mocking our neighbor, and detest in others the defects that are more plainly in ourselves, and marvel at them with astonishing impudence and heedlessness. Only yesterday I happened to see a man of understanding mocking, as amusingly as justly, the foolish manner of another who bores everyone to death with the register of his genealogies and family alliances, more than half of them false (those whose titles are the most dubious and least secure are the readiest to launch into such silly talk); and yet he, had he looked back at himself, would have found himself hardly less immoderate and tiresome in spreading abroad and vaunting the distinction of his wife’s family.
O importune presomption, de laquelle la femme se voit armee par les mains de son mary mesme? S’il entendoit du Latin, il luy faudroit dire, Age! si hæc non insanit satis sua sponte, instiga. Ie ne dis pas, que nul n’accuse, qui ne soit net: car nul n’accuseroit: voire ny net, en mesme sorte de tache. Mais i’entens, que nostre iugement chargeant sur vn autre, duquel pour lors il est question, ne nous espargne pas, d’vne interne et seuere iurisdiction. C’est office de charité, que, qui ne peut oster vn vice en soy, cherche ce neantmoins à l’oster en autruy: où il peut auoir moins maligne et reuesche semence.
What troublesome presumption, with which the wife finds herself armed by her husband’s own hands! If he understood Latin, one would have to tell him: Go on! If she is not mad enough of her own accord, egg her on. I do not say that no one should accuse unless he is clean, for then no one would accuse; nor even unless he is clean of the same kind of stain. But I mean that our judgment, when it bears down on another who is then in question, should not spare us from an inner and severe jurisdiction. It is a duty of charity that one who cannot remove a vice in himself should nonetheless try to remove it in another, where it may have a less malignant and stubborn seed.
Ny ne me semble responce à propos, à celuy, qui m’aduertit de ma faute, dire qu’elle est aussi en luy. Quoy pour cela? Tousiours l’aduertissement est vray et vtile. Si nous auions bon nez, nostre ordure nous deuroit plus puïr, d’autant qu’elle est nostre. Et Socrates est d’aduis, que qui se trouueroit coulpable, et son fils, et vn estranger, de quelque violence et iniure, deuroit commencer par soy, à se presenter à la condamnation de la iustice, et implorer, pour se purger, le secours de la main du bourreau: secondement pour son fils: et dernierement pour l’estranger. Si ce precepte prend le ton vn peu trop haut: au moins se doibt il presenter le premier, à la punition de sa propre conscience.
Nor does it seem to me a fitting reply, to someone who points out my fault, to say that he has it too. What of it? The warning is still true and useful. If we had a good nose, our own filth ought to stink more to us, since it is ours. And Socrates holds that anyone who found himself, his son and a stranger guilty of some violence and wrong should begin with himself, presenting himself for the sentence of justice and imploring the help of the executioner’s hand to purge himself; next he should do so for his son; and last for the stranger. If this precept pitches its tone a little too high, at least he ought to present himself first for the punishment of his own conscience.
The credit of rank
Gowns, fortune and silence lend weight to foolish men, and offices go by luck more than merit.
Les sens sont nos propres et premiers iuges, qui n’apperçoiuent les choses que par les accidens externes: et n’est merueille, si en toutes les pieces du seruice de nostre societé, il y a vn si perpetuel, et vniuersel meslange de ceremonies et apparences superficielles: si que la meilleure et plus effectuelle part des polices, consiste en cela. C’est tousiours à l’homme que nous auons affaire, duquel la condition est merueilleusement corporelle. Que ceux qui nous ont voulu bastir ces annees passees, vn exercice de religion, si contemplatif et immateriel, ne s’estonnent point, s’il en trouue, qui pensent, qu’elle fust eschappée et fondue entre leurs doigts, si elle ne tenoit parmy nous, comme marque, tiltre, et instrument de diuision et de part, plus que par soy-mesmes.
The senses are our own and first judges, and they perceive things only through their external accidents. So it is no wonder if, in every part of the workings of our society, there is so perpetual and universal a mixture of ceremonies and superficial appearances, to the point that the best and most effective part of government consists in them. It is always with man that we have to deal, and his condition is wonderfully corporeal. Let those who in recent years have tried to build us a form of worship so contemplative and immaterial not be astonished if some people think it would have slipped away and melted between their fingers, had it not held its ground among us as a mark, a title and an instrument of division and faction, more than by itself.
Comme en la conference. La grauité, la robbe, et la fortune de celuy qui parle, donne souuent credit à des propos vains et ineptes. Il n’est pas à presumer, qu’vn monsieur, si suiuy, si redouté, n’aye au dedans quelque suffisance autre que populaire: et qu’vn homme à qui on donne tant de commissions, et de charges, si desdaigneux et si morguant, ne soit plus habile, que cet autre, qui le salue de si loing, et que personne n’employe. Non seulement les mots, mais aussi les grimaces de ces gens là, se considerent et mettent en compte: chacun s’appliquant à y donner quelque belle et solide interpretation.
So it is in conversation. The gravity, the gown and the fortune of the speaker often lend credit to empty and foolish remarks. No one would suppose that a great gentleman, so attended, so feared, has no ability within him beyond the ordinary; or that a man given so many commissions and offices, so disdainful and so haughty, is not more capable than that other man who bows to him from so far off and whom nobody employs. Not only the words but even the grimaces of such people are weighed and taken into account, everyone setting himself to give them some fine and solid interpretation.
S’ils se rabaissent à la conference commune, et qu’on leur presente autre chose qu’approbation et reuerence, ils vous assomment de l’authorité de leur experience: ils ont ouy, ils ont veu, ils ont faict, vous estes accablé d’exemples. Ie leur dirois volontiers, que le fruict de l’experience d’vn chirurgien, n’est pas l’histoire de ses practiques, et se souuenir qu’il a guary quatre empestez et trois gouteux, s’il ne sçait de cet vsage, tirer dequoy former son iugement, et ne nous sçait faire sentir, qu’il en soit deuenu plus sage à l’vsage de son art. Comme en vn concert d’instruments, on n’oit pas vn leut, vne espinete, et la flutte: on oyt vne harmonie en globe: l’assemblage et le fruict de tout cet amas.
If they stoop to ordinary conversation and are offered anything other than approval and reverence, they club you with the authority of their experience: they have heard, they have seen, they have done; you are buried under examples. I would gladly tell them that the fruit of a surgeon’s experience is not the history of his cases, nor remembering that he has cured four plague victims and three gout sufferers, if he cannot draw from that practice the means to form his judgment, and cannot make us feel that he has grown wiser in the practice of his skill. Just as in a concert of instruments we do not hear a lute, a spinet and the flute: we hear a harmony as a whole, the union and fruit of the whole ensemble.
Si les voyages et les charges les ont amendez, c’est à la production de leur entendement de le faire paroistre. Ce n’est pas assez de compter les experiences, il les faut poiser et assortir: et les faut auoir digerees et alambiquees, pour en tirer les raisons et conclusions qu’elles portent. Il ne fut iamais tant d’historiens. Bon est-il tousiours et vtile de les ouyr, car ils nous fournissent tout plein de belles instructions et louables du magasin de leur memoire. Grande partie certes, au secours de la vie. Mais nous ne cherchons pas cela pour cette heure, nous cherchons si ces recitateurs et recueilleurs sont louables eux-mesmes.
If travels and offices have improved them, it is for the products of their understanding to show it. It is not enough to count up experiences; they must be weighed and sorted, and they must have been digested and distilled, to draw from them the reasons and conclusions they contain. There were never so many historians. It is always good and useful to listen to them, for they supply us with plenty of fine and commendable lessons from the storehouse of their memory—certainly a great asset for the help of life. But that is not what we are looking for at present; we are asking whether these narrators and collectors are themselves praiseworthy.
Ie hay toute sorte de tyrannie, et la parliere, et l’effectuelle. Ie me bande volontiers contre ces vaines circonstances, qui pipent nostre iugement par les sens: et me tenant au guet de ces grandeurs extraordinaires, ay trouué que ce sont pour le plus, des hommes comme les autres: Rarus enim fermè sensus communis in illa / Fortuna. A l’auanture les estime lon, et apperçoit moindres qu’ils ne sont, d’autant qu’ils entreprennent plus, et se montrent plus, ils ne respondent point au faix qu’ils ont pris. Il faut qu’il y ayt plus de vigueur, et de pouuoir au porteur, qu’en la charge.
I hate every kind of tyranny, both of words and of deeds. I readily brace myself against those empty trappings that cheat our judgment through the senses; and keeping watch on these extraordinary eminences, I have found that for the most part they are men like any others: For common sense is generally rare in that high / Station. Perhaps we judge them and see them as less than they are because they undertake more and show themselves more: they do not measure up to the burden they have taken on. There must be more vigor and strength in the bearer than in the load.
Celuy qui n’a pas remply sa force, il vous laisse deuiner, s’il a encore de la force au delà, et s’il a esté essayé iusques à son dernier poinct. Celuy qui succombe à sa charge, il descouure sa mesure, et la foiblesse de ses espaules. C’est pourquoy on voit tant d’ineptes ames entre les sçauantes, et plus que d’autres. Il s’en fust faict des bons hommes de mesnage, bons marchans, bons artizans: leur vigueur naturelle estoit taillee à cette proportion. C’est chose de grand poix que la science, ils fondent dessoubs. Pour estaller et distribuer cette riche et puissante matiere, pour l’employer et s’en ayder: leur engin n’a, ny assez de vigueur, ny assez de maniement.
The man who has not used his full strength leaves you guessing whether he has more strength still beyond it, and whether he has been tested to his utmost. The man who sinks under his load reveals his measure and the weakness of his shoulders. That is why one sees so many inept souls among the learned, more than among others. They would have made good householders, good merchants, good craftsmen: their natural vigor was cut to that size. Learning is a thing of great weight; they collapse under it. To display and dispense this rich and powerful material, to use it and profit from it, their wits have neither enough vigor nor enough dexterity.
Elle ne peut qu’en vne forte nature: or elles sont bien rares. Et les foibles, dit Socrates, corrompent la dignité de la philosophie en la maniant. Elle paroist et inutile et vicieuse, quand elle est mal estuyee. Voyla comment ils se gastent et affollent. Humani qualis simulator simius oris, / Quem puer arridens, pretioso stamine serum / Velauit, nudásques nates ac terga reliquit, / Ludibrium mensis. A ceux pareillement, qui nous regissent et commandent, qui tiennent le monde en leur main, ce n’est pas assez d’auoir vn entendement commun: de pouuoir ce que nous pouuons. Ils sont bien loing au dessoubs de nous, s’ils ne sont bien loing au dessus. Comme ils promettent plus, ils doiuent aussi plus.
Learning has power only in a strong nature, and such natures are very rare. And the weak, says Socrates, corrupt the dignity of philosophy by handling it. It looks both useless and harmful when it is badly housed. That is how they spoil themselves and make themselves ridiculous. Like an ape, that mimic of the human face, / Whom a laughing boy has dressed in costly silk, / Leaving its buttocks and its back bare, / A joke for the dinner table. Likewise, for those who rule and command us, who hold the world in their hand, it is not enough to have an ordinary understanding, to be able to do what we can do. They are far below us if they are not far above. As they promise more, so they owe more.
Et pourtant leur est le silence, non seulement contenance de respect et grauité, mais encore souuent de profit et de mesnage. Car Megabysus estant allé voir Apelles en son ouurouer, fut long temps sans mot dire: et puis commença à discourir de ses ouurages. Dont il reçeut cette reprimende: Tandis que tu as gardé silence, tu semblois quelque grande chose, à cause de tes cheines et de ta pompe: mais maintenant, qu’on t’a ouy parler, il n’est pas iusques aux garsons de ma boutique qui ne te mesprisent. Ces magnifiques atours, ce grand estat, ne luy permettoient point d’estre ignorant d’vne ignorance populaire: et de parler impertinemment de la peinture. Il deuoit maintenir muet, cette externe et presomptiue suffisance.
And so silence is for them not only a bearing that commands respect and gravity, but often also a source of profit and economy. For Megabyzus, having gone to see Apelles in his studio, stood a long time without saying a word, and then began to hold forth about his works. For this he received the following rebuke: “As long as you kept silent you seemed something great, because of your chains and your pomp; but now that you have been heard speaking, there is not even a boy in my workshop who does not despise you.” Those magnificent ornaments, that great state, did not allow him to be ignorant with a common ignorance and to talk nonsense about painting. He should have preserved that outward and presumed competence by keeping mute.
A combien de sottes ames en mon temps, a seruy vne mine froide et taciturne, de tiltre de prudence et de capacité?
For how many foolish souls in my time has a cold and taciturn air served as a title to wisdom and ability?
Les dignitez, les charges, se donnent necessairement, plus par fortune que par merite: et a lon tort souuent de s’en prendre aux Roys. Au rebours c’est merueille qu’ils y ayent tant d’heur, y ayans si peu d’adresse: Principis est virtus maxima, nosse suos. Car la nature ne leur a pas donné la veuë, qui se puisse estendre à tant de peuple, pour en discerner la precellence: et perser nos poitrines, où loge la cognoissance de nostre volonté et de nostre meilleure valeur. Il faut qu’ils nous trient par coniecture, et à tastons: par la race, les richesses, la doctrine, la voix du peuple: tres-foibles argumens.
Honors and offices are necessarily handed out more by fortune than by merit, and people are often wrong to blame kings for it. On the contrary, it is a wonder that they have such luck at it, having so little skill: The greatest virtue of a prince is to know his own people. For nature has not given them sight that can extend over so many people to discern who excels, and to pierce our breasts, where the knowledge of our will and of our best worth is lodged. They have to sort us by guesswork and groping: by family, wealth, learning, popular report—very weak evidence.
Qui pourroit trouuer moyen, qu’on en peust iuger par iustice, et choisir les hommes par raison, establiroit de ce seul trait, vne parfaite forme de police.
Whoever could find a way for us to be judged justly and for men to be chosen by reason would, by that single stroke, establish a perfect form of government.
Fortune and outcomes
Success is a poor witness of ability, since chance governs most human affairs.
Ouy mais, il a mené à poinct ce grand affaire. C’est dire quelque chose; mais ce n’est pas assez dire. Car cette sentence est iustement receuë, Qu’il ne faut pas iuger les conseils par les euenemens. Les Carthaginois punissoient les mauuais aduis de leurs capitaines, encore qu’ils fussent corrigez par vne heureuse yssue. Et le peuple Romain a souuent refusé le triomphe à des grandes et tres-vtiles victoires, par ce que la conduitte du chef ne respondoit point à son bon heur. On s’apperçoit ordinairement aux actions du monde, que la fortune, pour nous apprendre, combien elle peut en toutes choses: et qui prent plaisir à rabatre nostre presomption: n’ayant peu faire les mal-habiles sages, elle les fait heureux, à l’enuy de la vertu.
“Yes, but he brought that great business to a successful end.” That is saying something, but it is not saying enough. For this maxim is rightly accepted: that plans should not be judged by their outcomes. The Carthaginians punished the bad counsels of their generals even when they had been set right by a happy outcome. And the Roman people often refused a triumph for great and very useful victories because the commander’s conduct did not match his good luck. We commonly observe in the world’s affairs that Fortune—to teach us how much power she has in all things, and taking pleasure in humbling our presumption—having been unable to make the inept wise, makes them lucky, in rivalry with virtue.
Et se mesle volontiers à fauoriser les executions, où la trame est plus purement sienne. D’où il se voit tous les iours, que les plus simples d’entre nous, mettent à fin de tres-grandes besongnes et publiques et priuees. Et comme Sirannez le Persien, respondit à ceux qui s’estonnoient comme ses affaires succedoient si mal, veu que ses propos estoient si sages: Qu’il estoit seul maistre de ses propos, mais du succez de ses affaires, c’estoit la fortune. Ceux-cy peuuent respondre de mesme: mais d’vn contraire biais. La plus part des choses du monde se font par elles mesmes. Fata viam inueniunt. L’issuë authorise souuent vne tresinepte conduite. Nostre entremise n’est quasi qu’vne routine: et plus communement consideration d’vsage, et d’exemple, que de raison.
And she readily takes a hand in favoring those enterprises whose web is most purely her own. Hence we see every day that the simplest among us carry through very great tasks, both public and private. And as Siramnes the Persian replied to those who were amazed that his affairs turned out so badly when his words were so wise—that he alone was master of his words, but Fortune was master of the success of his affairs—these people can make the same reply, but from the opposite angle. Most things in the world happen by themselves. The Fates find a way. The outcome often lends authority to very inept conduct. Our intervention is hardly more than routine, and more commonly a matter of habit and example than of reason.
Estonné de la grandeur de l’affaire, i’ay autrefois sçeu par ceuz qui l’auoient mené à fin, leurs motifs et leur addresse: ie n’y ay trouué que des aduis vulgaires: et les plus vulgaires et vsitez, sont aussi peut-estre, les plus seurs et plus commodes à la pratique, sinon à la montre. Quoy si les plus plattes raisons, sont les mieux assises: les plus basses et lasches, et les plus battues, se couchent mieux aux affaires? Pour conseruer l’authorité du conseil des Roys, il n’est pas besoing que les personnes profanes y participent, et y voyent plus auant que de la premiere barriere. Il se doibt reuerer à credit et en bloc, qui en veut nourrir la reputation.
Struck by the greatness of some achievement, I once learned from those who had carried it through what their motives and methods had been; I found nothing in them but ordinary notions. And the most ordinary and familiar are perhaps also the surest and handiest in practice, if not for show. What if the flattest reasons are the best grounded, and the lowest, the loosest and the most hackneyed suit affairs best? To preserve the authority of kings’ councils, there is no need for the uninitiated to take part in them and see further in than the first barrier. Whoever wants to sustain their reputation must revere them on trust and wholesale.
Ma consultation esbauche vn peu la matiere, et la considere legerement par ses premiers visages: le fort et principal de la besongne, i’ay accoustumé de le resigner au ciel, Permitte diuis cætera.
My deliberation roughs out the matter a little and considers it lightly by its first appearances; the main and hardest part of the work I am accustomed to resign to heaven: Leave the rest to the gods.
L’heur et le mal’heur, sont à mon gré deux souueraines puissances. C’est imprudence, d’estimer que l’humaine prudence puisse remplir le rolle de la fortune. Et vaine est l’entreprise de celuy, qui presume d’embrasser et causes et consequences, et mener par la main, le progrez de son faict. Vaine sur tout aux deliberations guerrieres. Il ne fut iamais plus de circonspection et prudence militaire, qu’il s’en voit par fois entre nous. Seroit ce qu’on crainct de se perdre en chemin, se reseruant à la catastrophe de ce ieu? Ie dis plus, que nostre sagesse mesme et consultation, suit pour la plus part la conduicte du hazard.
Good luck and bad luck are, to my mind, two sovereign powers. It is imprudence to think that human prudence can play the part of Fortune. And vain is the undertaking of the man who presumes to embrace both causes and consequences and to lead the progress of his affair by the hand—vain above all in deliberations of war. There was never more military circumspection and caution than is sometimes seen among us. Could it be that people are afraid of getting lost along the way, and are saving themselves for the final act of this play? I say further that our very wisdom and deliberation for the most part follow the lead of chance.
Ma volonté et mon discours, se remue tantost d’vn air, tantost d’vn autre: et y a plusieurs de ces mouuemens, qui se gouuernent sans moy. Ma raison a des impulsions et agitations iournallieres, et casuelles: Vertuntur species animorum, et pectora motus / Nunc alios, alios dum nubila ventus agebat, / Concipiunt. Qu’on regarde qui sont les plus puissans aux villes, et qui font mieux leurs besongnes: on trouuera ordinairement, que ce sont les moins habiles. Il est aduenu aux femmelettes, aux enfans, et aux insensez, de commander des grands estats, à l’esgal des plus suffisans Princes. Et y rencontrent, dit Thucydides, plus ordinairement les grossiers que les subtils. Nous attribuons les effects de leur bonne fortune à leur prudence.
My will and my reasoning move now one way, now another, and many of these movements govern themselves without me. My reason has daily and accidental impulses and stirrings: The moods of minds are changed, and breasts conceive / Now one impulse, now another, as the wind / Drives on the clouds. Look at who are the most powerful in the cities and who do best in their business: you will usually find that they are the least capable. Little women, children and madmen have happened to rule great states as well as the ablest princes. And, says Thucydides, the dull succeed at it more often than the subtle. We attribute the effects of their good fortune to their prudence.
Vt quisque Fortuna vtitur, / Ita præcellet: atque exinde sapere illum omnes dicimus. Parquoy ie dis bien, en toutes façons, que les euenemens, sont maigres tesmoings de nostre prix et capacité.
As each man makes use of Fortune, / So he excels; and so we all say he is wise. Therefore I say, in every way, that outcomes are poor witnesses of our worth and ability.
Or i’estois sur ce poinct, qu’il ne faut que voir vn homme esleué en dignité: quand nous l’aurions cogneu trois iours deuant, homme de peu: il coule insensiblement en nos opinions, vne image de grandeur, de suffisance, et nous persuadons que croissant de train et de credit, il est creu de merite. Nous iugeons de luy non selon sa valeur: mais à la mode des getons, selon la prerogatiue de son rang. Que la chanse tourne aussi, qu’il retombe et se mesle à la presse: chacun s’enquiert auec admiration de la cause qui l’auoit guindé si haut. Est-ce luy? faict on: n’y sçauoit il autre chose quand il y estoit? les Princes se contentent ils de si peu? nous estions vrayement en bonnes mains.
Now I was on this point: that we need only see a man raised to high rank, and even if we had known him three days before as a man of little account, an image of greatness and ability steals imperceptibly into our opinions, and we persuade ourselves that, having grown in retinue and credit, he has grown in merit. We judge him not by his worth but, as with counters, by the privilege of his position. Let the luck turn, let him fall back and mingle with the crowd, and everyone asks in amazement what it was that had hoisted him so high. “Is that him?” they say. “Didn’t he know anything more than that when he was up there? Are princes satisfied with so little? We were in good hands indeed!”
C’est chose que i’ay veu souuent de mon temps. Voyre et le masque des grandeurs, qu’on represente aux comedies, nous touche aucunement et nous pippe. Ce que i’adore moy-mesmes aux Roys, c’est la foule de leurs adorateurs. Toute inclination et soubmission leur est deuë, sauf celle de l’entendement. Ma raison n’est pas duite à se courber et fleschir, ce sont mes genoux. Melanthius interrogé ce qu’il luy sembloit de la tragedie de Dionysius: Ie ne l’ay, dit-il, point veuë, tant elle est offusquee de langage. Aussi la pluspart de ceux qui iugent les discours des grans, deburoient dire: Ie n’ay point entendu son propos, tant il estoit offusqué de grauité, de grandeur, et de majesté.
It is something I have often seen in my time. Indeed, even the mask of greatness that is represented in plays touches us somewhat and deceives us. What I myself worship in kings is the crowd of their worshipers. All bowing and submission is due to them, except that of the understanding. My reason is not trained to bend and bow; my knees are. Melanthius, asked what he thought of Dionysius’s tragedy, said: “I have not seen it, it is so obscured by language.” So too most of those who judge the speeches of the great ought to say: “I did not understand what he said, it was so obscured by gravity, grandeur and majesty.”
Antisthenes suadoit vn iour aux Atheniens, qu’ils commandassent, que leurs asnes fussent aussi bien employez au labourage des terres, comme estoyent les cheuaux: sur quoy il luy fut respondu, que cet animal n’estoit pas nay à vn tel seruice: C’est tout vn, repliqua il; il n’y va que de vostre ordonnance: car les plus ignorans et incapables hommes, que vous employez aux commandemens de vos guerres, ne laissent pas d’en deuenir incontinent tres-dignes, par ce que vous les y employez. A quoy touche l’vsage de tant de peuples, qui canonizent le Roy, qu’ils ont faict d’entre eux, et ne se contentent point de l’honnorer, s’ils ne l’adorent.
Antisthenes one day urged the Athenians to order that their donkeys be used to plow the fields just as the horses were. He was told in reply that this animal was not born for such service. “It makes no difference,” he answered; “it depends only on your order. For the most ignorant and incapable men you appoint to command in your wars nonetheless become at once most worthy of it, simply because you appoint them.” This bears on the custom of so many peoples who canonize the king they have made from among themselves, and are not content to honor him unless they worship him.
Ceux de Mexico, dépuis que les ceremonies de son sacre sont paracheuees, n’osent plus le regarder au visage: ains comme s’ils l’auoient deifié par sa royauté, entre les serments qu’ils luy font iurer, de maintenir leur religion, leurs loix, leurs libertez, d’estre vaillant, iuste et debonnaire: il jure aussi, de faire marcher le soleil en sa lumiere accoustumee: d’esgouster les nuees en temps opportun: courir aux riuieres leurs cours: et faire porter à la terre toutes choses necessaires à son peuple.
The people of Mexico, once the ceremonies of his coronation are completed, no longer dare look him in the face. Rather, as if they had deified him by making him king, among the oaths they make him swear—to maintain their religion, their laws, their liberties, and to be valiant, just and kindly—he also swears to make the sun move in its accustomed light, to make the clouds drain their rain at the proper time, to make the rivers run their courses, and to make the earth bear all things needful for his people.
Ie suis diuers à cette façon commune: et me deffie plus de la suffisance, quand ie la vois accompagnée de grandeur de fortune, et de recommandation populaire. Il nous fault prendre garde, combien c’est, de parler à son heure, de choisir son poinct, de rompre le propos, ou le changer, d’vne authorité magistrale: de se deffendre des oppositions d’autruy, par vn mouuement de teste, vn sous-ris, ou vn silence, deuant vne assistance, qui tremble de reuerence et de respect. Vn homme de monstrueuse fortune, venant mesler son aduis à certain leger propos, qui se demenoit tout laschement, en sa table, commença iustement ainsi: Ce ne peut estre qu’vn menteur ou ignorant, qui dira autrement que, etc. Suyuez cette poincte philosophique, vn poignart à la main.
I differ from this common way: I distrust ability the more when I see it accompanied by great fortune and popular esteem. We must take note how much it counts to speak when one pleases, to pick one’s moment, to break off the conversation or change it with magisterial authority; to fend off other people’s objections with a nod of the head, a smile or a silence, before an audience trembling with reverence and respect. A man of prodigious fortune, adding his opinion to some light conversation that was idly going on at his table, began exactly like this: “Only a liar or an ignoramus would say otherwise than,” etc. Pursue that philosophical point—with a dagger in your hand.
Testing borrowed wit
A fine saying from a fool must be probed to see how far he understands it.
Voicy vn autre aduertissement, duquel ie tire grand vsage. C’est qu’aux disputes et conferences, tous les mots qui nous semblent bons, ne doiuent pas incontinent estre acceptez. La plus part des hommes sont riches d’vne suffisance estrangere. Il peut bien aduenir à tel, de dire vn beau traict, vne bonne responce et sentence, et la mettre en auant, sans en cognoistre la force. Qu’on ne tient pas tout ce qu’on emprunte, à l’aduenture se pourra-il verifier par moy-mesme. Il n’y faut point tousiours ceder, quelque verité ou beauté qu’elle ayt. Ou il la faut combatre à escient, ou se tirer arriere, soubs couleur de ne l’entendre pas: pour taster de toutes parts, comment elle est logee en son autheur.
Here is another piece of advice from which I get great use. It is that in disputes and conversations, not every remark that seems good to us should be accepted straightaway. Most men are rich with borrowed ability. A man may well happen to say a fine thing, a good reply or maxim, and put it forward without knowing its force. That we do not truly hold everything we borrow can perhaps be verified by me myself. We must not always yield to it, whatever truth or beauty it has. Either we must fight it in earnest, or draw back on the pretext of not understanding it, so as to probe from every side how it is lodged in its author.
Il peut aduenir, que nous nous enferrons, et aydons au coup, outre sa portee. I’ay autrefois employé à la necessité et presse du combat, des reuirades, qui ont faict faucee outre mon dessein, et mon esperance. Ie ne les donnois qu’en nombre, on les reçeuoit en poix. Tout ainsi, comme, quand ie debats contre vn homme vigoureux; ie me plais d’anticiper ses conclusions: ie luy oste la peine de s’interpreter: i’essaye de preuenir son imagination imparfaicte encores et naissante: l’ordre et la pertinence de son entendement, m’aduertit et menace de loing: de ces autres ie fais tout le rebours, il ne faut rien entendre que par eux, ny rien presupposer.
It may happen that we run onto the blade and help the blow beyond its reach. In the need and heat of combat, I have sometimes used counterthrusts that went through further than I intended or hoped. I delivered them only by count; they were received by weight. Just so, when I argue with a vigorous man, I like to anticipate his conclusions; I spare him the trouble of explaining himself; I try to forestall his idea while it is still incomplete and just being born; the order and pertinence of his understanding warn and threaten me from afar. With these others I do just the opposite: we must understand nothing except through them, and presuppose nothing.
S’ils iugent en parolles vniuerselles: Cecy est bon, cela ne l’est pas; et qu’ils rencontrent, voyez si c’est la fortune, qui rencontre pour eux. Qu’ils circonscriuent et restreignent vn peu leur sentence: Pourquoy c’est; par où c’est. Ces iugements vniuersels, que ie voy si ordinaires, ne disent rien. Ce sont gents, qui salüent tout vn peuple, en foulle et en troupe. Ceux qui en ont vraye cognoissance, le salüent et remarquent nommement et particulierement. Mais c’est vne hazardeuse entreprinse.
If they judge in general terms—“This is good, that is not”—and they hit the mark, see whether it is Fortune that hits it for them. Let them circumscribe and narrow their verdict a little: why it is so, in what respect it is so. These sweeping judgments, which I see so commonly, say nothing. They come from people who greet a whole population in a mass and a crowd. Those who really know it greet each person and pick them out by name and individually. But that is a risky undertaking.
D’où i’ay veu plus souuent que tous les iours, aduenir que les esprits foiblement fondez, voulants faire les ingenieux à remarquer en la lecture de quelque ouurage, le point de la beauté: arrestent leur admiration, d’vn si mauuais choix, qu’au lieu de nous apprendre l’excellence de l’autheur, ils nous apprennent leur propre ignorance. Cette exclamation est seure: Voyla qui est beau: ayant oüy vne entiere page de Vergile. Par là se sauuent les fins. Mais d’entreprendre à le suiure par espaulettes, et de iugement expres et trié, vouloir remarquer par où vn bon autheur se surmonte: poisant les mots, les phrases, les inuentions et ses diuerses vertus, l’vne apres l’autre: ostez vous de là.
Hence I have seen it happen more often than every day that poorly grounded minds, trying to show their cleverness by pointing out, as they read some work, where its beauty lies, fix their admiration on so bad a choice that instead of teaching us the excellence of the author they teach us their own ignorance. This exclamation is safe: “That is beautiful!” after hearing a whole page of Virgil. That is how the shrewd get by. But to undertake to follow him bit by bit, and, with explicit and discriminating judgment, try to point out where a good author surpasses himself, weighing the words, the phrases, the inventions and his various excellences one after another—stay clear of that!
Videndum est non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque sentiat, atque etiam qua de causa quisque sentiat.
We must consider not only what each man says, but also what he thinks, and even why he thinks it.
I’oy journellement dire à des sots, des mots non sots. Ils disent vne bonne chose: sçachons iusques où ils la cognoissent, voyons par où ils la tiennent. Nous les aydons à employer ce beau mot, et cette belle raison, qu’ils ne possedent pas, ils ne l’ont qu’en garde: ils l’auront produicte à l’auanture, et à tastons, nous la leur mettons en credit et en prix. Vous leur prestez la main. A quoy faire? Ils ne vous en sçauent nul gré, et en deuiennent plus ineptes. Ne les secondez pas, laissez les aller: ils manieront cette matiere, comme gens qui ont peur de s’eschauder, ils n’osent luy changer d’assiette et de iour, ny l’enfoncer.
Every day I hear fools say things that are not foolish. They say a good thing: let us find out how far they understand it, let us see by what end they hold it. We help them make use of that fine phrase and that fine argument which they do not own—they only have it in safekeeping; they will have brought it out by chance and groping; we give it credit and value for them. You lend them a hand. What for? They are not in the least grateful to you, and they become sillier for it. Don’t back them up; let them go on. They will handle that material like people afraid of scalding themselves; they dare not change its position or its light, nor go deeper into it.
Croullez la tant soit peu; elle leur eschappe: ils vous la quittent, toute forte et belle qu’elle est. Ce sont belles armes: mais elles sont mal emmanchees. Combien de fois en ay-ie veu l’experience? Or si vous venez à les esclaircir et confirmer, ils vous saisissent et desrobent incontinent cet aduantage de vostre interpretation: C’estoit ce que ie voulois dire: voyla iustement ma conception: si ie ne l’ay ainsin exprimé, ce n’est que faute de langue. Souflez. Il faut employer la malice mesme, à corriger cette fiere bestise. Le dogme d’Hegesias, Qu’il ne faut ny haïr, ny accuser: ains instruire: a de la raison ailleurs.
Shake it ever so little and it slips from them; they surrender it to you, strong and beautiful as it is. They are fine weapons, but badly hafted. How often have I seen this proved? Now if you go on to clarify and support them, they at once seize and steal from you the advantage of your interpretation: “That was what I meant; that is exactly my idea; if I didn’t express it that way, it was only for want of words.” Puff away! We must use even malice to correct this proud stupidity. The doctrine of Hegesias, that we should neither hate nor accuse, but instruct, has reason in it elsewhere.
Mais icy, c’est iniustice et inhumanité de secourir et redresser celuy, qui n’en a que faire, et qui en vaut moins. I’ayme à les laisser embourber et empestrer encore plus qu’ils ne sont: et si auant, s’il est possible, qu’en fin ils se recognoissent.
But here it is injustice and inhumanity to rescue and set right someone who has no use for it and is the worse for it. I like to let them get bogged down and entangled even more than they are, and so deeply, if possible, that in the end they recognize themselves.
La sottise et desreglement de sens, n’est pas chose guerissable par vn traict d’aduertissement. Et pouuons proprement dire de cette reparation, ce que Cyrus respond à celuy, qui le presse d’enhorter son ost, sur le point d’vne bataille: Que les hommes ne se rendent pas courageux et belliqueux sur le champ, par vne bonne harangue: non plus qu’on ne deuient incontinent musicien, pour ouyr vne bonne chanson. Ce sont apprentissages, qui ont à estre faicts auant la main, par longue et constante institution. Nous deuons ce soing aux nostres, et cette assiduité de correction et d’instruction: mais d’aller prescher le premier passant, et regenter l’ignorance ou ineptie du premier rencontré, c’est vn vsage auquel ie veux grand mal.
Stupidity and a disordered mind are not curable by a stroke of admonition. And we may fitly say of this kind of repair what Cyrus answers to the man who urges him to exhort his army on the point of battle: that men are not made brave and warlike on the spot by a good speech, any more than one becomes a musician at once by hearing a good song. These are apprenticeships that have to be served beforehand, through long and steady education. We owe this care to our own people, and this diligence in correction and instruction; but to go preaching to the first passerby and lecturing the ignorance or foolishness of the first person we meet is a practice I strongly dislike.
Rarement le fais-ie, aux propos mesme qui se passent auec moy, et quitte plustost tout, que de venir à ces instructions reculees et magistrales. Mon humeur n’est propre, non plus à parler qu’à escrire, pour les principians. Mais aux choses qui se disent en commun, ou entre autres, pour fauces et absurdes que ie les iuge, ie ne me iette iamais à la trauerse, ny de parole ny de signe.
I rarely do it, even in conversations held with me, and I would rather give up altogether than resort to these magisterial lessons that go back to first principles. My temperament is not suited to speaking, any more than to writing, for beginners. But as for things said in company or among others, however false and absurd I judge them, I never throw myself in the way, by word or by sign.
Au demeurant rien ne me despite tant en la sottise, que, dequoy elle se plaist plus, que aucune raison ne se peut raisonnablement plaire. C’est mal’heur, que la prudence vous deffend de vous satisfaire et fier de vous, et vous en enuoye tousiours mal content et craintif: là où l’opiniastreté et la temerité, remplissent leurs hostes d’esiouïssance et d’asseurance. C’est aux plus mal habiles de regarder les autres hommes par dessus l’espaule, s’en retournans tousiours du combat, pleins de gloire et d’allegresse. Et le plus souuent encore cette outrecuidance de langage et gayeté de visage, leur donne gaigné, à l’endroit de l’assistance, qui est communément foible et incapable de bien iuger, et discerner les vrays aduantages.
For the rest, nothing vexes me so much about stupidity as that it is more pleased with itself than any reason can reasonably be. It is a misfortune that prudence forbids you to be satisfied with yourself and to trust yourself, and always sends you away discontented and fearful, whereas obstinacy and rashness fill their hosts with joy and assurance. It is the least capable who look down on other men over their shoulder, always coming back from the fight full of glory and gladness. And most often, too, this arrogance of speech and cheerfulness of face wins them the day with the audience, which is commonly weak and incapable of judging well and discerning the real advantages.
Banter among friends
Sharp, playful teasing is a useful kind of conversation; rough horseplay is not.
L’obstination et ardeur d’opinion, est la plus seure preuue de bestise. Est il rien certain, resolu, dedeigneux, contemplatif, serieux, graue, comme l’asne? Pouuons nous pas mesler au tiltre de la conference et communication, les deuis poinctus et coupez que l’alegresse et la priuauté introduit entre les amis, gaussans et gaudissans plaisamment et vifuement les vns les autres? Exercice auquel ma gayeté naturelle me rend assez propre. Et s’il n’est aussi tendu et serieux que cet autre exercice que ie viens de dire, il n’est pas moins aigu et ingenieux, ny moins profitable, comme il sembloit à Lycurgus.
Obstinacy and heat of opinion are the surest proof of stupidity. Is there anything as certain, resolute, disdainful, contemplative, serious and grave as the donkey? May we not include under the heading of conversation and exchange the sharp, clipped banter that high spirits and intimacy bring in among friends, teasing and joking with one another pleasantly and briskly? It is an exercise for which my natural gaiety makes me fairly well suited. And if it is not as taut and serious as that other exercise I have just spoken of, it is no less keen and clever, nor less profitable, as Lycurgus thought.
Pour mon regard i’y apporte plus de liberté que d’esprit, et y ay plus d’heur que d’inuention: mais ie suis parfaict en la souffrance: car i’endure la reuenche, non seulement aspre, mais indiscrete aussi, sans alteration. Et à la charge qu’on me fait, si ie n’ay dequoy repartir brusquement sur le champ, ie ne vay pas m’amusant à suiure cette poincte, d’vne contestation ennuyeuse et lasche, tirant à l’opiniastreté. Ie la laisse passer, et baissant ioyeusement les oreilles, remets d’en auoir ma raison à quelque heure meilleure. Il n’est pas marchant qui tousiours gaigne. La plus part changent de visage, et de voix, où la force leur faut: et par vne importune cholere, au lieu de se venger, accusent leur foiblesse, ensemble et leur impatience.
For my part, I bring to it more freedom than wit, and I have more luck at it than invention; but I am perfect at taking it, for I endure retaliation—not only sharp but even tactless—without getting upset. And when I am attacked, if I have nothing to retort smartly on the spot, I do not waste my time pursuing the point with a tedious, feeble wrangle that verges on obstinacy. I let it pass, and, cheerfully lowering my ears, I put off getting even until some better hour. No merchant always makes a profit. Most people change their face and their voice when their strength fails them, and by an unseasonable anger, instead of getting their revenge, they betray their weakness and their impatience together.
En cette gaillardise nous pinçons par fois des cordes secrettes de nos imperfections, lesquelles, rassis, nous ne pouuons toucher sans offence: et nous entraduertissons vtilement de nos deffauts.
In this playfulness we sometimes pluck the secret strings of our imperfections, which we cannot touch in a calmer mood without giving offense; and we usefully warn one another of our faults.
Il y a d’autres ieux de main, indiscrets et aspres, à la Françoise: que ie hay mortellement: i’ay la peau tendre et sensible: i’en ay veu en ma vie, enterrer deux Princes de nostre sang royal. Il fait laid se battre en s’esbatant.
There are other games of horseplay, tactless and rough, in the French manner, which I hate mortally: I have a tender, sensitive skin. In my lifetime I have seen two princes of our royal blood buried because of them. It is an ugly thing to come to blows in fun.
Judging a man’s work
He asks writers what they think best in their work, and doubts his own judgment of the Essays.
Au reste, quand ie veux iuger de quelqu’vn, ie luy demande combien il se contente de soy: iusques où son parler ou sa besongne luy plaist. Ie veux euiter ces belles excuses, Ie le fis en me ioüant: Ablatum mediis opus est incudibus istud: ie n’y fus pas vne heure: ie ne l’ay reueu depuis. Or dis-ie, laissons donc ces pieces, donnez m’en vne qui vous represente bien entier, par laquelle il vous plaise qu’on vous mesure. Et puis: que trouuez vous le plus beau en vostre ouurage? est-ce ou cette partie, ou cette cy? la grace, ou la matiere, ou l’inuention, ou le iugement, ou la science? Car ordinairement ie m’apperçoy, qu’on faut autant à iuger de sa propre besongne, que de celle d’autruy.
Moreover, when I want to judge someone, I ask him how far he is satisfied with himself, how much his speech or his work pleases him. I want to avoid those fine excuses: “I did it for fun”; This work was taken from the anvil half-finished; “I wasn’t at it for an hour”; “I haven’t looked at it since.” Well then, I say, let us leave those pieces aside; give me one that represents you whole, one by which you would like to be measured. And then: what do you find finest in your work? Is it this part or that one? The grace, or the matter, or the invention, or the judgment, or the learning? For I usually notice that people err as much in judging their own work as in judging other people’s.
Non seulement pour l’affection qu’on y mesle: mais pour n’auoir la suffisance de la cognoistre et distinguer. L’ouurage de sa propre force, et fortune, peult seconder l’ouurier et le deuancer outre son inuention, et cognoissance. Pour moy, ie ne iuge la valeur d’autre besongne, plus obscurement que de la mienne: et loge les Essais tantost bas, tantost haut, fort inconstamment et doubteusement. Il y a plusieurs liures vtiles à raison de leurs subiects, desquels l’autheur ne tire aucune recommandation: et des bons liures, comme des bons ouurages, qui font honte à l’ouurier.
Not only because of the affection they mix into it, but because they lack the ability to know it and to distinguish its parts. A work, by its own force and fortune, can second the workman and outstrip him beyond his invention and knowledge. For my part, I judge the worth of no one else’s work more obscurely than my own; and I place the Essays now low, now high, very inconstantly and doubtfully. There are many books that are useful by reason of their subjects, from which the author gains no credit; and there are good books, as there are good works, that put the workman to shame.
I’escriray la façon de nos conuiues, et de nos vestemens: et l’escriray de mauuaise grace: ie publieray les edicts de mon temps, et les lettres des Princes qui passent és mains publiques: ie feray vn abbregé sur vn bon liure (et tout abbregé sur vn bon liure est vn sot abbregé) lequel liure viendra à se perdre: et choses semblables. La posterité retirera vtilité singuliere de telles compositions: moy quel honneur, si ce n’est de ma bonne fortune? Bonne part des liures fameux, sont de cette condition.
I will write about the fashion of our banquets and of our clothes, and write about it gracelessly; I will publish the edicts of my time and the letters of princes that pass into public hands; I will make an abridgment of a good book (and every abridgment of a good book is a foolish abridgment), which book will then come to be lost; and things like that. Posterity will derive singular use from such compositions; but what honor will there be for me, except for my good luck? A good many famous books are of this kind.
Quand ie leuz Philippes de Comines, il y a plusieurs annees, tresbon autheur certes; i’y remarquay ce mot pour non vulgaire: Qu’il se faut bien garder de faire tant de seruice à son maistre, qu’on l’empesche d’en trouuer la iuste recompence. Ie deuois louer l’inuention, non pas luy. Ie la rencontray en Tacitus, il n’y a pas long temps: Beneficia eò vsque læta sunt, dum videntur exolui posse; vbi multum anteuenere, pro gratia odium redditur. Et Seneque vigoureusement: Nam qui putat esse turpe non reddere, non vult esse cui reddat. Q.
When I read Philippe de Commynes several years ago—a very good author, certainly—I noted in him this saying as uncommon: that one must take good care not to do one’s master so much service that one prevents him from finding a fitting reward for it. I should have praised the idea, not him. I came across it in Tacitus not long ago: Benefits are welcome so long as they seem repayable; when they go far beyond that, hatred is returned instead of gratitude. And Seneca, vigorously: For he who thinks it shameful not to repay does not want there to be anyone to repay. Q.
Cicero d’vn biais plus lasche: Qui se non putat satisfacere modo amicus esse nullo, potest. Le subiect selon qu’il est, peut faire trouuer vn homme sçauant et memorieux: mais pour iuger en luy les parties plus siennes, et plus dignes, la force et beaute de son ame: il faut sçauoir ce qui est sien, et ce qui ne l’est point: et en ce qui n’est pas sien, combien on luy doibt en consideration du choix, disposition, ornement, et langage qu’il a fourny. Quoy, s’il y a emprunté la matiere, et empiré la forme? comme il aduient souuent.
Cicero, from a slacker angle: Whoever thinks he cannot repay you can in no way be your friend. The subject, depending on what it is, may make a man seem learned and gifted with a good memory; but to judge the qualities in him that are most his own and most worthy, the strength and beauty of his soul, we must know what is his and what is not; and, in what is not his, how much we owe him for the choice, arrangement, ornament and language he has supplied. What if he has borrowed the matter and spoiled the form, as often happens?
Nous autres qui auons peu de practique auec les liures, sommes en cette peine: que quand nous voyons quelque belle inuention en vn poëte nouueau, quelque fort argument en vn prescheur, nous n’osons pourtant les en louer, que nous n’ayons prins instruction de quelque sçauant, si cette piece leur est propre, ou si elle est estrangere. Iusques lors ie me tiens tousiours sur mes gardes.
Those of us who have little familiarity with books are in this difficulty: when we see some fine idea in a new poet, some strong argument in a preacher, we still dare not praise them for it until we have learned from some scholar whether this piece is their own or borrowed. Until then I always stay on my guard.
Reading Tacitus
A verdict on Tacitus: his judgment, his style, his view of Pompey and his reports of prodigies.
Ie viens de courre d’vn fil, l’histoire de Tacitus (ce qui ne m’aduient guere, il y a vingt ans que ie ne mis en liure, vne heure de suite) et l’ay faict, à la suasion d’vn Gentil-homme que la France estime beaucoup: tant pour sa valeur propre, que pour vne constante forme de suffisance, et bonté, qui se voit en plusieurs freres qu’ils sont. Ie ne sçache point d’autheur, qui mesle à vn registre public, tant de consideration des mœurs, et inclinations particulieres.
I have just read straight through Tacitus’s history (which hardly ever happens to me: it is twenty years since I spent a single hour at a stretch on a book), and I did so at the urging of a gentleman whom France holds in high esteem, both for his own worth and for a constant form of ability and goodness that is seen in the several brothers that they are. I know of no author who mixes into a public record so much consideration of private manners and inclinations.
Et me semble le rebours, de ce qu’il luy semble à luy: qu’ayant specialement à suiure les vies des Empereurs de son temps, si diuerses et extremes, en toute sorte de formes: tant de notables actions, que nommément leur cruauté produisit en leurs subiects: il auoit vne matiere plus forte et attirante, à discourir et à narrer, que s’il eust eu à dire des batailles et agitations vniuerselles. Si que souuent ie le trouue sterile, courant par dessus ces belles morts, comme s’il craignoit nous fascher de leur multitude et longueur. Cette forme d’histoire, est de beaucoup la plus vtile. Les mouuemens publics, dependent plus de la conduicte de la Fortune, les priuez de la nostre.
And I think the opposite of what he thinks: that, having in particular to follow the lives of the emperors of his time, so strange and extreme in every sort of way, and so many notable actions that their cruelty above all produced in their subjects, he had stronger and more attractive material to discuss and narrate than if he had had to tell of battles and general upheavals. So much so that I often find him barren, running over those fine deaths as if he feared to weary us with their number and length. This form of history is by far the most useful. Public movements depend more on the guidance of Fortune, private ones on our own.
C’est plustost vn iugement, que deduction d’histoire: il y a plus de preceptes, que de contes: ce n’est pas vn liure à lire, c’est vn liure à estudier et apprendre: il est si plein de sentences, qu’il y en a à tort et à droict: c’est vne pepiniere de discours ethiques, et politiques, pour la prouision et ornement de ceux, qui tiennent quelque rang au maniement du monde. Il plaide tousiours par raisons solides et vigoureuses, d’vne façon poinctue, et subtile: suyuant le stile affecté du siecle. Ils aymoient tant à s’enfler, qu’où ils ne trouuoyent de la poincte et subtilité aux choses, ils l’empruntoyent des parolles. Il ne retire pas mal à l’escrire de Seneque. Il me semble plus charnu, Seneque plus aigu.
It is a judgment rather than a narration of history; there are more precepts than stories in it; it is not a book to read, it is a book to study and learn. It is so full of maxims that they are scattered everywhere, right and left: it is a nursery of ethical and political reflections, for the supply and adornment of those who hold some rank in the management of the world. He always pleads with solid and vigorous reasons, in a pointed and subtle manner, following the affected style of the age. They loved so much to puff themselves up that where they found no point or subtlety in things, they borrowed it from words. His writing is not unlike Seneca’s. He seems to me meatier, Seneca sharper.
Son seruice est plus propre à vn estat trouble et malade, comme est le nostre present: vous diriez souuent qu’il nous peinct et qu’il nous pinse.
His service is better suited to a troubled and sick state, such as ours is at present: you would often say he is painting us and pinching us.
Ceux qui doubtent de sa foy, s’accusent assez de luy vouloir mal d’ailleurs. Il a les opinions saines, et pend du bon party aux affaires Romaines. Ie me plains vn peu toutesfois, dequoy il a iugé de Pompeius plus aigrement, que ne porte l’aduis des gens de bien, qui ont vescu et traicté auec luy: de l’auoir estimé du tout pareil à Marius et à Sylla, sinon d’autant qu’il estoit plus couuert. On n’a pas exempté d’ambition, son intention au gouuernement des affaires, ny de vengeance: et ont crainct ses amis mesmes, que la victoire l’eust emporté outre les bornes de la raison: mais non pas iusques a vne mesure si effrenee.
Those who doubt his good faith give themselves away well enough as bearing him ill will for other reasons. His opinions are sound, and he leans to the right side in Roman affairs. I do complain a little, though, that he judged Pompey more harshly than the opinion of the good men who lived and dealt with him warrants, and thought him altogether like Marius and Sulla, except that he was more secretive. Pompey’s intentions in the government of affairs have not been held free of ambition, nor of vengeance; and even his friends feared that victory would have carried him beyond the bounds of reason—but not to so unbridled a degree.
Il n’y a rien en sa vie, qui nous ayt menassé d’vne si expresse cruauté et tyrannie. Encores ne faut-il pas contrepoiser le souspçon à l’euidence: ainsi ie ne l’en crois pas. Que ses narrations soient naifues et droictes, il se pourroit à l’auanture argumenter de cecy mesme: Qu’elles ne s’appliquent pas tousiours exactement aux conclusions de ses iugements: lesquels il suit selon la pente qu’il y a prise, souuent outre la matiere qu’il nous montre: laquelle il n’a daigné incliner d’vn seul air. Il n’a pas besoing d’excuse, d’auoir approuué la religion de son temps, selon les loix qui luy commandoient, et ignoré la vraye. Cela, c’est son malheur, non pas son defaut.
There is nothing in his life that threatened us with such outright cruelty and tyranny. Besides, suspicion must not be weighed against evidence; so I do not believe Tacitus on this. That his narratives are artless and straightforward could perhaps be argued from this very fact: that they do not always fit exactly the conclusions of his judgments, which he follows according to the bent he has taken, often beyond the material he shows us, and that material he has not deigned to tilt in the slightest. He needs no excuse for having approved the religion of his time, according to the laws that commanded him, and for having been ignorant of the true one. That is his misfortune, not his defect.
I’ay principalement consideré son iugement, et n’en suis pas bien esclaircy par tout. Comme ces mots de la lettre que Tibere vieil et malade, enuoyoit au Senat: Que vous escriray-ie messieurs, ou comment vous escriray-ie, ou que ne vous escriray-ie point, en ce temps? Les dieux, et les deesses me perdent pirement, que ie ne me sens tous les iours perir, si ie le sçay. Ie n’apperçoy pas pourquoy il les applique si certainement, à vn poignant remors qui tourmente la conscience de Tibere. Aumoins lors que i’estois à mesme, ie ne le vis point.
I have chiefly considered his judgment, and I am not entirely clear about it throughout. Take these words from the letter that Tiberius, old and ill, sent to the Senate: “What shall I write to you, sirs, or how shall I write to you, or what shall I not write to you at this time? May the gods and goddesses destroy me worse than I feel myself perishing every day, if I know.” I do not see why he applies them so confidently to a stinging remorse tormenting Tiberius’s conscience. At least when I was reading it, I did not see it.
Cela m’a semblé aussi vn peu lasche, qu’ayant eu à dire, qu’il auoit exercé certain honnorable magistrat à Rome, il s’aille excusant que ce n’est point par ostentation, qu’il l’a dict. Ce traict me semble bas de poil, pour vne ame de sa sorte. Car le n’oser parler rondement de soy, accuse quelque faute de cœur. Vn iugement roide et hautain, et qui iuge sainement, et seurement: il vse à toutes mains, des propres exemples, ainsi que de chose estrangere: et tesmoigne franchement de luy, comme de chose tierce. Il faut passer par dessus ces regles populaires, de la ciuilité, en faueur de la verité, et de la liberté. I’ose non seulement parler de moy: mais parler seulement de moy.
It also seemed to me a little weak that, having had to mention that he had held a certain honorable magistracy in Rome, he goes on to excuse himself, saying that it was not out of ostentation that he said so. This trait seems to me shabby for a soul of his kind. For not daring to speak plainly of oneself betrays some lack of heart. A firm and lofty judgment, one that judges soundly and surely, uses its own examples on every occasion just as it would something foreign, and testifies frankly about itself as about a third party. We must pass over these common rules of civility in favor of truth and freedom. I dare not only to speak of myself, but to speak only of myself.
Ie fouruoye quand i’escry d’autre chose, et me desrobe à mon subiect. Ie ne m’ayme pas si indiscretement, et ne suis si attaché et meslé à moy, que ie ne me puisse distinguer et considerer à quartier: comme vn voysin, comme vn arbre. C’est pareillement faillir, de ne veoir pas iusques où on vaut, ou d’en dire plus qu’on n’en void. Nous deuons plus d’amour à Dieu, qu’à nous, et le cognoissons moins, et si en parlons tout nostre saoul.
I go astray when I write of anything else, and slip away from my subject. I do not love myself so indiscreetly, and am not so bound up and mingled with myself, that I cannot distinguish myself and consider myself apart, as a neighbor, as a tree. It is equally an error not to see how far one’s worth extends, or to say more of it than one sees. We owe more love to God than to ourselves, and we know him less, and yet we talk of him to our heart’s content.
Si ses escrits rapportent aucune chose de ses conditions: c’estoit vn grand personnage, droicturier, et courageux, non d’vne vertu superstitieuse, mais philosophique et genereuse. On le pourra trouuer hardy en ses tesmoignages. Comme où il tient, qu’vn soldat portant vn fais de bois, ses mains se roidirent de froid, et se collerent à sa charge, si qu’elles y demeurerent attachees et mortes, s’estants departies des bras. I’ay accoustumé en telles choses, de plier soubs l’authorité de si grands tesmoings.
If his writings reflect anything of his character, he was a great personage, upright and courageous, not with a superstitious virtue but with a philosophical and generous one. He may be found bold in his testimony. As where he maintains that a soldier carrying a load of wood had his hands stiffen with cold and stick to his burden, so that they stayed fastened there, dead, having come away from his arms. In such matters I am accustomed to bow to the authority of such great witnesses.
Ce qu’il dit aussi, que Vespasian, par la faueur du Dieu Serapis, guarit en Alexandrie vne femme aueugle, en luy oignant les yeux de sa saliue: et ie ne sçay quel autre miracle: il le fait par l’exemple et deuoir de tous bons historiens. Ils tiennent registres des euenements d’importance. Parmy les accidens publics, sont aussi les bruits et opinions populaires. C’est leur rolle, de reciter les communes creances, non pas de les regler. Cette part touche les theologiens, et les philosophes directeurs des consciences.
As for what he also says, that Vespasian, by the favor of the god Serapis, healed a blind woman in Alexandria by anointing her eyes with his spittle, and some other miracle or other: he does it following the example and the duty of all good historians. They keep records of important events, and among public occurrences are also popular rumors and opinions. It is their role to report common beliefs, not to regulate them. That part belongs to the theologians, and to the philosophers who direct consciences.
Pourtant tres-sagement, ce sien compagnon et grand homme comme luy: Equidem plura transcribo quàm credo: nam nec affirmare sustineo de quibus dubito, nec subducere quæ accepi: et l’autre: Hæc neque affirmare neque refellere operæ pretium est: famæ rerum standum est. Et escriuant en vn siecle, auquel la creance des prodiges commençoit à diminuer, il dit ne vouloir pourtant laisser d’inserer en ses annales, et donner pied à chose receuë de tant de gens de bien, et auec si grande reuerence de l’antiquité. C’est tresbien dict. Qu’ils nous rendent l’histoire, plus selon qu’ils reçoyuent, que selon qu’ils estiment. Moy qui suis Roy de la matiere que ie traicte, et qui n’en dois compte à personne, ne m’en crois pourtant pas du tout.
Therefore very wisely did that fellow historian of his, a great man like him, say: Indeed I transcribe more than I believe; for I can neither bring myself to affirm what I doubt, nor withhold what I have been told; and the other: These things are worth neither affirming nor refuting; we must abide by report. And writing in an age when belief in prodigies was beginning to decline, he says that he nevertheless does not want to fail to include in his annals, and to give a footing to, a thing accepted by so many good men and with such great reverence for antiquity. That is very well said. Let them give us history more as they receive it than as they judge it. I, who am king of the matter I treat and owe no one an account of it, nevertheless do not wholly believe myself about it.
Ie hazarde souuent des boutades de mon esprit, desquelles ie me deffie: et certaines finesses verbales dequoy ie secoue les oreilles: mais ie les laisse courir à l’auanture, ie voys qu’on s’honore de pareilles choses: ce n’est pas à moy seul d’en iuger. Ie me presente debout; et couché; le deuant et le derriere; à droitte et à gauche; et en touts mes naturels plis. Les esprits, voire pareils en force, ne sont pas tousiours pareils en application et en goust. Voyla ce que la memoire m’en presente en gros, et assez incertainement. Tous iugemens en gros, sont lasches et imparfaicts.
I often venture sallies of my mind that I distrust, and certain verbal subtleties at which I shake my ears; but I let them take their chance. I see that people take pride in such things; it is not for me alone to judge them. I present myself standing and lying down, front and back, right and left, and in all my natural folds. Minds, even when equal in strength, are not always equal in application and taste. That is what my memory presents to me about him, broadly and rather uncertainly. All broad judgments are loose and imperfect.