Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις, οὐδ’ ἐνσφραγίσεις λέγοντες ἐν ψυχῇ γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὰς μνήμας πάντως τε καὶ ἀκολούθως ἐροῦμεν κατοχὰς μαθημάτων καὶ αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῦ τύπου μείναντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὃς μηδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. διὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἂν εἴη ἄμφω, ἢ ἐγγίνεσθαί τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ μένειν, εἰ μνημονεύοιτο, ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ὁποτερονοῦν μὴ διδόντα μὴ διδόναι μηδὲ θάτερον. ὅσοι δὴ λέγομεν μηδέτερον, ἀναγκαίως ζητήσομεν, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἑκατέρου, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τὸν τύπον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐγγίνεσθαί φαμεν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τυποῦν αὐτήν, οὔτε τὴν μνήμην λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ τύπου ἐμμείναντος. εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως θεωροῖμεν τὸ συμβαῖνον, τάχ’ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων μεταφέροντες τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξεύροιμεν ἂν τὸ ζητούμενον.
Since we say that perceptions are not impressions or seal-imprints made in the soul, we shall not say either—and this follows consistently—that memories are retentions of what was learned and perceived, with the impression remaining in the soul; for it never came about in the first place. That is why the two go together: either impressions are formed in the soul and remain, if something is remembered, or, if one denies either one of them, one must deny the other as well. Those of us, then, who affirm neither must necessarily inquire how each of them works, since we say neither that the impression of the sense object comes to be in the soul and imprints it, nor that memory exists through the impression’s remaining. If we observe what happens in the clearest of the senses, perhaps by transferring the same to the other senses we might find what we are looking for.
δῆλον δὲ δήπου ἐν παντί, ὡς αἴσθησιν ὁτουοῦν λαμβάνοντες δι’ ὁράσεως ἐκεῖ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τῇ ὄψει προσβάλλομεν, οὗ τὸ ὁρατόν ἐστιν ἐπ’ εὐθείας κείμενον, ὡς ἐκεῖ δηλονότι τῆς ἀντιλήψεως γινομένης καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω τῆς ψυχῆς βλεπούσης, ἅτε μηδενός, οἶμαι, τύπου ἐν αὐτῇ γινομένου, οὐδὲ τῷ σφραγῖδα λαμβάνειν, ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ δακτυλίου, βλεπούσης. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδεήθη τοῦ ἔξω βλέπειν ἤδη ἔχουσα παρ’ ἑαυτῇ εἶδος τοῦ ὁρωμένου τούτῳ τῷ ἐκεῖ εἰσελθεῖν τὸν τύπον βλέπουσα.
It is surely clear in every case that when we perceive anything through sight, we see it out there, and direct our gaze to where the visible thing lies in a straight line. Evidently that is where the apprehension takes place, and the soul is looking outward, since no impression, I think, is formed in it, and it does not see by receiving a seal, the way wax receives one from a ring. For it would have no need to look outward if it already had within itself the form of the thing seen, seeing by the mere fact that the impression had entered it.
τὸ δὲ δὴ διάστημα προστιθεῖσα τῷ ὁράματι καὶ ἐξ ὅσου ἡ θέα ἡ ψυχὴ λέγουσα πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐδὲν ἀφεστηκὸς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ὡς πόρρω ὂν βλέποι; τό τε μέγεθος αὐτοῦ, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἔξω, πῶς ἂν ὅσον ἐστὶ λέγοι, ἢ ὅτι μέγα, οἷον τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τύπου τοσούτου γε εἶναι οὐ δυναμένου; τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἁπάντων· εἰ γὰρ τύπους λαμβάνοιμεν ὧν ὁρῶμεν, οὐκ ἔσται βλέπειν αὐτὰ ἃ ὁρῶμεν, ἰνδάλματα δὲ ὁραμάτων καὶ σκιάς, ὥστε ἄλλα μὲν εἶναι αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ἄλλα δὲ τὰ ἡμῖν ὁρώμενα. ὅλως δέ, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιθέντα τῇ κόρῃ τὸ ὁρατὸν θεάσασθαι, ἀποστήσαντα δὲ δεῖ οὕτως ὁρᾶν, τοῦτο χρὴ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μεταφέρειν.
And when the soul adds the distance to the object it sees and says how far away the sight is, how could it see what is in itself, not separated from it at all, as being far away? And as for the thing’s size, how big it is out there—how could the soul say how big it is, or that it is large, like the size of the heaven, when the impression in it cannot be that large? And the greatest point of all: if we received impressions of what we see, it would not be possible to see the very things we see, but only reflections and shadows of them, so that the things themselves would be one thing and what we see another. In general, as people say, you cannot see a visible thing by placing it on the pupil; you must set it at a distance to see it that way. This must be transferred to the soul too, and much more so.
εἰ γὰρ τὸν τύπον τοῦ ὁρατοῦ θείμεθα ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐκεῖνο μέν, ᾧ ἐνεσφράγισται, οὐκ ἂν ὅραμα ἴδοι· δεῖ γὰρ δύο γενέσθαι τό τε ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἄλλο ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ὁρῶν ἀλλαχοῦ κείμενον τὸν τύπον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι κείμενον. δεῖ ἄρα τὴν ὅρασιν οὐ κειμένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ κειμένου εἶναι, ἵνα ᾖ ὅρασις.
For if we were to posit the impression of the visible thing in the soul, the part on which it was stamped would not see any object of sight: there must be two, the seer and the seen. So the seer must be something different, and the impression must lie somewhere else, not in the seer itself. So for sight to be sight, it must be of what is not lying in it, not of what is lying in it.
εἰ οὖν μὴ οὕτως, τίς ὁ τρόπος; ἢ λέγει περὶ ὦν οὐκ ἔχει· τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμεως, οὐ τὸ παθεῖν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνηθῆναι καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι. οὕτως γὰρ ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, οὐκ εἰ τύποι ἄμφω, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ τύποι, μηδὲ πείσεις, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργειαι περὶ ὃ ἔνεισι πεφύκασιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες, μὴ οὐ δύνηται, ἐὰν μὴ πληγῇ, τὸ αὑτῆς γινώσκειν δύναμις ἑκάστη, πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, οὗ κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ’ οὐ κρατεῖσθαι.
If not like this, then how? Or rather: the soul speaks about things it does not hold. That is what a power does: not to be affected in some way, but to be capable, and to accomplish the work it is assigned. This, I think, is how the soul can tell the visible from the audible: not if both are impressions, but if they are not impressions or affections but activities directed at the objects they are naturally concerned with. We, however, doubting whether each power can know its own object unless it is struck, make it be affected by what is near it rather than know it—when it has been given the power to master, not to be mastered.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπ’ ἀκοῆς δεῖ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι· τὸν μὲν τύπον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πληγήν τινα οὖσαν διηρθρωμένην, οἷον γραμμάτων ἐγγεγραμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν πεποιηκότος, τὴν μέντοι δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν οἷον ἀναγνῶναι τοὺς τύπους [τοὺς] ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γεγραμμένους, ἐλθόντας πλησίον, εἰς ὃ ἐλθόντες πεφύκασιν ὁρᾶσθαι. γεύσεως δὲ καὶ ὀσφρήσεως τὰ μὲν πάθη, τὰ δ’ ὅσα αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶν καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν παθῶν εἰσι γνώσεις ἄλλαι τῶν παθῶν οὖσαι. τῶν δὲ νοητῶν ἡ γνῶσις ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀτύπωτός ἐστι μᾶλλον — ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ ἔσωθεν οἷον προπίπτει, τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν θεωρεῖται· καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἐνέργειαι καὶ κυριώτεραι — αὐτῆς γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἐνεργοῦσα ἕκαστον.
We must think the same happens with hearing. The impression is in the air, a kind of articulated blow, like letters written there by the one who made the sound; but the power and being of the soul, as it were, reads the impressions [the ones] written in the air when they come close, to the point where they are naturally seen. As for taste and smell, there are the affections; but their perceptions and judgments, insofar as they are such, are knowledge of the affections, distinct from the affections. Knowledge of the intelligibles is still more free of affection and impression—for here, conversely, it comes forward, as it were, from within, while sense objects are contemplated from outside; and these are more truly activities, and activities in a more proper sense—for they belong to the soul, and the soul, when it is active, is each of them.
πότερα δὲ αὑτὴν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ [ὡς] δύο καὶ ὡς ἕτερον ὁρᾷ, νοῦν δὲ ἓν καὶ ἄμφω τὰ δύο ἕν, ἐν ἄλλοις.
Whether the soul sees itself [as] two, as something other, while it sees Intellect as one, and both together as one—that is for another place.
νῦν δὲ τούτων εἰρημένων περὶ μνήμης ἐφεξῆς λεκτέον εἰποῦσι πρότερον, ὡς οὐ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δὲ θαυμαστὸν μέν, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ δεῖ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ μηδὲν λαβοῦσα εἰς αὑτὴν ἀντίληψιν ὧν οὐκ ἔσχε ποιεῖται. λόγος γάρ ἐστι πάντων, καὶ λόγος ἔσχατος μὲν τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, πρῶτος δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ παντί. διὸ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχει, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν εὐπαθοῦσα καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένη, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τῇ ὁμοιότητι ἀπατωμένη καὶ κατιοῦσα ὥσπερ θελγομένη.
Now that this has been said, we must speak next about memory. But first we should say that it is not surprising—or rather, it is surprising, but one must not disbelieve in such a power of the soul—if, without taking anything into itself, it apprehends what it did not hold. For the soul is a rational principle of all things: the nature of soul is the last rational principle of the intelligibles and of what is in the intelligible world, and the first of those in the whole perceptible world. That is why it is related to both: by the one it is well affected and comes back to life; by the other, deceived by the likeness, it goes down as if under a spell.
ἐν μέσῳ δὲ οὖσα αἰσθάνεται ἀμφοῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν νοεῖν λέγεται εἰς μνήμην ἐλθοῦσα, εἰ πρὸς αὐτοῖς γίγνοιτο· γινώσκει γὰρ τῷ αὐτά πως εἶναι· γινώσκει γὰρ οὐ τῷ ἐνιζάνειν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ἔχειν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ καὶ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἀμυδρότερον καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀμυδροῦ τῷ οἷον ἐγείρεσθαι ἐναργεστέρα καὶ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἰέναι. τὰ δ’ αἰσθητὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον συναψαμένη καὶ ταῦτα παρ’ αὑτῆς οἷον ἐκλάμπειν ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων εἶναι ἐργάζεται ἑτοίμης οὔσης καὶ οἷον ὠδινούσης πρὸς αὐτὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. ὅταν τοίνυν ῥωσθῇ πρὸς ὁτιοῦν τῶν φανέντων, ὥσπερ πρὸς παρὸν διάκειται ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον, τόσῳ ἀεί.
Being in the middle, it perceives both. It is said to think the intelligibles when it comes to remember them, if it turns toward them; for it knows them by being them, in a way. It knows them not by their settling into it, but by having them in a way, seeing them, and being them more dimly, and by becoming clearer out of the dimness through a kind of awakening, passing from potentiality into actuality. With sense objects it is the same: it links itself with them, as it were, and makes them, so to speak, shine out from itself, and sets them before its eyes, its power being ready and, as it were, in labor toward them. So whenever it has been strengthened toward any of the things that have appeared, it is disposed toward it as though it were present for a long time; and the more strongly, the more lastingly.
διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία μνημονεύειν λέγεται μᾶλλον, ὅτι μὴ ἀφίσταται, ἀλλὰ κεῖται αὐτοῖς πρὸ ὀμμάτων ὡς ἂν ὁρῶσιν οὔπω εἰς πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὀλίγα· οἷς δὲ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ δύναμις, ὥσπερ παραθέουσι καὶ οὐ μένουσιν. εἰ δέ γε ἔμενον οἱ τύποι, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸ πλῆθος ἧττον μνήμονας.
That is also why children are said to have better memories: things do not stand off from them but lie before their eyes, since they are not yet looking at a multitude but at a few things. Those whose thought and power are turned toward many things have them, as it were, running past and not staying. Yet if the impressions remained, the multitude would not have made people worse at remembering.
ἔτι, εἰ τύποι μένοντες, οὐδὲν ἔδει σκοπεῖν, ἵνα ἀναμνησθῶμεν, οὐδὲ πρότερον ἐπιλαθομένους ὕστερον ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι κειμένων. καὶ αἱ εἰς ἀνάληψιν δὲ μελέται δηλοῦσι δυνάμωσιν ψυχῆς τὸ γινόμενον ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ χειρῶν ἢ ποδῶν τὰ γυμνάσια εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ῥᾳδίως, ἃ μὴ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἢ ποσὶ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἃ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἡτοίμασται. διὰ τί γὰρ ἅπαξ μὲν ἀκούσας ἢ δεύτερον οὐ μέμνηται, ὅταν δὲ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ πρότερον ἀκούσας οὐκ ἔσχε πολλῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ μέμνηται ἤδη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ μέρη ἐσχηκέναι πρότερον τοῦ τύπου· ἔδει γὰρ τούτων μεμνῆσθαι· ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐξαίφνης γίγνεται τοῦτο ἔκ τινος τῆς ὑστέρας ἀκροάσεως ἢ μελέτης. ταῦτα γὰρ μαρτυρεῖ πρόκλησιν τῆς δυνάμεως καθ’ ἣν μνημονεύομεν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ῥωσθείσης ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο.
Further, if impressions remained, there would be no need to search in order to recall, nor to forget first and remember later things that were lying there. And the practice we do in order to retain things shows that what happens is a strengthening of the soul, just as the exercises of hands or feet aim at doing things easily—things that are not stored in the hands or feet, but which persistence has made them ready for. Why is it that, having heard something once or twice, one does not remember it, but when one has heard it many times, one remembers, long afterward, even what one did not retain on first hearing? Not, surely, because one had parts of the impression before—then one would have to remember those parts—but it happens, as it were, all at once, from some later hearing or practice. All this testifies to a calling forth of the soul’s power by which we remember, as having been strengthened either in general or for this particular thing.
ὅταν δὲ δὴ οὐ μόνον πρὸς ἃ ἐμελετήσαμεν τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν παρῇ, ἀλλ’ οἵπερ πολλὰ ἀνειλήφασιν ἐκ τοῦ εἰθίσθαι ἀπαγγελίαις χρῆσθαι, ῥᾳδίας ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰς λεγομένας ἀναλήψεις ποιῶνται, τί ἄν τις ἐπαιτιῷτο τῆς μνήμης ἢ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ῥωσθεῖσαν εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ τύποι μένοντες ἀσθένειαν [ἂν] μᾶλλον ἢ δύναμιν κατηγοροῖεν· τὸ γὰρ ἐντυπώτατον τῷ εἴκειν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, καὶ πάθους ὄντος τοῦ τύπου τὸ μᾶλλον πεπονθὸς τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μνημονεῦον μᾶλλον. τούτου δὲ τοὐναντίον φαίνεται συμβαῖνον· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ πρὸς ὁτιοῦν γυμνασία εὐπαθὲς τὸ γυμνασάμενον ποιεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐ τὸ ἀσθενὲς ὁρᾷ, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμός, ἀλλ’ ὅτῳ δύναμίς ἐστιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν πλείων. διὸ καὶ οἱ γεγηρακότες καὶ πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀσθενέστεροι καὶ πρὸς τὰς μνήμας ὡσαύτως.
And when the capacity to remember is present to us not only for what we have practiced, but people who have taken in a great deal, from being used to reciting, easily make the so-called recollections of other things too—what could one put memory down to, if not to the power’s having been strengthened? Impressions that remained would point to weakness rather than power: what takes impressions most readily is so by yielding, and since the impression is an affection, what has been most affected would be what remembers best. But we see the opposite happen: nowhere does training for anything make the trained thing easily affected. With the senses too, it is not the weak eye, say, that sees, but the one with more power for activity. That is why old people are weaker both in their perceptions and likewise in their memories.
ἰσχὺς ἄρα τις καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ μνήμη.
So perception and memory are each a kind of strength.
ἔτι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τυπώσεων οὐκ οὐσῶν, πῶς οἷόν τε τὰς μνήμας κατοχὰς τῶν οὐκ ἐντεθέντων οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι; ἀλλ’ εἰ δύναμίς τις καὶ παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸ ἕτοιμον, πῶς οὐχ ἅμα, ἀλλ’ ὕστερον εἰς ἀναπόλησιν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα; ἢ ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν δεῖ οἷον ἐπιστῆσαι καὶ ἑτοιμάσασθαι. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ὁρῶμεν, εἰς τὸ ποιῆσαι ὃ δύνανται ἑτοιμαζομένων καὶ τὰ μὲν εὐθύς, τὰ δέ, εἰ συλλέξαιντο ἑαυτάς, ἐργαζομένων. γίνονται δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις ἑκατέρου, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ὁ αὐτὸς πυκτικὸς καὶ δρομικὸς πολλάκις· ἐπικρατοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδέαι.
Further, since perceptions are not impressions, how can memories be retentions of things that were never deposited in the first place? But if memory is a power, a preparedness to be ready, why do we come to recall the same things not at once but later? Perhaps because the power must, as it were, be set to it and made ready. We see this with the other powers too: they get ready to do what they can do, and some work at once, others only if they gather themselves. Generally the same people are not both good at remembering and quick-witted, since the power for each is not the same, just as the same man is often not both a boxer and a runner: different types prevail in different people.
καίτοι οὐκ ἐκώλυε τὸν ἁστινασοῦν ἔχοντα πλεονεξίας ψυχῆς ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ κείμενα, οὐδὲ τὸν ταύτῃ ῥυέντα τὴν τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἔχειν τὸ πάθος ἀδυναμίαν κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ ἀμέγεθες (καὶ ὅλως) ψυχὴν μαρτυρεῖ δύναμιν εἶναι· καὶ ὅλως τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν πάντα [οὐ] θαυμαστὸν ἄλλον τρόπον ἔχειν, ἢ ὡς ὑπειλήφασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐξετάζειν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ ὡς πρόχειροι αὐτοῖς ἐπιβολαὶ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν ἐγγίνονται δι’ ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπατῶσαι· οἷον γὰρ ἐν πίναξιν ἢ δέλτοις γεγραμμένων γραμμάτων, οὕτως περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν διάκεινται, καὶ οὔτε οἱ σῶμα αὐτὴν θεωρούμενοι ὁρῶσιν, ὅσα ἀδύνατα τῇ ὑποθέσει αὐτῶν συμβαίνει, οὔτε οἱ ἀσώματον.
And yet, on their view, nothing would prevent someone with any superiority of soul at all from reading off what was stored; nor would someone who had slipped in that direction have acquired an incapacity for being affected and keeping the affection. The soul’s being without magnitude (and in general) testifies that soul is a power. And in general it is a wonder how everything about soul is otherwise than people have assumed from not examining it, or otherwise than the ready notions that come to them from sense objects suggest, deceiving them through likenesses. For they think of perceiving and remembering as if they were letters written on tablets or writing-boards; and neither those who consider the soul a body see how many impossibilities follow from their hypothesis, nor those who consider it incorporeal.