Forage Plotinus · Enneads · IV.8 On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies
Plotinus · Enneads

IV.8 On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies

Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα καθόδου τῆς ψυχῆς · Opening with his own ascents to the divine, Plotinus reconciles Plato's accounts of the soul's fall into bodies. · no. 6 in order of writing

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    Famous passage Waking up out of the bodyIn his most personal passage Plotinus writes: “Often I have woken up out of the body into myself,” seeing a wonderful beauty and becoming one with the divine.

    Πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ γινόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω, ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ εἴσω, θαυμαστὸν ἡλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, καὶ τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας πιστεύσας τότε μάλιστα εἶναι, ζωήν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἱδρυθεὶς εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνην ὑπὲρ πᾶν τε ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἱδρύσας, μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θείῳ στάσιν εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ καταβὰς ἀπορῶ, πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος τοῦτο οὖσα, οἷον ἐφάνη καθ’ ἑαυτήν, καίπερ οὖσα ἐν σώματι.

    Often I have woken up out of the body into myself, and come to be outside everything else and inside myself, and seen a beauty of wonderful greatness, and been confident that then above all I belonged to the better part. I have lived the best life and come to be one with the divine, and, settled firmly in it, I have come into that activity, setting myself above all else in the intelligible. Then, after this rest in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect into reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever come down, even now, and how my soul has ever come to be inside the body, when it is what it showed itself to be by itself, even while it is in a body.

    ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος, ὃς ἡμῖν παρακελεύεται ζητεῖν τοῦτο, ἀμοιβάς τε ἀναγκαίας τιθέμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁδόν τε ἄνω καὶ κάτω εἰπὼν καὶ ‘μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται’ καὶ ‘κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι’ εἰκάζειν δοκεῖ ἀμελήσας σαφῆ ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς δέον ἴσως παρ’ αὑτοῖς ζητεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ζητήσας εὗρεν. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε εἰπὼν ἁμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φυγὰς θεόθεν γενόμενος ἥκειν πίσυνος μαινομένῳ νείκει τοσοῦτον παρεγύμνου, ὅσον καὶ Πυθαγόρας, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ᾐνίττοντο περί τε τούτου περί τε πολλῶν ἄλλων. τῷ δὲ παρῆν καὶ διὰ ποίησιν οὐ σαφεῖ εἶναι.

    Heraclitus, who urges us to seek this, posits necessary exchanges from opposites, and speaks of a way up and down, and says “changing it rests” and “it is weariness to toil for the same masters and be ruled by them”; he seems to speak in images, not troubling to make his meaning clear to us, as if perhaps we ought to seek within ourselves, just as he himself sought and found. And Empedocles, who said that it is a law for souls that err to fall here, and that he himself has come here “an exile from the gods, trusting in raving Strife,” revealed no more than Pythagoras and his followers, I think, hinted at in riddles about this and many other things. In his case, besides, writing in verse kept him from being clear.

    The phrases quoted come from the fragments of Heraclitus and Empedocles.

    λείπεται δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων, ὃς πολλά τε καὶ καλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς εἶπε περί τε ἀφίξεως αὐτῆς πολλαχῇ εἴρηκεν ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ λόγοις, ὥστε ἐλπίδα ἡμῖν εἶναι λαβεῖν παρ’ αὐτοῦ σαφές τι.

    We are left, then, with the divine Plato, who said many fine things about the soul and has spoken about its coming here in many places in his works, so that we can hope to get something clear from him.

    τί οὖν λέγει ὁ φιλόσοφος οὗτος; οὐ ταὐτὸν λέγων πανταχῇ φανεῖται, ἵνα ἄν τις ἐκ ῥᾳδίας τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς βούλημα εἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν πανταχοῦ ἀτιμάσας καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν τῆς ψυχῆς μεμψάμενος ἐν δεσμῷ τε εἶναι καὶ τεθάφθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει, καὶ τὸν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενον λόγον μέγαν εἶναι, ὃς ἐν φρουρᾷ τὴν ψυχήν φησιν εἶναι· καὶ τὸ σπήλαιον αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τὸ ἄντρον, τόδε τὸ πᾶν δοκεῖ μοι λέγειν, ὅπου γε λύσιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἄνοδον ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου τῇ ψυχῇ φησιν εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν πορείαν. ἐν δὲ Φαίδρῳ πτερορρύησιν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀφίξεως· καὶ περίοδοι αὐτῷ ἀνελθοῦσαν πάλιν φέρουσι τῇδε, καὶ κρίσεις δὲ καταπέμπουσιν ἄλλας ἐνταῦθα καὶ κλῆροι καὶ τύχαι καὶ ἀνάγκαι.

    What, then, does this philosopher say? He will not be found saying the same thing everywhere, so that one could easily have seen what the man means. But everywhere he disparages the whole perceptible world and blames the soul’s communion with the body. He says the soul is in fetters and buried in it, and that the account told in the mysteries is a great one, which says that the soul is “under guard.” And his cave, like Empedocles’ grotto, seems to me to mean this All, since he says that the release from the fetters and the ascent from the cave is the soul’s journey to the intelligible. In the Phaedrus he makes the loss of its wings the cause of its coming here; and in his account cycles bring the soul back here after it has gone up, and judgments send others down here, and so do lots and fortunes and necessities.

    Plotinus is alluding to the Phaedo (prison and burial of the soul), the cave of Republic VII, the Phaedrus myth of the winged soul, and the myth of Er in Republic X.

    καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι μεμψάμενος τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄφιξιν πρὸς σῶμα, ἐν Τιμαίῳ περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς λέγων τόν τε κόσμον ἐπαινεῖ καὶ θεὸν λέγει εἶναι εὐδαίμονα τήν τε ψυχὴν παρὰ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔννουν τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι δεδόσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἔννουν μὲν αὐτὸ ἔδει εἶναι, ἄνευ δὲ ψυχῆς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι. ἥ τε οὖν ψυχὴ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς τούτου χάριν εἰς αὐτὸ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπέμφθη, ἥ τε ἑκάστου ἡμῶν, πρὸς τὸ τέλειον αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ ἔδει, ὅσα ἐν [τῷ] νοητῷ κόσμῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα γένη ζῴων καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ὑπάρχειν.

    And while in all these passages he blames the soul’s coming to body, in the Timaeus, speaking about this All, he praises the cosmos and calls it a blessed god, and says that soul was given by the good craftsman so that this All might be intelligent, since it had to be intelligent and this could not come about without soul. So the Soul of the All was sent into it by the god for this reason, and the soul of each of us too, so that the All might be complete; since the very same kinds of living beings that are in the intelligible world had to exist in the perceptible as well.

    Why souls come into bodies

    Plotinus reconciles Plato’s gloomy and hopeful accounts of the soul’s coming to body.

    ὥστε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς παρ’ αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν ζητήσασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὅλως ζητῆσαι, πῶς ποτε κοινωνεῖν σώματι πέφυκε, καὶ περὶ κόσμου φύσεως οἷόν τινα δεῖ αὐτὸν τίθεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ψυχὴ ἐνδιαιτᾶται [εἴτε] ἑκοῦσα εἴτε ἀναγκασθεῖσα εἴτε τις ἄλλος τρόπος· καὶ περὶ ποιητοῦ δὲ εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε ⟨…⟩ ὡς ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ οὖσαι ἴσως, ἃς ἔδει σώματα διοικούσας χείρω δι’ αὐτῶν εἴσω πολὺ δῦναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλον κρατήσειν, σκεδασθέντος μὲν ἂν ἑκάστου καὶ πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον φερομένου — ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ πάντα ἐν οἰκείῳ κατὰ φύσιν κεῖται — πολλῆς δὲ καὶ ὀχλώδους προνοίας δεομένων, ἅτε πολλῶν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων αὐτοῖς προσπιπτόντων ἀεί τε ἐνδείᾳ συνεχομένων καὶ πάσης βοηθείας ὡς ἐν πολλῇ δυσχερείᾳ δεομένων.

    So it turns out that, in seeking to learn from him about our own soul, we are necessarily led to take up the question of soul in general as well: how it is ever naturally fitted to associate with body. We must also ask about the nature of the cosmos—what sort of thing we should suppose it to be, in which soul makes its home, [whether] willingly or under compulsion or in some other way—and about its maker, whether he did rightly or ⟨…⟩ as perhaps our souls are, which, governing worse bodies, had to sink deep inside them if they were going to master them. For each of these bodies would scatter and be carried off to its own place—whereas in the All everything lies in its own place by nature—and they need much troublesome forethought, since many alien things are always falling upon them, and they are constantly gripped by need and require every kind of help, being in great difficulty.

    τὸ δὲ τέλειόν τε ὂν καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ αὔταρκες καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον αὑτῷ παρὰ φύσιν βραχέος οἷον κελεύσματος δεῖται· καὶ ὡς πέφυκε ψυχὴ ἐθέλειν, ταύτῃ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔχει οὔτε ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσα οὔτε πάσχουσα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεισιν οὐδὲ πρόσεισι. διὸ καί φησι καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν, εἰ μετ’ ἐκείνης γένοιτο τελείας, τελειωθεῖσαν καὶ αὐτὴν μετεωροπορεῖν καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖν, ὅτε [τε] μὴ ἀφίσταται εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων μηδέ τινος εἶναι, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς συνδιοικήσειν ῥᾳδίως τὸ πᾶν, ὡς οὐ κακὸν ὂν ψυχῇ ὁπωσοῦν σώματι παρέχειν τὴν τοῦ εἶναι δύναμιν, ὅτε μὴ πᾶσα πρόνοια τοῦ χείρονος ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ τὸ προνοοῦν μένειν.

    But what is complete, sufficient and self-sufficient, and has nothing in it contrary to its nature, needs only a brief command, as it were. And as soul naturally wishes, so it always is, having no desires and undergoing no affections, for nothing leaves it and nothing is added to it. That is why he says that our soul too, if it comes to be with that complete soul, is itself perfected and “walks on high and governs the whole cosmos.” When it does not withdraw so as to be inside bodies or to belong to some particular one, then it too, like the Soul of the All, will easily share in governing the All; for it is in no way bad for soul to give body the power to exist, since not every kind of care for the worse prevents what cares for it from remaining in the best.

    διττὴ γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια παντός, τοῦ μὲν καθόλου κελεύσει κοσμοῦσα ἀπράγμονι ἐπιστασίᾳ βασιλικῇ, τοῦ δὲ καθέκαστα ἤδη αὐτουργῷ τινι ποιήσει συναφῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πραττόμενον τὸ πρᾶττον τοῦ πραττομένου τῆς φύσεως ἀναπιμπλᾶσα. τῆς δὲ θείας ψυχῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἅπαντα διοικεῖν ἀεὶ λεγομένης, ὑπερεχούσης μὲν τῷ κρείττονι, δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην εἰς τὸ εἴσω πεμπούσης, αἰτίαν μὲν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι λέγοιτο ἔχειν τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἐν χείρονι πεποιηκέναι, ἥ τε ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀπεστέρηται τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐξ ἀιδίου τοῦτ’ ἔχουσα καὶ ἕξουσα ἀεί, ὃ μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῇ εἶναι· ὅπερ διηνεκῶς αὐτῇ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει οὔποτε ἀρξάμενον.

    For there are two kinds of care for anything. Care for the universal orders it by command, with an effortless, kingly supervision; care for the particular works by a kind of hands-on making, which through its contact with what is done infects the doer with the nature of what is done. Now since the divine soul is said always to govern the whole heaven in the first way, transcending it with its better part and sending its lowest power into the interior, the god could no longer be said to be to blame for having put the Soul of the All in something worse. Nor is the soul deprived of what is natural to it, since it has had this from eternity and will always have it, and it cannot be contrary to its nature; it belongs to it continuously and always, never having begun.

    τάς τε τῶν ἀστέρων ψυχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἔχειν λέγων, ὥσπερ τὸ πᾶν — ἐντίθησι γὰρ καὶ τούτων τὰ σώματα εἰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς περιφοράς — ἀποσώζοι ἂν καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτους πρέπουσαν εὐδαιμονίαν. δύο γὰρ ὄντων δι’ ἃ δυσχεραίνεται ἡ ψυχῆς πρὸς σώματα κοινωνία, ὅτι τε ἐμπόδιον πρὸς τὰς νοήσεις γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν πίμπλησιν αὐτήν, οὐδέτερον τούτων ἂν γένοιτο ψυχῇ, ἥτις μὴ εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἔδυ τοῦ σώματος, μηδέ τινός ἐστι, μηδὲ ἐκείνου ἐγένετο, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς, ἔστι τε τοιοῦτον, οἷον μήτε τινὸς δεῖσθαι, μήτε τινὶ ἐλλείπειν· ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν πίμπλασθαι ἢ φόβων.

    And when he says that the souls of the stars are related to their bodies in the same way as the All is—for he places their bodies too in the circuits of soul—he would preserve for them, too, the happiness that befits them. For there are two reasons why the soul’s association with bodies is objected to: that it becomes an obstacle to thinking, and that it fills the soul with pleasures, desires and pains. Neither of these could happen to a soul that has not sunk into the interior of the body and does not belong to anything—a soul that has not become the body’s, but the body has become its—when the body is such as neither to need anything nor to be lacking in anything; so that the soul is not filled with desires or fears either.

    οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν μήποτε περὶ σώματος προσδοκήσῃ τοιούτου, οὔτε τις ἀσχολία νεῦσιν ποιοῦσα κάτω ἀπάγει τῆς κρείττονος καὶ μακαρίας θέας, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἀπράγμονι δυνάμει τόδε τὸ πᾶν κοσμοῦσα.

    For it will never expect anything terrible concerning a body of that kind, nor does any preoccupation make it incline downward and draw it away from the better and blessed vision. It is always turned toward those things, ordering this All with an effortless power.

    περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς, ἣ ἐν σώματι πάντη λέγεται κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ταλαιπωρεῖν ἐν ἀνίαις καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ φόβοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς γιγνομένη, ᾗ καὶ δεσμὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τάφος, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῇ σπήλαιον καὶ ἄντρον, ἥντινα γνώμην οὐ διάφωνον ἔχει ἐκ τῶν αἰτιῶν οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τῆς καθόδου, νῦν λέγωμεν.

    As for the human soul, which is said to suffer badly in the body in every way and to be miserable, coming to be among griefs and desires and fears and the other evils, the soul for which the body is a fetter and a tomb and the cosmos a cave and a grotto: let us now say what his view of it is, a view not inconsistent, since the causes of the descent are not the same.

    ὄντος τοίνυν παντὸς νοῦ ἐν τῷ τῆς νοήσεως τόπῳ ὅλου τε καὶ παντός, ὃν δὴ κόσμον νοητὸν τιθέμεθα, ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτῳ περιεχομένων νοερῶν δυνάμεων καὶ νόων τῶν καθέκαστα — οὐ γὰρ εἷς νοῦς μόνος, ἀλλ’ εἷς καὶ πολλοί — πολλὰς ἔδει καὶ ψυχὰς καὶ μίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς τὰς πολλὰς διαφόρους, ὥσπερ ἐκ γένους ἑνὸς εἴδη τὰ μὲν ἀμείνω, τὰ δὲ χείρω, καὶ τὰ μὲν νοερώτερα, τὰ δ’ ἧττον ἐνεργείᾳ τοιαῦτα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ μὲν νοῦς περιέχων δυνάμει τἆλλα οἷον ζῷον μέγα, τὰ δ’ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕκαστον, ἃ δυνάμει περιεῖχε θάτερον· οἷον εἰ πόλις ἔμψυχος ἦν περιεκτικὴ ἐμψύχων ἄλλων, τελειοτέρα μὲν [ἡ] πόλεως καὶ δυνατωτέρα, οὐδὲν μὴν ἐκώλυε τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας.

    Since, then, Intellect as a whole is in the region of thought, whole and all—what we call the intelligible world—and since there also exist the intellectual powers contained in it and the individual intellects—for Intellect is not one only, but one and many—there had to be many souls and also one, and the many different souls had to come from the one, like species from one genus, some better and some worse, some more intellectual, others less actually so. For There too, in Intellect, there is Intellect, which contains the others potentially, like a great living being, and there are the others, each actually what the former contained potentially. It is as if a city were ensouled and contained other ensouled beings: the soul of the city would be more complete and more powerful, but nothing would prevent the others from being of the same nature.

    ἢ ὡς [ἂν] ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πυρὸς τὸ μὲν μέγα, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ πυρὰ εἴη· ἔστι δὲ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πυρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀφ’ ἧς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντός. ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον τῆς λογικωτέρας νοεῖν μέν, οὐ τὸ νοεῖν δὲ μόνον· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ νοῦ διαφέροι; προσλαβοῦσα γὰρ τῷ νοερὰ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλο, καθ’ ὃ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔσχεν ὑπόστασιν, νοῦς οὐκ ἔμεινεν, ἔχει τε ἔργον καὶ αὐτή, εἴπερ καὶ πᾶν, ὃ ἂν ᾖ τῶν ὄντων.

    Or it is as if from the universal fire there came a great fire and small fires; yet the whole being is that of the universal fire, or rather that from which the being of the universal fire also comes. The work of the more rational soul is to think, but not only to think—for then how would it differ from Intellect? In addition to being intellectual it took on something else, by which it acquired its own hypostasis, and it did not remain Intellect; and it too has a work, as does everything that exists.

    βλέπουσα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτῆς νοεῖ, εἰς δὲ ἑαυτὴν σώζει ἑαυτὴν, εἰς δὲ τὸ μετ’ αὐτὴν κοσμεῖ τε καὶ διοικεῖ καὶ ἄρχει αὐτοῦ· ὅτι μηδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν στῆναι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, δυναμένου ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἄλλου γενέσθαι ἐλάττονος μέν, ἀναγκαίου δὲ εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

    Looking to what is before it, it thinks; looking to itself, it preserves itself; looking to what comes after it, it orders, governs and rules it. For it was not possible for everything to come to a standstill in the intelligible, when something else could come next, something less, but necessary, given that what is before it exists.

    τὰς δὴ καθέκαστα ψυχὰς ὀρέξει μὲν νοερᾷ χρωμένας ἐν τῇ ἐξ οὗ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστροφῇ, δύναμιν δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε ἐχούσας, οἷά περ φῶς ἐξηρτημένον μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄνω ἡλίου, τῷ δὲ μετ’ αὐτὸ οὐ φθονοῦν τῆς χορηγίας, ἀπήμονας μὲν εἶναι [δεῖ] μετὰ τῆς ὅλης μενούσας ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ἐν οὐρανῷ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὅλης συνδιοικεῖν ἐκείνῃ, οἷα οἱ βασιλεῖς τῷ πάντων κρατοῦντι συνόντες συνδιοικοῦσιν ἐκείνῳ οὐ καταβαίνοντες οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων τόπων· καὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὁμοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τότε. μεταβάλλουσαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὸ μέρος τε εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ οἷον κάμνουσαι τῷ σὺν ἄλλῳ εἶναι ἀναχωροῦσιν εἰς τὸ αὑτῶν ἑκάστη.

    The individual souls, then, have an intellectual desire in their return toward that from which they came, but they also have a power directed to the things here, like light that depends above on the sun but does not begrudge its supply to what comes after it. They [must] be free from harm while they remain with the whole Soul in the intelligible, and in heaven they share with the whole Soul in its governance, like kings who keep company with the ruler of all and share in his governance without themselves coming down from the royal places either; for at that point they are together in the same place. But when they change from the whole to being a part and belonging to themselves, and grow weary, as it were, of being with another, they each withdraw into what is their own.

    ὅταν δὴ τοῦτο διὰ χρόνων ποιῇ φεύγουσα τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῇ διακρίσει ἀποστᾶσα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν βλέπῃ, μέρος γενομένη μονοῦταί τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέρος βλέπει καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου χωρισμῷ ἑνός τινος ἐπιβᾶσα καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πᾶν φυγοῦσα, ἐλθοῦσα καὶ στραφεῖσα εἰς τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο πληττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ὅλων καὶ πάντων τοῦ τε ὅλου ἀπέστη, καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον μετὰ περιστάσεως διοικεῖ ἐφαπτομένη ἤδη καὶ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ παροῦσα καὶ δῦσα αὐτοῦ πολὺ εἰς τὸ εἴσω.

    When a soul does this for a long time, fleeing the All and standing apart in its distinctness, and does not look toward the intelligible, it becomes a part and is isolated and weak, and busies itself with many things and looks toward a part. By its separation from the whole it alights on some one thing and flees all the rest, coming and turning to that one thing, which is battered by everything on every side. It has left the whole, and it governs the individual thing amid difficulties, by now touching and tending external things, present to it and sinking deep into its interior.

    ἔνθα καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῇ τὸ λεγόμενον πτερορρυῆσαι καὶ ἐν δεσμοῖς τοῖς τοῦ σώματος γενέσθαι ἁμαρτούσῃ τοῦ ἀβλαβοῦς τοῦ ἐν τῇ διοικήσει τοῦ κρείττονος, ὃ ἦν παρὰ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ὅλῃ· τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἦν παντελῶς ἄμεινον ἀναδραμούσῃ· εἴληπται οὖν πεσοῦσα καὶ πρὸς τῷ δεσμῷ οὖσα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐνεργοῦσα διὰ τὸ κωλύεσθαι τῷ νῷ ἐνεργεῖν καταρχάς, τεθάφθαι τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν σπηλαίῳ εἶναι, ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ πρὸς νόησιν λύεσθαί τε ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἀναβαίνειν, ὅταν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως θεᾶσθαι τὰ ὄντα. ἔχει γὰρ ἀεὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπερέχον τι.

    This is where what is spoken of happens to it: it “loses its wings” and comes to be in the fetters of the body, having missed the freedom from harm that it had with the whole Soul in governing the better; its earlier state is altogether better, if it runs back up to it. So it is caught, having fallen, and is at its fetter, and acts by perception because at the outset it is prevented from acting by intellect; and it is said to be buried and to be in a cave. But when it turns toward thinking, it is said to be freed from its fetters and to ascend, when it makes a beginning, from recollection, of contemplating the things that are. For it always, no less, has something that transcends.

    γίγνονται οὖν οἷον ἀμφίβιοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τόν τε ἐκεῖ βίον τόν τε ἐνταῦθα παρὰ μέρος βιοῦσαι, πλεῖον μὲν τὸν ἐκεῖ, αἳ δύνανται πλέον τῷ νῷ συνεῖναι, τὸν δὲ ἐνθάδε πλεῖον, αἷς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φύσει ἢ τύχαις ὑπῆρξεν. ἃ δὴ ὑποδεικνὺς ὁ Πλάτων ἠρέμα, ὅτε διαιρεῖ αὐτὰς ἐκ τοῦ ὑστέρου κρατῆρος καὶ μέρη ποιεῖ, τότε καί φησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθεῖν, ἐπείπερ ἐγένοντο μέρη τοιαῦτα. εἰ δὲ λέγει σπεῖραι τὸν θεὸν αὐτάς, οὕτως ἀκουστέον, ὥσπερ ὅταν καὶ λέγοντα καὶ οἷον δημηγοροῦντα ποιῇ· ἃ γὰρ ἐν φύσει ἐστὶ τῶν ὅλων, ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις γεννᾷ τε καὶ ποιεῖ εἰς δεῖξιν προάγουσα ἐφεξῆς τὰ ἀεὶ οὕτω γιγνόμενά τε καὶ ὄντα.

    So souls become, as it were, amphibious, of necessity, living by turns the life There and the life here. Those that can be with Intellect more live more the life There; those to whom the opposite has fallen, by nature or by fortune, live more the life here. Plato indicates this quietly when he divides them from the second mixing bowl and makes them parts; then too he says that they must come into becoming, since they have become parts of this kind. And if he says the god sowed them, this is to be understood in the same way as when he makes him speak and, as it were, address an assembly. For what is in the nature of the All, the account generates and makes, bringing forward one after another, for the sake of exposition, things that always come to be and are in this way.

    In the Timaeus (41d–42d) the craftsman mixes individual souls in a second, lesser mixing bowl, sows them into the heavenly bodies, and addresses the gods he has made.

    οὐ τοίνυν διαφωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις ἥ τε εἰς γένεσιν σπορὰ ἥ τε εἰς τελείωσιν κάθοδος τοῦ παντός, ἥ τε δίκη τό τε σπήλαιον, ἥ τε ἀνάγκη τό τε ἑκούσιον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει τὸ ἑκούσιον ἡ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὸ ἐν κακῷ τῷ σώματι εἶναι· οὐδ’ ἡ Ἐμπεδοκλέους φυγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πλάνη οὐδ’ ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἐφ’ ᾗ ἡ δίκη, οὐδ’ ἡ Ἡρακλείτου ἀνάπαυλα ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, οὐδ’ ὅλως τὸ ἑκούσιον τῆς καθόδου καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον αὖ. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἰὸν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀκούσιον, φορᾷ γε μὴν οἰκείᾳ ἰὸν πάσχον τὰ χείρω ἔχειν λέγεται τὴν ἐφ’ οἷς ἔπραξε δίκην.

    So there is no discord between the sowing into becoming and the descent for the completion of the All, or between the justice and the cave, or between necessity and the voluntary—since necessity contains the voluntary—or with being in the body as in something bad. Nor is there discord with Empedocles’ flight from the god and his wandering, nor with the error which justice follows, nor with Heraclitus’ rest in the flight, nor, in general, between the voluntary character of the descent and its involuntary character. For everything that goes to the worse goes involuntarily; but since it goes by its own motion, when it suffers the worse it is said to pay the penalty for what it did.

    ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν ᾖ ἀναγκαῖον ἀιδίῳ φύσεως νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ συμβαῖνον εἰς ἄλλου του χρείαν τῇ προόδῳ ἀπαντᾷ καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτό, θεὸν εἴ τις λέγοι καταπέμψαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀσύμφωνος οὔτε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἀφ’ ἧς ἀρχῆς ἕκαστα, εἰ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ πολλά, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναφέρεται.

    And when it is necessary to undergo and do these things by an eternal law of nature, and what happens, as it comes down from what is above it, meets in its procession the need of something else, then if one were to say that a god sent it down, he would be out of harmony neither with the truth nor with himself. For the last things too, even if there are many in between, are traced back to the principle from which each thing comes.

    διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἁμαρτίας οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ κατελθεῖν αἰτίᾳ, τῆς δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνθάδε γενομένην κακὰ δρᾶσαι, ἡ μέν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ πέπονθε κατελθοῦσα, τῆς δὲ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰς σώματα ἄλλα δῦναι καὶ θᾶττον [ἐξαναδῦναι] ἐκ κρίσεως τῆς κατ’ ἀξίαν — ὃ δὴ θεσμῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενον διὰ τοῦ τῆς κρίσεως ὀνόματος δηλοῦται — τὸ δὲ τῆς κακίας ἄμετρον εἶδος μείζονος καὶ τῆς δίκης ἠξίωται ἐπιστασίᾳ τιννυμένων δαιμόνων.

    The error is twofold: one concerns the cause of coming down, the other doing evil once it has come here. The first is just what the soul has undergone by coming down. The penalty for the second, if it is lesser, is to enter other bodies, and quickly [to emerge again], by a judgment according to desert—and because this happens by divine ordinance it is indicated by the word “judgment”—while the measureless form of wickedness is deemed to deserve a greater penalty too, under the supervision of punishing spirits.

    οὕτω τοι καίπερ οὖσα θεῖον καὶ ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν ἄνω ἐντὸς γίνεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ θεὸς οὖσα ὁ ὕστερος ῥοπῇ αὐτεξουσίῳ καὶ αἰτίᾳ δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ μετ’ αὐτὴν κοσμήσεως ὡδὶ ἔρχεται· κἂν μὲν θᾶττον φύγῃ, οὐδὲν βέβλαπται γνῶσιν κακοῦ προσλαβοῦσα καὶ φύσιν κακίας γνοῦσα τάς τε δυνάμεις ἀγαγοῦσα αὑτῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ δείξασα ἔργα τε καὶ ποιήσεις, ἃ ἐν τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ ἠρεμοῦντα μάτην τε ἂν ἦν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἀεὶ οὐκ ἰόντα τήν τε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν ἔλαθεν ἂν ἃ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐκφανέντα οὐδὲ πρόοδον λαβόντα· εἴπερ πανταχοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια τὴν δύναμιν ἔδειξε κρυφθεῖσαν ἂν ἁπάντη καὶ οἷον ἀφανισθεῖσαν καὶ οὐκ οὖσαν μηδέποτε ὄντως οὖσαν.

    So, then, although it is divine and comes from the regions above, the soul enters the body; and, being a god of the lower rank, it comes here by a self-determined inclination, because of its power and to set in order what comes after it. If it escapes quickly, it is not harmed at all; it has gained knowledge of evil and come to know the nature of wickedness, and has brought its powers into the open and displayed works and makings which, had they stayed quiet in the incorporeal, would have been in vain, never going into activity; and the soul itself would not have known what it had, if they had not come to light and gone forth. For everywhere activity has revealed the power, which would otherwise have been hidden altogether and, as it were, obliterated, and would not exist, since it would never really exist.

    νῦν μὲν γὰρ θαῦμα ἔχει τῶν ἔνδον ἕκαστος διὰ τῆς ποικιλίας τῶν ἔξω, οἷά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ τὰ γλαφυρὰ ταῦτα δρᾶσαι.

    As it is, everyone marvels at what is inside because of the variety of what is outside—at what it must be, judging from its having produced these elegant things.

    Why there must be a world below

    Every nature gives of itself, so procession reaches all the way down to matter.

    εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἓν μόνον εἶναι — ἐκέκρυπτο γὰρ ἂν πάντα μορφὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἔχοντα, οὐδ’ ἂν ὑπῆρχέ τι τῶν ὄντων στάντος ἐν αὑτῷ ἐκείνου, οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ πλῆθος ἦν ἂν τῶν ὄντων τούτων τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεννηθέντων μὴ τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸ τὴν πρόοδον λαβόντων, ἃ ψυχῶν εἴληχε τάξιν· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ ψυχὰς ἔδει μόνον εἶναι μὴ τῶν δι’ αὐτὰς γενομένων φανέντων, εἴπερ ἑκάστῃ φύσει τοῦτο ἔνεστι τὸ μετ’ αὐτὴν ποιεῖν καὶ ἐξελίττεσθαι οἷον σπέρματος ἔκ τινος ἀμεροῦς ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἰούσῃ, μένοντος μὲν ἀεὶ τοῦ.

    If, then, there must not be one thing only—for then all things would have been hidden, having no shape in it, and none of the things that are would exist if the One had stood still in itself; nor would there be the multitude of these beings generated from the One, if the things after it, which have been allotted the rank of souls, had not gone forth in procession—then in the same way there must not be souls only, without the things that came to be through them appearing. For it is inherent in every nature to make what comes after it and to unfold, as if from a seed, from some partless principle, proceeding to the perceptible as its end, while what comes before always remains

    προτέρου ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἕδρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ μετ’ αὐτὸ οἷον γεννωμένου ἐκ δυνάμεως ἀφάτου, ὅση ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἣν οὐκ ἔδει στῆσαι οἷον περιγράψαντα φθόνῳ, χωρεῖν δὲ ἀεί, ἕως εἰς ἔσχατον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τὰ πάντα ἥκῃ αἰτίᾳ δυνάμεως ἀπλέτου ἐπὶ πάντα παρ’ αὑτῆς πεμπούσης καὶ οὐδὲν περιιδεῖν ἄμοιρον αὑτῆς δυναμένης. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἦν ὃ ἐκώλυεν ὁτιοῦν ἔμμοιρον εἶναι φύσεως ἀγαθοῦ, καθ’ ὅσον ἕκαστον οἷόν τε ἦν μεταλαμβάνειν. εἴτ’ οὖν ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ τῆς ὕλης φύσις, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτὴν μὴ μετασχεῖν οὖσαν τοῦ πᾶσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἕκαστον χορηγοῦντος· εἴτ’ ἐπηκολούθησεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ γένεσις αὐτῆς τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῆς αἰτίοις, οὐδ’ ὣς ἔδει χωρὶς εἶναι, ἀδυναμίᾳ πρὶν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν στάντος τοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι οἷον ἐν χάριτι δόντος.

    in its own seat, and what comes after it is, as it were, generated from an unspeakable power, as great as was in those higher things. That power should not have halted, as if drawing a boundary around itself out of jealousy, but must always go on, until all things reach the last possible point, by virtue of an immense power that sends from itself over all things and cannot allow anything to be without a share in it. For there was nothing to prevent anything whatever from having a share in the nature of the good, to the extent each was able to participate. So whether the nature of matter always existed, it was not possible for it, since it existed, not to participate in what supplies the good to all things as far as each can receive it; or whether its coming into being followed necessarily on the causes before it, not even so should it be apart, as though that which gave it even its being, as a kind of gift, had halted through lack of power before reaching it.

    δεῖξις οὖν τῶν ἀρίστων ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ ἐν αἰσθητῷ κάλλιστον, τῆς τε δυνάμεως τῆς τε ἀγαθότητος αὐτῶν, καὶ συνέχεται πάντα εἰς ἀεὶ τά τε νοητῶς τά τε αἰσθητῶς ὄντα, τὰ μὲν παρ’ αὑτῶν ὄντα, τὰ δὲ μετοχῇ τούτων τὸ εἶναι εἰς ἀεὶ λαβόντα μιμούμενα τὴν νοητὴν καθ’ ὅσον δύναται φύσιν.

    So what is most beautiful in the perceptible is a manifestation of the best among the intelligibles, of their power and their goodness. And all things are held together forever, both those that exist intelligibly and those that exist perceptibly: the former existing from themselves, the latter receiving their being forever by participation in them, imitating the intelligible nature as far as they can.

    διττῆς δὲ φύσεως ταύτης οὔσης, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς, τῆς δὲ αἰσθητῆς, ἄμεινον μὲν ψυχῇ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη γε μὴν ἔχει καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν τοιαύτην φύσιν ἐχούσῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἀγανακτητέον αὐτήν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ κρεῖττον, μέσην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐπισχοῦσαν, θείας μὲν μοίρας οὖσαν, ἐν ἐσχάτῳ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ οὖσαν, ὡς ὅμορον οὖσαν τῇ αἰσθητῇ φύσει διδόναι μέν τι τούτῳ τῶν παρ’ αὑτῆς, ἀντιλαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τοῦ αὑτῆς ἀσφαλοῦς διακοσμοῖ, προθυμίᾳ δὲ πλείονι εἰς τὸ εἴσω δύοιτο μὴ μείνασα ὅλη μεθ’ ὅλης, ἄλλως τε καὶ δυνατὸν [ὂν] αὐτῇ πάλιν ἐξαναδῦναι ἱστορίαν ὧν ἐνταῦθα εἶδέ τε καὶ ἔπαθε προσλαβούσῃ καὶ μαθούσῃ, οἷον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῇ παραθέσει τῶν οἷον ἐναντίων σαφέστερον τὰ ἀμείνω μαθούσῃ.

    Since this nature is twofold, the one intelligible, the other perceptible, it is better for the soul to be in the intelligible; but, having the nature it has, it is necessarily bound to share in the perceptible as well. And it should not be resentful at not being in every respect the better, since it occupies a middle rank among the things that are. It is of the divine portion, but at the last edge of the intelligible, and, bordering on the perceptible nature, it gives it something of its own and receives something from it in return—if it does not keep itself safe while it orders it, but sinks inside with too much eagerness, not remaining whole with the whole. And all the more so since it can emerge again, having gained knowledge of what it saw and underwent here, and having learned what it is really like to be There, and having learned the better more clearly by comparing what are, as it were, opposites.

    γνῶσις γὰρ ἐναργεστέρα τἀγαθοῦ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ πεῖρα οἷς ἡ δύναμις ἀσθενεστέρα, ἢ ὥστε ἐπιστήμῃ τὸ κακὸν πρὸ πείρας γνῶναι. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ νοερὰ διέξοδος κατάβασίς ἐστιν εἰς ἔσχατον τὸ χεῖρον — οὐ γὰρ ἔνι εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἀναβῆναι, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργήσασαν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ μὴ δυνηθεῖσαν μεῖναι ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς φύσεως δὴ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ νόμῳ μέχρι ψυχῆς ἐλθεῖν· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦτο· ταύτῃ δὲ τὸ ἐφεξῆς παραδοῦναι αὐτὴν πάλιν ἀναδραμοῦσαν — οὕτως καὶ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια· τὸ μὲν μετ’ αὐτὴν τὰ τῇδε, τὸ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἡ θέα τῶν ὄντων, ταῖς μὲν παρὰ μέρος καὶ χρόνῳ γιγνομένου τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἐν τῷ χείρονι γιγνομένης ἐπιστροφῆς πρὸς τὰ ἀμείνω, τῇ δὲ λεγομένῃ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι τὸ μηδ’ ἐν τῷ χείρονι ἔργῳ γεγονέναι, ἀπαθεῖ δὲ κακῶν οὔσῃ θεωρίᾳ τε περινοεῖν τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτὴν ἐξηρτῆσθαί τε τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἀεί, ᾗ ἅμα δυνατὸν καὶ ἄμφω, λαμβανούσῃ μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, χορηγούσῃ δὲ ἅμα ἐνταῦθα, ἐπείπερ ἀμήχανον ἦν μὴ καὶ τούτων ἐφάπτεσθαι ψυχῇ οὔσῃ.

    For experience of evil is a clearer knowledge of the good for those whose power is too weak to know evil by knowledge before experiencing it. And just as the going-out of Intellect is a descent to the lowest, the worse—for it cannot go up to what is beyond; rather, having acted out of itself and being unable to stay in itself, it must, by the necessity and law of nature, come as far as soul, for that is its limit, and hand on what comes next to soul, and itself run back up—so it is with the activity of soul. What comes after it is the things here; what comes before it is the vision of the things that are. For some souls this happens partially and in time, and the return to the better takes place in the worse; but for the soul said to be the soul of the All it means never having come to be in the worse work, but, unaffected by evils, comprehending by contemplation what is below it and always depending on what is before it. Both at once are possible for it, receiving from There and at the same time supplying here, since, being soul, it could not avoid touching these things too.

    Part of the soul stays above

    Not all of our soul descends; a part of it always remains in the intelligible.

    καὶ εἰ χρὴ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τολμῆσαι τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον, οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ’ ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἔδυ, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ εἰ κρατοῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ κρατοῖτο καὶ θορυβοῖτο, οὐκ ἐᾷ αἴσθησιν ἡμῖν εἶναι ὧν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω· τότε γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς τὸ νοηθέν, ὅταν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἥκῃ καταβαῖνον· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ γίνεται περὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ψυχῆς, γινώσκομεν, πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην τὴν ψυχὴν ἥκῃ· οἷον καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ μένουσα [οὐ] γινώσκεται ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ τῇ ἔνδον δυνάμει ἢ καὶ διανοητικῇ ἀντιλαβώμεθα ἢ ἄμφω. πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ κάτω πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοῦ ἄνω πρὸς νοῦν.

    And if one must dare, against the opinion of others, to say more clearly what seems to be the case: not even our soul has sunk entirely; there is something of it always in the intelligible. But if the part in the perceptible gets the upper hand—or rather, if it is overpowered and thrown into confusion—it does not let us perceive what the upper part of the soul contemplates. For what is thought comes to us only when it comes down and reaches perception. We do not know everything that happens in any part of the soul until it reaches the whole soul. Desire, for example, while it remains in the desiring part, is [not] known to us, but only when we grasp it by the inner perceptive power, or by the power of discursive thought, or both. For every soul has something of the lower, toward the body, and something of the upper, toward Intellect.

    καὶ ἡ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλου τῷ αὐτῆς μέρει τῷ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὅλον κοσμεῖ ὑπερέχουσα ἀπόνως, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐκ λογισμοῦ, ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ νῷ, ὡς ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται, τοῦ κάτω αὐτῆς κοσμοῦντος τὸ ὅλον. αἱ δ’ ἐν μέρει γινόμεναι καὶ μέρους ἔχουσι μὲν καὶ αὗται τὸ ὑπερέχον, ἄσχολοι δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀντιλήψει πολλῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ λυπούντων καὶ ταραττόντων, ἅτε οὗ ἐπιμελοῦνται μέρους καὶ ἐλλιποῦς [ὄντος] καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντος τὰ ἀλλότρια κύκλῳ, πολλὰ δὲ ὧν ἐφίεται· καὶ ἥδεται δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἠπάτησε. τὸ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀνήδονον τὰς προσκαίρους ἡδονάς. ἡ δὲ διαγωγὴ ὁμοία.

    And the soul that is whole and belongs to the whole orders the whole with its part that faces the body, transcending it without toil, because it does not do so by reasoning, as we do, but by intellect—as art does not deliberate—with the lower part of it ordering the whole. The souls that have come to be partial and belong to a part also have the transcendent part, but they are occupied with perception, and through their apprehension they apprehend many things that are contrary to nature and pain and disturb them, since what they care for is a part, and deficient, with many alien things around it and many things it longs for. And it feels pleasure, and pleasure deceives it. But there is also a part that takes no pleasure in passing pleasures, and its way of life is similar.