Τίς τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος ἢ ἐπιτήδευσις ἡμᾶς οἷ δεῖ πορευθῆναι ἀνάγει; ὅποι μὲν οὖν δεῖ ἐλθεῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην, κείσθω διωμολογημένον καὶ διὰ πολλῶν δεδειγμένον· καὶ δὴ καὶ δι’ ὧν τοῦτο ἐδείκνυτο ἀναγωγή τις ἦν. τίνα δὲ δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀναχθησόμενον; ἆρά γε τὸν πάντα ἢ τὸν πλεῖστά, φησιν, ἰδόντα, ὃς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει [εἰσῄει] εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς ἐσομένου φιλοσόφου [ἢ] μουσικοῦ τινος ἢ ἐρωτικοῦ; ὁ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ ὁ ἐρωτικὸς ἀνακτέοι. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος; ἆρά γε εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅπασι τούτοις, ἢ καθ’ ἕνα ἕκαστον εἷς τις;
What art, method or practice leads us up to where we must go? Where we must go, toward the Good and the first principle, let that be taken as agreed and shown by many arguments. And indeed the means by which it was shown were themselves a kind of leading up. But what sort of person must the one be who is to be led up? Is it the one who has seen all things, or, as he says, “most things,” who at his first birth [entered] into the seed of a man who would be a philosopher [or] a musician of some kind or a lover? The philosopher by nature, the musician and the lover must be led up. What, then, is the way? Is it one and the same for all of these, or is there a particular way for each?
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ πορεία διττὴ πᾶσιν ἢ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἢ ἄνω ἐλθοῦσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ προτέρα ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἡ δέ γε δευτέρα, οἷς ἤδη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ γενομένοις καὶ οἷον ἴχνος θεῖσιν ἐκεῖ πορεύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ τόπου ἀφίκωνται, ὃ δὴ τέλος τῆς πορείας ὂν τυγχάνει, ὅταν τις ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ γένηται τῷ νοητῷ.
For all of them the journey is twofold, whether they are going up or have arrived above. The first starts from things below. The second is for those who are already in the intelligible and have, as it were, set foot there. They must travel on until they reach the farthest point of the region, which is in fact the end of the journey, when one is at the summit of the intelligible.
ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν περιμενέτω, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς πρότερον πειρατέον λέγειν. πρῶτον δὴ διασταλτέον τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους ἡμῖν ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ τοῦ μουσικοῦ ὅστις ἐστὶ λέγοντας τὴν φύσιν. θετέον δὴ αὐτὸν εὐκίνητον καὶ ἐπτοημένον μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ παρ’ αὑτοῦ κινεῖσθαι, ἕτοιμον δὲ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων οἷον κτύπων, ὥσπερ οἱ δειλοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ψόφους, οὕτως καὶ τοῦτον πρὸς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἕτοιμον, φεύγοντα ‘δὲ’ ἀεὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ᾀδομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τὸ εὔρυθμον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον διώκειν.
But let that one wait. First we must try to speak about the leading up. First, then, we must distinguish these men, beginning with the musician and saying what he is like by nature. We must take him to be easily moved and excited by beauty, but less able to be moved by himself. He is ready to respond to whatever impressions come his way, sounds as it were. As timid people react to noises, so he reacts to tones and the beauty in them. He always flees what is out of harmony and not one in songs, and he pursues what is rhythmical and well-shaped in rhythms.
μετὰ τοίνυν τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς τούτους φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχήματα οὕτως ἀκτέον· χωρίζοντα τὴν ὕλην ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ ἀναλογίαι καὶ οἱ λόγοι εἰς τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀκτέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὡς περὶ ἃ ἐπτόητο ἐκεῖνα ἦν, ἡ νοητὴ ἁρμονία καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ καλὸν καὶ ὅλως τὸ καλόν, οὐ τό τι καλὸν μόνον, καὶ λόγους τοὺς φιλοσοφίας ἐνθετέον· ἀφ’ ὧν εἰς πίστιν ἀκτέον ὧν ἀγνοεῖ ἔχων. τίνες δὲ οἱ λόγοι, ὕστερον.
After these sensible tones, rhythms and figures, then, he must be led on like this. Separating out the matter in which the proportions and ratios are found, he must be led to the beauty that is over them. He must be taught that what he was excited about was this: the intelligible harmony, the beauty in it, and beauty in general, not just some particular beauty. And the arguments of philosophy must be planted in him. From these he must be led to conviction about what he has without knowing it. What these arguments are, we will say later.
ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικός, εἰς ὃν μεταπέσοι ἂν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ μεταπεσὼν ἢ μένοι ἂν ἢ παρέλθοι, μνημονικός ἐστί πως κάλλους· χωρὶς δὲ ἂν ἀδυνατεῖ καταμαθεῖν, πληττόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄψει καλῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ἐπτόηται. διδακτέον οὖν αὐτὸν μὴ περὶ ἓν σῶμα πεσόντα ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀκτέον τῷ λόγῳ σώματα δεικνύντα τὸ ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτὸν καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἄλλοθεν λεκτέον καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ νόμους καλοὺς δεικνύντα — ἐν ἀσωμάτοις γὰρ ὁ ἐθισμὸς τοῦ ἐρασμίου ἤδη — καὶ ὅτι ἐν τέχναις καὶ ἐν ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ἐν ἀρεταῖς. εἶτα ἓν ποιητέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὅπως ἐγγίνονται. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἤδη [δεῖ] ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ νοῦν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν· κἀκεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω πορείαν.
The lover, into whom the musician too may turn and, having turned, either stay or pass beyond, has in a way a memory of beauty. But he cannot grasp it apart from bodies; struck by the beautiful things he sees, he is excited about them. So he must be taught not to fall for one body and be excited about it. He must be led by reason to all bodies and shown what is the same in all of them. He must be told that it is other than the bodies, that it comes from elsewhere, and that it is present more fully in other things. He should be shown beautiful ways of life and beautiful laws, for here his habituation to what is lovable already lies among incorporeal things. And he should be shown that it is in arts, sciences and virtues. Then these must be made one, and he must be taught how they come to be in things. From the virtues he [must] now ascend to Intellect, to being, and There he must walk the upward journey.
ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν ἕτοιμος οὗτος καὶ οἷον ἐπτερωμένος καὶ οὐ δεόμενος χωρίσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, κεκινημένος πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀπορῶν δὲ τοῦ δεικνύντος δεῖται μόνον. δεικτέον οὖν καὶ λυτέον βουλόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν τῇ φύσει καὶ πάλαι λελυμένον. τὰ μὲν δὴ μαθήματα δοτέον πρὸς συνεθισμὸν κατανοήσεως καὶ πίστεως ἀσωμάτου — καὶ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον δέξεται φιλομαθὴς ὤν — καὶ φύσει ἐνάρετον ὄντα πρὸς τελείωσιν ἀρετῶν ἀκτέον καὶ μετὰ τὰ μαθήματα λόγους διαλεκτικῆς δοτέον καὶ ὅλως διαλεκτικὸν ποιητέον.
The philosopher by nature is ready, as it were winged. He does not need separation, as these others do. He is already moving toward what is above, and, being at a loss, he needs only someone to show him the way. So he must be shown and set free, since he is willing by his own nature and has long been free. He should be given mathematics, to accustom him to thinking about and believing in the incorporeal; he will take it in easily, being a lover of learning. And since he is naturally virtuous, he must be led to the perfection of his virtues. After mathematics he must be given the arguments of dialectic, and in general he must be made a dialectician.
τίς δὲ ἡ διαλεκτική, ἣν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις παραδιδόναι; ἔστι μὲν δὴ ἡ λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστου δυναμένη ἕξις εἰπεῖν τί τε ἕκαστον καὶ τί ἄλλων διαφέρει καὶ τίς ἡ κοινότης· ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ ποῦ τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ὅ ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ὁπόσα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα αὖ, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντων. αὕτη καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ διαλέγεται καὶ περὶ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ τί τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, ἐπιστήμῃ δηλονότι περὶ πάντων, οὐ δόξῃ.
What is dialectic, which must be handed on to the others as well? It is the state that can say, by a reasoned account, about each thing what it is, how it differs from other things, and what it has in common with them. It can say among which things each is and where each belongs, and whether it is what it is. It can say how many the things that are are, and again the things that are not, which are other than the things that are. It discusses good and not good, what falls under the good and what under its opposite, what is eternal and what is not, and it does all this by knowledge, plainly, not by opinion.
παύσασα δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδρύει τῷ νοητῷ κἀκεῖ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει τὸ ψεῦδος ἀφεῖσα ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἀληθείας πεδίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφουσα, τῇ διαιρέσει τῇ Πλάτωνος χρωμένη μὲν καὶ εἰς διάκρισιν τῶν εἰδῶν, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων νοερῶς πλέκουσα, ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ πᾶν τὸ νοητόν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀναλύουσα, εἰς ὃ ἂν ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἔλθῃ.
It stops wandering about the sensible and settles in the intelligible, and does its work there. It has let go of falsehood and nourishes the soul in what is called the plain of truth. It uses Plato’s method of division to discern the Forms and to define what each thing is, and also for the primary kinds. It weaves together, intellectually, what comes from these until it has gone through the whole intelligible world. Then it unravels it again in reverse until it arrives at the principle.
τότε δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἄγουσα, ὡς μέχρι γέ του ἐκεῖ εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, οὐδὲν ἔτι πολυπραγμονοῦσα εἰς ἓν γενομένη βλέπει, τὴν λεγομένην λογικὴν πραγματείαν περὶ προτάσεων καὶ συλλογισμῶν, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ εἰδέναι γράφειν, ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ δοῦσα· ὧν τινα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πρὸ τέχνης ἡγουμένη, κρίνουσα δὲ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἡγουμένη καὶ μεθόδου τῆς ταῦτα βουλομένης.
Then it keeps still, since for as long as it is There it is at rest. It no longer busies itself with anything; it has become one, and it looks. The so-called logical study, about propositions and syllogisms, it hands over to another art, as it would knowing how to write. It regards some of these things as necessary and as coming before art. But it judges them as it judges everything else, and considers some useful and others superfluous, belonging to the method that wants them.
ἀλλὰ πόθεν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη; ἢ νοῦς δίδωσιν ἐναργεῖς ἀρχάς, εἴ τις λαβεῖν δύναιτο ψυχή· εἶτα τὰ ἑξῆς καὶ συντίθησι καὶ συμπλέκει καὶ διαιρεῖ, ἕως [ἂν] εἰς τέλειον νοῦν ἥκῃ. ‘ἔστι γάρ’, φησιν, ‘αὕτη τὸ καθαρώτατον νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως.’ ἀνάγκη οὖν τιμιωτάτην οὖσαν ἕξιν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον εἶναι, φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, νοῦν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. τί οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία; τὸ τιμιώτατον. ἢ ταὐτὸν φιλοσοφία καὶ διαλεκτική;
But where does this science get its principles? Intellect gives clear principles, if a soul is able to take them. Then it puts together, combines and divides what follows, until it arrives at perfect intellect. “For it is,” he says, “the purest part of intellect and understanding.” Being the most valuable of our states, then, it must be concerned with being and with what is most valuable: as understanding with being, as intellect with what is beyond being. What, then, is philosophy? The most valuable thing. Are philosophy and dialectic the same?
ἢ φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ τίμιον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἰητέον ὄργανον τοῦτο εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου· οὐ γὰρ ψιλὰ θεωρήματά ἐστι καὶ κανόνες, ἀλλὰ περὶ πράγματά ἐστι καὶ οἷον ὕλην ἔχει τὰ ὄντα· ὁδῷ μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτὰ χωρεῖ ἅμα τοῖς θεωρήμασι τὰ πράγματα ἔχουσα· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ σόφισμα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινώσκει ἄλλου ποιήσαντος ὡς ἀλλότριον κρίνουσα τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀληθέσι τὸ ψεῦδος, γινώσκουσα, ὅταν τις προσαγάγῃ, ὅτι παρὰ τὸν κανόνα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
Or rather, dialectic is the valuable part of philosophy. We should not think it is the philosopher’s tool. It is not bare theorems and rules; it concerns things, and has the things that are as its matter, so to speak. It does approach them methodically, though, holding the things together with the theorems. Falsehood and sophistry it knows only incidentally, when someone else has produced them. It judges falsehood as something foreign by the truths within itself. When someone brings it forward, it recognizes that it runs against the rule of truth.
περὶ προτάσεως οὖν οὐκ οἶδε — καὶ γὰρ γράμματα — εἰδυῖα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οἶδεν ὃ καλοῦσι πρότασιν, καὶ καθόλου οἶδε τὰ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅ τε τίθησι καὶ ὃ αἴρει, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο αἴρει ὃ τίθησιν ἢ ἄλλο, καὶ εἰ ἕτερα ἢ ταὐτά, προσφερομένων ὥσπερ κατ’ αἴσθησιν ἐπιβάλλουσα, ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι δὲ ἑτέρᾳ δίδωσι τοῦτο ἀγαπώσῃ.
So it does not know about the proposition as such (that would be like knowing letters). But because it knows the truth, it knows what they call a proposition. In general, it knows the movements of the soul: what it posits and what it rejects, whether it rejects the very thing it posits or something else, and whether things are different or the same. It grasps what is put before it, as perception does, and leaves precise detail to another discipline that enjoys it.
μέρος οὖν τὸ τίμιον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα φιλοσοφία· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ φύσεως θεωρεῖ βοήθειαν παρὰ διαλεκτικῆς λαβοῦσα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀριθμητικῇ προσχρῶνται αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι· μᾶλλον μέντοι αὕτη ἐγγύθεν κομίζεται παρὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· καὶ περὶ ἠθῶν ὡσαύτως θεωροῦσα μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, προστιθεῖσα δὲ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς ἀσκήσεις, ἐξ ὧν προίασιν αἱ ἕξεις. ἴσχουσι δὲ αἱ λογικαὶ ἕξεις καὶ ὡς ἴδια ἤδη τὰ ἐκεῖθεν· καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὰ πλεῖστα· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιλογισμός τις καὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον καὶ εἰ ἀντακολουθοῦσι καὶ εἰ δεῖ νῦν ἐπισχεῖν ἢ εἰσαῦθις ἢ ὅλως ἄλλο βέλτιον· ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἔτι καθόλου καὶ ἀύλως πάντα εἰς χρῆσιν προφέρει τῇ φρονήσει.
So dialectic is the valuable part, since philosophy has other parts as well. It studies nature too, with help from dialectic, just as the other arts also make use of arithmetic, though philosophy draws on dialectic from closer at hand. It studies ethics in the same way. It contemplates from there, but adds the states and the training from which the states proceed. The rational states hold what comes from there as already their own, for most of it involves matter. The other virtues apply reasoning to particular affections and actions. Understanding is a kind of higher reasoning, more concerned with the universal. It asks whether they imply one another, and whether to hold back now or later, or whether some other course is altogether better. Dialectic and wisdom, still more universally and immaterially, supply everything for understanding to use.
πότερα δὲ ἔστι τὰ κάτω εἶναι ἄνευ διαλεκτικῆς καὶ σοφίας; ἢ ἀτελῶς καὶ ἐλλειπόντως. ἔστι δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ διαλεκτικὸν οὕτως ἄνευ τούτων; ἢ οὐδ’ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ἢ πρότερον ἢ ἅμα συναύξεται. καὶ τάχα ἂν φυσικάς τις ἀρετὰς ἔχοι, ἐξ ὧν αἱ τέλειαι σοφίας προσγενομένης. μετὰ τὰς φυσικὰς οὖν ἡ σοφία· εἶτα τελειοῖ τὰ ἤθη. ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν οὐσῶν συναύξεται ἤδη ἄμφω καὶ συντελειοῦται ἢ προλαβοῦσα ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν ἐτελείωσεν· ὅλως γὰρ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὄμμα ἀτελὲς καὶ ἦθος ἔχει, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀμφοτέραις, ἀφ’ ὧν ἔχομεν.
Can the lower virtues exist without dialectic and wisdom? Yes, but incompletely and deficiently. And can one be wise and a dialectician without the lower virtues? It could not even happen: they must either come first or grow up alongside. Perhaps one might have natural virtues, from which the complete virtues come when wisdom is added. Then wisdom comes after the natural virtues, and then it perfects character. Or rather, once the natural virtues exist, both grow together and are perfected together; or one comes first and perfects the other. For in general natural virtue has both an imperfect eye and an imperfect character, and for both of them what counts most is the principles from which we have them.