Εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἢ φθείρεται πᾶς, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἄπεισιν εἰς σκέδασιν καὶ φθοράν, τὰ δὲ μένει εἰς ἀεί, ἅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ὧδ’ ἄν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐπισκοπούμενος. ἁπλοῦν μὲν δή τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη [ὁ] ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχή, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σῶμα εἴτ’ οὖν ὄργανον ὂν ἡμῖν, εἴτ’ οὖν ἕτερον τρόπον προσηρτημένον. ἀλλ’ οὖν διῃρήσθω γε ταύτῃ, καὶ ἑκατέρου τὴν φύσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν καταθεατέον.
Whether each of us is immortal, or perishes entirely, or some parts of us go off to dispersal and destruction while others, which are the self, remain forever—one could learn as follows, examining the question in accordance with nature. [The] human being would not be something simple: there is a soul in him, and he also has a body, whether it is an instrument for us or attached in some other way. Well, let it be divided like this, at any rate, and let us look at the nature and being of each.
τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ συγκείμενον οὔτε παρὰ τοῦ λόγου δύναται μένειν, ἥ τε αἴσθησις ὁρᾷ λυόμενόν τε καὶ τηκόμενον καὶ παντοίους ὀλέθρους δεχόμενον, ἑκάστου γε τῶν ἐνόντων πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ φερομένου, φθείροντός τε ἄλλου ἕτερον καὶ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἀπολλύντος, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ψυχὴ ἡ φίλα ποιοῦσα μὴ παρῇ τοῖς ὄγκοις. κἂν μονωθῇ δὲ ἕκαστον γινόμενον, ἓν οὐκ ἔστι, λύσιν δεχόμενον εἴς τε μορφὴν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς συστάσεις ἔχειν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ἅτε σώματα ὄντα, τεμνόμενά τε καὶ εἰς μικρὰ θραυόμενα καὶ ταύτῃ φθορὰν ἂν ὑπομένοι. ὥστ’ εἰ μὲν μέρος ἡμῶν τοῦτο, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἀθάνατοι, εἰ δὲ ὄργανον, ἔδει γε αὐτὸ εἰς χρόνον τινὰ δοθὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν φύσιν εἶναι.
The body, being itself composite, cannot remain, as reason shows; and perception sees it dissolving, wasting away and suffering every kind of destruction, as each of its constituents moves toward its own kind, one destroying another, changing into something else and perishing—especially when soul, which makes them friends, is not present to the masses. And even if each component becomes isolated, it is not one, since it admits of dissolution into shape and matter, from which even the simple bodies must take their composition. Moreover, since they are bodies and have magnitude, they would be cut and broken into small pieces, and in that way too undergo destruction. So if this is a part of us, we are not immortal as a whole; and if it is an instrument, it had to be of such a nature, being given for a certain time.
τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ἂν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὡς πρὸς ὕλην (τὸ σῶμα), ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ὡς πρὸς ὄργανον. ἑκατέρως δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός.
But the most important part, the man himself, would be either the form, related to matter (the body), or the user, related to an instrument. Either way, the soul is the man himself.
The soul is not a body
Against the Stoics: no body can explain life, perception, thought or virtue.
τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει; ἢ σῶμα μὲν ὂν πάντως ἀναλυτόν· σύνθετον γὰρ πᾶν γε σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἄλλης, κἀκείνην ἢ [κατὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλον σκεπτέον. πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον, εἰς ὅ τι δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ὃ λέγουσι ψυχήν, ἀναλύειν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ζωὴ ψυχῇ πάρεστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μὲν ἐκ δύο σωμάτων ἢ πλειόνων εἴη, ἤτοι ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, ἢ ἕκαστον ζωὴν σύμφυτον ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ μή, ἢ μηδέτερον ἔχειν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἑνὶ αὐτῶν προσείη τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη ψυχή. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη σῶμα ζωὴν παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἔχον;
What nature, then, does this have? If it is a body, it can certainly be dissolved, since every body is composite. If it is not a body but of another nature, that nature too must be examined, either [in] the same way or in another. But first we must consider into what this body, which they call soul, is to be dissolved. Since life is necessarily present to soul, this body, the soul, if it is made of two bodies or more, must either have innate life in both of them, or in each of them, or in one and not another, or in none. If living belongs to one of them, that one would be the soul. What body, then, could there be that has life from itself?
πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ ἄψυχα παρ’ αὑτῶν· καὶ ὅτῳ πάρεστι τούτων ψυχή, τοῦτο ἐπακτῷ κέχρηται τῇ ζωῇ, ἄλλα δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα σώματα οὐκ ἔστι. καὶ οἷς γε δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕτερα, σώματα, οὐ ψυχαί, ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔχοντα. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωήν, ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νοῦν γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐχ ὁπωσοῦν κραθέντα ταῦτα φήσουσι γίνεσθαι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι τὸ τάξον καὶ τὸ τῆς κράσεως αἴτιον· ὥστε τοῦτο τάξιν ἂν ἔχοι ψυχῆς.
For fire, air, water and earth are soulless in themselves; whichever of them has soul present uses a life brought in from outside; and there are no other bodies besides these. Even those who think there are elements other than these have said they are bodies, not souls, and that they have no life. If none of them has life and their coming together has produced life, that is absurd—or rather, it is impossible that a heap of bodies should produce life, and that things without intellect should generate intellect. Besides, they will say that these do not come about by being mixed just any way. So there must be what orders them, the cause of the mixture; and this would hold the rank of soul.
οὐ γὰρ ὅτι σύνθετον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔσης ἐν τῷ παντί, εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ, οὐδαμόθεν δ’ ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος, ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς.
For not only would there be no composite body among the things that are without soul in the All; there would be no simple one either, if it is a rational principle coming to matter that makes body, and a rational principle could come from nowhere but soul.
εἰ δέ τις μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῆ συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν λέγοι τῇ ἑνώσει καὶ ὁμοπαθείᾳ ἐλέγχοιτ’ ἂν (καὶ τῇ παραθέσει), μηδενὸς διόλου γινομένου ἑνὸς οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ ἀπαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἑνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων. ψυχὴ δὲ αὑτῇ συμπαθής. ἐκ δὲ ἀμερῶν [οὐ] σῶμα οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἂν γένοιτο. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ὅσον ὑλικὸν παρ’ αὑτοῦ ζωὴν ἔχειν οὐ φήσουσιν — ὕλη γὰρ ἄποιον — τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τεταγμένον ἐπιφέρειν τὴν ζωήν, εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν φήσουσι τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ συναμφότερον, θάτερον δὲ τούτων ἔσται ἡ ψυχή· ὃ οὐκέτ’ ἂν σῶμα· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ τοῦτο, ἢ πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀναλύσομεν.
Suppose someone says it is not like this, but that atoms or partless things coming together make soul by their union and shared affection. He would be refuted (and by their juxtaposition too), since nothing wholly one, nor anything in sympathy with itself, comes from bodies that are unaffected and cannot unite; but soul is in sympathy with itself. And from partless things no body could come to be, not even a magnitude. Moreover, if body is simple, they will not say that its material part has life from itself—for matter is without quality—but that what is ordered by form brings life. Then if they say that this form is a substance, the soul will be not the compound but one of the two; and that would no longer be body. For this too is not made of matter; or else we shall analyze it again in the same way.
εἰ δὲ πάθημα τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσίαν φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πάθημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐλήλυθε λεκτέον αὐτοῖς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη αὑτὴν μορφοῖ, οὐδὲ αὑτῇ ψυχὴν ἐντίθησι. δεῖ ἄρα τι εἶναι τὸ χορηγὸν τῆς ζωῆς, εἰ οὔτε τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ χορηγία, οὔθ’ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν σωμάτων, ἔξω ὂν καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωματικῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης.
But if they say it is an affection of matter and not a substance, they must tell us where the affection, and the life, came into matter from. For matter certainly does not shape itself, nor put soul into itself. So there must be something that supplies life, if the supplying belongs neither to matter nor to any body—something outside and beyond all bodily nature.
ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἂν εἴη σῶμα οὐδὲν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ οὔσης. ῥεῖ γάρ, καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, καὶ ἀπόλοιτο ἂν ὡς τάχιστα, εἰ πάντα σώματα εἴη, κἂν εἰ ὄνομα ἑνὶ αὐτῶν ψυχήν τις θεῖτο. ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν πάθοι τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ὕλης μιᾶς οὔσης αὐτοῖς. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ στήσεται ἐν ὕλῃ τὰ πάντα, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ μορφοῦντος αὐτήν. τάχα δ’ ἂν οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ ὕλη τὸ παράπαν εἴη, λυθήσεται δὲ καὶ τόδε τὸ ξύμπαν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ πιστεύσειε σώματος συνέρξει διδοὺς αὐτῷ ψυχῆς τάξιν μέχρι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀέρι καὶ πνεύματι σκεδαστοτάτῳ καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι ἔχοντι οὐ παρ’ αὑτοῦ. πῶς γὰρ τεμνομένων τῶν πάντων σωμάτων ᾡτινιοῦν τις ἀνατιθεὶς τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῆ ποιήσει;
Indeed, there would not even be any body if there were no power of soul. For body flows, its nature is in motion, and it would perish very quickly if all things were bodies, even if one gave the name “soul” to one of them. That one would suffer the same as the other bodies, since they all have one matter. Or rather, it would not even come into being: everything would stop at matter, with nothing there to shape it. Perhaps matter itself would not exist at all; and this whole All would be dissolved, if one entrusted it to the binding of a body, granting it the rank of soul as far as names go—to air and breath, the most easily scattered of things, which does not have its unity from itself. When all bodies can be cut, how could anyone who attributes this All to any one of them fail to make it unintelligent and carried along at random?
τίς γὰρ τάξις ἐν πνεύματι δεομένῳ παρὰ ψυχῆς τάξεως, ἢ λόγος, ἢ νοῦς; ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὔσης ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ζῴου ἑκάστου, ἄλλης παρ’ ἄλλου δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούσης· ταύτης δὲ μὴ παρούσης ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, οὐχ ὅτι ἐν τάξει.
For what order is there in breath, which itself needs order from soul—or what rational principle, or intellect? But if soul exists, all these things serve it for the constitution of the cosmos and of each living being, each contributing a different power to the whole; if it is not present in the universe, these things would be nothing, let alone in order.
μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγόμενοι, ὡς δεῖ τι πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρεῖττον αὐτῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἔννουν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ νοερὸν τιθέμενοι, ὥσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος οὐ δυναμένης τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι, τόπον δὲ ζητούσης εἰς τὸ ἱδρυθῆναι, δέον ζητεῖν, ὅπου τὰ σώματα ἱδρύσουσιν, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἱδρῦσθαι. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται, τί τὸ πολυθρύλητον αὐτοῖς πως ἔχον, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον; εἰ οὖν οὐ πᾶν μὲν πνεῦμα ψυχή, ὅτι μυρία πνεύματα ἄψυχα, τὸ δέ πως ἔχον πνεῦμα φήσουσι, τό πως ἔχον τοῦτο καὶ ταύτην τὴν σχέσιν ἢ τῶν ὄντων τι φήσουσιν, ἢ μηδέν.
They themselves bear witness, led by the truth, that there must be, prior to bodies, some form of soul superior to them, when they posit breath as intelligent and fire as intellectual—as if the superior lot could not exist among the things that are without fire and breath, but needed a place to be settled in; whereas they should have asked where they will settle bodies, since bodies must be settled in the powers of soul. And if they posit life and soul as nothing besides breath, what is this “in a certain state” of theirs, which they keep repeating, and in which they take refuge when they are forced to posit another, active nature besides bodies? If, then, not every breath is soul, since there are countless soulless breaths, but they will say soul is breath “in a certain state,” they will say that this “in a certain state,” this disposition, is either one of the things that are, or nothing.
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μηδέν, πνεῦμα ἂν εἴη μόνον, τὸ δέ πως ἔχον ὄνομα. καὶ οὕτως συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ θεὸν ὀνόματα πάντα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον [ὄν].
If it is nothing, there would be only breath, and “in a certain state” would be a mere name. And so it will follow that they say nothing else exists but matter, and that soul and god are all names, and only matter [is].
εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ σχέσις καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἐν ὕλῃ μέν, ἄυλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ μὴ πάλιν αὖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ὕλης, λόγος ἂν εἴη τις καὶ οὐ σῶμα καὶ φύσις ἑτέρα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε οὐχ ἧττον φαίνεται ἀδύνατον ὂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι σῶμα ὁτιοῦν. ἢ γὰρ θερμόν ἐστιν ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακόν, ὑγρόν τε ἢ πεπηγός, μέλαν τε ἢ λευκόν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ποιότητες σωμάτων ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλοις. καὶ εἰ μὲν θερμόν, μόνον θερμανεῖ· ψυχρὸν δέ, μόνον ψύξει· καὶ κοῦφα ποιήσει τὸ κοῦφον προσγενόμενον καὶ παρόν· καὶ βαρυνεῖ τὸ βαρύ, καὶ μελανεῖ τὸ μέλαν· καὶ τὸ λευκὸν λευκὸν ποιήσει. οὐ γὰρ πυρὸς τὸ ψύχειν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ψυχροῦ θερμὰ ποιεῖν.
But if the disposition is one of the things that are, and something other than the substrate and matter—in matter, but itself immaterial, since it is not in turn composed of matter—it would be a rational principle, and not body, and a different nature. Further, it is no less clear from the following that the soul cannot be any body whatsoever. It would be either hot or cold, hard or soft, fluid or solid, black or white, and have all the qualities of bodies, different ones in different bodies. If it is hot, it will only heat; if cold, only cool; what is light, when it comes and is present, will make things light; what is heavy will make them heavy; what is black will blacken; and what is white will make them white. For it is not for fire to cool, nor for the cold to heat.
ἀλλ’ ἥ γε ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν ζῴοις ἄλλα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐν τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐναντία, τὰ μὲν πηγνῦσα, τὰ δὲ χέουσα, καὶ τὰ μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δὲ ἀραιά, μέλανα λευκά, κοῦφα βαρέα [ποιοῦσα]. καίτοι ἓν ἔδει ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ποιότητά τε τὴν ἄλλην καὶ δὴ καὶ χρόαν· νῦν δὲ πολλά.
But the soul produces different effects in different living beings, and opposite effects in the same one: solidifying some things, liquefying others, making some dense and others rare, [making them] black or white, light or heavy. Yet it should produce one effect, corresponding to the body’s quality—both its other quality and its color too; but as it is, it produces many.
τὰς δὲ δὴ κινήσεις πῶς διαφόρους, ἀλλ’ οὐ μίαν, μιᾶς οὔσης παντὸς σώματος κινήσεως; εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν προαιρέσεις, τῶν δὲ λόγους αἰτιάσονται, ὀρθῶς μὲν τοῦτο· ἀλλ’ οὐ σώματος ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδὲ οἱ λόγοι, διάφοροί γε ὄντες, ἑνὸς ὄντος καὶ ἁπλοῦ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ μετὸν αὐτῷ τοιούτου γε λόγου, ἢ ὅσος δέδοται αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος θερμὸν αὐτὸ ἢ ψυχρὸν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν χρόνοις αὔξειν, καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου μέτρου, πόθεν ἂν τῷ σώματι αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ᾧ προσήκει μὲν αὔξεσθαι, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀμοίρῳ τοῦ αὔξειν εἶναι, ἢ ὅσον παραληφθείη ἂν ἐν ὕλης ὄγκῳ ὑπηρετοῦν τῷ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὴν αὔξην ἐργαζομένῳ;
And motions: how can they be different, and not one, when every body has one motion? If they put some down to choices and others to rational principles, that is right; but choice does not belong to body, nor do rational principles, since they are different while body is one and simple, and has no share in a principle of that kind beyond what was given to it by its maker—to be hot or cold. And making things grow over time, up to such and such a measure: where could body itself get this? It is suited to be grown, but has no share in causing growth, except insofar as it might be taken up into a mass of matter as a servant of what produces growth through it.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα οὖσα αὔξοι, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὴν αὔξεσθαι, προσθήκῃ δηλονότι ὁμοίου σώματος, εἰ μέλλοι εἰς ἴσον ἰέναι τῷ αὐξομένῳ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἢ ψυχὴ ἔσται τὸ προστιθέμενον ἢ ἄψυχον σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψυχή, πόθεν καὶ πῶς εἰσιούσης καὶ πῶς προστιθεμένης; εἰ δὲ ἄψυχον τὸ προστιθέμενον, πῶς τοῦτο ψυχώσεται καὶ τῷ πρόσθεν ὁμογνωμονήσει καὶ ἓν ἔσται καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν τῇ πρώτῃ μεταλήψεται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὥσπερ ξένη ψυχὴ αὕτη ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται ὧν ἡ ἑτέρα οἶδε; καὶ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄγκος ἡμῶν, τὸ μέν τι ἀπορρεύσεται αὐτοῦ, τὸ δέ τι προσελεύσεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔσται τὸ αὐτό; πῶς οὖν ἡμῖν αἱ μνῆμαι; πῶς δὲ ἡ γνώρισις οἰκείων οὐδέποτε τῇ αὐτῇ ψυχῇ χρωμένων;
Indeed, if the soul, being a body, caused growth, it would have to grow itself, evidently by the addition of similar body, if it is to keep pace with what it makes grow. What is added will be either soul or soulless body. If soul, where does it come from, how does it enter, and how is it added? If what is added is soulless, how will it be ensouled, agree with what was there before, become one with it, and share the same opinions as the first, rather than being like a foreign soul, ignorant of what the other knows? And, like the rest of our bulk, will some of it flow away and some be added, with nothing remaining the same? How then do we have memories? And how do we recognize the people close to us, if we never have the same soul?
καὶ μὴν εἰ σῶμά ἐστι, φύσις δὲ σώματος μεριζομένου εἰς πλείω ἕκαστον μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τῶν μερῶν τῷ ὅλῳ — εἰ τοσόνδε μέγεθος ψυχή, ὃ ἐὰν ἔλαττον ᾖ, ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται, ὥσπερ πᾶν ποσὸν ἀφαιρέσει τὸ εἶναι τὸ πρόσθεν ἠλλάξατο· εἰ δέ τι τῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων τὸν ὄγκον ἐλαττωθὲν τῇ ποιότητι ταὐτὸν μένοι, ᾗ μὲν σῶμα ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ ᾗ ποσόν, τῇ δὲ ποιότητι ἑτέρᾳ τῆς ποσότητος οὔσῃ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἀποσώζειν δύναται· τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες; πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχὴ οἵα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος οὔσης.
Moreover, if it is a body, and it is the nature of body, when divided into several pieces, that none of the parts is the same as the whole—if soul is a magnitude of a certain size, then if it becomes smaller it will not be soul, just as every quantity loses its former being by subtraction. But if something with magnitude, reduced in bulk, remains the same in quality, then as a body and as a quantity it is different, but it can keep its sameness through its quality, which is something other than quantity. What, then, will those who say the soul is body reply? First, about each part of the soul in the same body: is each part soul, just as the whole is? And again, the part of the part? Then magnitude contributed nothing to its being—though it should have, if soul were a quantity.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολλαχῇ, ὅπερ σώματι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει. καὶ προσέτι, εἰ ψυχῆς ἑκάστης τὸ μέγεθος ὡρισμένον ἔσται ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττόν τόν γε ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅταν τοίνυν ἐκ συνόδου μιᾶς καὶ ἑνὸς σπέρματος δίδυμα γένηται γεννήματα, ἢ καί, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, πλεῖστα τοῦ σπέρματος εἰς πολλοὺς τόπους μεριζομένου, οὗ δὴ ἕκαστον ὅλον ἐστί, πῶς οὐ διδάσκει τοῦτο τοὺς βουλομένους μανθάνειν, ὡς, ὅπου τὸ μέρος τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τῷ ὅλῳ, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, ἄποσον δὲ εἶναι αὐτὸ δεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης;
But it is also whole in many places, which cannot hold of a body: the same thing being whole in several places, and the part being exactly what the whole is. If they deny that each of the parts is soul, they will have soul made of soulless things. Besides, if the magnitude of each soul is fixed at both limits, then beyond it, toward the smaller or toward the greater, it will not be soul. So when twins are born from a single intercourse and a single seed—or, as in other animals, a great many offspring, the seed being divided into many places, each part of which is whole—how does this not teach those willing to learn that where the part is the same as the whole, this thing has, in its own being, gone beyond being a quantity, and must of necessity be itself without quantity?
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μένοι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ κλεπτομένου, ἅτε μὴ μέλον αὐτῷ ποσότητος καὶ ὄγκου, ὡς ἂν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἕτερόν τι οὔσης. ἄποσον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.
For in this way it could remain the same while its quantity was stolen away, since it has no concern with quantity or bulk, its being being something else. So the soul and the rational principles are without quantity.
ὅτι δέ, εἰ σῶμα εἴη ἡ ψυχή, οὔτε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ νοεῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὔτε ἀρετὴ οὔτε τι τῶν καλῶν ἔσται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἴ τι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος, ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα εἴη, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποιότητες, κἂν δι’ ἑνὸς ποικίλον, οἷον πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινός, ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ πάντων. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι’ ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ δι’ ἀκοῆς, ἕν τι δεῖ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ ἄμφω. ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐλθόντων;
That if the soul were a body there would be no perceiving, no thinking, no knowing, no virtue, nothing fine at all, is clear from the following. If something is going to perceive anything, it must itself be one, and apprehend everything with one and the same thing—even if many things come in through many sense organs, or there are many qualities belonging to one thing, or something complex comes in through one organ, a face, for instance. It is not one thing that perceives the nose and another the eyes, but the same thing perceives them all together. And if one thing comes through the eyes and another through hearing, there must be something one into which both come. Otherwise how could it say that they are different, if the sense impressions did not come together into the same thing?
δεῖ τοίνυν τοῦτο ὥσπερ κέντρον εἶναι, γραμμὰς δὲ συμβαλλούσας ἐκ περιφερείας κύκλου τὰς πανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι, ἓν ὄντως. εἰ δὲ διεστὼς τοῦτο γένοιτο, καὶ οἷον γραμμῆς ἐπ’ ἄμφω τὰ πέρατα [αἱ] αἰσθήσεις προσβάλλοιεν, ἢ συνδραμεῖται εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν, οἷον τὸ μέσον, ἢ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, [καὶ] ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου αἴσθησιν ἕξει· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἰσθοιο. καὶ εἰ ἓν εἴη τὸ αἴσθημα, οἷον πρόσωπον, ἢ εἰς ἓν συναιρεθήσεται — ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται· συναιρεῖται γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς κόραις· ἢ πῶς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα διὰ ταύταιν ὁρῷτο;
This, then, must be like a center, and the perceptions coming from all sides must end at it, like lines converging from the circumference of a circle; and what apprehends must be like this, truly one. If it were extended, and [the] perceptions struck it as at the two ends of a line, then either they will run together again into one and the same point, the middle, say, or one end will perceive one thing and the other another, [and] each will have its own perception—just as if I perceived one thing and you another. And if the sense object is one, like a face, either it will be contracted into one—which is evidently what happens, for it is contracted even in the pupils themselves; otherwise how could the largest things be seen through them?—
ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἰόντα οἷον ἀμερῆ νοήματα γίνεσθαι — καὶ ἔσται ἀμερὲς τοῦτο· ἢ μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ συμμερίζοιτο ἄν, ὥστε ἄλλον ἄλλου μέρους καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἴσχειν.
so that, all the more, when they reach the ruling part, they become, as it were, partless thoughts—and this will be partless; or, if it is a magnitude, the object would be divided up along with it, so that different parts would apprehend different parts and none of us would apprehend the sense object as a whole.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ διαιροῖτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἴσῳ ἐφαρμόσει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν παντὶ αἰσθητῷ. κατὰ πηλίκα οὖν ἡ διαίρεσις; ἢ εἰς τοσαῦτα διαιρεθήσεται, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ἀριθμοῦ ἔχῃ εἰς ποικιλίαν τὸ εἰσιὸν αἴσθημα. καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ ἐκείνων τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἆρα καὶ τοῖς μορίοις αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεται; ἢ ἀναίσθητα τὰ μέρη τῶν μορίων ἔσται; ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, εἰς ἄπειρα τοῦ μεγέθους διαιρεῖσθαι πεφυκότος ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ’ ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας.
But in fact the whole is one: how could it be divided? Equal will not be fitted to equal, since the ruling part is not equal to every sense object. Into how many parts, then, will the division go? Or will it be divided into as many as the incoming sense object has in number, according to its variety? And will each of those parts of the soul perceive with its own subparts too? Or will the parts of the subparts be without perception? But that is impossible. And if any part whatever perceives the whole, then, since magnitude is naturally divisible to infinity, it will follow that each has infinitely many perceptions of each sense object—as if there were infinitely many images of the same thing in our ruling part.
καὶ μὴν σώματος ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθανομένου οὐκ ἂν ἄλλον τρόπον γένοιτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ οἷον ἐν κηρῷ ἐνσημανθεῖσαι ἀπὸ δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες, εἴτ’ οὖν εἰς αἷμα, εἴτ’ οὖν εἰς ἀέρα τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐνσημαινομένων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ὑγροῖς, ὅπερ καὶ εὔλογον, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ συγχυθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται μνήμη· εἰ δὲ μένουσιν οἱ τύποι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλους ἐνσημαίνεσθαι ἐκείνων κατεχόντων — ὥστε ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἔσονται — ἢ γινομένων ἄλλων ἐκεῖνοι οἱ πρότεροι ἀπολοῦνται· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔσται [τὸ] μνημονεύειν. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ μνημονεύειν καὶ ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ ἐμποδιζόντων τῶν πρόσθεν, ἀδύνατον τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι.
Moreover, if what perceives is a body, perceiving could happen in no other way than like seals stamped in wax by rings, the sense objects being stamped either into blood or into air. If it is as with fluid bodies, which is indeed reasonable, they will be blurred, as if into water, and there will be no memory. But if the impressions remain, either others cannot be stamped while those occupy the place—so that there will be no further perceptions—or, when others come, the earlier ones will be destroyed—so that [the] remembering will come to nothing. But if there is remembering, and perceiving some things after others without the earlier ones getting in the way, it is impossible for the soul to be a body.
ἴδοι δ’ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀλγεῖν αἰσθήσεως τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ μὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δήπουθεν, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁμολογήσουσιν ὡς περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν γίνεται. ἄλλου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος μέρους (τοῦ πνεύματος) τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο συμβαίνει; διαδόσει, φήσουσι, παθόντος μὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος, μεταδόντος δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τούτου ἄλλῳ, ἕως οὗ πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἀφίκοιτο.
One can see the same point from the perception of pain as well. When a man is said to have a pain in his finger, the pain is surely in the finger; but they will plainly agree that the perception of the pain occurs in the ruling part. So while the suffering part (of the breath) is a different one, the ruling part perceives, and the whole soul feels the same. How does this happen, then? By transmission, they will say: the soul-breath in the finger is affected first, passes it on to the next, and that to another, until it reaches the ruling part.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον πονοῦν ᾔσθετο, ἄλλην τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ δευτέρου εἶναι, εἰ κατὰ διάδοσιν ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου [γε] ἄλλην καὶ πολλὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀπείρους [τὴν] περὶ ἑνὸς ἀλγήματος γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων ἁπασῶν ὕστερον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ ταύτας. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἑκάστην ἐκείνων μὴ τοῦ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἐφεξῆς τῷ δακτύλῳ, ὅτι ὁ ταρσὸς ἀλγεῖ, τὴν δὲ τρίτην, ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄνωθεν, καὶ πολλὰς εἶναι ἀλγηδόνας, τό τε ἡγεμονοῦν μὴ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτῷ, καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκειν μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐᾶν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ὅτι ἀλγεῖ ὁ δάκτυλος.
Then, necessarily, if the first part in pain perceived it, the perception of the second would be another one, if perception happens by transmission, and that of the third [indeed] another; and there would be many perceptions, infinitely many, [the ones] concerning a single pain; and after all these the ruling part would perceive them, and its own as well. But the truth would be that none of those is a perception of the pain in the finger: the one next to the finger would perceive that the palm hurts, the third that another part farther up does; there would be many pains; and the ruling part would perceive not the pain in the finger but the one next to itself, and know only that, and let the rest go, without knowing that the finger hurts.
εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ σώματος, ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλου γνῶσιν εἶναι — παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστί — δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει.
If, then, perception of such a thing cannot come about by transmission, and if, in a body, which is a mass, one part cannot know when another is affected—for in every magnitude one part is one thing and another another—we must posit what perceives as something that is everywhere the same as itself. And to do this belongs to some other kind of being than body.
ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οἷόν τε, εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ ὁτιοῦν εἴη, δεικτέον ἐκ τῶνδε. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ σώματι προσχρωμένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τὸ διὰ σώματος καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ἐστι τὸ ἄνευ σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, πολὺ πρότερον δεῖ μὴ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ νοῆσον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ αἰσθητῶν μὲν ἡ αἴσθησις, νοητῶν δὲ ἡ νόησις. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἔσονταί γε καὶ νοητῶν τινων νοήσεις καὶ ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις. πῶς οὖν μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν νοήσει; ἢ μέρει τινὶ ἀμερεῖ αὑτοῦ.
That thinking would not be possible either, if the soul were any body at all, must be shown from the following. If perceiving is the soul’s apprehending sense objects by making use of the body, thinking cannot also be grasping through the body, or it will be the same as perceiving. If, then, thinking is apprehending without the body, much more must what thinks not be a body. For perception is of sense objects, thinking of intelligibles. If they won’t have this, still there will at least be thoughts of some intelligibles and apprehensions of things without magnitude. How, then, will what is a magnitude think what is not a magnitude? And think the indivisible with what is divisible? Perhaps with some partless part of itself.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ νοῆσον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ ὅλου χρεία πρὸς τὸ θιγεῖν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἕν τι. εἰ μὲν οὖν συγχωρήσονται τὰς πρώτας νοήσεις, ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστιν, εἶναι τῶν πάντη σώματος καθαρωτάτων, αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ νοοῦν σώματος καθαρὸν ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον γιγνώσκειν. εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε τῶν σωμάτων γίγνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ μετὰ σαρκῶν ἢ ὅλως ὕλης ὁ χωρισμὸς κύκλου καὶ τριγώνου καὶ γραμμῆς καὶ σημείου. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος αὑτὴν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίσαι. δεῖ ἄρα μηδὲ αὐτὴν σῶμα εἶναι. ἀμέγεθες δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις.
But if so, what thinks will not be body: there is no need of the whole to make contact; some one point is enough. If, then, they grant—as is true—that the primary thoughts are of things entirely pure of body, each of them itself by itself, then what thinks must necessarily know them by being, or becoming, pure of body. If they say that thoughts are of forms in matter, still these come about when the forms are separated from bodies, with intellect doing the separating. For the separating of circle, triangle, line and point is not done together with flesh or with matter at all. So the soul too must separate itself from body in such an act; so it too must not be a body. And the beautiful and the just, I think, are without magnitude; so the thinking of them is too.
ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὑτῆς ὑποδέξεται καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται.
So when they approach, the soul will receive them with its partless part, and they will lie in it in something partless.
πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ σώματος οὔσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰ αὐτῆς, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη [ἀνδρεία τε καὶ ἄλλαι; πνεῦμά τι γὰρ ἢ αἷμά τι τὸ σωφρονεῖν [ἂν] εἴη ἢ δικαιότης ἢ ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ ἀνδρεία τὸ δυσπαθὲς τοῦ πνεύματος εἴη, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἡ εὐκρασία, τὸ δὲ κάλλος εὐμορφία τις ἐν τύποις, καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν ἰδόντες ὡραίους καὶ καλοὺς τὰ σώματα. ἰσχυρῷ μὲν οὖν καὶ καλῷ ἐν τύποις πνεύματι εἶναι προσήκοι ἄν· σωφρονεῖν δὲ τί δεῖ πνεύματι; ἀλλ’ οὖν τοὐναντίον ἐν περιπτύξεσι καὶ ἁφαῖς εὖ παθεῖν, ὅπου ἢ θερμανθήσεται, ἢ συμμέτρως ψύχεος ἱμερεῖ, ἢ μαλακοῖς τισι καὶ ἁπαλοῖς καὶ λείοις πελάσει. τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀξίαν νεῖμαι τί ἂν αὐτῷ μέλοι;
And how, if the soul were a body, could there be virtues of it—moderation and justice [courage and the others? For being moderate, or justice, or courage, [would] be some breath or some blood—unless courage were the breath’s resistance to being affected, moderation its good blend, and beauty some shapeliness in its configurations, the kind by which we call people lovely and beautiful in body when we see them. Strength and beauty of configuration might well suit breath; but what need has breath of being moderate? On the contrary, it would want to be pleasantly affected by embraces and touches, where it will be warmed, or long for a moderate coolness, or come close to soft, tender, smooth things. And what would it care about distributing according to merit?
πότερον δὲ ἀιδίων ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν νοητῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφάπτεται, ἢ γίνεταί τῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖ καὶ πάλιν φθείρεται; ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ ποιῶν καὶ πόθεν; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνο πάλιν μένοι. δεῖ ἄρα ἀιδίων εἶναι καὶ μενόντων, οἷα καὶ τὸ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἀιδίων καὶ μενόντων, οὐ σωμάτων. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔσται τοιοῦτον εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα μὴ σῶμα εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ μένει, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖ ἡ σώματος φύσις πᾶσα.
Does the soul make contact with the truths of virtue, which are eternal, and with the other intelligibles? Or does virtue come to someone, benefit him, and then perish again? But who makes it, and from where? For then that maker, in turn, would remain. So virtue must be of eternal and abiding things, like the truths of geometry. And if of eternal and abiding things, not of bodies. So that in which it will be must be of the same kind; so it must not be a body. For the whole nature of body does not remain, but flows.
εἰ δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ποιήσεις ὁρῶντες θερμαινούσας καὶ ψυχούσας καὶ ὠθούσας καὶ βαρυνούσας ἐνταῦθα τάττουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἷον ἐν δραστηρίῳ τόπῳ ἱδρύοντες αὐτήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα δυνάμεσι ταῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ταῦτα ἐργάζεται· ἔπειτα, ὅτι οὐ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀξιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐμφρόνως καὶ καλῶς ἁπάντων, ἄλλην οὐσίαν ζητεῖ. τὰς οὖν δυνάμεις τῶν σωμάτων μεταβιβάσαντες εἰς τὰ ἀσώματα οὐδεμίαν ἐκείνοις καταλείπουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσι δύναται ἃ δύναται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὁμολογήσουσι γὰρ ἕτερον ποιότητα καὶ ποσότητα εἶναι, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ποσὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ποιὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὴν ὕλην. ταῦτα δὲ ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν ποιότητα ὁμολογήσουσιν ἕτερον οὖσαν ποσοῦ ἕτερον σώματος εἶναι.
And if, seeing the actions of bodies—heating, cooling, pushing, weighing down—they assign soul to this rank, settling it, as it were, in an active place, then, first, they fail to realize that bodies themselves accomplish these things by the incorporeal powers in them; and second, that these are not the powers we consider to belong to soul: thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, caring for all things wisely and well—these call for a different kind of being. So, having transferred the powers of bodies to incorporeal things, they leave none for those. That bodies too can do what they can by incorporeal powers is clear from the following. They will agree that quality and quantity are different, that every body is a quantity, and further that not every body has quality—matter, for instance. Agreeing to this, they will agree that quality, being other than quantity, is other than body.
πῶς γὰρ μὴ ποσὸν οὖσα σῶμα ἔσται, εἴπερ πᾶν σῶμα ποσόν; καὶ μὴν ὅπερ καὶ ἄνω που ἐλέγετο, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα μεριζόμενον καὶ ὄγκος πᾶς ἀφαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἦν, κερματιζομένου δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ μέρει ἡ αὐτὴ ὅλη ποιότης μένει· οἷον [εἰ] ἡ γλυκύτης ἡ τοῦ μέλιτος οὐδὲν ἔλαττον γλυκύτης ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα [ἡ] γλυκύτης. ὁμοίως καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. ἔπειτα, εἰ σώματα ἦσαν αἱ δυνάμεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὰς μὲν ἰσχυρὰς τῶν δυνάμεων μεγάλους ὄγκους, τὰς δὲ ὀλίγον δρᾶν δυναμένας ὄγκους μικροὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ μεγάλων μὲν τῶν ὄγκων μικραί, [οὐκ] ὀλίγοι δὲ μικρότατοι τῶν ὄγκων μεγίστας ἔχουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ μεγέθει τὸ ποιεῖν ἀναθετέον· ἀμεγέθει ἄρα.
For how will it be body if it is not a quantity, when every body is a quantity? And again, as was said somewhere above: if every body and every mass, when divided, loses what it was, while when the body is chopped up the same quality remains whole in each part—as [if] the sweetness of honey is no less sweetness in each bit—then [the] sweetness would not be body. The same goes for the other qualities. Next, if the powers were bodies, the strong powers would necessarily have to be large masses, and those able to do little, small masses. But if large masses have small powers, and a few of the very smallest masses have the greatest powers, acting must be attributed to something other than magnitude—so to what has no magnitude.
τὸ δὲ ὕλην μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σῶμα, ὥς φασιν, οὖσαν, διάφορα δὲ ποιεῖν ποιότητας προσλαβοῦσαν, πῶς οὐ δῆλον ποιεῖ τὰ προσγενόμενα λόγους αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι; μηδ’ ὅτι πνεύματος ἢ αἵματος ἀποστάντων ἀποθνήσκει τὰ ζῷα λεγόντων. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἄνευ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη. καὶ μὴν οὔτε πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων οὔτε αἷμα, ψυχὴ δέ.
And their saying that matter is the same, being body, as they claim, but produces different effects when it takes on qualities—how does this not make it clear that what is added is rational principles, and incorporeal? Nor let them say that animals die when breath or blood leaves them. For they cannot exist without these, nor without many other things, none of which would be the soul. Besides, neither breath nor blood pervades everything; but soul does.
ἔτι εἰ σῶμα οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ διῆλθε διὰ παντός, κἂν κραθεῖσα εἴη, ὃν τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἡ κρᾶσις. εἰ δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων κρᾶσις οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐᾷ εἶναι τῶν κραθέντων, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνείη τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον ἀπολέσασα τὸ εἶναι ψυχή· ὥσπερ, εἰ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν κραθείη, τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔχομεν ψυχήν. τὸ δὲ δὴ σῶμα ὂν σώματι κεκρᾶσθαι ὅλον δι’ ὅλων, ὡς ὅπου ἂν ᾖ [θάτερον] καὶ θάτερον εἶναι, ἴσον ὄγκον ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸ πᾶν κατεχόντων καὶ μηδεμίαν αὔξην γεγονέναι ἐπεμβληθέντος τοῦ ἑτέρου, οὐδὲν ἀπολείψει ὃ μὴ τέμῃ.
Further, if the soul, being a body, pervaded everything, it would be mixed, in the way other bodies are mixed. But if the mixture of bodies leaves none of the things mixed in actuality, then neither would the soul any longer be in the bodies in actuality, but only potentially, having lost its being as soul—just as, if sweet and bitter were mixed, the sweet no longer exists. So we have no soul. And for a body to be mixed with a body whole through whole, so that wherever [the one] is the other is too, both occupying an equal volume and the whole of it, with no increase in size when the other is added—this will leave nothing that it does not cut.
οὐ γὰρ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη παραλλὰξ ἡ κρᾶσις — οὕτω γάρ φασι παράθεσιν ἔσεσθαι — διεληλυθὸς δὲ διὰ παντὸς τὸ ἐπεμβληθὲν ἐπὶ σμικρότερον· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἔλαττον ἴσον γενέσθαι τῷ μείζονι. ἀλλ’ οὖν διεληλυθὸς πᾶν τέμνει κατὰ πᾶν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ καθ’ ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον καὶ μὴ μεταξὺ σῶμα ἔσται ὃ μὴ τέτμηται, εἰς σημεῖα τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰς δὲ ἄπειρον τῆς τομῆς οὔσης — ὃ γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς σῶμα, διαιρετόν ἐστιν — οὐ δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὰ ἄπειρα ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι’ ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ σῶμα· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δι’ ὅλων· ἀσώματος ἄρα.
For the mixing is not by alternating large parts—that, they say, would be juxtaposition—but the added body passes through the whole, even if it is smaller; which is impossible, for the smaller to become equal to the larger. Anyway, having passed through, it cuts the whole at every point. Necessarily, then, if it is at every point and there is no body in between that has not been cut, the body must have been divided down to points, which is impossible. And if the cutting goes on to infinity—for whatever body you take is divisible—the infinite will be not only potential but actual. So it is not possible for a body to go whole through a whole; but soul goes through wholes; so it is incorporeal.
τὸ δὲ καὶ φύσιν μὲν προτέραν τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα λέγειν, ἐν δὲ ψυχρῷ γενομένην καὶ στομωθεῖσαν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι λεπτοτέραν ἐν ψυχρῷ γενομένην — ὃ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον, πολλὰ γὰρ ζῷα ἐν θερμῷ γίγνεται καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει οὐ ψυχθεῖσαν· ἀλλ’ οὖν φασί γε προτέραν φύσιν ψυχῆς εἶναι κατὰ συντυχίας τὰς ἔξω γιγνομένης. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ χεῖρον πρῶτον ποιεῖν καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἄλλο ἔλαττον, ἣν λέγουσιν ἕξιν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὕστατος ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι γενόμενος· ἢ εἰ πρὸ πάντων νοῦς, ἐφεξῆς ἔδει ψυχὴν ποιεῖν, εἶτα φύσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ ὕστερον χεῖρον, ᾗπερ πέφυκεν.
And to say that this same breath was previously nature, and that on coming into the cold and being tempered it becomes soul, growing finer in the cold—which is itself absurd, since many animals come into being in heat and have a soul that has not been cooled—well, at any rate they do say that nature is prior to soul, which comes about through external chance events. So it turns out that they put the worse first, and before it something still lesser, which they call “tenor,” while intellect comes last, evidently arising from soul. Or, if intellect is before everything, they should have put soul next, then nature, and always the later thing worse, in accordance with how things naturally are.
εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ὕστερος καὶ γεννητὸς καὶ ἐπακτὸν τὸ νοεῖν ἔχον, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μηδὲ ψυχὴν μηδὲ νοῦν μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι, εἰ τὸ δυνάμει μὴ ὄντος πρότερον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲ ἥξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν. τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἄγον, μὴ ὄντος ἑτέρου παρ’ αὐτὸ προτέρου; εἰ δ’ ἑαυτὸ ἄξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ βλέπον γε πρός τι ἄξει, ὃ οὐ δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἔσται. καίτοι τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει ἕξει, καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἥξει καὶ τοῦτο κρεῖττον ἔσται τοῦ δυναμένου οἷον ὀρεκτὸν ὂν ἐκείνου. πρότερον ἄρα τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἑτέραν φύσιν ἔχον σώματος καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ἀεί· πρότερον ἄρα καὶ νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ φύσεως.
If, then, their god too is later as regards intellect, and generated, and has his thinking brought in from outside, it would be possible for there to be neither soul nor intellect nor god—if what is potential could not come into being, nor arrive at actuality, unless what is actual existed first. For what will bring it there, if there is nothing other than it and prior to it? And if it brings itself into actuality—which is absurd—it will still do so by looking toward something that is not potential but actual. And yet if what is potential is to have the ability to remain always the same, it will come into actuality by itself, and this will be superior to what is potential, as being what it desires. So the superior, which has a nature other than body and is always in actuality, is prior; so intellect and soul are prior to nature.
οὐκ ἄρα οὕτως ψυχὴ ὡς πνεῦμα οὐδ’ ὡς σῶμα. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν οὐ σῶμα λέγοιτ’ ἄν, εἴρηται καὶ ἄλλοις ἕτερα, ἱκανὰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.
So soul does not exist in the way breath does, nor in the way body does. As for the case that it is not a body, others too have made other arguments; but these are enough as well.
Neither harmony nor entelechy
Soul is neither the harmony of the body nor its inseparable entelechy.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλης φύσεως, δεῖ ζητεῖν τίς αὕτη. ἆρ’ οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἷον ἁρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδὰς ἁρμονία. ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένων τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεταί τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ’ αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἁρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινομένου τὴν ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ζωήν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχὴν οὖσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν εἴρηται.
Since it is of another nature, we must ask what this nature is. Is it something other than body, yet something belonging to body, like a harmony? Since the Pythagoreans said this in a different sense, people thought it was something like the harmony of strings. Just as there, when the strings are stretched, something like an affection supervenes on them, which is called harmony, so, since our body consists of a blend of unlike things, the particular blend produces life, and the soul is the affection supervening on the blend. That this is impossible has already been argued at length against this opinion.
καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἡ ψυχή, ἡ δ’ ἁρμονία ὕστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῇ, ἁρμονία δὲ οὖσα οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα ποιοῖ, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία οὐκ οὐσία, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ οὖσα ὑγίεια ἂν εἴη καὶ ὅτι καθ’ ἕκαστον μέρος ἄλλως κραθὲν εἴη ἂν ψυχὴ ἑτέρα, ὥστε πολλὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ταύτης ἄλλην ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν ποιοῦσαν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ταύτην, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν μουσικὸν τὸν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς χορδαῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν λόγον ἔχοντα παρ’ αὑτῷ, καθ’ ὃν ἁρμόσει. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ χορδαὶ παρ’ αὑτῶν οὔτ’ ἐνταῦθα τὰ σώματα ἑαυτὰ εἰς ἁρμονίαν ἄγειν. δυνήσεται.
For it has been said that soul is prior, harmony posterior; that the one rules and commands the body and often fights against it, whereas, if it were a harmony, it could not do these things; that the one is a substance, while harmony is not a substance; that the blend of the bodies we are made of, being in due proportion, would be health; that each part, blended differently, would be a different soul, so that there would be many; and, most important, that before this soul there must be another soul which produces this harmony—as with instruments there is the musician who puts the harmony into the strings, having in himself the rational principle by which he will tune them. For neither there the strings, nor here the bodies, will be able to bring themselves into harmony on their own.
ὅλως δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐξ ἀψύχων ἔμψυχα ποιοῦσι καὶ ἐξ ἀτάκτων κατὰ συντυχίαν τεταγμένα καὶ τὴν τάξιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς αὐτομάτου τάξεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία.
In general, these people too make ensouled things out of soulless ones, and ordered things out of disordered ones by chance, and have order come not from soul, but soul itself get its existence from an order that arose spontaneously. That cannot happen either in particular things or in the wholes. So the soul is not a harmony.
τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεχείας ὧδ’ ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο, πῶς περὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται· τὴν ψυχήν φασιν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ εἴδους τάξιν ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα [τὸ] ἔμψυχον ἔχειν, σώματος δὲ οὐ παντὸς εἶδος οὐδὲ ᾗ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ᾗ παραβέβληται ὡμοίωται, ὡς μορφὴ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς χαλκόν, καὶ [δεῖ] διαιρουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμερίζεσθαι [καὶ] τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποκοπτομένου τινὸς μέρους μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκοπέντος [καὶ] ψυχῆς μόριον εἶναι, τήν τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀναχώρησιν μὴ γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ δεῖ προσφυᾶ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν οὗ ἐστιν εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἀληθές, μηδὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴν ἐντελεχείας οὔσης οὐδὲ ἐναντίωσιν λόγου πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας, ἓν δὲ καὶ ταὐτὸν δι’ ὅλου πεπονθέναι τὸ πᾶν οὐ διαφωνοῦν ἑαυτῷ.
As for entelechy, one might examine in this way how it is said of the soul. They say that in the composite the soul holds the rank of form, with [the] ensouled body as matter; yet form not of every body, nor of body as body, but of a natural organic body potentially having life. If, then, it has been made like the body in the way it is applied to it, as the shape of a statue is to the bronze, then when the body is divided the soul [must] be divided along with it, and when some part is cut off a portion of soul [too] goes with the part cut off; and the withdrawal in sleep would not happen, since the entelechy must be grown together with that of which it is the entelechy—in truth, there would be no sleep at all. And further, if soul is an entelechy, there would be no opposition of reason to desires; the whole would be affected in one and the same way throughout, without disagreeing with itself.
αἰσθήσεις δὲ μόνον δυνατὸν ἴσως γίνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ νοήσεις ἀδύνατον. διὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄλλην ψυχὴν τὸν νοῦν εἰσάγουσιν, ὃν ἀθάνατον τίθενται. τὴν οὖν λογιζομένην ψυχὴν ἄλλως ἐντελέχειαν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὐδ’ ἡ αἰσθητική, εἴπερ καὶ αὕτη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀπόντων τοὺς τύπους ἔχει, αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄρα ἕξει· εἰ δὲ μή, οὕτως ἐνέσονται ὡς μορφαὶ καὶ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον ἄλλους δέχεσθαι, εἰ οὕτως ἐνεῖεν· οὐκ ἄρα ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, μὴ σιτίων μηδὲ ποτῶν ἀλλ’ ἄλλων παρὰ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἀμφισβήτησιν ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν, μήποτε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐντελέχεια ἀχώριστος ᾖ.
Perceptions alone might perhaps be possible, but thoughts impossible. That is why they themselves bring in another soul, intellect, which they posit as immortal. So the reasoning soul must be an entelechy in some other way than this, if we must use the word at all. Nor is the perceiving soul an inseparable entelechy: if it too keeps the impressions of sense objects when they are absent, it will keep them, then, not together with the body; if not, they will be in it as shapes and images. But it would be impossible to receive others, if they were in it that way. So it is not an inseparable entelechy. Nor, indeed, is the desiring part—desiring not food and drink but things other than those of the body—an inseparable entelechy either. There would remain the vegetative part, which might seem open to dispute: might it not be an inseparable entelechy in this way?
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτο φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ παντὸς φυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν, καὶ αὐξανομένου τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ κάτω ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν φυτῶν, ἡ ψυχὴ δηλονότι ἀπολιποῦσα τὰ ἄλλα μέρη εἰς ἕν τι συνεστάλη· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐστι πρὶν αὐξηθῆναι τὸ φυτὸν ἐν τῷ ὀλίγῳ ὄγκῳ. εἰ οὖν καὶ εἰς ὀλίγον ἔρχεται ἐκ μείζονος φυτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου ἐπὶ πᾶν, τί κωλύει καὶ ὅλως χωρίζεσθαι; πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ ἀμερὴς οὖσα μεριστοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια γένοιτο μεριστή; ἥ τε αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἄλλου ζῴου ἄλλου γίνεται· πῶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ ἐφεξῆς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἦν ἐντελέχεια ἑνός; φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων ζῴων εἰς ἄλλα ζῷα.
But this does not seem to be so either. The principle of every plant lies around the root, and in many plants, when the rest of the body withers, the soul around the root and lower parts has evidently left the other parts and contracted into a single place. So it was not in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. And again, before the plant has grown, the soul is there in a small bulk. If, then, it withdraws into a small space from a larger plant, and spreads from a small one over the whole, what prevents it from being separated altogether? And how could it, being without parts, become the divided entelechy of a divided body? Besides, the same soul comes to belong to one animal after another. How could the soul of the earlier animal become that of the next, if it were the entelechy of one? This is evident from animals that change into other animals.
οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶδος εἶναί τινος τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐσία οὐ παρὰ τοῦ ἐν σώματι ἱδρῦσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσα, ἀλλ’ οὖσα πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε γενέσθαι οἷον ζῴου, οὗ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γεννήσει. τίς οὖν οὐσία αὐτῆς; εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα, μήτε πάθος σώματος, πρᾶξις δὲ καὶ ποίησις, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς, οὐσία παρὰ τὰ σώματα οὖσα ποία τίς ἐστιν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἥν φαμεν ὄντως οὐσίαν εἶναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσία, πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν εἶναι λέγοιτ’ ἄν, γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν, μεταλήψει δὲ τοῦ ὄντος] σωζόμενον, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνῃ.
So it does not have its being by being the form of something. It is a being that does not get its existence from being settled in a body; it exists even before it comes to belong to this particular thing, a living creature, say. It is not the body that will generate the soul. What, then, is its being? If it is neither body nor an affection of body, but action and making, and many things are both in it and from it, what sort of being is it, since it is other than bodies? Clearly, it is what we call being in the true sense. For everything bodily would be called becoming, not being: it comes into being and perishes and never really is, but is preserved by participation in being, to the extent that it participates in it.
ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα φύσις, ἡ παρ’ αὑτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι, πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν, ὃ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· ἢ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα οἰχήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ὕστερον γένοιτο τούτου ἀπολωλότος, ὃ παρέχει αὐτοῖς σωτηρίαν, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῷδε τῷ παντὶ διὰ ψυχῆς σωζομένῳ καὶ κεκοσμημένῳ. ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινήσεως ἥδε χορηγοῦσα τοῖς ἄλλοις κίνησιν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινουμένη, καὶ ζωὴν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ σώματι διδοῦσα, αὐτὴ δὲ παρ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα, ἣν οὔποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ἅτε παρ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα ἐπακτῷ ζωῇ χρῆται· ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα φύσιν πρώτως ζῶσαν εἶναι, ἣν ἀνώλεθρον καὶ ἀθάνατον εἶναι δεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἅτε ἀρχὴν ζωῆς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσαν.
The other nature, which has its being from itself, is all that really is, which neither comes into being nor perishes. Otherwise all other things will vanish, and could not come into being later once this had perished, since it is what provides their preservation: both to the other things and to this All, which is preserved and ordered through soul. For soul is the principle of motion. It supplies motion to the other things, while it is itself moved by itself, and it gives life to the ensouled body, while it has life from itself, a life it never loses, since it has it from itself. Not all things, after all, use a life brought in from outside; otherwise it will go on to infinity. There must be some nature that is primarily alive, which must of necessity be indestructible and immortal, since it is the principle of life for the other things as well.
ἔνθα δὴ καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ ζῶν παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὂν παρ’ αὑτοῦ, πρώτως ὂν καὶ ζῶν πρώτως, μεταβολῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν ἄμοιρον, οὔτε γινόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον. πόθεν γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένοιτο, ἢ εἰς τί ἀπόλοιτο; καὶ εἰ δεῖ ἐπαληθεύειν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος προσηγορίαν, αὐτὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι δεήσει· ὡς καὶ τὸ λευκόν, αὐτὸ τὸ χρῶμα, οὐ ποτὲ μὲν λευκόν, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ λευκόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὂν ἦν τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ τοῦ λευκὸν εἶναι ἦν ἂν ἀεί. ἀλλὰ μόνον ἔχει τὸ λευκόν. ᾧ δ’ ἂν τὸ ὂν ᾖ παρόν, παρ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ πρώτως ὂν ἀεὶ ἔσται.
This, then, is where all that is divine and blessed must be situated, living from itself and being from itself, being primarily and living primarily, with no share in change in its being, neither coming into being nor perishing. For where would it come from, or into what would it perish? And if the name “being” is to apply truly, it will have to be not something that is at one time and is not at another. Just so white, the color itself, is not white at one time and not white at another. If white were also being, then along with being white it would be always. But it has only whiteness. Whatever has being present to it, from itself and primarily, will always be.
τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ ὂν πρώτως καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν οὐχὶ νεκρόν, ὥσπερ λίθον ἢ ξύλον, ἀλλὰ ζῶν εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ζωῇ καθαρᾷ κεχρῆσθαι, ὅσον ἂν αὑτοῦ μένῃ μόνον· ὃ δ’ ἂν συμμιχθῇ χείρονι, ἐμπόδιον μὲν ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα, οὔτι γε μὴν τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἀπολωλεκέναι, ἀναλαβεῖν δὲ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀναδραμόν.
This, then, which is primarily and always, must not be dead like a stone or a piece of wood; it must be alive, and enjoy a pure life so far as it remains alone by itself. Whatever of it is mixed with the worse has an obstacle in the way of the best things, but it has by no means lost its own nature, and it recovers its ancient state when it runs back up to what is its own.
The soul sees its own divinity
A purified soul, looking at itself, finds that it is divine and immortal.
ὅτι δὲ τῇ θειοτέρᾳ φύσει συγγενὴς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῇ ἀιδίῳ, δῆλον μὲν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ μὴ σῶμα αὐτὴν δεδεῖχθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σχῆμα ἔχει οὐδὲ χρῶμα ἀναφής τε. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε ἔστι δεικνύναι. ὁμολογουμένου δὴ ἡμῖν παντὸς τοῦ θείου καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ζωῇ ἀγαθῇ κεχρῆσθαι καὶ ἔμφρονι, σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, οἷόν ἐστι τὴν φύσιν. λάβωμεν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ τὴν ἐν σώματι ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγους καὶ θυμοὺς προσλαβοῦσαν καὶ πάθη ἄλλα ἀναδεξαμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταῦτα ἀποτριψαμένην καὶ καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε μὴ κοινωνοῦσαν τῷ σώματι. ἥτις καὶ δῆλον ποιεῖ, ὡς προσθῆκαι τὰ κακὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλοθεν, καθηραμένῃ δὲ αὐτῇ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ἄριστα, φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή, οἰκεῖα ὄντα.
That the soul is akin to the more divine and eternal nature is shown, among other things, by the proof that it is not body. Nor, indeed, does it have shape or color, and it cannot be touched. But it can also be shown from the following. Since we agree that all that is divine and really is enjoys a good and intelligent life, we must next consider, starting from our own soul, what it is like in its nature. Let us take a soul—not one in a body that has taken on irrational desires and passions and admitted other affections, but one that has wiped these off and, as far as possible, has no communion with the body. Such a soul makes it clear that evils are additions to the soul and come from elsewhere, while in it, once it is purified, the best things are present, understanding and the rest of virtue, which are its own.
εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν ἀνέλθῃ, πῶς οὐ τῆς φύσεως ἐκείνης, οἵαν φαμὲν τὴν τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀιδίου παντὸς εἶναι; φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθὴς θεῖα ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἐγγένοιτο φαύλῳ τινὶ καὶ θνητῷ πράγματι, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη θεῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἅτε θείων μετὸν αὐτῷ, διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον. διὸ καὶ ὅστις τοιοῦτος ἡμῶν ὀλίγον ἂν παραλλάττοι τῶν ἄνω τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ μόνον τοῦτο, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν σώματι, ἐλαττούμενος. διὸ καί, εἰ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ἦν, ἢ πλῆθός τι τοιαύταις ψυχαῖς κεχρημένον, οὐδεὶς οὕτως [ἂν] ἦν ἄπιστος, ὡς μὴ πιστεύειν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς πάντη ἀθάνατον εἶναι.
If, then, the soul is like this when it goes back up into itself, how can it not be of that nature which we say belongs to all that is divine and eternal? For understanding and true virtue, being divine things, could not come to be in some paltry mortal thing; such a thing must be divine, since it has a share in divine things through kinship and sameness of being. That is why any of us who is like this would differ little from the beings above in his soul itself, falling short only in this: in so far as he is in a body. And that is why, if every human being were like this, or a large number had souls like this, no one would be so incredulous as not to believe that the soul in them is altogether immortal.
νῦν δὲ πολλαχοῦ λελωβημένην τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψυχὴν ὁρῶντες οὔτε ὡς περὶ θείου οὔτε ὡς περὶ ἀθανάτου χρήματος διανοοῦνται. δεῖ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου σκοπεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ ἀφορῶντα, ἐπείπερ τὸ προστεθὲν ἐμπόδιον ἀεὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν τοῦ ᾧ προσετέθη γίγνεται. σκόπει δὴ ἀφελών, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ ἀφελὼν ἑαυτὸν ἰδέτω καὶ πιστεύσει ἀθάνατος εἶναι, ὅταν ἑαυτὸν θεάσηται ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ γεγενημένον.
As it is, seeing the soul in most people mutilated in many ways, people do not think of it as something divine or immortal. But one must consider the nature of each thing by looking at it in its pure state, since what has been added is always an obstacle to knowing that to which it was added. So look by taking away—or rather, let the one who has taken away look at himself, and he will believe he is immortal, when he contemplates himself having come to be in the intelligible and in the pure.
ὄψεται γὰρ νοῦν ὁρῶντα οὐκ αἰσθητόν τι οὐδὲ τῶν θνητῶν τούτων, ἀλλ’ ἀιδίῳ τὸ ἀίδιον κατανοοῦντα, πάντα (τὰ) ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, κόσμον καὶ αὐτὸν νοητὸν καὶ φωτεινὸν γεγενημένον, ἀληθείᾳ καταλαμπόμενον τῇ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλήθειαν ὡς πολλάκις αὐτῷ δόξαι τοῦτο δὴ καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι· χαίρετ’ ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀναβὰς καὶ [εἰς] τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμοιότητα ἀτενίσας. εἰ δ’ ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀρίστων εἶναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἔνδον οὖσαι ἀναφαίνονται, αἳ δὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσιν.
For he will see an intellect that sees nothing perceptible, nothing of these mortal things, but grasps the eternal by the eternal, all the things in the intelligible, and himself become an intelligible world, full of light, illuminated by the truth that comes from the Good, which shines truth on all the intelligibles. So he will often think this was well said: “Farewell: to you I am an immortal god,” having gone up to the divine and fixed his gaze on his likeness to it. And if purification makes one be in knowledge of the best things, then the kinds of knowledge that are within also come to light, those that really are knowledge.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξω που δραμοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ σωφροσύνην καθορᾷ καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ παρ’ αὑτῇ ἐν τῇ κατανοήσει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὃ πρότερον ἦν ὥσπερ ἀγάλματα ἐν αὑτῇ ἱδρυμένα ὁρῶσα οἷον ὑπὸ χρόνου ἰοῦ πεπληρωμένα καθαρὰ ποιησαμένη· οἷον εἰ χρυσὸς ἔμψυχος εἴη, εἶτα ἀποκρουσάμενος ὅσον γεηρὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ πρότερον ἑαυτοῦ ὤν, ὅτι μὴ χρυσὸν ἑώρα, τότε δὴ αὑτὸν ἤδη τοῦ χρήματος θαυμάσειεν ὁρῶν μεμονωμένον, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔδει αὐτῷ κάλλους ἐπακτοῦ ἐνθυμοῖτο, αὐτὸς κρατιστεύων, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐῴη εἶναι.
For it is not by running off somewhere outside that the soul catches sight of moderation and justice. It sees them by itself, within itself, in its understanding of itself and of what it was before, like statues set up in it, which it has cleaned of the rust, as it were, that time had filled them with. It is as if gold had a soul, and then, knocking off all the earthy matter in it, having before been ignorant of itself because it did not see gold, then at last it would admire itself for what it is, seeing itself on its own, and would reflect that it had no need after all of any imported beauty, being itself supreme, if one would only let it be by itself.
περὶ τοιούτου χρήματος τίς ἂν ἀμφισβητοίη νοῦν ἔχων, ὡς οὐκ ἀθάνατον; ᾧ πάρεστι μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ζωή, ἣν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀπολέσθαι· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίκτητόν γε οὖσαν οὐδ’ αὖ οὕτως ἔχουσαν, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης πάρεστι; λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐπακτὸν ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρί, ἀλλ’ ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῷ πυρί, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ τῷ πυρὶ ὕλῃ. ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ διαλύεται τὸ πῦρ. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐχ οὕτω τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει, ὡς ὕλην μὲν οὖσαν ὑποκεῖσθαι, ζωὴν δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ γενομένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδεῖξαι.
About a thing like this, who with any sense would dispute that it is immortal? It has life present to it from itself, a life that cannot be lost. For how could it be, since it is not acquired, nor again possessed in the way heat is present to fire? I do not mean that heat is something brought into fire from outside, but that, even if not to the fire, it is to the matter underlying the fire. That is how fire is dissolved. But the soul does not have life in such a way that the soul underlies as matter and life, coming upon it, makes it a soul.
ἢ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή, καὶ ἔστιν οὐσία ἡ τοιαύτη παρ’ αὑτῆς ζῶσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ζητοῦμεν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον ὁμολογήσουσιν, ἢ ἀναλύσουσιν ὡς σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἀθάνατον ἔλθωσι παρ’ αὑτοῦ κινούμενον, ᾧ μὴ θέμις θανάτου μοῖραν δέχεσθαι· ἢ πάθος ἐπακτὸν τῇ ὕλῃ λέγοντες τὴν ζωήν, παρ’ ὅτου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν ὕλην, αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκασθήσονται ὁμολογεῖν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ἄδεκτον ὂν τοῦ ἐναντίου ᾧ ἐπιφέρει. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι μία φύσις ἐνεργείᾳ ζῶσα.
For either life is a substance, and such a substance is alive by itself—which is just what we are looking for—and they will agree that this is immortal; or they will analyze it, too, as composite, and so on again, until they come to something immortal, moved by itself, for which it is not lawful to receive the lot of death. Or, if they say life is an affection brought into matter, they will be compelled to admit that whatever this affection came into matter from is itself immortal, since it cannot receive the opposite of what it brings. But in fact there is one nature that is actually alive.
ἔτι εἰ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν φήσουσι φθαρτήν, πάλαι ἂν ἔδει πάντα ἀπολωλέναι· εἰ δὲ τὴν μέν, τὴν δ’ οὕ, οἷον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἡμετέραν μή, λεκτέον αὐτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν. ἀρχή τε γὰρ κινήσεως ἑκατέρα, καὶ ζῇ παρ’ αὑτῆς ἑκατέρα, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐφάπτεται νοοῦσα τά τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ τά τε οὐρανοῦ ἐπέκεινα καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστι κατ’ οὐσίαν ζητοῦσα καὶ μέχρι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀναβαίνουσα. ἥ τε δὴ παρ’ αὑτῆς ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ θεαμάτων κατανόησις αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως γιγνομένη πρὸ σώματός τε αὐτῇ δίδωσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀιδίοις ἐπιστήμαις κεχρημένην ἀίδιον καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι. πᾶν τε τὸ λυόμενον σύνθεσιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι εἰληφὸς ταύτῃ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκεν, ᾗ συνετέθη.
Further, if they say every soul is perishable, everything would long since have perished. If they say some souls are and some are not—that the soul of the All, say, is immortal, but ours is not—they must give the reason. For each is a principle of motion, each lives from itself, and each grasps the same things with the same faculty, thinking both what is in heaven and what is beyond heaven, seeking out everything that has being, and ascending as far as the first principle. And the understanding of each thing itself, which the soul has from itself out of the sights within it, arising from recollection, gives it being before the body, and shows that, since it possesses eternal kinds of knowledge, it is itself eternal too. And everything that is dissolved, having received composition in order to exist, is naturally dissolved in the way it was put together.
ψυχὴ δὲ μία καὶ ἁπλῆ ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσα ἐν τῷ ζῆν φύσις· οὐ τοίνυν ταύτῃ φθαρήσεται. ἀλλ’ ἄρα μερισθεῖσα [καὶ] κερματιζομένη ἀπόλοιτο ἄν. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὄγκος τις οὐδὲ ποσόν, ὡς ἐδείχθη, ἡ ψυχή. ἀλλ’ ἀλλοιωθεῖσα ἥξει εἰς φθοράν. ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις φθείρουσα τὸ εἶδος ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν δὲ ὕλην ἐᾷ· τοῦτο δὲ συνθέτου πάθος. εἰ οὖν κατὰ μηδὲν τούτων οἷόν τε φθείρεσθαι, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι ἀνάγκη.
But soul is one and simple, a nature whose being lies in the activity of living; so it will not perish in that way. Then perhaps it would perish by being divided [and] chopped into bits. But the soul, as has been shown, is not a mass or a quantity. Then it will come to destruction by alteration. But alteration, when it destroys, takes away the form and leaves the matter, and that is something that happens to a composite. If, then, it cannot be destroyed in any of these ways, it must be indestructible.
πῶς οὖν τοῦ νοητοῦ χωριστοῦ ὄντος ἥδε εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται; ὅτι ὅσος μὲν νοῦς μόνος, ἀπαθὴς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ζωὴν μόνον νοερὰν ἔχων ἐκεῖ ἀεὶ μένει — οὐ γὰρ ἔνι ὁρμὴ οὐδ’ ὄρεξις· ὃ δ’ ἂν ὄρεξιν προσλάβῃ ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ τῷ νῷ ὄν, τῇ προσθήκῃ τῆς ὀρέξεως οἷον πρόεισιν ἤδη ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ κοσμεῖν ὀρεγόμενον καθ’ ἃ ἐν νῷ εἶδεν, ὥσπερ κυοῦν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ὠδῖνον γεννῆσαι, ποιεῖν σπεύδει καὶ δημιουργεῖν. καὶ τῇ σπουδῇ ταύτῃ περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τεταμένη, μετὰ μὲν πάσης τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ διοικουμένου εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ τοῦ παντὸς συνεπιμελουμένη, μέρος δὲ διοικεῖν βουληθεῖσα μονουμένη καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ γιγνομένη, ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, οὐχ ὅλη οὐδὲ πᾶσα τοῦ σώματος γενομένη, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἔξω σώματος ἔχουσα.
How, then, since the intelligible is separate, does this soul come into body? Like this: whatever is intellect alone remains always There among the intelligibles, unaffected, having only intellectual life—for in it there is no impulse or desire. But what takes on desire, coming next after that Intellect, by the addition of desire proceeds, as it were, further already. Desiring to order things according to what it saw in Intellect, as if pregnant by them and in labor to give birth, it is eager to make and to craft. And straining toward the perceptible with this eagerness, together with the whole Soul of the All it transcends what it governs outside, and shares in the care of the All; but when it wants to govern a part, it becomes isolated and comes to be in that part in which it is, not becoming wholly and entirely the body’s, but keeping something outside the body as well.
οὔκουν οὐδὲ ὁ ταύτης νοῦς ἐμπαθής· αὐτὴ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐν σώματι, ὁτὲ δὲ σώματος ἔξω, ὁρμηθεῖσα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, εἰς δὲ τὰ τρίτα προελθοῦσα νοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ψυχῆς πάντα καλῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος, ἀθανάτου δι’ ἀθανάτου, εἴπερ ἀεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν ἔσται δι’ ἐνεργείας ἀπαύστου.
So its intellect, at least, is not subject to affection. The soul itself is sometimes in body, sometimes outside body. It started from the first things and has proceeded to the third, by an activity of Intellect, while Intellect remains in the same and through soul fills all things with beauty and sets them in order—the immortal through the immortal—since it too, always being, will be through unceasing activity.
περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ψυχῆς, ὅσαι μὲν αὐτῶν σφαλεῖσαι καὶ μέχρι θηρείων ἧκον σωμάτων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀθανάτους εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι εἶδος ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ζώσης φύσεως δεῖ καὶ ταύτην εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν οὖσαν ζωῆς τοῖς ζῴοις αἰτίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· ἅπασαι γὰρ ὡρμήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ζωὴν ἔχουσαι οἰκείαν ἀσώματοί τε καὶ αὗται καὶ ἀμερεῖς καὶ οὐσίαι. εἰ δὲ τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν τριμερῆ οὖσαν τῷ συνθέτῳ λυθήσεσθαι [φήσουσι], καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν τὰς μὲν καθαρὰς ἀπαλλαττομένας τὸ προσπλασθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἀφήσειν, τὰς δὲ τούτῳ συνέσεσθαι ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· ἀφειμένον δὲ τὸ χεῖρον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀπολεῖσθαι, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ὅθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολεῖται.
As for the soul of the other animals: those of them that have gone wrong and come as far as the bodies of beasts must also be immortal. If there is another kind of soul, it too must come from nowhere other than the living nature, since it too is the cause of life to animals; and the same holds for the soul in plants. For all of them started from the same principle, each with a life of its own, and these too are incorporeal, without parts, and substances. If [they say that] the human soul, being tripartite, will be dissolved as a composite, we too shall say that the pure souls, when they depart, will let go of what was molded on to them at birth, while the others will stay with it for a very long time; and that the worse part, once let go, will not itself perish either, as long as that from which it has its origin exists. For nothing that is will perish.
ἃ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀποδείξεως δεομένους ἐχρῆν λέγεσθαι, εἴρηται. ἃ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεομένους πίστεως αἰσθήσει κεκραμένης, ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῆς οὔσης ἐκλεκτέον, ἔκ τε ὧν θεοὶ ἀνεῖλον κελεύοντες μῆνιν ψυχῶν ἠδικημένων ἱλάσκεσθαι τιμάς τε νέμειν τεθνηκόσιν ὡς ἐν αἰσθήσει οὖσι, καθὰ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀπεληλυθότας. πολλαὶ δὲ ψυχαὶ πρότερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὖσαι σωμάτων ἔξω γενόμεναι οὐκ ἀπέστησαν τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν ἀνθρώπους· αἳ δὴ καὶ μαντεῖα ἀποδειξάμεναι εἴς τε τὰ ἄλλα χρῶσαι ὠφελοῦσι, καὶ δεικνύουσι δι’ αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, ὅτι μή εἰσιν ἀπολωλυῖαι.
What had to be said to those who require demonstration has been said. What is to be said to those who require a belief mixed with perception must be selected from the abundant record of such matters: from the oracles the gods gave, ordering people to appease the anger of souls that had been wronged and to pay honors to the dead as still capable of perception, as in fact all human beings do toward those who have departed. And many souls that were formerly in human beings, after coming to be outside bodies, have not stopped doing good to human beings. They have established oracles and help by prophesying about other matters too, and they show through themselves that the other souls have not perished either.