Τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτ’ ἐστὶ ζητοῦντες σῶμα οὐδὲν αὐτὴν δείξαντες εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀσωμάτοις αὖ ἁρμονίαν, τό τε τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὕτως, ὡς λέγεται, οὔτε δηλωτικὸν ὂν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀφέντες, καὶ μὴν τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως εἰπόντες καὶ τῆς θείας μοίρας εἶναι τάχα μὲν ἄν τι σαφὲς εἰρηκότες εἴημεν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς. ὅμως γε μὴν προσωτέρω χωρεῖν βέλτιον. τότε μὲν οὖν διῃροῦμεν αἰσθητῇ καὶ νοητῇ φύσει διαστελλόμενοι, ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τιθέμενοι. νῦν δὲ κείσθω μὲν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· κατ’ ἄλλην δὲ ὁδὸν τὸ προσεχὲς τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς μεταδιώκωμεν.
In investigating what the being of soul is, we showed that it is not a body, nor, among incorporeals, a harmony; we set aside the notion of entelechy, as not true in the way it is stated and as not revealing what soul is; and we said that it belongs to the intelligible nature and the divine portion. With that we may perhaps have said something clear about its being. All the same, it is better to go further. Then, we drew the distinction by separating the perceptible and the intelligible nature, and placed soul in the intelligible. Now let it be granted that it is in the intelligible; but let us pursue, by another road, what is closest to its nature.
λέγομεν δὴ τὰ μὲν πρώτως εἶναι μεριστὰ καὶ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει σκεδαστά· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι, ὧν οὐδὲν μέρος ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἄλλῳ μέρει οὔτε τῷ ὅλῳ, τό τε μέρος αὐτῶν ἔλαττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ὅλου. ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μεγέθη καὶ οἱ ὄγκοι, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴδιον τόπον ἔχει, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ταὐτὸν ἐν πλείοσι τόποις εἶναι.
We say, then, that some things are primarily divisible and by their nature dispersible: those of which no part is the same either as another part or as the whole, and whose part must be smaller than the all and the whole. These are perceptible magnitudes and masses, each of which has its own place; the same thing cannot be in several places at once.
ἡ δέ ἐστιν ἀντιτεταγμένη ταύτῃ οὐσία, οὐδαμῇ μερισμὸν δεχομένη, ἀμερής τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, διάστημά τε οὐδὲν οὐδὲ δι’ ἐπινοίας δεχομένη, οὐ τόπου δεομένη οὐδ’ ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων γινομένη οὔτε κατὰ μέρη οὔτε κατὰ ὅλα, οἷον πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐποχουμένη, οὐχ ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἱδρυθῇ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὰ ἄλλα ἄνευ αὐτῆς εἶναι μηδὲ θέλει, ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχουσα οὐσία, κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν ἐφεξῆς οἷον κέντρον ἐν κύκλῳ, ἀφ’ οὗ πᾶσαι αἱ πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν γραμμαὶ ἐξημμέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐῶσιν αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μένειν ἔχουσαι παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ μετέχουσι μὲν τοῦ σημείου, καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ ἀμερὲς αὐταῖς, προῆλθόν γε μὴν ἐξαψάμεναι αὑτὰς ἐκεῖθεν.
Opposed to this is another kind of being. It admits no division at all; it is without parts and indivisible; it admits no extension, not even in thought; it needs no place and comes to be in none of the things that are, either in parts or as a whole. It rides, as it were, on all things at once—not so as to be settled in them, but because the other things cannot be without it, and do not want to be. It is a being always in the same state, common to all that come after it, like the center in a circle: all the lines to the circumference are fastened to it, yet they let it remain by itself, though they have from it their coming-to-be and their being. They share in the point, and the partless is their principle; yet they have gone forth while keeping themselves fastened there.
τούτου δὴ τοῦ πρώτως ἀμερίστου ὄντος ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἀρχηγοῦ καὶ αὖ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς μεριστοῦ πάντη, πρὸ μὲν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐγγύς τι τούτου καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλη ἐστὶ φύσις, μεριστὴ μὲν οὐ πρώτως, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα, μεριστή γε μὴν γινομένη ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν· ὥστε διαιρουμένων τῶν σωμάτων μερίζεσθαι μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶδος, ὅλον γε μὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν μερισθέντων πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ γινόμενον, ὧν ἕκαστον πάντη ἄλλου ἀπέστη, ἅτε πάντη μεριστὸν γενόμενον· οἷα χρόαι καὶ ποιότητες πᾶσαι καὶ ἑκάστη μορφή, ἥτις δύναται ὅλη ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι διεστηκόσιν οὐδὲν μέρος ἔχουσα πάσχον τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἄλλῳ. διὸ δὴ μεριστὸν πάντη καὶ τοῦτο θετέον.
So there is this, which is primarily indivisible among the intelligibles and leads the things that are; and there is that, which is altogether divisible among perceptibles. Before the perceptible, close to it and in it, there is another nature. It is not primarily divisible, as bodies are, but it does become divisible in bodies. So when the bodies are divided, the form in them is divided too, yet it is whole in each of the divided parts, the same thing becoming many, each of which has departed altogether from the other, since it has become altogether divisible. Such are colors and all qualities, and each shape: it can be whole at once in many separate things, without having any part affected in the same way as another. That is why this too must be counted as altogether divisible.
πρὸς δ’ αὖ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀμερίστῳ πάντη φύσει ἄλλη ἑξῆς οὐσία ἀπ’ ἐκείνης οὖσα, ἔχουσα μὲν τὸ ἀμέριστον ἀπ’ ἐκείνης, προόδῳ δὲ τῇ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν σπεύδουσα φύσιν εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν κατέστη, τοῦ τε ἀμερίστου καὶ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον χρόα καὶ ποιότης πᾶσα πολλαχοῦ μέν ἐστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν πολλοῖς σωμάτων ὄγκοις, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀφεστὼς τοῦ ἑτέρου πάντη, καθ’ ὅσον καὶ ὁ ὄγκος τοῦ ὄγκου ἀπέστη.
Next to that altogether indivisible nature, again, there is another being, derived from it. It has its indivisibility from that, but in its procession from it, hastening toward the other nature, it has settled in the middle between both: between the indivisible and first, and the “divisible in bodies” that is upon bodies. It is not like color and every quality, which are the same in many places, in many bodily masses, while what is in each is altogether separated from the other, just as one mass is separated from another.
κἂν τὸ μέγεθος δὲ ἓν ᾖ, ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ μέρει ταὐτὸν κοινωνίαν οὐδεμίαν εἰς ὁμοπάθειαν ἔχει, ὅτι τὸ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἕτερον, τὸ δ’ ἕτερόν ἐστι· πάθημα γὰρ τὸ ταὐτόν, οὐκ οὐσία καὶ αὐτή. ἣν δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ φύσει φαμὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀμερίστῳ προσχωροῦσαν οὐσίᾳ, οὐσία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐγγίνεται σώμασι, περὶ ἃ καὶ μερίζεσθαι αὐτῇ συμβαίνει οὐ πρότερον τοῦτο πασχούσῃ, πρὶν σώμασιν ἑαυτὴν δοῦναι. ἐν οἷς οὖν γίνεται σώμασι, κἂν ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ γίνηται καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα διεστηκότι, δοῦσ’ ἑαυτὴν τῷ ὅλῳ οὐκ ἀφίσταται τοῦ εἶναι μία· οὐχ οὕτως, ὡς τὸ σῶμα ἕν· τῷ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἕν, ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἄλλο, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ· οὐδ’ ὡς ποιότης μία.
And even if the magnitude is one, what is the same in each part has no community that would make it affected in common, because this “same” is one thing here and another thing there; for the sameness is an affection, not itself a being. But the being that we say is above this nature, drawing near to the indivisible being, is a being and comes to be in bodies; and it happens to be divided in relation to them, though it does not undergo this before it gives itself to bodies. So in whatever bodies it comes to be—even if it comes to be in the largest, extended over everything—giving itself to the whole, it does not cease to be one. Not one as a body is one: a body is one by continuity, while each of its parts is different, one here and another elsewhere. Nor as a quality is one.
ἡ δ’ ὁμοῦ μεριστή τε καὶ ἀμέριστος φύσις, ἣν δὴ ψυχὴν εἶναί φαμεν, οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τὸ συνεχὲς μία, μέρος ἄλλο, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο ἔχουσα· ἀλλὰ μεριστὴ μέν, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτῶν ὅλη. καὶ ὁ τοῦτο κατιδὼν τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς εἴσεται, ὡς θεῖον τὸ χρῆμα αὐτῆς καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ χρήματα φύσεων.
The nature that is at once divisible and indivisible, which we say is soul, is not one in the way what is continuous is one, having one part here and another there. It is divisible because it is in all the parts of that in which it is, and indivisible because it is whole in all of them and whole in any one of them. Whoever has seen this will know the greatness of soul and its power: how divine and wonderful a thing it is, one of the natures beyond things.
μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσα παντὶ μεγέθει σύνεστι καὶ ὡδὶ οὖσα ὡδὶ πάλιν αὖ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ· ὥστε μεμερίσθαι καὶ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὐτὴν μηδὲ μεμερισμένην γεγονέναι· μένει γὰρ μεθ’ ἑαυτῆς ὅλη, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι μεμερισμένη τῶν σωμάτων τῷ οἰκείῳ μεριστῷ οὐ δυναμένων αὐτὴν ἀμερίστως δέξασθαι· ὥστε εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων πάθημα τὸν μερισμόν, οὐκ αὐτῆς.
Having no magnitude, it is present to every magnitude; it is here, and again it is there, not with another part but with the same. So it is divided and again not divided—or rather, it is not divided and has not become divided. For it remains whole with itself, and is divided in relation to bodies, because bodies, through their own divisibility, cannot receive it indivisibly. So the division is an affection of the bodies, not of soul.
ὅτι δὲ τοιαύτην ἔδει τὴν ψυχῆς φύσιν εἶναι καὶ παρὰ ταύτην οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ψυχὴν οὔτε ἀμέριστον οὖσαν μόνον οὔτε μόνον μεριστήν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἄμφω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἶναι, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἴτε γὰρ οὕτως ἦν, ὡς τὰ σώματα, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἔχουσα μέρος, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου παθόντος τὸ ἕτερον μέρος εἰς αἴσθησιν ἦλθε τοῦ παθόντος, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη ἂν ἡ ψυχή, οἷον ἡ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον, ὡς ἑτέρα καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς οὖσα ᾔσθετο τοῦ παθήματος, πολλαί τε ὅλως ἦσαν ψυχαὶ αἱ διοικοῦσαι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε οὐ μία, ἀλλὰ ἄπειροι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων. τὸ γὰρ τῆς συνεχείας, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἓν συντελοίη, μάταιον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅπερ ἀπατῶντες ἑαυτοὺς λέγουσιν, ὡς διαδόσει ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἴασιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, παραδεκτέον.
That the nature of soul had to be like this, and that apart from this there cannot be a soul that is either only indivisible or only divisible, but that it must be both in this way, is clear from the following. If it were like bodies, having one part here and another there, then when one part was affected, the other part would not come to perceive what was affected. Rather, that soul—the one around the finger, say—would perceive the affection as a separate soul existing by itself; and there would be, in general, many souls governing each of us. And indeed this All too would be governed not by one soul but by unlimitedly many, separate from one another. For continuity, unless it contributed to one, would be pointless. And we certainly must not accept what they say, deceiving themselves: that perceptions reach the ruling part by transmission.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονοῦν ψυχῆς μέρος ἀνεξετάστως λέγεται· πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριοῦσι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο φήσουσι; πηλίκῳ ποσῷ διαιροῦντες ἑκάτερον ἢ τίνι διαφορᾷ ποιότητος, ἑνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς ὄγκου ὄντος; καὶ πότερα μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἢ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέρη αἰσθήσεται; καὶ εἰ μὲν μόνον αὐτῷ προσπέσοι τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι, ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἱδρυμένον τὸ αἴσθημα αἰσθήσεται; εἰ δ’ ἄλλῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ πεφυκότι, τόδε τὸ μέρος οὐ διαδώσει τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι τὸ αὑτοῦ πάθημα, οὐδ’ ὅλως αἴσθησις ἔσται. καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι εἰ προσπέσοι, ἢ μέρει αὐτοῦ προσπεσεῖται καὶ αἰσθομένου τοῦδε τὰ λοιπὰ οὐκέτι [αἰσθήσεται]· μάταιον γάρ· ἢ πολλαὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἄπειροι ἔσονται καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιαι πᾶσαι.
First, a “ruling part” of soul is spoken of without examination. How will they divide soul and say this part is one thing and that another? By what quantity will they mark off each, or by what difference of quality, when the mass is one and continuous? And will only the ruling part perceive, or the other parts too? If the impression strikes only the ruling part itself, where will it perceive the sensation as located? But if it strikes another part of the soul, one not naturally able to perceive, this part will not transmit its affection to the ruling part, and there will be no perception at all. And if it strikes the ruling part itself, either it will strike one part of it, and once this part has perceived, the rest will no longer [perceive]—for that would be pointless—or there will be many perceptions, unlimited in number, and not all alike.
ἀλλ’ ἡ μέν, ὅτι πρώτως ἔπαθον ἐγώ, ἡ δ’ ὅτι τὸ ἄλλης πάθημα ᾐσθόμην· ποῦ τε ἐγένετο τὸ πάθημα, ἀγνοήσει ἑκάστη παρὲξ τῆς πρώτης.
One will say, “I was affected first”; another, “I perceived another’s affection.” And where the affection occurred, each will be ignorant except the first.
ἢ καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος ψυχῆς ἀπατήσεται δοξάζον, ὅπου ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ γεγονέναι. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος αἰσθήσεται, διὰ τί τὸ μὲν ἡγεμονοῦν ἔσται, τὸ δὲ οὔ; ἢ τί δεῖ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀνιέναι; πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν αἰσθήσεων, οἷον ὤτων καὶ ὀμμάτων, ἕν τι γνώσεται; εἰ δ’ αὖ πάντη ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, οἷον ἀμέριστον πάντη καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἕν, καὶ πάντη πλήθους καὶ μερισμοῦ ἐκφύγοι φύσιν, οὐδὲν ὅλον, ὅ τι ἂν ψυχὴ καταλάβῃ, ἐψυχωμένον ἔσται· ἀλλ’ οἷον περὶ κέντρον στήσασα ἑαυτὴν ἑκάστου ἄψυχον ἂν εἴασε πάντα τὸν τοῦ ζῴου ὄγκον. δεῖ ἄρα οὕτως ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεμερισμένον καὶ ἀμέριστον ψυχὴν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν [καὶ] πολλαχοῦ εἶναι.
Or else each part of soul will be deceived, supposing it happened where it is itself. And if not only the ruling part but any part at all perceives, why will one be the ruling part and another not? Or why must the perception go up to it? And how will it know a single thing from many perceptions, from ears and eyes, say? If, on the other hand, soul were altogether one—entirely indivisible and one by itself—and escaped altogether the nature of multiplicity and division, then nothing soul took hold of would be ensouled as a whole. Setting itself, as it were, at the center of each thing, it would have left the whole mass of the living being without soul. So soul must be one and many, divided and undivided, in this way; and we must not disbelieve that one and the same thing [also] can be in many places.
εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ παραδεχοίμεθα, ἡ τὰ πάντα συνέχουσα καὶ διοικοῦσα φύσις οὐκ ἔσται, ἥτις ὁμοῦ τε πάντα περιλαβοῦσα ἔχει καὶ μετὰ φρονήσεως ἄγει, πλῆθος μὲν οὖσα, ἐπείπερ πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, μία δέ, ἵνα ᾖ ἓν τὸ συνέχον, τῷ μὲν πολλῷ αὐτῆς ἑνὶ ζωὴν χορηγοῦσα τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσι, τῷ δὲ ἀμερίστῳ ἑνὶ φρονίμως ἄγουσα. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ φρόνησις, τὸ ἓν τὸ ἡγούμενον μιμεῖται τοῦτο. τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ θείως ᾐνιγμένον ‘τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης [οὐσίας] καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος.’ ἔστιν οὖν ψυχὴ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ οὕτως· τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ ἕν· τὰ δὲ σώματα πολλὰ μόνον· τὸ δὲ ὑπέρτατον ἓν μόνον.
For if we did not accept this, there would be no nature to hold all things together and govern them, embracing all things at once and leading them with understanding: a multiplicity, since the things that are are many, but one, so that what holds them together may be one. By what in its unity is many, it supplies life to all the parts; by what in its unity is indivisible, it leads them with understanding. And in things without understanding, the one that leads imitates this. This, then, is what is divinely hinted at in the riddle: “From the indivisible, always in the same state [being], and from the being that becomes divisible in bodies, he mixed a third form of being out of both.” So soul is one and many in this way; the forms in bodies are many and one; bodies are only many; and what is highest is only one.