Ἆρ’ ὥσπερ ψυχὴν ἑκάστου μίαν φαμὲν εἶναι, ὅτι πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη πάρεστι, καὶ ἔστιν ὄντως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον μία, οὐκ ἄλλο μέν τι αὐτῆς ὡδί, ἄλλο δὲ ὡδὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς οὕτως ἡ αἰσθητική, καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτικοῖς δὲ ὅλη πανταχοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ μέρει, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ μία καὶ πᾶσαι μία; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ ἐν πᾶσι μία οὐχ ὡς ὄγκῳ μεμερισμένη, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ταὐτόν; διὰ τί γὰρ ἡ ἐν ἐμοὶ μία, ἡ δ’ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ μία; οὐ γὰρ ὄγκος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σῶμα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σή, μία δὲ ἐκείνη, καὶ ταύτας δεῖ εἶναι μίαν.
We say that the soul of each individual is one because it is present whole everywhere in the body, and that it really is one in this way, not having one part of it here in the body and another there; the perceptive soul is like this in perceiving beings, and in plants the soul is whole everywhere, in each part. In the same way, then, are my soul and yours one, and all souls one? And in the All, is the soul in all things one, not divided like a mass but the same everywhere? For why should the soul in me be one and the soul in the All not be one? There too, after all, there is no mass and no body. If, then, my soul and yours both come from the soul of the All, and that is one, these too must be one.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ ἐκ ψυχῆς μιᾶς, πάλιν αὖ πᾶσαι μία. αὕτη τοίνυν τίς ἡ μία; ἀλλὰ πρότερον λεκτέον, εἰ ὀρθῶς λέγεται τὸ μίαν τὰς πάσας [εἶναι], ὥσπερ ἡ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου· ἄτοπον γάρ, εἰ μία ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ ὁτουοῦν ἄλλου. ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐμοῦ αἰσθανομένου καὶ ἄλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε ἐμοῦ παθόντος συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν. πῶς δὲ καὶ μιᾶς οὔσης ἡ μὲν λογική, ἡ δὲ ἄλογος, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐν ζῴοις, ἡ δὲ ἐν φυτοῖς ἄλλη; πάλιν δὲ εἰ μὴ θησόμεθα ἐκείνως, τό τε πᾶν ἓν οὐκ ἔσται, μία τε ἀρχὴ ψυχῶν οὐχ εὑρεθήσεται.
And if both the soul of the All and mine come from one soul, then again all are one. What, then, is this one soul? But first we must say whether it is right to say that all souls are one, as the soul of each individual is. For it is absurd if mine and that of anyone else whatever are one. Then, when I perceived, someone else would have to perceive too; if I were good, he would be good; if I desired, he would desire; and in general we would share the same experiences, both with each other and with the All, so that when I was affected the All would perceive it with me. And how, if it is one, is one soul rational and another irrational, and one in animals and another in plants? Yet if we do not posit it that way, the All will not be one, and a single principle of souls will not be found.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ, εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ μία ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ ἄλλου, ἤδη καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ ταὐτόν. ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ταὐτὸν ὂν οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἕξει ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐν ἐμοὶ κινουμένῳ καὶ ἐν σοὶ μὴ κινουμένῳ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὲν κινούμενος, ἐν σοὶ δὲ ἑστὼς ἔσται· καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδὲ παραδοξότερον τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἀνάγκη αἰσθανομένου ἐμοῦ καὶ ἄλλον πάντη τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἔχειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς σώματος τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας χειρὸς πάθημα ἡ ἑτέρα ᾔσθετο, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. εἰ δὴ ἔδει τὸ ἐμὸν γινώσκειν καὶ σέ, ἕν τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (ὂν) συνημμένον σῶμα ἐχρῆν εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ συναφθεῖσαι ἑκατέρα ᾔσθετο ταὐτόν.
First, then, if my soul and another’s are one, it does not immediately follow that the compound of each is the same as the other’s. For the same thing in one and in another will not have the same affections in each; thus the man in me, when I am moving, and in you, when you are not, will be moving in me and standing still in you. And it is not absurd, or any more paradoxical, that what is in me and in you should be the same; nor is it necessary that when I perceive another should have exactly the same experience. Not even within a single body did one hand perceive what happened to the other; it was the soul in the whole that perceived it. If, then, you too had to know what is mine, there would have to be one body joined together from both; for joined in this way each soul would perceive the same thing.
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δὲ προσήκει τὸ καὶ πολλὰ λανθάνειν τὸ ὅλον καὶ τῶν ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι γιγνομένων, καὶ τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ ἂν μέγεθος ἔχῃ τὸ σῶμα πολύ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κητῶν λέγεται μεγάλων, ἐφ’ ὧν παθήματός τινος περὶ τὸ μέρος ὄντος τῷ ὅλῳ αἴσθησις διὰ μικρότητα τοῦ κινήματος οὐδεμία προσέρχεται· ὥστε οὐκ ἀνάγκη διάδηλον τύπῳ τὴν αἴσθησιν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι ἑνός τινος παθόντος. ἀλλὰ συμπάσχειν μὲν οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδ’ ἀπογνωστέον, τύπωσιν δὲ αἰσθητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι. ἀρετὴν δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔχειν, κακίαν δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἴπερ καὶ κινεῖσθαι ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑστάναι ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἀδύνατον.
One should also bear in mind that the whole is unaware of many things even among those that happen in one and the same body, and the more so the larger the body is, as is said of great sea creatures: when something happens in a part of them, no perception of it reaches the whole, because the movement is so small. So when one part is affected, it is not necessary for the perception to arrive at the whole and entire with a distinct impression. It is not absurd for the whole to share in the affection, nor should that be ruled out, but a perceptual impression need not arise. And it is not absurd that the same soul should have virtue in me and vice in another, if it is not impossible for the same thing to be in motion in one and at rest in another.
οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτως μίαν λέγομεν, ὡς πάντη πλήθους ἄμοιρον — τοῦτο γὰρ τῇ κρείττονι φύσει δοτέον — ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ πλῆθος λέγομεν καὶ μετέχειν τῆς φύσεως τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς γινομένης καὶ τῆς ἀμερίστου αὖ· ὥστε πάλιν εἶναι μίαν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ τὸ γενόμενον περὶ τὸ μέρος πάθος οὐκ ἀνάγκη κρατεῖν τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ δ’ ἂν περὶ τὸ κυριώτερον γένηται φέρει τι εἰς τὸ μέρος, οὕτω τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς εἰς ἕκαστον σαφέστερα μᾶλλον ὁμοπαθούντων πολλαχοῦ τῷ ὅλῳ, τὰ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἄδηλον εἰ συντελεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.
For we do not call it one in the sense of being wholly without multiplicity—that must be granted to the higher nature—but we say it is one and many, and that it participates both in the nature that becomes divided in bodies and in the undivided nature, so that, again, it is one. And just as in my case an affection arising in a part need not dominate the whole, while what happens in the more important part carries something to the part, so what comes from the All to each individual is clearer, since individuals in many ways share the affections of the whole; but it is unclear whether what comes from us contributes anything to the whole.
καὶ μὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου φησὶν ὁ λόγος συμπαθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἡμᾶς καὶ συναλγοῦντας ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ διαχεομένους καὶ εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ἑλκομένους κατὰ φύσιν· μήποτε γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν διὰ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ ὅλως μαγεῖαι συνάγουσι καὶ συμπαθεῖς πόρρωθεν ποιοῦσι, πάντως τοι διὰ ψυχῆς μιᾶς. καὶ λόγος δὲ ἠρέμα λεχθεὶς διέθηκε τὸ πόρρω, καὶ κατακούειν πεποίηκε τὸ διεστὼς ἀμήχανον ὅσον τόπον· ἐξ ὧν ἔστι τὴν ἑνότητα μαθεῖν ἁπάντων τῆς ψυχῆς μιᾶς οὔσης. πῶς οὖν, εἰ ψυχὴ μία, ἡ μὲν λογική, ἡ δὲ ἄλογος, καί τις καὶ φυτική;
Moreover, from the opposite side, the argument says that we do share each other’s experiences, feeling pain together when we see pain, and delighting together, and being drawn by nature to love; for perhaps this is why there is love at all. And if incantations and magic arts in general bring people together and make them feel with one another at a distance, it is surely through one soul. A word spoken softly, too, has affected what is far away, and made what is separated by an immense distance hear it. From these things one can learn the unity of all things, since the soul is one. How, then, if soul is one, is one rational, another irrational, and some vegetative?
ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀμέριστον αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν τακτέον οὐ μεριζόμενον ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, τὸ δὲ μεριζόμενον περὶ σώματα ἓν μὲν ὂν καὶ αὐτό, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα μεριζόμενον παρεχόμενον τὴν αἴσθησιν πανταχοῦ, ἄλλην δύναμιν αὐτῆς θετέον, τό τε πλαστικὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ποιητικὸν σωμάτων δύναμιν ἄλλην. οὐχ ὅτι δὲ πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις, οὐ μία. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς τούτου πολλὰ ἕν. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ πᾶσαι; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ λεγομένης εἶναι ἡ αἴσθησις οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ὁμοία, ὅ τε λόγος οὐκ ἐν ὅλῳ, τό τε φυτικὸν καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ αἴσθησις· καὶ ὅμως εἰς ἓν ἀνατρέχει ἀποστάντος τοῦ σώματος.
Or rather, it is because the undivided part of it must be assigned to the rational, which is not divided in bodies, while the part divided in bodies—itself one, but divided in bodies, supplying perception everywhere—must be posited as another power of it, and its shaping, body-making part as yet another power. But having several powers does not make it not one. In the seed, too, there are several powers, and it is one, and from this one come many, which are one. Why, then, are not all the powers everywhere? Well, even with the one soul that is said to be everywhere, perception is not alike in all the parts, reason is not in the whole, and the vegetative is present even where there is no perception; and yet it runs back up into one when it leaves the body.
τὸ δὲ θρεπτικὸν εἰ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου ἔχει, καὶ ἐκείνης. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς τὸ θρεπτικόν; ὅτι τὸ τρεφόμενον μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ καὶ παθητικῶς αἰσθητικόν· ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἡ κρίνουσα μετὰ νοῦ ἕκαστον, ᾗ οὐδὲν ἔδει πλάττειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὴν πλάσιν ἔχον. ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐποίησεν αὐτή, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τούτῳ ἔδει αὐτὴν εἶναι.
And if it has the nutritive power from the whole, that too belongs to that soul. Why, then, does the nutritive not come from our soul as well? Because what is nourished is a part of the whole, which also perceives passively; but perception that judges each thing together with intellect is ours, and it had no need to shape what already has its shaping from the whole. For it would have done this itself, if it had not been necessary for it to be in this whole.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὡς μὴ θαυμάζειν τὴν εἰς ἓν ἀναγωγήν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ζητεῖ ὁ λόγος, πῶς μία; ἆρα γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς μία αἱ πᾶσαι; καὶ εἰ [ὡς] ἀπὸ μιᾶς, μεριζομένης ταύτης ἢ μενούσης μὲν ὅλης, ποιούσης δὲ παρ’ αὑτῆς οὐδὲν ἧττον πολλάς; καὶ πῶς ἂν μένουσα οὐσία πολλὰς ποιοῖ ἐξ αὑτῆς; λέγωμεν οὖν συλλήπτορα ἡμῖν γενέσθαι θεὸν παρακαλέσαντες, ὡς δεῖ μὲν εἶναι μίαν πρότερον, εἴπερ πολλαί, καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰς πολλὰς εἶναι.
This has been said so that the reduction to one should not cause astonishment. But the argument asks: how is it one? Are all souls one as coming from one? And if from one, is that one divided, or does it remain whole and nonetheless make many from itself? And how could a substance that remains make many out of itself? Let us, then, call on god to be our helper, and say that there must first be one, if there are many, and that the many must come from it.
εἰ μὲν οὖν σῶμα εἴη, ἀνάγκη μεριζομένου τούτου τὰς πολλὰς γίγνεσθαι, ἄλλην πάντη οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην γιγνομένην, καὶ ὁμοιομεροῦς οὔσης ὁμοειδεῖς πάσας γενέσθαι εἶδος ἓν ταὐτὸν φερούσας ὅλον, τοῖς δὲ ὄγκοις ἑτέρας, καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς ὄγκους εἶχον τοὺς ὑποκειμένους τὸ ψυχαὶ εἶναι, ἄλλας ἀλλήλων εἶναι, εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, μίαν τῷ εἴδει ψυχὰς εἶναι. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν πολλοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ πρὸ ταύτης τῆς μιᾶς τῆς ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλην αὖ εἶναι μὴ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀφ’ ἧς ἡ ἐν πολλοῖς μία, ὥσπερ εἴδωλον οὖσα πολλαχοῦ φερόμενον τῆς ἐν ἑνὶ μιᾶς, οἷον εἰ ἐκ δακτύλου ἑνὸς πολλοὶ κηροὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον ἀπομαξάμενοι φέροιεν.
If, then, it were a body, the many would necessarily come about by its division, each becoming a wholly different substance; and if it were homogeneous, they would all be of the same form, each carrying one and the same form whole, but different in their masses. And if they had their being as souls by virtue of the underlying masses, they would be different from one another; if by virtue of the form, the souls would be one in form. But this means that one and the same soul exists in many bodies, and that before this one soul in many there is another, not in many, from which the one in many comes, being an image of the one in one carried to many places—as if many pieces of wax took impressions from one signet ring and bore the same imprint.
ἐκείνως μὲν οὖν ἀνηλίσκετο ἂν εἰς πολλὰ σημεῖα, ὡς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἀσώματον μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐγίνετο. καὶ πάθημα μὲν ὂν θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν [ἂν] εἶχε μίαν ποιότητα γενομένην ἐξ ἑνός τινος ἐν πολλοῖς εἶναι· καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον δὲ ἡ ψυχή, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. νῦν δὲ ἀσώματόν τε αὐτὴν τιθέμεθα καὶ οὐσίαν.
In the first case, then, the soul would be used up in many imprints; in the second, it would turn out to be incorporeal. And if it were an affection, there would be nothing surprising in one quality, coming from some one thing, being in many; and if soul were the compound, nothing surprising either. But in fact we posit it as both incorporeal and a substance.
πῶς οὖν οὐσία μία ἐν πολλαῖς; ἢ γὰρ ἡ μία ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλη, ἢ ἀπὸ ὅλης καὶ μιᾶς αἱ πολλαὶ ἐκείνης μενούσης. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν μία, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ εἰς ταύτην ὡς μίαν δοῦσαν ἑαυτὴν εἰς πλῆθος καὶ οὐ δοῦσαν· ἱκανὴ γὰρ πᾶσι παρασχεῖν ἑαυτὴν καὶ μένειν μία· δύεται γὰρ εἰς πάντα ἅμα καὶ ἑκάστου οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται πάντη. τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν ἐν πολλοῖς. μὴ δή τις ἀπιστείτω· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὅλη καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς ὡς μένειν τὴν ὅλην καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη· καὶ τὸ σπέρμα ὅλον καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον ὅλον καὶ μένει ὅλον οὐκ ἠλαττωμένον τὸ ὅλον· ἡ δ’ ὕλη ἐμέρισε· καὶ πάντα ἕν.
How, then, is one substance in many? Either the one is whole in all, or the many come from a whole and one, while that remains. That one, then, is one, and the many are related to it as to one that gives itself to multiplicity and yet does not give itself. For it is able to supply itself to all and remain one: it enters into all at once and is not entirely cut off from any. So it is the same thing in many. Let no one be incredulous. Knowledge, too, is a whole, and its parts are such that the whole remains and the parts come from it; and the seed is whole, and from it come the parts into which it naturally divides, and each is whole, and the whole remains whole, undiminished. It is matter that divided it, and all are one.
ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴποι τις ἄν, τὸ μέρος οὐχ ὅλον. ἢ κἀκεῖ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν μέρος τὸ προχειρισθὲν οὗ χρεία καὶ τοῦτο προτέτακται, ἕπεται μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δυνάμει λανθάνοντα καὶ ἔστι πάντα ἐν τῷ μέρει· καὶ ἴσως ταύτῃ ἡ [μὲν] ὅλη λέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέρος. ἐκεῖ μὲν [οὖν] οἷον ἐνεργείᾳ ἅμα πάντα. ἕτοιμον οὖν ἕκαστον, ὃ προχειρίσασθαι θέλεις. ἐν δὲ τῷ μέρει τὸ ἕτοιμον. ἐνδυναμοῦται δὲ οἷον πλησιάσαν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔρημον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεωρημάτων οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται οὐκέτι τεχνικὸν οὐδὲ ἐπιστημονικόν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ εἰ παῖς λέγοι. εἰ οὖν ἐπιστημονικόν, ἔχει δυνάμει καὶ τὰ πάντα.
But in knowledge, someone might say, the part is not the whole. Or rather, there too the part that has been brought forward because it is needed is actual, and it is placed in front; but the others follow, potentially, unnoticed, and all are in the part. And perhaps this is the sense in which the whole is called the whole and the part the part. In the whole, all are, as it were, actual at once, so each one you want to bring forward is ready; but in the part, what is actual is what is ready. It is empowered, as it were, by coming near the whole. One must not think it is bereft of the other theorems; otherwise it will no longer be expert or scientific, but just as if a child were saying it. If, then, it is scientific, it potentially contains all the others too.
ἐπιστήσας γοῦν ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἐπάγει τὰ ἄλλα οἷον ἀκολουθίᾳ· καὶ ὁ γεωμέτρης δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ ἓν ἔχει τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντα, δι’ ὧν ἡ ἀνάλυσις, καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς δέ, ἃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾶται. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν ἀπιστεῖται, καὶ διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπισκοτεῖται· ἐκεῖ δὲ φανὰ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον.
At any rate, the knower, once he has stated it, brings in the others as by a kind of logical sequence; and the geometer shows in analysis that the one proposition contains all the ones before it, through which the analysis proceeds, and also those after it, which are generated from it. But we disbelieve these things because of our weakness, and they are obscured by the body. There, all things are clear, and each one.