Εἰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπίδοσιν τῷ χρόνῳ λαμβάνει τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὸς λαμβανομένου; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ εὐδαιμονῆσαι ποιοῖ ἄν τι, οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. ἡ δὲ διάθεσις ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ζωῆς.
Does happiness increase with time, when happiness is always taken with reference to the present? The memory of having been happy would make no difference; nor does happiness lie in saying something, but in being disposed in a certain way. And the disposition is a matter of the present, as is the activity of life.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι ἐφιέμεθα ἀεὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τοῦ τοιούτου εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγοι μᾶλλον, πρῶτον μὲν οὕτω καὶ ἡ αὔριον εὐδαιμονία μείζων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἑξῆς ἀεὶ τῆς προτέρας, καὶ οὐκέτι μετρηθήσεται τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τῇ ἀρετῇ. ἔπειτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ νῦν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονήσουσιν ἢ πρότερον καὶ οὔπω τέλειον καὶ οὐδέποτε τέλειον. ἔπειτα καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις λαβοῦσα τὴν τεῦξιν τὸ παρὸν εἴληφε καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν ζητεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εἶναι ζητοῦσα τοῦ παρόντος ἂν εἴη, εἰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι.
Suppose someone said that, since we always desire to live and to be active, attaining this is happiness in a fuller sense. Then, first, tomorrow’s happiness will be greater, and each succeeding one greater than the one before, and happiness will no longer be measured by virtue. Second, the gods too will be happier now than before, and not yet perfectly happy—and never perfectly. Third, desire, when it attains, has attained what is present, and always seeks the present, for as long as happiness is to be had. And the desire for life, since it seeks being, would be of the present, if being is in the present.
εἰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θέλει, ὃ ἔχει θέλει καὶ ὅ ἐστιν, οὐχ ὃ παρελήλυθεν οὐδ’ ὃ μέλλει, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ εἰσαεὶ ζητοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη εἶναι ἤδη.
And if it wants the future and what comes next, what it wants is what it has and what it is—not what is past or what is to come, but to be what already is. It seeks not perpetuity, but that what is present now should be, now.
τί οὖν; εἰ πλείονα χρόνον εὐδαιμόνησε καὶ πλείονα χρόνον εἶδε τοῖς ὄμμασι τὸ αὐτό; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλείονι τὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶδε, πλέον ἄν τι ὁ χρόνος αὐτῷ εἰργάσατο· εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς εἶδε, τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁ ἅπαξ θεασάμενος ἔχει.
What then? Suppose he was happy for a longer time, and saw the same thing with his eyes for a longer time? If in the longer time he saw it more exactly, the time would have done something more for him; but if he saw it in the same way throughout, the one who looked only once has as much.
ἀλλὰ πλείονα ἅτερος ἥσθη χρόνον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι ἀριθμεῖν εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγει τις τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ζητουμένῳ λέγει. καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ δὲ ἡ πλείων ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἔχει, τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς αὐτῆς οἴχεται.
“But the other enjoyed pleasure for a longer time.” That would not be right to count toward happiness. And if someone says that pleasure is unhindered activity, he is saying the same thing as what we are looking for. Even the greater pleasure has only the present; what is past of it is gone.
τί οὖν; εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐδαιμόνησεν εἰς τέλος, ὁ δὲ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὁ δὲ πρότερον εὐδαιμονήσας μετέβαλεν, ἔχουσι τὸ ἴσον; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἡ παραβολὴ οὐκ εὐδαιμονούντων γεγένηται πάντων, ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐδαιμονούντων, ὅτε μὴ εὐδαιμόνουν, πρὸς εὐδαιμονοῦντα. εἴ τι οὖν πλέον ἔχει, τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅσον ὁ εὐδαίμων πρὸς οὐκ εὐδαίμονας, ᾧ καὶ συμβαίνει πλεονεκτεῖν αὐτῶν τῷ παρόντι.
What then? If one man was happy from beginning to end, another in the later part of his life, and a third was happy earlier and then changed, do they have an equal share? Or rather, the comparison here is not between people who are all happy, but between people who were not happy, at the time when they were not, and one who is happy. So if he has anything more, what he has is what a happy man has over those who are not happy—and his advantage over them lies in the present.
τί οὖν ὁ κακοδαίμων; οὐ μᾶλλον κακοδαίμων τῷ πλείονι; καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα δυσχερῆ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλείονι χρόνῳ πλείονα τὴν συμφορὰν δίδωσιν, οἷον ὀδύναι πολυχρόνιοι καὶ λῦπαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτου τοῦ τύπου; ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ κακὸν ἐπαύξει, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὡσαύτως; ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λυπῶν καὶ ὀδυνῶν ἔχοι ἄν τις λέγειν, ὡς προσθήκην ὁ χρόνος δίδωσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐπιμένειν τὴν νόσον· ἕξις γὰρ γίνεται, καὶ κακοῦται μᾶλλον τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ σῶμα.
What, then, of the unhappy man? Is he not more unhappy for a longer time? And all the other troubles—do they not bring greater misfortune the longer they last, long-lasting pains, for instance, and griefs, and everything of that type? But if these things increase the evil with time in this way, why do their opposites, and happiness, not do the same? Perhaps one could say that in the case of griefs and pains time does add something—the persistence of a disease, for instance: it becomes a settled condition, and the body gets worse with time.
ἐπεί, εἴ γε τὸ αὐτὸ μένοι καὶ μὴ μείζων ἡ βλάβη, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν ἔσται, εἰ μὴ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς προσαριθμοῖ ἀφορῶν εἰς τὸ γενόμενον καὶ μένον ἐπί τε τῆς κακοδαίμονος ἕξεως τὸ κακὸν εἰς τὸν πλείονα χρόνον ἐπιτείνεσθαι αὐξανομένης καὶ τῆς κακίας τῷ ἐμμόνῳ. τῇ γοῦν προσθήκῃ τοῦ μᾶλλον, οὐ τῷ πλείονι τὸ μᾶλλον κακοδαιμονεῖν γίνεται. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἴσως οὐχ ἅμα ἐστὶν οὐδὲ δὴ πλεῖον ὅλως λεκτέον τὸ μηκέτι ὂν τῷ ὄντι συναριθμοῦντα. τὸ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὅρον τε καὶ πέρας ἔχει καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐπίδοσις παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον, ὥστε μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδόντα μείζονα, οὐ τὴν πολυετῆ εὐδαιμονίαν ἀριθμῶν ἐπαινεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μᾶλλον γενομένην τότε, ὅτε μᾶλλόν ἐστιν.
For if it stayed the same and the harm did not grow, here too the painful thing would always be the present—unless one counts in the past, looking at what has happened and what remains. And in the case of the unhappy condition, the evil is intensified over a longer time as the vice, too, grows by persisting. At any rate, being more unhappy comes about by the addition of intensity, not by length of time. And the longer is perhaps not there all at once; nor should one call it “longer” at all, counting what no longer is along with what is. The state of happiness, by contrast, has a boundary and limit, and is always the same. If someone finds an increase here too over a longer time, so that a man who advances to greater virtue is happier, he is not counting up and praising many years of happiness, but happiness that has become greater, at the time when it is greater.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἰ τὸ παρὸν θεωρεῖν δεῖ μόνον καὶ μὴ συναριθμεῖν τῷ γενομένῳ, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τῷ παρόντι συναριθμοῦντες πλείω λέγομεν; διὰ τί οὖν οὐχ, ὅσος ὁ χρόνος, τοσαύτην καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐροῦμεν; καὶ διαιροῖμεν ἂν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ χρόνου διαιρέσεις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· καὶ γὰρ αὖ τῷ παρόντι μετροῦντες ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὴν ποιήσομεν. ἢ τὸν μὲν χρόνον ἀριθμεῖν καὶ μηκέτι ὄντα οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ τῶν γενομένων μέν, μηκέτι δὲ ὄντων, ἀριθμὸν ἂν ποιησαίμεθα, οἷον τῶν τετελευτηκότων· εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ μηκέτι οὖσαν παρεῖναι λέγειν τῆς παρούσης πλείονα ἄτοπον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν συμβεβηκέναι ἀξιοῖ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁ πλείων παρὰ τὸν παρόντα τὸ μηκέτι εἶναι.
But if we must look only at the present and not count in what has been, why don’t we do the same with time, instead of counting the past together with the present and calling it more? Why, then, shall we not say that happiness is as great as the time? Then we would also divide happiness according to the divisions of time; for, conversely, by measuring it by the present we shall make it indivisible. Or rather: it is not absurd to count time even when it no longer is, since we can count things that have been but no longer are—the dead, for instance. But it is absurd to say that happiness that no longer is, is present and greater than present happiness. For being happy demands to be actually there, while the time beyond the present amounts to what no longer is.
ὅλως δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ πλέον σκέδασιν βούλεται ἑνός τινος ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄντος. διὸ καὶ εἰκὼν αἰῶνος εἰκότως λέγεται ἀφανίζειν βουλομένη ἐν τῷ σκιδναμένῳ αὑτῆς τὸ ἐκείνου μένον. ὅθεν κἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀφέληται τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μεῖναν καὶ αὑτῆς ποιήσηται, ἀπώλεσεν αὐτό, σωζόμενον τέως ἐκείνῳ τρόπον τινά, ἀπολόμενον δέ, ἐν αὐτῇ εἰ πᾶν γένοιτο. εἴπερ οὖν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν κατὰ ζωὴν ἀγαθήν, δηλονότι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος αὐτὴν θετέον ζωήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη. οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμητέα χρόνῳ, ἀλλ’ αἰῶνι· τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον οὔτε μήκει τινί, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἀδιάστατον καὶ τὸ οὐ χρονικὸν εἶναι.
In general, more time means the scattering of something that is one in the present. That is why time is fittingly called an image of eternity: it wants to make what remains in eternity disappear into its own scattering. So if it takes from eternity what remained in it and makes it its own, it destroys it—preserved till then, in a way, by eternity, but destroyed if it came to be wholly in time. If, then, happiness is in accordance with good life, clearly we must place it in accordance with the life of being, for that is the best. So it is not to be counted by time but by eternity; and eternity is neither more nor less, nor of any length, but is a “this,” unextended and not temporal.
οὐ συναπτέον τοίνυν τὸ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲ τῷ αἰῶνι τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲ τὸ χρονικὸν ἀεὶ τῷ αἰωνίῳ οὐδὲ παρεκτατέον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὅλον ληπτέον, εἴ ποτε λαμβάνοις, λαμβάνων οὐ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος τὴν ζωὴν τὴν οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ παντὸς χρόνου πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ.
So we must not join being to non-being, nor time to eternity, nor even the everlasting of time to the eternal, nor stretch out what is unextended. We must take it all as a whole, if we take it at all—taking not the indivisible of time, but the life of eternity, a life not made up of many times, but all together, out of all time.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν μνήμην τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐν τῷ ἐνεστηκότι μένουσαν παρέχεσθαι τὸ πλέον τῷ πλείονα χρόνον ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν γεγενημένῳ, τί ἂν τὸ τῆς μνήμης λέγοι; ἢ γὰρ φρονήσεως μνήμην τῆς πρόσθεν γεγενημένης, ὥστε φρονιμώτερον ἂν λέγοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν τηροῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν· ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν μνήμην, ὥσπερ πολλῆς περιχαρείας δεομένου τοῦ εὐδαίμονος καὶ οὐκ ἀρκουμένου τῇ παρούσῃ. καίτοι τί ἂν ἡδὺ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ ἡδέος ἔχοι; ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ μνημονεύοι τις, ὅτι χθὲς ἐπὶ ὄψῳ ἥσθη· ἢ εἰς δέκατον ἔτος, ἔτι ἂν εἴη γελοιότερος· τὸ δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως, ὅτι πέρυσιν ἐφρόνουν.
Suppose someone were to say that memory of the past, persisting in the present, gives something more to one who has spent more time in happiness. What would he mean by memory? Either memory of understanding that occurred earlier—in which case he would be saying that the man has more understanding, and would not be keeping to the hypothesis; or memory of pleasure, as if the happy man needed a great deal of delight and was not content with what is present. And yet what pleasure could the memory of the pleasant hold? It would be as if someone remembered that yesterday he enjoyed a fine dish—or, more ridiculous still, ten years ago. And so with understanding: remembering that last year I understood.
εἰ δὲ τῶν καλῶν εἴη ἡ μνήμη, πῶς οὐκ ἐνταῦθα λέγοιτο ἄν τι; ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐλλείποντος τοῖς καλοῖς ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν νυνὶ ζητοῦντος τὴν μνήμην τῶν γεγενημένων.
If the memory were of fine things, wouldn’t there be something in it? But this is the mark of a man who lacks fine things in the present, and who, because he does not have them now, seeks the memory of those that have been.
ἀλλ’ ὁ πολὺς χρόνος πολλὰς ποιεῖ καλὰς πράξεις, ὧν ἄμοιρος ὁ πρὸς ὀλίγον εὐδαίμων· εἰ δεῖ λέγειν ὅλως εὐδαίμονα τὸν οὐ διὰ πολλῶν τῶν καλῶν. ἢ ὃς ἐκ πολλῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων λέγει, ἐκ τῶν μηκέτι ὄντων ἀλλὰ παρεληλυθότων καὶ ἑνός τινος τοῦ παρόντος τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν συνίστησι. διὸ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐθέμεθα τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, εἶτα ἐζητοῦμεν, τὸ μᾶλλον εἰ ἐν πλείονι εὐδαιμονῆσαι μᾶλλόν ἐστι. τοῦτο οὖν ζητητέον, εἰ ταῖς πράξεσι ταῖς πλείοσι πλεονεκτεῖ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν.
“But a long time produces many fine actions, which the man happy for a short time has no share in”—if one should call happy at all the man who is not so through many fine things. Or rather, whoever says happiness comes from many times and many actions makes it consist of things that no longer exist but are past, together with some single present thing. That is why we placed happiness in the present and then asked whether being happy for longer is being more happy. So what we must examine is whether happiness over a long time has an advantage through its greater number of actions.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἔστι καὶ μὴ ἐν πράξεσι γενόμενον εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ πεπραχότος· ἔπειτα αἱ πράξεις οὐκ ἐξ αὑτῶν τὸ εὖ διδόασιν, ἀλλ’ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καλὰς ποιοῦσι καρποῦταί τε ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πράττων, οὐχ ὅτι πράττει οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ οὗ ἔχει. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πατρίδος γένοιτο ἂν καὶ παρὰ φαύλου, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς πατρίδος ἡδὺ καὶ ἄλλου πράξαντος γένοιτο ἂν αὐτῷ. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἡδονήν, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἴ τι ἡδὺ δι’ αὐτὴν ποιεῖ.
First, it is possible to be happy without being engaged in actions—and not less but more happy than the man who has acted. Second, actions do not give well-being of themselves; it is dispositions that make actions fine as well, and the man of understanding reaps the good even when acting, not because he acts, nor from the results, but from what he has. For the salvation of one’s country could come about through a worthless man too, and the pleasure at the country’s salvation could be one’s own even if someone else did it. So it is not this that produces the happy man’s pleasure; it is his settled state that produces both happiness and whatever pleasure there is because of it.
τὸ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἔξω τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι τιθέντος· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ φρονῆσαι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὡδὶ ἐνεργῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐδαιμόνως.
To place happiness in actions is to place it in things outside virtue and the soul. For the soul’s activity lies in understanding and in being active within itself in this way. And this is the happy state.