Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν λεγομένων δέκα γενῶν ἐπέσκεπται, εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν εἰς ἓν ἀγόντων γένος τὰ πάντα τέτταρα ὑπὸ τὸ ἓν οἷον εἴδη τιθεμένων, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων φαίνεται τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡμῖν πειρωμένοις εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγειν δόξαν.
Since we have examined the so-called ten genera, and have also discussed those who bring everything together into one genus and place four under that one as, so to speak, its species, it would follow to say what our own view of these matters is, as we try to bring our opinions back to Plato’s.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἓν ἔδει τίθεσθαι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ζητεῖν, οὔτ’ εἰ γένος ἓν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, οὔτε εἰ γένη μὴ ὑφ’ ἕν, οὔτ’ εἰ ἀρχάς, οὔτε εἰ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ γένη τὰς αὐτὰς δεῖ τίθεσθαι, οὔτε εἰ τὰ γένη καὶ ἀρχὰς τὰ αὐτά, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἁπάσας καὶ γένη, τὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν, ἢ ἐφ’ ἑκατέρων τινὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς καὶ γένη καί τινα γένη καὶ ἀρχάς, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἑτέρων πάντα καὶ θάτερα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων τινὰ καὶ θάτερα. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐχ ἕν φαμεν τὸ ὄν — διότι δέ, εἴρηται καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ ἑτέροις — ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως γίγνεται καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐπισκέψασθαι πρότερον εἰς μέσον θέντας, τίνα ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν καὶ πῶς.
If being had to be posited as one, there would be no need to ask whether there is one genus over all, or genera not under one, or principles; nor whether the principles and the genera must be posited as the same; nor whether the genera and principles are the same things; or whether all the principles are also genera, while the genera are not principles, or the reverse; or whether in each case some principles are also genera and some genera principles; or whether on one side all are also the other, while on the other side some are also the other. But since we say that being is not one—why, Plato and others have explained—it perhaps becomes necessary to examine these questions too, first setting before us what number we say there is, and how.
ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον παρ’ αὑτοῖς διελέσθαι τάδε, τί τε τὸ ὂν λέγομεν, περὶ οὗ ἡ σκέψις ὀρθῶς [ἂν] γίνοιτο νυνί, καὶ τί δοκεῖ μὲν ἄλλοις εἶναι ὄν, γινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν ταῦτα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων διῃρημένα οὐχ ὡς γένους τοῦ τὶ εἰς ταῦτα διῃρημένου, οὐδ’ οὕτως οἴεσθαι τὸν Πλάτωνα πεποιηκέναι. γελοῖον γὰρ ὑφ’ ἓν θέσθαι τὸ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις Σωκράτη ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ θεῖτο καὶ τὴν τούτου εἰκόνα. τὸ γὰρ διελέσθαι ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ ἀφορίσαι καὶ χωρὶς θεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δόξαν ὂν εἶναι εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἶναι ὄν, ὑποδείξαντα αὐτοῖς ἄλλο τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν εἶναι.
Since, then, we are inquiring into being or the beings, we must first distinguish for ourselves the following: what we call being, which our present inquiry would rightly concern, and what seems to others to be being but is, we say, coming to be, and never really is. These must be understood as divided from each other not as a genus, the “something,” divided into them; nor should we think that Plato did so. For it is ridiculous to put being under one genus with not-being, as if someone were to put Socrates and his image under the same. Here, to distinguish is to mark off and set apart, and to say that what seemed to be being is not being, showing them that what truly is is something else.
καὶ προστιθεὶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπέδειξεν, ὡς δεῖ τὸ ὂν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἷον μηδέποτε ψεύδεσθαι τὴν τοῦ ὄντος φύσιν. περὶ δὴ τούτου τοῦ ὄντος λέγοντες καὶ περὶ τούτου ὡς οὐχ ἑνὸς ὄντος σκεψόμεθα· ὕστερον δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ γινομένου καὶ κόσμου αἰσθητοῦ τι ἐροῦμεν.
And by adding “always” to being, he showed that being must be such as never to be false to the nature of being. It is about this being, then, that we shall speak, and we shall examine it as not one. Later, if it seems right, we shall also say something about becoming, about what comes to be, and about the perceptible cosmos.
ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἕν φαμεν, ἆρα ἀριθμόν τινα; ἢ ἄπειρον· πῶς γὰρ δὴ τὸ οὐχ ἓν ἢ ἓν ἅμα καὶ πολλὰ λέγομεν, καί τι ποικίλον ἓν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν ἔχον; ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τοῦτο τὸ οὕτως ἓν ἢ τῷ γένει ἓν εἶναι, εἴδη δ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ ὄντα, οἷς πολλὰ καὶ ἕν, ἢ πλείω ἑνὸς γένη, ὑφ’ ἓν δὲ τὰ πάντα, ἢ πλείω μὲν γένη, μηδὲν δὲ ἄλλο ὑπ’ ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον περιεκτικὸν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτό, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῶν γενῶν ἐλαττόνων ὄντων ἢ εἰδῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἀτόμων, συντελεῖν ἅπαντα εἰς μίαν φύσιν καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ, ὃν δὴ λέγομεν τὸ ὄν, τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι.
Since, then, we say it is not one, is it some number? Or is it unlimited? For in what sense do we call it not one, if not as one and many at once, a varied one that holds its many together in one? This thing that is one in this way, then, must be one of three things. It may be one in genus, with the beings as its species, through which it is many and one. Or there may be more than one genus, but all under one. Or there may be several genera, none under another, each embracing what falls under it, whether these are themselves lesser genera or species with individuals under them. In that case all of them contribute to one nature, and the intelligible world, which we call being, is constituted out of them all.
εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, οὐ μόνον γένη ταῦτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἅμα ὑπάρχειν· γένη μέν, ὅτι ὑπ’ αὐτὰ ἄλλα γένη ἐλάττω καὶ εἴδη μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄτομα· ἀρχὰς δέ, εἰ τὸ ὂν οὕτως ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχει. εἰ μέντοι πλείω μὲν ἦν ἐξ ὧν, συνελθόντα δὲ τὰ ὅλα ἐποίει τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὑπ’ αὐτά, ἀρχαὶ μὲν ἂν ἦσαν, γένη δὲ οὐκ ἄν· οἷον εἴ τις ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἐποίει τὸ αἰσθητόν, πυρὸς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἂν ἦσαν, γένη δὲ οὔ· εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως τὸ γένος.
If that is so, these will be not only genera but at the same time also principles of being. They are genera because under them are other, lesser genera, and after these species and individuals. They are principles if being is in this way made of many, and the whole exists out of these. If, however, there were several things out of which it is made, and these, coming together as wholes, made the All, but had nothing under them, they would be principles but not genera. Suppose someone made the perceptible world out of the four, fire and the rest: these would be principles, but not genera, unless “genus” is used homonymously.
λέγοντες τοίνυν καὶ γένη τινὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀρχάς, ἆρα τὰ μὲν γένη, ἕκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ, μιγνύντες ἀλλήλοις τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦμεν καὶ σύγκρασιν ποιοῦμεν ἁπάντων;
Then if we say that some are genera, and that these same are also principles, do we mix the genera with one another, each together with what falls under it, and so complete the whole and produce a blend of them all?
ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕκαστα οὐδὲ καθαρὸν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γένη ἐάσομεν, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον μίξομεν. τίνα οὖν ἔσται ἐφ’ αὑτῶν τὰ γένη; ἢ ἔσται κἀκεῖνα ἐφ’ αὑτῶν καὶ καθαρά, καὶ τὰ μιχθέντα οὐκ ἀπολεῖ αὐτά. καὶ πῶς; ἢ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς ὕστερον· νῦν δ’ ἐπεὶ συγκεχωρήκαμεν καὶ γένη εἶναι καὶ προσέτι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς καὶ τρόπον ἕτερον ἀρχὰς καὶ συνθέσεις, πρῶτον λεκτέον πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν γένη καὶ πῶς διίσταμεν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ καὶ οὐχ ὑφ’ ἓν ἄγομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τύχης συνελθόντα καὶ ἕν τι πεποιηκότα· καίτοι πολλῷ εὐλογώτερον ὑφ’ ἕν.
But then each will exist potentially, not actually, and none will be pure in itself. Then let us leave the genera alone and mix the particulars. What, then, will the genera be by themselves? Or rather: they too will exist by themselves and pure, and the mixtures will not destroy them. And how? That is for later. For now, since we have granted that there are genera, and further that they are principles of substance, and in another sense principles and compounds, we must first say which things we call genera, and how we distinguish them from one another instead of bringing them under one, as though they had come together by chance and made a single thing. And yet it would be far more reasonable to put them under one.
ἤ, εἰ μὲν εἴδη οἷόν τε ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ἅπαντα εἶναι καὶ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις τὰ ἄτομα καὶ μηδὲν τούτων ἔξω, ἦν ἂν ἴσως ποιεῖν οὕτως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη θέσις ἀναίρεσίς ἐστιν αὐτοῖς — οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ εἴδη εἴδη ἔσται, οὐδ’ ὅλως πολλὰ ὑφ’ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἕν, μὴ ἑτέρου ἢ ἑτέρων ἔξω ἐκείνου τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ ἐγένετο τὸ ἕν, ὥστε καὶ εἴδη γεννῆσαι, εἰ μή τι ἦν παρ’ αὐτὸ ἄλλο; οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ πολλά, εἰ μή τις ὡς μέγεθος κερματιεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἕτερον τὸ κερματίζον. εἰ δ’ αὐτὸ κερματιεῖ ἢ ὅλως διαιρήσει, πρὸ τοῦ διαιρεθῆναι ἔσται διῃρημένον.
Or rather: if all of them could be species of being, with individuals coming next after them and nothing outside these, it might perhaps be possible to do that. But since such a position does away with them—for the species will not be species, nor will there be many under one at all; everything will be one, since there will be no other thing, or other things, outside that one. How could the one have become many, so as to generate species as well, unless there were something else besides it? It is not of itself many, unless someone chops it up like a magnitude; but even then, what does the chopping is something else. And if it chops itself up, or divides itself in any way at all, it will be divided before it is divided.
ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν καὶ δι’ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀποστατέον τοῦ γένος ἓν καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἕκαστον ὁτιοῦν ληφθὲν ἢ ὂν ἢ οὐσίαν λέγειν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὄν, τῷ συμβεβηκέναι φήσει, οἷον εἰ λευκὸν λέγοι τὴν οὐσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ λευκὸν λέγει.
On this ground, then, and for many other reasons, we must give up the single genus; and also because it is not possible to call each thing you take, whatever it is, being or substance. And if someone did call it being, he would be saying so by accident, as if he called substance white: he is not saying that it is precisely what white is.
πλείω μὲν δὴ λέγομεν εἶναι καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην πλείω. οὐκοῦν ἀφ’ ἑνός. ἤ, εἰ καὶ ἀφ’ ἑνός, οὐ κατηγορουμένου δὲ κατ’ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἕκαστον οὐχ ὁμοειδὲς ὂν ἄλλῳ χωρὶς αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος. ἆρ’ οὖν ἔξωθεν τοῦτο τῶν γενομένων γενῶν τὸ αἴτιον μέν, μὴ κατηγορούμενον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔξω· ἐπέκεινα γὰρ τὸ ἕν, ὡς ἂν μὴ συναριθμούμενον τοῖς γένεσιν, εἰ δι’ αὐτὸ τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ γένη εἶναι. καὶ πῶς ἐκεῖνο οὐ συνηρίθμηται; ἢ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦμεν, οὐ τὸ ἐπέκεινα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὕτως· τί δὲ τὸ συναριθμούμενον; ἐφ’ οὗ καὶ θαυμάσειεν ἄν τις, πῶς συναριθμούμενον τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς.
We say, then, that there are more than one, and not more than one by chance. So they come from one. Or rather: even if they come from one, as long as that one is not predicated of them in what they are, nothing prevents each of them, since it is not of the same species as another, from being a genus by itself. Is this cause, then, outside the genera that came from it, their cause, yet not predicated of the others in their “what it is”? Or rather, one cause is outside: for the One is beyond, so as not to be counted along with the genera, if it is through it that the others exist, and these stand on an equal footing with one another as genera. And how is it not counted along with them? Or rather: we are looking for the beings, not for what is beyond. So much for that. But what about the one that is counted along with them? Here one might well wonder how it is counted along with the things it causes.
ἢ, εἰ μὲν ὑφ’ ἓν γένος αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ οἷς αἴτιον συναριθμεῖται ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ γένος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἔστι διάφορα τὰ ἐφεξῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ κατηγορεῖται αὐτῶν ὡς γένος οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι κατ’ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι ἔχοντα ὑφ’ αὑτά· οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ σὺ τὸ βαδίζειν ἐγέννας, ὑπὸ σὲ ὡς γένος τὸ βαδίζειν ἦν ἄν· καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ὡς γένος αὐτοῦ, ἦν δὲ τὰ μετ’ αὐτό, γένος ἂν ἦν τὸ βαδίζειν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν.
Or rather: if it and the others are under one genus, that is absurd. But suppose it is counted along with the things whose cause it is, as being itself the genus, with the others coming after it; and the things after it differ from it, and it is not predicated of them as a genus, nor is anything else predicated of them. Then these too must be genera, having things under them. For if you produced walking, walking would not fall under you as under its genus; and if there were nothing else before it as its genus, but there were things after it, walking would be a genus among the things that are.
ὅλως δὲ ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν φατέον αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οἷον μέρη αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον στοιχεῖα αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντα μίαν φύσιν μεριζομένην ταῖς ἡμῶν ἐπινοίαις, αὐτὸ δὲ εἶναι ὑπὸ δυνάμεως θαυμαστῆς ἓν εἰς πάντα καὶ φαινόμενον πολλὰ καὶ γινόμενον πολλά, οἷον ὅταν κινηθῇ, καὶ τὸ πολύχουν τῆς φύσεως ποιεῖν τὸ ἓν μὴ ἓν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε οἷον μοίρας αὐτοῦ προφέροντας ταύτας ἓν ἕκαστον τίθεσθαι καὶ γένος λέγειν ἀγνοοῦντας, ὅτι μὴ ὅλον ἅμα εἴδομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος προφέροντες πάλιν αὐτὰ συνάπτομεν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτὰ κατέχειν σπεύδοντα πρὸς αὑτά. διὸ πάλιν μεθίεμεν εἰς τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἐῶμεν ἓν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἓν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἴσως σαφέστερα ταῦτα ἔσται κἀκείνων ἐγνωσμένων, ἢν τὰ γένη λάβωμεν ὁπόσα· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ πῶς.
In general, perhaps we should not even say that the one is the cause of the others. Rather, they are, as it were, its parts, as it were its elements, and all of them one nature, divided up by our conceptions; while it, by a wonderful power, is one into all things, and appears many and becomes many, as it does, so to speak, when it moves; and the richness of its outpouring nature makes the one not one. We bring forward, as it were, these portions of it, posit each as one, and call it a genus, unaware that we have not seen the whole at once. We bring them forward part by part and then join them together again, unable to hold them down for long, since they hurry back toward one another. That is why we let them go again into the whole and allow it to become one, or rather to be one. But perhaps this will be clearer once those other matters are known too, if we grasp how many the genera are; for in that way we will grasp how as well.
ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ δεῖ λέγοντα μὴ ἀποφάσεις λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ἔννοιαν καὶ νόησιν ἰέναι τῶν λεγομένων, ὡδὶ ποιητέον·
But since a speaker must not just make denials, but must also arrive at a concept and a thought of what is being spoken of, we must proceed as follows.
Soul as one and many
Taking soul as a model, Plotinus finds being, life and motion together in it.
εἰ τὴν σώματος φύσιν ἰδεῖν ἐβουλόμεθα, οἷόν τί ἐστιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ὅλῳ ἡ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ φύσις, ἆρ’ οὐ καταμαθόντες ἐπί τινος τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐπὶ λίθου, ὥς ἐστι τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ὁπόσον αὐτοῦ, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ὁποῖον, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἄλλου σώματος εἴποιμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῇ σώματος φύσει τὸ μέν ἐστιν οἷον οὐσία, τὸ δέ ἐστι ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, ὁμοῦ μὲν πάντα, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ διαιρεθέντα εἰς τρία, καὶ σῶμα ἂν ἦν ἓν τὰ τρία; εἰ δὲ καὶ κίνησις αὐτοῦ παρῆν σύμφυτος τῇ συστάσει, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν συνηριθμήσαμεν, καὶ τὰ τέτταρα ἦν ἂν ἕν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἓν ἀπήρτιστο πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῖς ἅπασι.
Suppose we wanted to see the nature of body, what sort of thing the nature of body itself is in this All. Would we not learn it from one of its parts, say a stone? We would see that one aspect of it is like a substrate, another its how-much, its magnitude, another its what-sort, its color for instance. And we would say of every other body too that in the nature of body one thing is, as it were, substance, another quantity, another quality, all together, but divided into three by reason, and that body is the three as one. And if motion were also present in it, innate to its constitution, we would count that in too, and the four would be one, and the one body would be brought to completion as one, and in its own nature, by all of them.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον, ἐπειδὴ περὶ οὐσίας νοητῆς καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ γενῶν καὶ ἀρχῶν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀφελόντας χρὴ τὴν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι γένεσιν καὶ τὴν δι’ αἰσθήσεως κατανόησιν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη — οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ χωρὶς καὶ τὸ διεστηκότα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων εἶναι — λαβεῖν τινα νοητὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν καὶ μᾶλλον ἕν.
In the same way, since our discussion concerns intelligible substance and the genera and principles There, we must take away the coming-to-be found in bodies, apprehension through perception, and magnitudes—for that is what makes things separate and set apart from one another—and grasp an intelligible hypostasis, something that truly is and is more one.
ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ θαῦμα πῶς πολλὰ καὶ ἓν τὸ οὕτως ἕν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων συγκεχώρηται τὸ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕτερον τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ χωρίζεται· εἰ δέ τις λάβοι ψυχὴν μίαν, ἀδιάστατον, ἀμεγέθη, ἁπλούστατον, ὡς δόξει τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβολῇ, πῶς ἄν τις ἐλπίσειε πολλὰ εὑρήσειν πάλιν αὖ; καίτοι νομίσας εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾶν, ὅτε διῃρεῖτο τὸ ζῷον εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, καὶ σῶμα μὲν πολυειδὲς καὶ σύνθετον καὶ ποικίλον, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἐθάρρει ὡς ἁπλοῦν εὑρὼν ἀναπαύσασθαι τῆς πορείας ἐλθὼν ἐπ’ ἀρχήν.
And here lies the wonder: how what is one in this way is many and one. In the case of bodies it is granted that the same thing is one and many: the same body is divisible to infinity, and its color is one thing and its shape another, since they can be separated. But if someone takes a soul—one, without extension, without magnitude, utterly simple, as it will seem at the first glance of thought—how could he expect to find it many after all? And yet, when he divided the living creature into body and soul, he thought he had reached the end of this. He found body multiform, composite and varied, but soul he was confident he had found simple, and that he could rest from his journey, having arrived at a principle.
ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ τόπου προεχειρίσθη ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, λάβωμεν, πῶς τὸ ἓν τοῦτο πολλά ἐστι, καὶ πῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἕν ἐστιν, οὐ σύνθετον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ μία φύσις πολλά· διὰ γὰρ τούτου ληφθέντος καὶ φανεροῦ γενομένου καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἔφαμεν ἀλήθειαν φανερὰν ἔσεσθαι.
So let us take this soul, since it has been put before us from the intelligible region, as body was before from the perceptible one, and see how this one thing is many and how the many are one: not one composite made of many, but one nature that is many. For once this has been grasped and made clear, the truth about the genera in being too, as we said, will become clear.
πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο ἐνθυμητέον, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σώματα, οἷον τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πολλά ἐστι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ μεγέθεσι καὶ εἴδεσι μερῶν καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ἑνός, ἢ παντάπασιν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ ἕξει πάντη παντὸς ἑνός· ἢ μᾶλλον μὲν ἑνὸς ἢ οἷον τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντος ἢ τὸ γενόμενον· ὅσῳ γὰρ πρὸς ἓν ἡ ἀπόστασις, τόσῳ καὶ πρὸς ὄν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς μέν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἑνός, ὡς πάντη ἓν ἢ αὐτοέν — οὐ γὰρ ἂν διεστηκὸς πλῆθος ἐποίει — λείπεται εἶναι ἐκ πλήθους ἑνός. τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ἦν ψυχή· τοῦτο ἄρα πλῆθος ἕν. τί οὖν; τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι τῶν γινομένων; ἆρ’ οὖν αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ λόγοι δὲ ἄλλοι;
First we must consider this. Bodies—those of animals and plants, for instance—are each of them many, in colors and shapes and sizes and kinds of parts, one here and another there; yet they all come from one. They come either from what is altogether one, or from what will be one wholly and in every respect; or at least from what is more one than what comes from it, and so more truly being than what has come to be: for the farther something stands from one, the farther it stands from being. Since, then, they come from one, but not from one in the sense of wholly one, or the one-itself—for that would not have made a divided multiplicity—it remains that they come from a one that is a multiplicity. And what made them was soul; so soul is a multiplicity that is one. What then? Is the multiplicity the rational principles of the things that come to be? Is soul itself, then, one thing, and the rational principles another?
ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος καὶ κεφάλαιον τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐνεργούσης οἱ λόγοι· ἡ δὲ οὐσία δύναμις τῶν λόγων. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τοῦτο τὸ ἓν ἐξ ὧν εἰς ἄλλα ποιεῖ δεδειγμένον. τί δ’ εἰ μὴ ποιοῖ, ἀλλά τις αὐτὴν μὴ ποιοῦσαν λαμβάνοι ἀναβαίνων αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ ποιοῦν; οὐ πολλὰς καὶ ἐνταῦθα εὑρήσει δυνάμεις; εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν πᾶς ἄν τις συγχωρήσειεν· ἆρα δὲ ταὐτὸν ὡς εἰ καὶ λίθον ἔλεγεν εἶναι; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν. ἀλλ’ ὅμως κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου τὸ εἶναι τῷ λίθῳ ἦν οὐ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λίθῳ εἶναι· οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ εἶναι ψυχῇ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἔχει τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι. ἆρ’ οὖν ἄλλο τὸ εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ λοιπόν, ὃ συμπληροῖ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν;
Or rather: soul itself is a rational principle, the sum of the rational principles, and the rational principles are its activity as it acts according to its substance; while its substance is the power of the rational principles. So this one has been shown to be many on the basis of what it produces in other things. But what if it were not producing, and someone took it as not producing, climbing up to the part of it that does not produce? Will he not find many powers here too? Everyone would grant that it is. But is this the same as saying that a stone is? Or rather, it is not the same. And yet even there, in the case of the stone, being for the stone was not just being but being a stone; so here too, being for soul includes, along with being, being soul. Is being, then, one thing, and the rest, which completes the substance of soul, another?
καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄν, διαφορὰ δὲ ποιεῖ τὴν ψυχήν; ἤ τι ὂν μὲν ἡ ψυχή, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως, ὡς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, ἀλλ’ ὥς τις οὐσία μόνον· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ μὴ ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας ἔχειν ὃ ἔχει.
So is there being, and a differentia that makes soul? Or rather: soul is a particular being, though not in the way a man is white, but simply as a particular substance; and this is the same as not having what it has from outside its substance.
ἀλλ’ ἆρα οὐκ ἔξωθεν μὲν ἔχει τῆς ἑαυτῆς οὐσίας, ἵνα ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ᾖ, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι; ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι καὶ ἔξωθεν τὸ τοιόνδε, οὐ τὸ ὅλον καθ’ ὃ ψυχὴ ἔσται οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατά τι, καὶ μέρος αὐτῆς οὐσία, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ ὅλον οὐσία. ἔπειτα τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ τί ἔσται ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ λίθος; ἢ δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἷον πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα, ὅσα αὐτή· καὶ ζωὴν τοίνυν καὶ συνάμφω ἕν. ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἕν, ὡς ἕνα λόγον; ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕν· οὕτω δὲ ἕν, ὡς αὖ δύο ἢ καὶ πλείω, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ πρῶτα· ἢ οὖν οὐσία καὶ ζωή, ἢ ἔχει ζωήν.
But does it not, after all, have something from outside its own substance, so that it is in one respect by its being, and in another by its being of a certain kind? But if it is soul by being of a certain kind, and this “certain kind” comes from outside, then soul will not be substance as a whole, but only in some respect: part of it will be substance, but not the whole. And then, what will its being be without the rest? A stone? No: this being of it must be within its being as a kind of spring and principle—or rather it must be all that soul is; and so life too; and the two together are one. Is it one, then, in the way a single account is one? Or rather: the substrate is one, but one in such a way as to be two again, or even more, as many as are the primary things that soul is. So it is either substance and life, or it has life.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔχει, τὸ ἔχον καθ’ αὑτὸ οὐκ ἐν ζωῇ, ἥ τε ζωὴ οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχει θάτερον τὸ ἕτερον, λεκτέον ἓν ἄμφω. ἢ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ τοσαῦτα, ὅσα ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῷ ἑνί, καὶ ἓν ἑαυτῷ, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα πολλά, καὶ ἓν μὲν ὄν, ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτὸ ἐν τῇ οἷον κινήσει πολλά, καὶ ὅλον ἕν, οἷον δὲ θεωρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν ἑαυτὸ πολλά· ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἀνέχεται ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι πάντα δυνάμενον, ὅσα ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ θεωρία αἰτία τοῦ φανῆναι αὐτὸ πολλά, ἵνα νοήσῃ· ἐὰν γὰρ ἓν φανῇ, οὐκ ἐνόησεν, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἤδη ἐκεῖνο.
But if it has life, what has it is not, in itself, in life, and life is not in substance. But if neither has the other, we must say that both are one. Or rather: it is one and many, as many as appear in the one; it is one to itself, but many in relation to the others; it is one, but makes itself many in a kind of motion; it is one whole, but many as it tries, as it were, to contemplate itself. It is as though being cannot bear to be one, since it has the power to be all that it is. And contemplation is the cause of its appearing many, so that it may think; for if it appeared one, it would not have thought, but would already simply be that.
τίνα οὖν ἐστι καὶ πόσα τὰ ἐνορώμενα; ἐπεὶ δὴ ἐν ψυχῇ εὕρομεν οὐσίαν ἅμα καὶ ζωὴν καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν ἡ οὐσία ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ζωή, ζωὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν νῷ, ἐπεισαγαγόντες καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν τούτου ζωήν, κοινὸν τὸ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ζωῇ τὴν κίνησιν ἕν τι γένος θησόμεθα, οὐσίαν δὲ καὶ κίνησιν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν οὖσαν δύο γένη θησόμεθα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἕν, χωρίζει αὐτὰ τῇ νοήσει τὸ ἓν οὐχ ἓν εὑρών· ἢ οὐκ ἂν δυνηθείη χωρίσαι. ὅρα δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σαφῶς τοῦ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν ἢ τὴν ζωὴν χωριζομένην, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῇ σκιᾷ καὶ τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τοῦ εἶναι.
What, then, are the things seen in it, and how many? We have found in soul substance and life together. Substance is common to all soul, and life is common too; and there is life in Intellect as well. So let us bring in Intellect too, and its life, and posit what is common to all life, motion, as one genus; and substance and motion, which is the first life, we will posit as two genera. For even if they are one, thought separates them, finding that the one is not one; otherwise it could not separate them. Look too at other things, where motion or life is clearly separated from being—if not in true being, then in the shadow of being, what shares only its name.
ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ ἐλλείπει καὶ μάλιστα τὸ κύριον, ἡ ζωή, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ εἶναι σκιὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἀφῃρημένον τοῦ μάλιστα εἶναι, ὃ ἐν τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ ἦν ζωή. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἔσχομεν ἐντεῦθεν χωρίσαι τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ ζῆν. ὄντος μὲν δὴ εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ [ἓν] γένος· κίνησις δὲ οὔτε ὑπὸ τὸ ὂν τακτέα οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος, εὑρεθεῖσα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ· ἐνέργεια γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐδέτερον ἄνευ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἢ ἐπινοίᾳ, καὶ αἱ δύο φύσεις μία· καὶ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὄν, οὐ δυνάμει.
Just as in the image of a man many things are missing, above all the most important, life, so in perceptible things being is a shadow of being, deprived of what is being in the fullest sense, which in the archetype was life. But at any rate this enabled us to separate being from living and living from being. Of being, then, there are many species, and [one] genus. But motion is to be ranked neither under being nor above being, but with being, found in it not as in a substrate. For motion is its activity, and neither exists without the other except in thought, and the two natures are one; for being is in actuality, not in potentiality.
καὶ εἰ χωρὶς μέντοι ἑκάτερον λάβοις, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι κίνησις φανήσεται καὶ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τὸ ὄν, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἑκάτερον χωρὶς εἶχε θάτερον, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἡ διάνοια δύο φησὶ καὶ εἶδος ἑκάτερον διπλοῦν ἕν.
And yet if you take each of them separately, motion will appear in being and being in motion, just as in the “one being” each of the two, taken separately, had the other; but discursive thought nonetheless calls them two, and each a Form, a twofold one.
κινήσεως δὲ περὶ τὸ ὂν φανείσης οὐκ ἐξιστάσης τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν, μᾶλλον δ’ ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἷον τέλειον ποιούσης, ἀεί τε τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἐν τῷ οὕτω κινεῖσθαι μενούσης, εἴ τις μὴ στάσιν ἐπεισάγοι, ἀτοπώτερος ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ κίνησιν διδόντος· προχειροτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς στάσεως περὶ τὸ ὂν ἔννοια καὶ νόησις τῆς περὶ τὴν κίνησιν οὔσης· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ἐκεῖ. ἔστω δὴ καὶ στάσις ἓν γένος ἕτερον ὂν κινήσεως, ὅπου καὶ ἐναντίον ἂν φανείη. τοῦ δὲ ὄντος ὡς ἕτερον, πολλαχῇ δῆλον ἂν εἴη καὶ διότι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ταὐτὸν εἴη, οὐ μᾶλλον τῆς κινήσεως ταὐτὸν τῷ ὄντι.
Motion, then, has appeared around being, not displacing its nature but rather, as it were, making it perfect in its being, and such a nature always remains in moving in this way. If someone did not bring in rest as well, he would be more absurd than one who did not grant motion. For the concept and thought of rest in connection with being comes more readily than that of motion: what is in the same state, in the same way, and with a single account, is There. So let rest too be one genus, other than motion, since it might even appear to be its contrary. That it is other than being might be clear in many ways, and also because, if it were the same as being, it would be no more the same as being than motion is.
διὰ τί γὰρ ἡ μὲν στάσις τῷ ὄντι ταὐτόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις οὔ, ζωή τις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι; ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐχωρίζομεν τὴν κίνησιν αὐτοῦ ὡς ταὐτόν τε καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ὡς δύο ἄμφω ἐλέγομεν καὶ αὖ ἕν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν στάσιν χωριοῦμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ αὖ οὐ χωριοῦμεν τοσοῦτον χωρίζοντες τῷ νῷ, ὅσον ἄλλο γένος θέσθαι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν· ἢ εἰ συνάγοιμεν πάντη εἰς ἓν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὸ ὄν, μηδὲν μηδαμῇ διαφέρειν λέγοντες τό τε ὂν τῇ κινήσει ὡσαύτως, τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὄντος εἰς ταὐτὸν συνάξομεν, καὶ ἔσται ἡμῖν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ στάσις ἕν.
For why should rest be the same as being, and motion not, when motion is a kind of life of it, the activity both of its substance and of its very being? No: just as we separated motion from being, as both the same as it and not the same, and called the two both two and one, in the same way we will separate rest from it and again not separate it, separating it with our intellect only so far as to posit it as another genus among the things that are. Otherwise, if we brought rest and being together into one altogether, saying they differ in no way at all, and did the same with being and motion, we would bring rest and motion together into the same thing, with being as the middle term, and for us motion and rest would be one.
The five kinds of being
Looking at Intellect reveals being, motion, rest, sameness and otherness as the primary genera.
ἀλλὰ χρὴ τρία ταῦτα τίθεσθαι, εἴπερ ὁ νοῦς χωρὶς ἕκαστον νοεῖ· ἅμα δὲ νοεῖ καὶ τίθησιν, εἴπερ νοεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ νενόηται. οἷς μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι μετὰ ὕλης ἐστί, τούτων οὐκ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἄυλα· ἃ δ’ ἐστὶν ἄυλα, εἰ νενόηται, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι. ἴδε δὴ νοῦν καθαρὸν καὶ βλέψον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀτενίσας, μὴ ὄμμασι τούτοις δεδορκώς. ὁρᾷς δὴ οὐσίας ἑστίαν καὶ φῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ἄυπνον καὶ ὡς ἕστηκεν ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ὡς διέστηκεν ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ ζωὴν μένουσαν καὶ νόησιν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς τὸ μέλλον, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ ἤδη, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ἤδη καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἀεί, καὶ ὡς νοῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἔξω.
No: we must posit these three, since Intellect thinks each of them separately. It thinks them together and posits them, if it thinks, and they are, if they have been thought. For things whose being is with matter do not have their being in Intellect; but these are immaterial, and for immaterial things being thought is their being. Look, then, at Intellect pure, and gaze at it intently—not seeing with these eyes. You see the hearth of substance, and a sleepless light in it, and how it stands still in itself and how it stands apart while being all together; you see life that remains, and thinking whose activity is directed not toward the future but toward the now—or rather the always-now, the ever-present—and how it thinks within itself and not outside.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ νοεῖν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἑαυτὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὄν· ὢν γὰρ νοεῖ καὶ ὄντα ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς ὃ οἷον ἐπερείδετο ὄν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ εἰς αὑτὸν οὐκ οὐσία, εἰς ὃ δὲ καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ βλεπόμενον τὸ ὄν, οὐχ ἡ βλέψις· ἔχει δὲ καὶ αὕτη τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὃ ὄν. ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὄν, οὐ δυνάμει, συνάπτει πάλιν αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ οὐ χωρίζει, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ ἑαυτὸν ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο ἑαυτόν. ὂν δὲ τὸ πάντων ἑδραιότατον καὶ περὶ ὃ τὰ ἄλλα τὴν στάσιν ὑπεστήσατο καὶ ἔχει οὐκ ἐπακτόν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ.
In its thinking, then, lie activity and motion; in its thinking itself, substance and being. For it thinks as being, and thinks itself as being, and the being on which it, so to speak, was resting. The activity directed toward itself is not substance; but that toward which it is directed, and from which it comes, is being: for what is seen is being, not the seeing. Yet the seeing too has being, because that from which it comes and toward which it goes is being. And being in actuality, not in potentiality, it joins the two together again and does not separate them, but makes itself that and that itself. Being, the most firmly seated of all things, around which the others are, brought rest into existence, and has it not as something brought in from outside, but from itself and in itself.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ νόησις οὐκ ἀρξαμένη στάσις, καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ ὥρμηται οὐχ ὁρμήσασα στάσις· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδ’ εἰς κίνησιν.
And that in which thinking ends, though it never began, is rest; and that from which it set out, though it never set out, is rest: for motion does not come from motion, nor does it go into motion.
ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἰδέα ἐν στάσει πέρας οὖσα νοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοῦς αὐτῆς ἡ κίνησις, ὥστε ἓν πάντα, καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ δι’ ὅλων ὄντα γένη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὕστερόν τι ὂν καί τις στάσις καί τις κίνησις.
Further, the Form, being at rest, is the limit of Intellect, and Intellect is its motion. So all are one, both motion and rest; they are genera running through all things, and each of the later things is a particular being, a particular rest and a particular motion.
τρία δὴ ταῦτα ἰδών τις, ἐν προσβολῇ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως γεγενημένος, καὶ τῷ παρ’ αὑτῷ ὄντι τὸ ὂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰδὼν τὰ ἄλλα, τὴν κίνησιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσει, καὶ τῇ στάσει τὴν στάσιν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ἐφαρμόσας, ὁμοῦ μὲν γενομένοις καὶ οἷον συγκεχυμένοις συμμίξας οὐ διακρίνων, οἷον δ’ ὀλίγον διαστήσας καὶ ἐπισχὼν καὶ διακρίνας εἰσιδὼν ὂν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν, τρία ταῦτα καὶ ἕκαστον ἕν, ἆρ’ οὐχ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἴρηκε καὶ διέστησεν ἐν ἑτερότητι καὶ εἶδε τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑτερότητα τρία τιθεὶς καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πάλιν δὲ ταῦτα εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ πάντα ἕν, εἰς ταὐτὸν αὖ συνάγων καὶ βλέπων ταυτότητα εἶδε γενομένην καὶ οὖσαν;
So someone who has seen these three, having come into contact with the nature of being, sees being by the being in himself, and the others by the others: the motion in it by the motion in himself, rest by rest; and he fits these to those. While they came together and were, as it were, fused, he mingled them without distinguishing; but then, setting them a little apart, as it were, holding them back and distinguishing them, he looks in and sees being, rest and motion—three, and each one. Has he not said they are other than one another? Has he not set them apart in otherness, and seen the otherness in being, positing three, and each one? And again, when he brings them back into one, in one, all one, gathering them into the same and looking, has he not seen sameness, both coming to be and being?
οὐκοῦν πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις ἀνάγκη δύο ταῦτα προστιθέναι, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, ὥστε τὰ πάντα γένη γίγνεσθαι πέντε πᾶσι, καὶ ταῦτα διδόντα τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἑτέροις καὶ ταὐτοῖς εἶναι· καί τι γὰρ ταὐτὸν καί τι ἕτερον ἕκαστον· ἁπλῶς γὰρ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον ἄνευ τοῦ τὶ ἐν γένει ἂν εἴη. καὶ πρῶτα δὲ γένη, ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτῶν κατηγορήσεις ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ ὂν κατηγορήσεις αὐτῶν· ὄντα γάρ· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς γένος· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ὄν τι· οὐδ’ αὖ τῆς κινήσεως οὐδὲ τῆς στάσεως· οὐ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ ὄντος· ὄντα γὰρ τὰ μὲν ὡς εἴδη αὐτοῦ, τὰ δὲ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ ὂν μετέχον τούτων ὡς γενῶν αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπαναβέβηκεν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ πρότερα τοῦ ὄντος.
So to those three we must add these two, the same and the other, so that there are five genera in all; and it is these that give the things after them their being other and the same: for each of those is a particular same and a particular other, since the same and the other simply, without the “particular,” would belong to the genus. And these are primary genera, because you will predicate none of them of the others in their “what it is.” You will predicate being of them, since they are beings, but not as a genus: for they are not precisely something that is being. Nor, again, will you predicate it so of motion or of rest, for they are not species of being: of beings, some are beings as its species, others by participating in it. Nor, again, does being participate in these as its genera; for they do not stand above it, and they are not prior to being.
Why not the one, or quantity?
The one, number, quality and the other categories cannot be primary genera There.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν ταῦτα γένη πρῶτα, ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, βεβαιώσαιτο· ὅτι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις, πῶς ἄν τις πιστεύσειε; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἕν; διὰ τί δ’ οὐ τὸ ποσόν; καὶ τὸ ποιὸν δέ; τὸ δὲ πρός τι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἅπερ ἤδη ἕτεροι κατηρίθμηνται; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕν, εἰ μὲν τὸ πάντως ἕν, ᾧ μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόσεστι, μὴ ψυχή, μὴ νοῦς, μὴ ὁτιοῦν, οὐδενὸς ἂν κατηγοροῖτο τοῦτο, ὥστε οὐδὲ γένος· εἰ δὲ τὸ προσὸν τῷ ὄντι, ἐφ’ οὗ τὸ ἓν ὂν λέγομεν, οὐ πρώτως ἓν τοῦτο. ἔτι ἀδιάφορον ὂν αὑτοῦ πῶς ἂν ποιήσειεν εἴδη; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μή, οὐ γένος. πῶς γὰρ καὶ διαιρήσεις;
That these are primary genera, then, one could confirm from these considerations, and perhaps from others too. But how could one be convinced that these are the only ones, and that there are no others besides? Why not the one as well? Why not quantity? And quality? And relation and the rest, which others have already enumerated? As for the one: if it means what is altogether one, to which nothing else is added—not soul, not intellect, not anything—it would be predicated of nothing, and so it would not be a genus either. But if it means the one added to being, in virtue of which we speak of “one being,” this is not primarily one. Further, being without differentiae in itself, how could it make species? And if it does not, it is not a genus. How will you even divide it?
διαιρῶν γὰρ πολλὰ ποιήσεις· ὥστε αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ἔσται καὶ ἀπολεῖ ἑαυτό, εἰ ἐθέλοι γένος εἶναι. ἔπειτά τι προσθήσεις διαιρῶν εἰς εἴδη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶεν διαφοραὶ ἐν τῷ ἕν, ὥσπερ εἰσὶ τῆς οὐσίας. ὄντος μὲν γὰρ δέχεται ὁ νοῦς εἶναι διαφοράς, ἑνὸς δὲ πῶς; εἶτα ἑκάστοτε μετὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς δύο τιθεὶς ἀναιρεῖς τὸ ἕν, ἐπείπερ πανταχοῦ ἡ μονάδος προσθήκη τὸ πρότερον ποσὸν ἀφανίζει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι ἓν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ κινήσει ἓν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.
For in dividing it you will make many; so the one itself will be many and will destroy itself, if it wants to be a genus. Then, in dividing it into species, you will be adding something, for there could be no differentiae in the one as there are differentiae of substance. Intellect accepts that being has differentiae; but how could one? Then each time you posit two with the differentia, you abolish the one, since everywhere the addition of a unit makes the previous quantity disappear. Suppose someone were to say that the one in being, the one in motion and in the other things,
κοινὸν εἶναι, εἰς μὲν ταὐτὸν ἄγων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἐν ᾧ λόγῳ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἐποίει τῶν ἄλλων γένος, ὅτι μὴ ὅπερ [ὂν] ὄντα, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τρόπον ὄντα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν κοινὸν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ ἄλλως.
is common: then he is bringing being and the one together into the same thing. But by the same reasoning by which being did not make a genus of the others—because they are not precisely [being] beings, but beings in another way—the one will not be common to them either; it will belong to one primarily, to another in a different way.
εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντων λέγοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἕν τι ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἕν, ἤδη τοῦ ὄντος ἠριθμημένου ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ὄνομα εἰσάγει· εἰ δὲ ἓν ἑκάτερον, τινὰ φύσιν λέγει, καὶ εἰ μὲν προστίθησί τι, ἓν λέγει, εἰ δὲ μηδέν, ἐκεῖνο, ὃ οὐδενὸς κατηγορεῖται, πάλιν αὖ λέγει. εἰ δὲ τὸ τῷ ὄντι συνόν, εἴπομεν μέν, ὅτι οὐ πρώτως ἓν λέγει. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει πρώτως εἶναι τοῦτο ἐξῃρημένου· ἐκείνου τοῦ παντελῶς ἕν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μετ’ ἐκεῖνο λέγομεν ὂν καὶ ὂν πρώτως ὄν. ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὂν ἤ, εἴπερ ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν πρώτως [ὄν]· τούτου δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἕν.
And if he says it does not make a genus of all, but is some one thing by itself, like the others, then if being and one are the same for him, he is bringing in a mere name, since being has already been counted among the genera. If each of the two is one thing, he is speaking of some nature: if he adds something to it, he means a one; if nothing, he is again speaking of that which is predicated of nothing. And if he means the one that accompanies being, we have already said that he is not speaking of what is primarily one. But what prevents this from being primarily one, if we set aside that which is altogether one? After all, we call being, which comes after that, being, and primarily being. Or rather, that is because what comes before being is not being—or if it were, being would not be primarily [being]; whereas what comes before this one is itself one.
ἔπειτα χωρισθὲν τῇ νοήσει τοῦ ὄντος διαφορὰς οὐκ ἔχει· ἔπειτα ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἰ μὲν ἐπακολούθημα αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάντων καὶ ὕστερον — πρότερον δὲ τὸ γένος· εἰ δὲ ἅμα, καὶ πάντων — τὸ δὲ γένος οὐχ ἅμα· εἰ δὲ πρότερον, ἀρχή τις καὶ αὐτοῦ μόνον· εἰ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ, οὐ γένος αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ δέοι ἂν καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ ὄντι πλησιάζον τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ οἷον συνεκπῖπτον τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἓν ὄντος, τὸ δὲ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο ὄντος, ὃ δύναται καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μένον αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ οὐ θέλον μερίζεσθαι οὐδὲ γένος εἶναι βούλεσθαι.
Then again, separated in thought from being, it has no differentiae. Then again, within being: if it is a consequence of being, it is a consequence of all things, and later—but the genus is prior. If it is simultaneous, it belongs to all things—but the genus is not simultaneous. If it is prior, it is a principle, and of being alone; and if it is a principle of being, it is not its genus; and if it is not the genus of being, it is not the genus of the others either—or else being too would have to be the genus of all the others. In general, the one in being seems to be close to the One and, as it were, to coincide with being: being, insofar as it is turned toward the One, is one, and insofar as it comes after it, is being, which can also be many; while the one itself remains one, and does not wish to be divided or want to be a genus.
πῶς οὖν ἕκαστον τοῦ ὄντος ἕν; ἢ τῷ [τὸ] τὶ ἓν οὐχ ἕν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη τὸ τὶ ἕν· ἀλλ’ ὁμωνύμως ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος πλῆθος, ὥστε ἓν ἐνταῦθα ὡς στρατὸς ἢ χορός.
How, then, is each part of being one? Or rather: insofar as it is a particular one, it is not one, since a particular one is already many. Each of the species is one only homonymously; for the species is a multiplicity, so that “one” here is as an army or a chorus is one.
οὐ τοίνυν τὸ ἐκεῖ ἓν ἐν τούτοις, ὥστε οὐ κοινὸν τὸ ἓν οὐδὲ θεωροῖτο [ἂν] ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ τοῖς τὶ οὖσι τὸ αὐτό· ὥστε οὐ γένος τὸ ἕν· ἐπεὶ πᾶν γένος, καθ’ οὗ ἀληθεύεται οὐκέτι καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα· καθ’ οὗ δὲ παντὸς ὄντος ἀληθεύεται τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, καθ’ οὗ ἀληθεύσεται τὸ ἓν ὡς γένος, κατὰ τούτου ἔσται οὐχ ὡς γένος· ὥστε οὔτε τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀληθεύσεται ὡς γένος, ἐπείπερ καὶ τὸ ἓν ὂν οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ πολλά, οὐδέ τι τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν οὕτως ἕν, ὡς μὴ πολλά, οὔτε κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὑστέρων, ἃ πάντως πολλά. τὸ δ’ ὅλον γένος οὐδὲν ἕν· ὥστε, εἰ τὸ ἓν γένος, ἀπολεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τὸ ἕν· ἀριθμὸς δ’ ἔσται γενόμενον γένος.
So the one that is There is not in these. So the one is not common, nor would the same one be seen in being and in particular beings; so the one is not a genus. For every genus is such that its opposites are not also true of what it is truly said of; but since both one and its opposites are true of every being, whatever one is supposedly true of as a genus, it will be true of it not as a genus. So it will not be true as a genus of the primary genera, since even the one being is no more one than many, and none of the other genera is one in such a way as not to be many; nor of the later things, which are many in every way. In short, no genus is one; so if the one is a genus, it will lose its being one. For the one is not a number; but once it has become a genus, it will be a number.
ἔτι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ἕν· εἰ γὰρ γένει ἕν, οὐ κυρίως ἕν. ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἓν οὐχ ὡς γένος κατ’ αὐτῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν λέγεται, οὐ γένος δὲ λέγεται, οὕτως οὐδ’ εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἕν, γένος ἂν εἴη οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν πάντων.
Further, the one is one in number; if it were one in genus, it would not be one in the proper sense. Further, just as in numbers the one is not predicated of them as a genus, but is said to be present in them, not said to be a genus, so even if the one is in the things that are, it would be a genus neither of being nor of the others nor of all things.
ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἀρχὴ μὲν ἂν εἴη τοῦ οὐχ ἁπλοῦ, οὐ μὴν τούτου καὶ γένος — ἁπλοῦν γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ἁπλοῦν — οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ τὸ ἓν ἀρχή, οὐκ ἔσται τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸ γένος. ἔσται οὖν οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἔσται, τῶν ἓν ἑκάστων, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιώσειε χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἕν. τινῶν οὖν ἔσται. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ὂν οὐ πάντων γένος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὂν εἰδῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἓν ἑκάστων εἰδῶν. τίς οὖν διαφορὰ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο καθ’ ὃ ἕν, ὥσπερ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο ὄντος διαφορά;
Further, just as the simple would be a principle of the non-simple, but not also its genus—for then the non-simple would be simple too—so it is with the one: if the one is a principle, it will not be a genus of what comes after it. So it will be a genus neither of being nor of the others. If it is to be a genus at all, it will be of the things that are each one, as if someone thought fit to separate the one from substance. So it will be a genus of some things. For just as being is not a genus of all things, but of the species that are being, so the one too will be of the species that are each one. What, then, is the differentia of one from another insofar as each is one, as there is a differentia of one being from another?
ἀλλ’ εἰ συμμερίζεται τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τὸ ὂν τῷ μερισμῷ καὶ τῷ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ ἓν τοσαῦτα φαινόμενον, ὅσα ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἴσα μεριζόμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος; ἢ πρῶτον οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ἐνυπάρχει πολλοῖς, γένος εἶναι οὔτε αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχει, οὔτε ἄλλων, οὐδ’ ὅλως, εἴ τι κοινόν, πάντως γένος. τὸ γοῦν σημεῖον ἐνυπάρχον ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὐ γένος οὔτε αὐτῶν οὔτε ὅλως, οὐδέ γε, ὥσπερ ἐλέγετο, τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἓν οὔτε τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ διαφοραῖς οἰκείαις χρῆσθαι καὶ εἴδη ποιεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι· τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς τίνες ἂν εἶεν διαφοραί; ἢ ποῖα γεννᾷ εἴδη;
But if the one is divided along with being and substance, and being, by being divided and seen in many things, is the same genus, why should not the one too, appearing as many things as substance does and divided into as many parts, be a genus? Or rather: first of all, it is not necessary, if something is present in many things, that it be a genus either of those it is present in or of others; nor in general, if something is common, must it in every case be a genus. The point, at any rate, is present in lines but is not a genus, either of them or at all; nor, as we said, is the one in numbers a genus either of numbers or of anything else. For what is common and in many things must also employ its own differentiae, make species, and be in the “what it is.” But what differentiae could the one have? Or what species does it generate?
εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ εἴδη ποιεῖ, ἃ περὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη τῷ ὄντι, καὶ ὄνομα μόνον θάτερον, καὶ ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄν.
And if it makes the same species as those around being, it would be the same as being, one of the two would be a mere name, and “being” is enough.
ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, πῶς ἐν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἕν, καὶ πῶς ὁ λεγόμενος μερισμὸς καὶ ὅλως ὁ τῶν γενῶν, καὶ εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος ἑκάτερος. πρῶτον οὖν, πῶς ὅλως ἓν ἕκαστον ὁτιοῦν λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν, εἶτα εἰ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ὄντι λέγομεν καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖ λέγεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν οὐ ταὐτόν· οὕτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν νοητῶν — ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν — οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμοίως· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἐν χορῷ καὶ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ νηὶ καὶ οἰκίᾳ οὐδὲ αὖ ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ.
We must examine how the one is in being, and how the division we spoke of takes place, and in general the division of the genera, and whether the two divisions are the same or different. First, then: how in general is each thing whatever called one, and how is it one? Then: do we speak of it in the same way in the one being, and in what way is it spoken of There? The one is not the same in all things. It is not the same in perceptible and intelligible things—but then neither is being—nor in perceptible things compared with one another: it is not the same in a chorus, an army camp, a ship and a house, nor again in these and in what is continuous.
ἀλλ’ ὅμως πάντα τὸ αὐτὸ μιμεῖται, τυγχάνει δὲ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐν τῷ νῷ· ψυχὴ γὰρ μία καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον νοῦς εἷς καὶ τὸ ὂν ἕν. ἆρ’ οὖν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὸ ὂν αὐτοῦ λέγοντες ἓν λέγομεν καὶ ὡς ἔχει ὄντος, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἑνός; ἢ συμβέβηκε μὲν τοῦτο, οὐ μέντοι καθ’ ὃ ὂν καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὴ ἧττον ὂν ὑπάρχον ἧττον εἶναι ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἧττον στρατὸς ἢ χορὸς οἰκίας, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἧττον ἕν. ἔοικεν οὖν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἓν πρὸς ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον βλέπειν, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον τυγχάνει ἀγαθοῦ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ἕν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοῦ ἓν ἐν τούτῳ· εἶναι γὰρ θέλει ἕκαστον οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
And yet all imitate the same thing; some attain it from far off, others more nearly, and in Intellect already more truly: for soul is one, and Intellect still more so, and being is one. When we speak of the being of each thing, then, are we speaking of its one, and does it have one in the same measure as it has being? Or rather: that does happen, but it is not in the respect in which a thing is being that it is also one; something that is no less a being can be less one. An army or a chorus is no less a being than a house, but it is less one. So the one in each thing seems rather to look toward good, and to the extent that it attains good, to that extent it is also one, and the more and less of being one lies in this. For each thing wants not simply to be, but to be together with the good.
διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ μὴ ἓν ὡς δύναται σπεύδει ἓν γενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν φύσει αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει συνιόντα εἰς ταὐτὸν ἑνοῦσθαι αὑτοῖς θέλοντα· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων σπεύδει ἕκαστα, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ εἰς αὑτά· καὶ ψυχαὶ πᾶσαι εἰς ἓν ἂν βούλοιντο ἰέναι μετὰ τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν.
That is why even things that are not one strive, as far as they can, to become one. Natural things, by their very nature, come together, wanting to be united with themselves: things do not strive away from one another, but toward one another and toward themselves. And all souls would wish to go into one, following their own substance.
καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ τὸ εἰς ὅ· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἓν καὶ σπεύδει εἰς τὸ ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπέστη ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὁτιοῦν, ὑποστάν τε ἂν ἀνέχοιτο μὴ πρὸς τὸ ἓν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχον. τὰ μὲν δὴ φύσει οὕτω· τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις αὐτὴ ἑκάστη ἕκαστον πρὸς τοῦτο καθ’ ὅσον δύναται καὶ ὡς δύναται ἐκεῖνα οὕτως ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὂν μάλιστα πάντων τούτου τυγχάνει· ἐγγὺς γάρ· ὅθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγεται ἃ λέγεται μόνον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος· καὶ γάρ, εἴ ποτε λέγοιμεν εἷς, πρὸς δύο λέγομεν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὸ ἓν λέγομεν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, προστιθέντες λέγομεν.
And the One is on both sides: it is both that from which and that toward which. Things begin from the One and strive toward the One; for so it is with the Good too. Nothing whatever has come into existence among the things that are, or, having come into existence, could bear not to have its striving directed toward the One. That is how it is with natural things. As for things in the arts, each art itself directs each of its works toward this, as far as it can and as far as they allow. But being attains it most of all, for it is near. That is why the other things are called only what they are called, for example “man”: even if we sometimes say “one man,” we say it in contrast to two; and if we call it one in some other way, we say it as an addition.
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὄντος λέγομεν τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἓν ὂν καὶ ἀξιοῦμεν ὡς ἓν ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὴν σφόδρα αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν συνουσίαν. γίγνεται οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕν. τί οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕν; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ κοινὸν θεωρούμενον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς κοινὸν τὸ σημεῖον καὶ οὐ γένος τῶν γραμμῶν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς κοινὸν τὸ ἓν δὴ ἴσως τοῦτο καὶ οὐ γένος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἓν τῷ ἐπὶ μονάδος καὶ δυάδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν.
But with being we call this whole “one being” and claim it as one, indicating its intense intimacy with the Good. So the one comes to be in it too, as beginning and end, though not in the same way but in another, so that there is prior and posterior in the one as well. What, then, is the one in it? Is it not seen alike in all its parts, as something common? Or rather: first, in lines too the point is common, and it is not a genus of lines; and in numbers the one—perhaps this very one—is common, and not a genus. For the one said of the one itself is not the same as the one said of the unit, the dyad and the other numbers.
ἔπειτα καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, τὰ δ’ ὕστερα εἶναι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸ ἓν τοῖς τοῦ ὄντος, διαφορὰ οὐκ οὖσα αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ εἴδη ποιεῖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἴδη, οὐδὲ γένος αὐτὸ δύναται εἶναι.
Then, in being too, nothing prevents some things from being first and others later, some simple and others composite. And even if the one is the same in all the parts of being, since it has no differentia it does not make species either; and if not species, it cannot be a genus either.
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω. πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ ἓν εἶναι ἕκαστον ἀψύχοις οὖσιν; ἢ κοινὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ εἶναι ὅλως αὐτούς, ἡμεῖς περὶ ὄντων εἴπομεν, καθ’ ὃ ἓν ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ τὸ σημεῖον ζητοῖεν πῶς ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει, εἰ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ φήσουσιν εἶναι, εἰ μὲν ἄψυχον φήσουσι, τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ἐν κύκλῳ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐκείνου τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ σπεύδει ὡς δύναται διὰ τούτου ἐκεῖ. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὰ γένη ταῦτα; ἆρα καὶ τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἕκαστα; ἢ ὅλον ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὧν γένος. καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἕν; ἢ τὸ γένει ἓν ὡς ἐν πολλοῖς ὅλον.
So much for that. But how does the good lie, for numbers, in each being one, when they are soulless? Or rather: this is common to the other soulless things too. And if someone says that numbers do not exist at all, we were speaking of beings, insofar as each is one. And if they ask how the point participates in good: if they say it exists by itself—if they say it is soulless—they are asking the same question they ask about other such things. But if it is in other things, a circle for instance, the good of that is its good, its desire is directed toward this, and through this it strives, as far as it can, toward what is There. But how do these genera exist? Is each of them chopped into pieces? Or rather: each is whole in each of the things of which it is the genus. And how is it still one? Or rather: what is one in genus is one as a whole in many.
ἆρ’ οὖν μόνον ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν. ἀλλ’ ἴσως σαφέστερον ἔσται ὕστερον.
Is it, then, only in the things that participate in it? Or rather, no: it is both by itself and in its participants. But perhaps this will become clearer later.
νῦν δέ, πῶς τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τοῖς πρώτοις, καὶ αὖ τὸ ποιόν; ἢ ποσὸν μὲν οὐ πρῶτον μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἅμα μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος. κίνησις γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος ζωὴ αὐτοῦ οὖσα· καὶ στάσις ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συνεισῄει, μᾶλλον δὲ συνῆν τὸ εἶναι τούτοις ἑτέροις καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὥστε συνορᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτα. ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὕστερός τε ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ὕστερα ἐν τοῖς προτέροις· ὥστε ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις οὐκ ἂν καταριθμοῖτο· ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ὅλως γένος. τὸ μέντοι μέγεθος ἔτι μᾶλλον ὕστερον καὶ σύνθετον· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἐν τῷδε καὶ γραμμὴ (δύο τινὰ) καὶ ἐπίπεδον (τρία).
Now: why is quantity not among the primary genera, and quality too? Or rather: quantity is not primary along with the others, because those exist simultaneously with being. Motion goes with being, which is in actuality, since it is its life; and rest came in along with substance itself; or rather, being other and the same was there with them, so that these too are seen together. But number is later both than those and than itself: the later comes from the earlier, numbers follow one another in sequence, and the later are contained in the earlier. So it would not be counted among the first; whether it is a genus at all must be investigated. Magnitude, however, is still later, and composite: for there is number in it, and the line (a kind of two) and the plane (three).
εἰ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἔχει καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς μέγεθος τὸ ποσόν, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὄντος γένους πῶς ἂν τοῦτο ἔχοι; ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπὶ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ποσοῖς, τί τοῦτό ἐστι ληπτέον, καὶ εὑρόντας θετέον γένος ὕστερον, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· καὶ εἰ γένος μὴ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, εἴς τι ἀνακτέον τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν εἰς τὰ πρῶτα. δῆλον τοίνυν ἴσως, ὅτι ὅσον τι δηλοῖ ἡ τοῦ ποσοῦ φύσις καὶ μετρεῖ τὸ ὅσον ἑκάστου αὐτή τε ὅσον τι.
If, then, continuous magnitude too gets its quantity from number, how could it have it, if number is not a genus? There is also prior and posterior in magnitudes. And if being quantities is common to both, we must grasp what this is, and once we have found it, posit it as a later genus, not among the first; and if it is a genus not among the first, it must be traced back to one of the first, or to something that goes back to them. Perhaps, then, it is clear that the nature of quantity indicates an amount, and measures the amount of each thing, and is itself an amount.
ἀλλ’ εἰ κοινὸν ἐπ’ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μεγέθους τὸ ὅσον, ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρῶτος, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ἢ ὅλως ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐν μίξει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος κίνησίς τις ἢ ἐκ κινήσεως, τῆς μὲν κινήσεως εἰς ἀόριστον προιούσης, τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τῇ ἐποχῇ τοῦ προιόντος μονάδα ποιούσης. ἀλλὰ περὶ γενέσεως ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μεγέθους, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑποστάσεως καὶ ἐπινοίας, ὕστερον θεωρητέον. τάχα γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γένεσι, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ὕστερον ἐν συνθέσει· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἑστώτων, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἐν κινήσει. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον, ὥς φαμεν.
But if the amount is common to number and magnitude, then either number is first and magnitude comes from it, or, in general, number lies in a mixture of motion and rest, while magnitude is a kind of motion, or comes from motion: motion proceeds into the indefinite, and rest, by halting what proceeds, makes a unit. But the generation of number and magnitude—or rather their real existence and our conception of them—must be considered later. For perhaps number is among the primary genera, and magnitude later, in composition; and number belongs to things that stand still, while magnitude is in motion. But these matters are for later, as we say.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦ, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις; ἣ ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ὕστερον καὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. δεῖ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν παρακολουθοῦντα ταῦτα ἔχειν τὴν πρώτην, μὴ ἐκ τούτων δὲ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν, μηδὲ διὰ τούτων συμπληροῦσθαι· ἢ εἴη ἂν ὑστέρα ποιότητος καὶ ποσότητος. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς συνθέτοις οὐσίαις καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν, ἐν αἷς καὶ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ ποιότητες διαλλαγὴν ἐποίησαν αὐτῶν, καὶ ποιότητες εἶεν ἂν καὶ κοινότης τις ἐν αὐταῖς θεωρηθήσεται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις γένεσι τὴν διαίρεσιν οὐχ ἁπλῶν καὶ συνθέτων δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶν καὶ τῶν τὴν οὐσίαν συμπληρούντων, οὐ τὴν τινὰ οὐσίαν.
As for quality, why is it not among the first? Or rather: because it too is later and comes after substance. The first substance must have these as consequences, not have its constitution from them or be completed through them; otherwise it would be posterior to quality and quantity. In composite substances, made of many things, in which numbers and qualities have made them differ, there would be qualities, and some common feature will be seen in them. But in the primary genera the division must be made not between simple and composite, but between the simple and what completes substance—not a particular substance.
τὴν μὲν γὰρ τινὰ οὐσίαν συμπληροῦσθαι καὶ ἐκ ποιότητος οὐδὲν ἴσως ἄτοπον, ἐχούσης ἤδη τὴν οὐσίαν πρὸ τῆς ποιότητος, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ἔξωθεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἃ ἔχει οὐσιώδη ἔχειν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἠξιοῦμεν τὰ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας συμπληρωτικὰ ὁμωνύμως ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ’ ἔξωθεν μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχοντα ποιά, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ μετ’ αὐτὰς ἤδη πάθη· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν οὐκ οὐσίας ὅλως εἶναι συμπληρωτικὰ τὰ τῆς τινὸς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ οὐσίας προσθήκη γίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καθ’ ὃ ἄνθρωπος, εἰς οὐσίαν· ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐσία ἄνωθεν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ζῷον ἤδη, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸ λογικὸν ἥκειν.
That a particular substance should be completed also by quality is perhaps not absurd, since it already has substance before the quality, and its being of such a kind comes from outside; whereas substance itself must have what it has as belonging to its substance. And yet elsewhere we held that what completes substance is a quality only homonymously, while what comes from outside, after the substance, is quality; and that what is in substances is their activities, while what comes after them is by then affections. Now, however, we are saying that what belongs to a particular substance does not complete substance at all. For man, insofar as he is man, does not receive an addition of substance toward being substance: he is substance from higher up, before reaching the differentia, just as he is already an animal before he arrives at the rational.
πῶς οὖν τὰ τέτταρα γένη συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔπω ποιὰν οὐσίαν ποιοῦντα; οὐδὲ γὰρ τινά. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ὂν πρῶτον, εἴρηται, καὶ ὡς ἡ κίνησις οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο οὐδ’ ἡ στάσις οὐδὲ θάτερον οὐδὲ ταὐτόν, δῆλον· καὶ ὅτι οὐ ποιότητα ἐνεργάζεται ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, ἴσως μὲν φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ μᾶλλον ποιήσει σαφέστερον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ἐνέργεια δὲ τὸ ὂν καὶ ὅλως τὰ πρῶτα, οὐκ ἂν συμβεβηκὸς εἴη ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν συμπληρωτικὸν ἔτι λέγοιτο, ἀλλ’ αὐτή· ὥστε οὐκ ἐμβέβηκεν εἰς ὕστερόν τι οὐδ’ εἰς ποιότητα, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ ἅμα τέτακται.
How, then, do the four genera complete substance without yet making it qualified substance? For they do not make it a particular substance either. That being is first has been said; and it is clear that motion could not be anything else, nor rest, nor the other, nor the same. That this motion does not produce quality is perhaps evident, but saying so will make it clearer. If motion is the activity of substance, and being, and the first things in general, are activity, motion would not be an accident. Being the activity of what is in actuality, it could no longer even be called something that completes substance: it would be substance itself. So it has not entered into anything later, or into quality, but is ranked with what is simultaneous.
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὄν, εἶτα κεκίνηται, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὄν, εἶτα ἔστη· οὐδὲ πάθος ἡ στάσις, καὶ ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ θάτερον οὐχ ὕστερα, ὅτι μὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο πολλά, ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅπερ ἦν ἓν πολλά· εἰ δὲ πολλά, καὶ ἑτερότης, καὶ εἰ ἓν πολλά, καὶ ταυτότης. καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀρκεῖ· ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃ πρὸς τὰ κάτω προιέναι, τότε ἄλλα, ἃ οὐκέτι οὐσίαν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ ποιὰν οὐσίαν καὶ ποσὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ γιγνέσθω γένη οὐ πρῶτα.
For it is not that it is being and then is moved, nor that it is being and then comes to rest; nor is rest an affection. And the same and the other are not later, because it did not become many later on, but was what it was, one-many; and if many, then there is otherness, and if one-many, there is sameness. And these suffice for substance. But when it is about to proceed to what is below, then other things come in, which no longer make substance but qualified substance and quantified substance; and let these be genera that are not primary.
τὸ δὲ πρός τι παραφυάδι ἐοικὸς πῶς ἂν ἐν πρώτοις; ἑτέρου γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ οὐ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἡ σχέσις καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο. ποῦ δὲ καὶ πότε ἔτι πόρρω· τό τε γὰρ ποῦ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὥστε. δύο· τὸ δὲ γένος ἓν δεῖ εἶναι, οὐ σύνθεσιν· καὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἐκεῖ· νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ ἀλήθειαν· ὅ τε χρόνος εἰ ἐκεῖ, σκεπτέον. μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὔ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς μέτρον, ἀλλὰ κινήσεως, δύο καὶ σύνθετον τὸ ὅλον καὶ κινήσεως ὕστερον, ὥστε οὐχ ὅπου κίνησις ἐν ἴσῃ διαιρέσει. τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐν κινήσει. εἰ ἄρα ἐκεῖ τὸ πάσχειν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν, [τὸ ποιεῖν] δὲ δύο, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πάσχειν· οὐδέτερον οὖν ἁπλοῦν.
As for relation, which is like an offshoot, how could it be among the first? The relation is of one thing to another, not to itself, and toward something else. Where and when are still farther off. “Where” is one thing in another, so two; but the genus must be one, not a composition; and besides, there is no place There; and our discussion now is about what truly is. Whether time is There must be investigated; more likely, perhaps, it is not. And if it is a measure, and not simply a measure but the measure of motion, it is two, the whole is composite and later than motion, so that it does not stand on an equal footing with motion in the division. Acting and being acted on lie in motion. If, then, acting and being acted on are There—but [acting] is two, and so likewise is being acted on—neither is simple.
καὶ τὸ ἔχειν δύο καὶ τὸ κεῖσθαι ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ οὕτως, ὥστε τρία.
And having is two, and position is one thing in another in a particular way, so that it is three.
The good, beauty and the virtues
Good, beauty, knowledge and virtue are not primary genera but later or derived.
ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἣν δὴ λέγομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καθ’ ἧς οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς μὴ ἔχοντες ἄλλως σημῆναι οὕτω λέγομεν, γένος οὐδενὸς ἂν εἴη. οὐ γὰρ κατ’ ἄλλων λέγεται ἢ ἦν ἂν καθ’ ὧν λέγεται ἕκαστον ἐκεῖνο λεγόμενον· καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας δὲ ἐκεῖνο, οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ. εἰ δ’ ὡς ποιὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅλως τὸ ποιὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. τί οὖν; ἡ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις οὐκ ἀγαθόν; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλως καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνως, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ὡς ποιόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ.
But why are the beautiful and the good and the virtues not among the first—knowledge, intellect? Or rather: the Good, if it is the First, which we call the nature of the Good, of which nothing is predicated, though we, having no other way of indicating it, speak of it so—would be the genus of nothing. It is not said of other things; otherwise each of the things it is said of would be that. And that is before substance, not in substance. If the good is meant as a quality, quality in general is not among the first. What then? Is the nature of being not good? Or rather: first, it is good in another way, and not in the way the First is; and it is good not as a quality, but within itself.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔφαμεν γένη ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ διότι κοινόν τι ἦν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἑωρᾶτο, γένος. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾶται ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις, διὰ τί οὐ γένος καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις; ἢ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως καὶ ὑστέρως· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι θάτερον παρὰ θατέρου, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου, ἢ ὅτι παρ’ ἑνὸς πάντα τοῦ ἐπέκεινα, ἄλλα ἄλλως κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ γένος ἐθέλοι τις θέσθαι, ὕστερον· ὕστερον γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, κἂν ἀεὶ συνῇ, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν.
But we said the other genera too were in it, and that each was a genus because it was something common and seen in many things. If, then, the good too is seen in each part of substance or of being, or in most of them, why is it not a genus and among the first? Or rather: it is not the same in all the parts, but is there first, second and later. Either one comes from another, the later from the earlier, or all come from one, what is beyond, and they partake of it in different ways according to their own nature. And if someone did want to posit it as a genus, it would be a later one; for its very being good is later than substance and the “what it is,” even if it is always with them; whereas those genera belonged to being as being and went into its substance.
ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ οὐσία οὐ δύναται μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα [τὰ] ἠριθμημένα γένη καὶ εἶναι ἓν πολλά. εἰ μέντοι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄντι μὴ ὀκνοῖμεν λέγειν τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ἕν, τοῦτο [δ’] εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῦ, ἵν’ ἐκεῖθεν ἀγαθοειδὲς ᾖ, ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ κίνησις, ἣ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἕν τι τῶν γενῶν.
That is also why there is what is beyond being: being and substance cannot help being many, but must have these genera we have enumerated and be one-many. If, however, we did not shrink from saying that the good in being is its natural activity toward the One, that this is its good, so that from There it may have the form of good, then this good will be activity toward the Good; and this is its life; and this is motion, which is already one of the genera.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ, εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἡ πρώτη καλλονή, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν καὶ παραπλήσια λέγοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λόγοις· καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ οἷον ἀποστίλβον, ὅτι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ ὅτι ὕστερον τὸ ἀποστίλβειν. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ οὐσία αὐτή, ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἴρηται. εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ὁρῶντας τῷ τοιόνδε πάθος ποιεῖν ἐστι, τοῦτο τὸ ἐνεργεῖν κίνησις, καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἡ ἐνέργεια, κίνησις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτοκίνησις ὄψις οὖσα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἕξις· ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπὸ τὴν κίνησιν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὑπὸ τὴν στάσιν, ἢ καὶ ὑπ’ ἄμφω· εἰ δὲ ὑπ’ ἄμφω, ὡς μικτόν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὕστερον τὸ μικτόν.
As for beauty: if it means that first beauty, the same things, or nearly the same, would be said as in our discussion of the good. If it is, as it were, a radiance shining on the Form, we would say that it is not the same in all, and that the shining comes later. If beauty is nothing other than substance itself, it has been dealt with under substance. If it exists in relation to us who see it, by producing an affection of a certain kind, this acting is motion; and if the activity is directed toward that beauty, it is motion. Knowledge too is self-motion, being a sight of being and an activity, not a state; so it too comes under motion—or, if you like, under rest, or even under both; and if under both, as a mixture; and if so, the mixture is later.
ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὂν νοοῦν καὶ σύνθετον ἐκ πάντων οὐχ ἕν τι τῶν γενῶν· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς νοῦς ὂν μετὰ πάντων καὶ ἤδη πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τὸ δὲ ὂν μόνον ψιλὸν εἰς γένος λαμβανόμενον στοιχεῖον αὐτοῦ. δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὅλως ἀρετὴ ἐνέργειαί τινες νοῦ πᾶσαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἐν πρώτοις, καὶ ὕστερα γένους καὶ εἴδη.
Intellect, being thinking being and composed of all of them, is not one of the genera. The true Intellect is being with everything else, and already all the beings; while being alone, bare, taken as a genus, is an element of it. Justice and moderation and virtue in general are all particular activities of intellect; so they are not among the first, and are later than a genus, and species.
How the kinds make species
The great Intellect holds all Forms; numbers, figures and living beings arise from the kinds.
γένη δὴ ὄντα τὰ τέτταρα ταῦτα καὶ πρῶτα ἆρα καθ’ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴδη ποιεῖ; οἷον τὸ ὂν διαιροῖτο ἂν ἤδη ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὔ· ἐπειδὴ ἔξωθεν τοῦ γένους λαβεῖν δεῖ τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ εἶναι μὲν τοῦ ὄντος διαφορὰς ᾗ ὄν, οὐ μέντοι τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτό. πόθεν οὖν ἕξει; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων. εἰ δὴ ἐξ ὄντων, ἦν δὲ τὰ γένη τὰ τρία τὰ λοιπά, δηλονότι ἐκ τούτων καὶ μετὰ τούτων προστιθεμένων καὶ συνδυαζομένων καὶ ἅμα γινομένων. ἀλλὰ ἅμα γινόμενα τοῦτο δὴ ἐποίει τὸ ἐκ πάντων. πῶς οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶ μετὰ τὸ ἐκ πάντων; καὶ πῶς γένη πάντα ὄντα εἴδη ποιεῖ; πῶς δὲ ἡ κίνησις εἴδη κινήσεως; καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα;
These four, then, being genera and primary: does each of them by itself make species? Could being, for instance, be divided by itself, without the others? Or rather not: the differentiae must be taken from outside the genus, and they are differentiae of being as being, yet not being itself. Where, then, will it get them? Not, surely, from what is not. If from beings, and the remaining beings were the other three genera, then clearly from these and with these, as they are added, paired with it, and come into being together. But by coming into being together they made exactly this: what is made of all. How, then, do the other things exist after what is made of all? And how do they make species, when all of them are genera? How does motion make species of motion? And rest, and the others?
ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνο δεῖ παραφυλάττειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀφανίζοιτο ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι, μηδ’ αὖ τὸ γένος κατηγορούμενον ᾖ μόνον, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις θεωρούμενον, ἀλλ’ ᾖ [ἐν] ἐκείνοις ἅμα καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ μιγνύμενον αὖ καθαρόν, καὶ μὴ μιγνύμενον ὑπάρχῃ, μηδ’ ἄλλοις συντελοῦν εἰς οὐσίαν αὑτὸ ἀπολλύῃ. περὶ μὲν δὴ τούτων σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔφαμεν τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ὄντων νοῦν εἶναι ἕκαστον, πρὸ δὲ πάντων, ὡς εἰδῶν καὶ μερῶν, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τιθέμεθα νοῦν εἶναι, τὸν ἤδη νοῦν ὕστερον λέγομεν εἶναι· καὶ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ποιησώμεθα καὶ οἷον παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι εἰς γνῶσιν τῶν λεγομένων αὑτοὺς ἐμβιβάζωμεν.
For we must also take care that each is not obliterated in its species, and again that the genus is not merely predicated, as something seen in them, but that it is [in] them and at the same time in itself; that, though mixed, it is pure and exists unmixed, and does not destroy itself by contributing along with others to substance. These things, then, must be examined. But since we said that what is made of all the beings is each intellect, and we posit being and substance as Intellect before all, as before species and parts, we say that the intellect that is already intellect comes later. So let us make this difficulty useful for our inquiry and, using it as a kind of example, set ourselves on the way to knowledge of what is being said.
λάβωμεν οὖν τὸν μὲν εἶναι νοῦν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν ἐν μέρει οὐδ’ ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ ὁτιοῦν, ἵνα μὴ τὶς νοῦς γίγνοιτο, ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν μέρει εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ἐν εἴδει δὲ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ μερῶν· πᾶσα μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν μέρει δύναμις πάντων, ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκεῖνο, καὶ δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθόλου ὡσαύτως· αἱ μὲν ἐν εἴδει, αἳ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ δυνάμει κεῖνται, αἳ δὴ τὸ ἐν εἴδει λαβοῦσαι δυνάμει εἰσὶν ἡ ὅλη — κατηγορεῖται γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα, οὐ μόριον τῆς πάσης·
Let us take it, then, that there is an intellect that touches none of the particulars and is not active about anything, so that it does not become a particular intellect. In the same way knowledge is prior to its particular species, and the knowledge of a species is prior to its own parts. Knowledge as a whole is none of the particular ones, but the power of all; each is actually that particular one, and potentially all; and with universal knowledge likewise. The specific knowledges, which lie potentially in the whole, and which, having taken on the specific, are potentially the whole—for it is the whole that is predicated, not a part of the whole;
αὐτήν γε μὴν δεῖ ἀκέραιον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς εἶναι — οὕτω δὴ ἄλλως μὲν νοῦν τὸν ξύμπαντα εἰπεῖν εἶναι πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντων, ἄλλως δὲ ἑκάστους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μέρει ἐκ πάντων πληρωθέντας, τὸν δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι νοῦν χορηγὸν μὲν τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα, δύναμιν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἐκείνους, ἐκείνους τε αὖ ἐν τοῖς ἐν μέρει οὖσιν ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου, ὡς ἡ τὶς ἐπιστήμη τὴν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ εἶναι καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν τὸν μέγαν νοῦν καὶ ἑκάστους αὖ ἐν αὑτοῖς ὄντας, καὶ ἐμπεριέχεσθαι αὖ τοὺς ἐν μέρει τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸν ὅλον τοῖς ἐν μέρει, ἑκάστους δὲ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν πάντας ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντι δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντι τὰ πάντα ἅμα, δυνάμει δὲ ἕκαστον χωρίς, τοὺς δ’ αὖ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ὃ εἰσί, δυνάμει δὲ τὸ ὅλον.
yet the whole itself must remain intact by itself—so, then, we must say that the universal Intellect exists in one way, prior to the particular intellects that are actual, and the particular ones in another way. The partial ones are filled from all, while the Intellect over all supplies the particulars, is their power, and holds them within what is universal; and they in turn, in what is partial, hold the universal, as a particular branch of knowledge holds knowledge. The great Intellect exists by itself, and the particular ones in turn exist in themselves; the partial are encompassed by the whole, and the whole by the partial. Each of them is by itself and in another, and that one is by itself and in them. All are in that one, which exists by itself, potentially: it is actually all things at once, but potentially each separately; while they are actually what they are, but potentially the whole.
καθ’ ὅσον μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ὃ λέγονταί εἰσιν, ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνο ὃ λέγονται· ᾗ δ’ ἐν γένει ἐκείνῳ, δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο· ὁ δ’ αὖ, ᾗ μὲν γένος, δύναμις πάντων τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὸν εἰδῶν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἥσυχα· ᾗ δὲ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνεργείᾳ, τῶν οὐ καθ’ ἕκαστα. δεῖ δή, εἴπερ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσονται, οἷον ἐν εἴδει, τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.
For insofar as they are what they are called, they are actually that which they are called; but insofar as they are in that genus, they are that potentially. And it, in turn, insofar as it is a genus, is the power of all the species under it, and actually none of them: all of them lie quiet in it. But insofar as it is what it is before the species, it is in actuality, as what is not particular. So if the particulars are to be actual, as in a species, the activity that comes from it must become the cause.
πῶς οὖν μένων αὐτὸς ἓν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ ἐν μέρει ποιεῖ; τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν [τῷ] πῶς ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων ἐκείνων τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφεξῆς. ὅρα τοίνυν ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ] μεγάλῳ νῷ καὶ ἀμηχάνῳ, οὐ πολυλάλῳ ἀλλὰ πολύνῳ νῷ, τῷ πάντα νῷ καὶ ὅλῳ καὶ οὐ μέρει οὐδὲ τινὶ νῷ, ὅπως ἔνι τὰ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ἀριθμὸν δὴ πάντως ἔχει ἐν τούτοις οἷς ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἔστι δὲ ἓν καὶ πολλά, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ θαυμασταὶ δυνάμεις, οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἅτε καθαραὶ οὖσαι μέγισταί εἰσι καὶ οἷον σφριγῶσαι καὶ ἀληθῶς δυνάμεις, οὐ τὸ μέχρι τινὸς ἔχουσαι· ἄπειροι τοίνυν καὶ ἀπειρία καὶ τὸ μέγα.
How, then, does it produce the partial ones while remaining one in its account? This is the same question as how, from those four, come the things said to follow in order. Look, then, in this great and immense Intellect, an intellect not of many words but of much mind, the Intellect that is all things, whole, and not a part or some particular intellect, at how all things are in it, coming from it. It certainly has number, then, in the things that it sees. It is one and many, and these are powers: wonderful powers, not weak ones. Because they are pure, they are the greatest, bursting with vigor, as it were, and truly powers, not limited to a certain point. So they are unlimited: unlimitedness, and the great.
τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ μέγα σὺν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ καλῷ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτὸ ἀγλαίᾳ καὶ τῷ φωτὶ ὡς ἐν νῷ ὄντα ἰδὼν ὁρᾷς καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἤδη ἐπανθοῦν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ συνεχοῦς τῆς ἐνεργείας μέγεθος προφαινόμενον τῇ σῇ προσβολῇ ἐν ἡσύχῳ κείμενον. ἑνὸς δὲ καὶ δύο ὄντων καὶ τριῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τριττὸν ὂν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν πᾶν. τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ ἐνορωμένου καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ἄμφω εἰς ἓν ἰόντων καὶ οἷον γινομένων καὶ σχῆμα ὅρα.
This great, then, comes with the beauty of substance in it and the splendor and light around it, since all this is in Intellect. Once you have seen it, you see quality too, already blossoming on it. Along with the continuity of its activity you see magnitude, lying in stillness, showing itself to your gaze. And since one and two and three are there, magnitude is threefold too, and so is all quantity. And when quantity is seen in it, and quality, and both come together into one and, as it were, become one, see shape as well.
εἰσπίπτοντος δὲ τοῦ θατέρου καὶ διαιροῦντος καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν σχημάτων τε διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητες ἄλλαι· καὶ ταυτότης μὲν συνοῦσα ἰσότητα ποιεῖ εἶναι, ἑτερότης δὲ ἀνισότητα ἐν ποσῷ, ἔν τε ἀριθμῷ ἔν τε μεγέθει, ἐξ ὧν καὶ κύκλους· καὶ τετράγωνα καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀνίσων σχήματα, ἀριθμούς τε ὁμοίους καὶ ἀνομοίους, περιττούς τε καὶ ἀρτίους. οὖσα γὰρ ἔννους ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἀτελὴς οὐδὲν παραλείπει ὧν εὑρίσκομεν νῦν νοερὸν ἔργον ὄν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς δυνάμει ὄντα αὐτὰ ἔχουσα καὶ ὡς ἂν νοῦς ἔχοι.
And when otherness falls in and divides both quantity and quality, there are differences of shapes, and other qualities. Sameness, being present, makes equality be, and otherness makes inequality, in quantity, both in number and in magnitude. From these come circles, and squares, and figures made of unequal sides, and numbers like and unlike, odd and even. For since it is life full of intellect, and activity that is not incomplete, it leaves out nothing of what we now find to be the work of intellect. It has all things in its own power, having them as they themselves are, and as Intellect would have them.
ἔχει δὲ νοῦς ὡς ἐν νοήσει· νοήσει δὲ οὐ τῇ ἐν διεξόδῳ· παραλέλειπται δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα λόγοι, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν εἷς οἷον λόγος, μέγας, τέλειος, πάντας περιέχων, ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων αὑτοῦ ἐπεξιών, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀεὶ ἐπεξελθών, ὥστε μηδέποτε τὸ ἐπεξιέναι ἀληθὲς εἶναι. ὅλως γὰρ πανταχοῦ, ὅσα ἄν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ λάβῃ ἐν τῇ φύσει ὄντα, ταῦτα εὑρήσει ἐν νῷ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ὄντα, ὥστε νομίζειν τὸ ὂν νοῦν λελογισμένον οὕτω ποιῆσαι, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν τὰ ζῷα ποιούντων· ὡς γὰρ· ἂν ὁ ἀκριβέστατος λογισμὸς λογίσαιτο ὡς ἄριστα, οὕτως ἔχει πάντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πρὸ λογισμοῦ οὖσι. τί [οὖν] χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ φύσεως καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνωτέρω εἶναι;
Intellect has them as in thinking, but not in thinking that goes step by step. Nothing has been left out of all that rational principles are. It is one rational principle, as it were: great, complete, containing them all, proceeding outward from its own first principles. Or rather, it has always already proceeded, so that it is never true to say that it is proceeding. For in general, everywhere, whatever someone grasps by reasoning as existing in nature, he will find existing in Intellect without reasoning. So one would think that what is had been an intellect that worked things out by reasoning and made them accordingly. It is the same with the rational principles that make living things: just as the most precise reasoning would work things out in the best possible way, so all things are in the rational principles, which are prior to reasoning. What [then] should we expect to be the case in what is prior to nature and to the rational principles in it, higher up?
ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ νοῦς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτὸν οὔτε τὸ ὂν αὐτοῖς οὔτε ὁ νοῦς, ἀμογητὶ ἂν εἴη ἄριστα ἔχον, εἴπερ κατὰ νοῦν κείσεται, καὶ τοῦτο ὄν, ὃ θέλει νοῦς καὶ ἔστι· διὸ καὶ ἀληθινὸν καὶ πρῶτον· εἰ γὰρ παρ’ ἄλλου, ἐκεῖνο νοῦς.
For in those things whose substance is nothing other than Intellect, and to which neither being nor Intellect is brought in from outside, things would be in the best state without toil, if indeed they are to be arranged according to Intellect and to be just what Intellect wills and is. That is why it is both true and first. For if it came from something else, that other would be Intellect.
σχημάτων δὴ πάντων ὀφθέντων ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ποιότητος ἁπάσης — ἦν γὰρ οὐ τίς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν εἶναι μίαν τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐνούσης, ἀλλὰ μία καὶ πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ταυτότης ἦν· ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλά, καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν, ὥστε ἐν πᾶσιν εἴδεσι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά· μεγέθη δὴ διάφορα καὶ σχήματα διάφορα καὶ ποιότητες διάφοροι· οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ θεμιτὸν ἦν παραλελεῖφθαι οὐδέν, τέλειον γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὸ πᾶν ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν πᾶν — καὶ ζωῆς ἐπιθεούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ συνούσης πανταχοῦ, πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ζῷα ἐγίνετο, καὶ ἦν καὶ σώματα ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος οὐσῶν.
So all shapes were seen in being, and every quality. It was not some one particular quality, for there could not be just one, since the nature of otherness is in it. Rather, it was one and many, since sameness was There too. It was one and many, and such from the beginning, so that in all the Forms there is the one and many. So there are different magnitudes, different shapes, different qualities, for it was not even permitted that anything be left out: the All There is complete, or it would not be all. And with life running over it, or rather present with it everywhere, all things necessarily became living beings, and there were also bodies, since there were matter and quality.
γενομένων δὲ πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ μενόντων καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶναι αἰῶνι περιληφθέντων, χωρὶς μὲν ἑκάστων ἃ ἔστιν ὄντων, ὁμοῦ δ’ αὖ ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντων, ἡ πάντων ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντων οἷον συμπλοκὴ καὶ σύνθεσις νοῦς ἐστι· καὶ ἔχων μὲν τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὑτῷ ζῷόν ἐστι παντελὲς καὶ ὃ ἔστι ζῷον, τῷ δ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄντι παρέχων ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶσθαι νοητὸν γενόμενος ἐκείνῳ δίδωσιν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.
All things have come to be eternally and remain, embraced by eternity in their being. Each exists separately as what it is, and again all exist together in one. The interweaving, as it were, and composition of all of them in one is Intellect. Holding the beings in itself, it is the complete living being and “what living being is.” By offering itself to be seen by what comes from it, becoming intelligible to that, it gives that the right to be correctly so called.
καὶ ᾐνιγμένως Πλάτωνι τὸ ‘ᾗπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ οἷαί τε ἔνεισι καὶ ὅσαι καθορᾷ’. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ μετὰ νοῦν, καθ’ ὅσον ψυχὴ ἔχουσα ἐν αὑτῇ, ἐν τῷ πρὸ αὑτῆς βέλτιον καθορᾷ· καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν ἔχων [ἐν αὑτῷ] ἐν τῷ πρὸ αὑτοῦ βέλτιον καθορᾷ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὑτῷ καθορᾷ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸ αὑτοῦ καὶ καθορᾷ, ὅτι καθορᾷ. ὁ δὴ νοῦς οὗτος, ὅν φαμεν καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἀπαλλαγεὶς τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὤν, ἅτε ὢν ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θατέρου φύσιν συνοῦσαν ἔχων, εἷς πολλὰ γίνεται. εἷς δὲ νοῦς τὰ πολλὰ ὢν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς νοῦς ποιεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς τοιαύτης.
Plato puts this in a riddle: “just as Intellect sees the Forms present in the complete living being, what they are and how many.” For Soul too, after Intellect, though insofar as it is soul it has them in itself, sees them better in what is prior to it. Our intellect, too, though it has them [in itself], sees them better in what is prior to it: in itself it only sees, but in what is prior to it, it also sees that it sees. This intellect, then, which we say sees, is not cut off from what is prior to it but comes from it. Since it is many from one and has the nature of otherness with it, it becomes a one that is many. And being one Intellect that is the many, it also makes the many intellects, by a necessity of this kind.
ὅλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ λαβεῖν καὶ ἄτομον· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς, εἶδος· ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο αἰνιττόμενος ὁ Πλάτων εἰς ἄπειρά φησι κατακερματίζεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν. ἕως μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος, οἷον ἐκ γένους, οὔπω ἄπειρον· περατοῦται γὰρ τοῖς γεννηθεῖσιν εἴδεσι· τὸ δ’ ἔσχατον εἶδος, ὃ μὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς εἴδη, μᾶλλον ἄπειρον. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ‘τότε δὲ ἤδη εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα ἐᾶν χαίρειν’. ἀλλ’ ὅσον μὲν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, ἄπειρα· τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ περιληφθέντα εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἔρχεται ἤδη. νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ μεθ’ ἑαυτὸν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴν μέχρι τοῦ ἐσχάτου αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς ἤδη ἄπειρον παντάπασι.
In general, it is not possible to grasp there what is one in number and individual: whatever you grasp is a Form, since it is without matter. That is why Plato, hinting at this too, says that substance is chopped up into unlimited pieces. As long as it divides into another Form, as from a genus, it is not yet unlimited, since it is limited by the Forms it has generated. But the last Form, which is not divided into Forms, is more unlimited. And this is “then at last let it go into the unlimited, and say goodbye.” As far as they themselves go, they are unlimited; but embraced by unity, they now come into number. Intellect, then, has soul as what comes after it, so that soul too is in number down to its last part, while its last part is now altogether unlimited.
καὶ ἔστι νοῦς μὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος μέρος, καίπερ τὰ πάντα ἔχων, καὶ ὁ πᾶς καὶ οἱ αὐτοῦ μέρη ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντα αὐτοῦ ὄντος μέρους, ψυχὴ δὲ μέρος μέρους, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐνεργεῖ, τὰ ἐνεργούμενα οἱ ἄλλοι νοῖ, ὅτε δὲ ἐξ αὑτοῦ, ψυχή. ψυχῆς δὲ ἐνεργούσης ὡς γένους ἢ εἴδους αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ ὡς εἴδη· καὶ τούτων αἱ ἐνέργειαι διτταί. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω νοῦς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάτω αἱ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις κατὰ λόγον· ἡ δὲ ἐσχάτη ὕλης ἤδη ἐφαπτομένη καὶ μορφοῦσα καὶ τὸ κάτω αὐτῆς τὸ ἄλλο πᾶν οὐ κωλύει εἶναι ἄνω. ἢ καὶ τὸ κάτω λεγόμενον αὐτῆς ἴνδαλμά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἀποτετμημένον δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παρῇ ἔξω.
An intellect of this kind is a part, even though it has all things. So are the whole Intellect and its parts, which exist in actuality, since it itself is a part. Soul is a part of a part, but as an activity coming from it. When it is active within itself, the products of its activity are the other intellects; when it acts outward from itself, Soul. And when Soul is active as a genus or species, the other souls are like species. Their activities too are twofold. The one directed upward is intellect; the one directed downward is the other powers, in due proportion. The last, already touching matter and shaping it, is its lower part, and it does not prevent all the rest of it from being above. Or rather, what is called its lower part is an image of it. It is not cut off, but is like reflections in mirrors, which last as long as the original is present outside.
δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν, πῶς τὸ ἔξω. καὶ μέχρι τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδώλου ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος ἅπας τέλειος ἐκ πάντων νοητῶν, ὥσπερ ὅδε μίμημα ὢν ἐκείνου, καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἀποσώζειν εἰκόνα ζῴου, ζῷον αὐτό, ὡς τὸ γεγραμμένον ἢ τὸ ἐν ὕδατι φάντασμα τοῦ πρὸ ὕδατος καὶ γραφῆς δοκοῦντος εἶναι. τὸ δὲ μίμημα τὸ ἐν γραφῇ καὶ ὕδατι οὐ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοῦ μορφωθέντος ὑπὸ θατέρου. νοητοῦ τοίνυν εἰκὼν ἔχουσα ἰνδάλματα οὐ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, ἀλλὰ τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῷ πεποιηκότι, ὧν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ζῷον· ζῷον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, ἄλλως ἑκάτερον καὶ ἄμφω ἐν νοητῷ.
We must grasp how it is “outside.” Up to what comes before the image, the intelligible world is entire and complete, made of all intelligibles. This world, in turn, is an imitation of that one, and so is itself a living being, insofar as it can preserve the image of a living being. It is like a painted picture, or a reflection in water, of what seems to be there before the water and the painting. But the imitation in the painting and in the water is not of the compound of the two, but of the one of the two that was shaped by the other. So it is a likeness of the intelligible, holding images not of the maker but of the things contained in the maker, among which are man and every other living being. This is a living being, and so is its maker, each in a different way, and both in the intelligible.