Περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσα ἀπορήσαντας δεῖ εἰς εὐπορίαν καταστῆναι, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς ἀπορίαις στάντας τοῦτο γοῦν κέρδος ἔχειν, εἰδέναι τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἄπορον, ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν πραγματείαν ποιήσασθαι. περὶ τίνος γὰρ ἄν τις μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ λέγων καὶ σκοπούμενος εὐλόγως ἂν διατρίβοι ἢ περὶ ταύτης; διά τε πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ ὅτι ἐπ’ ἄμφω τὴν γνῶσιν δίδωσιν, ὧν τε ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν ἐστι. πειθοίμεθα δὲ ἂν καὶ τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ παρακελεύσματι αὑτοὺς γινώσκειν παρακελευομένῳ περὶ τούτου τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιούμενοι. ζητεῖν τε τὰ ἄλλα καὶ εὑρεῖν βουλόμενοι δικαίως ἂν τὸ ζητοῦν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ζητοῖμεν, τό τε ἐραστὸν ποθοῦν λαβεῖν θεαμάτων.
Concerning soul, it would be right to make this our treatise: all the questions where we must raise difficulties and then reach a resolution, or, stopping within the difficulties themselves, at least gain this much—to know what is difficult in them. For what subject could one more reasonably spend time on, speaking at length and examining it, than this? There are many reasons, and in particular that it gives knowledge in both directions: of the things of which it is the principle, and of those from which it comes. And in making this inquiry we would also be obeying the god’s command, which bids us know ourselves. Wanting to seek and find other things, we would rightly seek what this is that seeks, and what it is that longs to grasp the beloved among sights.
ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ νῷ τὸ διττόν· ὥστε εὐλόγως ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος τὸ μὲν οὕτως μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ οὕτως. τὰς δὲ ὑποδοχὰς τῶν θεῶν ὅπως, σκεπτέον.
For in the whole Intellect, too, there was this doubleness; so it is reasonable that in the partial ones one aspect should predominate in some, the other in others. How there are receptacles for the gods must be examined.
Are our souls parts of the World Soul?
Plotinus tests the claim that our souls are portions of the Soul of the All.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὅταν πῶς ἐν σώματι ψυχὴ γίνεται ζητῶμεν· νῦν δὲ πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴσως ἱκανὸν φήσουσιν εἶναι τὸ φθάνειν μέχρι τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας, μέχρις ὧν καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἔρχεται, μηδὲ τὸ ὁμοίως νοερόν, καὶ εἰ συγχωροῖεν τὸ ὁμοίως, τοῦ μὴ μόρια αὐτῆς εἶναι· εἶναι γὰρ ὁμοειδῆ καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις. παραθήσονται δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνα τοῦτο δοξάζοντα, ὅταν πιστούμενος τὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον εἶναι λέγῃ, ὡς σῶμα μέρος ὂν τοῦ παντὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν μέρος τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς εἶναι.
But that belongs to the inquiry into how soul comes to be in body. Now let us go back to those who say that our souls, too, come from the Soul of the All. For they will perhaps say that, to show our souls are not parts of it, it is not enough that ours too reach as far as the same things the Soul of the All reaches, or that they are intellectual in the same way—even if one grants the “in the same way”—since parts too are of the same form as their wholes. And they will cite Plato as holding this view, when, in establishing that the All is ensouled, he says that just as our body is a part of the All, so our soul is a part of the Soul of the All.
καὶ τὸ συνέπεσθαι δὲ ἡμᾶς τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾷ καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἐναργῶς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἐκεῖθεν λαμβάνοντας εἴσω τε γενομένους ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς τὴν ψυχὴν λαμβάνειν. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἡμῶν μέρος ἕκαστον ἡμῶν παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς λαμβάνει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μέρη πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὄντας παρὰ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς μεταλαμβάνειν ὡς μέρη. καὶ τὸ ‘ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου’ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σημαίνειν, ὡς οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔξωθεν ψυχῆς καταλείποντος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τὸ πᾶν ἄψυχον ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ τιθεμένη.
They also say that we follow the revolution of the All—this is both stated and clearly shown—and that we take our characters and fortunes from there, and that, coming to be inside it, we take our soul from what surrounds us. And just as in us each part of us receives from our soul, so we too, being parts in relation to the whole by the same ratio, receive a share from the whole Soul as parts. And “all soul cares for all that is soulless” means just this: that nothing outside soul is left after the Soul of the whole; for it is this soul that takes all that is soulless into its care.
πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὡς ὁμοειδῆ τιθέμενοι τῷ τῶν αὐτῶν συγχωρεῖν ἐφάπτεσθαι, τὸ αὐτὸ γένος κοινὸν διδόντες ἔξω ποιοῦσι τοῦ μέρος εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν καὶ ἑκάστην πᾶσαν δικαιότερον ἂν εἴποιεν. μίαν δὲ ποιοῦντες εἰς ἄλλο ἀναρτῶσιν, ὃ μηκέτι τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε ἀλλὰ οὐδενὸς ὂν αὐτὸ ἢ κόσμου ἤ τινος ἄλλου αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ὃ καὶ κόσμου καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἐμψύχου. καὶ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔχει μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν τινος εἶναι οὐσίαν γε οὖσαν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι, ἣ μή τινός ἐστιν ὅλως, τὰς δὲ ὅσαι τινὸς γίνεσθαί ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἴσως δὲ δεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς λέγεται σαφέστερον.
To this we must first say that by making the souls of the same form, in granting that they reach the same things, and by giving them the same common genus, they put them outside the status of parts. They would more justly say that it is one and the same soul, and that each is the whole. But making it one, they hang it on something else: something that no longer belongs to this or that, but to nothing, and that itself makes it the soul of the cosmos or of anything else—soul of the cosmos and of any ensouled thing. And it is right that not all soul belongs to something, since it is a being; there is soul that belongs to nothing at all, while those that belong to something come to do so at some time, incidentally. Perhaps we should grasp more clearly how “part” is meant in such cases.
τὸ μὲν δὴ ὡς σωμάτων μέρος, εἴτε ὁμοειδὲς τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε ἀνομοειδές, ἐατέον ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἐπισημηναμένους, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ὅταν λέγηται μέρος, κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον ἐστὶ τὸ μέρος, οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον τὴν λευκότητα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ γάλακτος λευκότης μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γάλακτος λευκότητος, ἀλλὰ μορίου μέν ἐστι λευκότης, μόριον δὲ οὐκ ἔστι λευκότητος· ἀμέγεθες γὰρ ὅλως καὶ οὐ ποσὸν ἡ λευκότης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως. ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐ σωμάτων λέγωμεν μέρος, ἤτοι οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λέγοιμεν ἄν, ὡς τὰ δύο τῶν δέκα· ἔστω δὲ ἐπὶ ψιλῶν μόνων τὸ λεγόμενον· ἢ ὡς κύκλου καὶ γραμμῆς μέρος, ἢ ὡς ἐπιστήμης μέρος.
“Part” in the sense used of bodies—whether the body is of the same form throughout or not—we may leave aside, noting only this: in things whose parts are alike, when one speaks of a part, the part is a part of the mass, not of the form—whiteness, for example. The whiteness in a portion of milk is not a part of the whiteness of all the milk; it is the whiteness of a portion, but not a portion of whiteness, for whiteness is altogether without magnitude and is not a quantity. But enough of that. When we speak of a part in things that are not bodies, we might speak of it as in numbers—two as part of ten (let this be said of bare numbers only)—or as a part of a circle and of a line, or as a part of a science.
ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μονάδων καὶ τῶν σχημάτων ἀνάγκη ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἐλαττοῦσθαί τε τὸ ὅλον τῷ εἰς τὰ μέρη μερισμῷ, ἐλάττω τε τὰ μέρη ἕκαστα τῶν ὅλων εἶναι· ποσὰ γὰρ ὄντα καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ἔχοντα, οὐ τὸ αὐτοποσὸν ὄντα, μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται. κατὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγεσθαι.
With units and figures, as with bodies, the whole must be diminished by division into parts, and each of the parts must be smaller than the wholes. Being quantities, and having their being in quantity, not being quantity itself, they necessarily become greater and smaller. In these senses, then, “part” cannot be said of soul.
οὔτε γὰρ ποσὸν οὕτως, ὡς δεκάδα τὴν πᾶσαν, τὴν δὲ μονάδα εἶναι· ἄλλα τε γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα συμβήσεται, καὶ οὐχ ἕν τι τὰ δέκα, καὶ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν τῶν μονάδων ἢ ψυχὴ ἔσται, ἢ ἐξ ἀψύχων ἁπάντων ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς συγκεχώρηται ὁμοειδὲς εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ συνεχοῦς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μέρος οἷον τὸ ὅλον εἶναι, οἷον κύκλου ἢ τετραγώνου, ἢ οὐ πάντα γε τὰ μόρια ὅμοια ἐφ’ ὧν ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μέρος [οἷον τὸ ὅλον], οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τριγώνων τρίγωνα, ἀλλὰ παραλλάσσοντα· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τίθενται εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν μέρος ἔχει τὸ γραμμὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει διαφέρει καὶ ἐνταῦθα.
For soul is not a quantity in the way that the whole would be a ten and one soul a unit. Many other absurdities would follow: the ten would not be one thing, and either each of the units would be a soul, or soul would be made up of things all soulless. Besides, it has been granted that the part of the whole soul is of the same form; whereas with the continuous, the part need not be like the whole—a circle, for example, or a square—or at any rate not all the parts one can take [like the whole] are alike, as with triangles, which have triangles as parts, but varying ones; yet they hold that soul is of the same form. And with a line, the part does have the being of a line, but here too it differs in magnitude.
ἐπὶ δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ διαφορὰ τῷ μεγέθει εἰ λέγοιτο τῆς μερικῆς πρὸς τὴν ὅλην, ποσόν τι ἔσται καὶ σῶμα τὴν διαφορὰν λαμβάνουσα καθὸ ψυχὴ παρὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ. ἀλλ’ ὑπέκειντο πᾶσαι ὅμοιαι καὶ ὅλαι. φαίνεται δὲ οὐδὲ μεριζομένη οὕτως ὡς τὰ μεγέθη, οὐδ’ ἂν συγχωρήσαιεν δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ κατατέμνεσθαι τὴν ὅλην εἰς μέρη· ἀναλώσουσι γὰρ τὴν ὅλην, καὶ ὄνομα μόνον ἔσται, εἴ τίς ποτε ἦν πᾶσα, ὡς εἰ οἴνου μερισθέντος εἰς πολλὰ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀμφορεῖ λέγοιτο μέρος οἴνου τοῦ ὅλου. ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτω μέρος ὡς θεώρημά τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης λέγεται τῆς ὅλης ἐπιστήμης, αὐτῆς μὲν μενούσης οὐδὲν ἧττον, τοῦ δὲ μερισμοῦ οἷον προφορᾶς καὶ ἐνεργείας ἑκάστου οὔσης; ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἕκαστον μὲν δυνάμει ἔχει τὴν ὅλην ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δέ ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὅλη.
But if the difference between the partial soul and the whole were said to be one of magnitude, soul will be a quantity and a body, taking its difference as soul from quantity. Yet it was laid down that they are all alike and whole. And soul plainly is not divided the way magnitudes are; nor would they themselves grant that the whole is chopped up into parts. They would use up the whole, and it will be a mere name—if there ever was a whole soul—as if, when wine had been divided into many portions, each portion in each jar were called a part of the whole wine. Is it a part, then, in the way a theorem is called a part of the whole science, while the science itself remains no less, and the division is, as it were, the bringing forth and putting into act of each theorem? In such a case each theorem holds the whole science potentially, and the science is no less whole.
εἰ δὴ οὕτως ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τῆς τε ὅλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ὅλη, ἧς τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη, ἔσται τινός, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦ κόσμου, ἀλλά τις καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἐν μέρει. μέρη ἄρα πᾶσαι μιᾶς ὁμοειδεῖς οὖσαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡ μὲν κόσμου, ἡ δὲ μερῶν τοῦ κόσμου;
If it is like this with soul, both the whole and the others, the whole of which such things are parts will not belong to anything, but will be itself by itself. So it will not be the soul of the cosmos either; even the soul of the cosmos will be one of the partial souls. So all are parts of one, being of the same form. But then how is one the soul of the cosmos, and others souls of parts of the cosmos?
ἀλλ’ ἆρα οὕτω μέρη, ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ζῴου τις εἴποι τὴν ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ψυχὴν μέρος τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ ζῴῳ ὅλης; ἀλλ’ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐδεμίαν ποιεῖ ψυχὴν ἔξω σώματος γίνεσθαι, ἢ πᾶσαν οὐκ ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ’ ἔξω τοῦ σώματος τοῦ κόσμου τὴν τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένην. σκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο· νῦν δὲ ὡς λέγοιτο ἂν κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐξεταστέον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς παρέχει αὑτὴν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν μέρει ζῴοις, καὶ οὕτω μέρος ἑκάστη, διαιρεθεῖσα μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὑτὴν ἑκάστῳ παρέχοι, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἡ ὅλη μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα οὖσα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκέτ’ ἂν τὴν μὲν ὅλην, τὴν δὲ μέρος ἂν εἶναι παράσχοιτο, καὶ μάλιστα οἷς τὸ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως πάρεστιν.
But are they perhaps parts in the way someone might say, in the case of a single living being, that the soul in the finger is part of the whole soul in the whole animal? But this account either makes no soul exist outside body, or makes all of it—what is called the Soul of the All—exist not in body but outside the body of the cosmos. This must be examined; for now we must consider how it might be put in terms of the image. If the Soul of the All gives itself to all the partial living beings, and each is a part in this way, it would not be divided when it gives itself to each; the whole will be the same everywhere, one and the same, existing in many things at once. But this would no longer allow one to be the whole and another a part, especially in things in which the same power is present.
ἐπεὶ καὶ οἷς ἄλλο ἔργον, οἷς δὲ ἄλλο, οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ ὠσίν, οὐ μόριον ἄλλο ψυχῆς ὁράσει, ἄλλο δὲ ὠσὶ λεκτέον παρεῖναι· ἄλλων δὲ τὸ μερίζειν οὕτως· ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτό, κἂν ἄλλη δύναμις ἐν ἑκατέροις ἐνεργῇ· εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἅπασαι· τῷ δὲ τὰ ὄργανα διάφορα εἶναι διαφόρους τὰς ἀντιλήψεις γίνεσθαι, πάσας μέντοι εἰδῶν εἶναι [οὐκ] εἰς πάντα δυναμένων μορφοῦσθαι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς ἓν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα ἰέναι. τῶν δὴ ὀργάνων διαφόρων [ὄντων καὶ] μὴ πάντα δυναμένων δέξασθαι, τὰ μὲν παθήματα διάφορα γίνεσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ κρίσιν παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἷον δικαστοῦ καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς λεγομένους καὶ τὰ πραχθέντα κατανενοηκότος.
For even where one thing has one function and another another—eyes and ears, for example—we must not say that one portion of soul is present to sight and another to the ears (dividing in this way belongs to other things); it is the same soul, even if a different power is active in each. For all the powers are in both; but because the organs differ, the perceptions turn out different, though all of them belong to forms that can [not] take shape in everything. This is also shown by the fact that everything must come to one. Since the organs differ [and] cannot receive everything, the affections that arise in the organs are different, but the judgment comes from the same thing, like a judge who has attended to the words spoken and the deeds done.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἕν γε πανταχοῦ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις τῶν ἔργων εἴ τε ὡς αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐκ ἔνι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν νοεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνην· (εἰ δ’ οἰκεία ἦν ἡ νόησις, ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἑκάστη). ὅταν δὲ καὶ λογικὴ ᾖ ψυχή, καὶ οὕτω λογικὴ ὡς ὅλη λέγεται, τὸ λεγόμενον μέρος ταὐτόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μέρος ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου.
But it has been said that soul is one everywhere, even in different functions. If the parts are like the senses, none of them can think; only that whole soul can (if thinking belonged to each, each would be by itself). But when soul is rational too, and rational in the way the whole is said to be, what is called a part will be the same, and not a part of the whole.
One soul and many souls
All souls are one, as Intellect is one, while each remains itself.
τί οὖν φατέον, εἰ οὕτω μία, ὅταν τις ζητῇ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν πρῶτον μὲν ἀπορῶν, εἰ οἷόν τε οὕτως ἓν ἅμα ἐν πᾶσιν [εἶναι], ἔπειτα, ὅταν [ἡ μὲν] ἐν σώματι ᾖ, ἡ δὲ μὴ ἐν σώματι. ἴσως γὰρ ἀκολουθήσει ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ παντός. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμετέρα λέγεται καταλείπειν τὸ σῶμα· καίτοι τινές φασι τόδε μὲν καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλ’ εἰ πάντη ἔξω σώματος ἔσται, πῶς ἡ μὲν καταλείψει, ἡ δὲ οὔ, ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα;
What, then, must we say, if it is one in this way, when someone pursues the inquiry from here? First he raises the difficulty whether one thing can [be] in all things at once in this way; then, what happens when [one soul] is in body and another not in body. For perhaps it will follow that all soul is always in body, and especially the Soul of the All. It is not said to leave the body the way ours is; and yet some say that ours will leave this body but will not be altogether outside body. But if it will be altogether outside body, how will one soul leave and the other not, though they are the same?
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ νοῦ ἑτερότητι χωριζομένου ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ μέρη [διαφέροντα] μάλιστα ἀλλήλων, ὄντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἀεί· ἀμέριστος γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ οὐσία· οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἂν ἀπορία κατέχοι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς λεγομένης μεριστῆς εἶναι κατὰ σώματα τοῦτο τὸ ἕν τι εἶναι πάσας πολλὰς ἂν ἔχοι ἀπορίας· εἰ μή τις τὸ μὲν ἓν στήσειεν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ πῖπτον εἰς τὸ σῶμα, εἶτ’ ἐξ ἐκείνου τὰς πάσας, τήν τε τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, μέχρι τινὸς οἷον συνούσας καὶ μίαν τῷ μηδενός τινος γίνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πέρασιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρτημένας καὶ συνούσας ἀλλήλαις πρὸς τὰ ἄνω ὡδὶ καὶ ὡδὶ ἐπιβάλλειν, οἷον φωτὸς ἤδη πρὸς τῇ γῇ μεριζομένου κατ’ οἴκους καὶ οὐ μεμερισμένου, ἀλλ’ ὄντος ἑνὸς οὐδὲν ἧττον·
With Intellect, which separates itself by otherness into parts that [differ] most from one another, yet are always together—for this being would be indivisible—no such difficulty would arise. But with the soul said to be “divisible in bodies,” this claim that all souls are one would involve many difficulties. Unless one were to set the one by itself, not falling into body, and then derive from it all the souls, that of the whole and the others: up to a point they are together, as it were, and one, by not belonging to any particular thing; but, fastened by their upper edges and together with one another toward what is above, they reach out this way and that—like light that, as it reaches the earth, is divided among houses and yet is not divided, but is one no less.
καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ἀεὶ ὑπερέχειν τῷ μηδὲ εἶναι αὐτῇ τὸ κατελθεῖν μηδὲ τὸ κάτω μηδὲ ἐπιστροφὴν [πρὸς] τὰ τῇδε, τὰς δ’ ἡμετέρας [οὐκ ἀεὶ] τῷ τε εἶναι ἀφωρισμένον αὐταῖς τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷδε καὶ τῆ ἐπιστροφῇ τοῦ προσδεομένου φροντίσεως, τῆς μὲν ἐοικυίας τῇ ἐν φυτῷ μεγάλῳ ψυχῇ, ἣ ἀπόνως τὸ φυτὸν καὶ ἀψόφως διοικεῖ, τῆς κατωτάτω τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός, τοῦ δὲ ἡμῶν κάτω, οἷον εἰ εὐλαὶ ἐν σαπέντι μέρει τοῦ φυτοῦ γίνοιντο — οὕτω γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἔμψυχον ἐν τῷ παντί· τῆς δὲ ἄλλης ψυχῆς τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς τῶν ἄνω τῆς ὅλης, οἷον εἴ τις γεωργὸς ἐν φροντίδι τῶν ἐν τῷ φυτῷ εὐλῶν γίνοιτο καὶ ταῖς μερίμναις πρὸς τῷ φυτῷ γίνοιτο, ἢ εἴ τις ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὑγιαινόντων ὄντα πρὸς ἐκείνοις εἶναι λέγοι, πρὸς οἷς ἐστιν ἢ πράττων ἢ θεωρίαις ἑαυτὸν παρέχων, νοσήσαντος δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαις ὄντος πρὸς τῷ σώματι εἶναι καὶ τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι.
And the Soul of the All always stays above, because it has no coming down, no lower part, no turning [toward] things here; but ours [not always], because a part of them has been marked off in this world, and because of their turning toward what needs care. The lowest part of the Soul of the All resembles the soul in a great plant, which governs the plant without toil and without noise; our lower part is as if maggots arose in a rotten part of the plant—for that is what the ensouled body is in the All. But the rest of our soul, which is of the same form as the upper parts of the whole Soul, is as if a farmer became worried about the maggots in the plant and gave his attention to the plant. Or it is as if one were to say that a man who is healthy and lives among other healthy men is devoted to the things he is devoted to, whether acting or giving himself to contemplation; but when he falls ill and is occupied with caring for his body, he is devoted to the body and has come to belong to the body.
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἔτι ἡ μὲν σή, ἡ δὲ τοῦδε, ἡ δὲ ἄλλου ἔσται; ἆρ’ οὖν τοῦδε μὲν κατὰ τὸ κάτω, οὐ τοῦδε δέ, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου κατὰ τὸ ἄνω; ἀλλ’ οὕτως γε Σωκράτης μὲν ἔσται, ὅταν ἐν σώματι ᾖ ἡ Σωκράτους ψυχή· ἀπολεῖται δέ, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ. ἢ ἀπολεῖται οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ οἱ νόες οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται, ὅτι μή εἰσι σωματικῶς μεμερισμένοι, (εἰς ἕν), ἀλλὰ μένει ἕκαστον ἐν ἑτερότητι ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν εἶναι.
But then how will one soul still be yours, another this man’s, and another someone else’s? Is it this man’s by its lower part, and not this man’s but that one’s by its upper part? But in that case Socrates will exist when the soul of Socrates is in body, and will perish precisely when he comes to be in the best. Or rather: none of the things that are will perish. For there too the intellects will not perish, because they are not divided bodily (into one); each remains in its otherness, keeping the same being that it is.
οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ [αἱ] ψυχαὶ ἐφεξῆς καθ’ ἕκαστον νοῦν ἐξηρτημέναι, λόγοι νῶν οὖσαι καὶ ἐξειλιγμέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οἷον πολὺ ἐξ ὀλίγου γενόμεναι, συναφεῖς τῷ ὀλίγῳ οὖσαι ἀμερεστέρῳ ἐκείνων ἑκάστῳ μερίζεσθαι ἤδη θελήσασαι καὶ οὐ δυνάμεναι εἰς πᾶν μερισμοῦ ἰέναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον σώζουσαι μένει τε ἑκάστη ἕν, καὶ ὁμοῦ ἓν πᾶσαι. εἴρηται δὴ κεφάλαιον τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἐκ μιᾶς, καὶ αἱ ἑκ μιᾶς πολλαὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ νῷ μερισθεῖσαι καὶ οὐ μερισθεῖσαι, καὶ λόγος εἷς τοῦ νοῦ ἡ μένουσα καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς λόγοι μερικοὶ καὶ ἄυλοι, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ.
So too the souls, fastened in order to each intellect, are rational principles of intellects and more unfolded than they are; they have become much, as it were, from little. Connected with the little, which is less divided than each of them, they now want to be divided, yet cannot go to complete division; keeping both sameness and otherness, each remains one, and all together are one. The heart of the argument has now been stated: that souls come from one; that the many souls from one are, like Intellect, divided and not divided; that the soul that remains is one rational principle of Intellect; and that from it come partial and immaterial rational principles, just as There.
Why the Soul of the All made the cosmos
The Soul of the All made the cosmos because it stays above, close to the whole Intellect.
διὰ τί δὲ ἡ μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ὁμοειδὴς οὖσα πεποίηκε κόσμον, ἡ δὲ ἑκάστου οὔ, ἔχουσα καὶ αὐτὴ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῇ; τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι ἐν πολλοῖς γίνεσθαι ἅμα καὶ εἶναι εἴρηται· νῦν δὲ λεκτέον, [πῶς]; τάχα γὰρ καὶ πῶς ταὐτὸν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ μὲν τοδί, τὸ δὲ τοδὶ ποιεῖ ἢ πάσχει ἢ ἄμφω γνωσθήσεται· ἢ καθ’ αὑτό γε τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον. πῶς οὖν καὶ διὰ τί κόσμον πεποίηκεν, αἱ δὲ μέρος τι τοῦ κόσμου διοικοῦσιν; ἢ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντας τοὺς μὲν πλειόνων, τοὺς δὲ ἐλαττόνων ἄρχειν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί εἰπεῖν ἂν ἔχοι τις.
But why has the Soul of the All, though of the same form, made a cosmos, while the soul of each individual has not, though it too has everything in itself? That it can come to be and exist in many things at once has been said; now we must say [how]. For perhaps we shall also learn how the same thing, in this and in that, does this or that, or is affected, or both; or perhaps this must be examined on its own. How, then, and why, did it make a cosmos, while the others govern some part of the cosmos? Perhaps it is no wonder that, among people with the same knowledge, some rule over more and others over fewer. But one might be able to say why.
ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, εἴποι τις ἄν, καὶ ψυχῶν διαφορὰ ᾗ μᾶλλον, καθὸ ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀπέστη τῆς ὅλης, ἀλλ’ ἔσχεν ἐκεῖ οὖσα περὶ αὑτὴν τὸ σῶμα, αἱ δὲ ἤδη ὄντος οἷον ἀδελφῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης μοίρας διέλαχον, οἷον προπαρασκευασάσης ταύτης αὐταῖς οἰκήσεις.
But, one might say, there is also a difference among souls, and a greater one, in that the one did not depart from the whole Soul but, remaining there, had the body around itself, while the others received their allotted portions when the body already existed and a sister soul, as it were, was already ruling—as though this soul had prepared dwellings for them in advance.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ [διαφορὰ τῷ] τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸν ὅλον νοῦν ἰδεῖν, τὰς δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς αὑτῶν τοὺς ἐν μέρει. τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ αὗται δύναιντο ποιεῖν, τῆς δὲ ποιησάσης οὐκέτι οἷόν τε καὶ αὐταῖς, πρώτης ἐκείνης ἀρξάσης. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ ἄν τις ἠπόρησε, καὶ εἰ ἡτισοῦν καὶ ἄλλη πρώτη κατεῖχε. βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τῷ ἐξηρτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄνω· τῶν γὰρ ἐκεῖ νενευκότων ἡ δύναμις μείζων. σώζουσαι γὰρ αὑτὰς ἐπ’ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾴστου ποιοῦσι — δυνάμεως γὰρ μείζονος μὴ πάσχειν ἐν οἷς ποιεῖ — ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐκ τοῦ ἄνω μένει. μένουσα οὖν ἐν αὑτῇ ποιεῖ προσιόντων, αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ προσῆλθον. ἀπέστησαν οὖν εἰς βάθος. ἢ πολὺ αὐτῶν καθελκυσθὲν συνεφειλκύσατο καὶ αὐτὰς ταῖς γνώμαις εἰς τὸ κάτω ἰέναι.
There is also [a difference in that] the one looks toward the whole Intellect, the others rather toward their own partial intellects. Perhaps these too could have made a world, but once that soul had made one, it was no longer possible for them as well, since that one had begun first. The same difficulty would arise if any other soul whatever had taken possession first. It is better to say: because it is more fastened to the things above; for the power of souls that incline toward that realm is greater. Keeping themselves in safety, they make things with the greatest ease—for it belongs to greater power not to be affected by what it makes—and the power comes from above. So, remaining in itself, it makes, and the things come to it; but the other souls themselves went to the things. So they departed into the depth. Or rather, a large part of them, dragged down, dragged them along too, with their thoughts, to go downward.
τὸ γὰρ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας τῷ ἐγγύθεν καὶ τῷ πορρώτερον ὑπονοητέον εἰρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν οὐχ ὁμοίως πάσαις ψυχαῖς ὑπάρχει τὰ πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἑνοῖντο ἄν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιβάλλοιεν ἂν ἐγγὺς ἐφιέμενοι, τοῖς δὲ ἧττον ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτο, καθ’ ὃ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν οὐ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ, οἱ δὲ τῇ μετ’ ἐκείνην, οἱ δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ, ἁπάντων τὰς πάσας ἐχόντων.
For the phrase “second and third” must be understood to refer to being nearer and farther. Just as among us, not all souls stand in the same relation to the things There: some would be united, some would reach toward them, aspiring from close by, and others would have this less, insofar as they are active not with the same powers, but some with the first, some with the one after it, others with the third, though all have all of them.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν Φιλήβῳ λεχθὲν παρέχον ὑπόνοιαν μοίρας τῆς τοῦ παντὸς τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι; βούλεται δὲ ὁ λόγος οὐ τοῦτο, ὅ τις οἴεται, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἦν χρήσιμον αὐτῷ τότε, καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔμψυχον εἶναι. τοῦτο οὖν πιστοῦται λέγων, ὡς ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν ἡμῶν, οἳ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν ἀψύχου τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος; δῆλον δὲ μάλιστα τὸ τῆς γνώμης αὑτοῦ ἐν Τιμαίῳ ποιεῖ, οὗ γενομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς ὕστερον τὰς ἄλλας ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μιγνύων κρατῆρος, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων, ὁμοειδῆ ποιῶν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν δευτέροις καὶ τρίτοις διδούς.
So much for that. But what about the passage in the Philebus that suggests the other souls are portions of the Soul of the All? The argument there does not mean what someone supposes, but what was useful to him at the time: that the heaven too is ensouled. He establishes this by saying it is absurd to call the heaven soulless when we, who have a part of the body of the All, have soul. For how could the part have soul if the All were soulless? He makes his view clearest in the Timaeus: after the Soul of the All has come into being, he makes the other souls later, mixing them in the same bowl from which the Soul of the whole came, making the rest of the same form too, but assigning the difference to “second” and “third.”
τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ ‘ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου’ ⟨…⟩ τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὃ σώματος τὴν φύσιν διοικεῖ καὶ ἢ πλάττει ἢ τάττει ἢ ποιεῖ, ἢ ἡ ψυχή; καὶ οὐχ ἡ μὲν πέφυκε τοῦτο δύνασθαι, ἡ δὲ οὔ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τελεία, φησίν, ἡ τοῦ παντὸς μετεωροποροῦσα οὐ δῦσα, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐποχουμένη, εἰς τὸν κόσμον ποιεῖ καὶ ‘ἥτις ἂν τελεία ᾖ, οὕτω διοικεῖ.’ ‘ἡ δὲ πτερορρυήσασα’ εἰπὼν ἄλλην ταύτην παρ’ ἐκείνην ποιεῖ. τὸ δὲ συνέπεσθαι τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾷ καὶ ἤθη ἐκεῖθεν κομίζεσθαι καὶ πάσχειν παρ’ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη σημεῖον τοῦτο τοῦ μέρη τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. ἱκανὴ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ παρὰ φύσεως τόπων πολλὰ ἀπομάττεσθαι καὶ ὑδάτων καὶ ἀέρος· [καὶ ἀπομάττουσι δὲ] καὶ πόλεων διαφόρων οἰκήσεις καὶ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κράσεις.
As for the line in the Phaedrus, “all soul cares for all that is soulless” ⟨…⟩ what else could it be that governs the nature of body and either molds it or orders it or makes it, if not soul? And it is not that one soul is naturally capable of this and another not. “The perfect soul,” he says—the Soul of the All—“travels on high,” not sinking in but riding on it, as it were, and acts upon the cosmos; and “whatever soul is perfect governs in this way.” When he speaks of “the one that has shed its wings,” he makes it different from that one. As for following the revolution of the All, getting our characters from there and being affected by it, this would be no sign that our souls are parts. For a soul is quite capable of taking many impressions from the nature of places, of waters and of air; [and impressions are also made by] living in different cities and by the mixtures of bodies.
καί τι ἔφαμεν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ὄντες τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ψυχῆς, καὶ παρὰ τῆς περιφορᾶς συνεχωροῦμεν τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀντετίθεμεν ἄλλην ψυχὴν πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ μάλιστα τῇ ἀντιστάσει δεικνυμένην ἄλλην. τὸ δ’ ὅτι εἴσω γεννώμεθα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μητέρων φαμὲν ἑτέραν εἶναι οὐ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς τὴν ἐπεισιοῦσαν.
And we said that, being in the All, we have something of the Soul of the whole, and we granted that we are affected by the revolution; but we set another soul against these influences, one shown to be other above all by its resistance. As for the fact that we are born inside it: with mothers too, we say that the soul that enters is a different one, not the mother’s.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι λύσεως καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπαθείας μὴ ἐμποδίζοντος τὸν λόγον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς αὐτῆς πᾶσαι οὖσαι, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὅλου, συμπαθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅτι καὶ μία καὶ πολλαί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τῆς διαφορᾶς ὅπως, εἴρηται. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὅλως περὶ διαφορᾶς ψυχῆς καὶ νῦν συντόμως λεγέσθω, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὰ σώματα ἂν γένοιτο διαφέρειν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι μάλιστα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς διανοίας ἔργοις ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων βίων. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς προβεβιωμένους φησὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίνεσθαι.
That, then, would be the solution to these points; and sympathy does not obstruct the argument either. Since all souls come from the same soul as the Soul of the whole, they are in sympathy. For it has been said that soul is both one and many. How the part differs from the whole has been said. Difference among souls in general has also been discussed; let it now be said briefly that souls might also come to differ because of bodies, and especially in their characters and in the works of discursive thought, as a result of lives lived before. For he says that souls’ choices are made in accordance with their former lives.
εἰ δέ τις φύσιν ψυχῆς ὅλως λαμβάνοι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις εἴρηνται αἱ διαφοραί, ἐν οἷς καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα ἐλέγετο, καὶ ὅτι πάντα πᾶσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεργῆσαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἑκάστη· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἑνοῦσθαι ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν γνώσει, τὴν δὲ ἐν ὀρέξει, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄλλην ἄλλα βλέπειν καὶ ἅπερ βλέπει εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι· καὶ τὸ πλῆρες δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τέλειον οὐχὶ ταὐτὸν πάσαις.
But if one takes the nature of soul as a whole, its differences have also been stated in the passages where “second” and “third” were spoken of, and where it was said that all souls are all things, but each according to what is active in it: one is united in activity, one in knowledge, one in desire. They also differ in that different souls look at different things and are and become what they look at. And the fullness and perfection of souls is not the same for all.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ποικίλον τὸ ὅλον σύνταγμα αὐταῖς — εἷς γὰρ πᾶς λόγος πολὺς καὶ ποικίλος, ὥσπερ ζῷον ψυχικὸν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἔχον· εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ σύνταξίς ἐστι, καὶ οὐ διέσπασται τὰ ὄντα ὅλως ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲ τὸ εἰκῆ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ὅπου μηδὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ἀριθμόν τινα ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἑστάναι δεῖ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ νοητὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστον ἓν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ τόδε.
But if the whole order they form is varied—for every rational principle is one, many and varied, like an ensouled living being with many shapes—if so, there is also an order, and the things that are are not wholly torn apart from one another. There is no chance among the things that are, since there is none even among bodies; and it follows that there is a definite number. For again, the things that are must stand fast, the intelligibles must be the same, and each must be one in number: that is how it is a “this.”
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων τῇ φύσει τοῦ καθέκαστον ῥέοντος ἅτε ἐπακτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους ὄντος τὸ εἶναι κατ’ εἶδος ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει μιμήσει τῶν ὄντων, τοῖς δὲ ἅτε οὐκ ἐκ συνθέσεως οὖσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστι ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ἀριθμῷ ἕν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὔτε γίνεται ὃ μὴ ἦν, οὔτε ὃ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ ποιοῦν τι ἔσται αὐτά, ἐκ μὲν ὕλης οὐκ ἄν· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, δεῖ τι καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐσιῶδες προσθεῖναι· ὥστε μεταβολὴ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, εἰ νῦν πλέον ποιεῖ ἢ ἔλαττον. καὶ διὰ τί νῦν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ οὕτως; καὶ τὸ γενόμενον δὲ οὐκ ἀίδιον, εἴπερ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον· κεῖται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον. πῶς οὖν ἄπειρον, εἰ στήσεται;
With bodies, because the nature of the individual is in flux, the form being brought in from outside, being in accordance with form always belongs to them by imitation of the things that are. But for things that do not come from composition, being consists in being what they are, one in number, which is theirs from the beginning; what was not does not come into being, and what is will not cease to be. For even if something is to make them, it will not make them out of matter; and if it does, it must add from itself something of the nature of being, so that there would be change in that very maker, if it now made more and now less. And why now, and not always thus? And what came into being would not be eternal, if it were more and less; but soul is laid down as being eternal. How, then, is it unlimited, if it is to stand fast?
ἢ τῇ δυνάμει τὸ ἄπειρον, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις ἄπειρος, οὐχ ὡς μερισθησομένης εἰς ἄπειρον.
Or rather: it is unlimited in power, because its power is unlimited—not as though it will be divided to infinity.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐ πεπερασμένος. καὶ αὗται τοίνυν οὐ πέρατι ἀλλοτρίῳ ἔστιν ἑκάστη ὃ ἔστιν, οἷον τοσαύτη, ἀλλ’ αὐτή ἐστιν ὅσον θέλει, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε γένηται προιοῦσα ἔξω αὑτῆς, ἀλλὰ φθάνει μὲν πανταχοῦ, ὃ πέφυκεν αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα φθάνειν· οὐ μὴν διέσπασται ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς, ὅταν ᾖ καὶ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποδί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἰς ὃ ἂν φθάνῃ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ μέρει φυτοῦ καὶ ἀποτετμημένου· ὥστε εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φυτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τετμημένῳ· ἓν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἑνί ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ.
For god too is not limited. So these souls, too, are each what they are not by an alien limit, as being of such and such a size; each is as much as it wants, and it never goes forth outside itself. It reaches everywhere—the part of it whose nature is to reach into bodies—yet it is not torn apart from itself when it is in the finger and in the foot. So too in the All: whatever it reaches, in this and that part of a plant, even one cut off, it is in both the original plant and the part cut from it. For the body of the All is one, and soul is everywhere in it as in one thing.
καὶ σαπέντος δὲ ζῴου εἰ πολλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐκείνη μὲν οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει αὖ τὸ δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέθανε. τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα πρὸς γενέσεις ζῴων, τὰ μὲν τῶνδε, τὰ δὲ τῶνδε, ἴσχει ψυχὴν οὐδενὸς ὄντος ὅτου ἀποστατεῖ, ὄντος δὲ τοῦ μὲν δέχεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μὴ δέχεσθαι δυναμένου. καὶ τὰ γινόμενα οὕτως ἔμψυχα οὐ πλείους ἐποίησε ψυχάς· ἐξήρτηται γὰρ τῆς μιᾶς, ἣ μένει μία· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀποτεμνομένων τινῶν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀντ’ αὐτῶν φυομένων, τῶν μὲν ἀπέστη ἡ ψυχή, τοῖς δὲ προσεγένετο, ἕως ἡ μία μένει. ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ μένει ἀεὶ ἡ μία· τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς τὰ μὲν ἴσχει, τὰ δὲ ἀποτίθεται, τῶν αὐτῶν ψυχικῶν μενόντων.
And if, when an animal has rotted, many come from it, the soul of the whole animal is no longer in the body; for the body no longer has what can receive it, or it would not have died. But the products of the decay that are suited to the generation of animals, some of one kind, some of another, have soul, since there is nothing from which soul stands aloof; but one thing can receive it and another cannot. And the things that become ensouled in this way have not made more souls: they depend on the one soul, which remains one. Just so in us: when some parts are cut away and others grow in their place, soul leaves the former and comes to the latter, as long as the one soul remains. And in the All the one soul always remains; of the things within it, it holds some and lets go of others, while what belongs to soul remains the same.
How soul enters body
The cosmos was never without soul; it lies in Soul like a net in the sea.
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐγγίνεται σώματι ψυχὴ ζητητέον. τίς ὁ τρόπος καὶ πῶς; οὐχ ἧττον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ζητῆσαι ἄξιον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν διττὸς ὁ τρόπος τῆς εἰς σῶμα ψυχῆς εἰσόδου — ἡ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ψυχῇ ἐν σώματι οὔσῃ τῇ τε μετενσωματουμένῃ καὶ τῇ ἐκ σώματος ἀερίνου ἢ πυρίνου εἰς γήινον γινομένῃ, ἣν δὴ μετενσωμάτωσιν οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι, ὅτι ἄδηλον τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ εἴσκρισις, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου εἰς ὁτιοῦν σῶμα, ἣ δὴ καὶ πρώτη ἂν εἴη ψυχῇ κοινωνία σώματι — ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ ταύτης, τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον πάθος τότε, ὅτε ψυχὴ καθαρὰ οὖσα σώματος πάντη ἴσχει περὶ αὑτὴν σώματος φύσιν.
But we must inquire how soul comes to be in body. What is the manner of it, and how does it happen? This too is no less worth wondering at and inquiring into. Soul enters body in two ways. The first happens to a soul already in a body: to the soul that transmigrates, and to the soul that passes from a body of air or fire into an earthy one. They do not call this second case transmigration, because it is unclear where the entry starts from. The other way is from the bodiless into any body whatever, and this would be soul’s first communion with body. So it would be right to examine this one: what exactly is the experience that takes place at that moment, when a soul entirely pure of body takes on a bodily nature around itself?
περὶ μὲν δὴ τῆς τοῦ παντός — ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἴσως ἄρξασθαι [ἄξιον], μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον τυγχάνει· δεῖ δὴ τῷ λόγῳ τὴν εἴσοδον καὶ τὴν ἐμψύχωσιν διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χάριν γίνεσθαι νομίζειν. ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἐψυχοῦτο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτε σῶμα ὑφειστήκει ψυχῆς ἀπούσης, οὐδὲ ὕλη ποτὲ ὅτε ἀκόσμητος ἦν· ἀλλ’ ἐπινοῆσαι ταῦτα χωρίζοντας αὐτὰ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τῷ λόγῳ οἷόν τε. ἔξεστι γὰρ ἀναλύειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ πᾶσαν σύνθεσιν.
As for the Soul of the All, it is perhaps [fitting] to begin there, or rather it is necessary. We must take it that our account speaks of its entry and ensoulment for the sake of teaching and clarity. For there was never a time when this All was not ensouled, nor a time when body existed while soul was absent, nor was matter ever unordered. But we can conceive these things by separating them from one another in thought, since we are free to take apart any composite in argument and in discursive thought.
ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς ὧδε ἔχει· σώματος μὲν μὴ ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν προέλθοι ψυχή, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἄλλος ἔστιν, ὅπου πέφυκεν εἶναι. προιέναι δὲ εἰ μέλλοι, γεννήσει ἑαυτῇ τόπον, ὥστε καὶ σῶμα. τῆς δὴ στάσεως αὐτῆς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στάσει οἱονεὶ ῥωννυμένης οἷον πολὺ φῶς ἐκλάμψαν ἐπ’ ἄκροις τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τοῦ πυρὸς σκότος ἐγίγνετο, ὅπερ ἰδοῦσα ἡ ψυχή, ἐπείπερ ὑπέστη, ἐμόρφωσεν αὐτό. οὐ γὰρ ἦν θεμιτὸν γειτονοῦντι αὐτῇ λόγου ἄμοιρον εἶναι, οἷον ἐδέχετο τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀμυδρὸν ἐν ἀμυδρῷ τῷ γενομένῳ.
For the truth is this. If there were no body, soul would not go forth, since there is no other place where it is naturally fitted to be. But if it is going to proceed, it will generate a place for itself, and so a body too. As its rest grew strong, as it were, in that very rest, it was as if a great light shone out, and at the outermost edges of the fire there came to be darkness. Soul saw this darkness, since it now existed, and gave it shape. For it was not permitted that anything neighboring Soul should be without a share of rational principle. So the darkness received such a share as it could, “dimly in the dim,” as the saying goes, in the dim thing that had come to be.
γενόμενος δὴ οἷον οἶκός τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ’ αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὑτὸν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ πᾶς ἄξιος ἐπιμελείας νομισθεὶς ὠφελίμου μὲν αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ καλῷ, ὅσον δὴ τοῦ εἶναι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτῷ μεταλαμβάνειν, ἀβλαβοῦς δὲ τῷ ἐφεστηκότι· ἄνω γὰρ μένων ἐπιστατεῖ· ἔμψυχος τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ, ἔχων ψυχὴν οὐχ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὑτῷ, κρατούμενος, οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχων. κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζῴη, οὐ δυνάμενον δὲ αὑτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δίκτυον ἐκτεινομένης ἤδη τῆς θαλάσσης συνεκτέταται, ὅσον αὐτὸ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἀλλαχόθι ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ἢ ὅπου κεῖται εἶναι.
Having come into being, then, like a beautiful and richly varied house, the cosmos was not cut off from its maker. Nor, on the other hand, did the maker give itself over to it. Instead the cosmos was judged worthy, everywhere and as a whole, of a care that benefits it in its being and its beauty, as far as it could share in being, and that does no harm to the one presiding over it, for that one presides while remaining above. The cosmos is ensouled in this way: it has a soul that is not its own but is there for it. It is mastered, not master; it is held, not holding. For it lies in the Soul that bears it up, and no part of it is without a share of Soul. It is like a net soaked in water, which would live but cannot make its own the element it is in. The sea is already spread out, and the net spreads out along with it as far as it can, since none of its parts can be anywhere other than where it lies.
ἡ δὲ τοσαύτη ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι μὴ τοσήδε, ὥστε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα καταλαμβάνειν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅπου ἂν ἐκταθῇ ἐκεῖνο, ἐκεῖ ἔστι· καὶ εἰ μὴ εἴη δὲ ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ εἰς μέγεθος μέλοι· ἔστι γὰρ ἥτις ἔστι. τοσοῦτον γάρ ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, ὅπου ἐστὶν αὐτή, καὶ ὁρίζεται τὸ ὅσον, εἰς ὅσον προιὸν σώζουσαν αὐτὴν αὑτὸ ἔχει. καὶ τοσαύτη ἐστὶν ἡ σκιά, ὅσος ὁ λόγος ὁ παρ’ αὐτῆς. ὁ δὲ λόγος τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὡς μέγεθος τοσοῦτον ἐργάσασθαι, ὅσον τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἐβούλετο (μέγεθος) ἐργάσασθαι.
But Soul is so great by nature precisely because it has no definite size. So it grasps the whole body with the same self, and wherever body extends, there Soul is. And if there were no body, magnitude would be no concern of Soul’s, for it is what it is. The All is as large as the extent where Soul is, and its size is bounded by how far it can go forward and still have Soul preserving it. The shadow is as large as the rational principle that comes from Soul, and that rational principle was such as to produce a magnitude as great as its form wanted to produce (a magnitude).
οὕτω δὴ ἀκούσαντας χρὴ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ οὕτως ἐλθόντας ὁμοῦ λαβεῖν πάντα ὄντα· οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ φῶς, τὸν ἥλιον, ἢ τὴν σελήνην καὶ πάλιν τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὁμοῦ πάντα, τάξιν δὲ πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴν ἀεὶ ἑστῶσαν, εἶτα [τὰ] πρῶτα καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, ὡς πυρὸς ἔσχατα εἰς ὕστερον τοῦ πρώτου ἐκ [τῆς] τοῦ ἐσχάτου νοουμένου πυρὸς σκιᾶς, εἶτα ἐπιφωτιζομένου ἅμα καὶ τούτου, ὥστε οἷον εἶδος ἐπιθεῖν τῷ ὑποβληθέντι πρώτῳ γενομένῳ παντάπασιν ἀμυδρῷ. ἐκοσμεῖτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐχούσης ἐν αὑτῇ δι’ ὅλης δύναμιν κατὰ λόγους κοσμεῖν· οἷα καὶ οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι τὰ ζῷα οἷον μικρούς τινας κόσμους.
Having heard it put this way, we must go back again to what is always so and take all things as being together: air, light, sun, or moon, and again light and air, all together, but with an order of first, second and third. Here there is Soul, always standing still. Then come [the] first things and those that follow, like the outermost edges of a fire. So what comes after the first is thought of as coming from [the] shadow of the last fire, and then this too is lit up at the same time. In this way something like a form runs over what was laid beneath first, which was altogether dim. It was set in order according to rational principle by the power of Soul, which has within itself, through the whole of itself, the power to order according to rational principles. In the same way the rational principles in seeds mold and shape living beings like little cosmoses.
ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ἐφάψηται ψυχῆς, οὕτω ποιεῖται, ὡς ἔχει φύσεως ψυχῆς ἡ οὐσία· ἡ δὲ ποιεῖ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ γνώμῃ οὐδὲ βουλὴν ἢ σκέψιν ἀναμείνασα· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἐπακτὸν τέχνην ἂν ποιοῖ. τέχνη γὰρ ὑστέρα αὐτῆς καὶ μιμεῖται ἀμυδρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ ποιοῦσα μιμήματα, παίγνια ἄττα καὶ οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξια, μηχαναῖς πολλαῖς εἰς εἰδώλων φύσιν προσχρωμένη. ἡ δὲ οὐσίας δυνάμει κυρία σωμάτων εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι τε καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς αὐτὴ ἄγει, οὐ δυναμένων τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῇ αὐτῆς βουλήσει.
For whatever comes into contact with Soul is made according to what Soul’s being is by nature. And Soul does not make things by a purpose brought in from outside, nor does it wait for deliberation or inquiry; if it did, it would make not by nature but by an imported art. Art comes later than Soul and imitates it. It produces dim and feeble imitations, toys of a sort that are not worth much, and uses a great many devices to produce images. But Soul, by the power of its being, is master of bodies, so that they come to be and are just as it leads them, and the things there from the beginning cannot oppose its will.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄλληλα ἐμποδίζοντα πολλάκις ἀποστερεῖται τοῦ τυχεῖν μορφῆς τῆς οἰκείας, ἣν ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν σμικρῷ θέλει· ἐκεῖ δὲ γινομένης καὶ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ τάξιν τῶν γενομένων ἅμα ἐχόντων ἀπόνως τὸ γινόμενον καὶ ἀνεμποδίστως καλόν ἐστι. κατεσκευάσατο δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ἀγάλματα, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἰκήματα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις. τί γὰρ ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ ψυχῆς, ἢ ὧν τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔχει; πυρὸς μὲν γὰρ θερμὰ ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸ ψύχειν ἄλλου, ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰς ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀψύχοις τὸ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον εὕδει κείμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἄλλο ὁμοιῶσαι πρὸς αὑτὸ τὸ παθεῖν δυνάμενον.
Among later things, they often obstruct one another and so fail to attain their proper shape, the shape that the rational principle on a small scale wants. But there the whole shape too comes into being from Soul, and the things that come to be have their order along with it, so what comes to be is beautiful without toil and without hindrance. Within it Soul built statues of gods, dwellings for human beings, and other things for others. For what should come from Soul but what it has the power to make? Fire’s part is to make things hot, and another thing’s part is to cool. Soul has one activity that goes out from it into another, and another within itself. In soulless things, the one that comes from themselves lies within them as if asleep, while the activity directed to something else is to make like themselves whatever can be affected.
καὶ κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο παντὶ τῷ ὄντι εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἑαυτῷ ἄγειν· ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγρηγορός τι καὶ τὸ εἰς ἄλλο ὡσαύτως. ζῆν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, ὅσα μὴ ζῇ παρ’ αὑτῶν, καὶ τοιαύτην ζωήν, καθ’ ἣν αὐτὴ ζῇ. ζῶσα οὖν ἐν λόγῳ λόγον δίδωσι τῷ σώματι, εἴδωλον οὗ ἔχει — καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἴδωλον ζωῆς, ὅσον δίδωσι τῷ σώματι — καὶ μορφὰς σωμάτων, ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ καὶ θεῶν καὶ πάντων. διὸ πάντα καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔχει.
This is common to everything that is: to bring things into likeness with itself. But Soul’s work is both something awake within itself and, likewise, what goes out to another. So it makes the other things live too, those that do not live of themselves, and it gives them the kind of life by which it lives itself. Living in rational principle, then, it gives a rational principle to the body, an image of what it has. For what it gives the body is an image of life too. It also gives the shapes of bodies, whose rational principles it has, and it has those of gods and of everything. That is why the cosmos too has everything.
καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι σοφοί, ὅσοι ἐβουλήθησαν θεοὺς αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγάλματα ποιησάμενοι, εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἀπιδόντες ἐν νῷ λαβεῖν, ὡς πανταχοῦ μὲν εὐάγωγον ψυχῆς φύσις, δέξασθαί γε μὴν ῥᾷστον ἂν εἴη ἁπάντων, εἴ τις προσπαθές τι τεκτήναιτο ὑποδέξασθαι δυνάμενον μοῖράν τινα αὐτῆς. προσπαθὲς δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μιμηθέν, ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἁρπάσαι εἶδός τι δυνάμενον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις πάντα εὐμηχάνως ποιησαμένη εἰς μίμησιν ὧν εἶχε τοὺς λόγους, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐγένετο ἐν ὕλῃ λόγος, ὃς κατὰ τὸν πρὸ ὕλης ἐμεμόρφωτο, συνήψατο τῷ θεῷ ἐκείνῳ, καθ’ ὃν ἐγίνετο καὶ εἰς ὃν εἶδεν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εἶχε ποιοῦσα. καὶ δὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἄμοιρον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον αὖ κατελθεῖν εἰς τοῦτο.
And I think that the wise men of old, who wanted the gods to be present to them and so made shrines and statues, looked to the nature of the All. They grasped that the nature of soul is everywhere easy to draw in, and that it would be easiest of all to receive it if one fashioned something sympathetic to it, something able to receive some portion of it. Whatever imitates it in any way at all is sympathetic, like a mirror able to catch a form. For the nature of the All too made everything skillfully, in imitation of the things whose rational principles it had. Each thing had thus become a rational principle in matter, shaped after the principle prior to matter, and so it was linked to that god after whom it had come to be, the god Soul looked to and held while making. So it was not possible for the thing to be without a share of him, nor, again, for him to come down into it.
ἦν δὲ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐκεῖ ἥλιος — οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν γινέσθω παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου — ἐφεξῆς δὲ τούτῳ ψυχὴ ἐξηρτημένη μένοντος νοῦ μένουσα. δίδωσι δὴ αὕτη τὰ πέρατα αὐτῆς τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἥλιον τούτῳ τῷ ἡλίῳ, καὶ ποιεῖ διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κἀκεῖ συνῆφθαι οἷον ἑρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τε ἀπ’ ἐκείνου εἰς τοῦτον καὶ τῶν τούτου εἰς ἐκεῖνον, ὅσον διὰ ψυχῆς εἰς ἐκεῖνον φθάνει. οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν οὐδὲ πόρρω οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν καὶ αὖ πόρρω τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ τῇ μίξει, ἀλλ’ [ἔστιν] εἶναι ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οὐ τόποις [χωριστὸν] καὶ συνεῖναι [αὖ] χωρὶς ὄν.
That god was Intellect, the sun There (let it serve as the model for our account). Next after it comes Soul, depending on it: Intellect remains, and Soul remains too. Soul gives its own boundaries, the ones that face this sun, to this sun. Through its mediation it makes this sun linked to the world There as well, acting as a kind of interpreter of what comes from that sun to this one and from this one to that, as far as anything reaches that one through Soul. For nothing is far or distant from anything; and yet, again, things are distant by difference and by mixture. Rather, [there is] being by oneself, not [separated] by places, and being together [again] while apart.
θεοὶ δέ εἰσιν οὗτοι τῷ ἀεὶ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν ἐκείνων, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ψυχῇ προσηρτῆσθαι τῇ οἷον ἀπελθούσῃ ψυχῇ, ταύτῃ δέ, ᾗπερ καὶ εἰσὶν ὃ λέγονται, πρὸς νοῦν βλέπειν οὐδαμοῦ ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐκεῖ βλεπούσης.
These are gods because they never stand apart from the beings There. They are attached to the original Soul by the soul that, as it were, went out from it, and by this soul, the one by which they are what they are called, they look toward Intellect, since their soul looks nowhere but There.
The descent of souls
Human souls go down to their images, each at its appointed time, as if called by a herald.
ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα αὑτῶν ἰδοῦσαι οἷον Διονύσου ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐκεῖ ἐγένοντο ἄνωθεν ὁρμηθεῖσαι, οὐκ ἀποτμηθεῖσαι οὐδ’ αὗται τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ. οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἦλθον, ἀλλ’ ἔφθασαν μὲν μέχρι γῆς, κάρα δὲ αὐταῖς ἐστήρικται ὑπεράνω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. πλέον δὲ αὐταῖς κατελθεῖν συμβέβηκεν, ὅτι τὸ μέσον αὐταῖς ἠναγκάσθη, φροντίδος δεομένου τοῦ εἰς ὃ ἔφθασαν, φροντίσαι. Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ ἐλεήσας πονουμένας θνητὰ αὐτῶν τὰ δεσμὰ ποιῶν, περὶ ἃ πονοῦνται, δίδωσιν ἀναπαύλας ἐν χρόνοις ποιῶν σωμάτων ἐλευθέρας, ἵν’ ἔχοιεν ἐκεῖ καὶ αὗται γίνεσθαι, οὗπερ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἀεὶ οὐδὲν τὰ τῇδε ἐπιστρεφομένη.
Human souls saw their images, as Dionysus did in the mirror, and came to be There, rushing down from above. Yet these souls too were not cut off from their own principle and from Intellect. For they did not come with their intellect: they reached as far as the earth, but their head is set firm above heaven. It falls to them to come further down because their middle part was compelled to take care, since what they had reached needed care. But Father Zeus, pitying them in their toil, makes mortal the bonds over which they toil and gives them rests at intervals, setting them free of bodies, so that they too may be There, where the Soul of the All always is, without turning toward things here at all.
ὃ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πᾶν, ἤδη αὔταρκες αὑτῷ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται κατὰ λόγους ἀεὶ ἑστηκότας ἐν χρόνοις περαινόμενον καὶ κατὰ χρόνους ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καθιστάμενον ἐν μέτροις βίων ὡρισμένων, εἰς συμφωνίαν ἄγον μὲν ταῦτα ἐκείνοις καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνα, τούτων δὲ περαινομένων ὑφ’ ἕνα λόγον πάντων τεταγμένων ἔν τε καθόδοις ψυχῶν καὶ ἀνόδοις καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα σύμπαντα.
For what the All has is already sufficient for it. It is, and it will be, brought to completion in its times according to rational principles that stand forever, and at fixed times it is always restored to the same state, in the measures of determined lives. It brings things here into harmony with those there, following them. These things are brought to completion with all of them ordered under one rational principle, in the descents and ascents of souls and in everything else.
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς συμφωνίας τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τάξιν οὐκ ἀπηρτημένων, ἀλλὰ συναπτουσῶν ἐν ταῖς καθόδοις ἑαυτὰς καὶ μίαν συμφωνίαν πρὸς τὴν περιφορὰν ποιουμένων, ὡς καὶ τὰς τύχας αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις σημαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῶν ἄστρων σχήμασι καὶ οἷον μίαν τινὰ φωνὴν ἐμμελῶς ἀφιέναι καὶ τῷ μουσικῶς καὶ ἐναρμονίως μᾶλλον τοῦτο εἶναι ᾐνιγμένον. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μὴ τοῦ παντὸς κατ’ ἐκεῖνα ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος ἕκαστα ἐν μέτροις περιόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ βίων κατὰ γένη διεξόδων, ἃς αἱ ψυχαὶ διεξοδεύουσιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ὁτὲ δὲ εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους ἐπιστρεφόμεναι.
The harmony of souls with the order of this All bears witness to this as well. Souls are not detached from it. In their descents they connect themselves to it and make one harmony with the revolution of the heavens, so that their fortunes, their lives and their choices are signified by the figures of the stars, and they give out, as it were, a single voice in tune. This, all the more, is what is hinted at by speaking of it in musical and harmonic terms. It would not be so unless the All acted and was acted on in each thing according to the beings There, in measures of periods, of orderings, and of courses of lives according to kinds. Souls travel through these courses, now There, now in heaven, now turning toward these regions here.
νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ἀεὶ ἄνω καὶ οὐ μή ποτε ἔξω τῶν αὑτοῦ γένοιτο [ἂν], ἀλλ’ ἱδρυμένος πᾶς ἄνω πέμπει εἰς τὰ τῇδε διὰ ψυχῆς. ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλησίον μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν διάκειται εἶδος καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτήν, ἡ μὲν ὡσαύτως, ἡ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, ἴσχουσα ἐν τάξει τὴν πλάνην. κάτεισι δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ἴσον, ἀλλ’ ὁτὲ μὲν πλέον, ὁτὲ δὲ ἔλαττον, κἂν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἴῃ· κάτεισι δὲ εἰς ἕτοιμον ἑκάστη καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν τῆς διαθέσεως. ἐκεῖ γὰρ ᾧ ἂν ὁμοιωθεῖσα ᾖ φέρεται, ἡ μὲν εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἡ δὲ εἰς ζῷον ἄλλη ἄλλο.
All Intellect is always above and could never be outside its own. It is wholly settled above and sends to things here through Soul. Soul, being nearer, is more disposed according to the form that comes from There, and it gives to what is under it. One soul does this always in the same way, another differently at different times, keeping its wandering in order. Soul does not always come down to the same degree, but sometimes more and sometimes less, even if it goes to the same kind. Each comes down into what is ready for it, according to the likeness of its disposition. For it is carried there, to whatever it has become like: one into a human being, another into another animal, each to a different one.
τὸ γὰρ ἀναπόδραστον καὶ ἡ δίκη οὕτως ἐν φύσει κρατούσῃ ἰέναι ἕκαστον ἐν τάξει πρὸς ὅ ἐστιν ἕκαστον γενόμενον εἴδωλον προαιρέσεως καὶ διαθέσεως ἀρχετύπου, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ πᾶν ψυχῆς εἶδος ἐκείνου πλησίον, πρὸς ὃ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχει, καὶ τοῦ τότε πέμποντος καὶ εἰσάγοντος οὐ δεῖ, οὔτε ἵνα ἔλθῃ εἰς σῶμα τότε οὔτε εἰς τοδί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ ἐνστάντος οἷον αὐτομάτως κάτεισι καὶ εἴσεισιν εἰς ὃ δεῖ· καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ χρόνος, οὗ παραγενομένου οἷον κήρυκος καλοῦντος κάτεισι καὶ εἰσέδυ εἰς τὸ πρόσφορον σῶμα, ὡς εἰκάσαι τὰ γιγνόμενα οἷον δυνάμεσι μάγων καὶ ὁλκαῖς τισιν ἰσχυραῖς κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ φέρεσθαι· οἷον καὶ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τελεῖται ἡ τοῦ ζῴου διοίκησις, ἐν χρόνῳ ἕκαστον κινούσης καὶ γεννώσης, οἷον γενειάσεις καὶ φύσις κεράτων καὶ νῦν πρὸς τάδε ὁρμὰς καὶ ἐπανθήσεις πρότερον οὐκ οὔσας, καὶ τὰς τῶν δένδρων διοικήσεις ἐν προθεσμίαις τακταῖς γιγνομένας.
For what is inescapable, and justice, consist in this: by a nature that prevails, each goes, in its order, to that of which it has become an image, an image of its archetypal choice and disposition. Every form of soul is There, close to that toward which it has the disposition within itself. There is no need of anyone to send it and bring it in at that time, either so that it comes into a body then or into this particular one. Rather, when the moment arrives, it comes down as if of its own accord and goes in where it must. Each has its own time, and when it arrives, as if a herald were calling, the soul comes down and slips into the fitting body. One might liken what happens to things moved and carried by the powers of magicians and by strong forces of attraction. In the same way, in each individual, the management of the living being is carried out, moving and generating each thing in its time: growing a beard, sprouting horns, impulses toward this or that at a given stage, blossomings that were not there before. So too the management of trees takes place at set, appointed times.
ἴασι δὲ οὔτε ἑκοῦσαι οὔτε πεμφθεῖσαι, οὔ γε τὸ ἑκούσιον τοιοῦτον ὡς προελέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὸ πηδᾶν κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ πρὸς γάμων φυσικὰς προθυμίας, ἢ πρὸς πράξεις τινὲς καλῶν οὐ λογισμῷ κινούμεναι· ἀλλ’ εἱμαρμένον ἀεὶ τῷ τοιῷδε τὸ τοιόνδε, καὶ τῷ [μὲν] τοιῷδε τὸ νῦν, τῷ δὲ τὸ αὖθις.
Souls go neither willingly nor sent. At least their willingness is not the kind that chooses. It is like springing up by nature, or like the natural longing for marriage, or the way some people are moved to fine deeds without reasoning. What is fated is always this sort of thing for this sort of soul: for one, now; for another, later.
καὶ ὁ μὲν πρὸ κόσμου νοῦς εἱμαρμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μένειν ἐκεῖ ὁπόσον καὶ πέμπειν, καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον τῷ καθόλου ὑποπῖπτον νόμῳ πέμπεται· ἔγκειται γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ καθόλου, καὶ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἔξωθεν τὴν ἰσχὺν εἰς τὸ τελεσθῆναι ἴσχει, ἀλλὰ δέδοται ἐν αὐτοῖς [τοῖς] χρησομένοις εἶναι καὶ περιφέρουσιν αὐτόν· κἂν ἐνστῇ ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὃ θέλει γενέσθαι γίνεται τότε ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτόν, ὥστε αὐτοὺς αὐτὸν τελεῖν ἅτε περιφέροντας καὶ ἰσχύσαντας τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς αὐτὸν ἱδρῦσθαι, οἷον βρίθοντα εἰς αὐτοὺς καὶ προθυμίαν ἐμποιοῦντα καὶ ὠδῖνα ἐκεῖ ἐλθεῖν, οὗ ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὢν οἷον ἐλθεῖν φθέγγεται.
Intellect, which is before the cosmos, has as its destiny to remain There, however much it also sends forth; and the individual, falling under the universal law, is sent. For the universal lies within each one, and the law does not get its power of fulfillment from outside. It is given to be in those very ones who will use it, and they carry it about with them. When the time comes, what it wants to happen happens then, through those who have it, so that they themselves fulfill it. They carry it about and have gained strength because it is settled within them, as if it weighed down on them and produced in them an eagerness, a birth pang, to go where the law within them, as it were, cries out to go.
τούτων δὴ γινομένων φῶτα πολλὰ ὁ κόσμος οὗτος ἔχων καὶ καταυγαζόμενος ψυχαῖς ἐπικοσμεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς προτέροις ἄλλους κόσμους ἄλλον παρ’ ἄλλου κομιζόμενος, παρά τε θεῶν ἐκείνων παρά τε νῶν τῶν ἄλλων ψυχὰς διδόντων· οἷον εἰκὸς καὶ τὸν μῦθον αἰνίττεσθαι, ὡς πλάσαντος τοῦ Προμηθέως τὴν γυναῖκα ἐπεκόσμησαν αὐτὴν καί οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί, καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τι δοῦναι καὶ Χάριτας καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλο δῶρον καὶ ὀνομάσαι ἐκ τοῦ δώρου καὶ πάντων τῶν δεδωκότων. πάντες γὰρ τούτῳ ἔδοσαν τῷ πλάσματι παρὰ προμηθείας τινὸς γενομένῳ. ὁ δὲ Προμηθεὺς ἀποποιούμενος τὸ δῶρον αὐτῶν τί ἂν σημαίνοι ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἐν νοητῷ μᾶλλον αἵρεσιν ἀμείνω εἶναι;
When this happens, this cosmos, which has many lights and is illuminated by souls, is adorned still further. On top of its earlier adornments it receives other adornments, one from one source and another from another, both from those gods and from the other intellects that give souls. This is probably what the myth hints at: when Prometheus had molded the woman, the other gods adorned her as well. Aphrodite gave something, the Graces too, and each gave a different gift, and they named her after the gift and after all who had given. For they all gave to this molded figure, which had come into being from a kind of forethought. And Prometheus refusing their gift: what would that signify, if not that the choice of what is more in the intelligible is better?
δέδεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ποιήσας, ὅτι πως ἐφάπτεται τοῦ γενομένου ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος δεσμὸς ἔξωθεν· καὶ ἡ λύσις ἡ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλέους, ὅτι δύναμίς ἐστιν αὐτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ὣς λελύσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅπῃ τις δοξάζει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐμφαίνει τὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν κόσμον δόσεως, καὶ προσᾴδει τοῖς λεγομένοις.
And the maker himself is bound, because in a way he touches what he has made, and a bond of this kind is external. His release by Heracles means that he has a power, so that even so he is set free. Let anyone take these things as he will. But the myth does display how gifts are given to the cosmos, and it is in tune with what we have said.
ἴασι δὲ ἐκκύψασαι τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς οὐρανὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ σῶμα ἐκεῖ προσλαβοῦσαι δι’ αὐτοῦ ἤδη χωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδέστερα σώματα, εἰς ὅσον ἂν εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθῶσι. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ εἰς σώματα τὰ κατωτέρω, αἱ δὲ ἀπ’ ἄλλων εἰς ἄλλα εἰσκρινόμεναι, αἷς ἡ δύναμις οὐκ ἤρκεσεν ἆραι ἐντεῦθεν διὰ βάρυνσιν καὶ λήθην πολὺ ἐφελκομέναις, ὃ αὐταῖς ἐβαρύνθη. γίγνονται δὲ διάφοροι ἢ σωμάτων εἰς ἃ ἐνεκρίθησαν παραλλαγαῖς ἢ καὶ τύχαις ἢ καὶ τροφαῖς, ἢ αὐταὶ παρ’ αὑτῶν τὸ διάφορον κομίζουσιν ἢ πᾶσι τούτοις ἤ τισιν αὐτῶν.
Souls go forth, peeping out of the intelligible, first into heaven. Having taken on a body there, they then pass through it into more earthy bodies, as far as they stretch out in length. Some go from heaven into lower bodies. Others pass from one body into another: these are the souls whose power was not enough to lift them out of here, because of the heaviness and forgetfulness they drag along in great quantity, which has weighed them down. They become different through variations in the bodies they have entered, or through fortunes, or upbringings, or else they bring the difference from themselves; or it comes through all of these, or some of them.
καὶ αἱ μὲν τὰ πάντα ὑποπεπτώκασιν εἱμαρμένῃ τῇ ἐνταῦθα, αἱ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως, ὁτὲ δὲ αὑτῶν, αἱ δὲ ὅσα μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ὑπομεῖναι συγχωροῦσι, δύνανται δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἔργα αὑτῶν εἶναι, ζῶσαι κατ’ ἄλλην τὴν τῶν συμπάντων τῶν ὄντων νομοθεσίαν ἄλλῳ ἑαυτὰς θεσμῷ δοῦσαι. πέπλεκται δὲ αὕτη ἔκ τε τῶν τῇδε λόγων τε καὶ αἰτίων πάντων καὶ ψυχικῶν κινήσεων καὶ νόμων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν συμφωνοῦσα ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν παραλαβοῦσα καὶ συνυφαίνουσα τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἀσάλευτα μὲν τηροῦσα, ὅσα δύναται σώζειν ἑαυτὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἕξιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ᾗ πέφυκε περιάγουσα, ὡς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς κατελθοῦσιν εἶναι οὕτως, ὡς τὰ μὲν ὡδὶ τεθῆναι, τὰ δὲ ὡδὶ κεῖσθαι.
Some souls are wholly subject to fate here. Others are sometimes subject to it, sometimes their own. Still others accept whatever must necessarily be endured, but in what are their own works they are able to be their own, living according to another legislation, that of the totality of real beings, and giving themselves to another ordinance. This order is woven together from all the rational principles and causes here, from the movements of souls, and from the laws that come from There. It is in harmony with those laws, takes its starting points from There, and weaves in what follows from them. It keeps unshaken whatever can preserve itself in accord with the condition of those beings, and leads the rest around as is natural. So the cause of some being placed here and others lying there is in those that have come down.
τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα τιμωρήματα εἰς τοὺς πονηροὺς μετὰ δίκης τῇ τάξει ἀποδιδόναι προσήκει ὡς κατὰ τὸ δέον ἀγούσῃ· ὅσα δὲ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς συμβαίνει ἔξω δίκης, οἷον κολάσεις ἢ πενίαι ἢ νόσοι, ἆρα διὰ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας λεκτέον γίνεσθαι; συμπέπλεκται γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ προσημαίνεται, ὡς καὶ αὐτὰ κατὰ λόγον γίνεσθαι. ἢ οὐ κατὰ λόγους φυσικοὺς ταῦτα, οὐδ’ ἦν ἐν τοῖς προηγουμένοις, ἀλλ’ ἑπόμενα ἐκείνοις· οἷον πιπτούσης τινὸς οἰκοδομίας τὸν ὑποπεσόντα ἀποθανεῖν ὁποῖός ποτ’ ἂν ᾖ, ἢ καί τινων δύο κατὰ τάξιν φερομένων ἢ καὶ ἑνὸς τὸ ἐμπεσὸν τρωθῆναι ἢ πατηθῆναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο οὐ κακὸν ὂν τῷ παθόντι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου χρήσιμον πλοκήν. ἢ οὐδὲ ἄδικον ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ἔχον τὴν δικαίωσιν.
The punishments that come upon the wicked we should rightly attribute to the order, as leading things as they ought to go. But what about the things that happen to good people undeservedly, such as punishments, poverty or diseases? Are we to say they come about because of earlier wrongdoing? For these things are woven together and signified in advance, so that they too come about according to reason. Or perhaps they are not according to natural rational principles and were not among the primary aims, but follow as consequences of them. Suppose a building falls: whoever is under it is killed, whatever sort of person he is. Or suppose two things are moving in their order, or even one, and whatever falls in their way is wounded or trampled. Or perhaps this injustice is not bad for the one who suffers it and is useful for the weaving of the whole. Or perhaps it is not even unjust, since it has its justification in what came before.
οὐ γὰρ τὰ μὲν δεῖ νομίζειν συντετάχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεχαλάσθαι εἰς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. εἰ γὰρ κατ’ αἰτίας γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἕνα καὶ τάξιν μίαν, καὶ τὰ σμικρότερα δεῖ συντετάχθαι καὶ συνυφάνθαι νομίζειν. καὶ τὸ ἄδικον δὴ τὸ παρ’ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον αὐτῷ μὲν τῷ ποιήσαντι ἄδικον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφείθη αἰτίας ὁ δράσας, συντεταγμένον δ’ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐκ ἄδικον ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐδ’ εἰς τὸν παθόντα ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἐχρῆν. εἰ δ’ ἀγαθὸς ὁ παθών, εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἡ τελευτὴ τούτων. δεῖ γὰρ τήνδε τὴν σύνταξιν οὐκ ἀθεεὶ οὐδὲ ἄδικον, ἀλλ’ ἀκριβῆ εἰς τὴν τοῦ προσήκοντος ἀπόδοσιν νομίζειν, ἀδήλους δὲ ἔχειν τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι παρέχειν μέμψεως αἰτίας.
For we must not think that some things are coordinated while others are let loose to their own independent power. If things must happen according to causes and natural sequences, according to one rational principle and one order, we must think that the smaller things too are coordinated and woven in. The wrong done by one person to another is a wrong on the part of the one who did it, and the doer is not let off from blame. But as coordinated in the All, it is not a wrong in the All, nor toward the one who suffered it; it had to be so. And if the sufferer was good, these things end in good. For we must think that this coordination is neither godless nor unjust, but exact in giving what is due. It keeps its causes hidden, however, and so gives those who do not know grounds for complaint.
ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς τὴν οὐρανοῦ ἴασιν αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ πρῶτον χώραν, λογίσαιτο ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γὰρ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τόπῳ ἀμείνων, εἴη ἂν προσεχὴς τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. ἐκεῖθεν τοίνυν ψυχοῦται ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ μεταλαμβάνει ὡς ἐπιτηδειότερα μεταλαμβάνειν. τὸ δὲ γεηρὸν ὕστατόν τε καὶ ψυχῆς ἧττον πεφυκὸς μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως πόρρω. πᾶσαι μὲν δὴ καταλάμπουσι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ διδόασιν οἷον τὸ πολὺ αὑτῶν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκείνῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖς ὑστέροις ἐναυγάζονται, αἱ δ’ ἐπιπλέον κατιοῦσαι ἐναυγάζουσι μᾶλλον κάτω, αὐταῖς δὲ οὐκ ἄμεινον εἰς πολὺ προιούσαις.
One might reason from considerations like these that souls go from the intelligible first into the region of heaven. If heaven is the better part of the perceptible realm, it would border on the last of the intelligibles. So these heavenly bodies are the first to be ensouled from There, and they participate first, as being better suited to participate. What is earthy is last, less naturally fitted to participate in soul and far from the bodiless nature. All the souls shine upon heaven and give it, as it were, the most and the first of themselves, while the other things are illuminated by their later parts. Those that come further down illuminate things further below, but it is not better for them to go far forward.
ἔστι γάρ τι οἷον κέντρον, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ κύκλος ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐκλάμπων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἄλλος, φῶς ἐκ φωτός· ἔξωθεν δὲ τούτων οὐκέτι φωτὸς κύκλος ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ δεόμενος οὗτος οἰκείου φωτὸς ἀπορίᾳ αὐγῆς ἀλλοτρίας. ἔστω δὲ ῥόμβος οὗτος, μᾶλλον δὲ σφαῖρα τοιαύτη, ἣ δὴ κομίζεται ἀπὸ τῆς τρίτης· προσεχὴς γὰρ αὐτῇ· ὅσον ἐκείνη ἐναυγάζεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγα φῶς μένον ἐλλάμπει, καὶ διήκει κατὰ λόγον ἐξ αὐτοῦ αὐγή, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα συνεπιλάμπει, τὰ μὲν μένοντα, τὰ δ’ ἐπιπλέον ἐπισπᾶται τῇ τοῦ ἐλλαμπομένου ἀγλαίᾳ.
For there is something like a center, and around it a circle shining out from it, and around these another, light from light. Outside these there is no longer another circle of light; this one, lacking light of its own, needs a radiance from elsewhere. Let this be a wheel, or rather a sphere of this kind, which receives light from the third circle, since it borders on it, as much as that circle is illuminated. So the great light shines while remaining, and radiance passes from it in due proportion. The other lights shine along with it: some remain, while others are drawn further by the brilliance of what is illuminated.
εἶτα δεομένων τῶν ἐλλαμπομένων πλείονος φροντίδος, ὥσπερ χειμαζομένων πλοίων κυβερνῆται ἐναπερείδονται πρὸς τὸ πλέον τῇ τῶν νεῶν φροντίδι καὶ ἀμελήσαντες αὑτῶν ἔλαθον, ὡς κινδυνεύειν συνεπισπασθῆναι πολλάκις τῷ τῶν νεῶν ναυαγίῳ, ἔρρεψάν τε πλέον καὶ αὗται καὶ [οὐ προσεῖχον] τοῖς ἑαυτῶν· ἔπειτα δὲ κατεσχέθησαν πεδηθεῖσαι γοητείας δεσμοῖς, σχεθεῖσαι φύσεως κηδεμονίᾳ. εἰ δ’ ἦν τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον ζῷον οἷον καὶ τὸ πᾶν, τέλειον καὶ ἱκανὸν σῶμα καὶ ἀκίνδυνον παθεῖν, καὶ παρεῖναι λεγομένη ψυχὴ οὐκ ἂν παρῆν αὐτῷ, καὶ παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ ζωὴν μένουσα πάντη ἐν τῷ ἄνω.
Then, since the things illuminated need more care, these souls leaned further down too and [paid no attention] to what was their own. They were like the pilots of storm-tossed ships, who throw themselves more and more into the care of their ships and, neglecting themselves, fail to notice that they are often in danger of being dragged down in the wreck. Then the souls were held fast, fettered in bonds of enchantment, held by their solicitude for nature. If each living being were like the All, a perfect and sufficient body in no danger of being affected, then the soul said to be present would not be present to it; it would give it life while remaining wholly in the world above.
πότερα δὲ λογισμῷ ψυχὴ χρῆται πρὶν ἐλθεῖν καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἐξελθοῦσα; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ὁ λογισμὸς ἐγγίνεται ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἤδη οὔσης καὶ φροντίδος πληρουμένης καὶ μᾶλλον ἀσθενούσης· ἐλάττωσις γὰρ νοῦ εἰς αὐτάρκειαν τὸ λογισμοῦ δεῖσθαι· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποροῦσι τοῖς τεχνίταις, ὅταν δὲ μὴ χαλεπὸν ᾖ, κρατεῖ καὶ ἐργάζεται ἡ τέχνη. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐκεῖ ἄνευ λογισμῶν, πῶς ἂν ἔτι λογικαὶ εἶεν; ἢ ὅτι δύνανται, εἴποι τις ἄν, ὅταν περιστάσεως ἀπορῶσι, διασκοπῆσαι. δεῖ δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν λαβεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις λογισμὸν λαμβάνει τὴν ἐκ νοῦ ἀεὶ γινομένην καὶ οὖσαν ἐν αὐταῖς διάθεσιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἑστῶσαν καὶ οἷον ἔμφασιν οὖσαν, εἶεν ἂν κἀκεῖ λογισμῷ χρώμεναι. οὐδὲ δὴ φωναῖς, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι νομιστέον ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ οὔσας, σώματα δ’ ἐχούσας ἐν οὐρανῷ.
Does soul use reasoning before it comes, and again after it has left? Or does reasoning arise here, when soul is already at a loss, filled with care and growing weaker? For needing reasoning is a falling short of intellect in its self-sufficiency. In the arts too, reasoning comes to craftsmen when they are at a loss; when there is no difficulty, the art takes charge and does the work. But if souls are without reasonings There, how could they still be rational? Perhaps, one might say, because they are able to examine a situation when they are at a loss in it. We must take reasoning in this sense. For if one takes reasoning to mean the disposition that always comes from Intellect and is in souls, a stable activity that is, as it were, a reflection, then they would use reasoning There too. Nor, I think, should we suppose that they use speech, either while they are in the intelligible or when they have bodies in heaven.
καὶ πάμπαν ὅσα μὲν διὰ χρείας ἢ δι’ ἀμφισβητήσεις διαλέγονται ἐνταῦθα, ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ποιοῦσαι δὲ ἐν τάξει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστα οὐδ’ ἂν ἐπιτάττοιεν οὐδ’ ἂν συμβουλεύοιεν, γινώσκοιεν δ’ ἂν καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἀλλήλων ἐν συνέσει. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὰ σιωπώντων γινώσκομεν δι’ ὀμμάτων· ἐκεῖ δὲ καθαρὸν πᾶν σῶμα καὶ οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς ἕκαστος καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ κρυπτὸν οὐδὲ πεπλασμένον, ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν ἄλλῳ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖνος ἔγνω. περὶ δὲ δαιμόνων καὶ ψυχῶν ἐν ἀέρι φωνῇ χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἄτοπον· ζῷα γὰρ τοιάδε.
In general, whatever souls discuss here because of needs or disputes would not exist There. Doing each thing in order and according to nature, they would neither give commands nor give advice, but they would know what comes from one another by understanding. Even here, after all, we know a great deal from people who are silent, through their eyes. There every body is pure and each is like an eye. Nothing is hidden or feigned: before one speaks to another, the other has seen and known. As for spirits and souls in the air, it is not absurd that they use voice, for they are living beings of that kind.
πότερα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστὸν ὥσπερ κραθέντων, ἢ ἄλλῃ μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἄλλο τὸ ἀμέριστον, τὸ δὲ μεριστὸν οἷον ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἕτερον μέρος αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν λογιζόμενόν φαμεν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἄλλο; γνωσθείη δ’ ἂν ληφθέντος τί λέγομεν ἑκάτερον. ἀμέριστον μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται αὐτῷ, μεριστὸν δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ σώματά φησι γινομένην μεριστὴν καὶ ταύτην οὐ γεγενημένην. τὴν δὴ σώματος φύσιν ὁρᾶν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οἵας ψυχῆς προσδεῖται, καὶ ὅ τι δεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ τῷ σώματι καὶ ὅλῳ παρεῖναι. πᾶν μὲν δὴ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, εἴπερ διὰ παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, ἀφικνεῖται πρὸς τὸ μερίζεσθαι· πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὂν μεμερίσθαι ἂν λέγοιτο. ὅλον δὲ πανταχοῦ φαινόμενον οὐ μεμερίσθαι ἂν παντελῶς λέγοιτο, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίνεσθαι μεριστόν.
Are the indivisible and the divisible in the same thing, as if blended together? Or is the indivisible in another place and in another respect, while the divisible comes next in order, as it were, and is a different part of the soul, in the way we say that the reasoning part is one thing and the irrational part another? This would become clear once we grasp what we mean by each. He calls it “indivisible” without qualification, but “divisible” not without qualification: he says it “becomes divisible in bodies,” not that it has already become so. So we must look at the nature of body and ask what kind of soul it needs in order to live, and what of soul must be present to the body everywhere, and to the whole of it. The whole perceptive power, if it is to perceive through the whole body, arrives at being divided, for since it is everywhere it could be said to be divided. But since it appears whole everywhere, it could not be said to be divided completely. Rather, it “becomes divisible in bodies.”
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι μηδὲ μεμερίσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ, λεκτέον, ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις· εἴπερ [γὰρ] σῶμά ἐστι τὸ μεταλαμβάνον, ἀνάγκη οὕτω μερίζεσθαι, ἔλαττον δὲ ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ φυτικὸν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ αὐξητικὸν ὡσαύτως· καὶ εἰ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν ὁ θυμός, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. ἀλλ’ ἴσως ταῦτα οὐ παραλαμβάνει ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μίγματι, ἴσως δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ ἔκ τινος τῶν παραληφθέντων ταῦτα. λογισμὸς δὲ καὶ νοῦς οὐκέτι σώματι δίδωσιν αὑτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν οὐ δι’ ὀργάνου τελεῖται τοῦ σώματος· ἐμπόδιον γὰρ τοῦτο, εἴ τις αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι προσχρῷτο.
Someone might say that in the other senses it is not divided at all, but only in touch. We must reply that it is divided in the others too. [For] if what participates is a body, it must be divided in this way, though less than in touch. The same holds for the vegetative and growth power of soul. And if desire is located around the liver and spiritedness around the heart, the same argument applies to these too. But perhaps he does not include these in that blend; perhaps they come in another way, from one of the ingredients he did include. Reasoning and intellect, however, no longer give themselves to body. Their work is not accomplished through a bodily instrument, and body would be a hindrance if one made use of it in one’s investigations.
ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστόν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἓν κραθέντα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν ἑκατέρου καθαροῦ καὶ χωρὶς τῇ δυνάμει. εἰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ σώματα γινόμενον μεριστὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐπάνω δυνάμεως ἔχει τὸ ἀμέριστον, δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστὸν εἶναι, οἷον κραθὲν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸ ἐλθούσης ἄνωθεν δυνάμεως.
So the indivisible and the divisible are each something different. They are not blended into one; they form a whole made of parts, each of them pure and separate in its power. If, however, what becomes divisible in bodies also has indivisibility from the power above, then this same thing can be both indivisible and divisible, blended, as it were, from itself and from the power that came into it from above.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῆς ψυχῆς λεγόμενα μέρη, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ποῦ, ἢ ὅλως οὐδέν, ἐπιστῆσαι προσήκει. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἀφοριοῦμεν ἑκάστοις τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς [μερῶν] τόπον τινὰ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν θέντες, οὐ μᾶλλον εἴσω τοῦ σώματος ἢ ἔξω ποιοῦντες, ἄψυχον αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν, τά τε δι’ ὀργάνων σωματικῶν ἔργα ὅπῃ γίγνεσθαι προσήκει εἰπεῖν ἀπορήσομεν, εἴτε τοῖς μέν, τοῖς δ’ οὔ, οἷς μὴ δίδομεν, οὐκ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ ποιεῖν δόξομεν, ὥστε μὴ πᾶσαν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι.
We should also consider whether these and the other so-called parts of the soul are in place, or whether these are not in place at all while the others are in place, and if so where, or whether none of them is. Suppose we do not mark off a place for each of the [parts] of the soul, putting none of them anywhere and making soul no more inside the body than outside. Then we shall make the body soulless, and we shall be at a loss to say where the works done through bodily organs are to take place. But suppose we give places to some and not to others. Then we shall seem not to put the ones we give no place to in us, so that not all our soul is in us.
How soul is present in body
Soul is in body not as in a place or vessel, but as light is present to air.
ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν οὐδὲ πᾶσαν φατέον ὡς ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι τῷ σώματι· περιεκτικὸν μὲν γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ περιεκτικὸν σώματος, καὶ οὗ ἕκαστον μερισθέν ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, ὡς μὴ ὅλον ἐν ὁτῳοῦν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ περιεχόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ περιέχον. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ· ἄψυχον γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε ὡς ἀγγεῖον, εἴτε ὡς ὁ τόπος περιέχει· εἰ μὴ ἄρα διαδόσει τινὶ αὐτῆς οὔσης πρὸς αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένης καὶ ἔσται, ὅσον μετέλαβε τὸ ἀγγεῖον, τοῦτο ἀπολωλὸς αὐτῇ. ὁ δὲ τόπος ὁ κυρίως ἀσώματος καὶ οὐ σῶμα· ὥστε τί ἂν δέοιτο ψυχῆς; καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῷ πέρατι αὑτοῦ πλησιάσει τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐχ αὑτῷ. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντιοῖτο ἂν πρὸς τὸ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι.
In general, then, we must say that no part of the soul, and not the whole of it, is in the body as in a place. Place is a container, a container of body. Where each divided part of a body is, there that part is, so that no body is as a whole in any one place. But soul is not a body, and it is no more contained than containing. Nor is it in the body as in a vessel. The body would then be soulless, whether it contained soul as a vessel does or as a place does, unless soul were in it by some distribution from itself while gathered together into itself; and then whatever the vessel took in would be lost to soul. Place in the strict sense is bodiless and not body, so why would it need soul? And the body would be near the soul with its boundary, not with itself. Many other things too would tell against soul’s being in body as in a place.
καὶ γὰρ συμφέροιτο ἂν ἀεὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ αὐτό τι ἔσται τὸν τόπον αὐτὸν περιφέρον· ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ εἰ ὁ τόπος διάστημα εἴη, πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τῷ σώματι. τὸ γὰρ διάστημα κενὸν εἶναι δεῖ· τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐ κενόν, ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἐν ᾧ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται, ὥστε ἐν τῷ κενῷ τὸ σῶμα.
For the place would always be carried around along with the body, and there will be something that carries its own place around. And even if place were an interval, the soul would all the more not be in the body as in a place. For an interval must be empty, and the body is not empty, though perhaps that in which the body is will be empty, so that the body is in the void.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται τῷ σώματι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ πάθος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, ὡς χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ χωριστὸν ἡ ψυχή. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ· οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ μέρος τῷ ζῴῳ, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν μένοι ἀπορία, πῶς ἐν ὅλῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ τοῦ οἴνου ὁ οἶνος, ἢ ὡς ὁ ἀμφορεύς, οὐδ’ ᾗ καὶ αὐτό τι ἐν αὑτῷ ἔσται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι· γελοῖον γὰρ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ὅλον λέγειν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα μέρη. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ· ἀχώριστον γὰρ τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδος, καὶ ἤδη ὕλης οὔσης ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος.
Nor will soul be in the body as in a subject. What is in a subject is an affection of that in which it is, as color and shape are, and the soul is separable. Nor is it there as a part in a whole, for the soul is not a part of the body. Someone might say it is a part in the whole living being. In the first place, the same puzzle would remain: how is it in the whole? It is surely not there as wine is in the wine jar, or as the jar is, nor in the way something is in itself. Nor is it there as a whole in its parts, for it is ridiculous to call the soul the whole and the body its parts. Nor is it there as form in matter. Form in matter is inseparable, and it comes later, when matter is already there.
ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἄλλη τοῦ εἴδους οὖσα. εἰ δὲ οὐ τὸ γενόμενον εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὸ χωριζόμενον φήσουσι, πῶς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ σώματι οὔπω φανερόν· ‘καὶ χωριστὸν ἡ ψυχή’. πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται πρὸς πάντων; ἢ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα· σῶμα οὖν ὁρῶντες, ἔμψυχον δὲ συνιέντες, ὅτι κινεῖται καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχειν φαμὲν ψυχὴν αὐτό. ἐν αὐτῷ ἄρα τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀκολούθως ἂν λέγοιμεν.
But the soul makes the form in the matter and is something other than the form. If they say it is not the form that comes to be in matter but the separable form, then it is not yet clear how this form is in the body; “and the soul is separable.” How is it, then, that everyone says the soul is in the body? Perhaps because the soul is not visible, while the body is. We see a body and understand that it is ensouled, because it moves and perceives, and so we say that it has a soul. So it would be consistent for us to say that the soul is in the body.
εἰ δέ γε ὁρατὸν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αἰσθητὸν ἦν περιειλημμένον πάντη τῇ ζωῇ καὶ μέχρις ἐσχάτων ἰοῦσα εἰς ἴσον, οὐκ ἂν ἔφαμεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κυριωτέρῳ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἐν τῷ συνέχοντι τὸ συνεχόμενον, καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ ῥέοντι τὸ ῥέον.
But if the soul were visible and perceptible, and it were seen to envelop the whole on every side with life, reaching evenly all the way to the extremities, we would not say that the soul is in the body. We would say that what is not of that kind is in what has more authority, the contained in the containing, the flowing in what does not flow.
τί οὖν; πῶς πάρεστιν εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη μηδὲν αὐτὸς λέγων ὅπως, τί ἐροῦμεν; καὶ εἰ ὁμοίως πᾶσα, ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ἄλλως, τὸ δ’ ἄλλως; ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τῶν νῦν λεγομένων τρόπων τοῦ ἔν τινι οὐδεὶς φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἁρμόττων, λέγεται δὲ οὕτως ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι ἡ ψυχή, ὡς ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐν τῇ νηί, πρὸς μὲν τὸ χωριστὴν δύνασθαι εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καλῶς εἴρηται, τὸν μέντοι τρόπον, ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ παραστήσειεν. ὡς μὲν γὰρ πλωτὴρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη ἐν αὐτῷ, ὡς δὲ κυβερνήτης πῶς; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ νηί, ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι.
What then? If someone asks how it is present, without saying how himself, what shall we answer? And is it present the same way as a whole, or one part in one way and another in another? None of the ways of being “in something” mentioned so far seems to fit the soul’s relation to the body. It is also said that soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship. That is well said as regards the soul’s being able to be separate, but it would hardly show the manner we are now looking for. As a passenger the soul would be in the body incidentally; but as a pilot, how? For the pilot is not in the whole ship, as soul is in the body.
ἀλλ’ ἆρα οὕτω φατέον, ὡς ἡ τέχνη ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις, οἷον ἐν τῷ οἴακι, εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ οἴαξ ἦν, ὥστε κυβερνητικὴν εἶναι ἔνδον τὴν κινοῦσαν τεχνικῶς; νῦν δὲ τούτῳ διαλλάττει, ὅτι ἔξωθεν ἡ τέχνη. εἰ οὖν κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ τοῦ κυβερνήτου τοῦ ἐνδύντος εἰς τὸν οἴακα θείμεθα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι ὡς ἐν ὀργάνῳ φυσικῷ — κινεῖ γὰρ οὕτως αὐτὸ ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ ποιεῖν· ἆρ’ ἄν τι πλέον ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον γένοιτο; ἢ πάλιν ἀπορήσομεν πῶς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὀργάνῳ, καίτοι τρόπος οὗτος ἕτερος τῶν πρόσθεν· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἔτι ποθοῦμεν ἐξευρεῖν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω προσελθεῖν.
Should we say, then, that it is in the body as the art is in its instruments, for instance in the tiller, if the tiller were ensouled, so that the pilot’s art moving it skillfully were inside it? As things are, there is this difference, that the art is outside. Suppose, then, following the example of a pilot who had gone into the tiller, we posit that the soul is in the body as in a natural instrument, since it moves the body in this way in whatever it wishes to do. Would we get any further toward what we are looking for? Or shall we again be at a loss as to how it is in the instrument, even though this manner is different from the earlier ones? All the same, we still long to find out and to come closer.
ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτω φατέον, ὅταν ψυχὴ σώματι παρῇ, παρεῖναι αὐτήν, ὡς τὸ πῦρ πάρεστι τῷ ἀέρι; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο παρὸν οὐ πάρεστι καὶ δι’ ὅλου παρὸν οὐδενὶ μίγνυται καὶ ἕστηκε μὲν αὐτό, ὁ δὲ παραρρεῖ· καὶ ὅταν ἔξω γένηται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὸ φῶς, ἀπῆλθεν οὐδὲν ἔχων, ἕως δέ ἐστιν ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς, πεφώτισται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ ἐν τῷ φωτί, ἤπερ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων καλῶς τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ θεὶς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, φησὶ τὸ μέν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ὧ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ἐν ᾧ σῶμα μηδέν, ὧν δηλονότι δυνάμεων οὐ δεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα.
Should we say, then, that when soul is present to body, it is present the way fire is present to air? For this too is present without being present. It is present throughout and yet mixes with nothing; it stands still while the air flows past. When the air passes out of the region where the light is, it goes away with nothing, and as long as it is under the light, it is lit. So it is right here too to say that the air is in the light rather than the light in the air. That is why Plato did well, in the case of the All, not to put the soul in the body but the body in the soul. He says that there is a part of the soul in which the body is, and a part in which there is no body: clearly the powers of soul that the body does not need.
καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. τῶν μὲν [οὖν] ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐδὲ παρουσίαν τῷ σώματι λεκτέον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὧν δὲ δεῖται, ταῦτα παρεῖναι, καὶ παρεῖναι οὐκ ἐνιδρυθέντα τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ οὐδ’ αὖ τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ πρὸς μὲν αἴσθησιν παρεῖναι παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, πρὸς δὲ ἐνεργείας ἠδη ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. λέγω δὲ ὧδε·
The same account applies to the other souls as well. Of the other powers, [then], we should not even say that the soul is present to the body. Those powers the body needs are present, and present without being settled in its parts or in the whole. For perception, the perceptive power is present to the whole of what perceives; for activities, a different power is present to a different part. Here is what I mean.
τοῦ σώματος πεφωτισμένου τοῦ ἐμψύχου ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο ἄλλως μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ μέρος· καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδειότητα, δύναμιν τὴν προσήκουσαν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἀποδιδοῦσαν, οὕτω τοι λέγεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς δύναμιν τὴν ὁρατικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἐν ὠσὶ τὴν ἀκουστικήν, καὶ γευστικὴν ἐν γλώσσῃ, ὄσφρησιν ἐν ῥισί, τὴν δὲ ἁπτικὴν ἐν παντὶ παρεῖναι· πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀντίληψιν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ παρεῖναι.
When the ensouled body is illuminated by soul, each part of it participates in a different way. Soul gives each organ the power suited to its work, according to the organ’s fitness for that work. So the power in the eyes is said to be the power of sight, the power in the ears that of hearing, the power of taste is in the tongue, smell in the nostrils, and the power of touch is present everywhere. For this kind of perception the whole body is present to the soul as its organ.
τῶν δὲ ἁπτικῶν ὀργάνων ἐν πρώτοις τοῖς νεύροις ὄντων, ἃ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ζῴου τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐνταῦθα τῆς τοιαύτης δούσης ἑαυτήν, ἀρχομένων δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγκεφάλου τῶν νεύρων, τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὁρμῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ ὅλως παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου ἐνταῦθα ἔθεσαν φέροντες, οὗ δηλονότι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἐκεῖ παρεῖναι τὸ χρησόμενον τιθέμενοι. βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς δυνάμεως ἐκεῖ· ὅθεν γὰρ ἔμελλε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὄργανον, ἐκεῖ ἔδει οἷον ἐναπερείδεσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἐκείνην τὴν τῷ ὀργάνῳ πρόσφορον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν δύναμιν· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις· ἐκεῖ δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ ἀρχή, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὀργάνου.
The organs of touch are primarily in the nerves, which also have the power to move the living being, and this kind of power gives itself to them there. Since the nerves start from the brain, they put the principle of perception and impulse, and in general of the whole living being, there, assuming that what will use the organs is present where the starting points of the organs clearly are. It is better to say that the starting point of the power’s activity is there. For where the instrument was to be moved from, there the craftsman’s power, the one suited to the instrument, had, as it were, to plant itself. Or rather, not the power, for the power is everywhere: the starting point of the activity is there, where the starting point of the instrument is.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρμᾶν ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰσθητικῆς καὶ φανταστικῆς φύσεως ἐπάνω ἑαυτῆς εἶχε τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἂν γειτονοῦσα πρὸς τὸ κάτω οὗ αὐτὴ ἐπάνω, ταύτῃ ἐτέθη τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὡς οὖσα οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, ᾧ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐκεῖνος ἵδρυτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔδει σώματι διδόναι, καὶ τῷ σώματος μάλιστα τῆς ἐνεργείας δεκτικῷ, τὸ δὲ σώματι οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνοῦν πάντως ἐκείνῳ κοινωνεῖν ἔδει, ὃ ψυχῆς εἶδος ἦν καὶ ψυχῆς δυναμένης τὰς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀντιλήψεις ποιεῖσθαι. αἰσθητικὸν γὰρ κριτικόν πως, καὶ φανταστικὸν οἷον νοερόν, καὶ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις φαντασίᾳ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμενα.
The power of perceiving and the power of impulse belong to soul, which is perceptive and imaginative in nature, and they had reason above them, bordering on it from below. That is why the ancients placed reason at the top of the whole living being, in the head: not as being in the brain, but as being in this perceptive part, through which reason was seated in the brain. One part had to be given to body, to the part of body most receptive of its activity. The other part, which has no communion with body at all, had to commune with what was a form of soul, of a soul able to receive the apprehensions that come from reason. For the perceptive part is in a way discerning, the imaginative part is, as it were, intellectual, and impulse and appetite follow imagination and reason.
ἐκεῖ οὖν τὸ λογιζόμενον οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ἐκεῖ ἀπολαύει αὐτοῦ. πῶς δὲ τὸ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, εἴρηται. τοῦ δὲ φυτικοῦ αὖ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ μηδενὸς ἀπολειπομένου, τρέφοντος δὲ τῷ αἵματι, τοῦ δὲ αἵματος τοῦ τρέφοντος ἐν φλεψὶν ὄντος, ἀρχῆς δὲ καὶ φλεβῶν καὶ αἵματος ἐν ἥπατι, ὅθεν ἐναπερειδομένης ταύτῃ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ μοῖρα τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκεῖν ἀπεδόθη. ὃ γάρ τοι καὶ γεννᾷ καὶ τρέφει καὶ αὔξει, τοῦτο καὶ τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀνάγκη. τοῦ δὲ λεπτοῦ καὶ κούφου καὶ ὀξέος καὶ καθαροῦ αἵματος θυμῷ προσφόρου [ὄντος] ὀργάνου, ἡ τούτου πηγή· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον αἷμα ἀποκρίνεται· τῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ζέσει πεποίηται οἴκησις πρέπουσα.
So the reasoning part is there, not as in a place, but because what is there benefits from it. How the perceptive part is “there” has already been explained. As for the vegetative, growth and nutritive part, it is missing from no part of the body and nourishes it by the blood. The nourishing blood is in the veins, and the starting point of the veins and of the blood is in the liver. Since the power plants itself there, the desiring portion of the soul was assigned to dwell there. For what generates, nourishes and makes things grow must also desire these things. The thin, light, quick and pure blood [is] an instrument suited to spiritedness, and its source, where blood of this kind is separated off, has been made a fitting dwelling for the seething of spiritedness.
Where souls go after death
Each soul goes where its disposition and the divine law send it; pure souls are with god.
ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἐξελθοῦσα τοῦ σώματος γενήσεται; ἢ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἔσται, οὗ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δεχόμενον ὁπωσοῦν, οὐδὲ δύναται παραμένειν τῷ μὴ πεφυκότι αὐτὴν δέχεσθαι, εἰ μή τι ἔχοι αὐτοῦ ὃ ἕλκει πρὸς αὑτὸ ἄφρονα οὖσαν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ ἄλλο ἔχοι, κἀκεῖ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὗ πέφυκε τοῦτο εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι. ὄντος δὲ πολλοῦ καὶ ἑκάστου τόπου, καὶ παρὰ τῆς διαθέσεως ἥκειν δεῖ τὸ διάφορον, ἥκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι δίκης. οὐ γὰρ μή ποτέ τις ἐκφύγοι, ὃ παθεῖν ἐπ’ ἀδίκοις ἔργοις προσήκει· ἀναπόδραστος γὰρ ὁ θεῖος νόμος ὁμοῦ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ κριθὲν ἤδη.
But where will soul be when it has left the body? It will not be here, where there is nothing whatever to receive it, and it cannot stay with what is not naturally fitted to receive it, unless it has something of body that draws it, senseless as it is, to itself. It is in that other thing if it has one, and follows it to where that thing naturally is and comes to be. Since there are many places, of every kind, the difference must come from the soul’s disposition, and it must also come from the justice in the nature of things. For no one could ever escape what he ought to suffer for unjust deeds. The divine law is inescapable, and it holds within itself, all at once, the execution of what has already been judged.
φέρεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πάσχων ἀγνοῶν ἐφ’ ἃ παθεῖν προσήκει, ἀστάτῳ μὲν τῇ φορᾷ πανταχοῦ αἰωρούμενος ταῖς πλάναις, τελευτῶν δὲ ὥσπερ πολλὰ καμὼν οἷς ἀντέτεινεν εἰς τὸν προσήκοντα αὐτῷ τόπον ἐνέπεσεν, ἑκουσίῳ τῇ φορᾷ τὸ ἀκούσιον εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ἔχων. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσον δεῖ παθεῖν, καὶ πάλιν αὖ ὁμοῦ συνέδραμεν ἡ ἄνεσις τῆς κολάσεως καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ἀναφυγεῖν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν τόπων, ἁρμονίας δυνάμει τῆς κατεχούσης τὰ πάντα. ἔχουσαι δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν κολάσεων ἔχουσι· ταῖς δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαραῖς οὔσαις καὶ μηδὲν μηδαμῇ ἐφελκομέναις τοῦ σώματος ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ σώματος ὑπάρξει εἶναι.
The one who is to suffer is himself carried, without knowing it, to what he ought to suffer. He is tossed about everywhere in his wanderings by an unsettled motion, but in the end, as if exhausted by his resistance, he falls into the place that befits him. His going there is a voluntary motion; his suffering is involuntary. The law also states how much and how long he must suffer. And again, the remission of the punishment and the power to escape from those places come together at once, by the power of the harmony that holds all things. Souls that have a body also perceive bodily punishments. But pure souls, which draw nothing of body after them in any way, will necessarily not be anywhere in body either.
εἰ οὖν εἰσι καὶ μηδαμοῦ σώματος — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσι σῶμα — οὗ ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ μετὰ τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ ἔσται. εἰ δ’ ἔτι ζητεῖς ποῦ, ζητητέον σοι ποῦ ἐκεῖνα· ζητῶν δὲ ζήτει μὴ τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδ’ ὡς ζητῶν σώματα.
So if they exist, and are nowhere in body (for they have no body), then where being is, and what is, and the divine, in god, there such a soul will be: with these and in this. If you still ask where, you must ask where those things are. And when you ask, do not ask with your eyes, nor in the way one asks about bodies.
Memory
Plotinus asks which soul remembers, and which of its powers does the remembering.
περὶ δὲ μνήμης, εἰ αὐταῖς ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶνδε τῶν τόπων ἐξελθούσαις μνημονεύειν ὑπάρχει, ἢ ταῖς μέν, ταῖς δ’ οὔ, καὶ πάντων ἤ τινων, καὶ εἰ μνημονεύουσιν ἀεί, ἢ ἐπί τινα χρόνον τὸν ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀφόδου, ζητεῖν ὁμοίως ἄξιον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν ποιεῖσθαι, ληπτέον τί ποτε τὸ μνημονεῦόν ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οὔ, τί μνήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τίνι συνίστασθαι πέφυκε τῶν ὄντων. τί μὲν γάρ ἐστι μνήμη, εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ πολλάκις τεθρύληται, τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν πεφυκὸς ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἀκριβέστερον ληπτέον. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἐπικτήτου τινὸς ἢ μαθήματος ἢ παθήματος, οὔτε τοῖς ἀπαθέσι τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τοῖς [μὴ] ἐν χρόνῳ ἐγγίνοιτο ἂν τὸ μνημονεύειν.
Memory is likewise worth inquiring into. Can souls themselves remember once they have left these regions, or can some and not others? Do they remember everything, or some things? And do they remember forever, or for some time close to their departure? But if we are going to inquire rightly into these questions, we must grasp what it is that remembers. I do not mean what memory is, but in which of the things that are it naturally arises. What memory is has been said elsewhere and talked over many times, but what it is that is naturally fitted to remember must be grasped more precisely. If memory is of something acquired, whether learned or experienced, then remembering would not arise either in beings that cannot be affected or in those [not] in time.
μνήμην δὴ περὶ θεὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ νοῦν [οὐ] θετέον· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ αἰὼν περὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ οὔτε τὸ πρότερον οὔτε τὸ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀεὶ ὡς ἔχει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐ δεχόμενον παράλλαξιν. τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁμοίῳ πῶς ἂν ἐν μνήμῃ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδ’ ἴσχον ἄλλην κατάστασιν μεθ’ ἣν εἶχε πρότερον, ἢ νόησιν ἄλλην μετ’ ἄλλην, ἵνα ἐν ἄλλῃ μὲν ᾖ, ἄλλης δὲ μνημονεύῃ ἣν εἶχε πρότερον; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει τὰς ἄλλων μεταβολὰς εἰδέναι οὐ μεταβάλλον αὐτό, οἷον κόσμου τὰς περιόδους;
So we must not attribute memory to god, nor to being and Intellect. For nothing comes to them, not even time; eternity surrounds being, and there is neither before nor after. Being always is as it is, in the same state, admitting no change. How could what is in the same state, always alike, be engaged in memory? It does not have, or acquire, another state after one it had before, or one thought after another, so as to be in one and remember another it had before. But what prevents it from knowing the changes of other things without changing itself, for instance the circuits of the cosmos?
ἢ ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ ὕστερον νοήσει ἐπακολουθοῦν ταῖς τοῦ τρεπομένου μεταβολαῖς, τό τε μνημονεύειν παρὰ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλο. τὰς δὲ αὑτοῦ νοήσεις οὐ μνημονεύειν λεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ ἦλθεν, ἵνα κατέχῃ μὴ ἀπέλθοιεν· ἢ οὕτω γε τὴν οὐσίαν [ἂν] αὑτοῦ φοβοῖτο μὴ ἀπέλθῃ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ψυχὴν φατέον μνημονεύειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον λέγομεν τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ὧν ἔχει συμφύτων, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἔστιν, ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κατ’ αὐτὰ καὶ μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα ἥκουσαν· τῷ δὲ καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη ταῖς ἐνεργούσαις ἃ εἶχον μνήμην καὶ ἀνάμνησιν προστιθέναι ἐοίκασιν οἱ παλαιοί· ὥσθ’ ἕτερον εἶδος μνήμης τοῦτο· διὸ καὶ χρόνος οὐ πρόσεστι τῇ οὕτως λεγομένῃ μνήμῃ. ἀλλ’ ἴσως εὐχερῶς περὶ τούτων ἔχομεν καὶ οὐκ ἐξεταστικῶς.
Because it would then be following the changes of what alters, thinking first one thing and then another. And remembering is something other than thinking. We must not say that it remembers its own thoughts either. They did not come to it, so that it would have to hold on to them lest they go away; otherwise it would fear that its own being might go away from it. Nor, then, should we say that soul remembers in the way we say that remembering concerns what it has innately. Rather, since it is here, it has them and is not active according to them, especially when it has just arrived here. The ancients seem to apply “memory” and “recollection” to souls that are already actively using what they had. So this is a different kind of memory, and that is why time is not involved in memory spoken of in this way. But perhaps we are being easygoing about this, and not examining it closely.
ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε, μήποτε οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾖ ἐκείνης ἡ λεγομένη τοιαύτη ἀνάμνησις καὶ μνήμη, ἀλλὰ ἄλλης ἀμυδροτέρας, ἢ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου. εἴτε γὰρ ἄλλης, πότε ἢ πῶς λαμβανούσης; εἴτε τοῦ ζῴου, πότε ἢ πῶς; διὸ ζητητέον τί ἐστι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ τὴν μνήμην ἴσχον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζητοῦμεν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ μνημονεύουσα, τίς δύναμις ἢ τί μέρος, εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῷον, ὅπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔδοξέ τισιν ὄν, τίς ὁ τρόπος, καὶ τί ποτε δεῖ φάναι τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἔτι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τῶν νοημάτων, ἢ ἄλλο τοῦ ἑτέρου.
For one might perhaps ask whether this so-called recollection and memory belongs not to that soul but to another, dimmer one, or to the compound. If it belongs to another soul, when or how did that soul get it? If to the living being, when or how? So we must inquire what in us has memory, which is just what we were inquiring from the start. If it is the soul that remembers, which power or which part of it? If it is the living being, which some have thought is also what perceives, how does it remember, and what are we to call the living being? And further, should we suppose that the same thing apprehends both perceptions and thoughts, or a different thing each?
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται, οἷον τὸ τρυπᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν, ἵνα κατὰ μὲν τὸν τεχνίτην ἡ ψυχὴ ᾖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, τοῦ μὲν σώματος πάσχοντος καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχομένης τὴν τύπωσιν τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ σώματος· οὗ δὴ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὕτω κοινὸν ἔργον λέγοιτο ἄν, ἡ δὲ μνήμη οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο τοῦ κοινοῦ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη παραδεξαμένης τὸν τύπον καὶ ἢ φυλαξάσης ἢ ἀποβαλούσης αὐτόν· εἰ μή τις τεκμαίροιτο κοινὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ταῖς κράσεσι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μνημονικοὺς καὶ ἐπιλήσμονας ἡμᾶς γίνεσθαι.
Now if the compound is what is involved in actual perceptions, perceiving must be something of this kind. That is why it is called common to both, like boring or weaving: in perceiving, the soul is in the place of the craftsman and the body in the place of the instrument. The body is affected and serves, while the soul receives the body’s impression, or the impression that comes through the body, or the judgment it has made from the body’s affection. On this view perception could be called a common work, but memory would not have to belong to the common thing, since the soul has already received the impression and either keeps it or loses it. Unless, that is, one inferred that remembering too is common from the fact that the blending of our bodies makes us good at remembering or forgetful.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς κωλυτικὸν ἂν ἢ οὐ κωλυτικὸν λέγοιτο τὸ σῶμα γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν οὐχ ἧττον εἴη. τῶν δὲ δὴ μαθήσεων πῶς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ μνημονεύουσα ἔσται; εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῷον συναμφότερον οὕτως, ὡς ἕτερον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον μήτε σῶμα μήτε ψυχὴν τὸ ζῷον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ μεταβαλόντων ἀμφοτέρων ἕτερόν τι ἔσται τὸ ζῷον οὐδ’ αὖ κραθέντων, ὡς δυνάμει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἧττον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν οἰνομέλιτος κράσει εἴ τι γλυκάζει, παρὰ τοῦ μέλιτος τοῦτο ἔσται.
But even so, the body could be said to be a hindrance or not a hindrance, and remembering would be no less the soul’s. And as for things learned, how will the common thing, and not the soul, be what remembers them? If the living being is a compound in the sense of being something different made out of both, then in the first place it is absurd to say the living being is neither body nor soul. For the living being will not be something different through both of them changing, nor through their being blended so that the soul is in the living being only potentially. And even so, remembering will be no less the soul’s, just as in a blend of wine and honey, whatever sweetness there is will come from the honey.
τί οὖν, εἰ αὐτὴ μὲν [μὴ] μνημονεύει, τῷ δὲ ἐν σώματι εἶναι τῷ μὴ καθαρὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ποιωθεῖσα, ἀναμάττεσθαι δύναται τοὺς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τύπους καὶ τῷ οἷον ἕδραν [ἔχειν] ἐν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὸ παραδέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ παραρρεῖν;
What, then, if the soul itself does [not] remember, but, because it is in body and not pure but, as it were, qualified, it can take on the imprints of perceptible things, since it [has], as it were, a seat in the body for receiving them and not letting them flow past?
ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ τύποι οὐ μεγέθη, οὐδ’ ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνσφραγίσεις οὐδ’ ἀντερείσεις ἢ τυπώσεις, ὅτι μηδ’ ὠθισμός, μηδ’ ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ, ἀλλ’ ὁ τρόπος οἷον νόησις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοήσεων τίς ἡ ἀντέρεισις λέγοιτο ἄν; ἢ τί δεῖ σώματος ἢ ποιότητος σωματικῆς μεθ’ ἧς; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν αὐτῆς κινημάτων ἀνάγκη μνήμην αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι, οἷον ὧν ἐπεθύμησε καὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀπήλαυσεν οὐδὲ ἦλθεν εἰς σῶμα τὸ ἐπιθυμητόν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ σῶμα περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς αὐτό; ἢ πῶς μετὰ σώματος μνημονεύσει, ὃ μὴ πέφυκε γινώσκειν ὅλως τὸ σῶμα; ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν λεκτέον εἰς ψυχὴν λήγειν, ὅσα διὰ σώματος, τὰ δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι μόνης, εἰ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναί τι καὶ φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ἔργον τι αὐτῆς.
But first, the imprints are not magnitudes. They are not like seal impressions, resistances or stampings, since there is no pushing, and it is not as in wax. Even in the case of perceptible things, the manner is like thinking. In the case of thoughts, what could be called the resistance? Or what need is there of body, or of bodily quality to go with it? Moreover, the soul must have memory of its own movements, for instance of things it desired and did not enjoy, where the object of desire never reached the body. How could the body speak about things that never came to it? Or how will the soul remember, together with the body, what the body is not naturally fitted to know at all? We must say instead that some things, those that come through the body, end in the soul, while others belong to the soul alone, if the soul is to be something and to have a nature and a work of its own.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἔφεσιν καὶ μνήμην τῆς ἐφέσεως ἄρα καὶ τῆς τεύξεως καὶ τῆς οὐ τεύξεως, ἐπείπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς οὐ τῶν ῥεόντων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ συναίσθησιν οὐδὲ παρακολούθησιν δώσομεν οὐδέ τινα σύνθεσιν καὶ οἷον σύνεσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα τούτων ἐν τῇ φύσει αὐτῆς ταῦτα κομίζεται ἐν σώματα, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείας μέν τινας ἴσχει ὧν ἔργων δεῖται ἡ ἐπιτέλεσις ὀργάνων, τῶν δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ἥκει φέρουσα, τῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας. τὸ δὲ τῆς μνήμης καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐμπόδιον ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν προστιθεμένων τινῶν λήθη, ἐν δ’ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ καθάρσει ἀνακύπτει πολλάκις ἡ μνήμη.
If so, then it has desire, and memory of the desire, and so of attaining and of not attaining, since its nature is not one of the things that flow. Otherwise we shall grant it neither self-awareness nor consciousness, nor any power of putting together and, as it were, understanding. For it is not that it has none of these in its nature and acquires them in bodies. Rather, it has certain activities whose works need instruments in order to be accomplished. For some of these it comes bringing the powers; for others, the activities as well. As for memory, the body is actually a hindrance to it. Even now, when things are added, there is forgetting, while with taking away and purification memory often comes back up.
μονῆς δὲ οὔσης αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν κινουμένην καὶ ῥέουσαν λήθης αἰτίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μνήμης εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὁ τῆς λήθης ποταμὸς οὕτως ἂν ὑπονοοῖτο. ψυχῆς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο.
Since memory is a kind of remaining, the nature of body, which moves and flows, must be the cause of forgetting, not of memory. That is also how the river of Lethe, Forgetfulness, could be understood. So let this experience belong to soul.
ἀλλὰ τίνος ψυχῆς, τῆς μὲν λεγομένης ὑφ’ ἡμῶν θειοτέρας, καθ’ ἣν ἡμεῖς, τῆς δὲ ἄλλης τῆς παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου; ἢ λεκτέον εἶναι μνήμας ἑκατέρας, τὰς μὲν ἰδίας, τὰς δὲ κοινάς· καὶ ὅταν μὲν συνῶσιν, ὁμοῦ πάσας, χωρὶς δὲ γενομένων, εἰ ἄμφω εἶεν καὶ μένοιεν, ἑκατέραν ἐπιπλέον τὰ ἑαυτῆς, ἐπ’ ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον τὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τὸ γοῦν εἴδωλον ἐν ᾅδου Ἡρακλέους· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ εἴδωλον, οἶμαι, χρὴ νομίζειν ἡμᾶς· μνημονεύειν τῶν πεπραγμένων πάντων κατὰ τὸν βίον, αὐτοῦ γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ ὁ βίος ἦν. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τὸ συναμφότερον οὖσαι οὐδὲν πλέον ὅμως εἶχον λέγειν ἢ τὰ τοῦ βίου τούτου· καὶ [γὰρ] αὗται τὸ συναμφότερον γενόμεναι ταῦτα ᾔδεσαν· ἢ εἴ τι δικαιοσύνης ἐχόμενον. ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλῆς αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδώλου τί ἔλεγεν, οὐκ εἴρηται.
But to which soul? To the one we call more divine, by which we are ourselves, or to the other one, which comes from the whole? Or should we say that there are memories belonging to each, some private and some shared? When the two are together, all their memories are together. When they have separated, if both should exist and remain, each holds its own memories longer and the other’s for a short time. At any rate, the image of Heracles in Hades remembers all that was done in his life, for the life was above all the image’s own. And I think we should regard this image as what we are. The other souls, being the compound, still had nothing more to tell than the things of this life. [For] they too, having become the compound, knew these things, or perhaps something to do with justice. But what Heracles himself, without the image, said, we are not told.
τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι ἡ ἑτέρα ψυχὴ ἀπαλλαγεῖσα μόνη; ἡ γὰρ ἐφελκομένη ὅτι κἂν πάντα, ὅσα ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔπαθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· χρόνου δὲ προιόντος ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ καὶ ἄλλων μνῆμαι ἂν φανεῖεν ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν βίων, ὥστε τινὰ τούτων καὶ ἀτιμάσασαν ἀφεῖναι. σώματος γὰρ καθαρωτέρα γενομένη καὶ ἃ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν μνήμῃ ἀναπολήσει· εἰ δ’ ἐν σώματι γενομένη ἄλλῳ ἐξέλθοι, ἐρεῖ μὲν τὰ τοῦ ἔξω βίου καὶ ἐρεῖ εἶναι, ὃ ἄρτι ἀφῆκεν, ἐρεῖ δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν πρόσθεν. χρόνοις δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἐπακτῶν ἀεὶ ἔσται ἐν λήθῃ. ἡ δὲ δὴ μόνη γενομένη τί μνημονεύσει; ἢ πρότερον σκεπτέον τίνι δυνάμει ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν παραγίνεται.
What, then, would the other soul say, once freed and alone? The soul that drags something of body after it would tell of everything the man did or suffered. But as time goes on after death, memories of other things would appear from earlier lives, so that it would even let some of the recent memories go, holding them of little account. For having become purer of body, it will also go back over things it did not hold in memory here. And if it leaves a body after having been in another, it will tell of the life outside the body, and will say that it is the one it has just let go, and it will tell many things of earlier lives too. But with time it will always be forgetting many of the things that came to it from outside. And the soul that has become alone, what will it remember? No: we must first examine which power of the soul it is that remembering belongs to.
ἆρά γε ᾧ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ᾧ μανθάνομεν; ἢ καὶ ᾧ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν καὶ τῶν ὀργιστῶν, τῷ θυμοειδεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἀπολαύσει, φήσει τις, ἄλλο δὲ μνημονεύσει τῶν ἐκείνου. τὸ γοῦν ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὧν ἀπέλαυσε τοῦτο κινεῖται πάλιν ὀφθέντος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ δηλονότι τῇ μνήμῃ. ἐπεὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἄλλου, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ αἴσθησιν τῶν τοιούτων διδόναι αὐτῷ καὶ τῶ αἰσθητικῷ τοίνυν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ παντάπασιν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἕκαστον λέγεσθαι;
Is it the power by which we perceive and by which we learn? Or is it also the part by which we desire what we desire, and, for what angers us, the spirited part? Someone will say that it isn’t one thing that enjoys and another that remembers what the first enjoyed. At any rate, the desiring part is moved again toward what it enjoyed when the object of desire is seen, and plainly that happens by memory. Otherwise, why isn’t it moved when something else is seen, or moved but not in this way? What, then, prevents us from giving it perception of such things as well, and in turn giving desire to the perceptive part, and so on all round, so that each is named after what predominates in it?
ἢ αἴσθησιν ἄλλως ἑκάστῳ· οἷον εἶδε μὲν ἡ ὅρασις, οὐ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἐκινήθη δὲ παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν οἷον διαδόσει, οὐχ ὥστε εἰπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν οἵα, ἀλλ’ ὥστε ἀπαρακολουθήτως παθεῖν· καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ εἶδε τὸν ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἀνέστη, οἷον εἰ ποιμένος ἰδόντος ἐπὶ ποίμνῃ λύκον ὁ σκύλαξ τῇ ὀδμῇ ἢ τῷ κτύπῳ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἰδὼν ὄμμασιν ὀρίνοιτο. καὶ τοίνυν ἀπέλαυσε μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καὶ ἔχει ἴχνος τοῦ γενομένου ἐντεῦθεν οὐχ ὡς μνήμην, ἀλλ’ ὡς διάθεσιν καὶ πάθος· ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἑωρακὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ παρ’ αὑτῷ ἔχον τὴν μνήμην τοῦ γεγενημένου. τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ μὴ εἰδυῖαν εἶναι τὴν μνήμην πολλάκις ὧν μετέσχε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καίτοι, εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἦν ἄν.
Or rather, each has perception in a different way. For instance, it was sight that saw, not the desiring part. The desiring part was moved by the perception through a kind of transmission, not so as to say what sort of perception it was, but so as to be affected without being conscious of it. So too with anger: sight saw the wrongdoer, and anger rose up. It is as when a shepherd sees a wolf at the flock, and the dog, without seeing it with its own eyes, is roused by the smell or the noise. So the desiring part did enjoy, and from this it keeps a trace of what happened, not as a memory but as a disposition and an affection. It is something else that saw the enjoyment and holds in itself the memory of what happened. The evidence is that memory often does not know what the desiring part has had a share in, although it would know if memory were in that part.
ἆρ’ οὖν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ φέροντες ἀναθήσομεν τὴν μνήμην, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν μνημονευτικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν ἔσται; ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον μνημονεύσει, ὡς ἐλέγετο, διττὸν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἔσται, καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δὲ τὸ μνημονευτικόν, ἀλλ’ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, διττὸν τὸ μνημονεῦον ἔσται. ἔτι τε εἰ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ἔσται, καὶ τῶν διανοημάτων ἔσται τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ἢ ἄλλο γε δεῖ ἑκατέρων. ἆρ’ οὖν κοινὸν θέμενοι τὸ ἀντιληπτικὸν τούτῳ δώσομεν ἀμφοῖν τὴν μνήμην; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ νοητῶν, τάχα ἄν τι λέγοιτο· εἰ δὲ διαιρεῖται διχῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον δύο ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ ψυχῇ δώσομεν ἄμφω, τέτταρα ἂν γένοιτο.
Shall we, then, go and assign memory to the perceptive faculty, so that the same thing in us will be what remembers and what perceives? But if the image will remember too, as was said, the perceptive faculty will be double. And if what remembers is not the perceptive faculty but something else, whatever it may be, what remembers will be double. Further, if the perceptive faculty is to remember what we have learned, it will also be the faculty of our thoughts. Or rather, there must be a different faculty for each. Shall we, then, posit a common faculty of apprehension and give it memory of both? Well, if it is one and the same thing that apprehends both sensibles and intelligibles, there might perhaps be something in that. But if it is divided in two, there would be two all the same. And if we give both to each of the two souls, there would be four.
ὅλως δὲ τίς ἀνάγκη, ᾧ αἰσθανόμεθα, τούτῳ καὶ μνημονεύειν, καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει γίνεσθαι ἄμφω, καὶ ᾧ διανοούμεθα, τούτῳ τῶν διανοημάτων μνημονεύειν; ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ οἱ αὐτοὶ διανοεῖσθαι κράτιστοι καὶ μνημονεύειν, καὶ ἐπίσης αἰσθήσει χρησάμενοι οὐκ ἐπίσης μνημονεύουσι, καὶ εὐαισθήτως ἔχουσιν ἄλλοι, μνημονεύουσι δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ὀξέως ἐν αἰσθήσει γεγενημένοι. ἀλλὰ πάλιν αὖ, εἰ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον δεήσει εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλο μνημονεύσει ὧν ἡ αἴσθησις ᾔσθετο πρότερον, κἀκεῖνο δεῖ αἰσθέσθαι οὗπερ μελλήσει μνημονεύειν. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύσει τῷ μνημονεύσοντι τὸ αἴσθημα φάντασμα εἶναι, καὶ τῷ φανταστικῷ ἄλλῳ ὄντι τὴν μνήμην καὶ κατοχὴν ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν, εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ μηκέτι οὔσης τούτῳ πάρεστι τὸ ὅραμα.
In general, what necessity is there that we remember with what we perceive with, and that both come about through the same power? Or that we remember our thoughts with what we think with? The same people are not the best at thinking and at remembering. People who make equal use of perception do not remember equally. Some have keen perception, while others, who are not sharp at perceiving, have good memories. But then again, if each must be something different, and something else is to remember what perception perceived before, that thing too must have perceived what it is going to remember. Or rather, nothing will prevent the percept from being a mental image for what is going to remember, and memory and retention from belonging to the faculty of imagination, which is something different. For this is where perception ends up, and when perception is no longer there, the thing seen is present to this faculty.
εἰ οὖν παρὰ τούτῳ τοῦ ἀπόντος ἤδη ἡ φαντασία, μνημονεύει ἤδη, κἂν μὲν ἐπ’ ὀλίγον παραμένῃ, ὀλίγη ἡ μνήμη, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον μνημονικοὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης οὔσης ἰσχυροτέρας, ὡς μὴ ῥᾳδίως τρεπομένης ἀφεῖσθαι ἀποσεισθεῖσαν τὴν μνήμην. τοῦ φανταστικοῦ ἄρα ἡ μνήμη, καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν τῶν τοιούτων ἔσται. διαφόρως δ’ ἔχειν πρὸς μνήμας φήσομεν ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν αὐτοῖς διαφόρως ἐχούσαις ἢ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἢ μή, ἢ καὶ σωματικαῖς κράσεσιν ἐνούσαις καὶ μή, καὶ ἀλλοιούσαις καὶ μή, καὶ οἷον θορυβούσαις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἑτέρωθι.
If, then, the imagination of something already absent is in this faculty, it is already remembering. If the image stays for a short time, the memory is short; if it stays long, people have better memories, since this power is stronger and does not easily change and so let the memory be shaken off. Memory, then, belongs to the faculty of imagination, and remembering will be of things of this kind. We will say that people differ in memory either because the powers themselves differ, or through practice or lack of it, or because of bodily mixtures that are present or not, and that alter us or not, and that, as it were, cause disturbance. But that is for another place.
τὸ δὲ τῶν διανοήσεων τί; ἆρά γε καὶ τούτων τὸ φανταστικόν; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πάσῃ νοήσει παρακολουθεῖ φαντασία, τάχα ἂν ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας, οἷον εἰκόνος οὔσης τοῦ διανοήματος, μενούσης οὕτως ἂν εἴη τοῦ γνωσθέντος ἡ μνήμη· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλο τι ζητητέον. ἴσως δ’ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τῷ νοήματι παρακολουθοῦντος ἡ παραδοχὴ εἰς τὸ φανταστικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ νόημα ἀμερὲς καὶ οὔπω οἷον προεληλυθὸς εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἔνδον ὂν λανθάνει, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀναπτύξας καὶ ἀπάγων ἐκ τοῦ νοήματος εἰς τὸ φανταστικὸν ἔδειξε τὸ νόημα οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ καὶ ἡ ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ οὕτω καὶ ἡ μονὴ καὶ ἡ μνήμη. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ κινουμένης πρὸς νόησιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅταν ἐν τούτῳ γίνηται, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀντίληψις.
And what about memory of our thoughts? Does the faculty of imagination remember these too? Well, if imagination accompanies every act of thinking, then perhaps, since this imagination is like an image of the thought, the memory of what was known would come about through its remaining. If not, we must look for something else. Perhaps it is the reception into the faculty of imagination of the verbal expression that accompanies the thought. For the thought is without parts and, not yet having as it were come forth to the outside, it stays within unnoticed. But the verbal expression unfolds it and draws it out of the thought into the faculty of imagination, and so displays the thought as in a mirror; and that is how it is apprehended, how it stays, and how it is remembered. That is why, although the soul is always moving toward thinking, we apprehend it only when it comes to be in this faculty.
ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις, καὶ νοοῦμεν μὲν ἀεί, ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι τὸ δεχόμενον οὐ μόνον δέχεται νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰσθήσεις κατὰ θάτερα.
For thinking is one thing and the apprehension of thinking another. We are always thinking, but we do not always apprehend it. This is because what receives does not receive only acts of thinking but, from the other side, perceptions as well.
ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ ἡ μνήμη, ἑκατέρα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ μνημονεύειν εἴρηται, δύο τὰ φανταστικά. χωρὶς μὲν οὖν οὖσαι ἐχέτωσαν ἑκατέρα, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ παρ’ ἡμῖν πῶς τὰ δύο καὶ τίνι αὐτῶν ἐγγίνεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμφοτέραις, διτταὶ ἀεὶ αἱ φαντασίαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἑτέρας τῶν νοητῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν παντάπασι δύο ζῷα οὐδὲν ἔχοντα κοινὸν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔσται. εἰ οὖν ἀμφοτέραις, τίς ἡ διαφορά; εἶτα πῶς οὐ γινώσκομεν;
But if memory belongs to the faculty of imagination, and each of the two souls has been said to remember, there are two faculties of imagination. Now when the souls are apart, let each have its own. But when they are in the same place, in us, how are there two, and in which of them does memory arise? If in both, our images will always be double. For of course it is not that one soul’s faculty images intelligibles and the other’s sensibles: in that case there would be two living beings with nothing whatever in common. If, then, it arises in both, what is the difference? And then how is it that we don’t notice?
ἢ ὅταν μὲν συμφωνῇ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, οὐκ ὄντων οὐδὲ χωρὶς τῶν φανταστικῶν, κρατοῦντος δὲ τοῦ τῆς κρείττονος, ἓν τὸ φάντασμα γίνεται, οἷον παρακολουθούσης σκιᾶς τῷ ἑτέρῳ, καὶ ὑποτρέχοντος οἷον σμικροῦ φωτὸς μείζονι· ὅταν δὲ μάχη ᾖ καὶ διαφωνία, ἐκφανὴς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα γίνεται· λανθάνει δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι καὶ ὅλως τὸ διττὸν τῶν ψυχῶν λανθάνει. εἰς ἓν γὰρ ἦλθον ἄμφω καὶ ἐποχεῖται ἡ ἑτέρα. ἑώρα οὖν ἡ ἑτέρα πάντα καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔχει ἐξελθοῦσα, τὰ δ’ ἀφίησι τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας· οἷον ἑταίρων ὁμιλίας φαυλοτέρων λαβόντες ποτὲ ἄλλους ἀλλαξάμενοι ὀλίγα τῶν ἐκείνων μεμνήμεθα, χρηστοτέρων δὲ γεγενημένων πλείω.
Or rather: when the one soul is in accord with the other, the two faculties of imagination are not separate either. The faculty of the better soul prevails, and the image becomes one, as if a shadow followed the other, or a small light slipped in under a larger one. But when there is conflict and discord, the other faculty too becomes evident on its own; while it is within the other it goes unnoticed, because the duality of the souls as a whole goes unnoticed. For the two have come together into one, and the one rides upon the other. So the one soul saw everything, and when it departs it takes some things with it and lets go of others that belong to the other soul. It is as when we have kept company with inferior companions and then exchange them for others: we remember little of the first, but more if they were better people.
τί δὲ δὴ φίλων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός; πατρίδος δὲ καὶ τῶν ὧν ἂν καὶ ἀστεῖος οὐκ ἄτοπος μνημονεύων; ἢ τὸ μὲν μετὰ πάθους ἑκάστου, ὁ δὲ ἀπαθῶς ἂν τὰς μνήμας τούτων ἔχοι· τὸ γὰρ πάθος ἴσως καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τῶν παθῶν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ, καθ’ ὅσον τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τι ἐκοινώνησε. πρέπει δὲ τὴν μὲν χείρονα καὶ τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας ἐνεργημάτων ἐφίεσθαι τῆς μνήμης καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν ἀστεία ᾖ καὶ αὐτή· γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμείνων καὶ τῇ παιδεύσει τῇ παρὰ τῆς κρείττονος. τὴν δὲ δεῖ ἀσμένως λήθην ἔχειν ἐθέλειν τῶν παρὰ τῆς χείρονος. εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ σπουδαίας οὔσης τῆς ἑτέρας τὴν ἑτέραν τὴν φύσιν χείρονα εἶναι κατεχομένην ὑπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας βίᾳ.
But what about friends, children, wife? Our country, and the things that even a good person would not be out of place remembering? Or rather, the one soul remembers each of these with emotion, while the good person would hold the memories of them without emotion. For perhaps the emotion was in that lower soul from the beginning, and the good emotions in the excellent soul only insofar as it had something in common with the other. It is fitting that the worse soul should aspire to the memory of the higher soul’s activities too, especially when it is itself good; for one can become better both from the start and through the education given by the better soul. But the better soul ought to be glad to forget what comes from the worse. For even when the one is excellent, the other can be worse by nature, and held in check by force by the first.
ὅσῳ δὴ σπεύδει πρὸς τὸ ἄνω πλειόνων αὐτῇ ἡ λήθη, εἰ μή που πᾶς ὁ βίος αὐτῇ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτος οἵῳ μόνων τῶν κρειττόνων εἶναι τὰς μνήμας· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καλῶς τὸ ἐξιστάμενον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων. ἀνάγκη οὖν καὶ τῶν μνημονευμάτων· ὥστε ἐπιλήσμονα ἄν τις λέγων τὴν ἀγαθὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ. ἐπεὶ καὶ φεύγει ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν συνάγει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀφιεῖσα. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οὐ μετὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλαφρὰ καὶ δι’ αὑτῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν ἐκεῖ ἐθέλῃ εἶναι, ἔτι οὖσα ἐνταῦθα ἀφίησι πάντα ὅσα ἄλλα· ὀλίγα τοίνυν κἀκεῖ τὰ ἐντεῦθεν· καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ οὖσα πλείω.
So the more it hurries upward, the more it forgets, unless perhaps its whole life even here has been such that its memories are only of better things. For even here it is good to stand apart from human concerns; necessarily, then, from the memories of them too. So if someone called the good soul forgetful, he would be right, in this sense. For it flees from multiplicity, and gathers the many into one, letting go of the unlimited. In this way it is not weighed down with many things, but light and by itself. Even here, when it wants to be There, it lets go of everything else while still here; so it takes few things from here with it There too. And when it is in heaven, more.
καὶ εἴποι ἂν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἐκεῖνος ἀνδραγαθίας ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα σμικρὰ ἡγούμενος καὶ μετατεθεὶς εἰς ἁγιώτερον τόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ γεγενημένος καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἡρακλέα ἰσχύσας τοῖς ἄθλοις, οἷα ἀθλεύουσι σοφοὶ [τίνων μνημονεύσει];
And that Heracles might speak of his own deeds of valor. But the other one, who considers even these small, who has been transferred to a holier place and come to be in the intelligible world, and who has prevailed beyond Heracles in the contests, the kind that the wise contend in—[what will he remember?]