Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπερεθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, εἰ μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ ἔστιν ὁρᾶν, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου του λεγομένου διαφανοῦς σώματος, νῦν σκεπτέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν διὰ σώματός τινος δεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὅλως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίγνεσθαι, εἴρηται· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ σώματος πάντη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος ἀντιλήψεως οὐ νοητῶν, ἀλλὰ αἰσθητῶν μόνον, δεῖ πως τὴν ψυχὴν συναφῆ γενομένην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς διὰ τῶν προσομοίων κοινωνίαν τινὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ γνώσεως ἢ παθήματος ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ δι’ ὀργάνων σωματικῶν ἡ γνῶσις· διὰ γὰρ τούτων οἷον συμφυῶν ἢ συνεχῶν ὄντων οἷον εἰς ἕν πως πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἰέναι, ὁμοπαθείας τινὸς οὕτω πρὸς αὐτὰ γινομένης. εἰ οὖν δεῖ συναφήν τινα πρὸς τὰ γινωσκόμενα γίνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τῶν ὅσα ἁφῇ τινι γινώσκεται, τί ἄν τις ζητοῖ;
Since we put off the question whether one can see when there is nothing in between—such as air, or some other body called transparent—we must examine it now. That seeing, and perception in general, must take place through some body has already been said: without body, the soul is wholly in the intelligible. And since perceiving is the apprehension not of intelligibles but only of perceptibles, the soul must in a way come into contact with perceptibles and, through things like them, establish a kind of communion with them, of knowledge or of affection. That is why knowledge here comes through bodily organs: through these, which are as it were grown together with the perceptibles or continuous with them, it goes, so to speak, into a kind of unity with the perceptibles themselves, and in this way a kind of shared affection with them arises. So if there must be some contact with the things known, why would anyone ask about the things known by some kind of touch?
περὶ δὲ τῆς ὁράσεως — εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ὕστερον· ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν, εἰ δεῖ τι μεταξὺ εἶναι σῶμα τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ χρώματος. ἢ νύττοι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν τὸ μεταξὺ σῶμα, συμβάλλεται δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ὅρασιν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν.
But about sight—and whether about hearing too, we shall see later—about seeing, the question is whether there must be some body between the sight and the color. Or rather, the body in between might impinge on it incidentally, but contributes nothing to vision for those who see.
ἀλλ’ εἰ πυκνὰ μὲν ὄντα τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ τὰ γεηρά, κωλύει ὁρᾶν, ὅσῳ δὲ λεπτότερα ἀεὶ τὰ μεταξύ, μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν, κωλυτικὰ ἄν τις τοῦ ὁρᾶν τὰ μεταξὺ θείη, ἤ, εἰ οὐ κωλυτικὰ οὐ συνεργὰ ταῦτα ἄν τις εἴποι. ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ πάθος πρότερον τὸ μεταξὺ παραδέχεται καὶ οἷον τυποῦται· σημεῖον δὲ τό, εἰ καὶ ἔμπροσθέν τις ἡμῶν ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῶμα βλέπων, κἀκεῖνον ὁρᾶν· πάθους ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ μὴ γενομένου οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ἀφικνοῖτο. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μεταξὺ πάσχειν, εἰ τὸ πεφυκὸς πάσχειν πάσχει, ἤ, εἰ πάσχοι, ἄλλο πάσχει· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ὁ κάλαμος ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς νάρκης καὶ τῆς χειρὸς [πάσχει], ὃ πάσχει ἡ χείρ. καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖ, εἰ μὴ μεταξὺ ὁ κάλαμος εἴη καὶ ἡ θρίξ, οὐκ ἂν πάθοι ἡ χείρ.
But if dense bodies, such as earthy ones, prevent seeing, and the finer the things in between, the better we see, one might set down what is in between as a hindrance to seeing—or, if not a hindrance, one might at least say it is no help. But suppose the medium receives the affection first and is, as it were, stamped by it. A sign of this would be that if someone stands in front of us looking toward the color, he sees it too: if no affection arose in the medium, it would not reach us either. Or rather, the medium need not be affected, if what is naturally fit to be affected is affected; or, if it is affected, it undergoes something different. For the rod between the electric ray and the hand does not [undergo] what the hand undergoes. And yet there too, if the rod and the line were not in between, the hand would not be affected.
ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀμφισβητοῖτο ἄν· καὶ γάρ, εἰ ἐντὸς δικτύου γένοιτο, ὁ θηρευτὴς πάσχειν λέγεται τὸ ναρκᾶν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς λεγομένας συμπαθείας ἰέναι. εἰ δὲ τοδὶ ὑπὸ τουδὶ πέφυκε πάσχειν συμπαθῶς τῷ τινα ὁμοιότητα ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν τὸ μεταξὺ ἀνόμοιον ὂν πάθοι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἂν πάθοι. εἰ [δὲ] τοῦτο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ πάθοι ἂν τὸ πεφυκὸς πάσχειν, κἂν τὸ μεταξὺ τοιοῦτον ᾖ, οἷον καὶ αὐτὸ παθεῖν τι.
Or rather, even this might be disputed: if the ray gets inside a net, the fisherman is said to feel the numbness. But the argument seems to be heading for the so-called sympathies. If this thing is naturally affected by that one sympathetically because it has some likeness to it, then the medium, being unlike, would not be affected, or not in the same way. [And] if so, what is naturally fit to be affected would be affected much more when there is nothing in between—even if the medium is such as to be affected itself in some way.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ὁρᾶν, οἷον τὸ τῆς ὄψεως φῶς συνάπτειν πρὸς τὸ φῶς μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, δεῖ μεταξὺ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ φῶς, καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις αὕτη τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦτο ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ τροπὴν ἐργάζεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα κεχρωσμένον, τί κωλύει τὴν τροπὴν εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ ὄμμα ἰέναι μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξύ; εἰ καὶ νῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἐστὶ τρέπεταί πως τὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πρόσθεν κείμενον. καὶ οἱ ἐκχέοντες δὲ τὰς ὄψεις οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἀκολουθοῦν τὸ πάντως μεταξύ τι εἶναι, εἰ μὴ φοβοῖντο, μὴ πέσοι ἡ ἀκτίς· ἀλλὰ φωτός ἐστι καὶ τὸ φῶς εὐθυποροῦν. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἔνστασιν αἰτιώμενοι δέοιντο ἂν πάντως τοῦ μεταξύ.
Now if seeing is of such a kind that the light of the eye joins with the light that stretches as far as the perceptible, then this light must be in between, and this hypothesis requires this medium. But if the colored underlying body produces an alteration, what prevents the alteration from going straight to the eye with nothing in between?—even if, as things are, when there is something in between, what lies in front of the eyes is necessarily altered in some way. Those who have sight pour out from the eyes would not be committed to there being anything in between at all, unless they feared the ray might fall; but it is a ray of light, and light travels straight. Those who make pressure the cause would certainly need the medium.
οἱ δὲ τῶν εἰδώλων προστάται διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ λέγοντες διιέναι χώραν ζητοῦσιν, ἵνα μὴ κωλυθῇ· ὥστε, εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον οὐ κωλύσει τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ, οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῇ ὑποθέσει. ὅσοι δὲ συμπαθείᾳ τὸ ὁρᾶν λέγουσιν, ἧττον μὲν ὁρᾶν φήσουσιν, εἴ τι μεταξὺ εἴη, ᾗ κωλύει καὶ ἐμποδίζει καὶ ἀμυδρὰν ποιεῖ τὴν συμπάθειαν· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀκόλουθον λέγειν ποιεῖν πάντως ἀμυδρὰν καὶ τὸ συγγενές, ᾗ καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ σῶμα συνεχὲς ἐν βάθει ἐκ προσβολῆς πυρὸς καίοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν βάθει αὐτοῦ τῇ προσβολῇ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἧττον ἂν πάσχοι.
The champions of images, who say they pass through the void, look for empty room so that the images won’t be hindered; so if having nothing at all in between will hinder them still less, they have no quarrel with the hypothesis. Those who say seeing comes by sympathy will say we see less well if there is something in between, insofar as it hinders, obstructs, and weakens the sympathy. But it is more consistent to say that even what is akin always weakens it, insofar as it too is affected. For if a body continuous in depth were burned by the impact of fire, its inner part would still be less affected by the impact than its front part.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ζῴου ἑνὸς μόρια εἴη συμπαθῆ, ἆρ’ ἂν ἧττον πάθοι, ὅτι μεταξύ τί ἐστιν; ἢ ἧττον μὲν ἂν πάθοι, σύμμετρον δ’ ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, ὅσον ἐβούλετο ἡ φύσις, κωλύοντος τὸ ἄγαν τοῦ μεταξύ· εἰ μή που τοιοῦτον εἴη τὸ διδόμενον, ὥστε ὅλως τὸ μεταξὺ μὴ πάσχειν. ἀλλ’ εἰ συμπαθὲς τῷ ἓν ζῷον εἶναι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν, ὅτι ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἑνός, πῶς οὐ δεῖ, ὅταν τοῦ πόρρω αἴσθησις ᾖ, συνέχειαν εἶναι; ἢ τὴν συνέχειαν καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ διὰ τὸ τὸ ζῷον δεῖν συνεχὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πάθος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς συνεχοῦς, ἢ πᾶν ὑπὸ παντὸς φήσομεν πάσχειν. εἰ δὲ τόδε μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦδε, ἄλλο δὲ ὑπ’ ἄλλου οὐ τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν δέοιτό τις τοῦ μεταξὺ πανταχοῦ.
But if the parts of a single living being are in sympathy, would one be affected less because there is something in between? Or rather, it would be affected less, but the affection would be in due measure, as much as nature intended, the medium preventing excess—unless what is given is such that the medium is not affected at all. But if there is sympathy because it is one living being, and we are affected because we are in one and belong to one, how can there not need to be continuity when there is perception of something far away? Or rather, there is continuity and a medium because the living being must be continuous, but the affection belongs to what is continuous only incidentally—or else we shall say that everything is affected by everything. But if this is affected by that, and something else by something else, not in the same way, one would not need the medium everywhere.
εἰ οὖν ἐπὶ ὄψεως λέγοι τις δεῖσθαι, διὰ τί φατέον· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ πανταχοῦ φαίνεται τὸ δι’ ἀέρος ἰὸν πάσχειν ποιοῦν τὸν ἀέρα, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον διαιρεῖν· οἷον λίθος εἰ ἄνωθεν πίπτοι, τί ἄλλο ἢ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὁ ἀήρ; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῇ ἀντιπεριστάσει εὔλογον κατὰ φύσιν οὔσης τῆς φορᾶς· ἐπεὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἄνω τῇ ἀντιπεριστάσει· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον· φθάνει γὰρ τὸ πῦρ τῇ αὑτοῦ κινήσει ταχείᾳ οὔσῃ τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν τοῦ ἀέρος.
So if someone says it is needed in the case of sight, he must say why. For it does not appear that whatever goes through air always affects the air; it may only divide it. If a stone falls from above, for instance, what happens except that the air does not resist? Nor is it reasonable that it falls by the circular thrust of the air, since its motion is natural; on that account fire too would rise by circular thrust. But that is absurd, for fire, with its own swift motion, outruns the circular thrust of the air.
εἰ δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ τάχους ταχύνεσθαί τις τὴν ἀντιπερίστασίν φησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν γίνοιτο, οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἄνωθεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ξύλων ἡ ὁρμὴ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω οὐκ ὠθούντων· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ κινούμενοι τέμνομεν τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀντιπερίστασις ὠθεῖ, πληροῖ δὲ μόνον ἐφεπόμενος τὸ παρ’ ἡμῶν κενούμενον. εἰ οὖν τοῖς σώμασι διίσταται τοῖς τοιούτοις μηδὲν παθών, τί κωλύει καὶ ἄνευ διαστάσεως συγχωρεῖν παριέναι τοῖς εἰς ὄψιν εἴδεσιν; εἰ δὲ μηδὲ πάρεισιν ὡς ἐν ῥοῇ τὰ εἴδη, τίς πάσχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάθος πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῷ προπαθεῖν ἰέναι; εἰ γὰρ τῷ προπαθεῖν τὸν ἀέρα ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποντες τὸ ὁρώμενον εἴδομεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ παρακειμένου ἔσχομεν ἂν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι.
And if someone says the circular thrust is quickened by the speed, that would happen incidentally, and not so as to drive anything upward; for even from burning logs the rush upward happens without their pushing. When we move, too, we cut the air, and the circular thrust does not push us; the air simply follows behind and fills what we leave empty. So if the air parts for such bodies without being affected, what prevents it from letting the forms that come to the sight pass through even without parting? And if the forms do not even pass through as in a flow, what necessity is there for the air to be affected, and for the affection to reach us through it by its being affected first? For if we perceived because the air was affected first, we would not see by looking at the visible object itself; we would get the perception from what lies next to us, as happens with being warmed.
ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὸ πόρρωθεν πῦρ, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ παρακείμενος θερμανθεὶς θερμαίνειν δοκεῖ· ἁφῇ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁράμασιν οὐχ ἁφῇ· ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἐπιτεθὲν τῷ ὄμματι τὸ αἰσθητὸν ὁρᾶν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ φωτισθῆναι δεῖ τὸ μεταξύ, ὅτι σκοτεινὸν ὁ ἀήρ. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τούτου σκοτεινοῦ οὐδ’ ἂν ἐδέησε φωτὸς ἴσως. τὸ γὰρ σκοτεινὸν ἐμπόδιον ὂν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δεῖ κρατηθῆναι τῷ φωτί. τάχα δὲ καὶ προσαχθὲν τῇ ὄψει οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ὅτι σκιὰν φέρει τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ.
There it is not the distant fire but the adjacent air, once heated, that seems to warm us; for that is by touch, while in seeing it is not by touch. That is why a perceptible placed right on the eye does not make it see; the medium must be lit, because air is dark. If it were not dark, perhaps there would be no need of light at all. For the dark, being an obstacle to seeing, must be overcome by light. And perhaps an object brought right up to the sight is not seen because it brings with it the shadow of the air and its own.
μέγιστον δὲ μαρτύριον τοῦ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος παθόντος τὸ εἶδος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ὁρᾶν ὥσπερ διαδόσει τὸ νύκτωρ ἐν σκότῳ πῦρ τε καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ τὰς τούτων μορφάς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσει τις ἐν τῷ σκοτεινῷ τὰ εἴδη γενόμενα οὕτω συνάψασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σκότος τοῦ πυρὸς ἐλλάμψαντος τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος. ἐπεὶ καὶ πάνυ πολλοῦ σκότου ὄντος καὶ κεκρυμμένων καὶ τῶν ἄστρων (καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς) καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ παρ’ αὐτῶν μὴ ἐλλάμποντος ἐκ τῶν φρυκτωρίων ὁρᾶται τὸ πῦρ, καὶ ἐκ τῶν πύργων τῶν ταῖς ναυσὶ σημαινόντων. εἰ δὲ καὶ διιέναι τις λέγοι καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ πῦρ ἐναντιούμενος τῇ αἰσθήσει, ἐχρῆν τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ ἀμυδροῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀντίληψιν, οὐκ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐναργές.
The strongest evidence that we do not see the form of the perceptible through the air being affected, as if by a passing-on, is that at night, in darkness, a fire and the stars are seen, and their shapes. No one will say that the forms came to be in the darkness and so made contact with us; otherwise there would be no darkness, since the fire would have lit up its own form. Even when the darkness is very deep, and the stars (and the fire) are hidden, and their light does not shine out, the fire is seen from the beacon towers and from the towers that signal to ships. And if someone, contradicting perception, says that in these cases too the fire passes through, then the sight ought to apprehend the faint thing in the air, not the fire itself in all its brightness.
εἰ δὲ μεταξὺ σκότου ὄντος ὁρᾶται τὸ ἐπέκεινα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μηδενός. ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ ἄν τις ἐπιστήσειε, μὴ τῷ μεταξὺ μηδενὶ οὐκ ἔσται ὁρᾶν, οὐχ ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι μεταξύ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἡ συμπάθεια τοῦ ζῴου ἀναιρεῖται πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν τῷ ἓν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁπωσοῦν εἶναι, ὅτι συμπαθὲς ζῷον τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἑαυτῷ.
And if what lies beyond is seen when darkness is in between, much more will it be seen when nothing is. But one might stop over this: perhaps with nothing at all in between it will not be possible to see—not because there is nothing in between, but because the sympathy of the living being with the things, and that of its parts with one another by being one, would be abolished. For this seems to be what perceiving of any kind depends on: that this All is a living being in sympathy with itself.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ἄλλο ἄλλου τῆς δυνάμεως μετελάμβανε καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πόρρω; τοῦτο δὴ ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄλλος κόσμος ἦν καὶ ἄλλο ζῷον μὴ συντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ ὄψις ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς νώτοις τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἰ ἐθεάσατο ἐκεῖνον ἐκ διαστήματος συμμέτρου, ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τούτῳ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἄν τις μαρτύραιτο εἰς τὸ μὴ τῷ πάσχειν τὸ μεταξὺ τούτῳ τὸ ὁρᾶν γίνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ δὴ πάσχοι τὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, σωματικῶς δήπουθεν ἀνάγκη πάσχειν· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οἷον ἐν κηρῷ τύπον γενέσθαι. μέρος δὴ δεῖ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καθ’ ἕκαστον μόριον τυποῦσθαι· ὥστε καὶ τὸ συναφὲς τῇ ὄψει μόριον τοσοῦτον, ὅσον καὶ ἡ κόρη τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μόριον τοῦ ὁρατοῦ δέχοιτο ἄν.
If it were not, how could one thing share in the power of another, especially of what is far away? This, then, must be examined: if there were another cosmos and another living being, not contributing to this one, and there were an eye on the back of the heaven, would it see that other cosmos from a suitable distance, or would this one have nothing to do with that one? But this later. For now one could bring this further evidence that seeing does not come about through the medium being affected. If the air were affected, it would surely have to be affected bodily, and that means an impression made as in wax. Then a part of the visible object would have to be stamped on each portion of air, so that the portion in contact with the sight would carry only as much as the pupil could receive—the part of the visible object corresponding to its own size.
νῦν δὲ πᾶν τε ὁρᾶται καὶ ὅσοι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, κατά τε τὸ καταντικρὺ ἔκ τε πλαγίων ἐπὶ πολὺ ὁρῶσιν ἐγγύς τε καὶ κατόπιν οὐκ ἐπιπροσθούμενοι· ὥστε ἕκαστον μόριον τοῦ ἀέρος ὅλον οἷον τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ ὁρώμενον ἔχειν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ κατὰ σώματος πάθημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μείζους καὶ ψυχικὰς καὶ ζῴου ἑνὸς συμπαθοῦς ἀνάγκας.
But in fact the whole is seen, and all who are in the air see it, from directly in front and from the sides, over a great distance, close up and from behind, as long as they are not blocked. So each portion of the air holds the whole of, say, the face being seen. And this happens not through a bodily affection, but through greater necessities, belonging to soul and to a single living being in sympathy with itself.
Light and the medium
Plotinus argues that sight does not depend on an affected medium between eye and object.
ἀλλὰ τὸ συναφὲς τῆς ὄψεως φῶς πρὸς τὸ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πῶς; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀέρος οὐ δεῖται, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀέρος ἄνευ λέγοιτο — οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο μεταξὺ κατὰ συμβεβηκός — αὐτὸ δὲ ἂν εἴη μεταξὺ οὐ πάσχον, οὐδ’ ὅλως πάθους ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ἀλλ’ ὅμως τοῦ μεταξύ· εἰ δὲ τὸ φῶς οὐ σῶμα, οὐ σώματος. καὶ δὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν ἁπλῶς δέοιτο ἂν τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ μεταξὺ ἡ ὄψις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πόρρω ὁρᾶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ τὸ φῶς γένοιτο [ἂν] ἄνευ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο σκεπτέον.
But how does it work if the light of the sight joins with the light around the sight and reaches all the way to the perceptible? Or rather, first, it does not need the air in between—unless light cannot be spoken of without air, in which case the air is in between incidentally. The light itself would be in between without being affected; there is no need for affection here at all, but there is still need of the medium. And if light is not a body, there is no need of a body. Moreover, the sight would need external light in between not for seeing simply, but for seeing far off. Whether light could exist without air we shall see later; for now we must examine this.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φῶς τοῦτο τὸ συναφὲς ἔμψυχον γίνεται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ δι’ αὐτοῦ φερομένη καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνομένη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔνδον, ἐν τῷ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δήπουθεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ μεταξὺ φωτός, ἀλλ’ ἁφῇ ἔσται ἐοικὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν, τῆς ὁρατικῆς δυνάμεως ἐν φωτὶ ἀντιλαμβανομένης πάσχοντος οὐδὲν τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται τῆς ὄψεως φορὰ ἐκεῖ. οὗ δὴ ζητητέον, πότερα τῷ διάστημά τι εἶναι ἐκεῖ δεῖ πορευθῆναι τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τῷ σῶμά τι εἶναι ἐν τῷ διαστήματι. καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ σῶμα ἐν τῷ διαστήματι εἶναι, τὸ διεῖργον εἰ ἀφαιρεθείη τοῦτο, ὄψεται· εἰ δ’ ὅτι διάστημα ἁπλῶς, ἀργὴν δεῖ ὑποθέσθαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν δρῶσαν ὅλως.
If this continuous light becomes ensouled, with soul traveling through it and present in it, as with the light inside, then in apprehending—which is what seeing is—it would not need the intervening light. Seeing would be like touch: the visual power apprehends in light, with nothing in between affected, and the sight simply travels there. Here we must ask whether the sight has to travel there because there is some distance, or because there is some body in the distance. If it is because there is a body in the distance, then if this obstruction were removed, it will see. But if it is simply because there is distance, we must suppose the nature of the visible to be idle and to do nothing at all.
ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἷόν τε· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἁφὴ ὅτι ἐγγύς τι λέγει καὶ ἅπτεται, ἀλλὰ τὰς τοῦ ἁπτοῦ πάσχουσα ἀπαγγέλλει διαφοράς, καὶ εἰ μὴ διείργοι τι, κἂν τοῦ πόρρω ᾔσθετο. ἅμα γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ μεταξὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς πυρὸς αἰσθανόμεθα οὐκ ἀναμείναντες θερμανθῆναι ἐκεῖνον. μᾶλλον γοῦν τὸ σῶμα θερμαίνεται τὸ στερεὸν ἢ ὁ ἀήρ· ὥστε δι’ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ αὐτόν. εἰ οὖν ἔχει δύναμιν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ πάσχειν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν, διὰ τί ἄλλου δεῖται μέσου εἰς ὃ δύναται πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι; τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμποδίου ἐστὶ δεῖσθαι.
But that is impossible. Touch does not merely say that something is near and touch it; it is affected, and reports the differences of what it touches, and if nothing intervened it would perceive what is far off too. For the air in between and we perceive fire at the same moment, without waiting for the air to be heated. At any rate a solid body is heated more than the air; so the heat comes rather through the air, but not because of it. If, then, one thing has the power to act and the other the power to be affected, in whatever way, why does it need another medium for what it can do to have its effect? That would be needing an obstacle.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ φῶς προσίῃ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, οὐ πρότερον δεῖ τὸν ἀέρα εἶτα καὶ ἡμᾶς [αἰσθάνεσθαι], ἀλλ’ ἅμα, καὶ πρὶν ἐγγὺς τῆς ὄψεως γενέσθαι πολλάκις ὄντος ἀλλαχοῦ, ὡς μὴ παθόντος τοῦ ἀέρος ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν, μεταξὺ ὄντος τοῦ μὴ πεπονθότος καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς μήπω ἐληλυθότος, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ τὴν ὄψιν συνάψαι. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς ὁρᾶν τὰ ἄστρα ἢ ὅλως πῦρ χαλεπὸν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποθέσει ἀπευθῦναι. εἰ δὲ μένει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς, φωτὸς δὲ δεῖται ὥσπερ βακτηρίας πρὸς τὸ φθάσαι, ἔδει τὴν ἀντίληψιν βίαιον καὶ ἀντερείδοντος εἶναι καὶ τεταμένου τοῦ φωτός, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ᾗ χρῶμα, ἀντιτυποῦν καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ διὰ μέσου αἱ ἁφαί.
When the sun’s light approaches, it is not that the air must [perceive] first and then we; it happens simultaneously, and often before the light has come near the sight, while it is still elsewhere—so that we see without the air being affected, with what is unaffected in between and the light the sight must connect with not yet arrived. And seeing the stars at night, or fire in general, is hard to account for on this hypothesis. And if the soul remains in itself but needs the light like a walking stick to reach its object, the apprehension would have to be forcible, with the light stretched taut and pressing against the object, and the perceptible, as color, would itself have to push back; for that is how contacts through a medium work.
εἶτα καὶ πρότερον ἐγγὺς γέγονε μηδενὸς μεταξὺ ὄντος τότε· οὕτω γὰρ ὕστερον τὸ διὰ μέσου ἅπτεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν γνῶσιν, οἷον τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον συλλογισμῷ· νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. ἀλλ’ εἰ παθεῖν δεῖ τὸ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν φῶς, εἶτα διαδοῦναι μέχρις ὄψεως, ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται ὑπόθεσις τῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ μεταξὺ πρότερον τρεπούσῃ, πρὸς ἣν ἤδη καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἠπόρηται.
Besides, in that case one has already been close to the object before, with nothing in between at the time; that is how touching through a medium later yields knowledge—as if by memory, and still more by inference. But this is not how it is now. And if the light next to the perceptible must be affected and then pass the affection on to the sight, this becomes the same hypothesis as the one in which the perceptible first alters the medium, against which difficulties have already been raised elsewhere.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἆρα ἐνταῦθα συγχωρητέον πάσχοντος τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν κίνησιν τὴν πρώτην τὸν παρακείμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν ψόφον ποιοῦντος τῷ τὸν μέχρι ἀκοῆς ἀέρα πάσχειν τὸ αὐτὸ οὕτως εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν τὸ μεταξὺ τῷ παρεῖναι ἐν μέσῳ, ἀναιρεθέντος δὲ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἅπαξ δὲ γενομένου τοῦ ψόφου, οἷον συμβαλόντων δύο σωμάτων, εὐθέως ἀπαντᾶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν αἴσθησιν; ἢ καὶ δεῖ μὲν ἀέρος τὴν πρώτην τοῦ πληττομένου, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἄλλως τὸ μεταξύ. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ κύριος εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ τοῦ ψόφου· μὴ γὰρ ἂν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι ψόφον δύο σωμάτων συρραγέντων, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀὴρ πληγεὶς ἐν τῇ ταχείᾳ συνόδῳ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξωσθεὶς πλήξας ἔδωκε τῷ ἐφεξῆς μέχρις ὤτων καὶ ἀκοῆς.
As for hearing, must we grant here that the air is affected—the adjacent air receiving the first motion from what makes the sound—and that it reaches perception because the air all the way to the hearing is affected in the same way? Or is the medium there only incidentally, by being present in between, so that if the medium were removed, once the sound had occurred—when two bodies strike together, say—the perception would immediately reach us? Or rather, air is needed for the first stage, the air that is struck, but from there on the medium plays a different role. For here the air seems to be in charge of the sound: no sound would arise at all when two bodies clash unless the air, struck in their rapid coming together and driven out, struck in turn and passed it on to the next air, all the way to the ears and the hearing.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ὁ ἀὴρ κύριος τοῦ ψόφου καὶ τούτου κινηθέντος ἡ πληγή, παρὰ τί ἂν εἶεν αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν φωνῶν καὶ τῶν ψόφων; ἄλλο γὰρ ἠχεῖ χαλκὸς πρὸς χαλκὸν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλο· ὁ δὲ ἀὴρ εἷς καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ πληγή· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ διαφοραί.
But if the air is in charge of the sound, and the stroke is the stroke of this air being moved, what would account for the differences between voices and sounds? Bronze struck against bronze sounds different from bronze against something else, and other things differently again; yet the air is one, and so is the stroke in it. For the differences are not only of loud and soft.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι πρὸς ἀέρα γενομένη πληγὴ ψόφον ἐποίησεν, οὐχ ᾗ ἀὴρ φατέον· τότε γὰρ φωνεῖ, ὅταν στάσιν λάβῃ στερεοῦ σώματος, πρὶν χυθῆναι μένων ὥσπερ στερεόν τι· ὥστε ἀρκεῖν τὰ συγκρούοντα καὶ τὴν σύρρηξιν καὶ ταύτην τὴν πληγὴν εἶναι τὸν ψόφον εἰς αἴσθησιν ἐλθοῦσαν· μαρτυρεῖν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον ἤχους τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ συγκρούσαντος καὶ πλήξαντος ἄλλο ἄλλου· οἷον καὶ ὀστῶν κάμψεις πρὸς ἄλληλα παρατριβομένων ἀέρος μὴ ὄντος μεταξὺ καὶ πρίσεις. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἠπορήσθω ὁμοίου ἤδη καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ζητήματος γενομένου, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως εἶναι, συναισθήσεώς τινος ὡς ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν πάθους ὄντος.
And if we say that a stroke against the air produced a sound, we must say it is not insofar as it is air. For air sounds when it takes on the stability of a solid body, holding together like something solid before it disperses. So the colliding things and the collision would suffice, and this stroke, on reaching perception, is the sound. The sounds inside living beings bear witness to this: they occur not in air but when one thing collides with and strikes another—the bending of bones that grind against each other with no air in between, for instance, and grindings. But let the difficulty about this rest here, since the inquiry has become the same as what was said about sight: the affection of hearing too is a kind of self-awareness, as in a living being.
What light is
Light is an incorporeal activity of luminous bodies, not an affection of the air.
εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς γένοιτο ἂν μὴ ὄντος ἀέρος, οἷον ἡλίου ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιλάμποντος, τοῦ μεταξὺ ὄντος κενοῦ καὶ νῦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι πάρεστι, φωτιζομένου; ἀλλ’ εἰ δι’ αὐτὸν παθόντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τῷ φωτὶ διὰ τὸν ἀέρα· πάθημα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· μὴ ἂν οὖν ἔσεσθαι τὸ πάθημα μὴ ὄντος τοῦ πεισομένου. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρώτως οὐδ’ ᾗ αὐτός. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου σώματος πυρίνου καὶ λαμπροῦ· καὶ δὴ καὶ λίθων τοιούτων φωτεινὴ χρόα. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς ἄλλο ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρόαν τοιαύτην ἰὸν ἆρα ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντος ἐκείνου;
But could light exist even if there were no air—with the sun, say, shining on the surface of bodies, while what lies between is empty, whereas now it is lit only incidentally, because it is there? But if other things are lit because the air is affected, then light also owes its existence to the air, being an affection of it; and so the affection would not exist without the thing to be affected. Or rather, first, light does not belong primarily to the air, nor to it as air. It belongs also to every fiery and bright body in itself; and indeed some stones of this kind have a luminous color. But would what passes into something else from what has such a color exist without the air?
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ποιότης μόνον καί τινος ποιότης, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὔσης πάσης ποιότητος ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φῶς ζητεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἔσται σώματι· εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀπ’ ἄλλου, διὰ τί οὐκ ὄντος ἐφεξῆς σώματος, ἀλλὰ οἷον κενοῦ μεταξύ, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, οὐκ ἔσται καὶ ἐπιβαλεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα; ἀτενὲς γὰρ ὂν διὰ τί οὐ περάσει οὐκ ἐποχούμενον; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον πεσεῖν, καταφερόμενον ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδ’ ὅλως τὸ φωτιζόμενον ἔσται τόδε ἕλκον ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτίζοντος καὶ βιαζόμενον προελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε πάντως ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ, ἢ πάθημα ἄλλου, ὥστε δεῖν εἶναι τὸ πεισόμενον· ἢ ἔδει μένειν ἐληλυθότος· νῦν δὲ ἄπεισιν· ὥστε καὶ ἔλθοι ἄν. ποῦ οὖν;
Now if it is only a quality, the quality of something, then since every quality is in a substrate, light too must look for a body to be in. But if it is an activity coming from something else, why, when there is no body next to it but something like a void in between—if that is possible—will it not exist and reach to what lies beyond? Since it stretches straight out, why will it not cross over without riding on anything? And if it is the kind of thing that can fall, it will be carried downward; for surely the air, or anything lit at all, will not be what draws it from the illuminator and forces it to go forward. It is not an accident, which would have to be entirely in something else, nor the affection of something else, which would require something to be affected. Otherwise it would have had to remain once the source had gone; but as it is, it goes away—so it could also arrive. Arrive where, then?
ἢ τόπον δεῖ μόνον εἶναι. ἢ οὕτω γε ἀπολεῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου σῶμα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ φῶς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὸ φῶς τινος ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἔκ τινος ὑποκειμένου, οὐκ εἰς ὑποκείμενον δέ· πάθοι δ’ ἄν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, εἰ παρείῃ. ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ζωὴ ἐνέργεια οὖσα ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια παθόντος ἄν τινος, οἷον τοῦ σώματος, εἰ παρείη, καὶ μὴ παρόντος δέ ἐστι, τί ἂν κωλύοι καὶ ἐπὶ φωτὸς οὕτως, εἴπερ ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ φωτεινοῦ εἴη; οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ ἀέρος γεννᾷ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ γῇ συμμιγνύμενον σκοτεινὸν ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν ὄντως· ὥστε ὅμοιον εἶναι λέγειν τι γλυκὺ εἶναι, εἰ πικρῷ μιγείη.
Or rather, there need only be place. Or else, on these terms, the sun’s body will lose the activity that goes out from it—and that activity was light. If so, light will not even belong to anything. But the activity comes from a substrate, not into a substrate; though a substrate, if present, might be affected. Life is an activity, the activity of soul, and something—the body, for instance—would be affected by it if present; but it exists even when the body is not present. What would prevent the same being true of light, if it is an activity of what is luminous? Even as things are, it is not the darkness of the air that generates the light; rather, the air, mixed with earth, makes it dark and not really pure. So it would be like saying that something is sweet when it is mixed with something bitter.
εἰ δέ τις τροπὴν λέγοι τοῦ ἀέρος τὸ φῶς, λεκτέον, ὡς ἐχρῆν αὐτὸν τρέπεσθαι τὸν ἀέρα τῇ τροπῇ, καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν αὐτοῦ μὴ σκοτεινὸν γεγονέναι ἠλλοιωμένον. νῦν δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ οἷός ἐστι μένει, ὡς ἂν οὐδὲν παθών. τὸ δὲ πάθημα ἐκείνου δεῖ εἶναι, οὗ πάθημα· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ χρῶμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ· πάρεστι δὲ ὁ ἀήρ. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὑτωσὶ ἐπεσκέφθω.
And if someone says that light is an alteration of the air, we must reply that the air itself would then have to be altered by the alteration, and its darkness would have to have changed into not-darkness. But in fact the air remains just as it is, as if it had undergone nothing. And an affection must belong to that of which it is an affection. So light is not even the air’s color: it exists by itself on its own, and the air is simply present. Let this, then, be examined in this way.
πότερα δὲ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἀνατρέχει; τάχα γὰρ ἄν τι καὶ ἐκ τούτου λάβοιμεν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἔνδοθεν, ὥστε τὸ μετειληφὸς ἔχειν οἰκεῖον ἤδη, τάχα ἄν τις εἶπεν ἀπόλλυσθαι· εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια οὐ ῥέουσα· περιέρρει γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐχεῖτο εἴσω πλέον ἢ ὅσον τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐπεβάλλετο· οὐκ ἂν ἀπολλύοιτο μένοντος ἐν ὑποστάσει τοῦ φωτίζοντος. μετακινουμένου δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τόπῳ, οὐχ ὡς παλιρροίας ἢ μεταρροίας γενομένης, ἀλλ’ ὡς τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐκείνου οὔσης καὶ παραγινομένης, εἰς ὅσον κωλύει οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ πολλαπλασία ἡ ἀπόστασις ἦν ἢ νῦν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦ ἡλίου, ἦν ἂν καὶ μέχρι ἐκεῖ φῶς μηδενὸς κωλύοντος μηδὲ ἐμποδὼν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἱσταμένου.
Does light perish, or run back? Perhaps from this too we might gain something for the earlier question. Or rather, if it were inside, so that what has received a share of it already had it as its own, one might perhaps say it perishes. But if it is an activity that does not flow—for then it would flow around and pour inward beyond what was cast out by the active thing—it would not perish so long as the illuminator remains in existence. When the illuminator moves, the light is in another place, not because there has been a flowing back or a change of current, but because the activity belongs to that thing and is present as far as nothing prevents it. Indeed, if the sun were many times farther from us than it is now, there would be light even that far, as long as nothing prevented it or stood in the way in between.
ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργεια καὶ οἷον ζωὴ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ φωτεινοῦ πλείων καὶ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ πηγή· ἡ δὲ μετὰ τὸ πέρας τοῦ σώματος, εἴδωλον τοῦ ἐντός, ἐνέργεια δευτέρα οὐκ ἀφισταμένη τῆς προτέρας. ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐνέργειαν, ἥ ἐστιν ὁμοίωμα αὐτοῦ, ὥστε αὐτοῦ ὄντος κἀκεῖνο εἶναι καὶ μένοντος φθάνειν εἰς τὸ πόρρω, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἔλαττον· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀμυδραί, αἱ δὲ καὶ λανθάνουσαι, τῶν δ’ εἰσὶ μείζους καὶ εἰς τὸ πόρρω· καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ πόρρω, ἐκεῖ δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι, ὅπου τὸ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ δυνάμενον, καὶ αὖ οὗ φθάνει.
The activity within the luminous body is, as it were, its life, the greater activity, and, as it were, the origin and spring of the activity. The one beyond the boundary of the body, an image of what is within, is a second activity that does not separate from the first. For each of the things that are has an activity that is a likeness of it, so that while the thing exists, that exists too, and while the thing remains, it reaches out into the distance—some farther, some less far. Some activities are weak and faint, some even go unnoticed, while those of other things are greater and reach far. And when an activity reaches far, we must think of it as being there, where the active and powerful thing is, and also where it reaches.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἰδεῖν ζῴων λαμπόντων τοῖς ὄμμασι, γινομένου αὐτοῖς φωτὸς καὶ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ζῴων, ἃ ἔνδον συνεστραμμένον πῦρ ἔχοντα ταῖς ἀνοιδάνσεσιν ἐν σκότῳ ἐκλάμπει εἰς τὸ ἔξω, καὶ ἐν ταῖς συστολαῖς αὐτῶν οὐδέν ἐστι φῶς ἔξω, οὐδ’ αὖ ἐφθάρη, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω. τί οὖν; εἰσελήλυθεν; ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ πῦρ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ἀλλ’ ἔδυ εἰς τὸ εἴσω. τὸ οὖν φῶς ἔδυ καὶ αὐτό;
One can see this also with the eyes of animals whose eyes shine: light arises for them outside their eyes as well. And with animals that have fire concentrated inside them, which shine out into the darkness when they swell, while when they contract there is no light outside—nor has it perished: it either is outside or it is not. What, then? Has it gone inside? Or rather, it is not outside, because the fire too is no longer directed outward but has sunk inward. Did the light, then, sink in as well?
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μόνον· δύντος δὲ ἐπίπροσθέν ἐστι τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα, ὡς μὴ ἐνεργεῖν ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ ἔξω. ἔστιν οὖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων φῶς ἐνέργεια φωτεινοῦ σώματος πρὸς τὸ ἔξω· αὐτὸ δὲ ὅλως τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν, ἃ δὴ πρώτως ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, οὐσία ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ φωτεινοῦ πρώτως σώματος. ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἀναμιχθῇ, χρόαν ἔδωκε· μόνη δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐ δίδωσιν, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐπιχρώννυσιν, ἅτε οὖσα ἄλλου κἀκείνου οἷον ἐξηρτημένη, οὗ τὸ ἀποστὰν κἀκείνου τῆς ἐνεργείας ἄπεστιν. ἀσώματον δὲ πάντως δεῖ τιθέναι, κἂν σώματος ᾖ. διὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπελήλυθε κυρίως οὐδὲ τὸ πάρεστιν, ἀλλὰ τρόπον ἕτερον ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐνέργεια.
No: only the fire did. Once it has sunk in, the rest of the body stands in front of it, so that it does not act outward. The light from bodies, then, is the activity of a luminous body directed outward. But the light itself, the light in bodies of this kind (those that are such primarily), is wholly the being that corresponds to the form of the primarily luminous body. When a body of this kind is mixed with matter, it gives color. The activity alone does not give color; it only, as it were, tints the surface, since it belongs to something else and is, as it were, suspended from it, so that whatever moves away from that thing moves away from its activity too. Still, it must certainly be counted as incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body. That is why “it has gone away” and “it is present” are not said of it in the strict sense, but in a different way: its reality is that of an activity.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ εἴδωλον ἐνέργειαν λεκτέον τοῦ ἐνορωμένου ποιοῦντος εἰς τὸ πάσχειν δυνάμενον οὐ ῥέοντος· ἀλλ’ εἰ πάρεστι, κἀκεῖνο ἐκεῖ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ὡς εἴδωλον χρόας ἐσχηματισμένης ὡδί. κἂν ἀπέλθῃ, οὐκέτι τὸ διαφανὲς ἔχει, ὃ ἔσχε πρότερον, ὅτε παρεῖχεν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνεργεῖν τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅσον ἐνέργεια ἄλλης προτέρας, μενούσης τῆς προτέρας μένει καὶ ἡ ἐφεξῆς ἐνέργεια. εἴ τις δὲ μὴ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐνεργείας, οἵαν ἐλέγομεν τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν ἤδη ζωήν, ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀναμεμιγμένον ἤδη τοῖς σώμασιν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα τῷ καὶ συμμεμῖχθαι τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ χρῶμα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ζωῆς τῆς τοῦ σώματος τί; ἢ παρακειμένης ψυχῆς ἄλλης ἔχει.
The image in a mirror, too, must be called an activity of the thing seen in it, acting on what is able to be affected, without flowing out. If the thing is present, the image appears there too, and exists in this way, as an image of color shaped like this. And if the thing goes away, the transparent surface no longer has what it had before, when the thing seen was there to act on it. So also with soul: insofar as it is the activity of another, prior soul, the subsequent activity remains as long as the prior one remains. But what about something that is not an activity but comes from an activity, like what we called the body’s life, which is now its own, just as the light that is now mixed into bodies? Or rather, in that case there is color because what produces the color has been mixed in as well. But what about the life of the body? Perhaps it has it because another soul is present beside it.
ὅταν οὖν τὸ σῶμα φθαρῇ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τι ἄμοιρον δύναται εἶναι — φθειρομένου οὖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ οὐκ ἐπαρκούσης αὐτῷ οὔτε τῆς δούσης οὔτ’ εἴ τις παράκειται, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ζωὴ μένοι; τί οὖν; ἐφθάρη αὕτη; ἢ οὐδὲ αὕτη· εἴδωλον γὰρ ἐκλάμψεως καὶ τοῦτο· οὐκέτι δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ μόνον.
So when the body perishes—for nothing can be without a share in soul—when, then, the body perishes, and neither the soul that gave it life nor any other that may be beside it is enough for it any longer, how could life still remain? What then? Has this life perished? No, not this either: it too is an image of an illumination. It is simply no longer there.
εἰ δ’ εἴη σῶμα ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ὄψις τις ἐντεῦθεν μηδενὸς κωλύοντος εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν, ἆρ’ ἂν θεάσαιτο ὅ τι μὴ συμπαθὲς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, εἰ τὸ συμπαθὲς νῦν διὰ τὴν ζῴου ἑνὸς φύσιν; ἢ εἰ τὸ συμπαθὲς διὰ τὸ ἑνὸς ζῴου τὰ αἰσθανόμενα καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὕτως οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τὸ ἔξω μέρος τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου· εἰ γὰρ εἴη, τάχα ἄν. εἰ μέντοι μὴ μέρος εἴη, σῶμα δὲ κεχρωσμένον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας ἔχον, οἷον τὸ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοειδὲς ὂν τῷ ὀργάνῳ;
Suppose there were a body outside the heaven, and sight from here, with nothing to block its view. Would it see what is not in sympathy with it, if sympathy, as things are, comes from the nature of a single living being? Or rather: if there is sympathy because perceivers and perceived belong to one living being, and perceptions work in this way, there would be no seeing unless this outside body were part of this living being; if it were, perhaps there would. But what if it were not a part, but a body that has color and the other qualities, like the bodies here, being of the same kind as the organ?
ἢ οὐδ’ οὕτως, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις· εἰ μή τις τούτῳ γε αὐτῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν πειρῷτο ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγων, εἰ μὴ χρῶμα ὄψεται ἡ ὄψις παρόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν παρόντων αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐνεργήσουσι πρὸς αὐτά. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο πόθεν δὴ φαίνεται; φήσομεν. ἢ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντες καὶ ἑνὸς ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν καὶ πάσχομεν. τοῦτο οὖν σκεπτέον, εἰ παρὰ τοῦτο. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτάρκως, δέδεικται· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ δι’ ἄλλων δεικτέον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῷον ὅτι συμπαθὲς αὑτῷ δῆλον, καὶ εἰ εἴη ζῷον, ἀρκεῖ· ὥστε καὶ τὰ μέρη, ᾗ ἑνὸς ζῴου. ἀλλ’ εἰ δι’ ὁμοιότητά τις λέγοι;
No, not even then, if the hypothesis is correct—unless someone tried to do away with the hypothesis on this very ground, saying it is absurd for sight not to see a color that is present, and for the other senses not to act on sense objects that are present to them. But where does this absurdity come from? we shall ask. Or rather, it is because here, being in one thing and belonging to one thing, we act and are affected in these ways. So we must look into this: whether it is because of this. If that is sufficient, the point has been shown; if not, it must be shown by other arguments too. That the living being is in sympathy with itself is clear, and if it is a living being, that is enough; so its parts are too, insofar as they belong to one living being. But what if someone were to say it is because of likeness?
ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀντίληψις κατὰ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὅτι τοῦ ὁμοίου μετέχει τὸ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ ὄργανον ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ· ὥστε ἡ αἴσθησις ψυχῆς ἀντίληψις ἔσται δι’ ὀργάνων ὁμοίων τοῖς ἀντιληπτοῖς. ἐὰν οὖν ζῷον ὂν αἰσθάνηται μὲν μὴ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ, τῶν δὲ ὁμοίων τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ, ᾗ μὲν ζῷον, ἀντιλήψεται· ᾗ μέντοι [ἀντιλήψεται] τὰ ἀντιληπτὰ ἔσται οὐχ ᾗ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ᾗ ὅμοια τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ. ἢ καὶ τὰ ἀντιληπτὰ οὕτως ἀντιληπτὰ ὅμοια ὄντα, ὅτι αὕτη αὐτὰ ὅμοια πεποίηκεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐ προσήκοντα εἶναι· ὥστε εἰ τὸ ποιοῦν ἐκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντη ἑτέρα, καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὑποτεθέντα ὅμοια οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτήν.
Well, apprehension and perception belong to the living being, because one and the same thing shares in what is like: the organ is like its object. So perception will be the soul’s apprehension through organs like the things apprehended. If, then, a living being perceives not the things within itself but things like those within itself, it will apprehend them insofar as it is a living being; but what makes the objects apprehensible [for it to apprehend] will be not that they are its own, but that they are like the things in it. Or rather, the apprehensible things are apprehensible as being alike in this way: because this soul has made them alike, so that they are not foreign to it. So if what made the things out there is an entirely different soul, then the things supposed to be alike out there have nothing to do with this one.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ ἀτοπία τὸ μαχόμενον ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει δείκνυσιν ὡς αἴτιόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς· ἅμα γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγει καὶ οὐ ψυχήν, καὶ συγγενῆ καὶ οὐ συγγενῆ, καὶ ὅμοια ταὐτὰ καὶ ἀνόμοια· ὥστε ἔχουσα τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐν αὑτῇ οὐδ’ ἂν ὑπόθεσις εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τούτῳ· ὥστε πᾶν καὶ οὐ πᾶν τίθησι, καὶ ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν καὶ οὐ τὸ μηδέν, καὶ τέλειον καὶ οὐ τέλειον. ὥστε ἀφετέον τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ὡς οὐκ ὂν ζητεῖν τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῷ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποτεθὲν ἐν αὑτῷ ἀναιρεῖν.
But in fact the absurdity shows that the contradiction in the hypothesis is what causes it. For the hypothesis speaks at once of soul and not soul, of kindred and not kindred, of things that are the same and alike and yet unlike. So, containing opposites within itself, it would not even be a hypothesis. For it treats it as if soul were in that body too; so it posits all and not all, other and not other, nothing and not nothing, complete and not complete. So we must let the hypothesis go: there is no looking for what follows from a supposition that destroys itself from within.