Τί οὖν ἐρεῖ, καὶ τίνων τὴν μνήμην ἕξει ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης γενομένη; ἢ ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνα θεωρεῖν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐνεργεῖν, ἐν οἷς ἔστιν, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖ εἶναι. τῶν οὖν ἐνταῦθα οὐδέν, οἷον ὅτι ἐφιλοσόφησε, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα οὖσα ἐθεᾶτο τὰ ἐκεῖ. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ὅτε τις ἐπιβάλλει τινὶ τῇ νοήσει, ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἢ νοεῖν κἀκεῖνο θεωρεῖν, καὶ ἐν τῇ νοήσει οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τὸ ἐνενοήκειν, ἀλλ’ ὕστερόν τις ἂν τοῦτ’ εἰ ἔτυχεν, εἴποι· τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη μεταβάλλοντος· οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καθαρῶς ὄντα μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν τῇδέ ποτε αὐτῷ τινι γεγενημένων.
What, then, will the soul say, and what will it remember, when it has come to be in the intelligible world and has arrived at that being? Or rather, it follows that we should say it contemplates those things and is active about them, the things it is among; otherwise it would not be There at all. So it remembers nothing of things here: for instance, that it practiced philosophy, or even that while it was here it contemplated the things There. But suppose that when one directs one’s thinking at something, one can do nothing other than think and contemplate it; and that having thought is not included in the thinking, but one might say it later, if it so happens—and that already belongs to someone who is changing. Then someone who is purely in the intelligible could not have memory of what once happened to him here.
εἰ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, ἄχρονος πᾶσα ἡ νόησις, ἐν αἰῶνι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντων τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀδύνατον μνήμην εἶναι ἐκεῖ οὐχ ὅτι τῶν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὁτουοῦν. ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἕκαστον παρόν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ διέξοδος οὐδὲ μετάβασις ἀφ’ ἑτέρου ἐπ’ ἄλλο. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔσται διαίρεσις ἄνωθεν εἰς εἴδη, ἢ κάτωθεν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ἄνω; τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄνω μὴ ἔστω ἐνεργείᾳ [πάντα] ὁμοῦ ὄντι, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ ἐκεῖ οὔσῃ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔσται;
And if, as seems to be the case, all thinking is timeless, since the things there are in eternity and not in time, then it is impossible for There to be memory There—not just of things here, but of anything at all. Rather, each thing is present; for there is no going through, and no passing from one thing to another. What then? Will there be no division from above into species, or ascent from below to the universal and the higher? Let there be none for what is above, since it is [all] together in activity; but why should there not be for the soul that is There?
τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ταύτῃ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀθρόαν ἀθρόων γίνεσθαι; ἆρ’ οὖν ῶς τινος ὁμοῦ; ἢ ὡς πολλῶν ὁμοῦ πάσας νοήσεις. τοῦ γὰρ θεάματος ὄντος ποικίλου ποικίλην καὶ πολλὴν τὴν νόησιν ἅμα [δεῖ] γίνεσθαι καὶ πολλὰς τὰς νοήσεις, οἷον αἰσθήσεις πολλὰς προσώπου ὀφθαλμῶν ἅμα ὁρωμένων καὶ ῥινὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἕν τι διαιρῇ καὶ ἀναπτύσσῃ; ἢ ἐν τῷ νῷ διῄρηται· καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐναπέρεισις μᾶλλον. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὐ χρόνῳ ὂν οὐδὲ τὴν νόησιν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου χρόνῳ ποιήσει· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τάξει, οἱονεὶ φυτοῦ ἡ τάξις ἐκ ῥιζῶν ἀρξαμένη ἕως εἰς τὸ ἄνω τῷ θεωμένῳ οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλως ἢ τάξει τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἅμα τὸ πᾶν θεωμένῳ.
What, then, prevents this soul too from making a single, all-at-once apprehension of things that are all at once? As of some one thing together? Or rather, as of many, all its acts of thinking together. For since the spectacle is varied, the thinking [must] come about varied and manifold at once, and the acts of thinking be many—like the many perceptions of a face when the eyes, the nose and the rest are seen at once. But what about when it divides and unfolds some one thing? Or rather, it is already divided in Intellect, and this kind of thing is more like a fixing of attention on it. And the prior and posterior in the Forms, since it is not in time, will not make the thinking of the prior and posterior temporal either. For there is prior and posterior in order too. The order of a plant, starting from the roots and going up to the top, holds its prior and posterior in no other way than in order, for someone who contemplates the whole at once.
ἀλλ’ ὅταν εἰς ἓν βλέπῃ, εἶτα πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ἔχῃ, πῶς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔσχε, τὰ δὲ ἐφεξῆς; ἢ ἡ δύναμις ἡ μία οὕτως ἦν μία, ὡς πολλὰ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μίαν νόησιν πάντα. αἱ γὰρ ἐνέργειαι οὐ καθ’ ἕνα, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ πᾶσαι δυνάμει ἑστώσῃ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις γινομένων. ἤδη γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὡς μὴ [τὸ] ἓν ὂν δυνηθῆναι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἐν αὑτῷ φύσιν δέξασθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντων.
But when it looks at one thing and then has many, indeed all, how did it have the first, and then those that follow? Or rather, the single power was one in such a way as to be many in something else, and not all in a single act of thinking. For the activities are not one at a time but always all together, from a power that stands still; it is in other things that they come to be. For that other thing was already able, as not being [the] one, to receive into itself the nature of the many, which were not there before.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πῶς; ἢ οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξει τὴν μνήμην, οὐδ’ ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ θεωρῶν, οἷον Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτι νοῦς ἢ ψυχή. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτά τις ἀναμνησθήτω, ὡς ὅταν καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεωρῇ καὶ μάλιστα ἐναργῶς, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε τῇ νοήσει, ἀλλ’ ἔχει μὲν ἑαυτόν, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, κἀκεῖνο γίνεται οἷον ὕλην ἑαυτὸν παρασχών, εἰδοποιούμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ δυνάμει ὢν τότε αὐτός. τότε οὖν αὐτός ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅταν μηδὲν νοῇ· ἤ, εἰ μὲν αὐτός, κενός ἐστι παντός. εἰ δέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος οἷος πάντα εἶναι, ὅταν αὑτὸν νοῇ, πάντα ὁμοῦ νοεῖ· ὥστε τῇ μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιβολῇ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν τὰ πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενα ἔχει, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενον ἑαυτόν.
So much for that. But how will it remember itself? Or rather, it will not have memory even of itself, nor that it is itself the one contemplating, Socrates, say, or that it is intellect or soul. In answer to this, let us recall that even here, when someone contemplates, and especially when the contemplation is vivid, he does not then turn back to himself in his thinking. He possesses himself, but his activity is directed at that object, and he becomes it, offering himself as matter, as it were, being formed according to what he sees, and being himself, at that moment, only potentially. So he is actually himself, then, when he thinks nothing. Or rather, if he is just himself, he is empty of everything. But if he is himself such as to be all things, then when he thinks himself he thinks all things at once. So such a one, seeing himself by the apprehension and activity directed at himself, has all things included in him; and by the activity directed at all things, he has himself included.
ἀλλ’ εἰ οὕτω ποιεῖ, μεταβάλλει τὰς νοήσεις, ὃ πρότερον αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἠξιοῦμεν. ἢ λεκτέον ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν οἷον ἐσχάτοις τοῦ νοητοῦ κειμένης γίνεσθαι τοῦτο δυνατὸν εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ προσχωρεῖν εἴσω· εἰ γάρ τι περὶ τὸ μένον γίνεται, δεῖ αὐτὸ παραλλαγὴν πρὸς τὸ μένον ἔχειν μὴ ὁμοίως μένον. ἢ οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ’ ἑαυτόν, καὶ ὅταν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα· πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ἄμφω ἕν. ἀλλ’ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὖσα τοῦτο πάσχει τὸ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ. ἢ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὖσα ἔχει τὸ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ αὐτή.
But if it does this, it changes its acts of thinking, which we ourselves did not allow earlier. Or rather, we must say that in Intellect things stay the same, while in the soul, which lies as it were at the outermost edges of the intelligible, this can happen, since it can also move further inward. For if something comes to be around what remains, it must differ from what remains, and not remain in the same way. Or rather, we should not even say there is change when it passes from its own contents to itself, or from itself to the others; for it is all things, and both are one. But the soul, when it is in the intelligible, undergoes this “one thing after another” in relation to itself and what is in it? Or rather, when it is purely in the intelligible, it too has unchangeability.
καὶ γὰρ αὐτή ἐστιν ἅ ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ᾖ τῷ τόπῳ, εἰς ἕνωσιν ἐλθεῖν τῷ νῷ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἐπεστράφη· στραφεῖσα γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταξὺ ἔχει, εἴς τε νοῦν ἐλθοῦσα ἥρμοσται, καὶ ἁρμοσθεῖσα ἥνωται οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη, ἀλλ’ ἕν ἐστιν ἄμφω καὶ δύο. οὕτως οὖν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοι ἂν ἀτρέπτως πρὸς νόησιν ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα τὴν συναίσθησιν αὑτῆς, ὡς ἓν ἅμα τῷ νοητῷ ταὐτὸν γενομένη.
For it too is what it is. When it is in that region, it must come into union with Intellect, if indeed it has turned back; for once turned, it has nothing in between. Having come to Intellect, it is fitted to it, and once fitted it is united—not destroyed, but both are one and two. Being in this state, then, it would not change, but would be unalterably directed toward thinking, with self-awareness at the same time, as having become one and the same with the intelligible.
Memory and the soul’s descent
Turning away from unity, the soul gains memory of itself and moves downward.
ἐξελθοῦσα δὲ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχομένη τὸ ἕν, τὸ δὲ αὑτῆς ἀσπασαμένη καὶ ἕτερον ἐθελήσασα εἶναι καὶ οἷον προκύψασα, μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑαυτῆς λαμβάνει. μνήμη δὲ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἐκεῖ ἔτι κατέχει μὴ πεσεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ὡδὶ φέρει, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκεῖ κατέχει, καὶ ὅλως, οὗ μνημονεύει, ἐκεῖνο ἔστι καὶ γίνεται. ἦν γὰρ τὸ μνημονεύειν ἢ νοεῖν ἢ φαντάζεσθαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία αὐτῇ οὐ τῷ ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οἷα ὁρᾷ καὶ οἷα διάκειται· κἂν τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἴδῃ, ὁπόσον αὐτῶν ἂν ἴδῃ, τοσοῦτον ἔχει τὸ βάθος. ὅτι γὰρ ἔχει πάντα δευτέρως, οὐχ οὕτω τελείως πάντα γίνεται, καὶ μεθόριον οὖσα καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ κειμένη ἐπ’ ἄμφω φέρεται.
But when it comes out from There and cannot bear the unity, but embraces its own self and wants to be different, and as it were puts its head out, it acquires, it seems, memory of itself. Memory of the things There still holds it back from falling; memory of things here carries it down here; memory of things in heaven holds it there. In general, it is, and becomes, what it remembers. For remembering was either thinking or imagining, and imagination comes to it not by possessing but according to what it sees and how it is disposed. And if it sees sensible things, it goes as deep as the amount of them it sees. For because it has all things in a secondary way, it does not become all things so perfectly; and being a boundary and placed in such a position, it moves in both directions.
ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν καὶ τἀγαθὸν διὰ νοῦ ὁρᾷ, οὐ γὰρ στέγεται ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μὴ διελθεῖν εἰς αὐτήν· ἐπεὶ μὴ σῶμα τὸ μεταξὺ ὥστε ἐμποδίζειν· καίτοι καὶ σωμάτων [ὄντων] μεταξὺ πολλαχῇ εἰς τὰ τρίτα ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἡ ἄφιξις. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ κάτω δοίη αὑτήν, ἀναλόγως τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἔχει ὃ ἠθέλησε. διὸ ἡ μνήμη, καὶ ὅταν τῶν ἀρίστων ᾖ, οὐκ ἄριστον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν μνήμην λαμβάνειν οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν διακέηται κατὰ τὰ πρόσθεν παθήματα ἢ θεάματα. γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα, ὅτι ἔχει, ἔχειν παρ’ αὑτῷ ἰσχυροτέρως ἢ εἰ εἰδείη.
There, then, it sees the Good too, through Intellect; for the Good is not shut off so that it cannot pass through to the soul, since there is no body in between to hinder it. And yet even when there are bodies in between, the first things often reach the third. But if the soul gives itself to the things below, it has what it wanted in proportion to its memory and imagination. That is why memory, even when it is of the best things, is not the best thing. We must take memory to be present not only in the kind of awareness, as it were, that one is remembering, but also when one is disposed according to earlier experiences or sights. For it can happen that someone, without being conscious that he has something, has it within himself more strongly than if he knew it.
εἰδὼς μὲν γὰρ τάχα ἂν ὡς ἄλλο ἔχοι ἄλλος αὐτὸς ὤν, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι ἔχει κινδυνεύει εἶναι ὃ ἔχει· ὃ δὴ πάθημα μᾶλλον πεσεῖν ποιεῖ τὴν ψυχήν. ἀλλ’ ἀφισταμένη τοῦ ἐκεῖ τόπου ἀναφέρει τὰς μνήμας, ὁπωσοῦν εἶχε κἀκεῖ· ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἐκείνων ἠφάνιζε τὴν μνήμην. οὐ γὰρ ὡς κείμενοι ἦσαν τύποι, ἵνα ἂν ἦν ἴσως ἄτοπον τὸ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλ’ ἡ δύναμις ἦν ἡ ἀφεθεῖσα ὕστερον εἰς ἐνέργειαν. παυσαμένης οὖν τῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἐνεργείας εἶδεν, ἃ πρότερον ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι ἰδοῦσα ἦν.
For if he knew it, he might perhaps have it as something other, being himself other; but not knowing that he has it, he runs the risk of being what he has. And it is just this experience that makes the soul fall further. But when it withdraws from the region There, it brings back memories that it had in some way even There; the activity of those things had kept the memory out of sight. For they were not lying there as imprints, in which case what happens might perhaps be absurd; it was the power that was later released into activity. So when the activity in the intelligible stopped, it saw what the soul had seen before it came to be There.
τί οὖν; κἀκεῖνα νῦν αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις, καθ’ ἣν τὸ μνημονεύειν, εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγει; ἢ εἰ μὲν μὴ αὐτὰ ἑωρῶμεν, μνήμῃ, εἰ δ’ αὐτά, ᾧ κἀκεῖ ἑωρῶμεν. ἐγείρεται γὰρ τοῦτο οἷς ἐγείρεται, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ὁρῶν περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. οὐ γὰρ εἰκασίᾳ δεῖ χρώμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι οὐδὲ συλλογισμῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄλλοθεν εἰληφότι, ἀλλ’ ἔστι περὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ὡς λέγεται, καὶ ἐνθάδε οὖσι τῷ αὐτῷ λέγειν, ὃ δύναμιν ἔχει τὰ ἐκεῖ θεωρεῖν. ταὐτὸ γὰρ οἷον ἐγείραντας δεῖ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκεῖ· οἷον εἴ τις ἀνάγων αὑτοῦ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐπί τινος ὑψηλῆς σκοπιᾶς ὁρῴη, ἃ οὐδεὶς τῶν οὐ σὺν αὐτῷ ἀναβεβηκότων. ἡ τοίνυν μνήμη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου φαίνεται ἄρχεσθαι ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ, ἤδη τῆς ψυχῆς τοὺς ἐκεῖ τόπους καταλιπούσης.
What then? Does this same power, by which we remember, now bring those things too into activity? Or rather: if we did not see them themselves, it is by memory; if we saw them themselves, it is by that with which we saw them There too. For this is awakened by whatever awakens it, and it is this that sees, concerning the things we have spoken of. One must not make pronouncements by conjecture, or by a syllogism that takes its principles from elsewhere. About the intelligibles, as is said, even those of us who are here can speak by that same thing which has the power to contemplate the things There. For we must, as it were, awaken that same thing and so see the things There—as if someone, lifting his eye from some high lookout, were to see what none of those who had not climbed with him could see. So by this argument memory seems to begin from heaven, when the soul has already left the regions There.
ἐντεῦθεν μὲν οὖν ἐν οὐρανῷ γενομένη καὶ στᾶσα θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν, εἰ τῶν ἐνθάδε μνήμην πολλῶν ἔχει οἵων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐπιγινώσκειν πολλὰς τῶν πρότερον ἐγνωσμένων, εἴπερ καὶ σώματα ἔχειν περὶ αὑτὰς ἀνάγκη ἐν σχήμασιν ὁμοίοις. καὶ εἰ τὰ σχήματα δὲ ἀλλάξαιντο σφαιροειδῆ ποιησάμεναι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν τρόπων ἰδιότητος [ἂν] γνωρίζοιεν· οὐ γὰρ ἄτοπον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη ἔστωσαν ἀποθέμεναι, τὰ δὲ ἤθη οὐ κωλύεται μένειν. εἰ δὲ καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δύναιντο, καὶ οὕτως ἂν γνωρίζοιεν. ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ κατέλθωσι, πῶς; ἢ ἀνακινήσουσι τὴν μνήμην, ἐλαττόνως μέντοι ἢ ἐκεῖναι, τῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλα τε γὰρ ἕξουσι μνημονεύειν, καὶ χρόνος πλείων λήθην παντελῆ πολλῶν πεποιηκὼς ἔσται. ἀλλ’ εἰ τραπεῖσαι εἰς τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον εἰς γένεσιν τῇδε πεσοῦνται, ποῖος τρόπος ἔσται τοῦ μνημονεύειν;
When it has come from here and settled in heaven, then, it is no wonder that it has memory of many things here, of the kind mentioned, and that souls recognize many of those they knew before, if indeed they must have bodies around them in similar shapes. And even if they changed their shapes and made them spherical, they would recognize one another through their characters and the individuality of their ways; there is nothing absurd in that. Let them have put away their emotions; nothing prevents their characters from remaining. And if they could also converse, they would recognize one another that way too. But when they come down from the intelligible, how? Or rather, they will stir up memory of the same things, though less than those other souls; for they will have other things to remember, and a longer time will have brought complete forgetting of many. But if they turn to the sensible world and fall into becoming here, what will their way of remembering be?
ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰς πᾶν βάθος πεσεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ κινηθείσας καὶ στῆναι ἐπί τι προελθούσας καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει πάλιν ἐκδῦναι, πρὶν γενέσεως ἐλθεῖν ἐπ’ ἔσχατον τόπον.
Or rather, they need not fall into the whole depth. Once in motion, they can stop when they have gone forward to some point; and nothing prevents them from coming back out before they reach the lowest region of becoming.
Do the stars remember?
The heavenly bodies and Zeus need no memory, since they live a single unchanging life.
τὰς μὲν οὖν μετιούσας καὶ μεταβαλλούσας ψυχὰς ἔχοι ἄν τις εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ μνημονεύουσι, τῶν γὰρ γεγενημένων καὶ παρεληλυθότων ἡ μνήμη· αἷς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει μένειν, τίνων ἂν αὗται μνημονεύοιεν; ἄστρων δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τῶν τε ἄλλων ἁπάντων καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἐπιζητεῖ ὁ λόγος τὰς μνήμας, καὶ τελευτῶν εἶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπιτολμήσει καὶ τοῦ Διὸς αὐτοῦ τὰς μνήμας πολυπραγμονεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ ζητῶν καὶ τὰς διανοίας αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τίνες εἰσὶ θεωρήσει, εἴπερ εἰσίν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ζητοῦσι μήτε ἀποροῦσιν — οὐδενὸς γὰρ δέονται, οὐδὲ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐν γνώσει· τίνες ἂν λογισμοὶ ἢ τίνες συλλογισμοὶ αὐτοῖς γίνοιντο ἢ διανοήσεις;
Now about souls that move about and change, one could say that they also remember, since memory is of what has happened and is past. But those whose lot is to remain in the same state—what would they remember? The argument looks for memories in the soul of the stars, all the others and in particular the sun and moon; in the end it will go on to the Soul of the All, and will even venture to pry into the memories of Zeus himself. And in this search it will consider what their discursive thoughts and reasonings are, if they have any. Now if they neither search nor are at a loss—for they need nothing, and do not learn what they did not know before—what reasonings, what syllogisms, what discursive thoughts could they have?
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αὐτοῖς ἐπίνοιαι καὶ μηχαναί, ἐξ ὧν διοικήσουσι τὰ ἡμέτερα ἢ ὅλως τὰ τῆς γῆς· ἄλλος γὰρ τρόπος τῆς εἰς τὸ πᾶν παρ’ αὐτῶν εὐθημοσύνης.
Nor do they have ideas and devices about human affairs by which they would manage our affairs, or the things of earth in general. The good order they bring to the All comes about in another way.
τί οὖν; ὅτι τὸν θεὸν εἶδον οὐ μνημονεύουσιν; ἢ ἀεὶ ὁρῶσιν· ἕως δ’ ἂν ὁρῶσιν, οὐκ ἔνι δήπου φάναι αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι· παυσαμένων γὰρ τοῦτο ἂν πάθος εἴη. τί δέ; οὐδ’ ὅτι περιῆλθον χθὲς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ πέρυσιν, οὐδ’ ὅτι ἔζων χθὲς καὶ πάλαι καὶ ἐξ οὗ ζῶσιν; ἢ ζῶσιν ἀεί· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ταὐτὸν ἕν, τὸ δὲ χθὲς τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη, οἷον ἂν εἴ τις τὴν ὁρμὴν τὴν κατὰ πόδα ἕνα γενομένην μερίζοι εἰς πολλά, καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην καὶ πολλὰς ποιοῖ τὴν μίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μία φορά, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν μετροῦνται πολλαὶ καὶ ἡμέραι ἄλλαι, ὅτι καὶ νύκτες διαλαμβάνουσιν. ἐκεῖ δὲ μιᾶς οὔσης ἡμέρας πῶς πολλαί; ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ πέρυσιν.
What then? Do they not remember that they saw the god? Or rather, they always see him; and as long as they see, they surely cannot say they have seen him. That would be the experience of those who had stopped. What about this: don’t they remember that yesterday they went round the earth, and last year? Or that they were alive yesterday, and long ago, and ever since they have been alive? Or rather, they live forever, and “forever” is one and the same. The “yesterday” and “last year” of their motion would be as if someone were to split up a movement made in a single stride into many, making the one into one and another and many. For there too there is one motion; it is with us that many are measured, and different days, because nights come between. But there, where there is one day, how could there be many? So there is no “last year” either.
ἀλλὰ τὸ διάστημα οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ζῳδίου τμῆμα ἄλλο. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐρεῖ ‘παρῆλθον τόδε, νῦν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἰμί’; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐφορᾷ τὰ [τῶν] ἀνθρώπων, πῶς οὐ καὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τὰς περὶ αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἄλλοι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι πρότερον ἕτεροι, καὶ ἕτερα· ὥστε καὶ μνήμη.
But the interval covered is not the same but different, and the segment of the zodiac is different. So why won’t it say, “I have passed this one, and now I am in another”? And if it also watches over human affairs, how will it not see the changes in them too, and that now there are different people? And if so, then also that before there were others, and other things; and so there is memory too.
ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη οὔτε ὅσα τις θεωρεῖ ἐν μνήμῃ τίθεσθαι, οὔτε τῶν πάντη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπακολουθούντων ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίνεσθαι, ὧν τε ἡ νόησις καὶ ἡ γνῶσις ἐναργεστέρα, εἰ ταῦτα αἰσθητῶς γίνοιτο, οὐκ ἀνάγκη παρέντα τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῶν τῷ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητῷ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι, εἰ μή τις ἔργῳ οἰκονομοῖτό τι, τῶν ἐν μέρει τῇ γνώσει τοῦ ὅλου ἐμπεριεχομένων. λέγω δὲ ἕκαστον ὧδε· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ἅ τις ὁρᾷ παρατίθεσθαι παρ’ αὑτῷ. ὅταν γὰρ μὴ διαφέρῃ, ἢ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ᾖ ὅλως ἡ αἴσθησις ἀπροαιρέτως τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὁρωμένων κινηθεῖσα, τοῦτο αὐτὴ ἔπαθε μόνη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ δεξαμένης εἰς τὸ εἴσω, ἅτε μήτε πρὸς χρείαν μήτε πρὸς ἄλλην ὠφέλειαν αὐτῇ τῆς διαφορᾶς μέλον.
Or rather, one need not store in memory everything one observes, nor do the merely incidental accompaniments need to come into imagination. And in the case of things of which one’s thinking and knowledge are clearer, if these were to occur in a perceptible way, one need not set aside one’s knowledge of them and direct attention to the particular perceptible—unless one is actually managing something—since the particulars are included in the knowledge of the whole. Let me explain each point. First, that it is not necessary to store up what one sees. When it makes no difference, or the perception has nothing at all to do with oneself, having been moved involuntarily by the differences in what is seen, the perception alone undergoes this, and the soul does not take it inside, since the difference matters to it neither for need nor for any other benefit.
ὅταν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῇ πρὸς ἄλλοις ᾖ, καὶ παντελῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιτο τῶν τοιούτων παρελθόντων τὴν μνήμην, ὅπου μηδὲ παρόντων γινώσκει τὴν αἴσθησιν. καὶ μὴν ὅτι τῶν πάντη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινομένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίνεσθαι, εἰ δὲ καὶ γίνοιτο, οὐχ ὥστε καὶ φυλάξαι καὶ παρατηρῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τύπος τοῦ τοιούτου οὐ δίδωσι συναίσθησιν, μάθοι ἄν τις, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτω λάβοι. λέγω δὲ ὧδε· εἰ μηδέποτε προηγούμενον γένοιτο τὸν ἀέρα τόνδε εἶτα τόνδε τεμεῖν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διελθεῖν, οὔτ’ ἂν τήρησις αὐτοῦ οὔτ’ ἂν ἔννοια βαδίζουσι γένοιτο.
And when its activity is directed at other things, it would not tolerate memory of such things at all once they are past, when it is not even aware of the perception while they are present. Again, that the wholly incidental things need not come into imagination—and that if they did, it would not be so as to keep and observe them, but the imprint of such a thing does not give self-awareness—one could understand by taking what I say in this way. I mean: if it were never one’s primary aim to cut through this air and then that in moving from place to place, or even more to pass through it, then there would be no observation of it, nor any notion of it, as we walk.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ εἰ μὴ ἐγίνετο τὸ τόδε διανύσαι προηγούμενον, δι’ ἀέρος δὲ ἦν τὴν διέξοδον ποιήσασθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο ἡμῖν μέλειν τοῦ ἐν ὅτῳ σταδίῳ γῆς ἐσμέν, ἢ ὅσον ἠνύσαμεν· καὶ εἰ κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἔδει μὴ τοσόνδε χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μόνον κινεῖσθαι, μηδ’ ἄλλην τινὰ πρᾶξιν εἰς χρόνον ἀνήγομεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐν μνήμῃ ἄλλον ἂν καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον ἐποιησάμεθα. γνώριμον δέ, ὅτι τῆς διανοίας ἐχούσης τὸ πραττόμενον ὅλον καὶ πιστευούσης οὕτω πάντως πραχθήσεσθαι οὐκ ἂν ἔτι προσέχοι γιγνομένοις ἑκάστοις.
So too with a journey: if covering this particular stretch were not our primary aim, and we had to make our way through the air, we would not care at what stade of the earth we were, or how far we had come. And if we had to move not for such and such a time but simply to move, and did not relate any other action to time, we would not have kept one time and another in memory. It is well known that when discursive thought holds the whole of what is being done, and trusts that it will certainly be done this way, it would no longer pay attention to each step as it happens.
καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν τις ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ ποιῇ, μάτην ἂν ἔτι παρατηροῖ ἕκαστα τοῦ ταὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν τὰ ἄστρα φερόμενα τὰ αὑτῶν πράττοντα φέρεται καὶ οὐχ ἵνα παρέλθῃ ταῦτα, ὅσα παρέρχεται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἡ θέα ὧν πάρεισιν, οὔτε τὸ παρελθεῖν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε ἡ πάροδος, πρὸς ἄλλοις τε ἡ γνώμη μείζοσι, τά τε αὐτὰ ἀεὶ δι’ ὧν διέρχονται ταῦτα, ὅ τε χρόνος οὐκ ἐν λογισμῷ ὁ ἐν τοσῷδε, εἰ καὶ διῃρεῖτο, οὐκ ἀνάγκη οὔτε τόπων ὧν παρίασιν οὔτε χρόνων εἶναι μνήμην, ⟨…⟩ ζωήν τε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα, ὅπου καὶ τὸ τοπικὸν αὐτοῖς περὶ ταὐτόν, ὡς μὴ τοπικόν, ἀλλὰ ζωτικὸν τὸ κίνημα εἶναι ζῴου ἑνὸς εἰς αὑτὸ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν στάσει μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, [ἐν] κινήσει δὲ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῇ ἀιδίῳ οὔσῃ.
Further, when someone is always doing the same thing, it would be pointless for him to keep observing each detail of the same thing. So suppose the stars, as they move, are doing their own work and not moving in order to pass the places they pass; their work is neither the sight of what they pass by nor the passing; the passing is incidental, and their mind is on other, greater things; what they pass through is always the same; and the time spent in a given stretch is not taken into account, even if it were divided. Then they need not have memory of the places they pass, or of the times, ⟨…⟩ and having the same life, since their local motion too is around the same point, so that their movement is not local but vital: the movement of a single living being active toward itself, at rest with respect to what is outside, but in motion by the life within it, which is eternal.
καὶ μὴν εἰ καὶ χορείᾳ ἀπεικάσειέ τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτῶν, εἰ μὲν ἱσταμένῃ ποτέ, ἡ πᾶσα ἂν εἴη τελεία ἡ συντελεσθεῖσα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος, ἀτελὴς δὲ ἡ ἐν μέρει ἑκάστη· εἰ δὲ τοιαύτῃ οἵα ἀεί, τελεία ἀεί. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ τελεία, οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τελεσθήσεται οὐδὲ τόπον· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἔφεσιν ἂν ἔχοι οὕτως· ὥστε οὔτε χρονικῶς οὔτε τοπικῶς μετρήσει· ὥστε οὐδὲ μνήμη τούτων.
Again, if one likened their motion to a dance: if it were a dance that stops at some point, the whole, completed from beginning to end, would be complete, while each part would be incomplete. But if it is a dance that goes on forever, it is forever complete. And if it is forever complete, it has no time in which it will be completed, nor any place; so in this way it would have no aspiration either; so it will not measure in terms of time or place; so there is no memory of these things either.
εἰ μέντοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ζωὴν ζῶσι μακαρίαν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς τὸ ζῆν προσεμβλέποντες, ταύτῃ δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν αὑτῶν πρὸς ἓν τῇ νεύσει καὶ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν ἐλλάμψει ὥσπερ χορδαὶ ἐν λύρᾳ συμπαθῶς κινηθεῖσαι μέλος ἂν ᾅσειαν ἐν φυσικῇ τινι ἁρμονίᾳ, εἰ οὕτω κινοῖτο ὁ σύμπας οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν, φερόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλως πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλης αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς θέσεως οὔσης, ἔτι ἂν μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὀρθοῖτο μιᾶς ζωῆς καὶ ὁμοίας τῆς πάντων ἔτι μᾶλλον οὔσης.
If, however, the stars themselves live a blessed life, gazing at life in their own souls, then by this inclination of their souls toward one, and by the illumination from them into the whole heaven, they would, like strings on a lyre moved in sympathy, sing a melody in a kind of natural harmony. If the whole heaven and its parts moved in this way toward itself, the heaven itself moving and its parts each in a different way toward the same goal, their positions too being different, then our argument would be even more right, since the life of all would be even more one and alike.
ὁ δὲ δὴ πάντα κοσμῶν Ζεὺς καὶ ἐπιτροπεύων καὶ διατιθείς, εἰς ἀεὶ ψυχὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ πρόνοιαν, ὅπως γίγνοιτο, καὶ γινομένων ἐπιστασίαν καὶ τάξει διοικῶν καὶ περιόδους ἑλίττων πολλὰς ἤδη καὶ τελέσας, πῶς ἂν ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι μνήμην οὐκ ἔχοι, ὁπόσαι τε ἐγένοντο καὶ οἷαι αἱ περίοδοι; καὶ ὡς ἂν καὶ ἔπειτα γένοιντο μηχανώμενος καὶ συμβάλλων καὶ λογιζόμενος [πῶς οὐ] μνημονικώτατος ἂν εἴη πάντων, ὅσῳ καὶ δημιουργὸς σοφώτατος; τὸ μὲν οὖν περιόδων τῆς μνήμης καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἂν ἔχοι πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, ὁπόσος ἀριθμὸς εἴη καὶ εἰ εἰδείη. πεπερασμένος γὰρ ὢν ἀρχὴν τῷ παντὶ χρονικὴν δώσει εἰ δ’ ἄπειρος, οὐκ εἰδήσει, ὁπόσα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἔργα.
But Zeus, who orders all things, manages them and arranges them, who has forever a kingly soul and a kingly intellect, providence for how things should come to be and oversight of them as they come to be, who governs in order and has already revolved and completed many cycles—how could he, in all this, not have memory of how many cycles there have been and of what kind? And as he devises how they will come about hereafter, putting things together and reasoning, he would [how could he not] be the one with the best memory of all, just as he is the wisest craftsman. Now memory of the cycles would by itself raise a great difficulty: what their number would be, and whether he would know it. For if the number is finite, he will give the All a beginning in time; and if it is unlimited, he will not know how many his works are.
ἢ ὅτι ἓν εἰδήσει καὶ μιᾷ ζωῇ ἀεί· οὕτως γὰρ ἄπειρος καὶ τὸ ἓν οὐ γνώσει ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ, συνόντος ἀεὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἀπείρου, μᾶλλον δὲ παρεπομένου καὶ θεωρουμένου οὐκ ἐπακτῷ γνώσει. ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἄπειρον τῆς ζωῆς οἶδεν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰς τὸ πᾶν μίαν οὖσαν, οὐχ ὅτι εἰς τὸ πᾶν.
Or rather, he will know that it is one, and with one life forever. For it is unlimited in this way, and he will know the one not by knowledge from outside but in actual fact, since what is unlimited in this way is always with him—or rather, it follows along with him and is contemplated by a knowledge that is not acquired from outside. For just as he knows the unlimitedness of his own life, so too he knows his activity toward the All as one, but not that it is toward the All.
ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ κοσμοῦν διττόν, [καὶ] τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸν δημιουργὸν λέγομεν, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν, καὶ τὸν Δία λέγοντες ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς ἐπί τὸν δημιουργὸν φερόμεθα, ὁτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντός, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἀφαιρετέον πάντη τὸ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω μίαν αὐτῷ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἄχρονον ζωὴν διδόντας. ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ζωὴ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχουσα ἔτι ἐπιζητεῖ λόγον. εἰ οὖν καὶ αὕτη μὴ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι ἔχει τὸ ζῆν, μηδ’ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν ὅ τι δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἤδη γὰρ ἐξεύρηται καὶ τέτακται ἃ δεῖ, οὐ ταχθέντα· τὰ γὰρ ταχθέντα ἦν τὰ γινόμενα, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αὐτὰ ἡ τάξις· τοῦτο δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἐξηρτημένης μενούσης φρονήσεως, ἧς εἰκὼν ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ τάξις.
But the ordering principle is double: one we call the Demiurge, the other the Soul of the All; and when we say “Zeus” we sometimes refer to the craftsman and sometimes to the ruling principle of the All. In the case of the craftsman, then, we must remove entirely the before and after, and grant him one life, unchanging and timeless. But the life of the cosmos, which has the ruling principle within itself, still calls for an account. If, then, this life too does not consist in reasoning, nor in searching for what it should do—for what must be has already been found and set in order, without having been set in order: the things set in order were what comes to be, while what produces them is the order itself; and this is the activity of a soul that depends on an understanding that remains, of which the order in it is an image—
οὐ τρεπομένης δὲ ἐκείνης ἀνάγκη μηδὲ ταύτην τρέπεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν βλέπει ἐκεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ βλέπει· ἀπολειπομένη γὰρ ἂν ἀποροῖ· μία γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ἓν ἔργον. τὸ γὰρ ἡγεμονοῦν ἓν κρατοῦν ἀεί, καὶ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν κρατοῦν, ὁτὲ δὲ κρατούμενον· πόθεν γὰρ τὰ πλείω, ὥστε καὶ γενέσθαι μάχην ἢ ἀπορίαν; καὶ τὸ διοικοῦν ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἐθέλει· διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἵνα εἰς πλείω ἀπορῇ;
then since that understanding does not change, this soul too cannot change. For it does not sometimes look There and sometimes not; if it fell away, it would be at a loss. For there is one soul and one work. The ruling principle is one and always rules; it is not sometimes ruling and sometimes ruled. Where would the plurality come from that could give rise to conflict or perplexity? And what governs, being one, always wills the same thing. Why would it will one thing and then another, only to be at a loss among several?
καίτοι, εἰ καὶ ἓν οὖσα μεταβάλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι εἴδη πολλὰ τὸ πᾶν καὶ μέρη ἔχει καὶ ἐναντιώσεις πρὸς τὰ μέρη, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀποροῖ, ὅπως διαθεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν ἄρχεται, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, καὶ ἀπὸ πρώτου ἀρξαμένη ὁδῷ ἀνεμποδίστῳ ἐπὶ πάντα εἶσι καὶ κοσμεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρατεῖ, ὅτι ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ἔργου μένει τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ταὐτόν. εἰ δὲ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο βουλεύοιτο, πόθεν τὸ ἄλλο; εἶθ’ ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ἀπορήσει, καὶ ἀσθενήσει τὸ ἔργον αὐτῇ εἰς ἀμφίβολον τοῦ πράττειν ἐν λογισμοῖς ἰούσῃ.
And yet even if, being one, it changed, it would not be at a loss. It is not because the All has many species and parts, and oppositions among the parts, that it would be at a loss how to arrange it. For it does not begin from the last things, nor from the parts, but from the first; and beginning from the first, it proceeds on an unobstructed path to all things and orders them. It rules because it remains in one and the same work, and is itself the same. But if it planned now one thing and now another, where would the “other” come from? Then it would be at a loss as to what to do, and its work would be weakened, as it fell into uncertainty about acting by going through reasonings.
Governing like nature, not like a doctor
The ruling principle of the All governs without reasoning, as nature does.
ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ζῴου ἡ διοίκησις, ἡ μέν τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ μερῶν, ἡ δέ τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἰατρὸς μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀρχόμενος καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἄπορος πολλαχῇ καὶ βουλεύεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπροσδεὴς βουλεύσεως. καὶ δεῖ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν διοίκησιν καὶ τὸν διοικοῦντα ἐν τῷ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐ κατ’ ἰατροῦ ἕξιν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ φύσις. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ὅσῳ κατὰ πάντων ἐμπεριειλημμένων ὡς μερῶν ζῴου ἑνός. πάσας γὰρ τὰς φύσεις κρατεῖ μία, αἱ δὲ ἕπονται ἀνηρτημέναι καὶ ἐξηρτημέναι καὶ οἷον ἐκφῦσαι· ὡς ἡ ἐν κλάδοις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φυτοῦ.
For it is like the management of a single living being: one kind works from outside and from the parts, another from inside and from the principle. A doctor begins from outside, goes part by part, is often at a loss, and deliberates; but nature begins from the principle and has no need of deliberation. And the management of the All, and its manager, in ruling, must not be in the condition of a doctor, but like nature. The simplicity there is far greater, insofar as all things are included as parts of one living being. For one nature rules all the natures, and they follow, attached to it and hanging from it, as though they had grown out of it—as the nature in the branches has grown out of that of the whole plant.
τίς οὖν ὁ λογισμὸς ἢ τίς ἀρίθμησις ἢ τίς ἡ μνήμη παρούσης ἀεὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἐνεργούσης καὶ κρατούσης καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ διοικούσης; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ποικίλα καὶ διάφορα τὰ γινόμενα, δεῖ συνεπόμενον ταῖς τοῦ γινομένου μεταβολαῖς καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡγεῖσθαι. ὅσῳ γὰρ ποικίλα τὰ γινόμενα, τοσούτῳ τὸ ποιοῦν ὡσαύτως μένον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ζῴου τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντα, αἱ ἡλικίαι, αἱ ἐκφύσεις ἐν χρόνοις, οἷον κεράτων, γενείων, μαζῶν αὐξήσεις, ἀκμαί, γενέσεις ἄλλων, οὐ τῶν πρόσθεν λόγων ἀπολλυμένων, ἐπιγινομένων δὲ ἄλλων. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ γεννωμένῳ αὖ ζῴῳ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ σύμπαντα λόγον εἶναι.
What reasoning, then, what counting, what memory could there be, when understanding is always present, active and ruling, and governing in the same way? It is not because what comes to be is varied and different that what makes it must lead by following the changes of what comes to be. The more varied what comes to be, the more what makes it remains the same. Even in each single living being, many things come about according to nature, and not all at once: the stages of life, the growths that appear in their time—horns, beards, breasts—the prime of life, the generation of other beings. The earlier rational principles are not destroyed; others come in addition. This is clear also from the fact that in the offspring, in turn, there is the same, complete rational principle.
καὶ δὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φρόνησιν ἄξιον περιθεῖναι καὶ ταύτην καθόλου εἶναι οἷον κόσμου φρόνησιν ἑστῶσαν, πολλὴν μὲν καὶ ποικίλην καὶ αὖ ἁπλῆν ζῴου ἑνὸς μεγίστου, οὐ τῷ πολλῷ ἀλλοιουμένην, ἀλλὰ ἕνα λόγον καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντα, οὐκ ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ μερῶν ἡ φρόνησις.
It is right, then, to ascribe the same understanding to the All, and to say that it is universal, the stable understanding, as it were, of the cosmos: manifold and varied, and yet simple, the understanding of one supremely great living being, not altered by its multiplicity, but one rational principle, all things at once. For if it were not all things, the understanding would not be that of the whole, but of what comes later and of the parts.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον ἔργον φύσεως ἄν τις εἴποι, φρονήσεως δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὔσης καὶ λογισμοὺς ἀνάγκην καὶ μνήμας εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων τὸ φρονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ φρονεῖν τιθεμένων, καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν φρονεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ φρονεῖν νενομικότων. τὸ γὰρ λογίζεσθαι τί ἄλλο ἂν εἴη, ἢ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι εὑρεῖν φρόνησιν καὶ λόγον ἀληθῆ καὶ τυγχάνοντα τοῦ ὄντος; ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ λογιζόμενος κιθαρίζοντι εἰς κιθάρισιν καὶ μελετῶντι εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ὅλως τῷ μανθάνοντι εἰς γνῶσιν. ζητεῖ γὰρ μαθεῖν ὁ λογιζόμενος ὅπερ ἤδη ἔχει ὁ φρόνιμος· ὥστ’ ἐν τῷ στάντι τὸ φρονεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λογισάμενος· ὅταν γὰρ εὕρῃ ὃ δεῖ, πέπαυται λογιζόμενος· καὶ ἀνεπαύσατο ἐν τῷ φρονῆσαι γενόμενος.
But perhaps someone will say that this kind of work belongs to nature, and that if there is understanding in the All, there must also be reasonings and memories. This is how people talk who place understanding in not understanding, and who believe that seeking to understand is the same as understanding. For what else would reasoning be than the aspiration to find understanding and a true account that hits upon what is? The reasoner is like someone playing the lyre to learn lyre-playing, or practicing to acquire a skill, and in general like a learner aiming at knowledge. The reasoner seeks to learn just what the person of understanding already has; so understanding lies in what has come to rest. The reasoner himself testifies to this: when he finds what is needed, he stops reasoning, and he has come to rest by arriving at understanding.
εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τοὺς μανθάνοντας τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦ παντὸς τάξομεν, λογισμοὺς ἀποδοτέον καὶ ἀπορίας καὶ μνήμας συμβάλλοντος τὰ παρεληλυθότα τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ τοῖς μέλλουσιν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰδότα, ἐν στάσει ὅρον ἐχούσῃ νομιστέον αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν. εἶτα εἰ μὲν οἶδε τὰ μέλλοντα — τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἰδέναι λέγειν ἄτοπον· διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ ὅπως ἔσται εἰδήσει; εἰ δὲ εἰδήσει καὶ ὅπως ἔσται, τί ἔτι δεῖ τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ τὰ παρεληλυθότα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα συμβάλλειν; καὶ ἡ γνῶσις δὲ τῶν μελλόντων, εἴπερ αὐτῷ συγχωρεῖται παρεῖναι, οὐ τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη, οἵα τοῖς μάντεσι πάρεστιν, ἀλλ’ οἵα αὐτοῖς τοῖς ποιοῦσι πεπιστευκόσιν ὅτι ἔσται.
So if we rank the ruling principle of the All with learners, we must assign it reasonings, perplexities and memories, as it compares the past with the present and the future. But if we rank it with the one who knows, we must think that its understanding consists in a rest that has reached its goal. Then, if it knows the future—and it is absurd to say it does not—why will it not also know how it will be? And if it knows how it will be, what further need is there to reason, and to compare the past with the present? And its knowledge of the future, if we grant that it has it, would not be the kind that seers have, but the kind that makers themselves have, who are confident that a thing will be.
τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν [τῷ] τοῖς πάντα κυρίοις, οἷς οὐδὲν ἀμφίβολον οὐδὲ ἀμφιγνοούμενον. οἷς ἄρα ἄραρεν ἡ δόξα, τούτοις παραμένει. ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα καὶ περὶ μελλόντων φρόνησις, οἵα καὶ ἡ περὶ παρόντων, κατὰ τὸ ἑστάναι· τοῦτο δὲ λογισμοῦ ἔξω. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ οἶδε τὰ μέλλοντα, ἃ αὐτὸς ποιήσει, οὐδὲ εἰδήσει ποιήσει οὐδὲ πρός τι βλέπων ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπελθὸν ποιήσει· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ εἰκῆ. μένει ἄρα καθ’ ὃ ποιήσει. ἀλλ’ εἰ μένει καθ’ ὃ ποιήσει, οὐκ ἄλλως ποιήσει, ἢ ὡς οἷον τὸ ἐν αὑτῷ παράδειγμα ἔχει. μοναχῶς ἄρα ποιήσει καὶ ὡσαύτως· οὐ γὰρ νῦν μὲν ἄλλως, ὕστερον δὲ ἄλλως, ἢ τί κωλύει ἀποτυχεῖν;
This is the same as the knowledge of those who are masters of everything, for whom nothing is doubtful or disputed; and those whose opinion is firmly fixed keep it. The understanding about the future, then, is the same as that about the present, in being stable; and this lies outside reasoning. But if it does not know the future things it will make, it will not make them knowingly, nor looking to anything, but will make whatever comes along; and that is the same as at random. So it remains fixed in that according to which it will make. But if it remains fixed in that according to which it will make, it will make in no other way than as the model it has within itself is. So it will make in one single way, and the same way: not now one way and later another—or else what is to prevent it from failing?
εἰ δὲ τὸ ποιούμενον διαφόρως ἕξει, ἀλλ’ ἔσχε γε διαφόρως οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δουλεῦον λόγοις· οὗτοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· ὥστε ἠκολούθησε τοῖς ἐφεξῆς λόγοις. ὥστε οὐδαμῇ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀναγκάζεσθαι πλανᾶσθαι οὐδ’ ἀπορεῖν οὐδ’ ἔχειν πράγματα, ὥσπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν δύσκολον εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πράγματα ἦν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἔργοις ἀλλοτρίοις· τοῦτο δὲ ὧν μὴ κρατεῖ. ὧν δέ τις κρατεῖ καὶ μόνος, τίνος ἂν οὗτος δέοιτο ἢ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ βουλήσεως; τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν [τῷ] τῆς αὑτοῦ φρονήσεως· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ ἡ βούλησις φρόνησις. οὐδενὸς ἄρα δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ οὐδ’ ἡ φρόνησις ἀλλοτρία, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς οὐδενὶ ἐπακτῷ χρώμενος. οὐδὲ λογισμῷ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μνήμῃ· ἐπακτὰ γὰρ ταῦτα.
If what is made turns out differently, it has indeed turned out differently not of itself, but as a servant of rational principles; and these come from the maker; so it has followed the rational principles in their sequence. So the maker is in no way forced to wander, or be at a loss, or have trouble, as some have thought that governing the universe is a burdensome business. For having trouble, it seems, meant taking on tasks that are not one’s own—that is, tasks one does not master. But where one is master, and the only master, what would one need except oneself and one’s own will? And this is the same as one’s own understanding; for in such a being, will is understanding. Such a being, then, needs nothing in order to make, since its understanding is not borrowed either; it uses nothing brought in from outside. So it needs neither reasoning nor memory, for these are brought in from outside.
Nature, the last image
Nature is the last reflection of understanding; it makes without knowing or imagining.
ἀλλὰ τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις; ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον· ἴνδαλμα γὰρ φρονήσεως ἡ φύσις καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὂν ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λόγον ἔχει, οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ διικνοῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος, ἐναργοῦς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἴχνους δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω. ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ· ὃ γὰρ ἔχει τῷ ἐφεξῆς διδοῦσα ἀπροαιρέτως τὴν δόσιν (τῷ σωματικῷ καὶ ὑλικῷ) ποίησιν ἔχει, οἷον καὶ τὸ θερμανθὲν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἁψαμένῳ δέδωκε τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος θερμὸν ἐλλαττόνως ποιῆσαν. διὰ τοῦτό τοι ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει· ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων· φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως.
But how will such understanding differ from what is called nature? Or rather: understanding is first, nature last. Nature is a reflection of understanding, and, being the last part of soul, it has the last glimmer of the rational principle shining in it—as if in thick wax an imprint went right through to the surface on the far side, distinct on the upper side and a weak trace on the lower. That is why nature does not know, but only makes. It gives what it has to what comes next, involuntarily, and its giving (to the bodily and material) is a making—as something that has been heated gives its own form, heat, to what touches it next, making it hot to a lesser degree. That is why nature does not even have imagination. Thinking is superior to imagination; and imagination is between the imprint of nature and thinking.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ φαντασία σύνεσιν ἐπακτοῦ· δίδωσι γὰρ τῷ φαντασθέντι εἰδέναι ἃ ἔπαθεν· ἡ δὲ γεννᾷ αὐτὴ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος. νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἔχει, ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἐκομίσατο εἰς ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ σύνεσις νοούσης· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐμφαντασθὲν εἰς ὕλην φύσις, ἐν ᾗ ἵσταται τὰ ὄντα, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου, καὶ ἔστιν ἔσχατα ταῦτα τοῦ νοητοῦ· ἤδη γὰρ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μιμήματα. ἀλλ’ ἡ φύσις εἰς αὐτὴν ποιοῦσα καὶ πάσχουσα, ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ πλησίον αὐτῆς ποιοῦσα οὐ πάσχει, ἡ δ’ ἔτι ἄνωθεν εἰς σώματα ἢ εἰς ὕλην οὐ ποιεῖ.
For nature has no apprehension or comprehension of anything, while imagination has comprehension of what comes from outside, since it lets the one who has the image know what he has experienced. But thinking generates of itself, and is active from the very source of its activity. Intellect, then, possesses; the Soul of the All received, and does so forever, and this is its life, and what appears in it at each moment is the comprehension of a soul that thinks. What is imaged from it into matter is nature, in which—or even before it—the real beings come to a stop; and these are the last of the intelligible, for what comes from here on are imitations. But nature acts on matter and is acted upon, while the soul that is before it and near it acts and is not acted upon, and the one still higher does not act on bodies or on matter.
τὰ δὲ σώματα ὑπὸ φύσεως λεγόμενα γίγνεσθαι τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὰ δὲ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἆρα οὕτως, ὥστε τὴν φύσιν οἷον παρακειμένην ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχειν; οἷον ἐπὶ φωτὸς ἀπελθόντος οὐδὲν ὁ ἀὴρ αὐτοῦ ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οἷον χωρὶς τὸ φῶς, χωρὶς δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ οἷον οὐ κιρνάμενος· ἢ οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ θερμανθέντος, οὗ ἀπελθόντος μένει τις θερμότης ἑτέρα οὖσα παρὰ τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ πυρί, πάθος τι τοῦ θερμανθέντος. τὴν μὲν γὰρ μορφήν, ἣν δίδωσι τῷ πλασθέντι, ἕτερον εἶδος θετέον παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν. εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅ ἐστιν οἷον μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, ζητητέον. καὶ ἥτις μὲν διαφορὰ φύσεως καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρονήσεως, εἴρηται.
As for the bodies said to come to be by nature: the elements are just that. But are animals and plants such that they have nature as it were lying beside them? Is it as with light: when it has gone, the air has nothing of it, but the light is apart, as it were, and the air apart, as though not mixed with it? Or is it as with fire and what has been heated, where, when the fire has gone, some heat remains that is different from the heat in the fire, an affection of what was heated? For the shape that nature gives to what it has molded we must take to be a form different from nature itself. But whether the body has something else besides this, something between this and nature itself, must be investigated. What difference there is between nature and the understanding in the All that we spoke of has been stated.
ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄπορον πρὸς τὰ νῦν ἅπαντα εἰρημένα· εἰ γὰρ αἰὼν μὲν περὶ νοῦν, χρόνος δὲ περὶ ψυχήν — ἔχειν γάρ φαμεν τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὸν χρόνον περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης· πῶς οὐ μεριζομένου τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἔχοντος μερίζοιτο ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἐπιστρέφουσα ποιήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ τὴν μνήμην; καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν μὲν τῷ αἰῶνι τὴν ταυτότητα, ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν ἑτερότητα [δεῖ] τίθεσθαι, ἢ ταὐτὸν αἰὼν ἔσται καὶ χρόνος, εἰ καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείαις τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐ δώσομεν.
But here is a difficulty with regard to everything just said. If eternity is bound up with Intellect and time with soul—for we say that time has its existence in relation to the activity of soul and from it—then since time is divided and has a past, how would the activity not be divided too, and, turning back to the past, create memory even in the Soul of the All? For again, we [must] place sameness in eternity and otherness in time; otherwise eternity and time will be the same, if we do not allow change even to the activities of soul.
ἆρ’ οὖν τὰς μὲν ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς μεταβολὴν δεχομένας τήν τε ἄλλην καὶ τὴν ἔνδειαν οἷα ἐν χρόνῳ φήσομεν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅλου γεννᾶν μὲν χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι; ἀλλ’ ἔστω μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ· τί [δ’] ἐστίν, ὃ ποιεῖ γεννᾶν αὐτὴν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰῶνα; ἢ ὅτι, ἃ γεννᾷ, οὐκ ἀίδια, ἀλλὰ περιεχόμενα χρόνῳ· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάθη αὐτῶν ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ποιήματα. ἀίδιοι γὰρ αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὕστερος, καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἔλαττον χρόνου· περιέχειν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ, φησί, τὸ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ.
Shall we say, then, that our souls, which admit change, including deficiency, are in time, while the Soul of the whole generates time but is not in time? Well, let it be not in time. [But] what is it that makes it generate time and not eternity? Or rather: it is because the things it generates are not eternal but contained by time. For souls are not in time either; certain of their affections are, and their products. Souls are eternal, and time is later, and what is in time is less than time; for time must contain what is in time, just as, he says, with what is in place and in number.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ τόδε μετὰ τόδε, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῶν ποιουμένων, καὶ εἰ ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ, νεύει καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρεληλυθός. ἢ ἐν τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ πρότερον καὶ παρεληλυθός, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ οὐδὲν παρεληλυθός, ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ λόγοι ἅμα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ οὐχ ἅμα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καίτοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ ὁμοῦ, οἷον χεῖρες καὶ πόδες οἱ ἐν λόγῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς χωρίς. καίτοι κἀκεῖ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ χωρίς· ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἄλλον τρόπον. ἢ τὸ μὲν χωρὶς εἴποι ἄν τις ἑτερότητι· τὸ δὲ πρότερον πῶς, εἰ μὴ ἐπιστατοῖ τὸ τάττον; ἐπιστατοῦν δὲ ἐρεῖ τὸ τόδε μετὰ τόδε· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἅμα πάντα ἔσται;
But if in it there is this after that, and the prior and posterior of the things it makes, and if it makes in time, then it also inclines toward the future; and if so, toward the past too. Or rather, the prior and the past are in the things it makes, while in it nothing is past; all the rational principles are together, as has been said. In the things made, things are not simultaneous, since they are not together either; whereas in the rational principles they are together—hands and feet, for instance, as they are in the rational principle; in sensible things they are apart. And yet there too there is apartness, in another way; so there is priority too, in another way. Or rather, one might say the apartness is by otherness; but how is there priority, unless what orders presides over them? And presiding, it will say “this after that.” For why will all things not be together?
ἢ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τὸ τάττον καὶ ἡ τάξις, οὕτως ὡς οἷον λέγειν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστατοῦν ἡ πρώτη τάξις, οὐκέτι λέγει, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ μόνον τόδε μετὰ τόδε. εἰ γὰρ λέγει, εἰς τάξιν βλέπον λέγει· ὥστε ἕτερον τῆς τάξεως ἔσται. πῶς οὖν ταὐτόν; ὅτι μὴ ὕλη καὶ εἶδος τὸ τάττον, ἀλλ’ εἶδος μόνον καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια δευτέρα μετὰ νοῦν ἐστι ψυχή· τὸ δὲ τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐ δυναμένοις ἅμα πάντα. σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον αὐξηθείς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα· εἰ τἀγαθόν τις κατὰ κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε, κινούμενον δὲ τῇ ἐφέσει.
Or rather: if what orders and the order were different, it would be, as it were, speaking. But if what presides is the primary order, it no longer speaks, but only makes this after that. For if it speaks, it speaks looking to an order, and so it will be other than the order. How, then, is it the same? Because what orders is not matter and form: Soul is form alone, and power, and activity second after Intellect. The “this after that” is in the things, which cannot be all at once. For such a soul too is something venerable, like a circle fitted to its center, expanding immediately after the center, an extension without extension. For this is how each stands: if one ranked the Good as center, one would rank Intellect as an unmoving circle, and Soul as a circle that moves—moved by aspiration.
νοῦς γὰρ εὐθὺς καὶ ἔχει καὶ περιείληφεν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος ἐφίεται. ἡ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖρα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκείνως ἐφιεμένην ἔχουσα ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι κινεῖται. πέφυκε δὲ ᾗ σῶμα τοῦ οὗ ἐστιν ἔξω ἐφίεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ περιπτύξασθαι καὶ περιελθεῖν πάντη ἑαυτῷ. καὶ κύκλῳ ἄρα.
For Intellect has and embraces at once, while Soul aspires to what is beyond. And the sphere of the All, having a soul that aspires in that way, moves in the way it is its nature to aspire. And it is its nature, as a body, to aspire to what it is outside of; and that means embracing it and going around it in every direction with itself. So, in a circle.
ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτως αἱ νοήσεις αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οἱ λόγοι, ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθα ἐν χρόνοις τὸ ὕστερον καὶ αἱ ζητήσεις ὡδί; ἆρ’ ὅτι πολλὰ ἃ ἄρχει καὶ κινεῖται, καὶ οὐχ ἓν κρατεῖ; ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὡρισμένον ἐν αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλο ἔξω· ὅθεν ἄλλο τὸ βούλευμα καὶ πρὸς καιρόν, ὅτε ἡ χρεία πάρεστι. καὶ συμβέβηκεν ἔξωθεν τουτί, εἶτα τουτί. καὶ γὰρ τῷ πολλὰ ἄρχειν ἀνάγκη πολλὰς καὶ τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι καὶ ἐπικτήτους καὶ καινὰς ἄλλου ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐμποδίους τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου κινήμασι καὶ ἐνεργήμασιν.
But how is it that in us the soul’s acts of thinking and its rational principles are not like this, but here the “later” is in time, and investigations go in this way? Is it because many things rule and are moved, and no one thing prevails? Or also because one thing after another comes in response to need and the present situation, not determined in itself but always in relation to something else outside? Hence the decision differs, and is suited to the moment, when the need is present. And this happens from outside, then that. And because many things rule, there must also be many imaginings, acquired and new, one from one thing and another from another, getting in the way of each one’s own movements and activities.
ὅταν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κινηθῇ, ἦλθεν ἡ φαντασία τούτου οἷον αἴσθησις ἀπαγγελτικὴ καὶ μηνυτικὴ τοῦ πάθους ἀπαιτοῦσα συνέπεσθαι καὶ ἐκπορίζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμούμενον· τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν ἀπόρῳ συνεπόμενον καὶ πορίζον ἢ καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον γίνεται. καὶ ὁ θυμὸς δὲ εἰς ἄμυναν παρακαλῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖ κινηθεὶς καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος χρεῖαι, καὶ τὰ πάθη ἄλλα ποιεῖ ἄλλα δοξάζειν· καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι εἴπῃ πάντη ἀγομένη, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος τούτων ἄλλα.
For when the desiring part is moved, the imagining of the object comes, like a perception that announces and reports the affection, demanding that we follow along and get what is desired; and what receives it is necessarily left perplexed, whether it follows along and provides or resists. Anger too, when stirred, calls us to retaliation and does the same; so do the body’s needs; and the affections make us hold one opinion and then another. So does ignorance of what is good, and the soul’s having nothing definite to say as it is pulled in every direction; and from the mixture of these come still other opinions.
ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον αὐτὸ ἄλλα δοξάζει; ἢ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἡ ἀπορία καὶ ἡ ἀλλοδοξία· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ βελτίστου ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δοθεὶς τῷ εἶναι ἐν τῷ μίγματι, οὐ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀσθενής, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ ἐκκλησίας ὁ ἄριστος τῶν συμβούλων εἰπὼν οὐ κρατεῖ, ἀλλ’ οἱ χείρονες τῶν θορυβούντων καὶ βοώντων, ὁ δὲ κάθηται ἡσυχῇ οὐδὲν δυνηθείς, ἡττηθεὶς δὲ τῷ θορύβῳ τῶν χειρόνων.
But does even the best part itself hold changing opinions? Or rather, the perplexity and the changing of opinions belong to the common part. From the best part comes right reason, given to the common part, and weak because it is in the mixture, not by its own nature. It is as in an assembly in great uproar: the best of the counselors speaks but does not prevail; the worse prevail, making an uproar and shouting, while he sits quietly, powerless, defeated by the uproar of the worse.
καὶ ἔστιν ἐν μὲν τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ ἀνδρὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐκ πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ πολιτείαν τινὰ φαύλην· ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ, ἐν ᾗ πόλει κἂν χρηστόν τι κρατήσειε δημοτικῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἀκράτου οὔσης· ἐν δὲ τῷ βελτίονι ἀριστοκρατικὸν τὸ τῆς ζωῆς φεύγοντος ἤδη τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν [αὑτὸν] διδόντος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀρίστῳ, τῷ χωρίζοντι, ἓν τὸ ἄρχον, καὶ παρὰ τούτου εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ἡ τάξις· οἷον διττῆς πόλεως οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ἄνω, τῆς δὲ τῶν κάτω, κατὰ τὰ ἄνω κοσμουμένης. ἀλλ’ ὅτι γε ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁμοίως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλως, καὶ δι’ ἅ, εἴρηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ.
In the worst man the common part is in charge, and the man is made up of everything, like a bad constitution. In the middling man it is like a city where something good might prevail, a democratic constitution that is not unmixed. In the better man, life is aristocratic, since he is already fleeing the common part of the human being and giving [himself] to the better. In the best, the one who separates himself, one thing rules, and order comes from it to the rest—as if there were a double city, one above, and one of those below, ordered according to what is above. But that in the Soul of the All there is what is one and the same and uniform, while in the others it is otherwise, and why, has been said. So much for that.
Pain, pleasure and desire
Affections belong to the body qualified by a trace of soul; soul only perceives them.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τι ἔχει τὸ σῶμα καὶ παρούσης ζῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχον ἤδη τι ἴδιον, ἢ ὃ ἔχει ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ προσομιλοῦν τῷ σώματι, [σκεπτέον]. ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις, οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἄψυχον καὶ οἷον ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ πεφωτισμένος. ἀλλ’ οἷον ὁ τεθερμασμένος, καὶ ἔστι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζῴου καὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ δὲ οἷον σκιὰν ψυχῆς ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι δὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς περὶ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμά ἐστιν· ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τούτου ἀλγηδὼν καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἡδονὴ εἰς γνῶσιν ἀπαθῆ ἔρχεται.
As to whether the body has anything of its own, and lives, with soul present, already possessing something proper to it, or whether what it has is nature, and this is what consorts with the body, [must be considered]. Or rather, the body itself, in which there are soul and nature, must not be like what is soulless, nor like air that has been lit up, but like air that has been heated. The body of an animal, and of a plant, has as it were a shadow of soul, and feeling pain and enjoying bodily pleasures belong to this kind of body; but to us its pain and this kind of pleasure come as a knowledge that is itself unaffected.
λέγω δὲ ἡμῖν τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ, ἅτε καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου, ἀλλ’ ἡμῶν ὄντος· διὸ καὶ μέλει ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ ὡς ἡμῶν ὄντος. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦτο ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς, οὔτε καθαροὶ τούτου ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐξήρτηται καὶ ἐκκρέμαται ἡμῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ κύριον, ἡμῶν δὲ ἄλλως ὁμοίως τοῦτο. διὸ καὶ ἡδομένου καὶ ἀλγοῦντος μέλει, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀσθενέστεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὅσῳ ἑαυτοὺς μὴ χωρίζομεν.
By “us” I mean the other soul, since this kind of body is not alien to us but ours; that is why we care about it, as being ours. For we are not this body, nor are we free of it. It is attached to us and hangs from us; we are what is in control, and it is ours in a different way, but ours all the same. That is why we care when it feels pleasure and pain—the more so the weaker we are, and the less we separate ourselves.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἡμῶν τὸ τιμιώτατον καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τιθέμεθα καὶ οἷον εἰσδυόμεθα εἰς αὐτό. χρὴ γὰρ τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ψυχῆς ὅλως εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ σώματος τοιοῦδε καί τινος κοινοῦ καὶ συναμφοτέρου. ὅταν γὰρ ἕν τι ᾖ, αὑτῷ οἷον αὔταρκές ἐστιν· οἷον σῶμα μόνον τί ἂν πάθοι ἄψυχον ὄν;
But we regard this as the most precious part of us, and as the human being, and we as it were sink into it. We must say that affections of this kind do not belong to soul at all, but to a body of this kind, and to something common and composite. For when something is one, it is as it were self-sufficient in itself. What could body alone suffer, being soulless?
διαιρούμενον γὰρ οὐκ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕνωσις· ψυχή τε μόνη οὐδὲ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσα ἐκφεύγει πᾶν· ὅταν δὲ δύο ἐθέλῃ ἓν εἶναι, ἐπακτῷ χρησάμενα τῷ ἓν τῷ οὐκ ἐᾶσθαι εἶναι ἓν τὴν γένεσιν εἰκότως τοῦ ἀλγεῖν ἔχει λέγω δὲ δύο οὐκ, εἰ δύο σώματα· μία γὰρ φύσις· ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἄλλη φύσις ἄλλῃ ἐθέλῃ κοινωνεῖν καὶ γένει ἄλλῳ, καί τι τὸ χεῖρον λάβῃ παρὰ τοῦ κρείττονος, καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν μὴ δυνηθῇ λαβεῖν, ἐκείνου δέ τι ἴχνος, καὶ οὕτω γένηται δύο καὶ ἓν μεταξὺ γενόμενον τοῦ τε ὃ ἦν καὶ τοῦ ὃ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἔχειν, ἀπορίαν ἐγέννησεν αὑτῷ ἐπίκηρον κοινωνίαν καὶ οὐ βεβαίαν εἰληχός, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἀεὶ φερομένην.
For when it is divided, it is not the body that is affected but the unity in it. And soul alone is not affected even by this; being in this state, it escapes everything. But when two want to be one, using a oneness brought in from outside, then in not being allowed to be one they reasonably have the origin of pain. I don’t mean two in the sense of two bodies, since these have one nature. I mean when one nature wants to associate with another, of a different kind, and the worse receives something from the better but cannot receive that itself, only a trace of it. And so it becomes two and one, having come to be between what it was and what it could not have, and it has bred trouble for itself, since the association it has been allotted is perishable and not secure, but is always borne in opposite directions.
κάτω τε οὖν καὶ ἄνω αἰωρούμενον φερόμενον μὲν κάτω ἀπήγγειλε τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀλγηδόνα, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἄνω τὴν [αὑτοῦ ἡδονὴν διὰ τὴν] ἔφεσιν τῆς κοινωνίας.
So, swinging between down and up, when it is borne downward it announces its pain, and when it is borne upward, [its pleasure, on account of] its aspiration to association.
τοῦτο δὴ. τὸ λεγόμενον ἡδονήν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, εἶναι μὲν ἀλγηδόνα γνῶσιν ἀπαγωγῆς σώματος ἰνδάλματος ψυχῆς στερισκομένου, ἡδονὴν δὲ γνῶσιν ζῴου ἰνδάλματος ψυχῆς ἐν σώματι ἐναρμοζομένου πάλιν αὖ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν τὸ πάθος, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γειτονίᾳ αἰσθομένης καὶ ἀπαγγειλάσης τῷ εἰς ὃ λήγουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. καὶ ἠλγύνθη μὲν ἐκεῖνο· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἠλγύνθη τὸ πέπονθεν ἐκεῖνο· οἷον ἐν τῇ τομῇ τεμνομένου τοῦ σώματος ἡ μὲν διαίρεσις κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον, ἡ δὲ ἀγανάκτησις κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον τῷ μὴ μόνον ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιόνδε ὄγκον εἶναι· ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ φλεγμονή· ᾔσθετο δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ παραλαβοῦσα τῷ ἐφεξῆς οἷον κεῖσθαι. πᾶσα δὲ ᾔσθετο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάθος οὐκ αὐτὴ παθοῦσα.
This, then, is what is meant by pleasure and pain. Pain is the awareness of a body being drawn away as it is deprived of the image of soul; pleasure is the awareness of the living being as the image of soul is fitted back into the body again. So the affection is there, in the body, while the awareness belongs to the perceptive soul, which perceives it in the neighborhood and reports it to that in which the perceptions end. And it is the body that was pained. By “was pained” I mean that it was affected. In a cut, for example, when the body is cut, the division is in the mass, but the distress is in the mass because it is not just a mass but a mass of a particular kind. The inflammation is there too. The soul perceived it, taking it over because it lies, as it were, next to it. The whole soul perceived the affection there without being affected itself.
αἰσθανομένη γὰρ πᾶσα ἐκεῖ λέγει τὸ πάθος εἶναι, οὗ ἡ πληγὴ καὶ ἡ ὀδύνη. εἰ δὲ ἦν αὐτὴ παθοῦσα ἐν παντὶ ὅλη τῷ σώματι οὖσα, οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐμήνυσεν ὅτι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἔπαθεν ἂν τὴν ὀδύνην πᾶσα καὶ ὠδυνήθη ὅλη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ ὅπου ἐστὶν εἶπεν ἂν ἐκεῖ· ἔστι δὲ πανταχοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὁ δάκτυλος ἀλγεῖ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλγεῖ, ὅτι ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. τὸν δὲ δάκτυλον ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται ἀλγεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ γλαυκὸς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ γλαυκόν. ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν τὸ πεπονθὸς ἀλγεῖ, εἰ μή τις τὸ ἀλγεῖν μετὰ τῆς ἐφεξῆς αἰσθήσεως περιλαμβάνοι· περιλαμβάνων δὲ δηλονότι τοῦτο σημαίνει, ὡς ὀδύνη μετὰ τοῦ μὴ λαθεῖν τὴν ὀδύνην τὴν αἴσθησιν.
Since it perceives as a whole, it says the affection is there, where the blow and the pain are. If it had been affected itself, being whole in the entire body, it would not have said or indicated that the pain is there. The whole of it would have suffered the pain and the whole would have been in pain. It would not have said or shown that it is there; it would have said “there” of wherever it is, and it is everywhere. As it is, the finger is in pain, and the man is in pain because the finger is the man’s. The man is said to be in pain in his finger, just as a man is called gray-eyed because of the gray in his eye. So what is in pain is what was affected, unless one includes in “being in pain” the perception that follows on it. And if one does include it, one plainly means this: pain together with the perception’s not failing to notice the pain.
ἀλλ’ οὖν τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν οὐκ ὀδύνην λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ γνῶσιν ὀδύνης· γνῶσιν δὲ οὖσαν ἀπαθῆ εἶναι, ἵνα γνῷ καὶ ὑγιῶς ἀπαγγείλῃ. πεπονθὼς γὰρ ἄγγελος σχολάζων τῷ πάθει ἢ οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλει, ἢ οὐχ ὑγιὴς ἄγγελος.
Still, we must not call the perception itself pain. It is awareness of pain, and being awareness, it must be unaffected, so that it can know and report soundly. A messenger who has been affected and is taken up with his affection either fails to deliver the message or is not a sound messenger.
καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως κοινοῦ καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης σωματικῆς φύσεως ἀκόλουθον τίθεσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι σώματι δοτέον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως καὶ προθυμίας, οὔτε τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ ἁλμυρῶν ἢ γλυκέων ζήτησιν, ἀλλὰ ὃ σῶμα μέν ἐστιν, ἐθέλει δὲ μὴ μόνον σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινήσεις ἐκτήσατο πλέον ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπίκτησιν ἠνάγκασται τρέπεσθαι· διὸ οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἔχον ἁλμυρῶν, οὑτωσὶ δὲ γλυκέων, καὶ ὑγραίνεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μελῆσαν, εἰ μόνον ἦν.
We should also posit that the origin of the bodily desires follows from this kind of common thing, this kind of bodily nature. We must not ascribe the origin of appetite and eagerness to body in any condition whatever. Nor must we ascribe the seeking of salty or sweet things to the soul itself. It belongs to what is body but wants to be not only body, and has acquired more movements even than the soul has, and because of this acquisition is compelled to turn toward many things. So in one condition it wants salty things, in another sweet things, and it wants to be moistened and warmed. None of this would have mattered to it if it were alone.
ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἐκ τῆς ὀδύνης ἐγίνετο ἡ γνῶσις, καὶ ἀπάγειν ἐκ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ πάθος ἡ ψυχὴ βουλομένη ἐποίει τὴν φυγήν, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου παθόντος διδάσκοντος τοῦτο φεύγοντός πως καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ συστολῇ, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις μαθοῦσα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐγγύς, ἣν δὴ φύσιν φαμὲν τὴν δοῦσαν τὸ ἴχνος, ἡ μὲν φύσις τὴν τρανὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τέλος οὖσαν τῆς ἀρξαμένης ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀφ’ ἧς ἤδη ἢ πορίζει ἡ ψυχή, ἧς τὸ πορίζειν, ἢ ἀντιτείνει καὶ καρτερεῖ καὶ οὐ προσέχει οὔτε τῷ ἄρξαντι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, οὔτε τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιτεθυμηκότι.
In the case of pain, the awareness came out of the pain, and the soul, wanting to draw the body away from what was producing the affection, brought about flight. The part first affected taught it this, and in a way fled too, by contracting. So it is here as well. Perception learns, and so does the soul that is near the body, which we call nature, the one that gave the trace. Nature learns the explicit desire, which is the completion of the desire that began in the body; perception learns the imagination of it. And from this the soul whose part it is to provide either provides, or resists, holds out, and pays no attention either to what started the desire or to what desired afterward.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δύο ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν μόνον τὸ σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε; ἢ εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον ἡ φύσις, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε παρὰ τῆς φύσεως γενόμενον — ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸ τοῦ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα γενέσθαι, αὕτη γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα πλάττουσα καὶ μορφοῦσα· ἀνάγκη μήτε ἄρχειν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα τὸ πεπονθὸς ταδὶ καὶ ἀλγυνόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει ἐφιέμενον, ἡδονῆς ἐκ τοῦ πονεῖν καὶ πληρώσεως ἐκ τῆς ἐνδείας· τὴν δὲ φύσιν ὡς μητέρα, ὥσπερ στοχαζομένην τῶν τοῦ πεπονθότος βουλημάτων, διορθοῦν τε πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐπανάγειν εἰς αὑτὴν καὶ ζήτησιν τοῦ ἀκεσομένου ποιουμένην συνάψασθαι τῇ ζητήσει τῇ τοῦ πεπονθότος ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τὴν περάτωσιν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκειν· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξ αὑτοῦ εἴποι ἄν τις προεπιθυμίαν καὶ ἴσως προθυμίαν, τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου καὶ δι’ ἄλλο ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὴν δὲ ποριζομένην ἢ μὴ ἄλλην εἶναι.
But why two desires? Why is the body of this kind not the only thing that desires? Or rather: if nature is one thing, and the body of this kind, which comes from nature, is another—for nature exists before the body of this kind comes to be, since it makes that body, molding and shaping it—then nature cannot be what begins the desire. It is the body of this kind, affected in these ways and in pain, that longs for the opposite of what it suffers: pleasure after distress, filling after lack. Nature, like a mother, as if guessing at the wishes of the one affected, tries to set it right and bring it back to herself. In seeking what will heal it, she attaches herself, through that seeking, to the desire of the affected body, and the completion passes from the body to her. So one might call the desiring that comes from the body itself a pre-desire, and perhaps an eagerness. Nature desires from another and on account of another. And the soul that provides, or does not, is something else again.
ὅτι δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι, περὶ ὃ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι μαρτυροῦσιν αἱ διάφοροι. ἄλλαι γὰρ παίδων καὶ μειρακίων καὶ ἀνδρῶν αἱ σωματικαὶ ὑγιαινόντων τε καὶ νοσούντων τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ σωματικὸν καὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε εἶναι τρεπόμενον παντοίας τροπὰς παντοδαπὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἴσχει. καὶ τὸ μὴ συνεγείρεσθαι δὲ πανταχοῦ ταῖς λεγομέναις προθυμίαις τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν εἰς τέλος τῆς σωματικῆς μενούσης καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὸν λογισμὸν εἶναι μὴ βούλεσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν ἐπί τι προελθοῦσαν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν λέγει, ὅσον ἦν ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι, τὴν δὲ φύσιν μὴ συνάψασθαι αὑτὴν μηδὲ προσθέσθαι μηδὲ βούλεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης ἄγειν εἰς φύσιν, ὡς ἂν αὐτὴν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστατοῦσαν.
That it is this body around which the origin of desire lies is attested also by the different ages of life. The bodily desires of children, young men and grown men are different, and so are those of the healthy and the sick, while the desiring part stays the same. Clearly it is because it is bodily, a body of this kind undergoing every sort of change, that it has every sort of desire. Consider, too, that the full desire is not always aroused together with the so-called eagernesses, though the bodily one persists to the end; and that, even before reasoning comes in, one does not want to eat or drink, though the desire has gone some way. This tells us that the desire went as far as it was in the body of this kind, but nature did not attach herself to it, or give her assent, or want it—as though the desire were not in a natural condition for her to bring back to nature, since she is the one who presides over what is contrary to nature and what accords with it.
εἰ δέ τις πρὸς τὸ πρότερον λέγοι ἀρκεῖν τὸ σῶμα διάφορον γινόμενον καὶ διαφόρους τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ποιεῖν, οὐκ αὔταρκες λέγει πρὸς τὸ ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλως αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου διαφόρους ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν, ὁπότε οὐδ’ αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ ποριζόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἡ τροφὴ ἢ θερμότης καὶ ὑγρότης οὐδὲ κίνησις οὐδὲ κούφισις κενουμένου οὐδὲ πλήρωσις μεστουμένου, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου πάντα.
Someone might reply to the earlier point that it is enough for the body to become different and produce different desires in the desiring part. But this does not adequately explain how, when one thing is affected in a different way, the desiring part should have different desires on behalf of another, since what is provided does not even come to it. The food, the heat and moisture, the movement, the relief of emptying and the filling of what is being filled do not go to the desiring part. They all belong to the body.
Does the earth perceive?
The earth is ensouled, a god, and may perceive even without organs like ours.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν ἆρα ἄλλο μὲν τὸ οἷον ἐναπηχηθὲν τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ χορηγῆσαν, ὃ δὴ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ φυτικόν, ἢ ἐν μὲν τῇ γῇ τοῦτο ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῇ οὔσης, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου; ζητήσειε δ’ ἄν τις πρότερον, τίς ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ γῇ, πότερα ἐκ τῆς σφαίρας τοῦ παντός, ἣν καὶ μόνην δοκεῖ ψυχοῦν πρώτως Πλάτων, οἷον ἔλλαμψις εἰς τὴν γῆν, ἢ πάλιν αὖ λέγων πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν τῶν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ δίδωσι ψυχὴν οἵαν καὶ τοῖς ἄστροις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἐκείνην ἔχοι; ὥστε συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅπως ἔχει ἐξευρεῖν [εἶναι] δύσκολον, καὶ μείζω ἀπορίαν ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὁ Πλάτων γίνεσθαι.
In the case of plants, is what is, as it were, echoed in their bodies one thing, and what supplied it another—what in us is the desiring part, and in them the vegetative part? Or is this in the earth, since there is soul in the earth, and what is in plants comes from it? But one might first ask what soul is in the earth. Does it come from the sphere of the All, which is the only thing Plato seems to make ensouled primarily, as a kind of illumination into the earth? Or, when he calls the earth “first and eldest of the gods within the heaven,” does he give it too a soul like the one the stars have? For how could it be a god if it did not have that kind of soul? So it turns out both that how the matter stands is [to be] hard to discover, and that what Plato has said makes the difficulty greater, or at least no smaller.
ἀλλὰ πρότερον, πῶς ἂν εὐλόγως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα δόξειε. τὴν μὲν οὖν φυτικὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ἔχει ἡ γῆ, ἐκ τῶν φυομένων ἐξ αὐτῆς ἄν τις τεκμαίροιτο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ζῷα πολλὰ ἐκ γῆς γινόμενα ὁρᾶται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ζῷον ἄν τις εἴποι αὐτὴν εἶναι; ζῷον δὲ τοσοῦτον οὖσαν καὶ οὐ σμικρὰν μοῖραν τοῦ παντὸς διὰ τί οὐ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φήσειε καὶ οὕτω θεὸν εἶναι; εἴπερ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἕκαστον, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν ζῷον μέρος τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου οὖσαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξωθεν μὲν συνέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀλλοτρίας φατέον, ἔνδον δὲ μὴ ἔχειν ὡς οὐ δυναμένης καὶ αὐτῆς ἔχειν οἰκείαν. διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ μὲν πύρινα δύναται, τὸ δὲ γήινον οὔ;
But first, how might the matter reasonably seem to stand? That the earth has a vegetative soul one could infer from the things that grow out of it. And if many animals are also seen to come from the earth, why should one not say it is a living being too? And if it is a living being of such size, no small portion of the All, why should one not say that it also has intellect and so is a god? If each of the stars is one, why not the earth, which is a living part of the living All? Surely we must not say that it is held together from outside by an alien soul and has none inside, as if it could not have one of its own. Why should the fiery bodies be able to have one, and the earthy body not?
σῶμα γὰρ ἑκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἶνες ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σάρκες οὐδ’ αἷμα οὐδὲ ὑγρόν· καίτοι ἡ γῆ ποικιλώτερον καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῶν σωμάτων.
Both are bodies, and in the stars there are no sinews, no flesh, no blood, no liquid. Yet the earth is more varied and made of all the bodies.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι δυσκίνητον, τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἐκ τόπου λέγοι τις ἄν. ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πῶς; πῶς γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ σαρκῶν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐδ’ ὅλως σῶμα δοτέον τῇ ψυχῇ, ἵνα αἰσθάνοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ σώματι δοτέον ψυχήν, ἵνα ᾖ καὶ σώζηται τὸ σῶμα· κριτικῇ δὲ οὔσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει βλεπούσῃ εἰς σῶμα ἐκ τῶν τούτου παθημάτων τὴν κρίσιν ποιεῖσθαι. τίνα οὖν παθήματα γῆς, καὶ τίνων αἱ κρίσεις; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καθ’ ὅσον γῆς οὐκ αἰσθάνεται· τίνων οὖν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ διὰ τίνων; ἢ οὐ τολμητέον καὶ ἄνευ ὀργάνων γίνεσθαι αἰσθήσεις. καὶ εἰς τίνα δὲ χρείαν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτῇ;
If the objection is that it is hard to move, one could say that applies only to not moving from its place. But how does it perceive? Well, how do the stars? Perceiving does not belong to flesh either. In general, we must not give the soul a body in order that it may perceive; we must give the body a soul, in order that the body may exist and be preserved. But since the soul is able to judge, it can look toward the body and make its judgments on the basis of the body’s affections. What, then, are the earth’s affections, and what are its judgments of? Plants, after all, insofar as they belong to earth, do not perceive. Of what, then, are the perceptions, and through what? Or should we not dare to say that perceptions occur even without organs? And what use would perceiving be to the earth?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἴσως γνῶσις, οἷς μὴ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεταί τις χρεία. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν τις συγχωρήσειεν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὴν χρείαν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἴδησίς τις οὐκ ἄμουσος, οἷον ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς· αἱ γὰρ τούτων αἰσθήσεις καὶ παρ’ αὑτῶν ἡδεῖαι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ πάλιν, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις τῇ γῇ, καὶ ζῴων τίνων αἱ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ πῶς. ἢ ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον ἀναλαβεῖν τὰ ἀπορηθέντα καὶ καθόλου λαβεῖν, εἰ ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ πρὸς χρείαν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, κἂν εἰ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν χρείαν γίγνοιτο.
Surely it is not for the sake of knowing. For beings that get no use from perceiving, the knowledge that comes from understanding is perhaps enough. Or rather, one would not grant this. Apart from use, there is in the objects of sense a kind of knowing that has its own grace—of the sun, for instance, and the other heavenly bodies, and of heaven and earth—for the perceptions of these are pleasant in themselves. But this must be considered later. For now, back to the question: whether the earth has perceptions, what kind of living being’s perceptions they are, and how. Or rather, we must first take up again the difficulties we raised and settle in general whether one can perceive without organs, and whether perceptions are for use, even if something else besides use comes of them.
δεῖ δὴ θέσθαι ὡς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀντίληψις τὴν προσοῦσαν τοῖς σώμασι ποιότητα συνιείσης καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν ἀποματτομένης. ἢ τοίνυν μόνη ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἀντιλήψεται, ἢ μετ’ ἄλλου. μόνη μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς πῶς; ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς γὰρ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ μόνον νόησις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, δεῖ πρότερον καὶ ταῦτα ἐσχηκέναι ἤτοι ὁμοιωθεῖσαν ἢ τῷ ὁμοιωθέντι συνοῦσαν. ὁμοιωθῆναι μὲν οὖν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς μένουσαν οὐχ οἷόν τε. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁμοιωθείη σημεῖον γραμμῇ; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἡ νοητὴ τῇ αἰσθητῇ ἂν γραμμῇ ἐφαρμόσειεν, οὐδὲ τὸ νοητὸν πῦρ ἢ ἄνθρωπος τῷ αἰσθητῷ πυρὶ ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ.
We must lay it down that perception of sensible things is, for the soul or for the living being, an apprehension in which the soul understands the quality attached to bodies and takes an impression of their forms. Then either it will apprehend alone, by itself, or together with something else. But how could it do so alone and by itself? By itself it apprehends only what is within it, and that is thinking. If it apprehends other things too, it must first have come to possess them, either by being made like them or by being joined to what has been made like them. But it cannot be made like them while remaining by itself. How could a point be made like a line? Not even the intelligible line would fit the sensible line, nor would intelligible fire or man fit sensible fire or man.
ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ γενομένῳ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνη, κἂν οἷόν τε τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐπιβάλλειν, τελευτήσει εἰς τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ σύνεσιν, ἐκφυγόντος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐχούσης, ὅτῳ αὐτοῦ λάβοιτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὁρατόν, ὅταν ψυχὴ πόρρωθεν ὁρᾷ, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα εἶδος εἰς αὐτὴν ἥκῃ ἀρχόμενον τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν οἷον ἀμερὲς ὄν, λήγει εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ ὁρώσης. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ μόνα ταῦτα εἶναι, τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὴν ψυχήν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἂν πάθοι· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ πεισόμενον τρίτον εἶναι, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ τὴν μορφὴν δεξόμενον.
Not even the nature that makes the man is identical with the man who comes to be. The soul on its own, even if it could direct itself to the sensible, would end up in an understanding of the intelligible; the sensible would escape it, since it would have nothing to grasp it with. Take what is visible, too: when the soul sees something at a distance, however fully the form comes to it—beginning, as it comes toward the soul, as something without parts, as it were—it ends, for the soul that sees, in the underlying color and shape, as large as it is out there. So there must not be only these two, the external thing and the soul; otherwise there would be no affection at all. There must be a third thing that will be affected, and this is what will receive the shape.
συμπαθὲς ἄρα καὶ ὁμοιοπαθὲς δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὕλης μιᾶς καὶ τὸ μὲν παθεῖν, τὸ δὲ γνῶναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι τὸ πάθος, οἷον σώζειν μέν τι τοῦ πεποιηκότος, μὴ μέντοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἅτε μεταξὺ τοῦ πεποιηκότος καὶ ψυχῆς ὂν τὸ πάθος ἔχειν μεταξὺ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ κείμενον μέσον ἀνὰ λόγον, συνάπτον πως τὰ ἄκρα ἀλλήλοις, δεκτικὸν ἅμα καὶ ἀπαγγελτικὸν ὑπάρχον, ἐπιτήδειον ὁμοιωθῆναι ἑκατέρῳ. ὄργανον γὰρ ὂν γνώσεώς τινος οὔτε ταὐτὸν δεῖ τῷ γινώσκοντι εἶναι οὔτε τῷ γνωσθησομένῳ, ἐπιτήδειον δὲ ἑκατέρῳ ὁμοιωθῆναι, τῷ μὲν ἔξω διὰ τοῦ παθεῖν, τῷ δὲ εἴσω διὰ τοῦ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ εἶδος γενέσθαι. εἰ δὴ τοίνυν ὑγιὲς λέγομεν, δι’ ὀργάνων δεῖ σωματικῶν τὰς αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀκόλουθον τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντη σώματος ἔξω γενομένην μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι αἰσθητοῦ.
So it must share the affection and be affected in the same way, and be of one matter with the object. One thing is affected, another knows. And the affection must be such as to preserve something of what produced it, without being identical with it. Being between what produced it and the soul, the affection must lie between sensible and intelligible as a proportional mean, in a way joining the extremes to each other, both receptive and able to report, fit to be made like each. For since it is the organ of a kind of knowledge, it must be the same neither as what knows nor as what is to be known, but fit to be made like each: like the external thing by being affected, like the internal by its affection becoming form. If what we are saying is sound, perceptions must occur through bodily organs. This also follows from the fact that the soul, once it is wholly outside body, apprehends nothing sensible.
τὸ δὲ ὄργανον δεῖ ἢ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, ἢ μέρος τι πρὸς ἔργον τι ἀφωρισμένον εἶναι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἁφῆς καὶ ὄψεως· καὶ τὰ τεχνητὰ δὲ τῶν ὀργάνων ἴδοι τις ἂν μεταξὺ τῶν κρινόντων καὶ τῶν κρινομένων γινόμενα καὶ ἀπαγγέλλοντα τῷ κρίνοντι τὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἰδιότητα. ὁ γὰρ κανὼν τῷ εὐθεῖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ συναψάμενος ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τεθεὶς τὸ κρίνειν τῷ τεχνίτῃ τὸ τεχνητὸν ἔδωκεν. εἰ δὲ συνάπτειν δεῖ τὸ κριθησόμενον τῷ ὀργάνῳ, ἢ καὶ διά τινος μεταξὺ διεστηκότος πόρρω τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον εἰ πόρρω τὸ πῦρ τῆς σαρκός, [ἢ καὶ] τοῦ μεταξὺ μηδὲν παθόντος, οἷον εἰ κενόν τι εἴη μεταξὺ ὄψεως καὶ χρώματος, δυνατὸν ὁρᾶν τοῦ ὀργάνου τῇ δυνάμει παρόντος, ἑτέρου λόγου.
The organ must be either the whole body or some part marked off for a particular task, as with touch and sight. One can see that the instruments made by art also stand between those who judge and what is judged, and report to the judge the particular character of the things before them. The ruler, placed in between and joined both to the straightness in the soul and to the straightness in the wood, gives the craftsman the power to judge his work. Does what is to be judged have to be in contact with the organ? Or can one perceive through some medium in between, at a distance from the sensible object—as when the fire is far from the flesh—[or even] with the medium affected not at all, as if there were a void between sight and color, so that it is possible to see with the organ present by its power? That belongs to another discussion.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι ψυχῆς ἐν σώματι καὶ διὰ σώματος ἡ αἴσθησις, δῆλον.
But it is clear that perception belongs to soul in body and comes about through body.
τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον. εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίγνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα καὶ ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθούσης· ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς· ἢ καὶ μεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι [φυλαξώμεθα] τὸ ποιοῦν, ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι φυλάξασθαι. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι, ἀλλ’ ἀμαθαίνοντι διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ.
Whether perception exists only for use must be examined as follows. If perception could not occur for soul alone, and perceptions occur with body, then perception would exist on account of body, since that is where perceptions come from. It would have been given because of the partnership with body. Either it follows of necessity—for whatever the body undergoes, the affection, when it is great enough, reaches as far as the soul—or it has been contrived so that, before what acts on us becomes great enough to destroy us, [we may guard against it], or even guard against it before it comes near. If so, perceptions would be for use. Even if they are for knowledge, that would be for one who is not in a state of knowledge but ignorant through misfortune, and for recollection by one who has forgotten—not for one who is neither in need nor in forgetfulness.
ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου. μέρεσι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς μέρη, οἷς καὶ τὸ παθεῖν ὑπάρχει, γένοιτο ἂν αἴσθησις κατὰ τὸν παρόντα λόγον, ὅλῳ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸ τίς ἂν εἴη ἀπαθῶς ἔχοντι πανταχῇ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτό; καὶ γὰρ εἰ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον τοῦ αἰσθανομένου εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ οὗ αἰσθάνεται ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὅλον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν δι’ οὗ, τὸ δὲ οὗ ἡ αἴσθησις· ἀλλὰ συναίσθησιν μὲν αὑτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν συναισθανόμεθα, δοτέον, αἴσθησιν δὲ ἀεὶ ἑτέρου οὖσαν οὐ δοτέον.
But if so, we should have to inquire not only about the earth but about all the stars, and above all about the whole heaven and the cosmos. On the present account, parts might have perception of parts, since they are capable of being affected. But what perception could the whole have of itself, when it is unaffected in every part of itself in relation to itself? If the organ must belong to the perceiver, and what it perceives must be something other than the organ, and the All is a whole, then it could not have one thing through which there is perception and another of which there is perception. We must grant it self-awareness, just as we are aware of ourselves; but perception, which is always of something else, we must not grant it.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἡμεῖς παρὰ τὸ καθεστὼς ἀεί τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀντιλαμβανώμεθα, ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον τῶν ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀντίληψις, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρει μέρους, τί κωλύει καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῇ ἀπλανεῖ τὴν πλανωμένην ὁρᾶν, καὶ ταύτῃ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ βλέπειν; καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀπαθῆ ταῦτα τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν, καὶ ἄλλως αἰσθήσεις ἔχειν, καὶ τὴν ὅρασιν μὴ μόνον ὡς καθ’ αὑτὴν τῆς ἀπλανοῦς εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀπαγγέλλοντος τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ ἃ εἶδε; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαθής, διὰ τί ὡς ὄμμα οὐκ ὄψεται φωτοειδὲς ἔμψυχον ὄν; ἀλλ’ ὀμμάτων, φησίν, οὐκ ἐπεδεῖτο.
Even with us, when we apprehend something in the body that departs from its constant settled state, we apprehend it as having come in from outside. But in our case there is apprehension not only of external things but also of one part by another. So what prevents the All, too, from seeing the sphere of the planets with the sphere of the fixed stars, and the earth and what is on it with the sphere of the planets? And if these are not exempt from the other affections, what prevents them from having perceptions in other ways too, and sight not merely as belonging to the sphere of the fixed stars by itself, but as an eye reporting to the Soul of the All what it saw? Even if it is unaffected by everything else, why should it not see like an eye, since it is luminous and ensouled? But, he says, it “had no need of eyes.”
ἀλλ’ εἰ ὅτι μηδὲν ἔξωθεν ὑπελέλειπτο ὁρατόν, ἀλλ’ ἔνδον γε ἦν καὶ ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν ὁρᾶν ἐκώλυσεν· εἰ δ’ ὅτι μάτην ἂν ἦν αὑτὸν ὁρᾶν, ἔστω μὴ προηγουμένως μὲν οὕτως ἕνεκα τοῦ ὁρᾶν γεγονέναι, ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ τῷ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὰ τί [δ’] οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοιούτῳ ὄντι σώματι τὸ ὁρᾶν;
But if this is because nothing visible was left outside, still there was something inside, and nothing prevented it from seeing itself. If it is because seeing itself would have been pointless, let us grant that it was not made this way primarily for the sake of seeing, but that seeing follows of necessity from its being so. Why [then] should seeing not belong to a body of this kind?
ἢ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δι’ οὗ, ἵνα ὁρᾷ καὶ ὅλως αἰσθάνηται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς νεύειν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. τῇ δὲ [τοῦ παντὸς] ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι, κἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ αὐτῇ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο τῷ πρὸς κρείττοσιν εἶναι, ὁπότε καὶ ἡμᾶς σφόδρα πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς ὄντας, ὅτε ἐσμέν, λανθάνουσι καὶ ὄψεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἄλλαι, κἂν πρὸς ἑτέρῳ δὲ ὅλως, τὰ ἕτερα λανθάνει. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέρει τινὶ μέρους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι θέλειν, οἷον ἑαυτὸν εἰ καταβλέποι, περίεργον καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἕνεκά τινος, μάτην· ἄλλου τε ὄψιν ὡς καλοῦ ὁρᾶν, πεπονθότος καὶ ἐνδεοῦς.
Or rather, for seeing, and perceiving in general, it is not enough that there be something through which one perceives. The soul must be so disposed as to incline toward sensible things. But it belongs to the soul [of the All] to be always turned toward the intelligibles. Even if it were able to perceive, this would not happen, because it is turned toward what is higher. Even we, when we are intensely turned toward the intelligibles, are unaware at such times of sights and the other perceptions; when one is wholly intent on one thing, everything else goes unnoticed. Besides, wanting to apprehend one part of oneself by another, as if one were to look down at oneself, is superfluous even in our case, and pointless unless it serves some purpose. And looking at something else as something beautiful is the mark of one who is affected and in need.
ὀσφραίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ γεύεσθαι χυμῶν περιστάσεις ἄν τις καὶ περιελκυσμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖτο, ἥλιον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν δέ. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι δι’ ἄμφω, οὐκ ἄλογος ἡ θέσις. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐπιστρέφοιτο, καὶ μνημονεύσει· ἢ ἄτοπον ὧν εὐεργετεῖ μὴ μνημονεύειν. πῶς οὖν εὐεργετεῖ, εἰ μὴ μνημονεύσει;
Smelling and tasting flavors one might count as distractions and diversions of the soul. But one might suppose that the sun and the other stars see incidentally, and hear too. And if they also turn toward us through both senses, the position is not unreasonable. But if they turn toward us, they will also remember. Or rather, it would be absurd for them not to remember those they do good to. How do they do them good, if they will not remember?
γίνονται δὲ εὐχῶν γνώσεις κατὰ οἷον σύναψιν καὶ κατὰ τοιάνδε σχέσιν ἐναρμοζομένων, καὶ αἱ ποιήσεις οὕτως· καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάγων τέχναις εἰς τὸ συναφὲς πᾶν· ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεσιν ἑπομέναις συμπαθῶς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν αἰσθάνεσθαι δώσομεν; ἀλλὰ ποίας αἰσθήσεις; ἢ διὰ τί οὐ πρῶτον ἁφὴν καὶ μέρει μέρους ἀναπεμπομένης ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ σῶμα δυσκίνητον, οὔτι γε ἀκίνητον. ἀλλ’ ἔσονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐ τῶν μικρῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί; ἢ ὅτι ἀνάγκη ψυχῆς ἐνούσης τὰς κινήσεις τὰς μεγίστας μὴ λανθάνειν.
Prayers come to be known through a kind of linking, as it were, and through a certain relation of things fitted together; and that is how their effects come about. In the arts of magicians, too, everything is directed toward this linking. These things happen through powers that follow in sympathy. If so, why shall we not grant that the earth perceives as well? But what kinds of perceptions? Why not, first of all, touch—both of part by part, with the perception passed up to the ruling part, and by the whole, of fire and the rest? Even if its body is hard to move, it is certainly not unmovable. But its perceptions will be not of small things but of great ones. Why? Or rather: because, since there is soul in it, the greatest movements cannot escape its notice.
κωλύει δ’ οὐδὲν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, ἵνα εὖ τίθοιτο τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ὅσον εἰς αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀνάκειται· εὖ τίθοιτο δὲ οἷον συμπαθῶς· καὶ ἀκούειν δὲ εὐχομένων καὶ ἐπινεύειν εὐχαῖς οὐχ ὃν ἡμεῖς τρόπον· καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι παθητὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ τἆλλα, οἷον ὀσμῶν πέρι καὶ τῶν γευστῶν, ὅσα ὀσφραντὰ κατὰ τὰς τῶν χυλῶν ὀσμὰς πρὸς ζῴων πρόνοιαν καὶ κατασκευὴν καὶ ἐπισκευὴν τοῦ σωματικοῦ αὐτοῖς. καὶ οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον ἃ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ὄργανα· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις ταὐτά· οἷον ὦτα οὐ πᾶσι, καὶ οἷς μή ἐστιν, ἀντίληψίς ἐστι ψόφων. περὶ δὲ ὄψεως, εἰ φωτὸς δεῖ, πῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀπαιτητέον ὄμματα.
Nothing prevents perception from also arising for this purpose: that the earth may arrange well what concerns human beings, insofar as human affairs depend on it—and arrange them well in a sympathetic way, so to speak. It also hears those who pray and grants their prayers, though not in the way we would. And through the other senses it is affected in relation to itself and to the rest, for instance with regard to smells and tastes—whatever is smelled through the smells of juices—for the care of animals and the building up and repair of their bodily part. We must not demand the organs we have; not all animals have the same ones. Not all have ears, for instance, and those without them still apprehend sounds. As for sight, if light is needed, how? Surely we must not demand eyes.
εἰ οὖν τοῦ φυτικοῦ συγχωρουμένου ἦν συγχωρεῖν ἐν πνεύματι ὄντος τοῦ φυτικοῦ πρώτως οὕτως ἔχειν, ὄντος πνεύματος τί χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν καὶ διαφανὲς εἶναι; μᾶλλον δ’ εἴπερ πνεῦμα, καὶ διαφανὲς καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενον παρὰ τοῦ κύκλου ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανές· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄτοπον οὐδ’ ἀδύνατον ὁρᾶν τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ψυχήν. καὶ δεῖ καὶ νοεῖν ψυχὴν οὐ φαύλου σώματος εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ θεὸν εἶναι· πάντως γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὴν δεῖ ἀεὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.
If, then, once the vegetative part is granted, we could grant that it is like this, since the vegetative part is primarily in breath, why should we doubt that, being breath, it is also transparent? Or rather, if it is breath, it is transparent, and when it is illuminated by the circuit of heaven, transparent in actuality. So there is nothing absurd or impossible in the soul in the earth seeing. And we must also realize that this soul belongs to no mean body, so that it is also a god; in any case, the soul must always be good.
εἰ οὖν τοῖς φυτοῖς δίδωσιν αὐτὴν τὴν γεννητικήν, ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν ἡ γεννητική, ταύτης δὲ ἴχνος ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ὡς ἡ σὰρξ ἔμψυχος ἤδη καὶ ἐκομίσατο, εἰ ἔχει καὶ τὴν γεννητικὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ φυτά. ἐνοῦσα δὲ δίδωσι τῷ σώματι τοῦ φυτοῦ ὅπερ βέλτιον, ᾧ διαφέρει τοῦ κοπέντος καὶ οὐκέτι φυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ξύλου. ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ γε τῷ σώματι τῆς γῆς τί δίδωσιν ἡ ψυχή; οὐ ταὐτὸν δεῖ νομίζειν σῶμα εἶναι γήινον ἀποτμηθέν τε τῆς γῆς καὶ μένον συνεχές, οἷα λίθοι δεικνύουσιν αὐξόμενοι μέν, ἕως εἰσὶ συνηρτημένοι, μένοντες δὲ ὅσον ἐτμήθησαν ἀφῃρημένοι.
If, then, the earth gives plants the generative soul itself—or rather, the generative soul is in the earth, and what is in plants is a trace of it—then the plant would be like flesh that is already ensouled and has received it, if plants also have the generative soul in them. Being present in the plant, it gives the plant’s body what is better, that by which it differs from what has been cut off and is no longer a plant but only wood. But what does the soul give to the body of the earth itself? We must not think that an earthy body cut off from the earth is the same as one that remains continuous with it. Stones show this: they grow while they are attached, but once removed they stay the size they were when they were cut.
ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν μέρος ἴχνος ἔχειν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἐπιθεῖν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν φυτικόν, ὃ οὐκέτι τοῦδε ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦδε, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὅλης· εἶτα τὴν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ φύσιν οὐκέτι τῷ σώματι συμπεφυρμένην, ἐποχουμένην δέ· εἶτα τὴν ἄλλην ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ἣν δὴ Ἑστίαν καὶ Δήμητραν ἐπονομάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι θείᾳ φήμῃ καὶ φύσει ἀπομαντευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα χρώμενοι.
We must think, then, that each part has a trace, and that over this runs the whole vegetative principle, which belongs no longer to this part or that but to the earth as a whole. Then comes the nature of the perceptive power, no longer mixed in with the body but riding upon it. Then the rest of soul, and intellect—which human beings call Hestia and Demeter, divining such things by a divine utterance and a natural gift.
Anger
Anger starts from the body’s condition, but reason can enlist it as an ally.
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. ἐπανιτέον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ζητητέον, εἰ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἡδονὰς — τὰ πάθη, οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις — ἐν τῷ οὕτως ἔχοντι σώματι ἐτίθεμεν τῷ οἷον ζῳωθέντι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἢ καὶ πάντα τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος σώματος θησόμεθα ἢ μέρους τινὸς σώματος, οἷον καρδίας οὕτως ἐχούσης ἢ χολῆς οὐ νεκροῦ σώματος· καὶ εἰ ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ διδόντος τὸ ἴχνος τὸ ψυχικὸν ἐνταῦθα ἕν τι τοῦτο ὁ θυμός, οὐκέτι παρὰ θυμικοῦ ἢ αἰσθητικοῦ.
So much for that. We must go back again and inquire about the spirited part. We placed the origin of the desires, and the pains and pleasures—the affections, not the perceptions—in the body so disposed, the body made alive, as it were. Shall we place the origin of anger there too? Or shall we place the whole of anger in the body so disposed, or in some part of the body—the heart so disposed, for example, or the bile, in a body that is not dead? And though what gives the trace of soul is something else, is anger here one particular thing, no longer coming from a spirited or perceptive part?
ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν καθ’ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυτικὸν ὂν παντὶ ἐδίδου τῷ σώματι τὸ ἴχνος, καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἦν ἐν παντί, καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐν παντὶ τοῦ πληροῦσθαι· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων οὐκ εἴρητο, ἀλλ’ ἔστω περὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν τοιούτων τελεστικά. ἔστω δὲ ὁ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ τόπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχή, ὅτι τὸ φυτικὸν ἐκεῖ ἐνεργεῖ μάλιστα, ὃ τὸ ἴχνος τὸ ψυχικὸν τῷ ἥπατι καὶ τῷ σώματι παρέχει· ἐκεῖ δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἄρχεται ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ τί τε αὐτὸς καὶ τίς ψυχή, καὶ εἰ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἴχνος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ἢ ἄλλο τι τὴν κίνησιν εἰς συναμφότερον τελοῦν παρέχεται, ἢ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἴχνος, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι παρέχεται. πρῶτον οὖν σκεπτέον, τί αὐτό.
In that case, the vegetative part, extending through the whole body, gave the trace to the whole body: pain was in all of it, and pleasure, and the origin of the desire for filling was in all of it. The origin of sexual desire was not discussed, but let it be in the parts that bring such things to completion. And let the region around the liver be the origin of desire, because the vegetative part is most active there, the part that supplies the trace of soul to the liver and to the body—there, because that is where its activity begins. But about anger: what is it, and what soul is it? Is there a trace from it around the heart? Or does something else supply the movement that ends in the compound? Or does it supply here not a trace but anger itself? First, then, we must consider what anger is.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάσχῃ τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν καὶ ἕτερός τις τῶν προσηκόντων, καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄν τις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ποιῇ, ὀργιζόμεθα, δῆλόν που· ὅθεν καὶ αἰσθήσεως δεῖ καὶ συνέσεώς τινος ἐν τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι. διὸ καὶ εἰς ταῦτά τις ὁρῶν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ φυτικοῦ ὡρμῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν ζητοῖ τὸν θυμὸν τὴν γένεσιν ἴσχειν.
That we grow angry not only over what the body suffers, but also over what someone close to us suffers, and generally over whatever anyone does that is improper, is clear enough. So anger requires perception and some understanding as well. Looking at these facts, then, one would look for the origin of anger not in the vegetative part but somewhere else.
ἀλλ’ ὅταν ταῖς σωματικαῖς διαθέσεσιν ἕπηται τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς πρόχειρον, καὶ ὅταν οἱ μὲν ζέοντες αἵματι καὶ χολῇ ἕτοιμοι εἰς τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ὦσιν, ἀνειμένοι δὲ πρὸς ὀργὰς οἱ ἄχολοι λεγόμενοι καὶ κατεψυγμένοι, τά τε θηρία πρὸς τὰς κράσεις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δοκηθὲν λυμήνασθαι, τὰς ὀργὰς ἔχωσι, πρὸς τὸ σωματικώτερον πάλιν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ ζῴου σύστασιν τὰς ὀργὰς ἄν τις ἀνοίσειε.
But readiness to anger follows the body’s dispositions. Those who boil with blood and bile are quick to anger, while those called bile-less and chilled are slack toward anger. Wild animals get angry according to their temperaments, at nothing but what seemed to harm them. Given all this, one would trace anger back again to what is more bodily, and to what holds together the structure of the living being.
καὶ ὅταν οἱ αὐτοὶ νοσοῦντες μὲν ὀργιλώτεροι ἢ ὑγιαίνοντες, ἄγευστοι δὲ σιτίων ἢ λαβόντες, σώματος τοιοῦδε μηνύουσι τὰς ὀργὰς ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ὀργῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν χολὴν ἢ τὸ αἷμα οἷον ψυχοῦντα παρέχεσθαι τὰς τοιάσδε κινήσεις, ὥστε παθόντος τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος εὐθέως κινεῖσθαι τὸ αἷμα ἢ τὴν χολήν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ γενομένης τὴν φαντασίαν κοινώσασαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ τοιοῦδε σώματος διαθέσει ἤδη πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἵεσθαι,
And the same people are more irritable when ill than when healthy, and when they have not tasted food than when they have eaten. This shows that anger, or the origins of anger, belong to a body of a certain kind, and that the bile or the blood, ensouling it as it were, supplies such movements. So when the body of this kind is affected, the blood or the bile is at once set in motion; and when perception has occurred, the imagination, making the soul share in the condition of the body of this kind, at once launches it against what is causing the pain;
ἄνωθεν δὲ αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν λογισμῷ χρωμένην φανέντος ἀδικήματος καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔχουσαν ἕτοιμον τὸ ἐκείνως θυμούμενον ἅτε πεφυκὸς τῷ ἀποδειχθέντι ἐναντίῳ μάχεσθαι σύμμαχον τοῦτο ποιεῖσθαι καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐγειρόμενον ἀλόγως καὶ ἐφέλκεσθαι τῇ φαντασίᾳ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ λῆγον εἰς τὸ πεφυκὸς χολοῦσθαι, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ φυτικοῦ καὶ γεννητικοῦ ἄμφω γίνεσθαι κατασκευάζοντος τὸ σῶμα οἷον ἀντιληπτικὸν ἡδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τῷ δὲ πεποιηκέναι χολῶδες καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ ψυχῆς ἴχνος τῷ ἐν τοιούτῳ εἶναι τοιάδε κινεῖσθαι δυσχεραντικὰ καὶ ὀργίλα καὶ τῷ κεκακῶσθαι πρῶτον αὐτὸ κακοῦν πως ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ οἷον ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτῷ.
and again, from above, the soul that uses reasoning, when a wrong has appeared—even one not concerning the body—has ready to hand the part that grows angry in that way, and since that part is naturally made to fight what has been shown to be hostile, it makes it its ally. So there is one anger that is aroused irrationally and drags reason after it by means of the imagination, and another that begins from reason and ends in what is naturally made to grow angry. Both come from the vegetative and generative part. It equips the body to be, so to speak, apprehensive of what is pleasant and painful; and by having made it bilious and bitter, it makes the trace of soul in such a body, because it is in such a body, move in this way—irritably and angrily. And having first been harmed itself, it seeks in a way to harm other things too, and, as it were, to make them like itself.
μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦτο τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἴχνει ψυχῆς τὸ τοὺς ἧττον τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδέων ἐφιεμένους καὶ ὅλως σώματος καταφρονοῦντας ἧττον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ ἀλογοπαθείας.
Evidence that this is of the same substance as the other trace of soul: those who are less eager for bodily pleasures, and who in general despise the body, are less moved to anger and to irrational affections.
τὸ δὲ τὰ δένδρα μὴ ἔχειν θυμὸν καίπερ τὸ φυτικὸν ἔχοντα οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αἵματος οὐδὲ χολῆς αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν. ἐγγενομένων μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ζέσις ἂν ἐγένετο μόνον καὶ οἷον ἀγανάκτησις, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἐγγενομένης καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀδικοῦν ἂν ἤδη, ὥστε καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι, ὁρμή. ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς διαιροῖτο εἰς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ [τὸ] θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ μὲν εἴη τὸ φυτικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἴχνος περὶ αἷμα ἢ χολὴν ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθὴ ἡ ἀντιδιαίρεσις γίγνοιτο, τοῦ μὲν προτέρου, τοῦ δὲ ὑστέρου ὄντος. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἄμφω ὕστερα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγενομένων ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὴν διαίρεσιν εἶναι· ὀρεκτικῶν γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις, ᾗ ὀρεκτικά, οὐ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν.
That trees have no anger, although they have the vegetative part, should not surprise us, since they have no share in blood or bile. If these were present without perception, there would only be a boiling and a kind of indignation. If perception were present too, there would then be an impulse against the wrongdoer, so as to retaliate. But suppose the irrational part of the soul were divided into the desiring part and [the] spirited part, and the one were the vegetative part, while the spirited part were a trace from it around the blood or bile or both. Then the division would not be a correct division into coordinate members, since one would be prior and the other posterior. Or rather, nothing prevents both from being posterior, and the division from being one of the things that arise from the same source. For the division is of the appetitive powers, as appetitive, not of the substance they came from.
ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ οὐσία καθ’ αὑτὴν οὐκ ὄρεξις, ἀλλ’ ἴσως τελειοῦσα τὴν ὄρεξιν συνάψασα αὑτῇ τὴν παρ’ αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν. καὶ τὸ ἐκπεσὸν δὲ εἰς θυμὸν ἴχνος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν λέγειν οὐκ ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐνταῦθα λεγέσθω εἶναι.
That substance is not, by itself, appetite. Perhaps it completes appetite by joining to it the activity that comes from itself. And it is not absurd to say that the trace that has fallen into anger is around the heart. Let us say that what is there is not the soul, but the source of blood of this kind.
πῶς οὖν, εἴπερ τῷ θερμανθέντι τὸ σῶμα ἔοικεν ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ φωτισθέντι, ἐξελθούσης τῆς ἄλλης ψυχῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι ζωτικὸν ἔχει; ἢ ἔχει ἐπ’ ὀλίγον, ἀπομαραίνεται δὲ θᾶττον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θερμανθέντων ἀποστάντων τοῦ πυρός. μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ τρίχες φυόμεναι ἐπὶ τῶν νεκρῶν σωμάτων καὶ ὄνυχες αὐξόμενοι καὶ ζῷα διαιρούμενα ἐπὶ πολὺ κινούμενα· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἔτι ἐγκείμενον ἴσως, καὶ εἰ συναπέρχεται δὲ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ, οὐ τεκμήριον τοῦτο τοῦ μὴ ἕτερον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἀπελθόντος ἡλίου οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐφεξῆς φῶς καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξηρτημένον ἀπέρχεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς τὸ ἔξω τούτου ὁρώμενον ἐν τοῖς παρακειμένοις ἕτερον ὂν ἐκείνου συναπέρχεται. ἆρ’ οὖν συναπέρχεται, ἢ φθείρεται;
How is it, then—if the body is like what has been warmed rather than what has been lit—that when the other soul has left it, it has nothing vital left? Or rather, it does have something for a little while, but it fades quickly, as warmed things do when they are taken away from the fire. Hair growing on dead bodies bears witness to this, and nails growing, and animals that have been cut up moving for a long time; perhaps this is what still remains in them. And if it departs along with the other soul, that is no proof that it is not something different. When the sun goes away, not only does the light next to it, belonging to it and attached to it, go away; the light that comes from this into what is beyond it, seen in the things nearby, which is different from the first, goes away with it too. Does it, then, go away with it, or does it perish?
τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ τοιούτου ζητητέον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἣν δή φαμεν οἰκείαν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦ φωτὸς λειπόμενον ἐν τοῖς πεφωτισμένοις, δῆλον· ἀλλ’ εἰ μεταπίπτει εἰς τὸ πεποιηκὸς ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς, ζητεῖ ὁ λόγος. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς ὄν γέ τι πρότερον; ἀλλὰ τί ἦν ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων, ἀφ’ ὧν τὸ φῶς, ἡ λεγομένη χρόα, καί, ὅταν φθαρτὰ ᾖ τὰ σώματα, μεταβαλλόντων οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ οὐδεὶς ζητεῖ, ὅπου τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ πυρὸς φθαρέντος, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ὅπου τὸ σχῆμα. ἢ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα σχέσις τις, ὥσπερ συστολὴ τῆς χειρὸς καὶ ἔκτασις, χρῶμα δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ γλυκύτης.
This must be asked about light of this kind, and also about the life in the body, which we say is the body’s own. That nothing of the light remains in the things that were lit is clear. But the argument asks whether it passes back into what produced it, or simply is no more. How could it simply be no more, when it was something before? But what was it, then, in short? It belongs to the bodies themselves from which the light comes; it is what is called their color. And when the bodies are perishable and change, it is no more, and no one asks where the color of a fire has gone when the fire has perished, any more than where its shape has gone. Or rather, shape is a kind of disposition, like the clenching and opening of the hand, but color is not like that; it is like sweetness.
τί γὰρ κωλύει φθαρέντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ γλυκέος τὴν γλυκύτητα μὴ ἀπολωλέναι καὶ τοῦ εὐώδους τὴν εὐωδίαν, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ σώματι γίνεσθαι, οὐκ αἰσθητὰ δὲ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τὰ σώματα τὰ μετειληφότα, ὥστε ἀντερείδειν τὰς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν γενομένας ποιότητας τῇ αἰσθήσει; οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ φῶς τῶν φθαρέντων σωμάτων μένειν, τὴν δὲ ἀντιτυπίαν τὸ ἐκ πάντων οὖσαν μὴ μένειν; εἰ μή τις λέγοι νόμῳ ὁρᾶν, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ποιότητας μὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις εἶναι.
For what prevents the sweetness from not being destroyed when the sweet body perishes, or the fragrance when the fragrant body perishes, but coming to be in another body—though not perceptible, because the bodies that have received them are not such that the qualities in them press back against perception? In the same way, then, could the light of perished bodies remain, while the resistance, which came from all of them, does not remain? Unless one were to say that we see by convention, and that the so-called qualities are not in the substrates.
ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἀφθάρτους ποιήσομεν καὶ οὐ γινομένας ἐν ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων συστάσεσι τὰς ποιότητας, καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι ποιεῖν τὰς χρόας, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποικίλων ὀρνίθων, ἀλλ’ οὔσας συνάγειν ἢ ποιεῖν μέν, προσχρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πλήρει ὄντι τῶν τοιούτων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὐ τοιαῦτα, οἷα, ὅταν γένηται, ἐν τοῖς σώμασι φαίνεται. ἀλλ’ αὕτη μὲν ἔστω ἡ ἀπορία ἐνθαδὶ κειμένη· μενόντων δὲ τῶν σωμάτων εἰ συνήρτηται καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, τί κωλύει τὸ φῶς μετακινουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμετακινεῖσθαι τό τε προσεχὲς καὶ εἴ τι τῷ προσεχεῖ συνήρτηται, κἂν μὴ ὁρᾶται ἀπιόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προσιὸν φαίνεται;
But if so, we shall make the qualities imperishable, not coming to be when bodies are formed. The rational principles in the seeds will not make the colors—in variegated birds, for example—but will gather colors that already exist; or they will make them, but also make use of those in the air, which is full of such things. For they exist in the air too, though not in the form in which they appear in bodies once they come to be there. But let this difficulty be left lying here. If the bodies remain, and the light is attached to them and not cut off, what prevents the light from moving along with the body when the body moves—both the adjacent light and whatever is attached to the adjacent light—even if it is not seen going away, just as it is not seen arriving either?
ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ συνέπεται τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς προτέροις καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀεὶ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα καὶ ἐστερημένα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάμενα ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν μένειν, ἢ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀποτέτμηται τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι μία καὶ πολλαί, καὶ ὅστις ὁ τρόπος — ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἤδη σώματος γενόμενον ἴχνος τῆς ψυχῆς ὄν; ἢ εἰ μὲν ψυχή, συνέψεται, εἴπερ μὴ ἀποτέτμηται, τῷ ψυχῆς λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ οἷον ζωὴ τοῦ σώματος, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐκεῖ, ὃς περὶ φωτὸς ἰνδάλματος ἠπορεῖτο, καὶ εἰ δυνατὸν ζωὴν ἄνευ ψυχῆς εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τῷ παρακεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς ἄλλο, ταῦτα σκεπτέον.
But in the case of soul: do the secondary things follow the prior ones, and what comes next always follow what comes before it? Or is each on its own, deprived of what is before it and able to remain by itself? Or is no part of soul cut off at all, so that all souls are one and many—and in what way? That belongs elsewhere. But what is the trace of soul that has now become the body’s? Or rather: if it is soul, it will follow along, if it is not cut off, as our account of soul requires. If it is like a life of the body, the same argument applies here as the one raised about the image of light. And we must consider whether life can exist without soul—unless, of course, through the soul’s being adjacent and active toward something else.
Prayers, stars and magic
How can the stars answer prayers if they have neither memory nor choice?
νῦν δ’ ἐπειδὴ μνήμας μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις περιττὰς εἶναι ἐθέμεθα, αἰσθήσεις δὲ ἔδομεν καὶ ἀκούσεις πρὸς ταῖς ὁράσεσι καὶ εὐχῶν δὴ κλύοντας ἔφαμεν, ἃς πρὸς ἥλιον ποιούμεθα καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄστρα ἄλλοι τινὲς ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πεπίστευται, ὡς δι’ αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς πολλὰ καὶ τελεῖται καὶ δὴ καὶ οὕτω ῥᾷστα, ὡς μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων συλλήπτορας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀδίκων, τούτων τε πέρι [τῶν] παραπεπτωκότων ζητητέον· ἔχει γὰρ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ μεγίστας καὶ πολυθρυλήτους παρὰ τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀπορίας, θεοὺς συνεργοὺς καὶ αἰτίους γίγνεσθαι ἀτόπων ἔργων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτας καὶ ἀκολάστους συλλήψεις· τούτων τε οὖν ἕνεκα καὶ μάλιστα περὶ οὗ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, τῆς μνήμης αὐτῶν.
Now, we laid it down that memories in the stars are superfluous, but granted them perceptions, hearing as well as sight, and said they listen to prayers—the prayers we make to the sun, and those that some other people make to the stars as well. It is also believed that many things are accomplished for people through the stars, and so easily that they are helpers not only in just deeds but in many unjust ones too. So we must inquire about these matters that have come up along the way. In themselves they raise very great difficulties, much talked about by those who object to the idea that gods become collaborators in and causes of outlandish deeds, among others even love affairs and the abetting of licentiousness. We must inquire for these reasons, then, and above all about what our discussion was about from the start: their memory.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ εὐξαμένων ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ παραχρῆμα δρῶσιν αὐτά, ἀλλ’ εἰς ὕστερον καὶ πάνυ πολλάκις εἰς χρόνους, μνήμην ὧν εὔχονται ἄνθρωποι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ πρόσθεν λόγος ὁ παρ’ ἡμῶν λεγόμενος οὐκ ἐδίδου τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους εὐεργεσίας ἦν ἂν τοιοῦτον, οἷον Δήμητρος καὶ Ἑστίας· εἰ μή τις τῆς γῆς μόνον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀνθρώπεια λέγοι.
For clearly, if they act when people have prayed, and do not do it at once but later, very often after long periods, they have memory of what people pray to them for. But our earlier argument did not allow this. And yet something of this kind would be needed for their benefactions to human beings as well, such as those of Demeter and Hestia—unless one were to say that only the earth does good to human affairs.
ἀμφότερα οὖν πειρατέον δεικνύναι, πῶς τε τὰ τῆς μνήμης θησόμεθα ἐν τούτοις, ὃ δὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχει, οὐ πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἳ οὐ κωλύονται μνήμας διδόναι· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλοκότως δοκούντων γίγνεσθαι, ὃ φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐπισκέψασθαι, εἴ πῃ ἔστιν ἀπολογήσασθαι πρὸς [ἀπορίας] τὰς κατὰ θεῶν τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ· καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου — ὡς καὶ εἰς τοῦτον εἶσιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη — εἰ πιστοὶ οἱ λέγοντες, οἳ καὶ αὐτόν φασι τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν γοητεύεσθαι ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων τόλμης καὶ τέχνης. καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων δὲ ἐπιζητήσει ὁ λόγος, ὅπως τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπουργεῖν λέγονται, εἰ μὴ διὰ [τὴν] τῶν προτέρων λύσιν καὶ τὰ τούτων λαμβάνοι.
So we must try to show both things. First, how we shall treat memory in these beings—which is our concern, not what the others think, who face no obstacle to granting them memories. Second, concerning what seem to be strange happenings, which it is philosophy’s task to examine: whether there is any way of answering those [difficulties] raised against the gods in heaven, and also about the whole cosmos itself—since accusations of this kind reach it too—whether we should believe those who say that even the whole heaven is bewitched by human boldness and skill. Our discussion will also inquire about spirits, how they are said to serve such ends, unless what concerns them is settled as well through [the] solution of the earlier questions.
καθόλου τοίνυν τὰς ποιήσεις ληπτέον ἁπάσας καὶ τὰς πείσεις, ὅσαι γίνονται ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ, τάς τε λεγομένας φύσει, καὶ ὅσαι τέχνῃ γίνονται· καὶ τῶν φύσει τὰς μὲν φατέον ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς γίνεσθαι εἰς τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἢ μερῶν εἰς μέρη, τὰς δὲ τέχνῃ γινομένας ἢ τῆς τέχνης, ὥσπερ ἤρξατο, ἐν τοῖς τεχνητοῖς τελευτώσης, ἢ προσχρωμένης δυνάμεσι φυσικαῖς εἰς ἔργων φυσικῶν ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις.
We must take, then, in general, all the actions and affections that occur in the whole cosmos, both those called natural and those that occur by art. Of the natural ones, we must say that some go from the All to the parts, and from the parts to the All, or from parts to parts. Of those that occur by art, either the art ends, as it began, in the products of art, or it makes use of natural powers to produce natural actions and affections.
τὰς μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὅλου λέγω, ὅσα τε ἡ φορὰ ἡ πᾶσα ποιεῖ εἰς αὑτὴν καὶ εἰς τὰ μέρη· κινουμένη γὰρ καὶ αὑτὴν διατίθησί πως καὶ τὰ μέρη αὑτῆς, τά τε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ ὅσα δίδωσι τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς· μερῶν δὲ πρὸς μέρη πείσεις εὔδηλοί που παντί, ἡλίου τε πρός τε τὰ ἄλλα σχέσεις καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις στοιχείοις αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς, περὶ ὧν ἑκάστου ἐξεταστέον.
By the actions of the whole I mean whatever the whole revolution of heaven does to itself and to its parts. In moving, it disposes in a certain way both itself and its parts—those within the revolution itself and everything it gives to the things on earth. The affections of parts by parts are plain enough, I think, to everyone: the relations and actions of the sun toward the other heavenly bodies and toward the things on earth, and what happens in the other elements, from the sun itself, from the other heavenly bodies, and from the things on earth. Each of these must be examined.
τέχναι δὲ αἱ μὲν οἰκίαν ποιοῦσαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τεχνητὰ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἔληξαν· ἰατρικὴ δὲ καὶ γεωργία καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ βοήθειαν εἰς τὰ φύσει εἰσφερόμεναι, ὡς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν· ῥητορείαν δὲ καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχαγωγίαν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἄγειν ἀλλοιούσας, ἐν αἷς ζητητέον, ὅσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ τίνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσι· καί, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τοῖς πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρείαν ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διὰ τί ἐφ’ ὅσον δυνατὸν πραγματευτέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φορὰ ποιεῖ, αὑτὴν μὲν πρῶτον διαφόρως διατιθεῖσα καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς αὑτῆς, ἀναμφισβητήτως μὲν τὰ ἐπίγεια οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεσι, καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον εἰς τὰ ἐπίγεια καὶ ὅλως τὰ κάτω ποιεῖ, πολλαχῇ δῆλον.
As for the arts, those that make a house and the other artifacts end in something of that kind. Medicine, farming and the like are subservient: they bring help to natural things, so that these may be in their natural state. Rhetoric, music and every art of swaying the soul alter people, leading them toward the better or the worse. Here we must ask how many the arts are and what power they have. And, if possible, in all these matters that bear on our present need, we must also work out, as far as we can, the reason why. That the revolution acts is clear in many ways. It disposes first itself, and the things within it, in different ways, and indisputably the things on earth, not only in their bodies but also in the dispositions of the soul; and each of its parts acts on the things on earth and generally on what is below.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνα, ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ τὰ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις συγχωρούμενα ἐάσαντες οὕτως ἔχειν, ὅσα διὰ λόγου φανεῖται, πειρατέον λέγειν τὸν τρόπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς ποιήσεως λαβόντας, οὐ γὰρ μόνον θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ ποιότητες πρῶται τῶν στοιχείων λέγονται, οὐδ’ ὅσαι ἐκ τῆς τούτων μίξεως, ποιεῖν λεκτέον οὐδὲ πάντα τὸν ἥλιον θερμότητι, ψύξει δὲ ἄλλον τινά· τί γὰρ ἂν ψυχρὸν εἴη ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ πυρίνῳ σώματι; οὐδ’ ἄλλον ὑγρῷ πυρί· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν οἷόν τε. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν γινομένων εἰς τούτων τι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀναγαγεῖν.
Whether these things, too, act on those above we shall see later. For now, let us leave as they are the things granted by all or most people, so far as argument will show them to be so, and try to state how the action works, taking it from the beginning. We must not say that only hot and cold and the like, which are called the primary qualities of the elements, act, or the qualities that arise from their mixture. Nor must we say that the sun does everything by heat, and some other star by cold—what cold could there be in heaven, in a fiery body?—or another by moist fire. That way one could not even grasp how they differ. And many of the things that happen cannot be traced back to any of these.
οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴ τις τὰς τῶν ἠθῶν διαφορὰς δοίη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων κράσεις διὰ ψυχρότητα ἐπικρατοῦσαν ἢ διὰ θερμότητα τοιαύτας, πῶς ἂν φθόνους ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ πανουργίας εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγοι; ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ταῦτα, τύχας γοῦν πῶς χείρους τε καὶ βελτίους, πλουσίους καὶ πένητας, καὶ πατέρων εὐγενείας ἢ αὖ θησαυρῶν τε εὑρέσεις; [καὶ] μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι λέγειν πόρρω ἄγων σωματικῆς ποιότητος τῆς ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἰς τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς ἰούσης. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ προαιρέσει ἀναθετέον τῶν ἄστρων καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς γνώμῃ καὶ τοῖς τούτων λογισμοῖς τὰ συμπίπτοντα περὶ ἕκαστα τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτά.
Suppose someone were to ascribe to them the differences in people’s characters, according to the mixtures of their bodies—characters being such because of a prevailing cold or heat. Even so, how could he trace envy or jealousy or villainy back to these? And even if he could, how could he trace back fortunes, worse and better, people being rich and poor, noble birth from one’s fathers, or the finding of treasure? [And] one could name countless things that lead far away from the bodily quality that passes from the elements into the bodies and souls of animals. Nor, again, must we ascribe to the choice of the stars, to the will of the All and to their reasonings what befalls each of the things beneath them.
ἄτοπον γὰρ ἐκείνους μηχανᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅπως οἱ μὲν γένοιντο κλέπται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδραποδισταὶ τοιχωρύχοι τε καὶ ἱερόσυλοι, ἄνανδροί τε ἄλλοι καὶ θήλεις τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ δρῶντες. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι θεῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων μετρίων, τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ ὡντινωνοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ καταμηχανᾶσθαι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοῖς οὐδ’ ἡτισοῦν ὠφέλεια ἂν γένοιτο.
It would be absurd for them to scheme over human affairs so that some become thieves, others kidnappers, housebreakers and temple-robbers, and others spineless and soft in what they do and in what they undergo, doing shameful things. To do and contrive such things, from which no benefit of any kind could come to them, is unworthy not only of gods but even of decent human beings—perhaps of anyone at all.
The All as one living being
Everything in the All is in sympathy, like the limbs of one animal or a single dance.
εἰ οὖν μήτε σωματικαῖς αἰτίαις ἀναθήσομεν μήτε προαιρέσεσιν, ὅσα ἔξωθεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα καὶ ὅλως [τὰ] ἐπὶ γῆς ἀφικνεῖται ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, τίς ἂν εἴη λοιπὴ καὶ εὔλογος αἰτία; πρῶτον τοίνυν θετέον ζῷον ἓν πάντα τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ περιέχον τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, ψυχὴν μίαν ἔχον εἰς πάντα αὐτοῦ μέρη, καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος· μέρος δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ αἰσθητῷ, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάντη, ὅσον δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς μετέχει, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ταύτῃ· καὶ τὰ μὲν μόνης ταύτης μετέχοντα κατὰ πᾶν ἐστι μέρη, ὅσα δὲ καὶ ἄλλης, ταύτῃ ἔχει τὸ μὴ μέρη πάντη εἶναι. πάσχει δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καθ’ ὅσον αὐτοῦ τι ἔχει, καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ ἔχει.
If, then, we attribute neither to bodily causes nor to deliberate choices whatever comes from outside, from heaven, to us and to the other animals and in general to [the] things on earth, what reasonable cause would remain? First, we must posit that this All is a single living being encompassing all the living beings within it, with one soul that extends to all its parts, insofar as each is a part of it. Each thing in the sensible All is a part of it: wholly so with respect to its body, and with respect to soul to the extent that it participates in the Soul of the All. Those that participate in this soul alone are parts in every respect; those that participate in another soul as well are, to that extent, not parts in every respect. But they are affected no less by the others, insofar as they have something of the All, and in accordance with what they have.
συμπαθὲς δὴ πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ ὡς ζῷον ἕν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω δὴ ἐγγύς, ὥσπερ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ὄνυξ καὶ κέρας καὶ δάκτυλος καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς· ἀλλὰ διαλείποντος τοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ παθόντος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τὸ οὐκ ἐγγύς. οὐ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς τῶν ὁμοίων κειμένων, διειλημμένων δὲ ἑτέροις μεταξύ, τῇ δὲ ὁμοιότητι συμπασχόντων, καὶ εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τὸ παρὰ τοῦ μὴ παρακειμένου δρώμενον, ζῴου τε ὄντος καὶ εἰς ἓν τελοῦντος οὐδὲν οὕτω πόρρω τόπῳ, ὡς μὴ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς ζῴου πρὸς τὸ συμπαθεῖν φύσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχον πεῖσιν ἔχει οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν, ἀνομοίου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἀλλότριον τὸ πάθημα καὶ οὐ προσηνὲς τὸ πάσχον ἴσχει.
This one thing, then, is all in sympathy, like a single living being, and what is far is near. It is like a single individual animal, where a nail or a horn or a finger, or some other part, is not next to another: the part between leaves a gap and is not affected at all, while the part that is not near is affected. Like things do not lie next to one another, but are separated by others in between; yet they share affections through their likeness, and so what is done by what is not adjacent must reach what is far. And since it is a living being and contributes to one whole, nothing is so far away in place that it is not near, by the nature of the one living being, so as to share its affections. So what is like the agent receives an affection that is not alien to it, but when the agent is unlike it, what is affected receives an affection that is alien and unwelcome.
βλαβερὰν δὲ ποίησιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο ἑνὸς ὄντος ζῴου οὐ δεῖ τεθαυμακέναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταῖς ἡμετέραις βλάπτοιτ’ ἂν ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου μέρος, ἐπεὶ καὶ χολὴ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄλλο, ὡς δοκεῖ, πιέζει καὶ κεντεῖ. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔστι τι θυμῷ καὶ χολῇ ἀνάλογον καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς δὲ ἐμπόδιον ἔσται ἄλλο ἄλλῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἀφαυᾶναι.
We should not be surprised that one thing acts harmfully on another, though there is one living being. In us too, in our own activities, one part might be harmed by another; bile and anger, it seems, press on something else and sting it. And in the All, too, there is something analogous to anger and bile, and other things analogous to other things. Among plants too, one will obstruct another, even to the point of withering it.
τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μόνον ἓν ζῷον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ὂν ὁρᾶται· ὥστε καθ’ ὅσον μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον τῷ ὅλῳ σώζεται, καθ’ ὅσον δὲ καὶ πολλὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντα πολλαχῇ τῷ διαφόρῳ ἔβλαψε καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ χρείαν ἄλλο ἕτερον ἔβλαψε, καὶ δὴ καὶ τροφὴν ἐποιήσατο συγγενὲς ἅμα καὶ διάφορον ὑπάρχον καὶ σπεῦδον ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ κατὰ φύσιν, ὅσον τε οἰκεῖον τοῦ ἑτέρου λαμβάνει εἰς αὑτὸ καὶ ὅσον ἀλλότριον ἐγίνετο ἀφανίζει εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔργον τε τὸ αὑτοῦ ποιοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν δυνηθὲν ἀπολαῦσαί τι τῶν αὐτοῦ ἔργων ὠφέλησεν, ὃ δ’ ἀδύνατον ἦν ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ὁρμὴν τοῦ ἔργου, ἠφάνισεν ἢ ἔβλαψεν, ὥσπερ ὅσα αὐανθείη ἂν παριόντος πυρὸς ἢ ζῷα ἐλάττω ὑπὸ μειζόνων δρόμου παρασυρείη ἢ καί που πατηθείη.
This All is seen to be not only one living being but also many. So insofar as each thing is one, it is preserved by the whole; but insofar as they are many and meet one another, they have often harmed each other through their difference. One has harmed another for its own need, and has even made it its food, since it is at once akin and different. Each strives for what is natural to it: it takes into itself as much of the other as is its own, and, out of good will toward itself, does away with as much as was alien. And each, doing its own work, has benefited whatever could enjoy something of its works, but whatever could not withstand the force of its work it has destroyed or harmed—as things wither when a fire passes by, or smaller animals are swept aside by the rush of larger ones, or even trampled.
πάντων δὲ τούτων ἡ γένεσις ἥ τε φθορὰ ἀλλοίωσίς τε πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς ζῴου ἐκείνου ἀνεμπόδιστον καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν ζωὴν ἀποτελεῖ, ἐπείπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἕκαστα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς μόνα ὄντα, οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὸ τέλος εἶναι καὶ βλέπειν μέρη ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὗπερ καὶ μέρη, διάφορά τε ὄντα μὴ πάντα τὰ αὑτῶν ἐν μιᾷ ζωῇ ὄντα ἀεὶ ἔχειν· οὐκ ἦν τε μένειν οὐδὲν πάντη ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ἔμελλε τὸ πᾶν μένειν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μένειν ἔχον.
The coming to be and perishing of all these things, and their alteration for the worse or the better, brings to completion the unhindered, natural life of that one living being. For it was not possible for each thing to be as if it were alone, nor, since they are parts, for the end to be directed toward them or for them to look to themselves. They must look toward that of which they are parts. And since they are different, they cannot always keep everything that is theirs while being in one life. Nor could anything remain wholly the same, if the All was to remain, since it has its remaining in its movement.
τῆς δὴ φορᾶς τὸ εἰκῆ οὐκ ἐχούσης, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ζῷον φερομένης, ἔδει καὶ συμφωνίαν τοῦ ποιοῦντος πρὸς τὸ πάσχον εἶναι καί τινα τάξιν εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συντάσσουσαν, ὥστε καθ’ ἑκάστην σχέσιν τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τῶν αὖ ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι, οἷον μίαν ὄρχησιν ἐν ποικίλῃ χορείᾳ ποιούντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ὀρχήσεσι τὰ μὲν ἔξω πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν κινημάτων ὡς ἑτέρως μεταβαλλόντων τῶν συντελούντων πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν, αὐλῶν τε καὶ ᾠδῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνηρτημένων, τί ἄν τις λέγοι φανερῶν ὄντων;
Since the revolution is not random, but moves according to the rational principle of the living being, there had to be a concord between agent and patient, and an order arranging things in relation to one another and together, so that at each configuration of the revolution, and of the things under it, the disposition is different—as when many perform one dance in an intricate choral performance. Take the dances we know. Why mention the things outside the dance—how, at each movement, the things that contribute to it, the pipes and songs and everything connected with them, change in a different way? These are obvious.
ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ τὴν ὄρχησιν παρεχομένου καθ’ ἕκαστον σχῆμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἂν ὡσαύτως δύναιτο λέγειν τῶν μελῶν τοῦ σώματος ταύτῃ συνεπομένων καὶ καμπτομένων, καὶ πιεζομένου μὲν ἑτέρου, ἀνιεμένου δὲ ἄλλου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν πονοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀναπνοήν τινα ἐν τῷ διαφόρῳ σχηματισμῷ δεχομένου.
But with the parts of the one who performs the dance, at each figure, one could not say the same thing, since the limbs of the body necessarily follow along with it and bend, one pressed, another relaxed, one laboring, another finding a kind of respite in the change of posture.
καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις τοῦ ὀρχουμένου πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπει, τὰ δὲ πάσχει τῇ ὀρχήσει ἑπομένως καὶ ὑπουργεῖ τῇ ὀρχήσει καὶ συναποτελεῖ τὴν πᾶσαν, ὥστε τὸν ἔμπειρον ὀρχήσεως εἰπεῖν ἄν, ὡς τῷ τοιούτῳ σχηματισμῷ αἴρεται μὲν ὑψοῦ τοδὶ μέλος τοῦ σώματος, συγκάμπτεται δὲ τοδί, τοδὶ δὲ ἀποκρύπτεται, ταπεινὸν δὲ ἄλλο γίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλως τοῦ ὀρχηστοῦ προελομένου τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σώματος ὀρχήσει θέσιν ταύτην ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχοντος τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τὴν ὄρχησιν διαπεραίνοντος.
The dancer’s choice looks to something else; the limbs are affected in accordance with the dance, serve the dance, and help to complete the whole of it. So an expert in dancing could say that in such a posture this limb of the body is raised high, that one bent, this one hidden, another lowered—not because the dancer independently chose to do this, but because in the dance of his whole body this part, which carries the dance through, holds this necessary position.
τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ φατέον ποιεῖν, ὅσα ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ καὶ σημαίνειν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν μὲν ὅλον κόσμον τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ ζωὴν ἐνεργεῖν κινοῦντα ἐν αὑτῷ τὰ μέρη τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μετασχηματίζοντα ἀεί, τὰς δὲ σχέσεις τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν θέσεις ἑπόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὡς ζῴου ἑνὸς κινουμένου, παρέχεσθαι, ὡδὶ μὲν ἴσχοντα κατὰ τὰς ὡδὶ σχέσεις καὶ θέσεις καὶ σχηματισμούς, ὡδὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὡδί, ὡς μὴ τοὺς σχηματιζομένους τοὺς ποιοῦντας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν σχηματίζοντα, μηδ’ αὖ τὸν σχηματίζοντα ἄλλο ποιοῦντα ἄλλο ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο· ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν πάντα τὰ γινόμενα εἶναι, ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ σχήματα, ἐνθαδὶ δὲ τὰ συνεπόμενα τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀναγκαῖα παθήματα περὶ τὸ οὑτωσὶ κινούμενον ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ αὖ περὶ τὸ οὑτωσὶ συγκείμενον καὶ συνεστὼς φύσει καὶ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν εἰς αὑτὸ ἀνάγκαις.
In this way, then, we must say that the heavenly bodies act, in whatever they do act, and that they also signify some things. Or rather: the whole cosmos lives out its whole life as activity, moving its great parts within itself and always reshaping them; and the relations of the parts to one another and to the whole, and their different positions, bring about everything else as consequences, as in one living being in motion. Things are in this condition according to these relations, positions and configurations, and in that condition according to those. So it is not the configured things that act, but the one who configures them. Nor, again, does the one who configures do one thing and make another, for he is not acting on something else; he himself is all that comes to be. There are the configurations; here are the necessary affections that follow the configurations, affecting the living being that moves in this way, and again what is composed and constituted in this way by nature and acts and is acted on in relation to itself by necessities.
ἡμᾶς δὲ διδόντας τὸ μέρος αὑτῶν εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅσον ἦν ἡμέτερον ἐκείνου τοῦ σώματος, μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἐκείνου νομίζοντας μέτρια παρ’ αὐτοῦ πάσχειν· ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμφρονες τῶν θητευόντων τὸ μέν τι τοῖς δεσπόζουσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες, τὸ δ’ αὑτῶν ὄντες, μετριωτέρων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου ἐπιταγμάτων διὰ τοῦτο τυγχάνοντες, ἅτε μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὄντες μηδὲ τὸ πᾶν ἄλλου. τὸ δὲ τῶν σχηματισμῶν διάφορον τῶν θεόντων μὴ ἰσοταχῶν ὄντων ἀναγκαῖον ἦν γίνεσθαι, ὡς νῦν γίνεται. λόγῳ δὲ φερομένων καὶ διαφόρων τῶν σχέσεων τοῦ ζῴου γινομένων, εἶτα καὶ ἐνταῦθα τούτων τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν συμπαθῶν πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ γινομένων, εὔλογον ζητεῖν, πότερα συνέπεσθαι φατέον ταῦτα συμφωνοῦντα ἐκείνοις, ἢ τὰ σχήματα τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν ποιουμένων ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ σχήματα ἁπλῶς ἢ τὰ τούτων.
As for us, we give over to being affected the part of ourselves that belonged to that body, but we do not think the whole of us belongs to it, and so we are affected by it only in measure. We are like sensible hired servants, who serve their masters with one part of themselves and belong to themselves with another, and for that reason receive more moderate orders from the master, since they are not slaves and do not wholly belong to another. The difference in the configurations was bound to arise, as it now does, since the heavenly bodies in their courses do not have equal speeds. And since they move according to a rational principle, and the relations of the living being become different, and since here in our world the things around us are in sympathy with what happens there, it is reasonable to ask whether we should say that these things follow in harmony with those, or that the configurations have the powers of what is brought about—and if so, whether configurations simply, or those of these particular bodies.
οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς σχηματισμὸς ταὐτοῦ ἐπ’ ἄλλου καὶ αὖ ἄλλων τὴν αὐτὴν σημασίαν ἢ ποίησιν ἐργάζεται· ἐπεὶ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστος διάφορον ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ. ἢ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὴν τούτων σχημάτισιν ταδὶ καὶ τοιάνδε διάθεσιν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλλων τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν ἐν σχηματισμῷ ἄλλην. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκέτι τοῖς σχήμασιν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς σχηματιζομένοις δώσομεν. ἢ συναμφοτέροις. τοῖς γοῦν αὐτοῖς διάφορον σχέσιν λαβοῦσιν ἄλλα, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ μόνον διάφορον τόπον ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τί; ποιήσεις ἢ σημασίας; ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ τῷ σχηματισμῷ τῷ τούτων ἄμφω, καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ σημασίας ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ σημασίας μόνον.
For the same configuration does not produce the same signification or effect in the case of one body as in the case of another, and again of others; for each seems to have a different nature by itself. Or rather, it is right to say that the configuration of these bodies is this particular disposition, of this kind, while the configuration of others, though the same as a figure, is different. But if so, we shall attribute the effects no longer to the configurations but to the configured things themselves. Or rather, to both. At any rate, the same things produce different results when they take a different relation, and the same body produces different results merely in a different place. But results of what kind—effects or significations? Or rather: the combination, the configuration together with these bodies, produces both, effects and significations, in many cases, and elsewhere significations only.
οὗτος τοίνυν ὁ λόγος δυνάμεις μὲν δίδωσι τοῖς σχήμασι, δυνάμεις δὲ καὶ τοῖς σχηματιζομένοις· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ὀρχουμένων ἔχει μὲν δύναμίν τινα καὶ χεὶρ ἑκατέρα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ σχήματα πολλήν, τρίτα δέ ἐστι τὰ συνεπόμενα, αὐτῶν τε τῶν εἰς τὴν ὄρχησιν παραλαμβανομένων τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα, οἷον χειρὸς τὰ συνθλιβόμενα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ φλέβες συμπαθοῦντα.
This account, then, gives powers to the configurations, and powers to the configured things as well. With dancers too, each hand has a certain power, and so do the other limbs, while the figures have great power. Third come the things that follow along: the parts of the limbs taken up into the dance, and what these are made of—the parts of the hand that are compressed, for example, and the sinews and veins that share the affection.
πῶς δὴ οὖν αὗται αἱ δυνάμεις; σαφέστερον γὰρ πάλιν λεκτέον. τί τὸ τρίγωνον παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον διάφορον ἔχει; τί δὲ ὁδὶ πρὸς τονδί, καὶ κατὰ τί τοδὶ ἐργάζεται καὶ μέχρι τίνος; ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν οὔτε ταῖς προαιρέσεσιν ἀπέδομεν τὰς ποιήσεις· τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν, ὅτι μὴ μόνον. σώματος ἦν ποιήματα τὰ γινόμενα, ταῖς δὲ προαιρέσεσιν, ὅτι ἄτοπον ἦν [κατὰ] προαίρεσιν θεοὺς ποιεῖν ἄτοπα.
How, then, do these powers work? We must say it again, more clearly. How does one triangle differ from another? What does this one have in relation to that one, in virtue of what does it produce this effect, and how far? For we did not attribute the actions either to their bodies or to their choices: not to their bodies, because what happened was not only the products of body; not to their choices, because it was absurd that gods should produce absurd things [by] choice.
εἰ δὲ μνημονεύοιμεν, ὅτι ζῷον ἓν ὑπεθέμεθα εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχον συμπαθὲς αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔδει εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι κατὰ λόγον ἡ διέξοδος τῆς ζωῆς σύμφωνος ἑαυτῇ ἅπασα, καὶ ὅτι τὸ εἰκῆ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ἀλλὰ μία ἁρμονία καὶ τάξις, καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ κατὰ λόγον, καὶ κατ’ ἀριθμοὺς δὲ ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ χορεύοντα ζῴου μέρη, ἄμφω ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι, τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα σχήματα καὶ τὰ σχηματιζόμενα μέρη αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τοῦτο συμβάλλειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχουσαι ἐγένοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις πεποιηκότος· καὶ τὰ μὲν σχήματα οἷον λόγους εἶναι ἢ διαστάσεις ζῴου καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχέσεις ζῴου κατὰ λόγον, τὰ δὲ διεστηκότα καὶ ἐσχηματισμένα μέλη ἄλλα· καὶ εἶναι τοῦ ζῴου δυνάμεις χωρὶς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἄλλας τὰς ὡς ζῴου μέρη, ἐπεὶ τὸ τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῖς ἔξω καὶ οὐ συντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦ ζῴου τοῦδε τὴν φύσιν.
But let us remember that we posited it to be one living being, and that, being such, it necessarily had to be in sympathy with itself; that the whole course of its life is in accord with itself according to a rational principle; that there is nothing random in its life, but one harmony and order; that the configurations accord with a rational principle; and that each thing, including the dancing parts of the living being, accords with numbers. If we remember this, we must agree that both belong to the activity of the All: the configurations that come about in it, its configured parts, and what follows on them. In this way the All lives, and the powers contribute to this, just as they came to have them from the one who made them by rational principles. The configurations are, as it were, rational principles, or intervals of the living being, its rhythms and relations according to a rational principle, while the limbs, spaced out and configured, are something else. And the living being has powers apart from its choice, other ones, those it has as parts of a living being; for choice lies outside them and does not contribute to the nature of this living being.
μία γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις ἑνὸς ζῴου, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις αἱ ἄλλαι αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλαί. ὅσαι δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ προαιρέσεις, πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ μία. ἐπιθυμία μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· λαβεῖν γάρ τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐθέλει μέρος τὸ ἄλλο μέρος ἐνδεὲς ὂν αὐτοῦ· καὶ θυμὸς πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅταν τι παραλυπῇ, καὶ ἡ αὔξησις παρ’ ἄλλου καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς ἄλλο τῶν μερῶν· τὸ δ’ ὅλον καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ βλέπει.
A single living being has a single choice, but its other powers, set against it, are many. And whatever choices there are within it are directed to the same thing as the single choice of the All. Desire is one part’s desire for another of the things within it: one part, lacking something, wants to take some other part. Anger is aimed at another part when something annoys it; growth comes from another part, and generation passes into another of the parts. The whole does these things in these parts, but itself seeks the good—or rather, looks at it.
τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ προαίρεσις ἡ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάθη ζητεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ταύτῃ συμβάλλει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν παρ’ ἄλλῳ θητευόντων πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῖς βλέπει πρὸς τὰ ἐπιταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὁ δεσπότης.
This, then, is what right choice also seeks, the choice that is above the passions, and in this way it contributes to the same end. It is the same with people who work for another as hired servants: many of their tasks look to what the master has ordered, but their desire for the good aims at the same thing the master’s does.
εἰ δὴ δρᾷ τι ὁ ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα εἰς τὰ τῇδε, χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν μὲν ἄνω βλέποντα εἶναι· ἐφ’ ἑνὸς γὰρ τὸν λόγον ποιητέον· ποιεῖσθαι δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς, οὕτω καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τοῦτο ψυχῆς διαδόσει, ὅσον ἐν αὐτῷ, φυτικῆς ψυχῆς πολλῆς οὔσης· καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ὁμοίως οἷον ἐλλάμπον δύναμιν παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἀπροαίρετον διδόναι καὶ πάντα δὴ ἕν τι οὕτως ἐσχηματισμένον γενόμενα τὴν διάθεσιν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην αὖ διδόναι, ὥστε καὶ τὰ σχήματα δυνάμεις ἔχειν· παρὰ γὰρ τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως· καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων γίνεσθαί τι· παρὰ γὰρ τούτους ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο αὖ παρ’ ἄλλους· ἐπεὶ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ τὰ σχήματα ὡς δυνάμεις ἔχει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῇδε ἄν τις ἴδοι.
So if the sun and the other stars do something to things here, we must suppose that the sun itself is looking upward—we should frame the argument on a single one of them—while something is produced from it. Just as things on earth are warmed by it, so too with anything that follows from this through a transmission of soul, as far as it has soul in it, since there is a great deal of vegetative soul in it. And another star in the same way gives a power from itself, shining it out, as it were, without any choice. And all of them together, once they have become a single thing configured in this way, give one disposition and then another, so that the figures too have powers: for depending on whether things are arranged this way or that, the results differ. And something also comes about through the configured bodies themselves: depending on these, one thing results, depending on others, another. That figures by themselves have something like powers can be seen in things here, too.
διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ μὲν φοβερὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι τῶν σχημάτων μηδέν τι προπεπονθότων τῶν φοβουμένων, τὰ δὲ οὐ φοβεῖ ὀφθέντα; καὶ ἄλλους μὲν ταδί, ἄλλους δὲ ταδί;
Why is it that some figures frighten those who see them, though the people frightened have suffered nothing beforehand, while others cause no fear when seen? And why do some frighten these people, others those?
ἢ ὅτι εἰς μὲν τὸν τοιόνδε ταδὶ ἐργάζεται, εἰς δὲ τοῦτον ἄλλα, οὐκ ἂν μὴ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πεφυκὸς ποιεῖν· καὶ οὑτωσὶ μὲν σχηματισθὲν ἐκίνησε τὴν ὄψιν, οὑτωσὶ δὲ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ κάλλος εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν τοῦτο, τὸν δὲ ἄλλο ἐκίνησε, μὴ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα διαφορᾶς τὴν δύναμιν ἐχούσης; διὰ τί γὰρ τὰς μὲν χρόας φήσομεν δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ σχήματα οὐ φήσομεν; ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως ἄτοπον εἶναι μέν τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, μὴ μέντοι ἔχειν τι ὃ δύναται. τὸ γὰρ ὂν τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοτέον τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἄμφω.
Or is it that these act on one kind of person and others on another—which could not be if they lacked the power to act on what is naturally suited to receive them? Shaped this way, a thing moved someone’s sight; shaped that way, it did not move the same person. And if someone says that beauty is what moves us, why did this move one person and something else another, unless the difference in figure has the power? Why should we say that colors have power and act, and not say so of figures? It would be altogether absurd, in fact, for something to exist among the things that are and yet have nothing it can do. For being is such as either to act or to be acted on: to some things we must grant acting, to others both.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ παρὰ τὰ σχήματα· καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν εἰσι πολλαί, ἃς οὐ θερμὰ ἢ ψυχρὰ παρέχεται, ἀλλὰ γενόμενα ποιότησι διαφόροις καὶ λόγοις εἰδοποιηθέντα καὶ φύσεως δυνάμεως μεταλαβόντα, οἷον καὶ λίθων φύσεις καὶ βοτανῶν ἐνέργειαι θαυμαστὰ πολλὰ παρέχονται.
There are powers in the substrates too, apart from the figures. Among the things around us there are many such powers that hot and cold things do not supply; they are supplied by things that have come to be with different qualities, given form by rational principles and sharing in the power of nature. So the natures of stones and the activities of plants produce many wonderful effects.
ποικιλώτατον γὰρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ λόγοι πάντες ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δυνάμεις ἄπειροι καὶ ποικίλαι. οἷον δή φασι καὶ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλην μὲν δύναμιν ἔχειν ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ ὀστοῦν τόδε, τοδὶ δ’ ἄλλην, χειρὸς μὲν τοδὶ καὶ δακτύλου τοῦ ποδός, καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος εἶναι ὃ μὴ ἔχει καὶ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχει — ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, εἰ μή τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμάθηκεν· οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον· μᾶλλον δέ, [ὅτι] ἴχνος ταῦτα ἐκείνων· ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀδιήγητον δὴ καὶ θαυμαστὴν ποικιλίαν εἶναι δυνάμεων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ’ οὐρανὸν φερομένοις.
For the All is supremely varied: all rational principles are in it, and its powers are unlimited and varied. They say, for instance, that in a human being the eye has one power, and this bone one, that bone another—this one of the hand, that one of the toe—and that there is no part without a power, and none with the same power as another. We don’t know this, unless we have studied such things. So it is, and much more so, in the All—or rather, [since] these are a trace of those: in the All there must be an indescribable and wonderful variety of powers, and above all in the bodies that travel through the heavens.
οὐ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἄψυχον οἰκίαν μεγάλην ἄλλως καὶ πολλὴν ἔκ τινων εὐαριθμήτων κατ’ εἶδος, οἷον λίθων καὶ ξύλων, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, εἰς κόσμον ἔδει αὐτὸ γεγονέναι, ἀλλ’ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πανταχῇ καὶ ζῶν ἄλλο ἄλλως καὶ μηδὲν δύνασθαι εἶναι, ὃ μή ἐστιν [ἐν] αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λύοιτο ἂν ἡ ἀπορία ἡ πῶς ἐν ζῴῳ ἐμψύχῳ ἄψυχον· οὕτως γὰρ ὁ λόγος φησὶν ἄλλο ἄλλως ζῆν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, ἡμᾶς δὲ τῷ μὴ αἰσθητῶς παρ’ αὐτοῦ κινουμένους ζῆν μὴ λέγειν· τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἕκαστον ζῶν λανθάνον, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητῶς ζῶν συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν μὴ αἰσθητῶς μὲν ζώντων, θαυμαστὰς δὲ δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ ζῆν τῷ τοιούτῳ ζῴῳ παρεχομένων.
It was not supposed to become an ordered world in the way a lifeless house does—large and big as it may be—out of a few kinds of material, easily counted, like stones and timber and, if you like, a few other things. No: it is awake everywhere and alive, each thing in a different way, and nothing can exist that is not [in] it. This is also how the puzzle might be solved, how there can be something lifeless in an ensouled living being. For the argument says that different things live in different ways within the whole, while we refuse to say that things live unless they visibly move by themselves. But in fact each of them lives without our noticing, and what visibly lives is composed of things that do not visibly live, yet supply wonderful powers for the life of such a living being.
μὴ γὰρ ἂν κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τοσαῦτα ἄνθρωπον ἐκ πάντη ἀψύχων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεων κινούμενον, μηδ’ αὖ τὸ πᾶν οὕτω ζῆν μὴ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶντος τὴν οἰκείαν ζωήν, κἂν προαίρεσις αὐτῷ μὴ παρῇ. ποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ προαιρέσεως οὐ δεηθέν, ἅτε προαιρέσεως ὂν προγενέστερον· διὸ καὶ πολλὰ δουλεύει αὐτῶν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν.
A human being could never have been moved to so many things if the powers within him that moved him were utterly lifeless. Nor could the All live as it does unless each thing in it lived its own life, even if choice is not present in it. For it acts without needing choice, since it is prior to choice; that is also why many things are in service to their powers.
οὐδὲν οὖν τῷ παντὶ ἀπόβλητον αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὅσα τῶν τοιούτων λέγομεν ποιεῖν, εἴ τις τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν ζητήσειε τί ποτέ ἐστι τῶν νῦν δοκούντων εἰδέναι, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν, εἰ μὴ δύναμιν ταύτην αὐτῷ ἀποδοίη ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖς ἐν χρήσει λέγοι. ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς τὰ μὲν συνήθη οὔτ’ ἀξιοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὔτ’ ἀπιστοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔξω τοῦ συνήθους δυνάμεων ἀπιστοῦμέν τε ὡς ἔχει ἕκαστον, καὶ τῷ ἀσυνήθει τὸ θαυμάζειν προστίθεμεν θαυμάσαντες ἂν καὶ ταῦτα, εἰ ἀπείροις αὐτῶν οὖσιν ἕκαστόν τις προφέρων ἐξηγοῖτο αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις.
So nothing in the All is to be thrown away. Take fire, and the other things of this kind that we say act: if any of those who now think they know were to ask what their acting really is, he would be at a loss—unless he granted that fire has this power by being in the All, and said the same of the other things in common use. But familiar things we neither think worth investigating nor doubt; it is the powers outside the familiar that we doubt, each as it is, and we attach wonder to the unfamiliar. Yet we would wonder at the familiar ones as well, if we had no experience of them and someone brought each one forward and explained its powers to us.
ἔχειν μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον δύναμίν τινα ἀνάλογον φατέον ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλασθὲν καὶ μορφωθὲν καὶ μετειληφός πως ψυχῆς παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου ὄντος ἐμψύχου καὶ περιειλημμένον ὑπὸ τοιούτου καὶ μόριον ὂν ἐμψύχου — οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅ τι μὴ μέρος — ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ δρᾶν δυνατώτερα, καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ τῶν οὐρανίων μᾶλλον, ἅτε ἐναργεστέρᾳ φύσει χρώμενα, καὶ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, οὐ τῇ προαιρέσει ἀφ’ ὧν δοκεῖ ἰέναι τὸ δρώμενον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ ἐπιστραφέντων τῇ δόσει τῆς δυνάμεως, κἂν ψυχῆς τι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἴῃ.
We must say, then, that each thing has some power proportionate to it, since it has been shaped and formed in the All and has in a way received a share of soul from the whole, which is ensouled; it is encompassed by something of that kind and is a part of something ensouled—for there is nothing in it that is not a part. But some things are more powerful than others for acting, and heavenly things more than those on earth, since they have a more vivid nature. And many things come about in accordance with these powers, not by the choice of those from which the effect seems to come—for such powers exist even in things that have no choice—nor because they have turned their attention to giving the power, even if something of soul does come from them.
γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζῷα ἐκ ζῴου οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ποιούσης οὐδ’ αὖ ἐλαττουμένου οὐδ’ αὖ παρακολουθοῦντος· αὐτὸ γὰρ [ἂν] ἦν ἡ προαίρεσις, εἰ ἔχοι, ἢ οὐκ ἦν ἡ ποιοῦσα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοι τι προαίρεσιν ζῷον, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν.
Living things can come from a living thing without its choice producing them, without its being diminished, and without its being conscious of it. For if it had choice, either the choice [would] itself have been the producing, or it was not the choice that produced. And if some living thing has no choice, all the less is it conscious of it.
ἅ τε οὖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μηδενὸς κινήσαντος ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης αὐτοῦ ζωῆς γίνεται, καὶ ὅλως ὅσα ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὅσα τε κινήσαντος ἄλλου, οἷον εὐχαῖς ἢ ἁπλαῖς ἢ τέχνῃ ᾀδομέναις, ταῦτα οὐκ εἰς ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν τοῦ δρωμένου φύσιν ἀνενεκτέον. καὶ ὅσα μὲν χρηστὰ πρὸς ζωὴν ἤ τινα ἄλλην χρείαν συμβάλλεται, τῇ δόσει ἀνενεκτέον, ἐξ ἄλλου μέρους μείζονος εἰς ἄλλο ἔλαττον ἰόν· ὅ τι δ’ ἂν δυσχερὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν λέγηται εἰς τὰς γενέσεις τῶν ζῴων ἰέναι, ἢ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ εὔχρηστον δέξασθαι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοδὶ καὶ ὡδὶ καὶ δεῖ καὶ τὸ πάσχον καὶ τὸ πεισόμενον ὑποκειμένην τινὰ καὶ τοιάνδε φύσιν ἔχειν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ αἱ μίξεις ποιοῦσιν, ἑκάστου τι εὔχρηστον εἰς τὸ ζῆν διδόντος.
So whatever comes from it out of the rest of its life when nothing has moved it, and in general all that comes from it, and whatever comes when something else has moved it—by prayers, for instance, whether simple ones or ones sung with art—all this must be referred not to each of those bodies individually, but to the nature of what is done. Whatever is useful and contributes to life or some other need must be referred to their giving, which passes from one, greater part to another, smaller one. And whatever harmful thing is said to come from them upon the generation of living beings comes about either because the substrate cannot receive the benefit—for what comes to be does not come to be without qualification, but into this particular thing and in this particular way, and both what is affected and what is going to be affected must have a particular underlying nature of a certain kind. Mixtures too produce many effects, each ingredient giving something useful for life.
γίνοιτο δ’ ἄν τῳ καὶ μὴ συμφερόντων τῶν λυσιτελῶν τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἡ σύνταξις ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐ δίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ ἀεὶ ὃ βούλεται· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ προστίθεμεν αὐτοὶ τοῖς δοθεῖσι. πάντα δ’ ὅμως εἰς ἓν συμπλέκεται καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὴν συμφωνίαν ἔχει καὶ ἀπ’ ἄλλων ἄλλα, κἂν ἀπ’ ἐναντίων ἴῃ· πάντα γὰρ ἑνός.
It can also happen to someone that what is beneficial does not suit his nature; and the coordination of the whole does not always give each thing what it wants. We also add a great deal ourselves to what has been given. Yet all things are woven together into one and have a wonderful harmony; different things come from different things, even when they come from opposites, for all belong to one.
καὶ εἴ τι δὲ ἐλλεῖπον πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τῶν γινομένων, μὴ εἰδοποιηθὲν εἰς τέλος μὴ κρατηθείσης τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ἐλλεῖπον τῷ γενναίῳ, οὗ στερηθὲν πίπτει εἰς αἰσχρότητα· ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖσθαι ὑπ’ ἐκείνων, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν εἰσφέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρ’ αὑτῶν προστιθέναι· συνταττομένων δὲ ἀεὶ πάντων καὶ εἰς ἓν συντελούντων πάντων, σημαίνεσθαι πάντα· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον· συνυφαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα τῇ συντάξει, ἅτε καὶ τῶν τῇδε ἐκεῖθεν ἐξηρτημένων, τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ τοῖς θειοτέροις, μετέχοντος καὶ τοῦδε ἐκείνων.
And if something that comes to be falls short of the better, not fully given form because matter has not been mastered, it falls short, as it were, of nobility, and deprived of that it sinks into ugliness. So some things are produced by those heavenly bodies, some are brought in by the underlying nature, and others the beings themselves add. But since all things are always coordinated and all contribute to one, all things are signified. “Virtue has no master”; yet its works too are woven into the coordination, since the things here depend on what is There—the things in this All on what is more divine—and this All too has a share in those.
γίνεται τοίνυν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικοὺς καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμάτων λόγους· οὐ γὰρ ἐν σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἔνι τι τῶν γινομένων παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ τῆς ὕλης εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούντων οὐδὲ τῶν δρωμένων εἰς ἄλληλα παρὰ τῶν γενομένων. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν ἐοίκοι ὁ λόγος τοῦ παντὸς κατὰ λόγον τιθέντα κόσμον πόλεως καὶ νόμον ἤδη εἰδότα, ἃ πράξουσιν οἱ πολῖται, καὶ δι’ ἃ πράξουσι, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα νομοθετοῦντα καὶ συνυφαίνοντα τοῖς νόμοις τὰ πάθη πάντα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας, πάντων ὁδῷ οἷον αὐτομάτῳ εἰς συμφωνίαν χωρούντων.
The things in the All, then, come about not according to seminal rational principles, but according to rational principles that are comprehensive and prior to those of the seeds. For the seminal principles contain nothing of what comes to be outside the seminal principles themselves, nothing of what matter contributes to the whole, and nothing of what the things that have come to be do to one another. The rational principle of the All is more like a man laying down the order and law of a city according to reason, who already knows what the citizens will do and why they will do it, legislates with all this in view, and weaves into the laws everything that happens to them, their actions, and the honors and dishonors their actions earn—so that everything moves into harmony as if of its own accord.
ἡ δὲ σημασία οὐ τούτου χάριν, ἵνα σημαίνῃ προηγουμένως, ἀλλ’ οὕτω γιγνομένων σημαίνεται ἐξ ἄλλων ἄλλα· ὅτι γὰρ ἓν καὶ ἑνός, καὶ ἀπ’ ἄλλου ἄλλο γινώσκοιτ’ ἄν, καὶ ἀπὸ αἰτιατοῦ δὲ τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ τὸ ἑπόμενον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προηγησαμένου, καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἀπὸ θατέρου, ὅτι θάτερον καὶ θάτερον ὁμοῦ.
Signification does not exist for its own sake, so as to signify as its primary purpose; rather, because things come about in this way, one thing is signified by another. Since it is one, and belongs to one, one thing can be known from another: the cause from the effect, what follows from what went before, and the composite from one of its components, because the one and the other are together.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, λύοιντο ἃν ἤδη αἱ ἀπορίαι, ἥ τε πρὸς τὸ κακῶν δόσιν παρὰ θεῶν γίνεσθαι τῷ μήτε προαιρέσεις εἶναι τὰς ποιούσας, φυσικαῖς δὲ ἀνάγκαις γίνεσθαι, ὅσα ἐκεῖθεν, ὡς μερῶν πρὸς μέρη, καὶ ἑπόμενα ἑνὸς ζωῇ, καὶ τῷ πολλὰ παρ’ αὑτῶν τοῖς γινομένοις προστιθέναι, καὶ τῷ τῶν διδομένων παρ’ ἑκάστων οὐ κακῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ μίξει γίνεσθαι ἄλλο τι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ἕνεκα ἑκάστου ἀλλ’ ἕνεκα τοῦ ὅλου τὴν ζωὴν [εἶναι], καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην δὲ φύσιν ἄλλο λαβοῦσαν ἄλλο πάσχειν καὶ μηδὲ δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι τοῦ δοθέντος.
If this is rightly said, the difficulties are now resolved. The difficulty about evils being given by gods is resolved because it is not choices that produce them: whatever comes from there comes by natural necessities, as from parts to parts, and as consequences of the life of a single being; also because beings add much of their own to what comes about; because, though what each gives is not bad, something different arises in the mixture; because the life [is] not for the sake of each individual but for the sake of the whole; and because the underlying nature receives one thing and experiences another, and cannot even master what is given.
How magic works
Spells work by natural sympathy; only contemplation, turned toward itself, is free of enchantment.
τὰς δὲ γοητείας πῶς; ἢ τῇ συμπαθείᾳ, καὶ τῷ πεφυκέναι συμφωνίαν εἶναι ὁμοίων καὶ ἐναντίωσιν ἀνομοίων, καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ εἰς ἓν ζῷον συντελούντων. καὶ γὰρ μηδενὸς μηχανωμένου ἄλλου πολλὰ ἕλκεται καὶ γοητεύεται· καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος αὖ. καὶ ὁ γόης ὁ πρῶτος καὶ φαρμακεὺς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν κατανοήσαντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις χρῶνται αὐτοῦ τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς γοητεύμασι.
And how do spells work? By sympathy, and by the natural concord of like things and opposition of unlike, and by the variety of the many powers that contribute to a single living being. Many things are drawn and enchanted without anyone else contriving it. The true magic is the Love in the All, and the Strife too. This is the first wizard and sorcerer; people have understood him and use his drugs and spells on one another.
καὶ γάρ, ὅτι ἐρᾶν πεφύκασι καὶ τὰ ἐρᾶν ποιοῦντα ἕλκει πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὁλκῆς ἐρωτικῆς διὰ γοητείας τέχνη γεγένηται προστιθέντων ἐπαφαῖς φύσεις ἄλλας ἄλλοις συναγωγοὺς καὶ ἐγκείμενον ἐχούσας ἔρωτα· καὶ συνάπτουσι δὲ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἄλλῃ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ φυτὰ διεστηκότα ἐξαψάμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι δὲ προσχρῶνται δυνάμεις ἔχουσι, καὶ αὑτοὺς σχηματίζοντες ὡδὶ ἐπάγουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἀψοφητὶ δυνάμεις ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντες εἰς ἕν· ἐπεὶ ἔξω γε τοῦ παντὸς εἵ τις ὑπόθοιτο τὸν τοιοῦτον, οὔτ’ ἂν ἕλξειεν οὔτ’ ἂν καταγάγοι ἐπαγωγαῖς ἢ καταδέσμοις· ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὅτι μὴ οἷον ἀλλαχοῦ ἄγει, ἔχει ἄγειν εἰδὼς ὅπῃ τι ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς ἄλλο ἄγεται.
Because people are naturally given to love, and the things that make them love draw them to one another, an art of drawing by love through sorcery has arisen. Its practitioners apply by contact to different people different substances that draw them together and have love inherent in them. They join one soul to another, as if they were tying together plants that stood apart. They also make use of figures that have powers, and by putting themselves into certain postures they silently draw powers to themselves, since they are within one thing and act upon one thing. For if you supposed such a man to be outside the All, he could neither draw nor bring down by spells of attraction or binding spells. As it is, since he does not draw, so to speak, from somewhere else, he is able to draw, knowing how one thing in the living being is drawn toward another.
πέφυκε δὲ καὶ ἐπῳδῆς τῷ μέλει καὶ τῇ τοιᾷδε ἠχῇ καὶ τῷ σχήματι τοῦ δρῶντος — ἕλκει γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ ἐλεεινὰ σχήματα καὶ φθέγματα — ἄγεσθαι ἡ ψυχή· οὐ γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδ’ ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ μουσικῆς θέλγεται, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἄλογος ψυχή, καὶ οὐ θαυμάζεται ἡ γοητεία ἡ τοιαύτη· καίτοι φιλοῦσι κηλούμενοι, κἂν μὴ τοῦτο αἰτῶνται παρὰ τῶν τῇ μουσικῇ χρωμένων. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ εὐχὰς οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀκουούσης οἰητέον· οὐ γὰρ οἱ θελγόμενοι ταῖς ἐπῳδαῖς οὕτως, οὐδ’ ὅταν γοητεύῃ ὄφις ἀνθρώπους, σύνεσιν ὁ γοητευόμενος ἔχει, οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ γινώσκει ἤδη παθών, ὅτι πέπονθεν, ἀπαθὲς δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν. ᾧ δ’ ηὔξατο, ἦλθέ τι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον· ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἢ ἄλλο ἄστρον οὐκ ἐπαίει.
The soul is also naturally drawn by the melody of an incantation, by a certain tone, and by the posture of the one performing it—for such things draw it, as piteous postures and cries do. It is not choice or reason that is charmed by music, but the irrational soul; and no one is surprised at this kind of enchantment. Indeed, people love being charmed, even if that is not what they ask of those who make music. Nor must we think that other prayers are heard by choice. Those charmed by incantations are not charmed that way; nor, when a snake bewitches people, does the bewitched person understand or perceive it. He knows, once he has been affected, that he has been affected, while his ruling part itself remains unaffected. And from the being someone prayed to, something came to him—or to someone else. But the sun, or any other star, does not hear.
καὶ γίνεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν εὐχὴν συμπαθοῦς μέρους μέρει γενομένου, ὥσπερ ἐν μιᾷ νευρᾷ τεταμένῃ· κινηθεῖσα γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κάτω καὶ ἄνω ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἄλλης κινηθείσης ἄλλη οἷον αἴσθησιν ἔχει κατὰ συμφωνίαν καὶ τῷ ὑπὸ μιᾷ ἡρμόσθαι ἁρμονίᾳ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ λύρᾳ ἡ κίνησις ἀπ’ ἄλλης ἔρχεται, ὅσον τὸ συμπαθές, καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τοίνυν μία ἁρμονία, κἂν ἐξ ἐναντίων ᾖ· καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίων δέ ἐστι καὶ πάντων συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ ὅσα λωβᾶται ἀνθρώποις, οἷον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἑλχθὲν μετὰ χολῆς εἰς ἥπατος φύσιν, ἦλθεν οὐχ ὡς λωβησόμενα· οἷον εἰ πῦρ τις ἐκ πυρὸς λαβὼν ἔβλαψεν ἄλλον οὐ μηχανησάμενος [εἰς ἐκεῖνον] ἐλθεῖν.
What is prayed for comes about because one part is in sympathy with another, as on a single stretched string: plucked at the bottom, it moves at the top as well. Often, too, when one string is plucked, another has, as it were, a perception of it, because of their concord and because they are tuned to a single harmony. And if the movement passes even from one lyre to another, as far as sympathy reaches, then in the All too there is a single harmony, even if it is made of opposites; it is also made of things that are alike, and all are akin, even the opposites. And the things that harm human beings—the spirited part, for instance, drawn along with bile into the substance of the liver—did not come in order to harm. It is as if someone took fire from a fire and harmed another without having contrived that it should go [to him].
ἢ ὁ λαβὼν ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ, τῷ δεδωκέναι γοῦν τι οἷον μεταθέντα ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο· καὶ τὸ ἐληλυθὸς δέ, εἰ μὴ οἷός τε ἐγένετο δέξασθαι εἰς ὃν μετηνέχθη.
Or rather, the man who took it does act, at least in that he gave something, transferring it, as it were, from one place to another; and so does what arrived, if the one to whom it was carried was unable to receive it.
ὥστε οὔτε μνήμης διὰ τοῦτο δεήσει τοῖς ἄστροις, οὗπερ χάριν καὶ ταῦτα πεπραγμάτευται, οὔτε αἰσθήσεων ἀναπεμπομένων· οὐδὲ ἐπινεύσεις τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εὐχαῖς, ὡς οἴονταί τινες, προαιρετικάς τινας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ’ εὐχῆς γίνεσθαί τι δοτέον καὶ εὐχῆς ἄνευ παρ’ αὐτῶν, ᾗ μέρη καὶ [αὐτὰ] ἑνός· καὶ ὅτι δυνάμεις καὶ χωρὶς προαιρέσεως πολλαὶ καὶ αὗται καὶ ἄνευ μηχανῆς καὶ μετὰ τέχνης, ὡς ἐν ζῴῳ ἑνί, καὶ ἀπολαύει ἄλλο ἄλλου καὶ βλάπτεται τῷ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, καὶ τέχναις καὶ ἰατρῶν καὶ ἐπαοιδῶν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἠναγκάσθη παρασχεῖν τι τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αὑτοῦ. καὶ τὸ πᾶν δὲ ὡσαύτως εἰς τὰ μέρη δίδωσι καὶ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑλκύσαντος ἄλλου εἰς μέρος τι αὐτοῦ κείμενον τοῖς αὑτοῦ μέρεσι τῷ αὐτῷ φυσικῷ, ὡς μηδενὸς ἀλλοτρίου τοῦ αἰτοῦντος ὄντος.
So for this reason the stars will not need memory—which is why we went into all this—nor perceptions sent up to them. Nor, in this way, do they give nods of assent to prayers by some act of choice, as some people think. We must grant that something comes from them both with prayer and without prayer, insofar as they are [themselves] parts of one being; and that there are many powers, these too, without choice, both without contrivance and with art, as in a single living being. One thing benefits from another and is harmed by another because it is so by nature, and by the arts of doctors and of enchanters one thing has been compelled to give another something of its own power. And the All likewise gives to its parts, both of itself and when something else draws on it for some part of it—what lies laid up in its own parts—by the same natural process, since no one who asks is a stranger to it.
εἰ δὲ κακὸς ὁ αἰτῶν, θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ ποταμῶν ἀρύονται οἱ κακοὶ καὶ τὸ διδὸν αὐτὸ οὐκ οἶδεν ὃ δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ δίδωσι μόνον· ἀλλ’ ὅμως συντέτακται καὶ δέδοται τῇ φύσει τοῦ παντός. ὥστε εἴ τις ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῶν πᾶσι κειμένων, οὐ δέον ἕπεσθαι αὐτῷ ἀναγκαίῳ νόμῳ τὴν δίκην.
If the one asking is bad, there is no need for surprise: bad people draw water from rivers too, and what gives does not know what it gives; it simply gives. Even so, this too has been coordinated and given within the nature of the All. So if someone has taken what he should not from what is set out for all, justice follows him by a necessary law.
οὔκουν δοτέον τὸ πᾶν πάσχειν· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἡγεμονοῦν αὐτοῦ ἀπαθὲς δοτέον πάντη εἶναι, γιγνομένων δὲ παθῶν ἐν μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνοις μὲν ἥκειν τὸ πάθος, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῷ ὄντος ἀπαθὲς τὸ γενόμενον ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄστροις, καθ’ ὅσον μὲν μέρη, τὰ πάθη, ἀπαθῆ μέντοι αὐτὰ τῷ τε τὰς προαιρέσεις καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς φύσεις ἀβλαβεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῷ, καὶ εἰ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τι διδόασι, μὴ ἐλαττοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ μένειν καί, εἴ τι ὑπεκρεῖ, ἀναισθήτως ἀπιόντος καὶ τοῦ προσιόντος, εἰ πρόσεισι, λανθάνοντος.
So we must not grant that the All is affected. Or rather, we must grant that its ruling part is wholly unaffected; when affections occur in its parts, the affection reaches those parts, but since nothing is contrary to nature for the All, what happens is no affection as far as it is concerned. The stars too have affections insofar as they are parts; yet they themselves are unaffected, because their choices are unaffected and their bodies and natures are unharmed; because, even if they give something through their soul, their soul is not diminished; and because their bodies remain the same—if anything flows away, it leaves imperceptibly, and what comes to them, if anything does, goes unnoticed.
ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος πῶς ὑπὸ γοητείας καὶ φαρμάκων; ἢ τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀπαθὴς εἰς γοήτευσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ λογικὸν αὐτοῦ πάθοι, οὐδ’ ἂν μεταδοξάσειε· τὸ δὲ ὅσον τοῦ παντὸς ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλογον κατὰ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔρωτας ἐκ φαρμάκων, εἴπερ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἐπινευούσης καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἄλλης τῷ τῆς ἄλλης παθήματι. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπῳδαῖς τὸ ἄλογον πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντεπᾴδων τὰς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεις ἀναλύσει· θάνατον δὲ ἐκ τοιούτων ἢ νόσους ἢ ὅσα σωματικὰ πάθοι ἄν. τὸ γὰρ μέρος τοῦ παντὸς ὑπὸ μέρους ἄλλου ἢ τοῦ παντὸς πάθοι ἄν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀβλαβής. τὸ δὲ μὴ εὐθύς, ἀλλ’ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ φύσεως.
And how is the good man affected by sorcery and drugs? Or rather, in his soul he is immune to enchantment: his rational part would not be affected or change its opinion. But in whatever of the All’s irrational element is in him, he could be affected in that respect—or rather, that part could be affected. Yet he would not fall in love because of drugs, if indeed loving requires that one soul also consent to what the other is undergoing. And just as the irrational part is affected by incantations, so he himself will undo the powers working there by counter-incantations. Death from such causes, though, or diseases, or anything bodily, he might suffer. For the part of the All might be affected by another part, or by the All, but he himself is unharmed. That the effect comes not at once but later is no departure from nature.
δαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἀπαθεῖς οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ· μνήμας δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τούτοις οὐκ ἄτοπον διδόναι καὶ θέλγεσθαι φυσικῶς ἀγομένους καὶ κατακούειν καλούντων τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐγγυτέρω τῶν τῇδε καὶ ὅσῳ πρὸς τὰ τῇδε. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο γοητεύεται ὑπ’ ἄλλου· πρὸς ὃ γάρ ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο γοητεύει καὶ ἄγει αὐτό· μόνον δὲ τὸ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἀγοήτευτον. διὸ καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξις γεγοήτευται καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ βίος· κινεῖται γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἃ θέλγει αὐτόν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ‘εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος Ἐρεχθέως δῆμος.’ τί γὰρ μαθών τις πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει; ἢ ἑλκόμενος οὐ μάγων τέχναις, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀπάτην δούσης καὶ συναψάσης ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο οὐ τοῖς τόποις, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἔδωκε φίλτροις.
Spirits too are not unaffected in their irrational part. It is not absurd to grant them memories and perceptions, and to say that they are charmed, being drawn by nature, and that they give ear to those who call on them—the ones of them that are nearer to things here, and in proportion as they are turned toward things here. For everything that is directed toward something else is enchanted by something else: what it is directed toward enchants and draws it. Only what is directed toward itself is free from enchantment. That is why every action is under a spell, and so is the whole life of the man of action: he is moved toward the things that charm him. Hence the saying, “For the people of great-hearted Erechtheus has a fair face.” What makes anyone turn toward something else? He is drawn—not by the arts of magicians, but by nature, which supplies the deception and joins one thing to another, not in place, but by the love potions it has given.
μόνη δὴ λείπεται ἡ θεωρία ἀγοήτευτος εἶναι, ὅτι μηδεὶς πρὸς αὑτὸν γεγοήτευται· εἷς γάρ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ θεωρούμενον αὐτός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἠπατημένος, ἀλλ’ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ζωὴν καὶ τὸ ἔργον ποιεῖ. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὑτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὁ λόγος τὴν ὁρμήν, ἀλλ’ ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, αἱ τοῦ πάθους προτάσεις. τέκνων μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ πρὸς γάμον σπουδαὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὁλκὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσα τε ἀνθρώπους δελεάζει ἡδέα γινόμενα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. πράξεις δὲ αἱ μὲν διὰ θυμὸν ἀλόγως κινοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δι’ ἐπιθυμίας ὡσαύτως, πολιτεῖαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχῶν ὀρέξεις τὸ φίλαρχον τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἔχουσι προκαλούμενον. καὶ αἱ μὲν γινόμεναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι τὸν φόβον, αἱ δ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλείονος τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.
Only contemplation, then, is left free from enchantment, because no one is enchanted by himself. He is one; what he contemplates is himself; and his reason is not deceived but does what it should, producing its own life and its own work. But in the other case the work is not one’s own, and reason does not supply the impulse; the irrational too is a starting point—the premises that passion supplies. Care for children and eagerness for marriage have an obvious pull, and so do all the pleasures that bait people through their desires. As for actions, some are set in motion irrationally by anger, others likewise by desires; political life and the craving for office have our love of power summoning them. Those done to avoid suffering have fear as their origin; those done to get more, desire.
αἱ δὲ τῶν χρειωδῶν χάριν τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἔνδειαν ζητοῦσαι ἀποπληροῦν φανερῶς ἔχουσι τὴν τῆς φύσεως βίαν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οἰκειώσασαν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὰς πράξεις τῶν καλῶν ἀγοητεύτους εἶναι, ἢ καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν καλῶν οὖσαν γοητεύεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ τὰς καλὰς λεγομένας πράξεις πράττοι [οὐκ] ἄλλο τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ἔχων, οὐ γεγοήτευται· οἶδε γὰρ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῇδε βλέπει οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ὁ βίος· ἀλλὰ τῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης βίᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκειώσει· δοκεῖ γὰρ εὔλογον ἴσως μὴ ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν διὰ τὴν οἰκείωσιν· ὅτι οὕτως ἐγοητεύθη.
Actions done for the sake of necessities, seeking to fill up nature’s lack, plainly have behind them the compulsion of nature, which has made living dear to us. But suppose someone says that actions aimed at fine things are free from enchantment—or else we would have to say that contemplation too, since it is of fine things, is enchanted. Then: if a man does even the so-called fine actions as necessary ones, while holding that what is truly fine is something else, he is not enchanted. For he knows the necessity, and does not look to what is here, nor is his life directed to other things. He acts under the compulsion of human nature and of attachment to life, the life of others or even his own—for it seems reasonable, perhaps, not to take himself out of life, because of that attachment—since to that extent he has been enchanted.
εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀγαπήσας καλὸν τὰς πράξεις αἱρεῖται ἀπατηθεὶς τοῖς ἴχνεσι τοῦ καλοῦ, γεγοήτευται τὸ περὶ τὰ κάτω καλὸν διώκων· ὅλως γὰρ ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐοικὸς τῷ ἀληθεῖ πραγματεία καὶ ὁλκὴ εἰς αὐτὸ πᾶσα ἠπατημένου ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτὰ ἑλκόντων. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ τῆς φύσεως γοητεία ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν διώκειν ἑλχθέντα τῷ ἐκείνου εἴδει ἀλόγοις ὁρμαῖς, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγομένου ὅπου μὴ ἤθελεν οὐκ εἰδότος. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἄν τις ἄλλο ἢ γοητείαν εἴποι; μόνος οὖν ἀγοήτευτος, ὃς ἑλκόμενος τοῖς ἄλλοις αὑτοῦ μέρεσι τούτων οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν λέγει εἶναι ὧν ἐκεῖνα λέγει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὃ οἶδεν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠπατημένος οὐδὲ διώκων, ἀλλ’ ἔχων. οὐκ ἂν οὖν ἕλκοιτο οὐδαμοῦ.
But if he has come to love the fine in actions and chooses actions because he is deceived by the traces of the fine, he is enchanted, pursuing the fine in the things below. In general, all concern with what resembles the true, and every pull toward it, belongs to someone deceived by the things that draw him toward them. This is what nature’s enchantment does. To pursue what is not good as good, drawn by its appearance through irrational impulses—that is to be led, without knowing it, where one did not want to go. And what could anyone call this but enchantment? Only he, then, is free from enchantment who, though drawn by the other parts of himself, says that none of the things those parts call good is good, but only what he knows himself, not deceived and not pursuing, but possessing it. Such a man could not be drawn anywhere.
Each soul finds its place
Each soul is carried by the law of the whole to the place its nature deserves.
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἁπάντων ἐκεῖνο φανερόν, ὅτι, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔχει φύσεως καὶ διαθέσεως, οὕτω τοι συντελεῖ εἰς τὸ πᾶν καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου ζῴου ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, ὡς ἔχει φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς, οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συντελεῖ καὶ ὑπουργεῖ καὶ τάξεως καὶ χρείας ἠξίωται· δίδωσι δὲ τὸ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ δέχεται τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσων αὐτοῦ δεκτικὴ ἡ φύσις, καὶ οἷον συναίσθησις παντὸς πρὸς πᾶν, καὶ εἰ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μερῶν καὶ ζῷον ἦν, εἶχεν ἂν καὶ ζῴου ἔργα ἕτερα ὄντα τῶν τοῦ μέρους.
From all that has been said, this much is clear. Each thing in the All, according to the nature and disposition it has, contributes to the All, is affected and acts; just as in each living being each of the parts, according to its nature and structure, contributes to the whole, serves it, and has been assigned its rank and function. It gives what comes from itself and receives from the others whatever its nature can receive, and there is, as it were, a self-awareness of all with all. And if each of the parts were also a living being, it would also have the functions of a living being, which differ from those of a part.
καὶ δὴ κἀκεῖνο ἀναφαίνεται, ὅπως τὸ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἔχει, ὡς ποιοῦντές τι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ μόνον ὅσα σῶμα πρὸς σῶμα καὶ πάσχον αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην αὑτῶν φύσιν εἰσφερόμεθα συναφθέντες τοῖς συγγενέσιν οἷς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὰ συγγενῆ τῶν ἔξω· καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν καὶ διαθέσεσι συναφεῖς γινόμενοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντες, πρός τε τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐν τῷ δαιμονίῳ τόπῳ καὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λανθάνομεν ὁποῖοί τινες ἐσμέν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πάντες δίδομεν οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν δεχόμεθα· ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἔχομεν πῶς ἂν μεταδοίημεν ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἀγαθόν; οὐδ’ αὖ τῷ μὴ δεκτικῷ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν τι κομιούμεθα.
And it also becomes clear how things stand with us. We too do something in the All, not only what body does to body and undergoes from body in turn; we also bring in the rest of our nature, joined by what is akin to it in us to what is akin to it outside. And since by our souls and dispositions we become connected—or rather, are connected—with what comes next in the region of spirits and with what lies beyond them, there is no way we can hide what sort of people we are. So we do not all give the same things, nor do we receive the same. How could we share with another what we do not have—something good, for instance? Nor, again, shall we bring anything good to what is not receptive of good.
τὴν οὖν αὑτοῦ τις κακίαν συνάψας ἐγνώσθη τε ὅς ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὤσθη εἰς ὃ ἔχει, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπαλλαγεὶς εἰς ἄλλον τοιοῦτον τόπον φύσεως ὁλκαῖς. τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ αἵ τε λήψεις αἵ τε δόσεις καὶ αἱ μεταθέσεις ἄλλαι, ὥσπερ ἐκ μηρίνθων ὁλκαῖς τισι φύσεως μετατιθεμένων.
So someone who has attached his own vice to the whole is known for who he is, and in accordance with his nature is thrust into what he already has; and when he is released from here, he is drawn by the pulls of nature into another place of the same sort. For the good man, the takings and givings and transfers are different, as though they were moved by certain pulls of nature, as if on cords.
οὕτω θαυμαστῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως καὶ τάξεως τόδε τὸ πᾶν γινομένων ἁπάντων ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ κατὰ δίκην, ἣν οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν οὐδενί, ἧς ἐπαίει μὲν ὁ φαῦλος οὐδέν, ἄγεται δὲ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἷ δεῖ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φέρεσθαι· ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ οἶδε, καὶ οὗ δεῖ ἄπεισι, καὶ γινώσκει πρὶν ἀπιέναι οὗ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἐλθόντι οἰκεῖν, καὶ εὔελπίς ἐστιν, ὡς μετὰ θεῶν ἔσοιτο. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγῳ ζῴῳ σμικραὶ τῶν μερῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ καὶ συναισθήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μέρη ζῷα εἶναι, εἰ μή που ἐπὶ βραχὺ ἔν τισιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐν ᾧ διαστάσεις τε τοσαῦται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ χάλασιν ἔχει καὶ ζῷά ἐστι πολλά, τὰς κινήσεις δεῖ καὶ τὰς μεταστάσεις μείζους εἶναι.
So wonderful are the power and order of this All: all things go “on a silent path, according to justice,” which no one can escape. The base man perceives nothing of it, but is led, without knowing it, to where in the All he must be carried. The good man knows it, goes where he must, knows before he goes where he must dwell when he arrives, and has good hope that he will be with gods. In a small living being the changes in the parts and their self-awareness are small, and its parts cannot be living beings, except perhaps briefly in some cases. But in a being with such great distances in it, where each thing has room to move and there are many living beings, the movements and changes of place must be greater.
ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα ἐν τάξει μετατιθέμενα καὶ μετακινούμενα. οὐ τοίνυν ἄλογον οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς μετατίθεσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἦθος σωζομένας, ταττομένας δὲ ἀνάλογον ὧν ἔπαθον καὶ ποιοῦσι τάξιν, [τὰς μὲν] οἷον κεφαλῆς, τὰς δὲ οἷον ποδῶν λαβούσας, πρὸς τὸ πᾶν σύμφωνον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινόν τε καὶ χεῖρον. ἡ δ’ ἂν μήτε τὸ ἄμεινον τὸ ἐνταῦθα αἱρῆται, μήτε τοῦ χείρονος μετέχουσα ᾖ, ἄλλον τόπον καὶ καθαρὸν ἠλλάξατο τοῦτον, ὃν εἵλετο, λαβοῦσα.
We see the sun and moon and the other stars changing place and moving in order. So it is not unreasonable that souls too should change place, not always keeping the same character, but ranked in proportion to what they have undergone and what they do, [some] taking the rank of a head, as it were, others of feet, in harmony with the All; for the All too has differences toward better and worse. A soul that neither chooses the better here nor has any share in the worse has exchanged this place for another, pure one, receiving the one it chose.
αἱ δὲ κολάσεις ὥσπερ νενοσηκότων μερῶν, τῶν μὲν ἐπιστύψεις φαρμάκοις, τῶν δὲ ἐξαιρέσεις ἢ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὸ πᾶν ἑκάστου διατιθεμένου οὗ δεῖ· τὸ δ’ ὑγιεινὸν τοῦ παντὸς [τοῦ μὲν] ἀλλοιουμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἐξαιρουμένου ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἐνθαδὶ νοσοῦντος, οὗ δὲ μὴ νοσήσει τιθεμένου.
Punishments are like the treatment of diseased parts: for some, astringent drugs; for others, removal, or alteration, so that the All may be healthy, with each thing put where it should be. And the All’s health comes about as [one part] is altered and another removed from here, as being sick here, and placed where it will not be sick.