Τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἆρα τούτων μεταδώσομεν; εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ᾗ πεφύκασιν ἀνεμποδίστως διεξάγειν, κἀκεῖνα τί κωλύει ἐν εὐζωίᾳ λέγειν εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ εἴτε ἐν εὐπαθείᾳ τὴν εὐζωίαν τις θήσεται, εἴτε ἐν ἔργῳ οἰκείῳ τελουμένῳ, κατ’ ἄμφω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρξει. καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθεῖν ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργῳ εἶναι· οἷον καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ τῶν ζῴων ὅσα τοῖς τε ἄλλοις εὐπαθεῖ καὶ δὴ καὶ ᾅδοντα ᾗ πέφυκε καὶ ταύτῃ αἱρετὴν αὑτοῖς τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει.
Suppose we place living well and being happy in the same thing: are we then going to grant them to the other animals too? If they can live out their lives unhindered in the way their nature intends, what prevents us from saying that they too are living well? Whether one places living well in pleasant experience or in accomplishing one’s proper work, on both counts it will belong to the other animals as well. They can have pleasant experiences, and they can be engaged in the work that accords with their nature. Take the musical animals: they have pleasant experiences in other ways, and above all they sing as their nature intends, and in this respect too their life is worth choosing for them.
καὶ τοίνυν καὶ εἰ τέλος τι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τιθέμεθα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἐν φύσει ὀρέξεως, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν αὐτοῖς μεταδοίημεν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἔσχατον ἀφικνουμένων, εἰς ὃ ἐλθοῦσιν ἵσταται ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις πᾶσαν ζωὴν αὑτῆς διεξελθοῦσα καὶ πληρώσασα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος. εἰ δέ τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καταφέρειν εἰς τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα — οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις αὐτῶν μεταδώσειν· μεταδώσειν δὲ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ζῶσι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ζωὴν ἐξελιττομένην εἰς τέλος ἔχουσι — πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος εἶναι οὐ δόξει μὴ ζῆν εὖ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα λέγων, ὅτι μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξια αὐτῷ δοκεῖ εἶναι; τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν διδόναι ὃ τοῖς ἅπασι ζῴοις δίδωσιν, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς.
And then, if we make happiness an end, the last term of natural desire, in this way too we would grant them a share in happiness when they reach their last point. That is the point at which the nature in them comes to rest, once they arrive there, having run through its whole life and filled it out from beginning to end. But someone may balk at bringing happiness down to the other animals: for then, he says, we will be granting it even to the lowest of them, and to plants as well, since they too are alive and have a life that unfolds to its end. Then, first of all, won’t he seem absurd in saying that the other animals do not live well, just because they don’t seem to him worth much? As for plants, he would not be forced to grant them what he grants to all animals, since they have no perception.
εἴη δ’ ἄν τις ἴσως καὶ ὁ διδοὺς τοῖς φυτοῖς, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν· ζωὴ δὲ ἡ μὲν εὖ ἂν εἴη, ἡ δὲ τοὐναντίον· οἷον ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ φυτῶν εὐπαθεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ καρπὸν αὖ φέρειν καὶ μὴ φέρειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ἄτοπος ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τὸ εὖ ζῆν· καὶ εἰ ἀταραξία δὲ εἴη, ὡσαύτως· καὶ εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν δὲ λέγοιτο τὸ εὖ ζῆν εἶναι.
Perhaps, though, there may be someone who grants it to plants too, if indeed he grants them life. One life would be good, another the opposite; plants too can do well or badly, and can bear fruit or fail to. So if pleasure is the end and living well consists in it, it is absurd to deny the other animals living well. The same holds if the end is freedom from disturbance, and also if living well is said to be living in accordance with nature.
τοῖς μέντοι φυτοῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ διδόντες κινδυνεύουσιν οὐδὲ τοῖς ζῴοις ἤδη ἅπασι διδόναι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι, τὸ τὸ πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ πάθος πρὸ τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν, οἷον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν, κἂν λανθάνῃ, καὶ [τὸ] οἰκεῖον εἶναι, κἂν μήπω γινώσκηται ὅτι οἰκεῖον καὶ ὅτι ἡδύ· δεῖ γὰρ ἡδὺ εἶναι· ὥστε ἀγαθοῦ τούτου ὄντος καὶ παρόντος ἤδη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ ἔχον. ὥστε τί δεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν προσλαμβάνειν; εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ πάθει τῇ καταστάσει τὸ ἀγαθὸν διδόασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ γνώσει καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει. ἀλλ’ οὕτω γε τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐνέργειαν ζωῆς αἰσθητικῆς· ὥστε καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἀντιλαμβανομένοις.
Those, however, who refuse it to plants because they lack perception run the risk of not being able to grant it even to all animals. For if by perceiving they mean this—that an affection does not go unnoticed—then the affection must be good before it is noticed: being in one’s natural state, for instance, even if this goes unnoticed, and being in a state proper to oneself, even if one does not yet recognize that it is proper and that it is pleasant. For it must be pleasant. So if this is good and present, whatever has it is already in a state of well-being. Why, then, must perception be added? Unless, of course, they attribute the good not to the affection that occurs, the condition, but to the knowing and perceiving of it. But then they will be saying that perception itself is the good, the activity of the perceptive life—and so it will belong to those who apprehend anything whatever.
εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσιν, οἷον αἰσθήσεως τοιούτου, πῶς ἑκατέρου ἀδιαφόρου ὄντος τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν; εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ πάθος, καὶ τὴν τοιάνδε κατάστασιν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ὅταν γνῷ τις τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ παρόν, ἐρωτητέον αὐτούς, εἰ γνοὺς τὸ παρὸν δὴ τοῦτο ὅτι πάρεστιν εὖ ζῇ, ἢ δεῖ γνῶναι οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἡδύ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ’ εἰ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αἰσθήσεως τοῦτο ἔργον ἤδη, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρας μείζονος ἢ κατ’ αἴσθησιν δυνάμεως. οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδομένοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλὰ τῷ γινώσκειν δυναμένῳ, ὅτι ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δὴ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ κρίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν.
If they say the good comes from both together—from perception of a state of this kind—how can they say that what comes from both is good, when each of the two is indifferent? And if the affection is good, and living well is this sort of condition, when one knows that the good is present to one, we must ask them: does one live well by knowing that this present thing is present? Or must one know not only that it is pleasant but that it is the good? But if one must know that it is the good, this is no longer the work of perception but of another power, greater than perception. Living well, then, will belong not to those who feel pleasure, but to the one who can know that pleasure is the good. So the cause of living well will not be pleasure, but what is able to judge that pleasure is good.
καὶ τὸ μὲν κρῖνον βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ πάθος· λόγος γὰρ ἢ νοῦς· ἡδονὴ δὲ πάθος· οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος αὑτὸν ἀφεὶς ἄλλο θήσεται ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει κείμενον κρεῖττον εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ;
And what judges is better than what goes by affection: it is reason or intellect, while pleasure is an affection, and nowhere is the irrational superior to reason. How, then, could reason set itself aside and declare something else, lying in the opposite genus, to be better than itself?
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐοίκασιν, ὅσοι τε τοῖς φυτοῖς οὐ διδόασι καὶ ὅσοι αἰσθήσει τοιᾷδε τὸ εὖ, λανθάνειν ἑαυτοὺς μεῖζόν τι τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητοῦντες καὶ ἐν τρανοτέρᾳ ζωῇ τὸ ἄμεινον τιθέντες. καὶ ὅσοι δὲ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ζωῇ, οὐδ’ εἰ αἰσθητικὴ εἴη, καλῶς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιεν. διὰ τί δὲ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον μόνον τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθενται ἐρωτᾶν αὐτοὺς προσήκει· ‘ἆρά γε τὸ λογικὸν προσλαμβάνετε, ὅτι εὐμήχανος μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀνιχνεύειν καὶ περιποιεῖν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν δύναται, ἢ κἂν μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ ἀνιχνεύειν μηδὲ τυγχάνειν;
In fact it looks as though both those who refuse it to plants and those who place well-being in perception of this kind are, without realizing it, looking for something greater in living well, and placing what is better in a more vivid life. As for those who say it lies in the rational life, and not in life simply, not even in perceptive life, they may well be right. But it is fair to ask them why they confine happiness to the rational animal alone, and to put it like this. Do you add rationality because reason is more resourceful and can easily track down and secure the primary things according to nature? Or would you add it even if it could not track them down or obtain them?
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀνευρίσκειν μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, ἔσται καὶ τοῖς μὴ λόγον ἔχουσιν, εἰ ἄνευ λόγου φύσει τυγχάνοιεν τῶν πρώτων, κατὰ φύσιν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, καὶ ὑπουργὸς ἂν ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ δι’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς γίγνοιτο οὐδ’ αὖ ἡ τελείωσις αὐτοῦ, ἥν φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι.
If it is because it is better able to find them, then happiness in accordance with nature will belong even to beings without reason, if they obtain the primary things by nature without reason. Reason would then become a servant, not chosen for its own sake—and neither would its perfection, which we say is virtue.
εἰ δὲ φήσετε μὴ διὰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτα ἔχειν τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὑτὸν ἀσπαστὸν εἶναι, λεκτέον τί τε ἄλλο ἔργον αὐτοῦ καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ τί τέλειον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ.’ ποιεῖν γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν τέλειον οὐ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τὸ τέλειον αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ φύσιν ἄλλην εἶναι αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν τούτων τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν μηδὲ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν μηδ’ ὅλως τούτου τοῦ γένους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κρείττονα τούτων ἁπάντων· ἢ πῶς τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶμαι ἕξειν αὐτοὺς λέγειν. ἀλλ’ οὗτοι μέν, ἕως ἂν κρείττονα εὕρωσι φύσιν τῶν περὶ ἃ νῦν ἵστανται, ἐατέοι ἐνταυθοῖ εἶναι, οὗπερ μένειν ἐθέλουσιν, ἀπόρως ἔχοντες ὅπῃ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, οἷς δυνατόν ἐστι τούτων.
If you say that it does not owe its value to the primary things according to nature but is welcome for its own sake, you must say what other work it has, what its nature is, and what makes it perfect. For what makes it perfect must not be the contemplation of these things. Its perfection must be something else, its nature must be different, and it must not itself be one of these primary things according to nature, nor of the things from which they arise, nor of this kind at all, but superior to all of them. Otherwise I don’t think they will be able to say how it has its value. But until these people find a nature superior to the things they now stop at, they must be left where they are, where they want to stay, at a loss to say how living well belongs to those of these beings that are capable of it.
ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι. τιθέμενοι δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν ζωῇ, εἰ μὲν συνώνυμον τὸ ζῆν ἐποιούμεθα, πᾶσι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἀπέδομεν δεκτικοῖς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι, εὖ δὲ ζῆν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκεῖνα, οἷς παρῆν ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν, οὗ ἐπεφύκει δεκτικὰ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν λογικῷ ἔδομεν δύνασθαι τοῦτο, τῷ δ’ ἀλόγῳ οὐκέτι· ζωὴ γὰρ ἦν τὸ κοινόν, ὃ δεκτικὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔμελλεν εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐν ζωῇ τινι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπῆρχεν. ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ λέγοντες τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ ζωῇ τιθέντες ἠγνόησαν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν οὐδὲ ζωὴν ὑποτιθέμενοι. ποιότητα δὴ τὴν λογικὴν δύναμιν, περὶ ἣν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἀναγκάζοιντο ἂν λέγειν.
Let us, for our part, say from the beginning what we take happiness to be. Suppose we place happiness in life. If we took “life” in one and the same sense, we would grant all living things that they are receptive of happiness. We would grant that those actually live well which possessed one and the same thing, of which all living beings were by nature receptive. And we would not grant the rational being the capacity for this and deny it to the irrational. For life was the common thing, which was to be receptive of the same thing with a view to happiness, if happiness lay in some kind of life. This is why, I think, those who say happiness arises in the rational life, by not placing it in life in common, failed to notice that they were not even supposing happiness to be life. They would be forced to say that the rational power, around which happiness is constituted, is a quality.
ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς λογική ἐστι ζωή· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται· ὥστε περὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἀντιδιῃρημένον τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν [τὸ μὲν] πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι. πολλαχῶς τοίνυν τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχούσης κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὁμωνύμως τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου — ἄλλως μὲν τοῦ φυτοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου — καὶ τρανότητι καὶ ἀμυδρότητι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχόντων, ἀνάλογον δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ. καὶ εἰ εἴδωλον ἄλλο ἄλλου, δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ ὡς εἴδωλον τοῦ εὖ.
But what they start from is rational life: it is around this whole that happiness is constituted, and so it is around another kind of life. I don’t mean one kind set against another by logical division, but in the way we say that [the one] is prior and the other posterior. Life, then, is spoken of in many ways, and differs according as it is first, second and so on in order; “living” is said in different senses, in one way of the plant, in another of the irrational animal; and these differ by vividness and faintness. Clearly, then, “well” differs in proportion. And if one is an image of another, clearly the “well” of the one is also an image of the “well” of the other.
εἰ δὲ ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν — τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδενὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐλλείπει — τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, μόνῳ ἂν τῷ ἄγαν ζῶντι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχοι· τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, εἴπερ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἄριστον τὸ ὄντως ἐν ζωῇ καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχοι, οὐδ’ ἄλλο τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλαχόθεν γενόμενον παρέξει αὐτῷ ἐν ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. τί γὰρ τῇ τελείᾳ ζωῇ ἂν προσγένοιτο εἰς τὸ ἀρίστην εἶναι; εἰ δέ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐρεῖ, οἰκεῖος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν τὸ αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον ζητοῦμεν.
But if happiness belongs to whatever has life to the full—that is, what falls short in no respect of life—then happiness would belong only to what lives to the full. To it belongs the best as well, if among the things that are, the best is what is really in life, the perfect life. In this way the good would not be something brought in from outside, nor would some other thing, coming from elsewhere and serving as a base, provide it with being in a good state. For what could be added to the perfect life to make it the best? If someone says, “the nature of the Good,” that account is congenial to us; but we are not looking for the cause, we are looking for what is present within.
ὅτι δ’ ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει, καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἰνδάλματα ζωῆς καὶ οὐ τελείως οὐδὲ καθαρῶς καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ζωαὶ ἢ τοὐναντίον, πολλάκις μὲν εἴρηται· καὶ νῦν δὲ λελέχθω συντόμως ὡς, ἕως ἂν πάντα τὰ ζῶντα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ᾖ, μὴ ἐπίσης δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ζῇ; ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν καὶ τὴν τελειοτάτην εἶναι.
That the perfect life, the true and real life, is in that intellectual nature, and that the others are imperfect, phantoms of life, lives neither perfectly nor purely, and no more lives than the opposite—this has often been said. Let it be said briefly now as well: so long as all living things come from a single principle, but the others do not live to the same degree, the principle must be the first and most perfect life.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν ἔχειν οἷός τε ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν ζωὴν εὐδαίμων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐν θεοῖς ἄν τις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν θεῖτο, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνοις ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, σκεπτέον πῶς ἔστι τοῦτο. λέγω δὲ ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τελείαν ζωὴν ἄνθρωπος οὐ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνον ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ νοῦν ἀληθινόν, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων. ἀλλ’ ἆρά γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; ἢ οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχων, ὃ δὴ καί φαμεν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο φήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς τὸ τέλειον εἶναι;
If, then, a human being is able to have the perfect life, a human being who has this life is happy. If not, one would place happiness among the gods, if such life is found in them alone. Since, then, we say that happiness exists among human beings too, we must examine how this is so. What I mean is this. That a human being has the perfect life, since he has not only the perceptive life but also reasoning and true intellect, is clear from other considerations too. But does he have it as one thing having another? Or rather, is there no human being at all who does not have this, either potentially or actually—and the one who has it actually is the one we call happy? But are we to say that this perfect form of life is in him as a part of him?
ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ μεταβέβηκε πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τοῦτο· περικεῖσθαι δ’ αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα ἤδη, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι περικείμενα· ἦν δ’ ἂν αὐτοῦ κατὰ βούλησιν συνηρτημένα. τούτῳ τοίνυν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν;
Or rather, the rest of mankind have it as a sort of part, since they have it potentially, while the happy man already is this actually and has passed over into being identical with it. The other things are now merely draped around him. One would not even count them as parts of him, since they are draped around him against his will; they would be his if they were attached to him by his choice. What, then, is the good for this man?
ἢ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ [τῷ] ὅπερ ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ παρὸν ἄλλως. μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄλλο ζητεῖν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζητήσειε; τῶν μὲν γὰρ χειρόνων οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ ἀρίστῳ σύνεστιν. αὐτάρκης οὖν ὁ βίος τῷ οὕτω ζωὴν ἔχοντι. κἂν σπουδαῖος ᾖ, αὐτάρκης εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἰς κτῆσιν ἀγαθοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ἔχει. ἀλλ’ ὃ ζητεῖ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖ, καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλά τινι τῶν αὑτοῦ. σώματι γὰρ προσηρτημένῳ ζητεῖ· κἂν ζῶντι δὲ σώματι, τὰ αὑτοῦ ζῶντι τούτῳ, οὐχ ἃ τοιούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστί. καὶ γινώσκει ταῦτα καὶ δίδωσιν ἃ δίδωσιν οὐδὲν τῆς αὑτοῦ παραιρούμενος ζωῆς.
Or rather, he is his own good, by what he has. What is beyond, the cause of the good in him, is good in a different way, and is present to him in a different way. The evidence that this is so is that one in this state seeks nothing else. What, after all, could he seek? Nothing of what is worse; and he is in company with the best. So the life of one who has life in this way is self-sufficient. If he is a good man, he is self-sufficient for happiness and for the possession of the good, since there is no good he does not have. What he does seek, he seeks as a necessity, and not for himself but for something that belongs to him. He seeks it for the body attached to him; and even granting that this is a living body, he seeks what belongs to it as living, not what belongs to a man of this kind. He knows these things, and he gives what he gives without taking anything away from his own life.
οὐδ’ ἐν τύχαις τοίνυν ἐναντίαις ἐλαττώσεται εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· μένει γὰρ καὶ ὣς ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή· ἀποθνησκόντων τε οἰκείων καὶ φίλων οἶδε τὸν θάνατον ὅ τι ἐστίν, ἴσασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πάσχοντες σπουδαῖοι ὄντες. οἰκεῖοι δὲ καὶ προσήκοντες τοῦτο πάσχοντες κἂν λυπῶσιν, οὐκ αὐτόν, τὸ δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, οὗ τὰς λύπας οὐ δέξεται.
So he will not be diminished as regards happiness even in adverse fortune, since such a life remains even so. When relatives and friends die, he knows what death is—and so do those who suffer it, if they are good men. Even if relatives and kin suffering this cause him grief, they grieve not him but what in him has no intellect, and he will not take on its pains.
ἀλγηδόνες δ’ ἔτι καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν; εἰ δὲ δὴ μηδ’ ἑαυτῷ παρακολουθοῖ; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐκ φαρμάκων καί τινων νόσων. πῶς δὴ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν ἔχοι; πενίας γὰρ καὶ ἀδοξίας ἐατέον. καίτοι καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἄν τις ἀποβλέψας ἐπιστήσειε καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολυθρυλλήτους αὖ μάλιστα Πριαμικὰς τύχας· ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ φέροι καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροι, ἀλλ’ οὐ βουλητά γε ἦν αὐτῷ· δεῖ δὲ βουλητὸν τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον, ψυχὴν τοιάνδε, μὴ συναριθμεῖσθαι δ’ αὐτοῦ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν. ἑτοίμως γὰρ τοῦτο φαῖεν ἂν λαμβάνειν, ἕως ἂν αἱ τοῦ σώματος πείσεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρωνται καὶ αὖ καὶ αἱ αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγαὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίγνωνται αὐτῷ.
But what about pains and diseases, and whatever else hinders activity? And what if he is not even conscious of himself? That can happen from drugs and certain diseases. How, in all these conditions, could he have living well and happiness? Poverty and obscurity we may leave aside. And yet someone might look at these too and raise a difficulty, and above all at the much-talked-of misfortunes of Priam. For even if he bore these, and bore them easily, still they were not what he wished for; and the happy life must be one that is wished for. Besides, the good man is not just this, a soul of a certain kind, with the nature of the body not counted in with his being. They would say they readily accept this, so long as the body’s affections are referred to the man himself, and his choices and avoidances in turn are made on the body’s account.
ἡδονῆς δὲ συναριθμουμένης τῷ εὐδαίμονι βίῳ πῶς ἂν λυπηρὸν διὰ τύχας καὶ ὀδύνας ἔχων εὐδαίμων εἴη, ὅτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαίῳ ὄντι γίγνοιτο; ἀλλὰ θεοῖς μὲν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις εὐδαίμων καὶ αὐτάρκης, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσθήκην τοῦ χείρονος λαβοῦσι περὶ ὅλον χρὴ τὸ γενόμενον τὸ εὔδαιμον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ μέρος, ὅτι ἐκ θατέρου κακῶς ἔχοντος ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν καὶ θάτερον ἐμποδίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου καλῶς ἔχει. ἢ ἀπορρήξαντα δεῖ σῶμα ἢ καὶ αἴσθησιν τὴν σώματος οὕτω τὸ αὔταρκες ζητεῖν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν.
And if pleasure is counted in with the happy life, how could anyone be happy who, because of misfortunes and pains, has something distressing—when these things happen to him though he is a good man? Such a disposition may be happy and self-sufficient for gods; but human beings have received an addition of something worse, and for them one must look for happiness in the whole that has come to be, not in a part. For if one part is in a bad way, the other would necessarily be hindered in its own work, since the affairs of the first are not going well. Otherwise one would have to tear away the body, or even the body’s perception, and look for self-sufficiency for happiness that way.
Misfortune and the one good
Happiness lies in the true good alone, so pain, illness and loss cannot diminish it.
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀλγεῖν μηδὲ νοσεῖν μηδὲ δυστυχεῖν μηδὲ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις περιπίπτειν ἐδίδου ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων εἶναι ὁντινοῦν εὐδαίμονα· εἰ δ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτήσει τοῦτό ἐστι κείμενον, τί δεῖ παρέντας τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας κρίνειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα τὰ ἄλλα ζητεῖν, ἃ μὴ ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἠρίθμηται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ συμφόρησις ἦν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τούτων λεγομένων, ἐχρῆν καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἕν τι εἶναι ἀλλ’ οὐ πολλὰ δεῖ — οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τέλη ἂν ζητοῖ — ἐκεῖνο χρὴ λαμβάνειν μόνον, ὃ ἔσχατόν τέ ἐστι καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ ὃ ἡ ψυχὴ ζητεῖ ἐν αὑτῇ ἐγκολπίσασθαι.
But if the argument placed happiness in not being in pain, not being ill, not suffering misfortune, not falling into great disasters, then no one could be happy while their opposites were present. If, however, it lies in the possession of the true good, why must we pass this by, and the practice of judging the happy man by looking to it, and look for other things that are not counted as part of happiness? If it were a heap of goods and necessities, or even of things that are not necessary but are also called goods, we would have to look for these to be present too. But if the end must be one thing and not many—otherwise one would be seeking not an end but ends—one must take only that which is last and most precious, and which the soul seeks to hold close within itself.
ἡ δὲ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ ἡ βούλησις οὐχὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῇ [τῇ] φύσει ἀλλὰ παρόντα μόνον φεύγει ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποικονομούμενος ἢ καὶ προσλαμβάνειν ζητεῖ· αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτῆς, οὗ ἐγγενομένου ἀποπεπλήρωται καὶ ἔστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ βουλητὸς ὄντως βίος. τῶν δ’ ἀναγκαίων τι παρεῖναι οὐ βούλησις ἂν εἴη, εἰ κυρίως τὴν βούλησιν ὑπολαμβάνοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ καταχρώμενός τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ἀξιοῦμεν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνομεν, καὶ οὐ δήπου βουλητὸν τὸ τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης· μᾶλλον γὰρ βουλητὸν τὸ μηδὲ δεηθῆναι τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτά, ὅταν παρῇ· οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ ἀνωδυνία. τί γὰρ τούτων ἐπαγωγόν ἐστι; καταφρονεῖται γοῦν ὑγίεια παροῦσα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν.
This seeking and this wishing are not aimed at not being in such conditions. Those things reasoning avoids, not by the very nature of the soul but only when they are present, managing them away; or else it seeks to acquire them in addition. But the soul’s desire itself is for what is better than itself: when that is present within it, it is filled and comes to rest, and this is the life that is really wished for. To have some necessity present would not be an object of wishing, if one takes “wishing” in its proper sense instead of speaking loosely, just because we think it right that these things too should be present. In general we avoid evils, and surely what that kind of avoidance achieves is not an object of wishing; what is wished for, rather, is not even to need such avoidance. The things themselves bear witness to this when they are present, health, for instance, and freedom from pain. What attraction do they have? At any rate, health and freedom from pain are disregarded when they are present.
ἃ δὲ παρόντα μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαγωγὸν ἔχει οὐδὲ προστίθησί τι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀπόντα δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων λυπούντων παρουσίαν ζητεῖται, εὔλογον ἀναγκαῖα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ φάσκειν εἶναι. οὐδὲ συναριθμητέα τοίνυν τῷ τέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων ἀκέραιον τὸ τέλος τηρητέον.
Things which, when present, have no attraction and add nothing to happiness, but are sought when absent because of the distressing presence of their opposites, may reasonably be called necessities rather than goods. So they are not to be counted in with the end either. Even when they are absent and their opposites are present, the end must be kept intact.
διὰ τί οὖν ὁ εὐδαιμονῶν ταῦτα ἐθέλει παρεῖναι καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπωθεῖται; ἢ φήσομεν οὐχ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰσφέρεταί τινα μοῖραν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων ἢ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ὅτι ἐνοχλεῖ τῷ τέλει παρόντα, οὐχ ὡς ἀφαιρούμενα αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὸ ἄριστον αὐτὸ μόνον βούλεται ἔχειν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι μετ’ αὐτοῦ, ὃ ὅταν παρῇ, οὐκ ἀφῄρηται μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δ’ ὅμως κἀκείνου ὄντος. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ, εἴ τι ὁ εὐδαίμων μὴ ἐθέλοι, παρείη δὲ τοῦτο, ἤδη παραιρεῖταί τι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· ἢ οὕτω γε καθ’ ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν μεταπίπτοι ἂν καὶ ἐκπίπτοι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· οἷον εἰ καὶ παῖδα ἀποβάλοι ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν κτημάτων.
Why, then, does the happy man want these things present and push their opposites away? Perhaps we shall say: not because they contribute any share to happiness, but rather to existence. He pushes their opposites away either because they tend toward non-existence, or because their presence is a nuisance to the end—not because they take it away, but because one who has the best wants to have it alone, and nothing else with it; and this other thing, when present, has not taken the best away, but is there all the same alongside it. In general, if there is something the happy man does not want, and it is present, it does not follow that something is at once taken away from his happiness. Otherwise he would be shifting and falling out of happiness every day—if he lost a child, for instance, or any of his possessions.
καὶ μυρία ἂν εἴη ἃ οὐ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβάντα οὐδέν τι παρακινεῖ τοῦ παρόντος τέλους αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα, φασί, καὶ οὐ τὰ τυχόντα. τί δ’ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγα, ὥστ’ ἂν μὴ καταφρονηθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναβεβηκότος πρὸς τὸ ἀνωτέρω ἁπάντων τούτων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν κάτω ἐξηρτημένου; διὰ τί γὰρ τὰς μὲν εὐτυχίας, ἡλικαιοῦν ἂν ὦσιν, οὐ μεγάλα ἡγεῖται, οἷον βασιλείας καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν ἀρχάς, οὐδὲ οἰκίσεις καὶ κτίσεις πόλεων, οὐδ’ εἰ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γίγνοιντο, ἐκπτώσεις δὲ ἀρχῶν καὶ πόλεως αὑτοῦ κατασκαφὴν ἡγήσεταί τι εἶναι μέγα;
There could be countless things that turn out against his wishes without in any way disturbing the end he has attained. “But great things,” they say, “not just any.” Yet what among human affairs could be so great as not to be looked down on by one who has climbed to what is higher than all of them and no longer depends on anything below? If he does not think good fortune great, however great it may be—kingship, rule over cities and nations, the founding and building of cities, even if he does it himself—why should he think the loss of power and the razing of his own city something great?
εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ κακὸν μέγα ἢ ὅλως κακὸν, γέλοιος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δόγματος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σπουδαῖος εἴη ξύλα καὶ λίθους καὶ νὴ Δία θανάτους θνητῶν μέγα ἡγούμενος, ᾧ φαμεν δεῖν δόγμα παρεῖναι περὶ θανάτου τὸ ἄμεινον ζωῆς τῆς μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. αὐτὸς δὲ εἰ τυθείη, κακὸν οἰήσεται αὑτῷ τὸν θάνατον, ὅτι παρὰ βωμοῖς τέθνηκεν; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ταφείη, πάντως που καὶ ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τεθὲν τὸ σῶμα [ἂν] σαπείη. εἰ δ’ ὅτι μὴ πολυδαπάνως, ἀλλ’ ἀνωνύμως τέθαπται οὐκ ἀξιωθεὶς ὑψηλοῦ μνήματος, τῆς μικρολογίας. ἀλλ’ εἰ αἰχμάλωτος ἄγοιτο, πάρ τοί ἐστιν ὁδὸς ἐξιέναι, εἰ μὴ εἴη εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἰ δὲ οἰκεῖοι αὐτῷ αἰχμάλωτοι, οἷον ἑλκόμενοι υἱοὶ καὶ θυγατέρες — τί οὖν, φήσομεν, εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἑωρακώς;
And if he thought it a great evil, or an evil at all, he would be ridiculous for his opinion, and no longer a good man, if he thinks timber and stones, and even—by Zeus—the deaths of mortals something great: he who, we say, must hold the opinion about death that it is better than life with the body. And if he himself were sacrificed, will he think his death an evil because he died at an altar? Or if he is not buried? His body will rot anyway, whether laid above ground or below it. If it is because he has been buried without expense, nameless, not thought worthy of a lofty monument—how petty! If he is led off as a captive, “the road is there for you” to depart, if it is not possible to be happy. And if his family are taken captive, his sons and daughters dragged away—what then, we shall say, if he died without having seen anything of the kind?
ἆρ’ ἂν οὕτως δόξης ἔχοι ἀπιών, ὡς μὴ ἂν τούτων ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι; ἀλλ’ ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δοξάσειεν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται τοιαύταις τύχαις τοὺς οἰκείους περιπεσεῖν; ἆρ’ οὖν διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἂν δοξάσαι ὡς καὶ γενησομένου ἂν οὐκ εὐδαίμων; ἢ καὶ δοξάζων οὕτως εὐδαίμων· ὥστε καὶ γινομένου. ἐνθυμοῖτο γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς φύσις τοιαύτη, οἵαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φέρειν καὶ ἕπεσθαι χρή. καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον αἰχμάλωτοι γενόμενοι πράξουσι. καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δὲ βαρυνομένοις ἀπελθεῖν· ἢ μένοντες ἢ εὐλόγως μένουσι καὶ οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἢ ἀλόγως μένοντες, δέον μή, αὑτοῖς αἴτιοι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄνοιαν οἰκείων ὄντων αὐτὸς ἐν κακῷ ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἄλλων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστυχίας ἀναρτήσεται.
Would he then have departed holding the opinion that such things could not happen? He would be absurd. So would he not hold the opinion that his family might fall into such misfortunes? Is he not happy, then, because he would hold the opinion that it might happen? No: he is happy even holding that opinion, and so he is happy even when it happens. For he would reflect that the nature of this All is such as to bring things like this too, and one must go along with it. Many, too, will actually fare better for having become captives. And if they find it heavy to bear, it is up to them to depart. If they stay, either they stay reasonably, and there is nothing terrible in it, or they stay unreasonably, when they should not, and are themselves responsible. For he certainly will not be in an evil state because of the folly of others, even if they are his family, nor will he hang on other people’s good and bad fortune.
τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων αὐτοῦ, ὅταν σφοδραὶ ὦσιν, ἕως δύναται φέρειν, οἴσει· εἰ δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ἐξοίσουσι. καὶ οὐκ ἐλεεινὸς ἔσται ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἔνδον φέγγος, οἷον ἐν λαμπτῆρι φῶς πολλοῦ ἔξωθεν πνέοντος ἐν πολλῇ ζάλῃ ἀνέμων καὶ χειμῶνι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ παρακολουθοῖ, ἢ παρατείνοι τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον αἰρόμενον, ὥστε ἐν τῷ σφοδρῷ ὅμως μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν παρατείνοι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν βουλεύσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἀφῄρηται τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐν τούτοις. χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐχ, οἷα τοῖς ἄλλοις φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ φανεῖται ἕκαστα, καὶ οὐ μέχρι τοῦ εἴσω ἕκαστα οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ οὔτε λυπηρά, ὅταν περὶ ἄλλους τὰ ἀλγεινά· ἀσθένεια γὰρ [ἂν] εἴη ψυχῆς ἡμετέρας.
As for his own pains, when they are severe, he will bear them as long as he can; if they are too much, they will carry him off. And he will not be pitiable in his pain: his own light is within, like the light in a lantern while outside the wind blows hard in a great storm of wind and winter weather. But what if he is not conscious, or the pain stretches out, mounting so high that, severe as it is, it still does not kill? If it stretches out, he will deliberate about what he ought to do, for his self-determination is not taken away in these circumstances. One must know that things will not appear to the good man as they appear to others, and that none of them reaches inside—neither other things, nor pains, nor griefs, when the painful things happen to others. That would be a weakness of our soul.
καὶ τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ, ὅταν λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς κέρδος ἡγώμεθα καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν, εἰ γίγνοιτο, κέρδος εἶναι τιθεμένων καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐκείνων ἔτι σκοπουμένων, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῶν, ὅπως μὴ λυποίμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἡμετέρα ἤδη ἀσθένεια, ἣν δεῖ περιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐῶντας φοβεῖσθαι μὴ γένηται. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι οὕτως ἡμᾶς πεφυκέναι, ὥστε ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν οἰκείων συμφοραῖς, γιγνωσκέτω, ὅτι οὐ πάντες οὕτω, καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον ἄγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς· κάλλιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς νομιζομένοις τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δεινοῖς εἶναι.
This is shown by the fact that we consider it a gain when such things escape our notice, and count it a gain if they should happen after we are dead—looking no longer to the others’ interest but to our own, so as not to be grieved. That is already a weakness of ours, which we must strip away, not leave in place and then be afraid that it will happen. If someone says that we are so made as to feel pain at the misfortunes of our families, let him recognize that not everyone is so, and that it belongs to virtue to lead what is common to our nature toward the better and the finer, beyond what most people reach; and it is finer not to give in to what common nature thinks terrible.
οὐ γὰρ ἰδιωτικῶς δεῖ, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἀθλητὴν μέγαν διακεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης πληγὰς ἀμυνόμενον, γινώσκοντα μέν, ὅτι τινὶ φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀρεστά, τῇ δὲ αὑτοῦ φύσει οἰστά, οὐχ ὡς δεινά, ἀλλ’ ὡς παισὶ φοβερά. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἤθελεν; ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μὴ θελητά, ὅταν παρῇ, ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχει δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν παρέχουσαν.
One must be disposed not like an amateur, but like a great athlete fending off the blows of fortune. He knows that such things are unwelcome to some natures, but bearable to his own—not as terrible, but as the sort of thing that frightens children. Did he want them, then? No: but even toward what is not wished for, when it comes, he has virtue, which makes his soul hard to move and hard to affect, toward these things too.
Happy without knowing it
The good man remains happy even asleep or unconscious, since awareness is not needed for activity.
ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὴ παρακολουθῇ βαπτισθεὶς ἢ νόσοις ἢ μάγων τέχναις; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν φυλάξουσιν αὐτὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ οἷα ἐν ὕπνῳ κοιμώμενον, τί κωλύει εὐδαίμονα αὐτὸν εἶναι; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀφαιροῦνται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτόν, οὐδ’ ὑπὸ λόγον ποιοῦνται τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὡς μὴ πάντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον φήσουσιν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔτι τὸν λόγον ποιοῦνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑποθέμενοι σπουδαῖον, εἰ εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ σπουδαῖος, ζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ’ ἔστω σπουδαῖός, φασι· μὴ αἰσθανόμενος [δὲ] μηδ’ ἐνεργῶν κατ’ ἀρετήν, πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων εἴη; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο ὅτι ὑγιαίνει, ὑγιαίνει οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅτι καλός, οὐδὲν ἧττον καλός· εἰ δὲ ὅτι σοφὸς μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο, ἧττον σοφὸς ἂν εἴη;
But what if he is not conscious, submerged by diseases or by the arts of magicians? If they will grant that he remains a good man in this state, as if sunk in sleep, what prevents him from being happy? After all, they do not take happiness away from him when he is asleep, nor do they take that time into account so as to deny that he is happy his whole life. If they say he is not a good man, they are no longer talking about the good man. We, however, have assumed a good man, and are asking whether he is happy so long as he is a good man. “Granted he is a good man,” they say, “but if he is not perceiving or acting in accordance with virtue, how could he be happy?” Well, if he did not perceive that he is healthy, he would be no less healthy; and if he did not perceive that he is handsome, no less handsome. If he did not perceive that he is wise, would he be less wise?
εἰ μή πού τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν αὑτῷ παρεῖναι· ἐν γὰρ τῇ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν σοφίᾳ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν παρεῖναι. ἐπακτοῦ μὲν οὖν ὄντος τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τῆς σοφίας λέγοι ἄν τι ἴσως ὁ λόγος οὗτος· εἰ δ’ ἡ τῆς σοφίας ὑπόστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ τινί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, οὐκ ἀπόλωλε δὲ αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἔν τε τῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας αὖ ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἄυπνος ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργοῖ μὲν ἂν καὶ τότε ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾗ τοιοῦτος· λανθάνοι δ’ ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ αὐτὸν πάντα, ἀλλά τι μέρος αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ τῆς φυτικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐνεργούσης οὐκ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἀντίληψις τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, καί, εἴπερ ἦμεν τὸ φυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐνεργοῦντες ἦμεν· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐσμέν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοοῦντος ἐνέργεια· ὥστε ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου ἐνεργοῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς.
Unless perhaps someone says that in wisdom perception and consciousness of oneself must be present, since happiness too is present in wisdom when it is active. Now if understanding and wisdom were something brought in from outside, there might perhaps be something in this argument. But suppose the reality of wisdom lies in a kind of being, or rather in being itself; and this being has not perished in one who is asleep or, in general, in one said to be not conscious of himself; and the activity of his being is in him, and such activity is sleepless. Then the good man, as such, would be active even then. This activity would escape the notice not of him as a whole, but of some part of him. So too, when the vegetative activity is at work, the awareness of such activity does not reach the rest of the man through the perceptive part; and if we were our vegetative part, we would be the ones active. As it is, we are not that, but the activity of what thinks; so that when that is active, we would be active.
λανθάνει δὲ ἴσως τῷ μὴ περὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· διὰ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὥσπερ μέσης περὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖν δεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ νοῦς διὰ τί οὐκ ἐνεργήσει καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ἡ πρὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως; δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πρὸ ἀντιλήψεως ἐνέργημα εἶναι, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι. καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀντίληψις εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀνακάμπτοντος τοῦ νοήματος καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον ἀπωσθέντος πάλιν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον.
Perhaps it escapes notice because it is not concerned with any object of perception; for it is through perception, as a kind of intermediary, that one must be active in relation to these things and about them. But why should intellect itself not be active, and the soul around it, which is prior to perception and to awareness in general? There must be an activity prior to awareness, if indeed “thinking and being are the same.” It seems that awareness exists and comes about when the act of thinking bends back, and what is active in the soul’s life is, as it were, thrown back again—like the image in a mirror, on a smooth, bright surface at rest.
ὡς οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις παρόντος μὲν τοῦ κατόπτρου ἐγένετο τὸ εἴδωλον, μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἐνέργεια πάρεστιν οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον ἦν ἄν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἄγοντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν τοιούτου, ᾧ ἐμφαίνεται τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονίσματα, ἐνορᾶται ταῦτα καὶ οἷον αἰσθητῶς γινώσκεται μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργεῖ. συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ταραττομένην ἁρμονίαν ἄνευ εἰδώλου ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἡ νόησις τότε· ὥστε καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄν τι νοοῖτο μετὰ φαντασίας τὴν νόησιν γίγνεσθαι οὐκ οὔσης τῆς νοήσεως φαντασίας.
In such cases, when the mirror is there, the image comes about; when it is not there, or not in the right condition, the activity of which there would have been an image is present all the same. In the same way, in the soul: when that in us in which the likenesses of discursive thought and intellect appear is at rest, they are seen in it and known, as it were, by perception, together with the prior knowledge that intellect and discursive thought are active. But when this is shattered because the harmony of the body is disturbed, discursive thought and intellect think without an image, and thinking then takes place without imagination. So one might gather this as well: that thinking takes place together with imagination, though thinking is not imagination.
πολλὰς δ’ ἄν τις εὕροι καὶ ἐγρηγορότων καλὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ πράξεις, ὅτε θεωροῦμεν καὶ ὅτε πράττομεν, τὸ παρακολουθεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας. οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν ὅτι ἀναγινώσκει καὶ τότε μάλιστα, ὅτε μετὰ τοῦ συντόνου ἀναγινώσκει· οὐδὲ ὁ ἀνδριζόμενος ὅτι ἀνδρίζεται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐνεργεῖ ὅσῳ ἐνεργεῖ· καὶ ἄλλα μυρία· ὥστε τὰς παρακολουθήσεις κινδυνεύειν ἀμυδροτέρας αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας, αἷς παρακολουθοῦσι, ποιεῖν, μόνας δὲ αὐτὰς οὔσας καθαρὰς τότε εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖν καὶ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει τῶν σπουδαίων γενομένων μᾶλλον τὸ ζῆν εἶναι, οὐ κεχυμένον εἰς αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνηγμένον.
One could find many fine activities, contemplations and actions, even when we are awake, which, while we contemplate and act, do not involve our being conscious of them. The reader need not be conscious that he is reading, least of all when he is reading with concentration. Nor need the brave man be conscious that he is being brave and acting in accordance with courage, so long as he is acting; and there are countless other cases. So it looks as though consciousness makes the very activities it accompanies fainter, and as though, when they are alone, they are pure, and more active, and more alive. And indeed, when good men are in such a state, their life is more truly life, not poured out into perception but gathered together in itself.
εἰ δέ τινες μηδὲ ζῆν λέγοιεν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ζῆν μὲν αὐτὸν φήσομεν, λανθάνειν δ’ αὐτοὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ τοιούτου, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν. εἰ δὲ μὴ πείθοιντο, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑποθεμένους τὸν ζῶντα καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον οὕτω ζητεῖν, εἰ εὐδαίμων, μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῦ ἐλαττώσαντας τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητεῖν εἰ πάρεστι μηδὲ ἀνελόντας τὸν ἄνθρωπον περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖν μηδὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον συγχωρήσαντας εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπεστράφθαι ἐν ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνεργείαις αὐτὸν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ὅλως τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ὑπόστασις εὐδαιμονίας εἴη, εἰ τὰ ἔξω βουλητὰ λέγοις καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον βούλεσθαι ταῦτα. ἐθέλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὖ πράττειν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν κακῶν περὶ μηδένα εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μὴ γινομένων ὅμως εὐδαίμων.
If some people say that such a man is not even alive, we shall say that he is alive, but that his happiness escapes their notice, just as his life does. If they are not persuaded, we shall ask them to assume a living man, a good man, and then inquire whether he is happy. They must not diminish his life and then ask whether living well is present; not do away with the man and then inquire about a man’s happiness; not grant that the good man has turned inward and then look for him in external activities; nor, in general, look for the object of his wishing in external things. For in that way there would not even be any reality to happiness, if you said that external things are objects of wishing and that the good man wishes for them. He would like all human beings to do well, and no evil to befall anyone; but if this does not happen, he is happy nonetheless.
εἰ δέ τις παράλογον ἂν αὐτὸν ποιήσειν φήσει, εἰ ταῦτα ἐθελήσει — μὴ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰ κακὰ μὴ εἶναι — δῆλον ὅτι συγχωρήσει ἡμῖν ἐπιστρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν βούλησιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω.
If someone says it would make him unreasonable to want these things—since it is not possible for evils not to exist—clearly he will agree with us when we turn the good man’s wishing inward.
τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ τῷ βίῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅταν ἀπαιτῶσιν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀκολάστων οὐδὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἀξιώσουσι παρεῖναι — αὗται γὰρ ἀδύνατοι παρεῖναι καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀφανιοῦσιν — οὐδὲ μὴν τὰς περιχαρείας — διὰ τί γάρ; — ἀλλὰ τὰς συνούσας παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐν κινήσεσιν οὔσας, οὐδὲ γινομένας τοίνυν· ἤδη γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάρεστι, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάρεστι, καὶ ἕστηκε τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἵλεων τοῦτο. ἵλεως δὲ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀεὶ καὶ κατάστασις ἥσυχος καὶ ἀγαπητὴ ἡ διάθεσις, ἣν οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν παρακινεῖ, εἴπερ σπουδαῖος. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλο εἶδος ἡδονῆς περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ, οὐ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ.
When they demand pleasantness for such a life, they will not ask for the pleasures of the dissolute or the pleasures of the body to be present—these cannot be present, and would make happiness vanish—nor indeed for transports of joy (why should they?). They will ask for the pleasures that accompany the presence of goods, which do not consist in motions and so do not come to be either. For the goods are already present, he is present to himself, and this pleasure and serenity stand still. The good man is always serene; his condition is calm and his disposition contented, and none of the things called evils disturbs it, if indeed he is a good man. If someone looks for another kind of pleasure in the good man’s life, it is not the good man’s life he is looking for.
οὐδ’ αἱ ἐνέργειαι δὲ διὰ τὰς τύχας ἐμποδίζοιντ’ ἄν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλαι ἂν κατ’ ἄλλας γίγνοιντο τύχας, πᾶσαι δὲ ὅμως καλαὶ καὶ καλλίους ἴσως ὅσῳ περιστατικαί. αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς θεωρίας ἐνέργειαι αἱ μὲν καθ’ ἕκαστα τάχα ἂν οἷον ἃς ζητήσας ἂν καὶ σκεψάμενος προφέροι· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μάθημα πρόχειρον ἀεὶ καὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, κἂν ἐν τῷ Φαλάριδος ταύρῳ λεγομένῳ ᾖ, ὃ μάτην λέγεται ἡδὺ δὶς ἢ καὶ πολλάκις λεγόμενον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φθεγξάμενον τοῦτο αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν ὑπάρχον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀλγοῦν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὃ συνὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνῇ, οὐκ ἀπολελείψεται τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας.
Nor would his activities be hindered by fortune. Different activities would arise under different fortunes, but all of them fine—and perhaps finer the more they are called forth by circumstance. As for the activities of contemplation, those concerned with particulars he might perhaps bring forth after inquiry and examination. But “the greatest study” is always at hand and with him—all the more so even if he is in the so-called bull of Phalaris, which it is pointless to call pleasant, however often one says it, twice or many times. For there, what uttered it is the very thing that is in pain. Here, what is in pain is one thing, and there is something else, which, keeping company with itself for as long as it must keep company with the body, will never be cut off from the vision of the whole Good.
τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφότερον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μάλιστα τὸν σπουδαῖον μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος καταφρόνησις. τὸ δὲ καθόσον ἀξιοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι γελοῖον εὐζωίας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔσης, ἣ περὶ ψυχὴν συνίσταται, ἐνεργείας ταύτης οὔσης καὶ ψυχῆς οὐ πάσης — οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς, ἵν’ ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο σώματος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο ἦν σώματος μέγεθος καὶ εὐεξία — οὐδ’ αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εὖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ κινδυνεύσουσιν αἱ τούτων πλεονεξίαι βαρύνασαι πρὸς αὑτὰς φέρειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἀντισηκώσεως δὲ οἷον ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα γενομένης μινύθειν [δεῖ] καὶ χείρω τὰ σώματα ποιεῖν, ἵνα δεικνύοιτο οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ἂν ἢ τὰ ἔξω.
That a human being, and especially the good man, is not the composite is attested also by the separation from the body and by contempt for the so-called goods of the body. To claim that happiness extends as far as the living being is ridiculous, since happiness is living well, which is constituted in the soul, being its activity—and not that of all soul. Not of the vegetative soul, for then it would have touched the body; happiness was certainly not size and fitness of body. Nor again does it lie in perceiving well, since excess in these things risks weighing a man down and dragging him toward themselves. Rather, as a sort of counterweight on the other side, toward the best, the bodies [must] be reduced and made worse, to show that this man is other than what is external.
ὁ δὲ τῶν τῇδε ἄνθρωπος ἔστω καὶ καλὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων ὡς ἂν ὢν τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου, καὶ οὐ φθονητέον αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων ἠπατημένῳ. περὶ δὲ σοφὸν ταῦτα ἴσως μὲν ἂν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γένοιτο, γενομένων δὲ ἐλαττώσει αὐτός, εἴπερ αὑτοῦ κήδεται. καὶ ἐλαττώσει μὲν καὶ μαρανεῖ ἀμελείᾳ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πλεονεξίας, ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποθήσεται. σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων οὐκ ἄπειρος νόσων εἶναι παντάπασι βουλήσεται· οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ ἄπειρος εἶναι ἀλγηδόνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων νέος ὢν μαθεῖν βουλήσεται, ἤδη δὲ ἐν γήρᾳ ὢν οὔτε ταύτας οὔτε ἡδονὰς ἐνοχλεῖν οὐδέ τι τῶν τῇδε οὔτε προσηνὲς οὔτε ἐναντίον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπῃ.
Let the man who belongs to this world be handsome, tall, rich, and ruler of all men, as one who belongs to this place; and we must not envy him, deceived as he is by such things. Around the wise man these things would perhaps not arise in the first place; and if they did, he will cut them down himself, if he cares for himself. He will diminish the body’s advantages and let them wither through neglect, and he will lay aside offices of rule. While preserving the health of his body, he will not want to be entirely without experience of disease, nor indeed without experience of pains. Even if they do not come, he will want to learn them when he is young; but once he is old, he will want neither these nor pleasures to trouble him, nor anything of this world, pleasant or the opposite, so that he does not look to the body.
γινόμενος δὲ ἐν ἀλγηδόσι τὴν πρὸς ταύτας αὐτῷ πεπορισμένην δύναμιν ἀντιτάξει οὔτε προσθήκην ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑγιείαις καὶ ἀπονίαις πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λαμβάνων οὔτε ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἐλάττωσιν ταύτης ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων. τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντίου μὴ προστιθέντος τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀφαιροῖ;
When he is in pain, he will set against it the power he has acquired for that purpose. He takes no addition to his happiness from pleasures, health and freedom from toil, and no subtraction or diminution of it from their opposites. For if one opposite adds nothing to a thing, how could the other opposite take anything away?
ἀλλ’ εἰ δύο εἶεν σοφοί, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ παρείη ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται, τῷ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἴσον φήσομεν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι; φήσομεν, εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί. εἰ δὲ καλὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἕτερος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα μὴ πρὸς σοφίαν μηδὲ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι, τί τοῦτο ἂν εἴη; ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ὁ ταῦτα ἔχων σεμνυνεῖται ὡς μᾶλλον εὐδαίμων τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρὸς αὐλητικὸν τέλος ἡ τούτων πλεονεξία συμβάλλοιτο.
But suppose there were two wise men, and one had all the things that are called according to nature, the other their opposites: shall we say that they have happiness equally? We shall, if they are equally wise. And if one of them is handsome in body and has all the other things that contribute nothing to wisdom, or to virtue in general, or to the vision of the best and to being the best, what would that amount to? Not even the man who has these things will take pride in being happier than the one who lacks them; an abundance of them would not contribute even to the goal of flute-playing.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ θεωροῦμεν τὸν εὐδαίμονα μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσθενείας φρικτὰ καὶ δεινὰ νομίζοντες, ἃ μὴ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων νομίσειεν· ἢ οὔπω οὔτε σοφὸς οὔτε εὐδαίμων εἴη μὴ τὰς περὶ τούτων φαντασίας ἁπάσας ἀλλαξάμενος καὶ οἷον ἄλλος παντάπασι γενόμενος πιστεύσας ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι μηδέν ποτε κακὸν ἕξει· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀδεὴς ἔσται περὶ πάντα ἢ δειλαίνων περί τινα οὐ τέλειος πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ἥμισύς τις ἔσται. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον πρὸ κρίσεως δέος κἄν ποτε πρὸς ἄλλοις ἔχοντι γένηται, προσελθὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἀπώσεται καὶ τὸν ἐν αὑτῷ κινηθέντα οἷον πρὸς λύπας παῖδα καταπαύσει ἢ ἀπειλῇ ἢ λόγῳ· ἀπειλῇ δὲ ἀπαθεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἐμβλέψαντος σεμνὸν μόνον [ὁ] παῖς ἐκπλαγείη.
The truth is that we look at the happy man with our own weakness, thinking things dreadful and terrible which the happy man would not think so. Or rather, he would not yet be wise or happy unless he had changed all his imaginings about these things, and become, as it were, an entirely different man, trusting himself that he will never have anything evil. That way he will also be fearless about everything; if he is cowardly about anything, he will not be perfect in virtue but a sort of half-man. Even the involuntary fear that arises before judgment, if it ever comes on him while his mind is on other things, the wise man will come forward and drive away. He will calm the child in him that has been stirred, as if toward distress, by threat or by reason—a threat without passion, as when a child is struck dumb merely by a stern look.
οὐ μὴν διὰ ταῦτα ἄφιλος οὐδὲ ἀγνώμων ὁ τοιοῦτος· τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ περὶ αὑτὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. ἀποδιδοὺς οὖν ὅσα αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις φίλος ἂν εἴη μάλιστα μετὰ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν.
This does not make such a man unfriendly or unfeeling; he is like this toward himself too, and in his own affairs. So, giving his friends all that he gives himself, he would be the best of friends, while keeping his intellect.
εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ νῷ τούτῳ ἄρας θήσει τὸν σπουδαῖον, κατάγοι δὲ πρὸς τύχας καὶ ταύτας φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, οὔτε σπουδαῖον τηρήσει, οἷον ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι. ὃς εἰ καὶ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάζεσθαι εὐδαίμων εἴη ἄξιος οὐκ ἔχων τὸ μέγα οὔτε ἐν ἀξίᾳ σοφίας οὔτε ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐκεῖθεν ἄνωθεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπειν τὸν μέλλοντα σοφὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο ζῆν.
If someone does not lift the good man up and set him here, in this intellect, but brings him down to fortune and fears that it may befall him, he will not preserve the good man as we think he should be. He will give us a decent man, mixed of good and bad, and assign to such a man a mixed life of some good and some bad—and such a man is not easy to find. Even if he did exist, he would not deserve to be called happy, since he would have nothing great, either in the worth of his wisdom or in purity of good. So it is not possible to live happily in what is common. Plato is right to require that the good be taken from there, from above, and that one who is to be wise and happy look to it, become like it, and live according to it.
τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν μόνον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα, ὡς ἂν καὶ τόπους μεταβάλλοι οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τόπων προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὡς στοχαζόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περικεχυμένων αὐτόν, οἷον εἰ ὡδὶ κατακείσεται ἢ ὡδί, διδοὺς μὲν τούτῳ ὅσα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ δύναται, αὐτὸς δὲ ὢν ἄλλος οὐ κωλυόμενος καὶ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, καὶ ἀφήσων δὲ ἐν καιρῷ φύσεως, κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτου.
This alone, then, he must have for the end. The rest he will treat as he would changes of place, which add nothing to his happiness; he takes account of them as of the other things that surround him, such as whether he will lie down here or there. He gives the body all it needs, as far as he can, while he himself is someone else, not prevented from leaving it, and ready to leave it at nature’s appointed time; and he is himself master of deliberating about this too.
ὥστε αὐτῷ τὰ ἔργα τὰ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνοντα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ οὐ τοῦ τέλους χάριν καὶ ὅλως οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ προσεζευγμένου, οὗ φροντιεῖ καὶ ἀνέξεται, ἕως δυνατόν, οἱονεὶ μουσικὸς λύρας, ἕως οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλην ἀλλάξεται, ἢ ἀφήσει τὰς λύρας χρήσεις καὶ τοῦ εἰς λύραν ἐνεργεῖν ἀφέξεται ἄλλο ἔργον ἄνευ λύρας ἔχων καὶ κειμένην πλησίον περιόψεται ᾅδων ἄνευ ὀργάνων. καὶ οὐ μάτην αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ὄργανον ἐδόθη· ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις.
So some of his works will contribute to happiness, while others will not be for the sake of the end, and not his at all, but belong to what is yoked to him. He will look after it and put up with it as long as possible, like a musician with his lyre, as long as it can be used. If not, he will change it for another, or he will give up using lyres and abstain from playing them, since he has another work that needs no lyre; he will leave it lying beside him and sing without instruments. And the instrument was not given him in vain at the start: he has used it many times already.