Περὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ὅπῃ δοκεῖ, καὶ ὡς συμφώνως ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόξαν, εἴρηται. δεῖ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερα τὰ αὐτὰ γένη θετέον, ἅπερ κἀκεῖ ἐθέμεθα, ἢ πλείω ἐνταῦθα πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἄλλα τιθέντας, ἢ ὅλως ἕτερα, ἢ τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖ, τὰ δ’ ἄλλως. δεῖ μέντοι τὸ ταὐτὰ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ ὁμωνυμίᾳ λαμβάνειν· τοῦτο δὲ φανήσεται γνωσθέντων.
We have said how we think about substance, and how this might agree with Plato’s view. But we must also examine the other nature. Should we posit the same kinds that we posited There? Or more kinds here, adding others to those? Or altogether different ones, or some as There and others differently? We must, however, take “the same” by analogy and homonymously; this will become clear once they are known.
ἀρχὴ δὲ ἡμῖν ἥδε· ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ περιείληπται, περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ζητεῖν διαιροῦντας τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἔστι διαιροῦντας κατὰ γένη θεῖναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν φωνὴν διῃρούμεθα ἄπειρον οὖσαν εἰς ὡρισμένα ἀνάγοντες τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν εἰς ἕν, εἶτα πάλιν ἄλλο καὶ ἕτερον αὖ, ἕως εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα θέντες ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις εἶδος λέγοντες, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι γένος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα τὰ φανέντα εἰς ἓν ἦν ἀνάγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν πάντων στοιχεῖον ἢ φωνήν· ἐπὶ δὲ ὧν ζητοῦμεν οὐχ οἷόν τε, ὡς δέδεικται.
Our starting point is this. Our discussion concerns sensible things, and everything sensible is embraced by this cosmos. So we must inquire about the cosmos, dividing its nature and what it is made of, and arranging these by kinds. We would be doing what we do when we divide vocal sound, which is unlimited, into definite parts. We bring what is the same in many back to one, then again another, and yet another, until we have set each of them in some number, calling what is over the individuals a species, and what is over the species a genus. In the case of sound, it was possible to bring each species, and all the ones that had appeared, together into one, and to predicate “letter” or “sound” of them all. But with what we are investigating, that is not possible, as has been shown.
διὸ δεῖ πλείω γένη ζητεῖν, καὶ τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἕτερον τοῦτο ἐκείνου καὶ οὐ συνώνυμον, ὁμώνυμον δὲ καὶ εἰκών. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ μίγματι καὶ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τὸ μέν ἐστι σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ψυχή — ζῷον γὰρ τὸ πᾶν — ἡ δὲ ψυχῆς φύσις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ νοητῷ καὶ οὐδ’ ἁρμόσει εἰς οὐσίας τῆς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένης σύνταξιν, ἀφοριστέον, εἰ καὶ χαλεπῶς, ὅμως μὴν τῆς ἐνταῦθα πραγματείας, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος τοὺς πολίτας συντάξαι πόλεώς τινος, οἷον κατὰ τιμήσεις ἢ τέχνας, τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ξένους παραλίποι χωρίς. περὶ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων, ὅσα μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἢ διὰ τὸ σῶμα περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαίνει, περὶ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον ὕστερον, ὅπως τακτέον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ζητῶμεν.
So we must look for more kinds, and for kinds of this All that differ from those, since this is different from that: not synonymous with it, but homonymous, an image. Here too, in the mixture and composition, one part is body and the other soul, for the All is a living being. But the nature of soul is in that intelligible world and will not fit into the classification of what is here called substance. So we must mark it off from the present treatment, difficult as it is. It is just as if someone wanting to classify the citizens of some city, say by property assessments or crafts, were to leave the visiting foreigners aside. As for the affections that happen to the soul with the body or because of the body, we must examine later how they should be classified, when we inquire about the things here.
Sensible substance
Bodily substance is substance only homonymously, a conglomeration of qualities upon matter.
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῆς λεγομένης οὐσίας θεωρητέον συγχωροῦντας τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα φύσιν ὁμωνύμως ἢ οὐδὲ ὅλως οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐφαρμόττειν τὴν ἔννοιαν ῥεόντων, ἀλλὰ γένεσιν οἰκείως λέγεσθαι. εἶτα τῆς γενέσεως τὰ μὲν τοῖα, τὰ δὲ τοῖα· καὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἰς ἕν, τά τε ἁπλᾶ τά τε σύνθετα, τά τε συμβεβηκότα ἢ παρακολουθοῦντα, διαιροῦντας ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων καὶ ταῦτα· ἢ τὸ μὲν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐπ’ αὐτῇ, καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ὡς γένος ἢ ὑφ’ ἓν ἄμφω, ὡς οὐσίαν ἑκάτερον ὁμωνύμως (ἢ γένεσιν). ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους; πῶς δὲ γένος ἡ ὕλη καὶ τίνων; τίς γὰρ διαφορὰ ὕλης; ἐν τίνι δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τακτέον;
First we must consider what is called substance. We grant that the nature associated with bodies is called substance only homonymously. Or rather, it is not substance at all, because the notion of things in flux fits it, and it is properly called becoming. Then, of becoming, some things are of one sort and others of another. The bodies, both simple and composite, are to be put into one class, and the accidents or concomitants into another, dividing these too from one another. Or one may call one thing matter and another the form upon it, and treat each separately as a genus, or both under one, each being homonymously substance (or becoming). But what is common to matter and form? How is matter a genus, and of what? What is a differentia of matter? And under which should we place the compound of both?
εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἴη αὐτὸ ἡ σωματικὴ οὐσία, ἐκείνων δὲ ἑκάτερον οὐ σῶμα, πῶς ἂν ἐν ἑνὶ τάττοιτο καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ μετὰ τοῦ συνθέτου; πῶς δ’ ἂν τὰ στοιχεῖά τινος μετ’ αὐτοῦ;
And if the compound of both were itself bodily substance, while neither of those two is body, how could they be ranked in one and the same genus with the composite? How could the elements of something be ranked with it?
εἰ δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἀρχοίμεθα, ἀρχοίμεθ’ ἂν ἀπὸ συλλαβῶν. διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἀνὰ λόγον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἡ διαίρεσις, λέγοιμεν ἂν ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐκεῖ ὄντος ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὕλην, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖ κινήσεως ἐνταῦθα τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ζωήν τινα καὶ τελείωσιν τῆς ὕλης, τῆς δὲ ὕλης τὴν οὐκ ἔκστασιν κατὰ τὴν στάσιν, καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον οὔσης καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἑτερότητος πολλῆς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος μᾶλλον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ὕλη οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ λαμβάνει τὸ εἶδος ὡς ζωὴν αὐτῆς οὐδὲ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἔπεισιν ἀλλαχόθεν οὐκ ὄν τι ἐκείνης.
If we were to start from bodies, we would be starting from syllables. But why shouldn’t we speak by analogy, even if the division is not the same? Here, matter would take the place of being There, and form the place of motion There, as a kind of life and perfection of matter. Matter’s not stepping out of itself would correspond to rest. And there would be the same and the other, since here too there is much otherness, or rather unlikeness. Or rather: first, matter does not have and receive form in this way, as its own life or its own activity. Form comes upon it from elsewhere and is nothing of its own.
εἶτα ἐκεῖ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργεια καὶ κίνησις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἄλλο καὶ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ εἶδος στάσις αὐτῆς μᾶλλον καὶ οἷον ἡσυχία· ὁρίζει γὰρ ἀόριστον οὖσαν· τό τε ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου ὄντος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἕτερον μεταλήψει καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ τὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον οὐδ’ ὡς ἐκεῖ εἴη ἄν τι ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις. στάσις δὲ τῆς ὕλης πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα ἑλκομένης μεγέθη καὶ ἔξωθεν τὰς μορφὰς [ἐχούσης] καὶ οὐκ αὐτάρκους ἑαυτῇ μετὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα γεννᾶν; ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀφετέον.
Next, There, form is activity and motion, while here motion is something else, an accident. Form is rather matter’s rest and, as it were, its stillness, since it bounds matter, which is unbounded. There, the same and the other belong to one thing that is both same and other. Here, something is other by participation and in relation to something else, and a particular same and a particular other might exist among the later things, but not as There. And how could there be rest in matter? It is dragged into every magnitude, [has] its shapes from outside, and is not sufficient by itself to generate the other things along with them. So we must abandon this division.
πῶς δὲ λέγωμεν; ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον οὕτως, τὸ μὲν ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δ’ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὰ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα· τῶν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὰ μὲν κατηγορούμενα μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότα· τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργήματα αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ παρακολουθήματα· καὶ τὴν μὲν ὕλην κοινὸν μὲν καὶ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς οὐσίαις, οὐ μὴν γένος, ὅτι μηδὲ διαφορὰς ἔχει — εἰ μή τις τὰς διαφορὰς κατὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν πυρίνην, τὴν δὲ τὴν ἀέρος μορφὴν ἔχειν.
How, then, should we put it? Let it be like this to begin with. There is matter, there is form, there is the mixture of both, and there are the things concerning these. Of the things concerning these, some are only predicated, others are also accidents. Of the accidents, some are in them, others are what they are in, some are their activities, some their affections, some their consequences. Matter is common, and in all substances, but it is not a genus, because it has no differentiae either. That holds unless one takes as differentiae the fact that one matter has the shape of fire and another that of air.
εἰ δέ τις ἀρκοῖτο τῷ κοινῷ τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν οἷς ἔστιν ὕλην εἶναι, ἢ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρη, ἄλλως γένος ἂν εἴη· καὶ στοιχεῖον δὲ ἓν τοῦτο δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ στοιχείου γένους εἶναι· τὸ δὲ εἶδος προσκειμένου τοῦ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἢ ἐν ὕλῃ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων εἰδῶν χωρίζει, οὐ μὴν περιλαμβάνει πᾶν εἶδος οὐσιῶδες. εἰ δὲ εἶδος λέγομεν τὸ ποιητικὸν οὐσίας καὶ λόγον τὸν οὐσιώδη κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, οὔπω τὴν οὐσίαν εἴπομεν πῶς δεῖ λαμβάνειν.
But if one were content with what is common to all the things in which there is matter, namely their being matter, or with the relation of whole to parts, it would be a genus in another way. This would be one element, since the element too can be a genus. As for form, adding “concerned with matter” or “in matter” separates it from the other forms, but does not take in every substantial form. And if we call form what produces substance, and call the rational principle that corresponds to the form substantial, we have not yet said how we should understand substance.
τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἰ τοῦτο μόνον οὐσίαν, ἐκεῖνα οὐκ οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ κἀκεῖνα καὶ τοῦτο, τί τὸ κοινὸν σκεπτέον. τὰ δὲ κατηγορούμενα μόνον ἐν τῷ πρός τι ἂν εἴη, οἷον αἴτιον εἶναι, στοιχεῖον εἶναι. τῶν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότων τὸ μὲν ποσὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν εἶναι, ἃ ἐν αὐτοῖς· τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις, ὡς τόπος καὶ χρόνος, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργήματα αὐτῶν καὶ πάθη, ὡς κινήσεις, τὰ δὲ παρακολουθήματα, ὡς τόπος καὶ χρόνος, ὁ μὲν τῶν συνθέτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως.
As for the compound of both: if this alone is substance, those two are not substances. If they are too, as well as this, we must look at what is common. The things that are only predicated would belong to relation, like being a cause or being an element. Of the accidents in them, one is being a quantity and another being a quality, and these are in them. Others are what they are in, like place and time. Others are their activities and affections, like motions. Others are consequences, like place and time: place of composites, time of motion.
καὶ τὰ μὲν τρία εἰς ἓν εὕρομεν κοινόν τι, τὴν ἐνταῦθα ὁμώνυμον οὐσίαν· εἶτα τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς, πρός τι, ποσόν, ποιόν, ἐν χρόνῳ, ἐν τόπῳ, κίνησις, (τόπος, χρόνος)· ἢ ληφθέντος τόπου καὶ χρόνου περιττὸν τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ, ὥστε εἶναι πέντε, ὡς ἓν τῶν πρώτων τριῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς ἓν τὰ τρία, ἔσται ὕλη, εἶδος, συναμφότερον, πρός τι, ποσόν, ποιόν, κίνησις. ἢ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ πρός τι· περιεκτικὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον.
We have found the first three to come into one common thing, what is here homonymously called substance. Then come the others in order: relation, quantity, quality, in time, in place, motion, (place, time). Or, once place and time are taken, “in time” and “in place” are superfluous, so that there are five, counting the first three as one. If the three do not go into one, there will be matter, form, the compound, relation, quantity, quality, motion. Or these too go into relation, since it is more comprehensive.
τί οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τρισί, καὶ τί ἔσται, ὃ ταῦτα ποιεῖ οὐσίαν τὴν ἐν τούτοις; ἆρα ὑποβάθραν τινὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ὕλη ὑποβάθρα καὶ ἕδρα δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἔσται ἐν οὐσίᾳ. τό τε σύνθετον ἄλλοις ὑποβάθρα καὶ ἕδρα, ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶδος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑποβεβλήσεται τοῖς συνθέτοις ἢ πᾶσί γε τοῖς μετὰ τὸ σύνθετον, οἷον ποσῷ, ποιῷ, κινήσει. ἀλλ’ ἆρα τὸ μὴ ἑτέρου ὃ λέγεται;
What, then, is the same in the three? What will it be that makes them the substance that is in these things? Is it being a sort of base for the other things? But matter seems to be a base and seat for form, so that form will not fall under substance. The composite, too, is a base and seat for other things. So form, together with matter, will underlie the composites, or at any rate all the things that come after the composite, such as quantity, quality and motion. Then is it what is not said to be what it is of something else?
λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἄλλου τοῦ λελευκωμένου, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον δὲ ἑτέρου· λέγω δὲ οὐ τοῦ ἡμίσεος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ξύλον διπλάσιον· καὶ πατὴρ ἄλλου, ᾗ πατήρ ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, καὶ τόπος δὲ πέρας ἄλλου, καὶ χρόνος μέτρον ἄλλου, πῦρ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου οὐδὲ ξύλον καθ’ ὃ ξύλον ἄλλου οὐδ’ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλου οὐδὲ Σωκράτης οὐδ’ ὅλως ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶδος ἄλλου, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου πάθος ἦν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὕλης εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ συναμφοτέρου μέρος· τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ταὐτόν· καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος ὅλου καὶ ἄλλου ὡς τοῦ ὅλου, οὐχ ὡς ἑτέρου ὄντος ἐκείνου, οὗ λέγεται· λευκὸν δὲ ὃ λέγεται εἶναι ἑτέρου ἐστίν.
White and black belong to something else, to what has been whitened, and the double belongs to something else. I don’t mean being double of the half, but the piece of wood being double. A father is of another, insofar as he is a father; knowledge is of another, of that in which it is; place is the limit of something else; and time is the measure of something else. But fire is not of another, nor is wood, insofar as it is wood, nor is a man, nor Socrates, nor composite substance in general. Nor is the substantial form of another, because it was not an affection of another. It is not the form of the matter but part of the compound, and the form of man and man are the same. Matter is part of a whole, and is of another only as of the whole, not as though that of which it is said were something different. But white, what it is said to be, it is of something else.
ὃ οὖν ἄλλου ὂν ἐκείνου λέγεται, οὐκ οὐσία· οὐσία τοίνυν, ὃ ὅπερ ἔστιν αὑτοῦ ἔστιν, ἢ μέρος ὂν τοιούτου συμπληρωτικόν ἐστι συνθέτου, ὄντος μὲν αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον μὲν ἢ ἑκάτερον αὑτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὸ σύνθετον ἄλλον τρόπον ἐκείνου λεγόμενον, ᾗ μὲν μέρος, πρὸς ἄλλο λεγόμενον, καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ φύσει ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὃ ἔστιν οὐχ ἑτέρου λεγόμενον.
So what is said to be what it is by belonging to something else is not substance. Substance, then, is what is just what it is of itself. Or it is what, being part of such a thing, helps to complete a composite. Each of these, or both of them, belongs to itself, but is said of the composite in another way: insofar as it is a part, it is said in relation to another. But by itself, by nature, in being what it is, it is not said to be of something else.
κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐπί τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου· ἀλλὰ ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη τῷ εἴδει, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον· ἢ οὔτε ἡ ὕλη ὑποκείμενον τῷ εἴδει· τελείωσις γὰρ τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς καθ’ ὅσον ὕλη καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δυνάμει· οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ εἶδος ἐν ταύτῃ· μεθ’ οὗ γάρ τι ἀπαρτίζει ἕν τι, οὐκ ἔσται θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ, ἀλλ’ ἄμφω ὁμοῦ ὑποκείμενα ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ὑπόκεινται τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ προυπάρχουσι τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν παρακολουθούντων, καὶ ἀφ’ ἧς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ δι’ ἣν τὰ ἄλλα καὶ περὶ ὃ τὸ πάσχειν καὶ ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ ποιεῖν.
Being a subject, something that underlies, is also common to matter, form and the compound. But matter is the subject of form in one way, and form and the compound are subjects of the affections in another. Or rather, matter is not the subject of form either, for form is its perfection insofar as it is matter and insofar as it is potential. Nor again is form in matter. When one thing, together with another, completes some one thing, neither will be in the other; both together underlie something else. In this way man, and some particular man, underlie the affections and exist prior to the activities and consequences. Substance is that from which the other things come, and because of which they exist, and about which being affected occurs, and from which acting comes.
ἀκουστέον δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε οὐσίας λεγομένης· εἰ δέ πῃ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνης συμβαίνει, ἴσως μὲν κατ’ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμωνύμως. καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ’ αὐτὸ λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς πρῶτον, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔσχατα ἄλλα πρῶτα μετ’ ἐκεῖνα.
These remarks should be understood as concerning what is called substance here. If they apply in some way to that substance too, perhaps it is by analogy and homonymously. For “first” too is said relative to what comes after it. It is not first absolutely: the last of those higher things are first relative to the others that come after them.
καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλως, καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐκεῖ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ εἰ κἀκεῖ, ἄλλο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάσχειν· καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας, εἰ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (εἶναι) δεῖ μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μηδ’ οὕτως, ὥστε μηδὲ συντελεῖν μετ’ ἐκείνου εἰς ἕν τι· μεθ’ οὗ γὰρ συντελεῖ εἰς σύνθετον οὐσίαν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὡς ὑποκειμένῳ οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε μήτε τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι ὡς ὑποκειμένῳ, μήτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει μέρος ὄντα Σωκράτους. ὃ οὖν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐσία· εἰ δὲ λέγομεν μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου, προσθετέον ὡς ἄλλου, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος λεγόμενος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου περιλαμβάνηται τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τῇ προσθήκῃ τῇ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλου.
Being a subject is meant differently There, and whether there is being affected There is disputed; if there is, being affected There is something else. Not being in a subject holds of all substance, if (being) in a subject must mean not belonging as a part to that in which it is, nor in such a way as to join with it in completing some one thing. For what joins with something to complete a composite substance would not be in it as in a subject. So form is not in matter as in a subject, nor is man in Socrates, since he is part of Socrates. What is not in a subject, then, is substance. But if we say “neither in a subject nor said of a subject,” we must add “as of something else.” That way man, said of some particular man, is also covered by the definition, thanks to the addition “not of something else.”
ὅταν γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατηγορῶ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὕτως λέγω, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ λευκὸν λευκόν· τὸν γὰρ Σωκράτην λέγων ἄνθρωπον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ τὸν Σωκράτην Σωκράτην λέγειν, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κατὰ ζῴου λογικοῦ τοιοῦδε τὸ ζῷον κατηγορεῖν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ ἴδιον εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι, τὴν γὰρ διαφορὰν μηδ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, μέρος οὐσίας λαμβάνων τὸ δίπουν τοῦτο οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ φησὶν εἶναι· ἐπεί, εἰ μὴ τὸ δίπουν λαμβάνοι, ὅ ἐστι τοιάδε οὐσία, ἀλλὰ διποδίαν, μὴ οὐσίαν λέγων, ἀλλὰ ποιότητα, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται τὸ δίπουν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδ’ ὁ τόπος.
When I predicate man of Socrates, I mean it like this: not as the wood is white, but as the white is white. In calling Socrates a man I am calling some particular man a man, and predicating man of the man in Socrates. That is the same as calling Socrates Socrates, and again as predicating animal of a rational animal of a certain kind. Someone might say that not being in a subject is not peculiar to substance, since the differentia too is not among the things in a subject. But he says that “two-footed” is not in a subject by taking it as part of substance. For if he took not “two-footed,” which is substance of a certain kind, but two-footedness, speaking of a quality rather than a substance, then the two-footed will be in a subject. But neither time nor place is in a subject.
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ μέτρον λαμβάνεται κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον, τὸ μέτρον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ὑπάρξει ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἥ τε κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνεται, ἐν τῷ μετροῦντι ἔσται τὸ μέτρον. ὁ δὲ τόπος πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος ὢν ἐν ἐκείνῳ. καίτοι περὶ ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος, γίνεται ἐναντίως ἢ κατὰ ἓν τούτων ἢ κατὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα λαμβάνεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐφαρμοττόντων καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ τῶν εἰρημένων.
But if the measure of motion is taken as what is measured, the measure will be in the motion as in a subject, and the motion in what is moving. If it is taken as what measures, the measure will be in what measures. And place, being the limit of what surrounds, is in that. With the substance under discussion, though, it works the other way round: substance of this kind can be grasped by one of these marks, or by several, or by all of them, since the marks mentioned fit matter, form and the compound alike.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ταῦτα μὲν ἔστω τεθεωρημένα περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὃ δ’ ἔστιν οὐκ εἴρηται, αἰτεῖ ἔτι ἴσως αἰσθητὸν ἰδεῖν τοῦτο· τὸ δ’ ἔστι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἂν ὁρῷτο. τί οὖν; τὸ πῦρ οὐκ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ; οὐσία οὖν ἑκάτερον, ὅτι ὁρᾶται; οὔ. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὕλην ἔχειν; οὔ. ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶδος; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῷ συναμφότερον. ἀλλὰ τίνι δή; τῷ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς δὴ φήσομεν ἄρα, ὅτι ὁμωνύμως. ἀλλὰ τί ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων τὸ ἔστι, καὶ τίς ἡ διαφορὰ τούτου τοῦ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς εἶναι λέγεται καὶ ἁπλῶς ὄν, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν εἶναι. τί οὖν;
Someone might say, “Granted, these points about substance have been observed, but what it is has not been said.” He is perhaps still asking to see it as something sensible. But its “is,” its being, could not be seen. What then? Are fire and water not substance? Is each of them substance, then, because it is seen? No. Because it has matter? No. Because it has form? Not that either. Nor because it is the compound. Then by what? By being. But quantity also is, and quality is. So we shall say that “is” is used homonymously. But what is the “is” in the case of fire and earth and things like that, and how does this “is” differ from the one used of the others? Perhaps the difference is that the one is said to be simply, and is simply being, while the other is said to be white. What then?
τὸ εἶναι τὸ προσκείμενον τῷ λευκῷ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἄνευ προσθήκης; οὐχί· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως ὄν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μετάληψιν καὶ δευτέρως. τό τε γὰρ λευκὸν προστεθὲν τῷ ὄντι πεποίηκε λευκὸν τὸ ὄν, τό τε ὂν τῷ λευκῷ προστεθὲν πεποίηκε τὸ λευκὸν ὄν, ὥστε ἑκατέρῳ, τῷ μὲν ὄντι συμβεβηκὸς τὸ λευκόν, τῷ δὲ λευκῷ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὄν. καὶ οὐχ οὕτως λέγομεν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν Σωκράτην λευκὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν Σωκράτην· ἐν γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ αὐτός.
Is the being added to white the same as being without any addition? No. The latter is being primarily, the former by participation and secondarily. White added to being has made being white, and being added to white has made the white be. So white is an accident of being, and being is an accident of the white. We do not mean this in the way someone might say “Socrates is white” and “the white thing is Socrates,” for in both, Socrates is the same.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν οὐ ταὐτόν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ τὸ λευκὸν Σωκράτης ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ Σωκράτης τῷ λευκῷ, ἐν δὲ τῷ Σωκράτης λευκὸς καθαρῶς συμβεβηκὸς τὸ λευκόν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ὂν λευκὸν συμβεβηκὸς ἔχει τὸ λευκόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ τὸ λευκὸν ὂν τὸ λευκὸν συνειλημμένον τῷ ὄντι. καὶ ὅλως τὸ μὲν λευκὸν ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ ἐν ὄντι· παρ’ ἐκείνου οὖν τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ὂν παρ’ αὑτοῦ τὸ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ λευκόν, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ λευκὸν ἐν αὐτῷ.
But perhaps the white is not the same. In “the white is Socrates,” Socrates is included in the white, while in “Socrates is white” the white is purely an accident. Here too, “being is white” has white as an accident, while in “the white is being” the white is taken together with being. In general, the white has its being because it is about being and in being, so its being comes from that. But being has being from itself, and white from the white: not because it is in the white, but because the white is in it.
ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὂν τὸ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ οὐ παρ’ αὑτοῦ ὄν, λεκτέον, ὅτι παρὰ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ἔχει τὸ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ ὄντως λευκοῦ ἔχει τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι, κἀκείνου τὸ λευκὸν ἔχοντος κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ ἐκεῖ ὄντος ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι.
But since this being in the sensible does not have being from itself either, we must say that it has its being from what really is, and its being white from what is really white. That, in turn, has its whiteness by participation in what has its being There.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι παρὰ τῆς ὕλης ἔχειν τὰ τῇδε ὅσα ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι, πόθεν ἕξει ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὂν ἀπαιτήσομεν. ὅτι δὲ μὴ πρῶτον ἡ ὕλη, εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις· εἰ δέ, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης, τὰ αἰσθητὰ φήσομεν.
Suppose someone says that the things here that are upon matter have their being from matter. We shall demand to know where matter itself gets its being, its existing at all. That matter is not first has been said elsewhere. And if it is because the other things could not exist except upon matter, we shall say that this holds of sensible things.
πρὸ τούτων δὲ οὖσαν ὕστερον πολλῶν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀμυδρὸν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν καὶ ἧττον ἢ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν λόγοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δ’ ἄλογος παντελῶς, σκιὰ λόγου καὶ ἔκπτωσις λόγου· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὕτη δίδωσι τοῖς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης τῷ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λευκῷ, λεκτέον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον ὂν δοίη ἂν τῷ ἧττον ὄντι τὸ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἧττον ὂν οὐκ ἂν δοίη τῷ μᾶλλον ὄντι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μᾶλλον ὂν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης, οὐκέτι κοινόν τι τὸ ὂν κατ’ ἀμφοῖν, οὐδ’ ἡ οὐσία γένος ἔχον τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ συναμφότερον, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοῖς ἔσται, ἅπερ λέγομεν, διάφορον δὲ ὅμως τὸ εἶναι.
Nothing prevents matter, while prior to these, from being posterior to many things, to all those There. Its being is dim, and less than that of the things upon it, insofar as they are rational principles and come more from being, while it is wholly without rational principle: a shadow of rational principle, and a falling away from it. Someone might say that matter gives being to the things upon it, as Socrates gives it to the white upon him. We must reply that what is more being could give being to what is less, but what is less could not give it to what is more. But if form is more being than matter, being is no longer something common to both. Nor is substance a genus with matter, form and the compound under it. They will have many things in common, the ones we mention, but their being is nevertheless different.
περὶ γὰρ ἐλαττόνως ὂν μᾶλλον ὂν προσελθὸν τάξει μὲν πρῶτον ἂν εἴη, οὐσίᾳ δὲ ὕστερον· ὥστε, εἰ μὴ ἐπίσης τὸ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ, κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη ἡ οὐσία ὡς γένος· ἄλλως μέντοι ἕξει πρὸς τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὡς κοινόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔχουσα τῷ αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὡς ζωῆς ἡ μέν τις ἀμυδρά, ἡ δ’ ἐναργεστέρα, καὶ εἰκόνων ἡ μέν τις ὑποτύπωσις, ἡ δὲ ἐξεργασία μᾶλλον.
For when what is more being comes upon what is less being, it would be first in order but later in substance. So if being does not belong equally to matter, form and the compound, substance would no longer be common as a genus. It will, however, relate in another way to what comes after them, as something common relative to those things, in that it belongs to them. In the same way, one kind of life is dim and another clearer, and among images one is an outline sketch and another more fully worked out.
εἰ δὲ τῷ ἀμυδρῷ τοῦ εἶναι μετροῖ τις τὸ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πλέον ἐῴη, τοῦτο πάλιν αὖ κοινὸν ἔσται τὸ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μήποτε οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἄλλο γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅλον, ἀλλ’ οὐ κοινόν τι τὸ ἀμυδρόν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι ἐπὶ θρεπτικῆς καὶ αἰσθητικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ εἴδους καὶ συνάμφω ἀφ’ ἑνὸς ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ῥυέντος. οὐ γὰρ μόνον, εἰ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς χεῖρον καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄμφω, ᾖ δὲ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον μετασχὸν πυρός, οἷον κέραμος, τὸ δὲ ἧττον, ὥστε μὴ κέραμος γενέσθαι.
If someone measured being by what is dim in being, and allowed more of it in the others, this again would make being something common. But perhaps we should not proceed this way. Each is a different whole, and the dimness is not something common, just as in the case of life there would be nothing common to the nutritive, the perceptive and the intellectual. So here too, the being of matter, of form and of the compound is different, flowing from one source in different ways. This is so not only if the second comes from the first and the third from the second, the one being more and the next worse and less. It is so even if both come from the same thing, but one has a greater share of fire, like a fired pot, and the other a lesser share, so that it does not become a fired pot.
τάχα δ’ οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· διαφορὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις.
But perhaps matter and form do not even come from the same source, for there is difference among those things too.
ἀλλ’ ἄρα τὸ μὲν διαιρεῖν εἰς στοιχεῖα ἐᾶν δεῖ, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας λέγοντα, ἣν δεῖ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι — οὐ γὰρ οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα, ἢ οὐκ ἂν αἰσθηταί γε οὐσίαι — ἑνὶ δὲ γένει περιλαμβάνοντα τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ λίθου καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων φυτῶν, ᾗ αἰσθητά, καὶ ζῴων ὡσαύτως· οὐ γὰρ παραλελείψεται ἡ ὕλη οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἔχει ταῦτα· ὕλη γὰρ καὶ εἶδος πῦρ καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα ἤδη πολλαὶ οὐσίαι εἰς ἕν· καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι τούτοις, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων κεχώρισται· ὑποκείμενα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλου· καὶ ὅσα εἴρηται, ὑπάρχει ταύτῃ.
But perhaps we should leave aside dividing into elements, especially when discussing sensible substance, which must be grasped by perception rather than by reason. Nor should we bring in what it is composed of, for those things are not substances, or at least not sensible substances. Instead we should embrace in one genus what is common to stone, earth, water and the plants that come from them, insofar as they are sensible, and to animals likewise. Matter and form will not be left out, since sensible substance has them: fire and earth and what lies between are matter and form, and the composites are already many substances in one. What is common to all these is that by which they are distinguished from the other things: they are subjects for the other things, and are not in a subject, nor of something else. And all the points mentioned apply to it.
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία οὐκ ἄνευ μεγέθους οὐδ’ ἄνευ ποιότητος, πῶς ἔτι τὰ συμβεβηκότα χωριοῦμεν; χωρίζοντες γὰρ ταῦτα, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ σχῆμα, τὸ χρῶμα, ξηρότητα, ὑγρότητα, τί τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν θησόμεθα; ποιαὶ γὰρ οὐσίαι αὗται. ἀλλά τι ἔστι, περὶ ὃ συμβαίνει τὰ ποιοῦντα ἐκ τοῦ μόνον οὐσίαν εἶναι ποιὰν οὐσίαν εἶναι· καὶ ἔσται τὸ πῦρ οὐχ ὅλον οὐσία, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ, οἷον μέρος. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη;
But if sensible substance is not without magnitude or without quality, how will we still separate off the accidents? If we separate these, magnitude, shape, color, dryness and wetness, what shall we posit as substance itself? These are qualified substances. Still, there is something to which the things occur that make it, instead of just substance, a qualified substance. And fire will not be wholly substance, but something of it, a part, as it were. What would that be?
ἢ ὕλη. ἀλλὰ ἆρά γε ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία συμφόρησίς τις ποιοτήτων καὶ ὕλης, καὶ ὁμοῦ μὲν πάντα ταῦτα συμπαγέντα ἐπὶ ὕλης μιᾶς οὐσία, χωρὶς δὲ ἕκαστον λαμβανόμενον τὸ μὲν ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται, ἢ ποιὰ πολλά· καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐλλεῖπον μήπω ἀπηρτισμένην ἐᾷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ὑπόστασιν, μέρος τῆσδε τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ δ’ ἂν γενομένῃ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐπισυμβῇ, τὴν οἰκείαν ἔχει τάξιν οὐ κρυπτόμενον ἐν τῷ μίγματι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὴν λεγομένην οὐσίαν; καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὡς ἐκεῖ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὄν ἐστιν οὐσία, συμπληροῦν ἕνα ὄγκον τοσόνδε καὶ τοιόνδε, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ μὴ συμπληροῦν ποιόν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐκεῖ ἕκαστον οὐσίαν, τὸ δ’ ὅλον τὸ ἐκ πάντων οὐσίαν.
Matter. But then is sensible substance a sort of conglomeration of qualities and matter? Are all these together, compacted upon one matter, a substance, while each taken separately will be a quality or a quantity, or many qualities? Is whatever, when lacking, keeps the thing’s existence from becoming complete a part of this substance? And does whatever supervenes on the substance once it has come to be have its own rank, not hidden in the mixture that makes what is called substance? I do not mean that it is substance in that case, together with the others, completing one mass of such a size and kind, and a quality elsewhere, where it does not complete it. I mean that even in that case none of them is substance by itself; the whole made of them all is substance.
καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον, εἰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἐξ οὐκ οὐσιῶν ποιοῦμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἀληθὴς οὐσία, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενον τὴν ἀληθῆ, ἥτις ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ἔχει τὸ ὂν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξ αὐτῆς γινομένων, ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἦν· ὡδὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑποβεβλημένον ἄγονον καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὄν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, σκιὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ σκιᾷ αὐτῇ οὔσῃ ζωγραφία καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι.
We should not be troubled if we make sensible substance out of things that are not substances. Not even the whole is true substance; it imitates the true one. That one has being without the other things around it, and the other things come to be from it, because it truly was. Here, though, what underlies is barren and not sufficient to be being, because the other things do not come from it either. It is a shadow, and upon it, itself a shadow, there is a painting: appearance.
καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς λεγομένης οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς καὶ γένους ἑνὸς ταύτῃ· εἴδη δ’ αὐτοῦ τίνα ἄν τις θεῖτο καὶ πῶς διέλοι; σῶμα μὲν οὖν τὸ σύμπαν θετέον εἶναι, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑλικώτερα, τὰ δὲ ὀργανικά· ὑλικώτερα μὲν πῦρ, γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ· ὀργανικὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς τὰς παραλλαγὰς σχόντα· εἶτα εἴδη γῆς λαμβάνειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ὀργανικῶν τά τε φυτὰ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς διαιροῦντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα ἢ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἐπίγεια καὶ ἔγγεια καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον στοιχεῖον τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν κοῦφα, τὰ δὲ βαρέα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ·
So much for what is called sensible substance, and for its being one genus. What species might one posit for it, and how might one divide it? The whole must be posited as body. Of bodies, some are more material, some organic. The more material are fire, earth, water and air. The organic are the bodies of plants and animals, which vary according to their shapes. Then one should take the species of earth and of the other elements. Among organic bodies, one should divide plants according to their shapes, and the bodies of animals by whether they live on the earth or in the earth, and, for each element, by those that live in it. Or one may divide bodies into the light, the heavy and the intermediate;
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι ἐν μέσῳ, τὰ δὲ περιέχειν ἄνωθεν, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ· καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων σώματα ἤδη σχήμασι διειλημμένα, ὡς εἶναι σώματα τὰ μὲν ζῴων οὐρανίων, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα· ἢ κατ’ εἴδη διαστησάμενον τὰ τέσσαρα τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλον τρόπον ἤδη συμπλέκειν καὶ μιγνύντα τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν κατὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τὰς μίξεις, οἷον πύρινα ἢ γήινα τῷ πλείονι καὶ ἐπικρατοῦντι λεγόμενα.
some standing in the middle, some surrounding from above, and some in between. In each of these there are bodies already distinguished by their shapes, so that some are the bodies of the heavenly living beings, others correspond to the other elements. Or, having separated the four into species, one may next combine them in another way, mixing their differences according to their places, their shapes and their mixtures. Things would then be called fiery or earthy, for instance, from the element that is greater and predominates in them.
τὸ δὲ πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας λέγειν, τόδε τὸ πῦρ καὶ πῦρ, ἄλλως μὲν ἔχειν διαφοράν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν καθέκαστον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου, οὐ μέντοι οὐσίας διαφοράν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ποιῷ τὶ λευκὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ γραμματική τις καὶ γραμματική. ἔπειτα τί ἔλαττον ἔχει ἡ γραμματικὴ πρὸς τινὰ γραμματικὴν καὶ ὅλως ἐπιστήμη πρὸς τινὰ ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γὰρ ἡ γραμματικὴ ὕστερον τῆς τινὸς γραμματικῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οὔσης γραμματικῆς καὶ ἡ ἐν σοί· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἐν σοὶ τίς ἐστι τῷ ἐν σοί· αὕτη δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ καθόλου. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ αὐτὸς ἔδωκε τῷ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Σωκράτει· μεταλήψει γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος.
As for calling some substances first and others second, this fire and fire: that is a difference in another respect, because one is particular and the other universal, but it is not a difference of substance. In quality too there is this white and white, this literacy and literacy. And then, what does literacy have less than some particular literacy, or in general knowledge than some particular knowledge? Literacy is not posterior to a particular literacy. Rather, it is because literacy exists that the literacy in you exists too. The literacy in you is particular by being in you, but in itself it is the same as the universal. And it was not Socrates who gave being man to what is not man; it was man who gave it to Socrates. For the particular man is a man by participation in man.
ἔπειτα ὁ Σωκράτης τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ἄνθρωπος τοιόσδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόσδε τί ἂν ἐργάζοιτο πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον οὐσίαν εἶναι; εἰ δ’ ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος μόνον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ, ἧττον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη· ἐν ὕλῃ γὰρ ὁ λόγος χείρων. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὕλῃ, τί ἔλαττον ἕξει τοῦ ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ αὐτὸς λόγος τοῦ ἐν τινὶ ὕλῃ; ἔτι πρότερον τῇ φύσει τὸ γενικώτερον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀτόμου· τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ ἁπλῶς πρότερον. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἧττον εἴη; ἀλλὰ τὸ καθέκαστον πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμώτερον ὂν πρότερον· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει.
Then what would Socrates be but a man of a certain kind? And what would “of a certain kind” contribute toward being more substance? Suppose the reason is that man is form alone, while Socrates is form in matter. Then he would by this very fact be less man, for the rational principle in matter is inferior. And if man, too, is taken not as form but as in matter, what will it have less than the man in matter, since it is itself the rational principle of what is in some particular matter? Moreover, the more generic is prior by nature, so that the species is prior to the individual, and what is prior by nature is also prior absolutely. How then could it be less? But the particular is prior because it is more knowable to us. This, however, makes no difference in the things themselves.
ἔπειτα οὕτως οὐχ εἷς λόγος τῆς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῦ πρώτως καὶ τοῦ δευτέρως οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἓν γένος.
Besides, in this way there is not one account of substance. The account of what is primarily and of what is secondarily is not the same, and they do not fall under one genus.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως διαιρεῖν, θερμῷ καὶ ξηρῷ, καὶ ξηρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ, καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ, ἢ ὅπως βούλεται τὸν συνδυασμὸν εἶναι· εἶτα ἐκ τούτων σύνθεσιν καὶ μῖξιν, καὶ ἢ μένειν ἐνταῦθα στάντα ἐπὶ τοῦ συνθέτου, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἔγγειον καὶ ἐπίγειον, ἢ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ζῴων διαφοράς, οὐ τὰ ζῷα διαιροῦντα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὄργανα, διαιροῦντα. οὐκ ἄτοπος δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς διαφορά, εἴπερ οὐδ’ ἡ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας αὐτῶν διαίρεσις, θερμότητας, ψυχρότητας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
One can also divide in this way: by hot and dry, dry and cold, cold and wet, or however one wants the pairing to go. Then one divides by the composition and mixture formed from these. Then either one stops here, at the composite, or one divides by being in the earth or on the earth, or by shapes and by the differences of animals. In that case one is not dividing the animals, but dividing according to their bodies, as instruments. Division by shapes is not out of place, if division by their qualities, heats, colds and the like, isn’t either.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ‘ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταύτας ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα’, καὶ κατὰ τὰς μίξεις φήσομεν ποιεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ σχήματα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ περὶ αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη, διαφοραῖς εἰ λαμβάνοιτο ταῖς πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὂν ἁπλῶς αὕτη, ἀλλ’ αἰσθητὸν ὂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῆς σύνοδον τῶν πρὸς αἴσθησιν ἔφαμεν εἶναι καὶ ἡ πίστις τοῦ εἶναι παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ ἄπειρος ἡ σύνθεσις, κατ’ εἴδη τῶν ζῴων διαιρεῖν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ σώματι· ποιότης γὰρ αὕτη σώματος, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος, ποιότησι δ’ οὐκ ἄτοπον διαιρεῖν. εἰ δ’ ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα εἴπομεν, ἀντιδιαιροῦντες τὸ σύνθετον τῷ ἁπλῷ, ὑλικώτερα εἴπομεν καὶ ὀργανικὰ οὐ προσποιούμενοι τὸ σύνθετον.
If someone says, “But it is by these that bodies act,” we shall say that they act by their mixtures too, and by their colors and shapes. Since the discussion is about sensible substance, it would not be out of place to take it by differences relative to perception. For it is not simply being: this whole is perceptible being. After all, we said that even its apparent existence is a coming together of perceptible things, and that the assurance of their being comes to them from perception. If the composition is unlimited, divide by the forms of animals, for example the form of man in a body. Such a form is a quality of body, and it is not out of place to divide by qualities. And if we spoke of some as simple and others as composite, contrasting the composite with the simple, we said “more material” and “organic” without bringing in the composite.
ἔστι δ’ οὐκ ἀντιδιαίρεσις τὸ σύνθετον πρὸς τὸ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρώτην διαίρεσιν τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων θέντα μίξαντα αὐτὰ ἀπ’ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ὑποβεβληκυίας διαφορὰν συνθέτων ἢ τόποις ἢ μορφαῖς ποιεῖσθαι, οἷον τὰ μὲν οὐράνια, τὰ δὲ γήινα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐσίας ἢ γενέσεως ταῦτα.
But there is no contrasting division of the composite against the simple. Rather, one posits the simple bodies by a first division and mixes them. Then, starting from another principle laid down beneath, one differentiates the composites, either by places or by shapes: some heavenly, for instance, others earthly. So much for substance, or becoming, in sensible things.
Quantity in the sensible world
Number and magnitude are quantities; great and small, many and few are contraries.
περὶ δὲ ποσοῦ καὶ ποσότητος, ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ μεγέθει, καθ’ ὅσον τοσοῦτον ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ διαστήματι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου — οὐ γὰρ περὶ χωριστοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ’ ὃ ποιεῖ τρίπηχυ εἶναι τὸ ξύλον, καὶ ἡ πεμπὰς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἵπποις — εἴρηται πολλάκις, ὅτι ταῦτα ποσὰ μόνον λεκτέον, τόπον δὲ καὶ χρόνον μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν νενοῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν χρόνον τῷ μέτρον κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ τῷ πρός τι δοτέον αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ τόπον σώματος περιεκτικόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐν σχέσει καὶ τῷ πρός τι κεῖσθαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ κίνησις συνεχὴς καὶ οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ ἐτέθη. μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ;
Concerning the quantitative and quantity, it should be placed in number and magnitude, insofar as each thing is so much. That is, it lies in the number of things in matter and in the extension of what underlies. The discussion is not about separate quantity, but about what makes the wood three cubits long, and the five that belongs to the horses. It has often been said that only these should be called quantities, and that place and time should not be thought of as quantity. Time, as the measure of motion, should be assigned to relation. Place contains body, so it too lies in a relationship, and so in relation. After all, motion too is continuous, and it was not placed in quantity. Why are great and small not in quantity?
ποσότητι γάρ τινι μέγα τὸ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος δὲ οὐ τῶν πρός τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον τῶν πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον. διὰ τί οὖν ὄρος μικρόν, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ μικρότερον λέγεται. εἰ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ ὁμολογεῖται καὶ παρ’ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι, ὁμολογεῖται, ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ μικρότερον λέγεται, καὶ μεγάλη κέγχρος οὐχ ἁπλῶς λεγομένη μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ κέγχρος μεγάλη. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν [τῷ] τῶν ὁμογενῶν· τῶν δὲ ὁμογενῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἂν λέγοιτο μείζων. ἔπειτα διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ καλὸν λέγοιτο ἂν τῶν πρός τι;
The great is great by a certain quantity, and magnitude does not belong to relation. But the greater and the less do, since they are relative to something else, like the double. Why, then, is a mountain called small and a millet seed large? Or rather, first of all, “small” is said in place of “smaller.” If it is agreed, even by those people, that it is said relative to things of the same kind, it is agreed that it is said in place of “smaller.” A large millet seed is not called large simply, but a large millet seed. This is the same as saying “[relative to] things of the same kind,” and compared with things of the same kind it would naturally be called “larger.” Then again, why shouldn’t the beautiful also be called relative?
ἀλλά φαμεν καλὸν μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ καὶ ποιόν, κάλλιον δὲ τῶν πρός τι· καίτοι καὶ καλὸν λεγόμενον φανείη ἂν πρὸς ἄλλο αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου κάλλος πρὸς θεῶν· ‘πιθήκων’, φησίν, ‘ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς συμβάλλειν ἑτέρῳ γένει’· ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν καλόν, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἢ κάλλιον ἢ τοὐναντίον. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν μέγα μεγέθους, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον· ἢ ἀναιρετέον τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἄλλο κάλλιον αὐτοῦ. οὕτω τοίνυν οὐδ’ ἀναιρετέον τὸ μέγα, ὅτι ἔστι τι μεῖζον αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ μεῖζον ὅλως ἂν εἴη μὴ μεγάλου ὄντος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κάλλιον μὴ καλοῦ.
But we say that beautiful is a quality, by itself, while more beautiful is relative. And yet even what is called beautiful might appear ugly relative to something else, as human beauty does compared with that of the gods. “The most beautiful of apes,” he says, “is ugly compared with another kind.” By itself it is beautiful, and relative to something else either more beautiful or the opposite. So here too, the great is great by itself, by its magnitude, but relative to something else it may not be. Otherwise we must do away with the beautiful too, because something else is more beautiful than it. So we must not do away with the great either, just because there is something greater than it. There would be no greater at all if there were no great, just as there would be no more beautiful if there were no beautiful.
ἀπολειπτέον τοίνυν καὶ ἐναντιότητα εἶναι περὶ τὸ ποσόν· αἱ γὰρ ἔννοιαι τὴν ἐναντιότητα συγχωροῦσιν, ὅταν μέγα λέγωμεν καὶ ὅταν μικρόν, ἐναντίας τὰς φαντασίας ποιοῦσαι, ὥσπερ ὅταν πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ παραπλήσια περὶ τοῦ ὀλίγα καὶ πολλὰ λεκτέον. πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλείους· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο· καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλάττους. καὶ δεῖ ὅλως τὰ πολλὰ πολὺ λέγειν πλῆθος ἐν ἀριθμῷ· πλῆθος δὲ πῶς τῶν πρός τι; τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἐπέκτασις ἀριθμοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον συστολή. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς τῆς ἐννοίας τὸ συνεχὲς προαγούσης εἰς τὸ πόρρω. ποσὸν μὲν οὖν, ὅταν τὸ ἓν προέλθῃ, καὶ τὸ σημεῖον.
We must allow, then, that there is contrariety in quantity too. Our notions admit the contrariety: when we say great and when we say small, they make contrary pictures in our imagination, as when we say many and few. Much the same must be said about few and many. “There are many in the house” is said in place of “more,” and that is relative to something else. “Few in the theater” is said in place of “fewer.” In general, “many” must be called a large multitude in number. And how is multitude relative? It is the same as an extension of number, and its contrary is a contraction. The same holds for the continuous, when the notion carries the continuous forward into the distance. There is quantity, then, when the unit goes forth, and the point too.
ἀλλ’ ἐὰν μὲν ταχὺ στῇ ἑκάτερον, τὸ μὲν ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ μικρόν· ἐὰν δ’ ἡ πρόοδος προιοῦσα μὴ παύσηται ταχύ, τὸ μὲν πολύ, τὸ δὲ μέγα. τίς οὖν ὅρος; τίς δὲ καλοῦ; θερμοῦ δέ; καὶ ἔνι θερμότερον καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἀλλὰ λέγεται τὸ μὲν θερμότερον πρός τι, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἁπλῶς ποιόν· ὅλως δὲ [δεῖ] λόγον τινά, ὥσπερ καλοῦ, οὕτω καὶ μεγάλου εἶναι, ὃς μεταληφθεὶς μέγα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ καλὸν ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ. ἐναντιότης τοίνυν κατὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ποσόν· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τόπον οὐκέτι, ὅτι μὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐπεὶ καί, εἰ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἦν ὁ τόπος, οὐκ ἦν ἐναντίον τὸ ἄνω τινὶ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ κάτω ἐν τῷ παντί.
If each of them stops quickly, the one is few and the other small. If the progression keeps going and does not stop quickly, the one is many and the other great. What, then, is the limit? What is the limit of the beautiful? Or of the hot? Here too there is a hotter. But hotter is said relatively, while hot is simply a quality. In general there [must] be a rational principle of great, as there is of beautiful, which, when something participates in it, makes it great, as the rational principle of the beautiful makes it beautiful. So there is contrariety in quantity in these respects. There is none with respect to place, since place does not belong to quantity. Even if place did belong to quantity, “up” would not be contrary to anything, since there is no “down” in the All.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω λεγόμενον ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἂν σημαίνοι ἢ ἀνωτέρω καὶ κατωτέρω καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερόν· ταῦτα δὲ τῶν πρός τι. συλλαβῇ δὲ καὶ λόγῳ συμβαίνει ποσοῖς εἶναι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ποσῷ. φωνὴ γὰρ ποσή· αὕτη δὲ κίνησίς τις. εἰς κίνησιν οὖν ὅλως ἀνακτέον, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν.
In the parts, “up” and “down” would signify nothing but higher and lower, like right and left, and these are relative. The syllable and speech happen to be quantities, serving as subjects for quantity. For vocal sound is a quantity, but it is a kind of motion. So it should be brought back to motion altogether, as action should too.
τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ διωρισμένου κεχωρίσθαι καλῶς· τῷ κοινῷ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ ὅρῳ εἴρηται. τὸ δ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἐπὶ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ περιττῷ, ἀρτίῳ· καὶ πάλιν, εἴ τινες διαφοραὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου, ἢ παραλειπτέον τοῖς περὶ ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσιν ἤδη, ἢ δεῖ ταύτας μὲν διαφορὰς τῶν μοναδικῶν ἀριθμῶν τίθεσθαι, τῶν δ’ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐκέτι. εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀριθμοὺς χωρίζει ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τούτων τὰς αὐτὰς νοεῖν διαφοράς. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς πῶς, εἰ τὸ μὲν γραμμή, τὸ δ’ ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δὲ στερεόν;
The continuous has rightly been separated from the discrete, by the common and the proper boundary, as has been said. From here on, number is divided into odd and even. And again, if there are differences within each of these, either we should leave them to those who deal with number, or we should posit them as differences of the numbers made of units, but not of the numbers in sensible things. But if reason separates the numbers in sensible things from them, nothing prevents us from thinking the same differences for these too. But how is the continuous to be divided, if one kind is line, another surface, another solid?
ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐφ’ ἕν, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ δύο, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τρία, οὐκ εἰς εἴδη διαιρουμένου δόξει, ἀλλὰ καταρίθμησιν μόνον ποιουμένου· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οὕτω λαμβανομένοις κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον κοινόν τι ἐπ’ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστι γένος, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πρώτης καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτης αὔξης κοινόν τι ἔσται. ἀλλὰ ἴσως καθ’ ὅσον ποσὸν τὸ ἴσον ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον ποσά, τὰ δὲ ἧττον, κἂν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλείω τὰς διαστάσεις ἔχῃ, τὰ δὲ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον. ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τοίνυν, καθ’ ὅσον πάντες ἀριθμοί, τὸ κοινὸν ἂν εἴη· ἴσως γὰρ οὐχ ἡ μονὰς τὴν δυάδα, οὐδ’ ἡ δυὰς τὴν τριάδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ πάντα.
Or perhaps one extended in one direction, another in two, another in three, will look like the work of someone merely enumerating rather than dividing into species. In numbers taken this way, by prior and posterior, there is never a genus common to them. Nor will there be anything common to the first, second and third increase in dimension. But perhaps, insofar as they are quantity, they are on a par, and some are not more quantity and others less, even if some have dimensions in more directions and others in fewer. In the case of numbers, then, there would be something common insofar as all are numbers. For perhaps it is not the unit that makes the two, nor the two the three, but the same thing that makes them all.
εἰ δὲ μὴ γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐπινοοῦμεν γινόμενα, ἔστω ὁ μὲν ἐλάττων πρότερος, ὁ δὲ ὕστερος ὁ μείζων· ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον ἀριθμοὶ πάντες ὑφ’ ἕν. καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν τοίνυν τὸ ἐπ’ ἀριθμῶν μετενεκτέον· χωριοῦμεν δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων γραμμήν, ἐπίπεδον, στερεόν, ὃ δὴ κέκληκε σῶμα, τῷ διάφορα τῷ εἴδει μεγέθη ὄντα εἶναι. εἰ δὲ δεῖ ἕκαστον τούτων διαιρεῖν, γραμμὴν μὲν εἰς εὐθύ, περιφερές, ἑλικοειδές, ἐπίπεδον δὲ [εἰς] εὐθύγραμμον καὶ περιφερὲς σχῆμα, στερεὸν δὲ εἰς στερεὰ σχήματα, σφαῖραν καὶ εὐθυγράμμους [ἔχοντα] πλευράς, καὶ ταῦτα πάλιν, οἷα οἱ γεωμέτραι ποιοῦσιν, [εἰς] τρίγωνα, τετράπλευρα, καὶ πάλιν ταῦτα εἰς ἄλλα, ἐπισκεπτέον.
If they do not come to be but simply are, and it is we who conceive them as coming to be, let the smaller be prior and the larger posterior. But insofar as all are numbers, they fall under one. What holds for numbers must be carried over to magnitudes. We separate line, surface and solid (which he has called body) from one another, because they are magnitudes different in species. Whether each of these should be divided further must be examined: line into straight, curved and spiral; surface [into] rectilinear and curved figure; solid into solid figures, the sphere and those [having] rectilinear sides; and these again, as geometers do, [into] triangles and quadrilaterals, and these again into others.
τί γὰρ ἂν φαῖμεν εὐθεῖαν; οὐ μέγεθος εἶναι; ἢ ποιὸν μέγεθος τὸ εὐθὺ φαίη τις ἄν. τί οὖν κωλύει διαφορὰν εἶναι ᾗ γραμμή; οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου τινὸς τὸ εὐθὺ ἢ γραμμῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐσίας διαφορὰς κομίζομεν παρὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ. ἡ οὖν εὐθεῖα ποσὸν μετὰ διαφορᾶς, καὶ οὐ σύνθετον διὰ τοῦτο ἡ εὐθεῖα ἐξ εὐθύτητος καὶ γραμμῆς· εἰ δὲ σύνθετον, ὡς μετὰ οἰκείας διαφορᾶς. τὸ δ’ ἐκ τριῶν γραμμῶν διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ; ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς τρεῖς γραμμαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀλλὰ οὑτωσὶ ἐχουσῶν, καὶ τὸ τετράπλευρον τέσσαρες οὑτωσί· καὶ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ ἡ εὐθεῖα οὑτωσὶ καὶ ποσόν· εἰ γὰρ τὴν εὐθεῖαν οὐ ποσὸν μόνον, τί κωλύει καὶ τὴν πεπερασμένην μὴ ποσὸν μόνον λέγειν; ἀλλὰ πέρας τῆς γραμμῆς στιγμὴ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
What would we say a straight line is? Isn’t it a magnitude? Or perhaps one would say that the straight is a qualified magnitude. What then prevents it from being a differentia of line, as line? Straightness belongs to nothing but line. After all, we also bring in differentiae of substance from quality. The straight line, then, is a quantity with a differentia, and it is not for that reason a composite of straightness and line. If it is a composite, it is so as having its own differentia. Why is the figure made of three lines not in quantity? Or rather: the triangle is not simply three lines, but three lines arranged in this particular way, and the quadrilateral is four arranged in this way. The straight line, too, is arranged in this way, and is a quantity. For if the straight line is not merely a quantity, what prevents us from saying that the bounded line is not merely a quantity either? But the limit of the line is a point, and it is not in anything else.
καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον τοίνυν ἐπίπεδον ποσόν, ἐπείπερ γραμμαὶ περατοῦσιν, αἳ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ εἰ οὖν τὸ πεπερασμένον ἐπίπεδον ἐν τῶ ποσῷ, τοῦτο δὲ ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ ἑξάπλευρον ἢ πολύπλευρον, καὶ τὰ σχήματα πάντα ἐν τῷ ποσῷ. εἰ δ’ ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον λέγομεν ποιὸν καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον, ἐν ποιῷ θησόμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν πλείοσι κατηγορίαις θέσθαι τὸ αὐτό· καθ’ ὃ μὲν μέγεθος καὶ τοιόνδε μέγεθος, ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, καθ’ ὃ δὲ τοιάνδε μορφὴν παρέχεται, ἐν ποιῷ· ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ τοιάδε μορφὴ τὸ τρίγωνον. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ τὴν σφαίραν ποιὸν λέγειν; εἰ οὖν τις ὁμόσε χωροῖ, τὴν γεωμετρίαν τοίνυν οὐ περὶ μεγέθη, ἀλλὰ περὶ ποιότητα καταγίνεσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ἡ πραγματεία αὕτη περὶ μεγέθη.
The bounded surface, then, is also a quantity, since lines bound it, and they are much more in quantity. If, then, the bounded surface is in quantity, and it is square, six-sided or many-sided, all figures are in quantity too. And if we place triangle and square in quality because we call them qualities, nothing prevents placing the same thing in several categories. Insofar as it is a magnitude, and a magnitude of a certain kind, it is in quantity; insofar as it presents a certain shape, it is in quality. Or perhaps the triangle itself is a certain shape. What then prevents us from calling the sphere a quality too? And if one charged straight ahead with this, geometry would be concerned not with magnitudes but with quality. But that is not what people think: this discipline is about magnitudes.
αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι τὸ μεγέθη αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ αἱ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐκ οὐσίας τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι. ἔτι πᾶν ἐπίπεδον πεπερασμένον, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄπειρον εἶναί τι ἐπίπεδον· ἔτι ὥσπερ, ὅταν περὶ οὐσίαν ποιότητα λαμβάνω, οὐσιώδη ποιότητα λέγω, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅταν τὰ σχήματα λαμβάνω, ποσότητος διαφορὰς λαμβάνω. ἔπειτα, εἰ μὴ ταύτας διαφορὰς μεγεθῶν ληψόμεθα, τίνων θησόμεθα; εἰ δὲ μεγεθῶν εἰσι διαφοραί, τὰ γενόμενα ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν μεγέθη διάφορα ἐν εἴδεσιν αὐτῶν τακτέον.
The differences among magnitudes do not abolish their being magnitudes, just as the differences among substances do not make substances not substances. Further, every surface is bounded, since no surface can be unlimited. Further, when I take a quality that concerns substance, I call it a substantial quality. In just the same way, and much more so, when I take figures, I am taking differences of quantity. And then, if we do not take these as differences of magnitudes, of what shall we make them differences? And if they are differences of magnitudes, the different magnitudes that result from the differences must be ranked as species of magnitude.
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἴδιον τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον; ὅμοια γὰρ τρίγωνα λέγεται. ἢ καὶ ὅμοια λέγεται μεγέθη καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης λεγομένη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποσῷ· ἴσως γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τὸ ὅμοιον ἄλλως καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῷ ποιῷ. ἔπειτα οὐκ, εἰ ἴδιον εἶπε τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον, ἀνεῖλε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον κατηγορεῖν τινων· ἀλλ’ εἰ εἶπε τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῦ ποιοῦ, ἄλλως λεκτέον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ. εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν τὸ ὅμοιον, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖ ἰδιότητας ἄλλας ἑκατέρου τοῦ γένους, τοῦ τε ποσοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ.
But how are equal and unequal peculiar to quantity? After all, triangles are called similar. Or rather, magnitudes too are called similar, and talk of similarity does not stop similar and dissimilar from being in quantity. Perhaps here, in magnitudes, similar is meant in another way, not as in quality. Then again, if he said that equal and unequal are peculiar to quantity, he did not thereby rule out predicating similar of some quantities. But if he said that similar and dissimilar belong to quality, then what is said of quantity must be meant differently, as we said. And if the similar is the same in both, then we must look here too for other properties peculiar to each genus, quantity and quality.
ἢ λεκτέον, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ λέγεσθαι, καθόσον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, καθόλου δέ, ὅτι συντάττειν δεῖ τὰς συμπληρούσας διαφορὰς τῷ οὗ διαφοραί, καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν μόνου ἐκείνου ᾖ διαφορὰ ἡ διαφορά. εἰ δ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ μή, οὗ μὲν συμπληροῖ, συντακτέον, οὗ δὲ μὴ συμπληροῖ, μόνον ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ληπτέον· συμπληροῦν δὲ λέγω τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ τὴν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιάνδε, τοῦ τοιάνδε προσθήκην οὐκ οὐσιώδη δεχομένου.
Or perhaps we should say that similar is said of quantity too, insofar as the differentiae are in it. In general, the differentiae that complete something must be ranked with what they are differentiae of, especially when the differentia belongs to that thing alone. If in one case it completes the substance and in another it does not, it must be ranked with what it completes, and taken by itself alone where it does not. By “completing the substance” I mean completing not substance simply, but substance of a certain kind, where the “of a certain kind” admits an addition that is not substantial.
κἀκεῖνο δὲ ἐπισημαντέον, ὅτι ἴσα μὲν λέγομεν καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ τετράγωνα καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων σχημάτων, ἐπιπέδων τε καὶ στερεῶν· ὥστε ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον κείσθω ἐπὶ ποσοῦ ἴδιον. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοιον, εἰ ἐπὶ ποιοῦ, ἐπισκεπτέον.
We should also note this: we call triangles and squares equal, and likewise all figures, plane and solid. So let equal and unequal be laid down as peculiar to quantity. Whether similar and dissimilar belong to quality must be examined.
Quality in the sensible world
Qualities here are images of rational principles and are hard to divide into species.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦ ἐλέχθη, ὡς σὺν ἄλλοις μὲν ὕλῃ καὶ ποσῷ συμμιχθὲν συμπλήρωσιν ἐργάζεται αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας, καὶ ὅτι κινδυνεύει ἡ λεγομένη αὕτη οὐσία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν, οὐ τί, ἀλλὰ ποιὸν μᾶλλον, καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος εἶναι οἷον πυρὸς τὸ τὶ σημαίνων μᾶλλον, ἣν δὲ μορφὴν ἐργάζεται, ποιὸν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ τὶ εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἀποτελεσθὲν ἐν σώματος φύσει εἴδωλον ὂν τοῦ λόγου ποιόν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι· οἷον εἰ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν γραφῇ χρώματα καὶ φάρμακα οὖσα Σωκράτης λέγοιτο· οὕτως οὖν καὶ λόγου ὄντος, καθ’ ὃν Σωκράτης, [οὐ] τὸν αἰσθητὸν Σωκράτην, ἀλλὰ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐκείνων τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μιμήματα εἶναι, καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ τοῦτον πρὸς τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἤδη λόγον τὸν ἀνθρώπου τὸ αὐτὸ πεπονθότα εἶναι.
About quality it was said that, mixed together with other things, matter and quantity, it brings sensible substance to completion. It was also said that this so-called substance is perhaps this thing made of many: not a “what” but rather a quality. The rational principle, of fire for instance, signifies rather the “what,” while the shape it produces is rather a quality. The rational principle of man is the “what it is,” while what is brought to completion in the nature of body, being an image of the rational principle, is rather a sort of quality. It is as if, Socrates being a man who is seen, his likeness in a painting, which is colors and pigments, were called Socrates. So too, since there is a rational principle by which Socrates is Socrates, [not] the sensible Socrates but colors and shapes are imitations of what is in the rational principle. And this rational principle in turn stands in the same relation to the truest rational principle, that of man.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως.
So much for that.
ἕκαστον δὲ λαμβανόμενον χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὴν λεγομένην οὐσίαν ποιότητα τὴν ἐν τούτοις εἶναι, οὐ τὸ τὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ποσὸν οὐδὲ κίνησιν σημαίνοντα, χαρακτῆρα δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν δηλοῦντα, [οἷον] καλὸν [καὶ] αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἐπὶ σώματι· ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ καλὸν τὸ τῇδε κἀκεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἄλλο. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πότερα ταὐτὸν ἢ ὁμώνυμον τῷ φαινομένῳ; καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖ προσνεμητέον ἢ τοῖς τῇδε; καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν; τὸ μὲν γὰρ καλὸν ὅτι ἄλλο, ἤδη δῆλον. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ποιῷ, καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ποιοῖς. ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ποιοῖς, τὰς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐκεῖ.
And each of the things involved in so-called substance, taken apart from the others, was said to be the quality in them. It signifies neither the “what” nor the quantity nor motion, but reveals the character, the “such-and-such,” the “of what sort”: [for example] beauty [and] ugliness in a body. For beauty here and beauty There share only a name, and so, then, does quality, since black and white are different There too. But what is in the seed and in a rational principle of that kind: is it the same as what appears, or does it share only its name? Should it be assigned to the things There or the things here? And what of ugliness in the soul? That beauty There is different is already clear. But if it is in this quality, virtue too is among the qualities here. Or perhaps some virtues are among the qualities here, others among those There.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς τέχνας λόγους οὔσας ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις εἰ· ἐν τοῖς τῇδε· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐν ὕλῃ λόγοι, ἀλλὰ ὕλη αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχή· ἀλλ’ ὅταν καὶ μετὰ ὕλης, πὼς ἐνταῦθα· οἷον κιθαρῳδία· καὶ γὰρ περὶ χορδὰς καὶ μέρος πως τῆς τέχνης ἡ ᾠδή, φωνὴ αἰσθητή, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐνεργείας ταύτας τις, ἀλλ’ οὐ μέρη, θεῖτο. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐνέργειαι αἰσθηταί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐν σώματι ἀσώματον· ἀλλ’ ἀπέδομεν αὐτὸ αἰσθητὸν ὂν τοῖς περὶ σῶμα καὶ σώματος. γεωμετρίαν δὲ καὶ ἀριθμητικὴν διττὴν θεμένους τὰς μὲν ὡδὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ποιῷ τακτέον, τὰς δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς πραγματείας πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖ τακτέον.
For one might also be at a loss about the arts, which are rational principles: are they among the things here? Even if they are rational principles in matter, their matter is the soul. But when they also involve matter, they are in a way here. Take singing to the lyre: it deals with strings, and the song, a sensible sound, is in a way part of the art—unless one regards these as activities rather than parts. Still, they are sensible activities. For beauty in a body is incorporeal too, yet since it is sensible we assigned it to what concerns body and belongs to body. As for geometry and arithmetic, we should take them as twofold: rank one kind here, in this quality, and the other, the soul’s own occupations with the intelligible, There.
καὶ δὴ καὶ μουσικήν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ὡσαύτως. τὰς τοίνυν τέχνας περὶ σώματα ἐχούσας καὶ ὀργάνοις αἰσθητοῖς καὶ αἰσθήσει χρωμένας, εἰ καὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι διαθέσεις, ἐπειδὴ κάτω νευούσης εἰσίν, ἐν τῷδε τῷ ποιῷ τακτέον. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐνταῦθα τὰς οὕτω πραττούσας ὡς πολιτικῶς τὸ πράττειν ἔχειν, ὅσαι μὴ χωρίζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄγουσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθα τὸ καλῶς ἐνεργοῦσι προηγούμενον τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον τιθέμεναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι τοίνυν καλὸν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τούτοις. τί οὖν; καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην, ἐν ᾗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι, ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ τῇδε τάξομεν;
Plato says the same about music and astronomy. So the arts that deal with bodies and use sensible instruments and perception, even if they are dispositions of the soul, are to be placed in this quality, since they belong to a soul that inclines downward. And nothing prevents us from placing here the practical virtues as well—those that act in such a way that their action is civic, insofar as they do not separate the soul by leading it toward the things There, but act well here, setting this as their primary aim rather than treating it as merely necessary. Beauty in the seed, then, and much more black and white, belong among these. What then? Shall we also place such a soul, the one in which these rational principles are, in the substance here?
ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα σώματα εἴπομεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ σωμάτων ποιήσεις οἱ λόγοι, ἐν ποιότητι ἐθέμεθα τῇ τῇδε· οὐσίαν δὲ αἰσθητὴν τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων θέμενοι οὐδαμῶς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐν αὐτῇ τάξομεν. ποιότητας δὲ ἀσωμάτους ἁπάσας λέγοντες ἐν αὐτῇ πάθη ὄντα νενευκότα τῇδε ἐνηριθμήσαμεν καὶ λόγους ψυχῆς τινος· τὸ γὰρ πάθος μεμερισμένον εἰς δύο, εἴς τε τὸ περὶ ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, ἐδίδομεν ποιότητι οὐ σωματικῇ οὔσῃ, περὶ σῶμα δὲ οὔσῃ· οὐκέτι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τῇδε τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ὅτι τὸ πρὸς σῶμα αὐτῆς πάθος ἤδη δεδωκότες ἦμεν ποιῷ· ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ πάθους καὶ τοῦ λόγου νοουμένην τῷ ὅθεν ἐστὶν ἀποδεδώκαμεν οὐδεμίαν οὐσίαν ὁπωσοῦν νοητὴν ἐνταῦθα καταλιπόντες.
No: we did not call these bodies either. But since the rational principles concern body and the making of bodies, we placed them in the quality here. And having posited sensible substance as what is made of all the things mentioned, we shall in no way place incorporeal substance in it. In calling all qualities incorporeal, we counted them in it as affections that incline toward here, and as rational principles of a certain soul. For we divided the affection into two, what it concerns and what it is in, and assigned it to quality, which is not corporeal but concerns body. But we did not go on to assign the soul to this substance, since we had already given its affection toward body to quality. Soul thought of without the affection and the rational principle we have handed back to where it comes from, leaving here no intelligible substance of any kind whatever.
εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω δοκεῖ, διαιρετέον τὰς μὲν ψυχικάς, τὰς δὲ σωματικάς, ὡς σώματος οὔσας ποιότητας. εἰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἁπάσας ἐκεῖ τις βούλεται, ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς τῇδε ποιότητας ἔστι διαιρεῖν, τὰς μὲν δι’ ὀμμάτων, τὰς δὲ δι’ ὤτων, τὰς δὲ δι’ ἁφῆς, γεύσεως, ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ τούτων εἴ τινες διαφοραί, ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα, ἀκοαῖς δὲ φωνάς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι· φωνὰς δέ, ᾗ ποιαί, ἡδύ, τραχύ, λεῖον.
If this is our view, qualities are to be divided into those of the soul and the bodily ones, which are qualities of body. But if one wants all souls to be There, one can divide the qualities here by the senses: some through the eyes, some through the ears, some through touch, taste, smell; and, if there are differences within these, colors by sight, sounds by hearing, and so on for the other senses; and sounds, insofar as they are qualified, as sweet, harsh, smooth.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότησι διαιρούμεθα καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς πράξεις καλὰς ἢ αἰσχρὰς καὶ ὅλως τοιάσδε — τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν ἢ ὀλιγάκις εἰς τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς εἴδη ποιούσας ἢ οὐδαμοῦ — καὶ τὸ ποσὸν δὲ ποιότησι ταῖς αὐτῶν οἰκείαις, πῶς ἄν τις καὶ τὸ ποιὸν διέλοι κατ’ εἴδη ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις ποίαις χρώμενος διαφοραῖς καὶ ἐκ ποίου γένους. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διαφορὰς οὐσίας οὐσίας πάλιν αὖ λέγοι. τίνι οὖν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν; τίνι δὲ τὰ χρώματα ὅλως ἀπὸ χυμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁπτικῶν ποιοτήτων;
We divide the differences in substance by qualities—and activities and actions too, as beautiful or ugly and in general of such-and-such a kind (for quantity enters into the differences that make species rarely or never)—and we divide quantity by the qualities proper to it. So one might be at a loss how to divide quality itself into species: using what differences, and taken from what genus? For it is absurd to divide it by itself or by something like it, just as if one said that the differences of substance were themselves substances again. By what, then, are white and black distinguished? By what are colors in general distinguished from flavors and the qualities of touch?
εἰ δὲ τοῖς διαφόροις αἰσθητηρίοις ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ διαφορά. ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴσθησιν πῶς; εἰ δ’ ὅτι τὸ μὲν συγκριτικόν, τὸ δὲ διακριτικὸν ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ διακριτικὸν γλώττης καὶ συγκριτικόν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν παθῶν, εἰ διακρίσεις τινὲς καὶ συγκρίσεις ταῦτα· ἔπειτα οὐκ αὐτὰ οἷς διαφέρει εἴρηκεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι οἷς δύνανται, καὶ οὐκ ἄλογον δὲ οἷς δύνανται, ἐκεῖνο ἴσως λεκτέον, ὡς οἷς δύνανται διαιρετέον τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα, οἷον τὰς ἐπιστήμας· αἰσθητὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὄντα διὰ τί ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖ; καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις δὲ διαιροῦντες οἷς δύνανται, καὶ ὅλως ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεσι διαστησάμενοι ὡς ἕτεραι ἐξ ὧν ποιοῦσιν, ἔχομεν λόγῳ διαφορὰς αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν οὐ μόνον περὶ ἅ, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγους αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες.
If by the different sense organs, the difference is not in the things underlying them. But how within the same sense? Suppose one says that one color contracts the eyes and another dilates them, and that one flavor dilates the tongue and another contracts it. First, there is dispute about the affections themselves, whether they are dilations and contractions. Second, he has not said what the things themselves differ by. If someone says they differ by what they can do—and “by what they can do” is not unreasonable—perhaps we should reply that it is the unseen things, such as the branches of knowledge, that are to be divided by what they can do. But these are perceptible: why divide them by their effects? Even with the branches of knowledge, when we divide them by what they can do, and in general when we distinguish the powers of the soul as different by what they produce, we are able to grasp their differences by reason, seeing not only what they deal with but also their rational principles.
ἢ τὰς μὲν τέχνας ἕξομεν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς θεωρήμασι, τὰς δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι ποιότητας πῶς; ἢ κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν διαφόρων πῶς ἕτεροι ζητήσειεν ἄν τις. καὶ γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος διαφέρειν· ἀλλὰ τίνι ζητοῦμεν.
Or perhaps we can deal with the arts by their rational principles and their theorems; but how with the qualities in bodies? Or perhaps even there, with the different rational principles, one might ask how they are different. For white plainly differs from black; but what it differs by is just what we are asking.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἅπαντα τὰ ἀπορηθέντα δεικνύει, ὡς τῶν ἄλλων δεῖ διαφορὰς ζητεῖν, αἷς χωριοῦμεν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἕκαστα, τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν διαφορὰς καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄλογον. οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίας οὐσιῶν οὔτε ποσοῦ ποσότητας οὔτε ποιότητας ποιοτήτων οὔτε διαφορὰς διαφορῶν οἷόν τε· ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη, οὗ ἐγχωρεῖ, τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἢ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς ἢ τοῖς τοιούτοις· οὗ δὲ μηδὲ ταῦτα, οἷον πράσινον ὠχροῦ, ἐπειδὴ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος λέγουσι, τί ἄν τις εἴποι; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὅτι ἕτερα, ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ ὁ νοῦς ἐρεῖ, καὶ οὐ δώσουσι λόγον, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις, ὅτι μηδ’ αὐτῆς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μόνον μηνύσεις διαφόρους ποιήσασθαι, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐν ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολαῖς ἁπλοῦς καὶ οὐ λόγοις χρῆται πανταχοῦ, ὡς λέγειν τόδε ἕκαστον τόδε.
But all these puzzles show that we must look for differences of the other things, by which we separate each from each; differences of differences, though, are both impossible and unreasonable. There cannot be substances of substances, quantities of quantity, qualities of qualities, or differences of differences. Rather, where possible, we must use external features, or productive ones, or the like. Where not even these are available—green as against pale yellow, for instance, since they say these come from white and black—what could one say? Rather, perception or intellect will say that they are different, and they will not give an account: perception, because giving an account is not its business, only making different reports; and intellect, because in its intuitive apprehensions it is simple and does not use accounts everywhere, so that it says of each thing “this is this.”
καὶ ἔστιν ἑτερότης ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτοῦ διαιροῦσα θάτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου οὐχ ἑτερότητος αὐτὴ δεομένη. αἱ τοίνυν ποιότητες πότερα διαφοραὶ πᾶσαι γίνοιντο ἂν ἢ οὔ; λευκότης μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὅλως αἱ χρόαι, καὶ περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ χυμοὺς γένοιντο ἂν διαφοραὶ ἑτέρων καὶ εἴδη ὄντα, γραμματικὴ δὲ καὶ μουσικὴ πῶς;
And there is an otherness in its motions that divides one thing from another, without itself needing otherness. Are all qualities, then, differences, or not? Whiteness, and colors in general, and the qualities of touch and of flavor, could be differences of other things while also being species; but how could grammar and music be?
ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν ψυχήν, τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ⟨…⟩ καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ φύσει εἶεν, ὥστε καὶ εἰδοποιοὺς διαφορὰς γίνεσθαι. καὶ εἰ εἴη τις διαφορὰ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου· καὶ εἰ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, οἷον ποιοτήτων ποιότητας. ἀρετὴ γὰρ καὶ κακία ἡ μὲν ἕξις τοιάδε, ἡ δὲ τοιάδε· ὥστε ποιοτήτων οὐσῶν τῶν ἕξεων αἱ διαφοραὶ ποιότητες· εἰ μή τις φαίη τὴν μὲν ἕξιν ἄνευ τῆς διαφορᾶς μὴ ποιότητα εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν τὴν ποιότητα ποιεῖν. ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ γλυκὺ ὠφέλιμον, βλαβερὸν δὲ τὸ πικρόν, σχέσει, οὐ ποιότητι, διαιρεῖ. τί δ’ εἰ τὸ γλυκὺ παχύ, τὸ δὲ αὐστηρὸν λεπτόν;
Perhaps in this way: the one a grammatical soul, the other a musical one ⟨…⟩, especially if they were natural, so that they too become differences that make species. And then, whether a difference could come from this genus or from another as well; and if from this genus, it would be a difference of things in the same genus—qualities of qualities, for example. For virtue and vice are, the one a state of this sort, the other of that sort; so, since states are qualities, their differences are qualities—unless one were to say that the state without the difference is not a quality, but that the difference makes the quality. But if the sweet is beneficial and the bitter harmful, this divides by relation, not by quality. What if the sweet is thick and the astringent thin?
οὐ [τὸ] τί ἦν γλυκὺ ἴσως λέγει παχύ, ἀλλ’ ᾧ ἡ γλυκύτης· καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐστηροῦ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· ὥστε εἰ πανταχοῦ μὴ ποιότητος ποιότης διαφορὰ σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ οὐδε οὐσίας οὐσία, οὐδὲ ποσοῦ ποσότης. ἢ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν διαφέρει δυσίν. ἢ ὑπερέχει δυσί, διαφέρει δ’ οὐ λέγεται· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ διαφέροι δυσὶν ἐν τοῖς τρισίν; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κίνησις κινήσεως κινήσει διαφέροι ἄν, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄν τις εὕροι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ληπτέον, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοῖς διοίσει.
Perhaps he does not mean that [the] what-it-is of sweet is thick, but that what the sweetness is in is thick; and the same argument holds for the astringent. So we must consider whether a quality is never a difference of a quality, just as substance is not of substance, nor quantity of quantity. Or does five differ from three by two? No: it exceeds it by two; it is not said to differ. For how could it differ by a two that is within the three? Nor would one motion differ from another by a motion, nor would one find this in the other cases. In the case of virtue and vice, one must take whole against whole, and in this way they will differ by themselves.
τὸ δὲ ἐκ ταὐτοῦ γένους, τοῦ ποιοῦ, καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἄλλου, εἴ τις διαιροῖ τῷ τὴν μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς, τὴν δὲ περὶ ὀργάς, καὶ τὴν μὲν περὶ καρποῦ κομιδήν, [τὴν δὲ περὶ δαπάνην εἶναι,] καὶ οὕτω παραδέξαιτο καλῶς ὡρίσθαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι διαφορὰς εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποιότητας.
As for differences from the same genus, quality, and not from another: if someone divides virtues by one being concerned with pleasures, another with anger, another with acquiring income, [another with spending,] and accepts that they are well defined in this way, then clearly there can be differences that are not qualities.
τῇ δὲ ποιότητι συντακτέον, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει, καὶ τοὺς κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιούς, καθ’ ὅσον ποιότης περὶ αὐτούς, οὐ προσποιουμένους αὐτούς, ἵνα μὴ κατηγορίαι δύο, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοῦτο ἀνιόντας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, ἀφ’ οὗ λέγονται. τὸ δὲ οὐ λευκόν, εἰ μὲν σημαίνει ἄλλο χρῶμα, ποιότης. εἰ δὲ ἀπόφασις μόνον εἴη πραγμάτων ἢ ἐξαρίθμησις, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ· φωνὴ ἢ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος γινομένου καὶ αὐτοῦ πράγματος· καὶ εἰ μὲν φωνή, κίνησίς τις, εἰ δ’ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος, πρός τι, καθὸ σημαντικά.
With quality we should rank, as we decided, the things qualified by qualities as well, insofar as quality concerns them—not adding them on as something extra, so that there would be two categories, but going up from them to that from which they are named. “Not white,” if it signifies another color, is a quality. But if it were merely a negation of things, or an enumeration, it would be nothing—unless it is a sound, or a name, or a phrase, which is itself a thing that comes to be. If a sound, it is a kind of motion; if a name or a phrase, it is relative, insofar as these signify.
εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον πραγμάτων ἡ ἐξαρίθμησις κατὰ γένος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ σημαίνοντα, τίνος ἕκαστον γένους σημαντικόν, ἐροῦμεν τὰ μὲν τίθεσθαι αὐτὰ μόνον δηλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ ἀναιρεῖν αὐτά· καίτοι βέλτιον ἴσως τὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτῶν μὴ συναριθμεῖν τάς τε καταφάσεις μὴ συναριθμοῦντας διὰ τὸ σύνθετον. τὰς δὲ στερήσεις πῶς; [ἤ,] εἰ ὧν αἱ στερήσεις ποιότητες, καὶ αὐταὶ ποιότητες, οἷον νωδὸς ἢ τυφλός· ὁ δὲ γυμνὸς καὶ ἠμφιεσμένος οὐδέτερος ποιός, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλόν πως ἔχων· ἐν σχέσει οὖν τῇ πρὸς ἄλλο. πάθος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἔτι οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλά τις κίνησις· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πεπονθέναι καὶ ἔχειν μένον ἤδη τὸ πάθος ποιότης· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοι ἔτι τὸ πάθος, λέγοιτο δὲ πεπονθέναι, κεκινῆσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἦν ἐν κινήσει.
But if the enumeration by genus is not only of things, but must also cover what is said and what signifies, stating what genus each signifies, we shall say that some posit things, merely indicating them, while others deny them. Yet perhaps it is better not to count negations along with them, since we do not count affirmations either, because they are composite. What about privations? [Or,] if the things of which they are privations are qualities, they are qualities too, like “toothless” or “blind.” But “naked” and “clothed” are neither of them qualified; rather they are in a certain state, so they consist in a relation to something else. An affection that is still in the undergoing is not a quality but a kind of motion; when it consists in having undergone and in keeping the affection, which now stays, it is a quality. If the thing no longer has the affection but is said to have undergone it, it has been moved; and that is the same as “was in motion.”
δεῖ δὲ μόνον κίνησιν νοεῖν ἀφαιροῦντα τὸν χρόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ νῦν προσλαμβάνειν προσήκει. τὸ δὲ καλῶς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μίαν νόησιν τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀνακτέον. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐρυθριᾶν εἰς τὸ ποιὸν ἀνακτέον, τὸν δὲ ἐρυθρὸν μηκέτι, ἐπισκεπτέον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρυθαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀνακτέον· πάσχει γὰρ ἢ ὅλως κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ μηκέτι ἐρυθαίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἤδη [ἐρυθρός] ἐστι, διὰ τί οὐ ποιός; οὐ γὰρ χρόνῳ ὁ ποιός. ἢ τίνι ὁριστέον; ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιῷδε, καὶ ἐρυθρὸν λέγοντες ποιὸν λέγομεν· ἢ οὕτως τὰς ἕξεις μόνας ποιότητας ἐροῦμεν, τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκέτι. καὶ θερμὸς τοίνυν οὐχ ὁ θερμαινόμενος, καὶ νοσῶν οὐχ ὁ ἀγόμενος εἰς νόσον.
But one should think of the motion alone, removing the time; it is not right to bring in even the “now.” “Well” and the like must be referred to a single notion, that of the genus. Whether being red should be referred to quality, but the red man no longer, must be examined. Turning red is rightly not to be referred to it, for that is being affected, or in general being moved. But if he is no longer turning red but already is [red], why is he not qualified? Being qualified is not a matter of time. Or else, by what are we to define it? By being “such”; and in calling him red we call him qualified. Otherwise we shall say that only states are qualities, and dispositions no longer. Then “hot” is not what is being heated, and “sick” is not one who is falling ill.
ὁρᾶν δὲ δεῖ, εἰ μὴ πάσῃ ποιότητί ἐστί τις ἄλλη ἐναντία· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῖς ἄκροις δοκεῖ ἐπ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἐναντίον εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων τὰ μεταξὺ οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι μίξεις τῶν ἄκρων τὰ μεταξύ, ἔδει μὴ ἀντιδιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ λευκῷ καὶ μέλανι, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα συνθέσεις. ἢ τῷ μίαν τινὰ ἄλλην ἐπὶ τῶν μεταξύ, κἂν ἐκ συνθέσεως ᾖ θεωρεῖσθαι, ἀντιτίθεμεν. ἢ ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία οὐ μόνον διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖστον. ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει τὸ πλεῖστον διαφέρειν λαμβάνεσθαι ἐν τῷ θέσθαι ἤδη ταῦτα τὰ μεταξύ· ἐπεί, εἴ τις ταύτην τὴν διάταξιν ἀφέλοι, τίνι τὸ πλεῖστον ὁριεῖ;
We must see whether every quality may not have another quality contrary to it; for in the case of virtue and vice the mean seems to be contrary to the extremes. But with colors the intermediates are not like this. Now if this is because the intermediates are mixtures of the extremes, we should not have set them up as opposites, but only white and black, the others being compounds. Or else we set them in opposition because there is some single other quality in the intermediates, even if it can be seen to arise from combination. Or because contraries do not merely differ, but differ most. But “differing most” seems to be grasped only once these intermediates have already been posited; for if one took away this arrangement, by what would one define the “most”?
ἢ ὅτι τὸ φαιὸν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ λευκοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μέλαν· καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς ὄψεως μηνύεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χυμῶν ὡσαύτως, θερμόν, ψυχρόν, τὸ μηδέτερον μεταξύ. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν εἰθίσμεθα, δῆλον· τάχα δ’ ἄν τις ἡμῖν συγχωροῖ ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν ὁμοίως πάντη ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι καὶ ἕτερα ὄντα ποιὰ ἐναντία εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ εἶναι μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἄλλα τούτων ἡ ἐναντιότης· ὑγιείᾳ γοῦν καὶ νόσῳ οὐδὲν παρεμπέπτωκε μεταξὺ καὶ ἐναντία. ἢ ὅτι τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ ἑκατέρου πλείστην παραλλαγὴν ἔχει. καὶ πῶς πλείστην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν μὴ οὐσῶν ἐν τοῖς μέσοις ἐλαττόνων; οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐπὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν. ἄλλῳ τοίνυν τὸ ἐναντίον, οὐ τῷ πλεῖστον, ὁριστέον.
Perhaps because gray is nearer to white than black is; and sight reports this. Likewise with flavors—and hot, cold, with what is neither between them. That we are used to thinking this way is clear. But perhaps someone might grant us these points and yet say that white and yellow, and anything with respect to anything, are all alike different from one another in every way, and that, being different qualities, they are contraries. For their contrariety does not depend on there being other things between them: health and sickness, at any rate, have nothing falling between them, and they are contraries. Or perhaps because what comes from each shows the greatest variation. But how can one speak of “greatest” when there are no lesser ones in the middle? With health and sickness, then, one cannot speak of “greatest.” So contrariety must be defined by something else, not by the “most.”
εἰ δὲ τῷ πολλῷ, εἰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέον πρὸς ἔλαττον, πάλιν τὰ ἄμεσα ἐκφεύξεται· εἰ δ’ ἁπλῶς πολύ, ἕκαστον φύσει πολὺ ἀφεστάναι συγχρωρηθέντος, μὴ τῷ πλείονι μετρεῖν τὴν ἀπόστασιν. ἀλλ’ ἐπισκεπτέον, πῶς τὸ ἐναντίον. ἆρ’ οὖν τὰ μὲν ἔχοντά τινα ὁμοιότητα· λέγω δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ γένος οὐδὲ πάντως τῷ μεμῖχθαι ἄλλαις οἷον μορφαῖς αὐτῶν ἢ πλείονα ἢ ἐλάττονα· οὐκ ἐναντία, ἀλλ’ οἷς μηδὲν ταὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐναντία, καὶ προσθετέον δὲ ἐν γένει τῷ ποιῷ· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἄμεσα τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷς μηδὲν εἰς ὁμοίωσιν, οὐκ ὄντων ἄλλων τῶν οἷον ἐπαμφοτεριζόντων καὶ ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐχόντων, τῶν δέ τινων μόνων μὴ ἐχόντων. εἰ [δὲ] τοῦτο, οἷς μέν ἐστι κοινότης ἐν τοῖς χρώμασιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐναντία.
If it is by “much,” then if “much” stands for “more” as against “less,” again the contraries without intermediates will escape; but if it is “much” simply, then, granting that each is by nature far removed, we should not measure the distance by the “more.” But we must examine what contrariety is. Do things that have some similarity—I mean not in genus, nor at all by being mixed, more or less, with each other’s shapes, so to speak—fail to be contraries, while those that have nothing the same in form are contraries? And we should add: in the genus of quality. For from this we get the contraries without intermediates—those that have nothing tending toward similarity, there being no other things that, as it were, lean both ways and have similarity to each other—while with others it is only certain ones that lack it. If [so], those colors that have something in common would not be contraries.
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν κωλύσει μὴ πᾶν μὲν παντί, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλῳ οὕτως εἶναι ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ χυμῶν δὲ ὡσαύτως. ταῦτα μὲν [οὖν] οὕτω διηπορήσθω. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐν μὲν τοῖς μετέχουσιν ὅτι ἐστίν, ἐδόκει, ὑγίεια δὲ αὐτὴ καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἠπορεῖτο. εἰ δὴ πλάτος ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις αὐτὰς δοτέον· ἐκεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅλον καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον.
But nothing will prevent it being the case that not every color is contrary to every other in this way, but one to another; and likewise with flavors. [So] let these puzzles be worked through like this. As for the “more,” it seemed that it is present in the things that participate, but there was a puzzle about health itself and justice itself. If each of these has a range, we must grant it to the states themselves too; but There, each is the whole and does not admit of the more.
Motion
Motion is the passage from potentiality into actuality; alteration and local motion are its kinds.
περὶ δὲ κινήσεως, εἰ δεῖ γένος θέσθαι, ὧδ’ ἄν τις θεωρήσειε· πρῶτον μέν, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο γένος ἀνάγειν προσῆκεν, ἔπειτα, εἰ μηδὲν ἄνωθεν αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγοροῖτο, εἶτα, εἰ πολλὰς διαφορὰς λαβοῦσα εἴδη ποιήσει, εἰς ποῖόν τις γένος αὐτὴν ἀνάξει; οὔτε γὰρ οὐσία οὔτε ποιότης τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτήν· οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν πολλαὶ κινήσεις· οὐδ’ αὖ εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅτι πολλαὶ κινήσεις ποιήσεις· ποιήσεις δὲ καὶ πείσεις εἰς ταύτην. οὐδ’ αὖ εἰς τὸ πρός τι ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τινὸς ἡ κίνησις καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ αὑτῆς οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἐν τῷ πρός τι· τινὸς γὰρ ἡ ποιότης καὶ ἔν τινι· καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ὡσαύτως.
About motion, whether we should posit it as a genus, one might consider the matter like this. First, whether it should not rather be referred to another genus; next, whether nothing above it is predicated in its “what it is”; then, whether by taking on many differences it will produce species. To what genus will one refer it? It is neither the substance nor a quality of the things that have it. Nor indeed is it to be referred to acting, for in being affected there are many motions; nor again to being affected, because many motions are actings—rather, actings and affections are to be referred to it. Nor would it be right to refer it to relation on the ground that motion is of something and not by itself; for in that way quality too would be in relation, since quality is of something and in something; and quantity likewise.
εἰ δ’ ὅτι ὄντα ἐκεῖνά τινα, κἄν τινος ᾖ, καθ’ ὅ ἐστι τὸ μὲν ποιότης, τὸ δὲ ποσότης εἴρηται· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐπειδή, κἄν τινος ἡ κίνησις ᾖ, ἔστι τι πρὸ τοῦ τινὸς εἶναι, ὃ ἔστιν ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ ληπτέον ἂν εἴη. ὅλως γὰρ πρός τι δεῖ τίθεσθαι οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν, εἶτ’ ἄλλου ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἡ σχέσις ἀπογεννᾷ οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἄλλου παρὰ τὴν σχέσιν καθ’ ὃ λέγεται, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον καθ’ ὃ λέγεται διπλάσιον ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ πηχυαῖον παραβολῇ τὴν γένεσιν λαβὸν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὐδὲν νοούμενον πρὸ τούτου ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον παραβεβλῆσθαι ἔσχε τοῦτο λέγεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἑτέρου ὄν ἐστί τι, ἵνα καὶ ἑτέρου ᾖ, ὡς τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ ἡ οὐσία;
If one says that those are something by being what they are, even if they are of something, the one being called quality and the other quantity, then in the same way, since motion, even if it is of something, is something before being of something, it should be taken for what it is in itself. In general, one must count as relative not what is something and then belongs to another, but what the relation generates, there being nothing besides the relation in virtue of which it is so called. The double, for instance, in virtue of which a thing is called double, gets its origin and its existence in the comparison with the cubit-long; nothing is conceived prior to this, and it got its being called and being double from being compared with another. What, then, is this thing which, belonging to another, is something, so that it can also belong to another, as quality, quantity and substance do?
ἢ πρότερον, ὅτι μηδὲν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὡς γένος κατηγορεῖται, ληπτέον. ἀλλ’ εἰ τὴν μεταβολὴν λέγοι τις πρὸ κινήσεως εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ταὐτὸν λέγει ἢ γένος λέγων ἐκεῖνο ποιήσει ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ πρόσθεν εἰρημένα· εἶτα δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν εἴδει τὴν κίνησιν θήσεται καί τι ἕτερον ἀντιθήσει τῇ κινήσει τὴν γένεσιν ἴσως, μεταβολήν τινα κἀκείνην λέγων, κίνησιν δὲ οὔ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ κίνησις ἡ γένεσις; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι μήπω ἐστὶ τὸ γινόμενον, κίνησις δὲ οὐ· περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδ’ ἂν μεταβολὴ δηλονότι ἂν εἴη ἡ γένεσις· εἰ δ’ ὅτι ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀλλοίωσίς τις καὶ αὔξη τῷ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν καὶ αὐξομένων τὴν γένεσιν εἶναι, τὰ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως λαμβάνει.
Or rather, we must first grasp that nothing is predicated before it as a genus. But if someone says change is prior to motion, then first, either he is saying the same thing, or, by calling change a genus, he will make it another genus besides those already mentioned. Then clearly he will place motion as a species and set something else against motion—coming-to-be, perhaps—calling that too a change, but not a motion. Why, then, is coming-to-be not a motion? If it is because what comes to be does not yet exist, and motion does not concern what does not exist, then clearly coming-to-be would not be a change either. But if it is because coming-to-be is nothing but a kind of alteration and growth, since coming-to-be consists in certain things being altered and growing, he is taking what precedes coming-to-be.
δεῖ δὲ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τούτοις ἕτερόν τι εἶδος λαβεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παθητικῶς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἡ γένεσις, οἷον θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ λευκαίνεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τούτων γενομένων μήπω τὴν ἁπλῶς γένεσιν γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἠλλοιῶσθαι· ἀλλ’ ὅταν ζῷον ἢ φυτόν, ὅταν εἶδός τι λαμβάνῃ. εἴποι δ’ ἄν τις τὴν μεταβολὴν μᾶλλον ἁρμόττειν ἐν εἴδει τίθεσθαι ἢ τὴν κίνησιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄλλο ἀνθ’ ἑτέρου ἐθέλει σημαίνειν, τὸ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ οἰκείου μετάστασιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τοπικὴ κίνησις· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο βούλεταί τις, ἀλλ’ ἡ μάθησις καὶ ἡ κιθάρισις, ἢ ὅλως ἡ ἀφ’ ἕξεως κίνησις· ὥστε εἶδός τι ἂν εἴη κινήσεως μᾶλλον ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἐκστατική τις οὖσα κίνησις.
But in these cases we must take coming-to-be as a different species. For becoming and coming-to-be do not consist in being passively altered, like being heated or whitened: when these have happened, coming-to-be in the strict sense may not yet have happened, only this very being altered, in the sense of becoming such. Rather, it is when an animal or a plant comes to be, when something takes on a form. Someone might say that it suits change better than motion to be placed as a species, because the word “change” means to signify one thing in place of another, whereas “motion” also includes departure from what is one’s own, as local motion does; and if one does not mean that, then learning and lyre-playing, or in general motion from a state. So alteration would rather be a species of motion, being a kind of motion that takes a thing out of itself.
ἀλλ’ ἔστω ταὐτὸν νοούμενον τὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως κατὰ τὸ παρακολουθεῖν τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἄλλο. τί οὖν δεῖ λέγειν τὴν κίνησιν; ἔστω δὴ ἡ κίνησις, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἐκ δυνάμεως ὁδὸς εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ὃ λέγεται δύνασθαι. ὄντος γὰρ δυνάμει τοῦ μέν, ὅτι ἥκοι ἂν εἰς εἶδός τι, οἷον δυνάμει ἀνδριάς, τοῦ δέ, ὅτι ἥκοι ἂν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, οἷον τὸ βαδιστικόν, ὅταν τὸ μὲν προίῃ εἰς ἀνδριάντα, ἡ πρόοδος κίνησις, τὸ δ’ [ὅταν] ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ᾖ, τὸ βαδίζειν αὐτὸ κίνησις· καὶ ὄρχησις ἐπὶ τοῦ δυναμένου ὀρχεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀρχῆται.
But let alteration be understood as the same thing, in that otherness accompanies motion. What, then, are we to say motion is? Let motion be, to put it in outline, the passage from potentiality into that which the thing is said to be capable of. One thing is potentially something because it might come to a form—a potential statue, for example; another, because it might come to activity—what is able to walk, for example. When the first advances into a statue, the advance is motion; when the other is walking, the walking itself is motion; and dancing, in the case of what is able to dance, when it dances.
καὶ ἐπὶ μέν τινι κινήσει εἶδος ἄλλο ἐπιγίνεται, ὃ εἰργάσατο ἡ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἁπλοῦν εἶδος ὂν τῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν ἔχει μετ’ αὐτὴν παυσαμένης τῆς κινήσεως· ὥστε, εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶδος ἐγρηγορὸς ἀντίθετον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσι τοῖς ἑστηκόσιν, ᾗ τὰ μὲν μένει, τὰ δὲ οὔ, καὶ αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν, ὅταν μετ’ αὐτήν τι γίνηται, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴη· εἰ δὲ καὶ ζωήν τις λέγοι σωμάτων ταύτην, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος νῦν [,οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴη]· τὴν γὰρ κίνησιν ταύτην ὁμώνυμον δεῖ λέγειν ταῖς νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κινήσεσιν. ὅτι δὲ γένος ἐστίν, οὐχ ἧττον ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ὁρισμῷ ἢ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι λαβεῖν πιστώσαιτο.
Upon some motion another form supervenes, which the motion has produced; but the other kind of motion, being as it were a simple form of the potentiality, has nothing after it once the motion stops. So if someone said that motion is a waking form, set against the other forms, which stand still—in that they remain and it does not—and the cause of the other forms whenever something comes about after it, he would not be absurd. And if someone also called this motion, the one we are now discussing, the life of bodies [, he would not be absurd]; for this motion must be said to share only its name with the motions of Intellect and Soul. That it is a genus one might be convinced no less from the fact that it is not easy, or even impossible, to grasp it by a definition.
ἀλλὰ πῶς εἶδός τι, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἡ κίνησις, ἢ ὅταν παθητικὴ ἡ κίνησις; ἢ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἰ] ἡ θέρμανσις τὰ μὲν αὔξοι ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὰ δὲ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἄγοι· καὶ ᾗ κοινόν τι ἡ κίνησις, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν, τοῖς δὲ ὑποκειμένοις τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν δοκοῦσαν ἔχει. ὑγίανσις οὖν καὶ νόσανσις ταὐτόν;
But how is it a form when the motion is toward the worse, or when the motion is passive? Perhaps it is like the way the heating that comes from the sun makes some things grow and leads others the opposite way. Insofar as it is something common, the motion is the same in both cases, and it gets its apparent difference from the things underlying it. Are getting well and getting sick, then, the same?
ἢ καθ’ ὅσον μὲν κίνησις ταὐτόν· τίνι δὲ διοίσει; πότερα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὕστερον, ὅταν περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ἐπισκοπῶμεν· νῦν δὲ τί ταὐτὸν ἐν πάσῃ κινήσει σκεπτέον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένος εἴη. ἢ πολλαχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ οὕτως ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ὄν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι ἴσως δεῖ, ὅσαι μὲν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγουσιν ἢ ἐνεργοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, ταύτας μὲν οἷον εἴδη εἶναι, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰς δὲ εἰς τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀγωγὰς ἀνὰ λόγον τίθεσθαι τοῖς ἐφ’ ἃ ἄγουσιν. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸν ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ γενέσεως καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις ἔτι τε τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς, καθ’ ὃ κινήσεις αὗται πᾶσαι;
Insofar as they are motion, they are the same. But by what will they differ? By the underlying things, or by something else as well? But this later, when we examine alteration; now we must consider what is the same in every motion, for that is how it would be a genus. Or perhaps it will be said in many ways, and it will be like being. As for the puzzle: perhaps the motions that lead to what is natural, or act in things that are natural, should be counted as species, so to speak, as was said, while those that lead to what is unnatural should be placed in proportion to what they lead to. But what is common to alteration, growth, coming-to-be and their contraries, and further to change of place, in virtue of which these are all motions?
ἢ τὸ μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἕκαστον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον ἦν, εἶναι μηδ’ ἠρεμεῖν μηδ’ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ παντελεῖ, ἀλλά, καθ’ ὅσον κίνησις πάρεστιν, ἀεὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον [τῷ] οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένειν· ἀπόλλυσθαι γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν, ὅταν μὴ ἄλλο. διὸ καὶ ἑτερότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ γεγονέναι καὶ μεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἑτερότης· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἕτερον ἀεί, διότι κίνησις αὐτὸν ποιεῖ· μεμετρημένη γὰρ κίνησις οὐ μένουσα· συνθεῖ οὖν αὐτῇ ὡς ἐπὶ φερομένης ὀχούμενος. κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ εἰς ἐνέργειαν πρόοδον καὶ ἀγωγὴν εἶναι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον καθ’ ὁποιανοῦν κίνησιν προυπάρχον δυνάμενον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι γίνεται.
Perhaps this: that each thing is not in the same state it was in before, nor quiet, nor in complete repose, but, insofar as motion is present, always has its direction toward something else; and its being other [lies in] not remaining in the same; for motion perishes when there is no “other.” That is why otherness here is not in having become other and remaining in the other, but is perpetual otherness. Hence time too is always other, because motion makes it; for it is motion measured, motion that does not stay. So it runs along with motion, as if riding on something that is carried along. And what is common to all is that there is an advance and passage from potentiality, from the potential, into activity. For everything moved by any motion whatever, existing beforehand with the capacity to do or undergo this, comes to do it in being moved.
καὶ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παρ’ ἄλλου ἐνιεμένη σείουσα καὶ ἐλαύνουσα καὶ ἐγείρουσα καὶ ὠθοῦσα τὰ μεταλαβόντα αὐτῆς, ὥστε μὴ εὕδειν μηδ’ ἐν ταυτότητι εἶναι, ἵνα δὴ τῇ μὴ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ οἷον πολυπραγμονήσει ταύτῃ εἰδώλῳ συνέχηται ζωῆς. δεῖ δὲ οὐ τὰ κινούμενα τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι νομίζειν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ πόδες ἡ βάδισις, ἀλλ’ ἡ περὶ τοὺς πόδας ἐνέργεια ἐκ δυνάμεως. ἀοράτου δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης τοὺς ἐνεργοῦντας πόδας ὁρᾶν μόνον ἀνάγκη, οὐ πόδας ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἡσύχαζον, ἀλλ’ ἤδη μετ’ ἄλλου, ἀοράτου μὲν τούτου, ὅτι δὲ μετ’ ἄλλου κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρωμένου τῷ τοὺς πόδας ὁρᾶν ἄλλον τόπον ἔχοντας καὶ ἄλλον καὶ μὴ ἠρεμεῖν· τὸ δ’ ἀλλοιούμενον παρὰ τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου, ὅτι μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ποιότης.
And motion in the sensible world, sent in from something else, shakes and drives and wakes and pushes the things that share in it, so that they do not sleep or stay in sameness—so that by this unrest and, as it were, busyness they may be held together by an image of life. One should not think that the moved things are the motion: the feet are not the walking; walking is the activity, from a potentiality, in the feet. Since the potentiality is invisible, we necessarily see only the active feet: not feet simply, as they would be if at rest, but feet now with something else. This something is invisible, but it is seen incidentally, as being with something else, because we see the feet occupying now one place, now another, and not at rest. And with alteration, we see it from the thing being altered, because its quality is not the same.
ἐν τίνι οὖν ἡ κίνησις, ὅταν ἄλλο κινῇ, καὶ ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἴῃ; ἆρα ἐν τῷ κινοῦντι; καὶ πῶς τὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον μεταλήψεται; ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ; διὰ τί οὖν ἐλθοῦσα οὐ μένει; ἢ δεῖ μήτε τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἀπηλλάχθαι μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἀποτετμημένην εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου εἰς ἐκεῖνο, οἷον πνοὴν εἰς ἄλλο.
In what, then, is the motion, when one thing moves another, and also when something passes from the potentiality within it into activity? In the mover? Then how will what is moved and affected share in it? In the thing moved? Then why, once it has come, does it not remain? Or rather, it must neither be detached from the agent nor be in it; it must come from the agent and go into the other—not cut off and lodged in the other, but from the one to the other, like a breath blowing into something else.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν βαδιστικὴ ᾖ, οἷον ὦσε καὶ πεποίηκεν ἄλλον ἀλλάττειν ἀεὶ τόπον, ὅταν δὲ θερμαντική, ἐθέρμανε· καὶ ὅταν ἡ δύναμις ὕλην λαβοῦσα εἰς φύσιν οἰκοδομῇ, αὔξησις, ὅταν δ’ ἄλλη δύναμις ἀφαιρῇ, μείωσις τοῦ δυναμένου ἀφαίρεσιν παθεῖν μειουμένου· καὶ ὅταν ἡ γεννῶσα φύσις ἐνεργῇ, γένεσις, ὅταν δὲ αὕτη ἀδυνατῇ, ἡ δὲ φθείρειν δυναμένη ἐπικρατῇ, φθορά, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονότι, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐν τῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ ὑγίανσις δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ποιεῖν δυναμένης ὑγίειαν ἐνεργούσης καὶ κρατούσης, νόσανσις δὲ τῆς ἐναντίας δυνάμεως τἀναντία ποιούσης· ὥστε συμβαίνειν μὴ παρὰ τὰ ἐν οἷς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐξ ὧν καὶ δι’ ὧν, καὶ τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἰδιότητα ποιὰν τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τοιάνδε εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις.
When the power of moving is a power of walking, it pushes, so to speak, and has made the other keep changing place; when it is a power of heating, it heats. When the power takes matter and builds it into a nature, that is growth; when another power takes away, that is diminution, as the thing capable of losing something is diminished. When the generating nature is active, that is coming-to-be; when it is powerless and the power capable of destroying prevails, that is destruction—not the destruction in what has already come to be, but in what is on its way. Getting well works the same way, when the power capable of producing health is active and prevails; getting sick, when the contrary power produces the contrary. So it turns out that the motion depends not only on the things in which it is, but also on the things from which and through which it comes, and that the distinctive character of the motion lies in its being a motion qualified and of a certain kind in such cases.
περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, εἰ τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον, καὶ τὸ κύκλῳ τοῦ ἐπ’ εὐθείας διοίσει, πῶς ἡ διαφορά, οἷον τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καὶ ὑπὸ πόδας ῥίπτειν; καὶ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ὠστικὴ μία, εἰ μή τις ἄλλην τὴν ἄνω ὠθοῦσαν καὶ ἄλλην [τὴν κάτω] λέγοι, καὶ ἄλλως τὴν κάτω πρὸς τὴν ἄνω φοράν, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ φυσικῶς κινοῖτο, εἰ ἡ μὲν κουφότης εἴη, ἡ δὲ βαρύτης. ἀλλὰ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον φέρεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνταῦθα κινδυνεύειν παρὰ τὰ ἔξω τὴν διαφορὰν γίνεσθαι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κύκλῳ καὶ ἐπ’ εὐθείας, εἰ οἷόν περ ἐπ’ εὐθείας καὶ κύκλῳ περιθρέξαιεν, πῶς ἄλλη;
As for local motion, if moving upward is contrary to moving downward, and circular motion differs from straight, how are we to understand the difference—as with throwing something over one’s head and down at one’s feet? For the pushing power is one—unless someone says that the power pushing upward is different from the one [pushing downward], and that downward travel differs from upward in a different way, especially if the motion is natural, the one being lightness, the other heaviness. But moving to one’s proper place is common and the same, so that here the difference seems to come from external factors. As for circular and straight motion, if people ran in a circle just as they run on a straight line, how is the motion different?
ἢ παρὰ τὸ τῆς πορείας σχῆμα, εἰ μή τις μικτὴν λέγοι τὴν κύκλῳ, ὡς οὐ παντελῶς οὖσαν κίνησιν οὐδὲ πάντη ἐξισταμένην. ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ὅλως μία τις εἶναι ἡ τοπικὴ τοῖς ἔξωθεν τὰς διαφορὰς λαμβάνουσα.
Perhaps by the shape of the path—unless one says that circular motion is mixed, as being neither entirely motion nor entirely a departure. But on the whole, local motion seems to be one, taking its differences from external things.
σύγκρισις δὲ καὶ διάκρισις ἐπισκεπτέα πῶς. ἆρ’ ἕτεραι κινήσεις τῶν εἰρημένων, γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως, τοπικῆς μεταβολῆς, ἀλλοιώσεως, ἢ εἰς ταύτας αὐτὰς ἀνακτέον, ἢ τούτων τινὰς συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτ’ ἔχει ἡ σύγκρισις, πρόσοδον ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ τὸ πελάζειν, καὶ αὖ ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τοὐπίσω, τοπικὰς ἄν τις κινήσεις λέγοι δύο κινούμενα λέγων πρὸς ἕν τι, ἢ ἀποχωροῦντα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων. εἰ δὲ σύγκρασίν τινα καὶ μῖξιν λαμβάνουσι καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ εἰς ἓν ἐξ ἑνὸς σύστασιν τὴν κατὰ τὸ συνίστασθαι γινομένην, οὐ κατὰ τὸ συνεστάναι ἤδη, εἰς τίνα ἄν τις ἀνάγοι τῶν εἰρημένων ταύτας;
Combination and separation: how are we to think of them? Are they motions other than those mentioned—coming-to-be and destruction, growth and decay, change of place, alteration—or should they be referred to these, or should some of these be regarded as combinations and separations? Now if combination involves the approach of one thing to another, their drawing near, and separation in turn their withdrawal backward, one might call them local motions, speaking of two things moving toward one point, or withdrawing from each other. But if they take it as a blending, a mixture, a fusion, a formation into one out of one—the formation in the process of coming together, not the one already complete—to which of the motions mentioned would one refer these?
ἄρξει μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοπικὴ κίνησις, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ τὸ γινόμενον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς αὔξης ἄν τις εὕροι ἄρχουσαν μὲν τὴν τοπικήν, ἐπιγινομένην δὲ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν κίνησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινηθῆναι, ἕπεται δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συγκριθῆναι οὐδ’ αὖ διακριθῆναι, ἀλλὰ γενομένης μὲν συμπλοκῆς τοῖς ἀπαντήσασι συνεκρίθη, σχισθέντων δὲ τῇ συντεύξει διεκρίθη· πολλαχοῦ δ’ ἂν καὶ διακρινομένων ἐφέποιτο ἂν ἡ τοῦ τόπου, ἢ ἅμα συμβαίνοι τοῦ πάθους ἄλλου περὶ τὰ διακρινόμενα, οὐ κατὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοπικῶς, νοουμένου, ἔν τε τῇ συγκρίσει ἄλλου πάθους καὶ συστάσεως ἐπακολουθοῦντος ἑτέρου τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως.
Local motion will begin it, but what comes about upon it would be something else. Just as with growth one would find local motion beginning and motion in quantity supervening, so here too being moved in place leads, and what follows, though not of necessity, is being combined or again being separated: when the things that met became intertwined, they were combined; when they were split apart by the encounter, they were separated. Often, too, when things are being separated, the motion of place would follow, or happen at the same time, while another affection is understood to concern the things being separated, not in respect of moving in place; and in combination, another affection and a formation follow, different from the local motion.
ἆρ’ οὖν ταύτας μὲν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοίωσιν εἰς ταύτας ἀνακτέον; πυκνὸν γὰρ γενόμενον ἠλλοίωται· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ συγκέκριται· μανὸν δὲ αὖ ἠλλοίωται· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ διακέκριται· καὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος μιγνυμένων ἄλλο ἢ πρότερον ἦν ἑκάτερον ἐγένετο· τοῦτο δὲ σύγκρισις, ἣ πεποίηκε τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν. ἢ φατέον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις τινῶν ἀλλοιώσεων, ἑτέρας δὲ αὐτὰς εἶναι συγκρίσεων ἢ διακρίσεων· οὔτε γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας ἀλλοιώσεις εἶναι τοιαύτας, οὔτε τὴν ἀραίωσιν καὶ πύκνωσιν σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἢ ἐκ τούτων ὅλως εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ κενὸν παραδέχοιτο. ἐπὶ δὲ μελανίας ἢ λευκότητος πῶς;
Should we, then, take these by themselves, and refer alteration to them? For a thing that has become dense has been altered, and that is the same as “has been combined”; a thing that has become rare has been altered, and that is the same as “has been separated”; and when wine and water are mixed, each becomes something other than it was before, and this is combination, which has produced the alteration. Or should we say that here too combinations and separations precede certain alterations, but that the alterations themselves are different from combinations and separations? For neither are the other alterations of this kind, nor are rarefaction and condensation combination and separation, or composed of these at all; for in that case one would also have to admit a void. And how would it be with blackness or whiteness?
εἰ δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφισβητεῖ, πρῶτον μὲν τὰς χρόας καὶ τάχα τὰς ποιότητας ἀναιρεῖ ἢ τάς γε πλείστας, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσας· εἰ γὰρ πᾶσαν ἀλλοίωσιν, ἣν λέγομεν κατὰ ποιότητα μεταβολήν, σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν λέγοι, τὸ γινόμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἐγγὺς κείμενα καὶ διεστῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι πῶς συγκρίσεις;
If someone disputes these, first, he does away with colors, and perhaps with qualities, or at least most of them—or rather all. For if he says every alteration, which we call change in respect of quality, is combination and separation, what comes about is nothing, only things lying close together and things standing apart. Second, how are learning and being taught combinations?
ἐπισκεπτέον δὴ περὶ τούτων καὶ ἤδη ζητητέον πάλιν αὖ τῶν κατ’ εἴδη λεγομένων κινήσεων, οἷον ἐπὶ τοπικῆς, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ εὐθείᾳ καὶ κύκλῳ, ὡς ἠπόρηται, εἰ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀψύχων κινήσει — οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία ἡ κίνησις τούτων — καὶ πάλιν ταύτας τῇ πεζῇ καὶ τῷ νεῖν καὶ πτήσει. ἢ καὶ τῷ φύσει γε καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τάχ’ ἄν τις διέλοι καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶδος· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν διαφοραὶ κινήσεων. ἢ ποιητικαὶ τούτων αὗται καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄνευ τούτων. καὶ ἡ φύσις δὲ ἀρχὴ δοκεῖ τούτων. ἢ τὰς μὲν φύσει, τὰς δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰς δὲ προαιρέσει· φύσει μὲν αὐξήσεις, φθίσεις, τέχνῃ δὲ οἰκοδομεῖν, ναυπηγεῖν, προαιρέσει δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι, μανθάνειν, πολιτεύεσθαι, ὅλως λέγειν, πράττειν.
We must examine these matters, and now inquire again into the motions said to be species—local motion, for example: whether it is divided not by up and down, straight and circular, as we puzzled over, but by the motion of living and lifeless things (for their motion is not alike), and these again by walking, swimming and flying. Or perhaps one might divide each species by natural and unnatural; but these are not external differences of motions. Or perhaps these produce the motions, and the motions would not exist without them. And nature seems to be their principle. Or perhaps some are by nature, some by art, some by choice: by nature growths and decays; by art building houses and building ships; by choice inquiring, learning, taking part in politics, and in general speaking and acting.
περὶ αὐξήσεως αὖ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ γενέσεως κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἢ ὅλως τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις.
As for growth, again, and alteration and coming-to-be: by natural or unnatural, or in general by the things underlying them.
Stillness
Stillness here is only the absence of motion; true rest belongs to the intelligibles.
περὶ δὲ στάσεως, ὃ ἀντιτέτακται κινήσει, ἢ ἠρεμίας τί ποτε χρὴ λέγειν; πότερα καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν τι γένος θετέον, ἢ εἴς τι γένος τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακτέον; βέλτιον δ’ ἴσως στάσιν τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀποδόντα ἠρεμίαν ἐνταῦθα ζητεῖν. τὴν οὖν ἠρεμίαν ταύτην ζητητέον πρῶτον τί ποτέ ἐστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸν φανείη τῇ στάσει, οὐδ’ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐνταῦθα ταύτην ζητοῖ οὐδενὸς ἑστηκότος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φαινομένου ἑστάναι σχολαιοτέρᾳ τῇ κινήσει χρωμένου· εἰ δ’ ἕτερον ἠρεμίαν στάσεως λέγοιμεν τῷ τὴν μὲν στάσιν περὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον παντελῶς εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἠρεμίαν περὶ τὸ ἑστώς, πεφυκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν μὴ κινῆται, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἠρεμίζεσθαι λέγοι τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κίνησιν οὔπω παυσαμένην, ἀλλ’ ἐνεστῶσαν· εἰ δὲ τὴν οὐκέτι περὶ τὸ κινούμενον οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον, εἴ τί ἐστι μὴ κινούμενον ἐνταῦθα.
About rest, which is set against motion, or stillness, what should we say? Should it too be posited as a single genus, or referred to one of the genera mentioned? Perhaps it is better to assign rest to the things There and to look for stillness here. So we must first inquire what this stillness is. If it should appear to be the same as rest, one would not be right to look for it here, where nothing stands still, and what appears to stand still is merely using a slower motion. If we say stillness is different from rest, in that rest concerns what is entirely unmoved, while stillness concerns what is stationary but naturally apt to move, when it is not moving, then: if one means by being still “coming to stillness,” it is a motion that has not yet stopped but is still going on; but if one means a state that no longer concerns what is moving, we must first ask whether there is anything here that is not moving.
εἰ δὲ μὴ πάσας οἷόν τέ τι τὰς κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ κινήσεις τινὰς μὴ κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῇ λέγειν τόδε τὸ κινούμενον εἶναι, τί ἄλλο χρὴ λέγειν τὸ μὴ κινούμενον κατὰ τόπον, ἀλλὰ ἠρεμοῦν ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ ὅτι μὴ κινεῖται; ἀπόφασις ἄρα ἔσται ἡ ἠρεμία τοῦ κινεῖσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐν γένει. ἠρεμεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον τὴν τοπικήν· τὴν οὖν ἀφαίρεσιν τούτου λέγει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι· διὰ τί δ’ οὐ τὴν κίνησιν ἀπόφασιν τῆς στάσεως φήσομεν; ὅτι, φήσομεν, ἥκει τι φέρουσα ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἐνεργοῦν καὶ οἷον ὠθοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ μυρία ἐργαζόμενον αὐτὸ καὶ φθεῖρον, ἡ δὲ ἠρεμία ἑκάστου οὐδέν ἐστι παρ’ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει μόνον, ὅτι κίνησιν οὐκ ἔχει.
If nothing can move with all the motions, but there must be some motions it does not move with, so that one can say that this is the thing moved, what else should one say of what is not moving in place, but is still with respect to this motion, than that it is not moving? Stillness, then, will be a negation of being moved; and that is not in a genus. A thing is still with respect to nothing other than this motion—local motion, for example; so stillness means the removal of this. If someone says, “Why shall we not call motion the negation of rest?,” we shall say: because motion comes bringing something; it is something else, active, as it were pushing the underlying thing, working countless effects on it and destroying it; whereas each thing’s stillness is nothing beside the thing itself, but signifies only that it has no motion.
τί οὖν οὐ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν στάσιν εἴπομεν ἀπόφασιν κινήσεως; ἢ ὅτι οὐδ’ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀναίρεσιν τῆς κινήσεως τὴν στάσιν, ὅτι οὐ παυσαμένης τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὔσης ἐκείνης καὶ αὕτη ἐστί· καὶ οὐ πεφυκὸς κινεῖσθαι, καθ’ ὅσον μὴ κινεῖται ἡ στάσις ἐκεῖ, ἀλλά, καθ’ ὃ στάσις κατείληφεν, ἕστηκε, καθ’ ὃ δέ ἐστι κινούμενον, ἀεὶ κινήσεται· διὸ καὶ στάσει ἕστηκε καὶ κινήσει κινεῖται· ἐνταῦθα δὲ κινήσει μὲν κινεῖται, ἀπουσίᾳ δὲ ἠρεμεῖ ἐστερημένον τῆς ὀφειλομένης κινήσεως. ἔπειτα δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ, τί ἐστιν ἡ στάσις αὐτὴ [ἡ ἐνταῦθα λεγομένη· οἷον ἐν νόσῳ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ. κινεῖται μὲν οὖν ὁ ὑγιαζόμενος] καὶ οὕτως, ὅταν ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν ἴῃ, ὑγιάζεται. τί οὖν τῇ ὑγιάνσει ταύτῃ ἠρεμίας εἶδος ἀντιτάξομεν;
Why, then, did we not call rest a negation of motion in the case of the intelligibles too? Because There one cannot even call rest the abolition of motion: it is not there when motion has stopped, but exists while motion also exists. And rest There does not belong to something naturally apt to move insofar as it is not moving; rather, insofar as rest has taken hold of it, it stands still, and insofar as it is in motion, it will always move. That is why it stands still by rest and moves by motion. Here, though, a thing moves by motion and is still by absence, deprived of the motion it ought to have. Next we must see what rest itself is [that is spoken of here: in sickness and health, for example. The one being healed is moving,] and in this way, when he passes from sickness to health, he is being healed. What species of stillness, then, shall we set against this healing?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ, νόσος, ἀλλ’ οὐ στάσις· εἰ δὲ τὸ εἰς ὅ, ὑγίεια· ὃ οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν ὑγίειαν ἢ τὴν νόσον τινὰ στάσιν εἶναι, εἴδη στάσεως τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν νόσον εἶναι φήσει· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ συμβεβηκέναι τῇ ὑγιείᾳ τὴν στάσιν, πρὸ τῆς στάσεως ἡ ὑγίεια οὐχ ὑγίεια ἔσται. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων, ὅπῃ δοκεῖ ἑκάστῳ.
If the “from which,” that is sickness, not rest; if the “to which,” that is health, which is not the same as rest. If someone says that health or sickness is a kind of rest, he will be saying that health and sickness are species of rest—which is absurd. If he says rest is an accident of health, then before the rest, health will not be health. But on these matters, let each think as he sees fit.
εἴρηται δ’ ὅτι τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν κινήσεις λεκτέον, καὶ ἔστι τὰς μὲν τῶν κινήσεων ἀπολύτους, τὰς δὲ ποιήσεις, τὰς δὲ πείσεις λέγειν. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν λεγομένων, ὅτι εἰς ταῦτα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ πρός τι, ὅτι ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο σχέσις, καὶ ὅτι σύνεισιν ἅμα καὶ ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ πρός τι δέ, ὅταν σχέσις οὐσίας ποιῇ αὐτό, οὐχ ᾗ οὐσία ἔσται πρός τι, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὃ μέρος, οἷον χεὶρ ἢ κεφαλὴ ἢ αἴτιον ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ στοιχεῖον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρός τι διαιρεῖν, ὥσπερ διῄρηται τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, τὰ μὲν ὡς ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ὡς μέτρα, τὰ δ’ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, τὰ δ’ ὅλως χωρίζοντα ὁμοιότησι καὶ διαφοραῖς. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τῶν γενῶν ταῦτα.
It has been said that acting and being affected are to be called motions, and that some motions can be called absolute, others actings, others affections. It has been said about the other so-called genera that they are referred to these; and about relation, that it is a condition of one thing toward another, and that both are present together at once; and that relation, when a condition of a substance makes it, will be relative not insofar as it is substance, but insofar as it is a part—a hand, say, or a head—or a cause, a principle, an element. One can also divide relatives, as the ancients divided them: some as productive, some as measures, some in excess and deficiency, some separating things in general by likenesses and differences. That is what we have to say about these genera.